Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims Appeal Procedures, 65296-65338 [E9-28707]
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services
I. Background
A. Overview of Existing Medicare Program
B. Appeals Procedures Under Previous
Regulations
C. Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000
(BIPA)
D. Related Provisions of the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)
E. Codification of Regulations
II. Analysis of Appeals Procedures and
Responses to Public Comments
A. Overview
B. Appeals
1. Statutory Basis and Scope, Definitions
and General Procedures (§ 405.900
Through § 405.904)
2. Parties to an Appeal, Medicaid State
Agencies, and Appointment of
Representatives (§ 405.906 Through
§ 405.910)
3. Assignment of Appeal Rights (§ 405.912)
4. Initial Determinations (§ 405.920
Through § 405.928)
a. Initial Determinations, Notice of Initial
Determinations, and Timeframe for
Processing Initial Determinations
(§ 405.920 Through § 405.922)
b. What Constitutes an Initial
Determination and Decisions That Are
Not Considered Initial Determinations
(§ 405.924 Through § 405.926)
c. Initial Determinations Subject to the
Reopenings Process (§ 405.927) and the
Effects of Initial Determinations
(§ 405.928)
5. Redeterminations (§ 405.940 Through
§ 405.958)
a. Redetermination Requests (§ 405.940
Through § 405.946)
b. Conduct and Effect of Redeterminations
(§ 405.948 Through § 405.958)
6. Reconsiderations (§ 405.960 Through
§ 405.978)
a. Processing Reconsideration Requests
(§ 405.960 Through § 405.964)
b. Evidence Submitted With the
Reconsideration Request—Full and Early
Presentation of Evidence (§ 405.966)
c. Conduct and Processing of
Reconsiderations (§ 405.968 Through
§ 405.978)
7. Reopenings of Initial Determinations,
Redeterminations, Reconsiderations,
Hearings and Reviews (§ 405.980
Through § 405.986)
a. Reopening Actions (§ 405.980)
b. Conduct of Reopenings (§ 405.982
through § 405.986)
8. Expedited Access to Judicial Review
(§ 405.990)
9. ALJ Hearings (§ 405.1000 Through
§ 405.1064)
a. Transfer of the ALJ Function
b. ALJ Hearings—General Rules
(§ 405.1000 Through § 405.1014)
c. Adjudication Deadlines—ALJ Level
(§ 405.1016)
d. Submission of Evidence Before the ALJ
Hearing (§ 405.1018)
e. Time and Place for a Hearing Before an
ALJ; Notice of Hearing; Objections to the
Issues (§ 405.1020 Through § 405.1024)
Table of Contents
42 CFR Part 405
[CMS–4064–F]
RIN 0938–AM73
Medicare Program: Changes to the
Medicare Claims Appeal Procedures
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AGENCY: Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS), DHHS.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: Under the procedures in this
final rule, Medicare beneficiaries and,
under certain circumstances, providers
and suppliers of health care services can
appeal adverse determinations regarding
claims for benefits under Medicare Part
A and Part B pursuant to sections 1869
and 1879 of the Social Security Act (the
Act). Section 521 of the Medicare,
Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits
Improvement and Protection Act of
2000 (BIPA) amended section 1869 of
the Act to provide for significant
changes to the Medicare claims appeal
procedures. After publication of a
proposed rule implementing the section
521 changes, additional new statutory
requirements for the appeals process
were enacted in Title IX of the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA). In
March 2005, we published an interim
final rule with comment period to
implement these statutory changes. This
final rule responds to comments on the
interim final rule regarding changes to
these appeal procedures, makes
revisions where warranted, establishes
the final implementing regulations, and
explains how the new procedures will
be put into practice.
DATES: Effective Date: These regulations
are effective on January 8, 2010.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Arrah Tabe-Bedward, (410) 786–7129
(for issues relating to general appeal
rights).
David Danek, (617) 565–2682 (for
issues relating to redeterminations,
reconsiderations, reopenings and
expedited access to judicial review
(EAJR) issues).
Katherine L. Hosna, (410) 786–4993
(for general appeal issues).
Peggy McFadden-Elmore, (703) 235–
0126 (for issues relating to
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
hearings).
Theodore Kim, (202) 565–0200 (for
issues relating to Medicare Appeals
Council (MAC) review).
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f. Disqualification of the ALJ (§ 405.1026)
g. Review of Evidence Submitted to the
ALJ, Hearing Procedures, and Issues
Before an ALJ (§ 405.1028 Through
§ 405.1032)
h. Remand Authority (§ 405.1034)
i. Description of the ALJ Hearing Process
and Discovery (§ 405.1036 and
§ 405.1037)
j. Deciding a Case Without an ALJ Hearing,
Conferences, the Administrative Record,
and Consolidated Hearings (§ 405.1038
Through § 405.1044)
k. Notice and Effect of ALJ’s Decision
(§ 405.1046 Through § 405.1048)
l. Removal of a Hearing Request From the
ALJ to the MAC, Dismissal of a Request
for ALJ Hearing, and the Effect of a
Dismissal (§ 405.1050 Through
§ 405.1054)
m. Applicability of Statutes, Regulations,
Medicare Coverage Policies, CMS
Rulings and Other Program Guidance
(§ 405.1060 Through § 405.1063)
n. ALJ Decisions Involving Statistical
Samples (§ 405.1064)
10. Review by the Medicare Appeals
Council (§ 405.1100 Through § 405.1134)
a. MAC Review of an ALJ’s Action
(§ 405.1100 Through § 405.1120)
b. Evidence That May Be Submitted to the
MAC and Subpoenas (§ 405.1122)
c. Oral Argument, Cases Remanded by the
MAC, the Effect of MAC Actions,
Escalation to Federal District Court, and
Extensions of Time To File Actions in
Federal District Court (§ 405.1124
Through § 405.1134)
11. Judicial Review (§ 405.1136 Through
§ 405.1140)
III. Provisions of the Final Regulations
IV. Collection of Information Requirements
V. Regulatory Impact Statement
I. Background
A. Overview of Existing Medicare
Program
The original Medicare program
consists of two parts: Part A and Part B.
Part A, known as the hospital insurance
program, covers certain care provided to
inpatients in hospitals, critical access
hospitals, and skilled nursing facilities,
as well as hospice care and some home
health care. Part B, the supplementary
medical insurance program, covers
certain physician’s services, outpatient
hospital care, and other medical
services that are not covered under Part
A.
In addition to the original Medicare
program, beneficiaries may elect to
receive health care coverage under Part
C of Medicare, the Medicare Advantage
(MA) program. Under the MA program,
an individual is entitled to those items
and services (other than hospice care)
for which benefits are available under
Part A and Part B. MA plans may
provide additional health care items and
services that are not covered under the
original Medicare program.
Beneficiaries can also elect to receive
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prescription drug coverage under Part D
of Medicare, which became effective
January 1, 2006.
Under the original Medicare program,
a beneficiary can generally obtain health
services from any institution, agency, or
person qualified to participate in the
Medicare program. After providing an
item or service, the provider or supplier
(or, in some cases, a beneficiary) can
submit a claim for benefits under the
Medicare program to the appropriate
government contractor: A fiscal
intermediary (FI) (for all Part A claims
and certain Part B claims); a carrier (for
most claims under Part B); or a
Medicare administrative contractor
(under Medicare contracting reform, a
contractor that processes all types of
Part A and Part B claims). If the claim
is for an item or service that falls within
a Medicare benefit category, is not
otherwise excluded by statute or rule,
and is reasonable and necessary for the
individual as set forth in § 1862(a) of the
Social Security Act, then the item or
service is covered and the contractor
may make payment for the claim.
However, the Medicare program does
not cover all health care expenses.
Therefore, if the Medicare contractor
determines that the medical care is not
covered under the Medicare program,
then it denies the claim.
B. Appeals Procedures Under Previous
Regulations
Generally, when a contractor denies a
claim, it notifies the provider or
supplier, and the beneficiary of the
denial and offers the opportunity to
appeal the denial. The pre-BIPA appeal
procedures for original Medicare are set
forth in regulations at 42 CFR part 405,
subparts G and H. Separate procedures
for appealing determinations made
under the MA program are set forth at
42 CFR part 422, subpart M. There is a
similar, separate appeals process for the
prescription drug program set forth at
subpart M of 42 CFR part 423. In
addition, we published a proposed rule
to describe the appeals procedures that
would apply at the ALJ and MAC levels
in deciding appeals brought by
individuals who have enrolled in the
Medicare Part D prescription drug
benefit program (73 FR 14342, March
17, 2008). After an appellant has
exhausted the administrative appeal
procedures offered under the Medicare
program, the Medicare statute provides
the opportunity for an individual who is
dissatisfied to seek review in Federal
court.
The regulations in part 405 subpart G
beginning at § 405.701 describe
reconsiderations and appeals under
Medicare Part A, prior to the statutory
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changes in BIPA and the MMA. As set
forth in these regulations, when a
Medicare contractor made a
determination for a Part A claim, the
beneficiary or, in some circumstances,
the provider, could appeal the
determination. Consistent with sections
1861(u) and 1866(e) of the Act and
§ 400.202, the term ‘‘provider’’ includes
hospitals, skilled nursing facilities
(SNFs), home health agencies (HHAs),
comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation
facilities (CORFs), and hospices, as well
as certain clinics, rehabilitation
agencies, and public health agencies.
Under this process, if a determination
was appealed, the contractor would
reconsider the initial determination. If
the contractor upheld the original
determination, a party could request a
hearing before an ALJ, provided that the
amount in controversy (AIC) was at least
$100. If a party was dissatisfied with the
ALJ’s decision, it could request review
by the Departmental Appeals Board
(DAB). Under these regulations, the
component within the DAB responsible
for Medicare claim appeals was the
MAC. (Although the Medicare appeals
regulations in part 405, subparts G and
H, contain some limited provisions
regarding ALJ and MAC proceedings,
these proceedings were generally
governed by the Social Security
Administration (SSA) regulations at 20
CFR part 404, subpart J.) MAC decisions
generally constituted the final decision
of the Secretary and could be appealed
to a Federal court. With few exceptions,
parties had to complete the lower level
of appeal before the appeal could go on
to the next level. Pre-BIPA and preMMA appeal procedures for Medicare
Part B are set forth in 42 CFR part 405
subpart H (§ 405.801, et. seq.). Under
these regulations, beneficiaries, and
suppliers that accepted assignment for
Medicare claims could request review of
the contractor’s initial determination
that a claim could not be paid, either in
full or in part. (The term ‘‘supplier’’ is
defined under section 1861(d) of the
Act, as amended by section 901(b) of the
MMA, and means a physician or other
practitioner, a facility, or other entity
(other than a provider of services that
furnishes items or services) under
Medicare.) Suppliers that did not take
assignment and providers, in some
circumstances, had limited appeal rights
under these regulations.
As defined in the pre-BIPA and preMMA regulation at § 405.815, if a party
to the contractor’s review determination
was dissatisfied and the amount in
controversy was at least $100, the party
was entitled to request a second level
appeal known as a ‘‘carrier hearing’’. If
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the carrier’s hearing officer upheld the
denial, a party to the carrier hearing
could request a hearing before an ALJ,
provided that the action met the amount
in controversy requirement. (We
published a ruling, CMS Ruling No. 02–
1, which implemented the $100 amount
in controversy requirement for Part B
ALJ hearings specified in section 521 of
BIPA for initial determinations made on
or after October 1, 2002. See 67 FR
62478, 62480 (Oct. 7, 2002). For initial
determinations made prior to October 1,
2002, the amount in controversy
threshold was $100 for home health
services and $500 for all other services.)
Subsequent aspects of the appeals
process for Part B claims are identical to
those described above for Part A claims.
C. Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP
Benefits Improvement and Protection
Act of 2000 (BIPA)
Section 521 of the Medicare,
Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits
Improvement and Protection Act of
2000 (BIPA) (Pub. L. 106–554) amended
section 1869 of the Act to require
revisions to the Medicare fee-for-service
(Part A and Part B) appeals process.
Among the major changes required by
the BIPA amendments were—
• Establishing a uniform process for
handling Medicare Part A and Part B
appeals, including the introduction of a
new level of appeal for Part A claims;
• Revising the timeframes for filing a
request for Part A and Part B appeals;
• Imposing time limits for
‘‘redetermination’’ decisions made by
the contractors;
• Establishing a new appeals entity,
the qualified independent contractor
(QIC), to conduct ‘‘reconsiderations’’ of
contractors’ initial determinations
(including redeterminations) and
allowing appellants to escalate cases to
the next level of appeal (an ALJ hearing)
if reconsiderations are not completed
within established time limits;
• Establishing a uniform amount in
controversy threshold for appeals at the
ALJ level;
• Imposing 90-day time limits for
issuing decisions at the ALJ and MAC
levels of appeal and allowing appellants
to escalate cases to the next level of
appeal if an ALJ or the MAC does not
meet the 90-day deadline; and
• Requiring ‘‘de novo’’ review when
the MAC reviews an ALJ decision made
after a hearing.
On November 15, 2002, we published
in the Federal Register a comprehensive
proposed rule (67 FR 69312) to set forth
proposed changes needed to implement
the provisions of section 521 of the
BIPA, as well as other complementary
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changes needed to improve the
Medicare claims appeal procedures.
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D. Related Provisions of the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)
On December 8, 2003, the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) (Pub.
L. 108–173) was enacted. The MMA
includes a number of provisions that
made additional changes to the
Medicare claim appeals process. To the
extent the new statutory language
necessitated revisions or additions to
our proposed regulations to ensure
conformance to the MMA, we have
incorporated the needed changes into
the interim final rule (70 FR 11420,
March 8, 2005), the correcting
amendments (70 FR 37700, June 30,
2005 and 70 FR 50214, August 26, 2005)
and this final rule. Among the major
changes required by MMA are—
• Transferring the ALJ function to the
Department of Health and Human
Services (Section 931 of the MMA).
• Establishing a process for expedited
access to judicial review (Section 932 of
the MMA).
• Requiring the full and early
presentation of evidence (Section 933(a)
of the MMA).
• Requiring the review of a patient’s
medical records in a QIC
reconsideration (Section 933(b) of the
MMA).
• Establishing content requirements
for appeal determination notices
(Section 933(c) of the MMA).
• Revising eligibility requirements for
QICs (Section 933(d) of the MMA).
• Precluding administrative or
judicial review of a determination by
the Secretary of sustained or high levels
of payment errors (Section 934(a) of the
MMA).
• Creating a separate process for the
correction of minor errors or omissions
(Section 937 of the MMA).
• Permitting appeals by providers and
suppliers when there is no other party
available (Section 939 of the MMA).
• Revising appeals timeframes and
amounts in controversy (Section 940 of
the MMA).
E. Codification of Regulations
The BIPA provisions and the
subsequent revisions made under MMA
make possible a largely uniform set of
appeals procedures that can be applied
for both Part A and Part B of Medicare.
In the interim final rule, we established
a new subpart I of part 405 that sets
forth in one location the requirements
for fee-for-service claims appeals
processed by Medicare carriers, FIs,
Medicare administrative contractors,
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and QICs. Also included in subpart I are
the provisions needed to govern
Medicare claims appeals to ALJs and the
MAC. Thus, subpart I will codify in one
location key regulations governing all
aspects of Medicare claim appeals,
beginning with the statutory
requirements that apply to initial
determinations and proceeding through
all four levels of the administrative
appeals process.
II. Analysis of Appeals Procedures and
Responses to Public Comments
A. Overview
Discussed below are the comments
and clarifications to the March 2005
interim final rule with comment period
implementing section 521 of BIPA and
the relevant sections of the MMA. In
general, we discuss those sections of the
interim final rule on which we received
comments from the public or which
required editorial changes to improve
the clarity and simplicity of the
regulations. We include a brief
explanation of each regulatory
provision, provide a summary of, and
responses to, the comments received,
and describe the changes, if any, to be
made in finalizing the provision in this
rulemaking. The changes made in this
final regulation are summarized in the
section of this preamble entitled
‘‘Provisions of the Final Regulations.’’
We received 26 timely comments on
the 2005 interim final rule with
comment period from individuals,
organizations representing providers
and suppliers, beneficiary advocacy
groups, law offices, health plans, and
others. The issues most frequently
raised by commenters include:
Beneficiary protections; deadlines for
filing appeals and timeframes for
decision-making; entities entitled to
receive notices; differences between an
assignee and the beneficiary’s appointed
representative; the role of the QICs that
will perform reconsiderations;
evidentiary requirements; the perceived
formality of the ALJ procedures,
especially proceedings where CMS or
one of its contractors enters the process,
and the impact on beneficiaries; and
whether the nature of an ALJ hearing
has changed, how much deference the
ALJ gives to CMS’ policies and, in
general, the manner in which the ALJs
conduct hearings. These comments and
our responses are discussed below.
B. Appeals
1. Statutory Basis and Scope,
Definitions and General Procedures
(§ 405.900 Through § 405.904)
In § 405.900, we set forth the general
statutory authority for the ensuing
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provisions and explain that this subpart
establishes the requirements for appeals
of initial determinations for benefits
under Part A and Part B of Medicare.
Section 405.902 sets forth the
definitions for terms used in subpart I.
Section 405.904 provides a general
description of the appeals process for
entitlement and claims appeals.
Additional detailed discussion of these
provisions is found in the interim final
rule at 70 FR 11427, 11431 through
11432, and 11434 through 11435.
In this final regulation, we are making
a technical revision to § 405.902 to
define the term contractor, as applicable
to the provisions in subpart I. We
believe the meaning of the term
contractor may have been unclear
because, in some instances, we specified
the entities that are included in the term
contractor whereas, in other instances,
we did not provide such detail. Thus,
we believe a technical revision to
clearly define the term contractor and to
ensure that the term is used consistently
throughout Subpart I is appropriate.
Contractor means an entity that
contracts with the Federal government
to review and/or adjudicate claims,
determinations and/or decisions. This
includes, but is not limited to, fiscal
intermediaries, carriers, Medicare
administrative contractors, qualified
independent contractors, and quality
improvement organizations (QIOs).
Although, based on this definition, the
term contractor includes many entities,
the meaning of the term contractor for
a particular provision is derived from
the context. For example, under
§ 405.920(a), after a claim is filed with
the appropriate contractor in the
manner and form described in part 424
subpart C, the contractor must
determine if the items and services
furnished are covered or otherwise
reimbursable under title XVIII of the
Act. Only fiscal intermediaries, carriers
and Medicare administrative contractors
make such determinations, so the term
contractor means only these three
entities in this context. We are also
making technical revisions to several
sections noted below, in order to
remove references to specific
contractors (such as QICs and QIOs)
when describing the general actions,
responsibilities, or authority of
contractors. However, there are
instances where we continue to use the
term contractor and also separately
include a reference to QICs in the same
provision (for example, § 405.910(i)(2)
and § 405.980(a)(4)). In those situations,
we are maintaining the separate
reference to the QIC in order to
highlight the specific responsibilities of
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the QIC with respect to
reconsiderations.
We received no comments on these
sections. Therefore, we are finalizing
§ 405.900 and § 405.904 without
modification. We are finalizing
§ 405.902, § 405.1000, § 405.1010 and
§ 405.1012 with modifications, as noted.
2. Parties to an Appeal, Medicaid State
Agencies, and Appointment of
Representatives (§ 405.906 Through
§ 405.910)
Section 405.906 discusses parties to
the appeals process. More detail is
provided on the role of Medicaid State
agencies in the appeals process in
section 405.908. Section 405.910
describes appointed representatives and
the process for becoming an appointed
representative. We received several
comments with respect to the rights of
Medicaid State agencies to file appeals,
and the rights and responsibilities of
representatives. A summary of the
comments and our responses is
included below. Additional detailed
discussion of these provisions is found
in the interim final rule at 70 FR 11423,
11427 through 11431, 11432, 11434
through 11435, 11441, 11444 through
11445, and 11468.
Comment: Several commenters asked
CMS to broaden the definition of
‘‘party’’ at the initial determination level
to include Medicaid State agencies.
Response: As set forth in
§ 405.906(b)(2), a Medicaid State agency
can be a party to a redetermination,
reconsideration, hearing or MAC
review. Section 405.908 explains the
process for a Medicaid State agency to
join the appeal as a party. Specifically,
in § 405.908, we allow the State agency
to file an appeal with respect to ‘‘a claim
for items or services furnished to a
dually eligible beneficiary only for
services for which the Medicaid State
agency has made payment, or for which
it may be liable.’’ Only after Medicare
has issued its initial determination on a
claim for items or services provided to
a dually eligible beneficiary can a
determination be made about a State
agency’s potential liability for all or part
of the associated charges, and thus, the
Medicaid State agency should not be a
party to the initial determination. If the
Medicaid program is not financially
responsible for the items or services on
a particular claim, it follows that the
State agency would have no interest in
the claim and thus, should not be a
party to any appeal of the initial
determination. Accordingly, we believe
it is appropriate to offer party status to
a Medicaid State agency only after there
has been a determination on the claim
by Medicare, and then only if the State
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agency makes payment or may be liable
to make payment for the items or
services on that claim. If these
requirements are met, the State agency
may file a request for a redetermination
and will retain party status through the
course of any subsequent appeals for the
particular claim.
Comment: One commenter stated that
although the interim final rule calls for
an adjudicator to contact the party and
provide a description of information
missing from the appointment of
representative form (§ 405.910(d)(1)),
there are no provisions explaining how
the need to cure a defective
appointment affects the time deadline
for filing an appeal. The commenter
recommended amending the rule to
indicate that an appeal filed within time
limits remains timely when the only
technical flaw is a defective
appointment of representative that can
be, and is, cured.
Response: Under § 405.910(d)(1), if an
appeal request is filed by an individual
attempting to represent a party, but the
submission contains a defective
appointment of representative (AOR)
form, the adjudicator will give the party
notice of the defect. The adjudicator
provides the party and the putative
representative with a reasonable
timeframe within which to cure the
defect. The adjudicator will not dismiss
an appeal request filed with a defective
AOR provided the defect is cured
within the timeframe established by the
adjudicator. Thus, in response to the
situation described by the commenter,
an appeal request filed timely will be
considered timely if the party submits a
corrected and valid appointment
instrument within the timeframe
specified by the adjudicator, even if that
period extends beyond the time limit for
filing the appeal.
However, if the adjudicator does not
receive a valid appointment instrument
within the timeframe specified by the
adjudicator, it may dismiss the appeal
request because the individual
requesting the appeal is not a proper
party to the appeal or does not
otherwise have a right to appeal. See
§ 405.952(b)(1), § 405.972(b)(1),
§ 405.1052(a)(3) and § 405.1114(b). If the
appeal request is dismissed, the party or
the representative may re-file the
request. If the resubmission is untimely,
consistent with § 405.942(b), the
representative must include an
explanation of the circumstances
leading to the late filing and request that
the contractor consider whether good
cause exists to extend the time for filing
the appeal.
Comment: One commenter asked that
§ 405.910(e)(1) be amended to note that
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65299
an appointment is valid for one year,
except as noted in § 405.910(e)(3). We
were also asked to clarify whether a
representative may be appointed before
the issuance of an initial determination.
Finally, a commenter asked when an
updated appointment of representative
form (Form CMS–1696) would be
available.
Response: Section 405.910(e)(1) states
that once the AOR form is executed, it
is valid for one year from the effective
date. Section 405.910(e)(2) states that
the representative must submit, with
each appeal request, a copy of the valid,
effective AOR or other conforming
written instrument in order to request a
redetermination or other appeal on
behalf of the party. Thus, a valid,
executed AOR will be honored for the
duration of the initial appeal request for
which it is filed, and for any subsequent
appeal request with which it is
submitted, provided the initial appeal
request is filed within one year of the
effective date of the AOR.
In § 405.910(e)(3), we made an
exception for appointments signed in
connection with Medicare Secondary
Payer recovery claims, because liability,
no-fault, and worker’s compensation
claims often take more than one year to
resolve. Where an appointment of
representative is related to these
recovery claims, the appointment is
valid from the date that it is signed
through the duration of any subsequent
appeal. We believe § 405.910(e) is clear
on its face and, thus, we are not revising
this subsection.
In the interim final rule, we stated
that, under § 405.910(a), the
appointment of representative
provisions apply at the initial
determination level and throughout the
appeals process. See 70 FR 11431.
Section 405.910(a) states that ‘‘[a]n
appointed representative may act on
behalf of an individual or entity in
exercising his or her right to an initial
determination or appeal.’’ In addition,
§ 405.910(c)(7) states that the AOR form
may ‘‘[b]e filed with the entity
processing the party’s initial
determination or appeal.’’ Finally,
§ 405.910(e)(1) states that the effective
date of the appointment is the date that
the AOR form or other conforming
written instrument contains the
signatures of both the party and
appointed representative. The AOR may
be completed prior to the submission of
a claim or appeal request, and a
representative may assist with the
preparation or submission of a claim.
(However, consistent with
§ 405.910(i)(1), notices and other
information regarding the initial
determination are only sent to the party
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to the initial determination, except for
Medicare secondary payer claims
appeals as discussed in § 405.910(i)(4)).
We believe these provisions convey that
a representative may be appointed prior
to the issuance of an initial
determination.
Finally, the revised appointment of
representative form, Form CMS–1696, is
available online, in both English and
Spanish, at https://www.cms.hhs.gov/
CMSForms/CMSForms/
list.asp#TopOfPage Representatives at
1–800–MEDICARE can also provide
information on how to obtain the
appointment of representative form.
Comment: One commenter questioned
the authority of CMS to impose a fee
review process when an appointed
representative for a beneficiary wished
to charge a fee for services rendered in
connection with an appeal before the
Secretary. The commenter contended
that beneficiary representatives should
be treated like provider representatives
who have no fee limitations. The
commenter stated that the regulations,
specifically, the fee review provisions,
decrease the likelihood that a
beneficiary will find an advocate to
assist in the appeal. The commenter also
stated that our regulations increase a
beneficiary’s need to be represented.
Response: Section 1869(b)(1)(B)(iv) of
the Act (captioned, ‘‘Requirements for
Representatives of a Beneficiary’’)
establishes that the provisions of
sections 205(j) and 206 (other than
subsection (a)(4)) of the Act apply to
representation of an individual for
Medicare claim appeals in the same
manner as they apply to representation
of an individual for Social Security
claims. By incorporating these sections
in § 1869(b)(1)(B)(iv) of the Act, the
Congress mandated that, for appeals
before the Secretary, appointed
representatives, including attorneys,
must obtain approval of fees before
charging a beneficiary. Consistent with
these statutory provisions and the
longstanding practice of fee petitions
before ALJs, § 405.910(f)(1) requires that
an appointed representative for a
beneficiary, who wishes to charge a fee
for services rendered in connection with
an appeal before the Secretary, must
obtain approval of the fee from the
Secretary.
As noted in the preamble to the
interim final rule (70 FR 11429 through
11430) and at § 405.910(f)(1), we do not
consider proceedings before the ALJ
hearing level (that is, initial
determination, redetermination, and
reconsideration levels) to be
proceedings ‘‘before the Secretary’’.
Section 206(a) of the Act authorizes the
Commissioner of Social Security to
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prescribe rules and regulations to
govern the representation of claimants
in proceedings before the
Commissioner. This provision has long
been interpreted to include only
proceedings at the ALJ level and
beyond. Thus, we have interpreted
appeals before the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS or the Department) to
include only the ALJ level and above.
Therefore, the fee petition provisions in
§ 405.910(f) do not apply to
administrative proceedings below the
ALJ hearing level. Furthermore, because
the clear intent of the fee petition
provision of the statute is to protect the
interests of individual Medicare
beneficiaries, we do not interpret them
as applying to non-beneficiary
appellants.
The fee petition process described in
§ 405.910(f) specifically is designed to
protect the interests of Medicare
beneficiaries by ensuring that the fees
charged by a representative are
reasonable. This process is not new to
these regulations. Rather, it has been a
longstanding requirement in both the
Medicare and Social Security programs
for appeals at the ALJ level. See 42 CFR
§ 405.701(c) and 42 CFR § 405.801(c),
incorporating by reference the
provisions of 20 CFR part 404, subpart
R regarding representation of parties.
Thus, we do not believe this regulation
will affect a beneficiary’s ability to
obtain assistance with an appeal.
Further, we do not believe the new
appeals process increases the need for a
beneficiary to obtain assistance with an
appeal. The new appeals process
primarily changes certain procedures
with respect to appeals filed by
providers and suppliers, the entities and
individuals who file the vast majority of
appeals (for example, the full and early
presentation of evidence requirement,
and CMS participation as a party or
participant at the ALJ level). However,
most of these changes do not affect
beneficiary initiated appeals.
Throughout the process, we have
attempted to minimize the impact of the
new appeals procedures on
beneficiaries. Therefore, we do not
believe that the new appeals process
increases the need for a beneficiary to
obtain assistance with an appeal.
Further, where we have made changes
to operational procedures, we have
developed notices and model language
for contractors to provide to parties that
explain the new process in clear, plain
language. We believe our newly
developed notices and forms provide
clear instructions to parties at each level
of the administrative appeals process.
We have also revised Your Medicare
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Rights and Protections (CMS
Publication No. 10112, available to
order from 1–800–MEDICARE, or
available to view on-line at https://
www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/
pdf/10112.pdf), which explains, in
detail, the various steps in the appeals
process. These notices, forms and
instructions will provide beneficiaries
and their representatives, as well as
other parties and advocates, with
additional information about the
procedures to be followed in the
administrative appeals process.
Comment: Two commenters
expressed concern regarding the
requirement that an appointed
representative has an affirmative duty to
‘‘[c]omply with all laws and CMS
regulations, CMS Rulings, and
instructions’’ (§ 405.910(g)(1)(v)). One
commenter requested the words ‘‘and
instructions’’ be struck from the
regulation, because an appointed
representative should not be bound to
comply with CMS instructions any more
than a beneficiary, a contractor or an
administrative law judge should be.
Another commenter stated that it is not
uncommon for an attorney or other
representative to challenge the validity
of CMS rulings, policy instructions and
other interpretations, and, as such, it is
unreasonable to require a representative
to defer to all such policies to the
potential detriment of the provider/
appellant.
Response: Section 405.910(g)(1)(v)
states that an appointed representative
has an affirmative duty to comply with
all laws and CMS regulations, CMS
rulings and instructions. While we
appreciate the commenters’ concerns,
we disagree with the commenters’
interpretation of this provision.
Providers and suppliers submitting
claims on behalf of beneficiaries, and
contractors processing claims are, in
fact, bound to follow all laws,
regulations, rulings and CMS operating
instructions. QICs, ALJs and the MAC
are bound to follow laws, regulations,
rulings, and NCDs, and to afford
substantial deference to CMS operating
instructions and other program
guidance. See § 405.968(b) and
§ 405.1062. As arbiters of fact in the
administrative appeals process, QICs,
ALJs and the MAC may determine that
an instruction should not apply to the
facts of a particular case. However,
QICs, ALJs and the MAC cannot rule on
the validity of the instruction. Similarly,
an appointed representative has a duty
to comply with such laws, regulations,
rulings and instructions. However, an
appointed representative is not
precluded from challenging the
application of that policy or instruction
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during the course of an appeal. Thus,
we do not believe a representative is
unfairly burdened by this requirement,
and we believe it is unnecessary to
revise § 405.910(g)(1)(v).
Comment: Several commenters asked
CMS to reconsider the policy
prohibiting the issuance of MSNs to a
beneficiary’s appointed representative.
One commenter stated that sending the
notice of initial determination to the
appointed representative is necessary to
assure that beneficiaries can be
effectively represented in the new
appeals process. Another commenter
indicated that quicker access to initial
determination information was needed
due to the shorter timeframes for
requesting redeterminations and
reconsiderations.
Response: Under § 405.910(i)(1),
contractors issue initial determination
notices (that is, Medicare Summary
Notices (MSNs) and Remittance Advice
(RAs)) only to the parties to the initial
determination, and not to appointed
representatives. As we stated in the
preamble to the interim final rule (70 FR
11434) and in § 405.910, appointed
representatives have the same right as
parties to receive information on claims
being appealed only after an appeal has
been filed. The information included on
MSNs covers the entire range of health
care services and items billed to
Medicare within a 90-day period;
similarly, an RA contains
comprehensive claims information for
all claims processed for a provider or
supplier during a specific period.
Because the scope of an appointment of
representation may vary, an appointed
representative may not have authority to
receive information on all such services
or items. Accordingly, for privacy and
confidentiality reasons, contractors
must provide MSNs and RAs only to the
parties to the initial determination. We
believe that a beneficiary can be
effectively represented without
contractors directly providing the MSNs
and RAs to appointed representatives
because parties can share their
respective notices with their
representatives.
We note that our policy with respect
to sending the notice of initial
determination to the party and not the
party’s representative is consistent with
the decision in Connecticut Department
of Social Services v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d
138 (2d Cir. 2005). The court held that
the due process interests of parties are
adequately protected by their own
receipt of the initial determination
notice, and declined to require that
contractors send these notices to the
appointed representative of a party.
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After the initial determination, the
contractor, QIC, ALJ and the MAC will
send notice of their action and requests
for information or evidence to the
appointed representative because,
unlike the MSN and RA, this
information is specific to the claim at
issue. We also note that under
§ 405.910(i)(4), initial determinations
and appeal notices that involve
Medicare Secondary Payer recovery
claims are sent to both the party and the
appointed representative. Unlike other
initial determinations, Medicare
Secondary Payer recovery claims
notices of initial determinations are
limited to include only information
related to the claim at issue.
We believe the current filing
timeframes and the quarterly issuance of
MSNs provide adequate time for
representatives to obtain claims
information from beneficiaries,
providers and suppliers. Currently,
parties have 120 calendar days from the
date of an initial determination to file
for a redetermination and 180 calendar
days from the date the party receives the
notice of the redetermination to file a
reconsideration. In addition, contractors
may extend redetermination and
reconsideration filing timeframes
(consistent with § 405.942(b) and
§ 405.962(b)) if a party shows good
cause for not meeting the filing
timeframe. Coupled with the quarterly
issuance of MSNs, we believe
individuals representing beneficiaries
have ample time to obtain relevant
information in order to submit an
appeal of an initial determination or
redetermination.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
sections 405.906 through 405.910
without modification.
3. Assignment of Appeal Rights
(§ 405.912)
The procedures for assigning appeal
rights from a beneficiary to a provider
or supplier are included in § 405.912.
We received several comments on the
assignment of appeal rights. A summary
of the comments and our responses is
included below. Additional detailed
discussion of this provision is found in
the interim final rule at 70 FR 11427
through 11428 and 11430 through
11432.
Comment: We received several
comments that requested clarification of
when an appointment of a
representative or assignment of appeal
rights was appropriate, given that
participating providers and
participating suppliers generally have
appeal rights equal to those of the
beneficiary.
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65301
Response: A number of the comments
reflected continued confusion between
the appointed representative provisions
at § 405.910 and the assignment of
appeal rights provisions at § 405.912.
Appointing a representative and
assigning appeal rights are two different
and unrelated actions under the new
appeals process. Beneficiaries have the
option of either (1) assigning
(transferring) their appeal rights to the
provider or supplier that provided the
item or service at issue, if such person
or entity is not a party to the initial
determination, or (2) appointing a
representative to act on their behalf
during the appeal.
As set forth in § 405.912, an
assignment of appeal rights constitutes
a complete transfer of party status and
all appeal rights from a beneficiary to
the provider or supplier that (1)
provided the item or service at issue to
the beneficiary and (2) does not already
have party status at the initial
determination. Thus, with an
assignment of appeal rights, the
provider or supplier becomes a party to
the appeal in place of the beneficiary.
In contrast, a party may choose to
appoint an individual as its
representative to assist with an appeal.
See § 405.902, defining appointed
representative, and § 405.910. For
example, a beneficiary may appoint his
provider or supplier as an appointed
representative. Appointing a
representative does not transfer a party’s
appeal rights, nor does it make the
appointed representative a party to the
appeal. Rather, an appointed
representative is simply an individual
chosen by a party to act on behalf of the
party in exercising his or her appeal
rights.
In an overwhelming majority of
appeals, there is no need for a
beneficiary to assign appeal rights to his
provider or supplier. For example,
under § 405.906(a)(2) and (a)(3), a
supplier who accepts assignment for
items or services furnished to a
beneficiary, and a provider who files a
claim for items or services furnished to
a beneficiary, are parties to the initial
determination, and thus, may appeal
that initial determination to the same
extent as the beneficiary.
In limited situations, a provider or
supplier will not have party status. For
example, if a claim is filed by a nonparticipating physician who does not
accept assignment on the claim, and the
claim is denied as a statutory exclusion
(such as certain cosmetic surgeries
under section 1862(a)(10) of the Act),
the physician submitting the claim
would not have a direct right to appeal
the initial determination made by the
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carrier. However, the physician could
get party status to file an appeal by
obtaining an assignment of appeal rights
from the beneficiary for this service. The
assignment of appeal rights must be
completed in accordance with the
procedures set forth in § 405.912.
Comment: A commenter suggested
that certain providers, such as clinical
laboratories, be exempt from the
provision requiring beneficiaries to sign
an assignment of appeal rights form
(§ 405.912(c)(2)).
Response: In situations where an
assignment of appeal rights is
appropriate, we believe the signature
requirement is necessary for the
protection of both the party and the
representative, as well as to assist
adjudicators in determining the proper
parties to the appeal. While we
acknowledge it may be difficult in some
instances for a provider or supplier to
obtain the signature of the beneficiary,
the binding nature of the assignment
and the effect of the assignment
(transferring a beneficiary’s appeal
rights to an assignee and waiving the
right of the provider or supplier to
collect payment) make it essential that
both parties sign the agreement. This
situation, however, may not arise
frequently because a supplier that is
required to accept assignment on a
claim, such as a clinical laboratory, is a
party to the initial determination and,
therefore, has direct standing to file an
appeal. Accordingly, it would be
inappropriate for a supplier, who
otherwise has party status, to seek
assignment of appeal rights from the
beneficiary.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the regulations indicate that when
beneficiaries assign their rights to
appeal an individual item or service to
a provider or supplier, the provider or
supplier must list all items or services
provided on the date of service on the
assignment form. The commenter
recommended that a provider or
supplier seeking assignment of appeal
rights should have to list only those
items or services for which appeal rights
are to be assigned.
Response: Section 405.912(c)(3)
requires that an assignment of appeal
rights ‘‘indicate the item or service for
which the assignment of appeal rights is
authorized.’’ A provider or supplier is
not required to list all items or services
provided on the date of service on the
assignment agreement—just those for
which appeal rights are to be assigned.
An assignment of appeal rights will only
be effective for the items or services
listed on the assignment form.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.912 without modification.
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4. Initial Determinations (§ 405.920
Through § 405.928)
Sections 405.920 through 405.928
discuss the initial determination
process, including how contractors
make initial determinations on claims
and what types of determinations are
considered or not considered initial
determinations.
We received several comments with
respect to claims submissions and the
processing of initial determinations as
set forth in the interim final rule. A
summary of the comments and our
responses are included below.
Additional discussion regarding these
provisions is found in the interim final
rule at 70 FR 11423 through 11424,
11428, and 11432 through 11436.
a. Initial Determinations, Notice of
Initial Determinations, and Timeframe
for Processing Initial Determinations
(§ 405.920 Through § 405.922)
Section 405.920 explains the process
a contractor must follow in making an
initial determination. Section 405.921
describes the notice of initial
determination, including the content of
the notice, and § 405.922 discusses the
timeframe for processing initial
determinations.
Comment: Two commenters
recommended that the term ‘‘non-clean
claim’’ be defined. Commenters also
suggested that if a claim is paid at the
QIC level or higher, such claims should
be considered clean, and that interest
should accrue from the date of the
original denial in order to provide
incentive to expedite claim
determinations and assure fairness. Two
commenters noted that although
contractors must issue an initial
determination within 45 days of receipt
of a ‘‘non-clean’’ claim, the regulations
do not provide for any interest
payments if the determination is issued
after the 45 day time period.
Response: The term ‘‘clean claim’’ is
clearly defined in statute at sections
1816(c)(2)(B)(i) and 1842(c)(2)(B)(i) of
the Act as ‘‘a claim that has no defect
or impropriety (including any lack of
any required substantiating
documentation) or particular
circumstance requiring special
treatment that prevents timely payment
from being made on the claim.’’ This
definition also is set forth in § 405.902.
Claims that do not meet this definition
are considered ‘‘non-clean claims.’’
Therefore, we do not believe that we
need to define non-clean claim because
the meaning of non-clean claim is
sufficiently clear given the meaning of
clean claim set forth in § 405.902.
Claims for services that cannot be
adjudicated timely at the initial
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determination level because they lack
sufficient documentation and/or require
special handling do not come within the
definition of clean claims. Claims
initially denied and subsequently paid
following a favorable appeal decision, or
revised following a reopening action,
are, by their nature, claims that require
special treatment. Often, during an
appeal or reopening action, additional
substantiating documentation is needed
to support the coverage and payment
decision. Thus, claims that are adjusted
as a result of the effectuation of an
appeal decision, and claims that are
revised following a reopening action do
not fall under the definition of ‘‘clean
claim’’ set forth in the statute.
Section 1869(a)(2)(A) of the Act, in
conjunction with sections 1816(c)(2)
and 1842(c)(2) of the Act, establishes
that, on all claims other than clean
claims, the initial determination shall be
concluded and a notice of such
determination must be mailed to the
individual filing the claim by no later
than 45 days after the contractor
receives the claim. Additionally, section
1869(a)(2)(A) of the Act, in conjunction
with sections 1816(c)(2) and 1842(c)(2)
of the Act, requires that interest accrue
if clean claims are not processed within
30 calendar days. Thus, reading these
provisions together, no interest accrues
on non-clean claims, including claims
that are adjusted as the result of the
effectuation of an appeal decision, and
claims that are revised following a
reopening action.
Finally, neither the statute nor our
regulations provide for escalation,
payment of interest or other remedies
when the 45-day deadline is missed for
non-clean claims. Through various tools
used to monitor the performance of our
contractors, we attempt to ensure that
claim determinations are both timely
and accurate. As we noted in the
interim final rule, providers and
suppliers play a vital role in the
contractors’ ability to meet their
decision-making timeframes. If
providers and suppliers submit clean
claims, they can avoid the delays that
are associated with processing nonclean claims. The more accurate the
claim is at initial submission, the greater
the ability of the Medicare contractor to
process the claim quickly.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§§ 405.920 and 405.921 without
modification. We are finalizing
§ 405.922 with modification as
discussed in section II.B.5.a. of this
preamble.
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b. What Constitutes an Initial
Determination and Decisions That Are
Not Considered Initial Determinations
(§ 405.924 Through § 405.926)
In § 405.924, we describe actions that
are initial determinations and are
subject to the administrative appeals
procedures in subpart I. In § 405.926, we
list examples of determinations that are
not considered initial determinations
and are not subject to the administrative
appeals procedures contained in this
subpart.
Comment: One commenter questioned
the need to maintain the number of
home health visits as a determination
that constitutes an initial determination
(§ 405.924(b)(7)). The commenter stated
that this particular item is no longer a
relevant factor in determining whether
the charges were covered under
Medicare Part A or Part B, and
suggested that this item be removed
from the list of determinations
considered initial determinations.
Response: We agree with the
commenter and have revised § 405.924
to eliminate paragraph (b)(7), which
specifically included the number of
home health visits used as an initial
determination.
Comment: One commenter stated that
under § 405.926(c), issues regarding the
computation of the payment amount of
program reimbursement of general
applicability are not considered initial
determinations and, therefore, are not
subject to appeal under subpart I. The
commenter questioned whether the
payment amount of a specific,
individual claim is considered an initial
determination. The commenter
suggested amending § 405.924 and
§ 405.926 to clarify that individual
determinations with respect to payment
amounts are initial determinations. In
addition, the commenter suggested that
we revise § 405.924(c) to state that a
provider’s notice of non-coverage to the
Medicare beneficiary is not an initial
determination. The commenter noted
that while the provider of service may
be the first decision maker regarding
Medicare coverage of an item or service,
its notice of non-coverage has not been
considered an initial determination
subject to appeal.
Response: Section 405.920 provides
that, after a claim is filed, a contractor
must perform certain actions, including
determining any amounts payable. Such
a determination constitutes an initial
determination subject to the subpart I
appeals process. Similarly, under
§ 405.924(b), a payment amount
determination with respect to a
particular item or service on a claim is
an initial determination that is
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appealable under subpart I. In contrast,
§ 405.926(c) specifies that ‘‘[a]ny issue
regarding the computation of the
payment amount of program
reimbursement of general applicability
for which CMS or a carrier has sole
responsibility under Part B such as the
establishment of a fee schedule * * *’’
is not an initial determination, and is
not subject to administrative appeal
under subpart I. For example, section
1848(i)(1) of the Act expressly prohibits
administrative and judicial review of
the components that comprise the
Medicare physician fee schedule. Thus,
in situations where payment amounts
are determined in accordance with
statutorily mandated methodologies
(such as the physician fee schedule),
adjudicators are required to follow such
methodologies when making a finding
regarding a payment amount. Therefore,
we believe that the regulations at
§§ 405.920, 405.924, and 405.926 clearly
provide that the payment amount of a
specific, individual claim is considered
an initial determination and also
appropriately convey the distinction
between a direct challenge to the
Medicare payment methodology and an
appeal that raises questions regarding a
determination of a payment amount for
a particular claim. Therefore, we do not
believe it is necessary to revise
§ 405.924 or § 405.926 to provide any
further clarification.
We agree with the commenter’s
statement that a provider’s notice of
non-coverage does not constitute an
initial determination, because it is not a
determination made by the Medicare
program. Instead, it is an opinion of the
provider, and the notices clearly state
that they are conveying the provider’s
opinion with respect to non-coverage.
The notices also clearly explain the
steps required to obtain a determination
by Medicare and how to appeal that
determination. Thus, we do not believe
it is necessary to revise § 405.924 or
§ 405.926 to include a provision
explicitly excluding such notices from
the definition of initial determination.
Comment: One commenter requested
that we define the phrase ‘‘sustained or
high levels of payment errors’’
(§ 405.926(p)) and requested that we
specify how such determinations will be
made. The commenter also requested
that CMS review dismissals on the
grounds that the claim involves a
sustained or high error rate. The
commenter suggested that CMS provide
clarification of the implications of such
a finding. Finally, the commenter
recommended that CMS provide a
mechanism for providers to be removed
from this ‘‘sanction’’.
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65303
Response: In section 1893(f)(3) of the
Act, added by section 935 of the MMA,
Congress placed restrictions on the use
of extrapolation to determine
overpayment amounts to be recovered
from Medicare providers, suppliers or
beneficiaries. In order to calculate an
overpayment by extrapolation, there
must be a determination of either: (1) A
sustained or high level of payment error,
or (2) a documented educational
intervention that has failed to correct
the payment error. In addition, in
section 1874A(h)(2) of the Act, as added
by section 934 of the MMA, Congress
required contractors to identify a
likelihood of sustained or high level of
payment error under section
1893(f)(3)(A) of the Act before initiating
non-random pre-payment reviews of a
provider or supplier, and in section
1893(f)(3) of the Act, expressly
precluded administrative or judicial
review of contractor determinations of
sustained or high levels of payment
errors. Accordingly, we included a
conforming provision at § 405.926(p) of
the interim final rule providing that
determinations of sustained or high
levels of payment error are not initial
determinations that may be appealed
under this subpart. We note, however,
that while the determination of whether
a provider or supplier has a sustained or
high level of payment error is not
subject to appeal, the initial or revised
determinations made on the underlying
claims for items or services would be
subject to appeal.
CMS issued operating instructions for
determining when a provider or
supplier has a sustained or high level of
payment error in June 2005: (https://
www.cms.hhs.gov/transmittals/
downloads/R114PI.pdf). Furthermore,
we issued a final rule on September 26,
2008 (73 FR 55753) to address when
contractors may terminate the nonrandom pre-payment review of claims
submitted by a provider or supplier. The
commenter’s concerns regarding the
practical considerations of
determinations of a provider’s or
supplier’s sustained or high error rates
are beyond the scope of this regulation.
With respect to the suggestion that CMS
review dismissals on the grounds that
the claim involved a sustained or high
error rate, as noted above, while that
determination does not constitute an
initial determination and is not subject
to appeal, any claim denials resulting
from the review would constitute initial
determinations that may be appealed.
Therefore, we do not anticipate any
denials of claims solely based on this
determination. Rather, the
determination of a sustained or high
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error rate will be used as the basis for
a contractor undertaking further review
of claims submitted by the provider or
supplier. Finally, we strongly disagree
with the commenter’s characterization
of the determination of a sustained or
high error rate as a sanction. This
determination does not result in an
assessment of civil money penalties, or
any other administrative action. Rather,
it serves as the basis for a contractor’s
review of a provider’s or supplier’s
subsequent claim submissions.
Comment: Section 405.926(s) states
that claim submissions on forms or
formats that are incomplete, invalid, or
do not otherwise meet the requirements
for a Medicare claim and, as a result, are
rejected or returned to the provider or
supplier, do not constitute initial
determinations. A commenter asked
whether this section would preclude
review where a claim is suspended for
medical review.
Response: A claim suspended for
development by a contractor’s medical
review staff is not considered a claim
that is invalid or incomplete as
described in § 405.926(s). Thus,
§ 405.926(s) would not preclude review
where a claim is suspended for medical
review because it does not apply to this
situation. Rather, a claim that is
suspended for development is one that
appears technically sufficient on its
face, but requires additional information
in order to make a coverage and
payment decision. At the time the claim
is suspended for development, an initial
determination has not been made, and
thus, appeal rights have not attached to
the claim. In addition, the medical
review staff’s decision to suspend a
claim for development does not
constitute an initial determination that
would be subject to appeal. Generally,
once the contractor makes a decision
regarding coverage and payment and
issues an initial determination in the
form of a MSN or RA, parties to the
initial determination have 120 calendar
days to request a redetermination.
However, if a contractor denies coverage
and payment of a claim because the
documentation requested during the
medical review of the claim was not
submitted within the specified
timeframe, any subsequent submission
of the requested documentation to the
contractor, or any timely request for a
redetermination of that claim will be
processed under our reopenings policy
at § 405.980(a)(2). If a revised
determination is issued following the
reopening of the claim, the revised
initial determination carries with it
appeal rights in accordance with
§ 405.984(a).
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Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.924 with modification as noted
above. We are finalizing § 405.926
without modification.
c. Initial Determinations Subject to the
Reopenings Process (§ 405.927) and the
Effects of Initial Determinations
(§ 405.928)
Section 405.927 states that minor
errors or omissions in an initial
determination must be corrected
through the contractor’s reopening
process under § 405.980(a)(3). Section
405.928 describes the effects of an
initial determination. We received no
comments on these sections.
Accordingly, we are finalizing § 405.927
and § 405.928 without modification.
5. Redeterminations (§ 405.940 Through
§ 405.958)
Sections 405.940 through 405.958
discuss the redetermination process. We
received comments with respect to
redetermination decision-making
timeframes and other aspects of the
redetermination process. A brief
overview of the relevant regulatory
provisions, a summary of the comments
and our responses follow. Additional
detailed discussion of the
redetermination process is included in
the interim final rule at 70 FR 11423,
11428, 11436 through 11443, and 11458.
a. Redetermination Requests (§ 405.940
Through § 405.946)
Section 405.940 establishes the
general rule that a person or entity that
may be a party to a redetermination
under § 405.906(b) and that is
dissatisfied with an initial
determination may request a
redetermination under subpart I.
Sections 405.942 and 405.944 then set
forth the requirements concerning the
timeframes and procedures for filing a
redetermination request. Section
405.946 describes the evidence that
should be submitted with a
redetermination request.
Comment: One commenter asked that
we specify when a standardized
redetermination request form will be
available.
Response: A standardized Form
20027, revised May 1, 2005, is available
to beneficiaries and other interested
parties and can be used to request a
redetermination. Customer service
representatives at 1–800–MEDICARE
can provide beneficiaries with
information on how they may obtain
standardized appeal forms. In addition,
updated appeal forms will continue to
be available on the Internet at https://
www.cms.hhs.gov/CMSForms/
CMSForms/list.asp#TopOfPage and
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https://www.medicare.gov/Basics/forms/
default.asp. In addition, representatives
at 1–800–MEDICARE can also provide
information on how to obtain appeals
forms.
Further, as noted previously,
beneficiaries receive information on the
appeals process and instructions for
requesting a redetermination (first level
appeal) as part of the MSN.
Beneficiaries can use the MSN to
request an appeal by circling the item or
service with which they disagree,
explaining why they disagree, signing
the MSN, and returning it, or a copy, to
the contractor address specified on the
notice.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that contractors and QICs send an
acknowledgment letter to all affected
parties to an appeal indicating receipt of
the appeal request. Thus, a provider
would know if a beneficiary has already
appealed a claim denial. The
commenter also requested that
adjudicators assign a reference number
to all appeals. The commenter suggested
that the appeal case number not utilize
a beneficiary’s HIC number, in order to
minimize confusion for provider
appeals involving multiple
beneficiaries.
Response: Due to the volume of
redetermination and reconsideration
requests, it is not feasible to require
contractors or the QICs to send an
acknowledgment letter to all parties for
each appeal (although we note that QICs
send acknowledgment letters to
appellants indicating receipt of the
request for reconsideration). While
having more than one party file an
appeal on a claim may appear to be
duplicative, we believe it may be in the
best interest of a party dissatisfied with
the outcome of an initial determination
or appeal decision to file an appeal
request and submit relevant evidence
with respect to the issues in the case
because of the full and early
presentation of evidence rule. Under
this rule, as set forth in § 405.966(a)(2),
a provider, supplier, or beneficiary
represented by a provider or supplier
that is a party to the reconsideration
must submit all evidence prior to the
issuance of the reconsideration. New
evidence submitted at the ALJ hearing
by a provider, supplier, or beneficiary
represented by a provider or supplier
will be excluded from consideration
unless the ALJ finds good cause to
explain why the evidence was not
submitted prior to the issuance of the
reconsideration. See § 405.1018(c) and
§ 405.1028. Thus, by filing an appeal, a
party can make sure that the evidence
it wants considered will not be
excluded from consideration. The
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contractor or QIC will then consolidate
timely appeal requests from multiple
parties into one proceeding, as required
under § 405.944(c) and § 405.964(c),
which will prevent possible disparate
appeal decisions.
Every appeal request at each level of
the appeals process receives a unique
control number. This number is
included on notices sent to parties. We
acknowledge the commenter’s concerns
regarding the use of a beneficiary’s HIC
number as the appeal control number
for ALJ hearings. In the past, certain ALJ
hearings processed by the Social
Security Administration used a
beneficiary’s HIC number. With the
implementation of the new Medicare
Appeals System (MAS) to control and
track appeals at the QIC and ALJ levels,
beneficiary HIC numbers are no longer
used for assigning case numbers to an
appeal. However, before a new case
number has been assigned to an appeal
request, beneficiary HIC numbers are
helpful when making status inquiries
with the QIC or an ALJ because these
numbers can be used internally to
identify the unique record for the
appeal.
In this final regulation, we are making
technical revisions to several sections
that set forth the deadlines and
timeframes that apply to various actions
taken by parties, appellants and
adjudicators. Throughout subpart I, we
use the words ‘‘day’’, ‘‘days’’ and
‘‘calendar days’’ when referring to these
timeframes and deadlines. Although we
believe parties and potential
participants to the appeals process and
adjudicators understand these terms are
used interchangeably, and that ‘‘days’’
means ‘‘calendar days’’ unless otherwise
stated, we believe technical revisions
are necessary to ensure that these terms
are used consistently throughout
subpart I and to clarify the timeframes
and deadlines set forth in the rule.
Further, we believe these revisions will
reduce potential confusion about the
specific date by which an action must
be taken by a party or adjudicator.
Therefore, we are revising the
following sections to insert the word
‘‘calendar’’ before the word ‘‘day’’ or
‘‘days’’: § 405.922, § 405.942(a)(1),
§ 405.942(b), § 405.946(b),
§ 405.950(b)(1), § 405.950(b)(2),
§ 405.950(b)(3), § 405.962(a)(1),
§ 405.962(a)(2), § 405.962(b),
§ 405.966(b), § 405.966(c),
§ 405.970(a)(2), § 405.970(b)(1),
§ 405.970(b)(2), § 405.970(b)(3),
§ 405.970(c), § 405.970(e)(2),
§ 405.974(b)(1), § 405.974(b)(1)(i),
§ 405.974(b)(1)(ii), § 405.980(d)(1),
§ 405.980(d)(2), § 405.980(d)(3),
§ 405.980(e)(1), § 405.980(e)(2),
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§ 405.980(e)(3), § 405.990(f)(2),
§ 405.990(f)(4), § 405.990(h)(2),
§ 405.990(i)(2), § 405.990(j)(1),
§ 405.1002(a)(1), § 405.1002(a)(3),
§ 405.1002(a)(4), § 405.1002(b)(2),
§ 405.1004(a)(1), § 405.1004(a)(3),
§ 405.1004(a)(4), § 405.1006(e)(1)(ii),
§ 405.1010(b), § 405.1012(b),
§ 405.1014(b)(1), § 405.1014(b)(2),
§ 405.1016(a), § 405.1016(c),
§ 405.1018(a), § 405.1018(b),
§ 405.1020(g)(3)(ii), § 405.1022(a),
§ 405.1024(a), § 405.1028(a),
§ 405.1036(f)(5)(iv), § 405.1037(c)(5),
§ 405.1037(e)(2)(iii), § 405.1042(b)(2),
§ 405.1044(d), § 405.1046(d),
§ 405.1052(a)(2)(ii), § 405.1052(a)(2)(iii),
§ 405.1100(c), § 405.1100(d),
§ 405.1102(a)(1), § 405.1102(a)(2),
§ 405.1104(a)(2), § 405.1106(b),
§ 405.1110(a), § 405.1110(b)(2),
§ 405.1110(d), § 405.1118,
§ 405.1122(e)(4), § 405.1124(b),
§ 405.1126(d)(1), § 405.1130,
§ 405.1132(b), § 405.1136(c)(3),
§ 405.1136(d)(2), § 405.1140(b)(1),
§ 405.1140(c)(1), § 405.1140(c)(4),
§ 405.1140(d).
Finally, to further ensure that
beneficiaries and others affected by the
rule understand the various time frames
and deadlines set forth in the rule, we
note that where the regulations provide
for a time frame and that time frame
ends on a Saturday, Sunday, legal
holiday, or any other Federal nonwork
day, we apply a rollover period that
extends the time frame within which an
act must be done to the first day after
the Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or
other Federal nonwork day.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
sections 405.940 and 405.944 without
modification. We are finalizing sections
405.942 and 405.946 with modification
as discussed in this section.
Per the discussion in this section, we
also are finalizing the following sections
to add the word ‘‘calendar’’ in front of
the word ‘‘day’’ or ‘‘days’’: § 405.922,
§ 405.942(a)(1), § 405.942(b),
§ 405.946(b), § 405.950(b)(1),
§ 405.950(b)(2), § 405.950(b)(3),
§ 405.962(a)(1), § 405.962(a)(2),
§ 405.962(b), § 405.966(b), § 405.966(c),
§ 405.970(a)(2), § 405.970(b)(1),
§ 405.970(b)(2), § 405.970(b)(3),
§ 405.970(c), § 405.970(e)(2),
§ 405.974(b)(1), § 405.974(b)(1)(i),
§ 405.974(b)(1)(ii), § 405.980(d)(1),
§ 405.980(d)(2), § 405.980(d)(3),
§ 405.980(e)(1), § 405.980(e)(2),
§ 405.980(e)(3), § 405.990(f)(2),
§ 405.990(f)(4), § 405.990(h)(2),
§ 405.990(i)(2), § 405.990(j)(1),
§ 405.1002(a)(1), § 405.1002(a)(3),
§ 405.1002(a)(4), § 405.1002(b)(2),
§ 405.1004(a)(1), § 405.1004(a)(3),
§ 405.1004(a)(4), § 405.1006(e)(1)(ii),
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65305
§ 405.1010(b), § 405.1012(b),
§ 405.1014(b)(1), § 405.1014(b)(2),
§ 405.1016(a), § 405.1016(c),
§ 405.1018(a), § 405.1018(b),
§ 405.1020(g)(3)(ii), § 405.1022(a),
§ 405.1024(a), § 405.1028(a),
§ 405.1036(f)(5)(iv), § 405.1037(c)(5),
§ 405.1037(e)(2)(iii), § 405.1042(b)(2),
§ 405.1044(d), § 405.1046(d),
§ 405.1052(a)(2)(ii), § 405.1052(a)(2)(iii),
§ 405.1100(c), § 405.1100(d),
§ 405.1102(a)(1), § 405.1102(a)(2),
§ 405.1104(a)(2), § 405.1106(b),
§ 405.1110(a), § 405.1110(b)(2),
§ 405.1110(d), § 405.1118,
§ 405.1122(e)(4), § 405.1124(b),
§ 405.1126(d)(1), § 405.1130,
§ 405.1132(b), § 405.1136(c)(3),
§ 405.1136(d)(2), § 405.1140(b)(1),
§ 405.1140(c)(1), § 405.1140(c)(4), and
§ 405.1140(d).
b. Conduct and Effect of
Redeterminations (§ 405.948 Through
§ 405.958)
Sections 405.948 and 405.950
describe basic procedures contractors
follow in conducting redeterminations,
including the adjudication timeframes
for issuing redetermination notices and
exceptions to the timeframes. Section
405.952 contains provisions relating to
the withdrawal or dismissal of a request
for a redetermination. Sections 405.954
and 405.956 address redetermination
decisions and notification rules. Section
405.958 discusses the effect of a
redetermination decision.
Comment: One commenter expressed
concern that the rule does not provide
a process for notifying an appellant of
new issues being considered by a
contractor during the redetermination.
The commenter recommended that
§ 405.948 be amended to require
contractor notification of the appellant
about new issues, and to provide an
opportunity for the appellant to respond
to those issues.
Response: We understand the
commenter’s concern about ensuring
appellants have an opportunity to
respond to new issues raised by
contractors during the redetermination
process. Thus, appellants are strongly
encouraged to submit all relevant
evidence at the earliest point possible to
support their assertion that the initial
determination is incorrect. This works
to enhance the efficiency and accuracy
of the appeals process and enables
adjudicators to make more informed
decisions at the first level of the appeals
process. Given the short timeframes for
processing redeterminations and the
high volume of requests, it is not
feasible to require contractors to send
formal notice of new issues raised
during the redetermination process.
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However, during the course of the
redetermination, if a contractor
determines that a new issue, distinct
from the issues considered at the initial
determination, warrants consideration,
and the pertinent documentation
necessary to make a decision on that
issue is missing from the record, it is
expected that the contractor will contact
the appropriate entity to obtain the
missing information prior to rendering
its decision. In addition, the contractor’s
redetermination notice will contain a
decision with respect to any new issues,
and parties dissatisfied with the
outcome may file a request for
reconsideration.
Comment: One commenter objected to
the provision that where two or more
parties requested an appeal on the same
initial determination, the contractor’s
deadline for processing the appeal
would be based on the latest filed
request (§ 405.950(b)(2)). The
commenter argued that the first
appellant was placed at a disadvantage
in the decision-making timeframe. The
commenter suggested that we stipulate
in this final regulation that the decisionmaking timeframe starts with the first
appeal request, extending the decisionmaking time by no more than 14 days
from the original deadline, applicable
only if a later party’s appeal request
contained new, relevant evidence.
Response: In sections 405.944(c),
405.950(b)(2), 405.964(c) and
405.970(b)(2) of the interim final rule,
we require carriers, FIs, and QICs to
consolidate multiple requests for a
redetermination, or multiple requests
for a reconsideration, into a single
proceeding in order to avoid duplication
and to issue one appeal decision within
60 days of the latest appeal request. This
policy allows time for the adjudicator to
carefully review and consider each of
the appeal requests, including any
additional evidence submitted with the
requests. Instances when more than one
party files a request for an appeal of the
same claim have always been rare, and
we do not expect any change in this
regard. Therefore, we do not believe that
consolidating the decision-making
timeframe for appeals requested by
multiple parties, such that the decisionmaking timeframe begins with the latest
filed request, creates an impediment to
the efficient resolution of appeals or
places the first appellant at a
disadvantage. To the contrary, we
believe that when another party
subsequently requests an appeal before
a decision has been made on the
original request, fairness and efficiency
is enhanced by combining the two
requests into one case and beginning the
decision-making timeframe with the
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latest filed request to allow adequate
time to review each request and the
evidence submitted before a decision is
made. Finally, we do not believe that
extending the decision-making
timeframe by no more than 14 days from
the original deadline of the first appeal
request received only if the later party’s
appeal request contained new, relevant
evidence would allow for careful review
and consideration of the appeals
request.
Comment: We received several
comments objecting to the extension of
the decision-making timeframes at the
redetermination and reconsideration
levels to allow for the submission of
new evidence (§ 405.950(b)(3), which
incorporates § 405.946(b), for
redeterminations, and § 405.970(b)(3),
which incorporates § 405.966(b), for
reconsiderations). Although most
commenters recognized the need to
ensure contractors have adequate time
to review new evidence, those who
objected to this provision believe that
the unlimited and automatic extensions
of the statutory decision-making
timeframes by up to 14 days upon
submission of new evidence are
contrary to section 1869(a)(3)(C)(ii) of
the Act for redeterminations and section
1869(c)(3)(C)(iv) of the Act for
reconsiderations. One commenter added
that the automatic extensions of the
decision-making timeframes contradict
the congressional intent behind the
establishment of timeframes for lowerlevel reviews: To expedite the appeals
process and avoid the huge backlogs
that have plagued the system. Another
commenter suggested that only those
submissions of evidence initiated by a
party should extend the decisionmaking timeframe, and that additional
evidence submitted by a party in
response to a request from the Medicare
contractor should not result in an
extension of the decision-making
timeframe.
Response: As stated in the interim
final rule, we continue to believe
allowing extensions of decision-making
timeframes under some circumstances is
consistent with the statute. See 70 FR
11439, 11445 through 11446. Since the
statute imposes decision-making
timeframes with the assumption that at
the time the appeal is filed, all relevant
evidence will be submitted to the
adjudicator, we believe extensions that
result from late-submitted evidence are
consistent with the statute. When an
appellant submits new information after
the appeal is filed, the adjudicator
should not be penalized for an
appellant’s late submission of evidence.
We also believe that appellants should
be afforded some flexibility to
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supplement the administrative record if
needed. Thus, the extensions of the
decision-making timeframe in
§ 405.950(b)(3) and § 405.970(b)(3)
balance the needs of the party with the
needs of the adjudicator by allowing an
appropriate timeframe within which the
adjudicator can carefully consider
additional evidence.
Further, we believe that contractors
should be afforded up to an additional
14 calendar days to issue a
redetermination decision when the
contractor requests missing
documentation from a party that is
essential to resolving the issues on
appeal. We believe the efficiency and
cost-effectiveness of the appeals process
is greatly enhanced by allowing this
additional time to ensure an accurate
decision is made at the lowest possible
level. The only way to avoid the need
for extended decision-making
timeframes would be to preclude the
submission of additional evidence by
appellants after they file their
redetermination requests. Although the
contractor may extend the deadline
when it receives additional evidence,
this policy does not mean that in all
cases we expect a contractor to take the
maximum time to issue the decision.
Similarly, at the reconsideration level,
the QIC’s adjudication deadline is
extended up to 14 days when a party
submits additional evidence not
included with the request for
reconsideration. However, the extension
does not apply to a party’s timely
submission of evidence in response to a
request by a QIC (unless the contractor,
in its redetermination notice, informed
the party that (1) the documentation was
missing from the administrative record,
and (2) the documentation must be
submitted with the request for
reconsideration, and then the party
failed to submit such documentation).
See § 405.956(b)(6), § 405.966(b); 70 FR
11446. As noted above, we believe the
adjudication timeframes presuppose a
complete record for the adjudicator.
Where evidence is missing from the
record, and the party is on notice that
the evidence must be submitted with
the reconsideration request, we believe
the extension of the adjudication
timeframe is both necessary and
consistent with the statute.
Finally, we do not expect an
extension of up to 14 days will cause
backlogs or significant delays in the
appeals process. Rather, we believe this
policy will encourage parties to submit
evidence as soon as practicable. As
stated previously, we urge appellants to
submit all necessary documentation
with their requests in order to avoid
delays.
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Comment: One commenter inquired
about the process for handling
redetermination requests from family
members when a beneficiary is
deceased. The commenter expressed
concern about the ability of a surviving
spouse or relative to provide proof of
their status as the legally authorized
representative of the decedent. The
commenter related instances where the
surviving family member attempting to
pursue an appeal is unable to produce
appropriate documentation to prove
such status because there is no will or
there are no assets to distribute by
probate. The commenter stated that
appeals should not be dismissed if
requisite documents are not provided by
surviving family members.
Response: We appreciate the concerns
of the commenter regarding the
difficulty surviving family members of a
deceased beneficiary may have in
securing proof of their authority to file
an appeal on behalf of the decedent. We
routinely require documentation of an
individual’s authority to file an appeal
request on behalf of a party. In part, this
is because the individually identifiable
health care information that may be
shared during the appeals process,
including information with respect to a
deceased person, cannot be disclosed
unless the disclosure is authorized by
law or authorized by the individual. In
order to protect against an unauthorized
disclosure, contractors must obtain
documentation of the status of any
person attempting to act on behalf of a
deceased beneficiary by filing an appeal.
For example, if the person attempting to
file an appeal on behalf of a deceased
beneficiary is authorized under State
law to administer the estate, then the
contractor must obtain documentation
of the individual’s authority (that is, as
the executor or administrator of the
estate) or information regarding the
intestate provisions of the relevant
State’s probate law. Similarly,
contractors determine whether an
individual meets the requirements set
forth in 42 CFR part 424, subpart E if the
individual asserts they have assumed a
legal obligation to pay for the services.
Contractors are not prohibited from
assisting individuals to obtain any
necessary information. However,
whether the beneficiary is living or
deceased, absent timely filed evidence
that the individual attempting to file an
appeal has authority to do so,
contractors must dismiss the
redetermination request. See
§ 405.952(b)(1).
Comment: We received two comments
concerning contractor notices to
beneficiaries on appeal issues. One
commenter agreed with our policy in
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§ 405.956(a)(2) that contractors should
issue written notice to only the
appellants when an appeal concerns an
overpayment involving multiple
beneficiaries who have no financial
liability. However, another commenter
thought our policies with respect to
beneficiary notification could deprive a
beneficiary of his or her appeal rights.
The commenter stated that when a fully
favorable decision is issued to a nonbeneficiary appellant, the beneficiary
does not receive a copy of the
redetermination notice. As a result, the
120 day period to request a
redetermination may expire without the
beneficiary knowing of the existing
appeal. The commenter further noted
that a decision that is fully favorable to
a provider or supplier may not be fully
favorable to the beneficiary. The
commenter questioned whether a
beneficiary still has appeal rights if the
redetermination is not favorable for the
beneficiary and what process follows if
the evidence submitted by the
beneficiary and provider conflict.
Response: We do not believe a
beneficiary would be deprived of any
appeal rights in the scenario described
by the commenter. In the case of a
redetermination that is fully favorable
(that is, fully reverses a denial of
coverage or payment on the initial
determination), parties will receive a
redetermination notice, MSN, or RA, as
applicable. See § 405.956(a)(1); Internet
Only Manual (IOM) Pub. 100–4, Ch. 29,
section 310.5. The MSN and RA will
reflect any adjustment made to the
claim, including a shift in the financial
liability from a provider to a beneficiary,
and will contain information regarding
further appeal rights.
With respect to the commenter’s
concern about the subsequent appeal
rights of a beneficiary when another
party has requested a redetermination, a
beneficiary’s right to appeal does not
depend on his or her status as an
appellant at previous levels in the
appeals process. Beneficiaries may
request a subsequent appeal even if they
did not initiate prior appeals (unless
they have formally assigned their appeal
rights to a provider or supplier and have
not revoked the assignment). In the
scenario presented by the commenter, if
a redetermination request is timely filed
by a second party before the
redetermination decision is issued, the
contractor will consolidate the multiple
redetermination requests consistent
with § 405.944(c). If a redetermination
request from another party is received
by the contractor after the
redetermination decision is issued, the
contractor would treat the
redetermination request as misfiled, and
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would forward the request to the QIC.
See CMS IOM, Publication 100–4,
Chapter 29, Section 320.1.B at (https://
www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/downloads/
clm104c29.pdf). Finally, in situations
where evidence submitted during an
appeal conflicts with other evidence in
the administrative record, the
adjudicator, as an arbiter of fact, is
responsible for examining all of the
evidence submitted, and making
appropriate findings of fact with respect
to such evidence.
In this final regulation, we are making
technical revisions to several sections
that describe the nature and effect of the
determinations, decisions, and other
actions issued by adjudicators. In
subpart I, we refer to these actions as
‘‘final’’, ‘‘final and binding’’ and
‘‘binding’’. Although we believe parties
to the appeals process understand the
meaning of these terms, we believe
technical revisions are necessary so that
these terms are used consistently
throughout subpart I. These revisions
will reduce potential confusion
regarding the effect of a determination
or decision issued by an adjudicator.
We believe referring to certain
decisions or actions as ‘‘final’’ or ‘‘final
and binding’’ may create confusion as to
whether the adjudicator’s action or
decision constitutes a final decision of
the Secretary for which judicial review
may be sought under section 205(g) of
the Act. As described in § 405.1132 and
§ 405.1136(a), to the extent authorized
by sections 1869, 1876(c)(5)(B), and
1879(d) of the Act, judicial review is
available to a party to a MAC decision,
or to an appellant who requests
escalation to Federal district court if the
MAC does not complete its review of
the ALJ’s decision (other than MAC
review of an ALJ dismissal) within the
applicable adjudication period. In
addition, judicial review is available
when a review entity certifies that a
party has met the expedited access to
judicial review (EAJR) requirements, or,
under § 405.990(f)(4), when the review
entity fails to make such certification
within the applicable timeframe
specified in § 405.990(f)(2). See section
1869(b)(2) of the Act; § 405.990. Judicial
review is also available under
§ 405.1140(a) when a Federal district
court remands a case for further
consideration, the MAC subsequently
remands the case to an ALJ, and the ALJ
issues a decision that becomes the final
decision of the Secretary. We are
reserving the term ‘‘final’’ to describe
those actions or decisions for which
judicial review may be immediately
sought. Thus, we believe these technical
revisions will ensure that parties will be
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able to understand when judicial review
is available.
When we state that an action or
decision is ‘‘binding’’ on parties, we
mean that the parties are obligated to
abide by the adjudicator’s action or
decision, unless further recourse to
challenge the action or decision is
available, and a party exercises that
right (for example, obtaining a decision
at the next level of appeal, or having the
adjudicator reopen and vacate the
decision or action). When a party may
take further action on an adjudicator’s
action or decision, we specify those
actions that may be taken. If a party
chooses not to take further action, or
further recourse is unavailable to
parties, then the adjudicator’s decision
is binding on the parties, and is final in
the sense that no further review of the
decision is available.
In summary, when we use the term
‘‘final’’ in the regulation text, we mean
those actions or decisions for which
judicial review may be immediately
sought. When we use the term
‘‘binding’’ in the regulation text, we
mean that the parties are obligated to
abide by the adjudicator’s action or
decision, unless further recourse to
challenge the action or decision is
available, and a party exercises that
right. As such, a final decision of the
Secretary is always a binding decision.
However, a binding decision may not be
a final decision of the Secretary for the
purposes of exhausting administrative
remedies when seeking judicial review.
We also are making related technical
revisions to several sections that
describe the decisions or actions issued
by adjudicators. In several instances we
use the term ‘‘final action’’ or ‘‘final
decision’’ to describe the actions taken
or the decisions issued by a QIC, an ALJ,
and the MAC. We believe that the
meaning of these terms may, at times, be
confusing since some of these ‘‘final
actions’’ or ‘‘final decisions’’ may not be
final as discussed above. We also
believe describing the specific actions
that an adjudicator may take, rather than
using a generic phrase, such as final
action, adds clarity and assists parties in
understanding both the effect of a
specific action issued by an adjudicator,
and when judicial review may be
available. Therefore, where we use the
terms ‘‘final action’’ or ‘‘final decision’’,
we are making technical revisions to
replace those terms, as appropriate, with
the specific determinations, decisions or
actions that the adjudicator may take.
For example, we are revising
§ 405.1136(a)(2) to remove the phrase
‘‘final action’’ and replace it with the
phrase ‘‘final decision, dismissal order,
or remand order’’.
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Furthermore, we are making similar
technical revisions to
§ 405.990(b)(1)(i)(A) to replace the term
‘‘final decision’’ with the specific
actions that, if taken by an ALJ, will
preclude a party from seeking EAJR in
place of an ALJ hearing, and to
§ 405.990(b)(1)(i)(B) by adding dismissal
orders and remand orders to the
description of the actions that, if taken
by the MAC, will preclude a party from
seeking EAJR in place of MAC review.
We believe that the use of the word
‘‘decision’’ alone in these subsections
does not clearly convey the specific
actions of the ALJ or MAC that will
preclude a party from seeking EAJR, and
thus we believe it is necessary to clearly
articulate which actions could preclude
such a request. Therefore, we are
making the following technical
revisions, consistent with the discussion
above:
We are revising the following sections
to remove the terms ‘‘final’’ and ‘‘final
and binding’’ and replace them with the
term ‘‘binding’’: § 405.952(e), § 405.958,
§ 405.972(e), § 405.974(b)(3), § 405.978,
§ 405.980(a)(1), § 405.980(a)(5),
§ 405.1004(c) and § 405.1052(a)(6).
We are revising § 405.990(b)(1)(i)(A)
to remove the phrase ‘‘final decision’’
and replace it with the phrase
‘‘decision, dismissal order, or remand
order’’.
We are revising § 405.990(b)(1)(i)(B) to
add the phrase ‘‘dismissal order, or
remand order’’ after ‘‘final decision’’.
We are revising § 405.990(b)(1)(ii) to
remove the term ‘‘final action’’ and
replace it with the phrase ‘‘decision or
dismissal order’’.
We are revising § 405.990(f)(3) to
remove the words ‘‘final and’’.
We are revising § 405.1002(b)(2) and
§ 405.1112(a) to remove the phrase
‘‘final action’’ with replace it with the
phrase ‘‘decision or dismissal order’’.
We are revising § 405.1046(c) to
remove the word ‘‘final’’ and replace it
with the phrase ‘‘binding on the
contractor’’.
We are revising § 405.1048(a) to
remove the phrase ‘‘either issues a final
action’’ and replace it with the phrase
‘‘issues a final decision or remand
order’’.
We are revising § 405.1100(c) and (d)
to remove the phrase ‘‘final action’’ and
replace it with the phrase ‘‘final
decision or dismissal order’’.
We are revising § 405.1104(a)(2) to
remove the phrase ‘‘final action or
remand the case to the QIC’’,
§ 405.1104(b)(1) to remove the phrase
‘‘final action or remand’’,
§ 405.1104(b)(2) to remove the phrase
‘‘final action or remand order’’, and
§ 405.1104(c) to remove the phrase
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‘‘final action’’ and replace them with the
phrase ‘‘decision, dismissal order, or
remand order’’.
We are revising § 405.1104(b)(3) to
remove the phrase ‘‘a final
administrative decision for purposes of
MAC review’’ and replace it with the
phrase ‘‘the decision that is subject to
MAC review consistent with
405.1102(a)’’.
We are revising § 405.1106(b) to
remove the phrase ‘‘final action or
remand the case to the ALJ’’,
§ 405.1132(b) to remove the phrase
‘‘final action or remand’’, and
§ 405.1136(a)(2) to remove the phrase
‘‘final action’’ and replace them with the
phrase ‘‘final decision, dismissal order,
or remand order’’.
We are revising § 405.1110(d) to
remove the phrase ‘‘remains the final
action in the case’’ and replace it with
the phrase ‘‘is binding on the parties to
the ALJ decision.’’
We are revising § 405.1126(a) to
remove the word ‘‘final’’.
We are revising § 405.1130 to add the
words ‘‘final and’’ before the word
‘‘binding’’.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.948, § 405.954, and § 405.956
without modification. We are finalizing
§ 405.950 with modification as
discussed in section II.B.5.a. of this
preamble. We are finalizing § 405.952,
§ 405.958, § 405.972, § 405.974,
§ 405.978, § 405.980, § 405.984,
§ 405.990, § 405.1002, § 405.1004,
§ 405.1046, § 405.1048, § 405.1052,
§ 405.1100, § 405.1104, § 405.1106,
§ 405.1110, § 405.1112, § 405.1126,
§ 405.1130, § 405.1132, and § 405.1136
with modifications, as noted.
6. Reconsiderations (§ 405.960 Through
§ 405.978)
Sections 405.960 through 405.978
address the reconsideration process. We
discuss specific sections and summarize
and respond to comments on the
reconsideration process below.
Additional detailed discussion of the
reconsideration process is included in
the interim final rule at 70 FR 11423,
11428, 11440, 11441, and 11443 through
11450.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that we establish for chain providers an
exception to the standard rule requiring
reconsiderations to be performed by the
QIC for the State in which the service
was rendered. In appeals involving
providers that have elected a single FI,
the commenter recommended that
providers have the option of having
appeals processed by the QIC for the
State in which the provider’s home
office is located or the State in which
the service was rendered.
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Response: In determining the
workload distribution for appeals
among the Part A QICs, CMS issued
instructions requiring that, for chain
providers that have elected to have their
claims processed by a single FI, any
related reconsiderations will be
processed by the QIC with jurisdiction
over the State where the FI is located.
Since there are no in-person
reconsiderations, we believe it is
unnecessary to adjust the jurisdictions
to accommodate home office locations.
The one exception to this general rule
applies to claims currently processed by
one of our contractors. Because this
contractor processes claims in all 50
States, it would be too burdensome to
require one QIC to process all the
reconsiderations for those claims. Thus,
we determined it was necessary to split
that workload among the Part A QICs
based on the State in which the service
is rendered.
a. Processing Reconsideration Requests
(§ 405.960 Through § 405.964)
Section 405.960 states that any person
or entity that is a party to a
redetermination and is dissatisfied with
that determination, may request a
reconsideration of the redetermination
by a QIC. Section 405.962 specifies that
appellants who wish to file a request for
reconsideration must do so within 180
calendar days of the date on which the
party receives the notice of the
redetermination, or within such
additional time as CMS may allow. In
§ 405.964, we set forth the place and
method for filing requests for
reconsideration.
We received no comments on these
sections; however, in this regulation, we
are making a technical revision to
§ 405.962(a). Section 405.962(a) states
that requests for reconsideration of a
contractor’s redetermination must be
filed within 180 calendar days from the
date the party receives notice of the
redetermination, unless the QIC extends
the timeframe upon a showing of good
cause for the late filing consistent with
§ 405.962(b). We inadvertently omitted a
reference to the different filing
timeframe applicable to requests for QIC
reconsideration of a contractor’s
dismissal of a request for
redetermination under § 405.974(b). In
§ 405.974(b)(1), we specify that a party
must file the written request for
reconsideration of a contractor’s
dismissal action with the QIC within 60
days after receipt of the contractor’s
notice of dismissal. While the
reconsideration of a dismissal action
under § 405.974(b) differs from the
reconsideration of a redetermination
under § 405.974(a) (for example, a QIC’s
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reconsideration of a dismissal action is
not subject to further review under
§ 405.974(b)(3)), for clarity, we are
amending § 405.962(a) to include the
reference to the timeframe applicable to
requests for QIC reconsideration of
contractor dismissals.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.960 and § 405.964 without
modification. We are finalizing
§ 405.962 with modification as noted
above, and as discussed in section
II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
b. Evidence Submitted With the
Reconsideration Request—Full and
Early Presentation of Evidence
(§ 405.966)
Section 405.966(a) specifies that a
party should present evidence and
allegations of fact or law related to the
issue in dispute and explain why it
disagrees with the initial determination
when filing a request for
reconsideration. Absent good cause,
failure to submit all evidence, including
documentation requested in the notice
of redetermination, prior to the issuance
of the notice of reconsideration
precludes subsequent consideration of
that evidence. Section 405.966(b)
explains that submissions of evidence
that do not accompany the request for
reconsideration extend the QIC’s 60-day
decision-making timeframe up to 14
calendar days for each submission.
Section 405.966(c) establishes an
exception to the full and early
presentation of evidence requirement,
and permits Medicaid State agencies
and beneficiaries, other than those
represented by providers or suppliers, to
submit additional new evidence after
the reconsideration level without
establishing good cause for the delayed
submission.
Comment: We received many
comments concerning the provision that
requires a provider or supplier to submit
all evidence prior to the QIC
reconsideration decision being
rendered, unless there is good cause for
submitting the evidence later. In
general, most commenters were in favor
of expediting the appeals process and
recognized the value of early evidence
submission. However, some
commenters argued that this provision
was too burdensome for providers,
suppliers, and beneficiaries, particularly
when they do not have easy access to
supporting documentation that may be
required, or may not know until after
the QIC decision that additional
evidence may be necessary or useful.
Several commenters requested that CMS
include in the regulations a specific list
of items, documents or circumstances
that constitute good cause for late
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submission of evidence. Some
commenters objected to the limitations
completely. One commenter stated that
evidence submission should be allowed
at any stage of the appeals process, as
long as the evidence proved relevant
and there was no prejudice to
permitting its submission.
Response: The requirement in
§ 405.966 for the early presentation of
evidence by providers and suppliers is
based on the statutory requirement
contained in section 1869(b)(3) of the
Act, as added by section 933(a) of the
MMA, which states that a provider or
supplier may not, in any subsequent
level of appeal, introduce evidence that
was not presented at the reconsideration
conducted by the QIC, unless there is
good cause that precluded the
introduction of that evidence at or
before the reconsideration. Section
405.966(c)(2) extends the full and early
presentation of evidence requirement to
beneficiaries represented by providers
or suppliers. We recognize that absent
advance notice of what documents are
needed to support a claim, appellants
may have difficulty determining what
constitutes relevant evidence for their
claim appeals. Thus, § 405.956(b)(6)
requires contractor redetermination
notices to identify ‘‘specific missing
documentation.’’ We believe this
provision helps appellants, since it
should enable appellants to better
understand the basis for the unfavorable
redetermination and understand the
information missing from the record.
Ultimately, we believe this can result in
a better developed record at the
reconsideration level, and will allow the
QIC to make more fully informed
reconsideration decisions. We do not
believe that it is either practical or
consistent with the statute to limit the
requirement for full and early
presentation of evidence by attempting
to distinguish categorically between
evidence that is readily available to the
provider, supplier, or beneficiary and
that which is obtained from entities not
directly involved in the claim dispute.
Limiting the requirement for full and
early presentation of evidence to
objective medical information would be
equally problematic. Given the vast
amount of medical services and items
that could be involved in a claim
dispute, it would be extremely difficult
to draw clear distinctions among the
numerous types of documentation that
might be needed. Nevertheless, where it
is not feasible to obtain this
documentation prior to issuance of the
reconsideration, as indicated in
§ 405.1028, an ALJ will make a
determination on whether good cause
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for failure to submit the evidence to the
QIC exists. This applies to all
documentation, including any items
listed in the notice of redetermination.
Finally, § 405.966(c) states that the
limitation on the presentation of new
evidence does not apply to beneficiary
appellants unless they are represented
by a provider or supplier or to Medicaid
State agencies. Therefore, although
contractor redetermination notices will
uniformly identify any necessary
missing documentation, beneficiaries,
except those represented by providers or
suppliers, and Medicaid State agencies
will still be permitted to introduce
evidence after the QIC reconsideration
level (although for efficiency reasons,
they would be better served by doing so
as soon as possible).
We are finalizing § 405.966 with
modification as discussed in section
II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
c. Conduct and Processing of
Reconsiderations (§ 405.968 Through
§ 405.978)
In § 405.968, we describe the manner
in which QICs conduct
reconsiderations. In § 405.970, we set
forth the timeframes for issuing
reconsideration notices. In § 405.972,
we explain the process by which a QIC
may dismiss, or a party may withdraw,
a request for reconsideration. Section
405.974 describes the reconsideration
by a QIC of a contractor’s determination
and a contractor’s dismissal of a
redetermination request. Section
405.976 discusses the notice
requirements for QIC reconsiderations.
Finally, § 405.978 explains the effect of
a reconsideration.
Comment: Several commenters
opposed the elimination of the Part B
fair hearing. These commenters believe
that appellants will be deprived of an
important opportunity to provide
adjudicators with clarifications and
additional information not contained in
the record, and that adjudicators will
not have an opportunity to personally
assess a beneficiary’s physical or mental
condition. The commenters suggested
that having an in-person hearing at the
second level of appeal would reduce the
number of cases appealed to the ALJ
level, thus speeding up reimbursement
to providers and reducing
administrative costs. One commenter
requested that QICs be encouraged to
contact beneficiaries, providers and
suppliers with questions or to request
input to obtain all relevant evidence.
Response: We continue to believe that
providing for an on-the-record review at
the QIC level of appeal, rather than an
in-person hearing, is consistent with
both BIPA and the MMA. Although it
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certainly could have, the Congress did
not provide for hearings by the QICs.
Instead, under section 1869(c)(3)(B)(i) of
the Act, Congress required QICs to
‘‘review’’ initial determinations. In
contrast, under section 1869(d)(1) of the
Act, the statute specifically provides for
a ‘‘hearing’’ at the ALJ level.
Furthermore, Congress also significantly
reduced the decision-making
timeframes at all levels of the appeals
process. As discussed in the interim
final rule, the significantly shortened
decision-making timeframes result in
appellants receiving a hearing before an
ALJ generally within the same
timeframe they would have received a
‘‘fair hearing’’ under the previous Part B
appeals process. See 70 FR 11448.
Finally, the regulatory provisions at
§ 405.968(a)(1) regarding QIC
reconsiderations continue to allow QICs
to contact appellants and obtain any
necessary information by phone, or
other means.
Comment: One commenter expressed
concern that the regulation does not
define ‘‘medical record’’, nor does it
address specific items and services that
require physician completion of a
Certificate of Medical Necessity (CMN).
The commenter suggested that we
clarify that the CMN is a medical record
and that Congress established the CMN
to enable physicians to demonstrate
medical necessity.
Response: We do not agree with the
commenter’s suggestion that it is
necessary to define the term ‘‘medical
record’’ in this regulation. The purpose
of this regulation is to implement the
changes made to the Medicare claims
appeals process as required by BIPA and
the MMA. The term ‘‘medical record’’ is
not a term of art that requires a
definition in this regulation, and neither
BIPA nor the MMA attach special
significance to the term with respect to
the claims appeals process. Further, we
do not believe it is appropriate to
include information related to the
completion of the CMN in this
regulation. Policies that relate to the
completion of the CMN are outside of
the scope of this regulation.
Nevertheless, we disagree with the
commenter’s assertion that completion
of the CMN demonstrates definitively
that an item or service is medically
reasonable and necessary for diagnosis
or treatment of illness or injury or to
improve the functioning of a malformed
body member under section
1862(a)(1)(A) of the Act. CMS’
longstanding policy has been that even
where a CMN has been provided,
contractors may request supporting
medical documentation to demonstrate
the ‘‘medical necessity’’ of items or
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services. This policy was affirmed in
Gulfcoast Medical Supply, Inc. v. Sec’y,
Health and Human Servs., 468 F.3d
1347 (11th Cir. 2006) and MacKenzie
Medical Supply, Inc v. Leavitt 506 F.3d
341 (4th Cir. 2007). In Gulfcoast, the
Circuit Court stated that the Medicare
statute ‘‘unambiguously permits carriers
and the Secretary to require suppliers to
submit evidence of medical necessity
beyond a CMN.’’ In MacKenzie, the
Circuit Court found that Congress did
not unambiguously mandate that the
CMN is the only document that can be
required of a supplier to show medical
necessity.
Comment: We received many
comments on § 405.968(b)(2), which
requires QICs to give substantial
deference to a local coverage
determination (LCD), local medical
review policy (LMRP), and CMS
program guidance, unless the QIC
determines, either at a party’s request or
at its own discretion that the policy
does not apply to the facts of the
particular case in which case the QIC
may decline to follow the policy.
Commenters raised many of the same
concerns voiced by commenters to the
proposed rule. They believe that CMS
exceeded its statutory authority by
specifying that QICs are bound by LCDs
and LMRPs and questioned the
propriety of requiring QICs to give
deference to policies that they allege
sometimes contradict statutes and
regulations, are against the intent of
BIPA, and are not promulgated through
notice and comment rulemaking. These
commenters suggested that deference to
these coverage policies should be
eliminated to preserve fairness and due
process. They also noted that QICs are
required to have extensive medical,
legal, and Medicare program knowledge
and so would be well equipped to make
decisions without deferring to these
policies.
Response: We continue to believe that
it is both appropriate and consistent
with the statutory intent of BIPA, which
added section 1869(c)(3)(B)(ii)(II) of the
Act to require QICs to consider LCDs in
making their decisions, to require QICs
to give substantial deference to LCDs
and LMRPs and other CMS program
guidance in the appeals they adjudicate
if these policies are applicable to a
specific case. See § 405.968(b)(2). As
noted in the proposed rule, the use of
consistent review criteria will serve
several important purposes, including
the identification of recurrent problems
with CMS policies, fostering
consistency in appeal decisions, and
potentially reducing both ALJ appeals
volume and the ALJ reversal rate. See 67
FR 69312, 69325 and 69328. In addition,
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as explained in the interim final rule,
Federal courts have considered and
applied deference standards in
considering the validity of various
Medicare policies and have also
recognized that ALJs and the MAC
properly consider issues relating to
deference as well. See Abiona v.
Thompson, 237 F.Supp.2d 258
(E.D.N.Y. 2002), and 70 FR 11458.
We note that section 522 of BIPA
provides an explicit process for
contesting LCDs. However, we agree
with the commenters’ assertion that
QICs should be able to evaluate whether
a particular coverage policy applies in a
specific appeal. In response to similar
comments on the proposed rule, in the
interim final rule, we revised
§ 405.968(b)(2) to allow QICs to decline
to follow an LMRP, LCD or other CMS
program guidance either at the request
of a party or at its own discretion if a
QIC determines that the policy does not
apply to the facts of the particular case.
However, we also believe that it is
necessary to ensure that the QICs, like
other appeals adjudicators, give the
contractors’ coverage policies
substantial deference if they are
applicable to a particular case. Thus, we
require QICs to give substantial
deference to LMRPs, LCDs and other
CMS program guidance, unless the QIC
finds that the policy is not applicable in
a particular case. This policy
acknowledges the extensive medical
expertise and program knowledge
within each QIC, and strikes a balance
between the need to preserve QIC
independence and the need to apply
consistent review criteria and to ensure
that the established coverage policies
are given appropriate consideration.
Comment: One commenter inquired
about the QIC’s ability to raise or
develop new issues. The commenter did
not understand how a new issue could
develop if the contractor had rendered
a redetermination with respect to the
claim. The commenter requested that
we modify the language of
§ 405.968(b)(5) to be consistent with
other regulatory provisions that
reference raising new issues.
Response: A reconsideration is a new
and independent review of an initial
determination, and we believe
adjudicators at the reconsideration level
should be permitted to raise and
develop any issues that they believe are
relevant to the claim(s) in the case at
hand. For example, if a claim was
denied initially as not medically
reasonable and necessary because
medical records were not submitted to
the carrier as requested, and during the
reconsideration, the review of the
medical records accompanying the
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appeal request shows that the services
would be excluded for a different reason
or under a different statutory authority,
the QIC should be permitted to explore
the new issues. Furthermore, we note
that the policy with regard to raising
new issues at § 405.968(b)(5) is
consistent with the policy with regard to
raising new issues as part of the
redetermination in § 405.948.
Accordingly, we are not modifying the
language in § 405.968(b)(5).
Comment: A number of commenters
asked that the final rule include more
explicit information about the QICs. In
particular, commenters wanted the final
rule to identify the minimum
qualifications for the QIC panel
members and reviewers, clearly define
the role of the QIC panel in the
reconsideration process, and describe
the on-going training that would be
made available to the panel members
and reviewers. Several commenters
recommended that the regulations list
specific physician or healthcare
specialties that would be included on
the QIC panel. Commenters also asked
that the final rule spell out the
provisions that would be put in place to
ensure the QICs’ independence. One
commenter supported some type of
sanction for QICs that failed to issue
timely decisions under § 405.970.
Finally, a commenter stated that if the
QIC’s decision contradicts the treating
physician’s judgment, such as
determining an item or service is not
medically necessary, despite a
physician’s certification on a CMN, then
the appeals decision should outline
circumstances that would justify this
finding.
Response: As noted in the interim
final rule (70 FR 11449), the
requirements for QIC reviewers and the
physicians who serve as panel members
are contained in section 933 of the
MMA and section 521 of BIPA.
Specifically, section 1869(c), (e)(3), and
(g) of the Act contain provisions
regarding the independence of the QICs,
qualification requirements for QICs, the
role of the QIC panel, and continuing
education for QICs with respect to
Medicare coverage of items and
services. Thus, we do not believe it is
appropriate or necessary to address
these issues, or the specific physician or
health care specialties that would be
included on the QIC panel, in any
further detail in these regulations.
Instead, through the QIC contracting
and evaluation processes, we ensure
that the QICs are fully compliant with
these statutory requirements, including
the appropriateness of the members of
QIC panels. In fact, we have already
taken action to replace a QIC that was
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having difficulty meeting the
performance standards imposed by the
statute.
In addition, although we are
committed to ensuring that QICs are
meeting the statutory decision-making
timeframes, we note that Congress has
already provided a remedy for those
cases in which a QIC fails to issue a
timely decision. In section
1869(c)(3)(C)(iii) of the Act and in
§ 405.970(c), appellants who do not
receive a reconsideration within the
applicable decision-making timeframe
have the right to escalate the appeal to
an ALJ. Therefore, we do not believe
that the regulations should contain
provisions sanctioning QICs for not
meeting the applicable decision-making
timeframes.
Finally, in the event a QIC’s decision
contradicts the treating physician’s
medical judgment, such as determining
that an item or service is not medically
necessary, we note that § 405.976(b)
requires that the notice of
reconsideration include a rationale for
the decision.
In this final regulation, we are also
making a technical revision to
§ 405.972(b)(3) (discussed below), and
further technical revisions to
§ 405.972(e) and § 405.1004(c) (see
section II.B.5.b. of this preamble for a
discussion of our prior revision). In
§ 405.972, we explain the process by
which a QIC may dismiss, or a party
may withdraw, a request for
reconsideration. We are revising
§ 405.972(e) to clarify that when a QIC
dismisses a request for review of a
contractor’s dismissal action, the
dismissal is binding and not subject to
further review. Similarly, we are
revising § 405.1004(c) to clarify that an
ALJ’s dismissal of a request for review
of a QIC’s dismissal action is binding
and not subject to further review.
In § 405.974(b)(1) and § 405.1004(a),
we offer parties an opportunity to
appeal a dismissal action to the next
adjudicative level and, under
§ 405.974(b)(3) and § 405.1004(c), the
decision of the adjudicator at that
subsequent level with respect to the
dismissal action is binding and not
subject to further review. See 70 FR
11444. We did not, however, intend to
permit additional opportunities for
review of dismissals where the request
for review of a dismissal is invalid and
thus, subject to dismissal. For example,
a contractor dismisses a request for a
redetermination. The party then
requests that the QIC review the
dismissal but the party, without having
good cause, does not file this request
with the QIC in a timely fashion. In this
scenario, the QIC would dismiss the
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request for reconsideration of the
contractor’s dismissal and the party
would not be entitled to ALJ review of
the QIC’s decision.
In allowing review of dismissals at the
next adjudicative level, we balance a
party’s need for review and the need for
administrative finality. If a party does
not file a valid request for review for a
second time, we believe the need for
finality in the administrative process
outweighs the need for further review.
Thus, a QIC’s dismissal of a request for
review of a contractor’s dismissal
action, and an ALJ’s dismissal of a
request for review of a QIC’s dismissal
are not subject to further review.
However, while a party may not request
further review in the administrative
appeals process when an adjudicator
dismisses a request for review of a
dismissal, we note that a party may still
request the dismissal be vacated
consistent with the provisions of
§ 405.952(d), § 405.972(d), § 405.1054,
and § 405.1108(b).
In addition, we are making a technical
revision to § 405.972(b)(3). In
§ 405.972(b)(3), when describing the
authority of the QIC to dismiss an
untimely filed request for
reconsideration, we inadvertently
omitted the cross-reference to requests
for QIC review of a contractor’s
dismissal of a redetermination request.
The timeframes for filing such requests,
which differ from the timeframes for
filing a request for reconsideration of a
contractor’s redetermination decision,
are found in § 405.974(b)(1). For clarity,
we are amending § 405.972(b)(3) to
reference the separate timeframes
applicable to appeals of contractor
dismissal actions at the redetermination
level.
In summary, we are amending
§ 405.972(b)(3) to include a reference to
the timeframe for filing a request for QIC
review of a contractor dismissal action,
and we are amending § 405.972(e) and
§ 405.1004(c) to clarify that a QIC’s
dismissal of a request for a
reconsideration of a contractor’s
dismissal of a request for
redetermination, and an ALJ’s dismissal
of a request for review of a QIC’s
dismissal of a request for
reconsideration is binding and not
subject to further review.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§§ 405.968 and 405.976 without
modification. We are finalizing
§§ 405.970 and 405.974 with
modification as discussed in section
II.B.5.a. of this preamble. We are
finalizing §§ 405.972 and 405.1004 with
modifications as noted above, and
§§ 405.972, 405.974 and 405.978 with
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modification as discussed in section
II.B.5.b. of this preamble.
7. Reopenings of Initial Determinations,
Redeterminations, Reconsiderations,
Hearings and Reviews (§ 405.980
Through § 405.986)
Sections 405.980 through 405.986 set
forth the requirements regarding the
reopenings process, including how
parties may request reopenings of
determinations and decisions, and how
contractors, QICs, ALJs, and the MAC
will conduct reopenings.
We received several comments with
respect to the reopening provisions as
set forth in the interim final rule. A
summary of the comments and our
responses are included below.
Additional detailed discussion of the
reopening process is included in the
interim final rule at 70 FR 11423, 11435,
11447, 11450 through 11453, and 11458.
a. Reopening Actions (§ 405.980)
Section 405.980 describes the general
rules for reopening initial
determinations, redeterminations,
reconsiderations, hearing decisions and
MAC review decisions.
Comment: One commenter
recommended that CMS create
enforcement provisions for the ‘‘good
cause’’ standard when contractors
reopen claims. The commenter believed
that contractors often ignore the
guidelines set out in regulations and
manuals, and recommended that the
good cause standard be enforced to
ensure fairness and finality for Medicare
providers and suppliers.
Response: Contractors are required to
follow Federal laws, regulations and
manual instructions in their business
operations. As noted in the interim final
rule in response to a similar comment
on the proposed rule (70 FR 11453), our
regulations require that contractors
abide by the good cause standard for
reopening actions as set forth in
§ 405.980(b) and § 405.986. CMS
conducts audits and evaluations of
contractor performance in order to
assess compliance with Medicare
policies. Thus, the necessary monitoring
and enforcement mechanisms are
already in place and we do not believe
it is necessary to add enforcement
provisions to these regulations.
Comment: One commenter believed
that CMS Change Request 3622 does not
comport with § 405.927 and
§ 405.980(a)(3) with respect to the
distinction between claim reopenings
and appeals of initial determinations.
The commenter stated that the
reopening provisions indicate that
adjustments resulting from clerical
errors are to be processed as reopenings.
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However, CMS instructions in Change
Request 3622, implemented July 5,
2005, state that the Medicare Carrier
System (MCS) will deny claims
resubmitted with new information (such
as diagnosis codes), requiring the
provider or supplier to submit an
appeal.
Response: Since the publication of the
interim final rule, we have issued
instructions to carriers to suspend
implementation of Change Request
3622. See https://www.cms.hhs.gov/
transmittals/downloads/R104PI.pdf
modified by JSM–05385, dated 06–20–
2005. CMS is re-evaluating the duplicate
edit policies to determine how best to
address the subsequent re-submission of
claims in light of the reopening policies
and will take into consideration the
concerns raised by the commenter.
As noted by the commenter and as
discussed in the preamble to the interim
final rule, in accordance with
§ 405.980(a)(3)(iii), contractors will
process disputes involving resubmitted
claims denied as duplicates through the
reopening process. See 70 FR 11451.
Generally, providers and suppliers
should avoid resubmitting claims for
previously denied items or services (this
does not apply to providers who submit
claim adjustments for returned claims).
Unless a claim is denied as the result of
a clerical error, when a denied claim
carries with it appeal rights, providers
and suppliers should file appeal
requests to dispute the determination
that denies items or services on the
claim. However, if a provider or
supplier decides to resubmit a claim for
items or services previously submitted
to Medicare, the appeals rights for those
items or services flow from the original
claim submission and not the
subsequent claim submission.
Resubmissions of claims for the same
items or services do not extend the
appeal rights available to a party. Thus,
we have instructed contractors to
process appeal requests for claims
denied as duplicates as reopenings, and
the sole issue to be resolved is whether
the claim is in fact a duplicate of a
previous submission. All other issues
not considered clerical errors (that is,
coverage and payment issues) must be
resolved through an appeal of the first
claim. If an appeal is pending on the
original submission of the item or
service, then the contractor will not
process the reopening on the
resubmitted claim. To do otherwise
could result in duplicate payment for
the items or services.
Comment: One commenter expressed
concern that a party cannot seek review
of a determination not to grant a request
for reopening. See § 405.926(l),
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§ 405.980(a)(5). The commenter argued
that not allowing an appeal in this
situation places too much authority in
the hands of the persons making
decisions regarding reopenings.
Response: As noted in our response to
a similar comment in the interim final
rule, it has been a longstanding
principle that failure to grant a request
for reopening is not reviewable. See 70
FR 11453. The Supreme Court has
upheld this concept. See Your Home
Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala,
525 U.S. 449 (1999); Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). This policy
does not violate a party’s due process
rights, because the administrative
appeals process for Medicare claims
already affords ample opportunities for
a party to challenge claim
determinations. The reopenings process
simply offers, but does not guarantee, an
additional process if a party believes an
error on a claim should be corrected, but
the party has exhausted his or her
appeal rights, or the error is one that
should not be resolved through the
appeals process. See § 405.927.
In § 405.980(a)(3), we indicate that a
contractor must refuse to process a
reopening request when it disagrees that
the dispute involves a clerical error and
must ‘‘dismiss’’ the reopening request
and advise the party of any appeal
rights, provided the timeframe to
request an appeal has not expired. The
use of the term ‘‘dismiss’’ in connection
with a reopening request does not
confer any right to obtain further review
of a decision on a reopening request.
See § 405.926(l) and § 405.980(a)(5).
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the definition of ‘‘similar fault’’ in
§ 405.902 is too broad and allows
contractors to reopen almost any claim,
for any reason and that it requires
providers and suppliers to maintain
supporting billing records for an
indefinite time period, at considerable
expense. One commenter cited a
difference between the definition of
‘‘similar fault’’ in the interim final rule
compared to the Medicare Claims
Processing Manual, Chapter 29, Appeals
of Claims Decisions, section 90.9
Unrestricted Reopenings, and urged
CMS to follow the policy as stated in the
claims processing manual.
Response: The definition of ‘‘similar
fault’’ contained in § 405.902 covers
situations in which a contractor
identifies an inappropriate billing that
does not rise to the level of fraud. The
definition covers situations where
Medicare payment is obtained by an
individual or entity with no legal right
to the funds, the contractor determines
that the individual or entity knows or
could reasonably be expected to know
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that the claims for items or services
should not have been paid, and there is
no determination by law enforcement
that the payment was obtained through
an act of fraud. The similar fault
provision is appropriately used where
fraudulent behavior is suspected, but
law enforcement is not proceeding with
recovery on the basis of fraud.
With respect to the commenter’s
concern about indefinite storage of
records, we do not believe this
regulation will significantly impact
providers and suppliers for several
reasons. First, it is a longstanding policy
in the Medicare program that a claim
may be reopened at any time if it was
procured by fraud or similar fault. Thus,
this regulation does not impose a new
burden on providers or suppliers. See
§ 405.750(b)(3)(ii) and § 405.841(c)(1). In
addition, State law and Federal
conditions of participation have
longstanding requirements for the
retention of records. Finally, providers
and suppliers who submit claims that
are in compliance with Medicare
program requirements, and do not
accept payment for claims which they
know, or should reasonably be expected
to know, they are not otherwise entitled,
will not have claims reopened for fraud
or similar fault. Thus, we believe the
fraud or similar fault provisions in this
regulation will not have a significant
impact on providers and suppliers.
In § 405.902 of the interim final rule,
we codified the definition of ‘‘similar
fault’’ for the purposes of reopening
initial determinations and appeal
decisions. This definition supersedes
the definition previously found in our
claims processing manual. Based on our
experience with the reopenings process,
we determined that the previous
definition of similar fault did not
provide adequate guidance to
adjudicators. We believe the new
definition more accurately conveys the
meaning of similar fault, and makes
clear that the fault must be ‘‘similar’’ to
fraud.
Comment: One commenter asked for
clarification on the types of errors that
could be corrected through reopenings.
Response: It is not possible to
delineate in a regulation all of the types
of minor clerical and technical errors
that can be addressed through the
reopening process. However, we have
issued operating instructions to
contractors that offer examples of issues
that are appropriate to handle as
reopenings, and those that should be
processed as appeals. See IOM 100–4
Chapter 34, Reopening and Revision of
Claim Determinations and Decisions
(https://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/
downloads/clm104c34.pdf).
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Under § 405.980(a)(3), we state that a
clerical error includes human and
mechanical mistakes on the part of the
party or the contractor (that is,
mathematical or computational
mistakes, inaccurate data entry, or
denials of claims as duplicates).
Nevertheless, we appreciate the
difficulty some providers and suppliers
may have in determining whether a
claim should be corrected through the
reopenings process or the initial
determination should be contested
through the appeals process. We note
that consistent with § 405.980(a)(3), if
the contractor determines that an appeal
request involves either the correction of
a clerical error, or another matter that
should be handled through the
reopenings process, the appeal request
will be treated as a request for a
reopening, and the contractor will
transfer the appeal request to the
reopenings unit for processing.
Similarly, if the contractor determines
that a request for reopening involves an
issue that must be resolved through the
appeals process, the reopening request
will be denied, and the contractor will
advise the party accordingly. Although
a contractor’s refusal to reopen an initial
determination is not subject to appeal,
a party may file an appeal request with
the contractor, subject to the filing
requirements in § 405.942 through
§ 405.946, if they continue to dispute
the initial determination on the items or
services at issue. Thus, if it is unclear
whether a particular dispute should be
resolved as a reopening or as an appeal,
a party’s best recourse may be to file an
appeal request.
In this final regulation, we are making
two technical corrections to the
introductory clause of § 405.980(b).
First, we are replacing the word ‘‘its’’
with the word ‘‘an’’. This correction
ensures that § 405.980(b) is consistent
with (1) our longstanding policy as set
forth in the interim final rule which
allows certain contractors, other than
the contractor that issued the initial
determination, to reopen an initial
determination (see 70 FR 11450), and (2)
the definition of contractor included as
a technical revision in this rule. In the
interim final rule, we explained that for
the purposes of reopening, the term
‘‘contractors’’ includes ‘‘carriers,
intermediaries, and program safeguard
contractors.’’ Program safeguard
contractors (PSCs) do not have authority
to issue initial determinations (see
section 1893 of the Act). Thus, PSCs
have not issued, and do not issue, initial
determinations; however, in order to
carry out their functions as authorized
under section 1893(b)(1) of the Act (for
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example, to conduct medical, utilization
and fraud review of claims), PSCs must
be able to reopen initial determinations
made by other contractors. Including
them in this list of ‘‘contractors’’ in the
interim final rule that can conduct
reopenings was meant to be consistent
with 1893(b)(1) of the Act. Furthermore,
the technical correction discussed above
is consistent with our clarification of the
term ‘‘contractor’’ set forth in this rule.
As clarified in this rule, the term
‘‘contractor’’ would include, among
other entities, PSCs.
We note that certain entities that did
not exist when the interim final rule
was published (and thus, were not
included in the list of entities
considered contractors for the purpose
of conducting reopenings), would be
included in the definition of
‘‘contractor’’ as clarified in this rule and
may be authorized to reopen initial
determinations made by other
contractors. For example, recovery audit
contractors (RACs) (considered
contractors as that term is clarified in
this rule) do not issue initial
determinations. However, in order to
carry out their functions as authorized
by section 1893(h)(1) of the Act, they
must be able to reopen initial
determinations made by other
contractors. Under section 1893(h)(1) of
the Act, RACs identify underpayments
and overpayments and recoup
overpayments. In order to identify
underpayments and overpayments, and
prior to initiating recoupment of an
overpayment, RACs must reopen the
initial determinations issued by other
contractors. Thus, consistent with their
authority under section 1893 of the Act,
RACs would be permitted to reopen
initial determinations under § 405.980.
Accordingly, consistent with our policy
as set forth in the interim final rule, we
are replacing the word ‘‘its’’ with ‘‘an’’
in the introductory clause of
§ 405.980(b) to more clearly convey our
policy to permit certain contractors,
other than those who issue initial
determinations, to reopen initial
determinations when appropriate.
Second, we are removing the words
‘‘and revise’’ from the introductory
clause of § 405.980(b). Subsections (c),
(d), and (e) of § 405.980, which are
analogous to subsection (b), in that they
discuss reopening timeframes and
requirements for determinations and
decisions requested by a party or
initiated by a QIC, ALJ, or the MAC, do
not include the words ‘‘and revise’’ and
we inadvertently included these words
in subsection (b). The provision, as
revised, now reflects our longstanding
policy that the timeframes for reopening
a determination or decision are
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measured by the date of the reopening
not the date of the revision of the
determinations or decisions. See 42 CFR
§ 405.750(b), § 405.841, § 405.842(a); 67
FR 69327; The Carriers Manual, Pub.
14–3 (Claims Process Part 3), Chapter
XII, section 12100.4, and The
Intermediary Manual, Pub. 13–3 (Claims
Process Part 3), Chapter VIII, section
3799.4. With the revisions described
above, the introductory clause of
§ 405.980(b) will read as follows: ‘‘A
contractor may reopen an initial
determination or redetermination on its
own motion —’’
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.980 with modifications as noted
above, with modification as discussed
in section II.B.5.b. of this preamble and
with modification as discussed in
section II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
b. Conduct of Reopenings (§ 405.982
Through § 405.986)
Section 405.982 discusses the
provision of notice of a revised
determination or decision. Section
405.984 explains the effect of a revised
determination or decision and § 405.986
sets forth the good cause standard for
reopening a determination or a decision.
Comment: We received several
comments concerning the reopening
timeframes. Some commenters
requested that CMS establish a response
and decision-making timeframe for
contractors to complete or deny
reopening requests from a party. One
commenter expressed concern about
uncertainty in the timing of the
reopening process. The commenter
explained that while awaiting a
contractor’s decision on whether to
reopen, the deadline for filing for a
redetermination could pass. The
commenter suggested that we require
adjudicators to find good cause and
extend the time limit for filing an appeal
if a decision regarding a reopening is
not made until after the relevant appeal
filing time limit has passed. One
commenter requested that the rule allow
for 60 days to file an appeal after a
contractor denies a reopening request.
Response: We appreciate the many
suggestions regarding the processing of
reopening requests. With respect to the
commenter’s concern about uncertainty
in the timing of the reopening process,
we acknowledge that there are no
regulatory timeframes that apply to the
processing of the reopening request
when a party requests that an
adjudicator reopen a determination.
Since reopenings are a discretionary
activity, we believe it is more
appropriate to establish applicable
response and decision-making
timeframes in our operating instructions
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to ensure the agency has adequate
flexibility to make necessary changes in
order to respond to shifts in contractor
workload. Current operating
instructions to contractors generally
require the resolution of party initiated
reopening requests within 60 days of
receipt of the reopening request. See
IOM 100–4 Chapter 34 Section 10.7
https://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/
downloads/clm104c34.pdf. If a party
misses the filing deadline for an appeal
while awaiting a decision on a
reopening request, the party may
request the adjudicator consider
granting an extension to the filing time
limit for good cause consistent with
§ 405.942(b). Thus, we are not amending
§ 405.980 or § 405.982 to include a
timeframe for resolving requests for
reopening.
Furthermore, we do not believe it is
appropriate to require adjudicators to
find good cause to extend filing time
limits if an adjudicator’s decision with
respect to a request for reopening is
made after the party’s deadline for filing
an appeal request has expired. Rather,
we believe a decision as to whether
good cause exists for extending appeals
filing time limits should be made on a
case by case basis. Alternatively, a party
may consider filing an appeal request (if
appeal rights are available) if there is
concern that the timeframe for filing a
subsequent appeal may expire should
the reopening request be denied. If the
issue involves a clerical error, consistent
with § 405.980(a)(3), the contractor will
process the request as a reopening.
We also considered the commenter’s
suggestion that we allow an additional
60 days following a denial of a
reopening request, to file an appeal on
the item or service at issue. While we
understand the concerns of the
commenter regarding the potential effect
a denied reopening request may have on
appeal rights, we believe that allowing
additional time to file an appeal as
suggested would provide an
inappropriate extension to appeals filing
timeframes. Moreover, as we noted in
the interim final rule, when a party is
unsure whether a dispute regarding an
item or service is to be handled as a
reopening or an appeal, to ensure that
the item or service at issue is reviewed
in some manner by the adjudicator, it
may be in the party’s best interest to
request an appeal, provided appeal
rights are available. See 70 FR 11452.
Thus, we are not adopting the
commenters’ suggestions to extend
appeals filing time limits or require a
finding of good cause for late filing
when decisions on reopenings occur
after the filing deadline has passed.
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Comment: One commenter objected to
the new regulatory definition of new
and material evidence in § 405.986(a)(1),
stating that it is far more restrictive than
prior regulations at 20 CFR § 404.988(b)
and § 404.989.
Response: Prior to the issuance of the
interim final rule, the reopening process
for Medicare claims relied on the
regulatory provisions found in 20 CFR
§ 404.988(b) and § 404.989 that govern
the reopening of Social Security
disability claims. See 42 CFR
§ 405.750(b) and § 405.841. 20 CFR
§ 404.988(b) states that a determination
or decision may be reopened within
four years of the date of the notice of
initial determination upon a finding of
good cause as defined in 20 CFR
§ 404.989. In 20 CFR § 404.989, good
cause to reopen a determination or
decision may be established if (1) new
and material evidence is furnished; (2)
a clerical error in the computation or
recomputation of benefits was made; or
(3) the evidence that was considered in
making the determination or decision
clearly shows on its face that an error
was made. The term ‘‘new and material
evidence’’ was not defined in the
regulations used by Social Security, nor
was it defined in the Medicare’s
regulations. However, operating
instructions used by Medicare carriers
and fiscal intermediaries in processing
reopenings have included a definition of
new and material evidence for more that
15 years, and this definition served as
the basis for the definition of new and
material evidence included in
§ 405.986(a)(1). See The Carriers
Manual, Pub. 14–3 (Claims Process Part
3), Chapter XII, section 12100.9 and The
Intermediary Manual, Pub. 13–3 (Claims
Process Part 3), Chapter VIII, section
3799.9. Thus, since we codified existing
operating instructions, we disagree with
the commenter’s assertion that our
standard for new and material evidence
under § 405.986(a)(1) is far more
restrictive than it had been prior to the
interim final rule.
Comment: One commenter asked for
clarification of § 405.986(b) regarding
changes in substantive law or
interpretative policy not serving as the
basis for reopening a determination. The
commenter believed the current
wording could be construed as giving
the contractor the ability to reopen a
case based on local coverage
determinations taking effect within one
year of the initial determination or
redetermination and lead to contractors
reopening decisions when coverage is
no longer extended to a certain
treatment. The commenter stated this
could then force providers to repay
contractors for payments made while
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the treatment was covered under a local
or national coverage decision. The
commenter recommended that the
regulation explicitly prohibit the
retroactive application of local and
national coverage determinations.
Response: While we appreciate the
commenter’s concern, we note that for
purposes of making claim payment
determinations, contractors apply the
NCD or LCD in place on the day the
item or service was provided by the
provider or supplier. Furthermore,
NCDs and LCDs include effective dates
that necessarily make their application
prospective. The only exception relates
to effectuation of coverage appeals. As
explained in § 405.986(b), in order to
effectuate a favorable coverage appeal,
contractors may reopen the specific
claim(s) associated with a challenge to
a local or national coverage
determination under section 1869(f) of
the Act and apply the revised coverage
policy, but only to the specific claims at
issue. The revised coverage policy
would not apply retroactively to any
other claims.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.982 and § 405.986 without
modification. We are finalizing
§ 405.984 with modification as
discussed in section II.B.5.b. of this
preamble.
8. Expedited Access to Judicial Review
(§ 405.990)
Section 405.990 sets forth a process
under which a party may obtain
expedited access to judicial review
when a review entity determines that
the MAC does not have the authority to
decide a question of law or regulation
relevant to the matters in dispute, and
that there is no material issue of fact in
dispute. We received no comments on
this section. However, as discussed in
this preamble at section II.B.5.b. above,
we are making technical revisions to
§ 405.990 in regards to describing
specific determinations, decisions or
actions that the adjudicator may take.
We are also making revisions to
§ 405.990, per our discussion in section
II.B.5.a.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.990 with modification as
discussed in section II.B.5.b. of this
preamble and with modification as
discussed in section II.B.5.a. of this
preamble.
9. ALJ Hearings (§ 405.1000 Through
§ 405.1064)
Our regulations under § 405.1000
through § 405.1064 describe the
procedures for conducting hearings
before ALJs. We received several
comments regarding these procedures.
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A brief overview of the relevant
regulatory provisions, a summary of the
comments, and our responses to those
comments are included below. Further
discussion regarding the procedures for
appeals at the ALJ level is found in the
interim final rule at 70 FR 11420, 11422,
11445 through 11446, and 11454
through 11466.
a. Transfer of the ALJ Function
Section 931 of the MMA required
transfer of the ALJ function for hearing
appeals under title XVIII of the Act (and
related provisions of title XI of the Act)
from the Commissioner of SSA to the
Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS or the
Department). The DHHS ALJs are
required to be organizationally and
functionally independent from CMS and
must report to, and be under the general
supervision of, the Secretary of DHHS.
The DHHS and SSA jointly developed a
plan to facilitate the transfer, which was
started on July 1, 2005 and completed
on October 1, 2005 as required by
section 931(b)(1) of the MMA.
Comment: At least one commenter
expressed concern about possible delays
in processing appeals resulting from the
transfer of the ALJ function from SSA to
DHHS. The commenter asked DHHS to
ensure that during the transition all
appeal rights and remedies are available
to parties in a timely fashion.
Response: We appreciate the
commenter’s concern, and note that the
transfer of the responsibility for the ALJ
function from the Commissioner of SSA
to the Secretary of the DHHS was
completed October 1, 2005. Staff in the
DHHS Office of Medicare Hearings and
Appeals (OMHA), the office responsible
for administering ALJ hearings, worked
closely with staff in the SSA Office of
Hearings and Appeals to ensure a
smooth transition and worked
collaboratively to correct problems, to
protect the rights of parties, and to issue
timely decisions.
Comment: One commenter
complained about the loss of Medicareexperienced SSA ALJs who have not
relocated to the new DHHS ALJ offices.
The commenter felt strongly that the
loss of these ALJs would adversely
impact the parties involved in appeals.
Response: The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 1104,
and 3105) provides that ALJs be selected
using a merit system of selection
administered by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM). OMHA’s ALJs are
recruited from OPM’s pool of qualified
candidates and are provided with
significant training in the relevant
Medicare statutes and regulations.
Furthermore, unlike SSA’s ALJs, whose
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main responsibility was to adjudicate
disability and Medicare cases, OMHA’s
ALJs focus exclusively on Medicare
appeals. Therefore, we do not think that
parties involved in appeals have been or
will be adversely impacted by this
transition.
Comment: We received several
comments concerning the training
provided to the ALJs. One commenter
expressed concern about the prospect of
having to educate new ALJs about the
Medicare regulations and questioned
whether these judges would be able to
address the highly complex and
technical issues associated with
Medicare claims appeals. Another
commenter asked for more information
about how ALJs will be trained and
requested that all training material be
made available to the public. The same
commenter wanted DHHS to allow
beneficiary and provider input into ALJ
training sessions. Finally, a commenter
noted that his inquiries to DHHS
regarding ALJ training had been referred
to the Public Affairs Office of CMS,
which concerned the commenter
because DHHS ALJs are required to be
independent of CMS.
Response: As stated in the previous
response, OMHA’s ALJs are provided
with significant and comprehensive
training. OMHA Headquarters, with
cooperation and input from its field
office Managing ALJs, conducts a
continuous evaluation of the ALJs’
training needs. The training provided to
the ALJs includes, but is not limited to,
a comprehensive review of the
following: The Medicare FFS, MA, and
Part D programs and appeals processes;
the applicable Medicare substantive
authorities, such as CMS regulations,
rulings, and program guidance; and the
processes and procedures associated
with conducting an administrative
hearing. This comprehensive training
provides ALJs with the knowledge and
expertise necessary to address the
highly complex and technical issues
associated with Medicare claims
appeals.
It is important for the ALJs to remain
independent from the parties that may
appear before them, including
providers, suppliers and beneficiaries,
and CMS and its contractors.
Accordingly, with consideration of the
statutory requirement at section 931 of
the MMA that ALJs be functionally and
organizationally independent from
CMS, OMHA evaluates each potential
trainer to determine whether the trainer,
or the training itself, would adversely
affect the independence or impartiality
of the ALJs, or even present the
appearance of a lack of independence or
impartiality. OMHA also would apply
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this impartiality standard in
determining whether to permit other
individuals or entities, such as
beneficiaries and providers, to provide
input into an ALJ training session.
Requests for copies of materials
provided to ALJs during training
sessions will be handled in accordance
with the DHHS rules regarding requests
for information under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). Such requests
should be filed with the DHHS Freedom
of Information Officer following the
procedures outlined in 45 CFR Part 5.
Finally, we note that at the time of the
publication of the interim final rule on
March 8, 2005, OMHA was not in
existence. Therefore, inquiries, such as
those noted by the commenter
concerning ALJ level function and
received prior to the establishment of
OMHA, were temporarily directed to the
CMS Office of External Affairs. Since
the establishment of OMHA, such
inquiries have been directed to OMHA.
b. ALJ Hearings—General Rules
(§ 405.1000 Through § 405.1014)
Section 405.1000 provides an
overview of the ALJ hearing process.
Section 405.1002 describes the
requirements for obtaining an ALJ
hearing and § 405.1004 describes the
process for obtaining ALJ review of a
QIC notice of dismissal. Section
405.1006 sets forth the amount in
controversy requirements for ALJ
hearings and judicial review. Section
405.1008 describes who may request an
ALJ hearing and describes the parties to
an ALJ hearing. Section 405.1010
explains the process by which CMS or
its contractors may participate in an ALJ
hearing, and § 405.1012 explains the
process by which CMS or its contractors
may choose to become a party to a
hearing. Section 405.1014 sets forth the
content and filing requirements for ALJ
hearing requests.
Comment: One commenter expressed
concern that ALJ hearings were no
longer considered de novo hearings. The
commenter stated that the removal of de
novo status for ALJ hearings will
hamper efforts to obtain the optimum
amounts of information about each case,
and lead to unfair and unjustified
denials of legitimate Medicare claims
for reimbursement.
Response: As stated in the Office of
Medicare Hearings and Appeals;
Statement of Organization, Functions,
and Delegations of Authority, 70 FR
36386 through 36387, ALJs conduct
impartial de novo hearings and this
standard of review has not changed.
Although the statute and implementing
regulations place limitations on the
submission of evidence, which impacts
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the scope of review, this limitation does
not impact the standard of review for
ALJ hearings. Rather, consistent with
§ 405.1032(a), the ALJ reviews anew all
issues brought out in the initial
determination, redetermination, or
reconsideration that were not decided
entirely in a party’s favor. In addition,
if evidence presented before the hearing
causes an ALJ to question a favorable
portion of a determination, the ALJ may
consider that issue at the hearing after
providing notice to the parties. See
§ 405.1032(a). However, to further
clarify that the ALJ conducts a de novo
review and to eliminate any potential
confusion, we are making a technical
revision to § 405.1000(d) to state that the
ALJ conducts a de novo review and
issues a decision based on the hearing
record.
Comment: We received many
comments regarding CMS’ and its
contractors’ participation as a party or
as a participant in the appeals process
as set forth in § 405.1010 and
§ 405.1012. Several commenters
generally objected to CMS or its
contractors participating in ALJ
hearings, or becoming a party at the ALJ
level of appeal. One commenter
contended that submission of evidence
by CMS or its contractor acting as a
party or participant should be
prohibited if CMS or its contractor had
the opportunity to submit the evidence
at the time of the redetermination
request. Another commenter objected to
submission of position papers and
clarifying testimony, stating that CMS
should only be permitted to submit
materials which ALJs must adhere to, or
defer to, pursuant to § 405.1060 through
§ 405.1063 (that is, NCDs, LCDs,
program guidance or CMS Rulings).
Some of these commenters felt that CMS
participation should be limited only to
instances where the ALJ required
information from CMS or its contractors.
Response: As discussed in detail in
the preamble to the interim final rule in
response to similar comments, we
continue to believe that limited
expansion of CMS’ role in the ALJ
hearing process is appropriate,
necessary and consistent with the
statute. See 70 FR 11459 through 11460.
As previously noted, section
1869(c)(3)(J) of the Act provides that the
QIC will not only prepare the record of
the reconsideration when a hearing
before an ALJ is requested, but also will
‘‘participate in such hearings as
required by the Secretary.’’ We continue
to believe that this provision indicates
a recognition of the benefit of agency
participation in the appeals process.
Based on our experience and the
experience of our contractors, there
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have been many instances in which an
ALJ has determined that input from
CMS or a contractor would help resolve
a policy issue or clarify factual issues in
a case. Prior to the interim final rule, the
regulations did not provide specific
procedures for ALJs to obtain input from
the agency. When ALJs requested
position papers, testimony, or other
evidence from CMS or a contractor, the
process was cumbersome because the
regulations did not provide specific
procedures for obtaining this input.
Thus, consistent with section
1869(c)(3)(J) of the Act, we afford CMS
and its contractors the discretion to
appear as a party in appeals other than
appeals involving unrepresented
beneficiaries under § 405.1012. In
addition, in § 405.1010, we provide
CMS and its contractors the discretion
to participate in a more limited role at
the hearing by providing assistance in
resolving factual or policy issues in a
case as a participant in the hearing.
Moreover, the Office of Inspector
General (OIG) report, as we noted in the
preamble to the IFC (OEI–04–97–00160
issued in September 1999), further
supports participation by CMS and its
contractors in ALJ hearings. See 70 FR
11459.
We disagree with the comment that
submission of evidence by CMS or its
contractors when participating in an
ALJ hearing should be prohibited if
CMS or its contractors had the
opportunity to submit the evidence at
the time of the redetermination request.
CMS and its contractors are not
permitted to participate in the appeals
process as a party or participant prior to
the ALJ level, and thus, are unable to
submit new evidence into the
administrative record at the
redetermination and reconsideration
levels. Therefore, if CMS or its
contractors elect to join an appeal as a
participant or a party, they should be
afforded an opportunity to present
evidence, and the ALJ level is the
earliest opportunity for this to take
place.
We also disagree with the
commenter’s suggestions that
participation by CMS or its contractor
should not include the submission of
position papers or clarifying testimony,
and CMS or its contractor should be
restricted to submitting materials to
which ALJs must adhere or defer. We
continue to believe that CMS or
contractor participation at a hearing
may assist beneficiaries, as well as
adjudicators, in understanding the
complex issues raised during claims
appeals, and that such participation will
assist ALJs and the MAC in creating a
fully developed record that resolves
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issues of fact and law. Participation, as
suggested by one commenter, that is
limited to the submission of evidence an
adjudicator is already required to follow
or defer to will have limited usefulness
because it will not necessarily take into
account the unique factual situations
involved in each case before an ALJ. We
expect that additional case development
resulting from the submission of
position papers or clarifying testimony
from CMS or its contractors may result
in a reduction in the number of cases
remanded from the MAC to the ALJ
level for additional development,
yielding faster decisions for parties and
administrative cost savings. Therefore,
we believe it is necessary and
appropriate for CMS and its contractors
to have an opportunity to participate at
the ALJ level, and that participation
should not be restricted to materials to
which the ALJ must adhere or defer.
In addition, we disagree with the
comment that CMS or contractor
participation should be limited to
instances where the ALJ requires
information from CMS or its contractor.
As noted above, we believe that CMS or
contractor participation at a hearing
may assist beneficiaries as well as
adjudicators in understanding and
resolving complex issues raised during
appeals. Some appeals may raise factual
or policy issues of which the ALJ is not
aware, and thus, we believe it is
necessary and appropriate to permit
CMS and its contractors to participate in
ALJ hearings (either as participants or as
parties) even if the ALJ does not
specifically request information from
them.
Thus, for the reasons discussed above,
we believe that CMS or contractor
participation in ALJ hearings under
§ 405.1010 and § 405.1012 is necessary
and appropriate and should not be
limited only to instances where the ALJ
requires information from CMS or its
contractors. Furthermore, as discussed
above, when participating in a hearing
as participants or as parties, CMS and
its contractors should not be restricted
to submitting materials to which the ALJ
is required to adhere or defer, and
should not be prohibited from
submitting position papers and
clarifying testimony.
Comment: One commenter viewed the
participation provisions as a mechanism
for CMS to insert itself as an adversary
of the Medicare beneficiary, and
objected to the use of Program dollars to
fund adversarial actions against
beneficiaries trying to obtain Medicare
covered benefits. Some commenters
objected to the provision prohibiting
CMS or its contractors from being called
as witnesses if they are participating in
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an ALJ hearing. Several commenters felt
that this provision should be eliminated
altogether. Several commenters
suggested that if CMS’ objective in
participating in hearings was to allow
for a more thorough examination of all
the issues, that goal was not feasible if
CMS immunized itself from being called
as witness. Finally, one commenter
suggested that if the provision regarding
participation by CMS or its contractors
is retained, an ALJ should be permitted
to draw an adverse inference if CMS or
its contractors refuse cross examination
or withdraw evidence.
Response: We do not believe that
participation in a hearing by CMS or its
contractor causes the hearing to become
an adversarial proceeding against a
beneficiary. When an unrepresented
beneficiary files a request for hearing,
CMS or its contractor may not be a party
to the hearing and may only choose to
act as a participant. See § 405.1010,
§ 405.1012(a). In general, the role of a
participant under § 405.1010 is to
provide information that assists the ALJ
by clarifying factual or policy issues in
a case. When compared to the rights
CMS and its contractors are afforded as
a party under § 405.1012, the scope of
a participant’s rights under § 405.1010 is
limited. For example, as a participant,
CMS and its contractors do not have the
right to call witnesses or cross-examine
the witnesses of parties. See
§ 405.1010(c). Nor does a participant
have a right to object to the issues
described in the ALJ’s notice of hearing.
See § 405.1024(a), which applies only to
parties. These are cornerstone elements
in an adversarial proceeding. Thus, we
believe the non-adversarial nature of an
ALJ hearing is preserved when CMS or
its contractor acts as a participant under
§ 405.1010.
We also disagree with the
commenter’s assertion that participation
by CMS or its contractor constitutes an
inappropriate use of program dollars. As
noted above, by conferring authority on
the Secretary to determine when the
QIC’s participation in hearings is
appropriate, Congress recognized the
benefit of such participation. See
section 1869(c)(3)(J) of the Act. In
addition, as discussed above, we believe
that CMS or contractor participation
may assist ALJs and the MAC in
creating a fully developed record that
resolves issues of fact and law, which
could result in a reduction in the
number of cases remanded from the
MAC to the ALJ, thereby yielding faster
decisions for parties and administrative
cost savings. Furthermore, participating
in a hearing reflects one of our agency’s
top mandates as stewards of the
Medicare Trust Fund: ensuring accurate
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payments. Thus, we do not believe
participation in an ALJ hearing as a
participant or as a party constitutes an
inappropriate use of program resources.
We also do not agree with the
commenters who suggested that we
eliminate the provision in § 405.1010(d)
that prohibits calling CMS or its
contractor as a witness when
participating in a hearing under
§ 405.1010. We believe this prohibition
is important in maintaining the nonadversarial manner for such hearings.
As previously noted, a participant’s role
under § 405.1010 is significantly limited
when compared to the role of a party
under § 405.1012. For example, as a
participant, CMS or its contractor can
file position papers or provide
testimony to help further clarify certain
factual or policy issues in the appeal.
However, as a participant, CMS or its
contractor may not call witnesses or
cross-examine the witnesses of a party,
nor may it be called as a witness during
the hearing. See § 405.1010(c) and
§ 405.1010(d). In contrast, as a party
under § 405.1012, CMS or its contractor
may exercise all of the rights available
to a party (such as, calling witnesses,
cross-examining witnesses of other
parties, requesting the issuance of
subpoenas, objecting to the issues to be
decided at the hearing). The election of
party status by CMS or its contractor
also makes the discovery process
available to parties under § 405.1037.
The differences between the role of
CMS or its contractor as a participant
under § 405.1010 and as a party under
§ 405.1012 reflect the distinction under
our regulations between a less formal,
non-adversarial style of hearing (when
CMS or its contractor participates as a
non-party) and a more formal,
adversarial style of hearing (when CMS
or its contractor elects party status). (As
further discussed below, CMS and its
contractors have discretion to determine
whether to participate in a hearing and
to determine the manner and extent of
participation.) Requiring CMS or its
contractor to be called as a witness
when it is a participant in a hearing
under § 405.1010 would blur this
distinction and would require CMS or
its contractor to take on an adversarial
role in the hearing when it has chosen
the non-adversarial role of participant
under § 405.1010. Thus, in order to
maintain the non-adversarial nature of
the hearing when CMS or its contractor
is a participant under § 405.1010, we
believe it is necessary to preclude
calling CMS or its contractor as a
witness during the hearing. We note that
the policy prohibiting CMS or its
contractor from being called as a
witness when it has chosen to
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participate as a non-party in the
proceeding under § 405.1010 is
consistent with the Department’s Touhy
regulations at 45 CFR Part 2, which
leaves to agency discretion the decision
of whether to permit agency officials or
certain contractors to testify or produce
evidence in proceedings in which the
agency is not a party.
Furthermore, even though CMS and
its contractors cannot be called as
witnesses when they participate in a
proceeding under § 405.1010, we
believe that participation by CMS or its
contractors under § 405.1010 still allows
for a more thorough examination of the
issues. As discussed above, when CMS
or its contractors participate under
§ 405.1010, they may file position
papers or provide testimony to clarify
factual or policy issues in a case,
thereby assisting ALJs and the MAC in
creating a fully developed record that
resolves issues of fact and law.
Finally, we disagree with commenters
who suggested that we permit ALJs to
draw an adverse inference if CMS or its
contractors refuse cross-examination or
withdraw evidence when they
participate in the proceeding under
§ 405.1010. The limited resources and
broad programmatic responsibilities
facing CMS and its contractors may not
allow for participation in all hearings.
Thus, while an ALJ may request that
CMS or its contractors participate in a
hearing or other proceeding, under
§ 405.1010(a), an ALJ cannot require
CMS or its contractors to participate in
a case. In addition, an ALJ may not
require CMS or its contractor to appear
as a witness under § 405.1010(d). Thus,
CMS and its contractors have discretion
to determine whether to participate in a
hearing and to determine the manner
and extent of participation. If CMS or its
contractor, in exercising this discretion,
chooses to participate in the proceeding
in the limited, non-adversarial manner
provided in § 405.1010, we do not
believe that it would be reasonable for
the ALJ to draw an adverse inference if
CMS or its contractor declines to extend
this participation beyond the limits set
forth in § 405.1010 (for example, by
refusing cross-examination).
Furthermore, given the discretion
provided to CMS and its contractors to
determine whether and how to
participate in a proceeding, we do not
think it would be reasonable for the ALJ
to draw an adverse inference if CMS or
its contractor chooses to withdraw
evidence. Therefore, we do not believe
it is appropriate to amend § 405.1010(f)
to permit an ALJ to draw an adverse
inference if CMS or its contractor
refuses cross-examination or withdraws
evidence.
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Comment: We received several
comments concerning the submission of
evidence by CMS or its contractors
when participating at the ALJ or MAC
levels of the appeals process. These
commenters stated that in cases where
CMS or its contractors submit new
evidence, there should be an
opportunity for the parties to respond,
without having to show good cause and
without delaying the adjudication
timeframes.
Response: We disagree with the
recommendation that providers and
suppliers should not have to show good
cause to submit new evidence at the ALJ
and MAC levels in response to the
submission of evidence by CMS or its
contractors, if the agency elects to join
the appeal as a party or participant. As
noted earlier in this rule, the MMA
amended several of the appeals
provisions contained in BIPA. Section
1869(b)(3) of the Act, as added by
section 933(a) of the MMA, requires that
a provider of services or supplier not
introduce evidence in any appeal that
was not presented at the reconsideration
conducted by the QIC, unless there is
good cause that precluded the
introduction of such evidence at or
before the reconsideration. In our
regulations at § 405.1018, we extended
this requirement to beneficiaries
represented by providers and suppliers.
However, section 1869(b)(3) of the Act,
and the corresponding regulatory
provisions, do not apply to CMS or its
contractors. To the extent participation
by CMS or its contractors raises new
issues in the appeal that were not
considered during the earlier levels of
appeal, this may provide good cause for
the introduction of new evidence by
parties at the ALJ level.
Finally, in light of the statutory
requirement for full and early
presentation of evidence, our provision
requiring parties to submit evidence
with the request for hearing or within 10
days of receipt of the notice of hearing
(§ 405.1018), and the need for the ALJ to
evaluate the good cause justification for
submission of new evidence after the
reconsideration as set forth in
§ 405.1018 and § 405.1028, it is
necessary to allow an ALJ additional
time to consider whether the new
evidence submitted by the appellant or
party may be considered at the hearing.
We believe that § 405.1018(b), which
tolls the ALJ adjudication timeframe
when a party submits evidence after the
deadline established in § 405.1018(a), is
consistent with the statute and with
Congressional intent. Congress has
clearly indicated that adjudicators must
devise procedures compatible with
meeting the statutory deadlines.
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Moreover, we do not believe it
appropriate for appellants to avail
themselves of the escalation provisions
if the appellant has delayed the
administrative process by submitting
evidence after the deadline. In addition,
we believe that by tolling the 90-day
adjudication period as provided in
§ 405.1018(b) in those instances in
which the appellant is responsible for
the delay, we provide an incentive for
appellants to submit all relevant
evidence as soon as possible (preferably
with the hearing request), to appear at
scheduled hearings, and otherwise
comply with hearing procedures. We
believe that tolling the ALJ adjudication
timeframe when a party submits
evidence after the deadline established
in § 405.1018(a), balances the party’s
need to submit new evidence in certain
circumstances, with the need to provide
the ALJ with sufficient time to evaluate
the good cause justification for
submitting the new evidence, and to
review any such additional evidence
that is to be admitted into the
administrative record. Furthermore, we
believe it is reasonable to toll the
decision-making timeframe to allow full
and careful consideration of all issues,
even if the evidence being considered is
in response to evidence submitted by
CMS or its contractors.
Comment: We received two comments
regarding the availability of attorney’s
fees when CMS or its contractors
participate in an ALJ hearing. Both
commenters argued that if CMS or its
contractors participate as a party it
would turn the hearing into an
adversarial proceeding and, under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), CMS
could be obligated to pay attorney’s fees
and other costs to prevailing appellants.
Response: In our response to an
identical question raised on the
proposed rule, we indicated that the
Department would review its EAJA
provisions to determine what, if any,
amendments might be necessary to
reflect the changes implemented in the
interim final rule. See 70 FR 11429
through 11430. To date, DHHS has not
amended its EAJA regulations to
expressly include administrative
appeals under this subpart in the list of
proceedings in 45 CFR part 13,
Appendix A that are considered
adversary adjudications, and to which
the EAJA rules apply.
In light of the commenter’s concern,
however, we believe it is appropriate to
clarify when a hearing involving claim
determinations becomes an adversary
adjudication for the purposes of making
an application for attorney fees under
the Department’s EAJA regulations.
Only those ALJ hearings in which CMS
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elects party status under § 405.1012(a)
meet the definition of an adversary
adjudication as set forth in 45 CFR
13.3(a). The Department’s EAJA
regulations at 45 CFR 13.3(a) state that
the EAJA rules apply only to adversary
adjudications. An adversary
adjudication is defined as ‘‘an
adjudication required to be under 5
U.S.C. 554, in which the position of the
Department or one of its components is
represented by an attorney or other
representative (‘the agency’s litigating
party’) who enters an appearance and
participates in the proceeding. * * *’’
We believe appeals where CMS elects
party status fall within this definition.
However, if a non-governmental
entity, such as a QIC or other CMS
contractor, decides to become a party to
an appeal at either an ALJ hearing or
MAC review, it does not constitute an
adversary adjudication for the purposes
of the EAJA, because the Department’s
position would not be represented by an
attorney employed by DHHS. DHHS has
previously indicated its position with
respect to a contractor-party in 45 CFR
part 13, Appendix A, which lists
proceedings covered by the
Department’s EAJA regulations. In that
appendix, a Provider Reimbursement
Review Board proceeding is considered
an adversary adjudication only when
DHHS employees appear as counsel for
the intermediary. In the context of a
hearing or MAC review, if a QIC or other
CMS contractor decides to become a
party, DHHS would not be represented
by its own attorney, and therefore, EAJA
would not apply.
Further, we do not believe the
Department’s EAJA rules cover ALJ
hearings or MAC review in which CMS
or one of its contractors chooses to
participate, but does not enter as a
party. Our regulations provide for two
completely separate options for CMS or
its contractors to participate in an ALJ
hearing or MAC review: as a party or as
a participant. In electing party status,
CMS or its contractor enters an ALJ
hearing with all of the rights and
responsibilities of other parties as
described in § 405.1012, including the
right to call witnesses, cross-examine
witnesses of the appellant or other
party, be subject to cross-examination,
and to submit evidence. In contrast, by
simply participating in the appeal as a
non-party, the agency or its contractors
have significantly more limited rights as
described in § 405.1010 (that is, the
right to submit position papers or to
provide testimony to clarify factual or
policy issues in the case). More
importantly, however, a non-party
participant does not have the right to
call witnesses or cross-examine the
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appellant’s or other parties’ witnesses,
and a non-party participant may not be
called as a witness at the hearing. Thus,
as we have stated in the proposed and
interim final rules, the role of CMS or
its contractors as a non-party participant
is non-adversarial. See 67 FR 69332; 70
FR 11459 through 11460. Accordingly,
we believe an ALJ hearing or MAC
review in which CMS or its contractor
is a participant, but not a party, does not
fall within the definition of an adversary
adjudication for the purposes of
applying the provisions of the EAJA.
Finally, we note that the Department’s
EAJA rules state: ‘‘The Department may
reimburse parties for expenses incurred
in adversary adjudications if the party
prevails in the proceeding and if the
Department’s position in the proceeding
was not substantially justified. * * *’’
See 45 CFR 13.1. The mere fact that a
party prevails in the proceeding does
not create a presumption that the
Department’s position was not
substantially justified. Rather, the
agency’s litigating party is afforded an
opportunity to show that the
Department’s position was reasonable in
fact and law, thus avoiding an award of
fees and expenses in connection with
the proceeding. See 45 CFR 13.5(b).
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.1008 without modification. We are
finalizing § 405.1000 with modification
as discussed above, and with
modification as discussed in section
II.B.1. of this preamble. We are
finalizing §§ 405.1002 and 405.1004
with modification as discussed in
section II.B.5.b. of this preamble and
with modification as discussed in
section II.B.5.a. of this preamble. We are
finalizing §§ 405.1006 and 405.1014
with modification as discussed in
section II.B.5.a. of this preamble. We are
finalizing §§ 405.1010 and 405.1012
with modification as discussed in
section II.B.1. of this preamble and with
modification as discussed in section
II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
c. Adjudication Deadlines—ALJ Level
(§ 405.1016)
Section 405.1016 sets forth the
timeframes for an ALJ to issue hearing
decisions, states that timeframes may be
extended as provided in subpart I, and
also includes provisions to toll
timeframes under limited
circumstances.
Comment: One commenter objected to
the provision that a request for an ALJ
hearing is considered timely filed when
it is received by the entity specified on
the QIC’s notice of reconsideration. The
commenter noted that the Medicare
statute specifies the decisionmaking
timeframe beginning on the date the
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request for a hearing was timely filed.
The commenter felt that many
beneficiaries, who had typically filed
appeals with the SSA, and may
continue to do so, would not get the
benefit of the revised statutory
timeframes.
Response: We agree with the
commenter that the decision-making
timeframe begins when a request for
hearing is timely filed. However, in
order to be timely filed, a hearing
request must contain all the required
information and be filed with the entity
specified in the reconsideration
decision within 60 days of receipt of the
reconsideration decision. See
§ 405.1014(a) and § 405.1014(b). We
believe that directing appellants to only
one filing location reduces confusion
and eliminates any potential delay in
transmitting the request. Thus, all
reconsideration decision letters issued
by QICs contain the specific OMHA
field office address where a request for
ALJ hearing must be filed. Although
some beneficiaries may continue to file
hearing requests with the SSA, we do
not believe it is appropriate to recognize
SSA field offices as filing locations for
ALJ hearing requests pertaining to
claims for benefits under Medicare Part
A and Part B, because the SSA no longer
has a role in the processing of these
Medicare appeals. (However, we note
that parties may file requests for ALJ
hearings pertaining to Part A and Part B
entitlement (see § 405.924(a)) and Part B
Income Related Monthly Adjustment
Amounts (IRMAA) directly with OMHA
or with SSA offices.) To ensure appeals
that are misfiled with the SSA are
promptly forwarded to the correct
entity, CMS and SSA developed
Emergency Message EM–05028
(originally issued on June 23, 2005).
This instruction directs SSA staff to
immediately forward misfiled Part A
and Part B claims appeals to the
appropriate OMHA field office and to
direct any beneficiaries who attempt to
file appeals in-person to send the
request to the entity specified in their
reconsideration decision letter. Thus,
we believe it is reasonable to begin the
adjudication timeframe on the date an
appeal request is timely filed with the
entity specified in the QIC’s notice of
reconsideration.
Pursuant to § 405.1014(b)(2), if a
request for hearing is timely filed with
an entity other than the entity specified
in the notice of reconsideration, the
request is not treated as untimely or
otherwise rejected. Rather, the deadline
for deciding the appeal under
§ 405.1016 begins on the date the entity
specified in the QIC’s reconsideration
notice receives the request for hearing.
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In situations such as this, where an
appellant’s actions do not meet
regulatory requirements and cause a
delay in the adjudication process, we
think it is both necessary and fair to
allow an ALJ the full 90 days afforded
by statute, beginning the date the correct
ALJ office receives the request, to issue
a decision. Section 405.1014(b)(2) states
that if the request for hearing is filed
with an entity, other than the entity
specified in the QIC’s reconsideration,
the ALJ hearing office must notify the
appellant of the date of receipt of the
request and the commencement of the
90 day adjudication timeframe.
Comment: We received two comments
regarding the decision-making
timeframes when cases are escalated.
One commenter agreed with the
provisions in § 405.970(c)(2) and
§ 405.970(e)(2)(i) which provide an
adjudicator five additional days to
complete a decision when an appellant
has requested the case to be escalated to
the next level. Another commenter
disagreed with any extension of the
decision-making timeframe in cases
involving escalation, and opined that
such an extension was not authorized
under the statute.
Response: Section 1869(d)(1)(A) of the
Act requires an ALJ to hold a hearing on
the decision of the QIC, and to render
a decision on such hearing within 90
days of the adjudicator’s receipt of a
request for a hearing (that is timely
filed). Section 1869(c)(3)(C)(ii) of the
Act provides that a party may escalate
an appeal to the ALJ if the QIC fails to
mail or provide notice (as applicable) of
the decision by the end of the applicable
decision-making timeframe. OMHA’s
adjudication timeframe in case of
escalation from a QIC is not explicitly
stated in statute. The statute provides
only a qualified right for an appellant to
escalate an appeal to the ALJ level if the
QIC does not timely issue a
reconsideration determination. As
discussed in the interim final rule, we
interpret the 90 day adjudication
provision as requiring an ALJ to decide
a case within 90 days only when the
QIC has issued a final action in a case.
See 70 FR 11454 through 11456, and
11463. Therefore, we state that, when an
appellant escalates an appeal from the
QIC to the ALJ level, the proceedings
before the ALJ will not be subject to the
90-day limit. Rather, as specified in
§ 405.1016(c), the ALJ will have up to
180 days to issue a decision, dismissal
order, or remand order (unless the time
period is otherwise extended as
provided in part 405 subpart I). The
absence of an actual reconsideration
determination and its attendant
administrative processes imposes a
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substantial additional burden on
OMHA, including locating and
acquiring relevant information from the
QIC, performing additional procedural
and jurisdictional reviews, and
organizing evidence in the case file.
Setting the adjudication timeframe by
regulation at 180 days for escalated
appeals balances the interests of the
appellant in timely resolving the
disputed appeal and an ALJ’s duty to
collect the evidence and perform the
administrative tasks necessary to fully
and fairly adjudicate an appeal that has
not been addressed in a reconsideration
determination. We note that the 180 day
timeframe does not preclude OMHA
from adjudicating the appeal more
expeditiously if possible.
We are finalizing § 405.1016 with
modification as discussed in section
II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
d. Submission of Evidence Before the
ALJ Hearing (§ 405.1018)
Section 405.1018 states that a
provider, supplier or beneficiary
represented by a provider or supplier
must submit all written evidence they
wish to have considered at the hearing
with the request for hearing or within 10
days of receiving notice of the hearing.
Any evidence that is not submitted prior
to the issuance of the QIC
reconsideration determination must be
accompanied by a written statement
explaining why the evidence was not
previously submitted to the QIC or a
prior decision-maker. We explain in
§ 405.1018 and § 405.1028 the process
an ALJ follows in determining whether
good cause exists to allow the new
evidence into the administrative record.
Comment: One commenter objected to
the provision limiting the submission of
evidence after the QIC level of appeal.
The commenter stated the appellant
should not be penalized by having to
draft statements showing good cause for
the submission of new evidence at the
ALJ level when many times the later
submission is due to circumstances that
are beyond a party’s control.
Response: Section 933(a) of the MMA
amended section 1869(b) of the Act to
require full and early presentation of
evidence by providers and suppliers.
Absent good cause for not presenting
the evidence prior to the issuance of a
reconsideration by the QIC, a provider
or supplier is precluded, by statute,
from introducing new evidence at the
ALJ or MAC levels. Sections 405.1018(c)
and 405.1028 implement the good cause
requirement. These provisions help to
ensure expeditious adjudication, while
recognizing that early presentation of
evidence is not always possible. We also
note that this requirement does not
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apply to evidence submitted by
beneficiaries, unless they are
represented by a provider or supplier.
See § 405.966(c) and § 405.1018(d); 70
FR 11446.
We are finalizing § 405.1018 with
modification as discussed in section
II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
e. Time and Place for a Hearing Before
an ALJ; Notice of Hearing; Objections to
the Issues (§ 405.1020 Through
§ 405.1024)
In § 405.1020, we set forth the
requirements for determining how
appearances will be made before the
ALJ, for providing notice of a hearing,
for waiving a hearing, for changing the
time and place of a hearing, and for
requesting an in-person hearing. In
§ 405.1022, we describe the content and
processing requirements with respect to
the notice of ALJ hearing sent to the
parties and other potential participants.
In § 405.1024, we explain the
procedures parties must follow if they
object to the issues described in the
ALJ’s notice of hearing.
Comment: We received many
comments concerning the types of
hearings available at the ALJ level.
Several of the commenters stated that an
appellant should have the right to an inperson hearing before an ALJ. One
commenter opined that the reliance on
videoteleconferencing (VTC) hearings
may be premature. Another commenter
questioned the adequacy of hearings by
VTC, opining that where credibility and
veracity are at issue, in-person hearings
will provide the decision maker with
the chance to observe all parties, and
allow the appellant to observe the
reaction of the ALJ to the evidence and
tailor presentations accordingly. The
commenter also noted that many
Medicare beneficiaries have visual,
hearing, or even cognitive impairments
which create difficulties in viewing VTC
screens, hearing telephone
conversations or participating in other
than face-to-face hearings. Many of
these commenters also objected to the
requirement that an appellant show
good cause before an ALJ will grant an
in-person hearing and characterized the
good cause standard as vague.
Response: Section 1869(b)(1)(A) of the
Social Security Act as amended by BIPA
provides that any individual dissatisfied
with any initial determination shall be
entitled to a reconsideration and to a
hearing to the same extent as is
provided in section 205(b) of the Act.
Section 1869(b)(1)(A) of the Act does
not specify the manner in which
hearings must be held. Congress,
however, instructed the DHHS to
explore the possibility of providing
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hearings using formats other than inperson hearings. Specifically, the MMA
instructed the DHHS to consider the
feasibility of conducting Medicare
hearings ‘‘using tele- or videoconference technologies.’’ See section
931(a)(2)(G) of the MMA.
At approximately the same time that
MMA was enacted, the SSA finalized
regulations that provided for VTC
hearings in Medicare and disability
appeals. See 68 FR 5210 (February 3,
2003). Taking into account SSA’s
regulations, the Secretary concluded
that the expanded use of VTC and
telephone hearings for Medicare appeals
is appropriate for various reasons. First,
contrary to the commenters’ assertions,
and unlike Social Security disability
hearings, where in-person hearings may
be needed in order to evaluate an
individual’s physical ability and/or
credibility, Medicare hearings are
generally less dependent on the
physical presence of the appellant or
other witnesses and are, therefore, better
suited to VTC hearings. Second, VTC
allows ALJs to conduct hearings more
quickly, which is particularly important
in light of the timeframes mandated by
the statute. For parties who might
otherwise waive their right to a hearing
and request an on-the-record decision
because of traveling or scheduling
difficulties, VTC hearings can be
scheduled locally in a convenient
setting where the party has an
opportunity to present his/her case
orally. Given these benefits, we believe
VTC is an efficient and effective method
of conducting ALJ hearings. Despite the
advantages of VTC, parties have the
opportunity to request an in-person
hearing, or an ALJ may determine that
an in-person hearing is more
appropriate than a hearing by VTC or
telephone in a particular case. Thus, as
explained in the interim final rule, we
determined it is appropriate to permit
ALJ hearings to be conducted by VTC.
See 70 FR 11456 through 11457.
Specifically, § 405.1020(b) provides
that an ALJ, with the concurrence of the
Managing Field Office ALJ, may
determine that an in-person hearing
should be conducted if either (1) VTC
technology is not available, or (2)
special or extraordinary circumstances
exist. The preamble to the interim final
rule provides guidance for ALJs in
determining whether special or
extraordinary circumstances exist, thus
warranting the scheduling of an inperson hearing under § 405.1020(b)(2).
See 70 FR 11457. Section 405.1020(i)
provides that a party may file a written
objection to a scheduled VTC or
telephone hearing, and request an inperson hearing. An ALJ may grant the
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65321
request, with the concurrence of the
Managing Field Office ALJ, upon a
finding of good cause. In the preamble
to the interim final rule, we provide
guidance as to what may constitute good
cause for an ALJ to grant a request for
an in-person hearing. For example, an
ALJ could find good cause to grant a
request for an in-person hearing when a
party demonstrates that the case
presents complex, challenging or novel
presentation issues that necessitate an
in-person hearing. See 70 FR 11457.
Similarly, an ALJ may find good cause
to schedule an in-person hearing based
on a party’s proximity to and ability to
go to the local hearing office. These
provisions ensure that appellants or
other parties who believe it is necessary
to have an in-person hearing to
effectively present and participate in
their cases, including parties with
physical and cognitive impairments,
have the option to request an in-person
hearing.
Furthermore, given the volume of
hearing requests and short adjudicative
timeframes imposed by BIPA, we
believe it is reasonable to use a good
cause standard in determining when it
is appropriate for an ALJ to grant a
request for an in-person hearing and
reschedule the hearing for a time and
place when the party can appear in
person before the ALJ, as provided in
§ 405.1020(i)(5). As explained above,
and to avoid the backlogs and delays
that historically plagued the hearing
process, we believe it is necessary and
appropriate to generally conduct
hearings by VTC or telephone. However,
in § 405.1020(i), we acknowledge that,
in some circumstances, it may be
appropriate to grant a request to change
the type of hearing scheduled and
permit an in-person hearing. Thus, ALJs
will evaluate in-person hearing requests
made under § 405.1020(i) using the good
cause standard established in
§ 405.1020(i)(5), and when appropriate
grant a request for an in-person hearing.
Finally, we believe our decision not to
provide an exhaustive description of the
good cause standard in this regulation
benefits parties by affording an ALJ the
flexibility to grant an in-person hearing
based on factors or circumstances that
may be relevant, yet unforeseen at this
time.
Comment: Several commenters were
concerned about the number of ALJ
offices available for in-person hearings
as well as the ALJ office locations. Some
commenters were concerned that the
number of office locations was
insufficient, and would impede
appellant access to VTC and/or inperson hearings and cause delays in
holding hearings. One commenter stated
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that a system that relies on VTC and
phone hearings and places ALJs in 4
locations around the country does not
satisfy the requirements of MMA section
931(b)(3), which requires appropriate
geographic distribution of offices to
ensure timely access to judges. One
commenter stated that since the current
ALJ office locations weren’t accessible
to New York residents, DHHS should
establish an ALJ office in New York
City, as well as an ALJ office in upstate
New York. A few commenters
recognized the need to streamline ALJ
locations and the ALJ hearing process
for efficiency, but asked that DHHS
monitor the process to ensure appellant
access is not hindered. Several of the
commenters opined that with only four
ALJ offices, appellants would be forced
to use VTC or telephones to conduct
hearings rather than incur the expense,
loss of income, and inconvenience of
traveling to distant offices. Another
commenter asked if any provisions
would be made to allow travel
allowances for appellants.
Response: In determining the number
and location of OMHA’s field offices,
the DHHS thoroughly researched and
considered, among other things, the
then-current and projected geographic
distribution of Medicare claims appeals
heard by SSA and Medicare contractor
jurisdictions. As a result, Arlington,
Virginia, Cleveland, Ohio, Irvine,
California, and Miami, Florida were
chosen as the four sites for the OMHA
field offices. The ALJs in these field
offices hold hearings by
videoteleconference and telephone, and
in-person. Furthermore, VTC hearings
are also held at sites other than the ALJ
offices. OMHA makes extensive use of
VTC to provide appellants with a vast
nationwide network of access points for
hearings close to their homes. Based on
this research and our experience, we
believe that the number and distribution
of ALJ offices is sufficient and would
not delay or impede access to in-person
or VTC hearings. Thus, we believe that
the number and locations of ALJs
throughout the country satisfy the
requirements section 931(b)(3) of the
MMA, and we do not believe that it is
necessary at this time to establish ALJ
offices in New York City or in upstate
New York.
While many appellants prefer the
convenience of a telephone hearing or
videoteleconference hearing, there are
instances when an in-person hearing is
appropriate. OMHA closely monitors
appellants’ access to the process via
internal case tracking systems, appellant
feedback during the scheduling of
hearings, and appellant feedback during
hearings. OMHA’s tracking numbers
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and feedback from appellants reflect an
overwhelming preference for telephone
hearings. Based on the feedback and raw
data received, OMHA adjusts its
internal resources and processes
accordingly.
Furthermore, when, in accordance
with the regulations, the ALJ determines
that a hearing will be held in-person,
the ALJ will also consider whether it is
most appropriate to travel to a location
close to the party or to have the party
travel to one of the OMHA field offices.
In making this determination, the ALJ
consults with the party requesting the
hearing. OMHA has developed a travel
reimbursement policy that it mails with
every notice of hearing. Pursuant to this
policy, eligible participants are
reimbursed for certain expenses
incurred in traveling to and from a field
office or a VTC site. Thus, we do not
believe that appellants are forced to use
VTC or telephones to conduct hearings
to avoid the expense of in-person
hearings. We believe that this policy
satisfies the mandate of section
931(b)(3) of the MMA to ensure timely
access to judges.
Comment: A commenter noted that
§ 405.1020(c) requires the ALJ to send a
notice of hearing to the contractor that
issued the initial determination. The
commenter expressed concern that
receiving ALJ notices of hearing for
every case may be cumbersome, and
suggests it may be more efficient to send
a notice of hearing to the contractor that
processed the initial determination only
when the ALJ requests that the
contractor be a party or participant.
Response: We agree with the concerns
raised by the commenter. We believe
sending the notice of hearing to the QIC
that processed the reconsideration
provides adequate notice to CMS and its
contractors of the pending ALJ hearing,
and thus it is not necessary to also send
notice of the hearing to the contractor
that issued the initial determination.
However, we note that, the ALJ would
send a notice of the hearing to the
contractor if an ALJ were to request that
the contractor that issued the initial
determination participate in, or be a
party to, a hearing. Accordingly, we
have revised § 405.1020(c) to remove the
reference to the ‘‘contractor that issued
the initial determination’’ from the list
of entities that receive notice of the ALJ
hearing.
Comment: We received several
comments concerning § 405.1020(i)(4),
which stipulates that when a request for
in-person hearing is granted, the party is
deemed to have waived the 90 day
timeframe for ALJ decision-making. One
commenter noted that § 1869(d)(1)(B) of
the Act only provides for a waiver of the
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time period upon motion or stipulation
of the party, and a request for an inperson hearing is not a motion or
stipulation to waive the 90 day time
period. The same commenter also
observed that the regulations do not
include a specific timeframe for making
a decision in this situation even though
Congress legislated set timeframes at
every level of appeal. Although all of
the commenters agreed that there
should be a timeframe attached to these
in-person hearings, they were split
when it came to recommending a
particular timeframe. Some commenters
believed strongly that the 90 day
timeframe that ordinarily applies to ALJ
hearings should apply to in-person
hearings. These commenters opined that
the intent of BIPA, as amended by the
MMA, was to give everyone access to an
ALJ hearing within the 90 day
timeframe. As such, ALJs should be
held to rendering their decision within
the 90 day timeframe for all hearing
formats. One of these commenters
suggested that the reduced number of
in-person hearings should enable ALJs
to meet the 90 day decision-making
timeframe. In contrast, another
commenter recommended setting a
longer, but still defined, timeframe,
such as 120 days, as a reasonable time
limit for an in-person hearing. Similarly,
another commenter suggested that in the
event of an in-person hearing, the ALJ
should have 90 days from the date of the
hearing (as opposed to 90 days from the
date the request for hearing is received)
within which to render the decision.
Response: As discussed previously, in
making revisions to the administrative
appeals process in both BIPA and MMA,
Congress did not specify the manner in
which ALJ hearings were to be
conducted. Thus, while hearings may be
conducted in-person, by VTC or by
telephone, parties do not have the right
to a specific type of hearing, and ALJs
are not required to offer an in-person
hearing to parties. The Congress
instructed the DHHS to consider the use
of teleconference and videoteleconference technologies for ALJ
hearings. See section 931(a)(2)(G) of the
MMA. After carefully considering the
feasibility of utilizing these
technologies, the logistical issues in
conducting hearings, and the need to
devise procedures compatible with
meeting the statutory deadlines, it
became clear that VTC and telephone
were appropriate methods for holding
most ALJ hearings. While a hearing may
be conducted in-person, by VTC or by
telephone (§ 405.1000(b)), under
§ 405.1020(b), an ALJ will conduct the
hearing by VTC if the technology is
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available, thereby establishing VTC as
the default method for conducting
hearings.
We are mindful, however, that some
parties may prefer or require an inperson hearing. Thus, under
§ 405.1020(b), an ALJ may offer to
conduct an in-person hearing when VTC
is not available, or if special or
extraordinary circumstances exist
making an in-person hearing necessary.
Additionally, in § 405.1020(i), we afford
parties an opportunity to object to a
hearing scheduled to be conducted by
VTC or telephone, and request an inperson hearing. If the ALJ grants the
request for an in-person hearing, in
many cases, the ALJ may need
additional time beyond the standard 90day adjudication time period specified
in § 405.1016 in order to schedule,
prepare for, and conduct an in-person
hearing, and issue a decision.
Accordingly, § 405.1020(i)(4), as
clarified in our correcting amendment to
the interim final rule issued June 30,
2005, states that the 90 day adjudication
timeframe is waived if a party objects to
the ALJ’s scheduling of a hearing by
VTC or telephone, and the ALJ, with the
concurrence of the Managing Field
Office ALJ, grants the party’s request for
an in-person hearing. See 70 FR 37700,
37701, 37704.
We have carefully considered the
commenter’s assertion that section
1869(d)(1)(B) of the Act only provides
for a waiver of the adjudication deadline
upon motion or stipulation of the party,
and that a request for an in-person
hearing is not a motion or stipulation to
waive the 90-day time period. While we
continue to believe that the statutory
language is consistent with a reading
that a party can be deemed to have
waived the adjudication deadline when
the party requests and is granted an inperson hearing, after further
consideration, we have decided to
amend § 405.1020(i) to state that when
a party’s request for an in-person
hearing under § 405.1020(i)(1) is
granted, the ALJ must issue a decision
within the adjudication timeframe
specified in § 405.1016 (including any
applicable extensions provided in
subpart I), unless the party requesting
the hearing waives the adjudication
timeframe in writing. We believe that
this revised regulation also is consistent
with the statutory language.
Commenters also offered
recommendations to impose a specific
adjudication timeframe for issuing
decisions when an ALJ grants a request
for an in-person hearing in response to
an objection to a scheduled VTC or
telephone hearing under § 405.1020(i).
Given the revisions to § 405.1020(i)
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described above, it is no longer
necessary to consider adopting these
alternative timeframes. Furthermore,
under § 405.1036(d), an appellant who
waives the 90 day adjudication
timeframe may work with the ALJ to
establish an alternative decision making
timeframe to ensure they have some
expectation of when the ALJ will render
his or her decision.
Finally, we are making a technical
revision to § 405.1022(a) to clarify that
even where a party waives receipt of the
notice of hearing, the ALJ must still
send the notice of hearing to all other
parties and potential participants who
have not waived their right to receive
the notice of hearing, consistent with
§ 405.1020(c). Section 405.1022(a)
provides that the ALJ sets the time and
place of the hearing and mails the notice
of hearing to the parties and other
potential participants as provided in
§ 405.1020(c) unless the parties have
indicated in writing that they do not
wish to receive this notice. In turn,
under § 405.1020(c)(2), parties to the
hearing (and any potential participant
from CMS or its contractor who wishes
to attend the hearing) are required to
reply to the notice of hearing to
acknowledge whether they plan to
attend the hearing, or to object to the
proposed time and/or place of the
hearing. In addition, under § 405.1010
and § 405.1012, CMS or its contractor is
required to notify the ALJ, appellant,
and all other parties identified in the
notice of hearing of their intent to
participate in the hearing or join as a
party within 10 days after receiving the
notice of hearing. In order for parties
and potential participants from CMS or
its contractor (who wish to attend the
hearing) to comply with
§ 405.1020(c)(2), and for CMS and its
contractors to provide the ALJ and all
parties timely notice of their intent to
join as a party or participate in the
hearing consistent with § 405.1010(b)
and § 405.1012(b), the ALJ must send
the notice of hearing to the appropriate
parties and potential participants,
consistent with § 405.1020(c)(1). Thus,
we are revising § 405.1022(a) to clarify
that even where a party waives receipt
of the notice of hearing, the ALJ must
still send the notice of hearing to all
other parties and potential participants
who have not waived their right to
receive the notice of hearing, consistent
with § 405.1020(c).
We are finalizing § 405.1020 and
§ 405.1022 with modifications as noted
above and as discussed in section
II.B.5.a. of this preamble. We are
finalizing § 405.1024 with modification
as discussed in section II.B.5.a. of this
preamble.
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f. Disqualification of the ALJ
(§ 405.1026)
In § 405.1026, we state that an ALJ
cannot conduct a hearing if he or she is
prejudiced or partial to any party or has
any interest in the matter pending for
decision. We also explain the process
that a party must follow if they object
to the ALJ assigned to conduct the
hearing.
Comment: A number of commenters
raised concerns about the independence
of the DHHS ALJs. One commenter
stated that, under SSA regulations, an
ALJ may grant an in-person hearing if
the party requesting it states they do not
wish to appear by VTC. By contrast, the
commenter noted that under DHHS
regulations for Medicare appeals, the
ALJ must seek the concurrence of the
Managing Field Office ALJ in order to
grant requests for in-person hearings.
Another commenter questioned how an
ALJ can be independent and base a
decision on the evidence before him or
her, if such concurrence is needed in
what may be the first motion in the case.
A few commenters also questioned
CMS’ influence over the ALJs. One
commenter recommended that
safeguards be put in place to avoid any
undue influence on the ALJs’
independence. Another commenter
viewed the issuance of the new appeals
regulation by CMS, and the content of
the provisions, as a strong indicator of
CMS’ intent to influence and control the
ALJs’ decision-making process. Finally,
a commenter stated that formalized
procedures in the form of promulgated
rules on how the new Office of
Medicare Hearings and Appeals will
function are necessary to ensure ALJ
independence.
Response: The Managing
Administrative Law Judge (MALJ) is
responsible for the administration of the
field office, and is charged with
ensuring the just, timely, accurate, and
professional adjudication of all
Medicare claims appeals whether they
are heard in-person, via VTC, or by
telephone. MALJ oversight is not
intended to impede the judicial
independence of the ALJ assigned to the
appeal, but rather, such oversight will
aid in the coordination of resources
needed to successfully carry out an inperson hearing and will also assist the
ALJs in fulfilling their responsibility to
ensure that appellants receive an
appropriate hearing and that appeals are
decided in a timely manner.
In terms of structural organization, the
DHHS is divided into a series of
operational divisions that are
administratively and programmatically
independent of one another. Each
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operational division has its own
personnel, administrative support, and
programmatic mission. While each
operational division is ultimately
accountable to the Secretary, they are
independent of one another. As
described in the June 23, 2005 Office of
Medicare Hearings and Appeals;
Statement of Organization, Functions,
and Delegations of Authority that
formally established OMHA, OMHA is
part of the Office of the Secretary and
is completely separate from CMS. 70 FR
36386. OMHA is under the direction of
the Chief Administrative Law Judge
who reports directly to the Secretary. 70
FR 36386 through 36387. Thus,
consistent with section 931(b)(2) of
MMA, Medicare appellants receive
hearings before ALJs from an office that
is organizationally and functionally
separate from CMS.
Section 521 of BIPA amended section
1869 of the Act to substantially revise
the Medicare claim appeals process. The
statute mandated a series of structural
and procedural changes to the existing
appeals process, which necessitated the
publication of new regulations to
implement the statutory changes. Since
CMS administers the Medicare program,
and is responsible for safeguarding the
interests of Medicare beneficiaries, it
was the agency’s responsibility to issue
regulations implementing the BIPA
provisions that revised the Medicare
claims appeals process. These
regulations were first published by CMS
in the Federal Register as a proposed
rule on November 15, 2002. CMS
subsequently published an interim final
rule with comment period on March 8,
2005, which included responses to the
comments submitted on the proposed
rule. The MMA mandated that the
transfer of ALJ appeals from SSA to
DHHS was not to begin earlier than July
1, 2005. Consequently, the proposed
and interim final regulations were
drafted and issued at a time when
OMHA was not in existence. We note
that the Medicare Appeals Council has
been involved in developing relevant
provisions of the proposed rule, interim
final rule and this final rule, and OMHA
has been involved in developing
responses to comments and revisions to
relevant regulatory provisions included
in this final rule.
Finally, as noted above, the June 23,
2005 Office of Medicare Hearings and
Appeals; Statement of Organization,
Functions, and Delegations of Authority
established OMHA as a part of the
Office of the Secretary completely
separate from CMS. See 70 FR 36386
through 36387. Pursuant to this
Statement, OMHA is under the direction
of the Chief Administrative Law Judge
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who reports directly to the Secretary.
The Statement further describes the
mission, organization and functions of
OMHA. We do not believe that
additional formalized procedures in the
form of promulgated rules on how
OMHA functions are necessary to
ensure ALJ independence.
Comment: One commenter inquired
about the possibility of establishing a
complaint mechanism for appellants
who feel the ALJ has failed to maintain
his/her impartiality.
Response: Section 405.1026(a)
establishes that ‘‘[a]n ALJ cannot
conduct a hearing if he or she is
prejudiced or partial to any party or has
any interest in the matter pending for
decision.’’ Under § 405.1026(b), ‘‘[i]f a
party objects to the ALJ who will
conduct the hearing, the party must
notify the ALJ within 10 calendar days
of the date of the notice of hearing. The
ALJ considers the party’s objections and
decides whether to proceed with the
hearing or withdraw.’’ Section
405.1026(c) provides that ‘‘[i]f the ALJ
does not withdraw, the party may, after
the ALJ has issued an action in the case,
present his or her objections to the MAC
in accordance with § 405.1100 et seq.’’
Section 405.1026(c) further provides
that ‘‘[i]f the case is escalated to the
MAC after a hearing is held but before
the ALJ issues a decision, the MAC
considers the reasons the party objected
to the ALJ during its review of the case
and, if the MAC deems it necessary,
may remand the case to another ALJ for
a hearing and decision.’’ We believe that
the provisions set forth in § 405.1026
provide sufficient procedures by which
a party can object to the presiding ALJ
for their hearing. Given these
safeguards, we believe that the
regulation as written sufficiently
addresses the commenter’s concerns.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.1026 without modification.
g. Review of Evidence Submitted to the
ALJ, Hearing Procedures, and Issues
Before an ALJ (§ 405.1028 Through
§ 405.1032)
In § 405.1028, we explain the process
for prehearing review of evidence
submitted to the ALJ, including the
procedures an ALJ follows in
determining whether good cause exists
to allow the submission of new
evidence at the ALJ hearing by a
provider, supplier or beneficiary
represented by a provider or supplier,
and the effect of a finding that good
cause does not exist. In § 405.1030, we
establish general procedures for ALJ
hearings, including the procedures that
apply when an ALJ determines that
there is material evidence missing at the
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hearing. In section 405.1032, we discuss
the types of issues that an ALJ may
consider at a hearing, the conditions
under which an ALJ may consider new
issues at the hearing, and the
restrictions imposed on adding new
claims to pending appeals.
Comment: One commenter stated that
§ 405.1032 appears to allow an ALJ to
consider new issues at the hearing that
result from the participation by CMS or
its contractors. The commenter
indicated that this should not be
allowed to occur if the matter could not
have been reopened under the
reopening provisions of § 405.980. The
commenter recommended that
§ 405.1032 be amended to specify that
no new issue should be addressed by
the ALJ unless the standards for
reopening are met.
Response: As noted in § 405.1032(a),
ALJs consider the issues raised during
previous levels of appeal not decided
entirely in a party’s favor (although, if
evidence presented before the hearing
causes the ALJ to question a favorable
portion of the determination, the ALJ
notifies the parties before the hearing
and may consider it an issue at the
hearing). However, there may be
instances where the evidence presented
to the ALJ brings to light a new issue.
Accordingly, under § 405.1032(b), we
allow an ALJ to consider new issues at
the hearing, subject to the limitations
described in § 405.1032(b)(1)(i) and (ii).
In the interest of the efficient
resolution of claims appeals, we have
developed procedures that foster the
early resolution of disputes over claim
determinations. With the requirement
for the full and early presentation of
evidence described above, as well as
other provisions, we are attempting to
avoid a prolonged and costly appeals
process. Thus, we expect under the
framework established in subpart I, that
parties will raise issues as soon as
practicable. It is neither efficient nor
effective for parties to wait until the ALJ
hearing to raise issues if those issues
could have been brought to light and
potentially resolved at previous levels.
Therefore, in § 405.1032, we placed
restrictions on the ability of a party to
raise a new issue at the ALJ level. We
believe that the restrictions currently set
forth in § 405.1032(b) strike a reasonable
balance between the need for efficient
resolution of claims appeals and the
need to consider new issues in certain
circumstances.
We agree with the commenter’s
general description of the provisions of
§ 405.1032(b). Under § 405.1032(b)(1),
an ALJ may raise and consider a new
issue at the hearing when the conditions
set forth in § 405.1032(b) are met. Like
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any other party, when CMS and its
contractors elect to be a party to an ALJ
hearing under § 405.1012, CMS and its
contractors have the right to raise new
issues, but the conditions established in
§ 405.1032(b) must be satisfied before
the ALJ may consider a new issue at the
hearing. Section 405.1032(b) requires an
ALJ to notify all of the parties about the
new issue prior to the start of the
hearing, and states that an ALJ may only
consider a new issue at the hearing if its
resolution could have a material impact
on the claim(s) that are the subject of the
request for hearing, and its resolution is
permissible under the rules governing
reopening of determinations and
decisions. When electing to be a
participant under § 405.1010, CMS and
its contractors do not have the right to
raise new issues at the ALJ level under
§ 405.1032. Rather, as a participant
under § 405.1010, CMS or its contractor
may provide evidence to the ALJ, and
an ALJ may, in response, raise and
consider a new issue at the hearing
based on such evidence, consistent with
§ 405.1032(b)(1).
We believe the regulation is
sufficiently clear in explaining that
when an ALJ or a party, including CMS
or its contractor when it elects party
status, raises a new issue, the conditions
set forth in § 405.1032(b) must be
satisfied in order to have that new issue
considered at the hearing. As discussed
above, § 405.1032(b) requires, in
pertinent part, that if a new issue is to
be considered at the hearing, its
resolution must be permissible under
the rules governing the reopening of
determinations and decisions. Thus, we
do not believe it is necessary to amend
§ 405.1032, since we believe the
regulation is already consistent with the
commenter’s suggested amendment
regarding the conditions under which
an ALJ may consider new issues.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§§ 405.1030 and 405.1032 without
modification. We are finalizing
§ 405.1028 with modification as
discussed in section II.B.5.a. of this
preamble.
h. Remand Authority (§ 405.1034)
Section 405.1034 discusses when the
ALJ can remand a case to the QIC.
Section 405.1034(a) of the interim final
rule states that in cases where the ALJ
believes that the written record is
missing information essential to
resolving the issues on appeal, and such
information can be provided only by
CMS or its contractors, ALJs may either
remand the case to the QIC that issued
the reconsideration, or retain
jurisdiction and request that the
contractor forward the missing
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information to the appropriate hearing
office.
It has come to our attention that there
has been much confusion regarding
what we meant by the phrase set forth
in § 405.1034(a), ‘‘can be provided only
by CMS or its contractors.’’ Thus, we are
revising § 405.1034 to clarify that the
phrase ‘‘can be provided only by CMS
or its contractors’’ means the
information is not publicly available,
and is not in the possession of, and
cannot be requested and obtained by
any of the parties to the appeal.
‘‘Publicly available’’ means the
information is available to the general
public via the Internet, or in a printed
publication. For example, information
available on a CMS or contractor Web
site or included in an official CMS or
DHHS publication is publicly available
information (for example, provisions of
NCDs or LCDs, procedure code or
modifier descriptions, fee schedule data,
and contractor operating manual
instructions). Similarly, medical records
and certificates of medical necessity are
examples of information that is in the
possession of, or could be requested and
obtained by, one or more parties to the
appeal, even though CMS or its
contractors may also possess or be able
to request such information.
Furthermore, we are revising
§ 405.1034(a) to clarify that if the
missing information is not information
that can be provided only by CMS or its
contractors, as clarified above, the ALJ
must retain jurisdiction of the case and
obtain the missing information on his or
her own, or directly from one of the
parties. We note that § 405.1028 allows
an ALJ, for good cause, to admit new
evidence submitted by a provider,
supplier, or a beneficiary represented by
a provider or supplier. If there is
missing information related to this new
evidence that is in the possession of, or
could be requested and obtained by the
provider, supplier or beneficiary
represented by a provider or supplier, a
remand pursuant to § 405.1034(a) to
obtain this missing information would
be inappropriate because such
information is not information that can
be provided only by CMS or its
contractors.
Similarly, if information missing from
the administrative record relates to a
new issue raised for the first time at the
ALJ level by the ALJ or a party under
§ 405.1032(b), the ALJ determines
whether the missing information related
to the new issue can be provided only
by CMS or its contractors, consistent
with § 405.1034(a), in determining
whether remanding to the QIC or
retaining jurisdiction of the case is
appropriate.
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Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.1034 with modifications as noted.
i. Description of the ALJ Hearing
Process and Discovery (§ 405.1036 and
§ 405.1037)
Section 405.1036 provides details
regarding the ALJ hearing process,
including the procedures for the
issuance of subpoenas by ALJs. In
§ 405.1037, we describe the discovery
process available at an ALJ hearing
when CMS or its contractor elects to
participate in the hearing as a party. We
received several comments regarding
the subpoena and discovery provisions.
A summary of the comments and our
responses are included below. Detailed
discussion of these provisions is
included in the interim final rule at 70
FR 11461 through 11462.
Comment: We received several
comments concerning subpoena
requests at the ALJ level of appeal. The
commenters expressed concern that a
party may only seek ALJ issuance of a
subpoena after all of the steps outlined
in § 405.1036(f)(4) regarding discovery
have been taken, but the subpoena must
be requested within 10 calendar days of
the receipt of the notice of hearing. See
§ 405.1036(f)(3). The commenters
recommended that the provision be
amended to state that the request for
subpoena may be filed at any time
before the ALJ issues a decision. One
commenter suggested that alternatively,
a party making a subpoena request
should be allowed a ‘‘reasonable’’
amount of time to file the request for a
subpoena, after the party has exhausted
all other required efforts to obtain the
records.
Response: We acknowledge that the
rule requiring parties to submit
subpoena requests within 10 calendar
days of receipt of the notice of hearing
as set forth in § 405.1036(f)(3) may be
difficult to comply with given the
requirements for the issuance of
subpoenas described in § 405.1036(f)(4).
We considered the commenters’
suggestions to allow for the submission
of subpoena requests anytime prior to
the issuance of the ALJ decision, or
alternatively, within a reasonable time
after exhausting required efforts to
obtain the requested information.
However, we believe allowing subpoena
requests to be submitted at anytime
prior to the decision may negatively
impact the ability of ALJs to issue
hearing decisions within the applicable
adjudication timeframes once discovery
is complete. Although we agree that it
would be appropriate to allow parties a
reasonable time to submit subpoena
requests after exhausting all other efforts
to obtain the necessary records, we must
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also consider the need to avoid
unnecessary delays in the hearing
process and the need to define the
timeframe during which discovery will
be completed. During the discovery
process, parties to the hearing will
become aware of any failure to comply
with an ALJ’s order compelling
disclosure. Since a party’s request for a
subpoena must follow non-compliance
with an order to compel disclosure, we
believe it is reasonable to require parties
to submit a request for subpoena prior
to the end of the discovery period
established by the ALJ in accordance
with § 405.1037(c). Thus, we are
amending § 405.1036(f)(3) accordingly.
Should an ALJ determine that
additional time is necessary in order to
issue the subpoena and obtain the
information requested or secure an
appearance and/or testimony, the ALJ
may extend the discovery period in
accordance with § 405.1037(c)(4).
Comment: We received two comments
concerning the discovery provisions.
Both commenters objected to the policy
making discovery available only when
CMS participates in the hearing as a
party. See § 405.1037(a). One
commenter suggested that any
documents relied upon by the
contractors in making previous
decisions should be discoverable.
Another commenter stated that the use
of admissions and interrogatories
should be allowable under § 405.1037
consistent with the standards applicable
to the use of depositions.
Response: Neither BIPA nor the MMA
explicitly provides for discovery during
ALJ proceedings, and given the
evidence requirements and timeframes
imposed by BIPA and the MMA, we do
not believe that a full discovery process
is necessary or even feasible at the ALJ
level. Nevertheless, we decided, in
response to comments received on the
proposed rule, to permit limited
discovery in § 405.1037 when CMS or
its contractors become a party at the ALJ
hearing level. See 70 FR 11461 through
11462. We continue to believe it is
appropriate to allow only limited
discovery in this instance, and that such
discovery enhances the fairness of
proceedings and the accuracy of
decisions. We also believe that, in
general, most information relevant to
the issues before an ALJ, including
documents relied upon by contractors in
making their decisions, is obtainable by
direct request of a party or the ALJ, or
is already included in the
administrative record. With respect to
our prohibition on the use of
interrogatories and admissions, we
believe such discovery practices are
unnecessary because the factual
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information typically obtained through
the use of admissions and
interrogatories is often already included
in the administrative record, can be
established during a pre-hearing
conference under § 405.1040, or can be
developed at the hearing. In addition, if
an ALJ determines evidence is missing
from the record, the ALJ may follow the
procedures set forth in § 405.1030(c) to
obtain such evidence. Thus, we do not
believe it is necessary to include more
expansive discovery provisions in the
final rule.
Finally, we have determined that it is
necessary to make technical revisions to
§ 405.1036(f) in order to clarify our
policies, as discussed below. Section
405.1036(f)(1) authorizes, when it is
reasonably necessary for the full
presentation of the case, an ALJ to issue
subpoenas, on his or her own initiative
or at the request of a party, for the
appearance and testimony of witnesses,
and for a party to make books, records,
correspondence, papers, or other
documents that are material to an issue
at the hearing available for inspection
and copying.
It has come to our attention that there
has been some confusion regarding the
participation regulations at § 405.1010
and § 405.1012 and the use of
subpoenas under § 405.1036(f). As
discussed above, an ALJ may not require
CMS or its contractors to participate in
a hearing either as a participant or as a
party, and may not draw an adverse
inference if CMS or its contractors
decide not to participate or be a party
in a proceeding before the ALJ. See
§§ 405.1010(a) and (f) and 405.1012(d).
Under these regulations, CMS and its
contractors have discretion to determine
whether to participate in ALJ
proceedings, and to determine the
manner and extent of their
participation. We are clarifying in this
final rule that § 405.1036(f) is not
intended to permit the use of subpoenas
to circumvent or limit the discretion
provided to CMS and its contractors
regarding participation in ALJ hearings.
Thus, we are amending § 405.1036(f)(1)
to clarify that an ALJ may not, on his or
her own initiative or at the request of a
party, issue a subpoena to CMS or its
contractors to compel an appearance,
testimony or the production of evidence
in the context of a Medicare claim
appeal under this subpart.
For similar reasons, we are also
amending § 405.1122(d)(1) to clarify that
the MAC may not issue subpoenas to
CMS or its contractors, on its own
initiative or at the request of a party, to
compel the production of evidence.
Similar to the policies and procedures
applicable to ALJ proceedings, CMS and
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its contractors have discretion to
determine whether to participate, and to
determine the manner and extent of
their participation, in a MAC review.
Specifically, in § 405.1124(d) regarding
oral argument, the MAC may request,
but not require, CMS or its contractor to
appear before it if the MAC determines
that it may be helpful in resolving issues
in a case. In addition, § 405.1124(e)
states that the MAC may not draw any
inference if CMS or its contractor
decides not to participate in an oral
argument. Furthermore, under
§ 405.1110, CMS or its contractors may
refer a case to the MAC for review under
the MAC’s own motion authority. Thus,
we are clarifying that § 405.1122(d) is
not intended to permit the use of
subpoenas to circumvent or limit the
discretion provided to CMS and its
contractors regarding participation in a
MAC review. Finally, we note that the
policy prohibiting the issuance of
subpoenas to CMS by ALJs and the
MAC as described above, is also
supported by the long-settled doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§§ 405.1036 and 405.1122 with
modifications as noted above. We are
finalizing §§ 405.1036 and 405.1037
with modification as noted in section
II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
j. Deciding a Case Without an ALJ
Hearing, Conferences, the
Administrative Record, and
Consolidated Hearings (§ 405.1038
Through § 405.1044)
In §§ 405.1038 through 405.1044, we
describe various procedures established
for the conduct of ALJ hearings. In
§ 405.1038, we outline the
circumstances in which an ALJ may
issue a decision without holding a
hearing. In § 405.1040, we describe the
process for holding prehearing and
posthearing conferences. In § 405.1042,
we explain the requirements applicable
to the creation of the administrative
record of the ALJ proceedings, and for
requesting and receiving copies of the
administrative record. In § 405.1044, we
describe the requirements applicable to
holding a consolidated hearing before
the ALJ. Additional discussion is
included in the interim final rule at 70
FR 11464 through 11465.
We received no comments on these
sections. However, in § 405.1038(b)(1)(i)
we made a technical correction,
changing the term ‘‘videoconferencing’’
to ‘‘videoteleconferencing’’, consistent
with the use of the term throughout this
regulation.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.1040 without modification. We are
finalizing § 405.1038 with the
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modification noted above. We are
finalizing §§ 405.1042 and 405.1044
with modification as discussed in
section II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
k. Notice and Effect of ALJ’s Decision
(§ 405.1046 Through § 405.1048)
Section 405.1046 sets forth general
rules regarding the notice of an ALJ’s
decision and describes certain
limitations on an ALJ’s decision, and
§ 405.1048 explains the effect of an ALJ
decision on all parties to the hearing.
We received one comment on the effect
of an ALJ decision. A summary of the
comment and our response are included
below. Additional detailed discussion is
included in the interim final rule at 70
FR 11466 through 11467.
Comment: We received a comment
concerning the effect of an ALJ decision.
The commenter urged CMS to state in
the regulations that ALJ decisions are
entitled to substantial deference by
other adjudicators in the appeals
process. The commenter believed that
cases that have made it to the ALJ level
are more likely to be cases concerning
issues most important to beneficiaries
and providers and, since the ALJ has
fully considered such issues, other
levels of appeal should benefit from
these prior decisions and accord them
substantial deference, similar to that
which a district court would accord to
a decision by another district court
within the same circuit.
Response: We disagree with the
commenter’s recommendation, and note
that, in some instances, it would be
inappropriate to require other
adjudicators to afford substantial
deference to ALJ decisions. For
example, the MAC is responsible for
reviewing certain ALJ decisions and
issuing final decisions on those appeals
for the DHHS. Section 521 of BIPA
added 1869(d)(2)(B) of the Social
Security Act to mandate that in
reviewing an ALJ decision, the MAC
shall review the case de novo. See
§ 405.1100(c), § 405.1108(a). This is an
expansion of the scope of review the
MAC previously exercised in pre-BIPA
appeals. Granting ALJ decisions
substantial deference would be
inconsistent with the DAB’s expanded
review authority provided by Congress.
In addition, the coverage and liability
determinations made on claims
submitted for treatment are largely
unique to the specific facts and
circumstances of a given case. Thus, it
would prove extremely difficult to
identify a set of decisions that could be
appropriately afforded deference.
Finally, we note that section 931 of
the MMA instructed DHHS to assess the
feasibility of developing a process to
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give decisions of the DAB addressing
broad legal issues, binding and
precedential authority. After thorough
consideration, DHHS determined that it
is neither feasible, nor appropriate at
this time to confer binding, precedential
authority upon decisions of the MAC.
Because MAC decisions are not given
precedential weight, it would be
impractical and illogical to afford any
form of deference to ALJ decisions.
Therefore, we do not believe it is
appropriate to adopt the commenter’s
suggestion to require other adjudicators
in the Medicare administrative appeals
process to afford substantial deference
to ALJ decisions.
We are finalizing §§ 405.1046 and
405.1048 with modification as
discussed in section II.B.5.b. of this
preamble. Additionally, we are
finalizing § 405.1046 with modification
as discussed in section II.B.5.a. of this
preamble.
l. Removal of a Hearing Request From
the ALJ to the MAC, Dismissal of a
Request for ALJ Hearing, and the Effect
of a Dismissal (§ 405.1050 Through
§ 405.1054)
In § 405.1050, we explain the process
for the MAC to assume responsibility for
holding a hearing if a request for hearing
is pending before an ALJ. In § 405.1052,
we explain the bases under which an
ALJ dismisses a request for hearing, and,
in § 405.1054, we explain the effect of
a dismissal of a request for ALJ hearing.
Additional discussion is included in the
interim final rule at 70 FR 11465
through 11466. We received no
comments on these provisions.
We are finalizing §§ 405.1050 and
405.1054 without modification. We are
finalizing § 405.1052 with modification
as discussed in section II.B.5.b. of this
preamble and with modification as
discussed in section II.B.5.a. of this
preamble.
m. Applicability of Statutes,
Regulations, Medicare Coverage
Policies, CMS Rulings and Other
Program Guidance (§ 405.1060 Through
§ 405.1063)
In § 405.1060, we explain the
applicability of national coverage
determinations (NCDs) to decisions
made by fiscal intermediaries, carriers,
QIOs, QICs, ALJs, and the MAC. In
§ 405.1062, we provide that ALJs and
the MAC must afford LCDs, LMRPs and
CMS program guidance (including
program memoranda and manual
instructions) substantial deference if
they are applicable to a particular case.
In § 401.108(c) and § 405.1063, we
explain that CMS rulings are binding on
all CMS components, on all DHHS
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components that adjudicate matters
under the jurisdiction of CMS, and on
the Social Security Administration to
the extent that components of the Social
Security Administration adjudicate
matters under the jurisdiction of CMS.
We received several comments with
respect to the requirement that ALJs and
the MAC afford Medicare local coverage
determinations and program guidance
substantial deference. A summary of the
comments, and our response to those
comments are included below.
Additional discussion is included in the
interim final rule at 70 FR 11457
through 11458.
Comment: We received several
comments concerning the provisions
requiring ALJs and the MAC to give
substantial deference to Medicare LCDs,
LMRPs and CMS program guidance, if
the pertinent policy or guidance is
applicable to the specific case
(§ 405.1062). Most of these commenters
objected to the substantial deference
provisions. Some commenters objected
to the presumption of validity attributed
to policies and guidance under this
provision, and believed it would lead to
adjudicators ‘‘rubber-stamping’’ the
previous appeal decision, while another
commenter noted that ALJs and the
MAC currently decide whether informal
policies are entitled to deference based
on Supreme Court precedents.
Response: As noted above and further
discussed below, ALJs and the MAC are
bound by the Medicare statute, CMS
regulations, CMS Rulings, and NCDs.
See sections 405.1060, 405.1063,
401.108; in addition see our discussion
at 70 FR 11457 through 11458. In
§ 405.1062, we explain the degree to
which ALJs and the MAC must defer to
non-binding CMS program guidance
(such as manual instructions and
program memoranda), LMRPs and
LCDs. ALJs and the MAC consider
whether guidance documents, LMRPs
and LCDs should apply to a specific
claim for benefits. If it is determined
that the policy is applicable in the
instant case, then the adjudicator must
grant substantial deference to the policy.
However, if the adjudicator declines to
follow a policy in a particular case, the
adjudicator must explain why the policy
was not followed. The decision to
disregard a policy in a specific case does
not have precedential effect. See
§ 405.1062(a) and (b). Thus, ALJs will
continue their traditional role as
independent evaluators of the facts
presented in specific, individual cases.
Requiring an ALJ to consider CMS
policy and give substantial deference to
it, if applicable to a particular case, does
not alter the ALJ’s role as an
independent fact finder. See 70 FR
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11458. Thus we do not believe this
regulation will lead to adjudicators
‘‘rubber-stamping’’ the previous appeal
decision.
In this final regulation, we are making
a technical correction to § 405.1063. In
§ 405.1063, we did not include a
provision that expressly stated our
longstanding policy, as described in the
interim final rule, regarding the
applicability of the Medicare statute and
CMS regulations to ALJs and the MAC.
See 70 FR 11457. We are making this
correction by adding paragraph (a) to
§ 405.1063 to specify that ALJs and the
MAC are bound by all laws and
regulations pertaining to the Medicare
and Medicaid programs, including, but
not limited to Titles XI, XVIII, and XIX
of the Social Security Act and
applicable implementing regulations.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.1060 and § 405.1062 without
modification. We are finalizing
§ 405.1063 with modifications as noted.
n. ALJ Decisions Involving Statistical
Samples (§ 405.1064)
In § 405.1064, we explain that when
an appeal from the QIC involves an
overpayment, and the QIC relied on a
statistical sample in reaching its
decision, the ALJ must base his or her
decision on a review of all claims in the
sample. We received two comments
regarding this provision. A summary of
the comments, and our responses are
provided below. Additional detailed
discussion is included in the interim
final rule at 70 FR 11466.
Comment: Two commenters
expressed concern that the regulation
does not address the authority of an ALJ
to consider challenges to the sampling
methodology when an overpayment
assessment is estimated through
extrapolation, and requested that we
clarify our position on this issue in the
regulation. One of these commenters
also suggested that we include a
provision requiring that appellants be
given all documentation concerning the
contractor’s sampling process.
Response: Medicare’s longstanding
policy has been to allow appellants a
full opportunity to challenge issues
related to the calculation of
overpayments estimated by
extrapolation from a sample. We
outlined in detail the basis for our
authority to extrapolate overpayments
in CMS (HCFA) Ruling 86–1, and since
1986, have included procedures for
contractors in operating instructions. As
explained in Ruling 86–1, we agree with
the commenter’s assertion that
appellants may challenge, and an ALJ
may review, the sampling methodology
used to calculate the overpayment.
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Sampling does not deprive a provider of its
rights to challenge the sample, nor of its
rights to procedural due process. Sampling
only creates a presumption of validity as to
the amount of an overpayment which may be
used as the basis for recoupment. The burden
then shifts to the appellant to take the next
step. The appellant could attack the
statistical validity of the sample, or it could
challenge the correctness of the
determination in specific cases identified by
the sample (including waiver of liability
[under section 1879 of the Act] where
medical necessity or custodial care is at
issue). In either case, the appellant is given
a full opportunity to demonstrate that the
overpayment is wrong. If certain individual
cases within the sample are determined to be
decided erroneously, the amount of
overpayment projected to the universe of
claims can be modified. If the statistical basis
upon which the projection was based is
successfully challenged, the overpayment
determination can be corrected. (HCFAR 86–
1–9, 10)
Adjudicators are bound by CMS
rulings. Thus, we do not believe it is
necessary to include further clarification
in the regulation.
Furthermore, parties may request and
receive the information contained in the
case file. See § 405.1042 and § 405.1118.
The case file should include all
documentation regarding the sampling
methodology used to calculate an
overpayment. If such documentation is
not in the administrative record, a party
may request the pertinent
documentation from the contractor or
adjudicator. Thus, we believe that
appellants already have adequate access
to documentation concerning the
contractor’s sampling process, and that
it is not necessary to include an
additional provision in the final rule.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.1064 without modification.
10. Review by the Medicare Appeals
Council (§ 405.1100 Through
§ 405.1134)
Sections 405.1100 through 405.1134
set forth the procedures for MAC review
of ALJ decisions and dismissals. We
received comments with respect to the
MAC’s standard of review and
submission of evidence during MAC
review. A brief description of the
pertinent regulatory provisions, a
summary of the comments, and our
responses to the comments follow
below. Additional discussion regarding
MAC review is included in the interim
final rule at 70 FR 11454 through 11456,
11459 through 11464, and 11466
through 11467.
a. MAC Review of an ALJ’s Action
(§ 405.1100 Through § 405.1120)
Section 405.1100 states that the MAC
undertakes a de novo review of an ALJ
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decision, and provides a general
description of the MAC review process.
Section 405.1102 describes the process
for requesting MAC review of an ALJ
decision or dismissal. Section 405.1104
describes an appellant’s right to request
escalation of a case from the ALJ level
to the MAC. In § 405.1106, we specify
the locations where parties must file
requests for MAC review or escalation.
Section 405.1108 sets forth the actions
a MAC may take upon receipt of a
request for review or escalation. Section
405.1110 describes the MAC’s authority
to review ALJ decisions or dismissals on
its own motion. Section 405.1112 sets
forth the content requirements for
requests for MAC review. Section
405.1114 describes the circumstances in
which the MAC dismisses a request for
review, and § 405.1116 describes the
effect of a dismissal by the MAC.
Section 405.1118 explains the process
by which a party may request a copy of
the administrative record developed at
the ALJ hearing and an opportunity to
comment on the evidence. Section
405.1120 discusses filing briefs with the
MAC.
Comment: Two of the comments we
received expressed concern about the
standard of review at the MAC level.
One commenter suggested modifying
§ 405.1100 to provide for a ‘‘substantial
evidence’’ standard of review as is
applicable in judicial review, or
alternatively, a ‘‘preponderance of
evidence’’ standard. However, both
commenters stated that although
§ 405.1100 provides for the MAC to
undertake de novo review of an ALJ
decision, the MAC’s rules limit the
opportunity for face-to-face hearings
and restrict a party’s right to submit
evidence. The commenters indicated
that these restrictions do not constitute
a de novo review.
Response: The de novo standard of
review that is applicable at the MAC
level is statutorily required by section
1869(d)(2)(B) of the Act, as added by
BIPA. Thus, the MAC may not review
ALJ decisions under a substantial
evidence standard as it had under
previous rules, nor may it utilize a
preponderance of evidence standard to
adjudicate appeals. Similarly, the
limitation on the submission of
evidence set forth in § 405.1122 is
required under section 1869(b)(3) of the
Act. We note that this limitation
restricts the scope of the MAC’s review,
not the applicable standard of review.
Finally, with respect to the
commenter’s concern about the
limitations on face-to-face hearings,
while most cases before the MAC are
resolved without oral argument, under
§ 405.1124, parties may request to
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appear before the MAC to present oral
argument, or the MAC may determine
on its own that oral argument is
necessary to decide the issues in the
case. The fact that the MAC may not
grant a party’s request to permit oral
argument in a case does not alter the de
novo standard of review by the MAC.
In this final rule, we are making
certain technical revisions to § 405.1106
and § 405.1110, and a technical
correction to § 405.1112(a). In
§ 405.1106(a), parties seeking MAC
review of an ALJ hearing decision must
send the request for review to the entity
specified in the notice of the ALJ’s
decision, and send a copy of the request
to the other parties to the ALJ decision
or dismissal. Similarly, when CMS or its
contractor refers a case to the MAC for
the MAC to consider reviewing under
its own motion review authority, in
accordance with § 405.1110(b)(2), CMS
sends a copy of the referral to the ALJ
and to all the parties to the ALJ’s action.
Furthermore, in § 405.1110(b)(2), a party
may file exceptions to CMS’ referral to
the MAC by submitting written
comments to the MAC, to CMS and to
all other parties to the ALJ’s decision.
We would like to clarify that, for the
purposes of MAC review, when an
appellant is required to send a copy of
the request for review to the ‘‘other
parties to the ALJ decision or dismissal’’
under § 405.1106(a), this means the
appellant must send a copy of the
review request to the other parties to the
ALJ decision or dismissal who received
a notice of the ALJ’s hearing decision
under § 405.1046(a), or a notice of the
ALJ’s dismissal under § 405.1052(b).
Similarly, if CMS refers a case to the
MAC for the MAC to consider under its
own motion review authority, when
CMS sends a copy of the referral to ‘‘all
parties to the ALJ’s action’’ under
§ 405.1110(b)(2), this means CMS must
send a copy of the referral to all parties
to the ALJ’s action who received a copy
of the ALJ’s hearing decision under
§ 405.1046(a) or a notice of the ALJ’s
dismissal under § 405.1052(b). Finally,
when a party submits written comments
regarding CMS’ referral to the MAC to
‘‘all other parties to the ALJ’s decision’’
under § 405.1110(b)(2), this means that
the party must send a copy of such
comments to all other parties to the
ALJ’s decision who received a copy of
the hearing decision under § 405.1046(a)
or a notice of the ALJ’s dismissal under
§ 405.1052(b). We note that if the ALJ
sends a copy of the ALJ hearing decision
or dismissal to a person or entity that is
not a party to the ALJ’s decision or
dismissal order (for example, a
Medicare contractor who has not elected
party status at the hearing under
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§ 405.1012), the appellant is not
required under § 405.1106(a) to send a
copy of the request for MAC review to
that person or entity because that person
or entity is not a party. See § 405.906(b)
and § 405.1008(b) for a description of
the parties to an ALJ hearing. Pursuant
to § 405.906, unless a beneficiary
undertakes an assignment of appeal
rights under § 405.912, the beneficiary is
always considered a party to the ALJ
hearing.
If the MAC determines that additional
parties should receive a copy of the
request for MAC review, the CMS
referral to the MAC, or comments
regarding CMS’ referral to the MAC, the
MAC may instruct the party or CMS, as
appropriate, to send copies to such
party or parties. We believe this will
minimize any confusion regarding the
parties an appellant or CMS must notify,
and will ensure that those parties with
an interest in the proceedings will be
notified of the status of the appeal
action.
We are also making a technical
correction to § 405.1112(a) to replace a
comma with a semi-colon following the
phrase, ‘‘if any’’.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§§ 405.1108, 405.1114, 405.1116, and
405.1120 without modification. We are
finalizing §§ 405.1102 and 405.1118
with modification as discussed in
section II.B.5.a. of this preamble. We are
finalizing §§ 405.1100, 405.1104,
405.1106, and 405.1110 with
modification as discussed in section
II.B.5.b. of this preamble and with
modification as discussed in section
II.B.5.a. of this preamble. We are
finalizing § 405.1112 with modification
as discussed in section II.B.5.b. of this
preamble. We are finalizing §§ 405.1106,
405.1110, and 405.1112 with additional
modifications as noted above.
b. Evidence That May Be Submitted to
the MAC and Subpoenas (§ 405.1122)
Section 405.1122 describes the
evidence that may be submitted to and
considered by the MAC, the process the
MAC follows in issuing subpoenas, the
reviewability of MAC subpoena rulings,
and the process for seeking enforcement
of subpoenas.
Comment: One commenter expressed
concern about a party’s ability to submit
new evidence for MAC review. The
commenter acknowledged the value of
submitting evidence early in the appeals
process. However, the commenter
believed new evidence should be
allowed at the MAC level if the
evidence becomes pertinent following
the ALJ’s decision.
Response: As noted above, the
limitation on submission of evidence is
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set forth at section 1869(b)(3) of the Act.
However, we believe that there are
certain circumstances in which
submission of new evidence for MAC
review may be appropriate. We have
described these circumstances at
§ 405.1122. As explained in
§ 405.1122(a)(1), when the MAC
undertakes review of an ALJ decision,
the MAC reviews all of the evidence
contained in the administrative record.
However, as explained in
§ 405.1122(a)(1), if the hearing decision
decides a new issue that the parties
were not afforded an opportunity to
address at the ALJ level, the MAC
considers any evidence related to that
issue if it is submitted with the request
for review. In addition, as set forth in
§ 405.1122(a)(2), if the MAC determines
that additional evidence is necessary to
resolve the issues in the case, and the
hearing record indicates that there were
no attempts to obtain such evidence in
the proceedings below, the MAC may
remand the case to the ALJ to obtain the
evidence and issue a new decision.
Consistent with § 405.1122(c), if a
provider, supplier, or a beneficiary
represented by a provider or supplier,
submits new evidence related to issues
previously considered by the QIC, the
MAC determines whether the party had
good cause for submitting the evidence
for the first time at the MAC level. The
MAC must exclude evidence from
consideration if good cause for late
filing is not established, and must notify
all parties of the exclusion. However,
the MAC may remand a case to an ALJ
if the new evidence was previously
submitted by a provider, supplier, or
beneficiary represented by a provider or
supplier at the ALJ level, and was
excluded from consideration because
the ALJ determined that good cause did
not exist under § 405.1028, but the MAC
determines that good cause for late
filing existed under § 405.1028 and the
ALJ should have reviewed the evidence.
See § 405.1122(c)(3). As set forth in
§ 405.1122(c)(3)(iii), the MAC may also
remand a case to an ALJ if the new
evidence is submitted by a party that is
not a provider, supplier, or beneficiary
represented by a provider or supplier.
Therefore, we believe the regulations
provide an appropriate balance between
the need for appellants to submit
evidence when the evidence becomes
pertinent following the ALJ decision,
and the need for the full and early
presentation of evidence as required by
the statute.
Although we received no comments
on § 405.1122(d) through (f), we have
determined that it is necessary to make
certain technical revisions to these
subsections to clarify our policies.
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Sections 405.1122(d) through (f) explain
the procedures the MAC follows when
issuing subpoenas, the review process
with respect to MAC rulings on
subpoena requests, and the enforcement
procedures to be followed if the MAC
determines that either a party or nonparty has failed to comply with a
subpoena. As explained above in
section II.B.9.i. of this preamble, we are
revising § 405.1122(d)(1) to clarify that
the MAC may not issue subpoenas to
CMS or its contractors, on its own
initiative or at the request of a party, to
compel the production of evidence.
In addition, we note that § 405.1122
contains several technical errors that
were not corrected in our previous
technical correction notice. First, we are
correcting the numbering of
§ 405.1122(e). Second, we are revising
paragraph (e)(2)(v) (renumbered in this
final rule as paragraph (e)(6)) to replace
the word ‘‘lifed’’ with the word ‘‘lifted.’’
Third, in § 405.1122(f)(1), we are
correcting the statutory reference to the
process followed by the Secretary when
seeking enforcement of a subpoena
issued by the MAC; we incorrectly
referenced section 205(c) of the Act and
42 U.S.C. 405(c) instead of section
205(e) of the Act and 42 U.S.C. 405(e).
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.1122 with modifications as noted
and with modification as discussed in
section II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
c. Oral Argument, Cases Remanded By
the MAC, the Effect of MAC Actions,
Escalation to Federal District Court, and
Extensions of Time To File Actions in
Federal District Court (§ 405.1124
Through § 405.1134)
In § 405.1124, we explain the
circumstances in which the MAC may
hear oral argument and the procedures
that apply when the MAC hears oral
argument. Section 405.1126 explains the
MAC’s remand authority and the
procedures that apply when the MAC
receives a recommended decision from
the ALJ. Section 405.1128 describes the
actions the MAC may take after
reviewing the administrative record and
any additional evidence (subject to the
limitations on MAC consideration of
additional evidence), and § 405.1130
describes the effect of the MAC’s
decision.
Section 405.1132 explains the process
for an appellant to seek escalation of an
appeal (other than an appeal of an ALJ
dismissal) from the MAC to Federal
district court if the MAC does not issue
a decision or dismissal or remand the
case to an ALJ within the adjudication
period specified in § 405.1100, or as
extended as provided in subpart I.
Section 405.1134 explains how parties
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may request an extension of time to file
an action in Federal district court.
We received no comments on these
provisions. We are finalizing
§§ 405.1128 and 405.1134 without
modification. We are finalizing
§ 405.1124 with modification as
discussed in section II.B.5.a. of this
preamble. We are finalizing §§ 405.1126,
405.1130 and 405.1132 with
modification as discussed in section
II.B.5.b. of this preamble and with
modification as discussed in section
II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
11. Judicial Review (§ 405.1136 Through
§ 405.1140)
Section 405.1136 sets forth the
requirements and procedures for filing
requests for judicial review of a MAC
decision in Federal district court,
specifies the Federal district court in
which such actions must be filed, and
describes the standard of review.
Sections 405.1138 and 405.1140 set
forth the procedures that apply to cases
that are remanded by a Federal district
court to the Secretary for further
consideration. We received two
comments on these provisions. A
summary of these comments, and our
responses are included below.
Comment: One commenter noted that,
in § 405.1136(b), we state that a party to
a MAC decision (or an appellant who
requests escalation from the MAC to
Federal court) must file a civil action in
the district court of the United States for
the judicial district in which the party
resides or where such individual,
institution, or agency has its primary
place of business. The commenter
believed that a party should be able to
file a civil action in Washington, DC or
the judicial district in which a regional
office of DHHS exists.
Response: Section 1869(b)(1)(A) of the
Act states that any individual
dissatisfied with any initial
determination shall be entitled to
reconsideration of the determination, a
hearing by the Secretary to the same
extent as is provided in section 205(b)
of the Act, and to judicial review of the
Secretary’s final decision after such
hearing as provided in section 205(g) of
the Act. Section 205(g) of the Act sets
forth the filing requirements for judicial
review. Our regulation restates these
statutory requirements. We do not have
the authority or discretion to alter the
filing procedures established in Federal
statute.
Comment: A commenter suggested
that the standard of review established
in § 405.1136(f) restricts Federal judges
from applying the Administrative
Procedure Act and evolving doctrines of
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judicial review of administrative
decisions that govern other agencies.
Response: We appreciate the
commenter’s concerns regarding the
standard of review applicable to judicial
review of Medicare claim
determinations. As discussed above,
section 1869(b)(1)(A) of the Act
provides for judicial review of the
Secretary’s final decision as provided in
section 205(g) of the Act. Section 205(g)
of the Act sets forth the standard of
review that applies to actions in Federal
district court, and our regulation
implements these statutory
requirements. We do not have the
authority or discretion to alter the
standard of review established in the
statute.
Accordingly, we are finalizing
§ 405.1138 without modification. We are
finalizing § 405.1136 with modification
as discussed in section II.B.5.b. of this
preamble and with modification as
discussed in section II.B.5.a. of this
preamble. We are finalizing § 405.1140
with modification as discussed in
section II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
III. Provisions of the Final Regulations
In this final rule, we made the
following changes to the interim final
rule published on March 8, 2005:
• In section 405.902, we are adding a
definition for the term contractor.
• In §§ 405.922, 405.942(a)(1),
405.942(b), 405.946(b), 405.950(b)(1),
405.950(b)(2), 405.950(b)(3),
405.962(a)(1), 405.962(a)(2), 405.962(b),
405.966(b), 405.966(c), 405.970(a)(2),
405.970(b)(1), 405.970(b)(2),
405.970(b)(3), 405.970(c), 405.970(e)(2),
405.974(b)(1), 405.974(b)(1)(i),
405.974(b)(1)(ii), 405.980(d)(1),
405.980(d)(2), 405.980(d)(3),
405.980(e)(1), 405.980(e)(2),
405.980(e)(3), 405.990(f)(2),
405.990(f)(4), 405.990(h)(2),
405.990(i)(2), 405.990(j)(1),
405.1002(a)(1), 405.1002(a)(3),
405.1002(a)(4), 405.1002(b)(2),
405.1004(a)(1), 405.1004(a)(3),
405.1004(a)(4), 405.1006(e)(1)(ii),
405.1010(b), 405.1012(b),
405.1014(b)(1), 405.1014(b)(2),
405.1016(a), 405.1016(c), 405.1018(a),
405.1018(b), 405.1020(g)(3)(ii),
405.1022(a), 405.1024(a), 405.1028(a),
405.1036(f)(5)(iv), 405.1037(c)(5),
405.1037(e)(2)(iii), 405.1042(b)(2),
405.1044(d), 405.1046(d),
405.1052(a)(2)(ii), 405.1052(a)(2)(iii),
405.1100(c), 405.1100(d),
405.1102(a)(1), 405.1102(a)(2),
405.1104(a)(2), 405.1106(b), 405.1110(a),
405.1110(b)(2), 405.1110(d), 405.1118,
405.1122(e)(4), 405.1124(b),
405.1126(d)(1), 405.1130, 405.1132(b),
405.1136(c)(3), 405.1136(d)(2),
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405.1140(b)(1), 405.1140(c)(1),
405.1140(c)(4), 405.1140(d), we added
the word ‘‘calendar’’ in front of the
word ‘‘day’’ or ‘‘days’’ to clarify the
timeframes referenced therein.
• In § 405.924, we removed paragraph
(b)(7), because a determination
regarding the number of home health
visits used by a beneficiary is no longer
considered an initial determination. We
are renumbering the remaining
paragraphs accordingly.
• In sections 405.952(e), 405.958,
405.972(e), 405.974(b)(3), 405.978,
405.980(a)(1), 405.980(a)(5),
405.1004(c), and 405.1052(a)(6), we
made technical corrections by removing
the term ‘‘final’’ or ‘‘final and binding’’
and replacing it with ‘‘binding’’ to
clarify that the actions taken by an
adjudicator described in the above
sections are not considered final
decisions of the Secretary for the
purposes of exhausting administrative
remedies when seeking judicial review
in Federal court.
• In § 405.962(a) and § 405.972(b)(3),
we made a technical correction by
adding a reference to § 405.974(b)(1),
which, as amended in this final rule,
provides for a 60 calendar day filing
timeframe to request a reconsideration
of a contractor’s redetermination
dismissal action, as an exception to the
180 calendar day timeframe for filing a
request for reconsideration of a
contractor’s redetermination decision.
• In § 405.972(e), we added a
provision to clarify that a QIC’s
dismissal of a request for
reconsideration of a contractor’s
dismissal action is binding and not
subject to further review.
• In § 405.980(b), we made technical
corrections by (1) replacing the word
‘‘its’’ with the word ‘‘an’’, and (2)
removing the words ‘‘and revise’’ from
the introductory sentence, so the
sentence will now read: ‘‘A contractor
may reopen an initial determination or
redetermination on its own motion—
* * *’’. We are replacing the word ‘‘its’’
with ‘‘an’’ to more clearly convey our
longstanding policy to permit certain
contractors, other than those who issue
initial determinations, to reopen initial
determinations when appropriate. In
addition, removing the words ‘‘and
revise’’ reflects our longstanding policy
that the timeframes for reopening a
determination or decision are measured
by the date of the reopening not the date
of the revision of the determination or
decision.
• In § 405.990(b)(1)(i)(A), we made a
technical correction to replace the
phrase ‘‘final decision’’ with ‘‘decision,
dismissal order, or remand order’’ to
specify the types of actions that, if taken
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by an ALJ, preclude a request for EAJR
and to be consistent with our
clarification regarding the term ‘‘final’’.
• In § 405.990(b)(1)(i)(B), we made a
technical correction by adding the
phrase ‘‘, dismissal order, or remand
order’’ after ‘‘final decision’’ to specify
the types of actions that, if taken by the
MAC, preclude a request for EAJR and
to be consistent with our clarification
regarding the term ‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.990(b)(1)(ii), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘final action’’ with ‘‘decision or
dismissal order’’ in order to clarify the
nature of the QIC’s action and to be
consistent with our clarification
regarding the term ‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.990(f)(3), we made a
technical correction by removing the
words ‘‘final and’’ to state that the
decision of the review entity to certify
or deny a request for EAJR is not subject
to further review.
• In § 405.1000(c), we removed the
phrase ‘‘, including the QIC, QIO, fiscal
intermediary or carrier’’ consistent with
our revision to § 405.902 in which we
define the term contractor.
• In § 405.1000(d), we made a
technical revision to clarify that the ALJ
conducts a de novo review.
• In § 405.1002(b)(2), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
words ‘‘final action’’ with ‘‘decision or
dismissal order’’ in order to state the
nature of the QIC’s action and to be
consistent with our clarification
regarding the term ‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1004(c), we made a
technical correction to clarify that an
ALJ’s dismissal of a request for review
of a QIC’s dismissal action is binding
and not subject to further review unless
vacated by the MAC under
§ 405.1108(b).
• In § 405.1010(a) and § 405.1012(a),
we made technical corrections by
removing the phrase ‘‘, including a QIC’’
consistent with our revision to § 405.902
in which we define the term contractor.
• In § 405.1020(c)(1), we removed the
reference to, ‘‘the contractor that issued
the initial determination’’ in specifying
which entities are to receive notice of
the ALJ hearing.
• We revised § 405.1020(i)(4) to state
that when a party’s request for an inperson hearing under § 405.1020(i)(1) is
granted, the ALJ must issue a decision
within the adjudication timeframe
specified in § 405.1016 (including any
applicable extensions provided in this
subpart) unless the party requesting the
hearing agrees to waive such
adjudication timeframe in writing.
• In § 405.1022(a), we made a
technical revision to clarify that when a
party waives its right to receive the
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65331
notice of hearing, the ALJ must still
send the notice of hearing to all other
parties and potential participants who
have not waived their right to receive
the notice of hearing, consistent with
§ 405.1020(c).
• In § 405.1034(a), we made several
clarifications to the provisions allowing
an ALJ to remand a case to the QIC. We
explain that the phrase ‘‘can be
provided only by CMS or its
contractors’’ means the information is
not publicly available and is not in the
possession of and cannot be requested
and obtained by any of the parties to the
appeal. We explain that the term
‘‘publicly available’’ refers to
information that is available to the
general public via the Internet, or in a
printed publication. We clarify that if
the missing information is not
information that can be provided only
by CMS or its contractors (as that phrase
is clarified above), the ALJ must retain
jurisdiction of the case and obtain the
missing information on his or her own,
or directly from one of the parties.
• In § 405.1036(f)(1), we clarified that
an ALJ may not issue subpoenas to CMS
or its contractors, to compel an
appearance, testimony or the production
of evidence.
• In § 405.1036(f)(3), we revised the
time period for submitting requests for
subpoenas to an ALJ, and now require
parties to submit a request for a
subpoena no later than the end of the
discovery period established by the ALJ
under § 405.1037(c).
• In § 405.1038(b)(1)(i), we changed
the term ‘‘videoconferencing’’ to
‘‘videoteleconferencing’’ consistent with
the use of the term throughout this
regulation.
• In § 405.1046(c), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
term ‘‘final’’ with ‘‘binding on the
contractor’’ consistent with our
clarification regarding the term ‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1048(a), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘either issues a final action’’
with ‘‘issues a final decision or remand
order’’ to clarify the types of actions
issued by the MAC that cause an ALJ
decision to not become binding, and to
be consistent with our clarification
regarding the term ‘‘final.’’
• Added § 405.1063(a) to clarify the
additional authorities that are binding
on ALJs and the MAC. The original
paragraph in § 405.1063 is reassigned to
subsection (b).
• In § 405.1100(c) and § 405.1100(d),
we made technical corrections by
replacing the phrase ‘‘final action’’ with
‘‘final decision or dismissal order’’ to
specify the actions taken by the MAC
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and to be consistent with our
clarification regarding the term ‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1104(a)(2) we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘final action or remand the case
to the QIC’’ with ‘‘decision, dismissal
order, or remand order’’ to specify the
actions taken by the MAC and to be
consistent with our clarification
regarding the term ‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1104(b)(1), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘final action or remand’’ with
‘‘decision, dismissal order, or remand
order’’ to specify the actions taken by
the MAC and to be consistent with our
clarification regarding the term ‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1104(b)(2), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘final action or remand order’’
with ‘‘decision, dismissal order, or
remand order’’ to specify the actions
taken by the MAC and to be consistent
with our clarification regarding the term
‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1104(b)(3), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘a final administrative decision
for purposes of MAC review’’ with the
phrase ‘‘the decision that is subject to
MAC review consistent with
§ 405.1102(a)’’ in order to clarify the
effect of the QIC decision and to be
consistent with our clarification
regarding the term ‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1104(c), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘final action’’ with the phrase
‘‘decision, dismissal order, or remand
order’’ in order to specify the actions
taken by the MAC and to be consistent
with our clarification regarding the term
‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1106(a), we clarified the
meaning of the phrase ‘‘other parties to
the ALJ decision or dismissal.’’
• In § 405.1106(b), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘final action or remand the case
to the ALJ’’ with the phrase ‘‘final
decision, dismissal order, or remand
order’’ in order to specify the actions
taken by the MAC and to be consistent
with our clarification regarding the term
‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1110(b)(2), we clarified the
meaning of the phrases ‘‘all parties to
the ALJ’s action’’ and ‘‘all other parties
to the ALJ’s decision.’’
• In § 405.1110(d), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘remains the final action in the
case’’ with the phrase ‘‘is binding on the
parties to the ALJ decision’’ consistent
with our clarification regarding the term
‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1112(a), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘final action’’ with the phrase
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‘‘decision or dismissal order’’ in order to
specify the actions taken by the ALJ and
to be consistent with our clarification
regarding the term ‘‘final’’. We also
made a technical correction by replacing
a comma with a semi-colon following
the phrase ‘‘if any.’’
• In § 405.1122(d)(1), we clarified that
the MAC may not issue subpoenas to
CMS or its contractors to compel the
production of evidence.
• We made a technical correction in
paragraph § 405.1122(e)(2)(v), correcting
the word ‘‘lifed’’ to read ‘‘lifted.’’
• We renumbered the paragraphs in
§ 405.1122(e).
• In § 405.1122(f)(1), we corrected the
reference to the Social Security Act
regarding the Secretary’s authority to
seek enforcement of subpoenas from
‘‘section 205(c) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
405(c)’’ to ‘‘section 205(e) of the Act, 42
U.S.C. 405(e).’’
• In § 405.1126(a), we made a
technical correction by removing the
word ‘‘final’’ consistent with our
clarification regarding the term ‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1130, we made a technical
correction by adding the words ‘‘final
and’’ before the word ‘‘binding’’
consistent with our clarification
regarding the term ‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1132(b), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘final action or remand’’ with
‘‘final decision, dismissal order, or
remand order’’ to specify the actions
taken by the MAC and to be consistent
with our clarification regarding the term
‘‘final.’’
• In § 405.1136(a)(2), we made a
technical correction by replacing the
phrase ‘‘final action’’ with ‘‘final
decision, dismissal order, or remand
order’’ to specify the actions taken by
the MAC and to be consistent with our
clarification regarding the term
‘‘final.kathe’’
IV. Collection of Information
Requirements
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995 (PRA), we are required to
provide 30 day notice in the Federal
Register and solicit public comment
when a collection of information
requirement is submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and approval. In order to fairly
evaluate whether an information
collection should be approved by OMB,
section 3506(c)(2)(A) of the PRA
requires that we solicit comment on the
following issues:
• The need for the information
collection and its usefulness in carrying
out the proper functions of our agency.
• The accuracy of our estimate of the
information collection burden.
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• The quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected.
• Recommendations to minimize the
information collection burden on the
affected public, including automated
collection techniques.
Therefore, we are soliciting public
comments on each of these issues for
the information collection requirements
discussed below.
The PRA exempts most of the
information collection activities
referenced in this interim final rule. In
particular, 5 CFR § 1320.4 excludes
collection activities during the conduct
of administrative actions such as
redeterminations, reconsiderations, and/
or appeals. Specifically, these actions
are taken after the initial determination
or a denial of payment. There is,
however, one requirement contained in
this rule that is subject to the PRA
because the burden is imposed prior to
an administrative action or denial of
payment. This requirement is discussed
below.
Appointed Representatives (§ 405.910)
In summary, § 405.910 states that an
individual or entity may appoint a
representative to act on their behalf in
exercising their right to receive an
initial determination on a request for
payment, or to pursue an appeal of an
initial determination. This appointment
of representation must be in writing and
must include all of the required
elements specified in this section.
The burden associated with this
requirement is the time and effort of the
individual or entity to prepare an
appointment of representation
containing all of the required
information of this section. In an effort
to reduce some of the burden associated
with this requirement, we have
developed a standardized form that the
individual/entity may use. This optional
standardized form is currently approved
under OMB# 0938–0950.
We estimate that approximately
13,413 individuals and entities will
elect to appoint a representative to act
on their behalf each year. Because we
have developed the optional
standardized form, we estimate that it
should only take approximately 15
minutes to supply the required
information to comply with the
requirements of this section. Therefore,
we estimate the total burden to be 3,353
hours on an annual basis.
If you comment on these information
collection and recordkeeping
requirements, please do either of the
following:
1. Submit your comments
electronically as specified in the
ADDRESSES section of this final rule; or
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2. Submit your comments to the
Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and
Budget, Attention: CMS Desk Officer,
CMS 4064–F; Fax: (202) 395–6974; or Email: OIRA_submission@omb.eop.gov.
V. Regulatory Impact Statement
We have examined the impact of this
final rule under the criteria of Executive
Order 12866 on Regulatory Planning
and Review (September 30, 1993, as
further amended), the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA) (September 19,
1980, Pub. L. 96–354), section 1102(b) of
the Social Security Act, section 202 of
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995 (March 22, 1995, Pub. L. 104–4),
Executive Order 13132 on Federalism
(August 4, 1999), and the Congressional
Review Act (5 U.S.C. 804(2)).
Executive Order 12866 (as amended
by Executive Orders 13258 and 13422
directs agencies to assess all costs and
benefits of available regulatory
alternatives and, if regulation is
necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety
effects, distributive impacts, and
equity). A regulatory impact analysis
(RIA) must be prepared for major rules
with economically significant effects
($100 million or more in any 1 year). As
detailed above, this final rule makes
only minimal changes to the existing
Medicare claims appeals procedures.
Thus, this rule will have negligible
financial impact on beneficiaries,
providers or suppliers.
Therefore, this does not constitute a
major rule and, consistent with
Executive Order 12866, we are not
preparing an RIA.
The RFA requires agencies, in issuing
certain rules, to analyze options for
regulatory relief of small businesses, if
a rule has a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities. For
purposes of the RFA, small entities
include small businesses, nonprofit
organizations, and government agencies.
For purposes of the RFA, all providers
and suppliers affected by this regulation
are considered to be small entities.
Individuals and States are not included
in the definition of a small entity.
In addition, section 1102(b) of the Act
requires us to prepare a RIA for a rule
that may have a significant impact on
the operations of a substantial number
of small rural hospitals. This analysis
must conform to the provisions of
section 604 of the RFA. For purposes of
section 1102(b) of the Act, we define a
small rural hospital as a hospital that is
located outside of a Metropolitan
Statistical Area and has fewer than 100
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beds. As noted above, this final rule
makes only minimal changes to the
existing appeals procedures and thus,
does not have a significant impact on
small entities or the operations of a
substantial number of small rural
hospitals. Therefore, we are not
preparing analyses for either the RFA or
section 1102(b) of the Act.
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 also
requires that agencies assess anticipated
costs and benefits before issuing any
rule that would include any Federal
mandate that may result in expenditure
in any one year by State, local, or Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million (adjusted
annually for inflation). In 2009, the
threshold is approximately $133
million. This rule will not meet this
threshold, in any 1 year, with respect to
expenditures by State, local, or Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector.
Executive Order 13132 establishes
certain requirements that an agency
must meet when it promulgates a
proposed rule (and subsequent interim
final and final rules) that imposes
substantial direct requirement costs on
State and local governments, preempts
State law, or otherwise has Federalism
implications. This rule does not have a
substantial effect on State or local
governments.
In accordance with the provisions of
Executive Order 12866, this regulation
was reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget.
List of Subjects in 42 CFR Part 405
Administrative practice and
procedure, Health facilities, Health
professions, Kidney diseases, Medical
devices, Medicare, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Rural
areas, X-rays.
■ For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services amends 42 CFR Part
405 as set forth below:
PART 405—FEDERAL HEALTH
INSURANCE FOR THE AGED AND
DISABLED
1. The authority citation for part 405
is revised to read as follows:
■
Authority: Secs. 205(a), 1102, 1861,
1862(a), 1869, 1871, 1874, 1881, and 1886(k)
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(a),
1302, 1395x, 1395y(a), 1395ff, 1395hh,
1395kk, 1395rr and 1395ww(k)), and sec. 353
of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
263a).
2. Section 405.902 is amended by
adding the definition of contractor in
alphabetical order to read as follows:
■
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§ 405.902
65333
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
Contractor means an entity that
contracts with the Federal government
to review and/or adjudicate claims,
determinations and/or decisions.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 405.922
[Amended]
3. Section 405.922 is amended by
removing the phrase ‘‘30 days’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘30
calendar days.’’
■
§ 405.924
[Amended]
4. Section 405.924 is amended by—
A. Removing paragraph (b)(7).
B. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(8)
through (b)(15) as paragraphs(b)(7)
through (b)(14), respectively.
■
■
■
§ 405.942
[Amended]
5. Section 405.942 is amended by—
A. In paragraph (a)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘5 days’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘5 calendar days’’.
■ B. In paragraph (b) introductory text,
removing the phrase ‘‘120-day’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘120
calendar day’’.
■
■
§ 405.946
[Amended]
6. Section 405.946(b) is amended by
removing the phrase ‘‘60-day’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘60
calendar day’’.
■
§ 405.950
[Amended]
7. Section 405.950 is amended by—
A. In paragraph (b)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘120-day’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘120 calendar day’’,
and removing the phrase ‘‘60-day’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘60
calendar day’’.
■ B. In paragraph (b)(2), removing the
phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘60 calendar days’’.
■ C. In paragraph (b)(3), removing the
phrase ‘‘60-day’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘60 calendar day’’.
■ 8. Section 405.952 is amended by
revising paragraph (e) to read as follows:
■
■
§ 405.952 Withdrawal or dismissal of a
request for redetermination.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) Effect of dismissal. The dismissal
of a request for redetermination is
binding unless it is modified or reversed
by a QIC under § 405.974(b) or vacated
under paragraph (d) of this section.
■ 9. Section 405.958 is amended by
revising the introductory text to read as
follows:
§ 405.958
Effect of a redetermination.
In accordance with section
1869(a)(3)(D) of the Act, once a
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redetermination is issued, it becomes
part of the initial determination. The
redetermination is binding upon all
parties unless—
*
*
*
*
*
■ 10. Section 405.962 is amended by—
■ A. Revising paragraph (a) introductory
text.
■ B. In paragraph (a)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘5 days’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘5 calendar days’’.
■ C. In paragraphs (a)(2) and (b)(1),
removing the phrase ‘‘180-day’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘180
calendar day’’.
The revision reads as follows:
§ 405.962 Timeframe for filing a request for
a reconsideration.
(a) Timeframe for filing a request.
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of
this section and in § 405.974(b)(1),
regarding a request for QIC
reconsideration of a contractor’s
dismissal of a redetermination request,
any request for a reconsideration must
be filed within 180 calendar days from
the date the party receives the notice of
the redetermination.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 405.966
[Amended]
11. Section 405.966 is amended by—
A. In paragraph (b), removing the
phrase ‘‘60-day’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘60 calendar day’’.
■ B. In paragraph (c), removing the
phrase ‘‘14-day’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘14 calendar day’’.
■
■
§ 405.970
[Amended]
12. Section 405.970 is amended by—
A. In paragraph (a)(2), removing the
phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘60 calendar days’’.
■ B. In paragraph (b)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘180-day’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘180 calendar day’’,
and removing the phrase ‘‘60-day’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘60
calendar day’’.
■ C. In paragraph (b)(2), removing the
phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘60 calendar days’’.
■ D. In paragraph (b)(3), removing the
phrase ‘‘60-day’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘60 calendar day’’, and
removing the phrase ‘‘14 days’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘14
calendar days’’.
■ E. In paragraph (c) introductory text,
removing the phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘60
calendar days’’.
■ F. In paragraph (e)(2) introductory
text, removing the phrase ‘‘5 days’’
wherever it appears and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘5 calendar days’’.
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■
■
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■
13. Section 405.972 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(3) and (e) to read
as follows:
in its place the phrase ‘‘180 calendar
days’’.
The revisions are as follows:
§ 405.972 Withdrawal or dismissal of a
request for a reconsideration.
§ 405.980 Reopenings of initial
determinations, redeterminations, and
reconsiderations, hearings and reviews.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(3) When the party fails to file the
reconsideration request in accordance
with the timeframes established in
§ 405.962, or fails to file the request for
reconsideration of a contractor’s
dismissal of a redetermination request
in accordance with the timeframes
established in § 405.974(b)(1);
*
*
*
*
*
(e) Effect of dismissal. The dismissal
of a request for reconsideration is
binding unless it is modified or reversed
by an ALJ under § 405.1004 or vacated
under paragraph (d) of this section. The
dismissal of a request for
reconsideration of a contractor’s
dismissal of a redetermination request is
binding and not subject to further
review unless vacated under paragraph
(d) of this section.
■ 14. Section 405.974 is amended by—
■ A. In paragraph (b)(1) introductory
text, removing the phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘60
calendar days’’.
■ B. In paragraph (b)(1)(i), removing the
phrase ‘‘5 days’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘5 calendar days’’.
■ C. In paragraph (b)(1)(ii), removing the
phrase ‘‘60-day’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘60 calendar day’’.
■ D. Revising paragraph (b)(3).
The revision reads as follows:
§ 405.974
Reconsideration.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(3) A QIC’s reconsideration of a
contractor’s dismissal of a
redetermination request is binding and
not subject to further review.
■ 15. Section 405.978 is amended by
revising the introductory text to read as
follows:
§ 405.978
Effect of a reconsideration.
A reconsideration is binding on all
parties, unless—
*
*
*
*
*
■ 16. Section 405.980 is amended by—
■ A. Revising paragraphs (a)(1)
introductory text and (a)(5).
■ B. In paragraph (b) introductory text,
removing the phrase ‘‘and revise its’’
and adding in its place the word ‘‘an’’.
■ C. In paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(2), and
(d)(3), removing the phrase ‘‘180 days’’
wherever it appears and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘180 calendar days’’.
■ D. In paragraphs (e)(1), (e)(2) and
(e)(3), removing ‘‘180 days’’ and adding
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(a) * * *
(1) A reopening is a remedial action
taken to change a binding determination
or decision that resulted in either an
overpayment or underpayment, even
though the binding determination or
decision may have been correct at the
time it was made based on the evidence
of record. That action may be taken by—
*
*
*
*
*
(5) The contractor’s, QIC’s, ALJ’s, or
MAC’s decision on whether to reopen is
binding and not subject to appeal.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 17. Section 405.990 is amended by—
■ A. Revising paragraphs (b)(1)(i)(A),
(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(1)(ii), and (f)(3).
■ B. In paragraphs (f)(2), (f)(4) and
(h)(2), removing the phrase ‘‘60 days’’
and adding in its place the phrase ‘‘60
calendar days’’.
■ C. In paragraph (i)(2), removing the
phrase ‘‘90-day’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘90 calendar day’’.
■ D. In paragraph (j)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘60-day’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘60 calendar day’’.
The revisions are as follows:
§ 405.990
review.
Expedited access to judicial
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) * * *
(A) An ALJ hearing in accordance
with § 405.1002 and a decision,
dismissal order, or remand order of the
ALJ has not been issued;
(B) MAC review in accordance with
§ 405.1102 and a final decision,
dismissal order, or remand order of the
MAC has not been issued; or
(ii) The appeal has been escalated
from the QIC to the ALJ level after the
period described in § 405.970(a) and
§ 405.970(b) has expired, and the QIC
does not issue a decision or dismissal
order within the timeframe described in
§ 405.970(e).
*
*
*
*
*
(f) * * *
(3) A determination by the review
entity either certifying that the
requirements for EAJR are met pursuant
to paragraph (g) of this section or
denying the request is not subject to
review by the Secretary.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 18. Section 405.1000 is amended by
revising paragraphs (c) and (d) to read
as follows:
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§ 405.1000
rule.
Hearing before an ALJ: General
*
*
*
*
*
(c) In some circumstances, a
representative of CMS or its contractor
may participate in or join the hearing as
a party. (See, § 405.1010 and
§ 405.1012.)
(d) The ALJ conducts a de novo
review and issues a decision based on
the hearing record.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 19. Section 405.1002 is amended by—
■ A. In paragraph (a)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘60 calendar days’’.
■ B. In paragraph (a)(3), removing the
phrase ‘‘5 days’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘5 calendar days’’.
■ C. In paragraph (a)(4), removing the
phrase ‘‘60-day’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘60 calendar day’’.
■ D. Revising paragraph (b)(2) to read as
follows:
§ 405.1002
Right to an ALJ hearing.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(2) The QIC does not issue a decision
or dismissal order within 5 calendar
days of receiving the request for
escalation in accordance with
§ 405.970(e)(2); and
*
*
*
*
*
■ 20. Section 405.1004 is amended by—
■ A. In paragraph (a)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘60 calendar days’’.
■ B. In paragraph (a)(3), removing the
phrase ‘‘5 days’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘5 calendar days’’.
■ C. In paragraph (a)(4), removing the
phrase ‘‘60-day’’ and adding in its place
the phrase ‘‘60 calendar day’’.
■ D. Revising paragraph (c) to read as
follows:
§ 405.1004 Right to ALJ review of QIC
notice of dismissal.
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*
*
*
*
*
(c) An ALJ’s decision regarding a
QIC’s dismissal of a reconsideration
request is binding and not subject to
further review. The dismissal of a
request for ALJ review of a QIC’s
dismissal of a reconsideration request is
binding and not subject to further
review, unless vacated by the MAC
under § 405.1108(b).
§ 405.1006
[Amended]
21. Section 405.1006(e)(1)(ii) is
amended by removing the phrase ‘‘60
days’’ and adding in its place the phrase
‘‘60 calendar days’’.
■ 22. Section 405.1010 is amended by—
■ A. Revising paragraph (a).
■
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B. In paragraph (b), removing the
phrase ‘‘10 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘10 calendar days’’.
The revision reads as follows:
■
§ 405.1010 When CMS or its contractors
may participate in an ALJ hearing.
(a) An ALJ may request, but may not
require, CMS and/or one or more of its
contractors to participate in any
proceedings before the ALJ, including
the oral hearing, if any. CMS and/or one
or more of its contractors may also elect
to participate in the hearing process.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 23. Section 405.1012 is amended by—
■ A. Revising paragraph (a).
■ B. In paragraph (b), removing the
phrase ‘‘10 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘10 calendar days’’.
The revision reads as follows:
§ 405.1012 When CMS or its contractors
may be a party to a hearing.
(a) CMS and/or one or more of its
contractors may be a party to an ALJ
hearing unless the request for hearing is
filed by an unrepresented beneficiary.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 405.1014
[Amended]
24. Section 405.1014 is amended by—
A. In paragraph (b)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘60 calendar days’’.
■ B. In paragraph (b)(2), removing the
phrase ‘‘90-day’’ where it appears and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘90
calendar day’’.
■
■
§ 405.1016
[Amended]
25. Section 405.1016 is amended by—
A. In paragraph (a), removing the
phrase ‘‘90-day’’ where it appears and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘90
calendar day’’.
■ B. In paragraph (c), removing the
phrase ‘‘180-day’’ where it appears and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘180
calendar day’’.
■
■
§ 405.1018
[Amended]
26. Section 405.1018(a) and (b) is
amended by removing the phrase ‘‘10
days’’ and adding in its place the phrase
‘‘10 calendar days’’.
■ 27. Section 405.1020 is amended by—
■ A. Revising paragraph (c)(1).
■ B. In paragraph (g)(3)(ii), removing the
phrase ‘‘10 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘10 calendar days’’.
■ C. Revising paragraph (i)(4).
The revisions read as follows:
■
§ 405.1020 Time and place for a hearing
before an ALJ.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) The ALJ sends a notice of hearing
to all parties that filed an appeal or
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65335
participated in the reconsideration, any
party who was found liable for the
services at issue subsequent to the
initial determination, and the QIC that
issued the reconsideration, advising
them of the proposed time and place of
the hearing.
*
*
*
*
*
(i) * * *
(4) When a party’s request for an inperson hearing as specified under
paragraph (i)(1) of this section is
granted, the ALJ must issue a decision
within the adjudication timeframe
specified in § 405.1016 (including any
applicable extensions provided in this
subpart) unless the party requesting the
hearing agrees to waive such
adjudication timeframe in writing.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 28. Section 405.1022 is amended by
revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
§ 405.1022
ALJ.
Notice of a hearing before an
(a) Issuing the notice. After the ALJ
sets the time and place of the hearing,
notice of the hearing will be mailed to
the parties and other potential
participants, as provided in
§ 405.1020(c) at their last known
address, or given by personal service.
The ALJ is not required to send a notice
of hearing to a party who indicates in
writing that it does not wish to receive
this notice. The notice is mailed or
served at least 20 calendar days before
the hearing.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 405.1024
[Amended]
29. Section 405.1024(a) is amended by
removing the phrase ‘‘5 days’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘5
calendar days’’.
■
§ 405.1028
[Amended]
30. Section 405.1028(a) is amended by
removing the phrase ‘‘10 days’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘10
calendar days’’.
■ 31. Section 405.1034 is amended by
revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
■
§ 405.1034 When an ALJ may remand a
case to the QIC.
(a) General rules. (1) If an ALJ believes
that the written record is missing
information that is essential to resolving
the issues on appeal and that
information can be provided only by
CMS or its contractors, then the ALJ
may either:
(i) Remand the case to the QIC that
issued the reconsideration or
(ii) Retain jurisdiction of the case and
request that the contractor forward the
missing information to the appropriate
hearing office.
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(2) If the information is not
information that can be provided only
by CMS or its contractors, the ALJ must
retain jurisdiction of the case and obtain
the information on his or her own, or
directly from one of the parties.
(3) ‘‘Can be provided only by CMS or
its contractors’’ means the information
is not publicly available, and is not in
the possession of, and cannot be
requested and obtained by one of the
parties. Information that is publicly
available is information that is available
to the general public via the Internet or
in a printed publication. It includes, but
is not limited to, information available
on a CMS or contractor Web site or
information in an official CMS or DHHS
publication (including, but not limited
to, provisions of NCDs or LCDs,
procedure code or modifier
descriptions, fee schedule data, and
contractor operating manual
instructions).
*
*
*
*
*
■ 32. Section 405.1036 is amended by—
■ A. Revising paragraphs (f)(1) and
(f)(3).
■ B. In paragraph (f)(5)(iv), removing the
phrase ‘‘15 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘15 calendar days’’.
The revisions read as follows:
§ 405.1036
process.
Description of an ALJ hearing
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*
*
*
*
*
(f) * * *
(1) Except as provided in this section,
when it is reasonably necessary for the
full presentation of a case, an ALJ may,
on his or her own initiative or at the
request of a party, issue subpoenas for
the appearance and testimony of
witnesses and for a party to make books,
records, correspondence, papers, or
other documents that are material to an
issue at the hearing available for
inspection and copying. An ALJ may
not issue a subpoena to CMS or its
contractors, on his or her own initiative
or at the request of a party, to compel
an appearance, testimony, or the
production of evidence.
*
*
*
*
*
(3) Parties to a hearing who wish to
subpoena documents or witnesses must
file a written request for the issuance of
a subpoena with the requirements set
forth in paragraph (f)(2) of this section
with the ALJ no later than the end of the
discovery period established by the ALJ
under § 405.1037(c).
*
*
*
*
*
§ 405.1037
[Amended]
33. Section 405.1037 is amended by—
A. In paragraph (c)(5), removing the
phrase ‘‘45 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘45 calendar days’’.
■
■
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B. In paragraph (e)(2)(iii), removing
the phrase ‘‘15 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘15 calendar days’’.
■
§ 405.1038
[Amended]
34. Section 405.1038(b)(1)(i) is
amended by removing the word
‘‘videoconferencing’’ and adding in its
place the word ‘‘videoteleconferencing’’.
■
§ 405.1042
[Amended]
35. Section 405.1042(b)(2) is amended
by removing the phrase ‘‘90-day’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘90
calendar day’’.
■
§ 405.1044
[Amended]
36. Section 405.1044(d) is amended
by removing the phrase ‘‘10 days’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘10
calendar days’’.
■ 37. Section 405.1046 is amended by—
■ A. Revising paragraph (c).
■ B. In paragraph (d), removing the
phrase ‘‘90-day’’ where it appears and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘90
calendar day’’.
The revision reads as follows:
■
§ 405.1046
Notice of an ALJ decision.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Limitation on decision. When the
amount of payment for an item or
service is an issue before the ALJ, the
ALJ may make a finding as to the
amount of payment due. If the ALJ
makes a finding concerning payment
when the amount of payment was not
an issue before the ALJ, the contractor
may independently determine the
payment amount. In either of the
aforementioned situations, an ALJ’s
decision is not binding on the contractor
for purposes of determining the amount
of payment due. The amount of
payment determined by the contractor
in effectuating the ALJ’s decision is a
new initial determination under
§ 405.924.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 38. Section 405.1048 is amended by
revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
§ 405.1048
The effect of an ALJ’s decision.
*
*
*
*
*
(a) A party to the hearing requests a
review of the decision by the MAC
within the stated time period or the
MAC reviews the decision issued by an
ALJ under the procedures set forth in
§ 405.1110, and the MAC issues a final
decision or remand order or the appeal
is escalated to Federal district court
under the provisions at § 405.1132 and
the Federal district court issues a
decision.
*
*
*
*
*
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§ 405.1052
[Amended]
39. Section 405.1052 is amended by—
A. In paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) and
(a)(2)(iii), removing the phrase ‘‘10
days’’ and adding in its place the phrase
‘‘10 calendar days’’.
■ B. In paragraph (a)(6), removing the
word ‘‘final’’ and adding in its place the
word ‘‘binding’’.
■ 40. Section 405.1063 is revised to read
as follows:
■
■
§ 405.1063 Applicability of laws,
regulations and CMS Rulings.
(a) All laws and regulations pertaining
to the Medicare and Medicaid programs,
including, but not limited to Titles XI,
XVIII, and XIX of the Social Security
Act and applicable implementing
regulations, are binding on ALJs and the
MAC.
(b) CMS Rulings are published under
the authority of the Administrator, CMS.
Consistent with § 401.108 of this
chapter, rulings are binding on all CMS
components, on all HHS components
that adjudicate matters under the
jurisdiction of CMS, and on the Social
Security Administration to the extent
that components of the Social Security
Administration adjudicate matters
under the jurisdiction of CMS.
§ 405.1100
[Amended]
41. Section 405.1100 is amended by
revising paragraphs (c) and (d) to read
as follows:
■
§ 405.1100 Medicare Appeals Council
review: General.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) When the MAC reviews an ALJ’s
decision, it undertakes a de novo
review. The MAC issues a final decision
or dismissal order or remands a case to
the ALJ within 90 calendar days of
receipt of the appellant’s request for
review, unless the 90 calendar day
period is extended as provided in this
subpart.
(d) When deciding an appeal that was
escalated from the ALJ level to the
MAC, the MAC will issue a final
decision or dismissal order or remand
the case to the ALJ within 180 calendar
days of receipt of the appellant’s request
for escalation, unless the 180 calendar
day period is extended as provided in
this subpart.
§ 405.1102
[Amended]
42. Section 405.1102 is amended by—
A. In paragraph (a)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘60 calendar days’’.
■ B. In paragraph (a)(2), removing the
phrase ‘‘5 days’’ and adding in its place
‘‘5 calendar days’’.
■
■
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43. Section 405.1104 is amended by
revising paragraphs (a)(2), (b) and (c) to
read as follows:
■
§ 405.1104 Request for MAC review when
an ALJ does not issue a decision timely.
(a) * * *
(2) The ALJ does not issue a decision,
dismissal order, or remand order within
the later of 5 calendar days of receiving
the request for escalation or 5 calendar
days from the end of the applicable
adjudication period set forth in
§ 405.1016.
(b) Escalation. (1) If the ALJ is not
able to issue a decision, dismissal order,
or remand order within the time period
set forth in paragraph (a)(2) of this
section, he or she sends notice to the
appellant.
(2) The notice acknowledges receipt
of the request for escalation, and
confirms that the ALJ is not able to issue
a decision, dismissal order, or remand
order within the statutory timeframe.
(3) If the ALJ does not act on a request
for escalation within the time period set
forth in paragraph (a)(2) of this section
or does not send the required notice to
the appellant, the QIC decision becomes
the decision that is subject to MAC
review consistent with § 405.1102(a).
(c) No escalation. If the ALJ’s
adjudication period set forth in
§ 405.1016 expires, the case remains
with the ALJ until a decision, dismissal
order, or remand order is issued or the
appellant requests escalation to the
MAC.
■ 44. Section 405.1106 is revised to read
as follows:
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§ 405.1106 Where a request for review or
escalation may be filed.
(a) When a request for a MAC review
is filed after an ALJ has issued a
decision or dismissal, the request for
review must be filed with the entity
specified in the notice of the ALJ’s
action. The appellant must also send a
copy of the request for review to the
other parties to the ALJ decision or
dismissal who received a copy of the
hearing decision under § 405.1046(a) or
a copy of the notice of dismissal under
§ 405.1052(b). Failure to copy the other
parties tolls the MAC’s adjudication
deadline set forth in § 405.1100 until all
parties to the hearing receive notice of
the request for MAC review. If the
request for review is timely filed with
an entity other than the entity specified
in the notice of the ALJ’s action, the
MAC’s adjudication period to conduct a
review begins on the date the request for
review is received by the entity
specified in the notice of the ALJ’s
action. Upon receipt of a request for
review from an entity other than the
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15:06 Dec 08, 2009
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entity specified in the notice of the
ALJ’s action, the MAC sends written
notice to the appellant of the date of
receipt of the request and
commencement of the adjudication
timeframe.
(b) If an appellant files a request to
escalate an appeal to the MAC level
because the ALJ has not completed his
or her action on the request for hearing
within the adjudication deadline under
§ 405.1016, the request for escalation
must be filed with both the ALJ and the
MAC. The appellant must also send a
copy of the request for escalation to the
other parties. Failure to copy the other
parties tolls the MAC’s adjudication
deadline set forth in § 405.1100 until all
parties to the hearing receive notice of
the request for MAC review. In a case
that has been escalated from the ALJ,
the MAC’s 180 calendar day period to
issue a final decision, dismissal order,
or remand order begins on the date the
request for escalation is received by the
MAC.
■ 45. Section 405.1110 is amended by—
■ A. In paragraph (a), removing the
phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘60 calendar days’’.
■ B. Revising paragraphs (b)(2) and (d)
to read as follows:
§ 405.1110
motion.
MAC reviews on its own
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(2) CMS’ referral to the MAC is made
in writing and must be filed with the
MAC no later than 60 calendar days
after the ALJ’s decision or dismissal is
issued. The written referral will state
the reasons why CMS believes the MAC
must review the case on its own motion.
CMS will send a copy of its referral to
all parties to the ALJ’s action who
received a copy of the hearing decision
under § 405.1046(a) or the notice of
dismissal under § 405.1052(b), and to
the ALJ. Parties to the ALJ’s action may
file exceptions to the referral by
submitting written comments to the
MAC within 20 calendar days of the
referral notice. A party submitting
comments to the MAC must send such
comments to CMS and all other parties
to the ALJ’s decision who received a
copy of the hearing decision under
§ 405.1046(a) or the notice of dismissal
under § 405.1052(b).
*
*
*
*
*
(d) MAC’s action. If the MAC decides
to review a decision or dismissal on its
own motion, it will mail the results of
its action to all the parties to the hearing
and to CMS if it is not already a party
to the hearing. The MAC may adopt,
modify, or reverse the decision or
dismissal, may remand the case to an
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
65337
ALJ for further proceedings or may
dismiss a hearing request. The MAC
must issue its action no later than 90
calendar days after receipt of the CMS
referral, unless the 90 calendar day
period has been extended as provided in
this subpart. The MAC may not,
however, issue its action before the 20
calendar day comment period has
expired, unless it determines that the
agency’s referral does not provide a
basis for reviewing the case. If the MAC
does not act within the applicable
adjudication deadline, the ALJ’s
decision or dismissal is binding on the
parties to the ALJ decision.
■ 46. Section 405.1112 is amended by
revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
§ 405.1112
Content of request for review.
(a) The request for MAC review must
be filed with the MAC or appropriate
ALJ hearing office. The request for
review must be in writing and may be
made on a standard form. A written
request that is not made on a standard
form is accepted if it contains the
beneficiary’s name; Medicare health
insurance claim number; the specific
service(s) or item(s) for which the
review is requested; the specific date(s)
of service; the date of the ALJ’s decision
or dismissal order, if any; if the party is
requesting escalation from the ALJ to
the MAC, the hearing office in which
the appellant’s request for hearing is
pending; and the name and signature of
the party or the representative of the
party; and any other information CMS
may decide.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 405.1118
[Amended]
47. Section 405.1118 is amended by
removing the phrase ‘‘90-day’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘90
calendar day’’.
■ 48. Section 405.1122 is amended by—
■ A. Revising paragraph (d)(1).
■ B. Redesignating paragraph (e)(2)(i) as
paragraph (e)(2).
■ C. Redesignating paragraphs (e)(2)(ii)
through (e)(2)(v) as paragraphs (e)(3)
through (e)(6), respectively.
■ D. In new redesignated paragraph
(e)(4), removing the phrase ‘‘15 days’’
and adding in its place ‘‘15 calendar
days’’.
■ E. In new redesignated paragraph
(e)(2)(6), removing the word ‘‘lifed’’ and
adding in its place the word ‘‘lifted’’.
■ F. In paragraph (f)(1), removing the
reference to ‘‘section 205(c) of the Act,
42 U.S.C. 405(c).’’ and adding in its
place the reference ‘‘section 205(e) of
the Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(e).’’.
The revision reads as follows:
■
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§ 405.1122 What evidence may be
submitted to the MAC.
§ 405.1130
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(1) Except as provided in this section,
when it is reasonably necessary for the
full presentation of a case, the MAC
may, on its own initiative or at the
request of a party, issue subpoenas
requiring a party to make books,
records, correspondence, papers, or
other documents that are material to an
issue at the hearing available for
inspection and copying. The MAC may
not issue a subpoena to CMS or its
contractors, on its own initiative or at
the request of a party, to compel the
production of evidence.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 405.1124
[Amended]
49. Section 405.1124(b) is amended by
removing the phrase ‘‘10 days’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘10
calendar days’’.
■
§ 405.1126
[Amended]
50. Section 405.1126 is amended by—
■ A. In paragraph (a), removing the
word ‘‘final’’ from the last sentence.
■ B. In paragraph (d)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘20 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘20 calendar days’’.
■
51. Section 405.1130 is revised to read
as follows:
WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with RULES2
■
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15:06 Dec 08, 2009
Jkt 220001
Effect of the MAC’s decision.
The MAC’s decision is final and
binding on all parties unless a Federal
district court issues a decision
modifying the MAC’s decision or the
decision is revised as the result of a
reopening in accordance with § 405.980.
A party may file an action in a Federal
district court within 60 calendar days
after the date it receives notice of the
MAC’s decision.
■ 52. Section 405.1132 is amended by
revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
§ 405.1132 Request for escalation to
Federal court.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) A party may file an action in a
Federal district court within 60 calendar
days after the date it receives the MAC’s
notice that the MAC is not able to issue
a final decision, dismissal order, or
remand order unless the party is
appealing an ALJ dismissal.
■ 53. Section 405.1136 is amended by—
■ A. Revising paragraph (a)(2).
■ B. In paragraphs (c)(3) and (d)(2),
removing the phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and
adding in its place the phrase ‘‘60
calendar days’’.
The revision reads as follows:
§ 405.1136
Judicial review.
(a) * * *
(2) If the MAC’s adjudication period
set forth in § 405.1100 expires and the
appellant does not request escalation to
Federal district court, the case remains
with the MAC until a final decision,
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
dismissal order, or remand order is
issued.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 405.1140
[Amended]
54. Section 405.1140 is amended by—
A. In paragraph (b)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘30 days’’ wherever it appears
and adding in its place the phrase ‘‘30
calendar days’’, and removing the
phrase ‘‘30-day’’ wherever it appears
and adding in its place the phrase ‘‘30
calendar day’’.
■ B. In paragraph (c)(1), removing the
phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘60 calendar days’’.
■ C. In paragraph (c)(4), removing the
phrase ‘‘30 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘30 calendar days’’.
■ D. In paragraph (d), removing the
phrase ‘‘60 days’’ and adding in its
place the phrase ‘‘60 calendar days’’.
■
■
(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
Program No. 93.773, Medicare—Hospital
Insurance; and Program No. 93.774,
Medicare—Supplementary Medical
Insurance Program)
Dated: February 6, 2009.
Charlene Frizzera,
Acting Administrator, Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services.
Approved: August 6, 2009.
Kathleen Sebelius,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9–28707 Filed 12–8–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4120–01–P
E:\FR\FM\09DER2.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 235 (Wednesday, December 9, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 65296-65338]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-28707]
[[Page 65295]]
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Part III
Department of Health and Human Services
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Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
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42 CFR Part 405
Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims Appeal Procedures;
Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 74 , No. 235 / Wednesday, December 9, 2009 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 65296]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
42 CFR Part 405
[CMS-4064-F]
RIN 0938-AM73
Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims Appeal
Procedures
AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), DHHS.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Under the procedures in this final rule, Medicare
beneficiaries and, under certain circumstances, providers and suppliers
of health care services can appeal adverse determinations regarding
claims for benefits under Medicare Part A and Part B pursuant to
sections 1869 and 1879 of the Social Security Act (the Act). Section
521 of the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and
Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) amended section 1869 of the Act to
provide for significant changes to the Medicare claims appeal
procedures. After publication of a proposed rule implementing the
section 521 changes, additional new statutory requirements for the
appeals process were enacted in Title IX of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA). In March 2005,
we published an interim final rule with comment period to implement
these statutory changes. This final rule responds to comments on the
interim final rule regarding changes to these appeal procedures, makes
revisions where warranted, establishes the final implementing
regulations, and explains how the new procedures will be put into
practice.
DATES: Effective Date: These regulations are effective on January 8,
2010.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Arrah Tabe-Bedward, (410) 786-7129 (for issues relating to general
appeal rights).
David Danek, (617) 565-2682 (for issues relating to
redeterminations, reconsiderations, reopenings and expedited access to
judicial review (EAJR) issues).
Katherine L. Hosna, (410) 786-4993 (for general appeal issues).
Peggy McFadden-Elmore, (703) 235-0126 (for issues relating to
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hearings).
Theodore Kim, (202) 565-0200 (for issues relating to Medicare
Appeals Council (MAC) review).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background
A. Overview of Existing Medicare Program
B. Appeals Procedures Under Previous Regulations
C. Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and
Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA)
D. Related Provisions of the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)
E. Codification of Regulations
II. Analysis of Appeals Procedures and Responses to Public Comments
A. Overview
B. Appeals
1. Statutory Basis and Scope, Definitions and General Procedures
(Sec. 405.900 Through Sec. 405.904)
2. Parties to an Appeal, Medicaid State Agencies, and
Appointment of Representatives (Sec. 405.906 Through Sec. 405.910)
3. Assignment of Appeal Rights (Sec. 405.912)
4. Initial Determinations (Sec. 405.920 Through Sec. 405.928)
a. Initial Determinations, Notice of Initial Determinations, and
Timeframe for Processing Initial Determinations (Sec. 405.920
Through Sec. 405.922)
b. What Constitutes an Initial Determination and Decisions That
Are Not Considered Initial Determinations (Sec. 405.924 Through
Sec. 405.926)
c. Initial Determinations Subject to the Reopenings Process
(Sec. 405.927) and the Effects of Initial Determinations (Sec.
405.928)
5. Redeterminations (Sec. 405.940 Through Sec. 405.958)
a. Redetermination Requests (Sec. 405.940 Through Sec.
405.946)
b. Conduct and Effect of Redeterminations (Sec. 405.948 Through
Sec. 405.958)
6. Reconsiderations (Sec. 405.960 Through Sec. 405.978)
a. Processing Reconsideration Requests (Sec. 405.960 Through
Sec. 405.964)
b. Evidence Submitted With the Reconsideration Request--Full and
Early Presentation of Evidence (Sec. 405.966)
c. Conduct and Processing of Reconsiderations (Sec. 405.968
Through Sec. 405.978)
7. Reopenings of Initial Determinations, Redeterminations,
Reconsiderations, Hearings and Reviews (Sec. 405.980 Through Sec.
405.986)
a. Reopening Actions (Sec. 405.980)
b. Conduct of Reopenings (Sec. 405.982 through Sec. 405.986)
8. Expedited Access to Judicial Review (Sec. 405.990)
9. ALJ Hearings (Sec. 405.1000 Through Sec. 405.1064)
a. Transfer of the ALJ Function
b. ALJ Hearings--General Rules (Sec. 405.1000 Through Sec.
405.1014)
c. Adjudication Deadlines--ALJ Level (Sec. 405.1016)
d. Submission of Evidence Before the ALJ Hearing (Sec.
405.1018)
e. Time and Place for a Hearing Before an ALJ; Notice of
Hearing; Objections to the Issues (Sec. 405.1020 Through Sec.
405.1024)
f. Disqualification of the ALJ (Sec. 405.1026)
g. Review of Evidence Submitted to the ALJ, Hearing Procedures,
and Issues Before an ALJ (Sec. 405.1028 Through Sec. 405.1032)
h. Remand Authority (Sec. 405.1034)
i. Description of the ALJ Hearing Process and Discovery (Sec.
405.1036 and Sec. 405.1037)
j. Deciding a Case Without an ALJ Hearing, Conferences, the
Administrative Record, and Consolidated Hearings (Sec. 405.1038
Through Sec. 405.1044)
k. Notice and Effect of ALJ's Decision (Sec. 405.1046 Through
Sec. 405.1048)
l. Removal of a Hearing Request From the ALJ to the MAC,
Dismissal of a Request for ALJ Hearing, and the Effect of a
Dismissal (Sec. 405.1050 Through Sec. 405.1054)
m. Applicability of Statutes, Regulations, Medicare Coverage
Policies, CMS Rulings and Other Program Guidance (Sec. 405.1060
Through Sec. 405.1063)
n. ALJ Decisions Involving Statistical Samples (Sec. 405.1064)
10. Review by the Medicare Appeals Council (Sec. 405.1100
Through Sec. 405.1134)
a. MAC Review of an ALJ's Action (Sec. 405.1100 Through Sec.
405.1120)
b. Evidence That May Be Submitted to the MAC and Subpoenas
(Sec. 405.1122)
c. Oral Argument, Cases Remanded by the MAC, the Effect of MAC
Actions, Escalation to Federal District Court, and Extensions of
Time To File Actions in Federal District Court (Sec. 405.1124
Through Sec. 405.1134)
11. Judicial Review (Sec. 405.1136 Through Sec. 405.1140)
III. Provisions of the Final Regulations
IV. Collection of Information Requirements
V. Regulatory Impact Statement
I. Background
A. Overview of Existing Medicare Program
The original Medicare program consists of two parts: Part A and
Part B. Part A, known as the hospital insurance program, covers certain
care provided to inpatients in hospitals, critical access hospitals,
and skilled nursing facilities, as well as hospice care and some home
health care. Part B, the supplementary medical insurance program,
covers certain physician's services, outpatient hospital care, and
other medical services that are not covered under Part A.
In addition to the original Medicare program, beneficiaries may
elect to receive health care coverage under Part C of Medicare, the
Medicare Advantage (MA) program. Under the MA program, an individual is
entitled to those items and services (other than hospice care) for
which benefits are available under Part A and Part B. MA plans may
provide additional health care items and services that are not covered
under the original Medicare program. Beneficiaries can also elect to
receive
[[Page 65297]]
prescription drug coverage under Part D of Medicare, which became
effective January 1, 2006.
Under the original Medicare program, a beneficiary can generally
obtain health services from any institution, agency, or person
qualified to participate in the Medicare program. After providing an
item or service, the provider or supplier (or, in some cases, a
beneficiary) can submit a claim for benefits under the Medicare program
to the appropriate government contractor: A fiscal intermediary (FI)
(for all Part A claims and certain Part B claims); a carrier (for most
claims under Part B); or a Medicare administrative contractor (under
Medicare contracting reform, a contractor that processes all types of
Part A and Part B claims). If the claim is for an item or service that
falls within a Medicare benefit category, is not otherwise excluded by
statute or rule, and is reasonable and necessary for the individual as
set forth in Sec. 1862(a) of the Social Security Act, then the item or
service is covered and the contractor may make payment for the claim.
However, the Medicare program does not cover all health care expenses.
Therefore, if the Medicare contractor determines that the medical care
is not covered under the Medicare program, then it denies the claim.
B. Appeals Procedures Under Previous Regulations
Generally, when a contractor denies a claim, it notifies the
provider or supplier, and the beneficiary of the denial and offers the
opportunity to appeal the denial. The pre-BIPA appeal procedures for
original Medicare are set forth in regulations at 42 CFR part 405,
subparts G and H. Separate procedures for appealing determinations made
under the MA program are set forth at 42 CFR part 422, subpart M. There
is a similar, separate appeals process for the prescription drug
program set forth at subpart M of 42 CFR part 423. In addition, we
published a proposed rule to describe the appeals procedures that would
apply at the ALJ and MAC levels in deciding appeals brought by
individuals who have enrolled in the Medicare Part D prescription drug
benefit program (73 FR 14342, March 17, 2008). After an appellant has
exhausted the administrative appeal procedures offered under the
Medicare program, the Medicare statute provides the opportunity for an
individual who is dissatisfied to seek review in Federal court.
The regulations in part 405 subpart G beginning at Sec. 405.701
describe reconsiderations and appeals under Medicare Part A, prior to
the statutory changes in BIPA and the MMA. As set forth in these
regulations, when a Medicare contractor made a determination for a Part
A claim, the beneficiary or, in some circumstances, the provider, could
appeal the determination. Consistent with sections 1861(u) and 1866(e)
of the Act and Sec. 400.202, the term ``provider'' includes hospitals,
skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), home health agencies (HHAs),
comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities (CORFs), and
hospices, as well as certain clinics, rehabilitation agencies, and
public health agencies. Under this process, if a determination was
appealed, the contractor would reconsider the initial determination. If
the contractor upheld the original determination, a party could request
a hearing before an ALJ, provided that the amount in controversy (AIC)
was at least $100. If a party was dissatisfied with the ALJ's decision,
it could request review by the Departmental Appeals Board (DAB). Under
these regulations, the component within the DAB responsible for
Medicare claim appeals was the MAC. (Although the Medicare appeals
regulations in part 405, subparts G and H, contain some limited
provisions regarding ALJ and MAC proceedings, these proceedings were
generally governed by the Social Security Administration (SSA)
regulations at 20 CFR part 404, subpart J.) MAC decisions generally
constituted the final decision of the Secretary and could be appealed
to a Federal court. With few exceptions, parties had to complete the
lower level of appeal before the appeal could go on to the next level.
Pre-BIPA and pre-MMA appeal procedures for Medicare Part B are set
forth in 42 CFR part 405 subpart H (Sec. 405.801, et. seq.). Under
these regulations, beneficiaries, and suppliers that accepted
assignment for Medicare claims could request review of the contractor's
initial determination that a claim could not be paid, either in full or
in part. (The term ``supplier'' is defined under section 1861(d) of the
Act, as amended by section 901(b) of the MMA, and means a physician or
other practitioner, a facility, or other entity (other than a provider
of services that furnishes items or services) under Medicare.)
Suppliers that did not take assignment and providers, in some
circumstances, had limited appeal rights under these regulations.
As defined in the pre-BIPA and pre-MMA regulation at Sec. 405.815,
if a party to the contractor's review determination was dissatisfied
and the amount in controversy was at least $100, the party was entitled
to request a second level appeal known as a ``carrier hearing''. If the
carrier's hearing officer upheld the denial, a party to the carrier
hearing could request a hearing before an ALJ, provided that the action
met the amount in controversy requirement. (We published a ruling, CMS
Ruling No. 02-1, which implemented the $100 amount in controversy
requirement for Part B ALJ hearings specified in section 521 of BIPA
for initial determinations made on or after October 1, 2002. See 67 FR
62478, 62480 (Oct. 7, 2002). For initial determinations made prior to
October 1, 2002, the amount in controversy threshold was $100 for home
health services and $500 for all other services.) Subsequent aspects of
the appeals process for Part B claims are identical to those described
above for Part A claims.
C. Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection
Act of 2000 (BIPA)
Section 521 of the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) (Pub. L. 106-554) amended
section 1869 of the Act to require revisions to the Medicare fee-for-
service (Part A and Part B) appeals process. Among the major changes
required by the BIPA amendments were--
Establishing a uniform process for handling Medicare Part
A and Part B appeals, including the introduction of a new level of
appeal for Part A claims;
Revising the timeframes for filing a request for Part A
and Part B appeals;
Imposing time limits for ``redetermination'' decisions
made by the contractors;
Establishing a new appeals entity, the qualified
independent contractor (QIC), to conduct ``reconsiderations'' of
contractors' initial determinations (including redeterminations) and
allowing appellants to escalate cases to the next level of appeal (an
ALJ hearing) if reconsiderations are not completed within established
time limits;
Establishing a uniform amount in controversy threshold for
appeals at the ALJ level;
Imposing 90-day time limits for issuing decisions at the
ALJ and MAC levels of appeal and allowing appellants to escalate cases
to the next level of appeal if an ALJ or the MAC does not meet the 90-
day deadline; and
Requiring ``de novo'' review when the MAC reviews an ALJ
decision made after a hearing.
On November 15, 2002, we published in the Federal Register a
comprehensive proposed rule (67 FR 69312) to set forth proposed changes
needed to implement the provisions of section 521 of the BIPA, as well
as other complementary
[[Page 65298]]
changes needed to improve the Medicare claims appeal procedures.
D. Related Provisions of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)
On December 8, 2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) (Pub. L. 108-173) was enacted. The
MMA includes a number of provisions that made additional changes to the
Medicare claim appeals process. To the extent the new statutory
language necessitated revisions or additions to our proposed
regulations to ensure conformance to the MMA, we have incorporated the
needed changes into the interim final rule (70 FR 11420, March 8,
2005), the correcting amendments (70 FR 37700, June 30, 2005 and 70 FR
50214, August 26, 2005) and this final rule. Among the major changes
required by MMA are--
Transferring the ALJ function to the Department of Health
and Human Services (Section 931 of the MMA).
Establishing a process for expedited access to judicial
review (Section 932 of the MMA).
Requiring the full and early presentation of evidence
(Section 933(a) of the MMA).
Requiring the review of a patient's medical records in a
QIC reconsideration (Section 933(b) of the MMA).
Establishing content requirements for appeal determination
notices (Section 933(c) of the MMA).
Revising eligibility requirements for QICs (Section 933(d)
of the MMA).
Precluding administrative or judicial review of a
determination by the Secretary of sustained or high levels of payment
errors (Section 934(a) of the MMA).
Creating a separate process for the correction of minor
errors or omissions (Section 937 of the MMA).
Permitting appeals by providers and suppliers when there
is no other party available (Section 939 of the MMA).
Revising appeals timeframes and amounts in controversy
(Section 940 of the MMA).
E. Codification of Regulations
The BIPA provisions and the subsequent revisions made under MMA
make possible a largely uniform set of appeals procedures that can be
applied for both Part A and Part B of Medicare. In the interim final
rule, we established a new subpart I of part 405 that sets forth in one
location the requirements for fee-for-service claims appeals processed
by Medicare carriers, FIs, Medicare administrative contractors, and
QICs. Also included in subpart I are the provisions needed to govern
Medicare claims appeals to ALJs and the MAC. Thus, subpart I will
codify in one location key regulations governing all aspects of
Medicare claim appeals, beginning with the statutory requirements that
apply to initial determinations and proceeding through all four levels
of the administrative appeals process.
II. Analysis of Appeals Procedures and Responses to Public Comments
A. Overview
Discussed below are the comments and clarifications to the March
2005 interim final rule with comment period implementing section 521 of
BIPA and the relevant sections of the MMA. In general, we discuss those
sections of the interim final rule on which we received comments from
the public or which required editorial changes to improve the clarity
and simplicity of the regulations. We include a brief explanation of
each regulatory provision, provide a summary of, and responses to, the
comments received, and describe the changes, if any, to be made in
finalizing the provision in this rulemaking. The changes made in this
final regulation are summarized in the section of this preamble
entitled ``Provisions of the Final Regulations.''
We received 26 timely comments on the 2005 interim final rule with
comment period from individuals, organizations representing providers
and suppliers, beneficiary advocacy groups, law offices, health plans,
and others. The issues most frequently raised by commenters include:
Beneficiary protections; deadlines for filing appeals and timeframes
for decision-making; entities entitled to receive notices; differences
between an assignee and the beneficiary's appointed representative; the
role of the QICs that will perform reconsiderations; evidentiary
requirements; the perceived formality of the ALJ procedures, especially
proceedings where CMS or one of its contractors enters the process, and
the impact on beneficiaries; and whether the nature of an ALJ hearing
has changed, how much deference the ALJ gives to CMS' policies and, in
general, the manner in which the ALJs conduct hearings. These comments
and our responses are discussed below.
B. Appeals
1. Statutory Basis and Scope, Definitions and General Procedures (Sec.
405.900 Through Sec. 405.904)
In Sec. 405.900, we set forth the general statutory authority for
the ensuing provisions and explain that this subpart establishes the
requirements for appeals of initial determinations for benefits under
Part A and Part B of Medicare. Section 405.902 sets forth the
definitions for terms used in subpart I. Section 405.904 provides a
general description of the appeals process for entitlement and claims
appeals. Additional detailed discussion of these provisions is found in
the interim final rule at 70 FR 11427, 11431 through 11432, and 11434
through 11435.
In this final regulation, we are making a technical revision to
Sec. 405.902 to define the term contractor, as applicable to the
provisions in subpart I. We believe the meaning of the term contractor
may have been unclear because, in some instances, we specified the
entities that are included in the term contractor whereas, in other
instances, we did not provide such detail. Thus, we believe a technical
revision to clearly define the term contractor and to ensure that the
term is used consistently throughout Subpart I is appropriate.
Contractor means an entity that contracts with the Federal government
to review and/or adjudicate claims, determinations and/or decisions.
This includes, but is not limited to, fiscal intermediaries, carriers,
Medicare administrative contractors, qualified independent contractors,
and quality improvement organizations (QIOs). Although, based on this
definition, the term contractor includes many entities, the meaning of
the term contractor for a particular provision is derived from the
context. For example, under Sec. 405.920(a), after a claim is filed
with the appropriate contractor in the manner and form described in
part 424 subpart C, the contractor must determine if the items and
services furnished are covered or otherwise reimbursable under title
XVIII of the Act. Only fiscal intermediaries, carriers and Medicare
administrative contractors make such determinations, so the term
contractor means only these three entities in this context. We are also
making technical revisions to several sections noted below, in order to
remove references to specific contractors (such as QICs and QIOs) when
describing the general actions, responsibilities, or authority of
contractors. However, there are instances where we continue to use the
term contractor and also separately include a reference to QICs in the
same provision (for example, Sec. 405.910(i)(2) and Sec.
405.980(a)(4)). In those situations, we are maintaining the separate
reference to the QIC in order to highlight the specific
responsibilities of
[[Page 65299]]
the QIC with respect to reconsiderations.
We received no comments on these sections. Therefore, we are
finalizing Sec. 405.900 and Sec. 405.904 without modification. We are
finalizing Sec. 405.902, Sec. 405.1000, Sec. 405.1010 and Sec.
405.1012 with modifications, as noted.
2. Parties to an Appeal, Medicaid State Agencies, and Appointment of
Representatives (Sec. 405.906 Through Sec. 405.910)
Section 405.906 discusses parties to the appeals process. More
detail is provided on the role of Medicaid State agencies in the
appeals process in section 405.908. Section 405.910 describes appointed
representatives and the process for becoming an appointed
representative. We received several comments with respect to the rights
of Medicaid State agencies to file appeals, and the rights and
responsibilities of representatives. A summary of the comments and our
responses is included below. Additional detailed discussion of these
provisions is found in the interim final rule at 70 FR 11423, 11427
through 11431, 11432, 11434 through 11435, 11441, 11444 through 11445,
and 11468.
Comment: Several commenters asked CMS to broaden the definition of
``party'' at the initial determination level to include Medicaid State
agencies.
Response: As set forth in Sec. 405.906(b)(2), a Medicaid State
agency can be a party to a redetermination, reconsideration, hearing or
MAC review. Section 405.908 explains the process for a Medicaid State
agency to join the appeal as a party. Specifically, in Sec. 405.908,
we allow the State agency to file an appeal with respect to ``a claim
for items or services furnished to a dually eligible beneficiary only
for services for which the Medicaid State agency has made payment, or
for which it may be liable.'' Only after Medicare has issued its
initial determination on a claim for items or services provided to a
dually eligible beneficiary can a determination be made about a State
agency's potential liability for all or part of the associated charges,
and thus, the Medicaid State agency should not be a party to the
initial determination. If the Medicaid program is not financially
responsible for the items or services on a particular claim, it follows
that the State agency would have no interest in the claim and thus,
should not be a party to any appeal of the initial determination.
Accordingly, we believe it is appropriate to offer party status to a
Medicaid State agency only after there has been a determination on the
claim by Medicare, and then only if the State agency makes payment or
may be liable to make payment for the items or services on that claim.
If these requirements are met, the State agency may file a request for
a redetermination and will retain party status through the course of
any subsequent appeals for the particular claim.
Comment: One commenter stated that although the interim final rule
calls for an adjudicator to contact the party and provide a description
of information missing from the appointment of representative form
(Sec. 405.910(d)(1)), there are no provisions explaining how the need
to cure a defective appointment affects the time deadline for filing an
appeal. The commenter recommended amending the rule to indicate that an
appeal filed within time limits remains timely when the only technical
flaw is a defective appointment of representative that can be, and is,
cured.
Response: Under Sec. 405.910(d)(1), if an appeal request is filed
by an individual attempting to represent a party, but the submission
contains a defective appointment of representative (AOR) form, the
adjudicator will give the party notice of the defect. The adjudicator
provides the party and the putative representative with a reasonable
timeframe within which to cure the defect. The adjudicator will not
dismiss an appeal request filed with a defective AOR provided the
defect is cured within the timeframe established by the adjudicator.
Thus, in response to the situation described by the commenter, an
appeal request filed timely will be considered timely if the party
submits a corrected and valid appointment instrument within the
timeframe specified by the adjudicator, even if that period extends
beyond the time limit for filing the appeal.
However, if the adjudicator does not receive a valid appointment
instrument within the timeframe specified by the adjudicator, it may
dismiss the appeal request because the individual requesting the appeal
is not a proper party to the appeal or does not otherwise have a right
to appeal. See Sec. 405.952(b)(1), Sec. 405.972(b)(1), Sec.
405.1052(a)(3) and Sec. 405.1114(b). If the appeal request is
dismissed, the party or the representative may re-file the request. If
the resubmission is untimely, consistent with Sec. 405.942(b), the
representative must include an explanation of the circumstances leading
to the late filing and request that the contractor consider whether
good cause exists to extend the time for filing the appeal.
Comment: One commenter asked that Sec. 405.910(e)(1) be amended to
note that an appointment is valid for one year, except as noted in
Sec. 405.910(e)(3). We were also asked to clarify whether a
representative may be appointed before the issuance of an initial
determination. Finally, a commenter asked when an updated appointment
of representative form (Form CMS-1696) would be available.
Response: Section 405.910(e)(1) states that once the AOR form is
executed, it is valid for one year from the effective date. Section
405.910(e)(2) states that the representative must submit, with each
appeal request, a copy of the valid, effective AOR or other conforming
written instrument in order to request a redetermination or other
appeal on behalf of the party. Thus, a valid, executed AOR will be
honored for the duration of the initial appeal request for which it is
filed, and for any subsequent appeal request with which it is
submitted, provided the initial appeal request is filed within one year
of the effective date of the AOR.
In Sec. 405.910(e)(3), we made an exception for appointments
signed in connection with Medicare Secondary Payer recovery claims,
because liability, no-fault, and worker's compensation claims often
take more than one year to resolve. Where an appointment of
representative is related to these recovery claims, the appointment is
valid from the date that it is signed through the duration of any
subsequent appeal. We believe Sec. 405.910(e) is clear on its face
and, thus, we are not revising this subsection.
In the interim final rule, we stated that, under Sec. 405.910(a),
the appointment of representative provisions apply at the initial
determination level and throughout the appeals process. See 70 FR
11431. Section 405.910(a) states that ``[a]n appointed representative
may act on behalf of an individual or entity in exercising his or her
right to an initial determination or appeal.'' In addition, Sec.
405.910(c)(7) states that the AOR form may ``[b]e filed with the entity
processing the party's initial determination or appeal.'' Finally,
Sec. 405.910(e)(1) states that the effective date of the appointment
is the date that the AOR form or other conforming written instrument
contains the signatures of both the party and appointed representative.
The AOR may be completed prior to the submission of a claim or appeal
request, and a representative may assist with the preparation or
submission of a claim. (However, consistent with Sec. 405.910(i)(1),
notices and other information regarding the initial determination are
only sent to the party
[[Page 65300]]
to the initial determination, except for Medicare secondary payer
claims appeals as discussed in Sec. 405.910(i)(4)). We believe these
provisions convey that a representative may be appointed prior to the
issuance of an initial determination.
Finally, the revised appointment of representative form, Form CMS-
1696, is available online, in both English and Spanish, at https://www.cms.hhs.gov/CMSForms/CMSForms/list.asp#TopOfPage Representatives at
1-800-MEDICARE can also provide information on how to obtain the
appointment of representative form.
Comment: One commenter questioned the authority of CMS to impose a
fee review process when an appointed representative for a beneficiary
wished to charge a fee for services rendered in connection with an
appeal before the Secretary. The commenter contended that beneficiary
representatives should be treated like provider representatives who
have no fee limitations. The commenter stated that the regulations,
specifically, the fee review provisions, decrease the likelihood that a
beneficiary will find an advocate to assist in the appeal. The
commenter also stated that our regulations increase a beneficiary's
need to be represented.
Response: Section 1869(b)(1)(B)(iv) of the Act (captioned,
``Requirements for Representatives of a Beneficiary'') establishes that
the provisions of sections 205(j) and 206 (other than subsection
(a)(4)) of the Act apply to representation of an individual for
Medicare claim appeals in the same manner as they apply to
representation of an individual for Social Security claims. By
incorporating these sections in Sec. 1869(b)(1)(B)(iv) of the Act, the
Congress mandated that, for appeals before the Secretary, appointed
representatives, including attorneys, must obtain approval of fees
before charging a beneficiary. Consistent with these statutory
provisions and the longstanding practice of fee petitions before ALJs,
Sec. 405.910(f)(1) requires that an appointed representative for a
beneficiary, who wishes to charge a fee for services rendered in
connection with an appeal before the Secretary, must obtain approval of
the fee from the Secretary.
As noted in the preamble to the interim final rule (70 FR 11429
through 11430) and at Sec. 405.910(f)(1), we do not consider
proceedings before the ALJ hearing level (that is, initial
determination, redetermination, and reconsideration levels) to be
proceedings ``before the Secretary''. Section 206(a) of the Act
authorizes the Commissioner of Social Security to prescribe rules and
regulations to govern the representation of claimants in proceedings
before the Commissioner. This provision has long been interpreted to
include only proceedings at the ALJ level and beyond. Thus, we have
interpreted appeals before the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS or the Department) to include only the ALJ
level and above. Therefore, the fee petition provisions in Sec.
405.910(f) do not apply to administrative proceedings below the ALJ
hearing level. Furthermore, because the clear intent of the fee
petition provision of the statute is to protect the interests of
individual Medicare beneficiaries, we do not interpret them as applying
to non-beneficiary appellants.
The fee petition process described in Sec. 405.910(f) specifically
is designed to protect the interests of Medicare beneficiaries by
ensuring that the fees charged by a representative are reasonable. This
process is not new to these regulations. Rather, it has been a
longstanding requirement in both the Medicare and Social Security
programs for appeals at the ALJ level. See 42 CFR Sec. 405.701(c) and
42 CFR Sec. 405.801(c), incorporating by reference the provisions of
20 CFR part 404, subpart R regarding representation of parties. Thus,
we do not believe this regulation will affect a beneficiary's ability
to obtain assistance with an appeal.
Further, we do not believe the new appeals process increases the
need for a beneficiary to obtain assistance with an appeal. The new
appeals process primarily changes certain procedures with respect to
appeals filed by providers and suppliers, the entities and individuals
who file the vast majority of appeals (for example, the full and early
presentation of evidence requirement, and CMS participation as a party
or participant at the ALJ level). However, most of these changes do not
affect beneficiary initiated appeals. Throughout the process, we have
attempted to minimize the impact of the new appeals procedures on
beneficiaries. Therefore, we do not believe that the new appeals
process increases the need for a beneficiary to obtain assistance with
an appeal. Further, where we have made changes to operational
procedures, we have developed notices and model language for
contractors to provide to parties that explain the new process in
clear, plain language. We believe our newly developed notices and forms
provide clear instructions to parties at each level of the
administrative appeals process. We have also revised Your Medicare
Rights and Protections (CMS Publication No. 10112, available to order
from 1-800-MEDICARE, or available to view on-line at https://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10112.pdf), which explains, in
detail, the various steps in the appeals process. These notices, forms
and instructions will provide beneficiaries and their representatives,
as well as other parties and advocates, with additional information
about the procedures to be followed in the administrative appeals
process.
Comment: Two commenters expressed concern regarding the requirement
that an appointed representative has an affirmative duty to ``[c]omply
with all laws and CMS regulations, CMS Rulings, and instructions''
(Sec. 405.910(g)(1)(v)). One commenter requested the words ``and
instructions'' be struck from the regulation, because an appointed
representative should not be bound to comply with CMS instructions any
more than a beneficiary, a contractor or an administrative law judge
should be. Another commenter stated that it is not uncommon for an
attorney or other representative to challenge the validity of CMS
rulings, policy instructions and other interpretations, and, as such,
it is unreasonable to require a representative to defer to all such
policies to the potential detriment of the provider/appellant.
Response: Section 405.910(g)(1)(v) states that an appointed
representative has an affirmative duty to comply with all laws and CMS
regulations, CMS rulings and instructions. While we appreciate the
commenters' concerns, we disagree with the commenters' interpretation
of this provision. Providers and suppliers submitting claims on behalf
of beneficiaries, and contractors processing claims are, in fact, bound
to follow all laws, regulations, rulings and CMS operating
instructions. QICs, ALJs and the MAC are bound to follow laws,
regulations, rulings, and NCDs, and to afford substantial deference to
CMS operating instructions and other program guidance. See Sec.
405.968(b) and Sec. 405.1062. As arbiters of fact in the
administrative appeals process, QICs, ALJs and the MAC may determine
that an instruction should not apply to the facts of a particular case.
However, QICs, ALJs and the MAC cannot rule on the validity of the
instruction. Similarly, an appointed representative has a duty to
comply with such laws, regulations, rulings and instructions. However,
an appointed representative is not precluded from challenging the
application of that policy or instruction
[[Page 65301]]
during the course of an appeal. Thus, we do not believe a
representative is unfairly burdened by this requirement, and we believe
it is unnecessary to revise Sec. 405.910(g)(1)(v).
Comment: Several commenters asked CMS to reconsider the policy
prohibiting the issuance of MSNs to a beneficiary's appointed
representative. One commenter stated that sending the notice of initial
determination to the appointed representative is necessary to assure
that beneficiaries can be effectively represented in the new appeals
process. Another commenter indicated that quicker access to initial
determination information was needed due to the shorter timeframes for
requesting redeterminations and reconsiderations.
Response: Under Sec. 405.910(i)(1), contractors issue initial
determination notices (that is, Medicare Summary Notices (MSNs) and
Remittance Advice (RAs)) only to the parties to the initial
determination, and not to appointed representatives. As we stated in
the preamble to the interim final rule (70 FR 11434) and in Sec.
405.910, appointed representatives have the same right as parties to
receive information on claims being appealed only after an appeal has
been filed. The information included on MSNs covers the entire range of
health care services and items billed to Medicare within a 90-day
period; similarly, an RA contains comprehensive claims information for
all claims processed for a provider or supplier during a specific
period. Because the scope of an appointment of representation may vary,
an appointed representative may not have authority to receive
information on all such services or items. Accordingly, for privacy and
confidentiality reasons, contractors must provide MSNs and RAs only to
the parties to the initial determination. We believe that a beneficiary
can be effectively represented without contractors directly providing
the MSNs and RAs to appointed representatives because parties can share
their respective notices with their representatives.
We note that our policy with respect to sending the notice of
initial determination to the party and not the party's representative
is consistent with the decision in Connecticut Department of Social
Services v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2005). The court held that
the due process interests of parties are adequately protected by their
own receipt of the initial determination notice, and declined to
require that contractors send these notices to the appointed
representative of a party.
After the initial determination, the contractor, QIC, ALJ and the
MAC will send notice of their action and requests for information or
evidence to the appointed representative because, unlike the MSN and
RA, this information is specific to the claim at issue. We also note
that under Sec. 405.910(i)(4), initial determinations and appeal
notices that involve Medicare Secondary Payer recovery claims are sent
to both the party and the appointed representative. Unlike other
initial determinations, Medicare Secondary Payer recovery claims
notices of initial determinations are limited to include only
information related to the claim at issue.
We believe the current filing timeframes and the quarterly issuance
of MSNs provide adequate time for representatives to obtain claims
information from beneficiaries, providers and suppliers. Currently,
parties have 120 calendar days from the date of an initial
determination to file for a redetermination and 180 calendar days from
the date the party receives the notice of the redetermination to file a
reconsideration. In addition, contractors may extend redetermination
and reconsideration filing timeframes (consistent with Sec. 405.942(b)
and Sec. 405.962(b)) if a party shows good cause for not meeting the
filing timeframe. Coupled with the quarterly issuance of MSNs, we
believe individuals representing beneficiaries have ample time to
obtain relevant information in order to submit an appeal of an initial
determination or redetermination.
Accordingly, we are finalizing sections 405.906 through 405.910
without modification.
3. Assignment of Appeal Rights (Sec. 405.912)
The procedures for assigning appeal rights from a beneficiary to a
provider or supplier are included in Sec. 405.912. We received several
comments on the assignment of appeal rights. A summary of the comments
and our responses is included below. Additional detailed discussion of
this provision is found in the interim final rule at 70 FR 11427
through 11428 and 11430 through 11432.
Comment: We received several comments that requested clarification
of when an appointment of a representative or assignment of appeal
rights was appropriate, given that participating providers and
participating suppliers generally have appeal rights equal to those of
the beneficiary.
Response: A number of the comments reflected continued confusion
between the appointed representative provisions at Sec. 405.910 and
the assignment of appeal rights provisions at Sec. 405.912. Appointing
a representative and assigning appeal rights are two different and
unrelated actions under the new appeals process. Beneficiaries have the
option of either (1) assigning (transferring) their appeal rights to
the provider or supplier that provided the item or service at issue, if
such person or entity is not a party to the initial determination, or
(2) appointing a representative to act on their behalf during the
appeal.
As set forth in Sec. 405.912, an assignment of appeal rights
constitutes a complete transfer of party status and all appeal rights
from a beneficiary to the provider or supplier that (1) provided the
item or service at issue to the beneficiary and (2) does not already
have party status at the initial determination. Thus, with an
assignment of appeal rights, the provider or supplier becomes a party
to the appeal in place of the beneficiary.
In contrast, a party may choose to appoint an individual as its
representative to assist with an appeal. See Sec. 405.902, defining
appointed representative, and Sec. 405.910. For example, a beneficiary
may appoint his provider or supplier as an appointed representative.
Appointing a representative does not transfer a party's appeal rights,
nor does it make the appointed representative a party to the appeal.
Rather, an appointed representative is simply an individual chosen by a
party to act on behalf of the party in exercising his or her appeal
rights.
In an overwhelming majority of appeals, there is no need for a
beneficiary to assign appeal rights to his provider or supplier. For
example, under Sec. 405.906(a)(2) and (a)(3), a supplier who accepts
assignment for items or services furnished to a beneficiary, and a
provider who files a claim for items or services furnished to a
beneficiary, are parties to the initial determination, and thus, may
appeal that initial determination to the same extent as the
beneficiary.
In limited situations, a provider or supplier will not have party
status. For example, if a claim is filed by a non-participating
physician who does not accept assignment on the claim, and the claim is
denied as a statutory exclusion (such as certain cosmetic surgeries
under section 1862(a)(10) of the Act), the physician submitting the
claim would not have a direct right to appeal the initial determination
made by the
[[Page 65302]]
carrier. However, the physician could get party status to file an
appeal by obtaining an assignment of appeal rights from the beneficiary
for this service. The assignment of appeal rights must be completed in
accordance with the procedures set forth in Sec. 405.912.
Comment: A commenter suggested that certain providers, such as
clinical laboratories, be exempt from the provision requiring
beneficiaries to sign an assignment of appeal rights form (Sec.
405.912(c)(2)).
Response: In situations where an assignment of appeal rights is
appropriate, we believe the signature requirement is necessary for the
protection of both the party and the representative, as well as to
assist adjudicators in determining the proper parties to the appeal.
While we acknowledge it may be difficult in some instances for a
provider or supplier to obtain the signature of the beneficiary, the
binding nature of the assignment and the effect of the assignment
(transferring a beneficiary's appeal rights to an assignee and waiving
the right of the provider or supplier to collect payment) make it
essential that both parties sign the agreement. This situation,
however, may not arise frequently because a supplier that is required
to accept assignment on a claim, such as a clinical laboratory, is a
party to the initial determination and, therefore, has direct standing
to file an appeal. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate for a
supplier, who otherwise has party status, to seek assignment of appeal
rights from the beneficiary.
Comment: One commenter stated that the regulations indicate that
when beneficiaries assign their rights to appeal an individual item or
service to a provider or supplier, the provider or supplier must list
all items or services provided on the date of service on the assignment
form. The commenter recommended that a provider or supplier seeking
assignment of appeal rights should have to list only those items or
services for which appeal rights are to be assigned.
Response: Section 405.912(c)(3) requires that an assignment of
appeal rights ``indicate the item or service for which the assignment
of appeal rights is authorized.'' A provider or supplier is not
required to list all items or services provided on the date of service
on the assignment agreement--just those for which appeal rights are to
be assigned. An assignment of appeal rights will only be effective for
the items or services listed on the assignment form.
Accordingly, we are finalizing Sec. 405.912 without modification.
4. Initial Determinations (Sec. 405.920 Through Sec. 405.928)
Sections 405.920 through 405.928 discuss the initial determination
process, including how contractors make initial determinations on
claims and what types of determinations are considered or not
considered initial determinations.
We received several comments with respect to claims submissions and
the processing of initial determinations as set forth in the interim
final rule. A summary of the comments and our responses are included
below. Additional discussion regarding these provisions is found in the
interim final rule at 70 FR 11423 through 11424, 11428, and 11432
through 11436.
a. Initial Determinations, Notice of Initial Determinations, and
Timeframe for Processing Initial Determinations (Sec. 405.920 Through
Sec. 405.922)
Section 405.920 explains the process a contractor must follow in
making an initial determination. Section 405.921 describes the notice
of initial determination, including the content of the notice, and
Sec. 405.922 discusses the timeframe for processing initial
determinations.
Comment: Two commenters recommended that the term ``non-clean
claim'' be defined. Commenters also suggested that if a claim is paid
at the QIC level or higher, such claims should be considered clean, and
that interest should accrue from the date of the original denial in
order to provide incentive to expedite claim determinations and assure
fairness. Two commenters noted that although contractors must issue an
initial determination within 45 days of receipt of a ``non-clean''
claim, the regulations do not provide for any interest payments if the
determination is issued after the 45 day time period.
Response: The term ``clean claim'' is clearly defined in statute at
sections 1816(c)(2)(B)(i) and 1842(c)(2)(B)(i) of the Act as ``a claim
that has no defect or impropriety (including any lack of any required
substantiating documentation) or particular circumstance requiring
special treatment that prevents timely payment from being made on the
claim.'' This definition also is set forth in Sec. 405.902. Claims
that do not meet this definition are considered ``non-clean claims.''
Therefore, we do not believe that we need to define non-clean claim
because the meaning of non-clean claim is sufficiently clear given the
meaning of clean claim set forth in Sec. 405.902.
Claims for services that cannot be adjudicated timely at the
initial determination level because they lack sufficient documentation
and/or require special handling do not come within the definition of
clean claims. Claims initially denied and subsequently paid following a
favorable appeal decision, or revised following a reopening action,
are, by their nature, claims that require special treatment. Often,
during an appeal or reopening action, additional substantiating
documentation is needed to support the coverage and payment decision.
Thus, claims that are adjusted as a result of the effectuation of an
appeal decision, and claims that are revised following a reopening
action do not fall under the definition of ``clean claim'' set forth in
the statute.
Section 1869(a)(2)(A) of the Act, in conjunction with sections
1816(c)(2) and 1842(c)(2) of the Act, establishes that, on all claims
other than clean claims, the initial determination shall be concluded
and a notice of such determination must be mailed to the individual
filing the claim by no later than 45 days after the contractor receives
the claim. Additionally, section 1869(a)(2)(A) of the Act, in
conjunction with sections 1816(c)(2) and 1842(c)(2) of the Act,
requires that interest accrue if clean claims are not processed within
30 calendar days. Thus, reading these provisions together, no interest
accrues on non-clean claims, including claims that are adjusted as the
result of the effectuation of an appeal decision, and claims that are
revised following a reopening action.
Finally, neither the statute nor our regulations provide for
escalation, payment of interest or other remedies when the 45-day
deadline is missed for non-clean claims. Through various tools used to
monitor the performance of our contractors, we attempt to ensure that
claim determinations are both timely and accurate. As we noted in the
interim final rule, providers and suppliers play a vital role in the
contractors' ability to meet their decision-making timeframes. If
providers and suppliers submit clean claims, they can avoid the delays
that are associated with processing non-clean claims. The more accurate
the claim is at initial submission, the greater the ability of the
Medicare contractor to process the claim quickly.
Accordingly, we are finalizing Sec. Sec. 405.920 and 405.921
without modification. We are finalizing Sec. 405.922 with modification
as discussed in section II.B.5.a. of this preamble.
[[Page 65303]]
b. What Constitutes an Initial Determination and Decisions That Are Not
Considered Initial Determinations (Sec. 405.924 Through Sec. 405.926)
In Sec. 405.924, we describe actions that are initial
determinations and are subject to the administrative appeals procedures
in subpart I. In Sec. 405.926, we list examples of determinations that
are not considered initial determinations and are not subject to the
administrative appeals procedures contained in this subpart.
Comment: One commenter questioned the need to maintain the number
of home health visits as a determination that constitutes an initial
determination (Sec. 405.924(b)(7)). The commenter stated that this
particular item is no longer a relevant factor in determining whether
the charges were covered under Medicare Part A or Part B, and suggested
that this item be removed from the list of determinations considered
initial determinations.
Response: We agree with the commenter and have revised Sec.
405.924 to eliminate paragraph (b)(7), which specifically included the
number of home health visits used as an initial determination.
Comment: One commenter stated that under Sec. 405.926(c), issues
regarding the computation of the payment amount of program
reimbursement of general applicability are not considered initial
determinations and, therefore, are not subject to appeal under subpart
I. The commenter questioned whether the payment amount of a specific,
individual claim is considered an initial determination. The commenter
suggested amending Sec. 405.924 and Sec. 405.926 to clarify that
individual determinations with respect to payment amounts are initial
determinations. In addition, the commenter suggested that we revise
Sec. 405.924(c) to state that a provider's notice of non-coverage to
the Medicare beneficiary is not an initial determination. The commenter
noted that while the provider of service may be the first decision
maker regarding Medicare coverage of an item or service, its notice of
non-coverage has not been considered an initial determination subject
to appeal.
Response: Section 405.920 provides that, after a claim is filed, a
contractor must perform certain actions, including determining any
amounts payable. Such a determination constitutes an initial
determination subject to the subpart I appeals process. Similarly,
under Sec. 405.924(b), a payment amount determination with respect to
a particular item or service on a claim is an initial determination
that is appealable under subpart I. In contrast, Sec. 405.926(c)
specifies that ``[a]ny issue regarding the computation of the payment
amount of program reimbursement of general applicability for which CMS
or a carrier has sole responsibility under Part B such as the
establishment of a fee schedule * * *'' is not an initial
determination, and is not subject to administrative appeal under
subpart I. For example, section 1848(i)(1) of the Act expressly
prohibits administrative and judicial review of the components that
comprise the Medicare physician fee schedule. Thus, in situations where
payment amounts are determined in accordance with statutorily mandated
methodologies (such as the physician fee schedule), adjudicators are
required to follow such methodologies when making a finding regarding a
payment amount. Therefore, we believe that the regulations at
Sec. Sec. 405.920, 405.924, and 405.926 clearly provide that the
payment amount of a specific, individual claim is considered an initial
determination and also appropriately convey the distinction between a
direct challenge to the Medicare payment methodology and an appeal that
raises questions regarding a determination of a payment amount for a
particular claim. Therefore, we do not believe it is necessary to
revise Sec. 405.924 or Sec. 405.926 to provide any further
clarification.
We agree with the commenter's statement that a provider's notice of
non-coverage does not constitute an initial determination, because it
is not a determination made by the Medicare program. Instead, it is an
opinion of the provider, and the notices clearly state that they are
conveying the provider's opinion with respect to non-coverage. The
notices also clearly explain the steps required to obtain a
determination by Medicare and how to appeal that determination. Thus,
we do not believe it is necessary to revise Sec. 405.924 or Sec.
405.926 to include a provision explicitly excluding such notices from
the definition of initial determination.
Comment: One commenter requested that we define the phrase
``sustained or high levels of payment errors'' (Sec. 405.926(p)) and
requested that we specify how such determinations will be made. The
commenter also requested that CMS review dismissals on the grounds that
the claim involves a sustained or high error rate. The commenter
suggested that CMS provide clarification of the implications of such a
finding. Finally, the commenter recommended that CMS provide a
mechanism for providers to be removed from this ``sanction''.
Response: In section 1893(f)(3) of the Act, added by section 935 of
the MMA, Congress placed restrictions on the use of extrapolation to
determine overpayment amounts to be recovered from Medicare providers,
suppliers or beneficiaries. In order to calculate an overpayment by
extrapolation, there must be a determination of either: (1) A sustained
or high level of payment error, or (2) a documented educational
intervention that has failed to correct the payment error. In addition,
in section 1874A(h)(2) of the Act, as added by section 934 of the MMA,
Congress required contractors to identify a likelihood of sustained or
high level of payment error under section 1893(f)(3)(A) of the Act
before initiating non-random pre-payment reviews of a provider or
supplier, and in section 1893(f)(3) of the Act, expressly precluded
administrative or judicial review of contractor determinations of
sustained or high levels of payment errors. Accordingly, we included a
conforming provision at Sec. 405.926(p) of the interim final rule
providing that determinations of sustained or high levels of payment
error are not initial determinations that may be appealed under this
subpart. We note, however, that while the determination of whether a
provider or supplier has a sustained or high level of payment error is
not subject to appeal, the initial or revised determinations made on
the underlying claims for items or services would be subject to appeal.
CMS issued operating instructions for determining when a provider
or supplier has a sustained or high level of payment error in June
2005: (https://www.cms.hhs.gov/transmittals/downloads/R114PI.pdf).
Furthermore, we issued a final rule on September 26, 2008 (73 FR 55753)
to address when contractors may terminate the non-random pre-payment
review of claims submitted by a provider or supplier. The commenter's
concerns regarding the practical considerations of determinations of a
provider's or supplier's sustained or high error rates are beyond the
scope of this regulation. With respect to the suggestion that CMS
review dismissals on the grounds that the claim involved a sustained or
high error rate, as noted above, while that determination does not
constitute an initial determination and is not subject to appeal, any
claim denials resulting from the review would constitute initial
determinations that may be appealed. Therefore, we do not anticipate
any denials of claims solely based on this determination. Rather, the
determination of a sustained or high
[[Page 65304]]
error rate will be used as the basis for a contractor undertaking
further review of claims submitted by the provider or supplier.
Finally, we strongly disagree with the commenter's characterization of
the determination of a sustained or high error rate as a sanction. This
determination does not result in an assessment of civil money
penalties, or any other administrative action. Rather, it serves as the
basis for a contractor's review of a provider's or supplier's
subsequent claim submissions.
Comment: Section 405.926(s) states that claim submissions on forms
or formats that are incomplete, invalid, or do not otherwise meet the
requirements for a Medicare claim and, as a result, are rejected or
returned to the provider or supplier, do not constitute initial
determinations. A commenter asked whether this section would preclude
review where a claim is suspended for medical review.
Response: A claim suspended for development by a contractor's
medical review staff is not considered a claim that is invalid or
incomplete as described in Sec. 405.926(s). Thus, Sec. 405.926(s)
would not preclude review where a claim is suspended for medical review
because it does not apply to this situation. Rather, a claim that is
suspended for development is one that appears technically sufficient on
its face, but requires additional information in order to make a
coverage and payment decision. At the time the claim is suspended for
development, an initial determination has not been made, and thus,
appeal rights have not attached to the claim. In addition, the medical
review staff's decision to suspend a claim for development does not
constitute an initial determination that would be subject to appeal.
Generally, once the contractor makes a decision regarding coverage and
payment and issues an initial determination in the form of a MSN or RA,
parties to the initial determination have 120 calendar days to request
a redetermination. However, if a contractor denies coverage and payment
of a claim because the documentation requested during the medical
review of the claim was not submitted within the specified timeframe,
any subsequent submission of the requested documentation to the
contractor, or any timely request for a redetermination of that claim
will be processed under our reopenings policy at Sec. 405.980(a)(2).
If a revised determination is issued following the reopening of the
claim, the revised initial determination carries with it appeal rights
in accordance with Sec. 405.984(a).
Accordingly, we are finalizing Sec. 405.924 with modification as
noted above. We are finalizing Sec. 405.926 without modification.
c. Initial Determinations Subject to the Reopenings Process (Sec.
405.927) and the Effects of Initial Determinations (Sec. 405.928)
Section 405.927 states that minor errors or omissions in an initial
determination must be corrected through the contractor's reopening
process under Sec. 405.980(a)(3). Section 405.928 describes the
effects of an initial determination. We received no comments on these
sections. Accordingly, we are finalizing Sec. 405.927 and Sec.
405.928 without modification.
5. Redeterminations (Sec. 405.940 Through Sec. 405.958)
Sections 405.940 through 405.958 discuss the redetermination
process. We received comments with respect to redetermination decision-
making timeframes and other aspects of the redetermination process. A
brief overview of the relevant regulatory provisions, a summary of the
comments and our responses follow. Additional detailed discussion of
the redetermination process is included in the interim final rule at 7