State of Nevada; Denial of Portions of Petition for Rulemaking, Consideration of the Remaining Portions in the Rulemaking Process, 64012-64016 [E9-29054]
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64012
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 74, No. 233
Monday, December 7, 2009
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Agricultural Marketing Service
7 CFR Part 1206
[Doc. No. AMS–FV–09–0071;FV–09–708]
Mango Promotion, Research and
Information Order; Continuance
Referendum
Agricultural Marketing Service.
Referendum Order.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
SUMMARY: This notice directs that a
referendum be conducted among
eligible first handlers and importers of
mangos to determine whether they favor
continuance of the Mango Promotion,
Research and Information Order (Order).
DATES: This referendum will be
conducted by mail ballot from March
15, 2010, through March 26, 2010. First
handlers receiving 500,000 or more
pounds of mangos from producers in a
calendar year and importers importing
500,000 or more pounds of mangos into
the United States, during the two year
representative period from January 1,
2008, to December 31, 2009, are eligible
to vote. Ballots must be received by the
close of business on March 26, 2010, to
be counted.
ADDRESSES: Copies of the Order may be
obtained from: Referendum Agent,
Research and Promotion Branch (RPB),
Fruit and Vegetable Programs (FVP),
AMS, USDA, Stop 0244, Room 0632–S,
1400 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20250–0244, telephone:
888–720–9917 (toll free), facsimile: 202–
205–2800, e-mail:
Kathie.Notoro@ams.usda.gov.
Pursuant
to the Commodity Promotion, Research
and Information Act of 1996 (7 U.S.C.
7411–7425) (Act), it is hereby directed
that a referendum be conducted to
ascertain whether continuance of the
Order is favored by eligible first
handlers and importers of mangos
covered under the program. The Order
is authorized under the Act.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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The representative period for
establishing voter eligibility for the
referendum shall be the two year period
from January 1, 2008, to December 31,
2009. First handlers receiving 500,000
or more pounds of mangos from
producers in a calendar year and
importers importing 500,000 or more
pounds of mangos into the United
States, during the two year
representative period are eligible to
vote. Persons who received an
exemption from assessments for the
entire representative period are
ineligible to vote. The referendum shall
be conducted by mail ballot from March
15, 2010, through March 26, 2010.
Section 518 of the Act authorizes
continuance referenda. Under section
1206.71(b) of the Order, the Department
of Agriculture (Department) shall
conduct a referendum every five years
or when 10 percent or more of the
eligible voters petition the Secretary of
Agriculture to hold a referendum to
determine if persons subject to
assessment favor continuance of the
Order. The Department would continue
the Order if continuance of the Order is
approved by a majority of the first
handlers and importers voting in the
referendum.
In accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
chapter 35), the referendum ballot has
been approved by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and
assigned OMB No. 0581–0093. It has
been estimated that there are
approximately five first handlers and
100 importers who will be eligible to
vote in the referendum. It will take an
average of 15 minutes for each voter to
read the voting instructions and
complete the referendum ballot.
Referendum Order
Kathie Notoro and Sonia Jimenez,
RPB, FVP, AMS, USDA, Stop 0244,
Room 0632–S, 1400 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20250–
0244, are designated as the referendum
agents to conduct this referendum. The
referendum procedures 7 CFR 1206.100
through 1206.108, which were issued
pursuant to the Act, shall be used to
conduct the referendum.
The referendum agents will mail the
ballots to be cast in the referendum and
voting instructions to all known first
handlers receiving 500,000 or more
pounds of mangos from producers in a
calendar year and importers importing
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500,000 or more pounds of mangos into
the United States, during the two year
representative period prior to the first
day of the voting period. Persons who
are first handlers and importers during
the representative period are eligible to
vote. Persons who received an
exemption from assessments during the
entire representative period are
ineligible to vote. Any eligible first
handler and importer who does not
receive a ballot should contact the
referendum agent no later than one
week before the end of the voting
period. Ballots must be received by the
referendum agent by the March 26, 2010
deadline, in order to be counted.
List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 1206
Administrative practice and
procedure, Advertising, Consumer
information, Marketing agreements,
mango promotion, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 7411–7425 and 7
U.S.C. 7401.
Dated: November 30, 2009.
Rayne Pegg,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. E9–28925 Filed 12–4–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410–02–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 73
[Docket No. PRM–73–10; NRC–2000–0026]
State of Nevada; Denial of Portions of
Petition for Rulemaking, Consideration
of the Remaining Portions in the
Rulemaking Process
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Closure of petition for
rulemaking docket; Partial Denial.
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is denying, in part,
a petition for rulemaking (PRM 73–10)
submitted by the State of Nevada on
June 22, 1999. The NRC will consider
the remainder of the petition in the
rulemaking process. The petitioner
requested that NRC amend its
regulations governing safeguards for
shipments of spent nuclear fuel against
sabotage and terrorism. The petitioner
also requested that the NRC conduct a
comprehensive assessment of the
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consequences of terrorist attacks that
have the capability of radiological
sabotage, including attacks against
transportation infrastructure used
during nuclear waste shipments, attacks
involving capture of nuclear waste
shipments and use of high energy
explosives against a cask or casks, and
direct attacks upon a nuclear waste
shipping cask or casks using antitank
missiles or other military weapons. This
action closes the docket for PRM–73–10.
DATES: The docket for the petition for
rulemaking PRM–73–10 is closed on
December 7, 2009.
You can access publicly
available documents related to this
petition for rulemaking using the
following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Public
comments and supporting materials
related to this petition for rulemaking
can be found at the Federal rulemaking
Web site https://www.regulations.gov by
searching on Docket ID: NRC–2000–
0026. Further NRC action on the
remaining issues raised by this petition
will be accessible at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching on
Docket ID NRC–2009–0163. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol
Gallagher (301) 492–3668; e-mail
Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR):
The public may examine and have
copied for a fee publicly available
documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O–
1F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland.
NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access
and Management System (ADAMS):
Publicly available documents created or
received at the NRC are available
electronically at the NRC’s Electronic
Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/adams.html. From this page,
the public can gain entry into ADAMS,
which provides text and image files of
NRC’s public documents. If you do not
have access to ADAMS or if there are
problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, contact the NRC
PDR reference staff at 1–800–397–4209,
(301) 415–4737, or by e-mail to
pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
The NRC also tracks all rulemaking
actions in the ‘‘NRC Regulatory Agenda:
Semiannual Report’’ (NUREG–0936).
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ADDRESSES:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Naiem S. Tanious, Office of Federal and
State Materials and Environmental
Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001, telephone (301) 415–
6103, e-mail Naiem.Tanious@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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The Petition
The petition, dated June 22, 1999, was
filed with NRC by the State of Nevada
and assigned Docket No. PRM 73–10 on
July 13, 1999. The NRC published a
notice of receipt of a petition for
rulemaking on September 13, 1999 (64
FR 49410). The petitioner (the State of
Nevada) states that it is a corridor State
for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments,
and has been a destination and origin
State for SNF shipments to and from
Federal research facilities. Nevada is
also the potential host State for a
Federal geologic repository and could
become the ultimate destination for
shipments of SNF and high-level
radioactive waste.
The petitioner requests that NRC
amend its regulations governing
safeguards for shipments of spent
nuclear fuel against sabotage and
terrorism. Specifically, the petitioner
requests seven amendments to 10 CFR
Part 73:
(1) Clarification of the meaning of the
term ‘‘hand-carried equipment’’ in 10
CFR 73.1(a)(1)(i)(D) to include: (a) One
or more large military demolition
devices, such as the U.S. Army M3A1
shaped charge weighing 40 pounds; (b)
a significant quantity (limited only by
the carrying capacity of the vehicle) of
commercial explosives packaged in
crates, boxes, suitcases, or other handcarried containers; and (c) numerous
man-portable antitank weapon systems
such as the Carl Gustav M2 recoilless
gun (weight 15 kg), the Milan antitank
missile (weight 32 kg), and the infantry
version of the TOW 2 antitank missile
(weight 116 kg with tripod launcher);
(2) Clarify the definition of
‘‘radiological sabotage’’ in 10 CFR 73.2
to include actions against SNF
shipments which are intended to cause
a loss of shielding or a release of
radioactive materials as well as those
deliberate actions which cause, or are
intended to cause economic damage or
social disruption regardless of the extent
to which public health and safety are
actually endangered by exposure to
radiation;
(3) Amend the advance route approval
requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(b)(7) to
specifically require shippers and
carriers to identify primary and
alternative routes which minimize
highway and rail shipments through
heavily populated areas, adopt the route
selection criteria in NUREG–0561, and
require shippers and carriers to
minimize use of routes which fail to
comply with the route selection criteria;
(4) Amend 10 CFR 73.37(c) to
eliminate the differential armed escort
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requirements based on population for
SNF shipments by road;
(5) Amend 10 CFR 73.37(d) to
eliminate the differential armed escort
requirements based on population for
SNF shipments by rail;
(6) Amend 10 CFR 73.37(b) to make
applicable to SNF shipments the 10 CFR
73.26(b)(1) planning and scheduling
requirements for special nuclear
material in transit; and
(7) Amend 10 CFR 73.37(d) to require
that SNF rail shipments be made by
dedicated trains.
In addition, the petitioner requests
that NRC, in support of the
aforementioned rulemaking, conduct a
comprehensive assessment of the
consequences of terrorist attacks that
have the capability of radiological
sabotage, including attacks against
transportation infrastructure used
during nuclear waste shipments, attacks
involving capture of nuclear waste
shipments and use of high energy
explosives against a cask or casks, and
direct attacks upon a nuclear waste
shipping cask or casks using antitank
missiles or other military weapons.
The petitioner’s rationale for
requesting a rulemaking to better deter,
prevent, and mitigate the consequences
of any attempted radiological sabotage,
as well as a comprehensive assessment
of the consequences of terrorist attacks
is based on the following:
(1) The petitioner asserts that the
thousands of shipments to a geologic
repository will create opportunity for
terrorist attacks or sabotage of spent fuel
shipments. The petitioner contends that
opportunity is created because the spent
fuel shipments will be over long
distances, many in number, regular and
predictable, and to a fixed destination.
(2) The petitioner asserts that the
means for mounting an attack are
available. The petitioner contends that
several varieties of high energy
explosives are currently available
including the M3A1 shaped charge,
commercial shaped charges, and
thousands of antitank weapons that
have been produced world-wide in the
last several years including the Milan
and TOW 2 antitank missiles.
(3) The petitioner asserts that the
spent fuel shipments may be attractive
targets. The petitioner contends that a
national repository may have a greater
symbolic value to terrorists as a target
than current reactor storage facilities,
and that ‘‘enhanced symbolic value’’
may extend to spent fuel shipments.
The petitioner also contends that a
single facility with a large stockpile of
spent fuel might be a more tempting
target. Further, the petitioner suggests
that a facility operated by the
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Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S.
Government agency responsible for
producing nuclear weapons, may have
greater symbolic value to terrorists as a
target than commercial storage facilities,
and that ‘‘enhanced symbolic value’’
may extend to DOE’s shipments of spent
fuel.
(4) The petitioner asserts that after
1984 when NRC last evaluated the
adequacy of spent fuel transportation
safeguards, the nature of the terrorist
threat has changed significantly. The
petitioner contends that during the past
17 years major changes have occurred,
including: an increase in the lethality of
terrorist attacks in the United States; an
increase in serious terrorist attacks
against transportation systems; and
renewed concern about nuclear
terrorism generally, and terrorist actions
involving potential radioactive
contamination specifically.
(5) The petitioner asserts that
shipping casks are vulnerable to
terrorist attack using high-energy
explosive devices. The petitioner
contends that this vulnerability is
caused by two developments: the
capabilities and availability of explosive
devices, especially antitank weapons,
have increased significantly; and new
shipping casks, developed to increase
payloads without exceeding specified
weight limits, appear to be more
vulnerable to attack using commercial
explosives or past, current, and future
weapons systems. The petitioner
perceives that after the early 1980s,
portable antitank weapons have become
more powerful, reliable, and available
world-wide. The petitioner states that
most of the antitank missiles, identified
in its attachment, have warheads
capable of completely perforating a
truck cask and its spent fuel cargo, and
deeply penetrating a rail cask and
damaging its spent fuel cargo. The
petitioner also states that spent fuel
shipping casks are vulnerable to attack
using military and commercial
explosives, particularly a conicalshaped charge with an incendiary
device. Lastly, the petitioner claims that
shaped charges developed for use in oil
and gas well perforating are particularly
powerful, efficient, and stable.
Public Comments on the Petition
The notice of receipt of the petition
for rulemaking invited interested
persons to submit comments. During the
comment period, which closed on
January 28, 2000,1 the NRC received 24
comment letters: 15 from States and
1 The NRC extended the comment period, which
originally was to close on November 29, 1999, to
January 28, 2000 (64 FR 59684, November 3, 1999).
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agencies or counties within States; 2
from Federal agencies; and 1 each from
the Nuclear Energy Institute, Western
Governors Association, Northeast HighLevel Radioactive Waste Transportation
Task Force, Association of American
Railroads, Heartland Operation to
Protect the Environment, an NRC
licensee, and a private individual.
Comment letter number 21 from the
Agency for Nuclear Projects, State of
Nevada provided additional
information. The comments have been
divided into three groups: (1) Those
supporting assessment only, (2) those
supporting both assessment and
rulemaking, and (3) those opposing both
assessment and rulemaking.
Nine commenters support assessment
only. They agree with the petitioner that
the estimated risks and potential
consequences to the public from a
terrorist attack of spent fuel in transit
should be made current, and if
indicated, the regulations should be
revised accordingly.
The State of Louisiana urges NRC to
review and strengthen, where necessary,
the applicable procedures and
safeguards to ensure the security and
safety of both the spent nuclear fuel
shipments and the citizens that would
be affected by any act of terrorism,
sabotage, or more importantly, an
accident which would result in the
release of radioactive materials. Also,
the State of Louisiana notes that the
technology for tracking sensitive freight
shipments is available and should be a
required safeguard. For example,
Automatic Vehicle Location Technology
allows near real-time tracking of
vehicles.
The Department of Environmental
Quality of the Commonwealth of
Virginia indicates that it is reasonable
for NRC to reevaluate its requirements
for safeguarding spent fuel shipments
against sabotage and terrorism.
The Department of Public Safety of
the State of Oklahoma agrees that
assessment of safeguards for the
shipment of spent fuel and response to
emergency situations during shipments
should be current.
The Western Governors Association
recommends that NRC: (1) Reevaluate
the adequacy of current physical
protection regulations for transporting
spent fuel, (2) conduct a comprehensive
consequence assessment of attacks that
have the potential for radiological
sabotage, (3) create a stakeholder
advisory group to assist NRC in the
comprehensive consequence
assessment, and (4) publish a full report
on all unclassified assessment findings.
The Nuclear Energy Institute concurs
that NRC should complete a
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comprehensive assessment of credible
threats of sabotage and terrorism on
spent fuel in transit.
Six commenters support both
assessment and rulemaking. They agree
with the petitioner that the safeguards
requirements for spent fuel in transit
should be strengthened and that a
proposed rulemaking effort should be
supported by a comprehensive
assessment of the potential
consequences of sabotage or terrorist
attack.
Nye County, Nevada asserts that there
is a need for a comprehensive
assessment of the consequences of
terrorist attacks that covers the entire
spectrum of nuclear waste and spent
fuel shipments to a repository, and that
the petition raises legitimate and
substantial issues that should be fully
explored in a proposed rulemaking.
Clark County, Nevada supports both
assessment and rulemaking because it
believes that NRC’s standards for safety
and security for spent fuel in transit are
out of date.
Eureka County, Nevada asserts that
the petition raises legitimate and
substantial issues that should be fully
explored in a notice and comment
rulemaking.
The State of Utah agrees with the
need to reevaluate requirements for
safeguarding shipments of spent nuclear
fuel due to the changing nature of
threats involving terrorism and
sabotage, wants any assessment to
address the need for a more
comprehensive and reliable system to
track shipments, and recommends
increased armed escort for shipments of
spent nuclear fuel.
The State of Utah also asserts that the
nature of the terrorist threat has
significantly changed since NRC last
assessed the adequacy of its spent fuel
transportation safeguards regulations,
and that the current regulations are
predicated on outdated assessments.
Eight commenters oppose both
assessment and rulemaking. They
disagree with the petitioner that either
an assessment or proposed rulemaking
is necessary.
One licensee asserts that the existing
safeguards regulations are adequate and
no rulemaking change to Part 73 is
necessary. Moreover, any assessment
undertaken in response to the petition
should consider the physical protection
requirements for spent fuel shipments
both in the context of all hazardous
material shipments and in comparison
to other targets for terrorist attack.
The Department of Emergency
Services within the Commonwealth of
Virginia acknowledges that terrorism
poses one of the most challenging
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threats to public safety today and agrees
that the possibility of such an attack
involving spent fuel warrants serious
consideration. However, this
Department believes that NRC, the DOE,
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and the national security agencies
should consider the issue of terrorism
involving nuclear shipments as part of
the overall domestic preparedness
mission. Moreover, this Department
states that changes in the nation’s
security programs and domestic
preparedness must be based on sound
risk assessment and threat analysis.
When such an analysis results in
additional risk factors, only then should
resources be committed to making
necessary regulatory changes.
The Northeast High-Level Radioactive
Waste Transportation Task Force,
representing nine States, asserts that
transportation casks are very robust and
do not make an attractive target, the
nature of a terrorist threat has not
changed significantly, and additional
rulemaking on safeguards for spent fuel
transportation is not necessary because
current safeguards provide adequate
protection. The Task Force points out
that there are a high number of
shipments routinely occurring without
difficulty, spent fuel shipments in NRC
certified casks have an excellent safety
record, and 2380 safe shipments have
occurred during the past 35 years
without radiological release, sabotage,
or terrorism. Moreover, leaving the
spent fuel in place has undesirable
features with respect to protecting
public health and safety since most
reactor storage sites are located near
rivers, lakes, or sea shores.
The Association of American
Railroads disagrees with the petitioner’s
assertion that ‘‘the NRC should
specifically require shippers and
carriers to identify primary and
alternate routes that minimize highway
and rail shipments through heavily
populated areas.’’ The Association
points out that a premise of hazardous
materials transportation is that
transportation time should be
minimized. Thus, routing to avoid
heavily-populated areas would be
counter productive by causing large
increases in transportation time because
routes around urban areas are almost
always significantly more circuitous.
The DOE asserts that the petition does
not offer compelling reasons for either a
comprehensive assessment or
rulemaking. DOE states that there is no
evidence that either a reassessment or
rulemaking would result in any
measurable increase in public health or
safety. DOE also states that their most
recent sabotage analyses indicate that
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the current regulations adequately
protect public health and safety and the
environment. Moreover, the petition’s
reference to terrorist events throughout
the world does not reflect the actual
situation in the U.S. or mean that spent
fuel shipments are actually terrorist
targets. Recent studies by DOE show
that the fundamental response of casks
to offensive weapons has not
dramatically changed. In addition, the
estimated consequences of credible
sabotage scenarios continue to be
bounded by the consequences evaluated
under severe accident conditions.
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program (NNPP), Department of the
Navy, states that the petitioner has not
provided sufficient justification for the
requested actions. Since 1957, the NNPP
has made 700 shipments of naval spent
fuel by rail, all safely. There have not
been any accidents, releases of
radioactivity, or acts of terrorism or
sabotage. Also, the NNPP disagrees that
the nature of the terrorist threat has
changed substantially from that which
the existing regulations are designed to
protect against. Moreover, simply listing
U.S. terrorist attacks of the past two
decades and speculating about
increased concerns for terrorist attacks
against spent fuel shipments does not
support the position that regulatory
changes are necessary. NNPP further
states that if a terrorist group could
obtain and use military weapons, they
would be likely to select targets where
they could cause large numbers of
immediate fatalities. Furthermore,
NNPP asserts that the petition provides
neither new technical information nor
other justification for the proposed
regulatory changes.
The NRC reviewed and considered
the comments in its decision to deny, in
part, the petition for rulemaking and to
consider the remainder of the petition in
the rulemaking process. In reaching its
decision, the NRC has also considered
the intervening events since 1999, when
the petition was filed and the comments
were received, including the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, and since
those attacks, the various security
assessments that have been conducted
and the various security measures that
have been put in place. The NRC’s
analysis is set forth below.
Petition Resolution
The NRC is denying the following two
specific requests from the petitioner:
(1) The request for amending the design
basis threat (DBT) for radiological
sabotage to include a clarification in the
meaning of the phrase ‘‘hand-held
equipment’’ in 10 CFR 73.1(a)(i)(D) and
to amend the DBT to include use of
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explosive devices and other weapons
larger than those commonly considered
to be hand-carried or hand-held, and the
use of vehicles other than four wheel
drive civilian land vehicles; and (2) the
request that the NRC conduct
comprehensive security assessment
studies. The remaining petition requests
are being considered in the NRC
rulemaking process.
Petition Requests that are being
denied:
1. Amending the DBT To Clarify the
Meaning of Hand-Carried Equipment
and To Include the Use of Explosive
Devices, Other Weapons Larger Than
Those Considered Hand-Carried, and
Vehicles Other Than 4-Wheel Drive
The Petitioner requested that the NRC
clarify the meaning of the phrase ‘‘handcarried equipment’’ in 10 CFR
73.1(a)(i)(D) to include: (a) One or more
large military demolition devices, such
as the U.S. Army M3A1 shaped charge
weighing 40 pounds; (b) a significant
quantity (limited only by the carrying
capacity of the vehicle) of commercial
explosives packaged in crates, boxes,
suitcases, or other hand-carried
containers; and (c) man-portable
antitank weapon systems such as the
Carl Gustav M2 recoilless gun (weight
15 kg), the Milan antitank missile
(weight 32 kg), and the infantry version
of the TOW 2 antitank missile (weight
116 kg with tripod launcher).
The NRC is denying this request for
rulemaking. On March 19, 2007, the
Commission issued a final rule
amending 10 CFR 73.1 (72 FR 12705),
Design Basis Threat. This rule contained
the Design Basis Threat with which
affected licensees must comply.
However, the Commission was careful
to set forth rule text that did not
compromise licensee security, but also
balances the necessity to keep the
public informed of the types of attacks
against which nuclear power plants and
Category I facilities are required to
defend. Specific information on
adversary capabilities (e.g., specific
weapons, ammunition type, etc) are
contained in adversary characteristics
documents which contain classified or
Safeguards Information (SGI).
The technical bases for the adversary
characteristic documents are derived
largely from intelligence information.
They contain classified or SGI
information which cannot be publicly
disclosed. These documents must be
withheld from public disclosure and
made available on a need-to-know basis
to those who are cleared for access.
Consequently, the petitioner’s suggested
changes to this regulation would be
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inconsistent with the Commission’s
recent revision of § 73.1.
The Petitioner also requested that the
NRC consider amending the DBT to
include use of explosive devices and
other weapons larger than those
commonly considered to be handcarried or hand-held, and the use of
vehicles other than four wheel drive
civilian land vehicles. Well-trained and
dedicated adversaries could conceivably
obtain and use military attack vehicles
or military aircraft armed with bombs,
missiles, or other powerful weapons.
The NRC is denying this request. The
specific details of the adversary’s
capabilities are now contained in
adversary characteristics documents
which contain classified or SGI
information. The adversary
characteristics documents are derived
largely from intelligence information.
These documents must be withheld
from public disclosure and made
available on a need to know basis to
those who are cleared for access. The
petitioner’s suggested changes to this
regulation would not be consistent with
the Commission’s recent revision to
§ 73.1.
2. Comprehensive Assessment of the
Consequences of Terrorist Attacks
The petitioner requested that the NRC
conduct a comprehensive assessment of
the consequences of terrorist attacks that
have the capability of radiological
sabotage to include: Attacks against
transportation infrastructure used by
nuclear waste shipments, attacks
involving capture of a nuclear waste
shipment and use of high energy
explosives against the cask, and direct
attacks upon a nuclear waste shipping
cask using antitank missiles.
The NRC is denying this request
because it does not involve (i.e.,
contain) a request to amend, create, or
revise the NRC’s existing regulations, as
is required by the provisions of 10 CFR
2.802, ‘‘Petition for Rulemaking.’’
Instead of requesting changes to the
NRC’s regulations (as it has specified for
other topics elsewhere in its petition)
the Petitioner has requested the NRC
complete a comprehensive assessment.
A comprehensive assessment is not a
change to the language of the NRC’s
regulations.
It is important to note however, that
relevant studies (which accomplish the
objectives of the Petitioner) were
performed at the request of the
Commission following the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks. As a result of
these studies, the staff has developed a
security assessment decision-making
framework to be used as a tool for NRC
to determine the appropriate level of
VerDate Nov<24>2008
15:11 Dec 04, 2009
Jkt 220001
security measures and mitigating
strategies required for a given threat
scenario, including threat scenarios
involving spent fuel storage casks and
certified radioactive material
transportation package designs.
Consideration in Rulemaking
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day
of November, 2009.
Frm 00005
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
The NRC will consider the issues
raised in PRM–73–10 and the remainder
of the petitioner’s requests in a
proposed SNF transportation security
rulemaking, which is expected to be
available for public comment in 2010.
The NRC has determined that the
underlying technical considerations
regarding the physical security of SNF
shipments are sufficiently related to this
ongoing rulemaking activity; therefore,
the issues raised in PRM–73–10, other
than the requests that are being denied,
are being considered in the rulemaking
activity.
Specifically, the NRC is considering a
proposed SNF transportation security
rulemaking which will require that
licensees plan and coordinate SNF
shipments, including routes and safe
havens, with the States through which
the shipment will pass. The proposed
rulemaking would also require
including armed escorts along the entire
length of the route, continuous and
active monitoring of the SNF shipment,
redundant communications capabilities
among the transport, local law
enforcement agencies and a licensee
movement control center, and planning
and development of normal and
contingency procedures.
The NRC is continuing work to
develop this proposed rulemaking.
Although the NRC will consider the
issues raised in the petition, other than
the requests being denied, the
petitioner’s concerns may not be
addressed exactly as the petitioner has
requested. During the rulemaking
process, the NRC will solicit comments
from the public and will consider all
comments before issuing a final rule. If
the NRC does not issue a proposed rule,
the NRC will issue a document in the
Federal Register that addresses why the
petitioner’s requested rulemaking
changes were not adopted by the NRC.
For the reasons provided above, the
NRC is denying the petition, in part, and
considering the remainder of the
petitioner’s requests in the NRC’s
ongoing rulemaking process. With this
action the NRC closes the docket for
PRM–73–10.
PO 00000
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
R.W. Borchardt,
Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. E9–29054 Filed 12–4–09; 8:45 am]
11 CFR Part 300
[Notice 2009–26]
Participation by Federal Candidates
and Officeholders at Non-Federal
Fundraising Events
Federal Election Commission.
Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
SUMMARY: The Federal Election
Commission seeks comments on
proposed changes to its rules regarding
participation by Federal candidates and
officeholders at non-Federal fundraising
events under the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, as amended.
These proposed changes are in response
to the decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Shays v. FEC. The
Commission has made no final decision
on the issues presented in this
rulemaking.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before Monday, February 8, 2010.
Reply comments must be limited to the
issues raised in the initial comments
and must be received on or before
Monday, February 22, 2010. The
Commission will hold a hearing on
these proposed rules on Wednesday,
March 10, 2010 at 10 a.m. Anyone
wishing to testify at the hearing must
file written comments by the due date
and must include a request to testify in
the written comments.
ADDRESSES: All comments must be in
writing, addressed to Ms. Amy L.
Rothstein, Assistant General Counsel,
and submitted in either electronic,
facsimile or hard copy form.
Commenters are strongly encouraged to
submit comments electronically to
ensure timely receipt and consideration.
Electronic comments should be sent to
SolicitationShays3@fec.gov. If the
electronic comments include an
attachment, the attachment must be in
Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) or Microsoft Word
(.doc) format. Faxed comments should
be sent to (202) 219–3923, with hard
copy follow-up. Hard copy comments
and hard copy follow-up of faxed
comments should be sent to the Federal
Election Commission, 999 E Street,
NW., Washington, DC 20463. All
comments must include the full name
and postal service address of the
E:\FR\FM\07DEP1.SGM
07DEP1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 233 (Monday, December 7, 2009)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 64012-64016]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-29054]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 73
[Docket No. PRM-73-10; NRC-2000-0026]
State of Nevada; Denial of Portions of Petition for Rulemaking,
Consideration of the Remaining Portions in the Rulemaking Process
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Closure of petition for rulemaking docket; Partial Denial.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying, in
part, a petition for rulemaking (PRM 73-10) submitted by the State of
Nevada on June 22, 1999. The NRC will consider the remainder of the
petition in the rulemaking process. The petitioner requested that NRC
amend its regulations governing safeguards for shipments of spent
nuclear fuel against sabotage and terrorism. The petitioner also
requested that the NRC conduct a comprehensive assessment of the
[[Page 64013]]
consequences of terrorist attacks that have the capability of
radiological sabotage, including attacks against transportation
infrastructure used during nuclear waste shipments, attacks involving
capture of nuclear waste shipments and use of high energy explosives
against a cask or casks, and direct attacks upon a nuclear waste
shipping cask or casks using antitank missiles or other military
weapons. This action closes the docket for PRM-73-10.
DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking PRM-73-10 is closed
on December 7, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You can access publicly available documents related to this
petition for rulemaking using the following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Public comments and supporting
materials related to this petition for rulemaking can be found at the
Federal rulemaking Web site https://www.regulations.gov by searching on
Docket ID: NRC-2000-0026. Further NRC action on the remaining issues
raised by this petition will be accessible at https://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2009-0163. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher (301) 492-3668; e-mail
Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have
copied for a fee publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O-
1F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are
available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC PDR
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, (301) 415-4737, or by e-mail to
pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
The NRC also tracks all rulemaking actions in the ``NRC Regulatory
Agenda: Semiannual Report'' (NUREG-0936).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Naiem S. Tanious, Office of Federal
and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-
6103, e-mail Naiem.Tanious@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The Petition
The petition, dated June 22, 1999, was filed with NRC by the State
of Nevada and assigned Docket No. PRM 73-10 on July 13, 1999. The NRC
published a notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking on September
13, 1999 (64 FR 49410). The petitioner (the State of Nevada) states
that it is a corridor State for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments, and
has been a destination and origin State for SNF shipments to and from
Federal research facilities. Nevada is also the potential host State
for a Federal geologic repository and could become the ultimate
destination for shipments of SNF and high-level radioactive waste.
The petitioner requests that NRC amend its regulations governing
safeguards for shipments of spent nuclear fuel against sabotage and
terrorism. Specifically, the petitioner requests seven amendments to 10
CFR Part 73:
(1) Clarification of the meaning of the term ``hand-carried
equipment'' in 10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)(i)(D) to include: (a) One or more
large military demolition devices, such as the U.S. Army M3A1 shaped
charge weighing 40 pounds; (b) a significant quantity (limited only by
the carrying capacity of the vehicle) of commercial explosives packaged
in crates, boxes, suitcases, or other hand-carried containers; and (c)
numerous man-portable antitank weapon systems such as the Carl Gustav
M2 recoilless gun (weight 15 kg), the Milan antitank missile (weight 32
kg), and the infantry version of the TOW 2 antitank missile (weight 116
kg with tripod launcher);
(2) Clarify the definition of ``radiological sabotage'' in 10 CFR
73.2 to include actions against SNF shipments which are intended to
cause a loss of shielding or a release of radioactive materials as well
as those deliberate actions which cause, or are intended to cause
economic damage or social disruption regardless of the extent to which
public health and safety are actually endangered by exposure to
radiation;
(3) Amend the advance route approval requirements in 10 CFR
73.37(b)(7) to specifically require shippers and carriers to identify
primary and alternative routes which minimize highway and rail
shipments through heavily populated areas, adopt the route selection
criteria in NUREG-0561, and require shippers and carriers to minimize
use of routes which fail to comply with the route selection criteria;
(4) Amend 10 CFR 73.37(c) to eliminate the differential armed
escort requirements based on population for SNF shipments by road;
(5) Amend 10 CFR 73.37(d) to eliminate the differential armed
escort requirements based on population for SNF shipments by rail;
(6) Amend 10 CFR 73.37(b) to make applicable to SNF shipments the
10 CFR 73.26(b)(1) planning and scheduling requirements for special
nuclear material in transit; and
(7) Amend 10 CFR 73.37(d) to require that SNF rail shipments be
made by dedicated trains.
In addition, the petitioner requests that NRC, in support of the
aforementioned rulemaking, conduct a comprehensive assessment of the
consequences of terrorist attacks that have the capability of
radiological sabotage, including attacks against transportation
infrastructure used during nuclear waste shipments, attacks involving
capture of nuclear waste shipments and use of high energy explosives
against a cask or casks, and direct attacks upon a nuclear waste
shipping cask or casks using antitank missiles or other military
weapons.
The petitioner's rationale for requesting a rulemaking to better
deter, prevent, and mitigate the consequences of any attempted
radiological sabotage, as well as a comprehensive assessment of the
consequences of terrorist attacks is based on the following:
(1) The petitioner asserts that the thousands of shipments to a
geologic repository will create opportunity for terrorist attacks or
sabotage of spent fuel shipments. The petitioner contends that
opportunity is created because the spent fuel shipments will be over
long distances, many in number, regular and predictable, and to a fixed
destination.
(2) The petitioner asserts that the means for mounting an attack
are available. The petitioner contends that several varieties of high
energy explosives are currently available including the M3A1 shaped
charge, commercial shaped charges, and thousands of antitank weapons
that have been produced world-wide in the last several years including
the Milan and TOW 2 antitank missiles.
(3) The petitioner asserts that the spent fuel shipments may be
attractive targets. The petitioner contends that a national repository
may have a greater symbolic value to terrorists as a target than
current reactor storage facilities, and that ``enhanced symbolic
value'' may extend to spent fuel shipments. The petitioner also
contends that a single facility with a large stockpile of spent fuel
might be a more tempting target. Further, the petitioner suggests that
a facility operated by the
[[Page 64014]]
Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Government agency responsible for
producing nuclear weapons, may have greater symbolic value to
terrorists as a target than commercial storage facilities, and that
``enhanced symbolic value'' may extend to DOE's shipments of spent
fuel.
(4) The petitioner asserts that after 1984 when NRC last evaluated
the adequacy of spent fuel transportation safeguards, the nature of the
terrorist threat has changed significantly. The petitioner contends
that during the past 17 years major changes have occurred, including:
an increase in the lethality of terrorist attacks in the United States;
an increase in serious terrorist attacks against transportation
systems; and renewed concern about nuclear terrorism generally, and
terrorist actions involving potential radioactive contamination
specifically.
(5) The petitioner asserts that shipping casks are vulnerable to
terrorist attack using high-energy explosive devices. The petitioner
contends that this vulnerability is caused by two developments: the
capabilities and availability of explosive devices, especially antitank
weapons, have increased significantly; and new shipping casks,
developed to increase payloads without exceeding specified weight
limits, appear to be more vulnerable to attack using commercial
explosives or past, current, and future weapons systems. The petitioner
perceives that after the early 1980s, portable antitank weapons have
become more powerful, reliable, and available world-wide. The
petitioner states that most of the antitank missiles, identified in its
attachment, have warheads capable of completely perforating a truck
cask and its spent fuel cargo, and deeply penetrating a rail cask and
damaging its spent fuel cargo. The petitioner also states that spent
fuel shipping casks are vulnerable to attack using military and
commercial explosives, particularly a conical-shaped charge with an
incendiary device. Lastly, the petitioner claims that shaped charges
developed for use in oil and gas well perforating are particularly
powerful, efficient, and stable.
Public Comments on the Petition
The notice of receipt of the petition for rulemaking invited
interested persons to submit comments. During the comment period, which
closed on January 28, 2000,\1\ the NRC received 24 comment letters: 15
from States and agencies or counties within States; 2 from Federal
agencies; and 1 each from the Nuclear Energy Institute, Western
Governors Association, Northeast High-Level Radioactive Waste
Transportation Task Force, Association of American Railroads, Heartland
Operation to Protect the Environment, an NRC licensee, and a private
individual. Comment letter number 21 from the Agency for Nuclear
Projects, State of Nevada provided additional information. The comments
have been divided into three groups: (1) Those supporting assessment
only, (2) those supporting both assessment and rulemaking, and (3)
those opposing both assessment and rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The NRC extended the comment period, which originally was to
close on November 29, 1999, to January 28, 2000 (64 FR 59684,
November 3, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nine commenters support assessment only. They agree with the
petitioner that the estimated risks and potential consequences to the
public from a terrorist attack of spent fuel in transit should be made
current, and if indicated, the regulations should be revised
accordingly.
The State of Louisiana urges NRC to review and strengthen, where
necessary, the applicable procedures and safeguards to ensure the
security and safety of both the spent nuclear fuel shipments and the
citizens that would be affected by any act of terrorism, sabotage, or
more importantly, an accident which would result in the release of
radioactive materials. Also, the State of Louisiana notes that the
technology for tracking sensitive freight shipments is available and
should be a required safeguard. For example, Automatic Vehicle Location
Technology allows near real-time tracking of vehicles.
The Department of Environmental Quality of the Commonwealth of
Virginia indicates that it is reasonable for NRC to reevaluate its
requirements for safeguarding spent fuel shipments against sabotage and
terrorism.
The Department of Public Safety of the State of Oklahoma agrees
that assessment of safeguards for the shipment of spent fuel and
response to emergency situations during shipments should be current.
The Western Governors Association recommends that NRC: (1)
Reevaluate the adequacy of current physical protection regulations for
transporting spent fuel, (2) conduct a comprehensive consequence
assessment of attacks that have the potential for radiological
sabotage, (3) create a stakeholder advisory group to assist NRC in the
comprehensive consequence assessment, and (4) publish a full report on
all unclassified assessment findings.
The Nuclear Energy Institute concurs that NRC should complete a
comprehensive assessment of credible threats of sabotage and terrorism
on spent fuel in transit.
Six commenters support both assessment and rulemaking. They agree
with the petitioner that the safeguards requirements for spent fuel in
transit should be strengthened and that a proposed rulemaking effort
should be supported by a comprehensive assessment of the potential
consequences of sabotage or terrorist attack.
Nye County, Nevada asserts that there is a need for a comprehensive
assessment of the consequences of terrorist attacks that covers the
entire spectrum of nuclear waste and spent fuel shipments to a
repository, and that the petition raises legitimate and substantial
issues that should be fully explored in a proposed rulemaking.
Clark County, Nevada supports both assessment and rulemaking
because it believes that NRC's standards for safety and security for
spent fuel in transit are out of date.
Eureka County, Nevada asserts that the petition raises legitimate
and substantial issues that should be fully explored in a notice and
comment rulemaking.
The State of Utah agrees with the need to reevaluate requirements
for safeguarding shipments of spent nuclear fuel due to the changing
nature of threats involving terrorism and sabotage, wants any
assessment to address the need for a more comprehensive and reliable
system to track shipments, and recommends increased armed escort for
shipments of spent nuclear fuel.
The State of Utah also asserts that the nature of the terrorist
threat has significantly changed since NRC last assessed the adequacy
of its spent fuel transportation safeguards regulations, and that the
current regulations are predicated on outdated assessments.
Eight commenters oppose both assessment and rulemaking. They
disagree with the petitioner that either an assessment or proposed
rulemaking is necessary.
One licensee asserts that the existing safeguards regulations are
adequate and no rulemaking change to Part 73 is necessary. Moreover,
any assessment undertaken in response to the petition should consider
the physical protection requirements for spent fuel shipments both in
the context of all hazardous material shipments and in comparison to
other targets for terrorist attack.
The Department of Emergency Services within the Commonwealth of
Virginia acknowledges that terrorism poses one of the most challenging
[[Page 64015]]
threats to public safety today and agrees that the possibility of such
an attack involving spent fuel warrants serious consideration. However,
this Department believes that NRC, the DOE, the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the national security agencies should consider
the issue of terrorism involving nuclear shipments as part of the
overall domestic preparedness mission. Moreover, this Department states
that changes in the nation's security programs and domestic
preparedness must be based on sound risk assessment and threat
analysis. When such an analysis results in additional risk factors,
only then should resources be committed to making necessary regulatory
changes.
The Northeast High-Level Radioactive Waste Transportation Task
Force, representing nine States, asserts that transportation casks are
very robust and do not make an attractive target, the nature of a
terrorist threat has not changed significantly, and additional
rulemaking on safeguards for spent fuel transportation is not necessary
because current safeguards provide adequate protection. The Task Force
points out that there are a high number of shipments routinely
occurring without difficulty, spent fuel shipments in NRC certified
casks have an excellent safety record, and 2380 safe shipments have
occurred during the past 35 years without radiological release,
sabotage, or terrorism. Moreover, leaving the spent fuel in place has
undesirable features with respect to protecting public health and
safety since most reactor storage sites are located near rivers, lakes,
or sea shores.
The Association of American Railroads disagrees with the
petitioner's assertion that ``the NRC should specifically require
shippers and carriers to identify primary and alternate routes that
minimize highway and rail shipments through heavily populated areas.''
The Association points out that a premise of hazardous materials
transportation is that transportation time should be minimized. Thus,
routing to avoid heavily-populated areas would be counter productive by
causing large increases in transportation time because routes around
urban areas are almost always significantly more circuitous.
The DOE asserts that the petition does not offer compelling reasons
for either a comprehensive assessment or rulemaking. DOE states that
there is no evidence that either a reassessment or rulemaking would
result in any measurable increase in public health or safety. DOE also
states that their most recent sabotage analyses indicate that the
current regulations adequately protect public health and safety and the
environment. Moreover, the petition's reference to terrorist events
throughout the world does not reflect the actual situation in the U.S.
or mean that spent fuel shipments are actually terrorist targets.
Recent studies by DOE show that the fundamental response of casks to
offensive weapons has not dramatically changed. In addition, the
estimated consequences of credible sabotage scenarios continue to be
bounded by the consequences evaluated under severe accident conditions.
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP), Department of the
Navy, states that the petitioner has not provided sufficient
justification for the requested actions. Since 1957, the NNPP has made
700 shipments of naval spent fuel by rail, all safely. There have not
been any accidents, releases of radioactivity, or acts of terrorism or
sabotage. Also, the NNPP disagrees that the nature of the terrorist
threat has changed substantially from that which the existing
regulations are designed to protect against. Moreover, simply listing
U.S. terrorist attacks of the past two decades and speculating about
increased concerns for terrorist attacks against spent fuel shipments
does not support the position that regulatory changes are necessary.
NNPP further states that if a terrorist group could obtain and use
military weapons, they would be likely to select targets where they
could cause large numbers of immediate fatalities. Furthermore, NNPP
asserts that the petition provides neither new technical information
nor other justification for the proposed regulatory changes.
The NRC reviewed and considered the comments in its decision to
deny, in part, the petition for rulemaking and to consider the
remainder of the petition in the rulemaking process. In reaching its
decision, the NRC has also considered the intervening events since
1999, when the petition was filed and the comments were received,
including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and since those
attacks, the various security assessments that have been conducted and
the various security measures that have been put in place. The NRC's
analysis is set forth below.
Petition Resolution
The NRC is denying the following two specific requests from the
petitioner: (1) The request for amending the design basis threat (DBT)
for radiological sabotage to include a clarification in the meaning of
the phrase ``hand-held equipment'' in 10 CFR 73.1(a)(i)(D) and to amend
the DBT to include use of explosive devices and other weapons larger
than those commonly considered to be hand-carried or hand-held, and the
use of vehicles other than four wheel drive civilian land vehicles; and
(2) the request that the NRC conduct comprehensive security assessment
studies. The remaining petition requests are being considered in the
NRC rulemaking process.
Petition Requests that are being denied:
1. Amending the DBT To Clarify the Meaning of Hand-Carried Equipment
and To Include the Use of Explosive Devices, Other Weapons Larger Than
Those Considered Hand-Carried, and Vehicles Other Than 4-Wheel Drive
The Petitioner requested that the NRC clarify the meaning of the
phrase ``hand-carried equipment'' in 10 CFR 73.1(a)(i)(D) to include:
(a) One or more large military demolition devices, such as the U.S.
Army M3A1 shaped charge weighing 40 pounds; (b) a significant quantity
(limited only by the carrying capacity of the vehicle) of commercial
explosives packaged in crates, boxes, suitcases, or other hand-carried
containers; and (c) man-portable antitank weapon systems such as the
Carl Gustav M2 recoilless gun (weight 15 kg), the Milan antitank
missile (weight 32 kg), and the infantry version of the TOW 2 antitank
missile (weight 116 kg with tripod launcher).
The NRC is denying this request for rulemaking. On March 19, 2007,
the Commission issued a final rule amending 10 CFR 73.1 (72 FR 12705),
Design Basis Threat. This rule contained the Design Basis Threat with
which affected licensees must comply. However, the Commission was
careful to set forth rule text that did not compromise licensee
security, but also balances the necessity to keep the public informed
of the types of attacks against which nuclear power plants and Category
I facilities are required to defend. Specific information on adversary
capabilities (e.g., specific weapons, ammunition type, etc) are
contained in adversary characteristics documents which contain
classified or Safeguards Information (SGI).
The technical bases for the adversary characteristic documents are
derived largely from intelligence information. They contain classified
or SGI information which cannot be publicly disclosed. These documents
must be withheld from public disclosure and made available on a need-
to-know basis to those who are cleared for access. Consequently, the
petitioner's suggested changes to this regulation would be
[[Page 64016]]
inconsistent with the Commission's recent revision of Sec. 73.1.
The Petitioner also requested that the NRC consider amending the
DBT to include use of explosive devices and other weapons larger than
those commonly considered to be hand-carried or hand-held, and the use
of vehicles other than four wheel drive civilian land vehicles. Well-
trained and dedicated adversaries could conceivably obtain and use
military attack vehicles or military aircraft armed with bombs,
missiles, or other powerful weapons.
The NRC is denying this request. The specific details of the
adversary's capabilities are now contained in adversary characteristics
documents which contain classified or SGI information. The adversary
characteristics documents are derived largely from intelligence
information. These documents must be withheld from public disclosure
and made available on a need to know basis to those who are cleared for
access. The petitioner's suggested changes to this regulation would not
be consistent with the Commission's recent revision to Sec. 73.1.
2. Comprehensive Assessment of the Consequences of Terrorist Attacks
The petitioner requested that the NRC conduct a comprehensive
assessment of the consequences of terrorist attacks that have the
capability of radiological sabotage to include: Attacks against
transportation infrastructure used by nuclear waste shipments, attacks
involving capture of a nuclear waste shipment and use of high energy
explosives against the cask, and direct attacks upon a nuclear waste
shipping cask using antitank missiles.
The NRC is denying this request because it does not involve (i.e.,
contain) a request to amend, create, or revise the NRC's existing
regulations, as is required by the provisions of 10 CFR 2.802,
``Petition for Rulemaking.'' Instead of requesting changes to the NRC's
regulations (as it has specified for other topics elsewhere in its
petition) the Petitioner has requested the NRC complete a comprehensive
assessment. A comprehensive assessment is not a change to the language
of the NRC's regulations.
It is important to note however, that relevant studies (which
accomplish the objectives of the Petitioner) were performed at the
request of the Commission following the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. As a result of these studies, the staff has developed a
security assessment decision-making framework to be used as a tool for
NRC to determine the appropriate level of security measures and
mitigating strategies required for a given threat scenario, including
threat scenarios involving spent fuel storage casks and certified
radioactive material transportation package designs.
Consideration in Rulemaking
The NRC will consider the issues raised in PRM-73-10 and the
remainder of the petitioner's requests in a proposed SNF transportation
security rulemaking, which is expected to be available for public
comment in 2010. The NRC has determined that the underlying technical
considerations regarding the physical security of SNF shipments are
sufficiently related to this ongoing rulemaking activity; therefore,
the issues raised in PRM-73-10, other than the requests that are being
denied, are being considered in the rulemaking activity.
Specifically, the NRC is considering a proposed SNF transportation
security rulemaking which will require that licensees plan and
coordinate SNF shipments, including routes and safe havens, with the
States through which the shipment will pass. The proposed rulemaking
would also require including armed escorts along the entire length of
the route, continuous and active monitoring of the SNF shipment,
redundant communications capabilities among the transport, local law
enforcement agencies and a licensee movement control center, and
planning and development of normal and contingency procedures.
The NRC is continuing work to develop this proposed rulemaking.
Although the NRC will consider the issues raised in the petition, other
than the requests being denied, the petitioner's concerns may not be
addressed exactly as the petitioner has requested. During the
rulemaking process, the NRC will solicit comments from the public and
will consider all comments before issuing a final rule. If the NRC does
not issue a proposed rule, the NRC will issue a document in the Federal
Register that addresses why the petitioner's requested rulemaking
changes were not adopted by the NRC.
For the reasons provided above, the NRC is denying the petition, in
part, and considering the remainder of the petitioner's requests in the
NRC's ongoing rulemaking process. With this action the NRC closes the
docket for PRM-73-10.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of November, 2009.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
R.W. Borchardt,
Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. E9-29054 Filed 12-4-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
