Aircraft Repair Station Security, 59874-59890 [E9-27624]
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 221 / Wednesday, November 18, 2009 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Transportation Security Administration
49 CFR Parts 1520 and 1554
[Docket No. TSA–2004–17131]
RIN 1652–AA38
Aircraft Repair Station Security
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AGENCY: Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), DHS.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
SUMMARY: TSA is proposing to issue
regulations to improve the security of
domestic and foreign aircraft repair
stations as required by the Vision 100–
Century of Aviation Reauthorization
Act. The proposed regulations establish
requirements for repair stations that are
certificated by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) under 14 CFR
part 145 to adopt and implement a
standard security program and to
comply with security directives issued
by TSA. This rule proposes to codify the
scope of TSA’s existing inspection
program and to require regulated parties
to allow TSA and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) officials to
enter, inspect, and test property,
facilities, and records relevant to repair
stations. The proposed regulations also
provide procedures for TSA to notify
repair stations of any deficiencies in
their security programs, and to
determine whether a particular repair
station presents an immediate risk to
security. The proposal includes a
process whereby a repair station may
seek review of a determination by TSA
that the station has not adequately
addressed security deficiencies or that
the repair station poses an immediate
risk to security.
DATES: Submit comments by January 19,
2010.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by Docket No. TSA–2004–
17131, to the Federal Docket
Management System (FDMS), a
government-wide, electronic docket
management system, using any one of
the following methods:
Electronically: You may submit
comments through the Federal
eRulemaking portal at https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the online
instructions for submitting comments.
Mail, Fax, or In Person: Address,
hand-deliver, or fax your written
comments to the Docket Management
System, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., West Building Ground
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Floor, Room W12–140, Washington, DC
20590–0001; Fax: 202–493–2251. The
Department of Transportation (DOT),
which maintains and processes TSA’s
official regulatory dockets, will scan the
submission and post it to FDMS.
See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for
format and other information about
comment submissions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Celio Young, Office of Security
Operations, TSA–29, Transportation
Security Administration, 601 South
12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598–6029;
telephone (571) 227–3580; facsimile
(571) 227–1905; e-mail
celio.young@dhs.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
TSA invites interested persons to
participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written comments, data, or
views. We also invite comments relating
to the economic, environmental, energy,
recordkeeping, or federalism impacts
that might result from adopting the
proposals in this document. See
ADDRESSES above for information on
where to submit comments.
With each comment, please identify
the docket number at the beginning of
your comments. TSA encourages
commenters to provide their names and
addresses. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the
rulemaking, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data. You may submit
comments and material electronically,
in person, or by mail as provided under
ADDRESSES, but please submit your
comments and material by only one
means. If you submit comments by mail
or delivery, submit them in two copies,
in an unbound format, no larger than 8.5
by 11 inches, suitable for copying and
electronic filing.
If you want TSA to acknowledge
receipt of your comments submitted by
mail, include with your comments a
self-addressed, stamped postcard on
which the docket number appears. We
will stamp the date on the postcard and
mail it to you.
TSA will file in the public docket
address, as well as items sent to the
address or email under FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT, in the public
docket, except for comments containing
confidential information and sensitive
security information (SSI).1 Should you
1 ‘‘Sensitive Security Information’’ or ‘‘SSI’’ is
information obtained or developed in the conduct
of security activities, the disclosure of which would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy,
reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential
information, or be detrimental to the security of
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wish your personally identifiable
information redacted prior to filing in
the docket, please so state. TSA will
consider all comments that are in the
docket on or before the closing date for
comments and will consider comments
filed late to the extent practicable. The
docket is available for public inspection
before and after the closing date.
Handling of Confidential or Proprietary
Information and Sensitive Security
Information (SSI) Submitted in Public
Comments
Do not submit comments that include
trade secrets, confidential commercial
or financial information, or SSI to the
public regulatory docket. Please submit
such comments separately from other
comments on the rulemaking.
Comments containing this type of
information should be appropriately
marked as containing such information
and submitted by mail to the address
listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section.
TSA will not place comments
containing SSI in the public docket and
will handle them in accordance with
applicable safeguards and restrictions
on access. TSA will hold documents
containing SSI, confidential business
information, or trade secrets in a
separate file to which the public does
not have access, and place a note in the
public docket explaining that
commenters have submitted such
documents. TSA may include a redacted
version of the comment in the public
docket. If an individual requests to
examine or copy information that is not
in the public docket, TSA will treat it
as any other request under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552)
and the Department of Homeland
Security’s (DHS’) FOIA regulation found
in 6 CFR part 5.
Reviewing Comments in the Docket
Please be aware that anyone is able to
search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our
dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the
comments, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review the applicable Privacy
Act statement published in the Federal
Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR
19477) and modified on January 17,
2008 (73 FR 3316).
You may review TSA’s electronic
public docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov. In addition, DOT’s
Docket Management Facility provides a
physical facility, staff, equipment, and
transportation. The protection of SSI is governed by
49 CFR part 1520.
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assistance to the public. To obtain
assistance or to review comments in
TSA’s public docket, you may visit this
facility between 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, excluding legal
holidays, or call (202) 366–9826. This
docket operations facility is located in
the West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140 at 1200 New Jersey Avenue,
SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Availability of Rulemaking Document
You may obtain an electronic copy
using the Internet by
(1) Searching the Federal Docket
Management System (FDMS) Web page
at https://www.regulations.gov;
(2) Accessing the Government
Printing Office’s Web page at https://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/; or
(3) Visiting TSA’s Security
Regulations Web page at https://
www.tsa.gov and accessing the link for
‘‘Research Center’’ at the top of the page.
In addition, copies of the rulemaking
document are available by writing or
calling the individual in the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.
Make sure to identify the docket number
of this rulemaking.
Outline of the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
I. Background
A. Introduction
B. Statutory Requirements
C. Summary of Proposed Rule
D. FAA Safety Regulations
E. Public Listening Session and Comments
F. Repair Station Site Visits
II. Summary of the Proposed Rule
A. Repair Station Standard Security
Program
B. Repair Station Profile
C. Security Inspections
D. Immediate Risk to Security
III. Section-by-Section Analysis
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
B. International Compatibility
C. Regulatory Impact Analyses
1. Regulatory Evaluation Summary
2. Executive Order 12866 Assessment
3. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(IRFA)
4. International Trade Impact Assessment
5. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Assessment
D. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
E. Environmental Analysis
F. Energy Impact Analysis
TSA is proposing to issue regulations
to provide for the security of
maintenance and repair work conducted
on aircraft and aircraft components at
domestic and foreign repair stations, of
the aircraft and aircraft components
located at these repair stations, and of
the repair station facilities as required
by Vision 100—Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, codified at 49
U.S.C. 44924 (Vision 100).
For purposes of this rulemaking,
‘‘repair stations’’ are those facilities
certificated by the FAA to perform
maintenance, repair, overhaul, or
alterations on U.S. aircraft or aircraft
components, including engines,
hydraulics, avionics, safety equipment,
airframes, and interiors. According to
the FAA, there are 4,227 domestic repair
stations located in the United States and
694 foreign repair stations located
outside the United States that have an
FAA certificate under part 145 of the
FAA’s rules.2
In addition, for purposes of this
rulemaking, the term ‘‘component’’
includes any article, airframe, aircraft
engine, propeller, appliance, or part that
is under repair. The term is used
broadly to encompass both articles and
appliances as defined by the FAA.3
Aircraft repair stations vary widely in
size, type of repair work performed,
number of employees, and proximity to
an airport. The FAA issues ratings to
certificated repair stations for the work
that can be performed at the repair
station.4 These include airframe ratings,
power plant ratings, propeller ratings,
radio ratings, instrument ratings, and
accessory ratings. Within each rating
there are different classes for particular
aircraft and equipment. The FAA also
issues limited ratings for certificated
repair stations that only work on a
particular type of airframe or equipment
or performs only specialized
maintenance operations.5 The FAA
certificates repair stations with few
employees located in industrial parks
and in residences that may work on
small components, such as aircraft
radios or seat cushions, as well as repair
stations with many employees that
perform major aircraft overhauls located
in close proximity to an airport
runway.6 Because repair station
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I. Background
A. Introduction
Civil aviation remains a target of
terrorist activity worldwide. Terrorists
continue to seek opportunities to
destroy public confidence in the safety
and security of travel, deny the ability
of the public to move and travel freely,
and damage international economic
security.
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2 FAA Fact Sheet, ‘‘FAA Oversight of Repair
Stations,’’ March 29, 2007. See ‘‘FAA Certificated
Repair Stations Directory,’’ Advisory Circular (AC)
140–7R, for a list of FAA certificated repair stations.
3 See 14 CFR 1.1 and 145.3(b).
4 14 CFR 145.59.
5 14 CFR 145.61.
6 Approximately 2,803 domestic repair stations
have fifteen or fewer employees and 1,407 have five
or fewer employees. Approximately 3,000
certificated domestic repair stations are not located
on an airport.
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characteristics vary widely, TSA
believes that existing security measures,
as well as the corresponding security
threat, also vary widely.
Repair stations are closely regulated
and monitored by the FAA and both the
FAA and the air carriers inspect work
done at repair stations. FAA
performance standards for foreign and
domestic repair stations are the same.
While the FAA has implemented
extensive safety requirements for both
foreign and domestic repair stations,
supplementing those requirements with
specific security measures for both
foreign and domestic repair stations
would further reduce the likelihood that
terrorists would be able to gain access
to aircraft under repair at a repair
station. As terrorist organizations
continue to seek new and creative
means of using aircraft to undermine the
security and safety of the traveling
public, the importance of requiring all
aircraft repair stations to have measures
in place to prevent persons from
commandeering, tampering, or
sabotaging aircraft has increased as well.
Enhancement of repair station security
will mitigate the potential threat that an
aircraft could be used as a weapon or
that an aircraft could be destroyed.
This rulemaking sets forth proposed
regulations to require all FAA
certificated repair stations to adopt and
carry out a standard security program.
The proposed regulations list
performance standards for security
measures that would be included in the
standard security program. The
proposed regulations also would require
repair stations to carry out Security
Directives issued by TSA in the event of
a specific threat.
In addition, the proposed regulations
codify the scope of TSA’s authority to
conduct inspections of both domestic
and foreign repair stations. The
proposed regulations also provide
procedures for TSA to notify repair
stations of deficiencies in their security
program and to determine whether a
particular repair station represents an
immediate risk to security. Finally, the
proposal contains a process whereby a
repair station may seek review of a
determination by TSA that security
deficiencies have not been addressed or
that the repair station poses an
immediate risk to security.
B. Statutory Requirements
Vision 100 requires DHS to
promulgate security regulations for
domestic and foreign aircraft repair
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stations.7 The statute includes the
following additional requirements
regarding security audits of foreign
repair stations:
• TSA must complete a security
review and audit of foreign repair
stations certificated by the FAA no later
than six months after regulations are
issued.8 When conducting the audit,
TSA must give priority to those repair
stations that pose a significant risk to
security. If security audits are not
completed within six months from the
date regulations are issued, the FAA is
barred from certificating any new
foreign repair stations until the security
audits are completed for existing repair
stations.
• TSA must notify the FAA of any
security issues or vulnerabilities
identified during the audit and require
foreign repair stations to address any
such issues or vulnerabilities within 90
days. If, after 90 days, TSA determines
that the foreign repair station does not
maintain and carry out effective security
measures, TSA must notify the FAA and
the FAA must suspend the repair
station’s certificate until such time as
TSA determines that the repair station
does maintain and carry out effective
security measures.
• TSA must notify the FAA if TSA
determines that a foreign repair station
poses an immediate risk to security and
the FAA must revoke the repair station’s
certificate. TSA must establish an
appeal procedure to be used when a
certificate is revoked.
C. Summary of Proposed Rule
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TSA is proposing regulations to:
• Codify TSA’s inspection authority.
• Require foreign and domestic repair
stations certificated by the FAA under
part 145 of the FAA’s rules to allow
TSA and DHS officials to enter, inspect,
audit, and test property, facilities, and
records relevant to repair stations.
• Require foreign and domestic repair
stations certificated by the FAA to adopt
and carry out a standard security
program issued by TSA to safeguard the
security of the repair station, the repair
work conducted at the repair station,
7 This section of Vision 100 is codified at 49
U.S.C. 44924. The requirement to promulgate
regulations is described in 49 U.S.C. 44924(f). The
statute also requires that the Under Secretary for
Border and Transportation Security issue the final
regulations. The Under Secretary delegated
authority for issuing such regulations to TSA on
September 16, 2005. TSA sent a Report to Congress
on August 24, 2004, as required at 49 U.S.C.
44924(g).
8 In the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110–53, 121
Stat. 266, Aug. 3, 2007), the original 18-month
deadline for completing security inspections of
foreign repair stations was reduced to 6 months.
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and all aircraft and aircraft components
at the repair station.
• Require each security program to
describe the specific measures the repair
station has implemented to identify
individuals authorized access to the
repair station, aircraft, and aircraft
components; control access to the repair
station, aircraft, and aircraft
components; challenge individuals who
are not authorized access and use escort
measures for authorized visitors;
provide security awareness training to
all employees; verify employee
background information; designate a
security coordinator; and establish a
contingency plan.
• Require each repair station to
comply with Security Directives issued
by TSA.
• Establish a process to notify the
FAA to suspend a certificate upon
written notification by TSA that a repair
station has not corrected security
deficiencies identified during a security
audit within 90 days and to permit
appeal of a certificate suspension.
• Establish a process to notify the
FAA to revoke a certificate upon written
notification by TSA that a repair station
is an immediate risk to security and to
permit appeal of a certificate revocation.
In developing these proposals, TSA
has consulted with FAA officials
responsible for repair station safety
matters.
D. FAA Safety Regulations
The security regulations proposed in
this NPRM are designed to build upon
the extensive certification and safety
requirements for repair stations
instituted by the FAA. The FAA
certificates repair stations, as well as
repairmen who work in repair stations.9
The FAA requires that in order to
receive certification, repair stations
must establish and maintain a quality
control system acceptable to the FAA
that ensures the airworthiness of the
articles on which the repair station or
any of its contractors performs
maintenance, preventive maintenance,
or alterations.10 The quality control
system must describe the procedures the
repair station uses to inspect incoming
raw materials, perform preliminary
inspection of all articles that are
maintained at the repair station, qualify
and monitor noncertificated persons
9 See 14 CFR part 145 and 14 CFR part 65. While
the FAA only certificates certain repair station
personnel who work in the United States, it does
require that those repair station personnel located
outside the United States have practical experience
or training in the work being performed.
Supervisors in repair stations located outside the
United States must understand, read, and write
English. 14 CFR 145.153.
10 14 CFR 145.211.
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who perform maintenance, preventive
maintenance, or alterations for repair
stations, and conduct final inspections
of maintained articles. In addition, the
FAA requires that a certificated repair
station inspect each article upon which
it has performed maintenance,
preventive maintenance, or alterations
before approving that article for return
to service.11 The FAA conducts safety
inspections of both foreign and
domestic repair stations.
While these quality control measures
provide a significant layer of protection
and oversight of the components and
aircraft under repair, the proposed
regulations would supplement those
measures by requiring that FAA
certificated repair stations also adopt
and carry out a security program that
would include procedures to control
access to the repair station itself, the
components and aircraft under repair,
and the work being performed; verify
the identity of repair station employees;
and establish a security coordinator to
serve as the point of contact for securityrelated matters.
E. Public Listening Session and
Comments
On February 27, 2004, TSA held a
public listening session to receive input
from stakeholders and other interested
parties on repair station security issues.
TSA also invited written comments to
be submitted by March 29, 2004.12 TSA
requested specific comments on the
following issues:
• Security measures that are currently
deployed.
• Existing security vulnerabilities.
• Standards that should be in place to
prevent unauthorized access, tampering,
and any other security breaches.
• Current security system costs.
• Whether security requirements
should be tailored to the type of
authorization the repair station holds,
number of employees, proximity to an
airport, number of repairs completed, or
other characteristics.
• Whether aircraft operators should
play a role in ensuring that repair
stations maintain a secure workplace.
• Whether any repair station operator
has experienced a breach in security.
Twelve parties, representing air
carriers, repair station operators and
employees, manufacturers, and unions,
spoke during the public meeting.13
While several parties questioned the
need for security regulations, most
11 14
CFR 145.211.
FR 8357 (Feb. 24, 2004).
13 A transcript of the public meeting and copies
of all filed comments are available in docket
number TSA–2004–17131 at https://regulations.gov/
search.
12 69
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recognized the importance of protecting
the security of the aircraft, the
maintenance work that repair stations
perform on aircraft and aircraft
components, and the facility itself,
noting that TSA is required by statute to
develop such regulations. Most parties
also agreed that the regulations should
be tailored to reflect security measures
that may already be in place, as well as
other factors, such as those listed by
TSA in its request for comments.
Concerns were expressed regarding the
expedited timing of the regulations and
the security audits, the potential
financial burdens resulting from the
imposition of new regulations,
particularly on small repair stations,
and the appeal process. Several parties
recommended that the regulations
define what constitutes an ‘‘immediate
risk to security,’’ as well as ‘‘existing
repair stations.’’ Other parties discussed
security initiatives that had been
employed at their facilities since
September 11, 2001.
TSA also received 21 written
comments, representing the views of
repair station operators and employees,
unions, air carriers, aircraft owners, and
manufacturers regarding potential
security regulations. The majority of
those submitting written comments also
supported the need for security
regulations, and agreed that the
regulations should be tailored to reflect
the particular characteristics of a repair
station. Some commenters suggested
that TSA include general security
criteria for domestic and foreign repair
stations and others offered
recommendations regarding specific
provisions that should be included in
the regulations, such as access controls,
personnel identification, employee
background checks, and security
awareness training. The comments
provide valuable input as to how repair
station security issues should be
addressed and the proposal reflects
many of the issues, as well as the
recommendations, contained in these
initial comments. TSA looks forward to
receiving further comments on the
proposed regulations.
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F. Repair Station Site Visits
In addition to the information
gathered during the public listening
session and through written comments,
TSA visited repair stations to conduct
research on the physical characteristics
of repair stations, the type of repair
work performed, and the extent of
security measures that had been
implemented. The following site visits
were conducted:
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• June 2005—1 repair station in
Hamburg, Germany, and 1 repair station
in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
• August 2005—5 repair stations in
Singapore.
• November 2006—9 repair stations
in the state of Arizona.
• December 2006—3 repair stations in
Naples, Italy.
• January 2007—3 repair stations in
the state of Georgia.
• May 2007—1 repair station in
Singapore and 1 repair station in
Guangzhou, China.
• July 2007—1 repair station in
Teterboro, New Jersey.
• May 2008—3 repair stations in
Bogota, Colombia.
These repair station site visits
provided valuable insight into the
different types of facilities certificated
by the FAA, the different types of repair
work conducted at the facilities, and the
different types of security measures
deployed by the various facilities. All of
the stations visited had some security
measures in place. For example, one
foreign repair station had over 10,000
employees with many buildings and its
own airport. This facility had perimeter
fencing, security guards, and
surveillance cameras to control access to
the facility. Its employees were required
to display identification media. Another
foreign repair station had only seven
employees and was located at an
industrial park. That facility was
planning to install surveillance cameras
to be monitored by a private security
company. In two countries the
government had mandated security
requirements for certain repair stations.
In the United States, one domestic
repair station facility with 40 employees
relied on personal recognition to
identify individuals authorized entry
into the facility, while another domestic
repair station with fifteen employees
used identification media and
surveillance cameras. By conducting
these site visits, TSA was able to study
security measures already deployed and
develop a proposal that reflects repair
station diversity.
II. Summary of the Proposed Rule
TSA proposes to add a new part 1554
to its regulations, entitled ‘‘Aircraft
Repair Station Security.’’ The new part
would require aircraft repair stations
that are certificated by the FAA under
14 CFR part 145, both domestic and
foreign, to adopt and carry out a
standard security program. The
regulations would require repair
stations to safeguard the security of the
aircraft and components located at the
station, the maintenance and repair
work performed there, as well as the
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59877
repair station’s facilities as required by
49 U.S.C. 44924. For a more detailed
discussion of the proposed regulations,
see the Section-by-Section Analysis
portion of this preamble.
TSA is also proposing changes to its
regulations regarding the protection of
sensitive security information (SSI) to
specify that a repair station security
program is categorized as SSI and that
the repair station operator or owner is
subject to the SSI requirements
described in 49 CFR part 1520.14
A. Repair Station Standard Security
Program
FAA certificated repair stations,
whether located at airports that have a
TSA security program,15 at general
aviation airports, or at off airport
properties, could be a target of terrorist
activity and TSA is proposing that each
FAA certificated repair station
implement and carry out a standard
security program issued by TSA to
mitigate that risk. If the repair station is
already incorporated within an airport’s
security program and uses the airport’s
access control measures, TSA will
consider the repair station to be in
compliance with the security measures
proposed in these regulations.
The proposed regulations list the
general security requirements that each
repair station would be required to carry
out in the standard security program.
The standard security program would
require each repair station to include (1)
a description of access controls for the
facility as well as for the aircraft and/or
aircraft components; (2) a description of
the measures used to identify employees
and others who are authorized to access
aircraft and/or aircraft components; (3)
a description of the procedures to
challenge unauthorized individuals; (4)
a description of security awareness
training for employees; (5) the name of
the designated security coordinator; (6)
a contingency plan; and (7) a
description of the means used to verify
employee background information. The
complete security program contents are
discussed in the Section by Section
analysis.
These requirements are consistent
with the recommendations included in
the written comments received by TSA,
14 ‘‘Sensitive Security Information’’ or ‘‘SSI’’ is
information obtained or developed in the conduct
of security activities, the disclosure of which would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy,
reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential
information, or be detrimental to the security of
transportation. The protection of SSI is governed by
49 CFR part 1520.
15 See 49 CFR part 1542 for a description of
airport security program requirements. Aircraft
repair stations located at a commercial airport may
be included within the airport security program.
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as well as with established security
procedures for aircraft operators, air
carriers, and airports.16
Recognizing that a ‘‘one size fits all’’
approach would not appropriately
address the diversity in repair station
characteristics, TSA believes that repair
stations should have some flexibility
regarding the particular equipment,
facilities, and measures that would be
listed in the standard security program
and used to comply with the proposed
regulations. While TSA would provide
a standard security program which
would contain the majority of security
measures that a repair station must
adopt to comply with the proposed
regulations, certain measures in the
standard security program that the
repair station must adopt may differ
depending upon risk factors considered
by TSA.
TSA would not require repair stations
that are not located on or adjacent to an
airport to implement the same physical
security measures in the standard
security program as those repair stations
that are located on or adjacent to an
airport. In adopting this approach, TSA
considered the security risks of repair
station operations to determine whether
there were any factors that could
increase the security risks of a repair
station. The factors TSA considered
were (1) size and type of aircraft to
which employees had access; (2) the
type of repair work permitted by the
FAA certificate; (3) whether the repair
station was located on an airport and
the type of airport; and (4) the number
of employees at the repair station.
Based on the information acquired
during the repair stations site visits, an
examination of FAA safety
requirements, and discussions with
FAA safety inspectors, TSA determined
that while all of the characteristics
examined had some effect on security
risks, repair stations that are located on
or adjacent to an airport could pose a
higher security risk. TSA found that at
airport locations, there was greater
accessibility to aircraft and proximity to
a runway, thereby increasing the
possibility that an aircraft could be
commandeered and used as a weapon or
sabotaged. At off-airport locations, TSA
found that repair station employees had
little, if any, access to operational
aircraft or runways. Repair station
employees at off airport locations
typically are not the last individuals
with access to aircraft prior to the
reintroduction of the aircraft into
service. TSA believes that it would be
difficult for an individual to damage an
16 See, generally, TSA security regulations at 49
CFR parts 1540, 1542, 1544, and 1546.
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aircraft at a repair station location that
is only rated to repair aircraft
components if the individual does not
have access to aircraft. FAA safety
regulations require inspection of the
repair work and the component before
it is installed in an aircraft and before
the aircraft is deemed to be airworthy.
Thus, TSA believes it is less likely that
a terrorist would attempt to target an
aircraft by sabotaging a component at an
off airport location.
This assessment of the greater risk
posed by repair stations located on or
adjacent to an airport was also
supported by several commenters. One
commenter noted that repair stations
located within an airport posed the
greatest risk to security because of the
larger number of entry points in such a
location. Another explained that repair
facilities located off airport generally
only work on aircraft components and
that the multiple layers of testing and
oversight already conducted by the FAA
serves as an important security function
as well. Another commenter agreed,
stating that repair stations that do not
have access to aircraft do not pose a
security risk because the airworthiness
of the components are tested before they
are released into service.
Based on this risk assessment, TSA
would specify particular security
measures in the standard security
program that would apply to repair
stations on or adjacent to an airport, but
that would not be required for other
repair stations. TSA believes that this
approach would be consistent with its
efforts to strengthen security measures
at the non public areas of the airport.
In addition, TSA would not require
repair stations on or adjacent to airports
that only serve aircraft with a maximum
certificated take-off weight (MTOW) of
12,500 pounds or less to include the
same security measures in the standard
security program as repair stations
located on or adjacent to airports that
serve larger aircraft. TSA has long
recognized that aircraft with a MTOW
over 12,500 pounds pose a greater risk
to security because such aircraft are of
sufficient size and weight to inflict
significant damage and loss of lives.17
Smaller aircraft may be a less attractive
target for terrorists. Therefore, the
security program would not include the
same requirements for repair stations
that are located on or adjacent to an
airport that serves small aircraft. While
the proposed regulations apply to all
FAA certificated repair stations, TSA
requests comment on whether it should
exempt certain repair stations after it
conducts security reviews and audits.
17 See
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For instance, TSA may consider
whether to exempt repair stations that
only perform maintenance on aircraft
that are 12,500 MTOW or less. TSA also
requests comments on whether there are
other considerations that could be used
to determine potential exemptions.
TSA is aware that the FAA may
certificate repair stations operating on a
Federal government facility, such as a
U.S. military base. TSA believes that the
security at such a facility would likely
meet and exceed the security
requirements proposed herein.
Therefore, TSA would not apply its
requirements to any FAA certificated
repair station at which the Federal
government has assumed responsibility
for security measures.
The issue of requiring drug and
alcohol testing of repair station
employees was raised during the public
listening session. TSA is not proposing
to include drug and alcohol testing as
part of its security program
requirements. TSA notes that the FAA
has instituted alcohol and drug testing
as part of its safety regulations.18 TSA
believes that such testing should remain
under the purview of the FAA.
TSA believes that the standard
security program would be useful to
repair stations that have not developed
or implemented a security program,
particularly small repair stations that
may lack the resources to create their
own security program. Further, the
standard security program would
provide consistency in format and
content for the thousands of security
programs that would be implemented
under this proposal. TSA anticipates
requesting comment from repair stations
on the standard security program before
a final rule is adopted and will make a
draft of the standard security program
available for review and comment by
the repair stations subject to the
regulations either electronically,
through meetings, or both.19
B. Repair Station Profile
To assess the security risks of a repair
station and to establish the priority by
which repair stations must be inspected,
TSA would require each repair station
to provide a brief profile, to include
general information as to location, such
as whether the repair station is located
18 See 14 CFR part 121 at Appendix I and
Appendix J. The FAA requires part 145 certificate
holders and non-certificated repair stations that
perform safety sensitive functions for air carriers
and commercial operators under 14 CFR parts 121
and 135 to implement an FAA Antidrug Program.
19 Security programs will be sensitive security
information and will not be available to the general
public. See Section-by-Section analysis for § 1520.3
in this preamble.
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on or adjacent to an airport,20 the total
number of employees, and the number
of employees with access to large
aircraft. The type of information is
discussed in the Section by Section
analysis. We note that while the FAA
holds some of this information, it does
not have all of it. We invite comments
on the burdens associated with TSA
collecting this profile. As explained
above, TSA has determined that repair
stations located on or adjacent to an
airport pose a higher security risk than
those that are not located on or adjacent
to an airport. In addition, TSA has
determined that repair stations on
airports that perform work on aircraft
over 12,500 MTOW pose a higher
security risk. Identifying these higher
risk repair stations will enable TSA to
make certain that they are given a higher
priority when scheduling inspections.
Further, the profile will assist TSA in
determining which measures included
in the standard security program must
be implemented to address the higher
risk posture of repair stations that are
located on or adjacent to an airport.
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C. Security Inspections
The proposed regulations would
codify TSA’s inspection authority and
would require repair stations to permit
TSA and DHS officials to enter, inspect,
and test property, facilities, and records
relevant to repair stations. The purpose
of the inspection would be to assess
threats to aviation security, enforce TSA
security regulations, directives, and
requirements, evaluate all aspects of the
repair station security program, verify
whether the security program is being
implemented and whether it is effective,
as well as to identify and correct
security deficiencies. Such oversight is
also necessary to monitor continuing
compliance with the security
requirements. Since the inspection
program is critical to the enforcement of
the security program requirement,
TSA’s inspection authority would
extend to all repair stations. TSA would
initiate foreign repair station
inspections by giving priority to those
foreign repair stations that pose the
greatest risk to aviation security as
required by Vision 100, and that have
identified themselves through the
profile as being located on or adjacent
to an airport and as performing repair
work on large aircraft.
Pursuant to the inspection process
and consistent with Vision 100, TSA is
proposing to notify the repair station
20 If located on an airport, whether the repair
station participates in the airport security program
will impact the need for the repair station to
comply with the proposed security regulations.
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and the FAA of any deficiencies in a
security program and to permit the
repair station 90 days to correct such
deficiencies. If the deficiencies are not
corrected within 90 days, TSA would
notify the FAA that it must suspend the
repair station’s certificate until such
time as TSA determines that the
deficiencies are resolved. The proposed
regulations also contain a process
whereby a repair station may request
further review of TSA’s determination
regarding security deficiencies.
D. Immediate Risk to Security
The proposed regulation contains a
specific process whereby a repair station
that poses an immediate risk to security
is identified and the FAA is notified of
such a determination. The FAA must
revoke the certificate of a station that
TSA determines poses an immediate
risk to security. Whether the threat is
immediate would be evaluated on a case
by case basis considering existing and
potential circumstances as information
is received and analyzed. The proposal
provides a repair station with the
opportunity to obtain the releasable
materials upon which the determination
was made and to seek review of such a
determination.
III. Section-by-Section Analysis
Part 1520—Protection of Sensitive
Security Information
59879
covered persons subject to its SSI
requirements. This change would
require that repair station operators
adhere to the SSI rules and protect SSI
from public dissemination. Access to
SSI is strictly limited to those persons
with a need to know, as defined in 49
CFR 1520.11. In general, a person has a
need to know specific SSI when he or
she requires access to the information in
order to carry out transportation
security activities that are governmentapproved, -accepted, -funded,
-recommended, or -directed, including
for purposes of training on, and
supervision of, such activities or to
provide legal or technical advice
regarding security-related requirements.
Accordingly, the protection of SSI
would apply to each repair station
standard security program pursuant to
part 1554.
Part 1554—Aircraft Repair Station
Security (New)
Section 1554.1—Scope and Purpose
Section 1554.1 of the proposed
regulation sets forth the scope and
purpose of new part 1554. The proposed
regulations would apply to all repair
stations, both domestic and foreign, that
are certificated by the FAA pursuant to
14 CFR part 145. The purpose of the
proposed regulations would be to
safeguard the security of domestic and
foreign aircraft repair stations as
required by 49 U.S.C. 44924. The
requirements would not apply to any
FAA certificated repair station at which
the U.S. government has assumed
responsibility for security measures.
Section 1520.5—Sensitive Security
Information
Protection of Sensitive Security
Information (SSI), as codified at 49 CFR
part 1520, would apply to each repair
station required to adopt and carry out
a security program. Airport and aircraft
operator security programs and plans,
amendments, security directives and
information circulars, technical
specifications of security screening and
detection systems and devices, among
other types of information, all constitute
SSI under current § 1520.5 and are
prohibited from public disclosure. TSA
is proposing to amend its part 1520
rules to include a repair station security
program as SSI. This change would
prevent the public disclosure of the
security measures implemented and
utilized by a repair station covered
under the new rules because such
disclosure would pose a threat to
transportation security. It would also
ensure that the repair station standard
security program is protected just as
other TSA required security programs
are protected.
Section 1554.3—Terms Used in This
Part
Section 1554.3 of the proposed rule
sets forth the definitions of certain terms
used in this part. The term ‘‘repair
station’’ is defined as any maintenance
facility that is certificated by FAA
pursuant to 14 CFR part 145 to perform
maintenance, preventive maintenance,
repair, overhaul, or alterations of an
aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine,
propeller, appliance, or component
part.21 Since the proposed regulations
apply to both foreign and domestic
repair stations, the section defines
‘‘domestic repair station’’ as any FAAcertificated repair station located within
the fifty States, the District of Columbia,
or the territories and possessions of the
United States. A ‘‘foreign repair station’’
is defined as any FAA-certificated repair
station located outside of the fifty
States, the District of Columbia, or the
Section 1520.7—Covered Persons
TSA proposes to amend § 1520.7 to
include repair station operators as
21 The proposed definition is consistent with the
description of the applicability of the FAA’s repair
station regulations at 14 CFR 145.1.
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territories and possessions of the United
States.
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Section 1554.5—TSA Inspection
Authority
Section 1554.5 would codify TSA’s
authority to inspect repair stations and
would require repair stations to permit
TSA and DHS officials to enter, inspect,
and test property, facilities, and records
relevant to repair stations. This section
would allow TSA to assess threats,
enforce regulations, security directives,
and requirements, inspect all facilities
and equipment, test the adequacy of
security measures, verify the
implementation of security measures,
review security programs and other
records, and perform such other duties
as appropriate. This section also would
allow TSA to request evidence of
compliance, including copies of records
in English.
The proposed regulatory language is
consistent with the inspection authority
currently codified at 49 CFR 1542.5 and
1546.3, which apply to certain U.S.
airports and foreign air carriers. TSA
has established protocols and
procedures on conducting inspections
outside the United States through its
Foreign Airport and Foreign Air Carrier
Assessment Programs. These established
procedures require advance notice to
the facility to be inspected and
coordination with the U.S. Department
of State and the appropriate foreign
government authorities. TSA inspectors
are required to have TSA identification
media and credentials with them when
inspecting facilities and must display
them when requested to do so. TSA will
use these established procedures when
conducting inspections of foreign repair
stations.
TSA is also amenable to working with
the U.S. Department of State and foreign
government authorities to facilitate
inspections of U.S. repair stations that
are certificated by a foreign government
authority. TSA currently permits such
inspections of U.S. airports and air
carriers by foreign government
authorities consistent with ICAO Annex
17, Section 2.1.
TSA has kept ICAO apprised of the
rulemaking and will continue its efforts
to harmonize its regulations with those
of other countries through its
participation in ICAO.
Section 1554.101—Adoption and
Implementation
Section 1554.101 would require each
repair station to adopt and carry out a
security program designed to safeguard
aircraft and aircraft components located
within the repair station, the
maintenance and repair work performed
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Section 1554.103—Security Program
Content, Availability, and Amendment
The standard security program must
include:
(1) A description of the measures used
to identify individuals who are
authorized to enter the repair station to
prevent unauthorized individuals from
entering the repair station;
(2) a description of the measures used
to control access to the repair station
and to detect and prevent the entry,
presence, and movement of
unauthorized individuals and vehicles
into or within the repair station;
(3) a description of the measures used
to control access to the aircraft and/or
aircraft components to allow only
authorized individuals to have such
access;
(4) a description of the measures used
to challenge any individual entering the
repair station to ascertain the authority
of the individual to enter or be present
in the repair station and measures to
escort an individual who does not have
unescorted authority while within the
repair station;
(5) a description of the measures to
train all individuals with authorized
access to aircraft and components on the
provisions of this part and the security
program;
(6) a description of the measures used
to verify employee background
information through confirmation of
prior employment and any other means
as appropriate to validate employee
information;
(7) the name, 24-hour contact
information, duties, and training
requirements of the designated security
coordinator who will serve as the
primary and immediate contact for
security-related activities and
communications with TSA;
(8) a contingency plan;
(9) a diagram with dimensions
detailing boundaries and pertinent
physical features of the repair station;
(10) a list and description of all entry
points; and
(11) an emergency response contact
list.
The regulations also would require
that the security program be in writing,
and signed by the repair station
operator, owner, or other authorized
person. Each repair station would not
have to submit the security program to
TSA, but would have to make it
available to TSA upon request or during
an inspection.
The individual standard security
program requirements are discussed
below.
Section 1554.103 would describe the
general requirements describing the
measures that each repair station must
adopt in the standard security program.
(1) Identification of Authorized
Individuals
The proposed regulations would
require the repair station to adopt and
there, and the facility itself. Repair
stations would be required to use the
TSA standard security program unless
otherwise authorized by TSA.
This section would also require a
repair station to submit a profile. The
purpose of the profile would be to
provide basic information regarding
repair station operations to assist TSA
in determining what measures the repair
station must include in its security
program to meet the security
requirements. The profile would also
assist TSA in prioritizing repair stations
for purposes of conducting inspections.
TSA would make the profile template
available to all repair stations either
through the TSA web site, by mail, or
both. The profile would request the
following types of information:
• Identification of the repair stations,
such as FAA certificate number, repair
station name as it appears on the FAA
certificate, and repair station address.
• Description of location (on or
adjacent to an airport, off airport in a
business location, off airport private
residence).
• Security coordinator who will serve
as the TSA point of contact.
• If on an airport, the name and three
letter designator of the airport.
• Total number of employees.
• Number of employees authorized
unescorted access to aircraft over 12,500
MTOW.
The name and location of each repair
station would assist TSA in identifying
the repair station and determining its
proximity to an airport since, as
explained above, TSA would consider
such repair stations to be a higher risk
than those that are not located on or
adjacent to an airport. The profile
information would also help TSA to
prioritize its inspections. Repair stations
would also be required to update their
profile information within 30 calendar
days if a change in the information
submitted occurs. This requirement
would enable TSA to maintain current
information on each regulated repair
station and make certain that it is
appraised of changes that could impact
the security posture of a repair station.
Repair stations would not be required to
alert TSA to changes in total number of
employees or number of employees who
work on large aircraft to prevent the
submission of a new profile every time
an employee is hired or terminated.
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describe measures to identify
individuals to prevent unauthorized
individuals from entering the repair
station. The specific requirements for a
personnel identification media system
would be included in the standard
security program. Personal recognition
may be sufficient at certain repair
station locations. During the inspection
process, TSA would use the following
factors to evaluate whether the
personnel identification media system
must be implemented and what type of
features the system must use:
• Number of employees and number
of shifts.
• Physical size of the repair station.
• Number of visitors.
• Proximity of other businesses or
operations.
• Type of work, size of aircraft, and
length of runway.
• Number of entry points into the
repair station.
• Airport security features.
• Other factors that increase ability of
unauthorized individuals or vehicles to
access the repair station.
For example, a repair station with 50
employees who work multiple shifts at
a repair station, located adjacent to an
airport with many access points, might
be required to adopt and carry out the
personnel identification media system.
Such a repair station would be
considered to be a higher risk because
of its proximity to an airport. Further,
the large number of employees working
multiple shifts would make it difficult
for employees to rely solely on personal
recognition as workers from different
shifts may not be able to recognize each
other. A repair station located in a
residence with a single employee would
not be required to adopt the personnel
identification media system in the
security program. TSA would not
anticipate requiring a repair station
located at an airport to adopt a
personnel identification media system if
employees were required to obtain and
display airport identification media.
broad spectrum, including standard
locks with key control, card swipe
access locks, cipher locks, locks with
coded keys, biometric access cards,
fencing, security guards, surveillance
cameras, and motion detectors.
As part of the standard security
program, the repair station would be
required to describe all of the entry
points to the facility and the specific
access control measures used for each.
During the inspection process, TSA
would determine whether the access
control measures deployed at the entry
point are appropriate. A repair station
located on or adjacent to an airport that
performs substantial maintenance on
large aircraft would be required to have
more stringent access controls. Such
controls could include such measures as
card swipe access locks, security guards,
electronically monitored access or
motion detectors, fencing or a
combination of such controls. A repair
station located in a private residence or
in a small component shop in an
industrial park would be required to
have less sophisticated controls, such as
standard locks with key control and an
inventory system to track the number of
keys. A repair station would be able to
select the above or other measures that
would provide a appropriate level of
security.
Access controls would also be
required to restrict unauthorized access
to components located within the
facility, such as locked storage
containers and inventory control of
keys.
(2) Repair Station Access Control
Measures
The standard security program would
specify the access control security
requirements for all repair stations.
Such requirements would include
measures to control access to the facility
and to the aircraft and components
within the repair station, to challenge
any individuals to determine if they are
authorized to enter or be present in the
facility, and to respond if unauthorized
individuals or vehicles are discovered.
Acceptable access control measures
would be specified in the security
program. Such measures would cover a
(4) Challenge Procedures
The security program would describe
the procedures to be followed when
challenging individuals who cannot be
readily identified. Only those
individuals who are designated and
trained in escort procedures would be
permitted to escort visitors to the repair
station. The responsibilities of the escort
would be specified in the security
program. At a small facility with few
employees, the ability to observe
individuals present within the facility
may be sufficient to ensure that access
to repair work and/or components is
controlled. At large repair station
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(3) Aircraft Access Control Measures
In addition, the security program
would include measures to control
access to aircraft, such as requiring
repair stations located on or adjacent to
an airport to secure large aircraft by
locking or disabling the aircraft, keeping
the aircraft in a secure hangar during
non-operational hours, fencing,
surveillance cameras, lighting, and
security guards.
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59881
facilities, such as those that use a
personnel identification media system,
employees may have to escort
individuals as part of their
responsibilities.
(5) Security Training Measures
The security program would include
measures to conduct initial and
recurrent security training programs,
such as providing guidance to repair
station personnel on how to implement
and maintain the security measures
included in the security program. The
security program would also specify
that the training curriculum be updated
to reflect current security requirements.
The repair station would be required to
maintain records of initial and recurrent
security training for each employee. The
standard security program would
include a model curriculum that the
repair station could modify based on the
specific security requirements
applicable to that repair station.
(6) Employee Background Verification
The security program would include
the measures by which the repair station
verifies the employment history of its
employees and conducts background
checks, to the extent permitted by the
laws of the country in which the repair
station is located. The employment
history, length of employment, and
measures used to verify the individual’s
employment would be listed in the
security program.
(7) Security Coordinator
Each repair station would be required
to designate a security coordinator who
would serve as the immediate and
primary point of contact for securityrelated activities and communications
with TSA. Each repair station would
include the name, responsibilities, and
contact information of the security
coordinator in the security program and
would also specify the training
curriculum required for the security
coordinator. The security coordinator
would not necessarily need to be on-site
at the repair station, but they must be
able to coordinate incident management
at any time.
(8) Contingency Plan
The security program would include
a contingency plan to include the
specific measures that would be taken to
address security-related incidents. The
security program would include such
items as the names of the repair station
employees designated to perform
specific tasks, the name and contact
information for any contingency
response organizations that would assist
the repair station, a description of the
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DHS threat advisory levels and the
additional security measures that would
be implemented based on the threat
level, and set forth the responsibilities
of all personnel involved. The plan
would also provide for training and
regular practices, if appropriate.
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Other Security Program Requirements
The proposed regulations would also
require that each security program
include a diagram of the repair station
detailing the boundaries and describing
the physical features of the repair
station. The security program would
also include a list and description of all
entry points into the repair station that
would be supplied by the repair station
operator. These requirements would
assist TSA in assessing the security
vulnerability of the repair station and
determining whether security measures
are appropriate. The security program
would also include emergency response
contact information.
Section 1554.103(b) would require
that the security program be in writing,
and hand-signed by the repair station
operator, owner, or other authorized
person. The security program would be
required to be accessible to employees
at the repair station facility and be
written in English and in the official
language of the repair station’s country.
The security program could be
accessible electronically so long as it
meets all of the requirements. This
section would also include a
requirement that repair stations must
restrict the distribution, disclosure, and
availability of sensitive security
information as described in 49 CFR part
1520.
Section 1554.103(c) would require a
repair station to notify TSA of any
amendment to the standard security
program and would require that the
repair station acknowledge receipt and
adopt an emergency amendment issued
by TSA within the time prescribed in
the emergency amendment. If the repair
station cannot implement the
emergency amendment, the repair
station must immediately notify TSA to
obtain approval of alternative measures.
They may contact their TSA inspector
or the TSA Repair Stations Office at
TSA headquarters.
Section 1554.105—Security Directives
This section would require a repair
station to comply with any Security
Directive issued by TSA mandating
security measures. Security Directives
may be issued when TSA determines
that additional or specific security
measures are necessary to respond to a
threat assessment or a specific threat
against aviation. Upon receipt of a
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Security Directive, the repair station
would be required to comply with the
measures in the time prescribed or
immediately notify TSA if it is unable
to implement the specified security
measures so that the repair station can
obtain approval of alternative measures.
The repair station would also be
required to restrict the availability of a
Security Directive to only those
individuals with an operational need to
know.
Section 1554.201—Notification of
Security Deficiencies; Suspension of
Certificate
Proposed § 1554.201 implements the
requirements of 49 U.S.C. 44924(c)(1)
regarding the suspension of a repair
station certificate. Vision 100 requires
audits to be conducted of foreign repair
stations within a specified timeframe.22
TSA would comply with that
requirement and intends to perform
ongoing audits and inspections of all
repair stations covered by the proposed
regulation in order to check for
compliance with the final regulations.
The proposed regulation would
provide that TSA would notify the
repair station and the FAA in writing of
any security deficiencies identified by
TSA during an audit. Repair stations
would be required to respond within 90
days of receipt of the written
notification that the deficiency has been
corrected and include a written
explanation of the efforts, methods, and
procedures used to correct the
deficiency. TSA may re-audit the repair
station to verify that the deficiencies
have been corrected. The proposal
specifies that TSA would provide
written notification to the FAA if the
repair station failed to respond and/or to
correct the deficiencies within the 90day period and that, consistent with the
statute, FAA would suspend the repair
station certificate. The suspension
would remain in effect until TSA makes
a determination that the deficiencies
had been corrected; TSA would then
notify the FAA requesting that the
suspension be lifted.23 This section also
provides that a repair station may seek
review of a TSA determination that
deficiencies have not been corrected
and includes the redress procedures.
22 In the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L 110–53, 121
Stat. 266, Aug. 3, 2007), the 18-month deadline for
completing security inspections of foreign repair
stations was reduced to 6 months.
23 If the repair station certificate covered more
than one facility, but not all the facilities were
found to have security deficiencies, TSA would
specify that only the facility that was found to be
deficient be suspended.
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Section 1554.203—Immediate Risk to
Security; Revocation of Certificate and
Review Process
Proposed § 1554.203 implements 49
U.S.C. 44924(c)(2) and requires that if
TSA makes an initial determination that
a repair station poses an immediate risk
to security, TSA would notify the repair
station and the FAA that the station’s
certificate must be revoked. The repair
station may seek review of TSA’s
determination that the station poses an
immediate risk to security; however, the
revocation would remain in effect
unless and until the review is complete
and a determination is made that the
repair station does not pose an
immediate risk to security.
Proposed § 1554.203(b) would allow
the repair station to request the
releasable materials upon which the
determination is based. Proposed
§ 1554.203(c) would permit the repair
station to request a review and to
provide a response to TSA. The
response may include any information
that the repair station deems relevant to
a final decision. TSA would conduct an
initial review of the basis for the
determination and the response and, if
the determination is upheld, a final
review by the TSA Assistant Secretary.
TSA would notify the FAA of its final
determination.
Section 1554.205—Nondisclosure of
Certain Information
This section preserves TSA’s
authority not to disclose classified
information or other information
protected by law or regulation.
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) requires
that TSA consider the impact of
paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the
public and, under the provisions of PRA
section 3507(d), obtain approval from
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for each collection of
information it conducts, sponsors, or
requires through regulations. This
proposed rule contains new information
collection activities subject to the PRA.
Accordingly, TSA has submitted the
following information requirements to
OMB for its review.
Title: Aircraft Repair Station Security.
Summary: This proposal would
require all aircraft and aircraft
component repair stations certificated
by the FAA under 14 CFR part 145 to
adopt and maintain a security program
that meets general security requirements
as required by 49 U.S.C. 44924(f). The
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proposed regulations also authorize
TSA to conduct security audits,
assessments, and inspections of repair
stations. Repair stations will be required
to implement a TSA standard security
program which must include the
specific security measures used by the
repair station to comply with the
regulation. In addition to the actual
security measures, the security program
must also contain any amendments to
the security program, a contingency
plan, a diagram of the facility with
dimensions detailing boundaries and
physical features, the name and contact
information for the person responsible
for security-related activities and
communications with TSA, a list and
description of all entry points and an
emergency response contact list. The
security program may be kept
electronically or in hard copy format. It
does not have to be submitted to TSA,
but must be made available for review
when TSA conducts a security audit or
inspection. Other records that must also
be made available during the audit or
inspection would include employee
training records, employee background
information, and any security directives
issued by TSA.
Use of: This proposal would support
the information needs of TSA in order
to ensure the security of maintenance
and repair work conducted on air carrier
aircraft and aircraft components at
repair stations, as well as the security of
the aircraft and the facility.
Respondents (including number of):
The likely respondents to this proposed
information requirement are the owners
and/or operators of repair stations
certificated by the FAA under 14 CFR
part 145, which is estimated to number
approximately 5,460 over the next ten
years.
Frequency: Each of the respondents
initially would submit a repair station
profile and develop and carry out a
standard security program provided by
TSA.
Annual Burden Estimate: Annualized
over the next three years, the average
yearly burden to create security
programs is estimated to be 12,620
hours for all respondents. Thus, the
total annual time burden estimate is
approximately 13,817 hours. The
estimated annual costs beyond the time
burden is approximately $45,200 for all
respondents when annualized over the
next three years.
TSA is soliciting comments to—
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
information requirement is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions
of the agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
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(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including using
appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms of
information technology.
Individuals and organizations may
submit comments on the information
collection requirements by January 19,
2010. Direct the comments to the
address listed in the ADDRESSES section
of this document, and fax a copy of
them to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget, Attention:
DHS–TSA Desk Officer, at (202) 395–
5806. A comment to OMB is most
effective if OMB receives it within 30
days of publication. TSA will publish
the OMB control number for this
information collection in the Federal
Register after OMB approves it.
As protection provided by the
Paperwork Reduction Act, as amended,
an agency may not conduct or sponsor,
and a person is not required to respond
to, a collection of information unless it
displays a currently valid OMB control
number.
B. International Compatibility
In keeping with U.S. obligations
under the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, it is TSA policy to
comply with ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices where possible.
TSA has determined that these
proposed regulations are consistent with
ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices for security of airports and
facilities contained in Annex 17 of the
Convention, the ICAO Security Manual
and the ICAO Security Audit Reference
Manual.
C. Regulatory Impact Analyses
1. Regulatory Evaluation Summary
Changes to Federal regulations must
undergo several economic analyses.
First, Executive Order 12866, Regulatory
Planning and Review (58 FR 51735,
October 4, 1993), directs each Federal
agency to propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended
regulation justify its costs. Second, the
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996) requires
agencies to analyze the economic
impact of regulatory changes on small
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entities. Third, the Trade Agreements
Act (19 U.S.C. 2531–2533) prohibits
agencies from setting standards that
create unnecessary obstacles to the
foreign commerce of the United States.
In developing U.S. standards, the Trade
Act requires agencies to consider
international standards, where
appropriate, as the basis of U.S.
standards. Fourth, the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C.
1531–1538) requires agencies to prepare
a written assessment of the costs,
benefits, and other effects of proposed
or final rules that include a Federal
mandate likely to result in the
expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more
annually (adjusted for inflation).
TSA has prepared a separate detailed
analysis document, which is available to
the public in the docket.24 With respect
to these four analyses, TSA provides the
following conclusions, supported by
additional summary information.
a. This proposed rule is not an
economically ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ as defined in the Executive
Order. However, this rulemaking may be
considered significant because of
Congressional and stakeholder interest
in security since the events of
September 11, 2001.
b. The Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (IRFA) shows that there may
be a significant impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
c. This proposed rule imposes no
significant barriers to international
trade.
d. This proposed rule does not impose
an unfunded mandate on State, local, or
tribal governments, or on the private
sector in excess of $100 million
(adjusted for inflation) in any one year.
2. Executive Order 12866 Assessment
This summary highlights the costs
and benefits of the proposed rule to
amend the transportation security
regulations to further enhance and
improve the security of repair stations.
TSA has determined that this is not a
major rule within the definition of
Executive Order (EO) 12866, as annual
costs to all parties do not pass the $100
million threshold in any year. The
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(IRFA) shows that there may be a
significant impact on a substantial
number of small entities. There are no
significant economic impacts for the
required analyses of international trade
24 See information on viewing the Docket under
‘‘Reviewing Comments in the Docket’’ above. The
Regulatory Evaluation is categorized as ‘‘Supporting
and Related Materials.’’
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 221 / Wednesday, November 18, 2009 / Proposed Rules
or unfunded mandates. Both in this
summary and the economic evaluation,
descriptive language is used to try to
relate the consequences of the
regulation. The tables are numbered as
they appear in the economic evaluation.
Although the regulatory evaluation
attempts to mirror the terms and
wording of the regulation, no attempt is
made to precisely replicate the
regulatory language and readers are
cautioned that the actual regulatory text,
not the text of the evaluation, is binding.
Comparison of Costs and Hypothetical
Benefits
Comparison of the total undiscounted
domestic costs of the proposed rule with
potential benefits from the proposed
aircraft repair station security program
relies on a breakeven comparison based
on the extent to which the program
must reduce the underlying baseline
risk of specific attack impact scenarios
in order for the program benefits to be
greater than the expected costs. Such a
comparison is presented in Table 2
following the ‘‘Benefits’’ section below.
This comparison is discussed briefly
above and in greater depth in the body
of the analysis.
Benefits
A major line of defense against an
aviation-related terrorist act is the
prevention of explosives, weapons, and/
or incendiary devices from getting on
board a plane. To date, efforts have been
primarily related to inspection of
baggage, passengers, and cargo, and
security measures at airports that serve
air carriers. With this rule, attention is
given to aircraft that are located at repair
stations, and to aircraft parts that are at
repair stations, themselves to reduce the
likelihood of an attack against aviation
and the country. Since repair station
personnel have direct access to all parts
of an aircraft, the potential exists for a
terrorist to seek to commandeer or
compromise an aircraft when the
aircraft is at one of these facilities.
Moreover, as TSA tightens security in
other areas of aviation, repair stations
increasingly may become attractive
targets for terrorist organizations
attempting to evade aviation security
protections currently in place.
To better inform the comparison of
the costs of the repair station security
program in the proposed rule with the
benefits to homeland security it might
afford due to reduced risk of successful
terror attack involving an aircraft, a
breakeven analysis was performed. In
this analysis, the annualized costs of the
program, discounted at seven percent,
are compared to the expected benefits of
avoiding or preventing three attack
scenarios of varying consequence. For
each scenario, the required extent of
annual risk reduction due to the
proposed program, expressed as the
frequency with which attacks must be
averted, is reported in the final column
of the break-even analysis (Table 2)
below.
TABLE 2—FREQUENCY OF ATTACKS AVERTED FOR AIRCRAFT REPAIR STATION SECURITY COSTS TO EQUAL EXPECTED
BENEFITS, BY ATTACK SCENARIO
[Annualized at 7 percent]
1
2
3
Minimal .............
Aircraft Target ..
Moderate ..........
Value of a
statistical
life (VSL)
at $5.8M
($ million)
Moderate
injuries
Valuation of
moderate
injuries
at 1.55%
of VSL
($ million)
Severe
injuries
Valuation of
serious injuries
at 18.75%
of VSL
($ million)
Estimated
aircraft market
value
($ million)
Total impact
($ million)
Attacks averted by
repair station security
required to break
even
A
Attack scenario
Lives
lost
B = A × 5.8
C
D = C × .0899
E
F = E × 1.0875
G
H = B+D+F+G
= H ÷ $24.5M *
3
132
250
$17.4
765.6
1,450.0
10
$0.9
0.0
0.0
$0.0
0.0
815.6
750
$9.3
21.8
9.3
$27.6
787.4
2,274.9
one every 1.1 years.
one every 32.1 years.
one every 92.7 years.
* The total cost of the rule annualized at 7 percent.
Costs
analyzed. Table 31 that follows provides
the 10-year cost of the preferred
alternative and two other alternatives,
As required, alternatives to the
primary rule requirements were
undiscounted and at three and seven
percent discount rates.
TABLE 31—TOTAL 10-YEAR COSTS BY SCENARIO AND DISCOUNT RATE
[2006$ millions]
Total by scenario
Undiscounted
3% Discount
sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with PROPOSALS
Primary Scenario .............................................................................................................
Security Threat Assessments ..........................................................................................
Vulnerability Assessments ...............................................................................................
$344.4
347.0
347.1
Using a seven percent discount rate,
TSA estimated the 10-year cost impacts
for the primary scenario of this
proposed rule would total $241.0
million. This total is distributed among
domestic repair stations, which would
incur total costs of $118.6 million;
foreign repair stations, which would
incur costs of $68.7 million; and TSAprojected Federal Government costs,
which would be $53.7 million.
regulation.’’ To achieve that principle,
the RFA requires agencies to solicit and
consider flexible regulatory proposals
and to explain the rationale for their
actions. The RFA covers a wide range of
small entities, including small
businesses, not-for-profit organizations,
and small governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to
determine whether a proposed or final
rule will have a significant economic
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3. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(IRFA)
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
(RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of
regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objective
of the rule and of applicable statutes, to
fit regulatory and informational
requirements to the scale of the
business, organizations, and
governmental jurisdictions subject to
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295.7
295.8
7% Discount
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243.1
243.3
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 221 / Wednesday, November 18, 2009 / Proposed Rules
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the determination is that it
will, the agency must prepare a
regulatory flexibility analysis as
described in the RFA. However, if an
agency determines that a proposed or
final rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities,
section 605(b) of the 1980 RFA, as
amended, provides that the head of the
agency may so certify and a regulatory
flexibility analysis is not required. The
certification must include a statement
providing the factual basis for this
determination, and the reasoning should
be clear.
As part of implementing this NPRM,
TSA expects security to be integrated
into actions the same way safety has and
to become an integral component of
doing business rather than adding layers
or extra program costs. The primary cost
to repair stations resulting from this
NPRM would be additional hours for
personnel to perform the duties of the
repair station security coordinator. For
many stations this may constitute an
insignificant impact, while for others
the costs to comply with the proposed
rule may prove significant. TSA has
conducted an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis and believes the
proposed requirements may result in a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
TSA requests comments, particularly
those supported by data, on this
preliminary conclusion.
Reason for the Proposed Rule
In 2003, Congress enacted Vision
100—Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act (Vision 100), Public
Law 108–176, (117 Stat. 2490, December
12, 2003). Vision 100, which was signed
into law by President George W. Bush
on December 12, 2003, expands TSA’s
authority to address the security of the
civil aviation system by requiring TSA
to issue final regulations to ensure the
security of both domestic and foreign
aircraft repair stations.
sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with PROPOSALS
Objectives of the Proposed Rule
The requirements proposed in this
NPRM are designed to increase overall
civil aviation security by bolstering the
level of security at domestic and foreign
aircraft repair stations.
Descriptions and Estimates of the
Number of Small Entities
Aircraft repair stations are classified
by the U.S. Census Bureau as falling
primarily within the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS),
code 488190 Other Support Activities
for Air Transportation. In its account of
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the industry, the U.S. Census Bureau
describes firms in this market as
‘‘providing specialized services for air
transportation (except air traffic control
and other airport operations).’’ 25 The
Small Business Administration defines
a small business within this NAICS
code as one having annual revenues of
$7.0 million or less.26 More details
about the industry can be obtained by
reading the ‘‘Discussion of the Industry
and Status Quo’’ section of the
Regulatory Evaluation.
To estimate the number of small
businesses in the aircraft repair station
industry affected by this NPRM, TSA
accessed information maintained by
Dun & Bradstreet, a provider of
international and U.S. business data.
The data obtained for this effort did not
identify the type of maintenance the
repair stations are certificated to
perform or their location. This made it
difficult for TSA to determine
compliance costs for the identified
small businesses (this is discussed more
below).
Through its research, TSA obtained
Dun & Bradstreet revenue and
employment records for 2,276 domestic
aircraft repair stations. Of this total,
2,123 reflected small businesses, as
defined by SBA, and 153 did not. TSA
was unable to find data on the
remaining domestic repair stations. For
the purposes of this analysis, and to
remain conservative in its estimates,
TSA assumed that the remaining
domestic repair stations are also small.
TSA thus estimated that 4,115 of 4,268
domestic aircraft repair stations are
small businesses, as defined by SBA.
Description and Estimate of Compliance
Requirements
In order to address the need for
security measures at aircraft repair
stations and to fulfill the obligations set
forth by Congress, TSA is proposing to
add a new part 1554 to its regulations,
entitled ‘‘Aircraft Repair Station
Security.’’ The new part would require
all aircraft repair stations that are
certificated by the FAA under 14 CFR
part 145, both domestic and foreign, to
adopt and carry out a security program
that includes specific security
requirements. The regulations would
require repair stations to safeguard
aircraft and components located at the
25 U.S. Census Bureau, ‘‘2002 NAICS
Definitions.’’ Retrieved from https://
www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/
ND488190.HTM#N488190 on January 31, 2007.
26 U.S. Small Business Administration, ‘‘Table of
Small Business Size Standards Matched to North
American Industry Classification System Codes.’’
https://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/
sba_homepage/serv_sstd_tablepdf.pdf.
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59885
station, the maintenance and repair
work conducted there, as well as the
repair station’s facilities, as required by
49 U.S.C. 44924.
TSA is also proposing changes to its
regulations regarding the protection of
sensitive security information (SSI) to
specify that a repair station security
program is categorized as SSI and that
the repair station operator or owner is
subject to the SSI requirements.
The proposed rule would require
repair stations to establish security
programs. TSA would provide a
standard security program that would
include the following: Access controls,
a personnel identification system,
security awareness training, the
designation of a security coordinator,
employee background verification, and
a contingency plan. While repair
stations would have some flexibility
regarding the particular equipment,
facilities, and measures used to comply
with the general security requirements,
their security methods would need to
address each of these requirements in a
manner commensurate with the
station’s security risk. For example,
small repair stations may meet the
requirement for a personal identification
system through employee recognition
and challenge procedures, while TSA
would require stations located on or
adjacent to an airport and having 50 or
more employees to implement a formal
badging system.
The proposed rule would require each
repair station to complete and return to
TSA a brief profile form. The profile
would identify information, such as
whether the repair station is located at
an airport,27 the total number of
employees, and the number of
employees with unescorted access to
aircraft with a maximum certificated
takeoff weight (MTOW) exceeding
12,500 pounds. These indicators would
assist TSA in conducting a risk-based
analysis of the repair station in order to
determine what measures would be
needed to meet the security
requirements proposed in the
regulations.
The proposed regulations also would
establish TSA’s authority to conduct
security audits, assessments, and
inspections in order to ascertain the
adequacy of the measures employed by
the repair stations to implement and
maintain the security requirements. The
proposed inspections and appeals
processes are described in detail in the
NPRM.
27 If located on an airport, whether the repair
station participates in the airport security program
will impact the repair station’s compliance with the
proposed security regulations.
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In its effort to fulfill the requirements
of the RFA, TSA attempted to estimate
all costs of complying with the above
described requirements for each firm for
which it had Dun & Bradstreet data and
to calculate those costs as a percent of
the repair station’s reported revenues.
TSA determined that this methodology
would best conclude whether the
proposed rule would represent a
considerable economic burden to a large
number of small businesses. After
completing this preliminary analysis
(described below), TSA has tentatively
concluded that the proposed rule may
impose a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities. The agency seeks comment on
this preliminary conclusion.
Compliance costs for the proposed
rule would vary across firms. A small
business with one employee who only
services one component of a particular
aircraft may incur very low compliance
costs. Such a business is likely to be
operated from a small shop or even a
private residence. Conversely, a larger
repair station that works on more
complex systems or even entire aircraft
may incur higher costs as a result of this
NPRM. These types of facilities may be
located at an airport, in an industrial
park, or may be part of an aircraft
manufacturing facility. For example, in
the ‘‘Cost of Compliance’’ section above,
TSA estimated repair stations located on
or adjacent to an airport would require
8 hours on average to complete their
security programs whereas repair
stations located off-airport would
require only 4. Unfortunately, TSA was
unable to pair the data from Dun &
Bradstreet with repair station data
provided by the FAA. As a result, TSA
could not estimate compliance costs
particular to repair station
characteristics such as whether it is
located on an airport or performs
substantial maintenance on commercial
aircraft.
Therefore, in order to characterize
compliance costs as a percentage of
repair station revenues, TSA estimated
unit compliance costs based on
weighted averages so as not to
underestimate the costs of the rule. As
a result, these estimates likely overstate
the costs to some small businesses while
understating them for others. TSA
welcomes comments that will assist it in
more accurately estimating compliance
costs for small businesses.
Using the assumptions and methods
described above, TSA estimated the
average compliance costs to be about
$3,013 for a business with one employee
to $4,216 for a business with 45
employees. Of this total, $2,733
represents costs for security
coordinators, and $253 represents costs
for development and implementation of
security programs. The remainder is
comprised of employee training costs.
These totals exclude costs for repair
stations located on or adjacent to an
airport and having 50 or more
employees to implement a badging
system. TSA assumed that firms with
100 or more employees likely already
have a badging system. Based on the
Dun and Bradstreet data, TSA estimated
the average compliance cost for firms
reported as having between 50 and 99
employees would be approximately
$4,728 before adding costs to implement
a badging system. These firms employ
an average of 64 individuals. Using the
estimate of $25 per badge cited in the
Regulatory Evaluation, badges would
add an average of nearly $1,600 to these
repair stations’ compliance costs,
resulting in a total cost of $6,328. Firms
having between 50 and 99 employees in
the Dun and Bradstreet sample reported
average revenue of nearly $6 million.
The estimated compliance costs would
therefore constitute less than one
percent of their annual revenues. Since
the proposed ID requirement would
affect a subset of these repair stations—
only those which are located on or
adjacent to an airport—TSA does not
believe the proposed ID requirement
would result in a significant impact on
affected repair stations.
Table 32 below shows the distribution
of compliance costs, excluding ID costs,
as a percent of repair station revenues.
TABLE 32—SMALL REPAIR STATION BUSINESS DISTRIBUTION OF COMPLIANCE COST-REVENUE RATIOS
Compliance costs as a percentage of revenue
Number of small businesses
Cumulative percentage of
small businesses
692
1,015
1,527
1,712
1,759
2,100
32.6
47.8
71.9
80.6
82.9
98.9
Total ..............................................................................................................
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≤1.0 ......................................................................................................................
≤2.0 ......................................................................................................................
≤3.0 ......................................................................................................................
≤4.0 ......................................................................................................................
≤5.0 ......................................................................................................................
≤10.0 ....................................................................................................................
2,123
100.0
The table uses rounded percentages to
show that TSA’s initial assessment is
that the NPRM may have a significant
impact on a substantial number of small
businesses. TSA believes that for 47.8
percent of the small businesses, the
compliance costs will result in an
economic impact of two percent of
annual revenue or less, and for 71.9
percent of the small businesses, the
compliance costs will be less than three
percent of annual revenue. TSA requests
comment on these estimates.
Significant Alternatives Considered
During the course of drafting this
NPRM, TSA considered regulatory
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alternatives. These alternatives included
requiring security threat assessments for
certain repair station employees and
requiring each repair station to complete
a vulnerability self-assessment. Both of
these alternatives would have increased
the burden on repair stations and thus
on small entities. A description of these
alternatives and the reasons they were
not adopted can be found in the section
of the Regulatory Evaluation titled,
‘‘Alternatives Considered.’’
Additionally, as noted above, TSA
requests comment on whether it should
exempt certain repair stations after it
conducts security reviews and audits.
For instance, TSA may consider
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whether to exempt repair stations that
only perform maintenance on small
aircraft (aircraft having a maximum
certificated takeoff weight of 12,500
pounds or less). To help the agency
evaluate the impact of this alternative,
TSA requests comments, supported by
data, on the number of repair stations
that work exclusively on such aircraft
and their compliance costs under the
proposed rule.
Identification of Duplication, Overlap
and Conflict With Other Federal Rules
TSA has no knowledge of any
duplicative, overlapping, or conflicting
Federal rules.
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Preliminary Conclusion
Based on this preliminary analysis,
TSA believes the proposed requirements
may result in a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. However, TSA holds a final
assessment in abeyance until such time
as information becomes available to
facilitate the development of a Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA).
TSA requests comments, particularly
those supported by data, to inform this
process.
4. International Trade Impact
Assessment
The Trade Agreement Act of 1979
prohibits Federal agencies from
engaging in any standards or related
activities that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States. Legitimate domestic
objectives, such as security, are not
considered unnecessary obstacles. The
statute also requires consideration of
international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for
U.S. standards. In addition, it is the
policy of TSA to remove or diminish, to
the extent feasible, barriers to
international trade, including both
barriers affecting the export of American
goods and services to foreign countries
and barriers affecting the import of
foreign goods and services into the U.S.
In keeping with U.S. obligations
under the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, it is TSA’s policy to
comply with International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards
and Recommended Practices where
possible. TSA has determined that there
are no ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices that
correspond to the regulatory standards
established by this notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM). TSA has assessed
the potential effect of this NPRM and
has determined that it is unlikely it
would create barriers to international
trade. The full evaluation provides an
analysis of a number of issues directly
related to international trade that were
considered with this proposed rule.
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5. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Assessment
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995 is intended, among other things,
to curb the practice of imposing
unfunded Federal mandates on State,
local, and tribal governments. Title II of
the Act requires each Federal agency to
prepare a written statement assessing
the effects of any Federal mandate in a
proposed or final agency rule that may
result in a $100 million or more
expenditure (adjusted annually for
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59887
inflation) in any one year by State, local,
and tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ‘‘significant regulatory
action.’’ This rulemaking does not
contain such a mandate. The
requirements of Title II of the Act,
therefore, do not apply.
of the EPCA. TSA has also analyzed this
proposed rule under E.O. 13211,
‘‘Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use,’’ 66 FR 28355 (May
18, 2001). TSA has determined that this
is not a ‘‘significant energy action’’
under that order.
D. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
TSA has analyzed this proposed rule
under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We
have determined that this action will
not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, on the relationship between
the National Government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government, and therefore will
not have federalism implications.
List of Subjects
E. Environmental Analysis
TSA has reviewed this action under
DHS Management Directive 5100.1,
Environmental Planning Program
(effective April 19, 2006) which guides
TSA compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321–4347). TSA has
determined that this proposal is covered
by the following categorical exclusions
(CATEX) listed in the DHS directive:
Number A3(a) (administrative and
regulatory activities involving the
promulgation of rules and the
development of policies); paragraph A4
(information gathering and data
analysis); paragraph A7(d) (conducting
audits, surveys, and data collection of a
minimally intrusive nature, to include
vulnerability, risk, and structural
integrity assessments of infrastructures);
paragraph B3 (proposed activities and
operations to be conducted in existing
structures that are compatible with
ongoing functions); paragraph B11
(routine monitoring and surveillance
activities that support homeland
security, such as patrols, investigations,
and intelligence gathering), and H1
(approval or disapproval of security
plans required under legislative
mandates where such plans do not have
a significant effect on the environment).
In addition, TSA has determined that
this proposal meets the three conditions
required for a CATEX to apply, as
described in paragraph 3.2, (Conditions
and Extraordinary Circumstances).
F. Energy Impact Analysis
The energy impact of this NPRM has
been assessed in accordance with the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA) Public Law 94–163, as amended
(42 U.S.C. 6362). TSA has determined
that this rulemaking is not a major
regulatory action under the provisions
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49 CFR Part 1520
Air carriers, Aircraft, Aircraft repair
stations, Airports, Maritime carriers,
Rail hazardous materials receivers, Rail
hazardous materials shippers, Rail
transit systems, Railroad carriers,
Railroad safety, Railroads, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements,
Security measures, Vessels.
49 CFR Part 1554
Aircraft, Aircraft repair stations,
Aviation safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Security
measures.
The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Transportation Security Administration
proposes to amend Chapter XII of Title
49, Code of Federal Regulations, to read
as follows:
Subchapter B—Security Rules for All
Modes of Transportation
PART 1520—PROTECTION OF
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for part 1520
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 46 U.S.C. 70102–70106, 70117;
49 U.S.C. 114, 40113, 44901–44907, 44913–
44914, 44916–44918, 44935–44936, 44942,
46105.
2. In § 1520.5, revise paragraph
(b)(1)(i) to read as follows:
§ 1520.5
Sensitive security information.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *;
(1) * * *;
(i) Any aircraft operator, airport
operator, fixed base operator, repair
station, or air cargo security program, or
security contingency plan under this
chapter;
*
*
*
*
*
3. In § 1520.7, add paragraph (o) to
read as follows:
§ 1520.7
Covered persons.
*
*
*
*
*
(o) Each operator or owner of an
aircraft repair station required to have a
security program under part 1554 of this
chapter.
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Subchapter C—Civil Aviation Security
§ 1554.5
PART 1554—AIRCRAFT REPAIR
STATION SECURITY
Subpart A—General
Sec.
1554.1 Scope and purpose.
1554.3 Terms used in this part.
1554.5 TSA inspection authority.
Subpart B—Security Program
1554.101 Adoption and implementation.
1554.103 Security Program content,
availability, and amendment.
1554.105 Security Directives.
Subpart C—Compliance and Enforcement
1554.201 Notification of security
deficiencies; suspension of certificate.
1554.203 Immediate risk to security;
revocation of certificate and review
process.
1554.205 Nondisclosure of certain
information.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 40113, 44903,
44924.
Subpart A—General
§ 1554.1
Scope and purpose.
This part applies to domestic and
foreign repair stations that are
certificated by the Federal Aviation
Administration pursuant to 14 CFR part
145 except for a repair station
certificated by the Federal Aviation
Administration at which the U.S.
Government has assumed responsibility
for security. The purpose of this part is
to provide for the security of
maintenance and repair work conducted
on aircraft and aircraft components at
domestic and foreign repair stations, of
the aircraft and aircraft components
located at the repair stations, and of the
repair station facilities, as required in 49
U.S.C. 44924.
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§ 1554.3
Terms used in this part.
In addition to the terms in §§ 1500.3
and 1540.5 of this chapter, the following
terms apply in this part:
Repair station means a domestic or
foreign facility certificated by the
Federal Aviation Administration
pursuant to 14 CFR part 145 that is
authorized to perform maintenance,
preventive maintenance, or alterations
of an aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine,
propeller, appliance, or component part.
(1) Domestic repair station means a
repair station located within the fifty
States, the District of Columbia, or the
territories and possessions of the United
States.
(2) Foreign repair station means a
repair station located outside the fifty
States, the District of Columbia, or the
territories and possessions of the United
States.
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TSA inspection authority.
(a) General. Each repair station must
allow TSA and other authorized DHS
officials, at any time and in a reasonable
manner, without advance notice, to
enter, conduct any audits, assessments,
tests, or inspections of any property,
facilities, equipment, and operations;
and to view, inspect, and copy records
as necessary to carry out TSA’s securityrelated statutory or regulatory
authorities, including its authority to—
(1) Assess threats to transportation
security;
(2) Enforce security-related
regulations, directives, and
requirements;
(3) Inspect, maintain, and test security
facilities, equipment, and systems;
(4) Ensure the adequacy of security
measures;
(5) Verify the implementation of
security measures;
(6) Review security programs; and,
(7) Carry out such other duties, and
exercise such other powers, relating to
transportation security as the Assistant
Secretary of Homeland Security for the
TSA considers appropriate, to the extent
authorized by law.
(b) Evidence of compliance. At the
request of TSA, each repair station
operator must provide evidence of
compliance with its security program
and with this part, including copies of
records.
(1) All records required under this
part must be available in English.
(2) All responses and submissions
provided to TSA or its designee,
pursuant to this part, must be in
English, unless otherwise requested by
TSA.
(c) Access to repair station. (1) TSA
and DHS officials working with TSA
may enter, without advance notice, and
be present within any area without
access media or identification media
issued or approved by the repair station
in order to inspect, test, or perform any
other such duties as TSA may direct.
(2) Repair stations may request TSA
inspectors and DHS officials working
with TSA to present their credentials for
examination, but the credentials may
not be photocopied or otherwise
reproduced.
Subpart B—Security Program
§ 1554.101
Adoption and implementation.
(a) General. Each repair station must
adopt and carry out a security program
to safeguard aircraft and aircraft
components located within the repair
station and its facilities, the repair and
maintenance work conducted at the
repair station, and the repair station
facility itself.
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(b) Repair station profile. No later
than 30 calendar days after final rules
are published in the Federal Register or
no later than 30 calendar days after FAA
certification, each repair station must
submit a profile in a manner prescribed
by TSA. Each repair station must report
changes in profile information as
specified by TSA within 30 calendar
days of the date of the change.
(c) Repair station security program.
Unless otherwise authorized by TSA,
each repair station must use the TSA
standard repair station security
program.
§ 1554.103 Security program content,
availability, and amendment.
(a) Content of security program. Each
security program must—
(1) Include measures to identify all
individuals who are authorized to enter
the repair station to prevent
unauthorized individuals from entering
the repair station.
(2) Include measures to control access
to the repair station. Such measures
must be designed to prevent, detect and
resolve any unauthorized entry,
presence, and movement of individuals
and vehicles into or within the repair
station.
(3) Include measures to control access
to the aircraft and aircraft components
to allow only authorized individuals to
have access to the aircraft and aircraft
components within the repair station.
(4) Include measures to challenge any
individual entering the repair station or
who is present in the repair station to
ascertain the authority of that individual
to enter or be present in the area and
measures to escort an unauthorized
individual while within the repair
station.
(5) Include measures to conduct
initial and recurrent security training of
all individuals with authorized access to
aircraft and components on the
provisions of this part and the security
program and to maintain a record of
training completed by each employee.
(6) Include measures to verify
employee background information
through confirmation of prior
employment and any other means as
appropriate to validate employee
information.
(7) Include the name, means of
contact on a 24 hour basis, duties, and
training requirements of the security
coordinator(s) who will serve as the
primary and immediate contact for
security-related activities and
communications with TSA.
(8) Include a contingency plan.
(9) Include a diagram with
dimensions detailing boundaries and
physical features of the repair station.
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(10) Include a list and description of
all repair station entry points.
(11) Include an emergency response
contact list.
(12) Be in writing and signed by the
operator, owner, or any person
delegated authority in this matter.
(b) Availability. (1) The repair station
security program must—
(i) Be written both in English and in
the official language of the repair
station’s country.
(ii) Be accessible at each facility.
(2) Each repair station must restrict
the distribution, disclosure, and
availability of sensitive security
information (SSI) as defined in part
1520 of this chapter to persons with a
need to know and refer all requests for
SSI by other persons to TSA.
(c) Amendment. (1) A repair station
must notify TSA of any amendment to
the standard security program.
(2) If TSA finds that there is a
situation requiring immediate action to
respond to a security threat, TSA may
issue an emergency amendment to the
standard security program. TSA will
provide an explanation of the reason for
the amendment. Each repair station
must acknowledge receipt and adopt the
emergency amendment within the time
prescribed. If a repair station is unable
to implement the emergency
amendment, the repair station
immediately must notify TSA to obtain
approval of alternative measures.
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§ 1554.105
Security Directives.
(a) General. When TSA determines
that additional security measures are
necessary to respond to a threat
assessment or to a specific threat against
civil aviation, TSA issues a Security
Directive setting forth mandatory
measures.
(b) Compliance. Each repair station
required to have a security program
must comply with each Security
Directive TSA issues to the repair
station within the time prescribed. Each
repair station that receives a Security
Directive must—
(1) Verbally acknowledge receipt of
the Security Directive.
(2) Specify the method by which
security measures have been or will be
implemented to meet the effective date.
(3) Notify TSA to obtain approval of
alternative measures, if the repair
station is unable to implement the
measures in the Security Directive.
(c) Availability. Each repair station
that receives a Security Directive and
each person who receives information
from a Security Directive must—
(1) Restrict the availability of the
Security Directive and the information
contained in the document to persons
who have an operational need to know.
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(2) Refuse to release the Security
Directive or the information contained
in the document to persons other than
those who have an operational need to
know without the prior written consent
of TSA.
Subpart C—Compliance and
Enforcement
§ 1554.201 Notification of security
deficiencies; suspension of certificate.
(a) General. Each repair station that
does not establish and carry out a
security program, as specified in this
part, may be subject to suspension of its
FAA certificate, as provided by 49
U.S.C. 44924(c)(1).
(b) Notice of security deficiencies.
TSA provides written notification to a
repair station and to the FAA of any
security deficiency identified by TSA.
(c) Response. A repair station must
provide TSA with a written explanation
in English of all efforts, methods, and
procedures used to correct the security
deficiencies identified by TSA within
45 days of receipt of the written
notification described in paragraph (b)
of this section.
(d) Suspension of certificate. If the
repair station does not correct security
deficiencies within 90 days of the repair
station’s receipt of the written notice of
security deficiencies, or if TSA
determines that the security deficiencies
have not been addressed sufficiently to
comply with this section, TSA provides
written notification to the repair station
and to the FAA that the station’s
certificate shall be suspended. The
notification includes an explanation of
the basis for the suspension. The
suspension remains in place until such
time as TSA determines that the
security deficiencies have been
corrected.
(e) Reply. No later than 20 calendar
days after the date of receipt of the
notification of suspension, the repair
station may serve upon TSA a written
request for review of the basis for the
determination that the security
deficiencies have not been addressed
sufficiently. The request must be in
English and may include any
information that the repair station
believes TSA should consider regarding
its determination. The suspension
remains in effect until the review is
complete.
(f) TSA Review. Not later than 30
calendar days, or such longer period as
TSA may determine for good cause,
after TSA receives the repair station’s
request for review, TSA reviews its
initial determination and issue a Final
Determination on the repair station and
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59889
the FAA in accordance with this
paragraph.
(1) TSA considers the initial
notification, the repair station’s reply,
and any other relevant materials before
issuing the Final Determination.
(2) If TSA determines that security
deficiencies exist and have not been
addressed, TSA serves upon the repair
station and the FAA a Final
Determination. The Final Determination
shall include a statement that TSA has
reviewed all of the relevant information
available and has determined that the
repair station is not in compliance with
this section.
(3) If TSA determines that security
deficiencies do not exist or have been
corrected in a manner consistent with
the requirements of this part, TSA
notifies the repair station and the FAA
that the repair station’s certification may
be reinstated.
§ 1554.203 Immediate risk to security;
revocation of certificate and review
process.
(a) Notice. TSA determines whether
any repair station poses an immediate
risk to security. If such a determination
is made, TSA provides written
notification of its determination to the
repair station and to the FAA that the
certificate must be revoked. The
notification includes an explanation of
the basis for the revocation. TSA does
not include classified information or
other information described in
paragraph (e) of this section.
(b) Request for review. Not later than
30 days after receipt of the notice, a
repair station may file a request for
review of the determination that the
repair station poses an immediate risk to
security. The revocation remains in
effect until the review is complete. The
request must be made in writing, in
English, signed by the repair station
operator or owner, and include—
(1) A statement that a review is
requested; and
(2) A response to the determination of
immediate risk to security, including
any information TSA should consider in
reviewing the basis for the
determination.
(c) TSA Review. Not later than 30
calendar days, or such longer period as
TSA may determine for good cause,
after TSA receives the repair station’s
request for review, TSA examines the
basis for the determination that the
repair station poses an immediate risk to
security, the repair station’s response,
and any other relevant materials.
(d) Final determination. If TSA
determines that the repair station poses
an immediate risk to security, the TSA
Assistant Secretary or his or her
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sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with PROPOSALS
designee reviews the notification, the
materials upon which the notification
was based, the repair station’s response
and any other available information. If
the TSA Assistant Secretary or his or
her designee determines that the repair
station continues to pose an immediate
risk to security, the TSA Assistant
Secretary or his or her designee submits
to the repair station and to the FAA a
Final Determination. The Final
Determination includes a statement that
the TSA Assistant Secretary or his or
her designee personally has reviewed all
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of the relevant information available
and has determined that the repair
station poses an immediate risk to
security. If TSA determines that the
repair station does not pose an
immediate risk to security, TSA notifies
the repair station and the FAA. A Final
Determination constitutes a final agency
action for purposes of 49 U.S.C. 46111.
§ 1554.205 Nondisclosure of certain
information.
In connection with the procedures
under this subpart, TSA does not
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disclose classified information, as
defined in Executive Order 12968
section 1.1(d), and TSA reserves the
right not to disclose any other
information or material not warranting
disclosure or protected from disclosure
under law or regulation.
Issued in Arlington, Virginia, on November
12, 2009.
Gale Rossides,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. E9–27624 Filed 11–17–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–05–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 221 (Wednesday, November 18, 2009)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 59874-59890]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-27624]
[[Page 59873]]
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Part V
Department of Homeland Security
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Transportation Security Administration
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49 CFR Parts 1520 and 1554
Aircraft Repair Station Security; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 74 , No. 221 / Wednesday, November 18, 2009 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 59874]]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Transportation Security Administration
49 CFR Parts 1520 and 1554
[Docket No. TSA-2004-17131]
RIN 1652-AA38
Aircraft Repair Station Security
AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration (TSA), DHS.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: TSA is proposing to issue regulations to improve the security
of domestic and foreign aircraft repair stations as required by the
Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act. The proposed
regulations establish requirements for repair stations that are
certificated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under 14 CFR
part 145 to adopt and implement a standard security program and to
comply with security directives issued by TSA. This rule proposes to
codify the scope of TSA's existing inspection program and to require
regulated parties to allow TSA and Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) officials to enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, and
records relevant to repair stations. The proposed regulations also
provide procedures for TSA to notify repair stations of any
deficiencies in their security programs, and to determine whether a
particular repair station presents an immediate risk to security. The
proposal includes a process whereby a repair station may seek review of
a determination by TSA that the station has not adequately addressed
security deficiencies or that the repair station poses an immediate
risk to security.
DATES: Submit comments by January 19, 2010.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. TSA-2004-
17131, to the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS), a government-
wide, electronic docket management system, using any one of the
following methods:
Electronically: You may submit comments through the Federal
eRulemaking portal at https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online
instructions for submitting comments.
Mail, Fax, or In Person: Address, hand-deliver, or fax your written
comments to the Docket Management System, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001; Fax: 202-493-2251. The
Department of Transportation (DOT), which maintains and processes TSA's
official regulatory dockets, will scan the submission and post it to
FDMS.
See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for format and other information
about comment submissions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Celio Young, Office of Security
Operations, TSA-29, Transportation Security Administration, 601 South
12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598-6029; telephone (571) 227-3580;
facsimile (571) 227-1905; e-mail celio.young@dhs.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
TSA invites interested persons to participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments
relating to the economic, environmental, energy, recordkeeping, or
federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in
this document. See ADDRESSES above for information on where to submit
comments.
With each comment, please identify the docket number at the
beginning of your comments. TSA encourages commenters to provide their
names and addresses. The most helpful comments reference a specific
portion of the rulemaking, explain the reason for any recommended
change, and include supporting data. You may submit comments and
material electronically, in person, or by mail as provided under
ADDRESSES, but please submit your comments and material by only one
means. If you submit comments by mail or delivery, submit them in two
copies, in an unbound format, no larger than 8.5 by 11 inches, suitable
for copying and electronic filing.
If you want TSA to acknowledge receipt of your comments submitted
by mail, include with your comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the
postcard and mail it to you.
TSA will file in the public docket address, as well as items sent
to the address or email under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT, in the
public docket, except for comments containing confidential information
and sensitive security information (SSI).\1\ Should you wish your
personally identifiable information redacted prior to filing in the
docket, please so state. TSA will consider all comments that are in the
docket on or before the closing date for comments and will consider
comments filed late to the extent practicable. The docket is available
for public inspection before and after the closing date.
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\1\ ``Sensitive Security Information'' or ``SSI'' is information
obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities, the
disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
privacy, reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential
information, or be detrimental to the security of transportation.
The protection of SSI is governed by 49 CFR part 1520.
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Handling of Confidential or Proprietary Information and Sensitive
Security Information (SSI) Submitted in Public Comments
Do not submit comments that include trade secrets, confidential
commercial or financial information, or SSI to the public regulatory
docket. Please submit such comments separately from other comments on
the rulemaking. Comments containing this type of information should be
appropriately marked as containing such information and submitted by
mail to the address listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.
TSA will not place comments containing SSI in the public docket and
will handle them in accordance with applicable safeguards and
restrictions on access. TSA will hold documents containing SSI,
confidential business information, or trade secrets in a separate file
to which the public does not have access, and place a note in the
public docket explaining that commenters have submitted such documents.
TSA may include a redacted version of the comment in the public docket.
If an individual requests to examine or copy information that is not in
the public docket, TSA will treat it as any other request under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552) and the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS') FOIA regulation found in 6 CFR part 5.
Reviewing Comments in the Docket
Please be aware that anyone is able to search the electronic form
of all comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the
individual submitting the comment (or signing the comments, if
submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review the applicable Privacy Act statement published in the
Federal Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477) and modified on
January 17, 2008 (73 FR 3316).
You may review TSA's electronic public docket on the Internet at
https://www.regulations.gov. In addition, DOT's Docket Management
Facility provides a physical facility, staff, equipment, and
[[Page 59875]]
assistance to the public. To obtain assistance or to review comments in
TSA's public docket, you may visit this facility between 9 a.m. to 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding legal holidays, or call (202)
366-9826. This docket operations facility is located in the West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140 at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
Availability of Rulemaking Document
You may obtain an electronic copy using the Internet by
(1) Searching the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) Web page
at https://www.regulations.gov;
(2) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at https://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/; or
(3) Visiting TSA's Security Regulations Web page at https://www.tsa.gov and accessing the link for ``Research Center'' at the top
of the page.
In addition, copies of the rulemaking document are available by
writing or calling the individual in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section. Make sure to identify the docket number of this
rulemaking.
Outline of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
I. Background
A. Introduction
B. Statutory Requirements
C. Summary of Proposed Rule
D. FAA Safety Regulations
E. Public Listening Session and Comments
F. Repair Station Site Visits
II. Summary of the Proposed Rule
A. Repair Station Standard Security Program
B. Repair Station Profile
C. Security Inspections
D. Immediate Risk to Security
III. Section-by-Section Analysis
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
B. International Compatibility
C. Regulatory Impact Analyses
1. Regulatory Evaluation Summary
2. Executive Order 12866 Assessment
3. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA)
4. International Trade Impact Assessment
5. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment
D. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
E. Environmental Analysis
F. Energy Impact Analysis
I. Background
A. Introduction
Civil aviation remains a target of terrorist activity worldwide.
Terrorists continue to seek opportunities to destroy public confidence
in the safety and security of travel, deny the ability of the public to
move and travel freely, and damage international economic security.
TSA is proposing to issue regulations to provide for the security
of maintenance and repair work conducted on aircraft and aircraft
components at domestic and foreign repair stations, of the aircraft and
aircraft components located at these repair stations, and of the repair
station facilities as required by Vision 100--Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, codified at 49 U.S.C. 44924 (Vision 100).
For purposes of this rulemaking, ``repair stations'' are those
facilities certificated by the FAA to perform maintenance, repair,
overhaul, or alterations on U.S. aircraft or aircraft components,
including engines, hydraulics, avionics, safety equipment, airframes,
and interiors. According to the FAA, there are 4,227 domestic repair
stations located in the United States and 694 foreign repair stations
located outside the United States that have an FAA certificate under
part 145 of the FAA's rules.\2\
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\2\ FAA Fact Sheet, ``FAA Oversight of Repair Stations,'' March
29, 2007. See ``FAA Certificated Repair Stations Directory,''
Advisory Circular (AC) 140-7R, for a list of FAA certificated repair
stations.
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In addition, for purposes of this rulemaking, the term
``component'' includes any article, airframe, aircraft engine,
propeller, appliance, or part that is under repair. The term is used
broadly to encompass both articles and appliances as defined by the
FAA.\3\
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\3\ See 14 CFR 1.1 and 145.3(b).
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Aircraft repair stations vary widely in size, type of repair work
performed, number of employees, and proximity to an airport. The FAA
issues ratings to certificated repair stations for the work that can be
performed at the repair station.\4\ These include airframe ratings,
power plant ratings, propeller ratings, radio ratings, instrument
ratings, and accessory ratings. Within each rating there are different
classes for particular aircraft and equipment. The FAA also issues
limited ratings for certificated repair stations that only work on a
particular type of airframe or equipment or performs only specialized
maintenance operations.\5\ The FAA certificates repair stations with
few employees located in industrial parks and in residences that may
work on small components, such as aircraft radios or seat cushions, as
well as repair stations with many employees that perform major aircraft
overhauls located in close proximity to an airport runway.\6\ Because
repair station characteristics vary widely, TSA believes that existing
security measures, as well as the corresponding security threat, also
vary widely.
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\4\ 14 CFR 145.59.
\5\ 14 CFR 145.61.
\6\ Approximately 2,803 domestic repair stations have fifteen or
fewer employees and 1,407 have five or fewer employees.
Approximately 3,000 certificated domestic repair stations are not
located on an airport.
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Repair stations are closely regulated and monitored by the FAA and
both the FAA and the air carriers inspect work done at repair stations.
FAA performance standards for foreign and domestic repair stations are
the same. While the FAA has implemented extensive safety requirements
for both foreign and domestic repair stations, supplementing those
requirements with specific security measures for both foreign and
domestic repair stations would further reduce the likelihood that
terrorists would be able to gain access to aircraft under repair at a
repair station. As terrorist organizations continue to seek new and
creative means of using aircraft to undermine the security and safety
of the traveling public, the importance of requiring all aircraft
repair stations to have measures in place to prevent persons from
commandeering, tampering, or sabotaging aircraft has increased as well.
Enhancement of repair station security will mitigate the potential
threat that an aircraft could be used as a weapon or that an aircraft
could be destroyed.
This rulemaking sets forth proposed regulations to require all FAA
certificated repair stations to adopt and carry out a standard security
program. The proposed regulations list performance standards for
security measures that would be included in the standard security
program. The proposed regulations also would require repair stations to
carry out Security Directives issued by TSA in the event of a specific
threat.
In addition, the proposed regulations codify the scope of TSA's
authority to conduct inspections of both domestic and foreign repair
stations. The proposed regulations also provide procedures for TSA to
notify repair stations of deficiencies in their security program and to
determine whether a particular repair station represents an immediate
risk to security. Finally, the proposal contains a process whereby a
repair station may seek review of a determination by TSA that security
deficiencies have not been addressed or that the repair station poses
an immediate risk to security.
B. Statutory Requirements
Vision 100 requires DHS to promulgate security regulations for
domestic and foreign aircraft repair
[[Page 59876]]
stations.\7\ The statute includes the following additional requirements
regarding security audits of foreign repair stations:
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\7\ This section of Vision 100 is codified at 49 U.S.C. 44924.
The requirement to promulgate regulations is described in 49 U.S.C.
44924(f). The statute also requires that the Under Secretary for
Border and Transportation Security issue the final regulations. The
Under Secretary delegated authority for issuing such regulations to
TSA on September 16, 2005. TSA sent a Report to Congress on August
24, 2004, as required at 49 U.S.C. 44924(g).
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TSA must complete a security review and audit of foreign
repair stations certificated by the FAA no later than six months after
regulations are issued.\8\ When conducting the audit, TSA must give
priority to those repair stations that pose a significant risk to
security. If security audits are not completed within six months from
the date regulations are issued, the FAA is barred from certificating
any new foreign repair stations until the security audits are completed
for existing repair stations.
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\8\ In the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266, Aug. 3, 2007), the
original 18-month deadline for completing security inspections of
foreign repair stations was reduced to 6 months.
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TSA must notify the FAA of any security issues or
vulnerabilities identified during the audit and require foreign repair
stations to address any such issues or vulnerabilities within 90 days.
If, after 90 days, TSA determines that the foreign repair station does
not maintain and carry out effective security measures, TSA must notify
the FAA and the FAA must suspend the repair station's certificate until
such time as TSA determines that the repair station does maintain and
carry out effective security measures.
TSA must notify the FAA if TSA determines that a foreign
repair station poses an immediate risk to security and the FAA must
revoke the repair station's certificate. TSA must establish an appeal
procedure to be used when a certificate is revoked.
C. Summary of Proposed Rule
TSA is proposing regulations to:
Codify TSA's inspection authority.
Require foreign and domestic repair stations certificated
by the FAA under part 145 of the FAA's rules to allow TSA and DHS
officials to enter, inspect, audit, and test property, facilities, and
records relevant to repair stations.
Require foreign and domestic repair stations certificated
by the FAA to adopt and carry out a standard security program issued by
TSA to safeguard the security of the repair station, the repair work
conducted at the repair station, and all aircraft and aircraft
components at the repair station.
Require each security program to describe the specific
measures the repair station has implemented to identify individuals
authorized access to the repair station, aircraft, and aircraft
components; control access to the repair station, aircraft, and
aircraft components; challenge individuals who are not authorized
access and use escort measures for authorized visitors; provide
security awareness training to all employees; verify employee
background information; designate a security coordinator; and establish
a contingency plan.
Require each repair station to comply with Security
Directives issued by TSA.
Establish a process to notify the FAA to suspend a
certificate upon written notification by TSA that a repair station has
not corrected security deficiencies identified during a security audit
within 90 days and to permit appeal of a certificate suspension.
Establish a process to notify the FAA to revoke a
certificate upon written notification by TSA that a repair station is
an immediate risk to security and to permit appeal of a certificate
revocation.
In developing these proposals, TSA has consulted with FAA officials
responsible for repair station safety matters.
D. FAA Safety Regulations
The security regulations proposed in this NPRM are designed to
build upon the extensive certification and safety requirements for
repair stations instituted by the FAA. The FAA certificates repair
stations, as well as repairmen who work in repair stations.\9\ The FAA
requires that in order to receive certification, repair stations must
establish and maintain a quality control system acceptable to the FAA
that ensures the airworthiness of the articles on which the repair
station or any of its contractors performs maintenance, preventive
maintenance, or alterations.\10\ The quality control system must
describe the procedures the repair station uses to inspect incoming raw
materials, perform preliminary inspection of all articles that are
maintained at the repair station, qualify and monitor noncertificated
persons who perform maintenance, preventive maintenance, or alterations
for repair stations, and conduct final inspections of maintained
articles. In addition, the FAA requires that a certificated repair
station inspect each article upon which it has performed maintenance,
preventive maintenance, or alterations before approving that article
for return to service.\11\ The FAA conducts safety inspections of both
foreign and domestic repair stations.
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\9\ See 14 CFR part 145 and 14 CFR part 65. While the FAA only
certificates certain repair station personnel who work in the United
States, it does require that those repair station personnel located
outside the United States have practical experience or training in
the work being performed. Supervisors in repair stations located
outside the United States must understand, read, and write English.
14 CFR 145.153.
\10\ 14 CFR 145.211.
\11\ 14 CFR 145.211.
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While these quality control measures provide a significant layer of
protection and oversight of the components and aircraft under repair,
the proposed regulations would supplement those measures by requiring
that FAA certificated repair stations also adopt and carry out a
security program that would include procedures to control access to the
repair station itself, the components and aircraft under repair, and
the work being performed; verify the identity of repair station
employees; and establish a security coordinator to serve as the point
of contact for security-related matters.
E. Public Listening Session and Comments
On February 27, 2004, TSA held a public listening session to
receive input from stakeholders and other interested parties on repair
station security issues. TSA also invited written comments to be
submitted by March 29, 2004.\12\ TSA requested specific comments on the
following issues:
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\12\ 69 FR 8357 (Feb. 24, 2004).
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Security measures that are currently deployed.
Existing security vulnerabilities.
Standards that should be in place to prevent unauthorized
access, tampering, and any other security breaches.
Current security system costs.
Whether security requirements should be tailored to the
type of authorization the repair station holds, number of employees,
proximity to an airport, number of repairs completed, or other
characteristics.
Whether aircraft operators should play a role in ensuring
that repair stations maintain a secure workplace.
Whether any repair station operator has experienced a
breach in security.
Twelve parties, representing air carriers, repair station operators
and employees, manufacturers, and unions, spoke during the public
meeting.\13\ While several parties questioned the need for security
regulations, most
[[Page 59877]]
recognized the importance of protecting the security of the aircraft,
the maintenance work that repair stations perform on aircraft and
aircraft components, and the facility itself, noting that TSA is
required by statute to develop such regulations. Most parties also
agreed that the regulations should be tailored to reflect security
measures that may already be in place, as well as other factors, such
as those listed by TSA in its request for comments. Concerns were
expressed regarding the expedited timing of the regulations and the
security audits, the potential financial burdens resulting from the
imposition of new regulations, particularly on small repair stations,
and the appeal process. Several parties recommended that the
regulations define what constitutes an ``immediate risk to security,''
as well as ``existing repair stations.'' Other parties discussed
security initiatives that had been employed at their facilities since
September 11, 2001.
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\13\ A transcript of the public meeting and copies of all filed
comments are available in docket number TSA-2004-17131 at https://regulations.gov/search.
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TSA also received 21 written comments, representing the views of
repair station operators and employees, unions, air carriers, aircraft
owners, and manufacturers regarding potential security regulations. The
majority of those submitting written comments also supported the need
for security regulations, and agreed that the regulations should be
tailored to reflect the particular characteristics of a repair station.
Some commenters suggested that TSA include general security criteria
for domestic and foreign repair stations and others offered
recommendations regarding specific provisions that should be included
in the regulations, such as access controls, personnel identification,
employee background checks, and security awareness training. The
comments provide valuable input as to how repair station security
issues should be addressed and the proposal reflects many of the
issues, as well as the recommendations, contained in these initial
comments. TSA looks forward to receiving further comments on the
proposed regulations.
F. Repair Station Site Visits
In addition to the information gathered during the public listening
session and through written comments, TSA visited repair stations to
conduct research on the physical characteristics of repair stations,
the type of repair work performed, and the extent of security measures
that had been implemented. The following site visits were conducted:
June 2005--1 repair station in Hamburg, Germany, and 1
repair station in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
August 2005--5 repair stations in Singapore.
November 2006--9 repair stations in the state of Arizona.
December 2006--3 repair stations in Naples, Italy.
January 2007--3 repair stations in the state of Georgia.
May 2007--1 repair station in Singapore and 1 repair
station in Guangzhou, China.
July 2007--1 repair station in Teterboro, New Jersey.
May 2008--3 repair stations in Bogota, Colombia.
These repair station site visits provided valuable insight into the
different types of facilities certificated by the FAA, the different
types of repair work conducted at the facilities, and the different
types of security measures deployed by the various facilities. All of
the stations visited had some security measures in place. For example,
one foreign repair station had over 10,000 employees with many
buildings and its own airport. This facility had perimeter fencing,
security guards, and surveillance cameras to control access to the
facility. Its employees were required to display identification media.
Another foreign repair station had only seven employees and was located
at an industrial park. That facility was planning to install
surveillance cameras to be monitored by a private security company. In
two countries the government had mandated security requirements for
certain repair stations.
In the United States, one domestic repair station facility with 40
employees relied on personal recognition to identify individuals
authorized entry into the facility, while another domestic repair
station with fifteen employees used identification media and
surveillance cameras. By conducting these site visits, TSA was able to
study security measures already deployed and develop a proposal that
reflects repair station diversity.
II. Summary of the Proposed Rule
TSA proposes to add a new part 1554 to its regulations, entitled
``Aircraft Repair Station Security.'' The new part would require
aircraft repair stations that are certificated by the FAA under 14 CFR
part 145, both domestic and foreign, to adopt and carry out a standard
security program. The regulations would require repair stations to
safeguard the security of the aircraft and components located at the
station, the maintenance and repair work performed there, as well as
the repair station's facilities as required by 49 U.S.C. 44924. For a
more detailed discussion of the proposed regulations, see the Section-
by-Section Analysis portion of this preamble.
TSA is also proposing changes to its regulations regarding the
protection of sensitive security information (SSI) to specify that a
repair station security program is categorized as SSI and that the
repair station operator or owner is subject to the SSI requirements
described in 49 CFR part 1520.\14\
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\14\ ``Sensitive Security Information'' or ``SSI'' is
information obtained or developed in the conduct of security
activities, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of privacy, reveal trade secrets or privileged or
confidential information, or be detrimental to the security of
transportation. The protection of SSI is governed by 49 CFR part
1520.
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A. Repair Station Standard Security Program
FAA certificated repair stations, whether located at airports that
have a TSA security program,\15\ at general aviation airports, or at
off airport properties, could be a target of terrorist activity and TSA
is proposing that each FAA certificated repair station implement and
carry out a standard security program issued by TSA to mitigate that
risk. If the repair station is already incorporated within an airport's
security program and uses the airport's access control measures, TSA
will consider the repair station to be in compliance with the security
measures proposed in these regulations.
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\15\ See 49 CFR part 1542 for a description of airport security
program requirements. Aircraft repair stations located at a
commercial airport may be included within the airport security
program.
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The proposed regulations list the general security requirements
that each repair station would be required to carry out in the standard
security program. The standard security program would require each
repair station to include (1) a description of access controls for the
facility as well as for the aircraft and/or aircraft components; (2) a
description of the measures used to identify employees and others who
are authorized to access aircraft and/or aircraft components; (3) a
description of the procedures to challenge unauthorized individuals;
(4) a description of security awareness training for employees; (5) the
name of the designated security coordinator; (6) a contingency plan;
and (7) a description of the means used to verify employee background
information. The complete security program contents are discussed in
the Section by Section analysis.
These requirements are consistent with the recommendations included
in the written comments received by TSA,
[[Page 59878]]
as well as with established security procedures for aircraft operators,
air carriers, and airports.\16\
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\16\ See, generally, TSA security regulations at 49 CFR parts
1540, 1542, 1544, and 1546.
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Recognizing that a ``one size fits all'' approach would not
appropriately address the diversity in repair station characteristics,
TSA believes that repair stations should have some flexibility
regarding the particular equipment, facilities, and measures that would
be listed in the standard security program and used to comply with the
proposed regulations. While TSA would provide a standard security
program which would contain the majority of security measures that a
repair station must adopt to comply with the proposed regulations,
certain measures in the standard security program that the repair
station must adopt may differ depending upon risk factors considered by
TSA.
TSA would not require repair stations that are not located on or
adjacent to an airport to implement the same physical security measures
in the standard security program as those repair stations that are
located on or adjacent to an airport. In adopting this approach, TSA
considered the security risks of repair station operations to determine
whether there were any factors that could increase the security risks
of a repair station. The factors TSA considered were (1) size and type
of aircraft to which employees had access; (2) the type of repair work
permitted by the FAA certificate; (3) whether the repair station was
located on an airport and the type of airport; and (4) the number of
employees at the repair station.
Based on the information acquired during the repair stations site
visits, an examination of FAA safety requirements, and discussions with
FAA safety inspectors, TSA determined that while all of the
characteristics examined had some effect on security risks, repair
stations that are located on or adjacent to an airport could pose a
higher security risk. TSA found that at airport locations, there was
greater accessibility to aircraft and proximity to a runway, thereby
increasing the possibility that an aircraft could be commandeered and
used as a weapon or sabotaged. At off-airport locations, TSA found that
repair station employees had little, if any, access to operational
aircraft or runways. Repair station employees at off airport locations
typically are not the last individuals with access to aircraft prior to
the reintroduction of the aircraft into service. TSA believes that it
would be difficult for an individual to damage an aircraft at a repair
station location that is only rated to repair aircraft components if
the individual does not have access to aircraft. FAA safety regulations
require inspection of the repair work and the component before it is
installed in an aircraft and before the aircraft is deemed to be
airworthy. Thus, TSA believes it is less likely that a terrorist would
attempt to target an aircraft by sabotaging a component at an off
airport location.
This assessment of the greater risk posed by repair stations
located on or adjacent to an airport was also supported by several
commenters. One commenter noted that repair stations located within an
airport posed the greatest risk to security because of the larger
number of entry points in such a location. Another explained that
repair facilities located off airport generally only work on aircraft
components and that the multiple layers of testing and oversight
already conducted by the FAA serves as an important security function
as well. Another commenter agreed, stating that repair stations that do
not have access to aircraft do not pose a security risk because the
airworthiness of the components are tested before they are released
into service.
Based on this risk assessment, TSA would specify particular
security measures in the standard security program that would apply to
repair stations on or adjacent to an airport, but that would not be
required for other repair stations. TSA believes that this approach
would be consistent with its efforts to strengthen security measures at
the non public areas of the airport.
In addition, TSA would not require repair stations on or adjacent
to airports that only serve aircraft with a maximum certificated take-
off weight (MTOW) of 12,500 pounds or less to include the same security
measures in the standard security program as repair stations located on
or adjacent to airports that serve larger aircraft. TSA has long
recognized that aircraft with a MTOW over 12,500 pounds pose a greater
risk to security because such aircraft are of sufficient size and
weight to inflict significant damage and loss of lives.\17\ Smaller
aircraft may be a less attractive target for terrorists. Therefore, the
security program would not include the same requirements for repair
stations that are located on or adjacent to an airport that serves
small aircraft. While the proposed regulations apply to all FAA
certificated repair stations, TSA requests comment on whether it should
exempt certain repair stations after it conducts security reviews and
audits. For instance, TSA may consider whether to exempt repair
stations that only perform maintenance on aircraft that are 12,500 MTOW
or less. TSA also requests comments on whether there are other
considerations that could be used to determine potential exemptions.
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\17\ See 49 CFR 1544.101(d) and 1550.7.
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TSA is aware that the FAA may certificate repair stations operating
on a Federal government facility, such as a U.S. military base. TSA
believes that the security at such a facility would likely meet and
exceed the security requirements proposed herein. Therefore, TSA would
not apply its requirements to any FAA certificated repair station at
which the Federal government has assumed responsibility for security
measures.
The issue of requiring drug and alcohol testing of repair station
employees was raised during the public listening session. TSA is not
proposing to include drug and alcohol testing as part of its security
program requirements. TSA notes that the FAA has instituted alcohol and
drug testing as part of its safety regulations.\18\ TSA believes that
such testing should remain under the purview of the FAA.
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\18\ See 14 CFR part 121 at Appendix I and Appendix J. The FAA
requires part 145 certificate holders and non-certificated repair
stations that perform safety sensitive functions for air carriers
and commercial operators under 14 CFR parts 121 and 135 to implement
an FAA Antidrug Program.
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TSA believes that the standard security program would be useful to
repair stations that have not developed or implemented a security
program, particularly small repair stations that may lack the resources
to create their own security program. Further, the standard security
program would provide consistency in format and content for the
thousands of security programs that would be implemented under this
proposal. TSA anticipates requesting comment from repair stations on
the standard security program before a final rule is adopted and will
make a draft of the standard security program available for review and
comment by the repair stations subject to the regulations either
electronically, through meetings, or both.\19\
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\19\ Security programs will be sensitive security information
and will not be available to the general public. See Section-by-
Section analysis for Sec. 1520.3 in this preamble.
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B. Repair Station Profile
To assess the security risks of a repair station and to establish
the priority by which repair stations must be inspected, TSA would
require each repair station to provide a brief profile, to include
general information as to location, such as whether the repair station
is located
[[Page 59879]]
on or adjacent to an airport,\20\ the total number of employees, and
the number of employees with access to large aircraft. The type of
information is discussed in the Section by Section analysis. We note
that while the FAA holds some of this information, it does not have all
of it. We invite comments on the burdens associated with TSA collecting
this profile. As explained above, TSA has determined that repair
stations located on or adjacent to an airport pose a higher security
risk than those that are not located on or adjacent to an airport. In
addition, TSA has determined that repair stations on airports that
perform work on aircraft over 12,500 MTOW pose a higher security risk.
Identifying these higher risk repair stations will enable TSA to make
certain that they are given a higher priority when scheduling
inspections.
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\20\ If located on an airport, whether the repair station
participates in the airport security program will impact the need
for the repair station to comply with the proposed security
regulations.
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Further, the profile will assist TSA in determining which measures
included in the standard security program must be implemented to
address the higher risk posture of repair stations that are located on
or adjacent to an airport.
C. Security Inspections
The proposed regulations would codify TSA's inspection authority
and would require repair stations to permit TSA and DHS officials to
enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, and records relevant to
repair stations. The purpose of the inspection would be to assess
threats to aviation security, enforce TSA security regulations,
directives, and requirements, evaluate all aspects of the repair
station security program, verify whether the security program is being
implemented and whether it is effective, as well as to identify and
correct security deficiencies. Such oversight is also necessary to
monitor continuing compliance with the security requirements. Since the
inspection program is critical to the enforcement of the security
program requirement, TSA's inspection authority would extend to all
repair stations. TSA would initiate foreign repair station inspections
by giving priority to those foreign repair stations that pose the
greatest risk to aviation security as required by Vision 100, and that
have identified themselves through the profile as being located on or
adjacent to an airport and as performing repair work on large aircraft.
Pursuant to the inspection process and consistent with Vision 100,
TSA is proposing to notify the repair station and the FAA of any
deficiencies in a security program and to permit the repair station 90
days to correct such deficiencies. If the deficiencies are not
corrected within 90 days, TSA would notify the FAA that it must suspend
the repair station's certificate until such time as TSA determines that
the deficiencies are resolved. The proposed regulations also contain a
process whereby a repair station may request further review of TSA's
determination regarding security deficiencies.
D. Immediate Risk to Security
The proposed regulation contains a specific process whereby a
repair station that poses an immediate risk to security is identified
and the FAA is notified of such a determination. The FAA must revoke
the certificate of a station that TSA determines poses an immediate
risk to security. Whether the threat is immediate would be evaluated on
a case by case basis considering existing and potential circumstances
as information is received and analyzed. The proposal provides a repair
station with the opportunity to obtain the releasable materials upon
which the determination was made and to seek review of such a
determination.
III. Section-by-Section Analysis
Part 1520--Protection of Sensitive Security Information
Section 1520.5--Sensitive Security Information
Protection of Sensitive Security Information (SSI), as codified at
49 CFR part 1520, would apply to each repair station required to adopt
and carry out a security program. Airport and aircraft operator
security programs and plans, amendments, security directives and
information circulars, technical specifications of security screening
and detection systems and devices, among other types of information,
all constitute SSI under current Sec. 1520.5 and are prohibited from
public disclosure. TSA is proposing to amend its part 1520 rules to
include a repair station security program as SSI. This change would
prevent the public disclosure of the security measures implemented and
utilized by a repair station covered under the new rules because such
disclosure would pose a threat to transportation security. It would
also ensure that the repair station standard security program is
protected just as other TSA required security programs are protected.
Section 1520.7--Covered Persons
TSA proposes to amend Sec. 1520.7 to include repair station
operators as covered persons subject to its SSI requirements. This
change would require that repair station operators adhere to the SSI
rules and protect SSI from public dissemination. Access to SSI is
strictly limited to those persons with a need to know, as defined in 49
CFR 1520.11. In general, a person has a need to know specific SSI when
he or she requires access to the information in order to carry out
transportation security activities that are government-approved, -
accepted, -funded, -recommended, or -directed, including for purposes
of training on, and supervision of, such activities or to provide legal
or technical advice regarding security-related requirements.
Accordingly, the protection of SSI would apply to each repair station
standard security program pursuant to part 1554.
Part 1554--Aircraft Repair Station Security (New)
Section 1554.1--Scope and Purpose
Section 1554.1 of the proposed regulation sets forth the scope and
purpose of new part 1554. The proposed regulations would apply to all
repair stations, both domestic and foreign, that are certificated by
the FAA pursuant to 14 CFR part 145. The purpose of the proposed
regulations would be to safeguard the security of domestic and foreign
aircraft repair stations as required by 49 U.S.C. 44924. The
requirements would not apply to any FAA certificated repair station at
which the U.S. government has assumed responsibility for security
measures.
Section 1554.3--Terms Used in This Part
Section 1554.3 of the proposed rule sets forth the definitions of
certain terms used in this part. The term ``repair station'' is defined
as any maintenance facility that is certificated by FAA pursuant to 14
CFR part 145 to perform maintenance, preventive maintenance, repair,
overhaul, or alterations of an aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine,
propeller, appliance, or component part.\21\ Since the proposed
regulations apply to both foreign and domestic repair stations, the
section defines ``domestic repair station'' as any FAA-certificated
repair station located within the fifty States, the District of
Columbia, or the territories and possessions of the United States. A
``foreign repair station'' is defined as any FAA-certificated repair
station located outside of the fifty States, the District of Columbia,
or the
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territories and possessions of the United States.
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\21\ The proposed definition is consistent with the description
of the applicability of the FAA's repair station regulations at 14
CFR 145.1.
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Section 1554.5--TSA Inspection Authority
Section 1554.5 would codify TSA's authority to inspect repair
stations and would require repair stations to permit TSA and DHS
officials to enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, and records
relevant to repair stations. This section would allow TSA to assess
threats, enforce regulations, security directives, and requirements,
inspect all facilities and equipment, test the adequacy of security
measures, verify the implementation of security measures, review
security programs and other records, and perform such other duties as
appropriate. This section also would allow TSA to request evidence of
compliance, including copies of records in English.
The proposed regulatory language is consistent with the inspection
authority currently codified at 49 CFR 1542.5 and 1546.3, which apply
to certain U.S. airports and foreign air carriers. TSA has established
protocols and procedures on conducting inspections outside the United
States through its Foreign Airport and Foreign Air Carrier Assessment
Programs. These established procedures require advance notice to the
facility to be inspected and coordination with the U.S. Department of
State and the appropriate foreign government authorities. TSA
inspectors are required to have TSA identification media and
credentials with them when inspecting facilities and must display them
when requested to do so. TSA will use these established procedures when
conducting inspections of foreign repair stations.
TSA is also amenable to working with the U.S. Department of State
and foreign government authorities to facilitate inspections of U.S.
repair stations that are certificated by a foreign government
authority. TSA currently permits such inspections of U.S. airports and
air carriers by foreign government authorities consistent with ICAO
Annex 17, Section 2.1.
TSA has kept ICAO apprised of the rulemaking and will continue its
efforts to harmonize its regulations with those of other countries
through its participation in ICAO.
Section 1554.101--Adoption and Implementation
Section 1554.101 would require each repair station to adopt and
carry out a security program designed to safeguard aircraft and
aircraft components located within the repair station, the maintenance
and repair work performed there, and the facility itself. Repair
stations would be required to use the TSA standard security program
unless otherwise authorized by TSA.
This section would also require a repair station to submit a
profile. The purpose of the profile would be to provide basic
information regarding repair station operations to assist TSA in
determining what measures the repair station must include in its
security program to meet the security requirements. The profile would
also assist TSA in prioritizing repair stations for purposes of
conducting inspections. TSA would make the profile template available
to all repair stations either through the TSA web site, by mail, or
both. The profile would request the following types of information:
Identification of the repair stations, such as FAA
certificate number, repair station name as it appears on the FAA
certificate, and repair station address.
Description of location (on or adjacent to an airport, off
airport in a business location, off airport private residence).
Security coordinator who will serve as the TSA point of
contact.
If on an airport, the name and three letter designator of
the airport.
Total number of employees.
Number of employees authorized unescorted access to
aircraft over 12,500 MTOW.
The name and location of each repair station would assist TSA in
identifying the repair station and determining its proximity to an
airport since, as explained above, TSA would consider such repair
stations to be a higher risk than those that are not located on or
adjacent to an airport. The profile information would also help TSA to
prioritize its inspections. Repair stations would also be required to
update their profile information within 30 calendar days if a change in
the information submitted occurs. This requirement would enable TSA to
maintain current information on each regulated repair station and make
certain that it is appraised of changes that could impact the security
posture of a repair station. Repair stations would not be required to
alert TSA to changes in total number of employees or number of
employees who work on large aircraft to prevent the submission of a new
profile every time an employee is hired or terminated.
Section 1554.103--Security Program Content, Availability, and Amendment
Section 1554.103 would describe the general requirements describing
the measures that each repair station must adopt in the standard
security program. The standard security program must include:
(1) A description of the measures used to identify individuals who
are authorized to enter the repair station to prevent unauthorized
individuals from entering the repair station;
(2) a description of the measures used to control access to the
repair station and to detect and prevent the entry, presence, and
movement of unauthorized individuals and vehicles into or within the
repair station;
(3) a description of the measures used to control access to the
aircraft and/or aircraft components to allow only authorized
individuals to have such access;
(4) a description of the measures used to challenge any individual
entering the repair station to ascertain the authority of the
individual to enter or be present in the repair station and measures to
escort an individual who does not have unescorted authority while
within the repair station;
(5) a description of the measures to train all individuals with
authorized access to aircraft and components on the provisions of this
part and the security program;
(6) a description of the measures used to verify employee
background information through confirmation of prior employment and any
other means as appropriate to validate employee information;
(7) the name, 24-hour contact information, duties, and training
requirements of the designated security coordinator who will serve as
the primary and immediate contact for security-related activities and
communications with TSA;
(8) a contingency plan;
(9) a diagram with dimensions detailing boundaries and pertinent
physical features of the repair station;
(10) a list and description of all entry points; and
(11) an emergency response contact list.
The regulations also would require that the security program be in
writing, and signed by the repair station operator, owner, or other
authorized person. Each repair station would not have to submit the
security program to TSA, but would have to make it available to TSA
upon request or during an inspection.
The individual standard security program requirements are discussed
below.
(1) Identification of Authorized Individuals
The proposed regulations would require the repair station to adopt
and
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describe measures to identify individuals to prevent unauthorized
individuals from entering the repair station. The specific requirements
for a personnel identification media system would be included in the
standard security program. Personal recognition may be sufficient at
certain repair station locations. During the inspection process, TSA
would use the following factors to evaluate whether the personnel
identification media system must be implemented and what type of
features the system must use:
Number of employees and number of shifts.
Physical size of the repair station.
Number of visitors.
Proximity of other businesses or operations.
Type of work, size of aircraft, and length of runway.
Number of entry points into the repair station.
Airport security features.
Other factors that increase ability of unauthorized
individuals or vehicles to access the repair station.
For example, a repair station with 50 employees who work multiple
shifts at a repair station, located adjacent to an airport with many
access points, might be required to adopt and carry out the personnel
identification media system. Such a repair station would be considered
to be a higher risk because of its proximity to an airport. Further,
the large number of employees working multiple shifts would make it
difficult for employees to rely solely on personal recognition as
workers from different shifts may not be able to recognize each other.
A repair station located in a residence with a single employee would
not be required to adopt the personnel identification media system in
the security program. TSA would not anticipate requiring a repair
station located at an airport to adopt a personnel identification media
system if employees were required to obtain and display airport
identification media.
(2) Repair Station Access Control Measures
The standard security program would specify the access control
security requirements for all repair stations. Such requirements would
include measures to control access to the facility and to the aircraft
and components within the repair station, to challenge any individuals
to determine if they are authorized to enter or be present in the
facility, and to respond if unauthorized individuals or vehicles are
discovered.
Acceptable access control measures would be specified in the
security program. Such measures would cover a broad spectrum, including
standard locks with key control, card swipe access locks, cipher locks,
locks with coded keys, biometric access cards, fencing, security
guards, surveillance cameras, and motion detectors.
As part of the standard security program, the repair station would
be required to describe all of the entry points to the facility and the
specific access control measures used for each. During the inspection
process, TSA would determine whether the access control measures
deployed at the entry point are appropriate. A repair station located
on or adjacent to an airport that performs substantial maintenance on
large aircraft would be required to have more stringent access
controls. Such controls could include such measures as card swipe
access locks, security guards, electronically monitored access or
motion detectors, fencing or a combination of such controls. A repair
station located in a private residence or in a small component shop in
an industrial park would be required to have less sophisticated
controls, such as standard locks with key control and an inventory
system to track the number of keys. A repair station would be able to
select the above or other measures that would provide a appropriate
level of security.
Access controls would also be required to restrict unauthorized
access to components located within the facility, such as locked
storage containers and inventory control of keys.
(3) Aircraft Access Control Measures
In addition, the security program would include measures to control
access to aircraft, such as requiring repair stations located on or
adjacent to an airport to secure large aircraft by locking or disabling
the aircraft, keeping the aircraft in a secure hangar during non-
operational hours, fencing, surveillance cameras, lighting, and
security guards.
(4) Challenge Procedures
The security program would describe the procedures to be followed
when challenging individuals who cannot be readily identified. Only
those individuals who are designated and trained in escort procedures
would be permitted to escort visitors to the repair station. The
responsibilities of the escort would be specified in the security
program. At a small facility with few employees, the ability to observe
individuals present within the facility may be sufficient to ensure
that access to repair work and/or components is controlled. At large
repair station facilities, such as those that use a personnel
identification media system, employees may have to escort individuals
as part of their responsibilities.
(5) Security Training Measures
The security program would include measures to conduct initial and
recurrent security training programs, such as providing guidance to
repair station personnel on how to implement and maintain the security
measures included in the security program. The security program would
also specify that the training curriculum be updated to reflect current
security requirements. The repair station would be required to maintain
records of initial and recurrent security training for each employee.
The standard security program would include a model curriculum that the
repair station could modify based on the specific security requirements
applicable to that repair station.
(6) Employee Background Verification
The security program would include the measures by which the repair
station verifies the employment history of its employees and conducts
background checks, to the extent permitted by the laws of the country
in which the repair station is located. The employment history, length
of employment, and measures used to verify the individual's employment
would be listed in the security program.
(7) Security Coordinator
Each repair station would be required to designate a security
coordinator who would serve as the immediate and primary point of
contact for security-related activities and communications with TSA.
Each repair station would include the name, responsibilities, and
contact information of the security coordinator in the security program
and would also specify the training curriculum required for the
security coordinator. The security coordinator would not necessarily
need to be on-site at the repair station, but they must be able to
coordinate incident management at any time.
(8) Contingency Plan
The security program would include a contingency plan to include
the specific measures that would be taken to address security-related
incidents. The security program would include such items as the names
of the repair station employees designated to perform specific tasks,
the name and contact information for any contingency response
organizations that would assist the repair station, a description of
the
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DHS threat advisory levels and the additional security measures that
would be implemented based on the threat level, and set forth the
responsibilities of all personnel involved. The plan would also provide
for training and regular practices, if appropriate.
Other Security Program Requirements
The proposed regulations would also require that each security
program include a diagram of the repair station detailing the
boundaries and describing the physical features of the repair station.
The security program would also include a list and description of all
entry points into the repair station that would be supplied by the
repair station operator. These requirements would assist TSA in
assessing the security vulnerability of the repair station and
determining whether security measures are appropriate. The security
program would also include emergency response contact information.
Section 1554.103(b) would require that the security program be in
writing, and hand-signed by the repair station operator, owner, or
other authorized person. The security program would be required to be
accessible to employees at the repair station facility and be written
in English and in the official language of the repair station's
country. The security program could be accessible electronically so
long as it meets all of the requirements. This section would also
include a requirement that repair stations must restrict the
distribution, disclosure, and availability of sensitive security
information as described in 49 CFR par