Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility Seismic Safety, 57461-57462 [E9-26774]

Agencies

• Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 214 (Friday, November 6, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57461-57462]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-26774]



[[Page 57461]]

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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 2009-2]


Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility Seismic Safety

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice, recommendation; correction.

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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board published a 
document in the Federal Register of November 2, 2009, concerning 
recommendation 2009-2 to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
2286a(a)(5) which identifies the need to execute both immediate and 
long-term actions that can reduce the risk posed by a seismic event at 
the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The previous 
notice omitted the recommendation. The notice now includes the 
recommendation.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the 
recommendation are due on or before December 7, 2009.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Faculties Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brian Grosner or Andrew L. Thibadeau 
at the address above or telephone number (202-694-7000).

Correction

    In the Federal Register of November 2, 2009, in FR Doc. E9-26304, 
on page 56595, immediately following the signature block, the 
recommendation should read as follows:

    Dated: November 2, 2009.
John E. Mansfield,
Vice Chairman.

Recommendation 2009-2 to the Secretary of Energy

Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility Seismic Safety

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(5) Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended
    Dated: October 26, 2009.
Background
    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is concerned 
about the potential consequences of seismic events at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory's (LANL) Plutonium Facility and the adequacy of the 
safety strategy currently being pursued to address these events. In 
particular, the mitigated offsite consequences predicated on a 
seismically induced large fire at this operating nuclear facility 
exceed the Department of Energy's (DOE) Evaluation Guideline by more 
than two orders of magnitude. The Board believes this situation 
warrants immediate attention and action.
    The Plutonium Facility has operated for more than a decade with a 
1996 Final Safety Analysis Report as its safety basis. DOE issued Title 
10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, 
in January 2001, requiring contractors for all its existing facilities 
to submit a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA). Ultimately, a DSA for the 
Plutonium Facility was submitted by LANL and approved by the National 
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Los Alamos Site Office (LASO) 
through a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) in December 2008. The DSA 
identifies an array of planned future upgrades to improve the safety 
posture of the facility. However, both the DSA and SER rely 
inappropriately on planned seismic upgrades to safety systems that (1) 
will not be implemented for many years and (2) are not sufficient to 
address adequately the bounding seismic accident scenarios. The only 
safety feature that can be credited for these accident scenarios is the 
passive confinement provided by the facility structure. Additionally, 
appropriate compensatory measures to protect public and worker health 
and safety have not been identified. As a result, a major deficiency in 
the facility's safety basis exists.
    The safety strategy approved by LASO is based on the assumption 
that future upgrades to reinforce the support stands for a limited set 
of ``high-risk'' gloveboxes (including those containing ignition 
sources, such as furnaces) will prevent a large fire from occurring 
after a seismic event. While planned seismic upgrades to high-risk 
gloveboxes will provide some safety benefit in the future, the Board 
believes the critical NNSA assumption that these upgrades are adequate 
is flawed and, as a result, the current safety strategy is not 
defensible for the following reasons. Not all ignition sources inside 
high-risk gloveboxes are seismically secured to the glovebox shell; 
therefore, fires could still result from ignition sources toppling 
inside gloveboxes during a seismic event, even if the gloveboxes 
themselves do not topple. Additionally, ignition sources that could 
initiate post-seismic fires exist outside of gloveboxes targeted for 
seismic upgrades. DOE must take steps to develop a defensible seismic 
safety strategy for the Plutonium Facility.
    Near-term actions and compensatory measures to reduce significantly 
the consequences of seismically induced events will likely involve 
operating the facility with restrictions on material-at-risk, removing 
inventory from susceptible locations or storing material in robust 
containers, and reducing the likelihood of a fire following a seismic 
event by identifying and implementing appropriate safety measures. 
Consistent with the Board's Recommendation 2004-2, Active Confinement 
Systems, one long-term strategy that could provide effective mitigation 
for seismic events involves upgrading the facility's confinement 
ventilation system to meet seismic performance category 3 criteria. 
This strategy would allow the confinement ventilation system to reduce 
reliably the consequences of a seismically induced event by many orders 
of magnitude to acceptably low values.
    In a letter to the Board dated June 16, 2009, the NNSA 
Administrator rejected the implementation of some upgrades identified 
to address performance gaps uncovered during execution of the 
Implementation Plan for Recommendation 2004-2 for the Plutonium 
Facility's confinement ventilation system on the grounds that these 
upgrades were not required under the current DSA/SER strategy. LASO's 
present position is that upgrades to ensure post-seismic operability 
for active confinement ventilation may be desirable, but LASO does not 
expect to develop the information necessary to make a decision (e.g., 
cost, scope, and mitigation benefits) until mid-fiscal year 2011. The 
Board believes that NNSA's current safety strategy is flawed and does 
not obviate the need for a seismically qualified safety class active 
confinement ventilation system at its Plutonium Facility.
    Given the magnitude of the potential consequences to the public, 
the Board believes DOE must develop expeditiously a defensible safety 
strategy for seismically induced events at the Plutonium Facility and a 
credible plan for implementing this strategy. DOE's response must 
include definite, measurable, and immediate means to substantially 
reduce the potential consequences at the site boundary. Implementation 
of a sound safety strategy must be pursued on an urgent basis.
Recommendation
    In this context, and in recognition of the fact that LANL's 
Plutonium Facility has been designated as the center for

[[Page 57462]]

plutonium operations in the complex, which includes the manufacture of 
pits for weapon assemblies, the Board recommends that DOE:
    1. Implement near-term actions and compensatory measures to reduce 
significantly the consequences of seismically induced events, including 
clear identification of consequence reduction targets/goals, schedule, 
and implementation methods. In planning for and completing these 
actions and compensatory measures, DOE should be guided by the need for 
immediate actions and mindful of the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 
2286d(f)(1) regarding implementation timelines.
    2. Develop and implement an acceptable safety strategy for 
seismically induced events that includes the following elements:
    a. A technically justifiable decision logic and criteria for 
evaluating and selecting safety-class structures, systems, and 
components that can effectively prevent or mitigate the consequences of 
seismic events to acceptably low values.
    b. The seismic analysis approach for structures, systems, and 
components required to implement the seismic safety strategy.
    c. A prioritized plan and schedule, including quarterly briefs to 
the Board for the next 12 months, for seismic analyses, necessary 
upgrades, and other actions to implement the seismic safety strategy.
    The severity of the problems that are the subject of this 
Recommendation and the urgency to remediate them argue forcefully for 
the Secretary to avail himself of the authority under the Atomic Energy 
Act (U.S.C. 2286d(e)) to ``implement any such recommendation (or part 
of any such recommendation) before, on, or after the date on which the 
Secretary transmits the implementation plan to the Board under this 
subsection.''


John E. Mansfield, Ph.D.,
Vice Chairman.
[FR Doc. E9-26774 Filed 11-5-09; 8:45 am]
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