Notice of Opportunity for Public Comment on the Proposed Model Safety Evaluation for Plant-Specific Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler-446, Revision 3, “Risk Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (WCAP-15791)”, 47289-47298 [E9-22182]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 177 (Tuesday, September 15, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 47289-47298]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-22182]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2009-0403]


Notice of Opportunity for Public Comment on the Proposed Model 
Safety Evaluation for Plant-Specific Adoption of Technical 
Specification Task Force Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk Informed 
Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion 
Times (WCAP-15791)''

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

ACTION: Notice of opportunity for public comment.

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SUMMARY: The NRC is requesting public comment on the enclosed proposed 
model safety evaluation, model no significant hazards consideration 
determination, and model application for plant-specific adoption of 
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler-446, Revision 3, 
``Risk Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve 
Completion Times (WCAP-15791).'' The TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3 is 
available in the Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS) 
under Accession Number ML080510164. The proposed changes would revise 
technical specification (TS) containment isolation valve (CIV) 
completion times for Westinghouse plants. This model safety evaluation 
will facilitate expedited approval of plant-specific adoption of TSTF 
Traveler-446, Revision 3.

DATES: Comment period expires October 15, 2009. Comments received after 
this date will be considered, if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Please include Docket ID NRC-2009-0403 in the subject line of your 
comments. Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be 
posted on the NRC Web site and on the Federal rulemaking Web site 
Regulations.gov. Because your comments will not be edited to remove any 
identifying or contact information, the NRC cautions you against 
including any information in your submission that you do not want to be 
publicly disclosed.
    The NRC requests that any party soliciting or aggregating comments 
received from other persons for submission to the NRC inform those 
persons that the NRC will not edit their comments to remove any 
identifying or contact information, and therefore, they should not 
include any information in their comments that they do not want 
publicly disclosed.
    Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and 
search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC-2009-0403. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 301-492-3668; e-mail 
Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
    Mail comments to: Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rulemaking and 
Directives Branch (RDB), Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, Mail Stop: TWB-05-B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by fax to RDB at (301) 492-
3446.
    You can access publicly available documents related to this notice 
using the following methods:
    NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have 
copied for a fee publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Public 
File Area O-1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland.
    NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): 
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are 
available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain 
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public 
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems 
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR 
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to 
pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The Proposed Model Safety Evaluation for Plant-
Specific Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler-446, 
Revision 3, ``Risk Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment 
Isolation Valve Completion Times (WCAP-15791)'' is available 
electronically under ADAMS Accession Number ML092260664.
    Federal Rulemaking Web site: Public comments and supporting 
materials related to this notice can be found at https://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID: NRC-2009-0403.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Michelle C. Honcharik, Senior 
Project Manager, Special Projects Branch, Mail Stop: O-12 D1, Division 
of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 20555-0001; telephone 
301-415-1774 or e-mail at michelle.honcharik@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    This notice provides an opportunity for the public to comment on 
proposed changes to the Standard TS (STS) after a preliminary 
assessment and finding by the NRC staff that the agency will likely 
offer the changes for adoption by licensees. This notice solicits 
comment on a proposed change to the STS that modifies the TS. The NRC 
staff will evaluate any comments received for the proposed change to 
the STS and reconsider the change or announce the availability of the 
change for adoption by licensees. Licensees opting to apply for this TS 
change are responsible for reviewing the NRC staff's evaluation, 
referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any 
necessary plant-specific information. The NRC will process and note 
each amendment application responding to the notice of availability 
according to applicable NRC rules and procedures.

Applicability

    TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, is applicable to all Westinghouse 
nuclear power reactors. The Traveler requires that a licensee's plant-
specific application must: (a) address or meet the requirements stated 
in Pressurized Water Reactor Owners' Group (PWROG) (formerly 
Westinghouse Owners' Group) Topical Report (TR) WCAP-15791-NP-

[[Page 47290]]

A, Revision 2, ``Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment 
Isolation Valve Completion Times,'' and (b) address or meet the 
requirements stated in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-04, Revision 
0, ``Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes,'' (ADAMS Accession 
No. ML003680088), and (c) include a demonstration of probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) quality for the licensee's Tier 3 assessments. The NRC 
staff approved NEI 99-04, by letter dated March 31, 2000 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML003679799). The NRC issued the final safety evaluation 
(SE) for TR WCAP-15791-P, Revision 2, on February 13, 2008 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML080170680). The PWROG issued accepted proprietary and 
non-proprietary versions of the WCAP (ADAMS Package Accession No. 
ML003696998). To efficiently process the incoming license amendment 
requests (LARs), the NRC staff requests that each licensee applying to 
implement the changes proposed in TSTF Traveler-446 include 
documentation regarding the technical adequacy of the PRA consistent 
with the requirements of Section 4.2 of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, 
Revision 2, ``An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities,'' 
dated March 1, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090410014). Applicants 
proposing to use PRA models for which NRC-endorsed standards do not 
exist must submit documentation that identifies the characteristics of 
those models consistent with Sections 1.2 and 1.3 of RG 1.200 or 
identify and justify the methods to be applied for assessing the risk 
contribution for those sources of risk not addressed by PRA models.
    The proposed change does not prevent licensees from requesting an 
alternate approach or proposing changes other than those proposed in 
TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3. However, significant deviations from the 
approach recommended in this notice or the inclusion of additional 
changes to the license require additional NRC staff review. This may 
increase the time and resources needed for the review or result in NRC 
staff rejection of the LAR. Licensees desiring significant deviations 
or additional changes should instead submit an LAR that does not claim 
to adopt TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of September 2009.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Stacey L. Rosenberg,
Chief, Special Projects Branch, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Proposed Model Application for Plant-Specific Adoption of TSTF 
Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk Informed Evaluation of Extensions to 
Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (WCAP-15791)''

Subject: Plant Name

Docket No. 50--
Application For Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed 
Justification For Containment Isolation Valve Allowed Outage Time 
Changes
Dear Sir or Madam:

    In accordance with the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.90, ``Application for Amendment 
of License, Construction Permit, or Early Site Permit,'' [LICENSEE] is 
submitting a request for an amendment to the technical specifications 
(TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.].
    The proposed amendment would modify [LICENSEE] technical 
specifications (TS) requirements for allowed outage time changes for 
containment isolation valves with the implementation of Topical Report 
WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, ``Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions 
to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times.''
    Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed change, the 
requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific 
verifications. Attachment 2 gives the existing TS pages marked to show 
the proposed change. Attachment 3 provides revised (clean) TS pages. 
Attachment 4 summarizes the regulatory commitments made in this 
submittal. Attachment 5 provides the proposed changes to the TS Bases. 
Attachment 6 provides the statement of proposed No Significant Hazards 
Consideration.
    [LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed license amendment by 
[DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 
DAYS].
    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, ``Notice for Public Comment; State 
Consultation,'' a copy of this application, with attachments, is being 
provided to the designated [STATE] Official.
    I declare [or certify, verify, state] under penalty of perjury that 
the foregoing is correct and true.
    Executed on [date] [Signature]
    If you should have any questions about this submittal, please 
contact [NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER].

Sincerely,

[Name, Title]

Attachments:
    1. Description and Assessment
    2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes
    3. Revised Technical Specification Pages
    4. Regulatory Commitments
    5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes
    6. Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regional Office
NRC Resident Inspector

ATTACHMENT 1

DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT

1.0 DESCRIPTION

    The proposed amendment would modify technical specifications (TS) 
requirements for allowed outage times for containment isolation valves 
(CIVs) associated with the implementation of Topical Report (TR) WCAP-
15791-NP-A, Revision 2, ``Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions to 
Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times for Westinghouse Plants.''
    The changes are consistent with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission's (NRC's) approved industry/Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) Standard TS (STS) change, TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3 
(Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession 
No. ML080510164). The Federal Register notice published on [DATE] 
announced the availability of this TS improvement.

2.0 ASSESSMENT

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation
    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the model safety evaluation (SE) dated 
[DATE]. The [LICENSEE] has also reviewed the NRC staff SE (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML080170680) approving TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, 
and the requirements specified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-04, 
``Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes,'' (ADAMS Accession 
No. ML003680088). [LICENSEE] has concluded that the justifications 
presented in the TSTF proposal and the SE are applicable to [PLANT, 
UNIT NOS.] and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the 
changes to the [PLANT] TS.

[[Page 47291]]

2.2 Optional Changes and Variations
    [LICENSEE] is not proposing any variations or deviations from the 
STS changes described in TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, and the NRC 
staff's model safety evaluation, dated [DATE].
    [If the licensee proposes variations or deviations, then the 
licensee needs to describe and justify these variations/deviations and 
include a statement, such as, the proposed amendment is consistent with 
the STS changes described in TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, but 
[LICENSEE] proposes variations or deviations from TSTF Traveler-446, as 
identified and justified below.]

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration
    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards 
consideration (NSHC) published in the Federal Register [DATE] ([ ] FR [ 
]). [LICENSEE] has concluded that the proposed NSHC presented in the 
Federal Register notice is applicable to [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] and is 
provided as Attachment [6] to this amendment request, which satisfies 
the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR) Section 50.91(a). [LICENSEE] has forwarded the NSHC to the 
appropriate State officials.
3.2 Verifications, Commitments, and Additional Information Needed
    [LICENSEE] has demonstrated the applicability of TSTF Traveler-446, 
Revision 3, to [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS] by addressing requirements 
specified in TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, in this license amendment 
request (LAR). This LAR provides the plant-specific information on 
limitations and conditions specified in Section 4.0 and the additional 
information specified in Section 5.0 of the SE approving TR WCAP-15791-
NP-A, Revision 2. In addition, consistent with TSTF Traveler-446, 
[LICENSEE] must demonstrate in this LAR applicable documentation/
evaluation for Items 3.2.1 through 3.2.12 as noted below.
3.2.1 Demonstration (Simultaneous LCO Entry Consideration)
    Option A:
    [LICENSEE] has incorporated new Condition D in TS [LCO 3.6.3 
``Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice 
Condenser, and Dual),''] as specified in TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3.
    Option B:
    [If the licensee did not incorporate Condition D, then it must 
demonstrate that the potential for any cumulative risk impact of failed 
CIVs and multiple CIV LCO entries was evaluated by the licensee. In 
addition, the licensee must demonstrate that the licensee's Tier 3 risk 
management program addresses the possibility of simultaneous LCO 
entries for inoperable CIVs in separate penetrations. The licensee must 
provide sufficient information such that defense-in-depth for safety 
systems will be maintained.]
    Discussion:
    TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, is based on only one CIV being in 
maintenance at any given time. The TR states that multiple systems are 
not expected to be out of service simultaneously during extended 
completion times (CTs), but it does not preclude the practice. Although 
TS LCO 3.6.3, Note 2, allows a separate condition entry for each 
penetration flow path, proposed Condition D addresses an inoperable CIV 
in more than one penetration flow path and limits the CT to 4 hours. If 
the licensee's proposed TS change does not include this Condition D, 
then the licensee's application must demonstrate that the potential for 
any cumulative risk impact of failed CIVs and multiple CIV LCO entries 
has been evaluated and is acceptable. The licensee must demonstrate 
that its Tier 3 risk management program, in accordance with 10 CFR 
50.65(a)(4), will address the possibility of simultaneous LCO entries 
of inoperable CIVs in separate penetrations to maintain defense-in-
depth for safety systems.
3.2.2 Demonstration (Penetration Configuration)
    Option A:
    [LICENSEE] has incorporated new Condition D in TS [LCO 3.6.3] as 
specified in TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3.
    Option B;
    [If the licensee did not incorporate Condition D, then it must 
demonstrate that the remaining CIVs in the affected penetration flow 
path (or another penetration flow path) are closed before entering the 
extended CT for the inoperable CIV and that the risk impacts (i.e., 
core damage frequency (CDF), large early release frequency (LERF), 
incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and incremental 
conditional large early release probability (ICLERP)) were evaluated by 
the licensee.]
    Discussion:
    The existing and proposed TS LCO 3.6.3 must not allow multiple 
simultaneous extended CIV CTs to occur for more than 4 hours, which is 
the existing CT for an inoperable CIV in LCO 3.6.3. This is to meet the 
TR assumption that only one valve within a single penetration can be in 
maintenance at a time (i.e., for more than the 4 hours allowed by the 
current LCO 3.6.3 Condition A). The existing LCO 3.6.3 Condition B, and 
the proposed LCO 3.6.3 Conditions A and D, ensure that this assumption 
is being met. If the TS do not prevent this case (i.e., Condition D is 
not adopted), then this case must be evaluated in the plant-specific 
applications to demonstrate that the risk-impact assumptions of CDF, 
LERF, ICCDP and ICLERP remain less than the acceptance guidelines in 
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the 
Licensing Basis,'' and RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, 
Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications.'' Also, the 
plant-specific application must address whether the position of the 
remaining CIVs in the affected penetration flow path (or another 
penetration flow path) have been confirmed before entering the extended 
CT for the inoperable CIV.
3.2.3 Demonstration (Failed CIVs and Multiple CIV LCO Entries)
    Option A:
    [LICENSEE] has incorporated new Condition D in TS [LCO 3.6.3] as 
specified in TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3.
    Option B:
    [If the licensee did not incorporate Condition D then it must 
demonstrate that the cumulative risk impact of failed CIVs and multiple 
CIV LCO entries was evaluated, and that remaining CIVs in the affected 
penetration flow path (or another penetration flow path) are closed 
prior to entering the extended CT. In addition, the licensee must 
demonstrate that the licensee's Tier 3 risk management program address 
the possibility of simultaneous LCO entries for inoperable CIVs in 
separate penetrations. The licensee must provide sufficient information 
such that defense-in-depth for safety systems will be maintained.]
    Discussion:
    The licensee needs to address how the following basis and general 
assumptions of TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, are incorporated in the 
specific plant practices, procedures, TS, and probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA):
     Only one CIV is in maintenance with an extended CT at any 
given time. This is a Tier 2 requirement, unless the

[[Page 47292]]

licensee has proposed the additional STS LCO 3.6.3 Condition D in its 
plant-specific application.
     Before maintenance or corrective maintenance (repair) is 
performed on a CIV, the TR evaluation assumes that any other CIVs in 
the penetration flow path have been checked to ensure that they are in 
their proper position. This is a Tier 2 requirement.
     Multiple systems are not expected to be out of service 
simultaneously during the extended CTs.
3.2.4 Demonstration (CIV Configuration)
    Option A:
    [LICENSEE] has confirmed that (a) the CIV configurations for [PLANT 
NAME, UNIT NOS.] match the configurations in TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, 
Revision 2, and (b) the risk-parameter values used in the TR are 
representative or bounding for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS].
    Option B:
    [If the licensee's does not confirm the above, it must provide 
justification for the deviation.]
    Discussion:
    Not all penetrations have the same impact on CDF, LERF, ICCDP, or 
ICLERP; therefore, the licensee needs to address the applicability of 
TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, to the specific plant. This analysis 
must include verification that (a) the CIV configurations for the 
specific plant match the configurations in the TR and (b) the risk-
parameter values used in the TR are bounding for the specific plant. 
Any additional CIV configurations and extended CTs, not specifically 
evaluated by the TR, or nonbounding risk-parameter values outside the 
scope of the TR, will require an NRC staff review of the specific 
penetrations and related justifications for the proposed CTs.
3.2.5 Demonstration (Tier 2 Evaluation)
    Option A:
    [LICENSEE] has demonstrated that its Tier 2 evaluation has 
identified potentially high-risk plant configurations associated with 
the proposed CIV CTs that should not be entered while a CIV is in 
maintenance, and how these controls have been implemented by the 
licensee.
    Option B:
    [If the licensee's evaluation identifies no risk-significant plant 
configurations associated with the proposed CIV CTs, then it must 
provide justification/evaluation and state applicable compensatory 
measures or commitments.]
    Discussion:
    A Tier 2 conclusion of the TR as applicable to the specific plant, 
or the plant-specific Tier 2 requirements must be provided by the 
licensee.
3.2.6 Demonstration (Tier 3 Evaluation)
    [LICENSEE] has addressed Tier 3 evaluation for [PLANT NAME, UNIT 
NOS.] by demonstrating conformance to the requirements of the 
maintenance rule as the requirements relate to the proposed CIV CTs and 
the guidance contained in the Nuclear Management and Resources Council 
(NUMARC) document, NUMARC 93-01, ``Industry Guideline for Monitoring 
the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,'' Revision 2, 
Section 11, issued April 1996, as endorsed by RG 1.182, ``Assessing and 
Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.'' 
[LICENSEE] has provided documentation on the [LICENSEE'S] maintenance 
rule program, with respect to CIVs, includes a LERF/ICLERP (i.e., 
ICLERP as defined in NUMARC 93-01) assessment as part of the 
maintenance rule process, and that the PRA quality is adequate, as part 
of the basis of a risk-informed licensing action.
    Discussion:
    The licensee needs to describe its configuration risk management 
program (CRMP) or maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)) program (as 
appropriate), including how it reflects the current PRA model, any 
simplifications or deviations in the CRMP model from the current plant 
model, and methods to update the CRMP to reflect the current plant-
specific model.
    The licensee needs to address the Tier 3 aspects of RG 1.177, 
including a description of the CRMP, and confirm that the licensee's 
Maintenance Rule Program (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)) meets all aspects of 
Section 2.3.7.2 of RG 1.177, including the referenced four key 
components.
    Also, the licensee needs to confirm that the plant (units) conform 
to the requirements of the maintenance rule, as they relate to the 
proposed CIV CTs and the guidance contained in NUMARC 93-01, Section 
11, as endorsed by RG 1.182, including verification that the 
maintenance rule program, with respect to CIVs, includes a LERF and 
ICLERP assessment, as part of the maintenance rule process, and that 
the CRMP is adequate, as part of the basis for evaluating the risk 
impact of CIV maintenance configurations. The licensee needs to confirm 
that its CRMP model calculates ICCDP (or ICDP) and ICLERP (or ILERP) 
and that the licensee's model is capable of modeling CIVs or has been 
modified to include CIVs.
3.2.7 Demonstration (Plant-Specific PRA Quality)
    [LICENSEE] has demonstrated that the plant-specific PRA quality is 
acceptable for Tier 3 application, in accordance with the guidelines 
given in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177.
    Discussion:
    The licensee needs to describe the scope of the plant-specific PRA 
and justify its technical adequacy for this application, in accordance 
with the guidance provided in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177. Specifically, the 
supporting documentation needs to address each area in sufficient 
detail to satisfy the following:
     Assurance that the plant-specific PRA reasonably reflects 
the as-built, as-operated plant.
     Assurance that plant-specific PRA updates, including any 
plant improvements or commitments cited and credited in the analysis, 
have been implemented from the individual plant evaluation (IPE) and 
the IPE for external events (IPEEE) and subsequent peer reviews and 
self-assessments. Reference to past submittals discussing this 
information is acceptable.
     Assurance that conclusions from the peer review, including 
facts and observations (A and B), that are applicable to proposed 
extended CTs for CIVs were considered and resolved consistent with RG 
1.200, Revision 2. If not resolved, the licensee must provide the 
justification for the acceptability of the conclusions (e.g., 
sensitivity studies showing negligible impact). The licensee should 
indicate the PRA revisions that underwent the peer review and were used 
in the plant-specific application.
     Assurance that there is PRA configuration control and 
updating, including PRA quality assurance programs, associated 
procedures, and PRA revision schedules.
     Assurance that there is PRA adequacy, completeness, and 
applicability with respect to evaluating the risk associated with the 
proposed CIV CT extensions.
     Assurance that plant design or operational modifications 
that are related to or could affect the proposed CT extensions are 
reflected in the PRA revision used in the plant-specific application or 
that a justification is provided for not including these modifications 
in the PRA.
    As clarified in Regulatory Issue Summary 2007-06, ``Regulatory 
Guide 1.200 Implementation,'' dated March 22, 2007, the NRC staff will 
use RG 1.200 to assess the technical adequacy of all risk-informed 
applications received

[[Page 47293]]

after December 2007. RG 1.200, ``An Approach for Determining the 
Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-
Informed Activities,'' describes an acceptable approach for defining 
the technical adequacy of an acceptable base PRA. This assessment can 
be performed by directly comparing the base PRA to the supporting 
requirements in the endorsed American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME) Standard RA-Sb-2005 and addressing the NRC staff position on 
each requirement discussed in Appendix A to RG 1.200. Alternatively, a 
licensee can perform the assessment starting with the results of a 
previous peer review, performed in accordance with the process 
documented in NEI 00-02 and addressing the NRC staff position on each 
requirement discussed in Appendix B to RG 1.200.
3.2.8 Demonstration (External Events Risk)
    [LICENSEE] has demonstrated that external events risk is bounded by 
TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, assumptions and will not have an 
adverse impact on the conclusions of the [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] 
analysis for extending the CIV CTs.
    Discussion:
    External events may include seismic, high winds, fires, floods, or 
other related events applicable to each licensee. The licensee needs to 
demonstrate, by either quantitative or qualitative means, that external 
event risk will not have an adverse impact on the conclusions of the 
plant-specific analyses with respect to the TR evaluation. For some 
participating plants, internal fires and other external event risks may 
contribute significantly to the overall plant baseline risk, which may 
affect TR WCAP-15791, so that a plant-specific application of the TR 
methodology may not be found acceptable in all cases. Specifically, the 
risk from external events should not make the total baseline risk 
exceed 1E-4/yr CDF or 1E-5/yr LERF without justification.
    The licensee's submittal must discuss the plant risk associated 
with external events and specifically identify (quantitatively or 
qualitatively) that the impact of the proposed CIV CTs on the risk 
associated with external events is small. The licensee needs to confirm 
that any increase in external event risk associated with the proposed 
CIV CTs should be minimal. The licensee must address this impact and 
discuss why the risk of external events (including internal fires) is 
negligible. Insights from IPEEE screening or quantitative approaches 
may be used to support the licensee's evaluations.
    If the licensee has performed an updated analysis of an external 
event since the NRC staff review of the licensee's IPEEE, and a 
quantitative PRA demonstration is used to support the submittal, the 
licensee needs to describe the significant changes involved in its 
updated analysis and the impact of these changes on plant risk 
associated with the external event and the proposed CIV CT extensions.
    For external events for which the licensee has a PRA, the licensee 
needs to provide the change in CDF, the change in LERF, the ICCDP, and 
the ICLERP associated with specifically analyzed external events. The 
licensee needs to also provide the total plant risk and total change in 
risk from all PRA contributors (the combination of internal events, 
internal flooding, internal fires, and external events). To conclude 
that the quantified risk associated with the proposed CIV CTs is 
acceptable, the total CDF and LERF values and the change in CDF, change 
in LERF, ICCDP, and ICLERP must meet the acceptance guidelines of RG 
1.174 and RG 1.177.
    For external events not included in the plant PRA but that rely on 
a non-PRA method (e.g., seismic margins analysis or fire-induced 
vulnerability evaluation) to confirm that plant risk remains 
acceptable, the licensee must confirm the following: a) that there are 
no vulnerabilities or outliers associated with these external events, 
b) that any vulnerabilities or outliers that were identified have been 
resolved, or c) that appropriate plant modifications have been 
implemented according to the licensee's analysis.
3.2.9 Demonstration (CIV Availability Monitoring)
    [LICENSEE] has demonstrated for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] how plant-
specific CIV availability is monitored and assessed at the plant under 
the maintenance rule, and that, performance continues to be consistent 
with the analysis assumptions used to justify extended CIV CTs, 
including the assumptions in TR WCAP-15791.
    Discussion:
    The licensee needs to address how CIV availability is monitored and 
assessed under the maintenance rule, which includes confirmation that 
performance continues to be consistent with the analysis assumptions 
used to justify extended CIV CTs and needs to describe what actions are 
to be taken if a previously approved risk-informed licensing action is 
found to no longer meet the acceptance guidelines of RG 1.174 and RG 
1.177.
3.2.10 Demonstration (Cumulative Risk Evaluation)
    [LICENSEE] has demonstrated that the cumulative risk has been 
evaluated for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] in accordance with guidance in RG 
1.174, with respect to past [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] license amendments 
or additional [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] applications for a TS change 
under NRC review that have not been incorporated into the baseline PRA 
used to evaluate the proposed change.
    Discussion:
    The cumulative risk impact of the proposed CT extensions for CIVs 
must be addressed in the plant-specific application, in accordance with 
the acceptance guidelines in RG 1.174. The cumulative risk impact must 
include both previous plant license changes and additional plant 
applications still under review.
3.2.11 Demonstration (PRA Uncertainty)
    [LICENSEE] has demonstrated that uncertainty caused by plant PRA 
models is addressed in the [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] submittal according 
to RG 1.174 guidance.
    Discussion:
    Licensee needs to address that uncertainty due to plant PRA models 
do not significantly impact the risk assessment results and decisions 
regarding acceptability.
3.2.12 Demonstration (Regulatory Commitment)
    [LICENSEE] has incorporated a regulatory commitment addressing how 
LERF/ICLERP is assessed and has provided documentation in the [PLANT 
NAME, UNIT NOS.] submittal.
    Discussion:
    Licensee needs to address the plant CRMP, including the maintenance 
rule program implemented under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), and explain how the 
LERF/ICLERP is assessed in the program.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in 
the proposed safety evaluation dated [DATE]. [LICENSEE] has concluded 
that the proposed determination presented in the notice is applicable 
to [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] and the determination is provided as an 
attachment to this LAR to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).

[[Page 47294]]

Attachment 2: Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)
Attachment 3: Proposed Technical Specification Pages
Attachment 4: List Of Regulatory Commitments
    The following table identifies those actions committed to by 
[LICENSEE] in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are 
provided for information purposes and are not considered to be 
regulatory commitments. Please direct questions regarding these 
commitments to [CONTACT NAME].

 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Regulatory commitments                      Due date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[LICENSEE] commits to implementing a           [Complete, implemented
 methodology for assessing the effect on        with amendment, OR
 large early release frequency and              within X days of
 incremental conditional large early release    implementation of
 probability when using the extended            amendment].
 completion times for containment isolation
 valves in the program for managing risk in
 accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Attachment 5: Proposed Changes To Technical Specification Bases
Attachment 6: Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration

Proposed Model No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination for 
Plant-Specific Adoption of Tstf Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk 
Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve 
Completion Times (Wcap-15791)''

    Description of Amendment Request: The change requests the adoption 
of an approved change to the standard technical specifications (STS) 
for Westinghouse plants (NUREG-1431), to allow modification of 
containment isolation valve (CIV) completion times associated with the 
implementation of topical report (TR) WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2. 
``Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve 
Completion Times,'' dated March 10, 2006. Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk Informed Evaluation of 
Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (Topical Report WCAP-
15791-P, Revision 2),'' dated February 19, 2008 (Agencywide Documents 
Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML080510164). The 
Notice of Availability published in the Federal Register on [Date] [xx 
FR xxxxx] described the proposed change.
    The proposed change extends the completion times for containment 
penetration flow paths with one CIV inoperable from 4 hours up to 168 
hours (7 days) for Westinghouse plants. This change is applicable to 
containment penetrations with one or more CIVs, in which one CIV is 
inoperable [for reasons other than shield building bypass or purge 
valve leakage not within limit] and where the CIV is either intact or 
not intact. In addition, this change addresses conditions where there 
are two or more penetration flow paths with one CIV inoperable (for 
reasons other than that the shield building bypass or purge valve 
leakage are not within limits). Basis for proposed no significant 
hazards consideration:
    As required by Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 
Section 50.91(a), the [LICENSEE] analysis of the issue of no 
significant hazards consideration is presented below:
    1: Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Increase in the 
Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes to the completion times do not change the 
response of the plant to any accidents, have no impact on the 
reliability of the CIV, and have an insignificant impact on the 
availability of the CIVs. The proposed changes will not result in a 
significant increase in the risk of plant operation. This is 
demonstrated by showing that the impact on plant safety, as measured by 
core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF), 
is not significantly increased, and is acceptable. In addition, for the 
completion time change, the incremental conditional core damage 
probabilities (ICCDP) and incremental conditional large early release 
probabilities (ICLERP) are also acceptable. These changes are 
consistent with the acceptance guidelines in Regulatory Guide (RG) 
1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-
Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' 
and RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed 
Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications.''
    The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or 
precursors nor do they alter the design assumptions, conditions, or 
configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is 
operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not alter or prevent 
the structures, systems, and components from performing their intended 
function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the 
assumed acceptance limits. The proposed changes do not affect the 
source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions 
used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated. Furthermore, the proposed changes do not increase 
the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released 
offsite, nor do they significantly increase individual or cumulative 
occupational or public radiation exposures. The proposed changes do not 
invalidate the safety analysis assumptions and resultant consequences. 
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2: Does the Proposed Change Create the Possibility of a New or 
Different Kind of Accident from any Accident Previously Evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not result in a change in the manner in 
which the CIVs provide plant protection. No design changes are 
associated with the proposed changes. The changes to completion times 
do not change any existing accident scenarios nor do they create any 
new or different accident scenarios. The changes do not involve a 
physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of 
equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods

[[Page 47295]]

governing normal plant operation. In addition, the changes do not 
impose any new or different requirements or eliminate any existing 
requirements. The proposed changes do not alter assumptions made in the 
safety analysis and do not invalidate the safety analysis assumptions 
and current plant operating practice.
    3: Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Reduction in a 
Margin of Safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for 
operation are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are 
not affected by these changes. The proposed changes will not result in 
plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis. The 
calculated impact on risk is consistent with the acceptance guidelines 
contained in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.
    Based upon the reasoning presented above, the licensee concludes 
that the requested change does not involve a significant hazards 
consideration, as set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), ``Issuance of 
Amendment.''

Proposed Model Safety Evaluation for Plant-Specific Adoption of 
Technical Specification Task Force Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk 
Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve 
Completion Times (WCAP-15791)''

1.0 INTRODUCTION

    By letter dated [DATE], [LICENSEE] (the licensee) proposed changes 
to the technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME]. The requested 
change is the adoption of NRC-approved Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk Informed Evaluation of 
Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (Topical Report WCAP-
15791-NP-A, Revision 2) RITSTF Initiative 4b,'' dated February 19, 2008 
(Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. 
ML080510164). TSTF Traveler-446 proposes a generic change to NUREG-
1431, Revision 3, ``Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse 
Plants,'' issued June 2004, to implement containment isolation valve 
(CIV) completion time changes associated with the implementation of 
Topical Report (TR) WCAP-15791, Revision 1, ``Risk-Informed Evaluation 
of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times,'' dated 
April 30, 2004. When implemented, the traveler would extend the CIV 
completion times for TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3, 
``Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice 
Condenser, and Dual),'' from 4 hours up to 168 hours (7 days). (For 
isolation valves that cannot demonstrate acceptable results for 168 
hours, shorter times are considered and evaluated).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

    In Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 
50.36, ``Technical Specifications,'' the NRC established its regulatory 
requirements related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS 
are required to include items in the following five specific categories 
related to station operation: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system 
settings, and limiting control settings, (2) LCOs, (3) surveillance 
requirements, (4) design features, and (5) administrative controls. 
However, the regulation does not specify the particular TS to be 
included in a plant's license. TSTF Traveler-446 is proposing changes 
to the TS LCO that concern the Category 2 requirements. The LCOs are 
the lowest functional capability, or performance levels, of equipment 
required for safe operation of the facility. When an LCO of a nuclear 
reactor is not met, the licensee shall follow any remedial actions 
permitted by the TS until the condition can be met or shall shut down 
the reactor.
    Furthermore, the completion times specified in the TS must be based 
on the reasonable protection of public health and safety. As set forth 
in 10 CFR 50.36, a licensee's TS must establish the LCOs that are the 
lowest functional capability, or performance levels, of equipment 
required for safe operation of the facility. This requirement includes 
completion times for structures, systems, and components (SSCs), such 
as CIVs. These completion times allow a certain amount of time in which 
to correct a condition that does not meet the LCO before the reactor 
must be brought to a condition that exits the mode of applicability, in 
most cases resulting in the reactor being shut down.
    The Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, ``Requirements for Monitoring 
the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,'' requires 
licensees to monitor the performance, or condition, of SSCs against 
licensee-established goals in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurance that SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. 
The implementation and monitoring program guidance in Section 2.3 of 
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the 
Licensing Basis,'' and Section 3 of RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-
Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,'' 
states that monitoring performed in conformance with the Maintenance 
Rule can be used when such monitoring is sufficient for the SSCs 
affected by the risk-informed application. In addition, 10 CFR 
50.65(a)(4), as it relates to the proposed extension of CIV completion 
times, requires the assessment and management of the increase in risk 
that may result from the proposed maintenance activity.
    The CIVs help ensure that adequate primary containment boundaries 
are maintained during and after accidents by minimizing potential 
pathways to the environment and help ensure that the primary 
containment function assumed in the safety analysis is maintained. The 
following general design criteria (GDC) apply to this change and 
establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and 
performance requirements for SSCs important to safety, which provide 
reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue 
risk to the health and safety of the public. [Pre-GDC (PGDC) facilities 
not licensed under the GDC in Appendix A, ``General Design Criteria for 
Nuclear Power Plants,'' to 10 CFR Part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' are licensed under similar 
plant-specific design criteria, as described in the facility's 
licensing-basis documents (such as updated final safety analysis 
reports).]
     GDC 54 (or PGDC), ``Piping Systems Penetrating 
Containment,'' requires the following: Those piping systems that 
penetrate primary containment be provided with leak detection, 
isolation, and containment capabilities having redundancy, reliability, 
and performance capabilities that reflect the importance to safety of 
isolating these piping systems. Such piping systems shall be designed 
with a capability to test periodically the operability of the isolation 
valves and associated apparatus and to determine if valve leakage is 
within acceptable limits.
     GDC 55 (or PGDC), ``Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 
Penetrating Containment,'' requires the following: Each line that is 
part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and that penetrates 
primary reactor containment shall be provided with CIVs as follows, 
unless it can be demonstrated that the containment isolation provisions 
for a

[[Page 47296]]

specific class of lines, such as instrument lines, are acceptable on 
some other defined basis:
    (1) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one locked closed 
isolation valve outside containment; or
    (2) One automatic isolation valve inside and one locked closed 
isolation valve outside containment; or
    (3) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatic 
isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be 
used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment; or
    (4) One automatic isolation valve inside and one automatic 
isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be 
used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment.
    Isolation valves outside containment shall be located as close to 
containment as practical and upon loss of actuating power, automatic 
isolation valves shall be designed to take the position that provides 
greater safety.
    Other appropriate requirements to minimize the probability or 
consequences of an accidental rupture of these lines or of lines 
connected to them shall be provided as necessary to assure adequate 
safety. Determination of the appropriateness of these requirements, 
such as higher quality in design, fabrication and testing, additional 
provisions for inservice inspection, protection against more severe 
natural phenomena, and additional isolation valves and containment, 
shall include consideration of the population density, use 
characteristics, and physical characteristics of the site environs.
     GDC 56 (or PGDC), ``Primary Containment Isolation,'' 
requires the following:
    Each line that connects directly to the containment atmosphere and 
penetrates primary reactor containment shall be provided with CIVs as 
follows, unless it can be demonstrated that the containment isolation 
provisions for a specific class of lines, such as instrument lines, are 
acceptable on some other defined basis:
    (1) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one locked closed 
isolation valve outside containment; or
    (2) One automatic isolation valve inside and one locked closed 
isolation valve outside containment; or
    (3) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatic 
isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be 
used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment; or
    (4) One automatic isolation valve inside and one automatic 
isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be 
used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment.
    Isolation valves outside containment shall be located as close to 
containment as practical and upon loss of actuating power, automatic 
isolation valves shall be designed to take the position that provides 
greater safety.
     GDC 57 (or PGDC), ``Closed System Isolation Valves,'' 
requires the following: Each line that penetrates the primary reactor 
containment and is neither part of the reactor coolant pressure 
boundary nor connected directly to the containment atmosphere shall 
have at least one CIV which shall be either automatic, or locked 
closed, or capable of remote manual operation. This valve shall be 
outside containment and located as close to the containment as 
practical. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic 
isolation valve.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for the Proposed Changes
    [LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, would allow 
extending CIV completion times specified in TS [LCO 3.6.3, 
``Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice 
Condenser, and Dual)'']. TR WCAP-15791-P-A, Revision 2, referenced in 
TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, describes a method to revise the 
completion time for specific conditions in TS LCO 3.6.3. The NRC staff 
reviewed, the risk impact, using the three-tiered approach referenced 
in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 associated with the proposed TS changes. The 
first tier evaluates the probabilistic risk assessment and the impact 
of the proposed extension of completion times for CIVs on plant 
operational risk. The second tier addresses the need to preclude 
potentially high-risk plant equipment outage configurations by 
identifying the need for additional controls or compensatory actions to 
be implemented during the time a CIV is unavailable because of 
maintenance. The third tier evaluates the licensee's overall 
configuration risk management program and confirms that risk insights 
are incorporated into the decisionmaking process before equipment is 
taken out of service before or during CIV maintenance.
    The NRC staff determined that the risk analysis methodology and 
approach used by TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, to estimate the risk 
impact was reasonable. The NRC staff stated that the risk impact of the 
proposed extended completion times for CIVs, as estimated by the change 
in CDF, the change in LERF, the ICCDP, and the ICLERP, is consistent 
with the acceptance guidelines specified in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 and 
the associated NRC guidance outlined in Sections 16.1, 19.1, and 19.2 
of NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis 
Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.'' CIV configurations, completion 
times, or nonbounding risk analysis parameters not evaluated by TR 
WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, require additional justification of the 
specific penetrations for the proposed CIV completion times.
    The NRC staff also noted that Tier 2, as presented in TR WCAP-
15791-NP-A, Revision 2, did not identify generic Tier 2 risk-
significant configurations as a result of the proposed CIV completion 
times. In its review of TR WCAP-15791, the NRC staff identified TS and 
analysis bases that allow only one CIV to be in maintenance with an 
extended completion time at any given time. In addition, before 
maintenance or corrective maintenance is performed, other CIVs in the 
penetration flow path shall be checked for proper position. The NRC 
staff's safety evaluation (SE), (ADAMS Accession No ML080170680) also 
noted that, for licensees adopting TR WCAP-15791, a plant-specific Tier 
2 evaluation should be performed to confirm the conclusions of the 
subject WCAP concerning Tier 2 remaining applicable to the licensee's 
plant.
    TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, did not address Tier 3, and 
therefore the NRC SE concluded that licensees adopting the subject TR 
would need to include an evaluation with respect to Tier 3 in their 
plant-specific application in accordance with the principles in RG 
1.177.
    The NRC-approved TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, for referencing in 
license applications to the extent specified and under the limitations 
and conditions stated in the TR and Section 4.0 of the NRC SE. In 
addition, per the SE, applications referencing TR WCAP-15791 must 
address items specified in Section 3.4, ``Regulatory Commitments,'' and 
Section 5.0, ``Additional Information Needed'' of the SE.
    The licensee's plant-specific application requesting adoption of 
TSTF Traveler-446 evaluated the conditions, limitations, and additional 
information needed that are referenced in the Sections 3.4, 4.0, and 
5.0 of the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2. In its application 
dated [DATE], the licensee provided supporting information for each of 
the conditions, limitations, and additional information

[[Page 47297]]

needed that are referenced in the NRC SE. The licensee's supporting 
information for each condition and limitation, as well as for the 
additional information needed, met the NRC staff's expectations and 
acceptance criteria [with the following exceptions: List any exceptions 
to the conditions and limitations or additional information required, 
as stated in the licensee's submittal, and include the NRC staff's 
evaluation and conclusions].
    Technical Assessment for the Proposed Changes:
    [LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3 would make 
changes to the TS [LCO 3.6.3, ``Containment Isolation Valves 
(Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual),''] as follows:
     TSTF Traveler-446 revises [LCO 3.6.3], which states ``Each 
containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE,'' to read ``Each 
containment isolation valve (CIV) shall be OPERABLE.'' Adding the 
abbreviation ``(CIV)'' to the LCO statement is editorial in nature and 
does not change the LCO requirement; therefore, this change is 
acceptable.
     TSTF Traveler-446 deletes the Condition A NOTE, which 
states ``Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two [or more] 
containment isolation valves.'' The existing Condition C, which is 
applicable to penetration flow paths with only one CIV and a closed 
system, is being deleted and replaced by a new Condition B. The new 
Condition B, along with the revised Condition A, accounts for all of 
the CIVs covered under existing Condition C; therefore, the Condition A 
NOTE is no longer required. Revised Condition A and new Condition B 
apply to all penetration flow paths with at least one CIV. This is 
consistent with the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791 and is therefore 
acceptable.
     TSTF Traveler-446 revises Condition A's applicability from 
``[for reasons other than Condition[s] D [and E]]'' to ``[for reasons 
other than Condition[s] E [and F]].'' This change is required by the 
addition of new Conditions B and D, which results in renumbering the 
conditions that follow Condition D. This change is editorial and does 
not result in a technical change; therefore, it is acceptable.
     TSTF Traveler-446 adds a new requirement to Condition A, 
which states ``Containment isolation valve pressure boundary intact.'' 
This is required to meet the entry condition for Condition A. This 
requirement is necessary, along with the addition of new Condition B, 
which is applicable when the CIV pressure boundary is not intact, 
because existing Condition C is being deleted. Existing Condition C is 
applicable to penetration flow paths with only one CIV and a closed 
system. In addition, revised Condition A and new Condition B are 
applicable to all conditions in which a CIV may be INOPERABLE. Revised 
Condition A, along with new Condition B, encompasses existing Condition 
C and is consistent with the NRC's SE for WCAP-15791; therefore, it is 
acceptable.
     TSTF Traveler-446 revises the existing 4-hour completion 
time for Condition A to completion times that range from 4 hours up to 
7 days, depending upon the category of the applicable CIV (Category 1 
through 7). This change has been evaluated and documented in the NRC SE 
of TR WCAP-15791. This change proposed by TSTF Traveler-446 is 
consistent with the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791 and is therefore 
acceptable.
     TSTF Traveler-446 adds a new Condition B, which states 
``One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation 
valve inoperable [for reasons other than Condition[s] E [and F]] AND 
containment isolation valve pressure boundary not intact.'' This new 
condition, in conjunction with revised Condition A, accounts for all 
situations where one or more CIVs become or are made inoperable. The 
new Condition B required actions and completion times are the same as 
those in the revised Condition A, with the exception of the Condition B 
category of valves. Condition A completion times apply to Category 1 
through 7 valves and Condition B completion times apply to Category 8 
through 14 valves. The addition of new Condition B has been evaluated 
and documented in the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791. This change proposed by 
TSTF Traveler-446 is consistent with the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791 and is 
therefore acceptable.
     TSTF Traveler-446 renames existing Condition B and 
Required Action B.1 as Condition C and Required Action C.1. In 
addition, existing Condition B wording, which states ``[for reasons 
other than Condition[s] D [and E]]'' is changed to ``[for reasons other 
than Condition[s] E [and F]].'' These changes are editorial in nature, 
are caused by adding conditions proposed by TSTF Traveler-446 that have 
been evaluated and documented in the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791, and are 
therefore acceptable.
     TSTF Traveler-446 deletes the existing Condition C and 
Required Actions C.1 and C.2, which are applicable to penetration flow 
paths with only one CIV and a closed system. The existing Condition C 
entry condition is ``One or more penetration flow paths with one 
containment isolation valve inoperable.'' With revised Condition A and 
the addition of Condition B, this covers all CIVs that would have been 
applicable to existing Condition C. The required actions for revised 
Condition A and new Condition B are identical to the existing Condition 
C. The completion times for revised Condition A and new Condition B are 
changed from the existing Condition C time of 72 hours and have been 
evaluated and documented in the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791. The deletion 
of existing Condition C is consistent with WCAP-15791, is accounted for 
by the revision to Condition A, and the addition of new Condition B, 
and is therefore acceptable.
     TSTF Traveler-446 adds a new Condition D, which states 
``Two or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation 
valve inoperable [for reasons other than Condition[s] E [and F]].'' 
This condition requires isolating all but one of the affected 
penetrations within 4 hours (the existing completion time for Condition 
A). Once this completion time is satisfied, and since revised Condition 
A and new Condition B will still be applicable, this essentially limits 
the completion times in Condition A and B to a single penetration. This 
added requirement enforces the basis of WCAP-15791 that only one CIV 
should be in maintenance at a time. This change addresses Section 4.0, 
``Limitations and Conditions,'' items 1 and 2, in the NRC SE of TR 
WCAP-15791 and is therefore acceptable.
     TSTF Traveler-446 renames Conditions D, E, and F, along 
with Required Actions D.1, E.1, E.2, E.3, F.1, and F.2, as Conditions 
E, F, and G, along with Required Actions E.1, F.1, F.2, F.3, G.1, and 
G.2. With the addition of new Conditions B and D, and the deletion of 
current Condition C, the remaining conditions and required actions need 
to be renumbered. This change is editorial, results in no technical 
change, and is therefore acceptable.

4.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

    The NRC staff has reviewed the [LICENSEE] proposed adoption of TSTF 
Traveler-446, Revision 3, to modify the TS requirements for allowed 
outage times for CIVs associated with the implementation of TR WCAP-
15791-NP-A, Revision 2. The NRC staff has reviewed these changes for 
consistency with the current NUREG-1431 and found them to be 
consistent.
    The NRC staff has concluded, on the basis of the considerations 
discussed

[[Page 47298]]

above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and 
safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or 
to the health and safety of the public.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The 
State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with 
subsequent disposition by the NRC staff].

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

    The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, ``Standards for 
Protection Against Radiation.'' The NRC staff has determined that the 
amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no 
significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released 
offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or 
cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has 
previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no 
significant hazards considerations, and there has been no public 
comment on the finding [FR]. Accordingly, the amendment meets the 
eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact 
statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection 
with the issuance of the amendments.

7.0 REFERENCES

    1. ``Forwarding of TSTFs,'' dated October 21, 2002 (ADAMS Package 
Accession No. ML022960409).
    2. ``TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 1, `Risk-Informed Evaluation of 
Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (WCAP-
15791),' '' dated January 31, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML050460293).
    3. WCAP-15791, Revision 2, ``Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions 
to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times,'' (ADAMS Package 
Accession No. ML071550223).
    4. ``TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 2, `Risk-Informed Evaluation of 
Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (WCAP-
15791),' '' dated January 11, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070110620).
    5. ``TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, `Risk-Informed Evaluation of 
Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (WCAP-
15791),' '' dated February 19, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080510164).
    6. NUREG-1431, ``Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse 
Plants,'' Revision 3, Ju