Information Collection, 41496-41520 [E9-19499]

Agencies

• Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 157 (Monday, August 17, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41496-41520]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-19499]



[[Page 41495]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Part II





Department of Transportation





-----------------------------------------------------------------------



Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration



-----------------------------------------------------------------------



Information Collection; Notice

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 157 / Monday, August 17, 2009 / 
Notices

[[Page 41496]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket No. PHMSA-2008-0211]


Information Collection

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.

ACTION: Request for public comments and OMB approval of existing 
information collection.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On September 4, 2008, as required by the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(PHMSA) published a notice in the Federal Register of its intent to 
revise the agency's standardized forms for reporting pipeline incidents 
and accidents. PHMSA later extended the time for responding to that 
notice until December 12, 2008, and received timely comments from 
several pipeline operators, five trade associations representing 
pipeline operators, the association representing State pipeline safety 
regulators, two State pipeline regulatory agencies, and one public 
interest group. PHMSA is publishing this notice to respond to comments, 
provide the public with an additional 30 days to comment on the 
proposed revisions to the incident and accident report forms, including 
the form instructions, and announce that the revised Information 
Collections will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) for approval.

DATES: Comments on this notice must be received by September 16, 2009 
to be assured of consideration.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Roger Little by telephone at 202-366-
4569, by fax at 202-366-4566, by e-mail at Roger.Little@dot.gov, or by 
mail at U.S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., PHP-10, 
Washington, DC 20590-0001.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number 
PHMSA-2008-0211 by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 1-202-395-6566
     Mail: Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 726 Jackson Place, NW., 
Washington, DC 20503, ATTN: Desk Officer for Department of 
Transportation (DOT).
     E-mail: Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA), Office of Management and Budget, at the following address: 
oira_submissions@omb.eop.gov.
    Requests for a copy of the information collection should be 
directed to Roger Little by telephone at 202-366-4569, by fax at 202-
366-4566, by e-mail at Roger.Little@dot.gov, or by mail at U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., PHP-10, Washington, DC 
20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of Federal 
Regulations requires PHMSA to provide interested members of the public 
and affected agencies an opportunity to comment on information 
collection and recordkeeping requests. This notice identifies revised 
information collection requests that PHMSA will be submitting to OMB 
for approval. These information collections are contained in the 
pipeline safety regulations, 49 CFR parts 190-199. PHMSA has revised 
burden estimates, where appropriate, to reflect current reporting 
levels or adjustments based on changes in proposed or final rules 
published since the information collections were last approved. The 
following information is provided for each information collection: (1) 
Title of the information collection; (2) OMB control number; (3) type 
of request; (4) abstract of the information collection activity; (5) 
description of affected public; (6) estimate of total annual reporting 
and recordkeeping burden; and (7) frequency of collection. PHMSA will 
request a three-year term of approval for each information collection 
activity. The comments are summarized and addressed below as specified 
in the following outline:

I. Background
II. Summary of Comments
    A. Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7100.1, Gas Distribution Systems 
(Impacted Information Collection: OMB Control No. 2137-0522)
    B. Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7100.2, Gas Transmission and 
Gathering Systems (Impacted Information Collection: OMB Control No. 
2137-0522)
    C. Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7000-1, Accident Report--
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Systems (Impacted Information Collection: 
OMB Control No. 2137-0047)
III. Proposed Information Collection Revisions and Request for 
Comments

I. Background

    The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
requires that an operator of a covered pipeline facility file a written 
report within 30 days of certain adverse events, defined by regulation 
as either an accident or incident, 49 CFR 191.1-191.27, 195.48-195.63 
(2008).\1\ PHMSA further requires that those reports be submitted to 
the agency on one of three standardized forms, PHMSA Form F 7100.1, 
Incident Report--Gas Distribution Pipelines, PHMSA Form F 7100.2, 
Incident Report--Gas Transmission and Gathering Systems, and PHMSA Form 
F 7000-1--Accident Report for Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Systems. PHMSA 
uses the information collected from these forms (1) to identify trends 
in the occurrence of safety-related problems, (2) to appropriately 
target its performance of risk-based inspections, and (3) to assess the 
overall efficacy of its regulatory program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Reportable events are referred to as ``incidents'' for gas 
pipelines, 49 CFR Sec.  191.3, and ``accidents'' for hazardous 
liquid pipelines, 49 CFR 195.50. An operator may also be required to 
file a supplemental report in certain circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA published a Federal Register notice on September 4, 2008 (73 
FR 51697) inviting public comment on a proposal to revise PHMSA Forms F 
7100.1, F 7100.2, and F 7000-1. PHMSA stated that the proposed 
revisions were needed ``to make the information collected more useful 
to'' all those concerned with pipeline safety and to provide 
additional, and in some instances more detailed, data for use in the 
development and enforcement of its risk-based regulatory regime. PHMSA 
published a subsequent Federal Register notice on October 30, 2008 (73 
FR 64661) to extend the comment period to December 12, 2008.

II. Summary of Comments

    During the three-month response period, the following groups 
provided PHMSA with comments on the proposal outlined in the September 
2008 Federal Register notice:

    --Five industry trade associations--American Gas Association (AGA), 
American Public Gas Association (APGA), American Petroleum Institute 
(API), American Oil Pipelines Association (AOPL), and Interstate 
Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA).

--The National Association of State Pipeline Safety Representatives 
(NAPSR) and two State pipeline regulatory agencies--Iowa Utilities 
Board (IUB) and Missouri Public Service Commission (MOPSC).
--Nine pipeline operators--Southern California Gas Company and San 
Diego Gas & Electric (SoCal/SDG&E), MidAmerican Energy Company 
(MidAmerican), Northern Illinois Gas Company d/b/a Nicor Gas Company 
(Nicor), Atmos Energy Corporation

[[Page 41497]]

(Atmos), Southwest Gas Corporation (Southwest), El Paso Pipeline Group 
(EPPG), Columbia Gas Transmission (CGT), Panhandle Energy (Panhandle), 
and Paiute Pipeline (Paiute).
--The Pipeline Safety Trust--A summary of those comments and PHMSA's 
responses is provided below for each of the three proposed incident 
report forms and related instructions.

A. Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7100.1--Gas Distribution Systems 
(Impacted Information Collection: OMB 2137-0522)

General Comments
    Increase in requested information: AGA and APGA noted that the 
proposed changes would increase the length of the form from 3 to 10 
pages. AGA and APGA cautioned that while such an increase was not 
objectionable per se, PHMSA should ensure the relevance of any 
additional information being collected.
    PHMSA response: The increase in the total number of pages in the 
revised PHSMA Form F 7100.1 does not accurately reflect the information 
collection burden that will be placed on operators. Most of the 
additional pages are dedicated to Part F, Cause Information. Part F is 
subdivided into 8 separate categories, and an operator is only required 
to complete the section that relates to the primary cause of the 
incident. In other words, an operator will only need to answer the 
questions presented on pages 6 and 7 if corrosion caused the incident, 
on page 7 if natural force damage caused the incident and, on page 8 
and 9 if excavation damage caused the incident. Similarly, depending on 
the location of the incident, only the Onshore or Offshore selection 
will need to be completed.
    Moreover, the vast majority of operators elect to use PHMSA's 
online incident reporting form, a tool that utilizes smart navigation 
and formatting to filter out irrelevant sections, thereby decreasing 
the actual numbers of pages that must be viewed by an operator. Thus, 
it is misleading to suggest that the increase in the total number of 
pages used in the revised form is indicative of an unduly burdensome 
information collection.
    Nevertheless, PHMSA acknowledges that the revised form will collect 
new, and in some instances more detailed, information. However, PHMSA 
has determined that the collection of such information is justified by 
the agency's need to identify trends in safety-related problems, to 
appropriately target its performance of risk-based inspections, and to 
assess the overall efficacy of its pipeline-safety regime.
    Rely more on narrative: APGA noted that prior studies show that 
narrative descriptions are a better source of data on the cause of 
reported incidents and suggested that PHMSA should provide more 
guidance with respect to the information sought in that portion of the 
revised form, rather than increasing the number of questions in others 
areas.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees with APGA's comment regarding the 
successful use of narrative descriptions in identifying the cause of 
reported incidents in prior studies. However, those studies required 
the investment of substantial time and effort into data extraction, and 
the lack of uniformity in the information collected meant that 
inferences often had to be drawn to reach a final conclusion. PHMSA has 
carefully examined this issue and determined that its incident 
reporting data collection needs are ill suited to such an approach, 
i.e., that the information submitted by operators must be presented in 
a standardized format that can be easily received, stored, and 
analyzed. The revised form is consistent with that approach.
    Report vs. investigation: Many industry stakeholders argued that 
the revised form seeks to collect more information than is necessary 
for an adequate incident report. Some even suggested that the new form 
cannot be completed without conducting a root cause investigation for 
each incident.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that the proposed revisions are 
designed to collect new, and in some instances more detailed, data on 
incidents, but firmly rejects the suggestion that a root cause 
investigation must be conducted to complete the form. To the contrary, 
PHMSA is confident that a prudent operator can complete the form in a 
reasonable amount of time based on the information available at or near 
the time of the incident. PHMSA also does not agree that the additional 
effort that may be needed in some cases to complete the revised form is 
unjustified. While the number of incidents that occur annually has 
declined in recent years, PHMSA remains committed to reducing the 
occurrence and mitigating the consequences of these adverse events, and 
more detailed data is required to support these analyses.
    Changes needed in criteria for reporting: A number of commenters 
suggested that the criteria for a reportable incident should be 
changed, focusing in particular on the $50,000 threshold for property 
damage and noting that the combined effects of inflation, escalating 
property values, and increases in the price of gas require that more 
and more incidents be reported.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA recognizes that the number of reportable 
incidents will increase with any rise in the cost of gas and property 
values. However, an incident is defined by regulation, and a rulemaking 
must be initiated to change that definition. That type of regulatory 
change is beyond the scope of this information collection request.
    Time to file: MidAmerica suggested that additional data and 
investigation will be required to complete the revised form; therefore, 
the deadline for its submission to PHMSA should be extended from 30 to 
60 days after an incident.
    PHMSA response: The 30-day deadline for filing an incident report 
is set by regulation and can only be changed in a notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, an action that is beyond the scope of this information 
collection request. Nonetheless, PHMSA acknowledges that certain 
information may not be known by an operator within 30 days of an 
incident, and that is why the regulation allows operators to include 
additional information in supplemental reports filed after the initial 
report is submitted.
    Relationship to pending rulemakings: Several pipeline operators 
noted that PHMSA is developing new rules on distribution integrity and 
control room management and that the revised form requests information 
on these issues. These operators therefore argued that the proposed 
revision of the incident reporting form should be deferred until those 
two rulemakings are completed.
    PHMSA response: Congress has mandated PHMSA to use its broad 
authority to collect information on pipeline facilities, 49 U.S.C. 
60117(b)(1)-(2), to obtain specific data from owners and operators on 
the role of controller fatigue in incidents and accidents. Pipeline 
Inspection, Protection and Safety Act (PIPES Act) of 2006, Public Law 
109-468, section 20, 120 Stat. 3498 (Dec. 29, 2006). However, rather 
than addressing that mandate in isolation, PHMSA is coordinating its 
collection of that information with its pending rulemakings on 
distribution integrity and control room management. Distribution lines 
are a key part of the nation's pipeline network, and Congress has 
determined that additional information on the contribution of 
controller fatigue to the occurrence of incidents and accidents is 
vital to PHMSA's safety mission. These authorities provide ample 
support for collecting all of the information sought

[[Page 41498]]

in the proposed revision to the incident reporting form without further 
delay.
Part A, Key Report Information
    Question 1 and 2,\2\ Operator identification: IUB suggested that a 
mailing address is still needed for any official correspondence that 
may be needed in response to an incident. IUB also noted that while 
PHMSA may have access to an address through its Operator Identification 
(OPID) system, others seeking to contact the company may not have 
access to such information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Question numbers used in this notice refer to the numbers on 
the draft forms about which comments were submitted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the suggested change.
    Question 4, location of incident: NAPSR suggested that question 4 
concerning location of an incident be modified to provide separate 
lines for entering City and County/Parish and to require that location 
be reported by GPS coordinates, including identification of the 
relevant ``projection'' to better define the latitude and longitude 
information. IUB also noted that distribution lines may be in 
unincorporated/undeveloped areas where a street address is not useful 
to define location and that some other means of describing the location 
is needed.
    PHMSA response: Latitude and longitude were included in this form 
when it was last revised. This information was not included in the 
draft revised form, but has been restored. Industry comments on the 
previous revision expressed concern over requirements to specify a 
projection, stating that this information would not be available to 
many distribution pipeline operators and may be confusing. PHMSA 
elected at that time to omit a requirement that operators specify the 
projection used. Since PHMSA did not propose such a change in the 
September 4, 2008, notice, the requirement to report latitude and 
longitude is being retained as in the previous form, without a need to 
report projection. PHMSA has made the editorial change suggested by 
NAPSR to separate City and County/Parish.
    Question 7, commodity released: A number of commenters noted that 
the term ``spilled'' is inappropriate for natural gas and suggested 
that it be replaced with ``released.'' NAPSR noted that natural gas and 
propane are the only commodities currently transported by gas 
distribution pipelines and suggested that other commodities listed be 
deleted. APGA and MidAmerican also noted that the gas distribution 
pipeline industry does not use the terms ``sour'' or ``wet'' to 
characterize gas carried and suggested that these terms be deleted or 
defined in the instructions.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the suggested changes.
    Question 8, type of system: MidAmerican suggested that the need to 
distinguish between privately- and municipally-owned systems should be 
eliminated, since the same regulations are applicable to both.
    PHMSA response: Part 192 safety regulations apply to both types of 
systems. Many outside factors affect private and municipal systems 
differently, however, and could result in different incident trends. 
This data is needed to be able to determine if incident trends are 
different for privately- and municipally-owned systems.
    Questions 9 and 10, amount released: Several pipeline operators 
objected to the need to report separately the volume of commodity 
released intentionally and unintentionally. They noted that it would be 
difficult, at best, to prepare these estimates. Atmos also noted that 
the form should reflect that these quantities are only estimates.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has revised the form to ask only 
for an estimate of total commodity released.
    Questions 11 and 12, number of fatalities and injuries: A number of 
pipeline operators suggested that PHMSA delete the category of 
``Workers working on the Public Easement or near pipeline facility but 
not associated with this operator or this pipeline facility.'' They 
consider the category confusing and note that the category of ``general 
public'' would already account for non-operator personnel. Southwest 
also suggested that the category of ``emergency responders'' should be 
limited to non-operator personnel, since operator employees and 
contractors are addressed in other categories.
    PHMSA response: Utility easements are used for purposes other than 
gas distribution pipelines. Thus, there may be workers associated with 
other utilities (e.g., electric, cable television, sewer/water) 
performing work on the easement. This category of ``public'' is more 
likely to be involved in an incident, since they are more likely to be 
engaged in work that might disturb pipelines in an easement than are 
other members of the public. PHMSA considers it important to collect 
this data to be able to determine if common location of utilities is a 
factor contributing to incident frequency. Similar situations exist for 
other pipeline types with other pipelines/utilities installed in common 
rights-of-way, and PHMSA also collects this data for those pipelines. 
Therefore, PHMSA has retained this category. PHMSA agrees with 
Southwest that the emergency responder category was intended to apply 
to responders not employed by the pipeline operator and has modified 
the form to so indicate.
    Question 15, number evacuated: MidAmerican suggested revising this 
question to seek the estimated number of general public evacuated, if 
known. They noted that non-operator emergency responders often suggest 
evacuation and persons self-evacuate and it may not be possible to know 
how many persons evacuated.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA recognizes that this data will be an estimate 
and may be subject to some uncertainty, but does not consider that 
changes to the form are needed. PHMSA expects operators to exercise 
reasonable diligence in estimating the number of people evacuated.
    Question 16, elapsed time: NAPSR suggested that this question be 
revised to collect a time sequence of key events such as when the 
operator was notified, when operator personnel arrived on site, and 
when the area was made safe. Other commenters noted that the form and 
instructions were not consistent for this question.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that a time sequence would provide 
more useful information and eliminate the need for an operator to make 
the calculation implicit in the original question--time between 
becoming aware of the incident and making the area safe. PHMSA has 
revised this question to a time sequence. PHMSA has implemented this 
change for the other incident report forms as well.
Part B, Additional Location Information
    Question 17, location of system involved: MidAmerican commented 
that the location of the system is of little importance and suggested 
that most of this question be deleted. Southwest commented that the 
location information sought in this question duplicates information to 
be collected later in the form (section F3, Excavation Damage) and 
therefore suggested that this question be deleted to avoid duplication. 
Southwest also questioned the meaning of ``bridge crossing,'' asking 
whether that term applied to waterway crossings or to all bridges. They 
noted that a bridge can cross a road, meaning that two of the available 
options could be selected. NAPSR suggested changing ``right-of-way'' to 
``easement,'' as that term is more appropriate for use in

[[Page 41499]]

distribution pipelines. Southwest also noted that the terms have 
different legal connotations.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA considers this data important to identify 
national trends. Excavation activities can be expected to occur more 
frequently in areas with utility easements, but more data is need to 
confirm that hypothesis. Similarly, utilities and their contractors 
should be more knowledgeable about one-call procedures and the need to 
avoid damage to underground utilities. Data is also needed to confirm 
that hypothesis and the need for additional regulatory action, if 
appropriate.
    Data on bridge and other types of crossings is needed to determine 
if such locations are more likely to experience an incident and, if so, 
the steps that can be taken to mitigate the consequences thereof. In 
addition, whether a bridge crosses a roadway or a waterway is not as 
important as the fact that the pipeline must be integrated with or 
attached to the bridge structure. PHMSA will clarify in the 
instructions that only one option should be selected.
    With regard to duplication, section F3 only applies if the cause of 
an incident is excavation damage. However, question 17 applies to all 
incident types. Therefore, the information sought is not unnecessarily 
duplicative.
    PHMSA agrees that ``easement'' is a more appropriate term for 
distribution pipelines and has used that term.
    Question 18, area of failure: Nicor and Atmos objected to the use 
of the undefined term ``failure'' and commented that an incident may 
result from circumstances outside the control of a pipeline operator, 
e.g., impact by a non-operator vehicle and not from a ``failure'' of 
the pipeline. In commenting on the gas transmission form, INGAA also 
noted that incidents can result from inappropriate but intentional 
releases of gas in which a failure does not occur. IUB noted that the 
options available on the form were not adequate to address many 
situations. For example, IUB observed that most underground pipelines 
are simply buried under soil, but that this is not one of the options 
for selection. Instead, it would need to be reported as ``other'' and 
described. IUB considered it inappropriate that reporting of the most 
common situation should be relegated to ``other.'' APGA also noted the 
need for an ``under soil'' selection. IUB also noted that the options 
do not address underground valve vaults and questioned the 
characterization of ``in an open ditch'' as an above-ground failure.
    PHMSA response: The comments questioning the use of the term 
``failure'' relate principally to the issue of liability. PHMSA 
recognizes in that regard that incidents may be caused by circumstances 
outside the control of a pipeline operator, and that the operator may 
not be culpable for their occurrence. However, a failure usually still 
occurs, i.e., pipe or some appurtenance that is supposed to contain 
transported gas fails to do so and gas is released. It is important to 
collect data on where these failures occur in order to be able to 
identify trends that may indicate a need for additional action, e.g., 
additional regulations or increased coordination with the other 
agencies with jurisdiction over the activities that can affect 
pipelines. Nevertheless, PHMSA recognizes that incidents can result 
from non-failure releases and has revised the form to avoid the use of 
the term ``failure,'' instead referring to ``area of incident.'' PHMSA 
will clarify in the instructions that this is to describe the point at 
which gas was released from the pipeline facility vs. where 
consequences were realized (e.g., neighboring building in which 
released gas collected resulting in ignition).
    PHMSA agrees with IUB that the options provided on the form did not 
adequately describe many typical installations, including ``under 
soil.'' PHMSA has revised the form to include those installations 
identified by IUB.
Part C, Additional Facility Information
    Question 20, information collected when mains or services are 
involved: NAPSR suggested that examples be added for pipe specification 
(e.g., API-5L, ASTM D2513). Several pipeline operators also suggested 
that the meaning of ``pipe specification'' was not clear. IUB commented 
that the original specification may not be known and that ``unknown'' 
should therefore be an option. Southwest suggested that the listed 
coating types be reviewed as they present some likelihood of overlap 
and confusion. Some pipeline operators also suggested that ``unknown'' 
needed to be an option for pipe coating; they also noted that this 
information was only important for incidents resulting from external 
corrosion. Some operators suggested that depth of cover is not a 
parameter of importance, or that it is important only on initial 
installation. MidAmerican suggested that none of the information sought 
in this question has much value for distribution pipelines. Several 
commenters also pointed out that numbering within this question was 
incorrect.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has adopted NAPSR's suggestion and added 
examples of pipe specification. PHMSA believes this obviates the need 
for a definition of the term. PHMSA has also added an option for 
``unknown'' for all of the information, except nominal pipe size.
    However, PHMSA rejects the notion that depth of cover is not 
important. It is true that requirements for depth of cover apply at 
installation. Nevertheless, inadequate depth of cover could be a factor 
in why incidents occur. The data that will be collected through this 
question will enable analyses to determine whether changes in depth of 
cover requirements or other mitigative actions may be needed. 
Similarly, PHMSA considers that the other data sought in this question 
is necessary to evaluate possible trends in incidents. PHMSA does not 
consider that collecting this information will impose unreasonable 
burdens, particularly since an option has been provided to indicate 
``unknown'' if the information is not readily discernible.
    PHMSA has corrected the numbering.
    Question 21, type of release: APGA suggested that overpressure is 
more appropriately classified as the cause of a failure and should 
therefore be removed as a type of failure.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the change.
    Question 22, material involved: NAPSR suggested adding Cellulose 
Acetate Butyrate (CAB) as a type of plastic pipe. APGA suggested that 
more instruction was needed to assure appropriate reporting of 
polyethylene (PE) and cross-linked PE or, alternatively, that the 
standard number for the pipe should be reported. Atmos noted that 
specified minimum yield stress (SMYS) is not an important parameter for 
distribution piping and suggested that it be deleted. Several 
commenters noted that standard dimension ratio (SDR) is not applicable 
to all plastic pipe and suggested that an option to report wall 
thickness be provided. For PE pipe, Atmos noted that ``grade'' is not 
an appropriate concept and Southwest suggested replacing this sub-
question with reporting of the Pipe Material Designation Code. Several 
commenters identified the need to allow ``unknown'' and ``other'' as 
options for the information sought in this question.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the suggested changes. 
The form has been modified to add the designator PEX for cross-linked 
polyethylene, which is commonly known by that acronym.
    Question 23, year of installation: IUB suggested that the form 
allow for ``unknown,'' as operators may not always know the year in 
which some components of a pipeline were installed.

[[Page 41500]]

    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the change.
Part D, Additional Consequence Information
    Question 24, cost data: MOPSC, Nicor, and Atmos noted that the cost 
of repair and the cost of emergency response are not required to be 
considered by 49 CFR 191.3 in determining whether an incident has 
occurred. They therefore suggested that it is not appropriate to 
collect this data. Most commenters suggested that cost of emergency 
response be limited to response costs incurred by the pipeline 
operator. Costs of outside response agencies are difficult to obtain 
and are often not directly comparable between jurisdictions. 
MidAmerican and Southwest questioned the need to estimate separately 
the cost of gas released intentionally and unintentionally. Several 
commenters also requested that the form explicitly recognize that the 
reported costs are expected to be estimates. Southwest asked for 
guidance concerning what estimated costs are sufficient to submit a 
``final'' report, noting that some repair and restoration costs (e.g., 
repaving) can be incurred over a significant period of time. 
MidAmerican suggested that the requirement to report emergency response 
costs could lead to a need for an administrative procedure to capture 
costs in real time that could delay emergency response.
    PHMSA response: The revision of this form does not change the 
criteria of an incident as defined in 49 CFR 191.3. Nevertheless, costs 
are incurred for repairs and for emergency response when most incidents 
occur. Consideration of these costs helps identify the relative 
significance of an incident, and PHMSA thus considers it appropriate to 
collect this data. PHMSA agrees that it would be an unreasonable burden 
to require operators to estimate the costs incurred by outside 
emergency response agencies and has limited this factor to costs 
incurred by the operator for emergency response. PHMSA has eliminated 
the need to estimate costs separately for intentionally and 
unintentionally released gas, consistent with the changes discussed 
above for questions 9 and 10. PHMSA has modified the form to note 
explicitly that the reported costs are expected to be estimates.
    With respect to the question asked by Southwest, PHMSA does not 
consider it practical to provide definitive guidance for when cost 
estimates can be considered final. This will vary depending on each 
particular situation, and inherently requires a judgment on the part of 
the operator. PHMSA expects that all significant costs associated with 
an incident will be estimated as part of the initial or a supplemental 
incident report, regardless of whether those costs are incurred soon 
after an incident or at some later time. Operator judgments in this 
regard will be reviewed as part of the regulator's investigation of an 
incident, and additional supplemental incident reports may be requested 
if the regulator concludes that significant costs have not been 
included in reported estimates.
    With respect to the potential for delaying emergency response, 
PHMSA considers that this claim is exaggerated. This form does not 
require that precise costs be reported. Real-time collection of cost 
data is neither needed nor required. Operators will be able to estimate 
costs for emergency response after an event and without affecting 
response during an incident.
    Question 25, customers out of service: SoCal/SDG&E, Nicor, and 
MidAmerican questioned the need to report this information. They 
suggested that the number of customers affected by an incident is not 
related to safety and that the need to report could create a 
disincentive to shut off services that might be contrary to safety. 
Nicor noted that outside emergency responders often turn off service to 
customers regardless of the seriousness of an incident. Southwest 
suggested that this question be re-phrased to seek total number of 
``customer accounts'' out of service. They note that in the case of 
master meter accounts, a pipeline operator may not know the number of 
customers beyond the master meter.
    PHMSA response: While subject to some degree of uncertainty, PHMSA 
has determined that the number of customers placed out of service as a 
result of an incident is a reasonable and readily available measure 
that helps to quantify the relative significance of an incident. PHMSA 
has therefore retained the requirement to report this information. 
PHMSA has not changed the terminology as suggested by Southwest. PHMSA 
is concerned that the number of ``accounts'' could lead to other 
confusion. PHMSA agrees that what is to be reported is the number of 
customers served by the pipeline operator, and that in the case of a 
master meter this would be one; PHMSA does not expect operators to 
estimate how many additional customers are beyond a master meter that 
the operator serves.
Part E, Additional Operating Information
    Question 26, estimated pressure: In addition to asking for the 
estimated pressure at the point and time of the incident, IUB suggested 
asking for the normal operating pressure as distribution systems often 
operate below their maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) and 
this information could be relevant to safety considerations.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has added this question.
    Question 28, MAOP: MidAmerican commented that this question should 
be deleted as this parameter is inspected by State utility boards and 
need not be reported here. Southwest recommended that 49 CFR 192.621 be 
referenced as another section under which a distribution pipeline MAOP 
may be established.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA understands that the established MAOP is 
subject to review by State pipeline safety regulators, but considers 
the information to be relevant to evaluating an incident or to 
subsequent analysis of incident trends. PHMSA has made the addition 
suggested by Southwest.
    Question 29, how detected: MidAmerican suggested that this question 
be deleted since an operator may not be aware of how an incident was 
detected. It may have been reported to the operator by emergency 
response personnel or others who may not have that information.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has revised this question to ask how the 
incident was initially identified by the operator. Notification by 
emergency responders is one of the options provided for selection. 
Operators need not report how those reporting an incident became aware 
of it, only how the operator became aware.
    Questions 30 and 31, controller involvement: AGA and Southwest 
suggested that these questions be deleted until the definition of 
controller was further clarified in the pending rulemaking on control 
room management. Several other commenters suggested that controller 
actions were not relevant for distribution pipelines and that the 
questions should therefore be deleted. AGA suggested adding an option 
for ``NA'' for cases where a controller had no involvement and another 
option to indicate that the extent of controller involvement was still 
under investigation.
    PHMSA response: As previously noted, Congress ordered PHMSA to 
collect information on the role of controller fatigue in incidents and 
accidents, and the agency is coordinating the execution of that mandate 
with its pending rulemaking on control room management. Nevertheless, 
PHMSA has responded to

[[Page 41501]]

the comments received from the various stakeholders by significantly 
reducing the amount of information sought in this section of the form, 
much of which PHMSA will obtain through the use of alternative means, 
including accident investigations. Having taken these steps, PHMSA is 
confident that it has resolved any past concerns over the information 
sought in this section. PHMSA has also added options in the controller 
involvement section for ``NA'' and result pending further investigation 
as suggested.
    Questions 32 and 33, drug and alcohol testing: AGA and APGA 
suggested that the number of operator employees and contractors be 
reported separately rather than together. AGA further suggested that 
the form make clear that the only contractors to be reported are those 
engaged by the pipeline operator. Southwest noted that the form 
implicitly assumes that a drug or alcohol test was required as a result 
of the incident and suggested that the form be revised to first report 
whether such a test was required.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the suggested changes. 
These questions have been modified to ask first if a post-incident drug 
or alcohol test was required and then separately to report the number 
of operator employees and operator-employed contractors who failed such 
tests.
    Question 34, operator qualification: AGA commented that whether an 
incident involved a task covered under operator qualification 
requirements (i.e., a ``covered task'') is a judgment that would be 
part of an incident investigation rather than a report. Nicor suggested 
adding ``NA'' as an option since they did not believe there was a way 
to indicate that a covered task was not involved.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA recognizes that identifying whether a covered 
task was involved might be part of an incident investigation and not 
immediately obvious upon occurrence. That does not mean, however, that 
it is inappropriate to report the information. There are other 
questions posed on this form that will require some investigation to 
answer. Collection of this data, including whether a covered task was 
involved and if employees were qualified, is important to analyzing 
trends to determine if regulations may be inefficient in preventing 
incidents. PHMSA notes that Nicor's suggested change is not needed. The 
form asks if actions that led to an incident were a covered task. If 
they were not, i.e., if no covered task was involved, then an operator 
simply reports ``no.'' PHMSA has moved these questions to Part F, Cause 
F7--Incorrect Operations, so they only need to be answered for 
incidents where personnel errors are the principal cause.
Part F, Cause Information
    Cause categories: Southwest suggested that this form should be 
consistent with causes being considered for distribution integrity 
management under a rulemaking docket that is still open.
    PHMSA response: Based in part on the contribution and views of 
industry stakeholders, including Southwest, the proposed rule on 
distribution integrity management only incorporates the broad cause 
categories that are listed in the revised incident reporting form, and 
those categories are unchanged from the previous version of the form. 
Thus, the cause categories are consistent with those used in the 
pending rule on distribution integrity management and the prior 
versions of this form and are well-known throughout the pipeline safety 
community. Moreover, the additional information requested in the 
revised form, including the sub-categories not explicitly included in 
the proposed integrity management rule, are important for analyzing 
incident trends. Lastly, PHMSA will address cause categories for the 
distribution integrity management and the annual report form for 
distribution systems in a subsequent Federal Register notice and 
coordinated with the pending distribution integrity management 
rulemaking. While we do not anticipate any changes to cause categories 
on incident forms as a result of the pending rulemaking, PHMSA will 
review the cause categories on the distribution annual report in the 
course of that rulemaking and align the cause categories with those 
implemented for incident forms through this Federal Register notice.
Part F, F1--Corrosion Failure
    Internal corrosion: The draft form posed a number of questions for 
incidents caused by external corrosion, but none for those related to 
internal corrosion. NAPSR suggested information that should be sought 
for internal-corrosion incidents. This included whether corrosion 
inhibitors were used, whether the interior was coated or lined with 
protective coating, whether corrosion coupons were used for monitoring, 
and an indication of whether the location of the incident was one at 
which internal corrosion might have been anticipated (e.g., low point, 
drop out). MOPSC also suggested collecting data about the nature of the 
location where the failure occurred. Southwest suggested asking if 
liquids were found in the system.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has added the questions NAPSR and 
Southwest suggested.
    Cathodic protection: MidAmerican suggested that the question 
relating to when cathodic protection (CP) was started should be made 
optional, because this information might not be available for older 
systems. They also suggested that the information might be of limited 
use, because it will not be clear whether protection was adequate.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has added an option for ``unknown'' to 
address those situations where operators might not know when protection 
was started for older systems. PHMSA understands that the adequacy of 
CP could still be questionable, but whether or not CP was provided is 
an objective data element that is relevant for incident trend analyses. 
In fact, a report that an external-corrosion incident occurred in a 
system that was protected by CP from installation could well indicate 
potential adequacy issues for the CP.
Part F, F2--Natural Force Damage
    Temperature: NAPSR suggested creating a separate sub-category for 
natural or forest fires and eliminating the sub-question regarding 
these under the temperature sub-cause. Southwest commented favorably on 
treatment of forest fires under ``temperature'' but asked if it would 
apply to fires caused by arson.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that treating forest fires as a sub-
category of temperature was inadequate. PHMSA has modified the form to 
treat incidents caused by outside fires in two places. One is under 
natural force damage--lightning, as a sub-category indicating a 
secondary impact such as resulting from nearby fires. The other is 
under outside force damage (F4) for nearby industrial, man-made, or 
other non-natural fire/explosion as the primary cause of the failure. 
Man-made fires, even if forest fires, would be reported under F4.
Part F, F3--Excavation Damage
    Several commenters suggested changes to the additional information 
sought for incidents caused by excavation damage. Among them:
     Deleting unknown/other as a choice for location, since 
operators should know the location.
     Requiring detailed information concerning the one-call 
notification.
     Clarifying the information required for utilities in 
common trenches.
     Clarifying that the name of excavator is a company name 
vs. an

[[Page 41502]]

individual or deleting the requirement to report the name.
     Rearranging the form.
     Adding additional types of markings.
     Requiring additional information about the interaction 
between the pipeline operator and those making one-call requests.
     Eliminating the questions concerning whether the excavator 
incurred downtime and whether the excavation had been ongoing for more 
than one month.
     Deferring to the Common Ground Alliance's Damage 
Information Reporting Tool (DIRT).
     Deleting information about circumstances over which the 
operator had no control.
     Deleting the question about whether notification of 
excavation had been received, because excavators are required to 
notify.
     Deleting the type of excavator and work performed.
     Deleting the type of locator.
     Requiring only mandatory DIRT fields or requiring 
reporting via DIRT rather than duplicating their reporting 
requirements.
    PHMSA response: The Common Ground Alliance (CGA) is the recognized 
authority for preventing excavation damage of underground utilities. 
The CGA has determined the information necessary to evaluate excavation 
damage trends via its DIRT system. PHMSA has adopted in this form the 
fields defined within the DIRT system as mandatory. Collecting 
information on excavation damage consistent with DIRT will allow for 
thorough analyses to identify trends related to excavation damage. It 
will also allow comparative analyses to consider information reported 
to DIRT by other underground utility operators, thereby expanding the 
database and potentially affording additional insights.
Part F, F4--Other Outside Force Damage
    Fire-caused: AGA recommended deleting the sub-category related to 
events caused by nearby fires. They contend that these events are 
outside of PHMSA jurisdiction, and that their inclusion in DOT 
statistics will distort the safety record. In support of their 
argument, they note that the DOT incident database records 17 such 
events in 2007 despite hundreds of thousands of fires reported by other 
Federal agencies. Nicor also suggested that this category be deleted as 
such events should only be reported if additional damage due to the gas 
release exceeds reporting criteria. Southwest questioned if this 
category is appropriate for reporting incidents initiated by fires 
caused by arson.
    PHMSA response: Fires whose causes are unrelated to gas 
distribution systems can cause situations that are reported as gas 
distribution incidents. AGA's citation to the 2007 DOT data proves that 
point. A 2003 analysis of incident data sponsored by PHMSA found that a 
small, but significant, percentage of reported incidents were such 
fire-first events. It is important to be able to identify these events 
when analyzing incident experience, in part to be able to separate them 
out as incidents that were not under the control of pipeline operators. 
In fact, many incidents are caused by circumstances not under the 
control of a pipeline operator and thus outside of PHMSA jurisdiction 
(e.g., excavation damage). Nevertheless, it is important to be able to 
characterize correctly the causes of incidents in order to draw 
appropriate lessons from analyses of incident data. PHMSA agrees that 
fire-first incidents need not be reported unless reporting criteria in 
49 CFR 191.3 are met, but that does not eliminate the need to capture 
appropriately the data for circumstances in which a report is required. 
PHMSA has retained this category. As described above, this category 
would be appropriate for reporting incidents from arson-related fires.
    Damage by vehicles: AGA and Nicor recommended eliminating the sub-
category for damage by vehicles not engaged in excavation. They note 
that vehicle accidents happen, that operators would not be culpable, 
and that collection of this data is thus unnecessary. Nicor and 
Southwest further noted that there are parameters relevant to a 
complete understanding of vehicle-impact events that will be unknown to 
pipeline operators.
    PHMSA response: Culpability is not the issue. As with fire-first 
events, analysis of distribution pipeline incident data has shown that 
incidents caused by vehicle impacts are a small, but significant, 
percentage of all incidents. Again, PHMSA is not attempting to regulate 
the operation of vehicles near pipelines. It is necessary to a complete 
understanding of the incident experience to be able to identify 
incidents caused by vehicle impacts. Asking whether a vehicle barrier 
was in place does not pre-suppose that the absence of such a barrier 
was a contributing cause to an incident. The presence or absence of 
such barriers is a factor that can be within the control of a pipeline 
operator and which could be important to understanding the importance 
of such protection. It is therefore appropriate to identify whether 
such barriers were present.
Part F, F5--Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure
    General: MidAmerican commented that this section adds little value 
for distribution pipelines and should be deleted. Southwest suggested 
that this section is disorganized and that it should be restructured to 
ask first questions related to both metal and plastic pipe and then 
those specific to a type of material.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA continues to consider this section important. 
The greater use of plastic pipe in distribution pipelines may make 
welds of relatively less significance, but other joints are potentially 
susceptible to failure. In particular, failure of mechanical/
compression couplings has been the cause of a number of serious 
incidents on distribution pipelines. PHMSA has made some editorial 
changes to this section in response to other comments, but has not 
reorganized it. The first portion of this section relates to the 
portion of the pipeline involved--body of pipe or type of joint. Some 
of the joint types are applicable to metal and some to plastic, but the 
reporting operator only needs to select the single appropriate entry. 
The latter portion poses questions that are applicable to all pipe 
types. PHMSA considers this organization appropriate.
    Compression couplings: NAPSR recommended that compression couplings 
be identified as a separate sub-cause. Failure of compression couplings 
has been the cause of a number of serious gas distribution pipeline 
incidents.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the recommended change.
    Additional information required: NAPSR suggested including 
``previous damage'' as one of the potential causes of failure. AGA 
suggested deleting ``design defect'' since they believe that it is 
unclear.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees with NAPSR and has made the 
recommended change. PHMSA did not make the change AGA suggested. PHMSA 
considers that design defects are a condition that could influence 
joint failures. PHMSA will add additional clarification in the 
instructions.
    Plastic joints: AGA and Southwest suggested that ``butt, 
electrofusion'' duplicates ``socket, electrofusion'' and that one of 
them should be deleted.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA disagrees. The electrofusion process may be 
the same. The presence of a pre-formed socket potentially affects the 
fit-up process and can affect the integrity of

[[Page 41503]]

the joint. PHMSA considers it worthwhile to collect data at a level of 
detail that would reflect these differences.
    Pipe seam: Southwest questioned why the type of pipe seam was no 
longer of interest for seam failures.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that this information is potentially 
important and has revised the form to restore the specification of seam 
type from the present form.
    Pressure tests: NAPSR and Southwest recommended that the question 
of whether a hydrostatic test has been conducted since installation be 
deleted. They noted that hydrostatic tests are generally not performed 
for distribution pipelines. Southwest also noted that it may be 
difficult to determine the actual test pressure.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA acknowledges that pressure tests are 
conducted rarely, if ever, for many distribution pipelines subsequent 
to initial construction, and that air or natural gas is often used as 
the test medium rather than water. PHMSA has revised this question to 
refer to pressure tests vs. hydrostatic tests. The fact that pressure 
tests may be rare for some distribution pipelines is not particularly 
relevant. Operators who have not conducted pressure tests since 
installation would simply check ``no'' for this question. PHMSA 
considers that whether a pipeline that has failed (i.e., suffered an 
incident) had been tested is an important piece of information. PHMSA 
recognizes that a precise determination of test pressure may be 
difficult, but notes that an estimate of the test pressure should be 
easier to obtain and will be sufficient. PHMSA will clarify the 
instructions to discuss the expected degree of precision.
Part F, F6--Equipment Failure
    Non-threaded failures: NAPSR suggested deletion of the 
clarification ``NOT pump seals'' since pumps are not used in 
distribution pipeline systems.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has made the suggested change.
    Malfunction of control/relief equipment: IUB noted that the reason 
for a failure is an important piece of information not collected.
    PHMSA response: A description of the failure/incident can always be 
included in Part G. PHMSA saw no reason why this particular incident 
cause should be separately identified as requiring additional 
explanation.
    Non-threaded connection failure: IUB noted that O-rings and gaskets 
are seals and questioned why operators were asked to specify either of 
these or ``seal or packing.''
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that O-rings and gaskets are, 
technically, types of seals. They are, however, in common use and 
generally referred to as O-rings and gaskets rather than as seals. 
PHMSA has modified this question for clarity to make the choices O-
rings, gaskets, and ``other'' seals or packing.
Part F, F-7, Incorrect Operation
    General: APGA noted that the instructions for this section do not 
address all of the sub-causes. They also questioned the value of sub-
categorizing these incidents.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA will revise the instructions. PHMSA cannot 
know at this time the value of collecting information at the sub-
category level, because the data has not previously been collected. 
PHMSA considers it worthwhile to collect this data to determine if 
there are sub-categories of incorrect operation that may require 
additional regulatory attention. Operators completing reports will only 
be required to check the box for the appropriate type of mal-operation, 
so PHMSA concludes that the additional burden required to collect this 
information will be minimal.
    Valve left or placed in wrong position: NAPSR suggested deleting 
reference to caverns since cavern storage is not a part of distribution 
pipelines. Nicor suggested that the term ``storage'' be defined
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has deleted all reference to storage. The 
question had asked whether incorrect valve operation resulted in 
overpressurization of storage. PHMSA has revised this question to ask 
simply whether overpressurization, of any pipeline portion/component, 
resulted.
Part F, F8--Other Cause
    Still under investigation: For incidents still under investigation, 
the form noted that a supplemental incident report was required. NAPSR 
suggested modifying the form to require that this report be submitted 
within one year.
    PHMSA response: The regulation requires supplemental reports, as 
deemed necessary, when additional relevant information is obtained. The 
regulation does not, however, specify a maximum time frame in which 
such reports must be submitted. PHMSA cannot use this change in the 
incident report form to impose such a requirement. PHMSA will modify 
the instructions to state its preference that supplemental reports 
addressing additional investigation be submitted within one year of the 
submission of the initial incident/accident report.
Instructions for Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7100.1--Gas Distribution 
Systems
    In response to many of the comments received, PHMSA has revised the 
instructions to reflect changes made in the form and for editorial 
purposes. PHMSA also received the following specific comments on the 
instructions:
    Duplication of the form: Many commenters noted that a large portion 
of the proposed instructions was duplicative of the information already 
provided on the incident reporting form and that such information could 
be deleted. These commenters also suggested that the instructions 
should only provide additional guidance, where needed, and that 
eliminating unnecessary or duplicative information would significantly 
shorten the instructions and make them more useful.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has deleted unnecessary 
duplication.
    Reporting to State regulators: NAPSR and State regulators suggested 
that the instructions include a reminder to operators of their 
obligations to comply with any applicable State reporting requirements.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has added such a reminder.
    Time to report: NAPSR noted that the indication that incidents are 
to be reported to the National Response Center by telephone within 24 
hours was a deviation from past practice. The regulation, 49 CFR 191.5, 
requires that telephonic reports be made ``at the earliest practicable 
moment.'' NAPSR notes a long-standing interpretation that such reports 
should be made in 2 hours and questions the change to 24 hours.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that this was an unintended change and 
has revised the instructions to reflect the long-standing 2-hour 
interpretation.
    Cost guidance: NAPSR and MOPSC suggested that additional guidance 
be provided for estimating costs associated with an accident. 
Specifically, they suggested including guidance published in advisory 
bulletin ADB-94-01.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has included the guidance from the advisory 
bulletin.
    Incidents significant in operator's judgment: An incident is 
defined as an event that meets certain threshold criteria or is 
otherwise ``significant, in the judgment of the operator.'' 49 CFR 
191.3. Southwest requested that the form include guidance on PHMSA's 
policy toward reporting the latter category of incidents, i.e., those 
based solely on the operator's judgment.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA does not believe that the provision of any

[[Page 41504]]

additional guidance on this issue is appropriate or required at this 
time. However, PHMSA reminds operators that Form F 7100.1 must be 
completed and submitted regardless of whether an incident is based on 
the specific threshold criteria or an operator's judgment.
    Classification of fatalities: Southwest suggested that the guidance 
on reporting an injury that ultimately results in fatality raises 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) concerns.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA disagrees. The identified guidance simply 
states that injuries that result in a fatality within 30 days of an 
incident should be reported as fatalities and that injuries that result 
in a fatality beyond that time should be reported as injuries. This is 
consistent with DOT's general guidelines and does not involve 
information protected by HIPAA.
Comments on Burden Estimate, Form 7100.1, Incident Report--Gas 
Distribution System
    Investigation Burden estimate: NAPSR and State regulators commented 
that the burden estimate did not account for the burden on State 
regulatory agencies to investigate incidents.
    PHMSA response: The burden associated with investigations is not 
related to the information that is collected via this form and has been 
appropriately excluded.
    Burden estimate: SoCal/SDG&E, Nicor, and MidAmerican commented that 
the burden for completing the form (estimated at 7 hours) was 
significantly underestimated. MidAmerican contended that the total time 
required to complete the form could be 20 to 40 hours or longer for 
complicated events. SoCal/SDG&E suggested that the burden could be 
reduced by redefining the thresholds for reporting incidents.
    PHMSA response: The operators provided little information in 
support of their contention. Nicor and SoCal/SDG&E simply stated that 
the burden was greater than estimated by PHMSA. MidAmerican provided 
estimates of hours that would be required to complete some sections of 
the form, but without substantiation. PHMSA agrees that complicated 
events may take longer, but notes that the shorter time that will be 
required for more ``simple'' events will balance this out. PHMSA 
believes that MidAmerican's estimates are excessive. Even if completion 
of the form would require more than the seven hours estimated, the 
total burden of this information collection is still minimal. Operators 
need only complete the form if they have an incident. There are 
approximately 150 incidents annually on gas distribution systems, and 
it is rare for an individual operator to experience more than one. 
PHMSA considers that the value of this information for future analysis 
of incident trends and the factors that influence the occurrence of 
incidents justifies the information collection burden. The threshold 
for reporting incidents is defined in the regulations and no change to 
those regulations has been proposed. Changing the threshold is beyond 
the scope of this information collection request.

B. Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7100.2, Gas Transmission and Gathering 
Systems

General Comments (Impacted Information Collection: OMB 2137-0522)
    Definition of incident: INGAA suggested that any information 
collection should be limited to only those events that meet the 
reporting thresholds for unintentional releases of gas, a limitation 
not included in the definition of incident in 49 CFR 191.3, but one 
that is included in the definition of incident in ASME/ANSI B31.8S 
(referenced in 49 CFR 192.945). Panhandle also suggested that a 
modification of the definition of incident, particularly given the 
recent change in the price of natural gas, should precede any change to 
the accompanying reporting form.
    PHMSA response: The definition of an incident is established by 
regulation and can only be changed in a notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
an action that is beyond the scope of this information collection 
request.
    Report vs. investigation: INGAA and certain pipeline operators 
argued that PHMSA's proposed changes to the reporting form go beyond 
what is necessary to report an incident and are tantamount to requiring 
a root cause investigation. INGAA suggested that this would likely mean 
that most of the incident reports submitted in 30 days would be 
incomplete. INGAA further suggested that the additional data items 
included in the new form actually undermine the original purpose of 
incident reporting. INGAA suggested that a rulemaking should be 
initiated if PHMSA wants to make changes of this magnitude.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that the revised form is designed to 
collect new, and in some