Positive Train Control Systems, 35950-36028 [E9-17184]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 138 (Tuesday, July 21, 2009)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 35950-36028]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-17184]



[[Page 35949]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Part III





Department of Transportation





-----------------------------------------------------------------------



Federal Railroad Administration



-----------------------------------------------------------------------



49 CFR Parts 229, 234, 235 et al.



Positive Train Control Systems; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 138 / Tuesday, July 21, 2009 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 35950]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229, 234, 235, and 236

[Docket No. FRA-2008-0132, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AC03


Positive Train Control Systems

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FRA proposes regulations implementing a requirement of the 
Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 that certain passenger and freight 
railroads install positive train control systems. The proposal includes 
required functionalities of the technology and the means by which it 
would be certified. The proposal also describes the contents of the 
positive train control implementation plans required by the statute and 
contains the proposed process for submission of those plans for review 
and approval by FRA. These proposed regulations could also be 
voluntarily complied with by entities not mandated to install positive 
train control systems.

DATES: (1) Written comments must be received by August 20, 2009. 
Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent 
possible without incurring additional expenses or delays.
    (2) FRA will hold an oral public hearing on a date to be announced 
in a forthcoming notice.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2008-0132, may 
be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Web Site: Comments should be filed at the Federal 
eRulemaking Portal, https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online 
instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12-140, Washington, DC 
20590.
     Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the 
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and 
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this 
rulemaking. Note that all comments received will be posted without 
change to https://www.regulations.gov including any personal 
information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document for Privacy Act information 
related to any submitted comments or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov at any time or to 
Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey 
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through 
Friday, except Federal Holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas McFarlin, Office of Safety 
Assurance and Compliance, Staff Director, Signal & Train Control 
Division, Federal Railroad Administration, Mail Stop 25, West Building 
3rd Floor West, Room W35-332, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 
DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6203); or Jason Schlosberg, Trial 
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, RCC-10, Mail Stop 10, West Building 
3rd Floor, Room W31-217, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 
20590 (telephone: 202-493-6032).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FRA is issuing this proposed rule to provide 
regulatory guidance and performance standards for the development, 
testing, implementation, and use of Positive Train Control (PTC) 
systems for railroads mandated by the Railroad Safety Improvement Act 
of 2008 section 104, Public Law 110-432, 122 Stat. 4854 (Oct. 16, 2008) 
(codified at 9 U.S.C. 20157) (hereinafter ``RSIA08'') to install PTC 
systems. These regulations may also be voluntarily complied with by 
entities not mandated to install PTC in lieu of the requirements 
contained in subpart H of part 236. The proposed rule establishes 
requirements for PTC system standard design and functionality, the 
associated submissions for FRA PTC system approval and certification, 
requirements for training, and required risk-based criteria. The RSIA08 
mandates that widespread implementation of PTC across a major portion 
of the U.S. rail industry be accomplished by December 31, 2015. This 
proposed rule is intended to provide the necessary Federal oversight, 
guidance, and assistance toward successful completion of that 
congressional requirement. This proposed rule also necessitates or 
results in some minimal revision or amendment to parts 229, 234 and 
235, as well as previously existing subparts A through H of part 236.

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Introduction
II. Background
    A. The Need for Positive Train Control Technology
    B. Earlier Efforts to Encourage Voluntary PTC Implementation
    C. Technology Advances Under Subpart H
III. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008
IV. RSAC
V. Use of Performance Standards
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis
VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    G. Energy Impact
    H. Privacy Act
VIII. The Rule

I. Introduction

    This proposed rule provides new performance standards for the 
implementation and operation of PTC systems as mandated by RSIA08 and 
as otherwise voluntarily adopted. The proposed rule also details the 
process and identifies the documents that railroads and operators of 
passenger trains are to utilize and incorporate in their PTC 
implementation plans required by the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 
2008 section 104, Public Law 110-432, 122 Stat. 4854, (Oct. 16, 2008) 
(codified at 9 U.S.C. 20157) (hereinafter ``RSIA08''). The proposal 
also details the process and procedure for obtaining FRA approval of 
such plans.
    FRA began the process of developing a proposed rule after RSIA08 
was signed into law. While developing the proposed rule, FRA applied 
the performance-based principles embodied in existing subpart H of part 
236 to identify and remedy any weaknesses discovered in the subpart H 
regulatory approach, while exploiting lessons learned from products 
developed under subpart H. FRA has continued to make performance-based 
safety decisions while supporting railroads in their development and 
implementation of PTC system technologies.
    Development of the proposed rule was enhanced with the 
participation of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which 
tasked a PTC Working Group to provide advice regarding development of 
implementing regulations for PTC systems and their deployment that are 
required under RSIA08. The PTC Working Group made a number of consensus 
recommendations, which have been

[[Page 35951]]

identified and included in this proposed rule. The preamble discusses 
the statutory background, the regulatory background, the RSAC 
proceedings, the alternatives considered and the rationale for the 
option selected, the proceedings to date, as well as the comments and 
conclusions on general issues. Other comments and resolutions are 
discussed within the corresponding section-by-section analysis.

II. Background

A. The Need for Positive Train Control Technology

    Since the early 1920s, systems have been in use that can intervene 
in train operations by warning crews or causing trains to stop if they 
are not being operated safely because of inattention, misinterpretation 
of wayside signal indications, or incapacitation of the crew. Pursuant 
to orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)--whose safety 
regulatory activities were later transferred to FRA when it was 
established in 1967--cab signal systems, automatic train control, and 
automatic train stop systems were deployed on a significant portion of 
the national rail system to supplement and enforce the indications of 
wayside signals and operating speed limitations. However, these systems 
were expensive to install and maintain, and with the decline of 
intercity passenger service following the Second World War, the ICC and 
the industry allowed many of these systems to be discontinued. During 
this period, railroads were heavily regulated with respect to rates and 
service responsibilities. The development of the Interstate Highway 
System and other factors led to reductions in the railroads' revenues 
without regulatory relief, leading to bankruptcies, railroad mergers, 
and eventual abandonment of many rail lines. Consequently, railroads 
focused on fiscal survival, and investments in expensive relay-based 
train control technology were economically out of reach. The removal of 
these train control systems, which had never been pervasively 
installed, permitted train collisions to continue, notwithstanding 
enforcement of railroad operating rules designed to prevent them.
    As early as 1970, following its investigation of the August 20, 
1969, head-on collision of two Penn Central Commuter trains near 
Darien, Connecticut, in which 4 people were killed and 45 people were 
injured, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) asked FRA to 
study the feasibility of requiring a form of automatic train control 
system to protect against operator error and prevent train collisions. 
Following the Darien accident, the NTSB continued to investigate one 
railroad accident after another caused by human error. During the next 
two decades, the NTSB issued a number of safety recommendations asking 
for train control measures. Following its investigation of the May 7, 
1986, rear-end collision involving a Boston and Maine Corporation 
commuter train and a Consolidated Rail Incorporated (Conrail) freight 
train in which 153 people were injured, the NTSB recommend that FRA 
promulgate standards to require the installation and operation of a 
train control system that would provide for positive train separation. 
NTSB Recommendation R-87-16 (May 19, 1987), available at https://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/1987/R87_16.pdf. When the NTSB first 
established its Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements 
in 1990, the issue of Positive Train Separation was among the 
improvements listed, and it remained on the list until just after 
enactment of RSIA08. Original ``Most Wanted'' list of Transportation 
Safety Improvements, as adopted September 1990, available at https://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/mostwanted/original_list.htm. The NTSB continues to 
follow the progress of the technology's implementation closely and 
participated through staff in the most recent PTC Working Group 
deliberations.
    Meanwhile, enactment of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 signaled a 
shift in public policy that permitted the railroads to shed 
unprofitable lines, largely replace published ``tariffs'' with 
appropriately priced contract rates, and generally respond to 
marketplace realities, which increasingly demanded flexible service 
options responsive to customer needs. The advent of microprocessor-
based electronic control systems and digital data radio technology 
during the mid-1980s led the freight railroad industry, through the 
Association of American Railroads (AAR) and the Railway Association of 
Canada, to explore the development of Advanced Train Control Systems 
(ATCS). With broad participation by suppliers, railroads, and FRA, 
detailed specifications were developed for a multi-level ``open'' 
architecture that would permit participation by many suppliers while 
ensuring that systems deployed on various railroads would work in 
harmony as trains crossed corporate boundaries. ATCS was intended to 
serve a variety of business purposes, in addition to enhancing the 
safety of train operations. Pilot versions of ATCS and a similar system 
known as Advanced Railroad Electronic Systems (ARES) were tested 
relatively successfully, but the systems were never deployed on a wide 
scale primarily due to cost. However, sub-elements of these systems 
were employed for various purposes, particularly for replacement of 
pole lines associated with signal systems.
    Collisions, derailments, and incursions into work zones used by 
roadway workers continued as a result of the absence of effective 
enforcement systems designed to compensate for the effects of fatigue 
and other human factors. Renewed emphasis on rules compliance and 
Federal regulatory initiatives, including rules for the control of 
alcohol and drug use in railroad operations, operational testing and 
inspection programs designed to verify railroad rules compliance, 
requirements for qualification and certification of locomotive 
engineers, and negotiated rules for roadway worker protection led to 
some reduction in risk. However, the lack of an effective collision 
avoidance system allowed the continued occurrence of accidents, some 
involving tragic losses of life and significant property damage.

B. Earlier Efforts To Encourage Voluntary PTC Implementation

    As the NTSB continued to highlight the opportunities for accident 
prevention associated with emerging train control technology through 
its investigations and findings, Congress showed increasing interest, 
mandating three separate reports over the period of a decade. In 1994, 
FRA reported to Congress on this problem, calling for implementation of 
an action plan to deploy PTC systems (Railroad Communications and Train 
Control, July 1994 (hereinafter ``1994 Report'')). The 1994 Report 
forecasted substantial benefits of advanced train control technology in 
supporting a variety of business and safety purposes, but noted that an 
immediate regulatory mandate for PTC could not be justified based upon 
normal cost-benefit principals relying on direct safety benefits. The 
report outlined an aggressive Action Plan implementing a public-private 
sector partnership to explore technology potential, deploy systems for 
demonstration, and structure a regulatory framework to support emerging 
PTC initiatives.
    Following through on the 1994 Report, FRA committed approximately 
$40 million through the Next Generation High Speed Rail Program and the 
Research and Development Program to support development,

[[Page 35952]]

testing, and deployment of PTC prototype systems in the Pacific 
Northwest, Michigan, Illinois, Alaska, and some Eastern railroads. FRA 
also initiated a comprehensive effort to structure an appropriate 
regulatory framework for facilitating voluntary implementation of PTC 
and for evaluating future safety needs and opportunities.
    In September of 1997, FRA asked the RSAC to address the issue of 
PTC. The RSAC accepted three tasks: Standards for New Train Control 
Systems (Task 1997-06), Positive Train Control Systems--Implementation 
Issues (Task 1997-05), and Positive Train Control Systems--
Technologies, Definitions, and Capabilities (Task 1997-04). The PTC 
Working Group was established, comprised of representatives of labor 
organizations, suppliers, passenger and freight railroads, other 
Federal agencies, and interested state departments of transportation. 
The PTC Working Group was supported by FRA counsel and staff, analysts 
from the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, and advisors 
from the NTSB staff.
    In 1999, the PTC Working Group provided to the Federal Railroad 
Administrator a consensus report (``1999 Report'') with an indication 
that it would be continuing its efforts. The report defined the PTC 
core functions to include: Prevention of train-to-train collisions 
(positive train separation); enforcement of speed restrictions, 
including civil engineering restrictions (curves, bridges, etc.) and 
temporary slow orders; and protection for roadway workers and their 
equipment operating under specific authorities. The PTC Working Group 
identified additional safety functions that might be included in some 
PTC architectures: Provide warning of on-track equipment operating 
outside the limits of authority; receive and act upon hazard 
information, when available, in a more timely or more secure manner 
(e.g., compromised bridge integrity, wayside detector data); and 
provide for future capability by generating data for transfer to 
highway users to enhance warning at highway-rail grade crossings. The 
PTC Working Group stressed that efforts to enhance highway-rail grade 
crossing safety must recognize the train's necessary right of way at 
grade crossings and that it is important that warning systems employed 
at highway-rail grade crossings be highly reliable and ``fail-safe'' in 
their design.
    As the PTC Working Group's work continued, other collaborative 
efforts, including development of Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
(including private standards through the American Public Transit 
Association), Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness rules, and 
proposals for improving locomotive crashworthiness (including improved 
fuel tank standards) have targeted reduction in collision and 
derailment consequences.
    In 2003, in light of technological advances and potential increased 
cost and system savings related to prioritized deployment of PTC 
systems, the Appropriations Committees of Congress requested that FRA 
update the costs and benefits for the deployment of PTC and related 
systems. As requested, FRA carried out a detailed analysis that was 
filed in August of 2004 (``2004 Report''), which indicated that under 
one set of highly controversial assumptions, substantial public 
benefits would likely flow from the installation of PTC systems on the 
railroad system. Further, the total amount of these benefits was 
subject to considerable controversy. While many of the other findings 
of the 2004 Report were disputed, there were no data submitted to 
challenge the 2004 Report finding that reaffirmed earlier conclusions 
that the safety benefits of PTC systems were relatively small in 
comparison to the large capital and maintenance costs. Accordingly, FRA 
continued to believe that an immediate regulatory mandate for 
widespread PTC implementation could not be justified based upon 
traditional cost-benefit principles relying on direct railroad safety 
benefits. Benefits and Costs of Positive Train Control (Report in 
Response to Committees on Appropriations, August 2004).
    Despite the economic infeasibility of PTC based on safety benefits 
alone, as outlined in the 1994, 1999, and 2004 Reports, FRA continued 
with regulatory and other efforts to facilitate and encourage the 
voluntary installation of PTC systems. As part of the High Speed Rail 
Initiative, and in conjunction with the National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation (Amtrak), the AAR, the State of Illinois, and the Union 
Pacific Railroad Company (UP), FRA created the North American Joint 
Positive Train Control (NAJPTC) Program, which set out to describe a 
single standardized open source PTC architecture and system. UP's line 
between Springfield and Mazonia, Illinois was selected for initial 
installation of a train control system to support Amtrak operations up 
to 110 mph, and the system was installed and tested on portions of that 
line. Although the system did not prove viable as then conceived, the 
project hastened the development of PTC technology that was 
subsequently employed in other projects. Promised standards for 
interoperability of PTC systems also proved elusive.
    In addition to financially supporting the NAJPTC Program, FRA 
continued to work with the rail carriers, rail labor, and suppliers on 
regulatory reforms to facilitate voluntary PTC implementation. The 
regulatory reform effort culminated when FRA issued a final rule on 
March 7, 2005, establishing a technology neutral safety-based 
performance standard for processor-based signal and train control 
systems. This new regulation, codified as subpart H to part 236, was 
carefully crafted to encourage the voluntary implementation and 
operation of processor-based signal and train control systems without 
impairing technological development. 70 FR 11052 (Mar. 7, 2005).
    FRA intended that final rule--developed in close cooperation with 
rail management, rail labor, and suppliers--to further facilitate 
individual railroad efforts to voluntarily develop and deploy cost 
effective PTC technologies that would make system-wide deployment more 
economically viable. It also appeared very possible that major 
railroads would elect to make voluntary investments in PTC to enhance 
safety, improve service quality, and foster efficiency (e.g., better 
asset utilization, reduced fuel use through train pacing).

C. Technology Advances Under Subpart H

    While FRA and RSAC worked to develop consensus on the regulations 
that would become subpart H, the railroads continued with PTC prototype 
development. The technology neutral, performance-based regulatory 
process established by subpart H proved to be very successful in 
facilitating the development of other PTC implementation approaches. 
Although the railroads prototype development efforts were generally 
technically successful and offered significant improvements in safety, 
costs of nationwide deployment continued to be untenable. Information 
gained from prototype efforts did little to reduce the estimated costs 
for widespread implementation of the core PTC safety functions on the 
nation's railroads.
    Working under subpart H, the BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), CSX 
Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), the Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS), and 
UP undertook more aggressive design and implementation work. The new 
subpart H regulatory approach also made it feasible for smaller 
railroads such as the Alaska Railroad and the Ohio Central Railroad to 
begin voluntary design and implementation work on PTC systems

[[Page 35953]]

that best suited their needs. FRA provided, and continues to provide, 
technical assistance and guidance regarding regulatory compliance to 
enable the railroads to more effectively design, install, and test 
their respective systems.
    In December 2006, FRA approved the initial version of the 
Electronic Train Management System (ETMS) product for deployment on 35 
of BNSF's subdivisions (``ETMS I Configuration'') comprising single 
track territory that was either non-signaled or equipped with traffic 
control systems. In a separate proceeding, FRA agreed that ETMS could 
be installed in lieu of restoring a block signal system on a line for 
which discontinuance had been authorized followed by a significant 
increase in traffic. During the same period, BNSF successfully 
demonstrated a Switch Point Monitoring System (SPMS)--a system that 
contains devices attached to switches that electronically report the 
position of the switches to the railroad's central dispatching office 
or the crew of an approaching train--and a Track Integrity Warning 
System (TIWS)--a system that electronically reports to the railroad's 
central dispatching office or the crew of an approaching train if there 
are any breaks in the rail that might lead to derailments. FRA believes 
both of these technologies help to reduce risk in non-signaled 
territory and are forward-compatible for use with existing and new PTC 
systems. To be forward-compatible, not to be confused with the similar 
concept of extensibility, a system must be able to gracefully provide 
input intended for use in later system versions. The introduction of a 
forward-compatible technology implies that older devices can partly 
understand and provide data generated or used by new devices or 
systems. The concept can be applied to electrical interfaces, 
telecommunication signals, data communication protocols, file formats, 
and computer programming languages. A standard supports forward-
compatibility if older product versions can receive, read, view, play, 
execute, or transmit data to the new standard. In the case of wayside 
devices, they are said to be forward compatible if they can 
appropriately communicate and interact with a PTC system when later 
installed. A wayside device might serve the function of providing only 
information or providing information and accepting commands from a new 
system.
    In addition to scheduling the installation of the ETMS I 
configuration as capital funding became available, BNSF voluntarily 
undertook the design and testing of complementary versions of ETMS that 
would support BNSF operations on more complex track configurations, at 
higher allowable train speeds, and with additional types of rail 
traffic. Meanwhile, CSXT was in the process of redesigning and 
relocating the test bed for its Communications Based Train Management 
(CBTM) system, which it has tested for several years, and UP and NS 
were working on similar systems using vital onboard processing.
    As congressional consideration of legislation that resulted in the 
RSIA08 commenced, all four major railroads had settled on the core 
technology developed for them by Wabtec Railway Electronics 
(``Wabtec''). As the legislation progressed, the railroads and Wabtec 
worked toward greater commonality in the basic functioning of the 
onboard system with a view toward interoperability. Accordingly, ETMS 
is now a generic architectural description of one type of PTC system. 
Examples of ETMS include the non-vital PTC systems of BNSF's ETMS I and 
ETMS II, CSXT's CBTM, UP's Vital Train Management System (VTMS), and 
NS's Optimized Train Control (OTC). Further work is being undertaken by 
BNSF to advance the capability of ETMS by integrating Amtrak operations 
(ETMS III). For a description of system enhancements planned by BNSF as 
per the Product Safety Plan filed in accordance with subpart H, see FRA 
Docket No. 2006-23687, Document 0017, at pp. 40-43.
    While the freight railroads' efforts for developing and installing 
PTC systems progressed over a relatively long period of time, starting 
with demonstrations of ATCS and ARES in the late 1980s and culminating 
in the initial ETMS Product Safety Plan approval in December of 2006, 
Amtrak demonstrated its ability to turn on revenue-quality PTC systems 
on its own railroad in support of high speed rail. Beginning in the 
early 1990s, Amtrak developed plans for enhanced high speed service on 
the Northeast Corridor (NEC), which included electrification and other 
improvements between New Haven and Boston and introduction of the Acela 
trainsets as the premium service from Washington to New York and New 
York to Boston. In connection with these improvements, which support 
train speeds up to 150 mph, Amtrak undertook to install the Advanced 
Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) as a supplement to existing cab 
signals and automatic train control (speed control). Together, these 
systems deliver PTC core functionalities. In support of this effort, 
FRA issued an order for the installation of the system, which required 
all passenger and freight operators in the New Haven-Boston segment to 
equip their locomotives with ACSES. See 63 FR 39343 (July 22, 1998). 
ACSES was installed between 2000 and 2002, and has functioned 
successfully between New Haven and Boston, and on selected high speed 
segments between Washington and New York for a number of years.
    Amtrak voluntarily began development of an architecturally 
different PTC system, the Incremental Train Control System (ITCS), for 
installation on its Michigan Line. Amtrak developed and installed ITCS 
under waivers from specific sections of 49 CFR part 236, subparts A 
through G, granted by FRA. ITCS was applied to tenant NS locomotives as 
well as Amtrak locomotives traversing the route. Highway-rail grade 
crossings on the route were fitted with ITCS units to pre-start the 
warning systems for high-speed trains and to monitor crossing warning 
system health in real time. The ITCS was tested extensively in the 
field for safety and reliability, and it was placed in revenue service 
in 2001. As experience was gained, FRA authorized increases in speed to 
95 mph; and FRA is presently awaiting final results of an independent 
assessment of verification and validation for the system with a view 
toward authorizing operations at the design speed of 110 mph.
    Despite these successes, the widespread deployment of these various 
train control systems, particularly on the general freight system, 
remained very much constrained by prohibitive capital costs. While the 
railroads were committed to installing these new systems to enhance the 
safety afforded to the public and their employees, the railroad's 
actual widespread implementation remained forestalled due to an 
inability to generate sufficient funding for these new projects in 
excess of the capital expenditures necessary to cover the ongoing 
operating and maintenance costs. Accordingly, the railroads continued 
to plan very slow deployments of PTC system technologies.

III. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008

    On May 1, 2007, the House of Representatives introduced H.R. 2095, 
which would, among other things, mandate the implementation and use of 
PTC systems. The bill passed the House on October 17, 2007. The bill 
was then amended and passed by the Senate on August 1, 2008. While the 
bill was awaiting final passage, the FRA Administrator testified before 
Congress that ``FRA is a strong supporter of PTC

[[Page 35954]]

technology and is an active advocate for its continued development and 
deployment.'' Senate Commerce Committee Briefing on Metrolink Accident, 
110th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2008) (written statement of Federal Railroad 
Administrator Joseph H. Boardman), available at https://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/PubAffairs/09-23-08FinalStatementFRAAdministratorPTC_Sen_Boxer_Meeting.pdf.
    On September 24, 2008, the House concurred with the Senate 
amendment and added another amendment pursuant to H. Res. 1492. When 
considering the House's amendment, various Senators made statements 
referencing certain train accidents that were believed to be PTC-
preventable. For instance, Senator Lautenberg (NJ) took notice of the 
collision at Graniteville, South Carolina in 2005, and Senators 
Lautenberg, Hutchinson (TX), Boxer (CA), Levin (MI), and Carper (DE) 
took notice of an accident at Chatsworth, California, on September 12, 
2008. According to Senator Levin, Federal investigators have said that 
a collision warning system could have prevented that crash and the 
subject legislation would require that new technology to prevent 
crashes be installed in high risk tracks. Senators Carper and Boxer 
made similar statements, indicating that PTC systems are designed to 
prevent train derailments and collisions, like the one in Chatsworth. 
154 Cong. Rec. S10283-S10290 (2008). Ultimately, on October 1, 2008, 
the Senate concurred with the House amendment.
    The Graniteville accident referenced by Senator Lautenberg was an 
early morning collision between two NS trains in non-signaled (dark) 
territory near the Avondale Mills Textile plant. One of the trains--
which was transporting chlorine gas, sodium hydroxide, and cresol on 
the main track--approached an improperly lined hand-operated switch. As 
the train diverged through the switch, it ran onto the siding track 
where it collided with a parked train. Various tank cars ruptured, 
releasing at least 90 tons of chlorine gas. Nine people died due to 
chlorine inhalation and at least 250 people were treated for chlorine 
exposure. In addition, 5,400 residents within a mile of the crash site 
were forced to evacuate for nearly two weeks while hazardous materials 
(hazmat) teams and cleanup crews decontaminated the area.
    The Chatsworth train collision occurred on the afternoon of 
September 12, 2008, when a Union Pacific freight train and a Metrolink 
commuter train collided head-on on a single main track equipped with a 
Traffic Control System (TCS) in the Chatsworth district of Los Angeles, 
California. Although NTSB has not yet released its final report, 
evidence summarized at the NTSB's public hearing suggested that the 
Metrolink passenger train was operated past a signal displaying a stop 
indication and entered a section of single track where the opposing UP 
freight train was operating on a signal indication permitting it to 
proceed over a switch and into a siding (after which the switch would 
have been lined for the Metrolink train to proceed). As a consequence 
of the accident, 25 people died and over 130 more were seriously 
injured.
    Prior to the accidents in Graniteville and Chatsworth, the 
railroads' slow incremental deployment of PTC technologies--while not 
uniformly agreed upon by the railroads, FRA, and NTSB--was generally 
deemed acceptable by them in view of the tremendous costs involved. 
Partially as a consequence and severity of these very public accidents, 
coupled with a series of other less publicized accidents, Congress 
passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 into law on October 16, 
2008, marking a public policy decision that, despite the implementation 
costs, railroad employee and general public safety warranted mandatory 
and accelerated installation and operation of PTC systems.
    As immediately relevant to this rulemaking, RSIA08 requires the 
installation and operation of PTC systems on all main lines, meaning 
all intercity and commuter lines--with limited exceptions entrusted to 
FRA--and on freight-only lines when they are part of a Class I railroad 
system, carrying at least 5 million gross tons of freight annually, and 
carrying any amount of poison- or toxic-by-inhalation (PIH or TIH) 
materials. While the statute vests certain responsibilities with the 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Secretary has 
since delegated those responsibilities to the FRA Administrator. See 49 
CFR 1.49(oo); 74 FR 26,981 (June 5, 2009); see also 49 U.S.C. 103(g).
    In RSIA08, Congress established very aggressive dates for PTC 
system build-out completion. Each subject railroad is required to 
submit to FRA by April 16, 2010, an implementation plan indicating 
where and how it intends to install PTC systems by December 31, 2015. 
As a result of this accelerated PTC system deployment schedule, 
railroads must immediately engage in a massive reprogramming of capital 
funds.
    In light of the timetable instituted by Congress, and to better 
support railroads with their installation while maintaining safety, FRA 
decided that it is appropriate for mandatory PTC systems to be reviewed 
by FRA differently than the regulatory approval process provided under 
subpart H. FRA believes that it is important to develop a process more 
suited specifically for PTC systems that would better facilitate 
railroad reuse of safety documentation and simplify the process of 
showing that the installation of the PTC system did not degrade safety. 
FRA also believes that subpart H does not clearly address the statutory 
mandates and that such lack of clarity would complicate railroad 
efforts to comply with the new statutory requirements. Accordingly, FRA 
is hereby proposing to amend part 236 by modifying existing subpart H 
and adding a new subpart I. FRA requests comments on whether this 
proposed regulation exercises the appropriate level of discretion and 
flexibility to comply with RSIA08 in the most cost effective and 
beneficial manner.

IV. RSAC

    In March 1996, FRA established the RSAC, which provides a forum for 
collaborative rulemaking and program development. The RSAC includes 
representatives from all of the agency's major stakeholder groups, 
including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, 
and other interested parties. When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to 
RSAC, and after consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the 
task. If accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the 
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop 
recommendation to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations are 
developed by consensus. The working group may establish one or more 
task forces or other subgroups to develop facts and options on a 
particular aspect of a given task. The task force, or other subgroup, 
reports to the working group. If a working group comes to consensus on 
recommendations for action, the package is presented to the RSAC for a 
vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority of the RSAC, the 
proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then determines what 
action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff has played an 
active role at the working group and subgroup levels in discussing the 
issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus 
proposal, and because the RSAC recommendation constitutes the consensus 
of some of the industry's

[[Page 35955]]

leading experts on a given subject, FRA is generally favorably inclined 
toward the RSAC recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to 
follow the recommendation and the agency exercises its independent 
judgment on whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's 
regulatory goals, is soundly supported, and was developed in accordance 
with the applicable policy and legal requirements. Often, FRA varies in 
some respects from the RSAC recommendation in developing the actual 
regulatory proposal.
    In developing this proposal, FRA adopted the RSAC PTC Working Group 
approach. As part of this effort, FRA is working with the major 
stakeholders affected by this subpart in as much a collaborative manner 
as possible. FRA believes establishing a collaborative relationship 
early in the product development and regulatory development cycles can 
help bridge the divide between the railroad carrier's management, 
railroad labor organizations, the suppliers, and FRA by ensuring that 
all stakeholders are working with the same set of data and have a 
common understanding of product characteristics or their related 
processes production methods, including the regulatory provisions, with 
which compliance is mandatory. However, where the group failed to reach 
consensus on an issue, FRA used its authority to resolve the issue, 
attempting to reconcile as many of the divergent positions as possible 
through traditional rulemaking proceedings.
    On December 10, 2008, the RSAC accepted a task (No. 08-04) entitled 
``Implementation of Positive Train Control Systems.'' The purpose of 
this task was defined as follows: ``To provide advice regarding 
development of implementing regulations for Positive Train Control 
(PTC) systems and their deployment under the Rail Safety Improvement 
Act of 2008.'' The task called for the RSAC PTC Working Group to 
perform the following:
     Review the mandates and objectives of the Act related to 
deployment of PTC systems;
     Help to describe the specific functional attributes of 
systems meeting the statutory purposes in light of available 
technology;
     Review impacts on small entities and ascertain how best to 
address them in harmony with the statutory requirements;
     Help to describe the details that should be included in 
the implementation plans that railroads must file within 18 months of 
enactment of the Act;
     Offer recommendations on the specific content of 
implementing regulations; and The task also required the PTC Working 
Group to:
     Report on the functionalities of PTC systems;
     Describe the essential elements bearing on 
interoperability and the requirements for consultation with other 
railroads in joint operations; and
     Determine how PTC systems will work with the operation of 
non-equipped trains.
    The PTC Working Group was formed from interested organizations that 
are members of the RSAC. The following organizations contributed 
members:

American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials 
(AAHSTO)
American Chemistry Council (ACC)
American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA)
Association of American Railroads (AAR)
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM)
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division (BMWED)
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen Division (BLETD)
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen
Federal Transit Administration*
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)*
Railway Supply Institute (RSI)
Transport Canada*
Tourist Railway Association Inc.
United Transportation Union (UTU)
    *Indicates associate (non-voting) member.

    From January to April 2009, FRA met with the entire PTC Working 
Group five times over the course of twelve days. During those meetings, 
in order to efficiently accomplish the tasks assigned to it, the PTC 
Working Group empowered three task forces to work concurrently. These 
task forces were the passenger, short line and regional railroad, and 
the radio and communications task forces. Each discussed issues 
specific to their particular interests and needs and produced proposed 
rule language for the PTC Working Group's consideration. The majority 
of the proposals were adopted into the rule as agreed upon by the 
working group, with rule language related to a remaining few issues 
being further discussed and enhanced for inclusion into the rule by the 
PTC Working Group.
    The passenger task force discussed testing issues relating to parts 
236 and 238 and the definition of ``main line'' under the statute, 
including possible passenger terminal and limited operations exceptions 
to PTC implementation. Recommendations of the task force were presented 
to the PTC Working Group, which adopted or refined each suggestion.
    The short line and regional railroad task group was formed to 
address the questions pertaining to Class II and Class III railroads. 
Specifically, the group discussed issues regarding the trackage rights 
of Class II and III railroads using trains not equipped with PTC 
technology over a Class I railroad's PTC territory, passenger service 
over track owned by a Class II or Class III railroads where PTC would 
not otherwise be required, and railroad crossings-at-grade involving a 
Class I railroad's PTC-equipped train and a Class II or III railroad's 
PTC unequipped train. After much discussion, there were no resolutions 
reached to any of the main issues raised. However, the discussion 
yielded insights utilized by FRA in preparing this proposed rule.
    The radio and communications task force addressed wireless 
communications issues, particularly as it relates to communications 
security, and recommended language for proposed Sec.  236.1033.
    FRA staff worked with the PTC Working Group and its task forces in 
developing many facets of this proposal. FRA gratefully acknowledges 
the participation and leadership of representatives who served on the 
PTC Working Group and its task forces. These points are discussed to 
show the origin of certain issues and the course of discussion on these 
issues at the task force and working group levels. We believe this 
helps illuminate the factors FRA weighed in making its regulatory 
decisions regarding this proposed rule and the logic behind those 
decisions.
    In general, the PTC Working Group agreed on the process for 
implementing PTC under the statute, including decisional criteria to be 
applied by FRA in evaluating safety plans, adaptation of subpart H 
principles to support this mandatory implementation, and refinements to 
subpart H and the part 236 appendices necessary to dovetail the two 
regulatory regimes and take lessons from early implementation of 
subpart H, including most aspects of the training requirements. Notable 
accords were reached, as well, on major functionalities of PTC and on 
exceptions applicable to passenger

[[Page 35956]]

service (terminal areas and main line exceptions). Major areas of 
disagreement included whether to allow non-equipped trains on PTC 
lines, extension of PTC to lines not within the statutory mandate, and 
whether to provide for additional onboard displays when two or more 
persons are regularly assigned duties in the cab. Some additional areas 
of concern were discussed but could not be resolved in the time 
available. It was understood that where discussion did not yield 
agreement, FRA would make proposals and receive public comment.

V. Use of Performance Standards

    Given the statutory mandate for the implementation of PTC systems, 
FRA intends the proposed rule to accelerate the promotion of, and not 
hinder, cost effective technological innovation by encouraging an 
efficient utilization of resources, an increased level of competition, 
and more innovative user applications and technological developments. 
FRA believes that, wherever possible, regulation must allow 
technologies the full freedom to exploit market opportunities, must 
support the challenges and opportunities resulting from the combination 
of emerging and varying technologies within an evolving marketplace, 
and should not discriminate between PTC systems vendors due to the 
technology or services provided.
    Accordingly, wherever possible, FRA has attempted to refrain as 
much as possible from developing technical or design standards, or even 
requiring implementation of particular PTC technologies that may 
prevent technological innovation or the development of alternative 
means to achieve the statutorily defined PTC functions. If FRA were to 
implement specific technical standards, emerging technologies may 
render those standards obsolete. Thus, implementation of systems by the 
railroads using new technologies that are not addressed by the specific 
standards would require railroads and FRA to manage the deployment of 
alternative technologies using a cumbersome and time consuming waiver 
process. Consequently, for the same reasons FRA expressed in the final 
rule implementing subpart H (70 FR 11052, 11055-11059 (Mar. 7, 2005)), 
FRA continues to believe that it is best to pursue a performance-based 
standard while providing sufficient basic parameters within which the 
PTC system's architectures and functionalities must be developed, 
implemented, and maintained.
    Like subpart H of part 236, proposed subpart I provides for the 
same level of product confidence and versatility in determining what 
PTC technology a railroad may elect to implement and operate, even if 
the railroad chooses to modify its PTC system over time. Unlike subpart 
H, however, proposed subpart I requires specific deployment of PTC 
while simplifying the application process, potentially reducing the 
size of the regulatory filings through facilitation of safety 
documentation reuse, and more narrowly defining the required 
performance targets based on railroad operations and in terms of more 
specific functional PTC behaviors. The approach under subpart I also 
reduces the likelihood of continually changing safety targets, which 
may vary based on each railroad's safety culture, and provides for 
incremental improvements in safety in coordination with FRA.
    To ensure sufficient confidence in each PTC system implemented 
under subpart I, FRA expects that all safety- and risk-related data be 
supported by credible evidence or information. Such credible evidence 
or information may be developed through laboratory or field testing, 
augmented by appropriate analysis and inspection, which may be 
monitored or reviewed by FRA. FRA expects that, as a practical matter, 
lab testing would be performed in the majority of cases. FRA does not 
believe it is necessary to require any railroad to lab test. However, 
field testing may be required in certain instances to test certain 
points of the PTC system in various conditions.
    If the railroad or FRA determines that the complexity of the 
technology or the supporting safety case warrants, credibility of this 
information may also be evaluated through an assessment of Verification 
and Validation performed by an acceptable independent third party 
selected and paid for by the railroad, subject to FRA approval. 
Ultimately, however, it is FRA's responsibility to determine whether 
each PTC system's performance results in an acceptable level of safety 
to railroad employees and the general public and whether any such 
system shall receive PTC System Certification, as required by statute. 
In order to provide meaningful flexibility, FRA is prepared to consider 
use of alternative risk analysis methods and proposals regarding the 
extent to which a product exhibits fail-safe behavior. FRA still 
emphasizes that higher speed and higher risk rail service should be 
supported by more highly competent train control technology and 
analysis.
    FRA recognizes that there may potentially be various PTC system 
configurations and a variety of operational scopes involved. FRA 
believes that the information requested under subpart I should be 
sufficient to permit FRA to predict whether a PTC system is fully 
adequate from a safety perspective. Subparts H and I require submission 
of similar technical data. Given the degree of uncertainty associated 
with the underlying analysis of a complex PTC system and its environs, 
subpart I--much like subpart H--requires application of FRA's judgment 
and expertise. Given the complexity of the underlying analysis--and 
FRA's need to ensure an acceptable level of safety and analytical 
uniformity between functionally equivalent but architecturally 
different systems--it is incumbent upon the subject railroad, possibly 
in concert with the vendor, supplier, or manufacturer of its PTC 
system, to make a persuasive case in its filings that the applicable 
performance standards are met. Primarily, the risk assessments required 
by the proposed rule should provide an objective measure of the safety 
risk levels involved, which will be reviewed by FRA for comparison 
purposes. As such, FRA believes that each risk assessment should 
determine relative risk levels, rather than absolute risk levels, but 
against a clearly delineated base case acceptable to FRA under the 
proposed regulation.
    Thus, this proposed rule attempts to emphasize the determination of 
relative risk. FRA believes that the guidelines captured in Appendix B 
adequately state the objectives and major considerations of any risk 
assessment it would expect to see submitted under proposed subpart I. 
FRA also believes that these guidelines allow sufficient flexibility in 
the conduct of risk assessments, yet provide sufficient uniformity by 
helping to ensure that final results are presented in familiar units of 
measurement.
    One of the major characteristics of a risk assessment is whether it 
is performed using qualitative or quantitative methods. FRA continues 
to believe that both quantitative and qualitative risk assessment 
methods may be used, as well as combinations of the two. FRA expects 
that qualitative methods should be used only where appropriate, and 
only when accompanied by an explanation as to why the particular risk 
cannot be fairly quantified. FRA also continues to believe that 
railroads and suppliers should not be limited in the type of risk 
assessments they should be allowed to perform to demonstrate compliance 
with the minimum performance standard. The state of the art of risk

[[Page 35957]]

assessment methods could potentially change more quickly than the 
regulatory process will allow, and not taking advantage of these 
innovations could slow the progress of implementation of safer signal 
and train control systems. Thus, as in subpart H, FRA is allowing risk 
assessment methods not meeting the guidelines of this rule, so long as 
it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the FRA Associate 
Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer (hereinafter 
Associate Administrator) that the risk assessment method used is 
suitable in the context of the particular PTC system. FRA believes this 
determination is best left to the Associate Administrator because the 
FRA retains authority to ultimately prevent implementation of a system 
whose plans do not adequately demonstrate compliance with the 
performance standard under the proposed rule.
    FRA is aware that some types of risk are more amenable to 
measurement by using certain methods rather than others because of the 
type and amount of data available. If a railroad does elect to use 
different risk assessment methods, FRA will consider this as a factor 
for PTC System Certification (see Sec.  236.1015). Also, in such cases, 
when the margin of uncertainty has been inadequately described, FRA 
will be more likely to require FRA monitored field or laboratory 
testing (see Sec.  236.1035) or an independent third-party assessment 
(see Sec.  236.1017).
    When FRA issued the final rule establishing subpart H, FRA 
considered the criteria of simplicity, relevancy, reliability, cost, 
and objectivity. FRA believes that these criteria remain applicable. 
FRA has attempted to make the requirements under subpart I simpler than 
the requirements of subpart H, so that railroads will be provided with 
a greater amount of flexibility to more easily demonstrate that its PTC 
system is certifiable by FRA. Like subpart H, subpart I focuses on the 
safety-relevant characteristics of systems and emphasizes all relevant 
aspects of product performance. FRA also drafted performance standards 
that can be applied reliably and precisely in a manner which should 
yield similar results each time it is applied to the same subject. 
Although RSIA08 appears to make cost a consideration secondary to 
safety, FRA believes that demonstrating compliance under subpart I 
should minimize those costs while not degrading the primary objective 
of public safety. FRA also believes that subpart I includes an 
objective performance standard where compliance can be determined 
through sound engineering analysis, testing, or investigation.

VI. Section-by-Section Analysis

    Unless otherwise noted, all section references below refer to 
sections in title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). FRA 
seeks comments on all proposals made in this NPRM.

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 229

Section 229.135 Event Recorders

    Advances in electronics and software technology have not only 
enabled the development of PTC systems, but have also resulted in 
changes to the implementation of locomotive control systems. These 
technological changes have provided for the introduction of new 
functional capabilities and the integration of different functions in 
ways that advance the building, operation, and maintenance of 
locomotive control systems. FRA also recognizes that advances in 
technology may further eliminate the traditional distinctions between 
locomotive control and train control functionalities. Indeed, 
technological advances may provide opportunities for increased or 
improved functionalities in train control systems that run concurrently 
with locomotive control.
    Train control and locomotive control, however, remain two 
fundamentally different operations with different objectives. FRA does 
not want to restrict the adoption of new locomotive control functions 
and technologies by imposing regulations on locomotive control systems 
intended to address safety issues associated with train control. 
Accordingly FRA is reviewing and enhancing the Locomotive Safety 
Standards (49 CFR part 229) to address the use of advanced electronics 
and software technologies to improve safe, efficient, and economical 
locomotive operations when a new or proposed locomotive control system 
function does not interface or commingle with a safety-critical train 
control system. In the meantime, FRA proposes to amend Sec.  229.135 to 
ensure its applicability to subpart I.

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 234

Section 234.275 Processor-Based Systems

    Section 234.275 of title 49 presently requires that each processor-
based system, subsystem, or component used for active warning at 
highway-rail grade crossings that is new or novel technology, or that 
provides safety-critical data to a railroad signal or train control 
system which is qualified using the subpart H process, shall also be 
governed by those requirements, including approval of a Product Safety 
Plan. Particularly with respect to high speed rail, FRA anticipates 
that PTC systems will in some cases incorporate new or novel technology 
to provide for crossing pre-starts (reducing the length of approach 
circuits for high speed trains), verify crossing system health as 
between the wayside and approaching trains, or slow trains approaching 
locations where storage has been detected on a crossing, among other 
options. Indeed, each of these functions is presently incorporated in 
at least one train control system, and others may one day be feasible 
(including in-vehicle warning). There would appear to be no reason why 
such a functionality intended for inclusion in a PTC system mandated by 
subpart I could not be qualified with the rest of the PTC system under 
subpart I. On the other hand, care should be taken to set an 
appropriate safety standard taking into consideration highway users, 
occupants of the high speed trains, and others potentially affected.
    In fact, with new emphasis on high speed rail, FRA needs to 
consider the ability of PTC systems to integrate this type of new 
technology and thereby reduce risk associated with high speed rail 
service. Risk includes derailment of a high speed train with 
catastrophic consequences after encountering an obstacle at a highway-
rail grade crossing. To avoid such consequences, as many crossings as 
possible should be eliminated. To that end, 49 CFR 213.347 requires a 
warning and barrier plan to be approved for Class 7 track (speeds above 
110 mph) and prohibits grade crossings on Class 8 and 9 track (above 
125 mph). That leaves significant exposure on Class 5 and 6 track that 
is currently not addressed by regulation. Comment is requested on how 
best to approach this issue, ensuring that various FRA regulations, 
including subpart I, address this safety need effectively and in 
harmony with one another.

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 235

Section 235.7 Changes Not Requiring Filing of Application

    FRA proposes to amend this section of the regulation which allows 
specified changes within existing signal or train control systems be 
made without the necessity of filing an application. The amendment 
consists of adding allowance for a railroad to remove an intermittent 
automatic train stop system

[[Page 35958]]

in conjunction with the implementation of a PTC system approved under 
subpart I of part 236.
    The changes allowable under this section, without filing of an 
application, are those identified on the basis that the resultant 
condition will be at least no less safe than the previous condition. 
The required functions of PTC within subpart I provide a considerably 
higher level of functionality related to both alerting and enforcing 
necessary operating limitations than an intermediate automatic train 
stop system does. Additionally, in the event of the loss of PTC 
functionality (i.e., a failure en route), the operating restrictions 
required will provide the needed level of safety in lieu of the 
railroad being expected to keep and maintain an underlying system such 
as intermittent automatic train stop for only in such cases. FRA 
therefore believes that with the implementation of PTC under the 
requirements of subpart I, the safety value of any previously existing 
intermittent automatic train stop system is entirely obviated. There 
were no objections in the PTC Working Group to this amendment.

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 236

Section 236.0 Applicability, Minimum Requirements, and Penalties

    FRA proposes to amend this existing section of the regulation to 
remove manual block from the methods of operation permitting speeds of 
50 miles per hour or greater for freight trains and 60 miles per hour 
or greater for passenger trains. Manual block rules do create a 
reasonably secure means of preventing train collisions. However, where 
the attributes of block signal systems are not present, misaligned 
switches, broken rails, or fouling equipment may cause a train 
accident. FRA believes that contemporary expectations for safe 
operations require this adjustment, which also provides a more orderly 
foundation for the application of PTC to the subject territories. There 
were no objections in the PTC Working Group to this change.

Section 236.909 Minimum Performance Standard

    FRA is proposing to modify existing Sec.  236.909 to make the risk 
metric sensitivity analysis an integral part of the full risk 
assessment required to be submitted with a product safety plan in 
accordance with Sec.  236.907(a)(7). The proposed amendment of this 
section would also eliminate an alternative option for a railroad to 
use a risk metric in which consequences of potential accidents are 
measured strictly in terms of fatalities.
    Currently, Sec.  236.909(e)(1) indicates how safety and risk should 
be measured for the full risk assessment, but does not accentuate the 
need for running a sensitivity analysis on chosen risk metrics to 
assure that the worst case scenarios for the proposed system failures 
or malfunctions are accounted for in the risk assessment. On the other 
hand, Appendix B to this part mandates that each risk metric for the 
proposed product must be expressed with an upper bound, as estimated 
with a sensitivity analysis. The FRA's experience gained while 
reviewing product safety plans submitted to FRA in accordance with 
subpart H, revealed that the railroad's did not understand a 
sensitivity analysis for the chosen risk metrics to be a mandatory 
requirement. Accordingly, to ensure clarity regarding FRA's 
expectations, FRA proposes to amend paragraph (e)(1) to explicitly 
require the performance of a sensitivity analysis for the chosen risk 
metrics. The language proposed in this rule explains the need for the 
sensitivity analysis and describes the key input parameters that must 
be analyzed.
    The proposed modification to paragraph (e)(2) is intended to 
clarify how the exposure and its consequences, as main components of 
the risk computation formula, must be measured. Under the proposed rule 
text, the exposure must be measured in train miles per year over the 
relevant railroad infrastructure where a proposed system is to be 
implemented. When determining the consequences of potential accidents, 
the railroad must identify the total costs involved, including those 
relating to fatalities, injuries, property damage, and other 
incidentals. FRA proposes to eliminate the option of using an 
alternative risk metric, which would allow the measurement of 
consequences strictly in terms of fatalities. It is FRA's experience 
that measuring consequences of accidents strictly in terms of 
fatalities did not serve as an adequate alternative to metrics of total 
cost of accidents for two main reasons. First, the statistical data on 
railroad accidents shows that accidents involving fatalities also cause 
injuries and significant damage to railroad property and infrastructure 
for both freight and especially passenger operations. Even though the 
cost of human life is often the highest component of monetary estimates 
of accident consequences, the dollar estimates of injuries, property 
losses, and damage to the environment associated with accidents 
involving fatalities cannot and should not be discounted in the risk 
analysis. Second, allowing fatalities to serve as the only risk metrics 
of accident consequences confused the industry and the risk assessment 
an