Notice of Availability of Technical Specification Improvement To Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control-Risk-Informed Technical Specification Task Force (RITSTF) Initiative 5b, Technical Specification Task Force-425, Revision 3, 31996-32006 [E9-15780]
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 127 / Monday, July 6, 2009 / Notices
contractor will copy documents for a
fee.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day
of June 2009.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Rebecca Tadesse,
Chief, Materials Decommissioning Branch,
Decommissioning and Uranium Recovery,
Licensing Directorate, Division of Waste
Management, and Environmental Protection,
Office of Federal and State Materials, and
Environmental Management Programs.
[FR Doc. E9–15790 Filed 7–2–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[NRC–2008–0637]
Notice of Availability of Technical
Specification Improvement To
Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to
Licensee Control—Risk-Informed
Technical Specification Task Force
(RITSTF) Initiative 5b, Technical
Specification Task Force—425,
Revision 3
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AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of Availability.
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has prepared a
model license amendment request
(LAR), model safety evaluation (SE), and
model no significant hazards
consideration (NSHC) determination.
These are related to changes to standard
technical specifications (STS) for
Technical Specification Task Force
(TSTF)—425, Revision 3, ‘‘Relocate
Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee
Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b,’’
(Agencywide Documents Access
Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML090850642). The
purpose of these models is to permit the
NRC to efficiently process amendments
that propose to relocate technical
specifications (TS) surveillance
frequencies. Licensees of nuclear power
reactors could then request
amendments, confirming the
applicability of the safety evaluation
and NSHC determination to their
reactors. Previously, on December 5,
2008, drafts of the model SE, model
NSHC determination, and model LAR
were published in the Federal Register
for public comment (73 FR 74202–
74210). Based on its evaluation of the
public comments received in response
to that notice, the NRC staff made
appropriate changes to the models, and
is including the final versions of the
models in this notice. This notice also
contains a description of each public
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comment and its disposition by the NRC
staff. Based on its evaluation of the
public comments, the NRC staff has
decided to announce the availability of
the model SE and model NSHC
determination to licensees for
referencing in LARs to adopt TSTF–425,
Rev 3. Licensees of nuclear power
reactors proposing to adopt these
changes should follow the guidance in
the model LAR and confirm the
applicability of the model SE and model
NSHC determination to their reactors.
DATES: The NRC staff hereby announces
that the attached model SE and model
NSHC determination (which differ only
slightly from the versions previously
published) may be used in support of
plant specific applications to adopt the
relocation of TS Surveillance
Requirements. The staff has also posted
the model LAR (which also differs only
slightly from the versions previously
published) to assist licensees in
applying for the proposed TS change.
The NRC staff can most efficiently
consider applications based upon the
model application if the application is
submitted within a year of this Federal
Register Notice.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Michelle Honcharik, Mail Stop: O–12E1,
Special Projects Branch, Division of
Policy and Rulemaking, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone
301–415–1774.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
This notice makes available for
adoption by licensees a change to the
STS that modifies surveillance
frequencies. Licensees opting to apply
for this change are responsible for
reviewing the staff’s evaluation,
providing the applicable technical
justifications, and providing any
necessary plant-specific information.
The NRC will process each amendment
application responding to the notice of
availability according to applicable NRC
rules and procedures.
TSTF–425, Rev. 3 involves the
relocation of most time-based
surveillance frequencies to a licenseecontrolled program, called the
Surveillance Frequency Control
Program (SFCP), and adds the SFCP to
the administrative controls section of
TS. The SFCP does not include
surveillance frequencies that are event
driven, controlled by an existing
program, or are condition-based.
Revision 3 of TSTF–425 addresses all
four reactor vendor types. The owners
groups participants proposed this
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change for incorporation into the STS.
TSTF–425, Rev. 3 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML090850642), can be viewed on
the NRC’s Web page at: https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
Applicability
TSTF–425, Rev. 3, is applicable to all
STS for nuclear power reactors and
requires the application of the Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) 04–10, Rev.1,
‘‘Risk-informed Technical
Specifications Initiative 5B, RiskInformed Method for Control of
Surveillance Frequencies,’’ (ADAMS
Accession No. ML071360456). The NRC
staff reviewed and approved NEI 04–10,
Rev. 1, by letter dated September 19,
2007 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML072570267). Each licensee applying
for the changes proposed in TSTF–425
will need to include documentation
regarding the probabilistic risk
assessment [PRA] technical adequacy
consistent with the guidance in Section
4.2 of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, ‘‘An
Approach for Determining the Technical
Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk
Assessment [PRA] Results for RiskInformed Activities’’ (ADAMS
Accession No. ML070240001).
Applicants proposing to use PRA
models for which NRC-endorsed
standards do not exist must submit
documentation that identifies
characteristics of those models. Sections
1.2 and 1.3 of RG 1.200 provides
guidance on the supporting information
needed for new methods. Applicants
must give supporting evidence for
methods to be applied for assessing the
risk contribution for those sources of
risk not addressed by NRC endorsed
PRA models.
The proposed change to adopt TSTF–
425 does not prevent licensees from
requesting an alternate approach or
proposing changes other than those
proposed in TSTF–425, Rev. 3.
Significant deviations from the
approach recommended in this notice,
or inclusion of additional changes to the
license, however, require additional
review by the NRC staff. This may
increase the time and resources needed
for the review or result in staff rejection
of the LAR. Licensees desiring
significant deviations or additional
changes should instead submit a license
amendment request that does not claim
to adopt TSTF–425, Rev 3.
Evaluation of Public Comments on the
Model Safety Evaluation
The NRC staff evaluated the public
comments received on the model SE,
model NSHC determination, and model
LAR published in the Federal Register
on December 5, 2008 (73 FR 74202–
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74210). Fifteen comments were received
from the pressurized and boiling water
reactor owners groups, TSTF (ADAMS
Accession No. ML090080162). The
comments and NRC staff’s disposition of
each comment follows. It should be
noted that the following comments were
made to the Federal Register Notice for
Comment which referenced TSTF–425,
Revision 2 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML080280275). TSTF–425, Revision 3
was submitted by the TSTF by letter
dated March 18, 2009 (ADAMS
Accession NO. ML090850642) to
address NRC disposition of TSTF
comment number 10.
1. (TSTF) Reference; model
application (73 FR 74204). Comment:
‘‘The model application contains
statements that are not consistent with
a letter from a licensee to the NRC, and
in many cases the model application is
worded similar to the NRC-issued Safety
Evaluation. For example, Section 2.1,
paragraph 2, of the model application
states, ‘The licensee has submitted
documentation which identifies the
quality characteristics of those models,
as described in RG 1.200 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML070240001).’ We
recommend that the model application
be reviewed from the standpoint of a
letter from a specific licensee to the
NRC and modify the wording to be
consistent with that task. For example,
if Comment 2 is incorporated, the
sentence above could be rewritten as
discussed in Comment 6, below.’’
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted
the comment regarding consistency of a
letter from a licensee to the NRC and
incorporated the recommended change
into the model application, where
appropriate. Disposition of Comment
Nos. 2 and 6 are discussed below.
2. (TSTF) Reference; model
application (73 FR 74205). Comment:
‘‘We recommend that the licensee’s
documentation of PRA adequacy be a
new Attachment 2 and the existing
attachments be renumbered. This will
allow standardization of the model
amendment and allow reference to the
attachment number in the Safety
Evaluation.’’
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted
the comment and incorporated the
recommended change into the model
application as new ‘‘Attachment 2,
Documentation of PRA Technical
Adequacy.’’
3. (TSTF) Reference; model
application (73 FR 74205). Comment:
‘‘Attachment 3 of the model application
includes the revised (clean) Technical
Specification (TS) pages. Whether
licensees are requested to include clean
typed TS pages with license
amendments varies among the NRC
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Project Managers. Given the number of
pages affected by this amendment and
the straightforward nature of the
changes, this attachment should be
marked as optional, allowing the
licensee and the NRC Project Manager to
decide whether clean TS pages should
be submitted.’’
Disposition: Essentially, the
commenter objects to providing final
requested change. When an applicant
desires to amend its TS, the
combination of § 50.36 and 50.90
require submission of the new, clean,
unmarked TS and bases. An applicant
could not reasonably decline to submit
proposed TS and bases under the claim
that the proposed pages were not
‘‘applicable’’ to its request. Thus, an
application is likely incomplete if it
fails to contain final clean TS and bases.
Regarding marked-up pages,
applicants generally submit marked-up
TS pages and bases. There is, however,
no direct requirement for submission of
the mark-ups. Should the Staff need the
mark-ups for their amendment review,
§ 50.90’s requirement that an LAR ‘‘fully
describe[s] the changes desired’’ could
be used to request a mark-up version.
No changes were made as a result of this
comment.
4. (TSTF) Reference; model
application (73 FR 74205) ‘‘Attachment
5 of the model application includes the
affected Bases pages. In the transmittal
letter for TSTF–425, Revision 1, dated
April 20, 2007, the TSTF stated, ‘‘In the
CLIIP model application for TSTF–425,
we request that NRC reflect that
appropriate plant-specific changes will
be made to the Technical Specifications
Bases by the licensees under the
Technical Specification Bases Control
Program and that, therefore, revised
Bases pages need not be included. This
will significantly reduce the size of the
plant-specific license amendment
requests submitted to adopt TSTF–425.’’
‘‘As further discussed in the TSTF’s
response to NRC’s RAI #8 (Letter from
TSTF to NRC dated January 17, 2008,
‘Response to NRC Request for
Additional Information Regarding
TSTF–425,’ Revision 1, ‘Relocate
Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee
Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b,’ dated
October 2, 2007), licensees have the
option of retaining the existing
description of the Frequency in their
Bases (as adoption of TSTF–425 does
not alter any existing Frequencies) or of
adopting the recommended Bases in
TSTF–425. In either case, neither the
existing Bases nor the revised Bases in
TSTF–425 include any information
material to the NRC’s review. Therefore,
we recommend that the model
application be revised to not reference
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the inclusion of Bases changes. See also
the related comment on the Safety
Evaluation below.’’
Disposition: For more than 50 years,
since the regulation governing license
amendment requests, 10 CFR 50.90, has
required that an applicant fully
describes the changes desired, and also
required the applicant to follow, as far
as applicable, the form prescribed for
the original operating license
application. The NRC’s regulation at 10
CFR 50.36 continues this philosophy of
requiring applications to include
technical specifications and bases.
Thus, to meet the requirements of 10
CFR 50.90, the applicant will need to
submit the applicable TSs and bases. An
applicant who does otherwise is at risk
of failing to meet the requirements in 10
CFR 50.90 of ‘‘fully describing the
changes desired, and following as far as
applicable, the form prescribed for
original applications’’. No changes were
made to the Federal Register Notice (73
FR 74202–74210) as a result of this
comment.
5. (TSTF) Reference; model
application (73 FR 74204). ‘‘Section 2.1,
‘Applicability of the Published Safety
Evaluation,’ first paragraph, states,
‘[LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety
evaluation dated [DATE]. This review
included a review of the NRC staff’s
evaluation, the supporting information
provided to support TSTF–425, Rev. 2,
and the requirements specified in NEI
04–10, Rev. 1, (ADAMS Accession No.
ML071360456).’ It is not clear what
information is included in ‘the
supporting information provided to
support TSTF–425, Rev. 2.’ In order for
licensees to provide complete and
accurate information, a more specific
description is needed.’’
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted
the comment and revised Section 2.1 to
read as follows: ‘‘[LICENSEE] has
reviewed the safety evaluation dated
[DATE]. This review included a review
of the NRC evaluation, TSTF–425, Rev.
2, and the requirements specified in NEI
04–10, Rev. 1 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML071360456).’’ The statement
regarding ‘‘The supporting information
provided to support TSTF–425,
Revision 2’’ was replaced by ‘‘TSTF–
425, Revision 2’’ since the TSTF
includes information which explains
and supports the STS changes and must
be considered by the licensee as part of
the license amendment request to
determine if the TSTF is applicable to
the licensee’s facility.
6. (TSTF) ‘‘Section 2.1, ‘Applicability
of the Published Safety Evaluation,’
contains two numbered paragraphs
joined by an ‘and’ referring to
documentation of PRA adequacy. These
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paragraphs do not provide sufficient
guidance to a licensee on what should
be submitted. Using the change in
Comment 2, we recommend that these
paragraphs be replaced with the
following, ‘Attachment 2 includes
documentation with regard to PRA
technical adequacy consistent with the
requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.200,
Revision 1, Section 4.2, and describes
any PRA models without NRC-endorsed
standards, including documentation of
the quality characteristics of those
models in accordance with Regulatory
Guide 1.200.’ Additional guidance, if
available, such as preferred organization
of the information, can be added to the
model application in Attachment 2.’’
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted
the comment and revised Section 2.1,
‘‘Applicability of the Published Safety
Evaluation’’. The numbered paragraphs
(1 and 2) of Section 2.1 are replaced to
state the following: ‘‘Attachment 2
includes [LICENSEE] documentation
with regard to PRA technical adequacy
consistent with the requirements of
Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 1
(ADAMS Accession No. ML070240001),
Section 4.2, and describes any PRA
models without NRC-endorsed
standards, including documentation of
the quality characteristics of those
models in accordance with Regulatory
Guide 1.200.’’
7. (TSTF) ‘‘We recommend Section
2.2, ‘‘Optional changes and variations,’’
be replaced with, ‘The proposed
amendment is consistent with the TS
changes described in TSTF–425, Rev. 2,
but proposes to modify the plantspecific Surveillances, which may
include more or less Surveillances than
those modified in TSTF–425, Rev. 2,
and those plant-specific Surveillances
may have differing Surveillance
numbers. The plant-specific changes are
consistent with the NRC staff’s model
safety evaluation dated [DATE],
especially the scope exclusions in
Section 1.0 of that model safety
evaluation, as revised.’’’
Disposition: Deviations or variations
from that described in TSTF are
recognized and addressed in Notice of
Opportunity to Comment on Model SE
on TS Improvement to Relocate
Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee
Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b, TSTF–
425, Revision 2 as published in the
Federal Register for public comment (73
FR 74203) which states: ‘‘The proposed
change to adopt TSTF–425 does not
prevent licensees from requesting an
alternate approach or proposing changes
other than those proposed in TSTF–425,
Rev. 2. Significant deviations from the
approach recommended in this notice,
or inclusion of additional changes to the
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license, however, require additional
review by the NRC staff. This may
increase the time and resources needed
for the review or result in staff rejection
of the LAR. Licensees desiring
significant deviations or additional
changes should instead submit a license
amendment request that does not claim
to adopt TSTF–425, Rev 2.’’ No changes
were made as a result of this comment.
8. (TSTF) The proposed regulatory
commitment in Attachment 4 to
implement NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, should be
deleted. The TS Administrative
Controls, ‘Surveillance Frequency
Control Program,’ required to be
adopted as part of the amendment,
states, ‘Changes to the Frequencies
listed in the Surveillance Frequency
Control Program shall be made in
accordance with NEI 04–10, ‘RiskInformed Method for Control of
Surveillance Frequencies,’ Revision 1.’
NRC Office Instruction LIC–105,
‘Managing Regulatory Commitments
Made by Licensees to the NRC,’ states,
‘Regulatory commitments are
appropriate for matters in which the
staff has significant interest but which
do not warrant either legally binding
requirements or inclusion in Updated
Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSARs)
or programs subject to a formal
regulatory change control mechanism.’
As TSTF–425, Rev. 2, proposes to have
a Technical Specification requirement
to implement NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, which
is a legally binding requirement, a
regulatory commitment to implement
NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, is unnecessary.’’
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted
the comment and revised the Model
Application by deleting the reference to
and the ‘‘Attachment 4 Regulatory
Commitments.’’
9. The ‘‘Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination’’
Criterion 3 discussion, should be
revised as shown, ‘‘To evaluate a change
in the relocated surveillance frequency,
[LICENSEE] will perform a probabilistic
risk evaluation using the guidance
contained in NRC approved NEI 04–10,
Rev. 1.’’
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted
the comment and provided additional
clarification with reference to the SFCP.
As a clarification of the ‘‘Proposed No
Significant Hazards Consideration’’
Criterion 3 (73 FR 74205) discussion the
statement was revised as follows: ‘‘To
evaluate a change in the relocated
surveillance frequency, [LICENSEE] will
perform a probabilistic risk evaluation
using the guidance contained in NRC
approved NEI 04–10, Rev. 1 in
accordance with the TS SFCP.’’
10. (TSTF) ‘‘Section 1.0,
‘Introduction,’ states that all
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Surveillance Frequencies can be
relocated except those meeting four
conditions. The first three conditions
are a restatement of the conditions
described in TSTF–425, Rev. 2, Section
2.0, ‘Proposed Change.’ The fourth
condition, ‘Frequencies that are related
to specific conditions (e.g., ‘battery
degradation, age, and capacity’) or
conditions for the performance of a
surveillance requirement (e.g., ‘drywell
to suppression chamber differential
pressure decrease’), does not appear in
TSTF–425, Rev. 2, and is not consistent
with the markups in TSTF–425, Rev. 2.’’
The TSTF’s response to NRC’s RAI #2
(Letter from TSTF to NRC dated January
17, 2008, ‘Response to NRC Request for
Additional Information Regarding
TSTF–425, Revision 1,’ ‘Relocate
Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee
Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b, dated
October 2, 2007’), addressed this issue.
It states, ‘The TSTF agrees that the
specific conditions of battery
degradation, age, and capacity are not
within the scope of NEI 04–10.
Surveillance 3.8.6.6 in NUREG–1430,
–1431, –1432, –1433, and –1434 is
revised to retain the conditions of
battery degradation, age, and capacity,
while relocating the Frequencies
consistent with the NRC-approved
Limerick lead plant submittal. The
Limerick Surveillances, 4.8.2.1.e and
4.8.2.1.f, contain the same requirements
as ISTS Surveillance 3.8.6.6. The 60
month Frequency is relocated to the
SFCP. The 12 month and 24 month
Frequencies associated with degraded
batteries, or batteries exceeding 85
percent of their expected life based on
available capacity are relocated to the
SFCP, but the criteria related to battery
degradation, age, and capacity are
retained.’
Therefore, based on this response and
the NRC’s approval of the Limerick
LAR, the Surveillance Frequencies
related to specific conditions are not
excluded from the scope of TSTF–425,
Rev. 2.
Disposition: The NRC Request for
Additional Information (RAI) Regarding
TSTF–425, Revision 1, dated October 2,
2007 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML072120630) states as follows: ‘‘In
NUREG–1433 SR 3.8.6.6, and NUREG–
1434 SR 3.8.6.6, TSTF–425 will relocate
the 12-month and 24-month
surveillance frequencies associated with
degraded batteries, or batteries
exceeding 85 percent of their expected
life based on available capacity. This is
inconsistent with the proposed changes
to similar SRs in NUREG–1430,
NUREG–1431, and NUREG–1432, which
would only relocate the 60-month
frequency associated with non-degraded
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batteries. The staff considers the specific
conditions of battery degradation, age,
and capacity as not within the scope of
NEI 04–10. Provide a revision to TSTF–
425 which retains, in NUREG–1433 and
NUREG–1434, the SRs for degraded or
old batteries.’’ As the NRC staff
indicated in the RAI and TSTF states in
their response (ADAMS Accession No.
ML090080162), ‘‘TSTF agrees that the
specific conditions of battery
degradation, age, and capacity are not
within the scope of NEI 04–10.’’ TSTF–
425, Revision 2, requires the use of NEI
04–10, Revision 1, in accordance with
the TS Surveillance Frequency Control
Program. Therefore, Surveillance
Frequencies related to specific
conditions remain an exception to
relocation under the SFCP. No changes
were made as a result of this comment.
11. (TSTF) ‘‘Section 1.0,
‘Introduction,’ (Federal Register page
74205, first column) states, ‘The TS
Bases for each affected surveillance is
revised to state that the frequency is set
in accordance with the Surveillance
Frequency Control Program. Various
editorial changes may be made to the
Bases as needed to facilitate the
addition of the Bases changes. Some
surveillance Bases do not contain a
discussion of the frequency. In these
cases, Bases describing the current
frequency were added to maintain
consistency with the Bases for similar
surveillances. These instances are noted
in the markup along with the source of
the text. The proposed changes to the
administrative controls of TS to
incorporate the SFCP includes a specific
reference to NEI 04–10, ‘Risk-Informed
Technical Specifications Initiative 5B,
Risk-Informed Method for Control of
Surveillance Frequencies,’ Revision 1
(Rev. 1), (Reference 2) as the basis for
making any changes to the surveillance
frequencies once they are relocated out
of TS.’ As discussed in Comment 4,
licensees are not required to revise the
Bases to adopt TSTF–425 and any
voluntary Bases changes should not be
submitted with the amendment as they
contain no information material to the
NRC’s review and can be made under
the Technical Specifications Bases
Control Program. In addition, Bases
changes are not within the scope of the
NRC’s review under 10 CFR 50.90
because, as stated in 10 CFR 50.36(a),
Bases are not part of the Technical
Specifications. Therefore, the Bases
changes should not be discussed in the
NRC’s Safety Evaluation.’’
Disposition: As identified by 10 CFR
50.90, Application for amendment of
license, construction permit, or early
site permit, which states: ‘‘Whenever a
holder of a license, including a
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construction permit and operating
license under this part, and an early site
permit, combined license, and
manufacturing license under part 52 of
this chapter, desires to amend the
license or permit, application for an
amendment must be filed with the
Commission, as specified in §§ 50.4 or
52.3 of this chapter, as applicable, fully
describing the changes desired, and
following as far as applicable, the form
prescribed for original applications.’’
Applicants requesting a license
amendment, such as the adoption of
TSTF–425, under 10 CFR 50.90 are,
therefore, required to submit an
application that includes the affected TS
Bases ‘‘* * * fully describing the
changes desired, and following as far as
applicable, the form prescribed for
original applications.’’ Therefore, while
the Bases are not part of the TSs,
affected TS Bases pages are required to
be submitted with an application for a
licensee amendment request. No
changes were made as a result of this
comment.
12. (TSTF) Section 3.2, ‘‘The
Proposed Change Maintains Sufficient
Safety Margins,’’ should be revised as
follows: ‘The engineering evaluations
that will be conducted by the licensee
under the Surveillance Frequency
Control Program when Frequencies are
revised will assess the impact of the
proposed Frequency change with the
principle that sufficient safety margins
are maintained. The guidelines used for
making that assessment will include
ensuring the proposed Surveillance test
frequency change is not in conflict with
approved industry codes and standards
or adversely affects any assumptions or
inputs to the safety analysis, or, if such
inputs are affected, justification is
provided to ensure sufficient safety
margin will continue to exist.’ This
section is referring to Surveillance
Frequency changes that will be
performed by the licensee under the
SFCP after approval of the license
amendment, not to any evaluations
provided with the license amendment
request.
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted
the comment and revised the first
paragraph of Section 3.4 to state as
follows: ‘‘The engineering evaluations
that will be conducted by the licensee
under the Surveillance Frequency
Control Program when Frequencies are
revised will assess the impact of the
proposed Frequency change with the
principle that sufficient safety margins
are maintained. The guidelines used for
making that assessment will include
ensuring the proposed Surveillance test
frequency change is not in conflict with
approved industry codes and standards
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or adversely affects any assumptions or
inputs to the safety analysis, or, if such
inputs are affected, justification is
provided to ensure sufficient safety
margin will continue to exist.’’
13. ‘‘Section 3.4.1, ‘Quality of the
PRA,’ references NEI 00–02, ‘PRA Peer
Review Process Guidance.’ While NEI
00–02 should continue to be referenced,
NEI 05–04, Rev. 2, ‘Process for
Performing Internal Events PRA Peer
Reviews,’ should also be referenced.’’
Disposition: Staff accepted the
comment as NRC has endorsed NEI 05–
04 Rev.2, ‘‘Process for Performing
Internal Events PRA Peer Reviews,’’ and
NEI 05–04 can be referenced as an
acceptable method.
14. (TSTF) ‘‘Section 3.4.6,
‘Acceptance Guidelines,’ first
paragraph, should be revised to clarify
that the acceptance guidelines are in
NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, so that it is not
implied that the Safety Evaluation
contains additional requirements. For
example, the first sentence could be
revised to state, ‘In accordance with NEI
04–10, Rev. 1, [LICENSEE] will
quantitatively evaluate the change in
total risk (including internal and
external events contributions) in terms
of core damage frequency (CDF) and
large early release frequency (LERF) for
both the individual risk impact of a
proposed change in surveillance
frequency and the cumulative impact
from all individual changes to
surveillance frequencies.’’’
Disposition: Section 3.4.6, first
paragraph, is rewritten to clarify that the
Safety Evaluation does not add
additional requirements. The revised
text states as follows: ‘‘[LICENSEE] will
quantitatively evaluate the change in
total risk (including internal and
external events contributions) in terms
of core damage frequency (CDF) and
large early release frequency (LERF) for
both the individual risk impact of a
proposed change in surveillance
frequency and the cumulative impact
from all individual changes to
surveillance frequencies using the
guidance contained in NRC approved
NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, in accordance with
the TS SFCP.’’
15. (TSTF) ‘‘Section 6.0, ‘References’,
Item 2, should be revised as follows,
‘NEI 04–10, Rev. 1,’ for consistency with
the rest of the document.’’
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted
the comment and revised Section 6.0,
‘‘References,’’ Item 2, to state: ‘‘NEI 04–
10, Revision 1’’ to correct the omission
of the revision number.
For each application the NRC staff
will publish a notice of consideration of
issuance of amendment to facility
operating licenses, a proposed no
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significant hazards consideration
determination, and a notice of
opportunity for a hearing. The staff will
also publish a notice of issuance of an
amendment to the operating license to
announce the relocation of surveillance
frequencies to licensee-controlled
document for each plant that receives
the requested change.
Dated at Rockville, MD, this 23rd day of
June 2009.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert Elliott,
Chief, Technical Specifications Branch,
Division of Inspection and Regional Support,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES
The following example of an
application was prepared by the NRC
staff. The model provides the expected
level of detail and content for an
application to revise technical
specifications regarding risk-informed
justification for relocation of specific TS
surveillance frequencies to a licensee
controlled program change. Licensees
remain responsible for ensuring that
their actual application fulfills their
administrative requirements as well as
NRC regulations.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC
20555.
SUBJECT: PLANT NAME: DOCKET NO. 50—
APPLICATION FOR TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION CHANGE REGARDING
RISK-INFORMED JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE RELOCATION OF SPECIFIC
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
REQUIREMENTS TO A LICENSEE
CONTROLLED PROGRAM
Dear Sir or Madam: In accordance with the
provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR Part 50.90),
‘‘Application for Amendment of License,
Construction Permit, or Early Site Permit,’’
[LICENSEE] is submitting a request for an
amendment to the technical specifications
(TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.].
The proposed amendment would modify
[LICENSEE] technical specifications by
relocating specific surveillance frequencies to
a licensee-controlled program with the
implementation of Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) 04–10, ‘‘Risk-Informed Technical
Specification Initiative 5B, Risk-Informed
Method for Control of Surveillance
Frequencies.’’
Attachment 1 provides a description of the
proposed change, the requested confirmation
of applicability, and plant-specific
verifications. Attachment 2 provides
documentation of PRA technical adequacy.
Attachment 3 provides the existing TS pages
marked up to show the proposed change.
Attachment 4 provides revised (clean) TS
pages. Attachment 5 provides the proposed
TS Bases changes. Attachment 6 Proposed No
Significant Hazards Consideration.
[LICENSEE] requests approval of the
proposed license amendment by [DATE],
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with the amendment being implemented [BY
DATE OR WITHIN X DAYS].
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, ‘‘Notice
for Public Comment; State Consultation,’’ a
copy of this application, with attachments, is
being provided to the designated [STATE]
Official.
I declare [or certify, verify, state] under
penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
correct and true. Executed on [Date]
[Signature]
If you should have any questions regarding
this submittal, please contact [NAME,
TELEPHONE NUMBER]
Sincerely,
[Name, Title]
Attachments:
1. Description and Assessment
2. Documentation of PRA Technical
Adequacy
3. Proposed Technical Specification Changes
4. Revised Technical Specification Pages
5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases
Changes
6. Proposed No Significant Hazards
Consideration
cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Regional Office, NRC Resident Inspector.
Attachment 1—Description and
Assessment
1.0
Description
The proposed amendment would
modify technical specifications by
relocating specific surveillance
frequencies to a licensee-controlled
program with the adoption of Technical
Specification Task Force (TSTF)–425,
Revision 3, ‘‘Relocate Surveillance
Frequencies to Licensee Control—Risk
Informed Technical Specification Task
Force (RITSTF) Initiative 5.’’
Additionally, the change would add a
new program, the Surveillance
Frequency Control Program, to TS
Section [5], Administrative Controls.
The changes are consistent with NRC
approved Industry/TSTF STS change
TSTF–425, Revision 3, (Rev. 3) (ADAMS
Accession No. ML080280275). The
Federal Register notice published on
[Date] announced the availability of this
TS improvement.
2.0
Assessment
2.1 Applicability of Published Safety
Evaluation
[Licensee] has reviewed the safety
evaluation dated [Date]. This review
included a review of the NRC staff’s
evaluation, TSTF–425, Revision 3, and
the requirements specified in NEI 04–
10, Rev. 1, (ADAMS Accession No.
ML071360456).
Attachment 2 includes [Licensee]
documentation with regard to PRA
technical adequacy consistent with the
requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.200,
Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML070240001), Section 4.2, and
PO 00000
Frm 00092
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
describes any PRA models without
NRC-endorsed standards, including
documentation of the quality
characteristics of those models in
accordance with Regulatory Guide
1.200.
[Licensee] has concluded that the
justifications presented in the TSTF
proposal and the safety evaluation
prepared by the NRC staff are applicable
to [Plant, Unit Nos.] and justify this
amendment to incorporate the changes
to the [Plant] TS.
2.2 Optional Changes and Variations
[Licensee] is not proposing any
variations or deviations from the STS
changes described in TSTF–425, Rev. 3,
and the NRC staff’s model safety
evaluation dated [Date].
[The proposed amendment is
consistent with the STS changes
described in TSTF–425, Revision 3, but
[Licensee] proposes variations or
deviations from TSTF–425, as identified
below and may include differing TS
Surveillance numbers].
3.0
Regulatory Analysis
3.1 No Significant Hazards
Consideration
[Licensee] has reviewed the proposed
no significant hazards consideration
determination (NSHC) published in the
Federal Register [Date]([ ] FR [ ]).
[Licensee] has concluded that the
proposed NSHC presented in the
Federal Register notice is applicable to
[Plant Name, Unit Nos.] and is provided
as an attachment to this amendment
request which satisfies the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.91(a).
Attachment 2—Documentation of PRA
Technical Adequacy
Attachment 3—Proposed Technical
Specification Changes (Mark-Up)
Attachment 4—Proposed Technical
Specification Pages
Attachment 5—Proposed Changes to
Technical Specification Bases Pages
Attachment 6—Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration
Description of Amendment Request:
The change requests the adoption of an
approved change to the standard
technical specifications (STS) for
[Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Plants
(NUREG–1430), Westinghouse Plants
(NUREG–1431), Combustion
Engineering Plants (NUREG–1432),
General Electric Plants, BWR/4
(NUREG–1433), and General Electric
Plants, BWR/6 (NUREG–1334)], to allow
relocation of specific TS surveillance
frequencies to a licensee-controlled
program. The proposed change is
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described in Technical Specification
Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF–425,
Revision 3 (Rev. 3) (ADAMS Accession
No. ML080280275) related to the
Relocation of Surveillance Frequencies
to Licensee Control—RITSTF Initiative
5b and was described in the Notice of
Availability published in the Federal
Register on [Date] ([xx FR xxxxx]).
The proposed changes are consistent
with NRC-approved Industry/Technical
Specification Task Force (TSTF)
Traveler, TSTF–425, Rev. 3, ‘‘Relocate
Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee
Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b.’’ The
proposed change relocates surveillance
frequencies to a licensee-controlled
program, the SFCP. This change is
applicable to licensees using
probabilistic risk guidelines contained
in NRC-approved NEI 04–10, ‘‘RiskInformed Technical Specifications
Initiative 5b, Risk-Informed Method for
Control of Surveillance Frequencies,’’
(ADAMS Accession No. 071360456).
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration: As required by
10 CFR 50.91(a), the [Licensee] analysis
of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relocates the
specified frequencies for periodic
surveillance requirements to licensee control
under a new Surveillance Frequency Control
Program. Surveillance frequencies are not an
initiator to any accident previously
evaluated. As a result, the probability of any
accident previously evaluated is not
significantly increased. The systems and
components required by the technical
specifications for which the surveillance
frequencies are relocated are still required to
be operable, meet the acceptance criteria for
the surveillance requirements, and be
capable of performing any mitigation
function assumed in the accident analysis.
As a result, the consequences of any accident
previously evaluated are not significantly
increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated?
Response: No.
No new or different accidents result from
utilizing the proposed change. The changes
do not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (i.e., no new or different type of
equipment will be installed) or a change in
the methods governing normal plant
operation. In addition, the changes do not
impose any new or different requirements.
The changes do not alter assumptions made
in the safety analysis. The proposed changes
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are consistent with the safety analysis
assumptions and current plant operating
practice.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety?
Response: No.
The design, operation, testing methods,
and acceptance criteria for systems,
structures, and components (SSCs), specified
in applicable codes and standards (or
alternatives approved for use by the NRC)
will continue to be met as described in the
plant licensing basis (including the final
safety analysis report and bases to TS), since
these are not affected by changes to the
surveillance frequencies. Similarly, there is
no impact to safety analysis acceptance
criteria as described in the plant licensing
basis. To evaluate a change in the relocated
surveillance frequency, [Licensee] will
perform a probabilistic risk evaluation using
the guidance contained in NRC approved NEI
04–10, Rev. 1 in accordance with the TS
SFCP. NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, methodology
provides reasonable acceptance guidelines
and methods for evaluating the risk increase
of proposed changes to surveillance
frequencies consistent with Regulatory Guide
1.177.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented
above, licensee concludes that the
requested change does not involve a
significant hazards consideration as set
forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), Issuance of
Amendment.
Proposed Safety Evaluation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Specification Task Force
(TSTF) Change TSTF–425; Relocate
Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee
Control
1.0 Introduction
By letter dated [ll, 20l], [Licensee]
(the licensee) proposed changes to the
technical specifications (TS) for [Plant
Name]. The requested change is the
adoption of NRC-approved TSTF–425,
Revision 3, ‘‘Relocate Surveillance
Frequencies to Licensee Control—
RITSTF Initiative 5b’’ (Reference 1).
When implemented, TSTF–425,
Revision 3 (Rev. 3) relocates most
periodic frequencies of technical
specification (TS) surveillances to a
licensee controlled program, the SFCP,
and provides requirements for the new
program in the administrative controls
section of TS. All surveillance
frequencies can be relocated except:
• Frequencies that reference other
approved programs for the specific
interval (such as the Inservice Testing
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32001
Program or the Primary Containment
Leakage Rate Testing Program),
• Frequencies that are purely eventdriven (e.g., ‘‘Each time the control rod
is withdrawn to the ‘full out’ position’’).
• Frequencies that are event-driven
but have a time component for
performing the surveillance on a onetime basis once the event occurs (e.g.,
‘‘within 24 hours after thermal power
reaching ≥95% RTP’’).
• Frequencies that are related to
specific conditions (e.g., battery
degradation, age and capacity) or
conditions for the performance of a
surveillance requirement (e.g., ‘‘drywell
to suppression chamber differential
pressure decrease’’).
[The definition of ‘‘Staggered Test
Basis’’ in TS Section 1.1, ‘‘Definitions,’’
is deleted. [Licensee] adopts TSTF–425,
Rev. 3, and no longer uses this defined
term in the technical specifications and
proposes removing it from Section 1.1.]
A new Administrative Controls Program
is added to TS section 5 as
[Specification 5.5.15 (NUREG–1433 and
-1434) or Specification 5.5.18 (NUREG–
1430, 1431, and 1432)]. The new
program is called the SFCP and
describes the requirements for the
program to control changes to the
relocated surveillance frequencies. The
TS Bases for each affected surveillance
are revised to state that the frequency is
set in accordance with the Surveillance
Frequency Control Program. [Various
editorial changes have been made to the
Bases to facilitate the addition of the
Bases changes.] Some surveillance Bases
do not contain a discussion of the
frequency. In these cases, Bases
describing the current frequency were
added to maintain consistency with the
Bases for similar surveillances. These
instances are noted in the markup along
with the source of the text. The
proposed licensee changes to the
administrative controls of TS to
incorporate the SFCP include a specific
reference to NEI 04–10, ‘‘Risk-Informed
Technical Specifications Initiative 5B,
Risk-Informed Method for Control of
Surveillance Frequencies,’’ Revision 1
(Rev. 1) (Reference 2) as the basis for
making any changes to the surveillance
frequencies once they are relocated out
of TS.
In a letter dated September 19, 2007,
the NRC staff approved Nuclear Energy
Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) 04–
10, Rev. 1, ‘‘Risk-Informed Technical
Specification initiative 5B, RiskInformed Method for Control of
Surveillance Frequencies’’ (ADAMS
Accession No. 072570267), as
acceptable for referencing in licensing
actions to the extent specified and
under the limitations delineated in NEI
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04–10, Rev. 1, and the final acceptance
SE providing the basis for NRC
acceptance of NEI 04–10, Rev 1.
2.0 Regulatory Evaluation
In the ‘‘Final Policy Statement:
Technical Specifications for Nuclear
Power Plants’’ published in the Federal
Register (FR) (58 FR 39132, 7/22/93) the
NRC addressed the use of Probabilistic
Safety Analysis (PSA, currently referred
to as Probabilistic Risk Analysis or PRA)
in STS. In this 1993 FR publication, the
NRC states, in part:
‘‘The Commission believes that it would be
inappropriate at this time to allow
requirements which meet one or more of the
first three criteria [of 10 CFR 50.36] to be
deleted from technical specifications based
solely on PSA (Criterion 4). However, if the
results of PSA indicate that technical
specifications can be relaxed or removed, a
deterministic review will be performed.’’
‘‘The Commission Policy in this regard is
consistent with its Policy Statement on
‘Safety Goals for the operation of Nuclear
Power Plants,’ 51 FR 30028, published on
August 21, 1986. The Policy Statement on
Safety Goals states in part, probabilistic
results should also be reasonably balanced
and supported through use of deterministic
arguments. In this way, judgments can be
made about the degree of confidence to be
given these [probabilistic] estimates and
assumptions. This is a key part of the process
for determining the degree of regulatory
conservatism that may be warranted for
particular decisions. This ‘defense-in-depth’
approach is expected to continue to ensure
the protection of public health and safety.’’
‘‘The Commission will continue to use
PSA, consistent with its policy on Safety
Goals, as a tool in evaluating specific lineitem improvements to Technical
Specifications, new requirements, and
industry proposals for risk-based Technical
Specification changes.’’
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Approximately two years later the
NRC provided additional detail
concerning the use of PRA in the ‘‘Final
Policy Statement: Use of Probabilistic
Risk Assessment in Nuclear Regulatory
Activities’’ published in the Federal
Register (60 FR 42622, August 16, 1995)
the NRC addressed the use of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment. In this
FR publication, the NRC states, in part:
‘‘The Commission believes that an overall
policy on the use of PRA methods in nuclear
regulatory activities should be established so
that the many potential applications of PRA
can be implemented in a consistent and
predictable manner that would promote
regulatory stability and efficiency. In
addition, the Commission believes that the
use of PRA technology in NRC regulatory
activities should be increased to the extent
supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA
methods and data and in a manner that
complements the NRC’s deterministic
approach.’’
‘‘PRA addresses a broad spectrum of
initiating events by assessing the event
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frequency. Mitigating system reliability is
then assessed, including the potential for
multiple and common-cause failures. The
treatment, therefore, goes beyond the single
failure requirements in the deterministic
approach. The probabilistic approach to
regulation is, therefore, considered an
extension and enhancement of traditional
regulation by considering risk in a more
coherent and complete manner.’’
‘‘Therefore, the Commission believes that
an overall policy on the use of PRA in
nuclear regulatory activities should be
established so that the many potential
applications of PRA can be implemented in
a consistent and predictable manner that
promotes regulatory stability and efficiency.
This policy statement sets forth the
Commission’s intention to encourage the use
of PRA and to expand the scope of PRA
applications in all nuclear regulatory matters
to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art
in terms of methods and data.’’
‘‘Therefore, the Commission adopts the
following policy statement regarding the
expanded NRC use of PRA:
(1) The use of PRA technology should be
increased in all regulatory matters to the
extent supported by the state-of-the-art in
PRA methods and data and in a manner that
complements the NRC’s deterministic
approach and supports the NRC’s traditional
defense-in-depth philosophy.
(2) PRA and associated analyses (e.g.,
sensitivity studies, uncertainty analyses, and
importance measures) should be used in
regulatory matters, where practical within
the bounds of the state-of-the-art, to reduce
unnecessary conservatism associated with
current regulatory requirements, regulatory
guides, license commitments, and staff
practices. Where appropriate, PRA should be
used to support the proposal for additional
regulatory requirements in accordance with
10 CFR 50.109 (Backfit Rule). Appropriate
procedures for including PRA in the process
should be developed and followed. It is, of
course, understood that the intent of this
policy is that existing rules and regulations
shall be complied with unless these rules and
regulations are revised.
(3) PRA evaluations in support of
regulatory decisions should be as realistic as
practicable and appropriate supporting data
should be publicly available for review.
(4) The Commission’s safety goals for
nuclear power plants and subsidiary
numerical objectives are to be used with
appropriate consideration of uncertainties in
making regulatory judgments on the need for
proposing and backfitting new generic
requirements on nuclear power plant
licensees.’’
In 10 CFR 50.36, the NRC established
its regulatory requirements related to
the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR
50.36, TS are required to include items
in the following five specific categories
related to station operation: (1) Safety
limits, limiting safety system settings,
and limiting control settings; (2)
limiting conditions for operation; (3)
surveillance requirements; (4) design
features; and (5) administrative controls.
As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3),
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‘‘Surveillance requirements are
requirements relating to test, calibration,
or inspection to assure that the
necessary quality of systems and
components is maintained, that facility
operation will be within safety limits,
and that the limiting conditions for
operation will be met.’’ These categories
will remain in TS. The new TS SFCP
provides the necessary administrative
controls to require that surveillances
relocated to the SFCP are conducted at
a frequency to assure that the necessary
quality of systems and components is
maintained, that facility operation will
be within safety limits, and that the
limiting conditions for operation will be
met. Changes to surveillance
frequencies in the SFCP are made using
the methodology contained in NEI 04–
10, Rev. 1, including qualitative
considerations, results of risk analyses,
sensitivity studies and any bounding
analyses, and recommended monitoring
of SSCs, and required to be
documented. Furthermore, changes to
frequencies are subject to regulatory
review and oversight of the SFCP
implementation through the rigorous
NRC review of safety related SSC
performance provided by the reactor
oversight program (ROP).
[licensee] SFCP ensures that
surveillance requirements specified in
the TS are performed at intervals
sufficient to assure the above regulatory
requirements are met. Existing
regulatory requirements, such as 10 CFR
50.65, ‘‘Requirements for Monitoring the
Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear
Power Plants,’’ and 10 CFR 50
Appendix B (corrective action program),
require licensee monitoring of
surveillance test failures and
implementing corrective actions to
address such failures. One of these
actions may be to consider increasing
the frequency at which a surveillance
test is performed. In addition, the SFCP
implementation guidance in NEI 04–10,
Rev. 1, requires monitoring of the
performance of structures, systems, and
components (SSCs) for which
surveillance frequencies are decreased
to assure reduced testing does not
adversely impact the SSCs.
This change is analogous with other
NRC-approved TS changes in which the
surveillance requirements are retained
in technical specifications but the
related surveillance frequencies are
relocated to licensee-controlled
documents, such as surveillances
performed in accordance with the InService Testing Program and the
Primary Containment Leakage Rate
Testing Program. Thus, this proposed
change complies with 10 CFR
50.36(c)(3) by retaining the
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requirements relating to test, calibration,
or inspection to assure that the
necessary quality of systems and
components is maintained, that facility
operation will be within safety limits,
and that the limiting conditions for
operation will be met and meets the first
key safety principle articulated in
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.177 (Reference
3) for plant-specific, risk-informed TS
changes by complying with current
regulations.
Licensees are required by TS to
perform surveillance test, calibration, or
inspection on specific safety-related
system equipment such as reactivity
control, power distribution, electrical,
instrumentation, and others to verify
system operability. Surveillance
frequencies, currently identified in TS,
are based primarily upon deterministic
methods such as engineering judgment,
operating experience, and
manufacturer’s recommendations. The
licensee’s use of NRC-approved PRA
methodologies identified in NEI 04–10,
Rev. 1, provides a way to establish riskinformed surveillance frequencies that
complement the deterministic approach
and support the NRC’s traditional
defense-in-depth philosophy.
These regulatory requirements, and
the monitoring required by NEI 04–10,
Rev. 1, ensure that surveillance
frequencies are sufficient to assure that
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 are
satisfied and that any performance
deficiencies will be identified and
appropriate corrective actions taken.
3.0 Technical Evaluation
[LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF–425,
Rev. 3, provides for administrative
relocation of applicable surveillance
frequencies, and provides for the
addition of the SFCP to the
administrative controls of TS. TSTF–
425, Rev. 3, also requires the application
of NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, for any changes to
surveillance frequencies within the
SFCP. The licensee’s application for the
changes proposed in TSTF–425, Rev. 3,
included documentation regarding the
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
technical adequacy consistent with the
requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.200
(RG–1.200) (Reference 4), ‘‘An
Approach for Determining the Technical
Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk
Assessment Results for Risk-Informed
Activities’’, Section 4.2. In accordance
with NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, probabilistic
risk assessment (PRA) methods are
used, in combination with plant
performance data and other
considerations, to identify and justify
modifications to the surveillance
frequencies of equipment at nuclear
power plants. This is in accordance
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with guidance provided in RG 1.174
(Reference 5) and RG 1.177 in support
of changes to surveillance test intervals.
RG 1.177 identifies five key safety
principles required for risk-informed
changes to TS. Each of these principles
is addressed by the industry
methodology document, NEI 04–10,
Rev. 1. The second through the fifth
principles, which relate to the technical
aspects of the proposed change, are
discussed below in Sections 3.1 through
3.4. The first principle requires the
proposed change to meet the current
regulations. The staff finds that the
change meets that requirement.
3.1 The Proposed Change Is Consistent
With the Defense-in-Depth Philosophy
Consistency with the defense-indepth philosophy, the second key safety
principle of RG 1.177, is maintained if:
• A reasonable balance is preserved
among prevention of core damage,
prevention of containment failure, and
consequence mitigation.
• Over-reliance on programmatic
activities to compensate for weaknesses
in plant design is avoided.
• System redundancy, independence,
and diversity are preserved
commensurate with the expected
frequency, consequences of challenges
to the system, and uncertainties (e.g., no
risk outliers). Because the scope of the
proposed methodology is limited to
revision of surveillance frequencies, the
redundancy, independence, and
diversity of plant systems are not
impacted.
• Defenses against potential common
cause failures are preserved, and the
potential for the introduction of new
common cause failure mechanisms is
assessed.
• Independence of barriers is not
degraded.
• Defenses against human errors are
preserved.
• The intent of the General Design
Criteria in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A,
is maintained.
TSTF–425, Rev. 3, requires the
application of NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, for any
changes to surveillance frequencies
within the SFCP. NEI 04–10, Rev. 1,
uses both the core damage frequency
(CDF) and the large early release
frequency (LERF) metrics to evaluate the
impact of proposed changes to
surveillance frequencies. The guidance
of RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 for changes
to CDF and LERF is achieved by
evaluation using a comprehensive risk
analysis, which assesses the impact of
proposed changes including
contributions from human errors and
common cause failures. Defense-indepth is also included in the
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32003
methodology explicitly as a qualitative
consideration outside of the risk
analysis, as is the potential impact on
detection of component degradation that
could lead to increased likelihood of
common cause failures. Both the
quantitative risk analysis and the
qualitative considerations assure a
reasonable balance of defense-in-depth
is maintained to ensure protection of
public health and safety, satisfying the
second key safety principle of RG 1.177.
3.2 The Proposed Change Maintains
Sufficient Safety Margins
The engineering evaluation that will
be conducted by the licensee under the
Surveillance Frequency Control
Program when Frequencies are revised
will assess the impact of the proposed
Frequency change with the principle
that sufficient safety margins are
maintained. The guidelines used for
making that assessment will include
ensuring the proposed Surveillance test
frequency change is not in conflict with
approved industry codes and standards
or adversely affects any assumptions or
inputs to the safety analysis, or, if such
inputs are affected, justification is
provided to ensure sufficient safety
margin will continue to exist.
The design, operation, testing
methods, and acceptance criteria for
SSCs, specified in applicable codes and
standards (or alternatives approved for
use by the NRC) will continue to be met
as described in the plant licensing basis
(including the [Updated] Final Safety
Analysis Report and bases to TS), since
these are not affected by changes to the
surveillance frequencies. Similarly,
there is no impact to safety analysis
acceptance criteria as described in the
plant licensing basis.
Thus, safety margins are maintained
by the proposed methodology, and the
third key safety principle of RG 1.177 is
satisfied.
3.3 When Proposed Changes Result in
an Increase in Core Damage Frequency
or Risk, the Increases Should Be Small
and Consistent With the Intent of the
Commission’s Safety Goal Policy
Statement
RG 1.177 provides a framework for
risk evaluation of proposed changes to
surveillance frequencies, which requires
identification of the risk contribution
from impacted surveillances,
determination of the risk impact from
the change to the proposed surveillance
frequency, and performance of
sensitivity and uncertainty evaluations.
TSTF–425, Rev. 3, requires application
of NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, in the SFCP. NEI
04–10, Rev. 1, satisfies the intent of RG
1.177 requirements for evaluation of the
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change in risk, and for assuring that
such changes are small by providing the
technical methodology to support risk
informed technical specifications for
control of surveillance frequencies.
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3.4.1 Quality of the PRA
The quality of the [Licensee] PRA is
compatible with the safety implications
of the proposed TS change and the role
the PRA plays in justifying the change.
That is, the more the potential change
in risk or the greater the uncertainty in
that risk from the requested TS change,
or both, the more rigor that must go into
ensuring the quality of the PRA.
[Licensee] used RG 1.200 to address
the plant PRA technical adequacy. RG
1.200 is NRC developed regulatory
guidance, which addresses the use of
the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) RA–Sb–2005,
Addenda to ASME RA–S–2002
Standard for Probabilistic Risk
Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant
Applications (Reference 6), NEI 00–02,
PRA Peer Review Process guidelines
(Reference 7) and NEI 05–04, Process for
Performing Follow-On PRA Peer
Reviews Using the ASME PRA Standard
(Reference 8). The licensee has
performed an assessment of the PRA
models used to support the SFCP
against the requirements of RG 1.200 to
assure that the PRA models are capable
of determining the change in risk due to
changes to surveillance frequencies of
SSCs, using plant specific data and
models. Capability category II of ASME
RA–Sb–2005 is applied as the standard,
and any identified deficiencies to those
requirements are assessed further in
sensitivity studies to determine any
impacts to proposed decreases to
surveillance frequencies. This level of
PRA quality, combined with the
proposed sensitivity studies, is
sufficient to support the evaluation of
changes proposed to surveillance
frequencies within the SFCP, and is
consistent with regulatory position 2.3.1
of RG 1.177.
3.4.2 Scope of the PRA
[Licensee] is required to evaluate each
proposed change to a relocated
surveillance frequency using the
guidance contained in NEI 04–10, Rev.
1, to determine its potential impact on
risk, due to impacts from internal
events, fires, seismic, other external
events, and from shutdown conditions.
Consideration is made of both CDF and
LERF metrics. In cases where a PRA of
sufficient scope or where quantitative
risk models were unavailable, [Licensee]
uses bounding analyses, or other
conservative quantitative evaluations. A
qualitative screening analysis may be
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used when the surveillance frequency
impact on plant risk is shown to be
negligible or zero. The licensee’s
evaluation methodology is sufficient to
ensure the scope of the risk contribution
of each surveillance frequency change is
properly identified for evaluation, and
is consistent with regulatory position
2.3.2 of RG 1.177.
3.4.3 PRA Modeling
The [Licensee] will determine
whether the SSCs affected by a
proposed change to a surveillance
frequency are modeled in the PRA.
Where the SSC is directly or implicitly
modeled, a quantitative evaluation of
the risk impact may be carried out. The
methodology adjusts the failure
probability of the impacted SSCs,
including any impacted common cause
failure modes, based on the proposed
change to the surveillance frequency.
Where the SSC is not modeled in the
PRA, bounding analyses are performed
to characterize the impact of the
proposed change to surveillance
frequency. Potential impacts on the risk
analyses due to screening criteria and
truncation levels are addressed by the
requirements for PRA technical
adequacy consistent with guidance
contained in RG 1.200, and by
sensitivity studies identified in NEI 04–
10, Rev. 1.
The licensee will perform quantitative
evaluations of the impact of selected
testing strategy (i.e., staggered testing or
sequential testing) consistently with the
guidance of NUREG/CR–6141 and
NUREG/CR–5497, as discussed in NEI
04–10 Rev. 1.
Thus, through the application of NEI
04–10, Rev. 1, the [Licensee] PRA
modeling is sufficient to ensure an
acceptable evaluation of risk for the
proposed changes in surveillance
frequency, and is consistent with
regulatory position 2.3.3 of RG 1.177.
3.4.4 Assumptions for Time Related
Failure Contributions
The failure probabilities of SSCs
modeled in the [licensee] PRA [include]
a standby time-related contribution and
a cyclic demand-related contribution.
NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, criteria adjust the
time-related failure contribution of SSCs
affected by the proposed change to
surveillance frequency. This is
consistent with RG 1.177 Section 2.3.3
which permits separation of the failure
rate contributions into demand and
standby for evaluation of surveillance
requirements. If the available data do
not support distinguishing between the
time-related failures and demand
failures, then the change to surveillance
frequency is conservatively assumed to
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
impact the total failure probability of
the SSC, including both standby and
demand contributions. The SSC failure
rate (per unit time) is assumed to be
unaffected by the change in test
frequency, and will be confirmed by the
required monitoring and feedback
implemented after the change in
surveillance frequency is implemented.
The process requires consideration of
qualitative sources of information with
regards to potential impacts of test
frequency on SSC performance,
including industry and plant-specific
operating experience, vendor
recommendations, industry standards,
and code-specified test intervals. Thus
the process is not reliant upon risk
analyses as the sole basis for the
proposed changes.
The potential beneficial risk impacts
of reduced surveillance frequency,
including reduced downtime, lesser
potential for restoration errors,
reduction of potential for test caused
transients, and reduced test-caused wear
of equipment, are identified
qualitatively, but are conservatively not
required to be quantitatively assessed.
Thus, through the application of NEI
04–10, Rev. 1, [Licensee] has employed
reasonable assumptions with regard to
extensions of surveillance test intervals,
and is consistent with regulatory
position 2.3.4 of RG 1.177.
3.4.5 Sensitivity and Uncertainty
Analyses
NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, requires sensitivity
studies to assess the impact of
uncertainties from key assumptions of
the PRA, uncertainty in the failure
probabilities of the affected SSCs,
impact to the frequency of initiating
events, and of any identified deviations
from capability Category II of ASME
PRA Standard (ASME RA–Sb–2005)
(Reference 4). Where the sensitivity
analyses identify a potential impact on
the proposed change, revised
surveillance frequencies are considered,
along with any qualitative
considerations that may bear on the
results of such sensitivity studies.
Required monitoring and feedback of
SSC performance once the revised
surveillance frequencies are
implemented will also be performed.
Thus, through the application of NEI
04–10, Rev. 1, [Licensee] has
appropriately considered the possible
impact of PRA model uncertainty and
sensitivity to key assumptions and
model limitations, consistently with
regulatory position 2.3.5 of RG 1.177.
3.4.6 Acceptance Guidelines
[Licensee] will quantitatively evaluate
the change in total risk (including
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internal and external events
contributions) in terms of core damage
frequency (CDF) and large early release
frequency (LERF) for both the
individual risk impact of a proposed
change in surveillance frequency and
the cumulative impact from all
individual changes to surveillance
frequencies using the guidance
contained in NRC approved NEI 04–10,
Rev. 1 in accordance with the TS SFCP.
Each individual change to surveillance
frequency must show a risk impact
below 1E–6 per year for change to CDF,
and below 1E–7 per year for change to
LERF. These are consistent with the
limits of RG 1.174 for very small
changes in risk. Where the RG 1.174
limits are not met, the process either
considers revised surveillance
frequencies which are consistent with
RG 1.174, or the process terminates
without permitting the proposed
changes. Where quantitative results are
unavailable to permit comparison to
acceptance guidelines, appropriate
qualitative analyses are required to
demonstrate that the associated risk
impact of a proposed change to
surveillance frequency is negligible or
zero. Otherwise, bounding quantitative
analyses are required which
demonstrate the risk impact is at least
one order of magnitude lower than the
RG 1.174 acceptance guidelines for very
small changes in risk. In addition to
assessing each individual SSC
surveillance frequency change, the
cumulative impact of all changes must
result in a risk impact below 1E–5 per
year for change to CDF, and below 1E–
6 per year for change to LERF, and the
total CDF and total LERF must be
reasonably shown to be less than 1E–4
per year and 1E–5 per year, respectively.
These are consistent with the limits of
RG 1.174 for acceptable changes in risk,
as referenced by RG 1.177 for changes
to surveillance frequencies. The staff
interprets this assessment of cumulative
risk as a requirement to calculate the
change in risk from a baseline model
utilizing failure probabilities based on
the surveillance frequencies prior to
implementation of the SFCP, compared
to a revised model with failure
probabilities based on changed
surveillance frequencies. The staff
further notes that [Licensee] includes a
provision to exclude the contribution to
cumulative risk from individual changes
to surveillance frequencies associated
with small risk increases (less than 5E–
8 CDF and 5E–9 LERF) once the
baseline PRA models are updated to
include the effects of the revised
surveillance frequencies.
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The quantitative acceptance guidance
of RG 1.174 is supplemented by
qualitative information to evaluate the
proposed changes to surveillance
frequencies, including industry and
plant-specific operating experience,
vendor recommendations, industry
standards, the results of sensitivity
studies, and SSC performance data and
test history.
The final acceptability of the
proposed change is based on all of these
considerations and not solely on the
PRA results compared to numerical
acceptance guidelines. Post
implementation performance
monitoring and feedback are also
required to assure continued reliability
of the components. The licensee’s
application of NEI 04–10, Rev. 1,
provides reasonable acceptance
guidelines and methods for evaluating
the risk increase of proposed changes to
surveillance frequencies, consistent
with Regulatory Position 2.4 of RG
1.177. Therefore, the proposed
[Licensee] methodology satisfies the
fourth key safety principle of RG 1.177
by assuring any increase in risk is small
consistent with the intent of the
Commission’s Safety Goal Policy
Statement.
3.4.7 The Impact of the Proposed
Change Should Be Monitored Using
Performance Measurement Strategies
[LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF–425,
Rev. 3, requires application of NEI 04–
10, Rev. 1, in the SFCP. NEI 04–10, Rev.
1, requires performance monitoring of
SSCs whose surveillance frequency has
been revised as part of a feedback
process to assure that the change in test
frequency has not resulted in
degradation of equipment performance
and operational safety. The monitoring
and feedback includes consideration of
maintenance rule monitoring of
equipment performance. In the event of
degradation of SSC performance, the
surveillance frequency will be
reassessed in accordance with the
methodology, in addition to any
corrective actions which may apply as
part of the maintenance rule
requirements. The performance
monitoring and feedback specified in
NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, is sufficient to
reasonably assure acceptable SSC
performance and is consistent with
regulatory position 3.2 of RG 1.177.
Thus, the fifth key safety principle of
RG 1.177 is satisfied.
3.4.8 Addition of Surveillance
Frequency Control Program to TS
Section 5
[Licensee] has included the SFCP and
specific requirements into TS Section
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32005
[5.5.15 or 5.5.18], administrative
controls, as follows:
This program provides controls for
surveillance frequencies. The program
ensures that surveillance requirements
specified in the technical specifications
are performed at intervals (frequencies)
sufficient to assure that the associated
limiting conditions for operation are
met.
a. The Surveillance Frequency
Control Program contains a list of
frequencies of those surveillance
requirements for which the frequency is
controlled by the program.
b. Changes to the frequencies listed in
the Surveillance Frequency Control
Program shall be made in accordance
with NEI 04–10, ‘‘Risk-Informed Method
for Control of Surveillance
Frequencies,’’ Revision 1.
c. The provisions of surveillance
requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 are
applicable to the frequencies established
in the Surveillance Frequency Control
Program.
Summary and Conclusions
The staff has reviewed the [Licensee]
proposed relocation of some
surveillance frequencies to a licensee
controlled document, and controlling
changes to surveillance frequencies in
accordance with a new program, the
SFCP, identified in the administrative
controls of TS. The SFCP and TS
Section [5.5.15, 5.5.18] references NEI
04–10, Rev. 1, which provides a riskinformed methodology using plantspecific risk insights and performance
data to revise surveillance frequencies
within the SFCP. This methodology
supports relocating surveillance
frequencies from TS to a licenseecontrolled document, provided those
frequencies are changed in accordance
with NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, which is
specified in the administrative controls
of the TS.
The proposed [Licensee] adoption of
TSTF–425, Rev. 3, and risk-informed
methodology of NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, as
referenced in the administrative
controls of TS, satisfies the key
principles of risk-informed decision
making applied to changes to TS as
delineated in RG 1.177 and RG 1.174, in
that:
• The proposed change meets current
regulations;
• The proposed change is consistent
with defense-in-depth philosophy;
• The proposed change maintains
sufficient safety margins;
• Increases in risk resulting from the
proposed change are small and
consistent with the Commission’s Safety
Goal Policy Statement; and
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• The impact of the proposed change
is monitored with performance
measurement strategies.
10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) states ‘‘Technical
specifications will include items in the
following categories: Surveillance
Requirements. Surveillance
Requirements are requirements relating
to test, calibration, or inspection to
assure that the necessary quality of
systems and components is maintained,
that facility operation will be within
safety limits, and that the limiting
conditions for operation will be met.’’
The NRC staff finds that with the
proposed relocation of surveillance
frequencies to an owner-controlled
document and administratively
controlled in accordance with the TS
SFCP, [Licensee] continues to meet the
regulatory requirement of 10 CFR 50.36,
and specifically, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3),
surveillance requirements.
The NRC has concluded, on the basis
of the considerations discussed above,
that (1) there is reasonable assurance
that the health and safety of the public
will not be endangered by operation in
the proposed manner, (2) such activities
will be conducted in compliance with
the NRC’s regulations, and (3) the
issuance of the amendments will not be
inimical to the common defense and
security or to the health and safety of
the public.
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES
4.0 State Consultation
In accordance with the NRC’s
regulations, the [ ] State official was
notified of the proposed issuance of the
amendment. The State official had [(1)
no comments or (2) the following
comments—with subsequent
disposition by the staff].
5.0 Environmental Consideration
The amendment[s] change[s] a
requirement with respect to the
installation or use of a facility
component located within the restricted
area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or
surveillance requirements. The NRC
staff has determined that the
amendment involves no significant
increase in the amounts, and no
significant change in the types, of any
effluents that may be released offsite,
and that there is no significant increase
in individual or cumulative
occupational radiation exposure. The
NRC has previously issued a proposed
finding that the amendment involves no
significant hazards consideration and
there has been no public comment on
such finding published [DATE] ([ ] FR
[ ]). Accordingly, the amendment meets
the eligibility criteria for categorical
exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)
and c(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
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17:06 Jul 02, 2009
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no environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the
issuance of the amendment.
6.0
References
1. TSTF–425, Revision 3, ‘‘Relocate
Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee
Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b,’’ March
18, 2009 (ADAMS Accession Number:
ML090850642).
2. NEI 04–10, Revision 1, ‘‘Risk-Informed
Technical Specifications Initiative 5B,
Risk-Informed Method for Control of
Surveillance Frequencies,’’ April 2007
(ADAMS Accession Number:
ML071360456).
3. Regulatory Guide 1.177, ‘‘An Approach for
Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,’’
August 1998 (ADAMS Accession
Number: ML003740176).
4. Regulatory Guide 1.200, Rev. 1 ‘‘An
Approach for Determining the Technical
Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk
Assessment Results for Risk-Informed
Activities,’’ Revision 1, January 2007
(ADAMS Accession Number:
ML070240001).
5. Regulatory Guide 1.174, ‘‘An Approach for
Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in
Risk-Informed Decisions on PlantSpecific Changes to the Licensing Basis,’’
NRC, August 1998 (ADAMS Accession
Number: ML003740133).
6. ASME PRA Standard ASME RA–Sb–2005,
Addenda to ASME RA–S–2002,
‘‘Standard for Probabilistic Risk
Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant
Application.’’
7. NEI 00–02, Rev. 1 ‘‘Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA) Peer Review Process
Guidance, Rev. 1, May 2006 (ADAMS
Accession Number: ML061510621).
8. NEI 05–04, ‘‘Process for Performing
Follow-On PRA Peer Reviews Using the
ASME PRA Standard’’, Rev. 0, August
2006.
[FR Doc. E9–15780 Filed 7–2–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Dealer Floor Plan Pilot Initiative
AGENCY: U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA).
ACTION: Notice and request for
comments.
SUMMARY: SBA is introducing a guaranty
loan pilot initiative to make available
7(a) loan guaranties for lines of credit
that provide floor plan financing to
support that sector of the Nation’s retail
community that traditionally requires
floor plan financing in order to acquire
titleable inventory. SBA is creating this
pilot initiative to help address the
significant decline in the number of
lenders that have provided the majority
of this type of financing in recent years.
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In the automobile industry, this often
included affiliates of the manufacturers
themselves. Under the Dealer Floor Plan
Pilot Initiative, which will be available
through September 30, 2010, SBA will
guarantee up to 75 percent of a floor
plan line of credit between $500,000
and $2,000,000 to eligible dealers of
titleable assets, including but not
limited to automobiles, motorcycles,
boats (including boat trailers),
recreational vehicles and manufactured
housing (mobile homes).
DATES: Effective Date: The Dealer Floor
Plan Pilot Initiative will be effective on
July 1, 2009, and will remain in effect
through September 30, 2010. SBA will
begin accepting applications on July 1,
2009 and begin reviewing and
approving applications the week of July
6, 2009.
Comment Date: Comments must be
received on or before August 5, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by SBA docket number SBA–
2009–0009 by any of the following
methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Mail: Dealer Floor Plan Pilot
Initiative Comments—Office of
Financial Assistance, U.S. Small
Business Administration, 409 Third
Street, SW., Suite 8300, Washington, DC
20416.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: Grady
Hedgespeth, Director, Office of
Financial Assistance, U.S. Small
Business Administration, 409 Third
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20416.
SBA will post all comments on
https://www.regulations.gov. If you wish
to submit confidential business
information (CBI) as defined in the User
Notice at https://www.regulations.gov,
please submit the information to Grady
Hedgespeth, Director, Office of
Financial Assistance, U.S. Small
Business Administration, 409 Third
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20416, or
send an e-mail to
dealerfloorplancomments@sba.gov.
Highlight the information that you
consider to be CBI and explain why you
believe SBA should hold this
information as confidential. SBA will
review the information and make the
final determination whether it will
publish the information.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Sloan Coleman, Office of Financial
Assistance, U.S. Small Business
Administration, 409 Third Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20416; (202) 205–7737;
w.coleman@sba.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 127 (Monday, July 6, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31996-32006]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15780]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2008-0637]
Notice of Availability of Technical Specification Improvement To
Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control--Risk-Informed
Technical Specification Task Force (RITSTF) Initiative 5b, Technical
Specification Task Force--425, Revision 3
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of Availability.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a
model license amendment request (LAR), model safety evaluation (SE),
and model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination.
These are related to changes to standard technical specifications (STS)
for Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)--425, Revision 3,
``Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control--RITSTF
Initiative 5b,'' (Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML090850642). The purpose of these models is to permit
the NRC to efficiently process amendments that propose to relocate
technical specifications (TS) surveillance frequencies. Licensees of
nuclear power reactors could then request amendments, confirming the
applicability of the safety evaluation and NSHC determination to their
reactors. Previously, on December 5, 2008, drafts of the model SE,
model NSHC determination, and model LAR were published in the Federal
Register for public comment (73 FR 74202-74210). Based on its
evaluation of the public comments received in response to that notice,
the NRC staff made appropriate changes to the models, and is including
the final versions of the models in this notice. This notice also
contains a description of each public comment and its disposition by
the NRC staff. Based on its evaluation of the public comments, the NRC
staff has decided to announce the availability of the model SE and
model NSHC determination to licensees for referencing in LARs to adopt
TSTF-425, Rev 3. Licensees of nuclear power reactors proposing to adopt
these changes should follow the guidance in the model LAR and confirm
the applicability of the model SE and model NSHC determination to their
reactors.
DATES: The NRC staff hereby announces that the attached model SE and
model NSHC determination (which differ only slightly from the versions
previously published) may be used in support of plant specific
applications to adopt the relocation of TS Surveillance Requirements.
The staff has also posted the model LAR (which also differs only
slightly from the versions previously published) to assist licensees in
applying for the proposed TS change. The NRC staff can most efficiently
consider applications based upon the model application if the
application is submitted within a year of this Federal Register Notice.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michelle Honcharik, Mail Stop: O-12E1,
Special Projects Branch, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone 301-415-1774.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
This notice makes available for adoption by licensees a change to
the STS that modifies surveillance frequencies. Licensees opting to
apply for this change are responsible for reviewing the staff's
evaluation, providing the applicable technical justifications, and
providing any necessary plant-specific information. The NRC will
process each amendment application responding to the notice of
availability according to applicable NRC rules and procedures.
TSTF-425, Rev. 3 involves the relocation of most time-based
surveillance frequencies to a licensee-controlled program, called the
Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP), and adds the SFCP to the
administrative controls section of TS. The SFCP does not include
surveillance frequencies that are event driven, controlled by an
existing program, or are condition-based.
Revision 3 of TSTF-425 addresses all four reactor vendor types. The
owners groups participants proposed this change for incorporation into
the STS. TSTF-425, Rev. 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090850642), can be
viewed on the NRC's Web page at: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
Applicability
TSTF-425, Rev. 3, is applicable to all STS for nuclear power
reactors and requires the application of the Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) 04-10, Rev.1, ``Risk-informed Technical Specifications Initiative
5B, Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies,''
(ADAMS Accession No. ML071360456). The NRC staff reviewed and approved
NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, by letter dated September 19, 2007 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML072570267). Each licensee applying for the changes proposed in
TSTF-425 will need to include documentation regarding the probabilistic
risk assessment [PRA] technical adequacy consistent with the guidance
in Section 4.2 of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, ``An Approach for
Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment
[PRA] Results for Risk-Informed Activities'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML070240001). Applicants proposing to use PRA models for which NRC-
endorsed standards do not exist must submit documentation that
identifies characteristics of those models. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 of RG
1.200 provides guidance on the supporting information needed for new
methods. Applicants must give supporting evidence for methods to be
applied for assessing the risk contribution for those sources of risk
not addressed by NRC endorsed PRA models.
The proposed change to adopt TSTF-425 does not prevent licensees
from requesting an alternate approach or proposing changes other than
those proposed in TSTF-425, Rev. 3. Significant deviations from the
approach recommended in this notice, or inclusion of additional changes
to the license, however, require additional review by the NRC staff.
This may increase the time and resources needed for the review or
result in staff rejection of the LAR. Licensees desiring significant
deviations or additional changes should instead submit a license
amendment request that does not claim to adopt TSTF-425, Rev 3.
Evaluation of Public Comments on the Model Safety Evaluation
The NRC staff evaluated the public comments received on the model
SE, model NSHC determination, and model LAR published in the Federal
Register on December 5, 2008 (73 FR 74202-
[[Page 31997]]
74210). Fifteen comments were received from the pressurized and boiling
water reactor owners groups, TSTF (ADAMS Accession No. ML090080162).
The comments and NRC staff's disposition of each comment follows. It
should be noted that the following comments were made to the Federal
Register Notice for Comment which referenced TSTF-425, Revision 2
(ADAMS Accession No. ML080280275). TSTF-425, Revision 3 was submitted
by the TSTF by letter dated March 18, 2009 (ADAMS Accession NO.
ML090850642) to address NRC disposition of TSTF comment number 10.
1. (TSTF) Reference; model application (73 FR 74204). Comment:
``The model application contains statements that are not consistent
with a letter from a licensee to the NRC, and in many cases the model
application is worded similar to the NRC-issued Safety Evaluation. For
example, Section 2.1, paragraph 2, of the model application states,
`The licensee has submitted documentation which identifies the quality
characteristics of those models, as described in RG 1.200 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML070240001).' We recommend that the model application be
reviewed from the standpoint of a letter from a specific licensee to
the NRC and modify the wording to be consistent with that task. For
example, if Comment 2 is incorporated, the sentence above could be
rewritten as discussed in Comment 6, below.''
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment regarding
consistency of a letter from a licensee to the NRC and incorporated the
recommended change into the model application, where appropriate.
Disposition of Comment Nos. 2 and 6 are discussed below.
2. (TSTF) Reference; model application (73 FR 74205). Comment: ``We
recommend that the licensee's documentation of PRA adequacy be a new
Attachment 2 and the existing attachments be renumbered. This will
allow standardization of the model amendment and allow reference to the
attachment number in the Safety Evaluation.''
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and incorporated
the recommended change into the model application as new ``Attachment
2, Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy.''
3. (TSTF) Reference; model application (73 FR 74205). Comment:
``Attachment 3 of the model application includes the revised (clean)
Technical Specification (TS) pages. Whether licensees are requested to
include clean typed TS pages with license amendments varies among the
NRC Project Managers. Given the number of pages affected by this
amendment and the straightforward nature of the changes, this
attachment should be marked as optional, allowing the licensee and the
NRC Project Manager to decide whether clean TS pages should be
submitted.''
Disposition: Essentially, the commenter objects to providing final
requested change. When an applicant desires to amend its TS, the
combination of Sec. 50.36 and 50.90 require submission of the new,
clean, unmarked TS and bases. An applicant could not reasonably decline
to submit proposed TS and bases under the claim that the proposed pages
were not ``applicable'' to its request. Thus, an application is likely
incomplete if it fails to contain final clean TS and bases.
Regarding marked-up pages, applicants generally submit marked-up TS
pages and bases. There is, however, no direct requirement for
submission of the mark-ups. Should the Staff need the mark-ups for
their amendment review, Sec. 50.90's requirement that an LAR ``fully
describe[s] the changes desired'' could be used to request a mark-up
version. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
4. (TSTF) Reference; model application (73 FR 74205) ``Attachment 5
of the model application includes the affected Bases pages. In the
transmittal letter for TSTF-425, Revision 1, dated April 20, 2007, the
TSTF stated, ``In the CLIIP model application for TSTF-425, we request
that NRC reflect that appropriate plant-specific changes will be made
to the Technical Specifications Bases by the licensees under the
Technical Specification Bases Control Program and that, therefore,
revised Bases pages need not be included. This will significantly
reduce the size of the plant-specific license amendment requests
submitted to adopt TSTF-425.''
``As further discussed in the TSTF's response to NRC's RAI
8 (Letter from TSTF to NRC dated January 17, 2008, `Response
to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding TSTF-425,' Revision
1, `Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control--RITSTF
Initiative 5b,' dated October 2, 2007), licensees have the option of
retaining the existing description of the Frequency in their Bases (as
adoption of TSTF-425 does not alter any existing Frequencies) or of
adopting the recommended Bases in TSTF-425. In either case, neither the
existing Bases nor the revised Bases in TSTF-425 include any
information material to the NRC's review. Therefore, we recommend that
the model application be revised to not reference the inclusion of
Bases changes. See also the related comment on the Safety Evaluation
below.''
Disposition: For more than 50 years, since the regulation governing
license amendment requests, 10 CFR 50.90, has required that an
applicant fully describes the changes desired, and also required the
applicant to follow, as far as applicable, the form prescribed for the
original operating license application. The NRC's regulation at 10 CFR
50.36 continues this philosophy of requiring applications to include
technical specifications and bases. Thus, to meet the requirements of
10 CFR 50.90, the applicant will need to submit the applicable TSs and
bases. An applicant who does otherwise is at risk of failing to meet
the requirements in 10 CFR 50.90 of ``fully describing the changes
desired, and following as far as applicable, the form prescribed for
original applications''. No changes were made to the Federal Register
Notice (73 FR 74202-74210) as a result of this comment.
5. (TSTF) Reference; model application (73 FR 74204). ``Section
2.1, `Applicability of the Published Safety Evaluation,' first
paragraph, states, `[LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety evaluation dated
[DATE]. This review included a review of the NRC staff's evaluation,
the supporting information provided to support TSTF-425, Rev. 2, and
the requirements specified in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, (ADAMS Accession No.
ML071360456).' It is not clear what information is included in `the
supporting information provided to support TSTF-425, Rev. 2.' In order
for licensees to provide complete and accurate information, a more
specific description is needed.''
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and revised Section
2.1 to read as follows: ``[LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety evaluation
dated [DATE]. This review included a review of the NRC evaluation,
TSTF-425, Rev. 2, and the requirements specified in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1
(ADAMS Accession No. ML071360456).'' The statement regarding ``The
supporting information provided to support TSTF-425, Revision 2'' was
replaced by ``TSTF-425, Revision 2'' since the TSTF includes
information which explains and supports the STS changes and must be
considered by the licensee as part of the license amendment request to
determine if the TSTF is applicable to the licensee's facility.
6. (TSTF) ``Section 2.1, `Applicability of the Published Safety
Evaluation,' contains two numbered paragraphs joined by an `and'
referring to documentation of PRA adequacy. These
[[Page 31998]]
paragraphs do not provide sufficient guidance to a licensee on what
should be submitted. Using the change in Comment 2, we recommend that
these paragraphs be replaced with the following, `Attachment 2 includes
documentation with regard to PRA technical adequacy consistent with the
requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 1, Section 4.2, and
describes any PRA models without NRC-endorsed standards, including
documentation of the quality characteristics of those models in
accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.200.' Additional guidance, if
available, such as preferred organization of the information, can be
added to the model application in Attachment 2.''
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and revised Section
2.1, ``Applicability of the Published Safety Evaluation''. The numbered
paragraphs (1 and 2) of Section 2.1 are replaced to state the
following: ``Attachment 2 includes [LICENSEE] documentation with regard
to PRA technical adequacy consistent with the requirements of
Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070240001),
Section 4.2, and describes any PRA models without NRC-endorsed
standards, including documentation of the quality characteristics of
those models in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.200.''
7. (TSTF) ``We recommend Section 2.2, ``Optional changes and
variations,'' be replaced with, `The proposed amendment is consistent
with the TS changes described in TSTF-425, Rev. 2, but proposes to
modify the plant-specific Surveillances, which may include more or less
Surveillances than those modified in TSTF-425, Rev. 2, and those plant-
specific Surveillances may have differing Surveillance numbers. The
plant-specific changes are consistent with the NRC staff's model safety
evaluation dated [DATE], especially the scope exclusions in Section 1.0
of that model safety evaluation, as revised.'''
Disposition: Deviations or variations from that described in TSTF
are recognized and addressed in Notice of Opportunity to Comment on
Model SE on TS Improvement to Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to
Licensee Control--RITSTF Initiative 5b, TSTF-425, Revision 2 as
published in the Federal Register for public comment (73 FR 74203)
which states: ``The proposed change to adopt TSTF-425 does not prevent
licensees from requesting an alternate approach or proposing changes
other than those proposed in TSTF-425, Rev. 2. Significant deviations
from the approach recommended in this notice, or inclusion of
additional changes to the license, however, require additional review
by the NRC staff. This may increase the time and resources needed for
the review or result in staff rejection of the LAR. Licensees desiring
significant deviations or additional changes should instead submit a
license amendment request that does not claim to adopt TSTF-425, Rev
2.'' No changes were made as a result of this comment.
8. (TSTF) The proposed regulatory commitment in Attachment 4 to
implement NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, should be deleted. The TS Administrative
Controls, `Surveillance Frequency Control Program,' required to be
adopted as part of the amendment, states, `Changes to the Frequencies
listed in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall be made in
accordance with NEI 04-10, `Risk-Informed Method for Control of
Surveillance Frequencies,' Revision 1.'
NRC Office Instruction LIC-105, `Managing Regulatory Commitments
Made by Licensees to the NRC,' states, `Regulatory commitments are
appropriate for matters in which the staff has significant interest but
which do not warrant either legally binding requirements or inclusion
in Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSARs) or programs subject
to a formal regulatory change control mechanism.' As TSTF-425, Rev. 2,
proposes to have a Technical Specification requirement to implement NEI
04-10, Rev. 1, which is a legally binding requirement, a regulatory
commitment to implement NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, is unnecessary.''
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and revised the
Model Application by deleting the reference to and the ``Attachment 4
Regulatory Commitments.''
9. The ``Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration
Determination'' Criterion 3 discussion, should be revised as shown,
``To evaluate a change in the relocated surveillance frequency,
[LICENSEE] will perform a probabilistic risk evaluation using the
guidance contained in NRC approved NEI 04-10, Rev. 1.''
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and provided
additional clarification with reference to the SFCP. As a clarification
of the ``Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration'' Criterion 3
(73 FR 74205) discussion the statement was revised as follows: ``To
evaluate a change in the relocated surveillance frequency, [LICENSEE]
will perform a probabilistic risk evaluation using the guidance
contained in NRC approved NEI 04-10, Rev. 1 in accordance with the TS
SFCP.''
10. (TSTF) ``Section 1.0, `Introduction,' states that all
Surveillance Frequencies can be relocated except those meeting four
conditions. The first three conditions are a restatement of the
conditions described in TSTF-425, Rev. 2, Section 2.0, `Proposed
Change.' The fourth condition, `Frequencies that are related to
specific conditions (e.g., `battery degradation, age, and capacity') or
conditions for the performance of a surveillance requirement (e.g.,
`drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure decrease'), does
not appear in TSTF-425, Rev. 2, and is not consistent with the markups
in TSTF-425, Rev. 2.''
The TSTF's response to NRC's RAI 2 (Letter from TSTF to
NRC dated January 17, 2008, `Response to NRC Request for Additional
Information Regarding TSTF-425, Revision 1,' `Relocate Surveillance
Frequencies to Licensee Control--RITSTF Initiative 5b, dated October 2,
2007'), addressed this issue. It states, `The TSTF agrees that the
specific conditions of battery degradation, age, and capacity are not
within the scope of NEI 04-10. Surveillance 3.8.6.6 in NUREG-1430, -
1431, -1432, -1433, and -1434 is revised to retain the conditions of
battery degradation, age, and capacity, while relocating the
Frequencies consistent with the NRC-approved Limerick lead plant
submittal. The Limerick Surveillances, 4.8.2.1.e and 4.8.2.1.f, contain
the same requirements as ISTS Surveillance 3.8.6.6. The 60 month
Frequency is relocated to the SFCP. The 12 month and 24 month
Frequencies associated with degraded batteries, or batteries exceeding
85 percent of their expected life based on available capacity are
relocated to the SFCP, but the criteria related to battery degradation,
age, and capacity are retained.'
Therefore, based on this response and the NRC's approval of the
Limerick LAR, the Surveillance Frequencies related to specific
conditions are not excluded from the scope of TSTF-425, Rev. 2.
Disposition: The NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI)
Regarding TSTF-425, Revision 1, dated October 2, 2007 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML072120630) states as follows: ``In NUREG-1433 SR 3.8.6.6, and
NUREG-1434 SR 3.8.6.6, TSTF-425 will relocate the 12-month and 24-month
surveillance frequencies associated with degraded batteries, or
batteries exceeding 85 percent of their expected life based on
available capacity. This is inconsistent with the proposed changes to
similar SRs in NUREG-1430, NUREG-1431, and NUREG-1432, which would only
relocate the 60-month frequency associated with non-degraded
[[Page 31999]]
batteries. The staff considers the specific conditions of battery
degradation, age, and capacity as not within the scope of NEI 04-10.
Provide a revision to TSTF-425 which retains, in NUREG-1433 and NUREG-
1434, the SRs for degraded or old batteries.'' As the NRC staff
indicated in the RAI and TSTF states in their response (ADAMS Accession
No. ML090080162), ``TSTF agrees that the specific conditions of battery
degradation, age, and capacity are not within the scope of NEI 04-10.''
TSTF-425, Revision 2, requires the use of NEI 04-10, Revision 1, in
accordance with the TS Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
Therefore, Surveillance Frequencies related to specific conditions
remain an exception to relocation under the SFCP. No changes were made
as a result of this comment.
11. (TSTF) ``Section 1.0, `Introduction,' (Federal Register page
74205, first column) states, `The TS Bases for each affected
surveillance is revised to state that the frequency is set in
accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Various
editorial changes may be made to the Bases as needed to facilitate the
addition of the Bases changes. Some surveillance Bases do not contain a
discussion of the frequency. In these cases, Bases describing the
current frequency were added to maintain consistency with the Bases for
similar surveillances. These instances are noted in the markup along
with the source of the text. The proposed changes to the administrative
controls of TS to incorporate the SFCP includes a specific reference to
NEI 04-10, `Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 5B, Risk-
Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies,' Revision 1
(Rev. 1), (Reference 2) as the basis for making any changes to the
surveillance frequencies once they are relocated out of TS.' As
discussed in Comment 4, licensees are not required to revise the Bases
to adopt TSTF-425 and any voluntary Bases changes should not be
submitted with the amendment as they contain no information material to
the NRC's review and can be made under the Technical Specifications
Bases Control Program. In addition, Bases changes are not within the
scope of the NRC's review under 10 CFR 50.90 because, as stated in 10
CFR 50.36(a), Bases are not part of the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, the Bases changes should not be discussed in the NRC's
Safety Evaluation.''
Disposition: As identified by 10 CFR 50.90, Application for
amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit, which
states: ``Whenever a holder of a license, including a construction
permit and operating license under this part, and an early site permit,
combined license, and manufacturing license under part 52 of this
chapter, desires to amend the license or permit, application for an
amendment must be filed with the Commission, as specified in Sec. Sec.
50.4 or 52.3 of this chapter, as applicable, fully describing the
changes desired, and following as far as applicable, the form
prescribed for original applications.'' Applicants requesting a license
amendment, such as the adoption of TSTF-425, under 10 CFR 50.90 are,
therefore, required to submit an application that includes the affected
TS Bases ``* * * fully describing the changes desired, and following as
far as applicable, the form prescribed for original applications.''
Therefore, while the Bases are not part of the TSs, affected TS Bases
pages are required to be submitted with an application for a licensee
amendment request. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
12. (TSTF) Section 3.2, ``The Proposed Change Maintains Sufficient
Safety Margins,'' should be revised as follows: `The engineering
evaluations that will be conducted by the licensee under the
Surveillance Frequency Control Program when Frequencies are revised
will assess the impact of the proposed Frequency change with the
principle that sufficient safety margins are maintained. The guidelines
used for making that assessment will include ensuring the proposed
Surveillance test frequency change is not in conflict with approved
industry codes and standards or adversely affects any assumptions or
inputs to the safety analysis, or, if such inputs are affected,
justification is provided to ensure sufficient safety margin will
continue to exist.' This section is referring to Surveillance Frequency
changes that will be performed by the licensee under the SFCP after
approval of the license amendment, not to any evaluations provided with
the license amendment request.
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and revised the
first paragraph of Section 3.4 to state as follows: ``The engineering
evaluations that will be conducted by the licensee under the
Surveillance Frequency Control Program when Frequencies are revised
will assess the impact of the proposed Frequency change with the
principle that sufficient safety margins are maintained. The guidelines
used for making that assessment will include ensuring the proposed
Surveillance test frequency change is not in conflict with approved
industry codes and standards or adversely affects any assumptions or
inputs to the safety analysis, or, if such inputs are affected,
justification is provided to ensure sufficient safety margin will
continue to exist.''
13. ``Section 3.4.1, `Quality of the PRA,' references NEI 00-02,
`PRA Peer Review Process Guidance.' While NEI 00-02 should continue to
be referenced, NEI 05-04, Rev. 2, `Process for Performing Internal
Events PRA Peer Reviews,' should also be referenced.''
Disposition: Staff accepted the comment as NRC has endorsed NEI 05-
04 Rev.2, ``Process for Performing Internal Events PRA Peer Reviews,''
and NEI 05-04 can be referenced as an acceptable method.
14. (TSTF) ``Section 3.4.6, `Acceptance Guidelines,' first
paragraph, should be revised to clarify that the acceptance guidelines
are in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, so that it is not implied that the Safety
Evaluation contains additional requirements. For example, the first
sentence could be revised to state, `In accordance with NEI 04-10, Rev.
1, [LICENSEE] will quantitatively evaluate the change in total risk
(including internal and external events contributions) in terms of core
damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) for
both the individual risk impact of a proposed change in surveillance
frequency and the cumulative impact from all individual changes to
surveillance frequencies.'''
Disposition: Section 3.4.6, first paragraph, is rewritten to
clarify that the Safety Evaluation does not add additional
requirements. The revised text states as follows: ``[LICENSEE] will
quantitatively evaluate the change in total risk (including internal
and external events contributions) in terms of core damage frequency
(CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) for both the individual
risk impact of a proposed change in surveillance frequency and the
cumulative impact from all individual changes to surveillance
frequencies using the guidance contained in NRC approved NEI 04-10,
Rev. 1, in accordance with the TS SFCP.''
15. (TSTF) ``Section 6.0, `References', Item 2, should be revised
as follows, `NEI 04-10, Rev. 1,' for consistency with the rest of the
document.''
Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and revised Section
6.0, ``References,'' Item 2, to state: ``NEI 04-10, Revision 1'' to
correct the omission of the revision number.
For each application the NRC staff will publish a notice of
consideration of issuance of amendment to facility operating licenses,
a proposed no
[[Page 32000]]
significant hazards consideration determination, and a notice of
opportunity for a hearing. The staff will also publish a notice of
issuance of an amendment to the operating license to announce the
relocation of surveillance frequencies to licensee-controlled document
for each plant that receives the requested change.
Dated at Rockville, MD, this 23rd day of June 2009.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert Elliott,
Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection and
Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The following example of an application was prepared by the NRC
staff. The model provides the expected level of detail and content for
an application to revise technical specifications regarding risk-
informed justification for relocation of specific TS surveillance
frequencies to a licensee controlled program change. Licensees remain
responsible for ensuring that their actual application fulfills their
administrative requirements as well as NRC regulations.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555.
SUBJECT: PLANT NAME: DOCKET NO. 50--APPLICATION FOR TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION CHANGE REGARDING RISK-INFORMED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
RELOCATION OF SPECIFIC SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY REQUIREMENTS TO A
LICENSEE CONTROLLED PROGRAM
Dear Sir or Madam: In accordance with the provisions of Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50.90),
``Application for Amendment of License, Construction Permit, or
Early Site Permit,'' [LICENSEE] is submitting a request for an
amendment to the technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT
NOS.].
The proposed amendment would modify [LICENSEE] technical
specifications by relocating specific surveillance frequencies to a
licensee-controlled program with the implementation of Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) 04-10, ``Risk-Informed Technical
Specification Initiative 5B, Risk-Informed Method for Control of
Surveillance Frequencies.''
Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed change, the
requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific
verifications. Attachment 2 provides documentation of PRA technical
adequacy. Attachment 3 provides the existing TS pages marked up to
show the proposed change. Attachment 4 provides revised (clean) TS
pages. Attachment 5 provides the proposed TS Bases changes.
Attachment 6 Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration.
[LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed license amendment
by [DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X
DAYS].
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, ``Notice for Public Comment;
State Consultation,'' a copy of this application, with attachments,
is being provided to the designated [STATE] Official.
I declare [or certify, verify, state] under penalty of perjury
that the foregoing is correct and true. Executed on [Date]
[Signature]
If you should have any questions regarding this submittal,
please contact [NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER]
Sincerely,
[Name, Title]
Attachments:
1. Description and Assessment
2. Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy
3. Proposed Technical Specification Changes
4. Revised Technical Specification Pages
5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes
6. Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration
cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regional Office, NRC
Resident Inspector.
Attachment 1--Description and Assessment
1.0 Description
The proposed amendment would modify technical specifications by
relocating specific surveillance frequencies to a licensee-controlled
program with the adoption of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-
425, Revision 3, ``Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee
Control--Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force (RITSTF)
Initiative 5.'' Additionally, the change would add a new program, the
Surveillance Frequency Control Program, to TS Section [5],
Administrative Controls.
The changes are consistent with NRC approved Industry/TSTF STS
change TSTF-425, Revision 3, (Rev. 3) (ADAMS Accession No.
ML080280275). The Federal Register notice published on [Date] announced
the availability of this TS improvement.
2.0 Assessment
2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation
[Licensee] has reviewed the safety evaluation dated [Date]. This
review included a review of the NRC staff's evaluation, TSTF-425,
Revision 3, and the requirements specified in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, (ADAMS
Accession No. ML071360456).
Attachment 2 includes [Licensee] documentation with regard to PRA
technical adequacy consistent with the requirements of Regulatory Guide
1.200, Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070240001), Section 4.2, and
describes any PRA models without NRC-endorsed standards, including
documentation of the quality characteristics of those models in
accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.200.
[Licensee] has concluded that the justifications presented in the
TSTF proposal and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are
applicable to [Plant, Unit Nos.] and justify this amendment to
incorporate the changes to the [Plant] TS.
2.2 Optional Changes and Variations
[Licensee] is not proposing any variations or deviations from the
STS changes described in TSTF-425, Rev. 3, and the NRC staff's model
safety evaluation dated [Date].
[The proposed amendment is consistent with the STS changes
described in TSTF-425, Revision 3, but [Licensee] proposes variations
or deviations from TSTF-425, as identified below and may include
differing TS Surveillance numbers].
3.0 Regulatory Analysis
3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration
[Licensee] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination (NSHC) published in the Federal Register
[Date]([ ] FR [ ]). [Licensee] has concluded that the proposed NSHC
presented in the Federal Register notice is applicable to [Plant Name,
Unit Nos.] and is provided as an attachment to this amendment request
which satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).
Attachment 2--Documentation of PRA Technical Adequacy
Attachment 3--Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)
Attachment 4--Proposed Technical Specification Pages
Attachment 5--Proposed Changes to Technical Specification Bases Pages
Attachment 6--Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration
Description of Amendment Request: The change requests the adoption
of an approved change to the standard technical specifications (STS)
for [Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Plants (NUREG-1430), Westinghouse Plants
(NUREG-1431), Combustion Engineering Plants (NUREG-1432), General
Electric Plants, BWR/4 (NUREG-1433), and General Electric Plants, BWR/6
(NUREG-1334)], to allow relocation of specific TS surveillance
frequencies to a licensee-controlled program. The proposed change is
[[Page 32001]]
described in Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF-
425, Revision 3 (Rev. 3) (ADAMS Accession No. ML080280275) related to
the Relocation of Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control--RITSTF
Initiative 5b and was described in the Notice of Availability published
in the Federal Register on [Date] ([xx FR xxxxx]).
The proposed changes are consistent with NRC-approved Industry/
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF-425, Rev. 3,
``Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control--RITSTF
Initiative 5b.'' The proposed change relocates surveillance frequencies
to a licensee-controlled program, the SFCP. This change is applicable
to licensees using probabilistic risk guidelines contained in NRC-
approved NEI 04-10, ``Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative
5b, Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies,''
(ADAMS Accession No. 071360456).
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration: As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the [Licensee] analysis of the issue of no
significant hazards consideration is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relocates the specified frequencies for
periodic surveillance requirements to licensee control under a new
Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Surveillance frequencies are
not an initiator to any accident previously evaluated. As a result,
the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not
significantly increased. The systems and components required by the
technical specifications for which the surveillance frequencies are
relocated are still required to be operable, meet the acceptance
criteria for the surveillance requirements, and be capable of
performing any mitigation function assumed in the accident analysis.
As a result, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated
are not significantly increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?
Response: No.
No new or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed
change. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be
installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or
different requirements. The changes do not alter assumptions made in
the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with the
safety analysis assumptions and current plant operating practice.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in
the margin of safety?
Response: No.
The design, operation, testing methods, and acceptance criteria
for systems, structures, and components (SSCs), specified in
applicable codes and standards (or alternatives approved for use by
the NRC) will continue to be met as described in the plant licensing
basis (including the final safety analysis report and bases to TS),
since these are not affected by changes to the surveillance
frequencies. Similarly, there is no impact to safety analysis
acceptance criteria as described in the plant licensing basis. To
evaluate a change in the relocated surveillance frequency,
[Licensee] will perform a probabilistic risk evaluation using the
guidance contained in NRC approved NEI 04-10, Rev. 1 in accordance
with the TS SFCP. NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, methodology provides reasonable
acceptance guidelines and methods for evaluating the risk increase
of proposed changes to surveillance frequencies consistent with
Regulatory Guide 1.177.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented above, licensee concludes that
the requested change does not involve a significant hazards
consideration as set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), Issuance of Amendment.
Proposed Safety Evaluation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change TSTF-425; Relocate
Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control
1.0 Introduction
By letter dated [----, 20--], [Licensee] (the licensee) proposed
changes to the technical specifications (TS) for [Plant Name]. The
requested change is the adoption of NRC-approved TSTF-425, Revision 3,
``Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control--RITSTF
Initiative 5b'' (Reference 1). When implemented, TSTF-425, Revision 3
(Rev. 3) relocates most periodic frequencies of technical specification
(TS) surveillances to a licensee controlled program, the SFCP, and
provides requirements for the new program in the administrative
controls section of TS. All surveillance frequencies can be relocated
except:
Frequencies that reference other approved programs for the
specific interval (such as the Inservice Testing Program or the Primary
Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program),
Frequencies that are purely event-driven (e.g., ``Each
time the control rod is withdrawn to the `full out' position'').
Frequencies that are event-driven but have a time
component for performing the surveillance on a one-time basis once the
event occurs (e.g., ``within 24 hours after thermal power reaching
>=95% RTP'').
Frequencies that are related to specific conditions (e.g.,
battery degradation, age and capacity) or conditions for the
performance of a surveillance requirement (e.g., ``drywell to
suppression chamber differential pressure decrease'').
[The definition of ``Staggered Test Basis'' in TS Section 1.1,
``Definitions,'' is deleted. [Licensee] adopts TSTF-425, Rev. 3, and no
longer uses this defined term in the technical specifications and
proposes removing it from Section 1.1.] A new Administrative Controls
Program is added to TS section 5 as [Specification 5.5.15 (NUREG-1433
and -1434) or Specification 5.5.18 (NUREG-1430, 1431, and 1432)]. The
new program is called the SFCP and describes the requirements for the
program to control changes to the relocated surveillance frequencies.
The TS Bases for each affected surveillance are revised to state that
the frequency is set in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency
Control Program. [Various editorial changes have been made to the Bases
to facilitate the addition of the Bases changes.] Some surveillance
Bases do not contain a discussion of the frequency. In these cases,
Bases describing the current frequency were added to maintain
consistency with the Bases for similar surveillances. These instances
are noted in the markup along with the source of the text. The proposed
licensee changes to the administrative controls of TS to incorporate
the SFCP include a specific reference to NEI 04-10, ``Risk-Informed
Technical Specifications Initiative 5B, Risk-Informed Method for
Control of Surveillance Frequencies,'' Revision 1 (Rev. 1) (Reference
2) as the basis for making any changes to the surveillance frequencies
once they are relocated out of TS.
In a letter dated September 19, 2007, the NRC staff approved
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) 04-10, Rev. 1,
``Risk-Informed Technical Specification initiative 5B, Risk-Informed
Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies'' (ADAMS Accession No.
072570267), as acceptable for referencing in licensing actions to the
extent specified and under the limitations delineated in NEI
[[Page 32002]]
04-10, Rev. 1, and the final acceptance SE providing the basis for NRC
acceptance of NEI 04-10, Rev 1.
2.0 Regulatory Evaluation
In the ``Final Policy Statement: Technical Specifications for
Nuclear Power Plants'' published in the Federal Register (FR) (58 FR
39132, 7/22/93) the NRC addressed the use of Probabilistic Safety
Analysis (PSA, currently referred to as Probabilistic Risk Analysis or
PRA) in STS. In this 1993 FR publication, the NRC states, in part:
``The Commission believes that it would be inappropriate at this
time to allow requirements which meet one or more of the first three
criteria [of 10 CFR 50.36] to be deleted from technical
specifications based solely on PSA (Criterion 4). However, if the
results of PSA indicate that technical specifications can be relaxed
or removed, a deterministic review will be performed.''
``The Commission Policy in this regard is consistent with its
Policy Statement on `Safety Goals for the operation of Nuclear Power
Plants,' 51 FR 30028, published on August 21, 1986. The Policy
Statement on Safety Goals states in part, probabilistic results
should also be reasonably balanced and supported through use of
deterministic arguments. In this way, judgments can be made about
the degree of confidence to be given these [probabilistic] estimates
and assumptions. This is a key part of the process for determining
the degree of regulatory conservatism that may be warranted for
particular decisions. This `defense-in-depth' approach is expected
to continue to ensure the protection of public health and safety.''
``The Commission will continue to use PSA, consistent with its
policy on Safety Goals, as a tool in evaluating specific line-item
improvements to Technical Specifications, new requirements, and
industry proposals for risk-based Technical Specification changes.''
Approximately two years later the NRC provided additional detail
concerning the use of PRA in the ``Final Policy Statement: Use of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Nuclear Regulatory Activities''
published in the Federal Register (60 FR 42622, August 16, 1995) the
NRC addressed the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment. In this FR
publication, the NRC states, in part:
``The Commission believes that an overall policy on the use of
PRA methods in nuclear regulatory activities should be established
so that the many potential applications of PRA can be implemented in
a consistent and predictable manner that would promote regulatory
stability and efficiency. In addition, the Commission believes that
the use of PRA technology in NRC regulatory activities should be
increased to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA
methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRC's
deterministic approach.''
``PRA addresses a broad spectrum of initiating events by
assessing the event frequency. Mitigating system reliability is then
assessed, including the potential for multiple and common-cause
failures. The treatment, therefore, goes beyond the single failure
requirements in the deterministic approach. The probabilistic
approach to regulation is, therefore, considered an extension and
enhancement of traditional regulation by considering risk in a more
coherent and complete manner.''
``Therefore, the Commission believes that an overall policy on
the use of PRA in nuclear regulatory activities should be
established so that the many potential applications of PRA can be
implemented in a consistent and predictable manner that promotes
regulatory stability and efficiency. This policy statement sets
forth the Commission's intention to encourage the use of PRA and to
expand the scope of PRA applications in all nuclear regulatory
matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in terms of
methods and data.''
``Therefore, the Commission adopts the following policy
statement regarding the expanded NRC use of PRA:
(1) The use of PRA technology should be increased in all
regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art
in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRC's
deterministic approach and supports the NRC's traditional defense-
in-depth philosophy.
(2) PRA and associated analyses (e.g., sensitivity studies,
uncertainty analyses, and importance measures) should be used in
regulatory matters, where practical within the bounds of the state-
of-the-art, to reduce unnecessary conservatism associated with
current regulatory requirements, regulatory guides, license
commitments, and staff practices. Where appropriate, PRA should be
used to support the proposal for additional regulatory requirements
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109 (Backfit Rule). Appropriate
procedures for including PRA in the process should be developed and
followed. It is, of course, understood that the intent of this
policy is that existing rules and regulations shall be complied with
unless these rules and regulations are revised.
(3) PRA evaluations in support of regulatory decisions should be
as realistic as practicable and appropriate supporting data should
be publicly available for review.
(4) The Commission's safety goals for nuclear power plants and
subsidiary numerical objectives are to be used with appropriate
consideration of uncertainties in making regulatory judgments on the
need for proposing and backfitting new generic requirements on
nuclear power plant licensees.''
In 10 CFR 50.36, the NRC established its regulatory requirements
related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS are required
to include items in the following five specific categories related to
station operation: (1) Safety limits, limiting safety system settings,
and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation;
(3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5)
administrative controls. As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3),
``Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test,
calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of
systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be
within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation
will be met.'' These categories will remain in TS. The new TS SFCP
provides the necessary administrative controls to require that
surveillances relocated to the SFCP are conducted at a frequency to
assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is
maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and
that the limiting conditions for operation will be met. Changes to
surveillance frequencies in the SFCP are made using the methodology
contained in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, including qualitative considerations,
results of risk analyses, sensitivity studies and any bounding
analyses, and recommended monitoring of SSCs, and required to be
documented. Furthermore, changes to frequencies are subject to
regulatory review and oversight of the SFCP implementation through the
rigorous NRC review of safety related SSC performance provided by the
reactor oversight program (ROP).
[licensee] SFCP ensures that surveillance requirements specified in
the TS are performed at intervals sufficient to assure the above
regulatory requirements are met. Existing regulatory requirements, such
as 10 CFR 50.65, ``Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,'' and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B
(corrective action program), require licensee monitoring of
surveillance test failures and implementing corrective actions to
address such failures. One of these actions may be to consider
increasing the frequency at which a surveillance test is performed. In
addition, the SFCP implementation guidance in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1,
requires monitoring of the performance of structures, systems, and
components (SSCs) for which surveillance frequencies are decreased to
assure reduced testing does not adversely impact the SSCs.
This change is analogous with other NRC-approved TS changes in
which the surveillance requirements are retained in technical
specifications but the related surveillance frequencies are relocated
to licensee-controlled documents, such as surveillances performed in
accordance with the In-Service Testing Program and the Primary
Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Thus, this proposed change
complies with 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) by retaining the
[[Page 32003]]
requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure
that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained,
that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the
limiting conditions for operation will be met and meets the first key
safety principle articulated in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.177 (Reference
3) for plant-specific, risk-informed TS changes by complying with
current regulations.
Licensees are required by TS to perform surveillance test,
calibration, or inspection on specific safety-related system equipment
such as reactivity control, power distribution, electrical,
instrumentation, and others to verify system operability. Surveillance
frequencies, currently identified in TS, are based primarily upon
deterministic methods such as engineering judgment, operating
experience, and manufacturer's recommendations. The licensee's use of
NRC-approved PRA methodologies identified in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1,
provides a way to establish risk-informed surveillance frequencies that
complement the deterministic approach and support the NRC's traditional
defense-in-depth philosophy.
These regulatory requirements, and the monitoring required by NEI
04-10, Rev. 1, ensure that surveillance frequencies are sufficient to
assure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 are satisfied and that any
performance deficiencies will be identified and appropriate corrective
actions taken.
3.0 Technical Evaluation
[LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF-425, Rev. 3, provides for
administrative relocation of applicable surveillance frequencies, and
provides for the addition of the SFCP to the administrative controls of
TS. TSTF-425, Rev. 3, also requires the application of NEI 04-10, Rev.
1, for any changes to surveillance frequencies within the SFCP. The
licensee's application for the changes proposed in TSTF-425, Rev. 3,
included documentation regarding the probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) technical adequacy consistent with the requirements of Regulatory
Guide 1.200 (RG-1.200) (Reference 4), ``An Approach for Determining the
Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-
Informed Activities'', Section 4.2. In accordance with NEI 04-10, Rev.
1, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods are used, in combination
with plant performance data and other considerations, to identify and
justify modifications to the surveillance frequencies of equipment at
nuclear power plants. This is in accordance with guidance provided in
RG 1.174 (Reference 5) and RG 1.177 in support of changes to
surveillance test intervals.
RG 1.177 identifies five key safety principles required for risk-
informed changes to TS. Each of these principles is addressed by the
industry methodology document, NEI 04-10, Rev. 1. The second through
the fifth principles, which relate to the technical aspects of the
proposed change, are discussed below in Sections 3.1 through 3.4. The
first principle requires the proposed change to meet the current
regulations. The staff finds that the change meets that requirement.
3.1 The Proposed Change Is Consistent With the Defense-in-Depth
Philosophy
Consistency with the defense-in-depth philosophy, the second key
safety principle of RG 1.177, is maintained if:
A reasonable balance is preserved among prevention of core
damage, prevention of containment failure, and consequence mitigation.
Over-reliance on programmatic activities to compensate for
weaknesses in plant design is avoided.
System redundancy, independence, and diversity are
preserved commensurate with the expected frequency, consequences of
challenges to the system, and uncertainties (e.g., no risk outliers).
Because the scope of the proposed methodology is limited to revision of
surveillance frequencies, the redundancy, independence, and diversity
of plant systems are not impacted.
Defenses against potential common cause failures are
preserved, and the potential for the introduction of new common cause
failure mechanisms is assessed.
Independence of barriers is not degraded.
Defenses against human errors are preserved.
The intent of the General Design Criteria in 10 CFR Part
50, Appendix A, is maintained.
TSTF-425, Rev. 3, requires the application of NEI 04-10, Rev. 1,
for any changes to surveillance frequencies within the SFCP. NEI 04-10,
Rev. 1, uses both the core damage frequency (CDF) and the large early
release frequency (LERF) metrics to evaluate the impact of proposed
changes to surveillance frequencies. The guidance of RG 1.174 and RG
1.177 for changes to CDF and LERF is achieved by evaluation using a
comprehensive risk analysis, which assesses the impact of proposed
changes including contributions from human errors and common cause
failures. Defense-in-depth is also included in the methodology
explicitly as a qualitative consideration outside of the risk analysis,
as is the potential impact on detection of component degradation that
could lead to increased likelihood of common cause failures. Both the
quantitative risk analysis and the qualitative considerations assure a
reasonable balance of defense-in-depth is maintained to ensure
protection of public health and safety, satisfying the second key
safety principle of RG 1.177.
3.2 The Proposed Change Maintains Sufficient Safety Margins
The engineering evaluation that will be conducted by the licensee
under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program when Frequencies are
revised will assess the impact of the proposed Frequency change with
the principle that sufficient safety margins are maintained. The
guidelines used for making that assessment will include ensuring the
proposed Surveillance test frequency change is not in conflict with
approved industry codes and standards or adversely affects any
assumptions or inputs to the safety analysis, or, if such inputs are
affected, justification is provided to ensure sufficient safety margin
will continue to exist.
The design, operation, testing methods, and acceptance criteria for
SSCs, specified in applicable codes and standards (or alternatives
approved for use by the NRC) will continue to be met as described in
the plant licensing basis (including the [Updated] Final Safety
Analysis Report and bases to TS), since these are not affected by
changes to the surveillance frequencies. Similarly, there is no impact
to safety analysis acceptance criteria as described in the plant
licensing basis.
Thus, safety margins are maintained by the proposed methodology,
and the third key safety principle of RG 1.177 is satisfied.
3.3 When Proposed Changes Result in an Increase in Core Damage
Frequency or Risk, the Increases Should Be Small and Consistent With
the Intent of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement
RG 1.177 provides a framework for risk evaluation of proposed
changes to surveillance frequencies, which requires identification of
the risk contribution from impacted surveillances, determination of the
risk impact from the change to the proposed surveillance frequency, and
performance of sensitivity and uncertainty evaluations. TSTF-425, Rev.
3, requires application of NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, in the SFCP. NEI 04-10,
Rev. 1, satisfies the intent of RG 1.177 requirements for evaluation of
the
[[Page 32004]]
change in risk, and for assuring that such changes are small by
providing the technical methodology to support risk informed technical
specifications for control of surveillance frequencies.
3.4.1 Quality of the PRA
The quality of the [Licensee] PRA is compatible with the safety
implications of the proposed TS change and the role the PRA plays in
justifying the change. That is, the more the potential change in risk
or the greater the uncertainty in that risk from the requested TS
change, or both, the more rigor that must go into ensuring the quality
of the PRA.
[Licensee] used RG 1.200 to address the plant PRA technical
adequacy. RG 1.200 is NRC developed regulatory guidance, which
addresses the use of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) RA-Sb-2005, Addenda to ASME RA-S-2002 Standard for Probabilistic
Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications (Reference 6), NEI
00-02, PRA Peer Review Process guidelines (Reference 7) and NEI 05-04,
Process for Performing Follow-On PRA Peer Reviews Using the ASME PRA
Standard (Reference 8). The licensee has performed an assessment of the
PRA models used to support the SFCP against the requirements of RG
1.200 to assure that the PRA models are capable of determining the
change in risk due to changes to surveillance frequencies of SSCs,
using plant specific data and models. Capability category II of ASME
RA-Sb-2005 is applied as the standard, and any identified deficiencies
to those requirements are assessed further in sensitivity studies to
determine any impacts to proposed decreases to surveillance
frequencies. This level of PRA quality, combined with the proposed
sensitivity studies, is sufficient to support the evaluation of changes
proposed to surveillance frequencies within the SFCP, and is consistent
with regulatory position 2.3.1 of RG 1.177.
3.4.2 Scope of the PRA
[Licensee] is required to evaluate each proposed change to a
relocated surveillance frequency using the guidance contained in NEI
04-10, Rev. 1, to determine its potential impact on risk, due to
impacts from internal events, fires, seismic, other external events,
and from shutdown conditions. Consideration is made of both CDF and
LERF metrics. In cases where a PRA of sufficient scope or where
quantitative risk models were unavailable, [Licensee] uses bounding
analyses, or other conservative quantitative evaluations. A qualitative
screening analysis may be used when the surveillance frequency impact
on plant risk is shown to be negligible or zero. The licensee's
evaluation methodology is sufficient to ensure the scope of the risk
contribution of each surveillance frequency change is properly
identified for evaluation, and is consistent with regulatory position
2.3.2 of RG 1.177.
3.4.3 PRA Modeling
The [Licensee] will determine whether the SSCs affected by a
proposed change to a surveillance frequency are modeled in the PRA.
Where the SSC is directly or implicitly modeled, a quantitative
evaluation of the risk impact may be carried out. The methodology
adjusts the failure probability of the impacted SSCs, including any
impacted common cause failure modes, based on the proposed change to
the surveillance frequency. Where the SSC is not modeled in the PRA,
bounding analyses are performed to characterize the impact of the
proposed change to surveillance frequency. Potential impacts on the
risk analyses due to screening criteria and truncation levels are
addressed by the requirements for PRA technical adequacy consistent
with guidance contained in RG 1.200, and by sensitivity studies
identified in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1.
The licensee will perform quantitative evaluations of the impact of
selected testing strategy (i.e., staggered testing or sequential
testing) consistently with the guidance of NUREG/CR-6141 and NUREG/CR-
5497, as discussed in NEI 04-10 Rev. 1.
Thus, through the application of NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, the [Licensee]
PRA modeling is sufficient to ensure an acceptable evaluation of risk
for the proposed changes in surveillance frequency, and is consistent
with regulatory position 2.3.3 of RG 1.177.
3.4.4 Assumptions for Time Related Failure Contributions
The failure probabilities of SSCs modeled in the [licensee] PRA
[include] a standby time-related contribution and a cyclic demand-
related contribution. NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, criteria adjust the time-
related failure contribution of SSCs affected by the proposed change to
surveillance frequency. This is consistent with RG 1.177 Section 2.3.3
which permits separation of the failure rate contributions into demand
and standby for evaluation of surveillance requirements. If the
available data do not support distinguishing between the time-related
failures and demand failures, then the change to surveillance frequency
is conservatively assumed to impact the total failure probability of
t