Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors, 28112-28147 [E9-13582]
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 112 / Friday, June 12, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
RIN 3150–AI19
[NRC–2007–0009]
Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for
New Nuclear Power Reactors
AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or the Commission)
is amending its regulations to require
applicants for new nuclear power
reactors to perform a design-specific
assessment of the effects of the impact
of a large, commercial aircraft. The
applicant is required to use realistic
analyses to identify and incorporate
design features and functional
capabilities to show, with reduced use
of operator actions, that either the
reactor core remains cooled or the
containment remains intact, and either
spent fuel cooling or spent fuel pool
integrity is maintained. These
requirements apply to applicants for
new construction permits; new
operating licenses that reference a new
construction permit; new standard
design certifications; renewal of any of
the four existing design certifications if
the design has not previously been
amended to comply with the rule; new
standard design approvals;
manufacturing licenses that don’t
reference a standard design certification
or standard design approval, or that
reference a standard design certification
issued before the effective date of the
rule which has not been amended to
comply with the rule; and combined
licenses that don’t reference a standard
design certification, standard design
approval, or manufactured reactor, or
that reference a standard design
certification issued before the effective
date of the rule which has not been
amended to comply with the rule. In
addition, these amendments contain
requirements for control of changes to
any design features or functional
capabilities credited to show that the
facility can withstand the effects of an
aircraft impact.
ADDRESSES: You can access publicly
available documents related to this
document using the following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for documents filed under Docket ID
[NRC–2007–0009]. Address questions
about NRC dockets to Ms. Carol
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Gallagher 301–492–3668; e-mail
Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR):
The public may examine and have
copied for a fee publicly available
documents at the NRC’s PDR, Public
File Area O1 F21, One White Flint
North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland.
NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access
and Management System (ADAMS):
Publicly available documents created or
received at the NRC are available
electronically at the NRC’s electronic
Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/adams.html. From this page,
the public can gain entry into ADAMS,
which provides text and image files of
NRC’s public documents. If you do not
have access to ADAMS or if there are
problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, contact the NRC’s
PDR reference staff at 1–800–397–4209,
301–415–4737, or by e-mail to
pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
DATES: The effective date is July 13,
2009.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Stewart Schneider, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001; telephone 301–415–
4123; e-mail:
Stewart.Schneider@nrc.gov or Ms.
Nanette Gilles, Office of New Reactors,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone
301–415–1180; e-mail:
Nanette.Gilles@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
II. Currently Operating Power Reactors
III. Currently Approved Standard Design
Certifications and Combined Licenses
Referencing These Certifications
IV. Renewal of an Operating License,
Standard Design Certification, Combined
License, or Manufacturing License
V. New Nuclear Power Reactors
A. Introduction
B. Description of Beyond-Design-Basis
Aircraft Impact
C. Aircraft Impact Assessment
VI. Responses to Public Comments
A. Overview of Public Comments
B. Responses to Specific Requests for
Comments
C. Responses to Remaining Comments
VII. Section-by-Section Analysis
VIII. Guidance
IX. Availability of Documents
X. Agreement State Compatibility
XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XII. Finding of No Significant Environmental
Impact: Availability
XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIV. Regulatory Analysis
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
XVI. Backfit Analysis
XVII. Congressional Review Act
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I. Introduction
The Commission believes that it is
prudent for nuclear power plant
designers to take into account the
potential effects of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. The Commission
has determined that the impact of a
large, commercial aircraft is a beyonddesign-basis event, and the NRC’s
requirements that apply to the design,
construction, testing, operation, and
maintenance of design features and
functional capabilities for design basis
events will not apply to design features
or functional capabilities selected by the
applicant solely to meet the
requirements of this final rule (aircraft
impact rule). The NRC’s approach to
aircraft impacts is consistent with its
previous approach to beyond-designbasis events. The objective of this rule
is to require nuclear power plant 1
designers to perform a rigorous
assessment of the design to identify
design features and functional
capabilities that could provide
additional inherent protection to
withstand the effects of an aircraft
impact (i.e., meet the rule’s acceptance
criteria). This rule should result in new
nuclear power reactor facilities being
more inherently robust with regard to an
aircraft impact than if they were
designed in the absence of this final
rule. This final rule provides an
enhanced level of protection beyond
that which is provided by the existing
adequate protection requirements,
which all operating power reactors are
required to meet.
The final rule requirement to perform
a design-specific assessment to identify
design features and functional
capabilities applies to applicants for
new construction permits; new
operating licenses that reference a new
construction permit; new standard
design certifications; renewal of any of
the four existing design certifications if
the design has not previously been
amended to comply with the final rule;
new standard design approvals;
manufacturing licenses that don’t
reference a standard design certification
1 The requirements of the final aircraft impact
rule may apply, in some contexts, to the designer
who is responsible for, or seeks certification or
regulatory approval of something less than a
complete nuclear power plant (e.g., a nuclear
reactor without site-specific elements such as the
ultimate heat sink). For ease of discussion in the
remainder of this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION,
reference to a ‘‘nuclear power plant designer’’ or
‘‘facility designer’’ is meant to include, in the
appropriate context, a designer of something less
than a complete nuclear power plant, but is at least
as encompassing as a ‘‘nuclear reactor.’’ Similarly,
a reference to the design of a ‘‘facility’’ also
encompasses, in the appropriate context, the design
of something less than a complete nuclear power
plant (e.g., the design of a reactor).
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or standard design approval, or that
reference a standard design certification
issued before the effective date of the
rule which has not been amended to
comply with the rule; and combined
licenses that don’t reference a standard
design certification, standard design
approval, or manufactured reactor, or
that reference a standard design
certification issued before the effective
date of the rule which has not been
amended to comply with the rule. All of
these applicants as a whole are referred
to as ‘‘applicants for new nuclear power
reactors’’ throughout the remainder of
the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for this
final rule. These applicants are required
to perform an assessment of the effects
on the designed facility of the impact of
a large, commercial aircraft. Using
realistic analyses, applicants must
identify and incorporate into the design
those design features and functional
capabilities to show, with reduced use
of operator action, that the reactor core
remains cooled or the containment
remains intact and spent fuel cooling or
spent fuel pool integrity is maintained
(herein after referred to as the
acceptance criteria). Applicants are
required to describe how such design
features and functional capabilities meet
the acceptance criteria of the rule.
Applicants and licensees are subject to
requirements for the control of changes
to the design features and functional
capabilities identified as a result of
complying with this final rule.
The Commission-approved design
basis threat (DBT) does not include an
aircraft attack. The NRC published its
final DBT rule in the Federal Register
on March 19, 2007 (72 FR 12705) (Title
10, § 73.1, ‘‘Purpose and scope,’’ of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR
73.1)). Two well-established bases
support the exclusion of aircraft attacks
from the DBT. First, it is not reasonable
to expect a licensee with a private
security force using weapons legally
available to it to be able to defend
against such an attack. Second, such an
act is in the nature of an attack by an
enemy of the United States (U.S.).
Power reactor licensees are not required
to design their facilities or otherwise
provide measures to defend against such
an attack, as provided by 10 CFR 50.13,
‘‘Attacks and destructive acts by
enemies of the United States; and
defense activities.’’
The Commission has addressed
aircraft attacks by regulatory means
other than the DBT rule in 10 CFR 73.1.
By order dated February 25, 2002
(Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM)
Order), the Commission required all
operating power reactor licensees to
develop and adopt mitigative strategies
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to cope with large fires and explosions
from any cause, including beyonddesign-basis aircraft impacts (67 FR
9792; March 4, 2002). The Commission
first proposed incorporating the
continuing requirement to provide for
such mitigative measures in the NRC’s
regulations in the proposed 10 CFR part
73 power reactor security requirements
(71 FR 62663; October 26, 2006),
specifically, the proposed Appendix C
to 10 CFR part 73, ‘‘Licensee Safeguards
Contingency Plans.’’ During
development of the power reactor
security final rule, the NRC determined
that several significant changes to the
proposed rule language would be
needed to adequately address
stakeholder comments and associated
implementation concerns. To address
these comments and concerns, the NRC
proposed to relocate the provisions from
10 CFR part 73 to a new paragraph (hh)
in 10 CFR 50.54, ‘‘Conditions of
licenses,’’ in a supplement to the power
reactor security requirements proposed
rule (73 FR 19443; April 10, 2008). On
March 27, 2009 (74 FR 13925), the
Commission published a final rule
amending existing security regulations
and adding new security requirements
pertaining to current and future nuclear
power reactors that included the new
provisions in 10 CFR 50.54(hh). All
current and future power reactors are
required to comply with the
requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(hh),
which were promulgated on the basis of
adequate protection of public health and
safety and common defense and
security.
The current requirements, in
conjunction with the revisions to 10
CFR 50.54 to address loss of large areas
of the plant due to explosions or fires,
will continue to provide adequate
protection of the public health and
safety and the common defense and
security. Nevertheless, the Commission
has decided to also require applicants
for new nuclear power reactors to
incorporate into their design additional
features to show that the facility can
withstand the effects of an aircraft
impact. This final rule to address the
capability of new nuclear power
reactors relative to an aircraft impact is
based both on enhanced public health
and safety and enhanced common
defense and security, but is not
necessary for adequate protection.
Rather, this rule’s goal is to enhance the
facility’s inherent robustness at the
design stage.
Requiring applicants for new nuclear
power reactors to perform a rigorous
aircraft impact assessment and identify
and incorporate into their design those
design features and functional
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capabilities that address the effects of a
beyond-design-basis aircraft impact is
consistent with the NRC’s historic
approach to beyond-design-basis events
and with the NRC’s position in its
‘‘Policy Statement on Severe Reactor
Accidents Regarding Future Designs and
Existing Plants’’ (50 FR 32138; August 8,
1985). The policy statement notes, ‘‘The
Commission expects that vendors
engaged in designing new standard [or
custom] plants will achieve a higher
standard of severe accident safety
performance than their prior designs.’’
The NRC reiterated that regulatory
approach in its ‘‘Policy Statement on the
Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power
Plants’’ (59 FR 35461; July 12, 1994),
when it stated, ‘‘The Commission
expects that advanced reactors would
provide enhanced margins of safety
and/or utilize simplified, inherent,
passive, or other innovative means to
accomplish their safety functions.’’
These concepts continue to be NRC
policy as reflected in the NRC’s 2008
‘‘Policy Statement on the Regulation of
Advanced Reactors’’ (73 FR 60612;
October 14, 2008). This regulatory
approach has demonstrated its success,
as all designs subsequently submitted to
and certified by the Commission
represent substantial improvement in
safety for operational events and
accidents. The final aircraft impact rule
will further enhance the safety of new
nuclear power plants for aircraft
impacts and is consistent with these
policy statements.
The Commission considered the
appropriate location for requirements on
an aircraft impact assessment during its
deliberations on the security assessment
rulemaking (draft 10 CFR 73.62)
proposed by the NRC staff in SECY–06–
0204, ‘‘Proposed Rulemaking—Security
Assessment Requirements for New
Nuclear Power Reactor Designs (RIN
3150–AH92),’’ dated September 26,
2006. In its Staff Requirements
Memorandum (SRM) on SECY–06–
0204, dated April 24, 2007, the
Commission disapproved the staff’s
recommended rulemaking as described
in SECY–06–0204. The Commission
directed the NRC staff to include the
aircraft impact assessment requirements
in 10 CFR part 52, ‘‘Licenses,
Approvals, and Certifications for
Nuclear Power Plants,’’ to encourage
reactor designers to incorporate
practical measures at an early stage in
the design process.
As a result of the Commission’s SRM,
the NRC published a proposed rule for
comment in the Federal Register (72 FR
56287; October 3, 2007). The proposed
rule would have required applicants to
assess the effects of the impact of a
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large, commercial aircraft on the nuclear
power facility. Based on the insights
gained from the assessment, the
applicant would have been required to
include in its application a description
and evaluation of design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies to
avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the aircraft
impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions. The public comment
period for the proposed rule closed on
December 17, 2007. A public meeting
was held during the public comment
period to discuss the proposed rule and
to address any questions on the
proposed rule. The NRC received 32
comment letters from industry
representatives, public interest groups,
and concerned citizens on the proposed
rule.
This final rule revises 10 CFR parts
50, ‘‘Domestic Licensing of Production
and Utilization Facilities,’’ and 52 to
require applicants for new nuclear
power reactors to perform a designspecific assessment of the effects of the
impact of a large, commercial aircraft.
The applicant is required to identify and
incorporate into the design those design
features and functional capabilities to
show that the facility can withstand the
effects of an aircraft impact with
reduced use of operator actions. This
aircraft impact rule, along with
provisions in the NRC’s power reactor
security rule, including the addition of
the provisions in 10 CFR 50.54(hh), and
voluntarily-submitted safeguards
assessments, render as duplicative and,
therefore, unnecessary the draft
proposed rule (10 CFR 73.62) to require
security assessments. The draft
proposed security assessment rule
would have required a security
assessment which would include
mitigation of large fires and explosions,
a target set analysis, and design features
to protect target sets against DBTs. The
provisions of that draft proposed rule
applicable to large fires and explosions
from an aircraft impact are subsumed by
this final aircraft impact rule and by the
addition of the provisions in 10 CFR
50.54(hh). Sufficient target set
provisions are included in the NRC’s
changes to 10 CFR 73.55, ‘‘Requirements
for physical protection of licensed
activities in nuclear power reactors
against radiological sabotage,’’ which
applicants for new facilities will have to
satisfy. Designers of new nuclear power
reactors are encouraged to account for
the provisions for mitigation of large
fires and explosions in the facility
design so as to minimize more costly,
post-design features to meet those
requirements. Design certification and
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combined license applicants are
voluntarily submitting security
assessments that identify design features
to protect target sets against DBTs.
Accordingly, the draft proposed 10 CFR
73.62 is not necessary.
This new aircraft impact assessment
rule complements the revisions to 10
CFR 50.54(hh) to mitigate the effects of
large fires and explosions. The 10 CFR
50.54(hh) provisions on mitigating large
fires and explosions codify the adequate
protection requirement imposed on
existing operating reactors by ICM
Order, Item B.5.b. The 10 CFR 50.54(hh)
provisions, therefore, are necessary for
adequate protection and must remain in
regulations that are applicable to all
currently operating reactors and must be
satisfied by all newly licensed power
reactors. Current reactor licensees have
already developed and implemented
procedures to comply with the 10 CFR
50.54(hh) requirements, and would not
require any additional action to comply
with those rule provisions. New
applicants for and new holders of
operating licenses under 10 CFR part 50
and combined licenses under 10 CFR
part 52 will be required to develop and
implement procedures that will employ
mitigating strategies similar to those
now employed by current licensees to
maintain or restore core cooling,
containment, and spent fuel pool
cooling capabilities under the
circumstances associated with loss of
large areas of the plant due to
explosions or fire. The requirements in
10 CFR 50.54(hh) relate to the
development of procedures for
addressing certain events that are the
cause of large fires and explosions that
affect a substantial portion of the
nuclear power plant, and are not limited
or directly linked to an aircraft impact.
The rule contemplates that the initiating
event for such large fires and explosions
could be any number of DBT or beyondDBT events. In addition, the NRC
regards 10 CFR 50.54(hh) as necessary
for reasonable assurance of adequate
protection to public health and safety
and common defense and security. This
is consistent with the NRC’s designation
of the orders on which 10 CFR 50.54(hh)
is based as being necessary for
reasonable assurance of adequate
protection.
In contrast to the adequate protection
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(hh), this
aircraft impact final rule will enhance
safety and security by requiring an
assessment of newly designed facilities
to show that the facility can withstand
the effects of an aircraft impact. New
nuclear power reactor applicants will be
subject to both the requirements of the
aircraft impact rule and the
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requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(hh). The
overall objective of these rules is to
enhance a nuclear power plant’s
capabilities to withstand the effects of a
large fire or explosion, whether caused
by an aircraft impact or other event,
from the standpoints of both design and
operation. The impact of a large aircraft
on the nuclear power plant is regarded
as a beyond-design-basis event. In light
of the NRC’s view that effective
mitigation of the effects of events
causing large fires and explosions
(including the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft) can be provided
through operational actions, the NRC
believes that the mitigation of the effects
of aircraft impacts through design
should be regarded as a safety
enhancement which is not necessary for
adequate protection. Therefore, the
aircraft impact rule—unlike 10 CFR
50.54(hh)—is regarded as a safety
enhancement, which is not necessary
for adequate protection.
The NRC regards the aircraft impact
and 10 CFR 50.54(hh) rulemakings to be
complementary in scope and objective.
The aircraft impact rule focuses on
enhancing the design of future nuclear
power plants to withstand large,
commercial aircraft impacts, with
reduced use of operator actions. The
provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(hh) focus on
ensuring that the nuclear power plant’s
licensees will be able to implement
effective mitigation measures for large
fires and explosions, including (but not
explicitly limited to) those caused by
the impact of a large, commercial
aircraft.
Consideration of a rule to require
applicants for new nuclear power
reactors to perform an aircraft impact
assessment and describe design features
and functional capabilities addressing
such impacts, which are beyond-designbasis scenarios, is similar to the
Commission’s consideration in the mid1980’s of new rules addressing
accidents more severe than design basis
accidents. The 1985 ‘‘Policy Statement
on Severe Reactor Accidents’’ explained
the Com mission’s conclusion that,
although it was proposing criteria to
show new reactor designs to be
acceptable for severe accident concerns,
then-existing plants posed no undue
risk to public health and safety, and
thus, there was no need for action on
operating reactors based on severe
accident risks. The Commission’s
reasoning in the severe accident context
supports its conclusion that although
new nuclear power reactors should be
assessed for aircraft impacts and
designed to show that they can
withstand the effects of an aircraft
impact, existing reactors and designs
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provide adequate protection of the
public health and safety and common
defense and security.
The NRC is making several changes
from the proposed rule requirements in
this final rule. First, based on
consideration of public comments, the
NRC is revising the criteria necessary to
comply with the final rule. The
proposed rule would have required
applicants for new nuclear power
reactors to perform a design-specific
assessment of the effects of the impact
of a large, commercial aircraft. Based
upon the insights gained from the
aircraft impact assessment, the
applicant would have been required to
include a description and evaluation of
the design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies to avoid or
mitigate the effects of the applicable,
beyond-design-basis aircraft impact and
describe how such design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies
avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the applicable
aircraft impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions. The evaluation of such
design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies would have been required
to include core cooling capability,
containment integrity, and spent fuel
pool integrity. In the final rule,
applicants continue to be required to
perform a design-specific assessment of
the effects of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. In addition, the
applicant is required to use realistic
analyses to identify and incorporate into
the design those design features and
functional capabilities which show,
with reduced use of operator action, that
the reactor core remains cooled or the
containment remains intact and spent
fuel cooling or spent fuel pool integrity
is maintained. The final rule removes
references to considering the
practicality of including the design
features and functional capabilities
identified as a result of the assessment.
The acceptance criteria in the rule must
be shown to be met to achieve
compliance with the rule’s
requirements.
The Commission ultimately decided
that the final rule should require
applicants to show that, in the event of
an aircraft impact at a nuclear power
plant, the reactor core would remain
cooled or the containment structure
would remain intact and spent fuel
cooling or spent fuel pool integrity
would be maintained. With
implementation of this final rule,
applicants for new nuclear power
reactors can use realistic analyses to
assess their designs but cannot rely
solely on operator actions to meet the
acceptance criteria. The Commission
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continues to believe that subsequent
generations of plants to be built in the
U.S. will be inherently more capable of
resisting beyond design basis events,
including aircraft impacts, due to safety
improvements previously incorporated
into these designs. The addition of this
rule, revised to include specific
acceptance criteria, will provide
additional assurance that all reasonable
design measures were taken to add
additional margin beyond the adequate
protection standard that is being met
through compliance with 10 CFR
50.54(hh). The addition of specific
acceptance criteria to this rule adds
regulatory stability and predictability
that is not achievable with criteria that
must only be met ‘‘to the extent
practical.’’ Acceptance criteria that are
based on functional requirements
provide a benchmark that can be
assessed for the purpose of determining
compliance with this rule, yet provide
the distinction necessary to keep
enhancements implemented for a
beyond-design-basis event separate from
design requirements necessary to meet
10 CFR part 100, ‘‘Reactor site criteria.’’
The NRC is also expanding the class
of applicants that are required to
comply with this rule based on
consideration of public comments and
implementation issues. In one change,
the NRC is applying the final rule to 10
CFR part 50 license applicants as well
as applicants under 10 CFR part 52. The
final rule requires both new power
reactor construction permit applicants
and operating license applicants to
perform the required assessment and
include the description of the identified
design features and functional
capabilities in their applications. The
NRC is applying the final rule to
applicants at both the construction
permit and operating license stages
because it is not until the operating
license stage that the applicant is
required to provide the NRC with its
final design. The NRC can issue a
construction permit based on
preliminary design information.
Therefore, the NRC believes it is
necessary to require applicants to
perform the aircraft impact assessment
at both stages and to include the
required information in both
applications based on the level of design
information available at the time of each
application. These changes are reflected
in the addition of new paragraphs
(a)(13) and (b)(12) in 10 CFR 50.34,
‘‘Contents of construction permit and
operating license applications; technical
information,’’ requiring all applicants
for a construction permit or operating
license which are subject to 10 CFR
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28115
50.150(a) (proposed 10 CFR 52.500) to
submit the information required by 10
CFR 50.150(b) as a part of their
application. Paragraph (a) of 10 CFR
50.150 has similarly been revised.
In making these additions, the NRC is
making it clear that the requirements are
not meant to apply to current or future
operating license applications for which
construction permits were issued before
the effective date of this final rule. This
is because existing construction permits
are likely to involve designs which are
essentially complete and may involve
sites where construction has already
taken place. Applying the final rule to
operating license applications for which
there are existing construction permits
could result in an unwarranted financial
burden to change a design for a plant
that is partially constructed. Such a
financial burden is not justifiable in
light of the fact that the NRC considers
the events to which the aircraft impact
rule is directed to be beyond-designbasis events and compliance with the
rule is not needed for adequate
protection to public health and safety or
common defense and security.
Moreover, such operating license
applicants will be required to comply
with the requirements in 10 CFR
50.54(hh) to identify actions to mitigate
the effects of large fires and explosions,
including those caused by aircraft
impacts. For these reasons, the NRC is
not requiring operating license
applicants with an existing construction
permit to comply with the final rule.
The NRC is also adding requirements
in 10 CFR 50.150(c) (proposed 10 CFR
52.502) for controlling changes to the
information required by 10 CFR
50.150(b) to be included in the
preliminary safety analysis report
(PSAR) by a construction permit
applicant and the final safety analysis
report (FSAR) by an operating license
applicant. The NRC is applying the
same change control requirements to
construction permit and operating
license holders as it is applying to
combined license holders. If the permit
holder or licensee changes the
information required by 10 CFR 50.34 to
be included in the PSAR or FSAR, then
the permit holder or licensee must
consider the effect of the changed
feature or capability on the original
assessment required by 10 CFR
50.150(a) and amend the information
required by 10 CFR 50.34 to be included
in the PSAR or FSAR to describe how
the modified design features and
functional capabilities continue to meet
the assessment requirements in 10 CFR
50.150(a)(1).
Because the final rule is applicable to
applicants under both 10 CFR parts 50
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and 52, the NRC is relocating the aircraft
impact assessment requirements that
were contained in proposed 10 CFR
52.500 to a new section, 10 CFR 50.150.
This change is also consistent with the
recent revision to 10 CFR part 52, where
the NRC took a comprehensive
approach to reorganizing 10 CFR part 52
and making conforming changes
throughout 10 CFR Chapter I, ‘‘Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,’’ to reflect the
licensing and approval processes in 10
CFR part 52. In making conforming
changes involving 10 CFR part 50
provisions in that rulemaking, the NRC
adopted the general principle of keeping
technical requirements in 10 CFR part
50 and maintaining applicable
procedural requirements in 10 CFR part
52. For these reasons, the NRC is
relocating the proposed aircraft impact
requirements from proposed 10 CFR
52.500 to 10 CFR 50.150.
Based on public comments, the NRC
is making the requirements in 10 CFR
50.150 applicable to the four existing
design certifications in 10 CFR part 52,
appendices A through D, at their first
renewal if the design has not previously
been amended to comply with the final
rule. This change is discussed in detail
in Section IV, ‘‘Renewal of an Operating
License, Standard Design Certification,
Combined License, or Manufacturing
License,’’ of this document.
The NRC is also making several
changes to the terminology that was
used in the proposed rule. In the
proposed rule, 10 CFR 52.500 stated that
applicants for new nuclear power
reactors were required to perform a
design-specific assessment of the effects
on the designed facility of the impact of
a large, commercial aircraft. Based on
the insights gained from that
assessment, applicants would have been
required to include a description and
‘‘evaluation’’ of the design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies to
avoid or mitigate the effects of the
applicable aircraft impact. Reference to
such an ‘‘evaluation’’ was made
throughout the Supplementary
Information in the proposed rule.
However, the NRC determined that the
term ‘‘evaluation’’ was used in more
than one context and concluded that
such inconsistent use could cause
confusion. In the final rule, the NRC has
eliminated the use of the term
‘‘evaluation’’ in the rule language. The
new requirements governing what
covered applicants are required to
submit in their applications (10 CFR
50.150(b)) states that applicants must
submit a description of the design
features and functional capabilities
identified in the assessment and a
description of how the identified design
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features and functional capabilities meet
the assessment requirements.
Another area where the NRC is
changing the terminology used in the
final aircraft impact rule is the
elimination of the term, ‘‘strategies.’’
The proposed aircraft impact rule
required the assessment to include a
description of the design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies to
avoid or mitigate the effects of the
applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft
impact (proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c)).
Neither the proposed rule nor its
Supplementary Information defined
‘‘strategies.’’ Upon consideration, the
NRC has decided to eliminate that term
in the final rule. A ‘‘strategy’’ is
typically associated with human action
and may, therefore, appear to conflict
with the direction in 10 CFR
50.150(a)(1) of the final aircraft impact
rule that there should be ‘‘reduced use
of operator actions.’’ In addition, the
aircraft impact rule is focused only on
design, and was not intended to address
or impose requirements on the
operation of a facility. By using the
term, ‘‘strategies’’ in the proposed
aircraft impact rule, there is a real
possibility that stakeholders may
erroneously interpret the aircraft impact
rule as requiring a designer to address
as part of the aircraft impact rule the
requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(hh) to
mitigate the effects of large fires and
explosions. This would be an
unnecessary duplication of effort, and
would require consideration of
procedural and operational matters at an
early stage, which is not the NRC’s
intent and may not be the optimal time
for consideration of operational matters.
For these reasons, the NRC is dropping
its use of the term ‘‘strategies’’ in the
final rule. Thus, under 10 CFR
50.150(b), the relevant applicants need
only include in their applications a
description of the relevant identified
design features and functional
capabilities, and need not address
strategies. The elimination of the term
‘‘strategies,’’ does not, however, relieve
applicants from the responsibility to
consider reducing use of operator
actions in performance of the aircraft
impact assessment and identification of
design features and functional
capabilities to comply with this final
rule.
In addition, the NRC’s decision to
remove the need for the designer to
identify design ‘‘strategies’’ does not
obviate the need for the designer to
determine, when considering potential
design features and functional
capabilities, whether there are
responsive actions and strategies (e.g.,
firefighting) that the nuclear power
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plant licensee could take to mitigate the
effects of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft that would be made
possible, or whose effectiveness could
be enhanced, by inclusion of such
features and capabilities in the design.
One objective of the final aircraft impact
rule is that the designer identifies and
includes in the design those features
and capabilities to support the eventual
development of effective response and
mitigation actions and strategies at the
facility licensing stage which make
possible or enhance the capability of the
plant licensee to respond to aircraft
impacts. The NRC believes that it is
reasonable for the designer to include
appropriate design features and
functional capabilities to support
practical responsive actions and
strategies that the plant licensee could
implement. The plant licensee should
not be precluded from using an effective
responsive action and strategy, simply
because the designer failed to include a
well-placed design feature that is
necessary for an effective responsive
action (e.g., a wall, a water outlet, a
control panel).
Finally, the Commission is adding a
requirement in the final rule that any
changes to the detailed aircraft impact
parameters set forth in guidance shall be
approved by the Commission.
II. Currently Operating Power Reactors
The Commission has determined that
the existing designs of currently
operating nuclear power plants, together
with the security program actions
mandated by the NRC’s orders (some of
which are codified in the NRC’s final
DBT rulemaking and others of which are
incorporated into other NRC
regulations) provide an adequate level
of protection to public health and safety
and common defense and security
against aircraft impacts. As a result of
the events of September 11, 2001, the
NRC has undertaken a series of actions
to provide continued reasonable
assurance of adequate protection to
public health and safety and common
defense and security at the U.S.
commercial nuclear power facilities.
The NRC has assessed the potential
vulnerabilities of operating nuclear
power reactors to aircraft impacts, and
it has issued orders and provided
associated guidance to licensees for
implementing a range of mitigative
strategies. The results of these aircraft
impact assessments were derived from
evaluation of plant damage mechanisms
(e.g., structural failures, shock and
vibration effects, and fire effects). The
NRC ensured that implementation of the
February 25, 2002, ICM Order included
measures to mitigate such scenarios.
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The Commission’s ICM Order, Item
B.5.b, established the requirement for
licensees to implement certain
mitigation measures at existing power
reactors for these beyond-design-basis
events. This requirement was
specifically intended to address ‘‘losses
of large areas of a (reactor) plant due to
fires and explosions.’’ The Commission
has since incorporated this requirement
into 10 CFR 50.54 in the power reactor
security rulemaking. Under the
provisions of 10 CFR 50.54, future
license applicants must identify and
implement mitigative measures similar
to those required for currently operating
nuclear power plants.
On March 19, 2007 (72 FR 12705), the
Commission published a final rule
amending the DBT in 10 CFR 73.1. The
DBT rule describes general attributes
that nuclear power plant licensees must
defend against with high assurance.
This rulemaking enhanced the DBT by
codifying generically applicable security
requirements similar to those previously
imposed by the Commission’s April 29,
2003, DBT Orders.
On the basis of the previous
information, the NRC concludes that
existing power reactors pose no undue
risk to public health and safety or
common defense and security from the
effects of an aircraft impact based on the
Commission’s specified aircraft impact
characteristics. Therefore, the NRC is
not applying this final rule to existing
operating nuclear power plants.
III. Currently Approved Standard
Design Certifications and Combined
Licenses Referencing These
Certifications
Based upon consideration of public
comments, the NRC has decided that the
designs of all newly designed and
constructed nuclear power plants (i.e.,
those designed and constructed after
July 13, 2009) must comply with the
aircraft impact rule. The NRC agreed
with the majority of commenters who
stated that the underlying objectives of
the aircraft impact rule would not be
fully achieved if a subset of new nuclear
power plant applicants—namely, those
applicants who reference one of the four
existing design certifications—is not
required to comply with the aircraft
impact rule. This decision stems from
acknowledgement of the views
expressed by a wide range of
stakeholders in favor of requiring all
new nuclear power plants to meet the
requirements of the aircraft impact rule.
Thus, the NRC is requiring that all new
nuclear power plants in the U.S. be
required to use designs that comply
with the aircraft impact rule.
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In evaluating this change, the NRC
considered regulatory approaches that
could be used if a combined license
application references one of the four
currently approved standard design
certifications in Appendices A through
D of 10 CFR part 52 which has not been
voluntarily amended to comply with the
aircraft impact rule. The NRC
considered whether the combined
license applicant should be required to
perform the assessment of aircraft
impacts itself and use the design
features and functional capabilities
identified as the result of its assessment
in the design of their plant, but with no
obligation to modify the referenced
design certification. A second approach
considered by the NRC would require
that the four currently approved design
certifications be amended by the
original design certification applicant to
comply with the aircraft impact rule
within a short time after issuance of the
final aircraft impact rule. The NRC also
considered a third approach, whereby
the NRC would require that the four
currently approved design certifications
be amended to comply with the aircraft
impact rule (without specifying who is
responsible for prosecuting the
amendment), but only if they are
referenced in a combined license
application. This approach would also
restrict the NRC from issuing a
combined license referencing one of the
four currently approved design
certifications, unless it had been
amended to comply with the aircraft
impact rule (again, without specifying
who is responsible for prosecuting the
amendment). The NRC has determined
that the first approach should be
adopted in the aircraft impact rule (i.e.,
the combined license applicant be
required to perform the assessment of
aircraft impacts and incorporate design
features and functional capabilities into
the design of the applicant’s facility
with no concurrent obligation to modify
the referenced design certification). The
NRC believes that this approach will
ensure that a nuclear power plant which
is constructed using one of the currently
approved design certifications will
nonetheless meet the aircraft impact
rule without unnecessary delays
associated with amending the
referenced design certification rule. The
NRC recognizes that the first approach
may result in less standardization of
design features and functional
capabilities addressing aircraft impact
for nuclear power plants referencing one
of the four currently approved design
certifications. However, the NRC
believes that, as a practical matter, given
the likely small number of combined
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license applications referencing one of
the four currently approved design
certifications which has not been
amended to comply with the rule, any
reduction in standardization is likely to
be minimal.
However, the NRC has also decided
that if any of the four currently
approved design certifications are not
amended to comply with the aircraft
impact rule by the end of the initial
period of effectiveness and an applicant
seeks to renew the design certification,
then the certified design must be
amended to comply with the aircraft
impact rule before the renewal is
approved by the NRC under the
provisions of 10 CFR 52.57 through 10
CFR 52.61. The NRC’s determination in
this regard is discussed in Section IV,
‘‘Renewal of an Operating License,
Standard Design Certification,
Combined License, or Manufacturing
License,’’ of this document. The NRC
has concluded that it should use the
same criteria for evaluating voluntary
requests for amendments to existing
design certifications as it uses for
evaluating new applications for design
certifications, to ensure consistency
among all new reactor designs.
IV. Renewal of an Operating License,
Standard Design Certification,
Combined License, or Manufacturing
License
This rulemaking does not require
updating the assessment of aircraft
impacts required by 10 CFR 50.150 as
part of an application for either a
renewed operating license under 10 CFR
part 54, ‘‘Requirements for Renewal of
Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ a renewed design certification
under 10 CFR 52.57, ‘‘Application for
renewal,’’ a renewed combined license
under 10 CFR 52.107, ‘‘Application for
renewal,’’ and 10 CFR part 54, or a
renewed manufacturing license under
10 CFR 52.177, ‘‘Application for
renewal.’’ The NRC’s requirement for
assessment of large, commercial aircraft
impacts is not an aging-related matter,
nor is it based on time-limited
considerations. Hence, aircraft impacts
under the final rule are outside the
scope of any operating license or
combined license renewal proceeding
under 10 CFR part 54, and neither
operating nor combined license holders
need to update the assessment required
by 10 CFR 50.150(b) at the license
renewal stage.
With regard to design certifications
and manufacturing licenses which
comply with the aircraft impact rule
upon initial issuance or upon
amendment, the NRC believes that their
renewal review should not include a
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reassessment of aircraft impacts and
possible changes to the design to
include new design features and
functional capabilities. In the NRC’s
view, there will not be any significant
benefit to requiring applicants for
renewal to reassess the design’s
vulnerability to aircraft impacts absent a
Commission-approved change in the
detailed parameters on aircraft impact
characteristics set forth in guidance for
use in the aircraft impact assessment. As
discussed later in Section V.B,
‘‘Description of Beyond-Design-Basis
Aircraft Impact,’’ of the Supplementary
Information for this final rule, the final
rule requires that the design-specific
impact assessment use the Commissionspecified aircraft impact characteristics
as described in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(2) and
changes to the detailed parameters on
aircraft impact characteristics set forth
in guidance shall be approved by the
Commission. Because this final rule is
intended to provide added protection
against the effects of a beyond-designbasis event, the choice of aircraft impact
characteristics and the scenario used for
this assessment will not be linked to
threat assessments or to any evolution of
aircraft design. Therefore, there is no
need to require a reassessment at the
design certification or manufacturing
license renewal stage. In addition,
mandating a change to the design at the
renewal stage would pose an undue
burden on those licensees who have
referenced the design certification in
their license, or used the manufactured
reactor at their facility. Under 10 CFR
52.63(a)(3) and 10 CFR 52.171(a)(2), the
NRC requires that any modification it
imposes on a design certification rule or
on the design of a manufactured reactor
be applied to all plants referencing the
certified design or reactor manufactured
under the manufacturing license, except
those to which the modification has
been rendered technically irrelevant. If
the NRC were to require reassessment of
the design at renewal, this could cause
licensees who have already designed
and constructed their plants (or used a
manufactured reactor) to modify their
plants to come into conformance with
the reassessed design. Such
modifications are likely to be costly.
Given the NRC’s determination that the
impact of a large, commercial aircraft is
a beyond-design-basis event, the
imposition of such costs as the result of
reassessment at design certification or
manufacturing license renewal does not
seem warranted. Moreover, once the
design features and functional
capabilities for addressing an aircraft
impact have been incorporated into a
nuclear power plant’s design, the goal of
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this final rule has been achieved in that
consideration of aircraft impacts has
been factored into the design. In any
event, 10 CFR 52.59, which establishes
limited finality control over the NRC’s
renewal of design certifications, does
permit the NRC to impose modifications
to the design at design certification
renewal under certain circumstances
(see 10 CFR 52.59(b)(1) through (3)).
Accordingly, given that future design
certifications and manufacturing
licenses must, under the final aircraft
impact rule, meet the requirements of
the rule upon initial issuance, the NRC
has decided that these design
certifications and manufacturing
licenses need not be required by rule to
update the aircraft impact assessment at
the time of renewal.
However, upon consideration of these
factors in relation to the renewal of the
four currently approved design
certifications, the NRC has come to the
conclusion that if any of these four
design certifications have not been
updated in the first 15-year duration of
effectiveness, then the design must be
amended to comply with the aircraft
impact rule at the time of renewal under
10 CFR 52.57 through 52.61. In this
situation, the NRC believes that
regulatory consistency, predictability,
and efficiency all favor requiring any of
the four current design certifications
which have not been amended to meet
the aircraft impact rule at the time of
renewal of the design certification to
comply with the aircraft impact rule as
part of the renewal process.
The NRC’s determination is reflected
in the final rule as an amendment to 10
CFR 52.59(a). As revised, paragraph (a)
requires the NRC to find, at the first
renewal of any of the four currently
approved design certifications, that the
renewed design (i.e., the design which
is being approved for use in the
renewed term of the design certification
rule) complies with the requirements of
the aircraft impact rule.
The NRC has determined, consistent
with the intent of 10 CFR 52.59(b), that
requiring the renewed design to comply
with the aircraft impact rule constitutes
a substantial increase in protection to
public health and safety. The reasons
supporting this determination are set
forth in Section XVI, ‘‘Backfit Analysis,’’
of the Supplementary Information for
this final rule. The NRC wishes to
emphasize that imposing this
requirement on the renewal of the four
currently approved design certifications
does not represent any substantial
decrease in the commercial interests of
the original applicants for these design
certifications (or their successors in
interests). Accordingly, the NRC
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concludes that the four currently
approved design certifications, if they
have not already been amended to
comply with the aircraft rule, must
comply with the rule the first time any
of those design certifications are
renewed.
The NRC notes that one of the
consequences of the NRC’s
determination that each of the four
currently approved design certifications
must comply with the aircraft impact
rule if renewed, is that there may be
increased public confidence in the
safety of the renewed designs. The
NRC’s view is based upon public
comments from several stakeholders
urging that the four design certifications
be required to comply with the aircraft
impact rule.
V. New Nuclear Power Reactors
A. Introduction
Under this final rule, relevant
applicants for new nuclear power
reactors are required to:
• Perform an assessment of the effects
on the designed facility of a beyonddesign-basis aircraft impact.
• Using realistic analyses, identify
and incorporate into the design those
design features and functional
capabilities to show, with reduced use
of operator action, that the facility can
withstand the effects of an aircraft
impact (i.e., that the rule’s acceptance
criteria are met).
• Describe how such design features
and functional capabilities show, with
reduced use of operator action, that the
facility can withstand the effects of an
aircraft impact.
This final rule is based on the premise
that it is desirable for newly-constructed
power reactors to be designed to
withstand the effects of an aircraft
impact through design features or
functional capabilities that reduce or
eliminate the need for operator actions.
Because this type of consideration is
more effectively done during the
development of the design itself, the
NRC directs the requirements of this
final rule at plant designers.
The NRC does not expect plant
designers to demonstrate that design
features alone, without operator action
or mitigative response activity as
required under 10 CFR 50.54(hh), will
completely address the effects of the
aircraft impact. The NRC recognizes that
the decision to rely on design features
(as opposed to operator action or
mitigative strategies required under 10
CFR 50.54(hh)) is complex, and often
involves a set of trade-offs between
competing considerations. The NRC’s
goal is to have the designer implement
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a rigorous assessment process to ensure
that the design process constitutes a
reasoned approach for assessing the
plant design to identify design features
and functional capabilities to show that
the facility can withstand the effects of
an aircraft impact.
B. Description of Beyond-Design-Basis
Aircraft Impact
Since September 11, 2001, the
Commission has used state-of-the art
technology to assess the effects of
aircraft impacts on nuclear power
plants. As part of a comprehensive
review of security for NRC-licensed
facilities, the NRC conducted detailed,
site-specific engineering studies of a
limited number of nuclear power plants
to assess potential vulnerabilities of
deliberate attacks involving large,
commercial aircraft. In conducting these
studies, the NRC consulted national
experts from several Department of
Energy laboratories using state-of-the-art
structural and fire analyses. The agency
also used realistic predictions of
accident progression and radiological
consequences.
This final rule presents a general
description of the aircraft impact
characteristics that are required to be
used to perform the beyond-design-basis
aircraft impact assessment. The
assessment must be based on the
beyond-design-basis impact of a large,
commercial aircraft used for long
distance flights in the U.S., with
aviation fuel loading typically used in
such flights, and an impact speed and
angle of impact considering the ability
of both experienced and inexperienced
pilots to control large, commercial
aircraft at the low altitude
representative of a nuclear power
plant’s low profile.
Beyond these general characteristics,
the NRC will specify for plant designers
in a safeguards information (SGI)
guidance document more detailed
parameters describing the large,
commercial aircraft impact that are
considered appropriate for use in the
required assessment. Although the
detailed aircraft impact assessment
parameters will be described in an SGI
guidance document and will not be
publicly available because of their
potential value to terrorists, the
following description of some of the
factors used in selecting the parameters
is offered to foster a better
understanding of this final rulemaking.
Changes to these detailed parameters on
aircraft impact characteristics set forth
in this guidance shall be approved by
the Commission.
1. The aircraft used by the terrorists
on September 11, 2001. The NRC staff
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has reviewed the results of the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
The NRC has used these reviews in
previous studies for operating reactors.
The NRC also used these reviews to
make its decisions with respect to this
final rulemaking.
2. Communications with other U.S.
Government agencies. Since September
11, 2001, the NRC has worked closely
with the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Defense,
and other agencies, both to understand
their information on terrorist threats and
to communicate the NRC’s study results.
3. Communications with foreign
governments. A number of foreign
governments are considering the
construction of new nuclear power
plants. The NRC is communicating with
the regulatory authorities in these
countries to understand their
requirements and to convey its own
results and plans.
4. Evaluations of commercial aircraft.
The NRC has studied the types,
numbers, and characteristics of
commercial aircraft flown in U.S.
airspace.
Because this final rule is intended to
provide added protection against the
effects of a beyond-design-basis event,
the choice of aircraft impact
characteristics and the scenario used for
this assessment will not be linked to
threat assessments or to any evolution of
aircraft design. The final rule requires
that the design-specific impact
assessment use the Commissionspecified aircraft impact characteristics
as described in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(2)
(proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b)). As stated
previously, more specific details about
the aircraft impact characteristics will
be contained in a separate guidance
document under SGI controls. Because
this guidance document containing
more detailed aircraft impact
assessment parameters will be SGI, the
document will only be made available
to those individuals with a need-toknow and who are otherwise qualified
to have access to SGI. Plant designers
(including their employees and agents)
who meet the Commission’s
requirements for access to SGI will have
access to the guidance document
containing these more detailed
parameters to perform the assessments
required by this final rule.
C. Aircraft Impact Assessment
Technical Issues
Because the aircraft impact is a
beyond-design-basis event, the methods
and acceptance criteria used should be
based on realistic assumptions. The
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aircraft impact assessment is expected
to include the items detailed in the
following paragraphs:
1. Consideration of aircraft impact
characteristics. The assessment must
consider the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft of the type currently
in use for long distance flights in the
U.S. as described previously in this
document and in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(2).
More detailed aircraft impact
assessment parameters that are
considered appropriate for use in this
assessment will be contained in a
separate guidance document under SGI
controls.
2. Plant functions, structures, systems,
components, and locations to be
assessed. The critical functions required
to be evaluated in the aircraft impact
assessment include core cooling
capability, containment, spent fuel
cooling capability, and spent fuel pool
integrity. Evaluation of the survivability
of these critical functions should
consider not only the key components,
but also power supplies, cable runs, and
other components that support these
functions. The assessment may take
credit for the availability of both safety
and non-safety equipment. The
assessment should evaluate whether the
structures containing equipment that
provides these critical functions are
likely to be affected by the specified
large, commercial aircraft impact.
Factors to be considered in the
assessment include the size and location
of the structures and the presence of
external impediments to impact.
3. Damage mechanisms. The
assessment should model the structural
response, shock and vibration effects,
and fire effects of the aircraft impact.
a. Structural assessment. The
structural assessment should be based
on a detailed structural model of the
plant taking into account the nonlinear
materials and geometric behavior. The
assessment should consider both local
and global (plant-wide) behavior, as
well as thermal effects resulting from
fire.
b. Shock assessment. The assessment
should evaluate both the local and
global (plant-wide) shock and vibration
effects resulting from the aircraft
impact.
c. Fire assessment. The fire
assessment should consider the extent
of structural damage and aviation fuel
deposition, if any, spread within the
impacted buildings. The assessment
should consider both short- and longterm fire effects.
4. Consideration of potential
responsive actions and strategies in
identifying design features and
functional capabilities. In determining
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design features and functional
capabilities, the designer is expected to
consider the potential responsive
actions and strategies in determining
what design features and functional
capabilities to adopt. After considering
potential actions and strategies, the
designer may identify design features
and functional strategies that would
facilitate the implementation and/or
enhance the effectiveness of such
responsive actions and strategies. An
objective of the rule is to ensure that
practical actions and strategies that the
nuclear power plant licensee could use
to respond to the effects of an aircraft
impact are not precluded by the design
and are available as effective options
through inclusion of appropriate design
features and functional capabilities.
Regulatory Treatment of the Assessment
The aircraft impact assessment will be
subject to inspection by the NRC and,
therefore, must be maintained by the
applicant along with the rest of the
information that forms the basis for the
relevant application, consistent with
paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 52.0, ‘‘Scope;
applicability of 10 CFR Chapter I
provisions,’’ 10 CFR 50.70,
‘‘Inspections,’’ and 10 CFR 50.71,
‘‘Maintenance of records, making of
reports.’’ The applicant is not required
to submit the aircraft impact
assessment—as opposed to the
‘‘description of the identified design
features and functional capabilities’’
required by 10 CFR 50.150(b) (proposed
10 CFR 52.500(c))—to the NRC in its
application.
Under the final rule, the NRC will
confirm that the information required by
10 CFR 50.150(b) is included in the
applicant’s PSAR or FSAR, namely, the
description of the design features and
functional capabilities identified as a
result of the assessment and a
description of how those features and
capabilities show, with reduced use of
operator action, that the assessment
requirements in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1) are
met. The NRC will review the
information contained in the
application and reach conclusions as to
whether the applicant has: (1)
Adequately described design features
and functional capabilities in
accordance with the aircraft impact rule;
and (2) conducted an assessment
reasonably formulated to identify design
features and functional capabilities to
show, with reduced use of operator
action, that the facility can withstand
the effects of an aircraft impact. The
NRC’s decision on an application
subject to 10 CFR 50.150 will be
separate from any NRC determination
that may be made with respect to the
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adequacy of the impact assessment
which the rule does not require be
submitted to the NRC. Therefore, the
adequacy of the impact assessment may
not be the subject of a contention
submitted as part of a petition to
intervene under 10 CFR 2.309, ‘‘Hearing
requests, petitions to intervene,
requirements for standing, and
contentions.’’ A person who seeks NRC
rulemaking action with respect to a
proposed standard design certification
on the basis that the requirements of the
rule with respect to the identification
and description of design features and
functional capabilities has not been met
could submit comments in the notice
and comment phase of that rulemaking.
A person who seeks rulemaking action
after the NRC has adopted a final design
certification rule on the basis that the
impact assessment performed for that
design certification is inadequate could
submit a petition for rulemaking under
10 CFR 2.802, ‘‘Petition for
rulemaking,’’ and 10 CFR 2.803,
‘‘Determination of petition,’’ seeking to
amend the standard design certification.
A person who seeks agency
enforcement-related action on a
combined license or manufacturing
license on the basis of an inadequate
impact assessment could file a petition
under 10 CFR 2.206, ‘‘Requests for
action under this subpart.’’
Applicants are only required to
submit a description of the identified
design features and functional
capabilities identified as a result of the
assessment in their PSAR or FSAR,
together with a description of how the
identified design features and functional
capabilities comply with the rule’s
requirements. Applicants subject to the
aircraft impact rule must make the
complete aircraft impact assessment
available for NRC inspection at the
applicants’ offices or their contractors’
offices, upon NRC request in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.70, 10 CFR 50.71, and
Section 161.c of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended. The NRC expects
that, generally, the information that it
needs to perform its review of the
application to assess the applicant’s
compliance with 10 CFR 50.150 will be
that information contained in the
applicant’s FSAR. However, if the NRC
believes, during the course of its review
of the application, that the application
contains incomplete or insufficient
descriptions of the design features and
functional capabilities included in the
design, or insufficient discussions of
how those features and capabilities
show, with reduced use of operator
action, that the facility can withstand
the effects of an aircraft impact, then the
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NRC may request additional information
or may review the assessment prior to
issuance of the design certification,
approval, or license, as applicable.
The NRC will confirm that the impact
assessment was performed consistent
with the regulatory requirements, but,
consistent with the previous discussion,
the NRC’s confirmation will proceed
independently of the NRC’s licensing or
approval action on the relevant
application. The NRC may take
appropriate enforcement action for any
violations of applicable NRC
requirements, including, but not limited
to, 10 CFR 50.150, ‘‘Aircraft impact
assessment;’’ 10 CFR 50.5 and 10 CFR
52.4, ‘‘Deliberate misconduct;’’ and 10
CFR 50.9 and 10 CFR 52.6,
‘‘Completeness and accuracy of
information.’’ A failure to perform the
assessment will be a violation of the
rule. The NRC expects the assessment to
be rigorous. Any assessment that is
inadequate to reasonably assess the
aircraft impact or to identify design
features or functional capabilities could
be considered a violation of the rule.
For design certifications, design
approvals, and manufacturing license
which are subject to and/or have been
determined by the NRC to be in
compliance with the aircraft impact
rule, issue resolution (in accordance
with the applicable NRC regulations and
law) will be accorded to the aircraft
impact assessment, the descriptions of
the design features and functional
capabilities required to be included in
the application, and the description of
how the identified design features and
functional capabilities meet the
requirements of this final rule.
Furthermore, the NRC has concluded in
this final rulemaking that issue
resolution also extends to the exclusion
of design features and functional
capabilities which have not been
included in the facility design. This
position represents a change from the
NRC’s proposed position as presented in
the proposed rule’s statement of
consideration (see 72 FR 56292, third
column (October 3, 2007)). The NRC’s
changed position on this matter stems
from a review of the issue resolution
provision in design certification
rulemaking. Under the ‘‘Issue
Resolution’’ section for each of the four
current design certifications, the NRC
included the following statement: ‘‘A
conclusion that a matter is resolved
includes the finding that additional or
alternative structures, systems, and
components, design features, design
criteria, testing, analyses, acceptance
criteria or justification are not necessary
for the [design which is certified].’’ 10
CFR part 52, Appendices A through D,
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paragraph IV.A. There is nothing
exceptional about the technical
requirements in the aircraft impact rule
which suggests that this provision on
issue resolution should not also apply to
matters addressed by the aircraft impact
rule. Accordingly, as part of this final
rulemaking the NRC adopts a different
position on the scope of issue resolution
with respect to excluded design features
and functional capabilities.
Once the applicant completes the
impact assessment and identifies in the
FSAR the design features and functional
capabilities that it has incorporated into
its design, the goal of this final rule has
been achieved. Accordingly, the final
rule does not require the impact
assessment to be updated by either: (1)
An operating license holder; (2) a design
certification applicant following the
NRC’s adoption of a final standard
design certification rule; (3) a design
approval holder; (4) a manufacturing
license applicant or holder whose
application references a design
certification or design approval; (5) a
combined license applicant or holder
whose application references a design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor; or (6) a combined
license or manufacturing license holder
who is required to prepare its own
assessment. However, if a permit holder,
licensee, approval holder, or design
certification applicant makes a change
to the information required to be
included in their PSAR or FSAR, then
they will be required to consider the
effect of the change on the original
assessment required by 10 CFR
50.150(a) and amend the information
required to be included in the PSAR or
FSAR. These requirements are
discussed in more detail later in this
section. Also, a construction permit
holder will need to update its initial
assessment when it is preparing to
submit its operating license application
because it is only at the operating
license stage that the applicant will be
seeking NRC approval of its final design.
No applicant or licensee will be
required to update the assessment in an
application for renewal under either 10
CFR 52.57, 10 CFR 52.107, 10 CFR
52.177 or 10 CFR part 54. An applicant
for renewal of one of the currently
approved design certifications which
has not been amended to comply with
the aircraft impact rule will have to
perform an aircraft impact assessment
before submitting its renewal
application.
Record Retention Requirements
The provisions of 10 CFR 50.71(c)
require that records that are required by
the regulations in 10 CFR parts 50 or 52
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must be retained for the period specified
by the appropriate regulation. If a
retention period is not otherwise
specified, the licensee must retain these
records until the Commission
terminates the facility license. Because
10 CFR 50.150(a) (proposed 10 CFR
52.500(b)) requires the performance of
the aircraft impact assessment, it falls
under the category of ‘‘records that are
required by the regulations’’ and
therefore, the licensee will be required
to retain the assessment until the
Commission terminates the facility
license. The NRC also expects to add
specific provisions to each standard
design certification rule for a design
covered by 10 CFR 50.150 governing
retention of the aircraft impact
assessment by both the applicant for the
design certification (including an
applicant after the Commission has
adopted a final standard design
certification rule) and a licensee who
references that design certification. The
NRC will require applicants and
licensees to retain the assessment
required by 10 CFR 50.150(a)
throughout the pendency of the
application and for the term of the
certification or license (including any
period of renewal). For all applicants,
the supporting documentation retained
onsite should describe the methodology
used in performing the assessment,
including the identification of potential
design features and functional
capabilities to show that the acceptance
criteria in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1) will be
met.
Identification of Design Features and
Functional Capabilities
The final rule requires designers of
new facilities to describe how the
design features and functional
capabilities identified in performance of
the aircraft impact assessment show,
with reduced use of operator action, that
the facility can withstand the effects of
an aircraft impact (i.e., that the rule’s
acceptance criteria are met). Plant
structures critical to maintaining facility
safety functions should be designed
such that an impact does not result in
structural failure, and aircraft parts and
jet fuel do not enter the structures. In
circumstances in which an impact
results in aircraft parts and jet fuel
entering structures or affecting
equipment, plant structures and layouts
should be evaluated with respect to
maintaining key safety functions (core
cooling, containment, spent fuel
cooling, and spent fuel pool integrity)
by addressing equipment survivability
following the entry of aircraft parts and
jet fuel. Key safety functions should be
accomplished notwithstanding the
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resulting internal damage from
structural loads, shock and vibration,
and fire.
As discussed previously, the
Commission has issued orders to
operating plants requiring mitigation of
the effects of losing large areas of the
plant from fires and explosions. These
requirements include some reliance on
operator actions, such as realigning
systems to ensure continued core
cooling following the loss of a large
area. Because this final rule applies to
newly designed facilities before
construction of the facility, the
Commission expects that improvements
can be made in the plant’s design that
may be even more effective than
operator actions credited in operating
plants. Thus, these designs should have
reduced reliance, relative to current
operating plants, on operator actions.
Nuclear power plants are inherently
very robust, secure structures designed
to withstand tornadoes, hurricanes,
earthquakes, floods, and other severe
events. They have redundant and
diverse safety equipment so that if an
active component becomes unavailable,
another component or system will
satisfy its function. The results of the
Commission’s evaluation of postulated
aircraft impacts on operating reactors
reinforced the value of design features
such as the following:
• Reinforced concrete walls.
• Redundancy and spatial separation
of key systems, structures and
components.
• Diversity of power supplies.
• Compartmentalization of interior
structures with pressure resisting
concrete walls and doors.
The NRC expects the required
assessment to consider such design
features and functional capabilities and
of possible improvements in these and
other features and capabilities for
addressing aircraft impacts.
Control of PSAR or FSAR Information
Design features or functional
capabilities credited for showing that
the facility can withstand the effects of
an aircraft impact should be described
in Chapter 19 of the FSAR, which
addresses severe accidents. The design
features may include structures or
features unchanged from the plant
design as it existed before the aircraft
impact assessment (e.g., an existing wall
is found to be effective), structures or
features included in the plant design but
enhanced to improve the response to an
aircraft impact (e.g., an existing wall is
made stronger), or new structures or
features added solely to address aircraft
impacts (e.g., a new wall). The
regulatory treatment of the design
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features (e.g., how changes to the
features are controlled) depends on
which of the previously mentioned
categories apply. For example, a design
feature added specifically to address the
effects of an aircraft impact will be
controlled only by requirements in 10
CFR 50.150(c) (proposed 10 CFR 52.502)
added in this final rule or requirements
that the NRC expects to add to future
design certifications that will be subject
to 10 CFR 50.150 (proposed 10 CFR
52.500). A safety-related structure
credited in the aircraft impact
assessment as a design feature will
continue to be controlled by Appendix
B to 10 CFR part 50, ‘‘Quality Assurance
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and
Fuel Reprocessing Plants,’’ 10 CFR part
21, ‘‘Reporting of Defects and
Noncompliance,’’ and other regulations
establishing technical and
administrative requirements on the nonaircraft impact functions, in addition to
the requirements for control of features
to address aircraft impacts.
For all applicants and licensees
subject to 10 CFR 50.150, control of
changes to any design features or
functional capabilities credited for
showing that the facility can withstand
the effects of an aircraft impact will be
governed by the requirements in a new
paragraph (c), ‘‘Control of changes,’’ of
10 CFR 50.150. For construction permits
which are subject to 10 CFR 50.150,
paragraph (c)(1) requires that, if the
permit holder changes the information
required by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(13) to be
included in the PSAR, then the permit
holder must consider the effect of the
changed feature or capability on the
original assessment required by 10 CFR
50.150(a) and amend the information
required by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(13) to be
included in the PSAR to describe how
the modified design features and
functional capabilities continue to meet
the assessment requirements in the
aircraft impact rule. Because this final
rule addresses a beyond-design-basis
event, the NRC has determined that it is
appropriate to apply the same standard
to any licensee-proposed changes to
features and capabilities that were
applied during the original evaluation of
those design features and functional
capabilities.
Paragraph (c)(2) of 10 CFR 50.150
provides that, for operating licenses
which are subject to the aircraft impact
rule (i.e., operating licenses for which
the underlying construction permits are
issued after July 13, 2009), if the
licensee changes the information
required by 10 CFR 50.34(b)(12) to be
included in the FSAR, then the licensee
shall consider the effect of the changed
feature or capability on the original
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assessment required by 10 CFR
50.150(b) and amend the information
required by 10 CFR 50.34(b)(12) to be
included in FSAR to describe how the
modified design features and functional
capabilities continue to meet the
assessment requirements in the aircraft
impact rule.
Paragraph (c)(3) of 10 CFR 50.150
governs changes to a design feature or
functional capability described in a
standard design certification. Such
changes may not be made generically
except by notice and comment
rulemaking (see 10 CFR 52.63, ‘‘Finality
of standard design certifications,’’
paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2)) and such a
change must meet one of the criteria in
10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). All referencing
combined licenses must implement any
generic change to a design certification
rule, as required by 10 CFR 52.63(a)(3).
The NRC acknowledges that the
applicant for a standard design
certification is not directly responsible
for maintaining the FSAR information
once a final design certification rule is
adopted by the NRC. Nonetheless, the
NRC continues to believe, for the
reasons set forth in the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION for the first design
certification rulemaking (see 62 FR
25800; May 19, 1997, at 25813–25814,
25826), that the original standard design
certification applicant should be
required to maintain the accuracy of the
design certification information.
Therefore, in future standard design
certification rulemakings, the NRC
expects to continue its practice of
adopting a records management
requirement analogous to Section X.A of
the four existing standard design
certification rules. In addition, any
applicant for an amendment to a design
certification is also subject to the
records management requirement. In the
case of amendment requests submitted
by someone other than the original
applicant, the NRC may need to develop
appropriate rule language to reflect the
record management responsibilities for
information (including SGI and
proprietary information) that was
developed by applicants other than the
original applicant. For combined license
holders subject to 10 CFR 50.150(a) (i.e.,
a licensee whose application does not
reference a standard design certification,
standard design approval, or
manufactured reactor, or that reference
a standard design certification issued
before the effective date of the rule
which has not been amended to comply
with the rule), 10 CFR 50.150(c)(4)(i)
states that if the licensee changes the
information required by 10 CFR
52.79(a)(47) to be included in the FSAR,
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then the licensee shall consider the
effect of the changed feature or
capability on the original assessment
required by 10 CFR 50.150(a) and
amend the information required by 10
CFR 52.79(a)(47) to be included in the
FSAR to describe how the modified
design features and functional
capabilities continue to meet the
acceptance criteria in the aircraft impact
rule.
Paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of 10 CFR 50.150
governs combined license applicants or
holders which are not subject to 10 CFR
50.150(a) and states that proposed
departures from the information
required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be
included in the FSAR for the referenced
standard design certification are
governed by the change control
requirements in the applicable design
certification rule. The NRC expects to
add a new change control provision to
future design certification rules subject
to 10 CFR 50.150 (including
amendments to any of the four existing
design certifications) to govern
combined license applicants and
holders referencing the design
certification that request a departure
from the design features or functional
capabilities in the referenced design
certification. The new change control
provision will require that, if the
applicant or licensee changes the
information required by 10 CFR
52.47(a)(28) to be included in the FSAR
for the standard design certification,
then the applicant or licensee shall
consider the effect of the changed
feature or capability on the original
assessment required by 10 CFR
50.150(a). The applicant or licensee
must also describe in a change to the
FSAR (i.e., a plant-specific departure
from the generic design control
document), how the modified design
features and functional capabilities
continue to meet the assessment
requirements in the aircraft impact rule.
An applicant or licensee’s submittal of
this updated information to the NRC
will be governed by the reporting
requirements in the applicable design
certification rule. The NRC expects to
continue, in future standard design
certification rulemakings, its practice of
adopting reporting requirements
analogous to Section X.B of the four
existing standard design certification
rules. Licensees making changes to
design features or capabilities included
in the certified design may also need to
develop alternate means to cope with
the loss of large areas of the plant from
explosions or fires to comply with the
requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(hh).
Paragraph (c)(4)(iii) of 10 CFR 50.150
governs combined license applicants or
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holders which are not subject to 10 CFR
50.150(a) but reference a manufactured
reactor which is subject to 10 CFR
50.150(a). For such applicants and
licensees, proposed departures from the
information required by 10 CFR
52.157(f)(32) to be included in the FSAR
for the manufacturing license are
governed by the applicable
requirements in 10 CFR 52.171(b)(2).
Paragraph (b)(2) of 10 CFR 52.171
allows an applicant or licensee who
references or uses a nuclear power
reactor manufactured under a
manufacturing license under this
subpart to request a departure from the
design characteristics, site parameters,
terms and conditions, or approved
design of the manufactured reactor. The
Commission may grant a request only if
it determines that the departure will
comply with the requirements of 10 CFR
52.7 and that the special circumstances
outweigh any decrease in safety that
may result from the reduction in
standardization caused by the
departure.
Generic changes for manufacturing
licenses which are subject to 10 CFR
51.150(a) are addressed in 10 CFR
50.150(c)(5)(i), which states that generic
changes to the information required by
10 CFR 52.157(f)(32) to be included in
the FSAR are governed by the
applicable requirements of 10 CFR
52.171. Under the provisions of 10 CFR
52.171, ‘‘Finality of manufacturing
licenses; Information requests,’’ the
holder of a manufacturing license may
not make changes to the design features
or functional capabilities described in
the FSAR without prior Commission
approval. The request for a change to
the design must be in the form of an
application for a license amendment,
and must meet the requirements of 10
CFR 50.90, ‘‘Application for amendment
of license, construction permit, or early
site permit,’’ and 10 CFR 50.92,
‘‘Issuance of amendment.’’
Paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of 10 CFR 50.150
governs manufacturing licenses which
are not subject to 10 CFR 50.150(a).
Similar to a combined license
application, in a manufacturing license
application referencing a design
certification, departures from the
information required by 10 CFR
52.47(a)(28) to be included in the FSAR
for the referenced standard design
certification are governed by the change
control requirements in the applicable
design certification rule.
There are no provisions in 10 CFR
50.150(c) governing changes to a
standard design approval because a
design feature or functional capability
described in a standard design approval
may not be changed generically except
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under an application for a new design
approval. There are no provisions in 10
CFR part 52 for making generic changes
to a standard design approval.
Paragraph (a) of 10 CFR 52.145,
‘‘Finality of standard design approvals;
information requests,’’ states that an
approved design must be used by and
relied upon by the NRC staff and the
Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards in their review of any
individual facility license application
that incorporates by reference a
standard design approval unless there
exists significant new information that
substantially affects the earlier
determination or other good cause.
Therefore, any changes to a design
feature or functional capability
described in a standard design approval
will be subject to review by the NRC in
any application that references the
design approval. Note that 10 CFR
52.131, ‘‘Scope of subpart,’’ states that
an applicant may submit standard
designs for a nuclear power reactor or
major portions thereof. To the extent
that a standard design approval is
issued for only a portion of a nuclear
power reactor, any applicant referencing
that design approval will have to
separately comply with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.150 for any
portion of the design not addressed in
the design approval issued by the NRC.
VI. Responses to Public Comments
A. Overview of Public Comments
The public comment period for the
proposed rule closed on December 17,
2007. The NRC received 32 comment
letters on the proposed rule. Of those
comments, 31 commenters were in favor
of requiring aircraft impact assessments
on nuclear power plants; one
commenter was against requiring an
aircraft impact assessment. Several
commenters also endorsed other
commenters’ views, where some
provided comments in addition to those
they endorsed. No commenters
supported the rule exactly as proposed.
Due to the large number of comments
received and the length of the responses
provided, this section of the final rule
only provides a summary of the
categories of comments with a general
description of the resolution of those
comments. The detailed description of
the comments and the NRC responses
are available electronically at the NRC’s
electronic Reading Room, ADAMS
Accession No. ML090610124.
The proposed aircraft impact rule was
published in advance of publication of
draft NRC guidance for implementing
the rule. The NRC indicated in the
proposed rule that commenters on the
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28123
proposed rule need not await the
publication of the draft guidance to
comment meaningfully on the proposed
rule (see 72 FR 56298; October 3, 2007).
The NRC only received one comment
suggesting that either the proposed rule
language or information on the aircraft
impact characteristics which was
provided in the Supplementary
Information for the proposed rule
prevented or significantly impeded the
commenter from understanding the
proposed rule or commenting on it.
Moreover, as described in the following
discussion, the NRC received many
comments effectively (if not explicitly)
directed at one or more aspects of the
aircraft impact characteristics.
Accordingly, the NRC concludes that
the NRC provided sufficient information
on the proposed aircraft impact rule to
allow the public a meaningful
opportunity to comment on the
proposed rule’s requirements.
B. Responses to Specific Requests for
Comments
In Section VIII of the Supplementary
Information for the proposed rule, the
NRC posed eight questions for which it
solicited stakeholder comments. In the
following paragraphs, these questions
are restated, comments received from
stakeholders are summarized, and the
NRC resolution of the public comments
is presented.
1. Inclusion of impact assessment in
application. The proposed rule does not
require that the assessment of aircraft
impacts that would be mandated by
proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b) be included
in the FSAR or otherwise submitted as
part of the application for a standard
design certification, standard design
approval, combined license, or
manufacturing license. However, the
NRC is proposing that a description of
the design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies credited by
the applicant to avoid or mitigate the
effects of the applicable, beyond-designbasis aircraft impact be included in the
FSAR submitted with the relevant
application. In addition, the FSAR must
contain an evaluation of how such
design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies to avoid or mitigate, to the
extent practicable, the effects of the
applicable aircraft impact with reduced
reliance on operator actions. The NRC is
seeking specific comments on the
desirability, or lack thereof, of requiring,
in the final rule, that applicants include
the aircraft impact assessment required
by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b) in the
FSAR or another part of the application.
Commenters’ Response: The three
industry commenters who addressed
this question (Nuclear Energy Institute
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(NEI), Morgan Lewis, and AREVA
Nuclear Power (AREVA NP)) indicated
that the impact assessment should not
be included with the application. NEI
indicated that a description [of the
assessment] and the evaluation under 10
CFR 52.500(c) need to be included. In a
separate comment, NEI expressed its
view that the submittal on aircraft
impacts would be classified as a
safeguards information document.
NRC Response: The final rule does
not require that the assessment of
aircraft impacts be included in the
PSAR or FSAR or otherwise submitted
as part of the application for a
construction permit, operating license,
standard design certification, standard
design approval, combined license, or
manufacturing license. However, 10
CFR 50.150(b) does require that a
description of the design features and
functional capabilities credited by the
applicant to show that the facility can
withstand the effects of the aircraft
impact be included in the PSAR or
FSAR submitted with the relevant
application. In addition, the PSAR or
FSAR must contain a description of how
such design features and functional
capabilities meet the acceptance criteria
in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1). The aircraft
impact assessment will be subject to
inspection by the NRC and, therefore,
must be maintained by the applicant
along with the rest of the information
that forms the basis for the relevant
application. The NRC expects that,
generally, the information that it needs
to perform its review of the application
to assess the applicant’s compliance
with 10 CFR 50.150 will be that
information contained in the applicant’s
PSAR or FSAR. For these reasons, the
final rule does not require applicants to
submit the aircraft impact assessment to
the NRC.
2. Acceptance criteria. The
acceptance criterion contained in
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 by which the
NRC may judge the required assessment
and evaluation is the practicability
criterion addressed in paragraph (c),
that is, that the applicant must describe
how the ‘‘design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies avoid or
mitigate, to the extent practicable, the
effects of the applicable aircraft impact
with reduced reliance on operator
actions.’’ The NRC is considering
adding an additional acceptance
criterion to proposed 10 CFR 52.500 for
judging the acceptability of the
applicant’s aircraft impact assessment
and evaluation. The NRC is seeking
specific comments on the desirability,
or lack thereof, of adding an additional
acceptance criterion in the final rule
beyond the proposed rule’s
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practicability criterion. Such an
additional acceptance criterion could
read, for example:
The application must also describe how
such design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies will provide reasonable
assurance that any release of radioactive
materials to the environment will not
produce public exposures exceeding 10 CFR
part 100 guidelines.
Commenters’ Response: Three
industry commenters (NEI, Morgan
Lewis, and AREVA NP) opposed the use
of 10 CFR part 100 dose limits as
acceptance criteria for the aircraft
impact rule. NEI and Morgan Lewis
asserted that the use of 10 CFR part 100
dose limits would imply that the aircraft
impact is a design basis event, inasmuch
as 10 CFR part 100 dose limits are used
to evaluate the acceptability of design
features addressing design basis events.
Use of 10 CFR part 100 dose limits,
therefore, could be misinterpreted and
result in unnecessary expenditure of
industry and NRC resources. As an
alternative, NEI suggested that the NRC
adopt the following functional
acceptance criteria: (1) Demonstrate that
the reactor core remains cooled or the
containment remains intact; and (2)
demonstrate that spent fuel cooling or
spent fuel pool integrity is maintained.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with
the commenters’ recommendations for
alternative acceptance criteria and
agrees that 10 CFR part 100 dose limits
should not be used for the purpose of
this rule. The NRC decided not to adopt
an additional acceptance criterion based
on 10 CFR part 100 dose limits in the
final rule for the reasons outlined by the
commenters, namely, that the 10 CFR
part 100 limits are limits that the NRC
uses to judge compliance with design
basis requirements. The NRC is revising
the criteria necessary to comply with
the final rule consistent with one
commenter’s suggestion. In the final
rule, applicants continue to be required
to perform a design-specific assessment
of the effects of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. In addition, the
final rule requires applicants to use
realistic analyses to identify and
incorporate into the design those design
features and functional capabilities to
show that, with reduced use of operator
action: (1) The reactor core remains
cooled or the containment remains
intact, and (2) spent fuel cooling or
spent fuel pool integrity is maintained.
The final rule removes references to
considering the practicality of including
the design features and functional
capabilities identified as a result of the
assessment. The acceptance criteria in
the rule must be shown to be met to
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achieve compliance with the rule’s
requirements.
3. Records retention. The proposed
rule relies on the general record
retention requirements in 10 CFR
50.71(c) for retention of the assessment
required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500 for
combined license and manufacturing
license applicants subject to proposed
10 CFR 52.500. The NRC intends to
similarly rely on a general design
certification rule provisions for
retention of the assessment required by
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 for design
certification applicants and combined
license and manufacturing license
holders that reference a design
certification. The NRC is requesting
specific comments on whether, in lieu
of the specific design certification rule
provisions or reliance on 10 CFR
50.71(c), the NRC should adopt as part
of the final 10 CFR 52.500 rulemaking
a specific provision that would
explicitly mandate the retention of the
assessment. Such a provision would be
included in an additional paragraph of
final 10 CFR 52.500, and would set forth
the proposed period of retention.
Inclusion of a generic records retention
requirement in final 10 CFR 52.500
would preclude the need for the NRC to
include a specific records retention
provision in each standard design
certification subject to final 10 CFR
52.500. The NRC requests comments on
whether such a provision should be
included in final 10 CFR 52.500,
together with specific reasons in
support of the commenter’s position.
The NRC also requests comments on
the appropriate period for retention of
the assessment, evaluation, and
supporting documentation. The NRC is
considering the following alternatives:
• For a standard design certification,
combined license, and manufacturing
license the period of NRC review prior
to NRC final action on the application.
• For a standard design certification
and manufacturing license, the duration
of the design certification or
manufacturing license (i.e., the period
during which the design certification or
manufactured reactor may be
referenced, including any renewal).
• For a standard design certification
or manufacturing license, until the
licensee of the final referencing license
has submitted a certification under 10
CFR 50.82(a), or the final referencing
license has been terminated.
• For a combined license, when the
licensee has submitted a certification
under 10 CFR 50.82(a), or the combined
license has been terminated.
Commenters’ Response: All the
industry commenters (NEI, Morgan
Lewis, and AREVA NP) who
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commented on this question stated that
the existing NRC records retention
requirements are sufficient. AREVA NP
also stated that the records retention
requirements should apply to design
certification holders for the time that the
design certification is in effect.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with
the commenters. No changes were made
to the proposed rule’s record retention
requirements in the final rule. The final
rule relies on the general record
retention requirements in 10 CFR
50.71(c) for retention of the assessment
for combined license and manufacturing
license holders subject to 10 CFR
50.150. The NRC intends to similarly
rely on general design certification rule
provisions for retention of the
assessment required by proposed 10
CFR 50.150 for design certification
applicants and combined license and
manufacturing license holders that
reference a design certification.
4. Requests to amend existing
standard design certifications to address
aircraft impacts. The NRC has
concluded that it does not need to apply
the proposed rule to the four currently
approved standard design certifications,
as discussed in detail in Section III of
the Supplementary Information of the
proposed rule. Nonetheless, the original
applicant (or another qualified entity)
may request an amendment to the
standard design certification to add
design features, functional capabilities,
or strategies in accordance with the
requirements of 10 CFR 52.500. The
NRC encourages such requests for
amendment by the applicants for the
four current standard design
certifications because it will further
enhance the already high levels of safety
and security provided by these reactor
designs. These design modifications
may be implemented in different ways
as described in Section III of the
Supplementary Information of the
proposed rule. However, under the
proposed rule, there are no standards,
other than those contained in 10 CFR
52.63(a), for judging changes to the
design to address the effects of an
aircraft impact. The NRC requests
specific comments on whether it should
use the same criterion to judge
amendments to an existing design
certification as it would use on a new
design certification applicant under the
proposed 10 CFR 52.500.
Commenters’ Response: One industry
commenter (NEI) stated that voluntary
requests to amend existing design
certifications to address aircraft impacts
should be held to the same standard as
new design certification applications,
because to do otherwise would
introduce inconsistency into the
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regulatory process. One industry
commenter (Morgan Lewis) agreed with
the NEI position, adding that if the
holder of an existing design certification
does not voluntarily comply with the
rule, then combined license applicants
that reference that design certification
will still be required to comply with the
proposed 10 CFR 73.55 amendment, and
these applicants would not receive the
benefits of any design changes in
response to the proposed rule on aircraft
impacts. As encouraged by the proposed
rule, some commenters noted that
reactor vendors with existing design
certifications may voluntarily request
the NRC to amend the design
certifications to address aircraft impacts.
Some commenters stated that the NRC
should use the same criteria for
evaluating such requests for
amendments to existing design
certifications as it uses for evaluating
new applications for design
certifications. Some commenters also
stated that combined license applicants
that reference the amendment to a
design certification that voluntarily
complies with the aircraft impact rule
should be treated the same as a
combined license applicant that
references a new design certification
that is required to comply with the
aircraft impact rule.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with
the commenters that the NRC should
use the same criteria for evaluating
voluntary requests for amendments to
currently approved design certifications
as it uses for evaluating new
applications for design certifications. To
ensure consistency among all new
reactor designs, the NRC must apply the
same criteria to voluntary requests for
amendments to existing design
certifications as it uses for evaluating
new applications for design
certifications or applications for
combined licenses that reference a
design certification that has not been
amended to address the aircraft impact
rule.
The NRC has determined, consistent
with the proposed aircraft impact rule,
that the four currently approved
standard design certifications in
Appendices A through D to 10 CFR part
52 should not be required to comply
with the final aircraft impact rule during
the period of effectiveness of the initial
certification period. However, an
applicant for renewal of one of the
currently approved design certifications
that has not been previously amended to
comply with the aircraft impact rule
must comply with the rule during
renewal. Therefore, the original
applicants for the four existing design
certifications (or their successors in
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28125
interest) are not required to submit
applications to recertify their designs as
complying with the final aircraft impact
rule, except at renewal if the
certifications have not voluntarily been
amended previously. However, based
upon NRC’s consideration of public
comments and its assessment of
alternative regulatory approaches for
ensuring that all newly designed and
constructed nuclear power plants
comply with the aircraft impact rule, the
NRC has decided that the best
regulatory approach is to require any
combined license applicant referencing
one of these four existing design
certifications to comply with the aircraft
impact rule, unless the referenced
design certification has been amended
to comply with the aircraft impact rule.
The NRC’s decision on the regulatory
approach for achieving the objective
that all newly-designed and constructed
nuclear power plants comply with the
aircraft impact rule stems from: (1)
NRC’s acknowledgement of the view—
expressed by a wide range of
stakeholders—that public confidence in
future nuclear power reactors will be
enhanced by requiring all newlyconstructed nuclear power plants,
including those based upon one of the
four currently approved design
certifications, to meet the requirements
of the aircraft impact rule; and (2) NRC’s
assessment that there appears to be little
or no commercial interest at this time by
domestic U.S. entities in using certain
design certifications. The NRC agrees
with the view, expressed by many
stakeholders across a wide spectrum of
interests and background, that the
underlying objectives of the aircraft
impact rule would not be fully achieved
if a subset of future nuclear power plant
applicants—namely, those applicants
who reference one of the four existing
design certifications—are not required
to comply with the aircraft impact rule.
Thus, the NRC has decided that all
future nuclear power plants to be
constructed and operated in the U.S.
should use designs which comply with
the final aircraft impact rule. However,
given that objective, the NRC believes
that it should adopt a regulatory
approach for achieving that objective in
a manner that does not unduly affect the
resource planning of potential combined
license applicants considering
referencing one of the currently
approved design certifications. To adopt
a regulatory approach which mandates
a delay in NRC action on a combined
license application referencing one of
the four currently approved until that
design certification is amended to
comply with the aircraft impact rule
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seems unduly restrictive, especially
where the combined license applicant is
ready and willing to comply with the
aircraft impact rule. Accordingly, the
NRC determined that it would adopt the
regulatory approach reflected in the
final rule.
5. Applicability to future 10 CFR part
50 license applicants. The NRC is
proposing to apply the requirements in
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 to 10 CFR part
52 applicants only, specifically, to
applicants for standard design
certifications issued after the effective
date of the final rule that do not
reference a standard design approval;
standard design approvals issued after
the effective date of the final rule;
combined licenses issued after the
effective date of the final rule that do
not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; and
manufacturing licenses issued after the
effective date of the final rule that do
not reference a standard design
certification or standard design
approval. However, the NRC is
considering extending the applicability
of the proposed 10 CFR 52.500
requirements to future applicants for
construction permits under 10 CFR part
50. The NRC requests specific
comments on the desirability, or lack
thereof, of extending, to future 10 CFR
part 50 construction permit applicants,
the applicability of the proposed
requirements to perform an aircraft
impact assessment and to evaluate the
design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies to avoid or mitigate, to the
extent practicable, the effects of the
applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft
impact.
Commenters’ Response: One industry
commenter (NEI) recommended that
future applicants for new construction
permits under 10 CFR part 50 should be
required to meet the rule, but that
current holders of construction permits,
including those whose plants are
essentially complete, should not be
required to comply with the rule. The
commenter suggested that plants with
an existing construction permit and
plants where construction is essentially
complete should be subject to the same
requirements as operating plants, which
are required to have mitigation actions
for large area fires and explosions. To
require otherwise would be impractical
and result in a financial burden in
changing a design that is essentially
built.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with
the commenter that future applicants for
new construction permits under 10 CFR
part 50 should be required to meet the
rule, but that current holders of
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construction permits should not be
required to comply with the rule. The
NRC is making the final rule applicable
to 10 CFR part 50 license applicants as
well as applicants under 10 CFR part 52
to maintain consistency in the technical
requirements that are applied to new
applicants under 10 CFR parts 50 and
52. The final rule requires both new
power reactor construction permit
applicants and operating license
applicants to perform the required
assessment and include the description
of the identified design features and
functional capabilities in their
applications. The final rule is being
applied to applicants at both
construction permit and operating
license stage because it is not until the
operating license stage that the
applicant is required to provide the NRC
with its final design. The NRC can issue
a construction permit based on
preliminary design information.
Therefore, the NRC believes it is
necessary to require applicants to
perform the aircraft impact assessment
at both stages and to include the
required information in both
applications based on the level of design
information available at the time of each
application.
In making these additions, the NRC is
making it clear that the requirements are
not meant to apply to operating license
applications for which construction
permits were issued before the effective
date of this final rule. This is because
existing construction permits are likely
to involve designs which are essentially
complete and may involve sites where
construction has already taken place.
Applying the final rule to operating
license applications for which there are
existing construction permits could
result in an undue financial burden to
change a design for a plant that is
partially constructed. Such a financial
burden is not justifiable in light of the
fact that the NRC considers the events
to which the aircraft impact rule is
directed to be beyond-design-basis
events and compliance with the rule is
not needed for adequate protection to
public health and safety or common
defense and security. Moreover, such
operating license applicants will be
required to comply with the
requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(hh) to
identify actions to mitigate the effects of
large fires and explosions, including
those caused by aircraft impacts. For
these reasons, the NRC is not requiring
operating license applicants with an
existing construction permit to comply
with the final rule.
6. Addition of technical requirements
to 10 CFR part 52. In the recent revision
to 10 CFR part 52, the NRC took a
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comprehensive approach to
reorganizing 10 CFR part 52 and making
conforming changes throughout 10 CFR
Chapter I, ‘‘Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,’’ to reflect the licensing
and approval processes in 10 CFR part
52. In that rulemaking, the NRC
reviewed the existing regulations in 10
CFR Chapter I to determine if the
existing regulations needed to be
modified to reflect the licensing and
approval processes in 10 CFR part 52. In
making conforming changes involving
10 CFR part 50 provisions, the NRC
adopted the general principle of keeping
the technical requirements in 10 CFR
part 50 and maintaining all applicable
procedural requirements in 10 CFR part
52. This proposed aircraft impact rule
represents a departure from that general
principle in that it proposes to include
specific technical requirements in 10
CFR part 52 and would create a separate
subpart for inclusion of future, similar,
technical requirements. The NRC is
considering relocating the proposed
aircraft impact requirements from 10
CFR 52.500 to a new section in 10 CFR
part 50 to maintain the general principle
it established in the comprehensive 10
CFR part 52 rulemaking. The NRC
requests specific comments on the
desirability, or lack thereof, of relocating
the proposed aircraft impact
requirements from 10 CFR 52.500 to a
new section in 10 CFR part 50.
Commenters’ Response: One industry
commenter (NEI) stated that the
requirements should be placed in 10
CFR part 52 because the assessment
relates to a beyond-design-basis event
and is intended to apply to design
certifications. One industry commenter
(Morgan Lewis) generally agreed with
NEI, but stated if the aircraft impact
rule’s requirements are to be imposed
on future 10 CFR part 50 construction
permit applicants, then the
requirements should be included in 10
CFR part 50, consistent with the general
principle established in the recent 10
CFR part 52 rulemaking (72 FR 49352;
August 28, 2007).
NRC Response: The NRC is relocating
the aircraft impact requirements from 10
CFR 52.500 as proposed to new section
10 CFR 50.150. Similarly, requirements
for the control of changes to FSAR
information is relocated from 10 CFR
52.502 as proposed to 10 CFR 50.150(c).
These sections were relocated to
maintain the general principle that the
NRC established in the comprehensive
10 CFR part 52 rulemaking, that is, to
maintain the technical requirements in
10 CFR part 50 for plants licensed under
10 CFR part 52. Furthermore, because
the final rule is also applicable to
applicants for new construction permits
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and operating licenses under 10 CFR
part 50, the relocation of the aircraft
impact assessment requirements to 10
CFR part 50 is necessary.
7. Applicability to design approvals
and manufacturing licenses. The
proposed rule would apply to future
design approvals or manufacturing
licenses. In the recent comprehensive
rulemaking on 10 CFR part 52, the NRC
strived for a high level of consistency in
the requirements for design
certifications, design approvals, and
manufacturing licenses, given the
similarity in the regulatory functions of
these three processes. However, it is not
clear that there will be future design
approval applications, in light of the
NRC’s recent determination to remove
the design approval as a prerequisite for
obtaining a design certification.
Similarly, there does not appear to be
any near-term interest in obtaining a
manufacturing license for the
manufacture of a nuclear power plant.
Therefore, the NRC is considering
eliminating the applicability of the
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 requirements
to future applicants for design approvals
and manufacturing licenses. The NRC
requests specific comments on the
desirability, or lack thereof, of
eliminating the applicability of the
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 requirements
to future applicants for design approvals
and manufacturing licenses.
Commenters’ Response: One industry
commenter (NEI) stated that the
proposed rule’s requirements should not
be applied to future applicants for
design approvals and manufacturing
licenses, but provided no rationale for
its recommendation. One industry
commenter (Morgan Lewis) indicated
that this issue is difficult to evaluate at
this time, and it would be better to defer
consideration of this issue, inasmuch as
the NRC could later amend the rule as
necessary.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees
with the commenters because the scope
of and reviews for design approvals and
manufacturing licenses are essentially
the same as for design certifications.
The NRC sees no benefit in deferring the
decision on applicability to design
approvals and manufacturing licenses to
a later time. Therefore, the final rule
applies to future design approval or
manufacturing license applicants.
8. Scope of design evaluated. The
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 would be
applicable to all standard design
certifications, standard design
approvals, and manufacturing licenses
issued after the effective date of the final
rule and to all combined licenses issued
after the effective date of the final rule
that do not reference a standard design
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certification, standard design approval,
or manufacturing license. However, the
proposed rule does not address the
difference in the scope of the facility
design that would be considered by an
applicant for a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufacturing license and the scope
of the design that would be considered
by a combined license applicant. For a
standard design certification, standard
design approval, or manufacturing
license, the applicant is required to
address only a subset of the facility
design that a combined license
applicant is required to address. In
general, a design certification, design
approval, or manufacturing license
applicant is required to address such
items as the reactor core, reactor coolant
system, instrumentation and control
systems, electrical systems, containment
system, other engineered safety features,
auxiliary and emergency systems, power
conversion systems, radioactive waste
handling systems, and fuel handling
systems. In contrast, a combined license
applicant also must address site-specific
design features, such as the ultimate
heat sink. Combined license applicants
that do not reference a design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor could address
such site-specific design features in
their evaluation of design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies to
avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the applicable
aircraft impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions. However, the proposed
rule does not impose any requirements
on a combined license applicant that
references a design certification, design
approval, or manufactured reactor with
regard to addressing the potential effects
of an aircraft impact on such sitespecific portions of the design. The
proposed rule could, therefore,
introduce an inconsistency in the
treatment of combined license
applicants that reference a design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor and combined
license applicants that submit a custom
design. Therefore, to ensure consistent
treatment of all combined license
applicants, the NRC is considering an
alternative approach in the final rule.
One approach that the NRC is
considering is to adopt additional
requirements for combined license
applicants that reference a design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor that would require
such applicants to evaluate that portion
of the design excluded from the design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor for additional
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design features, functional capabilities,
or strategies to avoid or mitigate, to the
extent practicable, the effects of the
applicable aircraft impact with reduced
reliance on operator actions.
Alternatively, the NRC is considering
limiting the scope of the evaluation for
combined license applicants not
referencing a design certification, design
approval, or manufactured reactor to
that portion of the design that would
otherwise be covered in a design
certification, design approval, or
manufacturing license application,
which would include the majority of the
facility considered most vulnerable to
an aircraft impact. The NRC requests
specific comments on the desirability,
or lack thereof, of adopting one of these
alternative approaches in the final rule.
Commenters’ Response: Two industry
commenters (NEI and Morgan Lewis)
argued that the scope of the aircraft
impact assessment for combined license
applicants should be the same scope as
the assessment required for a new
design certification. This would ensure
consistency among all combined license
applicants regardless of whether they
reference or not reference a design
certification, and would cover the
majority of the portion of the plant
design which is considered most
vulnerable to an aircraft impact.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees
with the commenters. The NRC believes
that the greatest benefit from
implementation of this final rule will be
achieved by having each applicant
consider as much of the facility design
as possible when it is performing the
aircraft impact assessment. Design
certification, design approval, and
manufactured reactor applicants will
only logically be able to consider that
part of the facility design within the
scope of the certification, approval, or
license. However, combined license
applicants that do not reference a design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor, or reference one
of the four currently approved design
certifications which has not been
previously amended to comply with the
aircraft impact rule, will have the entire
facility design available for
consideration. This means, as a practical
matter, that the scope of the overall
plant design which is subject to the
aircraft impact rule’s requirements may
be greater for a ‘‘custom’’ combined
license applicant who does not
reference a design certification, design
approval, or manufactured reactor. The
NRC believes it is preferable to benefit
from this broader review for those
combined license applicants that must
perform the aircraft impact assessment
than it is to limit their review to the
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scope of the design that would
otherwise be considered by, for
example, a design certification
applicant. The NRC believes its
approach is preferable to that suggested
by the commenters even though it
results in combined license applicants
that reference a certified design, design
approval, or manufactured reactor
assessing a different scope of the facility
design than a ‘‘custom’’ combined
license applicant. The NRC believes
that, as a result of such an approach,
combined license holders that reference
a certified design, design approval, or
manufactured reactor will likely need to
do more work to comply with the
proposed requirements for licensees to
develop and adopt mitigative strategies
to cope with large fires and explosions
in 10 CFR 50.54(hh) than will a
‘‘custom’’ combined license holder that
has assessed the entire facility at the
design stage in accordance with this
final rule. For these reasons, the NRC
has not made any changes to the
assessment requirements for combined
license applicants in the final rule.
C. Responses to Remaining Comments
The comments were separated into 11
categories based on their relevance to
particular topics. The comments and
responses contained in the first category
are summarized in Section VI.B of the
Supplementary Information of this
document. The comments and
responses contained in the second
through the eleventh category are
summarized in the following
paragraphs.
The second category addresses the
overall need to address aircraft impacts.
Some commenters supported, while
others opposed, requiring an aircraft
impact assessment. No changes were
made to the proposed rule as a result of
these comments. The NRC believes that
requiring new plant designers or
combined license applicants to perform
this assessment will result in new plants
having additional inherent protection
against the effects of an aircraft impact.
The third category addresses the
scope of applicants and licensees that
the rule is applicable to. Some
commenters suggested that the rule
should also apply to all currently
operating nuclear power reactors,
reactors with spent fuel in onsite pool
storage structures, combined license
applicants (regardless of the design
being referenced), and currently
approved design certifications. Other
commenters suggested not applying the
rule to currently operating reactors. The
final rule does not apply to currently
operating reactors but does apply to all
applicants for new nuclear power
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reactors. It also applies to the four
currently approved design certifications,
but only at renewal if they have not
been voluntarily amended to comply
with the aircraft impact rule.
The fourth category addresses
adequate protection and consideration
of aircraft impacts as a beyond-designbasis event. Some commenters agreed
that aircraft impacts should be treated as
a beyond-design-basis event, while
others opposed the treatment of aircraft
impacts as a beyond-design-basis event.
Others suggested that NRC does not
have the statutory authority to require
consideration of the effects of an action
in the nature of an attack by an enemy
of the U.S. The NRC did not make any
change to the proposed rule’s treatment
of these issues. The final rule continues
to identify an aircraft impact as a
beyond-design-basis event.
The fifth category addresses the
Commission’s specified aircraft
characteristics. Some commenters
suggested that the general description of
aircraft characteristics is adequate,
whereas others suggested that the
proposed aircraft characteristics are not
adequate. The description of the aircraft
characteristics has not changed in the
final rule.
The sixth category addresses the
aircraft impact assessment. Some
commenters suggested that the
assessment needs to consider all real
consequences of the aircraft impact,
while other commenters suggested that
the assessment should use standardized
and validated models and be based on
practical and realistic criteria,
assumptions, and methodologies. The
assessment requirements are not
changed from the proposed rule. The
final rule requires the assessment to be
rigorous and performed using realistic
assumptions.
The seventh category addresses the
evaluation of design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies as described
in the proposed rule. Some commenters
suggested providing acceptance criteria
in the rule, clarifying the NRC’s intent
in using the term ‘‘avoid,’’ requiring
features which would prevent the
impact from occurring, preventing the
applicant from implementing design
tradeoffs which would negatively
impact safety, and providing additional
guidance on the intent of the terms ‘‘to
the extent practical’’ and ‘‘reduced
reliance on operator actions.’’ The final
rule does provide explicit acceptance
criteria to judge the results of the
assessment and eliminates the use of the
phrases ‘‘avoid or mitigate’’ and ‘‘to the
extent practical.’’ In addition, the final
rule provides additional clarification on
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the intent of the term ‘‘reduced use of
operator actions.’’
The eighth category addresses issue
resolution and regulatory
implementation issues. Some
commenters suggested that the final rule
should clarify that the assessment and
evaluation are part of the design
certification rulemaking and provide
issue resolution for subsequent
combined license applicants, and that
contentions on their adequacy will not
be entertained in individual combined
license proceedings. Other commenters
suggested that the aircraft impact
assessment need not be updated as part
of a license renewal application, and
others suggested that the design features
incorporated into the design under a
design certification are not part of the
plant’s physical security requirements
and, therefore, not subject to review at
the combined license stage. The final
rule reflects that the NRC will review
the information required to be
submitted under 10 CFR 50.150(b) and
will accord issue resolution. The NRC
agreed, in general, with the comment
that the aircraft impact assessment need
not be updated as part of a license
renewal application, with one
exception. The NRC has added
provisions in the final rule that have the
effect of requiring each of the four
currently approved design certifications
to comply with the aircraft impact rule
at the time of renewal, if that design has
not been previously amended to comply
with the aircraft impact rule. The NRC
agrees that the design features selected
by the designer and incorporated into a
design certification are not subject to
review at the combined license stage
from the standpoint of compliance with
the aircraft impact rule. However, the
NRC disagrees with the view that design
features incorporated into a design
certification as a result of the aircraft
impact rule would not be subject to a
physical security review under 10 CFR
part 73 during a combined license
application proceeding where the
design certification is referenced.
The ninth category addresses
protection of safeguards and other
sensitive information. Some
commenters suggested that the aircraft
characteristics should not be provided
in the rule nor should details of the
design features that protect against
aircraft impacts be described in
licensing applications. One commenter
suggested that the proposed rule’s
failure to provide detailed aircraft
parameters prevents meaningful
involvement from the public and
experts in industry and academia, and
that the relevant September 11, 2001
aircraft parameters have been previously
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published in publicly available
government documents. The NRC
maintains the position from the
proposed rule that the general
information on aircraft characteristics
provided in the rule is sufficient for the
purposes of public comment, and no
changes were made to the final rule as
a result of these comments.
The tenth category addresses
compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act. Some
commenters suggested that the NRC
should prepare an environmental
impact statement because the rule is a
major federal action significantly
affecting the environment and should
consider alternatives to the proposed
rule. The final rule did not change as a
result of these comments because the
rulemaking does not constitute a ‘‘major
federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment.’’
The eleventh category addresses other
comments that did not logically fit into
the other categories. Commenters
suggested considering other threats, not
permitting siting of new reactors within
5 miles of an airport, and that the
aircraft impact assessment is an agingrelated matter. The final rule did not
change as a result of these comments.
VII. Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 50.8 Information Collection
Requirements: OMB Approval
This section, which lists all
information collections in 10 CFR part
50 which have been approved by the
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), is revised by adding a reference
to 10 CFR 50.150, the aircraft impact
rule. As discussed below, under the
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement,
the OMB has approved the information
collection and reporting requirements in
the final aircraft impact rule. No specific
requirement or prohibition is imposed
on applicants or licensees in this
section.
Section 50.34 Contents of Construction
Permit and Operating License
Applications; Technical Information
This section describes the technical
information which must be provided in
applications for construction permits
and operating licenses subject to 10 CFR
50.150. New paragraphs (a)(13) and
(b)(12) require each application for a
construction permit and operating
license subject to the aircraft impact
rule to include the information required
to be submitted to the NRC by 10 CFR
50.150.
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Section 50.150
Assessment
Aircraft Impact
The aircraft impact rule, § 50.150, is a
new requirement applicable at the
design stage for new nuclear power
facilities. The aircraft impact rule
requires a design-specific assessment of
the effects on the facility of the impact
of a large commercial aircraft, and
incorporation of design features and
functional capabilities to show (using
realistic analyses), with reduced use of
operator actions, that: (1) The reactor
core remains cooled or the containment
remains intact; and (2) spent fuel
cooling or spent fuel pool integrity is
maintained. The aircraft impact rule
was included in 10 CFR part 52 and
designated as 10 CFR 52.500 at the
proposed rule stage, but is now
included in 10 CFR part 50 and
redesignated as 10 CFR 50.150. This is
consistent with the NRC’s intention that
this technical requirement applies to
licenses under part 50 as well as
licenses and regulatory approvals under
part 52.
Paragraph (a) Assessment Requirements
Paragraph (a) sets forth the
requirements for an assessment of
aircraft impact to be applied to the
design of new nuclear power facilities.
Paragraph (a) also contains the key
provisions relating to the nature of the
aircraft impact characteristics to be
utilized when performing the
assessment. The requirements relating
to the assessment are separated into two
paragraphs, (a)(1) and (a)(2), to help
readers distinguish between the
assessment of aircraft impact, and the
characteristics of the aircraft impact that
must be used by the facility designer in
performing the assessment. Finally,
paragraph (a)(3) lists the licenses,
certifications, and regulatory approvals
involving nuclear power reactor design
to which the assessment requirements
in paragraph (a) apply.
Paragraph (a)(1) Assessment
Paragraph (a)(1) requires a designspecific assessment of the effects of an
impact of a large commercial aircraft on
a nuclear power reactor facility. As
discussed in the section-by-section
analysis for paragraph (a)(3), every new
nuclear power plant will meet the
aircraft impact rule, which is one of the
NRC’s key objectives.
Conceptually, the assessment required
by the aircraft impact rule has two
aspects. The first is consideration of the
effects on the facility of the impact of a
large commercial aircraft. The second
aspect is a showing that design features
and functional capabilities incorporated
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into the design meet, with reduced use
of operator actions, the acceptance
criteria in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (ii).
The designer may perform both aspects
of the assessment using realistic
analyses (discussed in greater detail
below). The aircraft impact
characteristics that must be used by the
designer in performing the assessment
are defined in paragraph (a)(2) of the
rule. In showing that the design features
and functional capabilities incorporated
into the design meet the requirements of
paragraph (a), the designer should use a
structured process requiring
consideration of the insights gained
when assessing the effects on the facility
of the aircraft impact. The NRC
recognizes that a designer’s approach for
implementing the rule may differ,
depending upon the stage of completion
of the facility design when this final
rule is adopted or the design process
that the designer chooses to employ. For
example, if a facility design is largely or
entirely completed when this rule
becomes effective—as in the case of the
current design applications under
review by the NRC—the designer may
focus on features and capabilities
already included in the design or on
potential enhancements of such features
and capabilities, and then identify any
additional features and capabilities. By
contrast, a designer who has not yet
commenced detailed design activities
may decide to use an iterative screening
process for identifying features and
capabilities. By setting forth
performance-based objectives, the
aircraft impact rule does not require the
designer to use a specific methodology,
process or approach for identifying
design features and functional
capabilities that meet the acceptance
criteria in paragraph (a)(1)(i) and (ii)
with reduced use of operator actions.
The designer may choose any number of
ways to meet these performance
requirements.
By a ‘‘design-specific’’ assessment, the
NRC means that the impact assessment
must address the specific design of the
facility which is either the subject of a
construction permit, operating license,
standard design certification, standard
design approval, combined license, or
manufacturing license application. The
aircraft impact rule uses the term
‘‘facility,’’ for convenience, although the
NRC recognizes that the scope of design
addressed in a design approval, design
certification, and manufactured reactor
may be less than the complete facility
and will be limited to non-site-specific
portions of the facility.
In performing the assessment, the
aircraft rule specifies that ‘‘realistic
analyses’’ be used. Analyses include
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both quantitative methods and
approaches, either deterministic or
probabilistic, and qualitative methods
and approaches, including the use of
expert panels. An assessment may use
quantitative and/or qualitative analyses.
Regardless of the method or
combination of methods employed by
the designer, it must be reasonable and
technically acceptable. This can be
shown by demonstrating that the
analytical techniques being used are
generally accepted by the relevant
professional/technical practitioners for
performing best-estimate analysis for the
given application. An analysis may not
be rejected by the NRC in a licensing or
rulemaking (design certification)
proceeding (or otherwise challenged by
an interested person in a hearing
contention) on the basis that a more
accurate analysis (i.e., one that more
closely reflects actual data or more
accurately models a known physical
phenomenon) is possible. In this
context, ‘‘realistic’’ is a relative term and
is simply intended to avoid requiring
the designer to utilize conservative or
bounding assumptions in recognition of
the NRC’s determination that the impact
of a large commercial aircraft is a
beyond-design-basis event. However,
the designer is free to utilize bounding
or more conservative approaches in
order to account for uncertainties, or to
reduce the cost of analysis at its option.
The NRC may not require, and an
interested person in a hearing
contention or in a design certification
rulemaking comment may not argue,
that the designer must use a
conservative, as opposed to a realistic,
analysis, or vice versa. Rather, the
NRC’s review should be focused on (and
any interested person in a hearing
contention may only raise an issue with
respect to) whether the designer’s
analyses are within the bounds of
known data, known physical
phenomena, and use professionallyaccepted approaches.
‘‘Design features and functional
capabilities’’ represent design
alternatives that could be included in
the design of a facility. Design features
are structures, systems, and components
(SSCs), including the physical
arrangement of such SSCs. Examples of
design features are major structures
such as reinforced concrete walls and
slabs; redundancy and spatial
separation of key SSCs; and diversity of
power supplies. Functional capabilities
are key characteristics of such SSCs that
result in their contribution to
withstanding the effects of the aircraft
impact. Examples of such functional
capabilities are the flow capacity of a
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pump, the load carrying capacity of a
wall, and the electrical capacity of
power supplies. When identifying
potential design features and functional
capabilities for inclusion in the design,
the designer is expected to consider
whether these design features and
functional capabilities would facilitate
the implementation and/or enhance the
effectiveness of practical responsive and
mitigation actions that the nuclear
power plant licensee could implement.
For example, if the designer determines
that a fire load due to the aircraft impact
in a specific area could be extinguished
or controlled through the placement of
a standpipe and hose near the area, or
that a fire affecting critical components
with a limited time-temperature rating
could be more quickly controlled with
a larger amount of water delivered
through a larger than normally-specified
pipe, then the designer should consider
the design feature of a new standpipe
and hose, or the functional capability of
a greater capacity (larger diameter) pipe.
The aircraft impact rule establishes
two sets of acceptance criteria in
paragraph (a)(1), each containing two
sub-criteria:
(i) The reactor core remains cooled, or
the containment remains intact; and
(ii) Spent fuel cooling or spent fuel
pool integrity is maintained.
The acceptance criteria in both
paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (ii) must be met
in order for the NRC to find that the
requirements of the aircraft impact rule
have been satisfied; it is not sufficient,
for example, to satisfy the criterion of
paragraph (a)(1)(i) but to fail the
criterion of paragraph (a)(1)(ii).
Each criterion is expressed in the
form of an alternative: within each
criterion, only one of the sub-criteria
needs to be satisfied in order to show
compliance with the aircraft impact
rule. The order of the sub-criteria does
not reflect any requirement with respect
to the logical order in which the NRC
expects a designer to determine if each
criterion is satisfied. For the first
criterion in paragraph (a)(1)(i), the NRC
prefers that designers identify design
features and functional capabilities to
demonstrate that, with reduced use of
operator actions, the reactor core
remains cooled. If core cooling can be
maintained with the identified design
features and functional capabilities (and
with reduced use of operator action),
then the designer need not identify and
incorporate design features and
functional capabilities to show that the
containment remains intact. Otherwise,
the designer must identify design
features and functional capabilities that
show that the containment remains
intact. Likewise, a designer is afforded
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the flexibility under the aircraft impact
rule of truncating the analysis and
simply demonstrating that the
containment remains intact.
For the second criterion in paragraph
(a)(1)(ii), the NRC prefers that designers
identify and incorporate design features
and functional capabilities to
demonstrate that, with reduced use of
operator action, spent fuel pool integrity
is maintained. If the applicant can show
that spent fuel pool integrity can be
maintained with the applicant’s
identified design features and functional
capabilities, then no further
consideration of design features and
functional capabilities to maintain spent
fuel cooling is necessary. However, if
spent fuel pool integrity cannot be
shown to be maintained, then spent fuel
cooling must be maintained. Likewise,
the aircraft impact rule affords the
designer the flexibility of simply
showing that spent fuel cooling can be
maintained without first considering
spent fuel pool integrity. The NRC
reiterates, however, that the aircraft
impact assessment must consider the
effects of the aircraft impact on all four
key safety functions—core cooling,
containment, spent fuel cooling, and
spent fuel pool integrity.
There are only two bases for either an
NRC determination or an interested
person’s contention that the acceptance
criteria in paragraph (a)(1) have not
been met. One is that the analyses
utilized by the designer in showing that
the acceptance criteria have been met
are not technically acceptable. The other
basis is that the design features and
functional capabilities overall do not
involve any reduced use of operator
actions. The NRC does not expect each
design feature and functional capability
incorporated into the design to involve
reduced use of operator actions; the
overall reduction in use of operator
actions must be judged for the complete
set of design features and functional
capabilities relied upon in the
assessment to show that both
acceptance criteria in paragraph (a)(1)(i)
and (ii) have been met. However, as
discussed below, the NRC does not
intend that the use of operator actions
be reduced without consideration of
countervailing considerations. In
addition, the NRC does not intend to
require consideration—much less
inclusion in its design—of a design
feature or functional capability that
could have adverse safety or security
consequences under a different
operational or accident scenario.
The acceptance criteria in paragraph
(a)(1) focus on the functions of core
cooling capability, containment, spent
fuel cooling capability, and spent fuel
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pool integrity following the aircraft
impact. These four functions are
applicable to light water reactors
(LWRs), and each may not be applicable
to non-LWR reactor designs, or may
have to be supplemented by other key
functions. When reviewing non-LWR
designs, the NRC will evaluate the
applicability of the acceptance criteria
set forth in the aircraft impact rule and
the possible need for other criteria. If
necessary, the NRC will issue
exemptions and impose supplemental
criteria to be used in the aircraft impact
assessment for such non-LWR designs.
The NRC believes this regulatory
approach is preferable to excluding nonLWRs from the applicability of the
aircraft rule, because such an exclusion
could be interpreted in an erroneous
manner as reflecting the NRC’s belief
that non-LWRs need not be designed
against large, commercial aircraft
impacts.
The design features and functional
capabilities selected by the designer
must show that the acceptance criteria
in the aircraft impact rule can be met
with ‘‘reduced use of operator action.’’
In this context, ‘‘operator action’’
includes actions of operators in the
control room or at alternative control
panels or control areas to control the
reactor and the nuclear facility. This
means that active operator intervention
and initiation of responsive action to
maintain core cooling or an intact
containment, and spent fuel cooling or
spent fuel pool integrity should be
reduced. The designer need not strive to
achieve the absolute minimum in
operator action. The NRC recognizes
that there may be countervailing
considerations that weigh against
reducing to the absolute minimum the
use of operator action to show that the
acceptance criteria in the aircraft impact
rule are met. The NRC expects the
designer to identify and consider in a
reasonable process the goal of
incorporating design features and
functional capabilities which achieve
the acceptance criteria in paragraph
(a)(1)(i) and (ii) with reduced use of
operator action.
Paragraph (a)(2) Aircraft Impact
Characteristics
The assessment required by paragraph
(a) of the aircraft impact rule must be
based on the aircraft impact
characteristics specified in paragraph
(a)(2). The characteristics of the aircraft
impact must be that of a large,
commercial aircraft used for long
distance flights in the United States,
with aviation fuel loading typically used
for such flights. The rule refers to long
distance flights ‘‘in the United States,’’
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which means those which originate and
terminate in the United States (i.e.,
domestic flights).
The NRC’s guidance on the aircraft
impact characteristics will be contained
in guidance documents. The guidance
will include the time-force curve, or
loading function, that is derived from
the aircraft impact characteristics for
use in applicants’ assessment of the
aircraft impact. In the case of a
combined license applicant that is
required to perform an aircraft impact
assessment, the applicant could take
credit for site-specific topographic
features (e.g., mountains) and siting
features (e.g., the existence of non-plant
structures) to limit the directions from
which the plant could experience an
impact.
Footnote 1 to paragraph (a)(2) states
that changes to the detailed parameters
on aircraft impact characteristics set
forth in guidance shall be approved by
the Commission. This footnote ensures
that changes to the guidance on the
aircraft characteristics will not be made
without Commission consideration and
approval.
Paragraph (a)(3) Applicability
As set forth in paragraph (a)(3), the
assessment requirement for the aircraft
impact rule applies to: (1) Construction
permits under 10 CFR part 50 issued
after July 13, 2009; (2) operating licenses
for which the underlying construction
permits were issued after July 13, 2009;
(3) design certifications issued after July
13, 2009; (4) the four currently approved
design certifications in 10 CFR part 52,
appendices A through D at the time of
renewal, but only if they have not been
amended to comply with the aircraft
impact rule by that time; (5) standard
design approvals issued after July 13,
2009; (6) combined licenses issued
under 10 CFR part 52 which either do
not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor, or reference
one of the four currently approved
design certifications if the referenced
design has not been amended to comply
with the aircraft impact rule; and (7)
manufacturing licenses that do not
reference a standard design approval or
standard design certification meeting
the requirements of this section.
Applicants for operating licenses
under part 50 whose underlying
construction permits were issued before
the aircraft impact rule need not (but
may voluntarily choose to) comply with
the aircraft impact rule. The NRC notes
that the applicability of the aircraft
impact rule is dependent upon the date
of the NRC’s final action on an
application, and not the date of filing of
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the application. Thus, a combined
license issued after the effective date of
the final 10 CFR 50.150 rule will be
subject to the requirements of the rule,
even if its application was filed before
the effective date of the final 10 CFR
50.150 rule.
Combined licenses and manufacturing
licenses which do not reference a
standard design certification meeting
the requirements of this rule are subject
to the assessment requirement in
paragraph (a)(1). However, combined
license applicants that choose to
reference a design for which a design
certification application has been
docketed but not granted need not
perform the assessment required by
paragraph (a), assuming that the
combined license which is issued
references a final design certification
rule which complies with the aircraft
impact rule. This is an
acknowledgement that, under 10 CFR
52.55(c), an applicant for a combined
license may, at its own risk, reference in
its application a design for which a
design certification application has been
docketed but not granted.
Certain combined license applicants
need not perform a plant-specific
assessment to comply with the aircraft
impact rule. If the combined license
application references a design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor which complies
(or will comply, upon amendment of the
design certification by the time of
issuance of the combined license) with
the assessment requirements of the
aircraft impact rule, then the combined
license applicant need not perform an
assessment to comply with the aircraft
impact rule. This means, as a practical
matter, that the scope of the overall
plant design which is subject to the
aircraft impact rule’s requirements may
be greater for a ‘‘custom’’ combined
license applicant who does not
reference a design certification, design
approval, or manufactured reactor
which complies (or will comply) with
the aircraft impact rule.
Analogous to the combined license
applicant, a manufacturing license
applicant who does not reference a
standard design certification or standard
design approval which has complied
with the aircraft impact rule, must
comply with the aircraft impact rule by
performing the assessment required by
10 CFR 50.150(a). The scope of the
assessment is limited to the scope of the
design of the reactor to be approved for
manufacture.
The four currently approved design
certifications are not required to comply
with the aircraft impact rule except
upon renewal if the design certification
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has not already been amended to
comply with the aircraft impact rule.
The original design certification
applicant may, at any time, voluntarily
request an amendment to the design
certification rule to recertify the design
certification as complying with the
aircraft impact rule. The NRC notes that
persons or entities other than the
original design certification applicant
may also request such an amendment of
one of the four currently approved
design certifications. However, such an
application must provide the full set of
information required by the aircraft
impact rule, including, as necessary,
information which substitutes for the
proprietary and safeguards information
provided in the original design
certification proceeding, but which is
not available for use in the design
certification amendment proceeding.
The amendment of the design
certification to reflect compliance with
the aircraft impact rule will be
accomplished through rulemaking.
As a result of these provisions, every
newly constructed nuclear power plant
will meet the aircraft impact rule, which
is the NRC’s key objective in adopting
this final aircraft impact rule.
Paragraph (b) Content of Application
Paragraph (b) requires the PSAR or
FSAR for each license, certification, and
regulatory approval application which
is subject to 10 CFR 50.150(a) to include
certain specified information related to
compliance with the rule. This
information consists of: (1) A
description of the design features and
functional capabilities which the
applicant has selected (identified) for
inclusion in the design to show that the
facility can withstand the effects of the
aircraft impact; and (2) a concise
description of how the identified design
features and functional capabilities meet
the assessment requirements in 10 CFR
50.150(a)(1). The application should
summarize the bases for the applicant’s
determination that the selected features
and capabilities incorporated into the
facility design show, with reduced use
of operator actions, that the acceptance
criteria in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1) are met.
The 10 CFR 50.150(b) information must
be included in the PSAR or FSAR in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.34(a)(13), 10
CFR 50.34(b)(12), 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28),
10 CFR 52.79(a)(47), 10 CFR
52.137(a)(26), or 10 CFR 52.157(f)(32)
and should address only those features
and capabilities selected by the
applicant for inclusion in the plant
design to address aircraft impacts.
The description of the features and
capabilities should be equivalent in
detail to descriptions of other design
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features and functional capabilities
addressing beyond-design-basis events
or severe accidents which are required
to be described in the license,
certification, or approval application.
Inclusion of any SGI in the
information submitted in the FSAR as
part of a relevant application must be in
accordance with applicable
requirements in 10 CFR part 73. The
NRC will process and address requests
for access to this information from the
general public in accordance with the
NRC’s existing regulations and
procedures.
The NRC reiterates that aircraft
impact is not a design basis event.
Therefore, the design and construction
of features and capabilities designated
by the designer as meeting the aircraft
impact rule’s requirements need not
meet the ‘‘special treatment’’
requirements applicable to safetyrelated and important to safety
structures, systems, and components.
Paragraph (c) Control of Changes
Paragraph (c) clarifies the
requirements governing changes to
information in the PSAR or FSAR which
reflects the results of compliance with
the aircraft impact rule for each of the
licensing or certification processes
subject to the aircraft impact rule. In the
proposed aircraft impact rule, the
provisions governing changes to such
information were in proposed 10 CFR
52.502.
The PSAR or FSAR information
required by the aircraft impact rule
which is subject to the change control
requirement in paragraph (c) are the
descriptions of the design features and
functional capabilities incorporated into
the final design of the nuclear power
facility and the description of how the
identified design features and functional
capabilities meet the assessment
requirements in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1).
Not all of the actual change controls are
presented in paragraph (c). Instead,
most of the sections in paragraph (c) cite
to an existing regulation presenting the
FSAR change controls for that type of
license or certification. Thus, in many
cases, paragraph (c) is simply a
‘‘pointer’’ to the already-existing change
controls. However, in all cases, the
objective of the change controls remains
the same: To determine whether the
design of the facility, as changed or
modified, is shown to withstand the
effects of the aircraft impact with
reduced use of operator actions. In other
words, the applicant or licensee must
continue to show, with the modified
design, that the acceptance criteria in 10
CFR 50.150(a)(1) are met with reduced
use of operator actions. The rule does
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not require an applicant or a licensee
implementing a design change to redo
the complete aircraft impact assessment
to evaluate the effects of the change. The
NRC believes it may be possible to
demonstrate that a design change is
bounded by the original design or that
the change provides an equivalent level
of protection, without redoing the
original assessment.
Paragraph (c)(1) provides that, for
construction permits which are subject
to the aircraft impact rule, if the permit
holder changes the information required
by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(13) to be included in
the PSAR, then the permit holder shall
consider the effect of the changed
feature or capability on the original
assessment required by 10 CFR
50.150(a) and amend the information
required by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(13) to be
included in PSAR to describe how the
modified design features and functional
capabilities continue to meet the
assessment requirements in 10 CFR
50.150(a)(1).
Paragraph (c)(2) provides that, for
operating licenses which are subject to
the aircraft impact rule (i.e., operating
licenses for which the underlying
construction permits are issued after
July 13, 2009), if the licensee changes
the information required by 10 CFR
50.34(b)(12) to be included in the FSAR,
then the licensee shall consider the
effect of the changed feature or
capability on the original assessment
required by 10 CFR 50.150(a) and
amend the information required by 10
CFR 50.34(b)(12) to be included in the
FSAR to describe how the modified
design features and functional
capabilities continue to meet the
assessment requirements in 10 CFR
50.150(a)(1).
Paragraph (c)(3) provides that, for
design certifications which are subject
to the aircraft impact rule, generic
changes to the information required by
10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be included in
the FSAR are governed by the
applicable requirements of 10 CFR
52.63. A design feature or functional
capability described in a standard
design certification may not be changed
in the design certification except by
notice and comment rulemaking (see 10
CFR 52.63(a)(1) and (2)), and such a
change must meet one of the criteria in
10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). Any generic change
to a design certification rule must be
implemented by all referencing
combined licenses, as required by 10
CFR 52.63(a)(3).
Paragraph (c)(4)(i) provides that, for
combined licenses which are subject to
10 CFR 50.150(a) (i.e., combined
licenses that do not reference a design
certification, design approval, or
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manufactured reactor that complies
with the rule), if the licensee changes
the information required by 10 CFR
52.79(a)(47) to be included in the FSAR,
then the licensee shall consider the
effect of the changed feature or
capability on the original assessment
required by 10 CFR 50.150 and amend
the information required by 10 CFR
52.79(a)(47) to be included in the FSAR
to describe how the modified design
features and functional capabilities
continue to meet the assessment
requirements in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1).
The NRC believes that, because this rule
addresses a beyond-design-basis event,
it is appropriate to apply the same
standard that was applied during the
original assessment of design features
and functional capabilities to any
licensee-proposed changes to such
features and capabilities.
Paragraph (c)(4)(ii) provides that, for
combined license applicants or holders
which are not subject to 10 CFR
50.150(a), but reference a standard
design certification which is subject to
10 CFR 50.150(a), proposed departures
from the information required by 10
CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be included in the
FSAR for the referenced standard design
certification are governed by the change
control requirements in the applicable
design certification rule. The NRC
expects to add a new change control
provision to future design certification
rules subject to 10 CFR 50.150(a)
(including amendments to any of the
four existing design certifications) to
govern combined license applicants and
holders referencing the design
certification that request a departure
from the design features or functional
capabilities in the referenced design
certification. The new change control
provision will require that, if the
applicant or licensee changes the
information required by 10 CFR
52.47(a)(28) to be included in the FSAR
for the standard design certification,
then the applicant or licensee shall
consider the effect of the changed
feature or capability on the original
assessment required by 10 CFR
50.150(a). The applicant or licensee
must also describe in a change to the
FSAR (i.e., a plant-specific departure
from the generic design control
document), how the modified design
features and functional capabilities
continue to meet the assessment
requirements in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1).
Paragraph (c)(4)(iii) provides that, for
combined license applicants or holders
which are not subject to 10 CFR
50.150(a) but reference a manufactured
reactor which is subject to 10 CFR
50.150(a), proposed departures from the
information required by 10 CFR
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52.157(f)(32) to be included in the FSAR
for the manufacturing license are
governed by the applicable
requirements in 10 CFR 52.171(b)(2).
Paragraph (b)(2) of 10 CFR 52.171
allows an applicant or licensee who
references or uses a nuclear power
reactor manufactured under a
manufacturing license under this
subpart to request a departure from the
design characteristics, site parameters,
terms and conditions, or approved
design of the manufactured reactor. The
Commission may grant a request only if
it determines that the departure will
comply with the requirements of 10 CFR
52.7 and that the special circumstances
outweigh any decrease in safety that
may result from the reduction in
standardization caused by the
departure.
Paragraph (c)(5)(i) provides that, for
manufacturing licenses which are
subject to 10 CFR 50.150(a), generic
changes to the information required by
10 CFR 52.157(f)(32) to be included in
the FSAR are governed by the
applicable requirements of 10 CFR
52.171. Paragraph (b)(1) of 10 CFR
52.171 does not allow the holder of a
manufacturing license to make changes
to the design of the nuclear power
reactor authorized to be manufactured
without prior Commission approval.
Any request for a change to the design
must be in the form of an application for
a license amendment, and must meet
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.90 and
10 CFR 50.92.
Paragraph (c)(5)(ii) provides that, for
manufacturing license applicants or
holders which are subject to 10 CFR
50.150(a), proposed departures from the
information required by 10 CFR
52.47(a)(28) to be included in the FSAR
for the referenced standard design
certification are governed by the change
control requirements in the applicable
design certification rule.
Section 52.47 Contents of
Applications; Technical Information
Section 52.47 identifies the required
technical information to be included in
an application for a standard design
certification. The final rule revises this
section by adding a new paragraph
(a)(28) requiring that the FSAR contain
the information required by 10 CFR
50.150, ‘‘Aircraft impact assessment.’’
This information, as contained in
paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 50.150, is:
1. A description of the design features
and functional capabilities identified in
10 CFR 50.150(a)(1); and
2. A description of how such design
features and functional capabilities meet
the assessment requirements in 10 CFR
50.150(a)(1).
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28133
The 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) requirement
applies only to those standard design
certification applications which are
subject to 10 CFR 50.150, that is, those
design certifications issued after the
effective date of the final rule (see 10
CFR 50.150(a)). Thus, any standard
design certification application that is
docketed and under review by the NRC
but has not yet been issued in final form
as of the effective date of 10 CFR 50.150
must amend its application to include
the information required by 10 CFR
50.150.
Section 52.59
Criteria for Renewal
Section 52.59 establishes the criteria
which must be met in order for the NRC
to renew a standard design certification.
The final rule revises paragraph (a) by
adding a requirement that the
Commission shall, the first time one of
the four existing design certifications is
to be renewed, find that the renewed
design complies with the applicable
requirements of the aircraft impact rule
if the design certification has not
already been amended to comply with
the aircraft impact rule. This finding
would be in addition to the (implicit)
findings which the Commission must
make under paragraph (a). The findings
need only be made the first time the
design certification is renewed. Once
the design certification has been
amended or renewed to reflect
compliance with the aircraft impact
rule, there is no need for the NRC to
remake the finding of compliance with
the aircraft impact rule nor does the
design or the assessment have to be
upgraded for purposes of aircraft impact
rule compliance in any subsequent
amendment or renewal.
Section 52.79 Contents of
Applications; Technical Information in
Final Safety Analysis Report
Section 52.79 identifies the required
technical information to be included in
an FSAR submitted in a combined
license application under 10 CFR part
52, subpart C, Combined Licenses. The
final rule revises this section by adding
a new paragraph (a)(47) requiring that
the FSAR contain the information
required by 10 CFR 50.150. This is the
same type of information that an
applicant for a standard design
certification will need to submit,
namely, the following:
1. A description of the design features
and functional capabilities identified in
10 CFR 50.150(a)(1); and
2. A description of how such design
features and functional capabilities meet
the assessment requirements in 10 CFR
50.150(a)(1).
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Only those combined licenses issued
after the effective date of the final rule
that do not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor, or that
reference a standard design certification
issued before the effective date of the
final rule which has not been amended
to address the requirements of 10 CFR
50.150, are subject to 10 CFR
52.79(a)(47). Thus, a combined license
application filed after the effective date
of 10 CFR 50.150 and referencing a
standard design certification, standard
design approval, or manufactured
reactor subject to the proposed rule, or
referencing one of the four current
standard design certifications (ABWR,
System 80+, AP600, and AP1000) which
has been amended to address the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.150 will not
have to separately include the
information required by 10 CFR 50.150
because it will be incorporated by
reference to the standard design or
manufactured reactor. This is consistent
with the requirements of 10 CFR
52.79(c), (d), and (e) which state that, if
the combined license application
references a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor, then the FSAR
need not contain information or
analyses submitted to the Commission
in connection with the design
certification, design approval, or
manufacturing license, as applicable. By
contrast, a combined license applicant
not referencing a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor whose
application is docketed and under
review by the NRC but for which a
license has not yet been issued as of the
effective date of 10 CFR 50.150, must
amend its application to include the
information required by 10 CFR 50.150.
Section 52.137 Contents of
Applications; Technical Information
Section 52.137 identifies the required
technical information to be included in
an application for a standard design
approval. The final rule revises this
section by adding a new paragraph
(a)(26) requiring that the FSAR contain
the information required by 10 CFR
50.150. This information, as currently
presented in paragraph (b) of 10 CFR
50.150 is:
1. A description of the design features
and functional capabilities identified in
10 CFR 50.150(a)(1); and
2. A description of how such design
features and functional capabilities meet
the assessment requirements in 10 CFR
50.150(a)(1).
The 10 CFR 52.137(a)(26) requirement
applies only to those standard design
approval applications which are subject
to 10 CFR 50.150, that is, those design
approvals issued after the effective date
of the final rule (see 10 CFR 50.150(a)).
Thus, any standard design approval
application that is docketed and under
review by the NRC but has not yet been
issued in final form as of the effective
date of 10 CFR 50.150 must amend its
application to include the information
required by final 10 CFR 50.150.
Section 52.157 Contents of
Applications; Technical Information in
Final Safety Analysis Report
Section 52.157 identifies the required
technical information to be included in
an application for a manufacturing
license. The final rule revises this
section by adding a new paragraph
(f)(32) requiring that the FSAR contain
the information required by 10 CFR
50.150. This information, as currently
presented in paragraph (b) of 10 CFR
50.150, is limited to the following:
1. A description of the design features
and functional capabilities identified in
10 CFR 50.150(a)(1); and
2. A description of how such design
features and functional capabilities meet
the assessment requirements in 10 CFR
50.150(a)(1).
The 10 CFR 52.157(f)(32) requirement
applies only to those manufacturing
license applications which are subject to
10 CFR 50.150(a)(1), that is, those
manufacturing licenses that do not
reference a design certification or design
approval complying with 10 CFR
50.150. Thus, any manufacturing license
application that is docketed and under
review by the NRC but has not yet been
issued in final form as of the effective
date of 10 CFR 50.150 must amend its
application to include the information
required by 10 CFR 50.150.
VIII. Guidance
The NRC staff expects to issue new
regulatory guidance on the requirements
in 10 CFR 50.150 that will endorse
guidance being prepared by NEI. This
guidance is intended to provide an
acceptable method by which relevant
applicants can perform the assessment
of aircraft impacts to meet the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.150. The
final rule requires that the designspecific impact assessment use the
aircraft impact characteristics specified
in the rule. A more detailed description
of the aircraft impact parameters that are
considered appropriate for use in the
assessment will be presented in the
NRC’s regulatory guidance. Any future
changes to the detailed parameters on
aircraft impact characteristics set forth
in the guidance will be approved by the
Commission. Because the portion of this
regulatory guidance describing the
detailed aircraft impact characteristics is
likely to contain SGI, that portion of the
document will only be made available
to those individuals with a need-toknow, and who are otherwise qualified
to have access to SGI. A version of the
document without the SGI will be made
publicly available. Publication of the
draft regulatory guidance is planned to
coincide with publication of the final
rule.
IX. Availability of Documents
The NRC is making the following
documents available to interested
persons through one or more of the
following methods as indicated.
Public Document Room (PDR). The
NRC PDR is located at 11555 Rockville
Pike, Public File Area O1 F21,
Rockville, Maryland 20852, e-mail
pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
Regulations.gov (Web). These
documents may be viewed and
downloaded electronically through the
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal https://
www.regulations.gov, Docket number
NRC–2007–0009.
NRC’s Electronic Reading Room
(ERR). The NRC’s public electronic
reading room is located at https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html.
Document
PDR
Web
ERR (ADAMS)
SECY–06–0204, ‘‘Proposed Rulemaking—Security Assessment Requirements for New Nuclear Power Reactor Designs (RIN 3150–AH92)’’ (September 28, 2006).
Staff Requirements Memorandum for SECY–06–0204 (April 24, 2007) ...............................................................
Regulatory History Index for the October 3, 2007 proposed rule ..........................................................................
Federal Register Notice ..........................................................................................................................................
Environmental Assessment ....................................................................................................................................
Response to Public Comments ..............................................................................................................................
SECY–08–0152, ‘‘Final Rule—Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors (RIN 3150–
AI19)’’ (October 15, 2008).
X
X
ML062300068
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Document
PDR
Web
ERR (ADAMS)
Staff Requirements Memorandum for SECY–08–0152 (February 17, 2009) ........................................................
X
X
ML090480610
environmental assessment for this rule.
No State comments were received.
Availability of the final environmental
assessment is provided in Section IX of
this document.
X. Agreement State Compatibility
Under the ‘‘Policy Statement on
Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement States Programs,’’ approved
by the Commission on June 20, 1997,
and published in the Federal Register
(62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997), this
rule is classified as compatibility
‘‘NRC.’’ Compatibility is not required for
Category ‘‘NRC’’ regulations. The NRC
program elements in this category are
those that relate directly to areas of
regulation reserved to the NRC by the
Atomic Energy Act or the provisions of
10 CFR. Although an Agreement State
may not adopt program elements
reserved to the NRC, it may wish to
inform its licensees of certain
requirements via a mechanism that is
consistent with the particular State’s
administrative procedure laws. Category
‘‘NRC’’ regulations do not confer
regulatory authority on the State.
comply with the rule; and combined
licenses that do not reference a standard
design certification, standard design
approval, or manufactured reactor, or
that reference a standard design
certification issued before the effective
date of the rule which has not been
amended to comply with the rule. In
addition, these amendments contain
requirements for control of changes to
any design features or functional
capabilities credited for showing that
the facility can withstand the effects of
an aircraft impact. This regulatory
action does not establish standards with
which all applicants must comply. For
these reasons, the Commission
concludes that this action does not
constitute the establishment of a
standard that contains generally
applicable requirements.
XII. Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact: Availability
XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer
and Advancement Act of 1995, Public
Law 104–113, requires that Federal
agencies use technical standards that are
developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies unless
using such a standard is inconsistent
with applicable law or is otherwise
impractical. In this final rule, the NRC
is amending its regulations to require
applicants for new nuclear power
reactors to perform a design-specific
assessment of the effects of the impact
of a large, commercial aircraft. The
applicant is required to use realistic
analyses to identify and incorporate
design features and functional
capabilities to show, with reduced use
of operator actions, that either the
reactor core remains cooled or the
containment remains intact, and either
spent fuel cooling or spent fuel pool
integrity is maintained. These
requirements apply to applicants for
new construction permits; new
operating licenses that reference a new
construction permit; new standard
design certifications, renewal of any of
the four existing design certifications if
the design has not previously been
amended to comply with the final rule;
new standard design approvals;
manufacturing licenses that do not
reference a standard design certification
or standard design approval, or that
reference a standard design certification
issued before the effective date of the
rule which has not been amended to
The Commission has determined
under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the
Commission’s regulations in subpart A
to 10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not
a major Federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human
environment and, therefore, an
environmental impact statement (EIS) is
not required. As presented in the final
environmental assessment, this action
will not have a significant
environmental impact because it applies
only to applicants for new nuclear
power reactors and requires them to use
realistic analyses to identify and
incorporate design features and
functional capabilities to show, with
reduced use of operator actions, that
either the reactor core remains cooled or
the containment remains intact, and
either spent fuel cooling or spent fuel
pool integrity is maintained, and
because the standards and requirements
applicable to radiological releases and
effluents are not affected by this
rulemaking.
The NRC requested public comments
on any aspect of the environmental
assessment. Three public comments
were received that discussed the need
for the preparation of an EIS for the
aircraft impact rulemaking. The NRC
responded that because the adoption of
this rule does not constitute a major
Federal action significantly affecting the
environment, an EIS was not prepared
for this rulemaking. The NRC also
requested the views of the States on the
XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act
Statement
The final rule contains new or
amended information collection
requirements contained in 10 CFR parts
50 and 52 that are subject to the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements
were approved by the Office of
Management and Budget, approval
numbers 3150–0011 and 3150–0151.
The burden to the public for these
information collections is estimated to
average 2,186.7 hours per response. This
includes the time for reviewing
instructions, searching existing data
sources, gathering and maintaining the
data needed, and completing and
reviewing the information collection.
Send comments on any aspect of these
information collections, including
suggestions for reducing the burden, to
the Records and FOIA/Privacy Services
Branch (T–5 F53), U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001, or by Internet
electronic mail to
INFOCOLLECTS.Resource@nrc.gov; and
to the Desk Officer, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
NEOB–10202, (3150–0011), Office of
Management and Budget, Washington,
DC 20503.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor,
and a person is not required to respond
to, a request for information or an
information collection requirement
unless the requesting document
displays a currently valid OMB control
number.
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XIV. Regulatory Analysis
The NRC has prepared a regulatory
analysis on this final rule and has
included it in this Federal Register
document. The analysis examines the
costs and benefits of the alternatives
considered by the NRC. No public
comments were received on the
proposed regulatory analysis.
1. Statement of the Problem and
Objective
This final rule amends 10 CFR part 50
and 10 CFR part 52 to require applicants
for new nuclear power reactors to
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perform a design-specific assessment of
the effects of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. The applicant is
required to use realistic analyses to
identify and incorporate design features
and functional capabilities to show,
with reduced use of operator actions,
that either the reactor core remains
cooled or the containment remains
intact, and either spent fuel cooling or
spent fuel pool integrity is maintained.
These requirements apply to applicants
for new construction permits; new
operating licenses that reference a new
construction permit; new standard
design certifications; renewal of any of
the four existing design certifications if
the design has not previously been
amended to comply with the final rule;
new standard design approvals;
manufacturing licenses that do not
reference a standard design certification
or standard design approval, or that
reference a standard design certification
issued before the effective date of the
rule which has not been amended to
comply with the rule; and combined
licenses that don’t reference a standard
design certification, standard design
approval, or manufactured reactor, or
that reference a standard design
certification issued before the effective
date of the rule which has not been
amended to comply with the rule. In
addition, these amendments contain
requirements for control of changes to
any design features or functional
capabilities credited for showing that
the facility can withstand the effects of
an aircraft impact. The objective of this
rule is to require nuclear power plant
designers to perform a rigorous
assessment of the design to identify
design features and functional
capabilities that could provide
additional inherent protection to show,
with reduced use of operator actions,
that either the reactor core remains
cooled or the containment remains
intact, and either spent fuel cooling or
spent fuel pool integrity is maintained.
2. Identification of Regulatory
Alternatives
The only alternative considered was
to conduct a rulemaking to require
applicants to perform an aircraft impact
assessment on new nuclear power
reactors because the Commission
directed the NRC staff in a staff
requirements memorandum dated April
24, 2007, to revise the regulations.
However, the NRC considers the noaction alternative as the baseline from
which to measure the costs and benefits
of the final rule.
The regulations in 10 CFR part 50 and
10 CFR part 52 are being amended for
applicants for new nuclear power
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reactors to require these applicants to
perform a design-specific assessment of
the effects of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. Applicants for new
nuclear power reactors are required to
use realistic analyses to identify and
incorporate design features and
functional capabilities to show, with
reduced use of operator actions, that
either the reactor core remains cooled or
the containment remains intact, and
either spent fuel cooling or spent fuel
pool integrity is maintained. This rule
should result in new nuclear power
reactor facilities being more inherently
robust with regard to an aircraft impact
than if they were designed in the
absence of this final rule.
3. Analysis of Values and Impacts of
Final Rulemaking
3.1 Identification of Affected
Attributes
The NRC identified the attributes that
the regulatory action could affect by
using the list of potential attributes
provided in Chapter 5 of NUREG/BR–
0184, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis Technical
Evaluation Handbook,’’ issued January
1997. Affected attributes include the
following:
Public Health (Accident). The
regulatory action will reduce the risk
that public health will be affected by the
release of radioactive materials to the
environment from the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft on a nuclear power
plant.
Occupational Health (Accident). The
regulatory action will reduce the risk
that occupational health will be affected
by the release of radioactive materials to
the environment from the impact of a
large, commercial aircraft on a nuclear
power plant.
Offsite Property. The regulatory action
will reduce the risk that offsite property
will be affected by the release of
radioactive materials to the environment
from the impact of a large, commercial
aircraft on a nuclear power plant.
Onsite Property. The regulatory action
will reduce the risk that onsite property
will be affected by the release of
radioactive materials to the environment
from the impact of a large, commercial
aircraft on a nuclear power plant.
Industry Implementation. The
regulatory action will require applicants
for new nuclear power reactors to
perform a design-specific assessment of
the effects of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. Applicants for new
nuclear power reactors are required to
use realistic analyses to identify and
incorporate design features and
functional capabilities to show, with
reduced use of operator actions, that
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either the reactor core remains cooled or
the containment remains intact, and
either spent fuel cooling or spent fuel
pool integrity is maintained. Applicants
will incur costs to develop an SGI
program, perform the assessment, and
incorporate the results into the design.
Industry Operation. The regulatory
action will require applicants and
licensees for new nuclear power
reactors to retain the aircraft impact
assessment throughout the pendency of
the application and for the term of the
certification or license (including any
period of renewal). Applicants and
licensees will incur costs to retain the
assessment and supporting
documentation.
NRC Implementation. Under the
regulatory action, the NRC will incur
costs to develop guidance on performing
an aircraft impact assessment and to
review the actions taken by the
applicant to comply with the aircraft
impact rule.
Improvements in Knowledge. The
regulatory action will improve
knowledge with regard to an aircraft
impact by ensuring that nuclear power
plant designers perform a rigorous
assessment of the design to identify
design features and functional
capabilities that could provide
additional inherent protection to
withstand the effects of an aircraft
impact.
Safeguards and Security
Considerations. The regulatory action to
address the capability of new nuclear
power reactors relative to an aircraft
impact is based both on enhanced
public health and safety and enhanced
common defense and security, but is not
necessary for adequate protection.
Rather, this rule’s goal is to enhance the
facility’s inherent robustness at the
design stage.
3.2 Methodology
This section describes the process
used to evaluate benefits and costs
associated with the regulatory action.
The benefits (values) come from any
desirable changes in the affected
attributes which are solely qualitative
for the regulatory action; the costs
(impacts or burdens) come from any
undesirable changes in the affected
attributes (e.g., monetary costs,
increased exposures). As described in
Section 3.1 of this regulatory analysis,
the attributes expected to be affected
include public health (accident),
occupational health (accident), offsite
property, onsite property, industry
implementation, industry operation,
NRC implementation, improvements in
knowledge, and safeguards and security
considerations.
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When possible, a cost-benefit analysis
quantifies the overall costs and benefits
of the regulatory options relative to each
of these attributes. This analysis relies
on a qualitative evaluation of several of
the affected attributes (public health,
occupational health, offsite property,
onsite property, improvements in
knowledge, and safeguards and security
considerations) because of the difficulty
in quantifying the impact of this
rulemaking. The regulatory action will
affect these attributes through the
associated reduction in the risks of
aircraft impact damage to the plant
resulting in the inability to maintain
either reactor core cooling or an intact
containment, and either spent fuel
cooling or spent fuel pool integrity.
The remaining attributes (industry
implementation, industry operation,
and NRC implementation) are evaluated
quantitatively. Quantitative analysis
requires a characterization of the
universe, including factors such as the
number of applicants and the scope of
the aircraft impact assessment being
performed. The NRC analyzed
incremental costs and benefits of the
regulatory action relative to the baseline
(i.e., the no-action alternative described
in Section 2 of this regulatory analysis).
Under OMB guidance and NUREG/
BR–0058, Revision 4, ‘‘Regulatory
Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,’’ issued
September 2004, the results of the cost
analysis are presented as discounted
flows of funds using 3- and 7-percent
real discount rates.
3.3 Data
The NRC derived information from
industry announcements on the
estimated number of applications
submitted for a new standard design
certification, renewal of an existing
design certification, and a combined
license that references a currently
approved standard design certification.
Data used was obtained during
September 2008. The NRC staff applied
its professional judgment in this
analysis given the uncertainty in the
number of applications for a new
construction permit; new operating
license; new standard design approval;
manufacturing license that does not
reference a standard design certification
or standard design approval, or that
references a standard design
certification issued before the effective
date of the rule which has not been
amended to comply with the rule; and
combined license that does not
reference a standard design certification,
standard design approval, or
manufactured reactor, or that references
a standard design certification issued
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before the effective date of the rule
which has not been amended to comply
with the rule.
3.4 Assumptions
The regulatory action will apply only
to applicants for new construction
permits; new operating licenses that
reference a new construction permit;
new standard design certifications,
renewal of any of the four existing
design certifications if the design has
not previously been amended to comply
with the final rule; new standard design
approvals; manufacturing licenses that
don’t reference a standard design
certification or standard design
approval, or that reference a standard
design certification issued before the
effective date of the rule which has not
been amended to comply with the rule;
and combined licenses that don’t
reference a standard design certification,
standard design approval, or
manufactured reactor, or that reference
a standard design certification issued
before the effective date of the rule
which has not been amended to comply
with the rule. It will not apply to a
construction permit, operating license,
standard design approval, or standard
design certification (except at renewal)
issued before the effective date of the
final rule.
3.5 Analysis
For Sections 3.5.1 through 3.5.10, the
cost-benefit analysis of the regulatory
action is based on the assumed number
of applicants in each category. In each
case, industry will incur both
implementation and operation costs.
Furthermore, because all of the benefits
are measured qualitatively in this
analysis, only costs are included in
these subsections.
This analysis uses $100 and $105 per
hour for NRC and industry staff rates,
respectively. In the analysis done for the
proposed rule, an NRC hourly staff rate
of $105 was used. This value was
recently revised to account for the
changing composition of the NRC staff
and re-baselining of estimates of hours
for training, annual leave, etc. In
addition, the NRC has reassessed the
cost to purchase an appropriate SGI
container and lock. This analysis uses
$1,200, rather than the $2,500 used for
the proposed rule analysis.
The annual results are derived as
present values using the 3- and 7percent discount rates as described in
Appendix B to NUREG/BR–0184.
3.5.1 Construction Permit
Applications
Under the regulatory action, an
applicant for a new construction permit
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28137
will need to comply with the
requirements for an aircraft impact
assessment in 10 CFR 50.150. However,
the NRC staff concludes that it is
unlikely that a request for a new
construction permit will be submitted to
the NRC for approval during the next 20
years. Therefore, no cost-benefit
analysis is needed for a construction
permit.
3.5.2 Operating License Applications
Under the regulatory action, an
applicant for a new operating license
will need to comply with the
requirements for an aircraft impact
assessment in 10 CFR 50.150. However,
the NRC staff concludes that it is
unlikely that a request for a new
operating license will be submitted to
the NRC for approval during the next 20
years. Therefore, no cost-benefit
analysis is needed for an operating
license.
3.5.3 Standard Design Certification
Applications
In implementing the regulatory
action, standard design certification
applicants will incur one-time costs to
develop an SGI program; purchase an
appropriate SGI storage container and
lock; perform the aircraft impact
assessment; and identify and
incorporate into the design those design
features and functional capabilities that
show, with reduced use of operator
action, that the facility can withstand
the effects of an aircraft impact. The
NRC estimates that each applicant will
spend 120 hours to develop the SGI
program. Using the assumed staff rate of
$105 per hour, the one-time cost of
developing the SGI program will be
$13,000 per applicant (120 hours ×
$105/hour). The NRC also estimates it
will cost $1,200 to purchase an
appropriate SGI storage container and
lock. Finally, the NRC estimates it will
take an applicant 24 staff-months for a
one-time cost of $400,000 (24 staffmonths × 4 weeks/month × 40 hours/
week × $105/hour) per application to
complete the assessment and
incorporate the results into the design.
Thus, the one-time cost for an applicant
to implement the regulatory action is
estimated to be $415,000.
For the standard design certification
process, this analysis assumes that three
applications will be affected by the final
rule in the year that the rule is
promulgated (i.e., year 0), and
thereafter, one application will be
submitted every 4 years at years 4, 8, 12,
16, and 20. Table 1 shows the
discounted flow of funds (using 3- and
7-percent discount rates) of the total
industry implementation costs for
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standard design certification
applications over a 20-year period.
With respect to industry operational
costs, there will be recordkeeping costs
for retention of the assessment and
supporting documentation. The NRC
will require standard design
certification applicants to retain these
records throughout the pendency of the
application and for the term of the
certification (including any period of
renewal). For this analysis, it is assumed
that it takes 4 years for the Commission
to adopt the application as a final
standard design certification rule, after
which the records are retained by the
applicant for 15 years as required by the
standard design certification rule. No
renewal of the standard design
certification rule is considered for this
analysis. Thus, the records are retained
for a total of 19 years. In addition, it is
assumed that an applicant spends 3
hours per year to maintain the records.
The estimated annual cost for
recordkeeping is $315 per applicant (3
hours × $105/hour). Table 2 shows the
discounted flow of funds of the
recordkeeping costs (using 3- and 7percent discount rates) for applications
submitted over a 20-year period, using
the schedule discussed previously.
After a standard design certification is
adopted by the NRC, any change to a
design feature or functional capability
credited for complying with the aircraft
impact rule will require that the
applicant or licensee consider the effect
of the changed feature or capability on
the original assessment. The applicant
or licensee must amend the information
included in the FSAR to describe how
the modified design feature or
functional capability continues to meet
the assessment requirements in the
aircraft impact rule. However, the NRC
staff concludes that after a standard
design certification is adopted, it is
unlikely that any changes will be made
to design features or functional
capabilities credited for complying with
the aircraft impact rule. Therefore, no
industry cost analysis is needed for this
portion of the regulatory action.
Under the final rule, any combined
license applicant referencing a design
certification that complies with the
requirements of this final rule will not
have to perform an aircraft impact
assessment.
TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY IMPLEMENTATION COSTS FOR STANDARD DESIGN CERTIFICATION APPLICANTS
Number of
standard
design certification
applications
Year
Implementation costs
Using 7-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
Using 3-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
0 .................................................................................................................................
4 .................................................................................................................................
8 .................................................................................................................................
12 ...............................................................................................................................
16 ...............................................................................................................................
20 ...............................................................................................................................
3
1
1
1
1
1
1,200
320
240
180
140
110
1,200
370
330
290
260
230
Total ....................................................................................................................
8
2,190
2,680
TABLE 2—SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY OPERATING COSTS FOR STANDARD DESIGN CERTIFICATION APPLICANTS
Number of
standard
design certification
applications
Year*
Operating costs
Using 7-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
Using 3-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
0 .............................................................................................................................
4 .............................................................................................................................
8 .............................................................................................................................
12 ...........................................................................................................................
16 ...........................................................................................................................
20 ...........................................................................................................................
3
1
1
1
1
1
9.8
2.5
1.9
1.4
1.1
0.84
14
4
3.6
3.2
2.8
2.5
Total ................................................................................................................
8
17.54
30.1
* Analysis assumes that it takes 4 years for the Commission to adopt the application as a final standard design certification rule, after which
the records are retained by the applicant for 15 years.
3.5.4 Applications for Renewal of Any
of the Four Existing Design
Certifications if the Design Has Not
Previously Been Amended To Comply
With the Final Rule
Under the regulatory action, an
applicant for renewal of any of the four
existing design certifications which has
not previously been amended to comply
with the final aircraft impact rule will
need to comply with the requirements
of an aircraft assessment in 10 CFR
50.150. The NRC is expecting one
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application for renewal of one of the
four existing design certifications that
will be required to comply with the
final rule to be submitted in the year
after the rule is promulgated (i.e., year
1).
This analysis assumes that the
applicant for renewal has an existing
SGI program and an appropriate SGI
storage container and lock; resulting in
no related costs to implement the
regulatory action. However, in
implementing the regulatory action, the
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applicant will incur one-time costs to
perform the aircraft impact assessment
and identify and incorporate into the
design those design features and
functional capabilities to show, with
reduced use of operator action, that the
facility can withstand the effects of an
aircraft impact. The NRC estimates it
will take this applicant 24 staff-months
for a one-time cost of $400,000 (24 staffmonths × 4 weeks/month × 40 hours/
week × $105/hour) to complete the
assessment and incorporate the results
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into the design. No other costs
associated with the application are
considered for this analysis (i.e., overall
costs to do the administrative work to
prepare and submit other portions of the
application). Thus the one-time cost for
this applicant to implement the
regulatory action is estimated to be
$400,000. For one application submitted
in the year after the rule is promulgated,
the discounted flow of funds of the
implementation costs are $390,000 and
$370,000 using 3- and 7-percent
discount rates respectively.
With respect to industry operational
costs, there will be recordkeeping costs
for retention of the assessment and
supporting documentation. The NRC
will require applicants for renewal of an
existing design certification to retain
these records throughout the pendency
of the application and for the term of the
certification. For this analysis, it is
assumed that it takes 3 years for the
Commission to adopt the application for
renewal as a final design certification
rule, after which the records are
retained by the applicant for 15 years as
will be required by the standard design
certification rule. No subsequent
renewal of the standard design
certification rule is considered for this
analysis. Thus, the records are retained
for a total of 18 years. In addition, it is
assumed that an applicant spends 3
hours per year to maintain the records.
The estimated annual cost for
recordkeeping is $315 per applicant (3
hours × $105/hour). Thus, the
discounted flow of funds of the
recordkeeping costs for one application
is $4,200 and $3,000 using 3- and 7percent discount rates respectively.
After a renewal of an existing design
certification is adopted by the NRC, any
change to a design feature or functional
capability credited for complying with
the aircraft impact rule will require that
the applicant or licensee consider the
effect of the changed feature or
capability on the original assessment.
The applicant must describe how the
modified design feature or functional
capability continues to meet the
assessment requirements in the aircraft
impact rule. However, the NRC staff
concludes that after the renewal is
adopted, it is unlikely that any changes
will be made to design features or
functional capabilities credited for
complying with the aircraft impact rule.
Therefore, no industry cost analysis is
needed for this portion of the regulatory
action.
The total industry cost is the sum of
the implementation and operation costs.
The implementation cost is the present
value of the assumed one application
($400,000) which when discounted is
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$390,000 (using a 3-percent discount
rate) and $370,000 (using a 7-percent
discount rate). The operating costs are
$4,200 and $3,000 using the 3- and 7percent discount rates as shown above.
Therefore, the total discounted industry
costs are $394,200 and $373,200 using
3- and 7-percent discount rates,
respectively.
3.5.5 Standard Design Approval
Applications
Under the regulatory action, an
applicant for a new standard design
approval will need to comply with the
requirements for an aircraft impact
assessment in 10 CFR 50.150. However,
the NRC staff concludes that it is
unlikely that a request for a new
standard design will be submitted to the
NRC for approval during the next 20
years. Therefore, no cost-benefit
analysis is needed for a standard design
approval.
3.5.6 Combined License Applications
Not Referencing a Standard Design
Certification, Standard Design
Approval, or Manufactured Reactor
Although the NRC concludes that
there is a low probability of a combined
license applicant not referencing a
standard design certification, standard
design approval, or manufactured
reactor, this analysis assumes that one
application will be submitted to the
NRC in year 10 following promulgation
of the rule.
In implementing the regulatory
action, combined license applicants will
incur one-time costs to develop an SGI
program; purchase an appropriate SGI
storage container and lock; perform the
aircraft impact assessment; and identify
and incorporate into the design those
design features and functional
capabilities to show, with reduced use
of operator action, that the facility can
withstand the effects of an aircraft
impact. The NRC estimates that each
applicant will spend 120 hours to
develop the SGI program. Assuming a
staff rate of $105 per hour, the one-time
cost of developing the SGI program will
be $13,000 per applicant (120 hours ×
$105/hour). The NRC also estimates it
will cost $1,200 to purchase an
appropriate SGI storage container and
lock. Finally, the NRC estimates it will
take an applicant 24 staff-months for a
one-time cost of $400,000 (24 staffmonths × 4 weeks/month × 40 hours/
week × $105/hour) per application to
complete the assessment and
incorporate the results into the design.
Thus, the one-time cost for an applicant
to implement the regulatory action is
estimated to be $415,000. For one
application submitted in year 10,
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28139
following promulgation of the rule, the
discounted flow of funds of the
implementation costs are $310,000 and
$210,000 using 3- and 7-percent
discount rates, respectively.
With respect to industry operational
costs, there will be recordkeeping costs
for retention of the assessment and
supporting documentation. The NRC
will require that these records be
retained throughout the pendency of the
application and for the term of the
license (including any period of
renewal). For this analysis, it is assumed
that it takes 4 years for the Commission
to approve the application, after which
the records are retained by the licensee
for 60 years (initial 40-year license
period plus a 20-year renewal period), at
which time the Commission terminates
the facility license. The records are
retained for a total of 64 years. In
addition, it is assumed that an applicant
spends 3 hours per year to maintain the
records. The estimated annual cost for
recordkeeping is $315 per applicant (3
hours × $105/hour). Thus, the
discounted flow of funds of the
recordkeeping costs for one application
is $6,000 and $2,200 using 3- and 7percent discount rates, respectively.
After a combined license application
is approved by the NRC, any change to
a design feature or functional capability
credited for complying with the aircraft
impact rule will require that the
licensee consider the effect of the
changed feature or capability on the
original assessment. The applicant must
describe how the modified design
feature or functional capability
continues to meet the assessment
requirements in the aircraft impact rule.
However, the NRC staff concludes that
after a combined license is issued, it is
unlikely that a licensee will make any
changes to design features or functional
capabilities credited at the application
stage. Therefore, no industry cost
analysis is needed for this portion of the
regulatory action.
The total industry cost is the sum of
the implementation and operation costs.
The implementation cost is the present
value of the assumed one application
($415,000) which when discounted is
$310,000 (using a 3-percent discount
rate) and $210,000 (using a 7-percent
discount rate). The operating costs are
$6,000 and $2,200 using the 3- and 7percent discount rates as shown above.
Therefore, the total discounted industry
costs are $316,000 and $212,200 using
3- and 7-percent discount rates,
respectively.
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3.5.7 Combined License Applications
Referencing a Standard Design
Certification Issued Before the Effective
Date of the Rule Which Has Not Been
Amended To Comply With the Rule
Under the regulatory action, an
applicant for a combined license that
references one of the four currently
approved design certifications must
comply with the rule. At present, the
NRC is aware of only two of the
currently approved designs that are
planned to be referenced in combined
license applications. For one of these
certified designs, the AP1000, the
original applicant has voluntarily
submitted to the NRC an amendment
that it believes will comply with the
requirements of the aircraft impact rule.
If the NRC approves the amendment as
meeting the aircraft impact rule, then
any combined license applicants
referencing the recertified design will
not be required to perform an aircraft
impact assessment. Furthermore, this
analysis assumes that after the
combined license application is
approved, the licensee makes no
changes to a design feature or functional
capability credited by the design
certification for complying with the
aircraft impact rule. Therefore, no costbenefit analysis is needed for combined
license applications that reference the
recertified AP1000 design.
Regarding the other currently
approved design certification that is
being referenced in at least one
combined license application, the NRC
is not aware of any plans by the original
applicant to submit an application to
amend the certification to comply with
the requirements of the aircraft impact
rule, prior to the renewal of the
certification. The NRC has received one
combined license application
referencing this certified design, and it
is expected that this final rule will be
effective before the NRC makes a
decision on the combined license
application. Therefore, the combined
license applicant will be required to
amend their application to comply with
the requirements of the aircraft impact
rule if the referenced design
certification is not amended to comply
with the rule during the pendency of the
combined license application.
In implementing the regulatory
action, the NRC is assuming that the
combined license applicant will submit
an amendment to their application to
comply with the aircraft impact rule. In
doing so, this combined license
applicant will incur one-time costs to
develop an SGI program; purchase an
appropriate SGI storage container and
lock; perform the aircraft impact
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assessment; and identify and
incorporate into the design those design
features and functional capabilities to
show, with reduced use of operator
action, that the facility can withstand
the effects of an aircraft impact. The
NRC estimates that this applicant will
spend 120 hours to develop the SGI
program. Assuming a staff rate of $105
per hour, the one-time cost of
developing the SGI program will be
$13,000 (120 hours × $105/hour). The
NRC also estimates it will cost $1,200 to
purchase an appropriate SGI storage
container and lock. Finally, the NRC
estimates it will take this applicant 24
staff-months for a one-time cost of
$400,000 (24 staff-months × 4 weeks/
month × 40 hours/week × $105/hour) to
complete the assessment and
incorporate the results into the design.
Thus, the one-time cost for this
applicant to implement the regulatory
action is estimated to be $415,000. This
analysis assumes that the application
will be affected by the final rule in the
year that the rule is promulgated (i.e.,
year 0), and therefore, the discounted
flow of funds of the implementation
costs is $415,000 using either 3- or 7percent discount rates.
With respect to industry operational
costs, there will be recordkeeping costs
for retention of the assessment and
supporting documentation. The NRC
will require that these records be
retained throughout the pendency of the
application and for the term of the
license (including any period of
renewal). For this analysis, it is assumed
that it takes 4 years for the Commission
to approve the application, after which
the records are retained by the licensee
for 60 years (initial 40-year license
period plus a 20-year renewal period), at
which time the Commission terminates
the facility license. The records are
retained for a total of 64 years. In
addition, it is assumed that an applicant
spends 3 hours per year to maintain the
records. The estimated annual cost for
recordkeeping is $315 per applicant (3
hours × $105/hour). Thus, the
discounted flow of funds of the
recordkeeping costs for one application
is $8,100 and $4,300 using 3- and 7percent discount rates, respectively.
After a combined license application
is approved by the NRC, any change to
a design feature or functional capability
credited for complying with the aircraft
impact rule will require that the
licensee consider the effect of the
changed feature or capability on the
original assessment. The applicant must
describe how the modified design
feature or functional capability
continues to meet the assessment
requirements in the aircraft impact rule.
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However, the NRC concludes that after
a combined license is approved, it is
unlikely that a licensee will make any
changes to design features or functional
capabilities credited in the design at the
application stage. Therefore, no industry
cost analysis is needed for this portion
of the regulatory action.
The total industry cost is the sum of
the implementation and operation costs.
The implementation cost is the present
value of the assumed one application
($415,000) which when discounted is
$415,000 (using either 3-or 7-percent
discount rates). The operating costs are
$8,100 and $4,300 using the 3- and 7percent discount rates as shown above.
Therefore, the total discounted industry
costs are $423,100 and $419,300 using
3- and 7-percent discount rates,
respectively.
3.5.8 Manufacturing License
Applications Not Referencing a
Standard Design Certification or
Standard Design Approval
Although the NRC concludes that
there is a low probability of a
manufacturing license application not
referencing a standard design
certification or standard design
approval, this analysis assumes that one
application will be submitted to the
NRC in year 10 following promulgation
of the rule.
In implementing the regulatory
action, manufacturing license applicants
will incur one-time costs to develop an
SGI program; purchase an appropriate
SGI storage container and lock; perform
the aircraft impact assessment; and
identify and incorporate into the design
those design features and functional
capabilities to show, with reduced use
of operator action, that the facility can
withstand the effects of an aircraft
impact. The NRC estimates that each
applicant will spend 120 hours to
develop the SGI program. Assuming a
staff rate of $105 per hour, the one-time
cost of developing the SGI program will
be $13,000 per applicant (120 hours ×
$105/hour). The NRC also estimates it
will cost $1,200 to purchase an
appropriate SGI storage container and
lock. Finally, the NRC estimates it will
take an applicant 24 staff-months for a
one-time cost of $400,000 (24 staffmonths × 4 weeks/month × 40 hours/
week × $105/hour) per application to
complete the assessment and
incorporate the results into the design.
Thus, the one-time cost for an applicant
to implement the regulatory action is
estimated to be $415,000. For one
application submitted in year 10,
following promulgation of the rule, the
discounted flow of funds of the
implementation costs are $310,000 and
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$210,000 using 3- and 7-percent
discount rates, respectively.
With respect to industry operational
costs, there will be recordkeeping costs
for retention of the assessment and
supporting documentation. The NRC
will require that these records be
retained throughout the pendency of the
application and for the term of the
license (including any period of
renewal). For this analysis, it is assumed
that it takes 4 years for the Commission
to approve the application, after which
the records are retained by the licensee
for 15 years, at which time the
Commission terminates the facility
license. The records are retained for a
total of 19 years. In addition, it is
assumed that an applicant spends 3
hours per year to maintain the records.
The estimated annual cost for
recordkeeping is $315 per applicant (3
hours × $105/hour). Thus, the
discounted flow of funds of the
recordkeeping costs for one application
is $3,400 and $1,700 using 3- and 7percent discount rates, respectively.
After a manufacturing license
application is approved by the NRC, any
change to a design feature or functional
capability credited for avoiding or
mitigating the effects of an aircraft
impact will require that the licensee
consider the effect of the changed
feature or capability on the original
assessment. The applicant must
describe how the modified design
feature or functional capability
continues to meet the assessment
requirements in the aircraft impact rule.
However, the NRC staff concludes that
after a manufacturing license is
approved, it is unlikely that a licensee
will make any changes to design
features or functional capabilities
credited in the design at the application
stage. Therefore, no industry cost
analysis is needed for this portion of the
regulatory action.
The total industry cost is the sum of
the implementation and operation costs.
The implementation cost is the present
value of the assumed one application
($415,000) which when discounted is
$310,000 (using a 3-percent discount
rate) and $210,000 (using a 7-percent
discount rate). The operating costs are
$3,400 and $1,700 using the 3- and 7percent discount rates as shown
previously. Therefore, the total
discounted industry costs are $313,400
and $211,700 using 3- and 7-percent
discount rates, respectively.
3.5.9 Manufacturing License
Applications Referencing a Standard
Design Certification Issued Before the
Effective Date of the Rule Which Has
Not Been Amended To Comply With the
Rule
Under the regulatory action, an
applicant for a manufacturing license
who references one of the four currently
approved design certifications will need
to comply with the requirements for an
aircraft impact assessment in 10 CFR
50.150. However, the NRC staff
concludes that it is unlikely that a
request for a manufacturing license
referencing one of these four design
certifications will be submitted to the
NRC for approval during the next 20
years. Therefore, no cost-benefit
analysis is needed for this type of
manufacturing license application.
3.5.10 NRC Implementation
Cost to Review the Applicant’s
Results. The NRC will incur costs to
review the actions taken by the
applicant to comply with the aircraft
impact rule. The one-time cost for NRC
verification of compliance with the rule,
consisting of reviewing the information
submitted by each applicant and onsite
inspection of the assessment, is
estimated to be $125,000 (7.8 staffmonths × 4 weeks/month × 40 hours/
week × $100/hour). As an example, the
total NRC cost in the year that the rule
is promulgated (i.e., year 0), is the
present value of the costs to review the
actions taken and assessments for three
applications for a standard design
certification. The NRC staff estimates
the cost to be $375,000 for the three
applications. Table 3 shows the
discounted flow of funds (using 3- and
7-percent discount rates) of the NRC
implementation costs over 20 years to
review the applications for a standard
design certification; renewal of an
existing standard design certification;
combined license that does not
reference a standard design certification,
standard design approval, or
manufactured reactor; combined license
that references a standard design
certification issued before the effective
date of the rule which has not been
amended to comply with the rule; and
manufacturing license that does not
reference a standard design certification.
Cost to Renew an Existing Design
Certification. The costs to the NRC to
conduct a rulemaking to adopt the
renewal of an existing design
certification are not included in this
analysis because they are not an impact
of this rule.
Cost to Develop Guidance. The NRC
assumes that it will take about 3.0 fulltime staff years to develop guidance to
support implementation of the
regulatory action. The cost to develop
guidance is estimated to be $500,000.
Cost to Provide Training. The NRC
will incur costs to develop a training
course to instruct NRC staff on the
changes to 10 CFR parts 50 and 52.
Assuming that it will take 20 staff-hours
to develop the training course, the cost
is estimated to be $2,000 (20 staff-hours
× $100/hour). The cost to train 20
people for 2 hours, plus the instructor’s
time of 2 hours is estimated to be $4,200
(21 people × 2 hours × $100/hour). The
total cost to the NRC to provide training
for the regulatory action is estimated to
be $6,000.
Table 3 shows the discounted flow of
funds of the total NRC implementation
costs for the regulatory action over 20
years.
TABLE 3—SUMMARY OF NRC IMPLEMENTATION COSTS
Application
Implementation costs
Year
Number reviewed
0 ........................................
0 ........................................
1 ........................................
4 ........................................
8 ........................................
10 ......................................
10 ......................................
12 ......................................
16 ......................................
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3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Jkt 217001
Using 7-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
Category *
DC ...............................................................................
COL .............................................................................
DC (renewal) ...............................................................
DC ...............................................................................
DC ...............................................................................
COL .............................................................................
ML ...............................................................................
DC ...............................................................................
DC ...............................................................................
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375
125
115
95
75
65
65
55
40
12JNR2
Using 3-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
375
125
120
110
100
95
95
90
80
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 112 / Friday, June 12, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
TABLE 3—SUMMARY OF NRC IMPLEMENTATION COSTS—Continued
Application
Implementation costs
Year
Number reviewed
20 ......................................
1
Using 7-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
Category *
Using 3-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
DC ...............................................................................
30
70
Cost to Review All Applications ...................................................................................................................
Cost to Develop Guidance ..........................................................................................................................
Cost to Provide Training ..............................................................................................................................
1,040
500
6
1,260
500
6
Total (rounded) .....................................................................................................................................
1,500
1,800
* DC = design certification. COL = combined license application. ML = manufacturing license application.
3.5.11 Impacts to Other Stakeholders
The NRC staff has not identified any
impacts to other stakeholders or the
Agreement States. However, the action
is expected to lead to an increase in
public confidence because nuclear
power plant designers will perform a
rigorous assessment of design features
and functional capabilities that could
provide additional inherent protection
to withstand the effects of an aircraft
impact.
3.5.12 Qualitative Benefits of the
Action
The benefits of the final rule can be
evaluated only on a qualitative basis.
The analysis estimates that the action
will result in qualitative benefits in
public health (accidental), occupational
health (accidental), offsite property,
onsite property, improvements in
knowledge, and safeguards and security
considerations.
Specifically, the benefits will include
improvements in knowledge because
applicants for new nuclear power
reactors will need to perform a designspecific assessment of the effects of the
impact of a large, commercial aircraft. If
the effects of an aircraft impact are not
assessed by nuclear power plant
designers at the design stage, it will be
more difficult at a later time to enhance
the facility’s inherent robustness to
show that it can withstand the effects of
an aircraft impact. Furthermore,
applicants will need to use realistic
analyses to identify and incorporate
design features and functional
capabilities to show, with reduced use
of operator actions, that either the
reactor core remains cooled or the
containment remains intact, and either
spent fuel cooling or spent fuel pool
integrity is maintained. In this manner,
this rule should result in new nuclear
power reactor facilities being more
inherently robust with regard to an
aircraft impact than if they were
designed in the absence of this rule.
In addition, because the impact of a
large, commercial aircraft is a beyonddesign-basis event, this rule provides an
enhanced level of protection beyond
that which is provided by the existing
adequate protection requirements,
which all operating power reactors are
required to meet.
4. Presentation of Results
Table 4 summarizes the results of the
cost analysis for industry.
TABLE 4—SUMMARY OF TOTAL INDUSTRY COSTS FOR ACTION
Using 7-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
Category of application*
Using 3-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
Implementation costs
DC ................................................................................................................................................................
DC (renewal) ................................................................................................................................................
COL ..............................................................................................................................................................
ML ................................................................................................................................................................
2,190
370
625
210
2,680
390
725
310
Operating costs
DC ................................................................................................................................................................
DC (renewal) ................................................................................................................................................
COL ..............................................................................................................................................................
ML ................................................................................................................................................................
17.54
3.0
6.5
1.7
30.1
4.2
14.1
3.4
Total (rounded) .....................................................................................................................................
3,400
4,200
* DC = design certification. COL = combined license application. ML = manufacturing license application.
Table 5 shows the total costs of the
regulatory action.
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 112 / Friday, June 12, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
TABLE 5—SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY AND NRC COSTS
Using 7-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
Using 3-percent
discount rate
($1,000)
Industry ........................................................................................................................................................
NRC .............................................................................................................................................................
3,400
1,500
4,200
1,800
Total (rounded) .....................................................................................................................................
4,900
6,000
5. Decision Rationale
The total present-valued costs of this
action are $6.0 million and $4.9 million
for 3- and 7-percent discount rates,
respectively. The benefits are expressed
only qualitatively and are discussed in
Section 3.5.11 of this regulatory
analysis. As noted previously, the key
benefit is improvement in knowledge
because the final rule requires
applicants for new nuclear power
reactors to perform a design-specific
assessment of the effects of the impact
of a large, commercial aircraft. The
applicant is required to use realistic
analyses to identify and incorporate
design features and functional
capabilities to show, with reduced use
of operator actions, that either the
reactor core remains cooled or the
containment remains intact, and either
spent fuel cooling or spent fuel pool
integrity is maintained.
6. Implementation Schedule
The final rule will become effective
30 days after publication in the Federal
Register.
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Certification
In accordance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the
Commission certifies that this rule will
not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities. This final rule affects only the
licensing of nuclear power plants. The
companies that will apply for an
approval, certification, permit, or
license in accordance with the
regulations affected by this rule do not
fall within the scope of the definition of
‘‘small entities’’ set forth in the
Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size
standards established by the NRC (10
CFR 2.810).
XVI. Backfit Analysis
The NRC has determined that, except
in one respect, the backfit rule, 10 CFR
50.109, and comparable provisions in 10
CFR part 52, do not apply to this final
rule and, therefore, a backfit analysis is
not required, because the final rule—
with one exception—does not contain
any provisions which either impose
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backfitting as defined in the backfit rule
or is otherwise inconsistent with any of
the comparable backfitting and finality
provisions in part 52. The aircraft
impact assessment requirements apply
to new construction permits; new
operating licenses that reference a new
construction permit; new standard
design certifications; new standard
design approvals; manufacturing
licenses that don’t reference a standard
design certification or standard design
approval, or that reference a design
certification issued before the effective
date of the rule which has not been
amended to comply with the rule; and
combined licenses that don’t reference a
standard design certification, standard
design approval, or manufactured
reactor, or that reference a standard
design certification issued before the
effective date of the rule which has not
been amended to comply with the rule.
They also apply to renewal of the four
existing design certifications in 10 CFR
part 52, appendices A through D, if the
design has not previously been
amended to comply with the aircraft
impact rule. However, combined license
applicants referencing one of the four
currently approved design certifications
must comply with the rule. The
backfitting issues for each of these
licenses, certifications, and regulatory
approvals are discussed below.
Construction Permits and Operating
Licenses
The aircraft impact rule applies to
construction permits issued after July
13, 2009, the effective date of the rule.
To the extent that the aircraft impact
rule revises the requirements for future
construction permits, the requirements
do not constitute backfitting, because
the requirements in the final aircraft
impact rule are prospective in nature
and effect. The backfit rule was not
intended to apply to every NRC action
which substantially changes the
expectations of future applicants under
10 CFR part 50. The final rule also does
not apply to current holders of
construction permits. Hence, there is no
backfitting of current holders of
construction permits. The final aircraft
impact rule also does not apply to
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applicants for operating licenses whose
underlying construction permits are
issued before July 13, 2009. Inasmuch as
the aircraft impact rule is not imposed
as a requirement on operating license
applicants whose underlying
construction permits were issued before
July 13, 2009, there is no backfitting
associated with such existing operating
licenses. However, future applicants for
operating licenses whose underlying
construction permits were also issued
after July 13, 2009 are required to
comply with the aircraft impact rule. To
the extent that the rule revises the
requirements for future operating
license applicants whose construction
permits are issued after July 13, 2009,
the requirements do not constitute
backfitting, because the requirements in
the final aircraft impact rule are
prospective in nature and effect. The
backfit rule was not intended to apply
to every NRC action which substantially
changes the expectations of future
applicants under 10 CFR part 50.
New Design Certifications and New
Design Approvals
The aircraft impact rule applies to
new standard design certifications and
new standard design approvals. To the
extent that the aircraft impact rule
revises the requirements for future
design certifications and design
approvals issued after July 13, 2009, the
requirements do not constitute
backfitting, because the requirements in
the aircraft impact rule are prospective
in nature and effect. The backfit rule
was not intended to apply to every NRC
action which substantially changes the
expectations of future applicants under
10 CFR part 52.
Four Currently-Approved Design
Certifications
The aircraft impact rule does not
directly change any of the four currently
approved design certifications in 10
CFR part 52, appendices A through D,
because the rule does not require that
the aircraft impact assessment be
performed for those four design
certifications during their current terms,
nor does the rule require that they be
modified to include any design features
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 112 / Friday, June 12, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
or functional capabilities that meet the
criteria in the rule. However, the aircraft
impact rule requires a combined license
applicant referencing one of the four
currently approved design certifications
to perform the assessment required by
the aircraft impact rule. In addition, the
rule requires that if any of the four
design certifications are renewed, then
the renewed design must meet the
requirements of the rule. Both situations
raise backfitting concerns, which are
addressed separately below.
1. Effect During Current Term of Design
Certification
The aircraft impact rule requires a
combined license applicant referencing
one of the four currently approved
design certifications to perform the
assessment required by the rule. As
such, the aircraft impact rule changes
the circumstances under which an
applicant for combined license may
reference one of the four currently
approved design certifications. In
addition, by requiring the combined
license applicant to perform the
assessment, and describe plant design
features and functional capabilities that
are within the scope of the certified
design, the aircraft impact rule may be
viewed as effectively constituting a
change to the design certification. Each
of the four currently approved design
certification rules contains several
provisions generally addressing the
referencing of the design certification.
None of these provisions require a
referencing combined license applicant
to, in effect, modify the referenced
design to address aircraft impacts.
Moreover, Section VI, ‘‘Issue
Resolution,’’ of each currently approved
design certification states that the NRC’s
safety finding on the design ‘‘includes
the finding that additional or alternative
structures, systems, components, design
features, * * * acceptance criteria, or
justifications are not necessary * * *.’’
In light of these provisions, the NRC
believes that the final aircraft impact
rule requirements effectively constitute
a change to these design certifications,
and the applicable criteria of Section VI
of each design certification rule and 10
CFR 52.63(a)(1) must be met by the
aircraft impact rule.
However, the NRC does not believe
that these criteria can be satisfied.
Accordingly, the Commission has
decided to administratively exempt the
aircraft impact rule from these finality
and issue resolution provisions in 10
CFR part 52. The Commission’s decision
is grounded on the following
considerations. First, the Commission
believes that performance of the
assessment required by the rule and
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incorporation of design features and
functional capabilities identified by the
assessment constitutes a substantial
increase in overall protection of public
health and safety and common defense
and security of the design and operation
of a nuclear power plant constructed in
accordance with the referenced design
certification, and that direct and
indirect implementation costs of
compliance with the aircraft impact rule
are justified in view of the increased
safety and security. Performing the
assessment itself provides a substantial
safety benefit in reducing licensee and
regulatory uncertainty regarding the
capability (and vulnerability) of the
design to the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. Although it is
difficult to quantify the safety
enhancement gained through
implementation of the aircraft impact
rule, the NRC nevertheless believes that
the cost of performing the assessment
and incorporating the results into the
design, as outlined in Section XIV,
‘‘Regulatory Analysis,’’ of the
Supplementary Information of this
document, is justified in view of the
increased safety provided by
implementation of the aircraft impact
rule.
Second, all of the four currently
approved certified designs contain one
or more advanced reactor attributes
described in the Commission’s ‘‘Policy
Statement on Regulation of Advanced
Reactors,’’ (73 FR 60612; October 14,
2008). These attributes include the use
of highly reliable and less complex
shutdown and decay heat removal
systems, longer time constants and
sufficient instrumentation to allow for
more diagnosis and management before
reaching safety system challenge and/or
exposure of vital equipment to adverse
conditions, and designs that minimize
the potential for severe accidents and
their consequences by providing
sufficient inherent safety, reliability,
redundancy, diversity and
independence in safety systems.
Incorporation of design features and
functional capabilities identified as part
of the assessment required by the
aircraft impact rule will serve to further
enhance the availability, capability and
effectiveness of those advanced reactor
attributes included in each of the
currently approved certified designs.
It also appears that a broad range of
stakeholders supported the overarching
concept that all newly-constructed
nuclear power plants should be required
to meet the aircraft impact rule. All of
the commenters representing nongovernmental organizations unaffiliated
with the nuclear industry supported the
application of the aircraft impact rule to
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
all newly-constructed reactors—
including those referencing currently
approved design certifications—and to
all of the currently approved design
certifications regardless of whether they
have been referenced in a combined
license application. NEI—the industry
organization representing, in part, the
companies who are most likely to be
combined license applicants and,
therefore, most likely to be adversely
affected by a NRC decision to impose
the aircraft impact rule on such
applicants—supported the extension of
the aircraft impact rule to all future
combined license applicants. The
original applicants for three of the four
existing design certifications supported
application of the aircraft impact rule to
combined license applications
referencing one of the four currently
approved designs. The NRC is aware
that Westinghouse Electric Company,
LLC, which was the original applicant
for the AP1000 design certification, is
seeking an amendment to the design
certification to address the (anticipated
final) aircraft impact rule. The NRC
notes that any adverse backfitting
impact is limited inasmuch as: (i) No
combined license referencing any of the
four existing design certifications has
been issued, (ii) combined license
applications referencing one of the four
existing design certifications are still in
the early stages of NRC review, and (iii)
the detailed aircraft impact parameters
were made available to design
certification applicants and affected
combined license applicants in early
2008.
Finally, the Commission emphasizes
that this is a highly exceptional action
limited to the specific circumstances of
this rulemaking. The Commission has
only once before taken action to
administratively exempt a rulemaking
from applicable backfitting or issue
finality provisions, and in that one
instance (involving revisions to 10 CFR
part 26, fitness for duty requirements)
the NRC ultimately withdrew the
rulemaking, see SRM on SECY–99–141
(June 24, 1999). Although the
Commission cannot, as a categorical
matter, rule out the possibility of its
taking administrative exemptions in the
future, the Commission emphasizes that
administrative exemptions will
continue to be an extremely rare action
to be taken only if regulatory
considerations strongly favor taking
such administrative exemption.
2. Effect at Renewal
The aircraft impact rule requires that
if any of the four design certifications be
renewed, then the renewed design meet
the requirements of the rule. The NRC
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 112 / Friday, June 12, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
evaluated whether 10 CFR
50.150(a)(3)(iii)(B) and the conforming
revision to 10 CFR 52.59(a), which
implement this requirement governing
the renewal of these four design
certifications, together represent a
violation of the finality protection
provided by 10 CFR 52.59(b). The NRC
concludes that these requirements do
not violate the finality protection
accorded by those regulatory provisions.
The finality protections accorded by 10
CFR 52.59(b) requirements do not
absolutely preclude the NRC from
applying new or modified requirements
to the design certification at the renewal
stage. To impose a new or modified
requirement at renewal, the NRC need
only find that the requirement is either
necessary for adequate protection,
necessary for compliance with
requirements in effect at the time of
initial certification, or provides a
substantial increase in protection to
public health and safety or common
defense and security that justifies the
cost of implementing the new
requirements.
As part of this rulemaking, the NRC
makes the finding that the aircraft
impact rule, when imposed upon any
one of the four design certifications at
the time of renewal, constitutes a
substantial increase in protection to
public health and safety. The reasons for
the NRC’s finding are set forth in the
discussion above in ‘‘Effect during
current term of design certification’’ and
in the overall discussion in this
statement of considerations of the
reasons underlying the adoption of this
rule. Accordingly, the NRC has decided
to impose by rule a requirement that
each of the four currently approved
design certification, if renewed, meet
the requirements of the aircraft impact
rule if they have not been previously
amended to comply with the rule.
Inasmuch as the NRC has made a
generic finding that the rule constitutes
a substantial increase in protection to
public health and safety and thereby
meets the criteria for design certification
renewal in 10 CFR 52.59(b), the NRC
does not intend to make an additional
finding on the same subject in any
renewal proceeding for one of the
currently approved design certifications.
Combined Licenses
The final aircraft impact rule applies
to all combined licenses which do not
reference a standard design certification,
standard design approval or
manufactured reactor. There are no
existing combined licenses protected by
the backfitting restrictions in 10 CFR
50.109 or the finality provisions in 10
CFR part 52. To the extent that the final
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17:54 Jun 11, 2009
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rule revises the requirements for future
combined licenses, including combined
license applications which are currently
pending before the NRC, the
requirements do not constitute
backfitting nor are they otherwise
inconsistent with the finality provisions
in 10 CFR part 52, because the
requirements in the final aircraft impact
rule are prospective in nature and effect.
Neither the backfit rule nor the finality
provisions in 10 CFR part 52 were
intended to apply to every NRC action
which substantially changes the
expectations of future applicants under
10 CFR part 52.
Manufacturing Licenses
The final aircraft impact rule applies
to all manufacturing licenses which do
not reference a standard design
certification or standard design
approval. There are no existing
manufacturing licenses protected by the
backfitting restrictions in 10 CFR 50.109
or the finality provisions in 10 CFR part
52. To the extent that the final rule
revises the requirements for future
manufacturing licenses, the
requirements do not constitute
backfitting nor are they otherwise
inconsistent with the finality provisions
in 10 CFR part 52, because the
requirements in the final aircraft impact
rule are prospective in nature and effect.
Neither the backfit rule nor the finality
provisions in 10 CFR part 52 were
intended to apply to every NRC action
which substantially changes the
expectations of future applicants under
10 CFR part 52.
28145
siting criteria, Redress of site, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements,
Standard design, Standard design
certification.
For the reasons set out in the
preamble and under the authority of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,
as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553,
the NRC is adopting the following
amendments to 10 CFR parts 50 and 52.
■
PART 50—DOMESTIC LICENSING OF
PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
1. The authority citation for part 50
continues to read as follows:
■
XVII. Congressional Review Act
Under the Congressional Review Act
of 1996, the NRC has determined that
this action is not a major rule and has
verified this determination with the
Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs of the Office of Management and
Budget.
Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 161, 182,
183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948,
953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83
Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133,
2134, 2135, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239,
2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C.
5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750
(44 U.S.C. 3504 note); sec. 651(e), Pub. L.
109–58, 119 Stat. 806–810 (42 U.S.C. 2014,
2021, 2021b, 2111). Section 50.7 also issued
under Pub. L. 95–601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951
(42 U.S.C. 5841). Section 50.10 also issued
under secs. 101, 185, 68 Stat. 955, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102,
Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).
Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also
issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2138).
Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also
issued under sec. 185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C.
2235). Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and Appendix
Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91–190,
83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34
and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204, 88 Stat.
1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91,
and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97–415,
96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78
also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42
U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80–50.81 also
issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also
issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C.
2237).
List of Subjects
■
10 CFR Part 50
Antitrust, Classified information,
Criminal penalties, Fire protection,
Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear
power plants and reactors, Radiation
protection, Reactor siting criteria,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
10 CFR Part 52
Administrative practice and
procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting,
Combined license, Early site permit,
Emergency planning, Fees, Inspection,
Limited work authorization, Nuclear
power plants and reactors, Probabilistic
risk assessment, Prototype, Reactor
PO 00000
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2. In § 50.8, paragraph (b) is revised to
read as follows:
§ 50.8 Information collection
requirements: OMB approval.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) The approved information
collection requirements contained in
this part appear in §§ 50.30, 50.33,
50.34, 50.34a, 50.35, 50.36, 50.36a,
50.36b, 50.44, 50.46, 50.47, 50.48, 50.49,
50.54, 50.55, 50.55a, 50.59, 50.60, 50.61,
50.62, 50.63, 50.64, 50.65, 50.66, 50.68,
50.69, 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, 50.74, 50.75,
50.80, 50.82, 50.90, 50.91, 50.120,
50.150, and appendices A, B, E, G, H,
I, J, K, M, N,O, Q, R, and S to this part.
*
*
*
*
*
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3. In § 50.34, paragraphs (a)(13) and
(b)(12) are added to read as follows:
■
§ 50.34 Contents of applications; technical
information.
(a) * * *
(13) On or after July 13, 2009,
stationary power reactor applicants who
apply for a construction permit shall
submit the information required by 10
CFR 50.150(b) as a part of their
preliminary safety analysis report.
(b) * * *
(12) On or after July 13, 2009,
stationary power reactor applicants who
apply for an operating license which is
subject to 10 CFR 50.150(a) shall submit
the information required by 10 CFR
50.150(b) as a part of their final safety
analysis report.
*
*
*
*
*
4. A new undesignated center heading
is added before § 50.120 to read as
follows:
■
Additional Standards for Licenses,
Certifications, and Regulatory
Approvals
5. A new § 50.150 is added to read as
follows:
■
§ 50.150
Aircraft impact assessment.
(a) Assessment requirements. (1)
Assessment. Each applicant listed in
paragraph (a)(3) shall perform a designspecific assessment of the effects on the
facility of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. Using realistic
analyses, the applicant shall identify
and incorporate into the design those
design features and functional
capabilities to show that, with reduced
use of operator actions:
(i) The reactor core remains cooled, or
the containment remains intact; and
(ii) spent fuel cooling or spent fuel
pool integrity is maintained.
(2) Aircraft impact characteristics.1
The assessment must be based on the
beyond-design-basis impact of a large,
commercial aircraft used for long
distance flights in the United States,
with aviation fuel loading typically used
in such flights, and an impact speed and
angle of impact considering the ability
of both experienced and inexperienced
pilots to control large, commercial
aircraft at the low altitude
representative of a nuclear power
plant’s low profile.
(3) Applicability. The requirements of
paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this
section apply to applicants for:
1 Changes to the detailed parameters on aircraft
impact characteristics set forth in guidance shall be
approved by the Commission.
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17:54 Jun 11, 2009
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(i) Construction permits for nuclear
power reactors issued under this part
after July 13, 2009;
(ii) Operating licenses for nuclear
power reactors issued under this part for
which a construction permit was issued
after July 13, 2009;
(iii)(A) Standard design certifications
issued under part 52 of this chapter after
July 13, 2009;
(B) Renewal of standard design
certifications in effect on July 13, 2009
which have not been amended to
comply with the requirements of this
section by the time of application for
renewal;
(iv) Standard design approvals issued
under part 52 of this chapter after July
13, 2009;
(v) Combined licenses issued under
part 52 of this chapter that:
(A) Do not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; or
(B) Reference a standard design
certification issued before July 13, 2009
which has not been amended to address
the requirements of this section; and
(vi) Manufacturing licenses issued
under part 52 of this chapter that:
(A) Do not reference a standard design
certification or standard design
approval; or
(B) Reference a standard design
certification issued before July 13, 2009
which has not been amended to address
the requirements of this section.
(b) Content of application. For
applicants identified in paragraph (a)(3)
of this section, the preliminary or final
safety analysis report, as applicable,
must include a description of:
(1) The design features and functional
capabilities identified in paragraph
(a)(1) of this section; and
(2) How the design features and
functional capabilities identified in
paragraph (a)(1) of this section meet the
assessment requirements in paragraph
(a)(1) of this section.
(c) Control of changes. (1) For
construction permits which are subject
to paragraph (a) of this section, if the
permit holder changes the information
required by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(13) to be
included in the preliminary safety
analysis report, then the permit holder
shall consider the effect of the changed
feature or capability on the original
assessment required by 10 CFR
50.150(a) and amend the information
required by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(13) to be
included in the preliminary safety
analysis report to describe how the
modified design features and functional
capabilities continue to meet the
assessment requirements in paragraph
(a)(1) of this section.
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(2) For operating licenses which are
subject to paragraph (a) of this section,
if the licensee changes the information
required by 10 CFR 50.34(b)(12) to be
included in the final safety analysis
report, then the licensee shall consider
the effect of the changed feature or
capability on the original assessment
required by 10 CFR 50.150(a) and
amend the information required by 10
CFR 50.34(b)(12) to be included in the
final safety analysis report to describe
how the modified design features and
functional capabilities continue to meet
the assessment requirements in
paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
(3) For standard design certifications
which are subject to paragraph (a) of
this section, generic changes to the
information required by 10 CFR
52.47(a)(28) to be included in the final
safety analysis report are governed by
the applicable requirements of 10 CFR
52.63.
(4)(i) For combined licenses which are
subject to paragraph (a) of this section,
if the licensee changes the information
required by 10 CFR 52.79(a)(47) to be
included in the final safety analysis
report, then the licensee shall consider
the effect of the changed feature or
capability on the original assessment
required by 10 CFR 50.150(a) and
amend the information required by 10
CFR 52.79(a)(47) to be included in the
final safety analysis report to describe
how the modified design features and
functional capabilities continue to meet
the assessment requirements in
paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
(ii) For combined licenses which are
not subject to paragraph (a) of this
section but reference a standard design
certification which is subject to
paragraph (a) of this section, proposed
departures from the information
required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be
included in the final safety analysis
report for the referenced standard
design certification are governed by the
change control requirements in the
applicable design certification rule.
(iii) For combined licenses which are
not subject to paragraph (a) of this
section but reference a manufactured
reactor which is subject to paragraph (a)
of this section, proposed departures
from the information required by 10
CFR 52.157(f)(32) to be included in the
final safety analysis report for the
manufacturing license are governed by
the applicable requirements in 10 CFR
52.171(b)(2).
(5)(i) For manufacturing licenses
which are subject to paragraph (a) of
this section, generic changes to the
information required by 10 CFR
52.157(f)(32) to be included in the final
safety analysis report are governed by
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the applicable requirements of 10 CFR
52.171.
(ii) For manufacturing licenses which
are not subject to paragraph (a) of this
section but reference a standard design
certification which is subject to
paragraph (a) of this section, proposed
departures from the information
required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be
included in the final safety analysis
report for the referenced standard
design certification are governed by the
change control requirements in the
applicable design certification rule.
PART 52—LICENSES,
CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS
FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
6. The authority citation for part 52
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183,
186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 948, 953, 954, 955,
956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2201, 2232, 2233,
2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C.
5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750
(44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
7. In § 52.47, paragraph (a)(28) is
added to read as follows:
■
§ 52.47 Contents of applications; technical
information.
*
*
*
(a) * * *
VerDate Nov<24>2008
*
*
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28147
(28) For applications for standard
design certifications which are subject
to 10 CFR 50.150(a), the information
required by 10 CFR 50.150(b).
*
*
*
*
*
50.150(a), the information required by
10 CFR 50.150(b).
*
*
*
*
*
■ 10. In § 52.137, paragraph (a)(26) is
added to read as follows:
8. In § 52.59, paragraph (a) is revised
to read as follows:
§ 52.137 Contents of applications;
technical information.
§ 52.59
*
■
Criteria for renewal.
(a) The Commission shall issue a rule
granting the renewal if the design, either
as originally certified or as modified
during the rulemaking on the renewal,
complies with the Atomic Energy Act
and the Commission’s regulations
applicable and in effect at the time the
certification was issued, provided,
however, that the first time the
Commission issues a rule granting the
renewal for a standard design
certification in effect on July 13, 2009,
the Commission shall, in addition, find
that the renewed design complies with
the applicable requirements of 10 CFR
50.150.
*
*
*
*
*
9. In § 52.79, paragraph (a)(47) is
added to read as follows:
■
§ 52.79 Contents of applications; technical
information in final safety analysis report.
(a) * * *
(47) For applications for combined
licenses which are subject to 10 CFR
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*
*
*
*
(a) * * *
(26) For applications for standard
design approvals which are subject to 10
CFR 50.150(a), the information required
by 10 CFR 50.150(b).
*
*
*
*
*
■ 11. In § 52.157, paragraph (f)(32) is
added to read as follows:
§ 52.157 Contents of applications;
technical information in final safety analysis
report.
*
*
*
*
*
(f) * * *
(32) For applications for
manufacturing licenses which are
subject to 10 CFR 50.150(a), the
information required by 10 CFR
50.150(b).
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day
of June 2009.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. E9–13582 Filed 6–11–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 112 (Friday, June 12, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 28112-28147]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-13582]
[[Page 28111]]
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Part II
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors; Final
Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 74 , No. 112 / Friday, June 12, 2009 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 28112]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
RIN 3150-AI19
[NRC-2007-0009]
Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors
AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission)
is amending its regulations to require applicants for new nuclear power
reactors to perform a design-specific assessment of the effects of the
impact of a large, commercial aircraft. The applicant is required to
use realistic analyses to identify and incorporate design features and
functional capabilities to show, with reduced use of operator actions,
that either the reactor core remains cooled or the containment remains
intact, and either spent fuel cooling or spent fuel pool integrity is
maintained. These requirements apply to applicants for new construction
permits; new operating licenses that reference a new construction
permit; new standard design certifications; renewal of any of the four
existing design certifications if the design has not previously been
amended to comply with the rule; new standard design approvals;
manufacturing licenses that don't reference a standard design
certification or standard design approval, or that reference a standard
design certification issued before the effective date of the rule which
has not been amended to comply with the rule; and combined licenses
that don't reference a standard design certification, standard design
approval, or manufactured reactor, or that reference a standard design
certification issued before the effective date of the rule which has
not been amended to comply with the rule. In addition, these amendments
contain requirements for control of changes to any design features or
functional capabilities credited to show that the facility can
withstand the effects of an aircraft impact.
ADDRESSES: You can access publicly available documents related to this
document using the following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and
search for documents filed under Docket ID [NRC-2007-0009]. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Ms. Carol Gallagher 301-492-3668; e-mail
Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have
copied for a fee publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Public
File Area O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are
available electronically at the NRC's electronic Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to
pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
DATES: The effective date is July 13, 2009.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Stewart Schneider, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone 301-415-4123; e-mail:
Stewart.Schneider@nrc.gov or Ms. Nanette Gilles, Office of New
Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001; telephone 301-415-1180; e-mail: Nanette.Gilles@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
II. Currently Operating Power Reactors
III. Currently Approved Standard Design Certifications and Combined
Licenses Referencing These Certifications
IV. Renewal of an Operating License, Standard Design Certification,
Combined License, or Manufacturing License
V. New Nuclear Power Reactors
A. Introduction
B. Description of Beyond-Design-Basis Aircraft Impact
C. Aircraft Impact Assessment
VI. Responses to Public Comments
A. Overview of Public Comments
B. Responses to Specific Requests for Comments
C. Responses to Remaining Comments
VII. Section-by-Section Analysis
VIII. Guidance
IX. Availability of Documents
X. Agreement State Compatibility
XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIV. Regulatory Analysis
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
XVI. Backfit Analysis
XVII. Congressional Review Act
I. Introduction
The Commission believes that it is prudent for nuclear power plant
designers to take into account the potential effects of the impact of a
large, commercial aircraft. The Commission has determined that the
impact of a large, commercial aircraft is a beyond-design-basis event,
and the NRC's requirements that apply to the design, construction,
testing, operation, and maintenance of design features and functional
capabilities for design basis events will not apply to design features
or functional capabilities selected by the applicant solely to meet the
requirements of this final rule (aircraft impact rule). The NRC's
approach to aircraft impacts is consistent with its previous approach
to beyond-design-basis events. The objective of this rule is to require
nuclear power plant \1\ designers to perform a rigorous assessment of
the design to identify design features and functional capabilities that
could provide additional inherent protection to withstand the effects
of an aircraft impact (i.e., meet the rule's acceptance criteria). This
rule should result in new nuclear power reactor facilities being more
inherently robust with regard to an aircraft impact than if they were
designed in the absence of this final rule. This final rule provides an
enhanced level of protection beyond that which is provided by the
existing adequate protection requirements, which all operating power
reactors are required to meet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The requirements of the final aircraft impact rule may
apply, in some contexts, to the designer who is responsible for, or
seeks certification or regulatory approval of something less than a
complete nuclear power plant (e.g., a nuclear reactor without site-
specific elements such as the ultimate heat sink). For ease of
discussion in the remainder of this Supplementary Information,
reference to a ``nuclear power plant designer'' or ``facility
designer'' is meant to include, in the appropriate context, a
designer of something less than a complete nuclear power plant, but
is at least as encompassing as a ``nuclear reactor.'' Similarly, a
reference to the design of a ``facility'' also encompasses, in the
appropriate context, the design of something less than a complete
nuclear power plant (e.g., the design of a reactor).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule requirement to perform a design-specific assessment
to identify design features and functional capabilities applies to
applicants for new construction permits; new operating licenses that
reference a new construction permit; new standard design
certifications; renewal of any of the four existing design
certifications if the design has not previously been amended to comply
with the final rule; new standard design approvals; manufacturing
licenses that don't reference a standard design certification
[[Page 28113]]
or standard design approval, or that reference a standard design
certification issued before the effective date of the rule which has
not been amended to comply with the rule; and combined licenses that
don't reference a standard design certification, standard design
approval, or manufactured reactor, or that reference a standard design
certification issued before the effective date of the rule which has
not been amended to comply with the rule. All of these applicants as a
whole are referred to as ``applicants for new nuclear power reactors''
throughout the remainder of the Supplementary Information for this
final rule. These applicants are required to perform an assessment of
the effects on the designed facility of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. Using realistic analyses, applicants must identify
and incorporate into the design those design features and functional
capabilities to show, with reduced use of operator action, that the
reactor core remains cooled or the containment remains intact and spent
fuel cooling or spent fuel pool integrity is maintained (herein after
referred to as the acceptance criteria). Applicants are required to
describe how such design features and functional capabilities meet the
acceptance criteria of the rule. Applicants and licensees are subject
to requirements for the control of changes to the design features and
functional capabilities identified as a result of complying with this
final rule.
The Commission-approved design basis threat (DBT) does not include
an aircraft attack. The NRC published its final DBT rule in the Federal
Register on March 19, 2007 (72 FR 12705) (Title 10, Sec. 73.1,
``Purpose and scope,'' of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR
73.1)). Two well-established bases support the exclusion of aircraft
attacks from the DBT. First, it is not reasonable to expect a licensee
with a private security force using weapons legally available to it to
be able to defend against such an attack. Second, such an act is in the
nature of an attack by an enemy of the United States (U.S.). Power
reactor licensees are not required to design their facilities or
otherwise provide measures to defend against such an attack, as
provided by 10 CFR 50.13, ``Attacks and destructive acts by enemies of
the United States; and defense activities.''
The Commission has addressed aircraft attacks by regulatory means
other than the DBT rule in 10 CFR 73.1. By order dated February 25,
2002 (Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order), the Commission
required all operating power reactor licensees to develop and adopt
mitigative strategies to cope with large fires and explosions from any
cause, including beyond-design-basis aircraft impacts (67 FR 9792;
March 4, 2002). The Commission first proposed incorporating the
continuing requirement to provide for such mitigative measures in the
NRC's regulations in the proposed 10 CFR part 73 power reactor security
requirements (71 FR 62663; October 26, 2006), specifically, the
proposed Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73, ``Licensee Safeguards
Contingency Plans.'' During development of the power reactor security
final rule, the NRC determined that several significant changes to the
proposed rule language would be needed to adequately address
stakeholder comments and associated implementation concerns. To address
these comments and concerns, the NRC proposed to relocate the
provisions from 10 CFR part 73 to a new paragraph (hh) in 10 CFR 50.54,
``Conditions of licenses,'' in a supplement to the power reactor
security requirements proposed rule (73 FR 19443; April 10, 2008). On
March 27, 2009 (74 FR 13925), the Commission published a final rule
amending existing security regulations and adding new security
requirements pertaining to current and future nuclear power reactors
that included the new provisions in 10 CFR 50.54(hh). All current and
future power reactors are required to comply with the requirements in
10 CFR 50.54(hh), which were promulgated on the basis of adequate
protection of public health and safety and common defense and security.
The current requirements, in conjunction with the revisions to 10
CFR 50.54 to address loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions
or fires, will continue to provide adequate protection of the public
health and safety and the common defense and security. Nevertheless,
the Commission has decided to also require applicants for new nuclear
power reactors to incorporate into their design additional features to
show that the facility can withstand the effects of an aircraft impact.
This final rule to address the capability of new nuclear power reactors
relative to an aircraft impact is based both on enhanced public health
and safety and enhanced common defense and security, but is not
necessary for adequate protection. Rather, this rule's goal is to
enhance the facility's inherent robustness at the design stage.
Requiring applicants for new nuclear power reactors to perform a
rigorous aircraft impact assessment and identify and incorporate into
their design those design features and functional capabilities that
address the effects of a beyond-design-basis aircraft impact is
consistent with the NRC's historic approach to beyond-design-basis
events and with the NRC's position in its ``Policy Statement on Severe
Reactor Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants'' (50 FR
32138; August 8, 1985). The policy statement notes, ``The Commission
expects that vendors engaged in designing new standard [or custom]
plants will achieve a higher standard of severe accident safety
performance than their prior designs.'' The NRC reiterated that
regulatory approach in its ``Policy Statement on the Regulation of
Advanced Nuclear Power Plants'' (59 FR 35461; July 12, 1994), when it
stated, ``The Commission expects that advanced reactors would provide
enhanced margins of safety and/or utilize simplified, inherent,
passive, or other innovative means to accomplish their safety
functions.'' These concepts continue to be NRC policy as reflected in
the NRC's 2008 ``Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced
Reactors'' (73 FR 60612; October 14, 2008). This regulatory approach
has demonstrated its success, as all designs subsequently submitted to
and certified by the Commission represent substantial improvement in
safety for operational events and accidents. The final aircraft impact
rule will further enhance the safety of new nuclear power plants for
aircraft impacts and is consistent with these policy statements.
The Commission considered the appropriate location for requirements
on an aircraft impact assessment during its deliberations on the
security assessment rulemaking (draft 10 CFR 73.62) proposed by the NRC
staff in SECY-06-0204, ``Proposed Rulemaking--Security Assessment
Requirements for New Nuclear Power Reactor Designs (RIN 3150-AH92),''
dated September 26, 2006. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) on
SECY-06-0204, dated April 24, 2007, the Commission disapproved the
staff's recommended rulemaking as described in SECY-06-0204. The
Commission directed the NRC staff to include the aircraft impact
assessment requirements in 10 CFR part 52, ``Licenses, Approvals, and
Certifications for Nuclear Power Plants,'' to encourage reactor
designers to incorporate practical measures at an early stage in the
design process.
As a result of the Commission's SRM, the NRC published a proposed
rule for comment in the Federal Register (72 FR 56287; October 3,
2007). The proposed rule would have required applicants to assess the
effects of the impact of a
[[Page 28114]]
large, commercial aircraft on the nuclear power facility. Based on the
insights gained from the assessment, the applicant would have been
required to include in its application a description and evaluation of
design features, functional capabilities, and strategies to avoid or
mitigate, to the extent practicable, the effects of the aircraft impact
with reduced reliance on operator actions. The public comment period
for the proposed rule closed on December 17, 2007. A public meeting was
held during the public comment period to discuss the proposed rule and
to address any questions on the proposed rule. The NRC received 32
comment letters from industry representatives, public interest groups,
and concerned citizens on the proposed rule.
This final rule revises 10 CFR parts 50, ``Domestic Licensing of
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' and 52 to require applicants
for new nuclear power reactors to perform a design-specific assessment
of the effects of the impact of a large, commercial aircraft. The
applicant is required to identify and incorporate into the design those
design features and functional capabilities to show that the facility
can withstand the effects of an aircraft impact with reduced use of
operator actions. This aircraft impact rule, along with provisions in
the NRC's power reactor security rule, including the addition of the
provisions in 10 CFR 50.54(hh), and voluntarily-submitted safeguards
assessments, render as duplicative and, therefore, unnecessary the
draft proposed rule (10 CFR 73.62) to require security assessments. The
draft proposed security assessment rule would have required a security
assessment which would include mitigation of large fires and
explosions, a target set analysis, and design features to protect
target sets against DBTs. The provisions of that draft proposed rule
applicable to large fires and explosions from an aircraft impact are
subsumed by this final aircraft impact rule and by the addition of the
provisions in 10 CFR 50.54(hh). Sufficient target set provisions are
included in the NRC's changes to 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for
physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors
against radiological sabotage,'' which applicants for new facilities
will have to satisfy. Designers of new nuclear power reactors are
encouraged to account for the provisions for mitigation of large fires
and explosions in the facility design so as to minimize more costly,
post-design features to meet those requirements. Design certification
and combined license applicants are voluntarily submitting security
assessments that identify design features to protect target sets
against DBTs. Accordingly, the draft proposed 10 CFR 73.62 is not
necessary.
This new aircraft impact assessment rule complements the revisions
to 10 CFR 50.54(hh) to mitigate the effects of large fires and
explosions. The 10 CFR 50.54(hh) provisions on mitigating large fires
and explosions codify the adequate protection requirement imposed on
existing operating reactors by ICM Order, Item B.5.b. The 10 CFR
50.54(hh) provisions, therefore, are necessary for adequate protection
and must remain in regulations that are applicable to all currently
operating reactors and must be satisfied by all newly licensed power
reactors. Current reactor licensees have already developed and
implemented procedures to comply with the 10 CFR 50.54(hh)
requirements, and would not require any additional action to comply
with those rule provisions. New applicants for and new holders of
operating licenses under 10 CFR part 50 and combined licenses under 10
CFR part 52 will be required to develop and implement procedures that
will employ mitigating strategies similar to those now employed by
current licensees to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and
spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated
with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. The
requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(hh) relate to the development of
procedures for addressing certain events that are the cause of large
fires and explosions that affect a substantial portion of the nuclear
power plant, and are not limited or directly linked to an aircraft
impact. The rule contemplates that the initiating event for such large
fires and explosions could be any number of DBT or beyond-DBT events.
In addition, the NRC regards 10 CFR 50.54(hh) as necessary for
reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety
and common defense and security. This is consistent with the NRC's
designation of the orders on which 10 CFR 50.54(hh) is based as being
necessary for reasonable assurance of adequate protection.
In contrast to the adequate protection requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(hh), this aircraft impact final rule will enhance safety and
security by requiring an assessment of newly designed facilities to
show that the facility can withstand the effects of an aircraft impact.
New nuclear power reactor applicants will be subject to both the
requirements of the aircraft impact rule and the requirements in 10 CFR
50.54(hh). The overall objective of these rules is to enhance a nuclear
power plant's capabilities to withstand the effects of a large fire or
explosion, whether caused by an aircraft impact or other event, from
the standpoints of both design and operation. The impact of a large
aircraft on the nuclear power plant is regarded as a beyond-design-
basis event. In light of the NRC's view that effective mitigation of
the effects of events causing large fires and explosions (including the
impact of a large, commercial aircraft) can be provided through
operational actions, the NRC believes that the mitigation of the
effects of aircraft impacts through design should be regarded as a
safety enhancement which is not necessary for adequate protection.
Therefore, the aircraft impact rule--unlike 10 CFR 50.54(hh)--is
regarded as a safety enhancement, which is not necessary for adequate
protection.
The NRC regards the aircraft impact and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)
rulemakings to be complementary in scope and objective. The aircraft
impact rule focuses on enhancing the design of future nuclear power
plants to withstand large, commercial aircraft impacts, with reduced
use of operator actions. The provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(hh) focus on
ensuring that the nuclear power plant's licensees will be able to
implement effective mitigation measures for large fires and explosions,
including (but not explicitly limited to) those caused by the impact of
a large, commercial aircraft.
Consideration of a rule to require applicants for new nuclear power
reactors to perform an aircraft impact assessment and describe design
features and functional capabilities addressing such impacts, which are
beyond-design-basis scenarios, is similar to the Commission's
consideration in the mid-1980's of new rules addressing accidents more
severe than design basis accidents. The 1985 ``Policy Statement on
Severe Reactor Accidents'' explained the Com mission's conclusion that,
although it was proposing criteria to show new reactor designs to be
acceptable for severe accident concerns, then-existing plants posed no
undue risk to public health and safety, and thus, there was no need for
action on operating reactors based on severe accident risks. The
Commission's reasoning in the severe accident context supports its
conclusion that although new nuclear power reactors should be assessed
for aircraft impacts and designed to show that they can withstand the
effects of an aircraft impact, existing reactors and designs
[[Page 28115]]
provide adequate protection of the public health and safety and common
defense and security.
The NRC is making several changes from the proposed rule
requirements in this final rule. First, based on consideration of
public comments, the NRC is revising the criteria necessary to comply
with the final rule. The proposed rule would have required applicants
for new nuclear power reactors to perform a design-specific assessment
of the effects of the impact of a large, commercial aircraft. Based
upon the insights gained from the aircraft impact assessment, the
applicant would have been required to include a description and
evaluation of the design features, functional capabilities, and
strategies to avoid or mitigate the effects of the applicable, beyond-
design-basis aircraft impact and describe how such design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies avoid or mitigate, to the
extent practicable, the effects of the applicable aircraft impact with
reduced reliance on operator actions. The evaluation of such design
features, functional capabilities, and strategies would have been
required to include core cooling capability, containment integrity, and
spent fuel pool integrity. In the final rule, applicants continue to be
required to perform a design-specific assessment of the effects of the
impact of a large, commercial aircraft. In addition, the applicant is
required to use realistic analyses to identify and incorporate into the
design those design features and functional capabilities which show,
with reduced use of operator action, that the reactor core remains
cooled or the containment remains intact and spent fuel cooling or
spent fuel pool integrity is maintained. The final rule removes
references to considering the practicality of including the design
features and functional capabilities identified as a result of the
assessment. The acceptance criteria in the rule must be shown to be met
to achieve compliance with the rule's requirements.
The Commission ultimately decided that the final rule should
require applicants to show that, in the event of an aircraft impact at
a nuclear power plant, the reactor core would remain cooled or the
containment structure would remain intact and spent fuel cooling or
spent fuel pool integrity would be maintained. With implementation of
this final rule, applicants for new nuclear power reactors can use
realistic analyses to assess their designs but cannot rely solely on
operator actions to meet the acceptance criteria. The Commission
continues to believe that subsequent generations of plants to be built
in the U.S. will be inherently more capable of resisting beyond design
basis events, including aircraft impacts, due to safety improvements
previously incorporated into these designs. The addition of this rule,
revised to include specific acceptance criteria, will provide
additional assurance that all reasonable design measures were taken to
add additional margin beyond the adequate protection standard that is
being met through compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh). The addition of
specific acceptance criteria to this rule adds regulatory stability and
predictability that is not achievable with criteria that must only be
met ``to the extent practical.'' Acceptance criteria that are based on
functional requirements provide a benchmark that can be assessed for
the purpose of determining compliance with this rule, yet provide the
distinction necessary to keep enhancements implemented for a beyond-
design-basis event separate from design requirements necessary to meet
10 CFR part 100, ``Reactor site criteria.''
The NRC is also expanding the class of applicants that are required
to comply with this rule based on consideration of public comments and
implementation issues. In one change, the NRC is applying the final
rule to 10 CFR part 50 license applicants as well as applicants under
10 CFR part 52. The final rule requires both new power reactor
construction permit applicants and operating license applicants to
perform the required assessment and include the description of the
identified design features and functional capabilities in their
applications. The NRC is applying the final rule to applicants at both
the construction permit and operating license stages because it is not
until the operating license stage that the applicant is required to
provide the NRC with its final design. The NRC can issue a construction
permit based on preliminary design information. Therefore, the NRC
believes it is necessary to require applicants to perform the aircraft
impact assessment at both stages and to include the required
information in both applications based on the level of design
information available at the time of each application. These changes
are reflected in the addition of new paragraphs (a)(13) and (b)(12) in
10 CFR 50.34, ``Contents of construction permit and operating license
applications; technical information,'' requiring all applicants for a
construction permit or operating license which are subject to 10 CFR
50.150(a) (proposed 10 CFR 52.500) to submit the information required
by 10 CFR 50.150(b) as a part of their application. Paragraph (a) of 10
CFR 50.150 has similarly been revised.
In making these additions, the NRC is making it clear that the
requirements are not meant to apply to current or future operating
license applications for which construction permits were issued before
the effective date of this final rule. This is because existing
construction permits are likely to involve designs which are
essentially complete and may involve sites where construction has
already taken place. Applying the final rule to operating license
applications for which there are existing construction permits could
result in an unwarranted financial burden to change a design for a
plant that is partially constructed. Such a financial burden is not
justifiable in light of the fact that the NRC considers the events to
which the aircraft impact rule is directed to be beyond-design-basis
events and compliance with the rule is not needed for adequate
protection to public health and safety or common defense and security.
Moreover, such operating license applicants will be required to comply
with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(hh) to identify actions to
mitigate the effects of large fires and explosions, including those
caused by aircraft impacts. For these reasons, the NRC is not requiring
operating license applicants with an existing construction permit to
comply with the final rule.
The NRC is also adding requirements in 10 CFR 50.150(c) (proposed
10 CFR 52.502) for controlling changes to the information required by
10 CFR 50.150(b) to be included in the preliminary safety analysis
report (PSAR) by a construction permit applicant and the final safety
analysis report (FSAR) by an operating license applicant. The NRC is
applying the same change control requirements to construction permit
and operating license holders as it is applying to combined license
holders. If the permit holder or licensee changes the information
required by 10 CFR 50.34 to be included in the PSAR or FSAR, then the
permit holder or licensee must consider the effect of the changed
feature or capability on the original assessment required by 10 CFR
50.150(a) and amend the information required by 10 CFR 50.34 to be
included in the PSAR or FSAR to describe how the modified design
features and functional capabilities continue to meet the assessment
requirements in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1).
Because the final rule is applicable to applicants under both 10
CFR parts 50
[[Page 28116]]
and 52, the NRC is relocating the aircraft impact assessment
requirements that were contained in proposed 10 CFR 52.500 to a new
section, 10 CFR 50.150. This change is also consistent with the recent
revision to 10 CFR part 52, where the NRC took a comprehensive approach
to reorganizing 10 CFR part 52 and making conforming changes throughout
10 CFR Chapter I, ``Nuclear Regulatory Commission,'' to reflect the
licensing and approval processes in 10 CFR part 52. In making
conforming changes involving 10 CFR part 50 provisions in that
rulemaking, the NRC adopted the general principle of keeping technical
requirements in 10 CFR part 50 and maintaining applicable procedural
requirements in 10 CFR part 52. For these reasons, the NRC is
relocating the proposed aircraft impact requirements from proposed 10
CFR 52.500 to 10 CFR 50.150.
Based on public comments, the NRC is making the requirements in 10
CFR 50.150 applicable to the four existing design certifications in 10
CFR part 52, appendices A through D, at their first renewal if the
design has not previously been amended to comply with the final rule.
This change is discussed in detail in Section IV, ``Renewal of an
Operating License, Standard Design Certification, Combined License, or
Manufacturing License,'' of this document.
The NRC is also making several changes to the terminology that was
used in the proposed rule. In the proposed rule, 10 CFR 52.500 stated
that applicants for new nuclear power reactors were required to perform
a design-specific assessment of the effects on the designed facility of
the impact of a large, commercial aircraft. Based on the insights
gained from that assessment, applicants would have been required to
include a description and ``evaluation'' of the design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies to avoid or mitigate the
effects of the applicable aircraft impact. Reference to such an
``evaluation'' was made throughout the Supplementary Information in the
proposed rule. However, the NRC determined that the term ``evaluation''
was used in more than one context and concluded that such inconsistent
use could cause confusion. In the final rule, the NRC has eliminated
the use of the term ``evaluation'' in the rule language. The new
requirements governing what covered applicants are required to submit
in their applications (10 CFR 50.150(b)) states that applicants must
submit a description of the design features and functional capabilities
identified in the assessment and a description of how the identified
design features and functional capabilities meet the assessment
requirements.
Another area where the NRC is changing the terminology used in the
final aircraft impact rule is the elimination of the term,
``strategies.'' The proposed aircraft impact rule required the
assessment to include a description of the design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies to avoid or mitigate the effects of the
applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft impact (proposed 10 CFR
52.500(c)). Neither the proposed rule nor its Supplementary Information
defined ``strategies.'' Upon consideration, the NRC has decided to
eliminate that term in the final rule. A ``strategy'' is typically
associated with human action and may, therefore, appear to conflict
with the direction in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1) of the final aircraft impact
rule that there should be ``reduced use of operator actions.'' In
addition, the aircraft impact rule is focused only on design, and was
not intended to address or impose requirements on the operation of a
facility. By using the term, ``strategies'' in the proposed aircraft
impact rule, there is a real possibility that stakeholders may
erroneously interpret the aircraft impact rule as requiring a designer
to address as part of the aircraft impact rule the requirements in 10
CFR 50.54(hh) to mitigate the effects of large fires and explosions.
This would be an unnecessary duplication of effort, and would require
consideration of procedural and operational matters at an early stage,
which is not the NRC's intent and may not be the optimal time for
consideration of operational matters. For these reasons, the NRC is
dropping its use of the term ``strategies'' in the final rule. Thus,
under 10 CFR 50.150(b), the relevant applicants need only include in
their applications a description of the relevant identified design
features and functional capabilities, and need not address strategies.
The elimination of the term ``strategies,'' does not, however, relieve
applicants from the responsibility to consider reducing use of operator
actions in performance of the aircraft impact assessment and
identification of design features and functional capabilities to comply
with this final rule.
In addition, the NRC's decision to remove the need for the designer
to identify design ``strategies'' does not obviate the need for the
designer to determine, when considering potential design features and
functional capabilities, whether there are responsive actions and
strategies (e.g., firefighting) that the nuclear power plant licensee
could take to mitigate the effects of the impact of a large, commercial
aircraft that would be made possible, or whose effectiveness could be
enhanced, by inclusion of such features and capabilities in the design.
One objective of the final aircraft impact rule is that the designer
identifies and includes in the design those features and capabilities
to support the eventual development of effective response and
mitigation actions and strategies at the facility licensing stage which
make possible or enhance the capability of the plant licensee to
respond to aircraft impacts. The NRC believes that it is reasonable for
the designer to include appropriate design features and functional
capabilities to support practical responsive actions and strategies
that the plant licensee could implement. The plant licensee should not
be precluded from using an effective responsive action and strategy,
simply because the designer failed to include a well-placed design
feature that is necessary for an effective responsive action (e.g., a
wall, a water outlet, a control panel).
Finally, the Commission is adding a requirement in the final rule
that any changes to the detailed aircraft impact parameters set forth
in guidance shall be approved by the Commission.
II. Currently Operating Power Reactors
The Commission has determined that the existing designs of
currently operating nuclear power plants, together with the security
program actions mandated by the NRC's orders (some of which are
codified in the NRC's final DBT rulemaking and others of which are
incorporated into other NRC regulations) provide an adequate level of
protection to public health and safety and common defense and security
against aircraft impacts. As a result of the events of September 11,
2001, the NRC has undertaken a series of actions to provide continued
reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety
and common defense and security at the U.S. commercial nuclear power
facilities. The NRC has assessed the potential vulnerabilities of
operating nuclear power reactors to aircraft impacts, and it has issued
orders and provided associated guidance to licensees for implementing a
range of mitigative strategies. The results of these aircraft impact
assessments were derived from evaluation of plant damage mechanisms
(e.g., structural failures, shock and vibration effects, and fire
effects). The NRC ensured that implementation of the February 25, 2002,
ICM Order included measures to mitigate such scenarios.
[[Page 28117]]
The Commission's ICM Order, Item B.5.b, established the requirement
for licensees to implement certain mitigation measures at existing
power reactors for these beyond-design-basis events. This requirement
was specifically intended to address ``losses of large areas of a
(reactor) plant due to fires and explosions.'' The Commission has since
incorporated this requirement into 10 CFR 50.54 in the power reactor
security rulemaking. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54, future
license applicants must identify and implement mitigative measures
similar to those required for currently operating nuclear power plants.
On March 19, 2007 (72 FR 12705), the Commission published a final
rule amending the DBT in 10 CFR 73.1. The DBT rule describes general
attributes that nuclear power plant licensees must defend against with
high assurance. This rulemaking enhanced the DBT by codifying
generically applicable security requirements similar to those
previously imposed by the Commission's April 29, 2003, DBT Orders.
On the basis of the previous information, the NRC concludes that
existing power reactors pose no undue risk to public health and safety
or common defense and security from the effects of an aircraft impact
based on the Commission's specified aircraft impact characteristics.
Therefore, the NRC is not applying this final rule to existing
operating nuclear power plants.
III. Currently Approved Standard Design Certifications and Combined
Licenses Referencing These Certifications
Based upon consideration of public comments, the NRC has decided
that the designs of all newly designed and constructed nuclear power
plants (i.e., those designed and constructed after July 13, 2009) must
comply with the aircraft impact rule. The NRC agreed with the majority
of commenters who stated that the underlying objectives of the aircraft
impact rule would not be fully achieved if a subset of new nuclear
power plant applicants--namely, those applicants who reference one of
the four existing design certifications--is not required to comply with
the aircraft impact rule. This decision stems from acknowledgement of
the views expressed by a wide range of stakeholders in favor of
requiring all new nuclear power plants to meet the requirements of the
aircraft impact rule. Thus, the NRC is requiring that all new nuclear
power plants in the U.S. be required to use designs that comply with
the aircraft impact rule.
In evaluating this change, the NRC considered regulatory approaches
that could be used if a combined license application references one of
the four currently approved standard design certifications in
Appendices A through D of 10 CFR part 52 which has not been voluntarily
amended to comply with the aircraft impact rule. The NRC considered
whether the combined license applicant should be required to perform
the assessment of aircraft impacts itself and use the design features
and functional capabilities identified as the result of its assessment
in the design of their plant, but with no obligation to modify the
referenced design certification. A second approach considered by the
NRC would require that the four currently approved design
certifications be amended by the original design certification
applicant to comply with the aircraft impact rule within a short time
after issuance of the final aircraft impact rule. The NRC also
considered a third approach, whereby the NRC would require that the
four currently approved design certifications be amended to comply with
the aircraft impact rule (without specifying who is responsible for
prosecuting the amendment), but only if they are referenced in a
combined license application. This approach would also restrict the NRC
from issuing a combined license referencing one of the four currently
approved design certifications, unless it had been amended to comply
with the aircraft impact rule (again, without specifying who is
responsible for prosecuting the amendment). The NRC has determined that
the first approach should be adopted in the aircraft impact rule (i.e.,
the combined license applicant be required to perform the assessment of
aircraft impacts and incorporate design features and functional
capabilities into the design of the applicant's facility with no
concurrent obligation to modify the referenced design certification).
The NRC believes that this approach will ensure that a nuclear power
plant which is constructed using one of the currently approved design
certifications will nonetheless meet the aircraft impact rule without
unnecessary delays associated with amending the referenced design
certification rule. The NRC recognizes that the first approach may
result in less standardization of design features and functional
capabilities addressing aircraft impact for nuclear power plants
referencing one of the four currently approved design certifications.
However, the NRC believes that, as a practical matter, given the likely
small number of combined license applications referencing one of the
four currently approved design certifications which has not been
amended to comply with the rule, any reduction in standardization is
likely to be minimal.
However, the NRC has also decided that if any of the four currently
approved design certifications are not amended to comply with the
aircraft impact rule by the end of the initial period of effectiveness
and an applicant seeks to renew the design certification, then the
certified design must be amended to comply with the aircraft impact
rule before the renewal is approved by the NRC under the provisions of
10 CFR 52.57 through 10 CFR 52.61. The NRC's determination in this
regard is discussed in Section IV, ``Renewal of an Operating License,
Standard Design Certification, Combined License, or Manufacturing
License,'' of this document. The NRC has concluded that it should use
the same criteria for evaluating voluntary requests for amendments to
existing design certifications as it uses for evaluating new
applications for design certifications, to ensure consistency among all
new reactor designs.
IV. Renewal of an Operating License, Standard Design Certification,
Combined License, or Manufacturing License
This rulemaking does not require updating the assessment of
aircraft impacts required by 10 CFR 50.150 as part of an application
for either a renewed operating license under 10 CFR part 54,
``Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power
Plants,'' a renewed design certification under 10 CFR 52.57,
``Application for renewal,'' a renewed combined license under 10 CFR
52.107, ``Application for renewal,'' and 10 CFR part 54, or a renewed
manufacturing license under 10 CFR 52.177, ``Application for renewal.''
The NRC's requirement for assessment of large, commercial aircraft
impacts is not an aging-related matter, nor is it based on time-limited
considerations. Hence, aircraft impacts under the final rule are
outside the scope of any operating license or combined license renewal
proceeding under 10 CFR part 54, and neither operating nor combined
license holders need to update the assessment required by 10 CFR
50.150(b) at the license renewal stage.
With regard to design certifications and manufacturing licenses
which comply with the aircraft impact rule upon initial issuance or
upon amendment, the NRC believes that their renewal review should not
include a
[[Page 28118]]
reassessment of aircraft impacts and possible changes to the design to
include new design features and functional capabilities. In the NRC's
view, there will not be any significant benefit to requiring applicants
for renewal to reassess the design's vulnerability to aircraft impacts
absent a Commission-approved change in the detailed parameters on
aircraft impact characteristics set forth in guidance for use in the
aircraft impact assessment. As discussed later in Section V.B,
``Description of Beyond-Design-Basis Aircraft Impact,'' of the
Supplementary Information for this final rule, the final rule requires
that the design-specific impact assessment use the Commission-specified
aircraft impact characteristics as described in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(2) and
changes to the detailed parameters on aircraft impact characteristics
set forth in guidance shall be approved by the Commission. Because this
final rule is intended to provide added protection against the effects
of a beyond-design-basis event, the choice of aircraft impact
characteristics and the scenario used for this assessment will not be
linked to threat assessments or to any evolution of aircraft design.
Therefore, there is no need to require a reassessment at the design
certification or manufacturing license renewal stage. In addition,
mandating a change to the design at the renewal stage would pose an
undue burden on those licensees who have referenced the design
certification in their license, or used the manufactured reactor at
their facility. Under 10 CFR 52.63(a)(3) and 10 CFR 52.171(a)(2), the
NRC requires that any modification it imposes on a design certification
rule or on the design of a manufactured reactor be applied to all
plants referencing the certified design or reactor manufactured under
the manufacturing license, except those to which the modification has
been rendered technically irrelevant. If the NRC were to require
reassessment of the design at renewal, this could cause licensees who
have already designed and constructed their plants (or used a
manufactured reactor) to modify their plants to come into conformance
with the reassessed design. Such modifications are likely to be costly.
Given the NRC's determination that the impact of a large, commercial
aircraft is a beyond-design-basis event, the imposition of such costs
as the result of reassessment at design certification or manufacturing
license renewal does not seem warranted. Moreover, once the design
features and functional capabilities for addressing an aircraft impact
have been incorporated into a nuclear power plant's design, the goal of
this final rule has been achieved in that consideration of aircraft
impacts has been factored into the design. In any event, 10 CFR 52.59,
which establishes limited finality control over the NRC's renewal of
design certifications, does permit the NRC to impose modifications to
the design at design certification renewal under certain circumstances
(see 10 CFR 52.59(b)(1) through (3)). Accordingly, given that future
design certifications and manufacturing licenses must, under the final
aircraft impact rule, meet the requirements of the rule upon initial
issuance, the NRC has decided that these design certifications and
manufacturing licenses need not be required by rule to update the
aircraft impact assessment at the time of renewal.
However, upon consideration of these factors in relation to the
renewal of the four currently approved design certifications, the NRC
has come to the conclusion that if any of these four design
certifications have not been updated in the first 15-year duration of
effectiveness, then the design must be amended to comply with the
aircraft impact rule at the time of renewal under 10 CFR 52.57 through
52.61. In this situation, the NRC believes that regulatory consistency,
predictability, and efficiency all favor requiring any of the four
current design certifications which have not been amended to meet the
aircraft impact rule at the time of renewal of the design certification
to comply with the aircraft impact rule as part of the renewal process.
The NRC's determination is reflected in the final rule as an
amendment to 10 CFR 52.59(a). As revised, paragraph (a) requires the
NRC to find, at the first renewal of any of the four currently approved
design certifications, that the renewed design (i.e., the design which
is being approved for use in the renewed term of the design
certification rule) complies with the requirements of the aircraft
impact rule.
The NRC has determined, consistent with the intent of 10 CFR
52.59(b), that requiring the renewed design to comply with the aircraft
impact rule constitutes a substantial increase in protection to public
health and safety. The reasons supporting this determination are set
forth in Section XVI, ``Backfit Analysis,'' of the Supplementary
Information for this final rule. The NRC wishes to emphasize that
imposing this requirement on the renewal of the four currently approved
design certifications does not represent any substantial decrease in
the commercial interests of the original applicants for these design
certifications (or their successors in interests). Accordingly, the NRC
concludes that the four currently approved design certifications, if
they have not already been amended to comply with the aircraft rule,
must comply with the rule the first time any of those design
certifications are renewed.
The NRC notes that one of the consequences of the NRC's
determination that each of the four currently approved design
certifications must comply with the aircraft impact rule if renewed, is
that there may be increased public confidence in the safety of the
renewed designs. The NRC's view is based upon public comments from
several stakeholders urging that the four design certifications be
required to comply with the aircraft impact rule.
V. New Nuclear Power Reactors
A. Introduction
Under this final rule, relevant applicants for new nuclear power
reactors are required to:
Perform an assessment of the effects on the designed
facility of a beyond-design-basis aircraft impact.
Using realistic analyses, identify and incorporate into
the design those design features and functional capabilities to show,
with reduced use of operator action, that the facility can withstand
the effects of an aircraft impact (i.e., that the rule's acceptance
criteria are met).
Describe how such design features and functional
capabilities show, with reduced use of operator action, that the
facility can withstand the effects of an aircraft impact.
This final rule is based on the premise that it is desirable for
newly-constructed power reactors to be designed to withstand the
effects of an aircraft impact through design features or functional
capabilities that reduce or eliminate the need for operator actions.
Because this type of consideration is more effectively done during the
development of the design itself, the NRC directs the requirements of
this final rule at plant designers.
The NRC does not expect plant designers to demonstrate that design
features alone, without operator action or mitigative response activity
as required under 10 CFR 50.54(hh), will completely address the effects
of the aircraft impact. The NRC recognizes that the decision to rely on
design features (as opposed to operator action or mitigative strategies
required under 10 CFR 50.54(hh)) is complex, and often involves a set
of trade-offs between competing considerations. The NRC's goal is to
have the designer implement
[[Page 28119]]
a rigorous assessment process to ensure that the design process
constitutes a reasoned approach for assessing the plant design to
identify design features and functional capabilities to show that the
facility can withstand the effects of an aircraft impact.
B. Description of Beyond-Design-Basis Aircraft Impact
Since September 11, 2001, the Commission has used state-of-the art
technology to assess the effects of aircraft impacts on nuclear power
plants. As part of a comprehensive review of security for NRC-licensed
facilities, the NRC conducted detailed, site-specific engineering
studies of a limited number of nuclear power plants to assess potential
vulnerabilities of deliberate attacks involving large, commercial
aircraft. In conducting these studies, the NRC consulted national
experts from several Department of Energy laboratories using state-of-
the-art structural and fire analyses. The agency also used realistic
predictions of accident progression and radiological consequences.
This final rule presents a general description of the aircraft
impact characteristics that are required to be used to perform the
beyond-design-basis aircraft impact assessment. The assessment must be
based on the beyond-design-basis impact of a large, commercial aircraft
used for long distance flights in the U.S., with aviation fuel loading
typically used in such flights, and an impact speed and angle of impact
considering the ability of both experienced and inexperienced pilots to
control large, commercial aircraft at the low altitude representative
of a nuclear power plant's low profile.
Beyond these general characteristics, the NRC will specify for
plant designers in a safeguards information (SGI) guidance document
more detailed parameters describing the large, commercial aircraft
impact that are considered appropriate for use in the required
assessment. Although the detailed aircraft impact assessment parameters
will be described in an SGI guidance document and will not be publicly
available because of their potential value to terrorists, the following
description of some of the factors used in selecting the parameters is
offered to foster a better understanding of this final rulemaking.
Changes to these detailed parameters on aircraft impact characteristics
set forth in this guidance shall be approved by the Commission.
1. The aircraft used by the terrorists on September 11, 2001. The
NRC staff has reviewed the results of the September 11, 2001 attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The NRC has used these reviews
in previous studies for operating reactors. The NRC also used these
reviews to make its decisions with respect to this final rulemaking.
2. Communications with other U.S. Government agencies. Since
September 11, 2001, the NRC has worked closely with the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and other agencies, both
to understand their information on terrorist threats and to communicate
the NRC's study results.
3. Communications with foreign governments. A number of foreign
governments are considering the construction of new nuclear power
plants. The NRC is communicating with the regulatory authorities in
these countries to understand their requirements and to convey its own
results and plans.
4. Evaluations of commercial aircraft. The NRC has studied the
types, numbers, and characteristics of commercial aircraft flown in
U.S. airspace.
Because this final rule is intended to provide added protection
against the effects of a beyond-design-basis event, the choice of
aircraft impact characteristics and the scenario used for this
assessment will not be linked to threat assessments or to any evolution
of aircraft design. The final rule requires that the design-specific
impact assessment use the Commission-specified aircraft impact
characteristics as described in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(2) (proposed 10 CFR
52.500(b)). As stated previously, more specific details about the
aircraft impact characteristics will be contained in a separate
guidance document under SGI controls. Because this guidance document
containing more detailed aircraft impact assessment parameters will be
SGI, the document will only be made available to those individuals with
a need-to-know and who are otherwise qualified to have access to SGI.
Plant designers (including their employees and agents) who meet the
Commission's requirements for access to SGI will have access to the
guidance document containing these more detailed parameters to perform
the assessments required by this final rule.
C. Aircraft Impact Assessment
Technical Issues
Because the aircraft impact is a beyond-design-basis event, the
methods and acceptance criteria used should be based on realistic
assumptions. The aircraft impact assessment is expected to include the
items detailed in the following paragraphs:
1. Consideration of aircraft impact characteristics. The assessment
must consider the impact of a large, commercial aircraft of the type
currently in use for long distance flights in the U.S. as described
previously in this document and in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(2). More detailed
aircraft impact assessment parameters that are considered appropriate
for use in this assessment will be contained in a separate guidance
document under SGI controls.
2. Plant functions, structures, systems, components, and locations
to be assessed. The critical functions required to be evaluated in the
aircraft impact assessment include core cooling capability,
containment, spent fuel cooling capability, and spent fuel pool
integrity. Evaluation of the survivability of these critical functions
should consider not only the key components, but also power supplies,
cable runs, and other components that support these functions. The
assessment may take credit for the availability of both safety and non-
safety equipment. The assessment should evaluate whether the structures
containing equipment that provides these critical functions are likely
to be affected by the specified large, commercial aircraft impact.
Factors to be considered in the assessment include the size and
location of the structures and the presence of external impediments to
impact.
3. Damage mechanisms. The assessment should model the structural
response, shock and vibration effects, and fire effects of the aircraft
impact.
a. Structural assessment. The structural assessment should be based
on a detailed structural model of the plant taking into account the
nonlinear materials and geometric behavior. The assessment should
consider both local and global (plant-wide) behavior, as well as
thermal effects resulting from fire.
b. Shock assessment. The assessment should evaluate both the local
and global (plant-wide) shock and vibration effects resulting from the
aircraft impact.
c. Fire assessment. The fire assessment should consider the extent
of structural damage and aviation fuel deposition, if any, spread
within the impacted buildings. The assessment should consider both
short- and long-term fire effects.
4. Consideration of potential responsive actions and strategies in
identifying design features and functional capabilities. In determining
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design features and functional capabilities, the designer is expected
to consider the potential responsive actions and strategies in
determining what design features and functional capabilities to adopt.
After considering potential actions and strategies, the designer may
identify design features and functional strategies that would
facilitate the implementation and/or enhance the effectiveness of such
responsive actions and strategies. An objective of the rule is to
ensure that practical actions and strategies that the nuclear power
plant licensee could use to respond to the effects of an aircraft
impact are not precluded by the design and are available as effective
options through inclusion of appropriate design features and functional
capabilities.
Regulatory Treatment of the Assessment
The aircraft impact assessment will be subject to inspection by the
NRC and, therefore, must be maintained by the applicant along with the
rest of the information that forms the basis for the relevant
application, consistent with paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 52.0, ``Scope;
applicability of 10 CFR Chapter I provisions,'' 10 CFR 50.70,
``Inspections,'' and 10 CFR 50.71, ``Maintenance of records, making of
reports.'' The applicant is not required to submit the aircraft impact
assessment--as opposed to the ``description of the identified design
features and functional capabilities'' required by 10 CFR 50.150(b)
(proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c))--to the NRC in its application.
Under the final rule, the NRC will confirm that the information
required by 10 CFR 50.150(b) is included in the applicant's PSAR or
FSAR, namely, the description of the design features and functional
capabilities identified as a result of the assessment and a description
of how those features and capabilities show, with reduced use of
operator action, that the assessment requirements in 10 CFR
50.150(a)(1) are met. The NRC will review the information contained in
the application and reach conclusions as to whether the applicant has:
(1) Adequately described design features and functional capabilities in
accordance with the aircraft impact rule; and (2) conducted an
assessment reasonably formulated to identify design features and
functional capabilities to show, with reduced use of operator action,
that the facility can withstand the effects of an aircraft impact. The
NRC's decision on an application subject to 10 CFR 50.150 will be
separate from any NRC determination that may be made with respect to
the adequacy of the impact assessment which the rule does not require
be submitted to the NRC. Therefore, the adequacy of the impact
assessment may not be the subject of a contention submitted as part of
a petition to intervene under 10 CFR 2.309, ``Hearing requests,
petitions to intervene, requirements for standing, and contentions.'' A
person who seeks NRC rulemaking action with respect to a proposed
standard design certification on the basis that the requirements of the
rule with respect to the identification and description of design
features and functional capabilities has not been met could submit
comments in the notice and comment phase of that rulemaking. A person
who seeks rulemaking action after the NRC has adopted a final