Special Conditions: TTF Aerospace, LLC, Modification to Boeing Model 767-400 Series Airplanes; Aft Lower-Lobe Crew-Rest Module (CRM), 15833-15838 [E9-7901]
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 66 / Wednesday, April 8, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
may damage surrounding structure or
any adjacent systems, equipment, or
electrical wiring of the airplane in such
a way as to cause a major or more-severe
failure condition, in accordance with 14
CFR 25.1309(b) and applicable
regulatory guidance.
6. Each lithium-battery installation
must have provisions to prevent any
hazardous effect on structure or
essential systems caused by the
maximum amount of heat the battery
can generate during a short circuit of the
battery or of its individual cells.
7. Lithium battery installations must
have a system to automatically control
the charging rate of the battery, to
prevent battery overheating or
overcharging, and,
a. A battery-temperature-sensing and
over-temperature-warning system with a
means for automatically disconnecting
the battery from its charging source in
the event of an over-temperature
condition, or,
b. A battery-failure-sensing-andwarning system with a means for
automatically disconnecting the battery
from its charging source in the event of
battery failure.
8. Any lithium-battery installation,
the function of which is required for
safe operation of the airplane, must
incorporate a monitoring-and-warning
feature that provides an indication to
the appropriate flight-crew members
when the state-of-charge of the batteries
has fallen below levels considered
acceptable for dispatch of the airplane.
9. The Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness, required by 14 CFR
25.1529 (and 26.11), must contain
maintenance steps to:
a. Assure that the lithium battery is
sufficiently charged at appropriate
intervals specified by the battery
manufacturer.
b. Ensure the integrity of lithium
batteries in spares-storage to prevent the
replacement of batteries, whose function
is required for safe operation of the
airplane, with batteries that have
experienced degraded charge-retention
ability or other damage due to
prolonged storage at a low state of
charge.
The Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness maintenance procedures
must contain precautions to prevent
mishandling of the lithium battery,
which could result in short-circuit or
other unintentional damage that, in
turn, could result in personal injury or
property damage.
Note 1: The term ‘‘sufficiently charged’’
means that the battery will retain enough of
a charge, expressed in ampere-hours, to
ensure that the battery cells will not be
damaged. A battery cell may be damaged by
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lowering the charge below a point where the
battery’s ability to charge and retain a full
charge is reduced. This reduction would be
greater than the reduction that may result
from normal, operational degradation.
Note 2: These special conditions are not
intended to replace 14 CFR 25.1353(b) in the
certification basis of the Boeing 737–600,
–700, –800, and –900 Series airplanes. These
special conditions apply only to lithium
batteries and their installations. The
requirements of 14 CFR 25.1353(b) remain in
effect for batteries and battery installations in
Boeing 737–600, –700, –800, and –900 Series
airplanes that do not use lithium batteries.
Compliance with the requirements of
these special conditions must be shown
by test, or analysis by the Aircraft
Certification Office, or its designees,
with the concurrence of the FAA
Transport Airplane Directorate.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on March
30, 2009.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9–7907 Filed 4–7–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. NM402; Special Conditions No.
25–381–SC]
Special Conditions: TTF Aerospace,
LLC, Modification to Boeing Model
767–400 Series Airplanes; Aft LowerLobe Crew-Rest Module (CRM)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request
for comments.
SUMMARY: These special conditions are
issued for Boeing Model 767–400 series
airplanes. These airplanes, modified by
TTF Aerospace, LLC (TTF), will have a
novel or unusual design feature
associated with an aft, lower-lobe, crewrest module (CRM). The applicable
airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards
for this design feature. These special
conditions contain the additional safety
standards that the Administrator
considers necessary to establish a level
of safety equivalent to that established
by the existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: The effective date for these
special conditions is March 31, 2009.
We must receive comments by May 26,
2009.
ADDRESSES: Please mail two copies of
your comments to: Federal Aviation
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15833
Administration, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Attention: Rules Docket
(ANM–113), Docket No. NM402, 1601
Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington
98057–3356. You may deliver two
copies to the Transport Airplane
Directorate at the same address. You
must mark your comments: Docket No.
NM402. You can inspect comments in
the Rules Docket weekdays, except
federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and
4 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John
Shelden, FAA, Airframe/Cabin Safety
Branch, ANM–115, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,
Renton, Washington, 98057–3356;
telephone (425) 227–2785; facsimile
(425) 227–1320.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA
has determined that notice and
opportunity for prior public comment is
impracticable, because these procedures
would significantly delay issuance of
the design approval and thus delivery of
the affected aircraft. In addition, the
substance of these special conditions
has been subject to the public-comment
process in several prior instances with
no substantive comments received. The
FAA therefore finds that good cause
exists for making these special
conditions effective upon issuance.
Comments Invited
We invite interested people to take
part in this rulemaking by sending
written comments, data, or views. The
most helpful comments reference a
specific portion of the special
conditions, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data. We ask that you send
us two copies of written comments.
We will file in the docket all
comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive
public contact with FAA personnel
about these special conditions. You can
inspect the docket before and after the
comment closing date. If you wish to
review the docket in person, go to the
address in the ADDRESSES section of this
preamble between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
We will consider all comments we
receive by the closing date for
comments. We may change these special
conditions based on the comments we
receive.
If you want us to acknowledge receipt
of your comments on these special
conditions, include with your
comments a self-addressed, stamped
postcard on which you have written the
docket number. We will stamp the date
on the postcard and mail it back to you.
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Background
On June 20, 2008, TTF Aerospace,
LLC, applied for a supplemental type
certificate to permit installation of an
aft, lower-lobe, crew-rest module (CRM)
in Boeing 767–400 series airplanes.
The CRM will be a one-piece, selfcontained unit to be installed under the
passenger-cabin floor in the aft portion
of the aft cargo compartment. It will be
attached to the existing cargo-restraint
system, and the aft portion of the crew
rest will be hard-mounted to the aircraft
structure. Occupancy for the CRM will
be limited to a maximum of five (5)
occupants. An approved seat or berth,
able to withstand the maximum flight
loads when occupied, will be provided
for each occupant permitted in the
CRM. The CRM is intended to be
occupied only in flight, i.e., not during
taxi, takeoff, or landing. A smokedetection system, manual fire-fighting
system, oxygen system, and occupant
amenities will be provided.
Two entry/exits between the maindeck area will be required. The floor
structure will be modified to provide
access for the main-entry hatch and the
emergency-access hatch.
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Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of § 21.101, TTF
must show that Boeing Model 767–400
series airplanes, with the CRM, continue
to meet either:
(1) The applicable provisions of the
regulations incorporated by reference in
Type Certificate No. A1NM, or
(2) The applicable regulations in
effect on the date of TTF’s application
for the change.
The regulations incorporated by
reference in the type certificate are
commonly referred to as the ‘‘original
type-certification basis.’’ The
certification basis for Boeing Model
767–400 series airplanes is 14 CFR part
25, as amended by Amendments 25–1
through 25–89. Refer to Type Certificate
No. A1NM for a complete description of
the certification basis for this model.
According to 14 CFR 21.16, if the
Administrator finds that the applicable
airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards
for the Boeing Model 767–400 series
airplanes because of a novel or unusual
design feature, the Administrator
prescribes special conditions for the
airplane.
As defined in 14 CFR 11.19, special
conditions are issued in accordance
with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of
the type-certification basis in
accordance with 14 CFR 21.101.
Special conditions are initially
applicable to the model for which they
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are issued. If the type certificate for that
model is amended to include any other
model that incorporates the same or
similar novel or unusual design feature,
the special conditions would also apply
to that model. Similarly, if any other
model already included on the same
type certificate is modified to
incorporate the same or similar novel or
unusual design feature, the special
conditions would apply to that other
model under the provisions of 14 CFR
21.101.
In addition to the applicable
airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, Boeing Model 767–400
series airplanes must comply with the
fuel-vent and exhaust-emission
requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the
noise-certification requirements of 14
CFR part 36.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
While installation of a CRM is not a
new concept for large, transportcategory airplanes, each module has
unique features based on its design,
location, and use. The CRM to be
installed on the Boeing Model 767–400
series airplanes is novel in that it will
be located below the passenger-cabin
floor in the aft portion of the aft cargo
compartment.
Because of the novel or unusual
features associated with the installation
of a CRM, special conditions are
considered necessary to provide a level
of safety equal to that established by the
airworthiness regulations incorporated
by reference in the type certificates of
these airplanes. These special
conditions do not negate the need to
address other applicable part 25
regulations.
Operational Evaluations and Approval
These special conditions specify
requirements for design approvals (i.e.,
type-design changes and supplemental
type certificates) of CRMs administered
by the FAA’s Aircraft Certification
Service. The FAA’s Flight Standards
Service, Aircraft Evaluation Group,
must evaluate and approve the ‘‘basic
suitability’’ of the CRM for occupation
by crewmembers before the module may
be used. If an operator wishes to use a
CRM as ‘‘sleeping quarters,’’ the module
must undergo an additional operational
evaluation and approval. The Aircraft
Evaluation Group would evaluate the
CRM for compliance to §§ 121.485(a)
and 121.523(b), with Advisory Circular
121–31, Flight Crew Sleeping Quarters
and Rest Facilities, providing one
method of compliance to these
operational regulations.
To obtain an operational evaluation,
the supplemental-type-design holder
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must contact the Aircraft Evaluation
Group within the Flight Standards
Service that has operational-approval
authority for the project. In this
instance, it is the Seattle Aircraft
Evaluation Group. The supplementaltype-design holder must request a
‘‘basic suitability’’ evaluation or a
‘‘sleeping quarters’’ evaluation of the
crew-rest module. The supplementaltype-design holder may make this
request concurrently with the
demonstration of compliance with these
special conditions.
The Boeing Model 767–400 Flight
Standardization Board Report Appendix
will document the results of these
evaluations. In discussions with the
FAA Principal Operating Inspector,
individual operators may refer to these
standardized evaluations as the basis for
an operational approval, instead of an
on-site operational evaluation.
Any change to the approved CRM
configuration requires an operational reevaluation and approval, if the change
affects any of the following:
• Procedures for emergency egress of
crewmembers,
• Other safety procedures for
crewmembers occupying the CRM, or
• Training related to these
procedures.
The applicant for any such change is
responsible for notifying the Seattle
Aircraft Evaluation Group that a new
evaluation of the CRM is required.
All instructions for continued
airworthiness, including service
bulletins, must be submitted to the
Seattle Aircraft Evaluation Group for
approval before the FAA approves the
modification.
Discussion of Special Conditions No. 9
and 12
The following clarifies the intent of
Special Condition No. 9 relative to the
requirements of § 25.1439(a):
Amendment 25–38 modified the
requirements of § 25.1439(a) by adding, ‘‘In
addition, protective breathing equipment
must be installed in each isolated separate
compartment in the airplane, including
upper and lower lobe galleys, in which
crewmember occupancy is permitted during
flight for the maximum number of
crewmembers expected to be in the area
during any operation.’’
The CRM is an isolated, separate
compartment, so § 25.1439(a) is
applicable. However, the requirements
of § 25.1439(a) for protective breathing
equipment in isolated, separate
compartments are not appropriate,
because the CRM is novel and unusual
in terms of the number of occupants.
In 1976, when Amendment 25–38 was
adopted, small galleys were the only
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isolated, separate compartments that
had been certificated. Two
crewmembers were the maximum
expected to occupy those galleys.
These special conditions address a
CRM which can accommodate up to five
crewmembers. This number of
occupants in an isolated, separate
compartment was not envisioned at the
time Amendment 25–38 was adopted. It
is not appropriate for all occupants to
don protective breathing equipment in
the event of a fire, because the first
action should be for each occupant to
leave the confined space, unless that
occupant is fighting the fire. Taking the
time to don protective breathing
equipment would prolong the time for
the emergency evacuation of the
occupants and possibly interfere with
efforts to extinguish the fire.
Regarding Special Condition No. 12,
the FAA considers that during the 1minute smoke-detection time,
penetration of a small quantity of smoke
from the aft, lower-lobe, CRM into an
occupied area of the airplane would be
acceptable, given the limitations in
these special conditions. The FAA
considers that the special conditions
place sufficient restrictions on the
quantity and type of material allowed in
crew carry-on bags that the threat from
a fire in the remote CRM would be
equivalent to the threat from a fire in the
main cabin.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special
conditions are applicable to Boeing
Model 767–400 series airplanes as
modified by TTF to include an aft
lower-lobe CRM. If TTF Aerospace
applies at a later date for a change to the
supplemental type certificate to include
another model listed on the same typecertificate data sheet, which
incorporates the same or similar novel
or unusual design feature, these special
conditions would also apply to that
model.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features on Boeing
Model 767–400 series airplanes. It is not
a rule of general applicability, and it
affects only the applicant which applied
to the FAA for approval of these features
on the airplane.
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List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,
44702, 44704.
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The Special Conditions
■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the following special conditions are
issued as part of the type-certification
basis for the Boeing Model 767–400
series airplanes, modified by TTF
Aerospace.
1. Occupancy of the aft, lower-lobe,
crew-rest module (CRM) is limited to
the total number of installed bunks and
seats in each module. An approved seat
or berth, able to withstand the
maximum flight loads when occupied
for each occupant permitted in the
CRM, must be provided. The maximum
occupancy in the CRM is five.
(a) There must be appropriate
placard(s) displayed in a conspicuous
place at each entrance to the CRM to
indicate the following:
(1) The maximum number of
occupants;
(2) Occupancy is restricted to
crewmembers who are trained in
evacuation procedures for the CRM;
(3) Occupancy is prohibited during
taxi, take-off and landing;
(4) Smoking is prohibited in the CRM;
(5) Hazardous quantities of flammable
fluids, explosives, or other dangerous
cargo are prohibited in the CRM.
(6) Stowage in the CRM must be
limited to emergency equipment,
airplane-supplied equipment (e.g.,
bedding), and crew personal luggage.
Cargo or passenger baggage is not
allowed.
(b) At least one ashtray must be
located conspicuously on or near the
side of any entrance to the CRM.
(c) A means must be available to
prevent passengers from entering the
CRM in the event of an emergency or
when no flight attendant is present.
(d) Any door installed between the
CRM and the passenger cabin must be
designed to be opened quickly from
inside the module, even when crowding
occurs at each side of the door.
(e) All doors installed in the
evacuation routes must be designed to
prevent anyone from being trapped
inside the module. If a locking
mechanism is installed, it must be
capable of being unlocked from the
outside without the aid of special tools.
The lock must not prevent opening from
the inside of the module at any time.
2. At least two emergency evacuation
routes must be available, each of which
can be used by each occupant of the
CRM to rapidly evacuate to the main
cabin. The exit door/hatch for each
route must be able to be closed from the
main cabin after evacuation of the CRM.
In addition:
(a) The routes must be located with
one at each end of the module, or with
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15835
two having sufficient separation within
the module and between the routes to
minimize the possibility of an event
(either inside or outside the CRM)
rendering both routes inoperative.
(b) The routes must minimize the
possibility of blockage which might
result from fire, mechanical, or
structural failure, or from persons
standing on top of or against the escape
route. If an evacuation route uses an
area where normal movement of
passengers occurs, it must be
demonstrated that passengers would not
impede egress to the main deck. If a
hatch is installed in an evacuation
route, the point at which the evacuation
route terminates in the passenger cabin
should not be located where normal
movement by passengers or crew
occurs. Examples include the main
aisle, cross aisle, passageway, or galley
complex. If it is not possible to avoid
such a location, the hatch or door must
be capable of being opened when a
person, the weight of a 95th percentile
male, is standing on the hatch or door.
The use of evacuation routes must not
depend on any powered device. If low
headroom is at or near an evacuation
route, provisions must be in place to
prevent or to protect occupants of the
CRM from head injury.
(c) Emergency-evacuation procedures
must be in place, including procedures
for the emergency evacuation of an
incapacitated occupant from the crewrest module. All of these procedures
must be transmitted to all operators for
incorporation into their training
programs and appropriate operational
manuals.
(d) There must be a limitation, in the
Airplane Flight Manual or other suitable
means, for training crewmembers in the
use of evacuation routes.
3. An incapacitated person,
representative of a 95th percentile male,
must be capable of being evacuated from
the CRM to the passenger-cabin floor.
The evacuation must be demonstrated
for all evacuation routes. A flight
attendant or other crewmember (a total
of one assistant within the CRM) may
provide assistance in the evacuation. Up
to three persons in the main passenger
compartment may provide additional
assistance. For evacuation routes having
stairways, the additional assistants may
descend to one-half the elevation
change from the main deck to the lowerdeck compartment or to the first
landing, whichever is higher.
4. The following signs and placards
must be provided in the CRM:
(a) At least one exit sign, which meets
the requirements of § 25.812(b)(1)(i) at
Amendment 25–58, located near each
exit. However, the exit sign may have a
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 66 / Wednesday, April 8, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
reduced background area of no less than
5.3 square inches (excluding the letters),
provided that it is installed so that the
material surrounding the exit sign is
light in color (e.g., white, cream, or light
beige). If the material surrounding the
exit sign is not light in color, an exit
sign with a minimum of a one-inchwide background border around the
letters would also be acceptable.
(b) An appropriate placard located
near each exit, defining the location and
the operating instructions for each
evacuation route;
(c) Placards must be readable from a
distance of 30 inches under emergencylighting conditions; and
(d) The exit handles and placards (see
4.(b) above) for each evacuation route
must be illuminated to at least 160
micro-lamberts under emergencylighting conditions.
5. In the event of failure of the
airplane’s main power system or of the
normal lighting system for the CRM,
emergency illumination to the CRM
must be automatically provided.
(a) This emergency illumination must
be independent of the main lighting
system.
(b) The sources of general cabin
illumination may be common to both
the emergency- and main-lighting
systems, if the power supply to the
emergency-lighting system is
independent of the power supply to the
main lighting system.
(c) The illumination level must be
sufficient for the occupants of the CRM
to locate and transfer to the main
passenger-cabin floor by means of each
evacuation route.
(d) The illumination level must be
sufficient for each occupant of the CRM
to locate a deployed oxygen mask,
including when privacy curtains, if
installed, are in the closed position.
6. Two-way voice communications
must be available between
crewmembers on the flightdeck and
occupants of the CRM. Public-addresssystem microphones must be located at
each flight-attendant seat that is
required to be near a floor-level exit in
the passenger cabin, per § 25.785(h) at
Amendment 25–51. The public-address
system must allow two-way voice
communications between flight
attendants and the occupants of the
CRM. However, one microphone may
serve more than one exit, if the
proximity of the exits allows unassisted
verbal communication between seated
flight attendants.
7. Manual activation of an aural
emergency-alarm system must be
available, audible during normal and
emergency conditions, to enable
crewmembers, on the flight deck and at
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each pair of required floor-level
emergency exits, to alert occupants of
the CRM to an emergency situation. Use
of a public-address or crew-interphone
system is acceptable, provided it has an
adequate means of differentiating
between normal and emergency
communications. The system must be
powered, in flight, for at least ten
minutes after the shutdown or failure of
all engines and auxiliary power units, or
the disconnection or failure of all power
sources that depend on the continued
operation of the engines and auxiliary
power units.
8. An indication to fasten seatbelts
must be readily detectable by seated or
standing occupants of the CRM. In the
event no seats are available, at least one
means, such as sufficient handholds,
must be in place to address anticipated
turbulence. Seatbelt-type restraints must
be provided for berths and must be
compatible for the sleeping attitude
during cruise conditions. A placard
must be located on each berth requiring
that seat belts be fastened when the
berth is occupied. If compliance with
any of the other requirements of these
special conditions is predicated on
specific head location, a placard must
identify the head position.
9. In lieu of the requirements
specified in § 25.1439(a) at Amendment
25–38 that pertain to isolated
compartments, and to provide a level of
safety equivalent to that which is
provided occupants of a small, isolated
galley, the following equipment must be
provided in the CRM:
(a) At least one approved, hand-held
fire extinguisher, appropriate for the
kinds of fires likely to occur; and
(b) Protective breathing equipment
approved to Technical Standard Order
(TSO)–C116 (or equivalent), suitable for
fire-fighting for at least two persons. If
three or more hand-held fire
extinguishers are installed, protective
breathing equipment must be available
for one person for each hand-held fire
extinguisher.
Note: Additional protective breathing
equipment and fire extinguishers in specific
locations (beyond the minimum numbers
prescribed in Special Condition No. 9) may
be required as a result of any egress analysis
accomplished to satisfy Special Condition
No. 2(a).
(c) One flashlight.
10. A smoke- or fire-detection system
(or systems) must be installed to
monitor each occupiable area within the
CRM, including areas partitioned by
curtains. Flight tests must be conducted
to show compliance with this
requirement. Each system (or systems)
must provide the following:
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(a) A visual indication to the
flightdeck within one minute after the
start of a fire;
(b) An aural warning in the CRM; and
(c) A warning in the main passenger
cabin. This warning must be readily
detectable by a flight attendant, taking
into consideration the positioning of
flight attendants throughout the main
passenger compartment during various
phases of flight.
11. The CRM must be designed so that
fires within the CRM can be controlled
without a crewmember entering the
module or so that crewmembers
equipped for fire fighting have
unrestricted access to the module. The
time for a crewmember on the main
deck to react to the fire alarm, don
protective gear (such as protective
breathing equipment and gloves), obtain
fire-fighting equipment, and gain access
to the module must not exceed the time
for the module to become smoke-filled,
making it difficult to locate the fire
source.
12. There must be a means to exclude
hazardous quantities of smoke or
extinguishing agent, originating in the
CRM, from entering any other
compartment occupied by crewmembers
or passengers. This means must include
the time periods during the evacuation
of the CRM and, if applicable, when
accessing the CRM to manually fight a
fire. Smoke entering any other
compartment occupied by crewmembers
or passengers, when the entrance to the
CRM is opened during an emergency
evacuation, must dissipate within five
minutes after the entrance to the module
is closed. Hazardous quantities of smoke
may not enter any other compartment
occupied by crewmembers or
passengers during subsequent access to
manually fight a fire in the CRM. (The
amount of smoke entrained by a
firefighter exiting the module through
the access is not considered hazardous).
During the 1-minute smoke-detection
time, penetration of a small quantity of
smoke from the CRM into an occupied
area is acceptable. Flight tests must be
conducted to show compliance with
this requirement.
If a built-in fire extinguishing system
is used instead of manual fire fighting,
the fire-extinguishing system must be
designed so that no hazardous
quantities of extinguishing agent enter
other compartments occupied by
passengers or crew. The system must
have adequate capacity to suppress any
fire occurring in the CRM, considering
the fire threat, the volume of the
module, and the ventilation rate.
13. A supplemental oxygen system
must be provided, equivalent to that
provided for main-deck passengers, for
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each seat and berth in the CRM. The
system must provide aural and visual
signals to warn the CRM occupants to
don oxygen masks in the event of
decompression. The warning must
activate before the cabin-pressure
altitude exceeds 15,000 feet, and must
sound continuously for a minimum of
five minutes or until a reset pushbutton
in the CRM is depressed. Procedures for
occupants of the CRM to follow, in the
event of decompression, must be
established. These procedures must be
transmitted to the operators for
incorporation into their training
programs and appropriate operational
manuals.
14. The following requirements apply
to CRMs that are divided into several
sections by curtains or partitions:
(a) To warn sleeping occupants, an
aural alert must be in place, that is
audible in each section of the CRM, and
that accompanies automatic
presentation of supplemental-oxygen
masks. In each section where seats or
berths are not installed, there must be a
visual indicator that occupants must
don oxygen masks. A minimum of two
supplemental oxygen masks is required
for each seat or berth. The crewmembers
must also be able to manually deploy
the oxygen masks from the flightdeck.
(b) A placard must be located adjacent
to each curtain that visually divides or
separates the CRM into small sections
for privacy. The placard must specify
that the curtain remains open when the
private section it creates is unoccupied.
(c) For each section of the CRM
created by a curtain, the following
requirements of these special conditions
apply, both with the curtain open and
with the curtain closed:
(1) Emergency illumination (Special
Condition No. 5);
(2) Emergency alarm system (Special
Condition No. 7);
(3) Seatbelt-fasten signal (see Special
Condition No. 8) or return-to-seat signal,
as applicable; and
(4) Smoke- or fire-detection system
(Special Condition No. 10).
(d) Crew-rest modules, visually
divided to the extent that evacuation
could be affected, must contain exit
signs that direct occupants to the
primary stairway exit. Exit signs must
be located in each separate section of
the CRM, and that meet the
requirements of § 25.812(b)(1)(i) at
Amendment 25–58. An exit sign with
reduced background area, as described
in Special Condition No. 4(a), may be
used to meet this requirement.
(e) For sections within a CRM that are
created by a partition with a door
separating the sections, the following
requirements of these special conditions
must be met both with the door open
and with the door closed:
(1) A secondary evacuation route
must be available from each section to
the main deck. Alternatively, any door
between the sections must preclude
anyone from being trapped inside the
compartment. The ability to remove an
incapacitated occupant from within this
area must be considered. A secondary
evacuation route from a small room,
designed for only one occupant for a
short time, such as a changing area or
lavatory, is not required. However, the
ability to remove an incapacitated
occupant from within this area must be
considered.
(2) Doors between the sections must
be capable of opening when crowded
against, even when crowding occurs at
each side of the door.
(3) No more than one door may be
located between any seat or berth and
the primary stairway exit.
(4) Exit signs must be located in each
section, and must meet the requirements
of § 25.812(b)(1)(i) at Amendment 25–
58. These signs must direct occupants to
the primary stairway exit. An exit sign
with reduced background area, as
described in Special Condition No. 4(a),
may be used to meet this requirement.
(5) The following Special Conditions
apply both with the door open and with
the door closed:
• Special Conditions No. 5
(emergency illumination),
• No. 7 (emergency alarm system),
• No. 8 (fasten-seatbelt signal or
return-to-seat signal, as applicable) and
• No. 10 (smoke- or fire-detection
system)
(6) Special Conditions No. 6 (two-way
voice communication) and No. 9
(emergency fire-fighting and protective
equipment) apply independently for
each separate section, except for
lavatories or other small areas that are
not occupied for extended periods.
15. Each waste-disposal receptacle
must have a built-in fire extinguisher
that discharges automatically upon
occurrence of a fire in the receptacle.
15837
16. Materials, including finishes or
decorative surfaces applied to the
materials, must comply with the
flammability requirements of § 25.853 at
Amendment 25–116, and mattresses
must comply with the applicable
flammability requirements of § 25.853(c)
at Amendment 25–116.
17. All lavatories within the CRM
must meet the requirements for a
lavatory installed on the main deck,
except with regard to Special Condition
No.10 for smoke detection.
18. When a CRM is installed or
enclosed as a removable module in part
of a cargo compartment or is located
directly adjacent to a cargo
compartment without an intervening
cargo compartment wall, the following
apply:
(a) Any wall of the module that forms
part of the boundary of the reduced
cargo compartment, subject to direct
flame impingement from a fire in the
cargo compartment, and that includes
any interface between the module and
the airplane structure or systems, must
meet the applicable requirements of
§ 25.855 at Amendment 25–72.
(b) When the CRM is not installed, the
fire-protection level of the cargo
compartment must comply with the
following regulations:
• § 25.855 at Amendment 25–72,
• § 25.857 at Amendment 25–60, and
• § 25.858 at Amendment 25–54.
(c) Use of each emergency-evacuation
route must not require occupants of the
CRM to enter the cargo compartment to
allow them to return to the passenger
compartment.
(d) The aural warning in Special
Condition No.7 must sound in the CRM
in the event of a fire in the cargo
compartment.
19. All enclosed stowage
compartments within the CRM that are
not limited to stowage of emergency
equipment or airplane-supplied
equipment (e.g., bedding) must meet the
design criteria in the table below. As
indicated in the table, this special
condition does not address enclosed
stowage compartments with an interior
volume greater than 200 cubic feet.
(Fire protection for such large stowage
compartments would necessitate design
requirements and operational
procedures similar to those for Class C
cargo compartments.)
Stowage compartment interior
volumes
Fire protection features
Less than
25 ft 3
Materials of Construction 1 .............................................................................................................................
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25 ft 3 to
57 ft 3
Yes ..........
Yes ..........
08APR1
57 ft 3 to
200 ft 3
Yes.
15838
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 66 / Wednesday, April 8, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
Stowage compartment interior
volumes
Fire protection features
Less than
25 ft 3
Detectors 2 .....................................................................................................................................................
Liner 3 .............................................................................................................................................................
Locating Device 4 ...........................................................................................................................................
25 ft 3 to
57 ft 3
No ............
No ............
No ............
Yes ..........
No ............
Yes ..........
57 ft 3 to
200 ft 3
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
1 Material: The material used to construct each enclosed stowage compartment must at least be fire resistant and must meet the flammability
standards for interior components specified in § 25.853. For compartments with an interior volume less than 25 cubic feet, the design must contain a fire likely to occur within the compartment under normal use.
2 Detectors: Enclosed stowage compartments equal to or exceeding 25 cubic feet in interior volume must have a smoke- or fire-detection system to ensure that a fire can be detected within 1 minute. Flight tests must be conducted to show compliance with this requirement. Each system
must provide the following:
(a) A visual indication in the flight deck within 1 minute after the start of a fire;
(b) An aural warning in the CRM; and
(c) A warning in the main passenger compartment. This warning must be readily detectable by a flight attendant, taking into account the location of flight attendants throughout the main passenger compartment during various phases of flight.
3 Liner: If the material used to construct the stowage compartment meets the flammability requirements of a liner for a Class B cargo compartment, then no liner would be required for enclosed stowage compartments equal to or greater than 25 cubic but less than 57 cubic feet in interior
volume. For those enclosed stowage compartments the interior volume of which is equal to or greater than 57 cubic feet, but less than or equal
to 200 cubic feet, the liner must meet the requirements of § 25.855 at Amendment 25–72 for a Class B cargo compartment.
4 Location Detector: Crew-rest areas that contain enclosed stowage compartments interior volumes of which exceed 25 cubic feet, and that are
located away from one central location, such as the entry to the CRM or a common area within the CRM, would require additional fire-protection
devices to assist the firefighter in determining the location of a fire.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on March
31, 2009.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9–7901 Filed 4–7–09; 8:45 am]
DATES:
Effective Date: May 8, 2009.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Nazih Khaouly, FAA, Airplane and
Flight Crew Interface Branch, ANM–
111, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington
98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2432;
facsimile (425) 227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Federal Aviation Administration
Background
14 CFR Part 25
On March 15, 2007, Aircell LLC,
applied for a type design change to an
existing STC (ST01388WI–D), to install
additional equipment on Dassault
Falcon 2000 series airplanes. This
installation adds components to the
existing airplane installation to include
a low power Wi-Fi handset containing
a single cell lithium polymer
rechargeable battery. The battery
identified for application in this design
is a low capacity, single cell lithium
polymer rechargeable battery, with a
nominal capacity of 1400mAh and a
nominal voltage of 3.7V. The battery has
a weight of 26.5 grams. The battery has
been Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.
(UL) tested and qualified by DO–160E in
the Aircell handset (P12857). The
design is supported by a System Safety
Assessment/Functional Hazard
Assessment (SSA/FHA) analysis. The
Aircell Wi-Fi handset, which is a
component of the Aircell ASE, consists
of a wireless handset and associated
base station (cradle and charging unit),
both with protective circuits and fuse
devices which provide multiple levels
of redundant protection from hazards,
such as overcharging or discharging.
The lithium battery is installed in the
handset.
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
[Docket No. NM395; Special Conditions No.
25–379–SC]
Special Conditions: Dassault Falcon
2000 Series Airplanes; Aircell Airborne
Satcom Equipment Consisting of a
Wireless Handset and Associated Base
Station, With Lithium Battery
Installations
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES
AGENCY: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions.
SUMMARY: These special conditions are
issued for the Dassault Falcon 2000
series airplanes. These airplanes, as
modified by Aircell LLC, will have a
novel or unusual design feature
associated with the Aircell airborne
satcom equipment (ASE) which use
lithium battery technology. The
applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for this design feature.
These special conditions contain the
additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to
establish a level of safety equivalent to
that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
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A lithium battery has certain failure,
operational, and maintenance
characteristics that differ significantly
from those of the nickel-cadmium and
lead-acid rechargeable batteries
currently approved for installation on
large transport category airplanes. The
FAA is issuing these special conditions
to require that (1) all characteristics of
the lithium batteries and their
installations that could affect safe
operation of the Dassault Falcon 2000
are addressed, and (2) appropriate
continued airworthiness instructions,
which include maintenance
requirements, are established to ensure
the availability of electrical power from
the batteries when needed. At present,
there is limited experience with use of
rechargeable lithium batteries in
applications involving commercial
aviation. However, other users of this
technology, ranging from wireless
telephone manufacturers to the electric
vehicle industry, have noted safety
problems with lithium batteries. These
problems include overcharging, overdischarging, and flammability of cell
components.
1. Overcharging
In general, lithium batteries are
significantly more susceptible to
internal failures that can result in selfsustaining increases in temperature and
pressure (i.e., thermal runaway) than
their nickel-cadmium or lead-acid
counterparts. This is especially true for
overcharging that causes heating and
destabilization of the components of the
cell, leading to the formation (by
plating) of highly unstable metallic
lithium. The metallic lithium can ignite,
resulting in a self-sustaining fire or
E:\FR\FM\08APR1.SGM
08APR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 66 (Wednesday, April 8, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 15833-15838]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-7901]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. NM402; Special Conditions No. 25-381-SC]
Special Conditions: TTF Aerospace, LLC, Modification to Boeing
Model 767-400 Series Airplanes; Aft Lower-Lobe Crew-Rest Module (CRM)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for Boeing Model 767-400
series airplanes. These airplanes, modified by TTF Aerospace, LLC
(TTF), will have a novel or unusual design feature associated with an
aft, lower-lobe, crew-rest module (CRM). The applicable airworthiness
regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for
this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional
safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to
establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the
existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: The effective date for these special conditions is March 31,
2009. We must receive comments by May 26, 2009.
ADDRESSES: Please mail two copies of your comments to: Federal Aviation
Administration, Transport Airplane Directorate, Attention: Rules Docket
(ANM-113), Docket No. NM402, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington
98057-3356. You may deliver two copies to the Transport Airplane
Directorate at the same address. You must mark your comments: Docket
No. NM402. You can inspect comments in the Rules Docket weekdays,
except federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Shelden, FAA, Airframe/Cabin
Safety Branch, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington,
98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2785; facsimile (425) 227-1320.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice and
opportunity for prior public comment is impracticable, because these
procedures would significantly delay issuance of the design approval
and thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In addition, the substance
of these special conditions has been subject to the public-comment
process in several prior instances with no substantive comments
received. The FAA therefore finds that good cause exists for making
these special conditions effective upon issuance.
Comments Invited
We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We ask
that you send us two copies of written comments.
We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel
about these special conditions. You can inspect the docket before and
after the comment closing date. If you wish to review the docket in
person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section of this preamble
between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for
comments. We may change these special conditions based on the comments
we receive.
If you want us to acknowledge receipt of your comments on these
special conditions, include with your comments a self-addressed,
stamped postcard on which you have written the docket number. We will
stamp the date on the postcard and mail it back to you.
[[Page 15834]]
Background
On June 20, 2008, TTF Aerospace, LLC, applied for a supplemental
type certificate to permit installation of an aft, lower-lobe, crew-
rest module (CRM) in Boeing 767-400 series airplanes.
The CRM will be a one-piece, self-contained unit to be installed
under the passenger-cabin floor in the aft portion of the aft cargo
compartment. It will be attached to the existing cargo-restraint
system, and the aft portion of the crew rest will be hard-mounted to
the aircraft structure. Occupancy for the CRM will be limited to a
maximum of five (5) occupants. An approved seat or berth, able to
withstand the maximum flight loads when occupied, will be provided for
each occupant permitted in the CRM. The CRM is intended to be occupied
only in flight, i.e., not during taxi, takeoff, or landing. A smoke-
detection system, manual fire-fighting system, oxygen system, and
occupant amenities will be provided.
Two entry/exits between the main-deck area will be required. The
floor structure will be modified to provide access for the main-entry
hatch and the emergency-access hatch.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of Sec. 21.101, TTF must show that Boeing
Model 767-400 series airplanes, with the CRM, continue to meet either:
(1) The applicable provisions of the regulations incorporated by
reference in Type Certificate No. A1NM, or
(2) The applicable regulations in effect on the date of TTF's
application for the change.
The regulations incorporated by reference in the type certificate
are commonly referred to as the ``original type-certification basis.''
The certification basis for Boeing Model 767-400 series airplanes is 14
CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-89. Refer to Type
Certificate No. A1NM for a complete description of the certification
basis for this model.
According to 14 CFR 21.16, if the Administrator finds that the
applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the Boeing Model 767-400 series
airplanes because of a novel or unusual design feature, the
Administrator prescribes special conditions for the airplane.
As defined in 14 CFR 11.19, special conditions are issued in
accordance with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of the type-certification
basis in accordance with 14 CFR 21.101.
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. If the type certificate for that model is amended to
include any other model that incorporates the same or similar novel or
unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to that
model. Similarly, if any other model already included on the same type
certificate is modified to incorporate the same or similar novel or
unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that
other model under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, Boeing Model 767-400 series airplanes must comply with the
fuel-vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the
noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
While installation of a CRM is not a new concept for large,
transport-category airplanes, each module has unique features based on
its design, location, and use. The CRM to be installed on the Boeing
Model 767-400 series airplanes is novel in that it will be located
below the passenger-cabin floor in the aft portion of the aft cargo
compartment.
Because of the novel or unusual features associated with the
installation of a CRM, special conditions are considered necessary to
provide a level of safety equal to that established by the
airworthiness regulations incorporated by reference in the type
certificates of these airplanes. These special conditions do not negate
the need to address other applicable part 25 regulations.
Operational Evaluations and Approval
These special conditions specify requirements for design approvals
(i.e., type-design changes and supplemental type certificates) of CRMs
administered by the FAA's Aircraft Certification Service. The FAA's
Flight Standards Service, Aircraft Evaluation Group, must evaluate and
approve the ``basic suitability'' of the CRM for occupation by
crewmembers before the module may be used. If an operator wishes to use
a CRM as ``sleeping quarters,'' the module must undergo an additional
operational evaluation and approval. The Aircraft Evaluation Group
would evaluate the CRM for compliance to Sec. Sec. 121.485(a) and
121.523(b), with Advisory Circular 121-31, Flight Crew Sleeping
Quarters and Rest Facilities, providing one method of compliance to
these operational regulations.
To obtain an operational evaluation, the supplemental-type-design
holder must contact the Aircraft Evaluation Group within the Flight
Standards Service that has operational-approval authority for the
project. In this instance, it is the Seattle Aircraft Evaluation Group.
The supplemental-type-design holder must request a ``basic
suitability'' evaluation or a ``sleeping quarters'' evaluation of the
crew-rest module. The supplemental-type-design holder may make this
request concurrently with the demonstration of compliance with these
special conditions.
The Boeing Model 767-400 Flight Standardization Board Report
Appendix will document the results of these evaluations. In discussions
with the FAA Principal Operating Inspector, individual operators may
refer to these standardized evaluations as the basis for an operational
approval, instead of an on-site operational evaluation.
Any change to the approved CRM configuration requires an
operational re-evaluation and approval, if the change affects any of
the following:
Procedures for emergency egress of crewmembers,
Other safety procedures for crewmembers occupying the CRM,
or
Training related to these procedures.
The applicant for any such change is responsible for notifying the
Seattle Aircraft Evaluation Group that a new evaluation of the CRM is
required.
All instructions for continued airworthiness, including service
bulletins, must be submitted to the Seattle Aircraft Evaluation Group
for approval before the FAA approves the modification.
Discussion of Special Conditions No. 9 and 12
The following clarifies the intent of Special Condition No. 9
relative to the requirements of Sec. 25.1439(a):
Amendment 25-38 modified the requirements of Sec. 25.1439(a) by
adding, ``In addition, protective breathing equipment must be
installed in each isolated separate compartment in the airplane,
including upper and lower lobe galleys, in which crewmember
occupancy is permitted during flight for the maximum number of
crewmembers expected to be in the area during any operation.''
The CRM is an isolated, separate compartment, so Sec. 25.1439(a)
is applicable. However, the requirements of Sec. 25.1439(a) for
protective breathing equipment in isolated, separate compartments are
not appropriate, because the CRM is novel and unusual in terms of the
number of occupants.
In 1976, when Amendment 25-38 was adopted, small galleys were the
only
[[Page 15835]]
isolated, separate compartments that had been certificated. Two
crewmembers were the maximum expected to occupy those galleys.
These special conditions address a CRM which can accommodate up to
five crewmembers. This number of occupants in an isolated, separate
compartment was not envisioned at the time Amendment 25-38 was adopted.
It is not appropriate for all occupants to don protective breathing
equipment in the event of a fire, because the first action should be
for each occupant to leave the confined space, unless that occupant is
fighting the fire. Taking the time to don protective breathing
equipment would prolong the time for the emergency evacuation of the
occupants and possibly interfere with efforts to extinguish the fire.
Regarding Special Condition No. 12, the FAA considers that during
the 1-minute smoke-detection time, penetration of a small quantity of
smoke from the aft, lower-lobe, CRM into an occupied area of the
airplane would be acceptable, given the limitations in these special
conditions. The FAA considers that the special conditions place
sufficient restrictions on the quantity and type of material allowed in
crew carry-on bags that the threat from a fire in the remote CRM would
be equivalent to the threat from a fire in the main cabin.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to
Boeing Model 767-400 series airplanes as modified by TTF to include an
aft lower-lobe CRM. If TTF Aerospace applies at a later date for a
change to the supplemental type certificate to include another model
listed on the same type-certificate data sheet, which incorporates the
same or similar novel or unusual design feature, these special
conditions would also apply to that model.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
on Boeing Model 767-400 series airplanes. It is not a rule of general
applicability, and it affects only the applicant which applied to the
FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
0
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type-certification basis for the Boeing Model 767-400 series
airplanes, modified by TTF Aerospace.
1. Occupancy of the aft, lower-lobe, crew-rest module (CRM) is
limited to the total number of installed bunks and seats in each
module. An approved seat or berth, able to withstand the maximum flight
loads when occupied for each occupant permitted in the CRM, must be
provided. The maximum occupancy in the CRM is five.
(a) There must be appropriate placard(s) displayed in a conspicuous
place at each entrance to the CRM to indicate the following:
(1) The maximum number of occupants;
(2) Occupancy is restricted to crewmembers who are trained in
evacuation procedures for the CRM;
(3) Occupancy is prohibited during taxi, take-off and landing;
(4) Smoking is prohibited in the CRM;
(5) Hazardous quantities of flammable fluids, explosives, or other
dangerous cargo are prohibited in the CRM.
(6) Stowage in the CRM must be limited to emergency equipment,
airplane-supplied equipment (e.g., bedding), and crew personal luggage.
Cargo or passenger baggage is not allowed.
(b) At least one ashtray must be located conspicuously on or near
the side of any entrance to the CRM.
(c) A means must be available to prevent passengers from entering
the CRM in the event of an emergency or when no flight attendant is
present.
(d) Any door installed between the CRM and the passenger cabin must
be designed to be opened quickly from inside the module, even when
crowding occurs at each side of the door.
(e) All doors installed in the evacuation routes must be designed
to prevent anyone from being trapped inside the module. If a locking
mechanism is installed, it must be capable of being unlocked from the
outside without the aid of special tools. The lock must not prevent
opening from the inside of the module at any time.
2. At least two emergency evacuation routes must be available, each
of which can be used by each occupant of the CRM to rapidly evacuate to
the main cabin. The exit door/hatch for each route must be able to be
closed from the main cabin after evacuation of the CRM. In addition:
(a) The routes must be located with one at each end of the module,
or with two having sufficient separation within the module and between
the routes to minimize the possibility of an event (either inside or
outside the CRM) rendering both routes inoperative.
(b) The routes must minimize the possibility of blockage which
might result from fire, mechanical, or structural failure, or from
persons standing on top of or against the escape route. If an
evacuation route uses an area where normal movement of passengers
occurs, it must be demonstrated that passengers would not impede egress
to the main deck. If a hatch is installed in an evacuation route, the
point at which the evacuation route terminates in the passenger cabin
should not be located where normal movement by passengers or crew
occurs. Examples include the main aisle, cross aisle, passageway, or
galley complex. If it is not possible to avoid such a location, the
hatch or door must be capable of being opened when a person, the weight
of a 95th percentile male, is standing on the hatch or door. The use of
evacuation routes must not depend on any powered device. If low
headroom is at or near an evacuation route, provisions must be in place
to prevent or to protect occupants of the CRM from head injury.
(c) Emergency-evacuation procedures must be in place, including
procedures for the emergency evacuation of an incapacitated occupant
from the crew-rest module. All of these procedures must be transmitted
to all operators for incorporation into their training programs and
appropriate operational manuals.
(d) There must be a limitation, in the Airplane Flight Manual or
other suitable means, for training crewmembers in the use of evacuation
routes.
3. An incapacitated person, representative of a 95th percentile
male, must be capable of being evacuated from the CRM to the passenger-
cabin floor. The evacuation must be demonstrated for all evacuation
routes. A flight attendant or other crewmember (a total of one
assistant within the CRM) may provide assistance in the evacuation. Up
to three persons in the main passenger compartment may provide
additional assistance. For evacuation routes having stairways, the
additional assistants may descend to one-half the elevation change from
the main deck to the lower-deck compartment or to the first landing,
whichever is higher.
4. The following signs and placards must be provided in the CRM:
(a) At least one exit sign, which meets the requirements of Sec.
25.812(b)(1)(i) at Amendment 25-58, located near each exit. However,
the exit sign may have a
[[Page 15836]]
reduced background area of no less than 5.3 square inches (excluding
the letters), provided that it is installed so that the material
surrounding the exit sign is light in color (e.g., white, cream, or
light beige). If the material surrounding the exit sign is not light in
color, an exit sign with a minimum of a one-inch-wide background border
around the letters would also be acceptable.
(b) An appropriate placard located near each exit, defining the
location and the operating instructions for each evacuation route;
(c) Placards must be readable from a distance of 30 inches under
emergency-lighting conditions; and
(d) The exit handles and placards (see 4.(b) above) for each
evacuation route must be illuminated to at least 160 micro-lamberts
under emergency-lighting conditions.
5. In the event of failure of the airplane's main power system or
of the normal lighting system for the CRM, emergency illumination to
the CRM must be automatically provided.
(a) This emergency illumination must be independent of the main
lighting system.
(b) The sources of general cabin illumination may be common to both
the emergency- and main-lighting systems, if the power supply to the
emergency-lighting system is independent of the power supply to the
main lighting system.
(c) The illumination level must be sufficient for the occupants of
the CRM to locate and transfer to the main passenger-cabin floor by
means of each evacuation route.
(d) The illumination level must be sufficient for each occupant of
the CRM to locate a deployed oxygen mask, including when privacy
curtains, if installed, are in the closed position.
6. Two-way voice communications must be available between
crewmembers on the flightdeck and occupants of the CRM. Public-address-
system microphones must be located at each flight-attendant seat that
is required to be near a floor-level exit in the passenger cabin, per
Sec. 25.785(h) at Amendment 25-51. The public-address system must
allow two-way voice communications between flight attendants and the
occupants of the CRM. However, one microphone may serve more than one
exit, if the proximity of the exits allows unassisted verbal
communication between seated flight attendants.
7. Manual activation of an aural emergency-alarm system must be
available, audible during normal and emergency conditions, to enable
crewmembers, on the flight deck and at each pair of required floor-
level emergency exits, to alert occupants of the CRM to an emergency
situation. Use of a public-address or crew-interphone system is
acceptable, provided it has an adequate means of differentiating
between normal and emergency communications. The system must be
powered, in flight, for at least ten minutes after the shutdown or
failure of all engines and auxiliary power units, or the disconnection
or failure of all power sources that depend on the continued operation
of the engines and auxiliary power units.
8. An indication to fasten seatbelts must be readily detectable by
seated or standing occupants of the CRM. In the event no seats are
available, at least one means, such as sufficient handholds, must be in
place to address anticipated turbulence. Seatbelt-type restraints must
be provided for berths and must be compatible for the sleeping attitude
during cruise conditions. A placard must be located on each berth
requiring that seat belts be fastened when the berth is occupied. If
compliance with any of the other requirements of these special
conditions is predicated on specific head location, a placard must
identify the head position.
9. In lieu of the requirements specified in Sec. 25.1439(a) at
Amendment 25-38 that pertain to isolated compartments, and to provide a
level of safety equivalent to that which is provided occupants of a
small, isolated galley, the following equipment must be provided in the
CRM:
(a) At least one approved, hand-held fire extinguisher, appropriate
for the kinds of fires likely to occur; and
(b) Protective breathing equipment approved to Technical Standard
Order (TSO)-C116 (or equivalent), suitable for fire-fighting for at
least two persons. If three or more hand-held fire extinguishers are
installed, protective breathing equipment must be available for one
person for each hand-held fire extinguisher.
Note: Additional protective breathing equipment and fire
extinguishers in specific locations (beyond the minimum numbers
prescribed in Special Condition No. 9) may be required as a result
of any egress analysis accomplished to satisfy Special Condition No.
2(a).
(c) One flashlight.
10. A smoke- or fire-detection system (or systems) must be
installed to monitor each occupiable area within the CRM, including
areas partitioned by curtains. Flight tests must be conducted to show
compliance with this requirement. Each system (or systems) must provide
the following:
(a) A visual indication to the flightdeck within one minute after
the start of a fire;
(b) An aural warning in the CRM; and
(c) A warning in the main passenger cabin. This warning must be
readily detectable by a flight attendant, taking into consideration the
positioning of flight attendants throughout the main passenger
compartment during various phases of flight.
11. The CRM must be designed so that fires within the CRM can be
controlled without a crewmember entering the module or so that
crewmembers equipped for fire fighting have unrestricted access to the
module. The time for a crewmember on the main deck to react to the fire
alarm, don protective gear (such as protective breathing equipment and
gloves), obtain fire-fighting equipment, and gain access to the module
must not exceed the time for the module to become smoke-filled, making
it difficult to locate the fire source.
12. There must be a means to exclude hazardous quantities of smoke
or extinguishing agent, originating in the CRM, from entering any other
compartment occupied by crewmembers or passengers. This means must
include the time periods during the evacuation of the CRM and, if
applicable, when accessing the CRM to manually fight a fire. Smoke
entering any other compartment occupied by crewmembers or passengers,
when the entrance to the CRM is opened during an emergency evacuation,
must dissipate within five minutes after the entrance to the module is
closed. Hazardous quantities of smoke may not enter any other
compartment occupied by crewmembers or passengers during subsequent
access to manually fight a fire in the CRM. (The amount of smoke
entrained by a firefighter exiting the module through the access is not
considered hazardous). During the 1-minute smoke-detection time,
penetration of a small quantity of smoke from the CRM into an occupied
area is acceptable. Flight tests must be conducted to show compliance
with this requirement.
If a built-in fire extinguishing system is used instead of manual
fire fighting, the fire-extinguishing system must be designed so that
no hazardous quantities of extinguishing agent enter other compartments
occupied by passengers or crew. The system must have adequate capacity
to suppress any fire occurring in the CRM, considering the fire threat,
the volume of the module, and the ventilation rate.
13. A supplemental oxygen system must be provided, equivalent to
that provided for main-deck passengers, for
[[Page 15837]]
each seat and berth in the CRM. The system must provide aural and
visual signals to warn the CRM occupants to don oxygen masks in the
event of decompression. The warning must activate before the cabin-
pressure altitude exceeds 15,000 feet, and must sound continuously for
a minimum of five minutes or until a reset pushbutton in the CRM is
depressed. Procedures for occupants of the CRM to follow, in the event
of decompression, must be established. These procedures must be
transmitted to the operators for incorporation into their training
programs and appropriate operational manuals.
14. The following requirements apply to CRMs that are divided into
several sections by curtains or partitions:
(a) To warn sleeping occupants, an aural alert must be in place,
that is audible in each section of the CRM, and that accompanies
automatic presentation of supplemental-oxygen masks. In each section
where seats or berths are not installed, there must be a visual
indicator that occupants must don oxygen masks. A minimum of two
supplemental oxygen masks is required for each seat or berth. The
crewmembers must also be able to manually deploy the oxygen masks from
the flightdeck.
(b) A placard must be located adjacent to each curtain that
visually divides or separates the CRM into small sections for privacy.
The placard must specify that the curtain remains open when the private
section it creates is unoccupied.
(c) For each section of the CRM created by a curtain, the following
requirements of these special conditions apply, both with the curtain
open and with the curtain closed:
(1) Emergency illumination (Special Condition No. 5);
(2) Emergency alarm system (Special Condition No. 7);
(3) Seatbelt-fasten signal (see Special Condition No. 8) or return-
to-seat signal, as applicable; and
(4) Smoke- or fire-detection system (Special Condition No. 10).
(d) Crew-rest modules, visually divided to the extent that
evacuation could be affected, must contain exit signs that direct
occupants to the primary stairway exit. Exit signs must be located in
each separate section of the CRM, and that meet the requirements of
Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(i) at Amendment 25-58. An exit sign with reduced
background area, as described in Special Condition No. 4(a), may be
used to meet this requirement.
(e) For sections within a CRM that are created by a partition with
a door separating the sections, the following requirements of these
special conditions must be met both with the door open and with the
door closed:
(1) A secondary evacuation route must be available from each
section to the main deck. Alternatively, any door between the sections
must preclude anyone from being trapped inside the compartment. The
ability to remove an incapacitated occupant from within this area must
be considered. A secondary evacuation route from a small room, designed
for only one occupant for a short time, such as a changing area or
lavatory, is not required. However, the ability to remove an
incapacitated occupant from within this area must be considered.
(2) Doors between the sections must be capable of opening when
crowded against, even when crowding occurs at each side of the door.
(3) No more than one door may be located between any seat or berth
and the primary stairway exit.
(4) Exit signs must be located in each section, and must meet the
requirements of Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(i) at Amendment 25-58. These signs
must direct occupants to the primary stairway exit. An exit sign with
reduced background area, as described in Special Condition No. 4(a),
may be used to meet this requirement.
(5) The following Special Conditions apply both with the door open
and with the door closed:
Special Conditions No. 5 (emergency illumination),
No. 7 (emergency alarm system),
No. 8 (fasten-seatbelt signal or return-to-seat signal, as
applicable) and
No. 10 (smoke- or fire-detection system)
(6) Special Conditions No. 6 (two-way voice communication) and No.
9 (emergency fire-fighting and protective equipment) apply
independently for each separate section, except for lavatories or other
small areas that are not occupied for extended periods.
15. Each waste-disposal receptacle must have a built-in fire
extinguisher that discharges automatically upon occurrence of a fire in
the receptacle.
16. Materials, including finishes or decorative surfaces applied to
the materials, must comply with the flammability requirements of Sec.
25.853 at Amendment 25-116, and mattresses must comply with the
applicable flammability requirements of Sec. 25.853(c) at Amendment
25-116.
17. All lavatories within the CRM must meet the requirements for a
lavatory installed on the main deck, except with regard to Special
Condition No.10 for smoke detection.
18. When a CRM is installed or enclosed as a removable module in
part of a cargo compartment or is located directly adjacent to a cargo
compartment without an intervening cargo compartment wall, the
following apply:
(a) Any wall of the module that forms part of the boundary of the
reduced cargo compartment, subject to direct flame impingement from a
fire in the cargo compartment, and that includes any interface between
the module and the airplane structure or systems, must meet the
applicable requirements of Sec. 25.855 at Amendment 25-72.
(b) When the CRM is not installed, the fire-protection level of the
cargo compartment must comply with the following regulations:
Sec. 25.855 at Amendment 25-72,
Sec. 25.857 at Amendment 25-60, and
Sec. 25.858 at Amendment 25-54.
(c) Use of each emergency-evacuation route must not require
occupants of the CRM to enter the cargo compartment to allow them to
return to the passenger compartment.
(d) The aural warning in Special Condition No.7 must sound in the
CRM in the event of a fire in the cargo compartment.
19. All enclosed stowage compartments within the CRM that are not
limited to stowage of emergency equipment or airplane-supplied
equipment (e.g., bedding) must meet the design criteria in the table
below. As indicated in the table, this special condition does not
address enclosed stowage compartments with an interior volume greater
than 200 cubic feet.
(Fire protection for such large stowage compartments would
necessitate design requirements and operational procedures similar to
those for Class C cargo compartments.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stowage compartment interior volumes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire protection features 57 ft \3\ to 200 ft
Less than 25 ft \3\ 25 ft \3\ to 57 ft \3\ \3\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Materials of Construction \1\......... Yes.................... Yes.................... Yes.
[[Page 15838]]
Detectors \2\......................... No..................... Yes.................... Yes.
Liner \3\............................. No..................... No..................... Yes.
Locating Device \4\................... No..................... Yes.................... Yes.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Material: The material used to construct each enclosed stowage compartment must at least be fire resistant
and must meet the flammability standards for interior components specified in Sec. 25.853. For compartments
with an interior volume less than 25 cubic feet, the design must contain a fire likely to occur within the
compartment under normal use.
\2\ Detectors: Enclosed stowage compartments equal to or exceeding 25 cubic feet in interior volume must have a
smoke- or fire-detection system to ensure that a fire can be detected within 1 minute. Flight tests must be
conducted to show compliance with this requirement. Each system must provide the following:
(a) A visual indication in the flight deck within 1 minute after the start of a fire;
(b) An aural warning in the CRM; and
(c) A warning in the main passenger compartment. This warning must be readily detectable by a flight attendant,
taking into account the location of flight attendants throughout the main passenger compartment during various
phases of flight.
\3\ Liner: If the material used to construct the stowage compartment meets the flammability requirements of a
liner for a Class B cargo compartment, then no liner would be required for enclosed stowage compartments equal
to or greater than 25 cubic but less than 57 cubic feet in interior volume. For those enclosed stowage
compartments the interior volume of which is equal to or greater than 57 cubic feet, but less than or equal to
200 cubic feet, the liner must meet the requirements of Sec. 25.855 at Amendment 25-72 for a Class B cargo
compartment.
\4\ Location Detector: Crew-rest areas that contain enclosed stowage compartments interior volumes of which
exceed 25 cubic feet, and that are located away from one central location, such as the entry to the CRM or a
common area within the CRM, would require additional fire-protection devices to assist the firefighter in
determining the location of a fire.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 31, 2009.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-7901 Filed 4-7-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
