Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1; Exemption, 15779-15783 [E9-7807]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 65 (Tuesday, April 7, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15779-15783]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-7807]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-289; NRC-2009-0154]


Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Three Mile Island Nuclear 
Station, Unit No. 1; Exemption

1.0 Background

    The Exelon Generation Company (Exelon, the licensee, formerly 
AmerGen Energy Company, LLC) is the holder of Facility Operating 
License No. DPR-50 which authorizes operation of the Three Mile Island 
Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1). The license provides, among other 
things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and 
orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) 
now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) located 
in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.

2.0 Request/Action

    Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), part 50, 
Section 50.48, requires that nuclear power plants that were licensed 
before January 1, 1979, must satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix R, Section III.G, ``Fire protection of safe shutdown 
capability.'' TMI-1 was licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979. 
As such, the licensee's Fire Protection Program (FPP) must satisfy the 
established fire protection features of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, 
Section III.G. NRC Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2006-10, 
``Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph III.G.2, Operator 
Manual Actions,'' noted that NRC inspections identified that some 
licensees had relied upon operator manual actions, instead of the 
options specified in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 
(III.G.2) as a permanent solution to resolve issues related to Thermo-
Lag 330-1 fire barriers.
    In a letter dated February 4, 2008 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML080350369), supplemented 
by letter dated January 28, 2009 (ADAMS Accession Number ML090280577), 
the licensee identified one operator manual action that was previously 
included in correspondence with the NRC and found acceptable in a fire 
protection-related Safety Evaluation (SE) dated September 7, 1988 
(ADAMS Accession Number ML082060262). However, RIS 2006-10 identifies 
that an exemption under 10 CFR 50.12 is necessary for the use of 
operator manual actions in lieu of the requirements of III.G.2 even if 
the NRC previously issued an SE that found the manual actions 
acceptable.
    The licensee also identified a second operator manual action that 
was previously permitted for use in a fire area covered by 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3 (III.G.3). As such, an exemption was 
not required because the action was found acceptable as part of a 
safety evaluation for alternate shutdown. However, since the fire area 
of origin requiring this manual action was reclassified as a III.G.2 
area, the manual action requires approval for use in a III.G.2 area. 
Since III.G.2 is a separate part of the rule and this action is not 
considered previously approved for III.G.2, the NRC has preformed a new

[[Page 15780]]

review of this action in accordance with the NRC's current review 
standard, NUREG-1852, ``Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability 
of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire.'' Since both operator 
manual actions require an exemption from III.G.2, the staff has 
reviewed the request and determined that both operator manual actions 
are acceptable. This exemption provides the formal vehicle for NRC 
approval for the use of the two specified operator manual actions in 
lieu of the requirements specified in III.G.2 for TMI-1.
    In summary, by letter dated February 4, 2008, supplemented by 
letter dated January 28, 2009 (ADAMS Accession Numbers ML080350369 and 
ML090280577, respectively), Exelon submitted a request for exemption 
from 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, ``Fire Protection of 
Safe Shutdown Capability,'' for the use of one operator manual action 
in lieu of the requirements specified in III.G.2 for one previously 
approved operator manual action and one new review of an operator 
manual action that was previously approved as part of a III.G.3 review.

3.0 Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR PART 50 when: (1) The exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) when special circumstances are present. One of these special 
circumstances, described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), is that the 
application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not 
serve the underlying purpose of the rule, or is not necessary to 
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.
    The underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section 
III.G.2 is to ensure that one of the redundant trains necessary to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire 
damage in the event of a fire. Section III.G.2 provides the following 
means to ensure that a redundant train of safe shutdown cables and 
equipment is free of fire damage, where redundant trains are located in 
the same fire area outside of primary containment:
    a. Separation of cables and equipment by a fire barrier having a 3-
hour rating;
    b. Separation of cables and equipment by a horizontal distance of 
more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards and 
with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system installed 
in the fire area; or
    c. Enclosure of cables and equipment of one redundant train in a 
fire barrier having a 1-hour rating and with fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system installed in the fire area.
    Exelon indicated that the operator manual actions listed in their 
February 4, 2008, exemption request are those that were previously 
included in correspondence with the NRC and were found acceptable in a 
Fire Protection SE dated September 7, 1988. The first operator manual 
action included in this exemption is the tripping of all four reactor 
coolant pumps (RCPs) locally at the 1A and 1B switchgear for a fire in 
Fire Area CB-FA-1, which is located in the Control Building Health 
Physics Lab (Lab). The second operator manual action included in this 
exemption is the transferring of Nuclear Service River Water Pump 1B 
(NR-P-1B) to its alternate power supply for a fire in Fire Area CB-FA-
2b, which is located in the Control Building 1S Switchgear Room 
(Switchgear Room). This action was described in the January 28, 2009, 
letter as not previously approved as part of III.G.2. Section 2.1, 
titled ``Fire Hazards Analysis Report Revision 9'', of the September 7, 
1988, SE states,

    By letter dated October 27, 1987, GPU [General Public Utilities] 
Nuclear, the licensee, submitted Revision 9 to the Fire Hazards 
Analysis Report (FHAR) for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 
1. This revision includes a number of modifications which have 
resulted from an extensive design verification effort by the 
licensee. As stated by the licensee, Revision 9 represents the ``as-
built condition of TMI-1''. Also, Revision 9 includes a number of 
modifications involving the addition of references to GPUN and NRC 
correspondence concerning the justification and subsequent 
acceptance of exemptions to 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R and deviations 
from Appendix A to [Branch Technical Position] APCSB 9.5-1. In 
addition, the FHAR has been modified to specify where certain fire 
barriers may not be completely rated or contain some non-rated 
feature but have been analyzed to provide adequate protection. This 
type of analysis is allowed by Generic Letter 86-10 and the non-
rated features included in Revision 9 have generally been evaluated 
in previous NRC Safety Evaluation Reports.
    The FHAR has been reviewed by Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC) under contract to the NRC, and has been found to 
be in compliance with NRC guidelines. The details of the review are 
discussed in Enclosure 2, which is the Technical Evaluation Report 
(TER) prepared by SAIC. The staff concurs with the TER findings and 
concludes that the changes to the fire protection program identified 
by the licensee in Revision 9 are acceptable.

    The two operator manual actions in question are listed in 
attachments 3-0 and 3-3Q of the FHAR where a brief description of the 
action to be performed and its location is also included. In the 
January 28, 2009, letter, responding to a request for additional 
information from the NRC staff, Exelon included a detailed discussion 
and justification of the two manual actions that describe how defense-
in-depth is maintained during the scenarios where these manual actions 
would be necessary. The licensee outlined the approach that was taken 
to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the operator manual actions 
and provided a justification for why the operator manual actions are 
appropriate for maintaining equivalency and consistency with the intent 
of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's evaluation in support of the 
subject exemption request for the use of operator manual actions in 
lieu of the requirements specified in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, 
and concluded that given the existing fire protection features in the 
affected fire zones in conjunction with the use of the two operator 
manual actions, in specific instances, Exelon continues to demonstrate 
equivalence to the underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, 
Section III.G.2 for TMI-1. The following technical evaluation provides 
the basis for this conclusion.

3.1 Operator Manual Action To Trip RCPs

3.1.1 Fire Prevention

    The Lab area has limited or low combustible fuel loading 
(equivalent fire severity of less than 45 minutes). The combustible 
fuel loads consist primarily of stored and transient materials, cable 
insulation, and Thermo-Lag. Thermo-Lag is a fire barrier material used 
for the protection of cable raceways that is considered combustible. 
The primary sources of ignition in the areas are limited to cabling and 
electrical equipment. The licensee has indicated that in most cases, 
the cable insulation is qualified to the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineering, Inc. (IEEE) 383 flame test, thereby the growth 
and spread of cable insulation fires would be slow. The redundant 
cables in this area that are required for safe shutdown are located 
greater than 25 feet apart, thus providing physical separation. 
Additionally, the Lab area is of a large volume (90,000 cubic feet) to 
potentially disperse and stratify heat and smoke within the space to 
prevent wide area

[[Page 15781]]

damage due to a damaging hot gas layer forming in the area.
    The NRC staff finds that the limited fuel load combined with the 
number of ignition sources, and spatial characteristics in the Lab 
area, results in a low likelihood of a fire occurring and spreading 
within the fire area.

3.1.2 Detection, Control and Suppression

    The NRC staff evaluated the fire detection, control and suppression 
systems in the Lab area. The Lab area has an automatic ionization smoke 
detection system installed that sends an alarm to the Control Room upon 
activation of the fire/smoke detections systems.
    The area is enclosed by 3-hour rated walls, floors and ceilings to 
prevent fire from spreading to or from the area and the structural 
frame is also protected with 3-hour fireproofing material. In addition, 
all doors, penetrations and ventilation dampers through the fire area 
boundaries are provided with 3-hour rated fire protection assemblies.
    The Lab area also has a wet-pipe fire sprinkler system installed 
below the suspended ceiling in the area. In this fire area, rated 
Thermo-Lag fire barriers, with ratings ranging from 39 to 50 minutes, 
are also provided for circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment.\1\ 
The active fire suppression systems listed above are supplemented by 
handheld fire extinguishers and hose lines staged at locations directly 
outside the fire area. Additionally, fire brigade response time has 
been estimated to be within 15 minutes.
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    \1\ NRC letter dated April 20, 1999, (ADAMS Legacy Library 
Accession Number 9905040102) approved the exemption request on these 
barriers from the requirements of Section III.G.2.c for 1-hour fire 
barriers where circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment in the 
same fire area are enclosed in a 1-hour fire barrier.
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    The NRC staff finds that the fire barriers, fire detection, control 
and suppression systems are adequate to mitigate and contain the fire 
hazards in this area.

3.1.3 Feasibility and Preservation of Safe Shutdown Capability

    The NRC staff has evaluated the feasibility review provided by the 
licensee in the January 28, 2009, letter responding to a request for 
additional information from the NRC staff. The feasibility review 
documents that procedures are in place, in the form of abnormal 
operating procedures (AOPs), to ensure that clear and accessible 
instructions on how to perform the manual action are available to the 
operators. The instructions outline the number of fully trained, 
dedicated operators that are required and the procedures they are to 
follow to perform the action including any tools or equipment necessary 
to complete the action. Several potential environmental concerns were 
also evaluated, such as radiation levels, temperature/humidity 
conditions, ventilation configuration and fire effects that the 
operators may encounter during certain emergency scenarios, and were 
determined not to have a material effect on the performance of the 
manual action. The licensee's feasibility review shows that the 
operator manual action is feasible because the operators performing the 
manual actions would not be exposed to adverse or untenable conditions 
during the operator manual action procedure or during the time needed 
to perform the procedure, primarily because the manual actions are 
located in fire areas that are completely separated from the 
originating fire area. The NRC staff has evaluated the licensee's 
feasibility review and determined that the operator manual actions can 
be reasonably completed in time to support the needed mitigative 
functions. Training, equipment, and procedures are maintained to 
support the specified actions.
    Given the procedures and conditions described above, the NRC staff 
finds that this operator manual action is feasible and that the 
operator will be provided with adequate access and egress to the area 
such that environmental conditions will not preclude completion of the 
action or result in harm to the operator.

3.1.4 Time To Ensure Reliability

    The NRC staff reviewed the time necessary to complete the manual 
action versus the time before the action becomes critical to safely 
shutting down the unit as presented in the feasibility analyses. This 
manual action must be completed within 10 minutes. The action is 
identified in the AOPs as OP-TM-AOP-001-C01 and requires an operator to 
travel from the control room to a location in the turbine building, 
where the 1A and 1B 6900V feeder breakers are located, to trip the 
reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). The combined time to complete the travel 
and specified action requires a total of 8 minutes, leaving a 2 minute 
margin of safety. While a 2 minute margin of safety is considered 
small, this action is only needed when both of the cables located in 
the fire area are affected by fire. Based on the protection and spatial 
separation between the cables, it is highly unlikely that both DC 
control power cables would be lost before the control room operator 
could trip the RCPs. Based on information provided by the licensee, 
this manual operator action will commence immediately upon detection/
confirmation of a fire in CB-FA-1 (Lab) and/or failure to trip the RCPs 
from the control room. The licensee has indicated that the manual 
operator action was verified via walkdowns with different operators to 
verify the reliability of the manual action.
    In addition, the fire area where the redundant equipment trains 
reside is located in a separate building from the fire area where the 
manual action occurs, with the exception of the portion of travel in 
the control tower stairwell (to trip the RCPs), which is separated from 
the control building by 3-hour assemblies. This helps to ensure that 
operators do not encounter untenable or fire-affected conditions during 
the operator manual action procedure.
    The NRC staff finds that the margin available to perform the action 
is small. Based on the low likelihood of the damage occurring to both 
DC control power cables, as well as the procedural controls and 
walkdowns described, the NRC staff concludes that the small margin is 
acceptable due to the low likelihood of a fire that impacts both DC 
control power cables.

3.2 Operator Manual Action To Transfer Nuclear Service River Water to 
Alternate Power

3.2.1 Fire Prevention

    The Switchgear Room has limited or low combustible fuel loading 
(equivalent fire severity of less than 45 minutes). The combustible 
fuel loads consist primarily of minor transient materials, cable 
insulation, Thermo-Lag and electrical equipment. The primary sources of 
ignition in the area are limited to cabling and electrical equipment. 
The licensee has indicated that in most cases, the cable insulation is 
qualified to the IEEE 383 flame test, thereby the growth and spread of 
cable insulation fires would be slow.
    The NRC staff finds that the limited fuel load, combined with the 
number of ignition sources, results in a low likelihood of a fire 
occurring and spreading within the fire.

3.2.2 Detection, Control and Suppression

    The NRC staff evaluated the fire detection, control and suppression 
systems in the Switchgear Room. There is an incipient fire detection 
system,\2\ as

[[Page 15782]]

well as an HVAC duct smoke detection system installed in the space that 
sends an alarm to the Control Room upon activation of the fire/smoke 
detections systems.
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    \2\ An incipient fire detection system is a fire detection 
system designed to provide more rapid detection than conventional 
smoke detection systems.
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    The Switchgear Room is enclosed by 3-hour rated walls, floors and 
ceilings to prevent fire from spreading to or from the area and the 
structural frame is also protected with 3-hour fire proofing material. 
In addition, all doors, penetrations and ventilation dampers through 
the fire area boundaries are provided with 3-hour rated fire protection 
assemblies.
    The Switchgear Room does not have a fire suppression system 
installed but does have 1-hour rated fire barriers provided for 
circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment. A 1-hour rated fire 
barrier is not provided for the transfer of nuclear service water to 
alternate power cables. Manual suppression capability can be provided 
by operators and fire brigade by using the handheld fire extinguishers 
and hose lines staged at locations directly outside of the fire area. 
Additionally, fire brigade response time has been estimated to be 
within 15 minutes for this fire area. The NRC approved an exemption on 
July 11, 1997, (ADAMS Accession No. ML003765666) exempting this area 
from the requirement to have an automatic suppression system.
    The NRC staff finds that the fire barriers, fire detection system 
and the manual suppression capability, in conjunction with the passive 
means of protection, is adequate to mitigate and contain the fire 
hazards in this area.

3.2.3 Feasibility and Preservation of Safe Shutdown Capability

    The NRC staff evaluated the feasibility review provided by the 
licensee in the January 28, 2009, letter, responding to a request for 
additional information from the NRC staff. The feasibility review 
documents that procedures are in place, in the form of AOPs, to ensure 
that clear and accessible instructions on how to perform the manual 
action are available to the operators. The instructions outline the 
number of fully trained, dedicated operators that are required and the 
procedures they are to follow to perform the action including any tools 
or equipment necessary to complete the action. Several potential 
environmental concerns were also evaluated, such as radiation levels, 
temperature/humidity conditions, ventilation configuration and fire 
effects that the operators may encounter during certain emergency 
scenarios, and determined not to have a material effect on the 
performance of the manual action. The NRC staff has evaluated the 
licensee's feasibility review and determined that the operator manual 
actions can be reasonably completed in time to support the needed 
mitigative functions. Training, equipment, and procedures are 
maintained to support the specified actions.
    In addition, the fire area where the redundant equipment trains 
reside is located in a separate building from the fire area where the 
manual actions occur. This helps to ensure that operators do not 
encounter untenable or fire-affected conditions during the operator 
manual action procedure.
    Given the procedures and conditions described above, the NRC staff 
finds that this operator manual action is feasible and that the 
operator will be provided with adequate access and egress to the area 
such that environmental conditions will not preclude completion of the 
action or result in harm to the operator.

3.2.4 Time To Ensure Reliability

    The NRC staff also reviewed the time necessary to complete the 
manual action versus the time before the action becomes critical to 
safely shutting down the unit as presented in the feasibility analyses. 
The action must be completed within 4 hours. This action is identified 
in the AOPs as OP-TM-AOP-001-C2B, which states that AOP OP-TN-541-443 
(``Swap NR-P-1B to Alternate Power Supply''), should be performed and 
instructs an operator to travel from the control room to the intake 
screen and pump house (ISPH), which is outside the plant protected 
area. The operator must first pass through a security access gate 
before traveling to Fire Areas ISPH-FZ-1 and ISPH-FZ-2 where they will 
energize nuclear service river water pump, NR-P-1B, at the 1R 480V 
switchgear to provide nuclear river (NR) water flow and support letdown 
for a fire in Fire Area CB-FA-2b (Switchgear Room). In order to swap 
the NR pump power supply, the operator manual action entails racking 
out the NR-P-1B breaker on the 1T 480V bus and racking in the NR-P-1B 
breaker on the 1R 480V bus. The combined time to complete the travel, 
including the time required for security to open the access gate, and 
the specified actions is less than 30 minutes. Additionally, this 
action is only necessary if the pressurizer heaters are unavailable and 
is of low complexity with a time margin of 3\1/2\ hours.
    The NRC staff finds that there is a sufficient amount of time 
available to complete this proposed operator manual action and that 
adequate conditions exist for it to be performed efficiently and 
reliably.

3.3 Evaluation

    As stated in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section II:
    The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-
depth to fire protection with the following objectives:
    1. To prevent fires from starting,
    2. To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires 
that do occur, and
    3. To provide protection for structures, systems, and components 
important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by 
the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of 
the plant.
    The NRC staff has evaluated the elements of defense-in-depth used 
for fire protection at TMI-1, applicable to the fire zones under 
review. Based upon consideration of the limited fire ignition sources 
and fire hazards in the affected areas, and the existing fire 
protection measures at TMI-1, the NRC staff concludes that objective 
one of defense-in-depth is adequately met.
    Based on the evaluation of fire detection and suppression systems 
provided in the affected fire zones, the NRC staff determined that any 
postulated fire is expected to be promptly detected by the available 
automatic fire detection systems in the associated fire areas. The 
available fire detection and suppression equipment in these fire areas 
ensure that a postulated fire will not be left unchallenged. In 
addition, all fire areas are separated from adjacent fire areas by 
fire-rated barriers and penetrations to provide a level of 
compartmentalization between the fire areas and buildings. This 
compartmentalization helps to ensure that fires will not spread to 
adjacent fire areas and that any fire damage will be limited to the 
fire area of origin. In addition, when fires are contained in the fire 
area of origin, the licensee has demonstrated that the manual actions 
are feasible and reliable. Based on this information, the NRC staff 
concludes that objectives 2 and 3 of defense-in-depth are adequately 
met.
    Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the requested exemption to 
use operator manual actions in combination with the other installed 
fire protection features in lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, 
Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is consistent with the underlying purpose 
of the rule and the defense-in-depth concepts necessary at nuclear 
power plants and will maintain an equivalent level of protection for 
post-fire safe-shutdown capability at TMI-1.

[[Page 15783]]

3.4 Authorized by Law

    This exemption would allow TMI-1 the use of operator manual actions 
in lieu of meeting the requirements specified in 10 CFR part 50, 
Appendix R, Section III.G.2. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the 
NRC to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The 
NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed 
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, the 
exemption is authorized by law.

3.5 No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    The underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section 
III.G.2 is to ensure that one of the redundant trains necessary to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire 
damage in the event of a fire. Based on the existing fire barriers, 
fire detectors, automatic and manual fire suppression equipment, and 
the absence of significant combustible loads and ignition sources in 
the fire areas associated with this exemption, the NRC staff has 
concluded that granting of this involves no undue risk to public health 
and safety.
    The NRC staff has determined that this exemption also does not 
increase the probability or consequences of previously evaluated 
accidents. This determination is based on the NRC staff finding that 
the operator manual actions are not the sole form of protection relied 
upon due to the other fire protection features and procedures in place 
and the manual actions are considered feasible and reliable to ensure 
safe shutdown capability following a fire. The combination of the 
operator manual actions in conjunction with all of the measures and 
systems discussed above, results in an adequate level of protection. No 
new accident initiators are created by allowing the use of operator 
manual actions in the fire areas identified in this exemption and the 
probability of postulated accidents is not increased. Similarly, the 
consequences of postulated accidents are not increased. Therefore, 
there is no undue risk to public health and safety.

3.6 Consistent With Common Defense and Security

    This exemption would allow TMI-1 to credit the use of specific 
operator manual actions and installed fire protection features in lieu 
of meeting the requirements specified in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, 
Section III.G.2. This change, to the operation of the plant, has no 
relation to security issues nor does it diminish the level of safety 
from what was intended by the requirements contained in Section 
III.G.2. Therefore, the common defense and security is not impacted by 
this exemption.

3.7 Special Circumstances

    One of the special circumstances described in 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii) is that the application of the regulation is not 
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying 
purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is to ensure 
that one of the redundant trains necessary to achieve and maintain hot 
shutdown conditions remains free of fire damage in the event of a fire. 
For the fire areas specified in this exemption, the NRC staff finds 
that the operator manual actions are feasible, can be reliably 
performed and that the fire protection features installed in the areas 
are effective at preventing and suppressing fires. Therefore, the 
conditions described herein will ensure that a redundant train 
necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown of the plant will 
remain free of fire damage in the event of a fire in these fire areas. 
The staff concludes that combination of the operator manual actions, in 
conjunction with all of the measures and systems discussed above, 
results in an equivalent level of protection to that intended by 
III.G.2. Since the underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, 
Section III.G is achieved, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii) for the granting of an exemption from 10 CFR part 50, 
Appendix R, Section III.G.2 exist.

4.0 Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present such that 
application of the regulation in these particular circumstances is not 
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, the 
Commission hereby grants Exelon an exemption from the requirements of 
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R of 10 CFR part 50, to TMI-1 for the two 
operator manual actions discussed above.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (74 FR 9437).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of March 2009.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Joseph G. Giitter,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E9-7807 Filed 4-6-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P