Action Affecting Export Privileges; Balli Group PLC; Balli Aviation; Balli Holdings; Vahid Alaghband; Hassan Alaghband; Blue Sky One Ltd.; Blue Sky Two Ltd.; Blue Sky Three Ltd.; Blue Airways; Mahan Airways; Blue Airways FZE, 12836-12839 [E9-6607]
Download as PDF
<![CDATA[
12836
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 25, 2009 / Notices
RETRIEVABILITY:
Delete and replace with the following
language:
‘‘Staff producing statistical products
will have access only to data sets from
which Social Security Numbers have
been deleted and replaced by unique
non-identifying codes internal to the
Census Bureau. Fewer than ten sworn
Census Bureau staff, who work within a
secure restricted-access environment,
will be permitted to retrieve records
containing Social Security Numbers.’’
PWALKER on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
SAFEGUARDS:
Delete and replace with the following
language:
‘‘Each project must be approved by an
in-house Project Review Board to ensure
that data relating to the project will be
used only for authorized purposes. All
uses of the data will be only for
statistical purposes, which by definition
means that uses will not directly affect
any individual. Once the Project Review
Board has approved a project,
construction of statistical extracts with
information from one or more of the
source data sets may occur. Extract data
sets will be based on unique nonidentifying codes and will only be
released to designated sworn Census
Bureau staff with a need-to-know. The
data in the extracts for these projects
will not be made publicly available.
Any publications based on the StARS
will be cleared for release under the
direction of the Census Bureau’s
Disclosure Review Board, which will
confirm that all the required disclosure
protection procedures have been
implemented. No information will be
released that identifies any individual.
All employees are subject to the
restrictions, penalties, and prohibitions
of 13 U.S.C. 9 and 214; 5 U.S.C.
552a(b)(4); 18 U.S.C. 1905; 26 U.S.C.
7213; and 42 U.S.C. 1306. When
confidentiality or penalty provisions
differ, the most stringent provisions
apply to protect the data. Employees are
regularly advised of the regulations
issued pursuant to 13 U.S.C. 9 and 214
and other relevant statutes governing
confidentiality of the data. For example,
13 U.S.C. 214 provides for penalties of
up to five years in prison, and
applicable criminal statutes could
impose fines up to $250,000, for releases
of confidential data. The restrictedaccess environment has been
established to limit the number of
Census Bureau employees with direct
access to the personal identifiers in this
system, so as to protect the
confidentiality of the data and to
prevent unauthorized use or access.
These safeguards provide a level and
scope of security that meet the level and
VerDate Nov<24>2008
01:23 Mar 25, 2009
Jkt 217001
scope of security established by the
Office of Management and Budget in
OMB Circular No. A–130, Appendix III,
Security of Federal Automated
Information Resources. Furthermore, the
use of unsecured telecommunications to
transmit individually identifiable
information is prohibited.’’
RETENTION AND DISPOSAL:
Delete and replace with the following
language:
‘‘Records are to be retained in
accordance with the unit’s Records
Control Schedule, which is based on
separate agreements with each source
entity. Retention is not to exceed 10
years, unless, by agreement with the
source entity, it is determined that a
longer period is necessary for statistical
purposes. At the end of the retention
period or upon demand, all original data
sets, extracts, and paper copies, from
each source entity will be returned or
destroyed as mandated by the
agreements.’’
SYSTEM MANAGER AND ADDRESS:
Delete and replace with the following
language:
‘‘Associate Director for Demographic
Programs, U.S. Census Bureau, 4600
Silver Hill Road, Washington, DC
20233–8000.’’
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE:
Delete and replace with the following
language:
‘‘For the Census Bureau’s records,
information may be obtained from:
Assistant Division Chief for Data
Management, Data Integration Division,
Demographic Directorate, U.S. Census
Bureau, 4600 Silver Hill Road,
Washington, DC 20233–8100.’’
Add the following information:
RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES:
See ‘‘Record Notification Procedure’’
above.
Add the following information:
CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES:
‘‘None.’’
RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES:
Delete and replace with the following
language:
‘‘Individuals covered by selected
administrative record systems and
Census Bureau censuses and surveys.’’
EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED FOR SYSTEM:
Delete and replace with the following
language:
‘‘Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(4), this
system of records is exempted from the
notification, access, and contest
requirements of the agency procedures
(under 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1),
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f)). This
exemption is applicable as the data are
maintained by the Bureau of the Census
solely as statistical records, as required
under Title 13 U.S.C., and are not used
in whole or in part in making any
determination about an identifiable
individual. This exemption is made in
accordance with agency rules published
in the rules section of this Federal
Register.’’
Dated: March 19, 2009.
Brenda Dolan,
Department of Commerce, Freedom of
Information/Privacy Act Officer.
[FR Doc. E9–6557 Filed 3–24–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–07–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Action Affecting Export Privileges;
Balli Group PLC; Balli Aviation; Balli
Holdings; Vahid Alaghband; Hassan
Alaghband; Blue Sky One Ltd.; Blue
Sky Two Ltd.; Blue Sky Three Ltd.;
Blue Airways; Mahan Airways; Blue
Airways FZE
In the matter of:
Balli Group PLC, 5 Stanhope Gate, London,
UK, W1K 1AH;
Balli Aviation, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK,
W1K 1AH;
Balli Holdings, 5 Stanhope Gate, London,
UK, W1K 1AH;
Vahid Alaghband, 5 Stanhope Gate, London,
UK, W1K 1AH;
Hassan Alaghband, 5 Stanhope Gate, London,
UK, W1K 1AH;
Blue Sky One Ltd., 5 Stanhope Gate, London,
UK, W1K 1AH;
Blue Sky Two Ltd., 5 Stanhope Gate, London,
UK, W1K 1AH;
Blue Sky Three Ltd., 5 Stanhope Gate,
London, UK, W1K 1AH;
Blue Airways, 8/3 D Angaght Street, 376009
Yerevan, Armenia;
Mahan Airways, Mahan Tower, No. 21,
Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way,
Tehran, Iran; Respondents;
and
Blue Airways FZE, a/k/a Blue Airways, #G22
Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754
DAFZA, Dubai, UAE;
Blue Airways, Riqa Road, Dubai 52404, UAE;
Related Persons.
Order Renewing Order Temporarily
Denying Export Privileges
Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the
Export Administration Regulations, 15
CFR Parts 730–774 (2008) (‘‘EAR’’ or the
‘‘Regulations’’), I hereby grant the
request of the Bureau of Industry and
Security (‘‘BIS’’) to renew for 180 days
the Order Temporarily Denying the
Export Privileges of Respondents Balli
Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli
E:\FR\FM\25MRN1.SGM
25MRN1
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 25, 2009 / Notices
Holdings, Vahid Alaghband, Hassan
Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky
Two Ltd., Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue
Airways and Mahan Airways
(collectively, ‘‘Respondents’’) and Blue
Airways FZE and Blue Airways
(collectively the ‘‘Related Persons’’), as
I find that renewal of the TDO is
necessary in the public interest to
prevent an imminent violation of the
EAR. However, I do not renew the TDO
against Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky
Five Ltd., and Blue Sky Six Ltd., who
were each Respondents in the initial
TDO and the September 17, 2008
Renewal Order.
PWALKER on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
I. Procedural History
On March 17, 2008, the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement (‘‘Assistant Secretary’’)
signed an Order Temporarily Denying
the Export Privileges of Balli Group
PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings,
Vahid Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband,
Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd.,
Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd.,
Blue Sky Five Ltd., Blue Sky Six Ltd.,
Blue Airways and Mahan Airways for
180 days on the grounds that its
issuance was necessary in the public
interest to prevent an imminent
violation of the Regulations (‘‘TDO’’).
The TDO was issued ex parte pursuant
to Section 766.24(a), and went into
effect on March 21, 2008, the date it was
published in the Federal Register. On
July 18, 2008, the Assistant Secretary
issued an Order adding Blue Airways
FZE and Blue Airways, both of Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, as Related
Persons to the TDO in accordance with
Section 766.23 of the Regulations.1 On
September 17, 2008, the TDO was
renewed for an additional 180 days in
accordance with Section 766.24 of the
Regulations, and was effective upon
issuance.2 The TDO would expire on
March 16, 2009, unless renewed in
accordance with Section 766.24 of the
Regulations.
On February 24, 2009, BIS, through its
Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’),
filed a written request for renewal of the
TDO against each of the Respondents
and Related Persons for an additional
180 days, and served a copy of its
request on the Respondents and Related
Persons in accordance with Section
766.5 of the Regulations. On the evening
of March 9, 2009, Balli Group PLC, Balli
Aviation, Balli Holdings, Vahid
1 The Related Persons Order was issued in
accordance with Section 766.23 of the Regulations,
15 CFR § 766.23, and was published in the Federal
Register on July 24, 2008.
2 The September 17, 2008 Renewal Order was
published in the Federal Register on October 1,
2008.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
01:23 Mar 25, 2009
Jkt 217001
Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue
Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue
Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue
Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky Six Ltd.
(collectively, ‘‘Balli’’ or the ‘‘Balli
Respondents’’) submitted an opposition
to the renewal request. As part of its
opposition, the Balli Respondents
submitted a request for a copy of the
TDO renewal request exhibits. On
March 12, 2009, I issued an Order
granting discovery to the Balli
Respondents of a copy of all of the
exhibits referenced in OEE’s renewal
request, and a copy of the exhibits was
provided to Balli that same day. No
opposition to renewal of the TDO was
received from Respondents Blue
Airways or Mahan Airways.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to section 766.24(d)(3) of the
EAR, the sole issue to be considered in
determining whether to continue a TDO
is whether the TDO should be renewed
to prevent an ‘‘imminent’’ violation of
the EAR as defined in Section 766.24.
‘‘A violation may be ’imminent’ either
in time or in degree of likelihood.’’ 15
CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ‘‘either
that a violation is about to occur, or that
the general circumstances of the matter
under investigation or case under
criminal or administrative charges
demonstrate a likelihood of future
violations.’’ Id. As to the likelihood of
future violations, BIS may show that
‘‘the violation under investigation or
charges is significant, deliberate, covert
and/or likely to occur again, rather than
technical and negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of
information establishing the precise
time a violation may occur does not
preclude a finding that a violation is
imminent, so long as there is sufficient
reason to believe the likelihood of a
violation.’’ Id.
B. The TDO and BIS’s Request for
Renewal
OEE’s request for renewal of the TDO
was based upon the facts underlying the
issuance of the initial TDO, as well as
evidence developed over the course of
this investigation indicating a clear
willingness on the part of the Balli
Respondents to disregard U.S. export
controls and engage in a pattern of false
and deceptive statements. The initial
TDO was issued as a result of evidence
that showed that the Respondents
engaged in conduct prohibited by the
EAR by knowingly re-exporting to Iran
three U.S.-origin aircraft, specifically
Boeing 747s (‘‘Aircraft 1–3’’), items
subject to the EAR and classified under
Export Control Classification Number
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
12837
(‘‘ECCN’’) 9A991.b, without the required
U.S. Government authorization. Further
evidence submitted by BIS indicated
that Respondents were attempting to reexport three additional U.S.-origin
Boeing 747s to Iran (‘‘Aircraft 4–6’’), and
had ignored a re-delivery order for these
additional three aircraft issued by BIS in
accordance with Section 758.8(b) of the
Regulations.
As more fully discussed in the
September 17, 2008 TDO Renewal
Order, evidence presented with BIS’s
August 28, 2008 renewal request and
Balli’s September 10, 2008 opposition
and ‘‘supplemental disclosure’’
indicated that Aircraft 1–3 continued to
be flown on Mahan Airways’ routes
after issuance of the TDO, in violation
of the Regulations and the TDO itself.3
It also showed that Aircraft 1–3 had
been and continued to be flown in
further violation of the Regulations and
the TDO on the routes of Iran Air, an
Iranian Government airline. The Balli
Respondents also made unsubstantiated
and unpersuasive assertions concerning
their level of knowledge of the potential
unlawfulness of their actions, including
long denying any involvement by
Mahan Airways with Aircraft 1–3 and
ignoring warnings from both BIS and
Boeing concerning their lease and
operation, and concerning their level of
cooperation with BIS and efforts to
recover the aircraft.
At the time of the TDO, the Balli
Respondents had failed to produce any
documents concerning payments for the
leases of Aircraft 1–3, which Balli
maintained only involved Blue Airways.
As part of its renewal request, OEE has
presented evidence that the Aircraft 1–
3 were financed by Mahan Air and
evidence of contracts between Balli and
Mahan Airways regarding the
acquisition and operation of the aircraft
that were signed by Balli’s Chief
Executive Officer (‘‘CEO’’) Hassan
Alaghband. OEE has also produced
documents showing that more than one
Iranian bank was used by the
Respondents to facilitate the
transaction. OEE argues that the
contracts and agreements between Balli
and Mahan Airways provide further
evidence of Mahan’s involvement with
the lease and operation of Aircraft 1–3,
as well as the false and misleading
nature of multiple statements by Balli
during this investigation that it had no
knowledge its actions were in violation
or potential violation of the Regulations
and that it was unaware of Mahan’s role
in the acquisition and use of the aircraft.
3 Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial
order violates the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and
(k).
E:\FR\FM\25MRN1.SGM
25MRN1
12838
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 25, 2009 / Notices
As noted above, OEE also is
requesting the TDO be renewed against
Blue Airways and Mahan Airways based
on their participation in the violations
discussed in the initial and renewed
TDOs, as well as additional unlawful
actions since the TDO was renewed on
September 17, 2008. Specifically, in
October 2008, Mahan Airways and Blue
Airways deregistered Aircraft 1–3 from
the Armenian civil aircraft registry and
subsequently registered the aircraft in
Iran. The aircraft have been relocated to
Iran and have been issued Iranian tail
numbers, including EP–MNA and EP–
MNB, and continue to be operated on
Mahan Airway flights in violation of the
Regulations and the TDO.
On February 10, 2009, almost one
year after the initial TDO was issued,
the Balli Respondents for the first time
acknowledged the existence of a side
letter agreement between Balli, Mahan
Airways and other parties which
included certain drafted and undated
bills of sales allowing ownership of
Aircraft 1–3 to be transferred to Mahan
Airways. However, this partial
acknowledgment, contained in one of
Balli’s court filings in the United
Kingdom, fails to explain the full scope
and involvement of Mahan Airways in
this transaction.
PWALKER on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
C. The Respondents’ Opposition to the
Renewal Request
The Balli Respondents, through
counsel, oppose renewal of the TDO on
three grounds: (1) None of the six
aircraft4 in the initial TDO are currently
subject to the control of the Balli
Respondents, and specifically that
Aircraft 1–3 ‘‘were subject to
unauthorized release by Blue Airways
and conversion in October 2008, as set
forth in documents submitted to OEE
investigators on February 10, 2009[,]’’
Balli Opposition, at 3; (2) Balli is
engaged in on-going efforts to produce
documents and information requested
by OEE; and (3) Balli is engaged in ongoing litigation in the United Kingdom
against Blue Airways and Mahan
Airways regarding ownership and
possession of the aircraft.
D. Findings
In determining whether to renew the
TDO in order to prevent imminent
violation of the Regulations, I have
reviewed the entire record, including
OEE’s and Balli’s current and prior
submissions and related evidence. I find
that violations of the Regulations have
occurred and continue to occur
4 The record indicates that Aircraft 4–6 have been
repossessed by the lender. This information is only
relevant to Respondents Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue
Sky Five Ltd. and Blue Sky Six Ltd.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
01:23 Mar 25, 2009
Jkt 217001
involving the unlicensed re-export of
Aircraft 1–3 to Iran. Moreover, Aircraft
1–3 are currently located in Iran and are
registered and/or operated by the
Respondents in violation of the
Regulations and the TDO. In addition,
the Balli Respondents have engaged in
a repeated pattern of making false and
deceptive statements to BIS in order to
both conceal the true nature of their
activities and to seek termination of the
TDO against them. Contrary to Balli’s
previous submissions and efforts to
mislead BIS, OEE’s investigation has
obtained evidence that Balli was dealing
directly with Mahan Airways officials to
obtain financing and to negotiate and
enter agreements pertaining to the
purchase and lease of three Boeing 747
aircraft (Aircraft 1–3). Moreover, the
record shows that more than one Iranian
bank was used by Balli and Mahan
Airways to transfer funds for the
acquisition of the aircraft.
This evidence directly calls into
doubt the veracity of prior submissions
by the Balli Respondents to the
Assistant Secretary and BIS. For
example, by letter dated October 10,
2007, BIS warned Balli, via its English
counsel, that ‘‘[i]t has come to BIS’s
attention there is evidence that during
this lease agreement Blue Airways
operated the three 747s aircraft by or for
the benefit of an Iranian entity,
specifically Mahan Air.’’ Despite the
fact that Balli Respondent and CEO
Hassan Alaghband signed contracts with
Mahan Airways in May of 2007, Balli
stated in its September 10, 2008
submission that the Balli Respondents
had ‘‘failed to focus on the underlying
substantive legal concerns associated
with Boeing and BIS communications,’’
because they believed they were targets
of a ‘‘disinformation campaign’’
orchestrated by ‘‘Iranian expatriate
groups that have a long history of
hostility to Balli interests and the
Alaghband family[,]’’ including
‘‘militant opposition groups hostile to
Iran, including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq.’’
BIS and Boeing’s communications
involved warnings to Balli that the
aircraft were being operated in violation
of the Regulations and were being flown
by or for the benefit of Mahan Airways.
Balli’s production of requested
documents and information has been
delayed, limited and halting at best, and
its repeated pattern of false and
misleading statements further
undermines its assertions concerning
complete, good faith cooperation with
BIS.
Balli’s opposition asserts that Aircraft
1–3 ‘‘were subject to unauthorized
release by Blue Airways and conversion
in October 2008, as set forth in
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
documents submitted to OEE
investigators on February 10, 2009.’’
Balli Opposition, at 3. Balli also has
asserted that Blue Airways and Mahan
Airways ‘‘have previously fabricated
documents—in the offices of Mahan
Airlines in Teheran, Iran—which were
used to unlawfully effect transfer of
control of the subject aircraft for use in
Iran.’’ Id., at 2. These assertions feed
into the Balli Respondents’ remaining
arguments that the TDO should be
terminated against them on the grounds
that they no longer control Aircraft 1–
3 and are litigating with those entities
in England, with an expected July 2009
trial date.
I find Balli’s argument that it is
currently in litigation against Mahan
Airways and Blue Airways in England
to be an unpersuasive and insufficient
basis to terminate the TDO against Balli,
particularly in light of recent evidence
that, contrary to prior statements and
submissions to BIS and the Assistant
Secretary, Balli negotiated directly with
Mahan Air regarding the financing and
operation of the aircraft. However, I find
based upon the entire record before me,
including submissions from OEE and
Balli, that Aircraft 4–6 have been
physically and legally repossessed by
the lender, which is not a respondent in
this action. Therefore, the TDO shall not
be renewed as to Respondents Blue Sky
Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue
Sky Six Ltd.
Unlike the facts involving Aircraft 4–
6, Balli’s argument based on the asserted
ground that Aircraft 1–3 are not
currently under its control due to the
alleged conversion—which Balli asserts
resulted (as referenced above) in the
transfer of control of the subject aircraft
‘‘for use in Iran’’—is unpersuasive and
insufficient. Although the Balli
Respondents refused until September
10, 2008, to admit or acknowledge
Mahan Airway’s involvement, the
record indicates that Aircraft 1–3 were
already in use in Iran under the leases
between Balli and, at least nominally,
Blue Airways. Moreover, the record
before me contains evidence indicating
that the Balli Respondents knowingly
arranged for the financing of the aircraft
with Mahan Airways. This evidence
may well explain why the Balli
Respondents were unable to produce
evidence demonstrating any lease
payments by Blue Airways. In any
event, the fact that Balli is now involved
in an apparent contractual dispute with
its co-conspirators involving items reexported in violation of the Regulations
is simply not a proper basis to let the
TDO expire, especially in light of Balli’s
pattern of false and misleading
statements to BIS.
E:\FR\FM\25MRN1.SGM
25MRN1
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 25, 2009 / Notices
I have considered all of Balli’s
arguments and with the exception of the
argument involving Aircraft 4–6 find
them without merit. I find that the
evidence presented by BIS convincingly
demonstrates that the Respondents have
violated the EAR and the TDO involving
re-exports of aircraft to Iran, that such
violations have been significant,
deliberate and covert, and that there is
a likelihood of future violations. As
such, a TDO is needed to give notice to
persons and companies in the United
States and abroad that they should
continue to cease dealing with the
Respondents in export transactions
involving items subject to the EAR.
Such a TDO is consistent with the
public interest to prevent or preclude
violations of the EAR.
Accordingly, I find pursuant to
Section 766.24, that renewal of the TDO
for 180 days against Balli Group PLC,
Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, Vahid
Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue
Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue
Sky Three Ltd., Blue Airways and
Mahan Airways and both Related
Persons is necessary in the public
interest to prevent an imminent
violation of the EAR.
PWALKER on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
III. Order
It is therefore ordered:
First, that the Respondents, BALLI
GROUP PLC, 5 Stanhope Gate, London,
UK, W1K 1AH; BALLI AVIATION, 5
Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH;
BALLI HOLDINGS, 5 Stanhope Gate,
London, UK, W1K 1AH; VAHID
ALAGHBAND, 5 Stanhope Gate,
London, UK, W1K 1AH; HASSAN
ALAGHBAND, 5 Stanhope Gate,
London, UK, W1K 1AH; BLUE SKY
ONE LTD., 5 Stanhope Gate, London,
UK, W1K 1AH; BLUE SKY TWO LTD.,
5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K
1AH; BLUE SKY THREE LTD., BLUE
AIRWAYS, 8/3 D Angaght Street,
376009 Yerevan, Armenia; and MAHAN
AIRWAYS, Mahan Tower, No. 21,
Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp.Way,
Tehran, Iran (each a ‘‘Denied Person’’
and collectively the ‘‘Denied Persons’’),
and BLUE AIRWAYS FZE, a/k/a Blue
Airways, #G22 Dubai Airport Free Zone,
P.O. Box 393754 DAFZA, Dubai, United
Arab Emirates and BLUE AIRWAYS,
Riqa Road, Dubai 52404, United Arab
Emirates (each a ‘‘Related Person’’ and
collectively the ‘‘Related Persons’’) may
not, directly or indirectly, participate in
any way in any transaction involving
any commodity, software or technology
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
‘‘item’’) exported or to be exported from
the United States that is subject to the
Export Administration Regulations
VerDate Nov<24>2008
01:23 Mar 25, 2009
Jkt 217001
(‘‘EAR’’), or in any other activity subject
to the EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using
any license, License Exception, or
export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the EAR, or in any other
activity subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefiting in any way from any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the EAR, or in any
other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly
or indirectly, do any of the following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf
of the Denied Persons or Related
Persons any item subject to the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the
acquisition or attempted acquisition by
the Denied Persons or Related Persons
of the ownership, possession, or control
of any item subject to the EAR that has
been or will be exported from the
United States, including financing or
other support activities related to a
transaction whereby the Denied Persons
or Related Persons acquires or attempts
to acquire such ownership, possession
or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted
acquisition from the Denied Persons or
Related Persons of any item subject to
the EAR that has been exported from the
United States;
D. Obtain from the Denied Persons or
Related Persons in the United States any
item subject to the EAR with knowledge
or reason to know that the item will be,
or is intended to be, exported from the
United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service
any item subject to the EAR that has
been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by the Denied
Persons or Related Persons, or service
any item, of whatever origin, that is
owned, possessed or controlled by the
Denied Persons or Related Persons if
such service involves the use of any
item subject to the EAR that has been or
will be exported from the United States.
For purposes of this paragraph,
servicing means installation,
maintenance, repair, modification or
testing.
Third, that, after notice and
opportunity for comment as provided in
section 766.23 of the EAR, any other
person, firm, corporation, or business
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
12839
organization related to any of the
Denied Persons by affiliation,
ownership, control, or position of
responsibility in the conduct of trade or
related services may also be made
subject to the provisions of this Order.
Fourth, that this Order does not
prohibit any export, reexport, or other
transaction subject to the EAR where the
only items involved that are subject to
the EAR are the foreign-produced direct
product of U.S.-origin technology.
In accordance with the provisions of
Section 766.24(e) of the EAR, the
Respondents may, at any time, appeal
this Order by filing a full written
statement in support of the appeal with
the Office of the Administrative Law
Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing
Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore,
Maryland 21202–4022.
In accordance with the provisions of
Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may
seek renewal of this Order by filing a
written request not later than 20 days
before the expiration date. The
Respondents may oppose a request to
renew this Order by filing a written
submission with the Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Export Enforcement,
which must be received not later than
seven days before the expiration date of
the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be served
on the Respondents and the Related
Persons and shall be published in the
Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately and
shall remain in effect for 180 days.
Entered this 16th day of March 2009.
Kevin Delli-Colli,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E9–6607 Filed 3–24–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
RIN: 0648–XO35
Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
Council; Public Meetings
AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of public meetings.
SUMMARY: The Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council (Council) will
convene public meetings.
DATES: The meetings will be held April
14–17, 2009.
E:\FR\FM\25MRN1.SGM
25MRN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 56 (Wednesday, March 25, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 12836-12839]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-6607]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Action Affecting Export Privileges; Balli Group PLC; Balli
Aviation; Balli Holdings; Vahid Alaghband; Hassan Alaghband; Blue Sky
One Ltd.; Blue Sky Two Ltd.; Blue Sky Three Ltd.; Blue Airways; Mahan
Airways; Blue Airways FZE
In the matter of:
Balli Group PLC, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH;
Balli Aviation, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH;
Balli Holdings, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH;
Vahid Alaghband, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH;
Hassan Alaghband, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH;
Blue Sky One Ltd., 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH;
Blue Sky Two Ltd., 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH;
Blue Sky Three Ltd., 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH;
Blue Airways, 8/3 D Angaght Street, 376009 Yerevan, Armenia;
Mahan Airways, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp.
Way, Tehran, Iran; Respondents;
and
Blue Airways FZE, a/k/a Blue Airways, G22 Dubai Airport
Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754 DAFZA, Dubai, UAE;
Blue Airways, Riqa Road, Dubai 52404, UAE; Related Persons.
Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges
Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration
Regulations, 15 CFR Parts 730-774 (2008) (``EAR'' or the
``Regulations''), I hereby grant the request of the Bureau of Industry
and Security (``BIS'') to renew for 180 days the Order Temporarily
Denying the Export Privileges of Respondents Balli Group PLC, Balli
Aviation, Balli
[[Page 12837]]
Holdings, Vahid Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue
Sky Two Ltd., Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue Airways and Mahan Airways
(collectively, ``Respondents'') and Blue Airways FZE and Blue Airways
(collectively the ``Related Persons''), as I find that renewal of the
TDO is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent
violation of the EAR. However, I do not renew the TDO against Blue Sky
Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky Six Ltd., who were each
Respondents in the initial TDO and the September 17, 2008 Renewal
Order.
I. Procedural History
On March 17, 2008, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement (``Assistant Secretary'') signed an Order Temporarily
Denying the Export Privileges of Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli
Holdings, Vahid Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue
Sky Two Ltd., Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five
Ltd., Blue Sky Six Ltd., Blue Airways and Mahan Airways for 180 days on
the grounds that its issuance was necessary in the public interest to
prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations (``TDO''). The TDO was
issued ex parte pursuant to Section 766.24(a), and went into effect on
March 21, 2008, the date it was published in the Federal Register. On
July 18, 2008, the Assistant Secretary issued an Order adding Blue
Airways FZE and Blue Airways, both of Dubai, United Arab Emirates, as
Related Persons to the TDO in accordance with Section 766.23 of the
Regulations.\1\ On September 17, 2008, the TDO was renewed for an
additional 180 days in accordance with Section 766.24 of the
Regulations, and was effective upon issuance.\2\ The TDO would expire
on March 16, 2009, unless renewed in accordance with Section 766.24 of
the Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Related Persons Order was issued in accordance with
Section 766.23 of the Regulations, 15 CFR Sec. 766.23, and was
published in the Federal Register on July 24, 2008.
\2\ The September 17, 2008 Renewal Order was published in the
Federal Register on October 1, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 24, 2009, BIS, through its Office of Export Enforcement
(``OEE''), filed a written request for renewal of the TDO against each
of the Respondents and Related Persons for an additional 180 days, and
served a copy of its request on the Respondents and Related Persons in
accordance with Section 766.5 of the Regulations. On the evening of
March 9, 2009, Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, Vahid
Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue
Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky
Six Ltd. (collectively, ``Balli'' or the ``Balli Respondents'')
submitted an opposition to the renewal request. As part of its
opposition, the Balli Respondents submitted a request for a copy of the
TDO renewal request exhibits. On March 12, 2009, I issued an Order
granting discovery to the Balli Respondents of a copy of all of the
exhibits referenced in OEE's renewal request, and a copy of the
exhibits was provided to Balli that same day. No opposition to renewal
of the TDO was received from Respondents Blue Airways or Mahan Airways.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to section 766.24(d)(3) of the EAR, the sole issue to be
considered in determining whether to continue a TDO is whether the TDO
should be renewed to prevent an ``imminent'' violation of the EAR as
defined in Section 766.24. ``A violation may be 'imminent' either in
time or in degree of likelihood.'' 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show
``either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general
circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal
or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future
violations.'' Id. As to the likelihood of future violations, BIS may
show that ``the violation under investigation or charges is
significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather
than technical and negligent[.]'' Id. A ``lack of information
establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a
finding that a violation is imminent, so long as there is sufficient
reason to believe the likelihood of a violation.'' Id.
B. The TDO and BIS's Request for Renewal
OEE's request for renewal of the TDO was based upon the facts
underlying the issuance of the initial TDO, as well as evidence
developed over the course of this investigation indicating a clear
willingness on the part of the Balli Respondents to disregard U.S.
export controls and engage in a pattern of false and deceptive
statements. The initial TDO was issued as a result of evidence that
showed that the Respondents engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR by
knowingly re-exporting to Iran three U.S.-origin aircraft, specifically
Boeing 747s (``Aircraft 1-3''), items subject to the EAR and classified
under Export Control Classification Number (``ECCN'') 9A991.b, without
the required U.S. Government authorization. Further evidence submitted
by BIS indicated that Respondents were attempting to re-export three
additional U.S.-origin Boeing 747s to Iran (``Aircraft 4-6''), and had
ignored a re-delivery order for these additional three aircraft issued
by BIS in accordance with Section 758.8(b) of the Regulations.
As more fully discussed in the September 17, 2008 TDO Renewal
Order, evidence presented with BIS's August 28, 2008 renewal request
and Balli's September 10, 2008 opposition and ``supplemental
disclosure'' indicated that Aircraft 1-3 continued to be flown on Mahan
Airways' routes after issuance of the TDO, in violation of the
Regulations and the TDO itself.\3\ It also showed that Aircraft 1-3 had
been and continued to be flown in further violation of the Regulations
and the TDO on the routes of Iran Air, an Iranian Government airline.
The Balli Respondents also made unsubstantiated and unpersuasive
assertions concerning their level of knowledge of the potential
unlawfulness of their actions, including long denying any involvement
by Mahan Airways with Aircraft 1-3 and ignoring warnings from both BIS
and Boeing concerning their lease and operation, and concerning their
level of cooperation with BIS and efforts to recover the aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates
the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and (k).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the time of the TDO, the Balli Respondents had failed to produce
any documents concerning payments for the leases of Aircraft 1-3, which
Balli maintained only involved Blue Airways. As part of its renewal
request, OEE has presented evidence that the Aircraft 1-3 were financed
by Mahan Air and evidence of contracts between Balli and Mahan Airways
regarding the acquisition and operation of the aircraft that were
signed by Balli's Chief Executive Officer (``CEO'') Hassan Alaghband.
OEE has also produced documents showing that more than one Iranian bank
was used by the Respondents to facilitate the transaction. OEE argues
that the contracts and agreements between Balli and Mahan Airways
provide further evidence of Mahan's involvement with the lease and
operation of Aircraft 1-3, as well as the false and misleading nature
of multiple statements by Balli during this investigation that it had
no knowledge its actions were in violation or potential violation of
the Regulations and that it was unaware of Mahan's role in the
acquisition and use of the aircraft.
[[Page 12838]]
As noted above, OEE also is requesting the TDO be renewed against
Blue Airways and Mahan Airways based on their participation in the
violations discussed in the initial and renewed TDOs, as well as
additional unlawful actions since the TDO was renewed on September 17,
2008. Specifically, in October 2008, Mahan Airways and Blue Airways
deregistered Aircraft 1-3 from the Armenian civil aircraft registry and
subsequently registered the aircraft in Iran. The aircraft have been
relocated to Iran and have been issued Iranian tail numbers, including
EP-MNA and EP-MNB, and continue to be operated on Mahan Airway flights
in violation of the Regulations and the TDO.
On February 10, 2009, almost one year after the initial TDO was
issued, the Balli Respondents for the first time acknowledged the
existence of a side letter agreement between Balli, Mahan Airways and
other parties which included certain drafted and undated bills of sales
allowing ownership of Aircraft 1-3 to be transferred to Mahan Airways.
However, this partial acknowledgment, contained in one of Balli's court
filings in the United Kingdom, fails to explain the full scope and
involvement of Mahan Airways in this transaction.
C. The Respondents' Opposition to the Renewal Request
The Balli Respondents, through counsel, oppose renewal of the TDO
on three grounds: (1) None of the six aircraft\4\ in the initial TDO
are currently subject to the control of the Balli Respondents, and
specifically that Aircraft 1-3 ``were subject to unauthorized release
by Blue Airways and conversion in October 2008, as set forth in
documents submitted to OEE investigators on February 10, 2009[,]''
Balli Opposition, at 3; (2) Balli is engaged in on-going efforts to
produce documents and information requested by OEE; and (3) Balli is
engaged in on-going litigation in the United Kingdom against Blue
Airways and Mahan Airways regarding ownership and possession of the
aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The record indicates that Aircraft 4-6 have been repossessed
by the lender. This information is only relevant to Respondents Blue
Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd. and Blue Sky Six Ltd.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Findings
In determining whether to renew the TDO in order to prevent
imminent violation of the Regulations, I have reviewed the entire
record, including OEE's and Balli's current and prior submissions and
related evidence. I find that violations of the Regulations have
occurred and continue to occur involving the unlicensed re-export of
Aircraft 1-3 to Iran. Moreover, Aircraft 1-3 are currently located in
Iran and are registered and/or operated by the Respondents in violation
of the Regulations and the TDO. In addition, the Balli Respondents have
engaged in a repeated pattern of making false and deceptive statements
to BIS in order to both conceal the true nature of their activities and
to seek termination of the TDO against them. Contrary to Balli's
previous submissions and efforts to mislead BIS, OEE's investigation
has obtained evidence that Balli was dealing directly with Mahan
Airways officials to obtain financing and to negotiate and enter
agreements pertaining to the purchase and lease of three Boeing 747
aircraft (Aircraft 1-3). Moreover, the record shows that more than one
Iranian bank was used by Balli and Mahan Airways to transfer funds for
the acquisition of the aircraft.
This evidence directly calls into doubt the veracity of prior
submissions by the Balli Respondents to the Assistant Secretary and
BIS. For example, by letter dated October 10, 2007, BIS warned Balli,
via its English counsel, that ``[i]t has come to BIS's attention there
is evidence that during this lease agreement Blue Airways operated the
three 747s aircraft by or for the benefit of an Iranian entity,
specifically Mahan Air.'' Despite the fact that Balli Respondent and
CEO Hassan Alaghband signed contracts with Mahan Airways in May of
2007, Balli stated in its September 10, 2008 submission that the Balli
Respondents had ``failed to focus on the underlying substantive legal
concerns associated with Boeing and BIS communications,'' because they
believed they were targets of a ``disinformation campaign''
orchestrated by ``Iranian expatriate groups that have a long history of
hostility to Balli interests and the Alaghband family[,]'' including
``militant opposition groups hostile to Iran, including the Mujahedin-
e-Khalq.'' BIS and Boeing's communications involved warnings to Balli
that the aircraft were being operated in violation of the Regulations
and were being flown by or for the benefit of Mahan Airways. Balli's
production of requested documents and information has been delayed,
limited and halting at best, and its repeated pattern of false and
misleading statements further undermines its assertions concerning
complete, good faith cooperation with BIS.
Balli's opposition asserts that Aircraft 1-3 ``were subject to
unauthorized release by Blue Airways and conversion in October 2008, as
set forth in documents submitted to OEE investigators on February 10,
2009.'' Balli Opposition, at 3. Balli also has asserted that Blue
Airways and Mahan Airways ``have previously fabricated documents--in
the offices of Mahan Airlines in Teheran, Iran--which were used to
unlawfully effect transfer of control of the subject aircraft for use
in Iran.'' Id., at 2. These assertions feed into the Balli Respondents'
remaining arguments that the TDO should be terminated against them on
the grounds that they no longer control Aircraft 1-3 and are litigating
with those entities in England, with an expected July 2009 trial date.
I find Balli's argument that it is currently in litigation against
Mahan Airways and Blue Airways in England to be an unpersuasive and
insufficient basis to terminate the TDO against Balli, particularly in
light of recent evidence that, contrary to prior statements and
submissions to BIS and the Assistant Secretary, Balli negotiated
directly with Mahan Air regarding the financing and operation of the
aircraft. However, I find based upon the entire record before me,
including submissions from OEE and Balli, that Aircraft 4-6 have been
physically and legally repossessed by the lender, which is not a
respondent in this action. Therefore, the TDO shall not be renewed as
to Respondents Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky Six
Ltd.
Unlike the facts involving Aircraft 4-6, Balli's argument based on
the asserted ground that Aircraft 1-3 are not currently under its
control due to the alleged conversion--which Balli asserts resulted (as
referenced above) in the transfer of control of the subject aircraft
``for use in Iran''--is unpersuasive and insufficient. Although the
Balli Respondents refused until September 10, 2008, to admit or
acknowledge Mahan Airway's involvement, the record indicates that
Aircraft 1-3 were already in use in Iran under the leases between Balli
and, at least nominally, Blue Airways. Moreover, the record before me
contains evidence indicating that the Balli Respondents knowingly
arranged for the financing of the aircraft with Mahan Airways. This
evidence may well explain why the Balli Respondents were unable to
produce evidence demonstrating any lease payments by Blue Airways. In
any event, the fact that Balli is now involved in an apparent
contractual dispute with its co-conspirators involving items re-
exported in violation of the Regulations is simply not a proper basis
to let the TDO expire, especially in light of Balli's pattern of false
and misleading statements to BIS.
[[Page 12839]]
I have considered all of Balli's arguments and with the exception
of the argument involving Aircraft 4-6 find them without merit. I find
that the evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that the
Respondents have violated the EAR and the TDO involving re-exports of
aircraft to Iran, that such violations have been significant,
deliberate and covert, and that there is a likelihood of future
violations. As such, a TDO is needed to give notice to persons and
companies in the United States and abroad that they should continue to
cease dealing with the Respondents in export transactions involving
items subject to the EAR. Such a TDO is consistent with the public
interest to prevent or preclude violations of the EAR.
Accordingly, I find pursuant to Section 766.24, that renewal of the
TDO for 180 days against Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli
Holdings, Vahid Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue
Sky Two Ltd., Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue Airways and Mahan Airways and
both Related Persons is necessary in the public interest to prevent an
imminent violation of the EAR.
III. Order
It is therefore ordered:
First, that the Respondents, BALLI GROUP PLC, 5 Stanhope Gate,
London, UK, W1K 1AH; BALLI AVIATION, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K
1AH; BALLI HOLDINGS, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH; VAHID
ALAGHBAND, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH; HASSAN ALAGHBAND, 5
Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH; BLUE SKY ONE LTD., 5 Stanhope Gate,
London, UK, W1K 1AH; BLUE SKY TWO LTD., 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK,
W1K 1AH; BLUE SKY THREE LTD., BLUE AIRWAYS, 8/3 D Angaght Street,
376009 Yerevan, Armenia; and MAHAN AIRWAYS, Mahan Tower, No. 21,
Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp.Way, Tehran, Iran (each a ``Denied
Person'' and collectively the ``Denied Persons''), and BLUE AIRWAYS
FZE, a/k/a Blue Airways, G22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box
393754 DAFZA, Dubai, United Arab Emirates and BLUE AIRWAYS, Riqa Road,
Dubai 52404, United Arab Emirates (each a ``Related Person'' and
collectively the ``Related Persons'') may not, directly or indirectly,
participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity,
software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as
``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is
subject to the Export Administration Regulations (``EAR''), or in any
other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License
Exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity
subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefiting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of the Denied Persons or
Related Persons any item subject to the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by the Denied Persons or Related Persons of the ownership,
possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or
will be exported from the United States, including financing or other
support activities related to a transaction whereby the Denied Persons
or Related Persons acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership,
possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from the Denied Persons or Related Persons of
any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United
States;
D. Obtain from the Denied Persons or Related Persons in the United
States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know
that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United
States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is
owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Persons or Related
Persons, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned,
possessed or controlled by the Denied Persons or Related Persons if
such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has
been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes of this
paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to any of the Denied Persons by
affiliation, ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the
conduct of trade or related services may also be made subject to the
provisions of this Order.
Fourth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or
other transaction subject to the EAR where the only items involved that
are subject to the EAR are the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-
origin technology.
In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(e) of the EAR,
the Respondents may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full
written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.
In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR,
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not
later than 20 days before the expiration date. The Respondents may
oppose a request to renew this Order by filing a written submission
with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, which
must be received not later than seven days before the expiration date
of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be served on the Respondents and the
Related Persons and shall be published in the Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect
for 180 days.
Entered this 16th day of March 2009.
Kevin Delli-Colli,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E9-6607 Filed 3-24-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P
