Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes, 10457-10469 [E9-5290]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 46 (Wednesday, March 11, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 10457-10469]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-5290]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-1318; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-155-AD; 
Amendment 39-15848; AD 2009-06-12]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional 
Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) 
for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory 
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation 
authority of another country to identify and correct

[[Page 10458]]

an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the 
unsafe condition as:
* * * * *
    The Bombardier CL-600-2B19 airplanes have had a history of flap 
failures at various positions for several years. Flap failure may 
result in a significant increase in required landing distances and 
higher fuel consumption than planned during a diversion. * * *

* * * * *
We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe 
condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective April 15, 2009.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of April 15, 
2009.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of certain other publications listed in this AD as of 
September 5, 2007 (72 FR 46555, August 21, 2007).

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, 
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Parrillo, Aerospace Engineer, 
Systems and Flight Test Branch, ANE-171, FAA, New York Aircraft 
Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New 
York 11590; telephone (516) 228-7305; fax (516) 794-5531.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. 
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on December 18, 2008 
(73 FR 76974) and proposed to supersede AD 2008-01-04, Amendment 39-
15329 (73 FR 1964, January 11, 2008). That NPRM proposed to correct an 
unsafe condition for the specified products.
    That NPRM proposed to retain the requirements of AD 2008-01-04, 
i.e., revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to incorporate a 
temporary revision (TR) into the AFM, adding operational procedures 
into the AFM, training flight crewmembers and operational control/
dispatch personnel on the operational procedures, and doing corrective 
maintenance actions. The corrective maintenance actions include a 
pressure test of the flexible drive-shaft and corrective actions, and a 
low temperature torque test of the flap actuators and corrective 
actions.
    That NPRM also proposed to add repetitive low temperature torque 
tests of the flap actuators and corrective actions. In addition, that 
NPRM proposed to require revising the AFM to incorporate a new TR 
(adding maximum flaps operating speed data and clarifying maximum flaps 
extended speeds), and to modify the Operational Limitations. That NPRM 
also proposed to require revising the annual simulator training for 
``Flap Zero Landing'' events and revising the previously required 
training for flight crewmembers and operational control/dispatch 
personnel on the operational procedures.
    Further, the NPRM proposed to require certain maintenance actions 
following a flap fail event and installation of a cockpit placard that 
specifies new flap operating limitations. That NPRM also proposed to 
allow installing modified flap actuators, which would terminate certain 
sections of the operational procedures.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. We considered the comments received.

Request To Revise Wording in Paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM

    Mesa Group requests that we revise the wording in paragraph (h)(6) 
of the NPRM. The commenter points out that paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM 
specifies to do maintenance actions ``except if maintenance actions 
cannot be done and normal flap system operation can be restored after 
an on-ground circuit breaker reset operation, then continued revenue 
operation is permitted without further maintenance action for up to 10 
flight cycles * * *.'' The commenter states the descriptions of the 
actions in paragraphs (h)(6)(i) and (h)(6)(ii) of the NPRM--i.e., to 
``do the maintenance actions specified in paragraph (h)(6) of the 
AD''--create a ``loop'' and jeopardize safety of flight because 
operators can continue flight indefinitely as long as the airplane 
lands where maintenance actions cannot be done.
    We disagree with the commenter's assertion that the actions 
proposed in paragraphs (h)(6)(i) and (h)(6)(ii) of the NPRM create a 
loop. Paragraph (h)(6) of this AD provides an exception to doing the 
maintenance actions before further flight on airplanes on which a flap 
fail message occurs. The exception allows flight without further 
maintenance action for up to 10 flight cycles subject to certain 
operating limitations and after an on-ground circuit breaker reset 
operation, except as provided by the actions described in paragraphs 
(h)(6)(i) and (h)(6)(ii) of this AD.
    Paragraph (h)(6)(i) of this AD limits the allowable flight cycles 
by specifying that the maintenance actions specified in paragraph 
(h)(6) of this AD must be done within 10 flight cycles following the 
initial on-ground circuit breaker reset operation. Paragraph (h)(6)(ii) 
of this AD also limits the allowable flight cycles by specifying that 
if another flap fail event occurs any time after the initial circuit 
breaker reset operation, then the maintenance actions specified in 
paragraph (h)(6) of this AD must be done before further flight.
    Once operators have done the on-ground circuit breaker reset 
operation, the maintenance actions must be done within the compliance 
time specified in paragraph (h)(6)(i) or (h)(6)(ii) of this AD, 
depending on whether another flap fail event occurs. Paragraphs 
(h)(6)(i) and (h)(6)(ii) of this AD do not allow any exceptions to the 
specified compliance times. However, for clarity, we have revised 
paragraphs (h)(6)(i) and (h)(6)(ii) to refer to the service information 
instead of paragraph (h)(6) of this AD.

Request To Revise or Supersede AD 2006-12-21

    Comair requests that we revise or supersede AD 2006-12-21, 
amendment 39-14647 (71 FR 34793, June 16, 2006), to add a statement 
indicating that the installation of the actuators called out in 
paragraph (h)(5) of the NPRM is acceptable for compliance with 
paragraph (h) of AD 2006-12-21. The commenter notes that in paragraph 
(i) of the NPRM we include such a statement, but there will still be no 
cross reference within AD 2006-12-21 itself.
    We do not agree that it is necessary to revise or supersede AD 
2006-12-21. The intent of paragraph (i) of this AD is simply to specify 
that installing certain flap actuators provides a method of compliance 
with paragraph (h) of AD 2006-12-21. In addition, a global alternative 
method of compliance (AMOC) to AD 2006-12-21 was granted to Bombardier 
on November 18, 2008, which allowed installation of actuator part 
numbers (P/Ns) 601R93103-23/24 (Vendor P/N 853D100-23/24) in lieu of P/
Ns 601R93103-19/20 (Vendor P/Ns 853D100-19/20) as a way to comply with 
paragraph (h) of AD 2006-12-21. The AMOC also allows installation of 
actuator P/Ns 601R93104-23/24 (Vendor P/N 854D100-23/24) in lieu of P/
Ns 601R93104-19/20 (Vendor P/N 854D100-19/20) as a way to comply with 
paragraph (h) of AD 2006-12-21.

[[Page 10459]]

We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Revise AFM Reference

    Comair and Air Wisconsin request that we revise an AFM reference in 
the quoted material of paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM from ``AFM TR/165'' 
to ``AFM TR RJ/165-1.'' Both commenters request that we revise the AFM 
reference in Note 1 following ``paragraph 1.'' of the quoted material. 
Comair also requests that we revise the AFM reference in the Note 
following ``paragraph 2.'' of the quoted material.
    We agree to revise the AFM reference because AFM TR RJ/165-1 is the 
latest AFM TR. We have revised the notes within the quoted material in 
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD accordingly.

Request To Remove Training Requirement

    Two commenters, Comair and Air Wisconsin, request that we remove 
training requirements from the NPRM. Comair states that paragraphs 
(f)(3), (g)(1), and (h)(3) of the NPRM contain training requirements 
and that an AD is not the proper mechanism to mandate training. Comair 
states that 14 CFR 39.3 defines airworthiness directives as ``* * * 
legally enforceable rules that apply to the following products: 
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances.'' Comair 
further states that these paragraphs requiring training are issued 
against people and not against a product. Air Wisconsin also states 
that paragraphs (g)(1), (h)(3)(i), and (h)(3)(ii) of the NPRM do not 
belong in the AD because those paragraphs apply to flight crewmembers 
and operational control/dispatch personnel.
    We disagree with the request to remove training requirements. 
Section 39.11 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.11) 
describes the types of actions that ADs can require, including 
``conditions and limitations you must comply with.'' While we agree 
that section 39.3 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.3) 
applies to the products listed in 14 CFR 39.11, we retain broad 
authority to require any corrective action that is determined to be 
most effective in addressing an identified unsafe condition on any of 
the products listed in 14 CFR 39.3.
    In this AD, we have found that one of the factors contributing to 
the identified unsafe condition is lack of flightcrew training in 
operating an airplane when a flap failure occurs in flight (such as in 
freezing conditions). Due to the unsafe condition, we determined that 
these training requirements, in conjunction with the other requirements 
of this AD, are necessary for safe operation of the airplane. We have 
not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify Requirements in Paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) 
of the NPRM

    Comair requests that we clarify the requirements specified in 
paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of the NPRM. Comair states that in 
recent years it seems to have become common practice when an AD is 
superseded by another AD that the old requirements are restated as they 
appeared in the superseded AD. Paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of 
AD 2008-01-04 refer to ``2,000 flight hours.'' Paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and 
(g)(3)(ii) of this NPRM now list ``5,000 flight cycles.'' Comair states 
that if there is a new requirement, for consistency, it should fall 
under paragraph (h) of the NPRM.
    Comair is correct in observing that we generally restate the 
requirements of the existing AD in the new AD. We restate the 
requirements as a necessity when the requirements of the existing AD 
continue in the new AD or when certain requirements of the new AD are 
tied to accomplishment of an action or actions in the existing AD, and 
as a courtesy to operators for their reference. When there are 
compliance changes to the actions in the existing AD, we may keep the 
actions in the restatement section; thus, we restated paragraph (g)(3) 
of this AD with a change to the accumulated time on the actuators.
    In this case, we have extended the accumulated time on the 
actuators that are affected by paragraph (g)(3) of this AD. We 
explained this in the Discussion section of the NPRM as follows:

    This proposed AD also re-identifies the airplanes affected by 
paragraph (g)(3) of the existing AD. The accumulated time on the 
actuators specified in paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of this 
AD has been extended from ``2,000 flight hours'' to ``5,000 flight 
cycles.''

The re-identification does not affect airplanes that have already 
complied with the actions specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this AD and 
is relieving for airplanes that have not yet complied with the actions 
specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this AD. No change has been made to 
paragraph (g)(3) of this AD.

Request To Clarify Requirements of Paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(4) of the 
NPRM

    Air Wisconsin requests that we clarify the requirements of 
paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(4) of the NPRM. Air Wisconsin states that 
paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of the NPRM and paragraphs 
(h)(4)(i) and (h)(4)(ii) of the NPRM are confusing because they seem to 
duplicate each other. Air Wisconsin suggests that paragraphs (h)(4)(i) 
and (h)(4)(ii) be removed and that we refer to paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and 
(g)(3)(ii) instead in paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM.
    Air Wisconsin further requests that we clarify whether paragraphs 
(g)(3) and (h)(4) of the NPRM apply to actuators that had the pinion 
shaft seals replaced since February 15, 2008, and have fewer than 5,000 
flight cycles since replacement. In addition, Air Wisconsin also 
requests that we clarify whether paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(4) of the 
NPRM do not apply to actuators that are overhauled or that had the 
pinion shaft seals replaced.
    We agree that the requirements of paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(4) 
should be clarified. Paragraph (g)(3) of this AD applies to airplanes 
that have actuators (identified in paragraph (g)(3) of this AD) that 
meet the conditions of either paragraph (g)(3)(i) or (g)(3)(ii) of this 
AD. Once an actuator accumulates more than 5,000 flight cycles since 
new, or a repaired actuator accumulates more than 5,000 flight cycles 
on the pinion shaft seals, operators must do the low-temperature torque 
test specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this AD. If an actuator has 5,000 
or fewer flight cycles since new, or if an actuator that has been 
repaired has 5,000 or fewer flight cycles since pinion shaft seal 
replacement, then paragraph (g)(3) of this AD does not apply to that 
actuator. Therefore, paragraph (g)(3) of this AD also does not apply to 
overhauled actuators with 5,000 or fewer flight cycles since the pinion 
shaft seals have been replaced.
    The intent of paragraph (h)(4) of this AD is to require repetitive 
low temperature torque tests to be done for actuators having more than 
5,000 flight cycles, and on repaired actuators having more than 5,000 
flight cycles on the pinion shaft seals.
    If the actuators are replaced with new actuators having 5,000 
flight cycles or fewer, or with repaired actuators having 5,000 flight 
cycles or fewer on the pinion shaft seals, then the repetitive torque 
tests are terminated.
    However, the replaced actuators will be affected by the 
requirements of paragraph (g)(3) of this AD once the new actuator 
accumulates more than 5,000 flight cycles since new, or the repaired 
actuator accumulates more than 5,000 flight cycles on the pinion shaft 
seals; once these actuators are required to have the low temperature 
torque test specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this AD, these actuators 
will be affected by the requirements of paragraph (h)(4) of this AD if 
they pass the torque test (i.e., the actuators that do not need to be

[[Page 10460]]

replaced). We have revised paragraph (h)(4) of this AD to clarify these 
requirements and removed paragraphs (h)(4)(i) and (h)(4)(ii) of this 
AD.

Request To Revise Language in the Quoted Material in Paragraph (h)(2) 
of the NPRM

    Several commenters request that we revise specific language in the 
section titled ``4. Dispatch Following a Flap Failed Event'' of the 
quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM:
     Comair requests that we clarify the listing for conditions 
a., b., c., and d. specified in paragraph 4. of the quoted material.
    We agree to clarify the listing for conditions a., b., c., and d. 
specified in paragraph 4. of the quoted material. We have determined 
that the current wording is not clear in specifying that conditions 
``a. and b., and either c. or d.,'' must be met. Therefore, we have 
revised the wording in the section titled ``4. Dispatch Following a 
Flap Failed Event'' of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this 
AD as follows:

    ``If normal flap system operation can be restored after an on-
ground system reset, continued revenue operation of that airplane is 
permitted, provided conditions a. and b., and either c. or d., below 
are satisfied: * * *.''

     Air Wisconsin and Pinnacle Airlines request that we 
clarify that the maintenance technician/personnel or flight crewmember 
can accomplish the operational check specified in paragraph 4.b. of the 
quoted material.
    We agree with the request to clarify paragraph 4.b. of the quoted 
material. The flightcrew has the responsibility for verifying the 
operability of the systems called out in paragraph 4.b. of the quoted 
material. We have revised paragraph 4.b. of the quoted material in 
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD to read:

    ``Prior to each flight following an on-ground circuit breaker 
reset, the thrust reversers, ground spoilers, and brake system are 
verified operational by the flightcrew.''

     Comair requests that we clarify that there is no 
requirement to document the results of the flightcrew system tests, and 
suggests adding the following statement to paragraph 4. of the quoted 
material: ``Note: No maintenance log entry is required for the 
following action.''
    We disagree with the commenter's request. There must be operator-
controlled documentation that accounts for the 10-flight-cycle 
limitation following the initial reset of a circuit breaker. The method 
of documentation is up to the discretion of the operator and the 
principal operations inspector (POI). We have not revised this AD in 
this regard.
     Comair also requests that we add the following statement 
to paragraph 4. of the quoted material: ``Until a maintenance action 
can be performed as specified by (h)(3)(6), for each flight following 
an on-ground circuit breaker reset, either condition a. or b. [landing 
distance available], below, must be satisfied: * * *.''
    We disagree with the request to add the statement. We find that the 
language suggested by the commenter provides no substantive change from 
the meaning of the paragraph as it is written in the NPRM, and that no 
clarity would be added with such a change. We have not revised this AD 
in this regard.
     Air Wisconsin and PSA Airlines request that the action 
specified in paragraph 4.b. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) 
of the NPRM be revised to clarify what needs to be accomplished and 
what is expected. Air Wisconsin states that the type of check should be 
specified. PSA Airlines suggests that the word ``verify'' be removed. 
Comair also requests that we clarify paragraph 4.b. by specifying ``For 
each flight following an on-ground circuit breaker reset, prior to 
take-off, the following checks [thrust reversers, ground spoilers, and 
brake system] must be performed: * * *.'' In addition, Comair requests 
that additional information on the operational checks be provided.
    We clarify that paragraph 4.b. of the quoted material in paragraph 
(h)(2) of this AD is intended to apply to all operators. Individual 
operators have the option of using more restrictive language. We find 
no need to revise this AD in this regard.
     Pinnacle Airlines requests that we clarify who must 
perform the on-ground circuit breaker reset. Pinnacle Airlines infers 
that the flightcrew does the reset.
    We clarify that the following wording in paragraph (h)(6) of this 
AD makes it apparent the flightcrew performs the reset: ``* * * the 
circuit breaker reset operation can be performed by the flightcrew when 
authorized by the operator's maintenance control organization.'' We 
have not revised this AD in this regard.
     Pinnacle Airlines states that we should clarify that the 
flightcrew or maintenance personnel can perform the operation of the 
flaps for 5 cycles specified in paragraph 4.a. of the quoted material 
in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD. Pinnacle states that allowing only 
flightcrews to perform this function, under certain circumstances (such 
as crew duty time issues), could have substantial negative logistic 
impacts, which could have a negative impact on passenger service.
    We disagree with the commenter. The operation of the flaps for 5 
cycles, as specified in paragraph 4.a. of the quoted material in 
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD, is intended to be a flightcrew function. 
Doing this operation is predicated on the condition specified in (h)(6) 
of this AD when maintenance resources are not available. If maintenance 
personnel are available, operators should be performing the maintenance 
procedures in accordance with the fault isolation manual, as specified 
in paragraph (h)(6) of this AD. We have not revised this AD in this 
regard.
     Pinnacle Airlines requests that we clearly specify when 
the operational checks in paragraph 4.b. of the quoted material 
terminate.
    We disagree with the request to add a statement for terminating 
action for paragraph 4.b. of the quoted material. We have determined 
that to mitigate the risk of multiple flap fail events, and until 
further rulemaking is considered, the requirements of paragraph 4.b. 
must be followed as stipulated in paragraph (h)(6) of this AD. We have 
not revised this AD in this regard.
     Air Wisconsin requests that we add language stating that 
``an aircraft can be returned to revenue service after a flap system 
reset is accomplished after a Flap Fail event provided that (then list 
the conditions).''
    We disagree with the request to add language to paragraph 4. of the 
quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD to specify when an 
aircraft can be returned to service. The requirements of paragraph 
(h)(2) of this AD are limitations. However, in paragraph (h)(6) of this 
AD, we do specify the criteria for returning the airplane to service 
following a flap fail event. We have not revised this AD in this 
regard.
     Regarding paragraph 4.a. of the quoted material in 
paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM, Comair requests that, for the flightcrew 
system tests, we clarify that the cycling of the flaps through 5 cycles 
applies only to the first flight following the flap reset by 
specifying, ``For the first flight following an on-ground circuit 
breaker reset, prior to dispatch, the flaps must be operated for five 
full extension/retraction cycles with no subsequent failures.''
    We clarify that the intent is to perform the action of paragraph 
4.a. once prior to dispatch following a flap fail event. We have 
revised that paragraph to read: ``Prior to the initial dispatch 
following an on-ground circuit breaker reset, the flaps must be 
operated for five full extension/retractions cycles by the flightcrew 
with no subsequent failures.''

[[Page 10461]]

     Comair requests that, for flightcrew system tests, we 
clarify that the term ``take-off,'' instead of ``dispatch,'' should be 
used for the following tests to allow the crew to perform them during 
taxi-out: thrust reverse, ground spoiler, and brake system. Air 
Wisconsin requests that we replace the word ``dispatch'' with the word 
``flight'' in paragraphs 4.a. and 4.b. of the quoted material in 
paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM.
    We disagree with revising the word ``dispatch'' in paragraph 4.a. 
of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM. We intend that 
these operations are to be performed as part of a pre-taxi checklist. 
We do not want these operations to be performed during taxi where, if 
discrepancies are noted, corrective actions would impact airport 
congestion and ground control services if the airplane has to return to 
the gate. However, as stated previously, we have revised paragraph 4.b. 
of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD to specify ``each 
flight'' instead of ``dispatch.''

Request To Clarify Paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM

    Comair requests that we clarify the intent of paragraph (h)(4) of 
the NPRM. Comair states that many of its actuators are in the category 
covered by paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of the NPRM, for which 
no additional action for paragraph (g)(3) of the NPRM is required. 
Comair questions whether the intent of the new maintenance action in 
paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM is to require a low-temperature torque 
test even for those actuators for which no action was required under 
paragraph (g)(3) of the NPRM.
    We provide the following clarification. Paragraph (h)(4) of this AD 
does not apply to actuators on which no action was required by 
paragraph (g)(3) of this AD. The wording in paragraph (h)(4) of this 
AD, ``New Maintenance Action,'' is explicit in that it applies to ``* * 
* airplanes for which the low temperature torque test of flap actuators 
is required by paragraph (g)(3) of this AD * * *'' Paragraph (g)(3) of 
this AD applies only to actuators identified in paragraph (g)(3) and 
that meet the specifications in paragraph (g)(3)(i) or (g)(3)(ii) of 
this AD. Therefore, there is no requirement to perform a repetitive 
low-temperature torque test for actuators for which no action was 
required under paragraph (g)(3) of this AD. We have not revised this AD 
in this regard.

Request To Add Phase-in Period to Paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM

    Comair and Air Wisconsin request that we add a phase-in period to 
paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM. Comair notes that a number of actuators 
are compliant with Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27-150, dated July 
12, 2007, from as early as February 15, 2008. Comair states that it is 
unlikely this NPRM will supersede AD 2008-01-04 before February 15, 
2009, and therefore some actuators will already have exceeded 12 months 
since last compliance. Comair concludes that since under AD 2008-01-04, 
paragraph (g)(3) was only a one-time compliance, and paragraph (h)(4) 
of the NPRM will now make that repetitive, a phase-in is necessary for 
actuators having early compliance.
    We agree with the commenter's request to add a grace period to the 
compliance time of ``within 12 months after doing the low temperature 
torque test'' specified in paragraph (h)(4) of this AD. To avoid undue 
burden on the operators, adding a grace period is both desirable and 
prudent. We have determined that adding a 60-day grace period will not 
adversely affect safety. We have revised paragraph (h)(4) of this AD 
accordingly.

Request To Revise Reference

    Comair, PSA Airlines, and Pinnacle Airlines request that we revise 
the reference to the fault isolation manual specified in paragraph 
(h)(6) of the NPRM. The commenters state that because the NPRM 
specifies Revision 38, dated January 10, 2008, of Section 27-50-00 of 
Chapter 27 of the Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet CRJ 100/200/440 
Fault Isolation Manual CSP A-009, Volume 1 (the ``FIM''), operators 
will not be in compliance when using later revisions of the FIM. Comair 
states that operators have no control over Bombardier revisions. PSA 
and Pinnacle state that an alternative method of compliance would be 
needed to use later Bombardier revisions. PSA recommends we remove the 
reference to Revision 38 of the FIM. Pinnacle recommends that we add 
``or later revisions'' to the FIM reference.
    We cannot agree to revise the reference to the FIM specified in 
paragraph (h)(6) of this AD. We must specify a revision and a date to 
meet Office of Federal Register (OFR) regulations for publications 
incorporated by reference. We also cannot refer to ``later revisions'' 
of applicable service information according to OFR regulations. We have 
not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Revise Certain ``Part'' References

    Comair, Pinnacle Airlines, and Mesa Airlines request that we revise 
certain ``Part'' references in the NPRM. (The ``Part'' references 
correspond to language in the mandatory continuing airworthiness 
information.) Comair states that both paragraphs (h)(6) and (h)(7) of 
the NPRM are listed as ``Part V.'' Mesa states that paragraphs (h)(4) 
and (h)(5) are labeled as ``Part IV.'' Pinnacle notes that paragraphs 
(h)(5), (h)(6), and (h)(7) of the NPRM should refer to Parts V, VI, and 
VII, respectively.
    Based on the commenters' remarks, we have reconsidered including 
``Part'' references in this AD. In the NPRM, we intentionally included 
these references to correspond to the Canadian airworthiness directive. 
However, we find that referring to a ``Part'' of a Canadian 
airworthiness directive in the U.S. AD does not add clarity, is 
unnecessary, and may result in confusion for the reader. Therefore, we 
have removed these references from this AD.

Request To Limit Reporting Requirement

    Comair and Air Wisconsin request that we limit the reporting 
requirement specified in paragraph (h)(7) of the NPRM. Comair states 
that a 2-year limit should provide enough data. Air Wisconsin also 
states that reporting should be limited to 2 years or dropped from the 
requirements. Pinnacle also notes that the reporting requirement is 
onerous and will require substantial logistics on the operator's part.
    We agree to revise the reporting requirement in paragraph (h)(7) of 
this AD. The reporting requirement is necessary and must be mandated to 
monitor the effectiveness of the AD actions and to assist the 
manufacturer and the regulatory authorities in determining if 
additional rulemaking action is necessary. However, we agree the 
reporting can be limited. We have revised paragraph (h)(7) of this AD 
to specify that reporting is required for only 24 months.

Request for Clarification on Inoperable Items

    PSA Airlines requests that we clarify whether it is OK to operate 
with items that are inoperable per the minimum equipment list (MEL).
    The AD takes precedence over other service information. Operating 
an airplane that does not comply with the AD violates part 39 of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39).

[[Page 10462]]

According to sections 121.628(b)(2) and 91.213(b)(2) of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.628(b)(2) and 91.213(b)(2)), 
instruments and equipment required by an AD to be in operable condition 
may not be included in the MEL unless the AD provides otherwise.

Request To Clarify Compliance With the FIM

    PSA Airlines requests that we clarify how to comply with the FIM 
requirements in paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM. The commenter states that 
since the FIM is a multiple-part document covering flight operations, 
dispatch, and maintenance, it is difficult to provide documentation for 
compliance with each part. The commenter also states that if part of 
this AD will require sign-offs for each event, compliance documentation 
could be very confusing after a number of sign-offs. The commenter 
recommends inserting language that would eliminate the need for 
repetitive sign-offs, such as stating that the FIM maintenance 
requirements of paragraph (h)(6) must be tracked and completed in a 
manner acceptable to the principal maintenance inspector (PMI).
    We agree that adding the statement PSA Airlines requests would be 
effective. Therefore, we have revised paragraph (h)(6) of this AD to 
add the following statement: ``These maintenance requirements must be 
tracked in a manner acceptable to the principal maintenance inspector 
(PMI).''

Request To Clarify Paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of the NPRM

    Several commenters request that we clarify paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of 
the NPRM.
    Air Wisconsin requests that we clarify whether paragraph (h)(6)(ii) 
of the NPRM, which states ``If another flap fail event occurs any time 
after the initial circuit breaker reset operation * * *'' is meant to 
be within the process of exercising the components/systems specified in 
paragraph 4. ``Dispatch Following a Flap Failed Event'' of the quoted 
material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD.
    PSA Airlines requests that we clarify paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of the 
NPRM by adding, ``another event within the 10 cycle limit'' or 
``another event prior to completion of the FIM procedure from the 
previous event.'' PSA states that the current wording could be 
interpreted to mean either another event within the 10-cycle limit, or 
anytime after an initial flap rest, regardless of whether the FIM 
procedure has been complied with.
    Pinnacle Airlines requests that we add language to paragraph 
(h)(6)(ii) of the NPRM that specifies when the requirement to perform 
the maintenance actions of paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM is no longer 
relevant. The commenter indicates that the statement requires that the 
action be continued in perpetuity.
    We agree to clarify paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of this AD. Paragraph 
(h)(6)(ii) of this AD is intended to apply to any flap fail event, 
whether in flight or during any of the checks required in paragraph 
4.a. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD. However, we 
do not intend that paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of this AD apply to any event 
regardless of whether the FIM procedure has been complied with. The 
paragraph (h)(6)(ii) requirement to perform the maintenance actions is 
required only if another flap fail event occurs during the 10-flight-
cycle period following the initial circuit breaker rest authorized in 
paragraph (h)(6) of this AD. We have revised paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of 
this AD to clarify that if another flap fail event occurs anytime 
``within the 10-flight-cycle limit'' after the initial circuit breaker 
reset operation, the maintenance actions are required to be done before 
further flight.

Request To Clarify Special Flight Permits

    PSA Airlines requests that a statement be added to indicate that 
aircraft having a second flap event or an aircraft on which the flaps 
cannot be reset may be ferried to a location where the FIM procedure 
specified in paragraph (h)(6) of this AD can be accomplished.
    We do not agree that it is necessary to add a statement to this AD. 
This AD does not prohibit ferry flights. Special flight permits, as 
described in Section 21.197 and Section 21.199 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199), may be requested to operate the 
airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be 
accomplished. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Substantiate Repetitive Low Temperature Torque Test

    Mesa Airlines requests data for substantiating the repeat of the 
low temperature torque test every 12 months following the initial test.
    The necessity for repeat tests and the compliance time interval 
were determined by the State of Design authority (Transport Canada 
Civil Aviation (TCCA)) based on risk analysis and consultation with the 
airplane manufacturer. We have considered TCCA's determination, as well 
as the safety implications and the time necessary to do the 
inspections, and have determined that requiring the repetitive low 
temperature torque tests at 12-month intervals is appropriate. However, 
under the provisions of paragraph (j) of the AD, we will consider 
requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are submitted 
to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an acceptable 
level of safety. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Consider an Option to the Existing Actuator System

    Cox and Company requests that its ``Flap Actuator Heating System'' 
be considered as an ``add on'' option to the existing actuator system. 
The commenter states that its test data indicate that its ``Flap 
Actuator Heating System'' will eliminate nearly all soft jams that 
occur on Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 airplanes during cold weather.
    We do not concur. We cannot include such an option in an AD when 
that option is not yet certificated. When the design has received an 
FAA Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), it is the operator's 
discretion to consider installation. However, under the provisions of 
paragraph (j) of this AD, we will consider requests from operators for 
approval of an AMOC if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate 
that the installation would provide an acceptable level of safety. We 
have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Add Calendar Limitation

    Pinnacle Airlines requests that we add a calendar limitation to 
paragraph 4. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM 
that is similar to the limitation specified in paragraph 3. of the same 
quote. Pinnacle is concerned that not having a calendar limitation 
would result in significant operational impacts throughout the calendar 
year.
    We disagree with the request to add a calendar limitation to 
paragraph 4. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD. 
Paragraph 3. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD is 
specifically focused on mitigating a cold weather flap fail event. 
However, while paragraph 4. applies to cold weather events, it is not 
limited to that scenario. Therefore, regardless of weather conditions, 
paragraph 4. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD is 
necessary to address the identified unsafe condition. We have not 
revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify Compliance

    Pinnacle Airlines asks whether non-compliance with the AD would 
happen if the flightcrew does the operational check specified in 
paragraph 4.a. of the

[[Page 10463]]

quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM and neglects to record 
compliance with the check. Pinnacle Airlines also asks whether for 
paragraph 4.b. in the quoted material in the same paragraph non-
compliance with the AD would happen if the flightcrew neglects to 
record compliance with the requirement for the operational check of the 
thrust reversers, ground spoilers, and brake system.
    Compliance with paragraphs 4.a. and 4.b. of the quoted material in 
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD is predicated on paragraph (h)(6) of this 
AD, which invokes the limitation specified in paragraph (h)(2) of this 
AD if the maintenance actions cannot be performed. The exception to 
doing the maintenance actions was intended for relief only when an 
airplane was at a location where maintenance personnel and/or equipment 
were not available. Maintenance control authorization is required for 
the flightcrew to perform this operation. The method of documentation 
is at the discretion of the operator and the principal operations 
inspector (POI). We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify the Phrase ``Maintenance Actions Cannot Be Done''

    Pinnacle Airlines and Air Wisconsin request that we clarify the 
phrase ``maintenance actions cannot be done'' in paragraph (h)(6) of 
the NPRM. Pinnacle Airlines requests that we provide specific language 
and conditions concerning this statement and questions if maintaining 
flight schedule integrity is an adequate reason to establish that 
``maintenance actions cannot be done.''
    We agree that the statement can be clarified. The intent of this AD 
is to prevent an unsafe condition. The only reason for deferring 
maintenance is a lack of available maintenance resources. We have 
revised paragraph (h)(6) of this AD by replacing ``if maintenance 
actions cannot be done'' with ``if maintenance resources are not 
available.''

Request To Add Requirement to Paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM

    Pinnacle Airlines requests that we include in paragraph 4. of the 
quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM the following 
statement: ``Circuit breaker reset operation can be performed by the 
flight crew when authorized by the operator's maintenance control 
organization.'' Pinnacle Airlines notes that this statement is also in 
paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM.
    We disagree with the request to add the statement suggested by the 
commenter. The reset function stipulated in paragraph 4. of the quoted 
material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD is intended to be done by the 
flightcrew. Compliance with this paragraph is predicated on paragraph 
(h)(6) of this AD, which invokes the limitation specified in paragraph 
(h)(2) of this AD only if maintenance actions in accordance with the 
FIM cannot be performed. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify Compliance With Paragraph (h)(7) of the NPRM

    Pinnacle Airlines requests that we clarify compliance with 
paragraph (h)(7) of the NPRM. Pinnacle questions whether it would 
constitute non-compliance with the AD if the operator does not obtain 
all of the flaps electronic control unit (FECU) codes and report them 
to Bombardier within 30 days. Pinnacle also would like to know how the 
operator brings an airplane back into regulatory compliance if the FAA 
considers the aforementioned scenario to be non-compliance with the AD.
    Non-compliance with the reporting requirement in paragraph (h)(7) 
of this AD is non-compliance with the AD. The operator brings the 
aircraft back into compliance by meeting the reporting requirements. 
Under the provisions of paragraph (j) of this AD, we will consider 
requests from affected persons for approval of an AMOC. We have not 
revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify the Phrase ``or 30 Days After the Effective Date of 
This AD''

    Air Wisconsin requests that we clarify what is meant in paragraph 
(h)(7) of the NPRM by the phrase, ``or 30 days after the effective date 
* * *.''
    The intent of the phrase ``30 days after the effective date'' in 
paragraph (h)(7) of the NPRM is to allow additional time for operators 
to report if fault data were found before the effective date of this 
AD. However, we have revised paragraph (h)(7) of this AD to limit the 
need to report to ``as of the effective date of this AD'' and, 
therefore, we have removed the phrase ``30 days after the effective 
date'' from paragraph (h)(7) of this AD.

Request To Revise Reference

    Pinnacle Airlines requests that paragraph (h)(7) of the NPRM be 
amended to indicate ``Task 05-51-50-980-801 as introduced in the 
Canadair Regional Jet TR 05-035, dated July 13, 2007, to the Canadair 
Regional Jet Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), or latest revision.'' 
Pinnacle Airlines states that when Bombardier incorporates TR 05-035 
into the AMM, operators will have to obtain an AMOC to comply with the 
AD.
    We cannot agree with the commenter's request to add a reference to 
the latest revision of the service bulletin. We cannot refer to later 
revisions of applicable service information according to OFR 
regulations for publications incorporated by reference. We agree that 
affected persons will have to obtain an AMOC to comply with the AD if 
they plan to use later revisions. We have not revised this AD in this 
regard.

Request To Clarify Intent of Paragraph 3.a.(i) in the Quoted Material 
of Paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM

    Air Wisconsin requests that we verify that the intent of paragraph 
3.a.(i) of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM was to 
include a reference to overhaul.
    The text in paragraph 3.a.(i) of the quoted material in paragraph 
(h)(2) of this AD is correct. We intended to include a reference to 
overhaul. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify Compliance With Paragraph (g)(3) of the NPRM

    Air Wisconsin asks whether paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM supersedes 
paragraph (g)(3) of the NPRM.
    Paragraph (h)(4) of this AD does not ``supersede'' paragraph (g)(3) 
of this AD. Paragraph (h)(4) of this AD refers to paragraph (g)(3) of 
this AD as a means of identification of those actuators to which the 
requirements of paragraph (h)(4) apply. In other words, for those 
actuators that have had the initial test required by paragraph (g)(3) 
of this AD, operators must repeat the test in accordance with the 
requirements of paragraph (h)(4) of this AD every 12 months. We have 
not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Revise FIM Reference To Refer to Part Numbers

    Air Wisconsin requests that we revise paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM 
to say ``* * * IAW section 27-50-00 of the FIM, CSP A-009 as introduced 
in revision 38 dated January 10, 2008 as it applies to the affected 
part numbers identified in par (g)(3)(i) and (ii).''
    We do not agree to revise paragraph (h)(6) of this AD. The 
conditions of paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of this AD apply to 
the low temperature torque testing requirements of paragraph (g)(3) of 
this AD. Those conditions have no

[[Page 10464]]

correlation to the FIM procedures that are to be followed after a flap 
fail event. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify Actions

    Air Wisconsin requests that we clarify what to do if the 
maintenance actions specified in paragraph (h)(6)(i) of the NPRM cannot 
be done.
    If an operator cannot comply with an AD, the operator must contact 
the FAA for repair instructions. For this AD, operators may request an 
AMOC, as specified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD. We have not revised 
this AD in this regard.

Request for an Alternative Method to Paragraph (h)(8) of the NPRM

    Air Wisconsin requests that we allow the installation of a placard 
that is an alternative to the placard specified in paragraph (h)(8) of 
the NPRM. The commenter suggests that, as an alternative to using the 
placard identified in Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-11-090, dated 
August 15, 2008, operators can use a placard that says ``Do Not Extend 
Flaps to 8 or 20 above 200 KIAS.''
    We do not agree to revise paragraph (h)(8) of this AD. The 
intention of this paragraph is to apply to all operators. Individual 
operators have the option of using an alternative placard by requesting 
an AMOC in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (j) of 
this AD. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Revise Wording in Paragraphs 1.a. and 1.b. of the Quoted 
Material in Paragraph (f)(2) of the NPRM

    The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) requests that we revise the 
wording in paragraphs 1.a. and 1.b. of the quoted material in paragraph 
(f)(2) of the NPRM so that the phrase ``and can be reasonably expected 
to remain at or above this visibility until after landing'' is replaced 
with ``and shall be forecast in the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) to 
remain at or above this visibility until after landing.''
    We acknowledge the commenter's request. However, paragraph (f)(2) 
of this AD is a restatement of the existing requirements of AD 2008-01-
04. We cannot change the wording, as those who have already complied 
with the AFM revision specified in that AD would then be out of 
compliance.
    However, we infer the commenter intended to request that we revise 
the new AFM revision specified in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD. We have 
changed the wording in paragraph 1.a. of the quoted material in 
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD as follows:

    ''When conducting a precision approach, the reported visibility 
(or RVR) is confirmed to be at or above the visibility associated 
with the landing minima for the approach in use, and shall be 
forecast in the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) to remain at or above 
this visibility until after landing; or''

We have changed the wording in paragraph 1.b. of the quoted material in 
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD as follows:

    ''When conducting a non-precision approach, the reported ceiling 
and visibility (or RVR) are confirmed to be at or above the ceiling 
and visibility associated with the landing minima for the approach 
in use, and shall be forecast in the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) to 
remain at or above this visibility until after landing; or''

Request To Add Language Calling for a Permanent Solution

    ALPA requests that we add language to the NPRM to be similar to 
Canadian AD CF-2007-10R1, which calls out the need for a permanent 
solution. The commenter states that it appears that a flap actuator 
redesign proposal has been accepted by the Canadian Transportation 
Safety Board and is being developed by the manufacturer that will 
ultimately remove some of the operational and maintenance actions 
called out in this AD. The commenter also states that a provision for a 
permanent solution that will ultimately remove some of the operational 
and maintenance actions called out in this AD must be included in this 
AD.
    We do not agree to add language specifying that there is a need for 
a permanent solution. Such a statement adds no additional risk 
mitigation or clarification. The new actuators referred to in paragraph 
(h)(5) of this AD are an optional maintenance action that would 
terminate the requirements of paragraph 3. of the quoted material in 
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD. In addition, the reporting requirement of 
paragraph (h)(7) of this AD is being used to monitor the effectiveness 
of the AD actions and will enable the manufacturer to obtain better 
insight into the nature, cause, and extent of the issue, and eventually 
to develop final action to address the unsafe condition. Once final 
action has been identified, we might consider further rulemaking. We 
have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Add Language To Address ``Known Icing Enroute''

    ALPA requests that we add language to the NPRM to address ``known 
icing enroute.'' ALPA states that diversion operations in icing 
conditions could pose a serious icing risk for aircraft operating with 
the flaps at some intermediate setting. ALPA concludes that the 
unintended consequences of an aircraft's flaps being exposed to icing 
conditions for extended periods of time must be addressed in the 
operational portion of the NPRM.
    We appreciate ALPA's comment for identifying a generic issue in the 
AFM. While this comment is not specific to this AD, it has highlighted 
a deficiency in the Abnormal Procedures section of the AFM. Flap 
failure in an extended position while in icing conditions is a generic 
issue. A TR to the AFM may be issued to address this deficiency. Once 
this TR has been issued and approved, we might consider further 
rulemaking. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the available data, including the comments received, 
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting 
the AD with the changes described previously. We determined that these 
changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or 
increase the scope of the AD.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have required different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences 
are highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 684 products of U.S. registry. 
We also estimate that it will take about 18 work-hours per product to 
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate 
is $80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost a negligible amount per 
product. Where the service information lists required parts costs that 
are covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no 
charge for these parts. As we do not control warranty coverage for 
affected parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated 
here. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of

[[Page 10465]]

this AD to the U.S. operators to be $984,960, or $1,440 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications 
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The street address for 
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the 
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly 
after receipt.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by removing Amendment 39-15329 (73 FR 
1964, January 11, 2008) and adding the following new AD:

2009-06-12 Bombardier, Inc. (Formerly Canadair): Amendment 39-15848. 
Docket No. FAA-2008-1318; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-155-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective April 
15, 2009.

Affected ADs

    (b) This AD supersedes AD 2008-01-04, Amendment 39-15329.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional 
Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes, certificated in any category, 
serial numbers 7003 through 7990 and 8000 and subsequent.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight 
controls.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:
* * * * *
    The Bombardier CL-600-2B19 airplanes have had a history of flap 
failures at various positions for several years. Flap failure may 
result in a significant increase in required landing distances and 
higher fuel consumption than planned during a diversion. * * *
* * * * *

Requirements of AD 2007-17-07, Amendment 39-15165: Actions and 
Compliance

    (f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
    (1) Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Change: Within 30 days after 
September 5, 2007 (the effective date of AD 2007-17-07), revise the 
Canadair Regional Jet Airplane Flight Manual CSP A-012, by 
incorporating the information in Canadair Regional Jet Temporary 
Revision (TR) RJ/165, dated July 6, 2007, into the AFM. 
Accomplishing the requirements of paragraph (h)(1) of this AD 
terminates the requirements of this paragraph and the AFM revision 
required by this paragraph may be removed from the AFM.

    Note 1: The actions required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD may 
be done by inserting a copy of Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/165, 
dated July 6, 2007, into the Canadair Regional Jet Airplane Flight 
Manual CSP A-012. When this TR has been included in general 
revisions of the AFM, the general revisions may be inserted in the 
AFM.

    (2) Operational Procedures: Within 30 days after September 5, 
2007, revise the Limitations Section of the Canadair Regional Jet 
Airplane Flight Manual CSP A-012, to include the following 
statement. This may be done by inserting a copy of paragraph (f)(2) 
of this AD in the AFM. Accomplishing the requirements of paragraph 
(h)(2) of this AD terminates the requirements of this paragraph and 
the AFM revision required by this paragraph may be removed from the 
AFM.

``1. Flap Extended Diversion

    Upon arrival at the destination airport, an approach shall not 
be commenced, nor shall the flaps be extended beyond the 0 degree 
position, unless one of the following conditions exists:
    a. When conducting a precision approach, the reported visibility 
(or RVR) is confirmed to be at or above the visibility associated 
with the landing minima for the approach in use, and can be 
reasonably expected to remain at or above this visibility until 
after landing; or
    b. When conducting a non-precision approach, the reported 
ceiling and visibility (or RVR) are confirmed to be at or above the 
ceiling and visibility associated with the landing minima for the 
approach in use, and can be reasonably expected to remain at or 
above this ceiling and visibility until after landing; or
    c. An emergency or abnormal situation occurs that requires 
landing at the nearest suitable airport; or
    d. The fuel remaining is sufficient to conduct the approach, 
execute a missed approach, divert to a suitable airport with the 
flaps extended to the landing position, conduct an approach at the 
airport and land with 1000 lb (454 kg) of fuel remaining.

    Note 1: The fuel burn factor (as per AFM TR/165) shall be 
applied to the normal fuel consumption for calculation of the flaps 
extended missed approach, climb, diversion and approach fuel 
consumption.


    Note 2: Terrain and weather must allow a minimum flight altitude 
not exceeding 15,000 feet along the diversion route.


    Note 3: For the purpose of this AD, a ``suitable airport'' is an 
airport that has at least one usable runway, served by an instrument 
approach if operating under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), and the 
airport is equipped as per the applicable regulations and standards 
for marking and lighting. The existing and forecast weather for this 
airport shall be at or above landing minima for the approach in use.

2. Flap Failure After Takeoff

    When a takeoff alternate is filed, terrain and weather must 
allow a minimum flight

[[Page 10466]]

altitude not exceeding 15,000 feet along the diversion route to that 
alternate, or other suitable airport. The fuel at departure shall be 
sufficient to divert to the takeoff alternate or other suitable 
airport with the flaps extended to the takeoff position, conduct and 
approach and land with 1000 lb (454 kg) of fuel remaining.

    Note: The fuel burn factor (as per AFM TR/165) shall be applied 
to the normal fuel consumption for calculation of the flaps 
extended, climb, diversion and approach fuel consumption.

3. Flap Zero Landing

    Operations where all useable runways at the destination and 
alternate airports are forecast to be wet or contaminated (as 
defined in the AFM) are prohibited during the cold weather season 
(December to March inclusive in the northern hemisphere) unless one 
of the following conditions exists:
    a. The flap actuators have been verified serviceable in 
accordance with Part C (Low Temperature Torque Test of the Flap 
Actuators) of SB 601R-27-150, July 12, 2007, or
    b. The flight is conducted at a cruise altitude where the SAT is 
-60 deg C or warmer. If the SAT in flight is colder than -60 deg C, 
descent to warmer air shall be initiated within 10 minutes, or
    c. The Landing Distance Available on a useable runway at the 
destination airport is at least equal to the actual landing distance 
required for flaps zero. This distance shall be based on Bombardier 
performance data, and shall take into account forecast weather and 
anticipated runway conditions, or
    d. The Landing Distance Available on a useable runway at the 
filed alternate airport, or other suitable airport is at least equal 
to the actual landing distance for flaps zero. This distance shall 
be based on Bombardier performance data, and shall take into account 
forecast weather and anticipated runway conditions.

    Note 1: If the forecast destination weather is less than 200 
feet above DH or MDA, or less than 1 mile (1500 meters) above the 
authorized landing visibility (or equivalent RVR), as applied to the 
usable runway at the destination airport, condition 3.a., 3.b., or 
3.d. above must be satisfied.


    Note 2: When conducting No Alternate IFR (NAIFR) operations, 
condition 3.a., 3.b., or 3.c. above must be satisfied.''

    (3) Training: As of 30 days after September 5, 2007, no affected 
airplane may be operated unless the flight crewmembers of that 
airplane and the operational control/dispatch personnel for that 
airplane have received training that is acceptable to the principal 
operations inspector (POI) on the operational procedures required by 
paragraph (f)(2) of this AD. Accomplishing the requirements of 
paragraph (h)(3)(i) of this AD terminates the requirements of this 
paragraph.
    (4) Maintenance Actions: Within 120 days after September 5, 
2007, do the cleaning and lubrication of the flexible shafts, 
installation of metallic seals in the flexible drive-shafts, and all 
applicable related investigative and corrective actions by doing all 
the applicable actions specified in ``PART A'' of the Accomplishment 
Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27-150, dated July 
12, 2007; except if torque test results are not satisfactory, before 
further flight, install a serviceable actuator in accordance with 
the service bulletin or, if no serviceable actuators are available, 
contact the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 
for corrective action. Do all applicable related investigative and 
corrective actions before further flight.

Requirements of AD 2008-01-04: Actions and Compliance With Revised 
Affected Airplanes for Paragraph (g)(3)

    (g) Unless already done, do the following actions.
    (1) As of November 30, 2008, no affected airplane may be 
operated unless the flight crewmembers of that airplane have 
received simulator training on reduced or zero flap landing that is 
acceptable to the POI. Thereafter, this training must be done during 
the normal simulator training cycle, at intervals not to exceed 12 
months. Accomplishing the requirements of paragraph (h)(3)(ii) of 
this AD terminates the requirements of this paragraph.
    (2) Within 24 months or 4,000 flight hours after February 15, 
2008 (the effective date of AD 2008-01-04), whichever occurs first: 
Do a pressure test of the flexible drive-shaft, and do all 
applicable corrective actions, by doing all the applicable actions 
specified in ``PART B'' of the Accomplishment Instructions of 
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27-150, dated July 12, 2007. Do all 
applicable corrective actions before further flight.
    (3) For airplanes having flap actuators, part numbers (P/Ns), 
852D100-19/-21, 853D100-19/-20, and 854D100-19/-20 (Bombardier P/Ns 
601R93101-19/-21, 601R93103-19/-20, and 601R93104-19/-20), specified 
in paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of this AD: Within 24 months 
after February 15, 2008, do a low temperature torque test of the 
flap actuators, and do all applicable corrective actions, by doing 
all the applicable actions specified in ``PART C'' of the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27-
150, dated July