Portfolio Holdings, 5609-5618 [E9-2047]
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 19 / Friday, January 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
to consider in determining whether to
finalize the proposed action. The
Director may, in his or her sole
discretion, convene an informal hearing
with representatives of the Bank to
receive or discuss any such information.
The Director, in his or her sole
discretion, also may extend the period
in which the Bank may respond to a
notice for an additional 30 calendar
days for good cause, or shorten such
comment period if the Director
determines the condition of the Bank
requires faster action or a shorter
comment period or if the Bank consents
to a shorter comment period. The
Director shall inform the Bank in
writing, which may be provided as part
of the notice required under paragraphs
(a) or (b) of this section, of any decision
to extend or shorten the comment
period. The failure of a Bank to provide
information during the allotted
comment period will waive any right of
the Bank to comment on the proposed
action.
(d) Final action. At the earlier of the
completion of the comment period
established under paragraph (c) or the
receipt of information provided by the
Bank during such period, the Director
shall determine whether to take the
proposed action or actions that were the
subject of the notice under paragraphs
(a) or (b) of this section, after taking into
consideration any information provided
by the Bank. Such notice shall respond
to any information submitted by the
Bank. Any final order that the Bank take
action, refrain from action or comply
with any other requirement that was the
subject of a notice under paragraph (b)
of this section shall take effect upon the
Bank’s receipt of the notice required
under this paragraph, unless a different
effective date is set forth in this notice,
and shall remain in effect and binding
on the Bank until terminated in writing
by the Director or until any terms and
conditions for termination, as set forth
in the notice, have been met.
(e) Final actions under this section.
Any final decision that the Bank take
action, refrain from action or comply
with any other requirement that was the
subject of a notice under paragraph (b)
of this section shall constitute an order
under the Safety and Soundness Act.
The Director in his or her discretion
may apply to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia or to
the United States district court for the
judicial district in which the Bank in
question is established pursuant to
section 3 of the Bank Act (12 U.S.C.
1423) for the enforcement of such order,
as allowed under § 1375 of the Safety
and Soundness Act (12 U.S.C. 4635) . In
addition, a Bank or any executive officer
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or director of a Bank can be subject to
enforcement action, including the
imposition of civil monetary penalties,
under § 1371, § 1372 or § 1376 of the
Safety and Soundness Act (12 U.S.C.
4631, 4632, or 4636) for failure to
comply with such an order.
(f) Judicial review. A Bank that is not
classified as critically undercapitalized
may obtain judicial review of any final
capital classification decision or of any
final decision to take supervisory action
made by the Director under § 1229.2,
§ 1229.4, § 1229.7 or § 1229.9 in
accordance with the requirements and
procedures set forth in § 1369D of the
Safety and Soundness Act (12 U.S.C.
4623).
Dated: January 26, 2009.
James B. Lockhart III,
Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency.
[FR Doc. E9–2083 Filed 1–29–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8070–01–P
FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE
AGENCY
12 CFR Part 1252
RIN 2590–AA22
Portfolio Holdings
AGENCY: Federal Housing Finance
Agency.
ACTION: Interim final rule; request for
comments.
SUMMARY: The Federal Housing Finance
Agency is issuing an interim final
regulation to govern the portfolio
holdings of the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac). Comments
on the issues and questions set forth in
the preamble are requested, and the
agency will amend the rule as
appropriate after considering comments.
DATES: Effective Date: January 30, 2009.
Comment Date: Written comments
must be submitted on or before June 1,
2009.
ADDRESSES: You may submit your
comments, identified by ‘‘Portfolio
Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN 2590–AA22],’’
by any of the following methods:
• U.S. Mail, United Parcel Post,
Federal Express, or Other Mail Service:
The mailing address for submitting
comments is: Alfred M. Pollard, General
Counsel, Attention: Comments
‘‘Portfolio Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN
2590–AA22],’’ Federal Housing Finance
Agency, Fourth Floor, 1700 G Street,
NW., Washington, DC 20552.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: The hand
delivery address for submitting
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5609
comments is: Alfred M. Pollard, General
Counsel, Attention: Comments
‘‘Portfolio Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN
2590–AA22],’’ Federal Housing Finance
Agency, Fourth Floor, 1700 G Street,
NW., Washington, DC 20552. The
package should be logged at the Guard
Desk, First Floor, on business days
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.
• E-mail: Comments may be
submitted via electronic mail at
RegComments@FHFA.gov addressed to
Alfred M. Pollard, General Counsel.
Please include ‘‘Portfolio Holdings IFR/
RFC, [RIN 2590–AA22]’’ in the subject
line of the message.
• Federal eRulemaking: Instructions
on comment submission are also
available on the eRulemaking portal at
https://www.regulations.gov.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) requests that comments
submitted in hard copy also be
accompanied by the electronic version
in Microsoft Word or in a portable
document format (PDF) on 3.5’’ disk or
CD–ROM, and identify the comments as
pertaining to the Portfolio Holdings
Interim Final Rule.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Ming-Yuen Meyer-Fong, Office of the
General Counsel, (202) 414–3798, or
Valerie Smith, Office of Policy Analysis
and Research, (202) 414–3770, Federal
Housing Finance Agency, 1700 G Street,
NW., Washington, DC 20552. The
telephone number for the
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf
is (800) 877–8339. For more information
on this Interim Final Regulation, see the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Comments and Access
Instructions: FHFA requests that
comments submitted in hard copy also
be accompanied by the electronic
version in Microsoft® Word or in a
portable document format (PDF) on 3.5’’
disk or CD–ROM, and identify that
comments pertain to ‘‘Portfolio
Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN 2590–AA22].’’
Statement of Availability: This
Interim Final Regulation as well as any
comments posted may be accessed via
the internet. Users can access the FHFA
web page at https://www.fhfa.gov; select
Supervision and Regulations Tab; select
Regulations, Notices and Public
Comments; then, select the link titled
‘‘Portfolio Holdings’’ or via the
worldwide eRulemaking portal at
https://www.regulations.gov. User can
also access Exhibits A to F referenced in
this interim rule document. Specifically,
Exhibit A (Amended and Restated
Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
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Agreement for Fannie Mae) may be
accessed at https://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/reports/seniorpreferredstock
purchaseagreementfnm1.pdf, and
Exhibit B (Amended and Restated
Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreement for Freddie Mac) at https://
www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
seniorpreferredstockpurchaseagreement
frea.pdf. Also, Exhibit C (Certificate of
Designation of Terms of Variable
Liquidation Preference Senior Preferred
Stock, Series 2008–2 for Fannie Mae)
may be accessed at https://www.treas.
gov/press/releases/reports/certificate
fnm2.pdf, and Exhibit D (Certificate of
Terms and Conditions of Variable
Liquidation Preference Senior Preferred
Stock for Freddie Mac) may be accessed
at https://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/certificatefreb.pdf. Finally,
Exhibit E (Warrant to Purchase Common
Stock of Fannie Mae) may be accessed
at https://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/warrantfnm3.pdf, and Exhibit F
(Warrant to Purchase Common Stock of
Freddie Mac) may be accessed at
https://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/warrantfrec.pdf. In addition,
copies of all comments received will be
available for examination by the public
on business days between the hours of
10 a.m. and 3 p.m., at the Federal
Housing Finance Agency, Fourth Floor,
1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC
20552. To make an appointment to
inspect comments, please call the Office
of General Counsel (FHFA) at (202) 414–
6924.
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II. Background
A. Establishment of the Federal Housing
Finance Agency
On July 30, 2008, the President signed
the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act (Act) (Pub. L. 110–289, 122 Stat.
2564). Among other things, the Act
established a new independent
executive branch agency known as the
Federal Housing Finance Agency and
transferred the supervisory and
oversight responsibilities for Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac (the Enterprises)
from the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). The
Enterprises are government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) chartered by
Congress for the purposes of
establishing secondary market facilities
for residential mortgages. 12 U.S.C. 1716
et seq. (Fannie Mae Charter Act) and 12
U.S.C. 1451, et seq. (Freddie Mac
Corporation Act). Specifically, Congress
established the Enterprises to provide
stability in the secondary market for
residential mortgages, respond
appropriately to the private capital
market, provide ongoing assistance to
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the secondary market for residential
mortgages, and promote access to
mortgage credit throughout the country.
Id.
The Act amended the Federal
Housing Enterprises Financial Safety
and Soundness Act of 1992 (Safety and
Soundness Act) (Pub. L. 102–550,
(codified at 12 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.).
Among other things, the Act required
FHFA to establish criteria by regulation
governing the portfolio holdings of the
Enterprises. 12 U.S.C. 4624. The
purpose of such regulation is to ensure
that the portfolio holdings are backed by
sufficient capital and consistent with
the mission and the safe and sound
operations of the Enterprises. 12 U.S.C.
4624(a). Further, the Act directed that
FHFA consider the ability of the
Enterprises to provide a liquid
secondary market through securitization
activities, the portfolio holdings in
relation to the overall mortgage market,
and adherence to standards of
prudential management and operations
established by FHFA in accordance with
section 1313B of the Act. 12 U.S.C.
4624. The Act also required that any
criteria governing Enterprise portfolio
holdings ensure that such holdings are
consistent with the Enterprises’ mission,
which includes facilitating the financing
of affordable housing for low- and
moderate-income families in a manner
consistent with their overall public
purposes. 12 U.S.C. 4624(a); 12 U.S.C.
4501(7).
B. Discussion and Analysis of Interim
Rule
The FHFA is issuing this regulation as
an interim final rule, with an effective
date of January 30, 2009. The name of
the newly established part 1252 will
read ‘‘Portfolio Holdings,’’ which will
contain the rules governing Enterprise
portfolio holdings. The provisions of
this regulation are adopted on an
interim final basis and will remain in
effect until amended. A 120-day
comment period is provided on the
interim final rule and on the topics and
questions raised in the Request for
Comments section.
In accordance with section 1109(b) of
the Act, FHFA is required to issue
regulations establishing criteria
governing Enterprise portfolio holdings.
The criteria should ensure that
Enterprise portfolio holdings are backed
by sufficient capital and consistent with
the mission as well as the safe and
sound operations of the Enterprises. 12
U.S.C. 4624(a).
The Act authorizes the Director to
order temporary adjustments to the
established criteria for an Enterprise or
both Enterprises, including during times
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of economic distress or market
disruption. 12 U.S.C. 4624(b). In
addition, the Act provides that the
Director monitor the portfolio of each
Enterprise and authorizes the Director to
order an Enterprise to dispose of or
acquire any asset under terms and
conditions to be determined by the
Director, if the Director determines that
such action is consistent with the
purposes of the Safety and Soundness
Act or the authorizing statute of the
Enterprise. 12 U.S.C. 4624(c).
C. Enterprise Conservatorships and
Senior Preferred Stock Agreements With
the Department of the Treasury
On September 6, 2008, FHFA, with
the concurrence of the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
into conservatorship. By board
approval, both Enterprises consented to
the appointment of a conservator.
FHFA’s goals in placing the Enterprises
into conservatorship included
enhancing their capacity to fulfill their
mission of providing liquidity and
stability to the mortgage markets and
mitigating the systemic risk posed by
the Enterprises, which had contributed
to instability in mortgage and broader
financial markets. Upon a determination
by the Director of FHFA that either
Enterprise has returned to a safe and
solvent condition and the systemic risks
contributing to the conservatorship
decision have been addressed
adequately, the Director will issue an
order terminating the conservatorship of
that Enterprise. There is no exact time
frame as to when the conservatorship of
either Enterprise may end.
In order to prevent Enterprise capital
from being exhausted, FHFA, upon
appointing itself conservator for the
Enterprises and on behalf of each
Enterprise, entered into separate Senior
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements
(Stock Purchase Agreements) with the
Department of the Treasury. See
Exhibits A & B (Stock Purchase
Agreements for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac). Under the Stock Purchase
Agreements, each Enterprise’s capacity
to issue new guarantees of mortgagebacked securities (MBS) and to maintain
and grow its mortgage portfolio holdings
was fortified through a commitment by
the Department of the Treasury to
acquire up to $100 billion of senior
preferred stock in that Enterprise as
necessary to ensure that the Enterprise
avoid a negative net worth. In exchange
for that commitment, each of the
Enterprises granted to the Department of
the Treasury shares of Senior Preferred
Stock with an initial liquidation
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preference of $1 billion (and which
value would increase with each
investment by the Department of the
Treasury up to Treasury’s commitment
of $100 billion for each Enterprise, as
well as with any unpaid commitment
fees or dividends owed). Id.; see also
Exhibits C & D (Certificates of
Designation of Terms of Variable
Liquidation Preference Senior Preferred
Stock, Series 2008–2 for Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac). The Enterprises also
granted to the Department of the
Treasury warrants for shares of common
stock. See Exhibits E & F (Warrants to
Purchase Common Stock of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac). In conjunction with
enhancing the Enterprises’ capacity to
engage in new business and to maintain
and grow their mortgage portfolio
holdings, the Stock Purchase
Agreements also established criteria
governing those holdings.
Under the portfolio holdings criteria
set forth in the Stock Purchase
Agreements, each Enterprise may,
through December 31, 2009, increase its
mortgage assets to a level not to exceed
$850 billion, thereby allowing each
Enterprise to provide additional
liquidity during this period of mortgage
market stress. After December 31, 2009,
the portfolio holdings criteria set forth
in the Stock Purchase Agreements
require the reduction of each
Enterprise’s mortgage assets at the rate
of 10 percent per year until they reach
a size of $250 billion, which would be
around the year 2020. That reduction is
expected to be achieved largely through
natural run-off. The portfolio holdings
criteria set forth in the Stock Purchase
Agreements do not address Enterprise
holdings of non-mortgage assets.
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III. Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1252.1
Section 1252.1 adopts the portfolio
holdings criteria established by the
Stock Purchase Agreements, as they
may be amended from time to time, as
the standards for this rule. Under the
current Stock Purchase Agreements,
which currently have the same portfolio
holdings criteria for both Enterprises, an
Enterprise may grow its mortgage assets
up to $850 billion on December 31,
2009. Starting on December 31, 2010,
the Enterprise must hold 10 percent less
mortgage assets in its portfolio than at
the end of the preceding year until those
assets reach a level of $250 billion, at
which point, no further decrease is
currently required. Adjustments could
be made to those criteria by amendment
of the Stock Purchase Agreements.
FHFA’s establishment of criteria
governing Enterprise portfolio holdings
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in the Stock Purchase Agreements
represents an exercise of authority
consistent with the authority granted by
Congress under section 1369E of the
Safety and Soundness Act. FHFA’s goals
for the conservatorship include
fortifying Enterprise capacity to support
the secondary mortgage market. The
criteria for Enterprise portfolio holdings
established in the Stock Purchase
Agreements allow the Enterprises
immediate capacity to provide stability
and liquidity to the secondary mortgage
market, while mitigating systemic risk,
and facilitating Enterprise efforts to
achieve a balance between their mission
and safe and sound operations in the
intermediate term. Given the severe
deterioration in mortgage market
conditions and findings by FHFA that
the Enterprises were unable to raise
capital, immediate, coordinated
government action was required to
reinforce Enterprise capacity to provide
liquidity to the secondary mortgage
market. Establishing criteria governing
Enterprise portfolio holdings was an
essential part of that action.
Section 1252.2
Section 1252.2 addresses the effective
duration of the interim rule. FHFA
expects these regulations to be effective
until any amendment or until the
Enterprises are no longer subject to the
terms and obligations of the Stock
Purchase Agreements.
IV. Regulatory Requirements
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
The interim rule does not contain any
information collection requirement to
require the approval of OMB under the
Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq.). Therefore, the
requirements of the Paperwork
Reduction Act do not apply.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires that a
regulation that has a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, small
businesses, or small organizations must
include an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis describing the regulation’s
impact on small entities. Such an
analysis need not be undertaken if the
agency has certified that the regulation
does not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. 5 U.S.C. 605(b). FHFA has
considered the impact of the interim
final rule under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. The General Counsel of
FHFA certifies that the interim final rule
is not likely to have a significant
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5611
economic impact on a substantial
number of small business entities
because the regulation is applicable
only to the Enterprises, which are not
small entities for purposes of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act.
C. Good Cause for Issuance of Interim
Final Rule
An agency may issue an interim final
rule when the agency for good cause
finds that notice and public procedure
thereon are ‘‘impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.’’ 5 U.S.C. 553(b). The interim
final rule issued herein meets the Act’s
requirement for issuance of regulations
establishing portfolio holdings pursuant
to section 1369E of the Safety and
Soundness Act, 12 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.,
as amended, as well as the requirements
for good cause pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
553(b).
HERA requires the Director to issue
regulations establishing the portfolio
holding standards for the Enterprises
within 180 days of enactment. In
addition, this interim final rule adopts
criteria governing the portfolio holdings
of the Enterprises that have been in
place and currently govern the actions
of the Enterprises. Given these facts, the
Director has determined that prior
notice and comment procedures are
impractical and contrary to public
interest.
Further, given that the Enterprises
received notice of the portfolio holdings
criteria set forth in the Stock Purchase
Agreements, and consented to the
portfolio holdings criteria through their
conservator, opportunity for further
comment by the Enterprises is
unnecessary. The issuance of this
interim final rule and publication in the
Federal Register serve to comply with
the formal requirement in the Act that
FHFA issue regulations within 180 days
of enactment. See section 1109(b) of the
Act.
V. Request for Comments
A. Interim Final Rule (§§ 1252.1 and
1252.2)
FHFA is interested in receiving
comments on all aspects of the Interim
Final Rule, and all relevant comments
will be considered. FHFA will amend
the interim final rule as appropriate
after reviewing comments received.
FHFA also requests comments on the
issues and questions set forth herein to
give the public an opportunity to
comment on criteria governing
Enterprise portfolio holdings that will
apply when the Enterprises are no
longer subject to Stock Purchase
Agreements that establish holdings
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criteria. When addressing a specific
question contained in this interim final
rule, FHFA asks that commenters
specifically note, by number, which
question is being addressed. In
particular, the FHFA is seeking
comments in the areas and on the issues
discussed below. Comments should be
identified as pertaining to the Portfolio
Holdings IFR and should be submitted
as indicated in the ADDRESSES section of
this preamble.
B. Request for Comments
FHFA as conservator is working to
restore each Enterprise to a safe and
sound condition. FHFA anticipates that,
once housing and mortgage markets
stabilize, the Enterprises may return to
profitability. While many—including,
for example, then-Secretary of the
Treasury Henry M. Paulson 1—have
suggested major changes in the structure
or roles of the Enterprises, until
Congress acts to make changes to their
charters, FHFA must implement current
law in the best way possible.
Accordingly, FHFA plans to develop a
regulation establishing criteria that will
govern their portfolio holdings at such
time as the Enterprises are no longer
subject to Stock Purchase Agreements
that establish portfolio holdings criteria.
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1. Public Policy Objectives of the
Regulation
Section 1369E of the Safety and
Soundness Act specifies two public
policy objectives that guide FHFA’s
development of a regulation establishing
criteria governing Enterprise portfolio
holdings. The first objective is ensuring
that portfolio holdings are backed by
sufficient capital. 12 U.S.C. 4624(a). The
Enterprises are subject to capital
regulations as set forth in 12 CFR part
1750. As initially enacted, in 1992, the
Safety and Soundness Act established
fixed minimum capital requirements in
statute, directed OFHEO to establish
risk-based capital requirements for the
Enterprises as prescribed in statute, and
greatly limited the agency’s flexibility
with respect to adjusting those riskbased capital requirements. Capital
regulations issued in accordance with
those authorities allowed the
Enterprises to operate with considerable
leverage relative to their risks and
relative to other regulated financial
institutions, regardless of economic
conditions or the phase of the mortgage
credit cycle. Each Enterprise’s core
capital—comparable to Tier 1 capital for
1 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Henry M.
Paulson, Jr., ‘‘The Role of the GSEs in Supporting
the Housing Recovery,’’ before the Economic Club
of Washington (January 7, 2009).
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banks—consistently represented less
than 2 percent of the sum of its
mortgage assets and guaranteed MBS.
High leverage relative to their risks
contributed significantly to the systemic
risk posed by the Enterprises and their
inability to continue to perform their
mission and operate in a safe and sound
manner as they incurred losses in 2007
and 2008.
Under the Act, OFHEO’s capital
regulations remain in effect for the
Enterprises until modified or replaced.
The Act amended the Safety and
Soundness Act to provide FHFA with
broad authorities with respect to capital
regulation comparable to those
possessed by the federal bank regulatory
agencies. Accordingly, FHFA has begun
to develop a new and more rigorous
capital regime that will be applicable to
the Enterprises after the
conservatorships are terminated. FHFA
intends that any new risk-based capital
regulation and any amendment to an
existing minimum capital regulation
ensure that the Enterprises’ portfolio
holdings are backed by sufficient
capital, consistent with the
requirements of section 1369E of the
Safety and Soundness Act.
FHFA has determined that it is
prudent and in the best interests of the
secondary mortgage market to suspend
capital classifications of the Enterprises,
during the conservatorships, in light of
the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreements. FHFA continues to closely
monitor Enterprise capital levels, but
the existing statutory and FHFAdirected regulatory capital requirements
are not binding during the
conservatorships.
The second public policy objective
that guides FHFA’s development of a
regulation is ensuring that the
Enterprises’ portfolio holdings are
consistent with their mission and safe
and sound operations. The statutory
mission of the Enterprises is to provide
stability in the secondary market for
residential mortgages, respond
appropriately to the private capital
market, provide ongoing assistance to
the secondary market for residential
mortgages by increasing the liquidity of
mortgage investments and improving
the distribution of capital available for
residential mortgage lending, promote
access to mortgage credit throughout the
country, and support financing for
housing affordable by low- and
moderate-income households and in
underserved areas. The mission is most
challenging and most important during
the part of the mortgage credit cycle
when market conditions are weakest.
Thus, the Enterprises, as a matter of
public policy, must maintain sufficient
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financial strength to make business
decisions throughout that cycle that are
relatively unconstrained by solvency or
liquidity problems. To do so, the
Enterprises must limit their risk
exposures and build sufficient capital,
relative to their risks, in periods of
housing and mortgage market
expansion, to be able to absorb losses
and maintain sufficient capital to
comply with regulatory capital
requirements and perform their mission
during contractions in the housing
sector or the broader economy. In
addition, to fulfill their mission to
provide stability and ongoing assistance
to the secondary mortgage market, the
Enterprises should not themselves
present unnecessary systemic risk to the
secondary market or the broader
mortgage finance or financial markets.
FHFA intends that a regulation
establishing criteria governing
Enterprise portfolio holdings, in
combination with a revised capital
regime for the Enterprises, will give
them incentives that will promote their
ability to perform their mission at all
points in the mortgage credit cycle.
2. Questions Requesting Public
Comment Regarding Standards
Governing Portfolio Holdings of
Mortgage Assets
The Enterprises’ mortgage portfolio
holdings have long been a source of
debate by lawmakers, policy makers,
researchers, and others, principally
because of the size of those holdings.
Recent events that eventually caused
FHFA to place the Enterprises in
conservatorship highlight the risks
posed by their large mortgage portfolio
holdings and the failure of the
Enterprises to hold capital
commensurate with the risks posed by
those holdings. In mid-2006, the
Enterprises agreed to cap the growth of
their mortgage portfolio holdings due to
their accounting, internal control, and
risk management weaknesses. Recent
events also underscore the need to
establish criteria governing the holdings
that will allow the Enterprises to carry
out their mission in a safe and sound
manner.
Section 1369E of the Safety and
Soundness Act makes clear that
Congress considered the Enterprises’
mortgage portfolio holdings necessary
for them to carry out their mission, at
least in some circumstances.
Accordingly, Congress granted FHFA
authority to complete determine the
appropriate size and composition of the
mortgage portfolio holdings going
forward, and whether the Enterprises
should and how they can be encouraged
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to operate in a more counter-cyclical 2
fashion so that they can respond
appropriately when the secondary
mortgage market is under stress. FHFA
invites public comments on those and
related issues. Separate questions are
posed about Enterprise purchases of
mortgage assets for portfolio and about
portfolio holdings of those assets, since
those activities raise distinct issues.
i. Benefits of Enterprise Purchases of
Mortgage Assets for Portfolio.
The Enterprises provide liquidity—
ready access to funds on reasonable
terms—to the thousands of banks,
thrifts, and mortgage companies that
make loans to housing in the U.S. The
Enterprises do so primarily by
transforming individual mortgages into
MBS backed by Enterprise guarantees of
timely payment of principal and
interest. Lenders provide the Enterprises
with the individual mortgages used to
create Enterprise MBS and use the cash
raised to engage in further lending.
Securitization helps provide a
continuous, stable supply of funds to
finance purchases of homes by
individuals and families and apartment
buildings and other multifamily
dwellings by investors.
In some circumstances, the
Enterprises provide additional liquidity
and stability to the secondary mortgage
market by buying whole loans from
lenders, and by purchasing MBS that
they or the Government National
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) have
guaranteed, or private-label MBS issued
by large lenders or Wall Street firms.
The Enterprises hold those mortgage
assets in portfolio and finance them
with debt. By standing ready to
purchase MBS they have guaranteed
when the market yields of those
securities are high relative to the yields
of alternative investments, the
Enterprises enhance the liquidity of the
MBS. Enterprise purchases of selected
tranches of private-label MBS may also
enhance the liquidity and reduce the
yields of those securities.
The economic benefits provided by
Enterprise purchases of mortgage assets
for their portfolios during periods when
the secondary mortgage market is
generally liquid and stable are
uncertain. Research at the Federal
Reserve Board, using data from a period
2 Financial institutions and markets experience
periodic lending booms and busts that amplify the
business cycle, making economic activity more
volatile than it would otherwise be. Countercyclical behavior by the Enterprises—building up
capital relative to their risks in periods of housing
and mortgage market expansion and using that
capital to absorb losses and increase their activity
during contractions—might reduce the volatility of
mortgage lending, housing activity, and overall
economic activity.
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of relative market stability, found that
purchases for the Enterprises’ portfolios
appear to have no material effect on the
cost or availability of mortgage credit.3
Studies conducted by other researchers
have found that the Enterprises’
purchases of whole loans and MBS for
their portfolios reduce mortgage interest
rates and mortgage rate volatility,
increase the volume of mortgage lending
and refinancing, and increase liquidity
in the secondary mortgage market.4
A large portion of the mortgage assets
purchased for portfolio by the
Enterprises finance dwelling units that
are affordable to low- and moderateincome households, or are located in
geographic areas designated as
underserved. Those and other loans may
have characteristics that make them
difficult or uneconomical to securitize.
Enterprise purchases of such loans may
enhance the liquidity and lower the
interest rates that lenders require on
those assets. The Enterprises’
acquisition of those assets for portfolio
may increase the availability and reduce
the cost of such financing more than
securitization alone.5
Further, the Enterprises can support
mortgage markets and the housing
sector and reduce market yields of MBS
by purchasing those securities during
periods of severe stress or turmoil in
mortgage markets or the broader
financial system. In the recent period of
mortgage market stress, Enterprise
purchases of MBS appear to have had
some impact on the secondary market
pricing and liquidity of mortgage
securities of those securities. When such
conditions ease, the Enterprises may be
able to sell such mortgage assets in an
orderly manner, rather than holding
them indefinitely in portfolio.
Question 1: What additional benefits
are provided to the secondary mortgage
market and the housing sector by
Enterprise purchases for portfolio of
mortgage loans and MBS, beyond the
benefits provided by their securitization
activities? What is the magnitude of
those additional benefits?
Question 2: Is it possible for the
Enterprises to fulfill their mission of
providing stability and liquidity to the
secondary mortgage market without
3 Andrea Lehnert, S. Wayne Passmore, and Shane
Sherland, ‘‘GSEs, Mortgage Rates, and Secondary
Market Activities.’’ (April 2008) Journal of Real
Estate Finance and Economics 36(3), 343–363.
4 See the studies cited in James C. Miller, III, and
James E. Pearce, Revisiting the Net Benefits of
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (a study prepared for
Freddie Mac, November 2006).
5 Bernanke, Ben S., ‘‘GSE Portfolios, Systemic
Risk, and Affordable Housing,’’ Speech before the
Independent Community Bankers of America’s
Annual Convention and Techworld, Honolulu,
Hawaii (March 6, 2007).
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purchasing mortgage assets for
portfolio? If so, how? If not, what types
of mortgage assets should they be
allowed to purchase for portfolio, and in
what amounts?
Question 3: Could the U.S.
government better ensure the liquidity
and stability of the secondary mortgage
market other than through Enterprise
purchases of mortgage assets for
portfolio—for example, through the
activities of the Federal Reserve System,
mortgage asset purchases by the
Department of the Treasury, or the
provision of an explicit government
guarantee of MBS securitized by the
Enterprises?
Question 4: Should the Enterprises’
purchases of mortgage assets vary over
the mortgage credit cycle or with
conditions in the secondary mortgage
market? If so, how?
Question 5: If the Enterprises
purchase large volumes of mortgage
assets during periods of stress or turmoil
in the secondary mortgage market,
should they be required to sell those
assets once that market stabilizes? If so,
when and how should the Enterprises
conduct such sales?
ii. Benefits of Enterprise Mortgage
Portfolio Holdings.
The Enterprises’ portfolio holdings of
mortgage assets grew rapidly beginning
in the 1990s and extending through the
early part of the current decade. The
pace of that growth greatly exceeded the
growth of the mortgage market as a
whole, as measured by residential
mortgage debt outstanding (RMDO). The
Enterprises’ combined holdings of
mortgage assets increased from $135
billion, or 4.7 percent of RMDO, at the
end of 1990, to $1,410 billion, or 20.4
percent of RMDO, at the end of 2002. In
the years that ensued, the Enterprises
were plagued by accounting scandals
related to the hedging of their mortgage
portfolios, internal control problems,
and other issues that led to the
imposition of supervisory restrictions
on the growth of their mortgage assets
and capital surcharges. Between 2004
and 2007, the mortgage portfolios of the
Enterprises shrunk or grew significantly
more slowly than RMDO. At the end of
June 2008, their combined holdings of
mortgage assets totaled $1,541 billion,
or 12.7 percent of RMDO.
Historically, key beneficiaries of the
Enterprises’ large mortgage portfolio
holdings were their shareholders, who
profited from the Enterprises’ low
funding costs. Some types of mortgage
assets acquired for the portfolio may
have contributed to the Enterprises’
mission objectives. Such assets may
have included whole loans that finance
affordable housing that are not easily
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securitized because of non-standard
features and small volumes, as well as
mortgage securities that are backed by
affordable housing loans and that are
not traded in markets with the broad
appeal and liquidity of Enterprise MBS.
The mortgage portfolios have also been
used to support the Enterprises’
securitization activities, to provide
liquidity and stability to the secondary
mortgage market, and to support the
liquidity of the Enterprises’ own MBS.
Question 6: Could the benefits of the
Enterprises’ mortgage portfolio holdings
be achieved if the levels of those
holdings were substantially lower than
current levels? Could the Enterprises
carry out their mission of providing
stability and liquidity to the secondary
mortgage market and of supporting
affordable housing without maintaining
portfolios of mortgage assets? If so,
explain how.
iii. Additional Risks to the Enterprises
Posed by Their Mortgage Portfolio
Holdings.
The Enterprises’ securitization
activities and portfolio holdings of
whole loans expose them to mortgage
credit risk—the risk of losses if
borrowers do not make their payments
due or default on their loans. The recent
credit crisis demonstrates that broadbased and sizable losses from exposure
to mortgage credit risk can occur.
Securitization and portfolio investment
in whole loans also expose the
Enterprises to the risk that lenders,
mortgage servicers, and mortgage
insurers may not fulfill their contractual
obligations, with significant
consequences during a systemic event.
The mortgage portfolios of the
Enterprises expose them to risks beyond
those posed by their securitization
activities. The principal additional risks
are interest rate risk, derivatives
counterparty credit risk, the risk of
declines in the fair values of MBS
holdings due to increased credit and
market liquidity risks, funding and basis
risks, and operational risks. Their
exposure to interest rate risk arises
primarily from the long-term, fixed-rate
mortgages that they hold, directly or
through MBS. Because borrowers can
prepay their mortgages at any time, a
mismatch of the durations of Enterprise
mortgage assets and liabilities can
result. The Enterprises use various
techniques, including hedging with
derivatives, to manage the risk resulting
from this mismatch. Using derivatives to
hedge that risk exposes the Enterprises
to derivatives counterparty credit risk.
The Enterprises’ holdings of privatelabel MBS pose additional credit risk
and significant risk of asset price
declines due to declines in market
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liquidity. Funding risk is the risk that a
firm will be unable to obtain funds at a
reasonable cost or at all when its
existing debt matures or its payments
are due. Basis risk is the risk that the
interest rates in different financial
markets will not move in the same
direction or amount at the same time.
Operational risk can manifest itself in
a number of ways, most commonly
through the breakdown of internal
controls, ineffective corporate
governance, inadequate policies and
procedures, employee behavior, and
external events. The Enterprises face
operational risks due to technology
failures, business disruptions, internal
or external fraud, processing errors, and
weaknesses in internal policies and
procedures. For example, the
accounting scandals at both Enterprises
in the early part of the decade were
partially due to irregularities in the
implementation of complex derivatives
accounting principles.
Section 1369E of the Safety and
Soundness Act requires that in
establishing criteria governing the
Enterprises’ portfolio holdings, the
Director shall consider the Enterprises’
adherence to prudent management and
operations standards established under
section 1313B of the Act. 12 U.S.C.
4624(a). Those standards must address
many issues related to managing risks
posed by the Enterprises’ mortgage
portfolio holdings, including
management of interest rate risk
exposure, management of market risk,
adequacy and maintenance of liquidity
and reserves, management of asset and
investment portfolio growth, overall risk
management processes, management of
credit and counterparty risk, and
management of operational risks.
Question 7: Aside from reducing the
volume or altering the composition of
mortgage assets held by the Enterprises,
are there other ways in which FHFA can
use criteria governing their mortgage
portfolio holdings to reduce their
exposure to or improve their
management of interest rate, credit,
operational, and other risks? If so, what
approaches should FHFA take?
Question 8: How can FHFA best use
criteria governing mortgage portfolio
holdings, in conjunction with capital
regulations and other supervisory tools,
such as prudent management and
operations standards established in
accordance with section 1313B of the
Safety and Soundness Act, to address
the Enterprises’ exposure to the
additional risks posed by such
holdings?
iv. Systemic Risk Posed by Enterprise
Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
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There is broad agreement among
policymakers and economists that the
Enterprises pose substantial systemic
risk to mortgage markets and the
broader financial system.6 As the
Treasury Department recently stated,
‘‘[t]he systemic importance of these two
enterprises, and the systemic impact of
a collapse of either, cannot be
overstated.’’ 7 The Enterprises’ systemic
risk arises from four sources:
• High leverage increases the risk of
Enterprise failure and of the adverse
consequences for mortgage lending and
housing activity attendant on such
failure.
• The Enterprises’ combined
mortgage assets totaled nearly $1.6
trillion as of November 30, 2008. If
either Enterprise had to shrink its
portfolio holdings rapidly, the market
values of the mortgage assets held by
many other financial institutions would
be adversely affected, exacerbating
solvency and liquidity problems.
• Mortgage lender dependence on the
Enterprises, already high since the mid1980s, has increased substantially since
the collapse of the secondary market for
private-label MBS in the third quarter of
2007. If either Enterprise greatly
reduced or sharply curtailed its
mortgage purchases, mortgage rates
would increase, which would reduce
new mortgage lending, depress the
market values of mortgage assets held
throughout the industry, and tend to
weaken housing and the broader
economy.
• Outstanding Enterprise debt—over
$1.6 trillion at the end of November
2008—is widely held by commercial
banks in the U.S., institutional
investors, foreign central banks, and
other foreign investors. If Enterprise
6 See, among many other studies, Bernanke, Ben
S., ‘‘GSE Portfolios, Systemic Risk, and Affordable
Housing,’’ Speech before the Independent
Community Bankers of America’s Annual
Convention and Techworld, Honolulu, Hawaii
(March 6, 2007); Eisenbeis, Robert A, W. Scott
Frame, and Larry D. Wall, ‘‘An Analysis of the
Systemic Risks Posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac and an Evaluation of the Policy Options for
Reducing Those Risks,’’ Journal of Financial
Services Research (Vol. 31, Nos. 2–3, June 2007),
75–99; Greenspan, Alan, ‘‘Government-Sponsored
Enterprises,’’ Remarks Delivered at the Conference
on Housing, Mortgage Finance, and the
Macroeconomy, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
(May 19, 2005); Mankiw, N. Gregory, Remarks at the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, State
Banking Summit and Leadership Conference
(November 6, 2003); Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight, Systemic Risk: Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the Role of OFHEO (Washington,
DC: February 2003); and Poole, William. ‘‘Housing
in the Macroeconomy,’’ Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis (May/June 2003), 1–8.
7 Department of the Treasury, Responses to
Questions of the First Report of the Congressional
Oversight Panel for Economic Stabilization
(December 31, 2008), 10.
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5615
markets and the broader financial
system be affected? What steps could
the federal government take to
maximize any improvement in stability?
v. Criteria Governing Enterprise
Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
a. Size of Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
Under the portfolio holdings criteria
established in the Stock Purchase
Agreements, the mortgage assets of each
Enterprise will decline by 10 percent
each year starting in 2010 and each year
thereafter until the holdings of each
Enterprise reached $250 billion. FHFA
projects that would occur in 2020, at the
end of which each Enterprise’s mortgage
portfolio holdings would represent
about 2.0 percent of projected RMDO.
(Chart 1).
Stock Purchase Agreements until each
Enterprise’s mortgage portfolio
represented no more than, say, 2.1
percent of RMDO—the share that $250
billion represented as of mid-2008—and
limit each portfolio’s future growth so as
to maintain its ratio to RMDO at 2.1
percent thereafter. FHFA projects that
would occur in 2016, at the end of
which each Enterprise’s mortgage assets
would be about $400 billion (Chart 2).
Under any such approach, increases in
the mortgage assets of an Enterprise or
both Enterprises could be permitted on
a temporary basis in times of economic
distress or market disruption, consistent
with 12 U.S.C. 4624(b).
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increased, and to avoid adverse
consequences for the housing sector and
economy. If the mortgage portfolio
holdings of the Enterprises were
reduced in order to limit the systemic
risk they pose, the overall effect on
financial stability would depend on
what other entities acquired the assets,
how they funded the assets and
managed the associated risks, and how
much capital they held against those
risks.
Question 9: Should FHFA use criteria
governing the Enterprises’ mortgage
portfolio holdings to mitigate the
systemic risk posed by the Enterprises?
If so, how? If the mortgage portfolio
holdings of the Enterprises were
reduced in an effort to mitigate the
systemic risk posed by the Enterprises,
how would the stability of the mortgage
Another approach could establish
criteria that, rather than specifying
dollar amounts, specified maximum
ratios between each Enterprise’s
mortgage assets and some indicator of
the size of the mortgage market such as
RMDO. For example, the criteria could
require each Enterprise’s mortgage
assets to decline as required by the
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solvency or liquidity problems led to
large declines in the market value of
that debt, there could be serious adverse
effects on banks and other investors.
The Enterprises are also among the
largest end-users of over-the-counter
(OTC) interest rate derivatives.
Uncertainty about how counterparties
would replace their OTC derivatives
with one or both Enterprises, if either
failed, could adversely affect those
institutions and the OTC derivatives
markets.
As noted above, a key objective of
placing the Enterprises in
conservatorship and executing the Stock
Purchase Agreements was to limit the
systemic risk they posed, which had
risen sharply in 2007 and the first half
of 2008, as they reported financial losses
and their leverage and borrowing costs
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 19 / Friday, January 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
Other criteria could be devised to
internalize at the Enterprises some of
the potential costs of large portfolio
holdings, in order to create an incentive
for the Enterprises to restrain those
holdings below a desired level. Thus,
the criteria could impose a firm limit on
the mortgage assets of each Enterprise,
but create a range below that limit
within which holdings would be
increasingly discouraged. For example,
that range could begin at their combined
share of RMDO at the end of 1991 (5
percent—2.5 percent per Enterprise) and
go as high as their combined market
share at the end of 1994, the mid-point
of the seven-year period 1991 through
1997 (or 8.3 percent—4.1 percent per
Enterprise). A sliding scale minimum
capital surcharge could apply if an
Enterprise chose to hold more than the
lower amount of the range. The
surcharge would increase as the
holdings moved toward the limit, with
a maximum surcharge of, perhaps, an
additional two percent of mortgage
assets.
Yet another approach could establish
criteria that would allow the mortgage
portfolio holdings of each Enterprise to
expand and contract with its mortgage
credit book of business—the sum of
those holdings plus its guaranteed MBS
held by other investors.
Question 10: Should the size of the
Enterprises’ mortgage portfolio holdings
be limited to a fixed dollar amount, be
linked to a market indicator, or be
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linked to the size of their MBS
outstanding?
Question 11: Should the permissible
size of the Enterprises’ holdings of
mortgage assets vary in a manner related
to the phase of the mortgage credit cycle
or conditions in the secondary mortgage
market? If so, how should FHFA
monitor that cycle or secondary
mortgage market conditions, and how
should the permissible size of those
holdings vary?
Question 12: How could decreases in
the Enterprises’ mortgage portfolio
holdings affect their operational
infrastructures? How would changes in
their operational infrastructures affect
their ability to expand their purchases
of mortgage assets for portfolio during
times of stress in the secondary
mortgage market? Does each Enterprise
need a minimum level of mortgage
portfolio holdings to maintain the
infrastructure needed to expand its
purchases under such conditions?
Question 13: Should each Enterprise’s
minimum capital requirement increase
with the size or composition of its
mortgage portfolio holdings? If so, how
should such increase be imposed?
Should a capital surcharge be imposed
on each Enterprise if its mortgage
portfolio holdings exceed some level? If
so, how should such surcharge be
imposed?
b. Composition of Mortgage Portfolio
Holdings.
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Criteria regarding the Enterprises’
mortgage portfolios could limit their
holdings of certain types of assets, while
encouraging them to hold more of
mortgage products that make a greater
contribution to specific elements of
their mission.
Question 14: Should FHFA restrict
the types of mortgage assets the
Enterprises are allowed to hold to those
that are strictly related to specific
elements of their mission? If so, how
should those assets be defined? For
example, should FHFA prohibit or place
a limit on each Enterprise’s holdings of
mortgage-related securities guaranteed
by the other Enterprise or Ginnie Mae or
its holdings of private-label MBS?
Question 15: Should FHFA require
that assets purchased for the portfolio
each year comply with affordable
housing goals and sub-goals established
for that year?
Question 16: Should FHFA allow the
Enterprises to hold, without limit, either
whole loans (or securities backed by
them) that finance affordable housing
not easily securitized because of nonstandard features and small volumes or
mortgage securities backed by loans that
finance affordable housing, where
markets for those securities are small or
thin? Please provide examples of such
loans or securities. Alternatively, should
FHFA place a limit on the amount of
such loans or securities that an
Enterprise can hold? If so, what is an
appropriate level?
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d. Counter-Cyclical Changes in
Enterprise Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
FHFA could establish criteria that
limit the rate of growth of each
Enterprise’s mortgage assets once the
Enterprise complied with criteria
related to the size of those holdings. The
growth limit could be tied to the average
growth rate of the mortgage market over
a long period, which would allow each
Enterprise’s portfolio holdings to grow
more slowly (or rapidly) than the overall
market during periods in which the
market was expanding more rapidly (or
slowly) than on average. That type of
growth limit would require the
Enterprises to vary the rate of growth of
their mortgage portfolio holdings in a
counter-cyclical manner. One way of
achieving this could be to require that
growth in each Enterprise’s portfolio
holdings be limited to the preceding 10year rolling annual average growth rate
of RMDO (Chart 3).
The Enterprises need to maintain
adequate levels of liquidity so that they
can carry out their day-to-day operating
activities. Maintaining adequate levels
of liquidity can help strengthen the
Enterprises’ ability to meet their
statutory mission of providing stability
and liquidity to the secondary mortgage
market, during good times and during
periods of market stress, without
incurring extraordinary financing costs.
The risk of not maintaining a portfolio
of highly liquid non-mortgage assets
was illustrated in the recent market
disruption. The quick reversal in market
conditions illustrates how fast liquidity
can disappear and how a prolonged
period of market illiquidity can affect
firms such as the Enterprises and their
counterparties. Indeed, during that
period, spreads between the yields of
Enterprise debt and U.S. Treasury
securities reached all time highs. In
addition, the Enterprises’ large holdings
of mortgage assets were not useful
sources of cash as the MBS repurchase
agreement market shriveled, and sales of
MBS would have only exacerbated
problems in the market.
There is an opportunity cost
associated with holding a sizable
volume of generally low-yielding assets
3. Questions Requesting Public
Comment Regarding Standards
Governing Enterprise Holdings of NonMortgage Assets
i. Benefits and Risks of Enterprises
Holdings of Non-Mortgage Assets.
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management standards, the agency’s
examination process, and by a new riskbased capital standard.
Question 17: Should FHFA establish
criteria governing the Enterprises’
mortgage portfolio holdings that specify
that the Enterprises adhere to a specific
maximum ratio of short-term debt to
mortgage assets or minimum ratio of
callable debt to long-term, fixed-rate
mortgage assets or to total long-term
debt?
Question 18: Should FHFA specify
criteria that condition Enterprise
mortgage portfolio holdings above a
certain amount on maintaining
measures of the risks—e.g., duration and
convexity—associated with those
portfolios within specified levels?
Should adherence to appropriate limits
on such risks be addressed through of
prudential management and operations
standards in accordance with section
1313B of the Act and FHFA’s
examination process?
Question 19: Should FHFA create
incentives for the Enterprises to behave
in a counter-cyclical manner through
criteria governing their portfolio
holdings of mortgage and non-mortgage
assets, regulatory capital requirements,
or both? If so, how? What are the
implications of specifying such criteria
for the Enterprises’ mission?
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c. Funding of Mortgage Portfolio
Holdings.
The Enterprises fund their portfolios
of mortgage assets largely by issuing
debt. The Enterprises are also highly
leveraged—historically, each
Enterprise’s core capital represented
less than 2 percent of the sum of its
mortgage assets and guaranteed MBS.
The Enterprises have relied heavily on
short-term debt to fund their mortgage
portfolio holdings, used financial
derivatives to alter synthetically the
maturity of that debt, and depended on
their ability to roll over debt and enter
into new derivatives contracts in all
market conditions. Because of the
favorable funding costs enjoyed by the
Enterprises, they benefitted from
attractive spreads between the yields on
the assets comprising their mortgage
portfolio holdings and their cost of
funds. FHFA will address issues related
to the funding of Enterprise mortgage
assets through promulgation of risk
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in an effort to ensure adequate liquidity
in a financial crisis. However, up to a
point that cost is offset by the potential
benefit of the Enterprises being prepared
to maintain funding for their long-term
assets and to respond in an appropriate
and meaningful way to a market
disruption.
Question 20: What risks and costs are
associated with requiring the
Enterprises to maintain a portfolio of
liquid, non-mortgage assets?
Question 21: Is it appropriate to
require the Enterprises to hold a large
portfolio of highly liquid assets even
during periods of market tranquility? If
so, why? Should the Enterprises be
compensated for holding ‘‘excess’’
levels of non-mortgage assets during
periods of market tranquility? If so,
what are appropriate incentives?
ii. Standards Governing Enterprise
Non-Mortgage Assets.
The rationale for establishing
standards governing the size and
composition of the Enterprises’ nonmortgage assets is to ensure that they
maintain sufficient liquidity to meet
their obligations and engage in new
business during market distress and to
ensure that the Enterprises do not hold
amounts of those assets beyond those
needed to achieve their mission. That
can be best achieved by requiring that
the Enterprises maintain portfolios of
marketable, highly liquid non-mortgage
assets at prescribed levels. Those assets
would be easily converted into cash,
without loss of value and disruption to
financial markets. Indeed, during a
market crisis such as that experienced
in the recent past, a portfolio of highly
liquid non-mortgage assets would better
enable the Enterprises to perform their
mission of providing liquidity and
stability to the secondary mortgage
market.
a. Size of the Non-Mortgage Portfolios.
FHFA could establish criteria
governing the size of the Enterprises’
holding of non-mortgage assets. For
example, the criteria could require that
each Enterprise maintain a minimum
balance of marketable, highly liquid
non-mortgage assets equal to 30 days of
expected net cash needs and totaling at
least $30 billion at all times.
Question 22: Should the Enterprises
be required to maintain a specific
minimum dollar amount of highly
liquid non-mortgage assets at all times?
If so, what is an appropriate dollar
amount? Alternatively, should the level
of non-mortgage assets be set at a
percentage of an Enterprise’s total assets
or a specified number of days of
liquidity? If so, what is an appropriate
percentage factor or number of days?
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Question 23: Should the Enterprises’
non-mortgage portfolios grow with the
phases of the mortgage credit cycle or
counter to that cycle? Should the
Enterprises be given incentives for
holding large volumes of liquid nonmortgage assets during periods of ample
market liquidity? If so, how should such
incentives be provided? For instance,
after criteria governing holdings of nonmortgage assets are established, FHFA
could reduce each Enterprise’s
minimum capital requirement by, for
example, 75 percent of the amount of
non-mortgage assets held to comply
with those criteria.
b. Composition of the Non-Mortgage
Portfolios.
In establishing criteria governing the
composition of the Enterprises’ nonmortgage portfolios, FHFA could require
that U.S. Treasury securities with
maturities of 30 days or less represent
a specified percentage of each
Enterprise’s total non-mortgage assets
(for example, 50 percent). The balance
of each Enterprise’s portfolio could
include other marketable, liquid, highlyrated securities, with maturities of one
year or less, such as the following—
• Commercial paper (rated A1/P1);
• Short-term Eurodollar time
deposits;
• Short-term money market accounts;
and
• Short-term municipal securities.
Question 24: Should the criteria
enumerate the specific types of
investments the Enterprises should hold
in the non-mortgage portfolios. If so,
what type assets should be included?
Should U.S. Treasury securities
represent a specific share of the nonmortgage portfolios? If so, what is an
appropriate percentage or dollar
amount?
Question 25: What is an appropriate
maturity range for securities comprising
the non-mortgage portfolios? How
should holdings be distributed
according to that range?
4. Questions Requesting Public
Comment Regarding Temporary
Adjustment of Criteria Governing
Portfolio Holdings
The Act authorizes the Director to
order temporary adjustments to the
established criteria governing the
portfolio holdings of an Enterprise or
both Enterprises, including during times
of economic distress or market
dislocation. 12 U.S.C. 4624(b).
Question 26: Should FHFA attempt
to specify in advance how it might
adjust criteria governing Enterprise
mortgage or non-mortgage portfolio
holdings in specific circumstances?
PO 00000
Frm 00024
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
List of Subjects
12 CFR Part 1252
Government-sponsored enterprises,
Portfolio holdings, Mortgages.
Authority and Issuance
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in
the preamble, under the authority of 12
U.S.C. 4624, the Federal Housing
Finance Agency hereby amends Title
12, Chapter XII, Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
■
CHAPTER XII—FEDERAL HOUSING
FINANCE AGENCY
Subchapter C—Enterprises
1. Add Subchapter C consisting of
part 1252 to read as follows:
■
PART 1252—PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS
Sec.
1252.1 Enterprise portfolio holdings
criteria.
1252.2 Effective duration.
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 4624.
§ 1252.1
criteria.
Enterprise portfolio holding
The Enterprises are required to
comply with the portfolio holdings
criteria set forth in their respective
Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreements with the Department of the
Treasury, as they may be amended from
time to time.
§ 1252.2
Effective duration.
This part shall be in effect for each
Enterprise so long as—
(a) This part has not been superseded
through amendment, and
(b) The Enterprise remains subject to
the terms and obligations of the
respective Senior Preferred Stock
Purchase Agreement.
Dated: January 16, 2009.
James B. Lockhart III,
Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency.
[FR Doc. E9–2047 Filed 1–29–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8070–01–P
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD
29 CFR Part 102
Revisions of Regulations Concerning
Procedures for Electronic Filing
AGENCY:
National Labor Relations
Board.
ACTION:
Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Board is amending
regulations concerning the procedures
for filing documents with the Agency
E:\FR\FM\30JAR1.SGM
30JAR1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 19 (Friday, January 30, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 5609-5618]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-2047]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY
12 CFR Part 1252
RIN 2590-AA22
Portfolio Holdings
AGENCY: Federal Housing Finance Agency.
ACTION: Interim final rule; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Housing Finance Agency is issuing an interim final
regulation to govern the portfolio holdings of the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac). Comments on the issues and questions set
forth in the preamble are requested, and the agency will amend the rule
as appropriate after considering comments.
DATES: Effective Date: January 30, 2009.
Comment Date: Written comments must be submitted on or before June
1, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may submit your comments, identified by ``Portfolio
Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN 2590-AA22],'' by any of the following methods:
U.S. Mail, United Parcel Post, Federal Express, or Other
Mail Service: The mailing address for submitting comments is: Alfred M.
Pollard, General Counsel, Attention: Comments ``Portfolio Holdings IFR/
RFC, [RIN 2590-AA22],'' Federal Housing Finance Agency, Fourth Floor,
1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552.
Hand Delivery/Courier: The hand delivery address for
submitting comments is: Alfred M. Pollard, General Counsel, Attention:
Comments ``Portfolio Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN 2590-AA22],'' Federal
Housing Finance Agency, Fourth Floor, 1700 G Street, NW., Washington,
DC 20552. The package should be logged at the Guard Desk, First Floor,
on business days between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.
E-mail: Comments may be submitted via electronic mail at
RegComments@FHFA.gov addressed to Alfred M. Pollard, General Counsel.
Please include ``Portfolio Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN 2590-AA22]'' in the
subject line of the message.
Federal eRulemaking: Instructions on comment submission
are also available on the eRulemaking portal at https://
www.regulations.gov.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) requests that comments
submitted in hard copy also be accompanied by the electronic version in
Microsoft Word or in a portable document format (PDF) on 3.5'' disk or
CD-ROM, and identify the comments as pertaining to the Portfolio
Holdings Interim Final Rule.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ming-Yuen Meyer-Fong, Office of the
General Counsel, (202) 414-3798, or Valerie Smith, Office of Policy
Analysis and Research, (202) 414-3770, Federal Housing Finance Agency,
1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552. The telephone number for the
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf is (800) 877-8339. For more
information on this Interim Final Regulation, see the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Comments and Access
Instructions: FHFA requests that comments submitted in hard copy
also be accompanied by the electronic version in Microsoft[supreg] Word
or in a portable document format (PDF) on 3.5'' disk or CD-ROM, and
identify that comments pertain to ``Portfolio Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN
2590-AA22].''
Statement of Availability: This Interim Final Regulation as well as
any comments posted may be accessed via the internet. Users can access
the FHFA web page at https://www.fhfa.gov; select Supervision and
Regulations Tab; select Regulations, Notices and Public Comments; then,
select the link titled ``Portfolio Holdings'' or via the worldwide
eRulemaking portal at https://www.regulations.gov. User can also access
Exhibits A to F referenced in this interim rule document. Specifically,
Exhibit A (Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
[[Page 5610]]
Agreement for Fannie Mae) may be accessed at https://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/seniorpreferredstockpurchaseagreementfnm1.pdf,
and Exhibit B (Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreement for Freddie Mac) at https://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/seniorpreferredstockpurchaseagreementfrea.pdf. Also, Exhibit C
(Certificate of Designation of Terms of Variable Liquidation Preference
Senior Preferred Stock, Series 2008-2 for Fannie Mae) may be accessed
at https://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/certificatefnm2.pdf, and
Exhibit D (Certificate of Terms and Conditions of Variable Liquidation
Preference Senior Preferred Stock for Freddie Mac) may be accessed at
https://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/certificatefreb.pdf.
Finally, Exhibit E (Warrant to Purchase Common Stock of Fannie Mae) may
be accessed at https://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
warrantfnm3.pdf, and Exhibit F (Warrant to Purchase Common Stock of
Freddie Mac) may be accessed at https://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/warrantfrec.pdf. In addition, copies of all comments received
will be available for examination by the public on business days
between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m., at the Federal Housing Finance
Agency, Fourth Floor, 1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552. To make
an appointment to inspect comments, please call the Office of General
Counsel (FHFA) at (202) 414-6924.
II. Background
A. Establishment of the Federal Housing Finance Agency
On July 30, 2008, the President signed the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act (Act) (Pub. L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2564). Among other
things, the Act established a new independent executive branch agency
known as the Federal Housing Finance Agency and transferred the
supervisory and oversight responsibilities for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac (the Enterprises) from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO). The Enterprises are government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) chartered by Congress for the purposes of establishing secondary
market facilities for residential mortgages. 12 U.S.C. 1716 et seq.
(Fannie Mae Charter Act) and 12 U.S.C. 1451, et seq. (Freddie Mac
Corporation Act). Specifically, Congress established the Enterprises to
provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages,
respond appropriately to the private capital market, provide ongoing
assistance to the secondary market for residential mortgages, and
promote access to mortgage credit throughout the country. Id.
The Act amended the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety
and Soundness Act of 1992 (Safety and Soundness Act) (Pub. L. 102-550,
(codified at 12 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.). Among other things, the Act
required FHFA to establish criteria by regulation governing the
portfolio holdings of the Enterprises. 12 U.S.C. 4624. The purpose of
such regulation is to ensure that the portfolio holdings are backed by
sufficient capital and consistent with the mission and the safe and
sound operations of the Enterprises. 12 U.S.C. 4624(a). Further, the
Act directed that FHFA consider the ability of the Enterprises to
provide a liquid secondary market through securitization activities,
the portfolio holdings in relation to the overall mortgage market, and
adherence to standards of prudential management and operations
established by FHFA in accordance with section 1313B of the Act. 12
U.S.C. 4624. The Act also required that any criteria governing
Enterprise portfolio holdings ensure that such holdings are consistent
with the Enterprises' mission, which includes facilitating the
financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families
in a manner consistent with their overall public purposes. 12 U.S.C.
4624(a); 12 U.S.C. 4501(7).
B. Discussion and Analysis of Interim Rule
The FHFA is issuing this regulation as an interim final rule, with
an effective date of January 30, 2009. The name of the newly
established part 1252 will read ``Portfolio Holdings,'' which will
contain the rules governing Enterprise portfolio holdings. The
provisions of this regulation are adopted on an interim final basis and
will remain in effect until amended. A 120-day comment period is
provided on the interim final rule and on the topics and questions
raised in the Request for Comments section.
In accordance with section 1109(b) of the Act, FHFA is required to
issue regulations establishing criteria governing Enterprise portfolio
holdings. The criteria should ensure that Enterprise portfolio holdings
are backed by sufficient capital and consistent with the mission as
well as the safe and sound operations of the Enterprises. 12 U.S.C.
4624(a).
The Act authorizes the Director to order temporary adjustments to
the established criteria for an Enterprise or both Enterprises,
including during times of economic distress or market disruption. 12
U.S.C. 4624(b). In addition, the Act provides that the Director monitor
the portfolio of each Enterprise and authorizes the Director to order
an Enterprise to dispose of or acquire any asset under terms and
conditions to be determined by the Director, if the Director determines
that such action is consistent with the purposes of the Safety and
Soundness Act or the authorizing statute of the Enterprise. 12 U.S.C.
4624(c).
C. Enterprise Conservatorships and Senior Preferred Stock Agreements
With the Department of the Treasury
On September 6, 2008, FHFA, with the concurrence of the Secretary
of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into
conservatorship. By board approval, both Enterprises consented to the
appointment of a conservator. FHFA's goals in placing the Enterprises
into conservatorship included enhancing their capacity to fulfill their
mission of providing liquidity and stability to the mortgage markets
and mitigating the systemic risk posed by the Enterprises, which had
contributed to instability in mortgage and broader financial markets.
Upon a determination by the Director of FHFA that either Enterprise has
returned to a safe and solvent condition and the systemic risks
contributing to the conservatorship decision have been addressed
adequately, the Director will issue an order terminating the
conservatorship of that Enterprise. There is no exact time frame as to
when the conservatorship of either Enterprise may end.
In order to prevent Enterprise capital from being exhausted, FHFA,
upon appointing itself conservator for the Enterprises and on behalf of
each Enterprise, entered into separate Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreements (Stock Purchase Agreements) with the Department of the
Treasury. See Exhibits A & B (Stock Purchase Agreements for Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac). Under the Stock Purchase Agreements, each
Enterprise's capacity to issue new guarantees of mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) and to maintain and grow its mortgage portfolio
holdings was fortified through a commitment by the Department of the
Treasury to acquire up to $100 billion of senior preferred stock in
that Enterprise as necessary to ensure that the Enterprise avoid a
negative net worth. In exchange for that commitment, each of the
Enterprises granted to the Department of the Treasury shares of Senior
Preferred Stock with an initial liquidation
[[Page 5611]]
preference of $1 billion (and which value would increase with each
investment by the Department of the Treasury up to Treasury's
commitment of $100 billion for each Enterprise, as well as with any
unpaid commitment fees or dividends owed). Id.; see also Exhibits C & D
(Certificates of Designation of Terms of Variable Liquidation
Preference Senior Preferred Stock, Series 2008-2 for Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac). The Enterprises also granted to the Department of the
Treasury warrants for shares of common stock. See Exhibits E & F
(Warrants to Purchase Common Stock of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). In
conjunction with enhancing the Enterprises' capacity to engage in new
business and to maintain and grow their mortgage portfolio holdings,
the Stock Purchase Agreements also established criteria governing those
holdings.
Under the portfolio holdings criteria set forth in the Stock
Purchase Agreements, each Enterprise may, through December 31, 2009,
increase its mortgage assets to a level not to exceed $850 billion,
thereby allowing each Enterprise to provide additional liquidity during
this period of mortgage market stress. After December 31, 2009, the
portfolio holdings criteria set forth in the Stock Purchase Agreements
require the reduction of each Enterprise's mortgage assets at the rate
of 10 percent per year until they reach a size of $250 billion, which
would be around the year 2020. That reduction is expected to be
achieved largely through natural run-off. The portfolio holdings
criteria set forth in the Stock Purchase Agreements do not address
Enterprise holdings of non-mortgage assets.
III. Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1252.1
Section 1252.1 adopts the portfolio holdings criteria established
by the Stock Purchase Agreements, as they may be amended from time to
time, as the standards for this rule. Under the current Stock Purchase
Agreements, which currently have the same portfolio holdings criteria
for both Enterprises, an Enterprise may grow its mortgage assets up to
$850 billion on December 31, 2009. Starting on December 31, 2010, the
Enterprise must hold 10 percent less mortgage assets in its portfolio
than at the end of the preceding year until those assets reach a level
of $250 billion, at which point, no further decrease is currently
required. Adjustments could be made to those criteria by amendment of
the Stock Purchase Agreements.
FHFA's establishment of criteria governing Enterprise portfolio
holdings in the Stock Purchase Agreements represents an exercise of
authority consistent with the authority granted by Congress under
section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act. FHFA's goals for the
conservatorship include fortifying Enterprise capacity to support the
secondary mortgage market. The criteria for Enterprise portfolio
holdings established in the Stock Purchase Agreements allow the
Enterprises immediate capacity to provide stability and liquidity to
the secondary mortgage market, while mitigating systemic risk, and
facilitating Enterprise efforts to achieve a balance between their
mission and safe and sound operations in the intermediate term. Given
the severe deterioration in mortgage market conditions and findings by
FHFA that the Enterprises were unable to raise capital, immediate,
coordinated government action was required to reinforce Enterprise
capacity to provide liquidity to the secondary mortgage market.
Establishing criteria governing Enterprise portfolio holdings was an
essential part of that action.
Section 1252.2
Section 1252.2 addresses the effective duration of the interim
rule. FHFA expects these regulations to be effective until any
amendment or until the Enterprises are no longer subject to the terms
and obligations of the Stock Purchase Agreements.
IV. Regulatory Requirements
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
The interim rule does not contain any information collection
requirement to require the approval of OMB under the Paperwork
Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Therefore, the requirements of
the Paperwork Reduction Act do not apply.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires that
a regulation that has a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, small businesses, or small organizations must
include an initial regulatory flexibility analysis describing the
regulation's impact on small entities. Such an analysis need not be
undertaken if the agency has certified that the regulation does not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. 5 U.S.C. 605(b). FHFA has considered the impact of the
interim final rule under the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The General
Counsel of FHFA certifies that the interim final rule is not likely to
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
business entities because the regulation is applicable only to the
Enterprises, which are not small entities for purposes of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act.
C. Good Cause for Issuance of Interim Final Rule
An agency may issue an interim final rule when the agency for good
cause finds that notice and public procedure thereon are
``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' 5
U.S.C. 553(b). The interim final rule issued herein meets the Act's
requirement for issuance of regulations establishing portfolio holdings
pursuant to section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act, 12 U.S.C.
4501 et seq., as amended, as well as the requirements for good cause
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b).
HERA requires the Director to issue regulations establishing the
portfolio holding standards for the Enterprises within 180 days of
enactment. In addition, this interim final rule adopts criteria
governing the portfolio holdings of the Enterprises that have been in
place and currently govern the actions of the Enterprises. Given these
facts, the Director has determined that prior notice and comment
procedures are impractical and contrary to public interest.
Further, given that the Enterprises received notice of the
portfolio holdings criteria set forth in the Stock Purchase Agreements,
and consented to the portfolio holdings criteria through their
conservator, opportunity for further comment by the Enterprises is
unnecessary. The issuance of this interim final rule and publication in
the Federal Register serve to comply with the formal requirement in the
Act that FHFA issue regulations within 180 days of enactment. See
section 1109(b) of the Act.
V. Request for Comments
A. Interim Final Rule (Sec. Sec. 1252.1 and 1252.2)
FHFA is interested in receiving comments on all aspects of the
Interim Final Rule, and all relevant comments will be considered. FHFA
will amend the interim final rule as appropriate after reviewing
comments received.
FHFA also requests comments on the issues and questions set forth
herein to give the public an opportunity to comment on criteria
governing Enterprise portfolio holdings that will apply when the
Enterprises are no longer subject to Stock Purchase Agreements that
establish holdings
[[Page 5612]]
criteria. When addressing a specific question contained in this interim
final rule, FHFA asks that commenters specifically note, by number,
which question is being addressed. In particular, the FHFA is seeking
comments in the areas and on the issues discussed below. Comments
should be identified as pertaining to the Portfolio Holdings IFR and
should be submitted as indicated in the ADDRESSES section of this
preamble.
B. Request for Comments
FHFA as conservator is working to restore each Enterprise to a safe
and sound condition. FHFA anticipates that, once housing and mortgage
markets stabilize, the Enterprises may return to profitability. While
many--including, for example, then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry M.
Paulson \1\--have suggested major changes in the structure or roles of
the Enterprises, until Congress acts to make changes to their charters,
FHFA must implement current law in the best way possible. Accordingly,
FHFA plans to develop a regulation establishing criteria that will
govern their portfolio holdings at such time as the Enterprises are no
longer subject to Stock Purchase Agreements that establish portfolio
holdings criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Remarks by Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., ``The
Role of the GSEs in Supporting the Housing Recovery,'' before the
Economic Club of Washington (January 7, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Public Policy Objectives of the Regulation
Section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act specifies two public
policy objectives that guide FHFA's development of a regulation
establishing criteria governing Enterprise portfolio holdings. The
first objective is ensuring that portfolio holdings are backed by
sufficient capital. 12 U.S.C. 4624(a). The Enterprises are subject to
capital regulations as set forth in 12 CFR part 1750. As initially
enacted, in 1992, the Safety and Soundness Act established fixed
minimum capital requirements in statute, directed OFHEO to establish
risk-based capital requirements for the Enterprises as prescribed in
statute, and greatly limited the agency's flexibility with respect to
adjusting those risk-based capital requirements. Capital regulations
issued in accordance with those authorities allowed the Enterprises to
operate with considerable leverage relative to their risks and relative
to other regulated financial institutions, regardless of economic
conditions or the phase of the mortgage credit cycle. Each Enterprise's
core capital--comparable to Tier 1 capital for banks--consistently
represented less than 2 percent of the sum of its mortgage assets and
guaranteed MBS. High leverage relative to their risks contributed
significantly to the systemic risk posed by the Enterprises and their
inability to continue to perform their mission and operate in a safe
and sound manner as they incurred losses in 2007 and 2008.
Under the Act, OFHEO's capital regulations remain in effect for the
Enterprises until modified or replaced. The Act amended the Safety and
Soundness Act to provide FHFA with broad authorities with respect to
capital regulation comparable to those possessed by the federal bank
regulatory agencies. Accordingly, FHFA has begun to develop a new and
more rigorous capital regime that will be applicable to the Enterprises
after the conservatorships are terminated. FHFA intends that any new
risk-based capital regulation and any amendment to an existing minimum
capital regulation ensure that the Enterprises' portfolio holdings are
backed by sufficient capital, consistent with the requirements of
section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act.
FHFA has determined that it is prudent and in the best interests of
the secondary mortgage market to suspend capital classifications of the
Enterprises, during the conservatorships, in light of the Senior
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements. FHFA continues to closely monitor
Enterprise capital levels, but the existing statutory and FHFA-directed
regulatory capital requirements are not binding during the
conservatorships.
The second public policy objective that guides FHFA's development
of a regulation is ensuring that the Enterprises' portfolio holdings
are consistent with their mission and safe and sound operations. The
statutory mission of the Enterprises is to provide stability in the
secondary market for residential mortgages, respond appropriately to
the private capital market, provide ongoing assistance to the secondary
market for residential mortgages by increasing the liquidity of
mortgage investments and improving the distribution of capital
available for residential mortgage lending, promote access to mortgage
credit throughout the country, and support financing for housing
affordable by low- and moderate-income households and in underserved
areas. The mission is most challenging and most important during the
part of the mortgage credit cycle when market conditions are weakest.
Thus, the Enterprises, as a matter of public policy, must maintain
sufficient financial strength to make business decisions throughout
that cycle that are relatively unconstrained by solvency or liquidity
problems. To do so, the Enterprises must limit their risk exposures and
build sufficient capital, relative to their risks, in periods of
housing and mortgage market expansion, to be able to absorb losses and
maintain sufficient capital to comply with regulatory capital
requirements and perform their mission during contractions in the
housing sector or the broader economy. In addition, to fulfill their
mission to provide stability and ongoing assistance to the secondary
mortgage market, the Enterprises should not themselves present
unnecessary systemic risk to the secondary market or the broader
mortgage finance or financial markets. FHFA intends that a regulation
establishing criteria governing Enterprise portfolio holdings, in
combination with a revised capital regime for the Enterprises, will
give them incentives that will promote their ability to perform their
mission at all points in the mortgage credit cycle.
2. Questions Requesting Public Comment Regarding Standards Governing
Portfolio Holdings of Mortgage Assets
The Enterprises' mortgage portfolio holdings have long been a
source of debate by lawmakers, policy makers, researchers, and others,
principally because of the size of those holdings. Recent events that
eventually caused FHFA to place the Enterprises in conservatorship
highlight the risks posed by their large mortgage portfolio holdings
and the failure of the Enterprises to hold capital commensurate with
the risks posed by those holdings. In mid-2006, the Enterprises agreed
to cap the growth of their mortgage portfolio holdings due to their
accounting, internal control, and risk management weaknesses. Recent
events also underscore the need to establish criteria governing the
holdings that will allow the Enterprises to carry out their mission in
a safe and sound manner.
Section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act makes clear that
Congress considered the Enterprises' mortgage portfolio holdings
necessary for them to carry out their mission, at least in some
circumstances. Accordingly, Congress granted FHFA authority to complete
determine the appropriate size and composition of the mortgage
portfolio holdings going forward, and whether the Enterprises should
and how they can be encouraged
[[Page 5613]]
to operate in a more counter-cyclical \2\ fashion so that they can
respond appropriately when the secondary mortgage market is under
stress. FHFA invites public comments on those and related issues.
Separate questions are posed about Enterprise purchases of mortgage
assets for portfolio and about portfolio holdings of those assets,
since those activities raise distinct issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Financial institutions and markets experience periodic
lending booms and busts that amplify the business cycle, making
economic activity more volatile than it would otherwise be. Counter-
cyclical behavior by the Enterprises--building up capital relative
to their risks in periods of housing and mortgage market expansion
and using that capital to absorb losses and increase their activity
during contractions--might reduce the volatility of mortgage
lending, housing activity, and overall economic activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Benefits of Enterprise Purchases of Mortgage Assets for
Portfolio.
The Enterprises provide liquidity--ready access to funds on
reasonable terms--to the thousands of banks, thrifts, and mortgage
companies that make loans to housing in the U.S. The Enterprises do so
primarily by transforming individual mortgages into MBS backed by
Enterprise guarantees of timely payment of principal and interest.
Lenders provide the Enterprises with the individual mortgages used to
create Enterprise MBS and use the cash raised to engage in further
lending. Securitization helps provide a continuous, stable supply of
funds to finance purchases of homes by individuals and families and
apartment buildings and other multifamily dwellings by investors.
In some circumstances, the Enterprises provide additional liquidity
and stability to the secondary mortgage market by buying whole loans
from lenders, and by purchasing MBS that they or the Government
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) have guaranteed, or private-
label MBS issued by large lenders or Wall Street firms. The Enterprises
hold those mortgage assets in portfolio and finance them with debt. By
standing ready to purchase MBS they have guaranteed when the market
yields of those securities are high relative to the yields of
alternative investments, the Enterprises enhance the liquidity of the
MBS. Enterprise purchases of selected tranches of private-label MBS may
also enhance the liquidity and reduce the yields of those securities.
The economic benefits provided by Enterprise purchases of mortgage
assets for their portfolios during periods when the secondary mortgage
market is generally liquid and stable are uncertain. Research at the
Federal Reserve Board, using data from a period of relative market
stability, found that purchases for the Enterprises' portfolios appear
to have no material effect on the cost or availability of mortgage
credit.\3\ Studies conducted by other researchers have found that the
Enterprises' purchases of whole loans and MBS for their portfolios
reduce mortgage interest rates and mortgage rate volatility, increase
the volume of mortgage lending and refinancing, and increase liquidity
in the secondary mortgage market.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Andrea Lehnert, S. Wayne Passmore, and Shane Sherland,
``GSEs, Mortgage Rates, and Secondary Market Activities.'' (April
2008) Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 36(3), 343-363.
\4\ See the studies cited in James C. Miller, III, and James E.
Pearce, Revisiting the Net Benefits of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (a
study prepared for Freddie Mac, November 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A large portion of the mortgage assets purchased for portfolio by
the Enterprises finance dwelling units that are affordable to low- and
moderate-income households, or are located in geographic areas
designated as underserved. Those and other loans may have
characteristics that make them difficult or uneconomical to securitize.
Enterprise purchases of such loans may enhance the liquidity and lower
the interest rates that lenders require on those assets. The
Enterprises' acquisition of those assets for portfolio may increase the
availability and reduce the cost of such financing more than
securitization alone.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Bernanke, Ben S., ``GSE Portfolios, Systemic Risk, and
Affordable Housing,'' Speech before the Independent Community
Bankers of America's Annual Convention and Techworld, Honolulu,
Hawaii (March 6, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the Enterprises can support mortgage markets and the
housing sector and reduce market yields of MBS by purchasing those
securities during periods of severe stress or turmoil in mortgage
markets or the broader financial system. In the recent period of
mortgage market stress, Enterprise purchases of MBS appear to have had
some impact on the secondary market pricing and liquidity of mortgage
securities of those securities. When such conditions ease, the
Enterprises may be able to sell such mortgage assets in an orderly
manner, rather than holding them indefinitely in portfolio.
Question 1: What additional benefits are provided to the secondary
mortgage market and the housing sector by Enterprise purchases for
portfolio of mortgage loans and MBS, beyond the benefits provided by
their securitization activities? What is the magnitude of those
additional benefits?
Question 2: Is it possible for the Enterprises to fulfill their
mission of providing stability and liquidity to the secondary mortgage
market without purchasing mortgage assets for portfolio? If so, how? If
not, what types of mortgage assets should they be allowed to purchase
for portfolio, and in what amounts?
Question 3: Could the U.S. government better ensure the liquidity
and stability of the secondary mortgage market other than through
Enterprise purchases of mortgage assets for portfolio--for example,
through the activities of the Federal Reserve System, mortgage asset
purchases by the Department of the Treasury, or the provision of an
explicit government guarantee of MBS securitized by the Enterprises?
Question 4: Should the Enterprises' purchases of mortgage assets
vary over the mortgage credit cycle or with conditions in the secondary
mortgage market? If so, how?
Question 5: If the Enterprises purchase large volumes of mortgage
assets during periods of stress or turmoil in the secondary mortgage
market, should they be required to sell those assets once that market
stabilizes? If so, when and how should the Enterprises conduct such
sales?
ii. Benefits of Enterprise Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
The Enterprises' portfolio holdings of mortgage assets grew rapidly
beginning in the 1990s and extending through the early part of the
current decade. The pace of that growth greatly exceeded the growth of
the mortgage market as a whole, as measured by residential mortgage
debt outstanding (RMDO). The Enterprises' combined holdings of mortgage
assets increased from $135 billion, or 4.7 percent of RMDO, at the end
of 1990, to $1,410 billion, or 20.4 percent of RMDO, at the end of
2002. In the years that ensued, the Enterprises were plagued by
accounting scandals related to the hedging of their mortgage
portfolios, internal control problems, and other issues that led to the
imposition of supervisory restrictions on the growth of their mortgage
assets and capital surcharges. Between 2004 and 2007, the mortgage
portfolios of the Enterprises shrunk or grew significantly more slowly
than RMDO. At the end of June 2008, their combined holdings of mortgage
assets totaled $1,541 billion, or 12.7 percent of RMDO.
Historically, key beneficiaries of the Enterprises' large mortgage
portfolio holdings were their shareholders, who profited from the
Enterprises' low funding costs. Some types of mortgage assets acquired
for the portfolio may have contributed to the Enterprises' mission
objectives. Such assets may have included whole loans that finance
affordable housing that are not easily
[[Page 5614]]
securitized because of non-standard features and small volumes, as well
as mortgage securities that are backed by affordable housing loans and
that are not traded in markets with the broad appeal and liquidity of
Enterprise MBS. The mortgage portfolios have also been used to support
the Enterprises' securitization activities, to provide liquidity and
stability to the secondary mortgage market, and to support the
liquidity of the Enterprises' own MBS.
Question 6: Could the benefits of the Enterprises' mortgage
portfolio holdings be achieved if the levels of those holdings were
substantially lower than current levels? Could the Enterprises carry
out their mission of providing stability and liquidity to the secondary
mortgage market and of supporting affordable housing without
maintaining portfolios of mortgage assets? If so, explain how.
iii. Additional Risks to the Enterprises Posed by Their Mortgage
Portfolio Holdings.
The Enterprises' securitization activities and portfolio holdings
of whole loans expose them to mortgage credit risk--the risk of losses
if borrowers do not make their payments due or default on their loans.
The recent credit crisis demonstrates that broad-based and sizable
losses from exposure to mortgage credit risk can occur. Securitization
and portfolio investment in whole loans also expose the Enterprises to
the risk that lenders, mortgage servicers, and mortgage insurers may
not fulfill their contractual obligations, with significant
consequences during a systemic event.
The mortgage portfolios of the Enterprises expose them to risks
beyond those posed by their securitization activities. The principal
additional risks are interest rate risk, derivatives counterparty
credit risk, the risk of declines in the fair values of MBS holdings
due to increased credit and market liquidity risks, funding and basis
risks, and operational risks. Their exposure to interest rate risk
arises primarily from the long-term, fixed-rate mortgages that they
hold, directly or through MBS. Because borrowers can prepay their
mortgages at any time, a mismatch of the durations of Enterprise
mortgage assets and liabilities can result. The Enterprises use various
techniques, including hedging with derivatives, to manage the risk
resulting from this mismatch. Using derivatives to hedge that risk
exposes the Enterprises to derivatives counterparty credit risk. The
Enterprises' holdings of private-label MBS pose additional credit risk
and significant risk of asset price declines due to declines in market
liquidity. Funding risk is the risk that a firm will be unable to
obtain funds at a reasonable cost or at all when its existing debt
matures or its payments are due. Basis risk is the risk that the
interest rates in different financial markets will not move in the same
direction or amount at the same time.
Operational risk can manifest itself in a number of ways, most
commonly through the breakdown of internal controls, ineffective
corporate governance, inadequate policies and procedures, employee
behavior, and external events. The Enterprises face operational risks
due to technology failures, business disruptions, internal or external
fraud, processing errors, and weaknesses in internal policies and
procedures. For example, the accounting scandals at both Enterprises in
the early part of the decade were partially due to irregularities in
the implementation of complex derivatives accounting principles.
Section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act requires that in
establishing criteria governing the Enterprises' portfolio holdings,
the Director shall consider the Enterprises' adherence to prudent
management and operations standards established under section 1313B of
the Act. 12 U.S.C. 4624(a). Those standards must address many issues
related to managing risks posed by the Enterprises' mortgage portfolio
holdings, including management of interest rate risk exposure,
management of market risk, adequacy and maintenance of liquidity and
reserves, management of asset and investment portfolio growth, overall
risk management processes, management of credit and counterparty risk,
and management of operational risks.
Question 7: Aside from reducing the volume or altering the
composition of mortgage assets held by the Enterprises, are there other
ways in which FHFA can use criteria governing their mortgage portfolio
holdings to reduce their exposure to or improve their management of
interest rate, credit, operational, and other risks? If so, what
approaches should FHFA take?
Question 8: How can FHFA best use criteria governing mortgage
portfolio holdings, in conjunction with capital regulations and other
supervisory tools, such as prudent management and operations standards
established in accordance with section 1313B of the Safety and
Soundness Act, to address the Enterprises' exposure to the additional
risks posed by such holdings?
iv. Systemic Risk Posed by Enterprise Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
There is broad agreement among policymakers and economists that the
Enterprises pose substantial systemic risk to mortgage markets and the
broader financial system.\6\ As the Treasury Department recently
stated, ``[t]he systemic importance of these two enterprises, and the
systemic impact of a collapse of either, cannot be overstated.'' \7\
The Enterprises' systemic risk arises from four sources:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See, among many other studies, Bernanke, Ben S., ``GSE
Portfolios, Systemic Risk, and Affordable Housing,'' Speech before
the Independent Community Bankers of America's Annual Convention and
Techworld, Honolulu, Hawaii (March 6, 2007); Eisenbeis, Robert A, W.
Scott Frame, and Larry D. Wall, ``An Analysis of the Systemic Risks
Posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an Evaluation of the Policy
Options for Reducing Those Risks,'' Journal of Financial Services
Research (Vol. 31, Nos. 2-3, June 2007), 75-99; Greenspan, Alan,
``Government-Sponsored Enterprises,'' Remarks Delivered at the
Conference on Housing, Mortgage Finance, and the Macroeconomy,
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (May 19, 2005); Mankiw, N. Gregory,
Remarks at the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, State Banking
Summit and Leadership Conference (November 6, 2003); Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Systemic Risk: Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the Role of OFHEO (Washington, DC: February 2003);
and Poole, William. ``Housing in the Macroeconomy,'' Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (May/June 2003), 1-8.
\7\ Department of the Treasury, Responses to Questions of the
First Report of the Congressional Oversight Panel for Economic
Stabilization (December 31, 2008), 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
High leverage increases the risk of Enterprise failure and
of the adverse consequences for mortgage lending and housing activity
attendant on such failure.
The Enterprises' combined mortgage assets totaled nearly
$1.6 trillion as of November 30, 2008. If either Enterprise had to
shrink its portfolio holdings rapidly, the market values of the
mortgage assets held by many other financial institutions would be
adversely affected, exacerbating solvency and liquidity problems.
Mortgage lender dependence on the Enterprises, already
high since the mid-1980s, has increased substantially since the
collapse of the secondary market for private-label MBS in the third
quarter of 2007. If either Enterprise greatly reduced or sharply
curtailed its mortgage purchases, mortgage rates would increase, which
would reduce new mortgage lending, depress the market values of
mortgage assets held throughout the industry, and tend to weaken
housing and the broader economy.
Outstanding Enterprise debt--over $1.6 trillion at the end
of November 2008--is widely held by commercial banks in the U.S.,
institutional investors, foreign central banks, and other foreign
investors. If Enterprise
[[Page 5615]]
solvency or liquidity problems led to large declines in the market
value of that debt, there could be serious adverse effects on banks and
other investors. The Enterprises are also among the largest end-users
of over-the-counter (OTC) interest rate derivatives. Uncertainty about
how counterparties would replace their OTC derivatives with one or both
Enterprises, if either failed, could adversely affect those
institutions and the OTC derivatives markets.
As noted above, a key objective of placing the Enterprises in
conservatorship and executing the Stock Purchase Agreements was to
limit the systemic risk they posed, which had risen sharply in 2007 and
the first half of 2008, as they reported financial losses and their
leverage and borrowing costs increased, and to avoid adverse
consequences for the housing sector and economy. If the mortgage
portfolio holdings of the Enterprises were reduced in order to limit
the systemic risk they pose, the overall effect on financial stability
would depend on what other entities acquired the assets, how they
funded the assets and managed the associated risks, and how much
capital they held against those risks.
Question 9: Should FHFA use criteria governing the Enterprises'
mortgage portfolio holdings to mitigate the systemic risk posed by the
Enterprises? If so, how? If the mortgage portfolio holdings of the
Enterprises were reduced in an effort to mitigate the systemic risk
posed by the Enterprises, how would the stability of the mortgage
markets and the broader financial system be affected? What steps could
the federal government take to maximize any improvement in stability?
v. Criteria Governing Enterprise Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
a. Size of Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
Under the portfolio holdings criteria established in the Stock
Purchase Agreements, the mortgage assets of each Enterprise will
decline by 10 percent each year starting in 2010 and each year
thereafter until the holdings of each Enterprise reached $250 billion.
FHFA projects that would occur in 2020, at the end of which each
Enterprise's mortgage portfolio holdings would represent about 2.0
percent of projected RMDO. (Chart 1).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR30JA09.000
Another approach could establish criteria that, rather than
specifying dollar amounts, specified maximum ratios between each
Enterprise's mortgage assets and some indicator of the size of the
mortgage market such as RMDO. For example, the criteria could require
each Enterprise's mortgage assets to decline as required by the Stock
Purchase Agreements until each Enterprise's mortgage portfolio
represented no more than, say, 2.1 percent of RMDO--the share that $250
billion represented as of mid-2008--and limit each portfolio's future
growth so as to maintain its ratio to RMDO at 2.1 percent thereafter.
FHFA projects that would occur in 2016, at the end of which each
Enterprise's mortgage assets would be about $400 billion (Chart 2).
Under any such approach, increases in the mortgage assets of an
Enterprise or both Enterprises could be permitted on a temporary basis
in times of economic distress or market disruption, consistent with 12
U.S.C. 4624(b).
[[Page 5616]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR30JA09.001
Other criteria could be devised to internalize at the Enterprises
some of the potential costs of large portfolio holdings, in order to
create an incentive for the Enterprises to restrain those holdings
below a desired level. Thus, the criteria could impose a firm limit on
the mortgage assets of each Enterprise, but create a range below that
limit within which holdings would be increasingly discouraged. For
example, that range could begin at their combined share of RMDO at the
end of 1991 (5 percent--2.5 percent per Enterprise) and go as high as
their combined market share at the end of 1994, the mid-point of the
seven-year period 1991 through 1997 (or 8.3 percent--4.1 percent per
Enterprise). A sliding scale minimum capital surcharge could apply if
an Enterprise chose to hold more than the lower amount of the range.
The surcharge would increase as the holdings moved toward the limit,
with a maximum surcharge of, perhaps, an additional two percent of
mortgage assets.
Yet another approach could establish criteria that would allow the
mortgage portfolio holdings of each Enterprise to expand and contract
with its mortgage credit book of business--the sum of those holdings
plus its guaranteed MBS held by other investors.
Question 10: Should the size of the Enterprises' mortgage portfolio
holdings be limited to a fixed dollar amount, be linked to a market
indicator, or be linked to the size of their MBS outstanding?
Question 11: Should the permissible size of the Enterprises'
holdings of mortgage assets vary in a manner related to the phase of
the mortgage credit cycle or conditions in the secondary mortgage
market? If so, how should FHFA monitor that cycle or secondary mortgage
market conditions, and how should the permissible size of those
holdings vary?
Question 12: How could decreases in the Enterprises' mortgage
portfolio holdings affect their operational infrastructures? How would
changes in their operational infrastructures affect their ability to
expand their purchases of mortgage assets for portfolio during times of
stress in the secondary mortgage market? Does each Enterprise need a
minimum level of mortgage portfolio holdings to maintain the
infrastructure needed to expand its purchases under such conditions?
Question 13: Should each Enterprise's minimum capital requirement
increase with the size or composition of its mortgage portfolio
holdings? If so, how should such increase be imposed? Should a capital
surcharge be imposed on each Enterprise if its mortgage portfolio
holdings exceed some level? If so, how should such surcharge be
imposed?
b. Composition of Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
Criteria regarding the Enterprises' mortgage portfolios could limit
their holdings of certain types of assets, while encouraging them to
hold more of mortgage products that make a greater contribution to
specific elements of their mission.
Question 14: Should FHFA restrict the types of mortgage assets the
Enterprises are allowed to hold to those that are strictly related to
specific elements of their mission? If so, how should those assets be
defined? For example, should FHFA prohibit or place a limit on each
Enterprise's holdings of mortgage-related securities guaranteed by the
other Enterprise or Ginnie Mae or its holdings of private-label MBS?
Question 15: Should FHFA require that assets purchased for the
portfolio each year comply with affordable housing goals and sub-goals
established for that year?
Question 16: Should FHFA allow the Enterprises to hold, without
limit, either whole loans (or securities backed by them) that finance
affordable housing not easily securitized because of non-standard
features and small volumes or mortgage securities backed by loans that
finance affordable housing, where markets for those securities are
small or thin? Please provide examples of such loans or securities.
Alternatively, should FHFA place a limit on the amount of such loans or
securities that an Enterprise can hold? If so, what is an appropriate
level?
[[Page 5617]]
c. Funding of Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
The Enterprises fund their portfolios of mortgage assets largely by
issuing debt. The Enterprises are also highly leveraged--historically,
each Enterprise's core capital represented less than 2 percent of the
sum of its mortgage assets and guaranteed MBS. The Enterprises have
relied heavily on short-term debt to fund their mortgage portfolio
holdings, used financial derivatives to alter synthetically the
maturity of that debt, and depended on their ability to roll over debt
and enter into new derivatives contracts in all market conditions.
Because of the favorable funding costs enjoyed by the Enterprises, they
benefitted from attractive spreads between the yields on the assets
comprising their mortgage portfolio holdings and their cost of funds.
FHFA will address issues related to the funding of Enterprise mortgage
assets through promulgation of risk management standards, the agency's
examination process, and by a new risk-based capital standard.
Question 17: Should FHFA establish criteria governing the
Enterprises' mortgage portfolio holdings that specify that the
Enterprises adhere to a specific maximum ratio of short-term debt to
mortgage assets or minimum ratio of callable debt to long-term, fixed-
rate mortgage assets or to total long-term debt?
Question 18: Should FHFA specify criteria that condition
Enterprise mortgage portfolio holdings above a certain amount on
maintaining measures of the risks--e.g., duration and convexity--
associated with those portfolios within specified levels? Should
adherence to appropriate limits on such risks be addressed through of
prudential management and operations standards in accordance with
section 1313B of the Act and FHFA's examination process?
d. Counter-Cyclical Changes in Enterprise Mortgage Portfolio
Holdings.
FHFA could establish criteria that limit the rate of growth of each
Enterprise's mortgage assets once the Enterprise complied with criteria
related to the size of those holdings. The growth limit could be tied
to the average growth rate of the mortgage market over a long period,
which would allow each Enterprise's portfolio holdings to grow more
slowly (or rapidly) than the overall market during periods in which the
market was expanding more rapidly (or slowly) than on average. That
type of growth limit would require the Enterprises to vary the rate of
growth of their mortgage portfolio holdings in a counter-cyclical
manner. One way of achieving this could be to require that growth in
each Enterprise's portfolio holdings be limited to the preceding 10-
year rolling annual average growth rate of RMDO (Chart 3).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR30JA09.002
Question 19: Should FHFA create incentives for the Enterprises to
behave in a counter-cyclical manner through criteria governing their
portfolio holdings of mortgage and non-mortgage assets, regulatory
capital requirements, or both? If so, how? What are the implications of
specifying such criteria for the Enterprises' mission?
3. Questions Requesting Public Comment Regarding Standards Governing
Enterprise Holdings of Non-Mortgage Assets
i. Benefits and Risks of Enterprises Holdings of Non-Mortgage
Assets.
The Enterprises need to maintain adequate levels of liquidity so
that they can carry out their day-to-day operating activities.
Maintaining adequate levels of liquidity can help strengthen the
Enterprises' ability to meet their statutory mission of providing
stability and liquidity to the secondary mortgage market, during good
times and during periods of market stress, without incurring
extraordinary financing costs.
The risk of not maintaining a portfolio of highly liquid non-
mortgage assets was illustrated in the recent market disruption. The
quick reversal in market conditions illustrates how fast liquidity can
disappear and how a prolonged period of market illiquidity can affect
firms such as the Enterprises and their counterparties. Indeed, during
that period, spreads between the yields of Enterprise debt and U.S.
Treasury securities reached all time highs. In addition, the
Enterprises' large holdings of mortgage assets were not useful sources
of cash as the MBS repurchase agreement market shriveled, and sales of
MBS would have only exacerbated problems in the market.
There is an opportunity cost associated with holding a sizable
volume of generally low-yielding assets
[[Page 5618]]
in an effort to ensure adequate liquidity in a financial crisis.
However, up to a point that cost is offset by the potential benefit of
the Enterprises being prepared to maintain funding for their long-term
assets and to respond in an appropriate and meaningful way to a market
disruption.
Question 20: What risks and costs are associated with requiring
the Enterprises to maintain a portfolio of liquid, non-mortgage assets?
Question 21: Is it appropriate to require the Enterprises to hold
a large portfolio of highly liquid assets even during periods of market
tranquility? If so, why? Should the Enterprises be compensated for
holding ``excess'' levels of non-mortgage assets during periods of
market tranquility? If so, what are appropriate incentives?
ii. Standards Governing Enterprise Non-Mortgage Assets.
The rationale for establishing standards governing the size and
composition of the Enterprises' non-mortgage assets is to ensure that
they maintain sufficient liquidity to meet their obligations and engage
in new business during market distress and to ensure that the
Enterprises do not hold amounts of those assets beyond those needed to
achieve their mission. That can be best achieved by requiring that the
Enterprises maintain portfolios of marketable, highly liquid non-
mortgage assets at prescribed levels. Those assets would be easily
converted into cash, without loss of value and disruption to financial
markets. Indeed, during a market crisis such as that experienced in the
recent past, a portfolio of highly liquid non-mortgage assets would
better enable the Enterprises to perform their mission of providing
liquidity and stability to the secondary mortgage market.
a. Size of the Non-Mortgage Portfolios.
FHFA could establish criteria governing the size of the
Enterprises' holding of non-mortgage assets. For example, the criteria
could require that each Enterprise maintain a minimum balance of
marketable, highly liquid non-mortgage assets equal to 30 days of
expected net cash needs and totaling at least $30 billion at all times.
Question 22: Should the Enterprises be required to maintain a
specific minimum dollar amount of highly liquid non-mortgage assets at
all times? If so, what is an appropriate dollar amount? Alternatively,
should the level of non-mortgage assets be set at a percentage of an
Enterprise's total assets or a specified number of days of liquidity?
If so, what is an appropriate percentage factor or number of days?
Question 23: Should the Enterprises' non-mortgage portfolios grow
with the phases of the mortgage credit cycle or counter to that cycle?
Should the Enterprises be given incentives for holding large volumes of
liquid non-mortgage assets during periods of ample market liquidity? If
so, how should such incentives be provided? For instance, after
criteria governing holdings of non-mortgage assets are established,
FHFA could reduce each Enterprise's minimum capital requirement by, for
example, 75 percent of the amount of non-mortgage assets held to comply
with those criteria.
b. Composition of the Non-Mortgage Portfolios.
In establishing criteria governing the composition of the
Enterprises' non-mortgage portfolios, FHFA could require that U.S.
Treasury securities with maturities of 30 days or less represent a
specified percentage of each Enterprise's total non-mortgage assets
(for example, 50 percent). The balance of each Enterprise's portfolio
could include other marketable, liquid, highly-rated securities, with
maturities of one year or less, such as the following--
Commercial paper (rated A1/P1);
Short-term Eurodollar time deposits;
Short-term money market accounts; and
Short-term municipal securities.
Question 24: Should the criteria enumerate the specific types of
investments the Enterprises should hold in the non-mortgage portfolios.
If so, what type assets should be included? Should U.S. Treasury
securities represent a specific share of the non-mortgage portfolios?
If so, what is an appropriate percentage or dollar amount?
Question 25: What is an appropriate maturity range for securities
comprising the non-mortgage portfolios? How should holdings be
distributed according to that range?
4. Questions Requesting Public Comment Regarding Temporary Adjustment
of Criteria Governing Portfolio Holdings
The Act authorizes the Director to order temporary adjustments to
the established criteria governing the portfolio holdings of an
Enterprise or both Enterprises, including during times of economic
distress or market dislocation. 12 U.S.C. 4624(b).
Question 26: Should FHFA attempt to specify in advance how it
might adjust criteria governing Enterprise mortgage or non-mortgage
portfolio holdings in specific circumstances?
List of Subjects
12 CFR Part 1252
Government-sponsored enterprises, Portfolio holdings, Mortgages.
Authority and Issuance
0
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the preamble, under the
authority of 12 U.S.C. 4624, the Federal Housing Finance Agency hereby
amends Title 12, Chapter XII, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
CHAPTER XII--FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY
Subchapter C--Enterprises
0
1. Add Subchapter C consisting of part 1252 to read as follows:
PART 1252--PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS
Sec.
1252.1 Enterprise portfolio holdings criteria.
1252.2 Effective duration.
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 4624.
Sec. 1252.1 Enterprise portfolio holding criteria.
The Enterprises are required to comply with the portfolio holdings
criteria set forth in their respective Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreements with the Department of the Treasury, as they may be amended
from time to time.
Sec. 1252.2 Effective duration.
This part shall be in effect for each Enterprise so long as--
(a) This part has not been superseded through amendment, and
(b) The Enterprise remains subject to the terms and obligations of
the respective Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement.
Dated: January 16, 2009.
James B. Lockhart III,
Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency.
[FR Doc. E9-2047 Filed 1-29-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8070-01-P