Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 Airplanes, 4126-4129 [E9-26]
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4126
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 14 / Friday, January 23, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
Prohibition of Installing Gasket P/N 365533
(m) After the effective date of this AD, do
not install gasket, P/N 365533, onto any fuel
injection servo.
Identification of Servo Plug Gaskets
(n) Servo plug gaskets, P/N 365533, are
identified as being made of either a paper or
fiber material, impregnated with synthetic
rubber. They are relatively flexible and have
a rough surface.
(o) Servo plug gaskets, P/N 2577258, are
identified as being made of metal with a
coating of synthetic rubber. They are
relatively rigid and have a smooth surface.
Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on
January 13, 2009.
Peter A. White,
Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9–1047 Filed 1–22–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2008–0558; Directorate
Identifier 2007–NM–365–AD; Amendment
39–15783; AD 2009–01–04]
Special Flight Permits Prohibited
(p) Under 14 CFR part 39.23, we are
prohibiting special flight permits.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
RIN 2120–AA64
(q) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, may approve alternative
methods of compliance for this AD if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19.
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model
A318, A319, A320, and A321 Airplanes
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES
Related Information
(r) For Precision Airmotive LLC, Richard
Simonson, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion
Branch, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington
98055; e-mail: Richard.simonson@faa.gov;
telephone (425) 917–6507; fax (425) 917–
6590.
(s) For Lycoming Engines, Norm Perenson,
Aerospace Engineer, New York Aircraft
Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller
Directorate, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410,
Westbury, NY 11590; e-mail:
Norman.perenson@faa.gov; telephone (516)
228–7337; fax (516) 794–5531.
(t) For Teledyne Continental Motors, Kevin
Brane, Aerospace Engineer, Atlanta Aircraft
Certification Office, FAA, Small Airplane
Directorate, One Crown Center, 1895 Phoenix
Blvd., Suite 450, Atlanta, GA 30349; e-mail:
kevin.brane@faa.gov; telephone (770) 703–
6063; fax (770) 703–6097.
(u) For Superior Air Parts, Inc., Tausif Butt,
Aerospace Engineer, Special Certification
Office, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Southwest Regional Headquarters, 2601
Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; email: Tausif.butt@faa.gov; telephone (817)
222–5195; fax (817) 222–5785.
(v) FAA Special Airworthiness Information
Bulletin NE–09–04, dated January 9, 2009,
also pertains to checking servo plugs for
looseness on Precision Airmotive LLC RSA–
5 and RSA–10 series, and Bendix RSA–5 and
RSA–10 series, earlier produced fuel
injection servos, not affected by this AD.
(w) Precision Airmotive LLC MSB No.
PRS–107, Revision 4, dated July 16, 2008,
also pertains to the subject of this AD.
Contact Precision Airmotive LLC, 14800 40th
Avenue, NE., Marysville, Washington 98271;
telephone (360) 651–8282; https://
www.precisionairmotive.com, for a copy of
this MSB.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(x) None.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
16:34 Jan 22, 2009
Jkt 217001
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results
from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI)
originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct
an unsafe condition on an aviation
product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as:
Some operators have reported occurrences
of loss of the AC BUS 1 with subsequent loss
of the AC ESS BUS and DC ESS BUS,
resulting in the loss of 5 upper Display Units
and the loss of integral lighting. In this
situation, flight crew[s] have reported
concerns in reading the standby instruments
when the DOME lights were selected to OFF.
This situation, if not corrected, could
increase the workload of the flight crew
* * *.
*
*
*
*
*
The unsafe condition is reduced
ability of the flightcrew to maintain the
safe flight and landing of the airplane in
adverse operating conditions. We are
issuing this AD to require actions to
correct the unsafe condition on those
products.
DATES: This AD becomes effective
February 27, 2009.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of a certain publication listed in this AD
as of February 27, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD
docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov or in person at the
U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M–30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim
Dulin, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM–116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057–3356; telephone
(425) 227–2141; fax (425) 227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would
apply to the specified products. That
NPRM was published in the Federal
Register on May 20, 2008 (73 FR 29089).
That NPRM proposed to correct an
unsafe condition for the specified
products. The MCAI states:
Some operators have reported occurrences
of loss of the AC BUS 1 with subsequent loss
of the AC ESS BUS and DC ESS BUS,
resulting in the loss of 5 upper Display Units
and the loss of integral lighting. In this
situation, flight crews[s] have reported
concerns in reading the standby instruments
when the DOME lights were selected to OFF.
This situation, if not corrected, could
increase the workload of the flight crew
* * *.
This Airworthiness Directive (AD)
mandates the modification of the electrical
supply logic by adding a back-up supply on
the battery hot bus for the under glare shield
flood lighting.
The unsafe condition is reduced ability
of the flightcrew to maintain the safe
flight and landing of the airplane in
adverse operating conditions. You may
obtain further information by examining
the MCAI in the AD docket.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to
participate in developing this AD. We
considered the comments received.
Request To Include Revised Service
Information
Airbus, United Airlines, and the Air
Transport Association on behalf of its
member U.S. Airways, ask that Airbus
Mandatory Service Bulletin A320–33–
1057, Revision 01, dated January 31,
2008, be referred to in the AD for doing
the proposed modification. Airbus
Service Bulletin A320–33–1057, dated
May 11, 2007, was referred to in the
NPRM as the appropriate source of
service information for doing the
modification.
We agree and we have changed
paragraphs (f) and (h) of this AD to
include Airbus Mandatory Service
Bulletin A320–33–1057, Revision 01,
dated January 31, 2008, as the
appropriate source of service
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 14 / Friday, January 23, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
information for doing the modification.
No additional work is necessary for
airplanes modified in accordance with
Airbus Service Bulletin A320–33–1057,
dated May 11, 2007. We have also
included credit for accomplishing
Airbus Service Bulletin A320–33–1057,
dated May 11, 2007, to do the
modification before the effective date of
the AD.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES
Request To Reduce Compliance Time
The Airline Pilots Association,
International (ALPA) asks that the 42month compliance time proposed in the
NPRM be reduced to 18 months. ALPA
states that, given the potentially serious
consequences of a flightcrew being
unable to view their standby
instruments, a shorter compliance time
should be imposed.
We do not agree that the compliance
time should be reduced. In developing
the compliance time for this AD action,
we considered not only the safety
implications of the identified unsafe
condition, but the average utilization
rate of the affected fleet, the practical
aspects of modifying the fleet during the
compliance time, and the availability of
required parts. In addition, we have
coordinated with the European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA), which is the
Technical Agent for the Member States
of the European Community. We have
determined that the 42-month
compliance time to do the modification
addresses the identified unsafe
condition and ensures an adequate level
of safety for the affected fleet. We have
made no change to the AD in this
regard.
Request To Allow Another Source of
Service Information
Northwest Airlines (NWA) asks that
we allow accomplishing the actions
specified in either Airbus Service
Bulletin A320–24–1120, Revision 01,
dated December 19, 2007; or Airbus
Service Bulletin A320–33–1057, dated
May 11, 2007; as a method of complying
with the NPRM. The NPRM proposes to
require accomplishing the modification
in accordance with Airbus Service
Bulletin A320–33–1057, dated May 11,
2007, and makes no reference to Airbus
Service Bulletin A320–24–1120,
Revision 01, dated December 19, 2007.
NWA states that Airbus Service Bulletin
A320–33–1057, dated May 11, 2007,
does not correct the root cause of the
problem, and does not alleviate other
operational consequences of the faults.
NWA notes that Airbus Service Bulletin
A320–33–1057, dated May 11, 2007,
adds the provision for lighting of the
standby instruments if there is a loss of
AC BUS1, and AC and DC ESS BUS.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
16:34 Jan 22, 2009
Jkt 217001
NWA adds that the majority of
commercial air traffic occurs during
daylight when the illumination of
standby instruments by the glare shield
lighting is not required. NWA states that
no lost systems are recovered and the
flightcrew must work through COM
procedures, possibly during critical
flight phases. NWA notes that the only
additional margin of safety provided is
at night, under some flight phases. NWA
states that it prefers to accomplish the
modification specified in Airbus Service
Bulletin A320–24–1120, dated
December 19, 2007, because it negates
the need for the improved lighting
specified in Airbus Service Bulletin
A320–33–1057, dated May 11, 2007.
NWA adds that Airbus Service Bulletin
A320–24–1120, Revision 01, dated
December 19, 2007, addresses the
unsafe condition by installing an
automatic switching system for the AC
and DC ESS BUS fault to recover all lost
systems in approximately five seconds.
NWA adds that the automatic recovery
resolves the display outage, loss of VHF
radios, and nose wheel steering with no
flightcrew intervention.
We do not agree to allow
accomplishing the actions specified in
Airbus Service Bulletin A320–24–1120,
Revision 01, dated December 19, 2007,
as an option to accomplishing the
actions in Airbus Service Bulletin
A320–33–1057, dated May 11, 2007; or
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin
A320–33–1057, Revision 01, dated
January 31, 2008. We have determined
that accomplishment of actions in
Airbus Service Bulletin A320–33–1057,
dated May 11, 2007; or Airbus
Mandatory Service Bulletin A320–33–
1057, Revision 01, dated January 31,
2008, not only ensures adequate lighting
to the standby instruments in all phases
of flight, but also provides backup
power to the conventional standby
attitude indicator itself from the hot
battery bus. We agree that
accomplishing the modification
specified in Airbus Service Bulletin
A320–33–1057, dated May 11, 2007; or
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin
A320–33–1057, Revision 01, dated
January 31, 2008; does not address the
root cause of the problem or alleviate all
other operational problems related to
the AC BUS 1 failures. We have not
determined the root cause for loss of
first officer displays following failure of
AC BUS 1, but we know the root cause
of this failure condition is not addressed
by accomplishing Airbus Service
Bulletin A320–24–1120, Revision 01,
dated December 19, 2007. Although we
agree that accomplishing Airbus Service
Bulletin A320–24–1120, Revision 01,
PO 00000
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Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
4127
dated December 19, 2007, would
alleviate some of the other operational
problems related to the AC BUS 1
failures, the auto switching may not
restore power to AC BUS1 and AC and
DC ESS BUS. The modification
specified in Airbus Service Bulletin
A320–33–1057, dated May 11, 2007; or
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin
A320–33–1057, Revision 01, dated
January 31, 2008; will ensure that the
standby instruments are visible in night
operations and will continue to function
for at least 30 minutes after failure of AC
BUS 1 with no pilot action. In light of
these factors, we may consider further
rulemaking related to Airbus Service
Bulletin A320–24–1120, Revision 01,
dated December 19, 2007, in the future.
We have made no change to the AD in
this regard.
Conclusion
We reviewed the available data,
including the comments received, and
determined that air safety and the
public interest require adopting the AD
with the changes described previously.
We determined that these changes will
not increase the economic burden on
any operator or increase the scope of the
AD.
Differences Between This AD and the
MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and
related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But
we might have found it necessary to use
different words from those in the MCAI
to ensure the AD is clear for U.S.
operators and is enforceable. In making
these changes, we do not intend to differ
substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related
service information.
We might also have required different
actions in this AD from those in the
MCAI in order to follow our FAA
policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a note within the AD.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect
550 products of U.S. registry. We also
estimate that it will take about 30 workhours per product to comply with the
basic requirements of this AD. The
average labor rate is $80 per work-hour.
Required parts will cost about $0 per
product. Where the service information
lists required parts costs that are
covered under warranty, we have
assumed that there will be no charge for
these costs. As we do not control
warranty coverage for affected parties,
some parties may incur costs higher
than estimated here. Based on these
figures, we estimate the cost of the AD
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 14 / Friday, January 23, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
on U.S. operators to be $1,320,000, or
$2,400 per product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, section 44701:
General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not
have federalism implications under
Executive Order 13132. This AD will
not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify this AD:
1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the
Docket Operations office between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains the NPRM, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The street address for
the Docket Operations office (telephone
(800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES
section. Comments will be available in
the AD docket shortly after receipt.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
16:34 Jan 22, 2009
Jkt 217001
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
■
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new AD:
■
2009–01–04 Airbus: Amendment 39–15783.
Docket No. FAA–2008–0558; Directorate
Identifier 2007–NM–365–AD.
Effective Date
(a) This airworthiness directive (AD)
becomes effective February 27, 2009.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A318,
A319, A320, and A321 airplanes, certificated
in any category; all certified models; all serial
numbers; on which classical standby
instruments have been installed per Airbus
Modification 20011 or 21999 in production,
or per Airbus Service Bulletin A320–34–1280
in service; excluding airplanes identified in
paragraphs (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this AD.
(1) Airplanes on which ISIS equipment
was installed per Airbus Modification 27620
in production or per Airbus Service Bulletin
A320–34–1261 or Airbus Service Bulletin
A320–34–1372 in service.
(2) Airplanes on which Airbus
Modification 37329 or 37330 was installed in
production or per Airbus Service Bulletin
A320–33–1057 in service.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of
America Code 33: Lights.
Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI) states:
‘‘Some operators have reported
occurrences of loss of the AC BUS 1 with
subsequent loss of the AC ESS BUS and DC
ESS BUS, resulting in the loss of 5 upper
Display Units and the loss of integral
lighting. In this situation, flight crews[s] have
reported concerns in reading the standby
instruments when the DOME lights were
selected to OFF.
‘‘This situation, if not corrected, could
increase the workload of the flight crew
* * *.
‘‘This Airworthiness Directive (AD)
mandates the modification of the electrical
supply logic by adding a back-up supply on
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
the battery hot bus for the under glare shield
flood lighting.’’
The unsafe condition is reduced ability of the
flightcrew to maintain the safe flight and
landing of the airplane in adverse operating
conditions.
Actions and Compliance
(f) Unless already done, within 42 months
after the effective date of this AD: Modify the
electrical supply logic of the under glare
shield flood lighting in accordance with the
instructions given in Airbus Mandatory
Service Bulletin A320–33–1057, Revision 01,
dated January 31, 2008. Modifications done
before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin
A320–33–1057, dated May 11, 2007, are
acceptable for compliance with the
modification in this paragraph.
FAA AD Differences
Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/
or service information as follows: No
differences.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to
this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs): The Manager, International
Branch, ANM–116, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
Send information to ATTN: Tim Dulin,
Aerospace Engineer, International Branch,
ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate,
FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425)
227–2141; fax (425) 227–1149. Before using
any approved AMOC on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies, notify your
appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the
FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO),
or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement
in this AD to obtain corrective actions from
a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective
actions are considered FAA-approved if they
are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required
to assure the product is airworthy before it
is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any
reporting requirement in this AD, under the
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act,
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
has approved the information collection
requirements and has assigned OMB Control
Number 2120–0056.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation
Safety Agency Airworthiness Directive 2007–
0286, dated November 14, 2007; and Airbus
Mandatory Service Bulletin A320–33–1057,
Revision 01, dated January 31, 2008; for
related information.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(i) You must use Airbus Mandatory Service
Bulletin A320–33–1057, Revision 01, dated
January 31, 2008, to do the actions required
by this AD, unless the AD specifies
otherwise.
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 14 / Friday, January 23, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference of
this service information under 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in
this AD, contact Airbus, Airworthiness
Office—EAS, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte,
31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; fax +33 5 61
93 44 51; e-mail: account.airwortheas@airbus.com; Internet https://
www.airbus.com.
(3) You may review copies of the service
information that is incorporated by reference
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington. For information on the
availability of this material at the FAA, call
425–227–1221 or 425–227–1152.
(4) You may also review copies of the
service information at the National Archives
and Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go
to: https://www.archives.gov/federal_register/
code_of_federal_regulations/ibr
_locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
December 28, 2008.
Linda Navarro,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9–26 Filed 1–22–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2008–0625; Directorate
Identifier 2008–NM–069–AD; Amendment
39–15789; AD 2009–01–10]
Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier
Model CL–600–2C10 (Regional Jet
Series 700, 701, and 702) Airplanes;
CL–600–2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705)
Airplanes; and CL–600–2D24 (Regional
Jet Series 900) Airplanes
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES
AGENCY: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results
from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI)
originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct
an unsafe condition on an aviation
product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as:
During a pre-delivery flight of a CL–600–
2C10 aircraft, the AC essential bus did not
come on-line following deployment of the
Air Driven Generator (ADG). Following
16:34 Jan 22, 2009
Jkt 217001
The unsafe condition is a malfunction of
the emergency AC generation and
control system that supplies emergency
AC power to essential flight
instruments, including the flap and slat
system, pitch trim system, and
hydraulic pump 3B. Loss of essential
flight instruments could prevent
continued safe flight and landing of the
airplane. We are issuing this AD to
require actions to correct the unsafe
condition on these products.
DATES: This AD becomes effective
February 27, 2009.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of certain publications listed in this AD
as of February 27, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD
docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov or in person at the
U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M–30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Wing Chan, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Flight Test Branch, ANE–
172, FAA, New York Aircraft
Certification Office, 1600 Stewart
Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York
11590; telephone (516) 228–7311; fax
(516) 794–5531.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
RIN 2120–AA64
VerDate Nov<24>2008
investigation, it was determined that a
specific batch of contactors in the ADG
Power Center (ADGPC) is susceptible to
failure due to low contact pressure. * * *
We issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would
apply to the specified products. That
NPRM was published in the Federal
Register on June 9, 2008 (73 FR 32493).
That NPRM proposed to correct an
unsafe condition for the specified
products. The MCAI states:
During a pre-delivery flight of a CL–600–
2C10 aircraft, the AC essential bus did not
come on-line following deployment of the
Air Driven Generator (ADG). Following
investigation, it was determined that a
specific batch of contactors in the ADG
Power Center (ADGPC) is susceptible to
failure due to low contact pressure. This
directive mandates inspection of the ADGPC
and replacement of any contactors in the
suspect batch. It also prohibits future
installation of ADGPCs and contactors that
have not been inspected per this directive.
The unsafe condition is a malfunction of
the emergency AC generation and
control system that supplies emergency
AC power to essential flight
instruments, including the flap and slat
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Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
4129
system, pitch trim system, and
hydraulic pump 3B. Loss of essential
flight instruments could prevent
continued safe flight and landing of the
airplane. You may obtain further
information by examining the MCAI in
the AD docket.
Comments
Interested persons have been afforded
an opportunity to participate in the
making of this amendment. Due
consideration has been given to the
comments received from a single
commenter.
Request To Reduce Compliance Time
The Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA) supports the intent of the
NPRM, but recommends that the
compliance time allowed for the
proposed actions be shortened from 24
months to 3 months. ALPA states that
although its review of available fleet
data did not reveal any incidents of full
electrical failures in Bombardier
airplanes, the ADG is the only
remaining source of electrical power
sustaining the batteries and flightcritical electrical systems if all other
generators fail or are unavailable. ALPA
adds that, under certain circumstances,
there are procedures for deferring
activation of an engine-driven or
auxiliary power unit (APU) generator;
however, the ADG is a non-deferrable
item. ALPA notes that, given the
potential consequences of a full
electrical system failure, particularly in
the low visibility weather conditions in
which these airplanes routinely operate,
the compliance time should be reduced.
We do not agree to reduce the
compliance time specified in paragraph
(f)(1) of this AD. In developing the
compliance time for this AD action, we
considered not only the safety
implications of the identified unsafe
condition, but the average utilization
rate of the affected fleet, the practical
aspects of an orderly inspection of the
fleet during regular maintenance
periods, and the availability of
replacement parts. In addition, we also
considered the manufacturer’s
recommendation for an appropriate
compliance time. After considering all
the available information, we
determined that performing the actions
within 5,000 flight hours or 24 months,
whichever occurs first, represents an
appropriate interval of time in which
the required actions can be performed in
a timely manner within the affected
fleet, while still maintaining an
adequate level of safety. We have made
no change to the AD in this regard.
E:\FR\FM\23JAR1.SGM
23JAR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 14 (Friday, January 23, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 4126-4129]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-26]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2008-0558; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-365-AD;
Amendment 39-15783; AD 2009-01-04]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
Some operators have reported occurrences of loss of the AC BUS 1
with subsequent loss of the AC ESS BUS and DC ESS BUS, resulting in
the loss of 5 upper Display Units and the loss of integral lighting.
In this situation, flight crew[s] have reported concerns in reading
the standby instruments when the DOME lights were selected to OFF.
This situation, if not corrected, could increase the workload of
the flight crew * * *.
* * * * *
The unsafe condition is reduced ability of the flightcrew to
maintain the safe flight and landing of the airplane in adverse
operating conditions. We are issuing this AD to require actions to
correct the unsafe condition on those products.
DATES: This AD becomes effective February 27, 2009.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of February 27,
2009.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim Dulin, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-2141; fax (425) 227-1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products.
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on May 20, 2008 (73 FR
29089). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the
specified products. The MCAI states:
Some operators have reported occurrences of loss of the AC BUS 1
with subsequent loss of the AC ESS BUS and DC ESS BUS, resulting in
the loss of 5 upper Display Units and the loss of integral lighting.
In this situation, flight crews[s] have reported concerns in reading
the standby instruments when the DOME lights were selected to OFF.
This situation, if not corrected, could increase the workload of
the flight crew * * *.
This Airworthiness Directive (AD) mandates the modification of
the electrical supply logic by adding a back-up supply on the
battery hot bus for the under glare shield flood lighting.
The unsafe condition is reduced ability of the flightcrew to maintain
the safe flight and landing of the airplane in adverse operating
conditions. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in
the AD docket.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. We considered the comments received.
Request To Include Revised Service Information
Airbus, United Airlines, and the Air Transport Association on
behalf of its member U.S. Airways, ask that Airbus Mandatory Service
Bulletin A320-33-1057, Revision 01, dated January 31, 2008, be referred
to in the AD for doing the proposed modification. Airbus Service
Bulletin A320-33-1057, dated May 11, 2007, was referred to in the NPRM
as the appropriate source of service information for doing the
modification.
We agree and we have changed paragraphs (f) and (h) of this AD to
include Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A320-33-1057, Revision 01,
dated January 31, 2008, as the appropriate source of service
[[Page 4127]]
information for doing the modification. No additional work is necessary
for airplanes modified in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A320-
33-1057, dated May 11, 2007. We have also included credit for
accomplishing Airbus Service Bulletin A320-33-1057, dated May 11, 2007,
to do the modification before the effective date of the AD.
Request To Reduce Compliance Time
The Airline Pilots Association, International (ALPA) asks that the
42-month compliance time proposed in the NPRM be reduced to 18 months.
ALPA states that, given the potentially serious consequences of a
flightcrew being unable to view their standby instruments, a shorter
compliance time should be imposed.
We do not agree that the compliance time should be reduced. In
developing the compliance time for this AD action, we considered not
only the safety implications of the identified unsafe condition, but
the average utilization rate of the affected fleet, the practical
aspects of modifying the fleet during the compliance time, and the
availability of required parts. In addition, we have coordinated with
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Community. We have
determined that the 42-month compliance time to do the modification
addresses the identified unsafe condition and ensures an adequate level
of safety for the affected fleet. We have made no change to the AD in
this regard.
Request To Allow Another Source of Service Information
Northwest Airlines (NWA) asks that we allow accomplishing the
actions specified in either Airbus Service Bulletin A320-24-1120,
Revision 01, dated December 19, 2007; or Airbus Service Bulletin A320-
33-1057, dated May 11, 2007; as a method of complying with the NPRM.
The NPRM proposes to require accomplishing the modification in
accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A320-33-1057, dated May 11,
2007, and makes no reference to Airbus Service Bulletin A320-24-1120,
Revision 01, dated December 19, 2007. NWA states that Airbus Service
Bulletin A320-33-1057, dated May 11, 2007, does not correct the root
cause of the problem, and does not alleviate other operational
consequences of the faults. NWA notes that Airbus Service Bulletin
A320-33-1057, dated May 11, 2007, adds the provision for lighting of
the standby instruments if there is a loss of AC BUS1, and AC and DC
ESS BUS. NWA adds that the majority of commercial air traffic occurs
during daylight when the illumination of standby instruments by the
glare shield lighting is not required. NWA states that no lost systems
are recovered and the flightcrew must work through COM procedures,
possibly during critical flight phases. NWA notes that the only
additional margin of safety provided is at night, under some flight
phases. NWA states that it prefers to accomplish the modification
specified in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-24-1120, dated December 19,
2007, because it negates the need for the improved lighting specified
in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-33-1057, dated May 11, 2007. NWA adds
that Airbus Service Bulletin A320-24-1120, Revision 01, dated December
19, 2007, addresses the unsafe condition by installing an automatic
switching system for the AC and DC ESS BUS fault to recover all lost
systems in approximately five seconds. NWA adds that the automatic
recovery resolves the display outage, loss of VHF radios, and nose
wheel steering with no flightcrew intervention.
We do not agree to allow accomplishing the actions specified in
Airbus Service Bulletin A320-24-1120, Revision 01, dated December 19,
2007, as an option to accomplishing the actions in Airbus Service
Bulletin A320-33-1057, dated May 11, 2007; or Airbus Mandatory Service
Bulletin A320-33-1057, Revision 01, dated January 31, 2008. We have
determined that accomplishment of actions in Airbus Service Bulletin
A320-33-1057, dated May 11, 2007; or Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin
A320-33-1057, Revision 01, dated January 31, 2008, not only ensures
adequate lighting to the standby instruments in all phases of flight,
but also provides backup power to the conventional standby attitude
indicator itself from the hot battery bus. We agree that accomplishing
the modification specified in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-33-1057,
dated May 11, 2007; or Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A320-33-1057,
Revision 01, dated January 31, 2008; does not address the root cause of
the problem or alleviate all other operational problems related to the
AC BUS 1 failures. We have not determined the root cause for loss of
first officer displays following failure of AC BUS 1, but we know the
root cause of this failure condition is not addressed by accomplishing
Airbus Service Bulletin A320-24-1120, Revision 01, dated December 19,
2007. Although we agree that accomplishing Airbus Service Bulletin
A320-24-1120, Revision 01, dated December 19, 2007, would alleviate
some of the other operational problems related to the AC BUS 1
failures, the auto switching may not restore power to AC BUS1 and AC
and DC ESS BUS. The modification specified in Airbus Service Bulletin
A320-33-1057, dated May 11, 2007; or Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin
A320-33-1057, Revision 01, dated January 31, 2008; will ensure that the
standby instruments are visible in night operations and will continue
to function for at least 30 minutes after failure of AC BUS 1 with no
pilot action. In light of these factors, we may consider further
rulemaking related to Airbus Service Bulletin A320-24-1120, Revision
01, dated December 19, 2007, in the future. We have made no change to
the AD in this regard.
Conclusion
We reviewed the available data, including the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
the AD with the changes described previously. We determined that these
changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or
increase the scope of the AD.
Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have required different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences
are highlighted in a note within the AD.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect 550 products of U.S. registry.
We also estimate that it will take about 30 work-hours per product to
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate
is $80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $0 per product.
Where the service information lists required parts costs that are
covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge
for these costs. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected
parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based
on these figures, we estimate the cost of the AD
[[Page 4128]]
on U.S. operators to be $1,320,000, or $2,400 per product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
2009-01-04 Airbus: Amendment 39-15783. Docket No. FAA-2008-0558;
Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-365-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective February
27, 2009.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321
airplanes, certificated in any category; all certified models; all
serial numbers; on which classical standby instruments have been
installed per Airbus Modification 20011 or 21999 in production, or
per Airbus Service Bulletin A320-34-1280 in service; excluding
airplanes identified in paragraphs (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this AD.
(1) Airplanes on which ISIS equipment was installed per Airbus
Modification 27620 in production or per Airbus Service Bulletin
A320-34-1261 or Airbus Service Bulletin A320-34-1372 in service.
(2) Airplanes on which Airbus Modification 37329 or 37330 was
installed in production or per Airbus Service Bulletin A320-33-1057
in service.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 33: Lights.
Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
``Some operators have reported occurrences of loss of the AC BUS
1 with subsequent loss of the AC ESS BUS and DC ESS BUS, resulting
in the loss of 5 upper Display Units and the loss of integral
lighting. In this situation, flight crews[s] have reported concerns
in reading the standby instruments when the DOME lights were
selected to OFF.
``This situation, if not corrected, could increase the workload
of the flight crew * * *.
``This Airworthiness Directive (AD) mandates the modification of
the electrical supply logic by adding a back-up supply on the
battery hot bus for the under glare shield flood lighting.''
The unsafe condition is reduced ability of the flightcrew to
maintain the safe flight and landing of the airplane in adverse
operating conditions.
Actions and Compliance
(f) Unless already done, within 42 months after the effective
date of this AD: Modify the electrical supply logic of the under
glare shield flood lighting in accordance with the instructions
given in Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A320-33-1057, Revision
01, dated January 31, 2008. Modifications done before the effective
date of this AD in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A320-33-
1057, dated May 11, 2007, are acceptable for compliance with the
modification in this paragraph.
FAA AD Differences
Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows: No differences.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, has the authority to approve
AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR
39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tim Dulin, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone
(425) 227-2141; fax (425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC
on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate
principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office
(FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness
Directive 2007-0286, dated November 14, 2007; and Airbus Mandatory
Service Bulletin A320-33-1057, Revision 01, dated January 31, 2008;
for related information.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(i) You must use Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A320-33-1057,
Revision 01, dated January 31, 2008, to do the actions required by
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
[[Page 4129]]
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Airbus, Airworthiness Office--EAS, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte,
31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; e-mail:
account.airworth-eas@airbus.com; Internet https://www.airbus.com.
(3) You may review copies of the service information that is
incorporated by reference at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.
(4) You may also review copies of the service information at the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information
on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or
go to: https://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_
regulations/ibr_locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 28, 2008.
Linda Navarro,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-26 Filed 1-22-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
