Science and Technology Directorate; Record of Decision for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement, 3065-3080 [E9-914]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Science and Technology Directorate;
Record of Decision for the National Bio
and Agro-Defense Facility
Environmental Impact Statement
AGENCY: Science and Technology
Directorate (Office of National
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Laboratories within the Office of
Research), DHS.
ACTION: Record of Decision (ROD).
SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), Science and
Technology Directorate is issuing this
ROD on the proposed siting,
construction, and operation of the
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility
(NBAF) (the Proposed Action). This
ROD is based on the information and
analysis in the NBAF Final
Environmental Impact Statement (NBAF
Final EIS) including public comments,
and consideration of other appropriate
factors such as national policy, site
evaluation criteria, threat and risk
assessment, costs, security, and other
programmatic requirements. The Notice
of Availability for the NBAF Final EIS
was published in the Federal Register
(73 FR 75665–75667) on December 12,
2008.
DHS has decided to implement the
Preferred Alternative identified in
Section 2.6 of the NBAF Final EIS.
Implementation of this alternative
would result in construction of the
NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site in
Manhattan, Kansas, and initiation of the
transition of mission activities and
resources from the Plum Island Animal
Disease Center (PIADC), located on
Plum Island, New York, to the
Manhattan Campus Site.
DHS appreciates the significant cost,
time, and effort that each consortium
expended during this comprehensive
decision process, and DHS thanks the
consortia for their support of the
homeland security mission. The
comprehensive and well thought out
proposals from states around the Nation
and their consortia reflected the
impressive capabilities of their
communities. Each consortium and host
state demonstrated a strong desire to
make the Nation safer for animal
agriculture through advanced research
on foreign animal and zoonotic and
emerging diseases.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: The
NBAF Final EIS (approximately 5,000
pages), Executive Summary, and this
ROD are available on the DHS Web site
at https://www.dhs.gov/nbaf. Requests
for copies of the NBAF Final EIS, the
Executive Summary, or this ROD should
be mailed to Mr. James V. Johnson:
Department of Homeland Security;
Science and Technology Directorate;
Office of National Laboratories, Room
10–052, Mail Stop #2100; 245 Murray
Lane, SW., Building 410; Washington,
DC 20528. You may also request copies
from: toll-free facsimile 1–866–508–
NBAF (6223); toll-free voice mail 1–
866–501–NBAF (6223); or e-mail at
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nbafprogrammanager@dhs.gov. For
more information or general questions
about the NBAF EIS, contact Mr. James
V. Johnson at the address given
previously.
Copies of the NBAF Final EIS,
Executive Summary, and this ROD are
also available for review at the following
public reading rooms:
infrastructure costs (submitted to DHS
by March 31, 2008); (4) the
environmental impacts identified in the
NBAF Final EIS; and (5) information
contained in the supporting documents
(Threat and Risk Assessment, Site Cost
Analysis, Site Characterization Study,
and The Plum Island Facility Closure
and Transition Cost Study).
Georgia
Purpose and Need for Agency Action
University of Georgia Main Library, 320
South Jackson Street, Athens, GA
30602.
Oconee County Library, 1080
Experiment Station Road,
Watkinsville, GA 30677.
DHS is charged with the
responsibility and has the national
stewardship mandate for detecting,
preventing, protecting against, and
responding to terrorist attacks within
the United States. These
responsibilities, as applied to the
defense of animal agriculture, are shared
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) and require a coordinated
strategy to adequately protect the Nation
against threats to animal agriculture.
Consultations between DHS and USDA
on a coordinated agricultural research
strategy, as called for in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107–296)
and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 9 (HSPD–9), ‘‘Defense of
United States Agriculture and Food,’’
dated January 30, 2004, revealed a
capability gap that must be filled by an
integrated research, development, test,
and evaluation infrastructure for
combating agricultural and public
health threats posed by foreign animal
and zoonotic diseases. The DHS Science
and Technology Directorate is
responsible for addressing the identified
gap.
Accordingly, to bridge the capability
gap and to comply with HSPD–9, DHS
proposed to build the NBAF, an
integrated research, development, test,
and evaluation facility.
Co-locating DHS with USDA’s Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service—
Veterinary Services (APHIS–VS) and
Agricultural Research Service (ARS) at
the NBAF would enable research,
diagnostics, and responses to outbreaks
in agricultural animals (i.e. cattle,
swine, and sheep) at a U.S.-based
facility. Co-locating these functions in a
single secure facility would maximize
synergies and provide enhanced
capabilities for the detection and
prevention of foreign animal diseases in
the United States.
The NBAF would meet the
capabilities required in HSPD–9 by
providing a domestic, modern,
integrated high-containment facility
containing BSL–2, BSL–3E, BSL–3Ag,
and BSL–4 laboratories for an estimated
250 to 350 scientists and support staff
to safely and effectively address the
accidental or intentional introduction
Kansas
Manhattan Public Library, 629 Poyntz
Avenue, Manhattan, KS 66502.
Hale Library, Kansas State University,
Manhattan, KS 66506.
Mississippi
City of Flora Library, 144 Clark Street,
Flora, MS 39071.
New York
Acton Public Library, 60 Old Boston
Post Road, Old Saybrook, CT 06475.
Southold Free Library, 53705 Main
Road, Southold, NY 11971.
North Carolina
Richard H. Thornton Library, 210 Main
Street, Oxford NC 27565–0339.
South Branch Library, 1547 South
Campus Drive, Creedmoor, NC 27522.
Texas
Central Library, 600 Soledad, San
Antonio, TX 78205.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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I. Background
DHS prepared this ROD pursuant to
the regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) for
implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (40
CFR Parts 1500–1508) and DHS
Directive 023–01 (renumbered from
management Directive 5100.1),
Environmental Planning Program. This
ROD is based on: (1) The site’s ability
to satisfy the evaluation criteria
published in the ‘‘Public Notice
Soliciting Expressions of Interest (EOIs)
for Potential Sites for the NBAF’’ (which
was published in the Federal Register
on January 19, 2006); (2) the site’s
ability to satisfy the preferences
(including request of site in-kind
contributions to offset infrastructure
costs) communicated to all second
round potential NBAF sites (by letter
dated December 8, 2006); (3)
confirmation of the site offers for site
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into the United States of animal diseases
of high consequence.
Currently, the Plum Island Animal
Disease Center (PIADC), where much of
the Biosafety Level-3 Agricultural (BSL–
3Ag) research on foreign animal
diseases is performed, is an essential
component of the national strategy for
protecting U.S. agriculture from threats
caused by intentional attack (i.e., agroterrorism) or unintentional introduction
of foreign animal disease viruses such as
foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV).
However, PIADC was built in the 1950s,
is nearing the end of its lifecycle, and
does not contain the necessary biosafety
level facilities to meet the NBAF
research requirements. The NBAF
would fulfill the need for a secure U.S.
facility that could support collaborative
efforts among researchers from Federal
and state agencies, academia, and
international partners to perform
necessary research at the required
biosafety levels 3 and 4. Additionally, as
discussed in the recent Report of the
Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Proliferation and Terrorism (December
2008), the United States should
continue to undertake a series of
mutually reinforcing domestic measures
to prevent bioterrorism.
Prior to passage of the Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008
(H.R. 6124 [2008 Farm Bill]) which
became law on May 22, 2008, the
United States Code (21 U.S.C. Section
113a) stipulated that live FMDV could
not be studied on the U.S. mainland
unless the Secretary of Agriculture
made a determination that such study
was necessary and in the public interest
and issued a permit for such research to
be conducted on the mainland. Section
7524 of the 2008 Farm Bill directs the
Secretary of Agriculture to issue a
permit to the Secretary of Homeland
Security for work on the live FMDV at
any facility that is a successor to the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center and
charged with researching highconsequence biological threats
involving zoonotic and foreign animal
diseases. The permit is limited to a
single successor facility. On December
18, 2008, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, Michael Chertoff sent a letter
to the Secretary of Agriculture, Ed
Schafer requesting that a permit be
issued if a mainland site is selected. On
January 9, 2009 DHS received a letter
from Secretary Schafer that affirmed
USDA’s intention of complying with
Congressional direction to issue a
permit for the movement and use of live
FMDV at the NBAF.
As stated in Section 2.2.2 of the NBAF
EIS, the NBAF may be operated as a
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Government Owned/Government
Operated Facility (GOGO) or as a
Government Owned/Contractor
Operated Facility (GOCO). The final
decision regarding the operating model
for the NBAF will be made at a later
date. The current planning approach is
to utilize the Plum Island operating
model, which is a GOGO facility.
Should a decision be made to operate
the NBAF as a GOCO facility,
procurement of such services would
follow the Federal Acquisition
Regulation and applicable DHS
procurement requirements, and a
program management plan, which
would set forth management,
supervisory, and contracting activities
between the Federal government and a
contractor, would be prepared.
Site Selection Process and Evaluation
Criteria
DHS conducted a competitive site
selection process to identify and
evaluate potential candidate sites for the
NBAF; Plum Island was also included
as an alternative site for evaluation, as
described in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1 of
the NBAF Final EIS. The site selection
process was initiated by publication of
a Notice of Request for EOI submissions
for Potential Sites for the NBAF in the
Federal Register on January 19, 2006
(71 FR 3107–3109). DHS requested EOI
submissions from Federal agencies, state
and local governments, industry,
academia, and interested parties and
organizations for potential locations that
would accommodate the construction
and operation of the NBAF.
Twenty-nine EOI submissions were
received from consortia comprised of
various governmental, industry, and
academic partners by the March 31,
2006 response deadline. DHS developed
and implemented a rigorous process for
the first round evaluation of the 29 EOIs
received, against DHS’s four evaluation
criteria (i.e., Proximity to Research
Capabilities, Proximity to Workforce,
Acquisition/Construction/Operations
(ACO) Requirements, and Community
Acceptance) and associated sub-criteria.
These criteria and their associated subcriteria were developed by an
interagency working group to ensure
that the NBAF would meet the
interdependent needs of DHS and
USDA to adequately protect the Nation
against biological threats to animal
agriculture. DHS emphasizes that the
Proximity to Research Capabilities and
Workforce ratings apply exclusively to
the specific research and workforce
needs of the proposed NBAF and are not
a general statement on the research
capability and workforce expertise of
the proposing states and consortia. For
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example, the Proximity to Research
evaluation criterion considered existing
research programs that could be linked
to NBAF mission requirements
pertaining to large livestock diseases
studied in Biosafety Level 3 and 4
facilities and the Proximity to
Workforce evaluation criterion
considered site proximity to a local
labor force with expertise in
biocontainment facilities relevant to the
NBAF mission. Included within the
ACO criterion were sub-criteria in the
areas of: (1) Land acquisition/
development potential, (2)
environmental compatibility, including
the presence of existing environmental
concerns/contamination or
environmentally sensitive areas, and (3)
adequate utility infrastructure. These
factors, in part, enabled DHS to screen
candidate sites for significant
environmental constraints prior to
initiating the EIS. Three committees
comprised of Federal employees
evaluated the EOI submissions,
assessing their strengths, weaknesses,
and deficiencies against the four
evaluation criteria and associated subcriteria. A Steering Committee, also
comprised of Federal employees, made
recommendations to the DHS Selection
Authority (DHS Under Secretary for
Science and Technology), who then
selected those sites that had sufficient
qualifications with regard to the
evaluation criteria, and eliminated
others from further consideration. On
August 9, 2006, DHS selected 18 sites
submitted by 12 consortia for further
review.
Subsequently, on December 8, 2006,
DHS sent a letter to the 12 remaining
consortia. This letter requested
additional information to complete the
next phase of the evaluations,
communicated DHS’s ‘‘preferences’’
within each of the four criteria,
provided instructions on how to submit
the requested information, and provided
information on the next steps in the site
selection process. DHS stated it would
give strong preference to six specific
‘‘preferences’’ in the next phase of the
evaluation. Two examples of these
preferences are: (1) For the proximity to
research criterion, that the proposed site
is within a comprehensive research
community that has existing research
programs in areas related to the NBAF
mission requirements (veterinary,
medical and public health, and
agriculture), and (2) for the ACO
criterion, any in-kind contributions
[e.g., deeded land at no cost rather than
sale, new utility provisions and/or
upgrades (e.g., sewer, electricity, water,
chilled water, steamed water, etc.) and
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new roadways] would be offered to DHS
(by the consortium, state government,
local government, or private entities).
The decision to offer land, financial
offsets or other incentives was solely at
the discretion of the consortium. This
letter is posted on the DHS Web site at
https://www.dhs.gov/nbaf.
Upon receipt of the requested
additional information and in-kind
offers from the consortia in February
2007, an evaluation team of USDA and
DHS Federal employees conducted site
visits to 17 sites. The Hinds County Site,
originally proposed by the Mississippi
Consortium, was withdrawn in a letter
DHS received on April 5, 2007. The
intent of each site visit was to: (1) Verify
the information provided and
representations made in the EOI
submissions and the additional
information submitted, (2) enable
evaluation committee representatives to
view any observable physical conditions
and constraints at the proposed sites
and, if applicable, (3) to view the sites’
utilities and infrastructure. Based on the
evaluation team’s analysis of the
additional information and observations
on the site visits, the team provided
recommendations to the DHS Selection
Authority. Additionally and
independently of the evaluation team,
the DHS Selection Authority (DHS
Under Secretary for Science and
Technology) visited each of the 17 sites.
In July 2007, DHS identified five site
alternatives that surpassed others in
meeting the DHS evaluation criteria,
sub-criteria, and DHS preferences, and
determined that they, along with the
Plum Island Site, would be evaluated in
the EIS as reasonable alternatives for the
proposed NBAF. The Final Selection
Memorandum for Site Selection for the
Second Round Potential Sites for the
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility
(NBAF) and the Plum Island
Memorandum for the Record, which are
available on the DHS_Web site at
https://www.dhs.gov/nbaf, documented
the findings of this process. The site
alternatives selected for evaluation in
the EIS were:
South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens,
Georgia
Manhattan Campus Site; Manhattan,
Kansas
Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora,
Mississippi
Plum Island Site; Plum Island, New
York
Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner,
North Carolina
Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio,
Texas
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NEPA Process
On July 31, 2007, DHS published a
Notice of Intent in the Federal Register
(72 FR 41764–41765) to prepare the
NBAF EIS to evaluate the environmental
impacts of constructing and operating
the proposed NBAF at one of the
reasonable site alternatives. The 60-day
scoping period for the NBAF EIS ended
on September 28, 2007. Scoping
meetings were held in the vicinity of the
six site alternatives (Old Saybrook,
Connecticut; Southold, New York;
Manhattan, Kansas; Flora, Mississippi;
San Antonio, Texas; Creedmoor, NC;
and Athens, Georgia), along with one
regional meeting in Washington, DC.
More than 1,350 people attended the
scoping meetings. Nearly 300 people
provided oral comments at the public
meetings, and more than 3,870
comments were received during the
scoping period. Areas of concern shared
by many commentors during scoping
were the placement of the proposed
NBAF in a highly populated area or in
an area that houses institutionalized
populations. These concerns focused on
the public health risk should an
accidental or intentional (criminal or
terrorist) release occur, its potential
effects on the population, and the ability
of affected communities to evacuate the
area. Other concerns were: locating the
facility near herds or flocks of animals
susceptible to the diseases studied,
environmental effects to biological and
natural resources, and resources
required for the construction and
operation of the NBAF, particularly
water. Details on the scoping process
and issues identified are documented in
the February 2008, NBAF EIS Scoping
Report, which is available on the DHS
Web site at https://www.dhs.gov/nbaf
and in the aforementioned public
reading rooms.
The Notice of Availability of the
NBAF Draft EIS was published in the
Federal Register on June 27, 2008 (73
FR 36540–36542). The public comment
period extended through August 25,
2008. Thirteen public meetings were
held between late July and mid-August
2008 at the same locations as the
scoping meetings or at nearby alternate
locations as follows: Washington, DC
(one meeting); Butner, North Carolina
(two meetings); Manhattan, Kansas (two
meetings); Flora, Mississippi (two
meetings); San Antonio, Texas (two
meetings); Old Saybrook, Connecticut
(one meeting); Greenport, New York
(one meeting); and Athens, Georgia (two
meetings).
During the 60-day public comment
period on the NBAF Draft EIS, more
than 1,770 individuals attended the
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public meetings on the NBAF Draft EIS,
378 of whom provided oral comments.
Analysis of the oral and written
comment documents received, yielded
more than 5,400 delineated comments.
Specifically, a number of comments
focused on the ability of DHS to safely
operate the NBAF and the potential for
a pathogenic release to occur through
accidents, natural phenomena, and
terrorist actions. The majority of the
comments related to the following
concerns: (1) Ability of DHS to safely
operate a biosafety facility; (2) the May
2008 U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report regarding whether
FMD research could be safely conducted
on the U.S. mainland; (3) impacts of
natural phenomena such as tornadoes,
earthquakes, and hurricanes on the
NBAF resulting in the release of a
pathogen; (4) the possibility that an
escaped infected mosquito vector would
cause a pathogen such as Rift Valley
fever virus to become established in the
United States; (5) economic effects of a
release or a perceived release on the
local, state, and national livestock
industry or on local deer populations
and the hunting industry; (6) accident
risk of transportation of infectious
agents; (7) the likelihood that the NBAF
and the surrounding community would
become a prime terrorist target that DHS
could not adequately protect from
attack; (8) release of a pathogen due to
human error or by disgruntled
employee(s); (9) the availability of
appropriate funding to safely construct
and operate the NBAF; (10) use of the
NBAF to manufacture bioweapons; (11)
the need for and effects of mosquito
control and spraying of insecticides;
(12) the site selection process and the
evaluation criteria used to select the
Preferred Alternative; (13) waste
management regarding carcass disposal,
including identification of precise
methods of disposal, the effects to local
sewage treatment infrastructure, and
possible effects to air quality from
incineration; (14) pollution of ground or
surface water resources due to spills and
leaks; (15) the amount of water that
would be used by the NBAF in light of
the current regional drought in North
Carolina and Georgia; (16) in Georgia,
the proximity of the South Milledge
Avenue Site to the State Botanical
Gardens, the Audubon-designated
Important Bird Area, and the Oconee
River; (17) in North Carolina, concerns
that institutionalized populations were
not afforded the appropriate level of
analysis; (18) in New York, the limited
routes from an island location should an
accident requiring evacuation occur;
and (19) in Kansas, the number of cattle
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in the region and the economic effects
of a release impacting them.
All comments received during the
public comment period were
considered. DHS’s responses to
comments are presented in Appendix H
of the NBAF Final EIS, and the NBAF
EIS was revised, as necessary, in
response to comments. The Notice of
Availability for the NBAF Final EIS was
published in the Federal Register on
December 12, 2008 (73 FR 75665–
75667).
As identified in the Notice of
Availability of the NBAF Draft EIS and
as further discussed in Section 2.6 of the
NBAF Final EIS, additional studies were
performed to provide important
decision-making information, and for
formulation of this ROD. The supporting
documents considered include: (1)
Threat and Risk Assessment dated
October 2008, (2) Site Cost Analysis,
dated July 25, 2008 (3) Site
Characterization Study, dated July 25,
2008 (4) Plum Island Facility Closure
and Transition Cost Study dated July
2008; and (5) a prior analysis of the
alternative sites against DHS’s four
evaluation criteria (i.e., Final Selection
Memorandum for Site Selection for the
Second Round Potential Sites for the
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility
(NBAF) dated July 2007, and The Plum
Island Memorandum for the Record
dated November 2008). CEQ regulations
(40 CFR 1505.1(e)) encourage agencies
to make ancillary decision documents
available to the public before a decision
is made. Accordingly, the Site Cost
Analysis, Site Characterization Study,
Plum Island Facility Closure and
Transition Cost Study, Final Selection
Memorandum, and other reports were
made available in August 2008 on the
DHS Web site with redactions to mask
certain sensitive financial and security
information. The Threat and Risk
Assessment, which was designated For
Official Use Only, was not posted on the
Web site. Relevant information from
these reports was used in the
preparation of the NBAF Final EIS.
II. Alternatives Considered
DHS evaluated the potential
environmental impacts that could result
from implementation of alternatives for
construction and operation of the
NBAF. A No Action Alternative and the
six site alternatives were analyzed in the
NBAF EIS.
No Action Alternative
Under the No Action Alternative,
consideration of which is required by
NEPA, the NBAF would not be
constructed. DHS and USDA would
continue to use the PIADC on Plum
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Island, New York. Plum Island is an
840-acre island located about 12 miles
southwest of New London, Connecticut,
and 1.5 miles from the northeast tip of
Long Island, New York (i.e., Orient
Point). While the island is technically
located in the Village of Greenport,
Town of Southold, Suffolk County, New
York, Plum Island is administered
wholly by the Federal government. The
Homeland Security Act of 2002
recognized that protecting the U.S.
agricultural infrastructure is a critical
element of homeland security and
transferred PIADC from USDA to DHS
in 2003. While DHS now has
responsibility for operating PIADC, both
DHS and USDA conduct programs there
as part of an integrated agro-defense
strategy.
Under the No Action Alternative,
investment in necessary facility
upgrades, replacements, and repairs,
which are ongoing, would continue so
that PIADC could continue to operate at
its current BSL–3Ag capability.
However, PIADC’s capabilities would
not be expanded to address the NBAF
mission requirements. The BSL–3Ag
work at PIADC (large livestock research
on foreign animal diseases and zoonotic
diseases in the United States) would
continue, and BSL–4 research would
continue to be performed outside of the
United States. This alternative does not
satisfy the purpose of and the need for
the Proposed Action.
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South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens,
Georgia
This alternative would locate the
NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue
Site located west of the South Milledge
Avenue and Whitehall Road
intersection in Clarke County, Georgia.
The site is part of the University of
Georgia Whitehall Farm and is located
near the University of Georgia Livestock
Instructional Area. The site is a 67-acre
tract of land consisting of open
pastureland and wooded land and is
utilized by the University of Georgia
Equestrian Team. The topography is
rolling terrain, which slopes towards the
southwest. The site has been
undeveloped land since at least 1936
and is currently zoned for government
use.
Manhattan Campus Site; Manhattan,
Kansas
This alternative would locate the
NBAF on the campus of Kansas State
University (KSU) immediately adjacent
to the Biosecurity Research Institute.
The Biosecurity Research Institute,
constructed in 2006, is a KSU BSL–3Ag
research facility. The Manhattan
Campus Site consists of approximately
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48.4 acres southeast of the intersection
of Kimball Avenue and Denison
Avenue. The site has been used for
animal research since the 1970s. The
site includes several structures,
including five research buildings, a
residential structure, and a storage
building for recycling materials. The site
is currently zoned as University District
and was annexed to the City of
Manhattan in 1994. The 48.4-acre site
could be expanded to 70 acres.
Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora,
Mississippi
This alternative would locate the
NBAF at the Flora Industrial Park Site,
which is located in Madison County,
Mississippi. The site is owned by the
Madison County Economic
Development Authority. Flora Industrial
Park is a mixed-use commercial park 45
miles from the Jackson-Evers
International Airport. Additional land is
available surrounding the site for
support facilities. The site is located on
the east side of U.S. Highway 49, north
and east of the intersection with North
1st Street. The Flora Industrial Park Site
is approximately 150 acres of idle
pasture land with two small ponds and
a few scattered wooded areas. An
overhead power transmission line is
present through the south-central and
west-central portions of the site. The
site is currently zoned as limited
industrial. Based on historical
information, the site had previously
been cultivated and was in pasture land
and previously occupied by two small
tenant houses and one hay barn.
Adjoining properties appear to have
been predominantly agricultural and
rural residential until construction of
the southwest-adjoining Primos
Manufacturing Company in the early
2000s.
Plum Island Site; Plum Island, New
York
This alternative would locate the
NBAF on Plum Island, New York. The
Plum Island Site consists of
approximately 24 acres of land located
directly to the east of the existing
PIADC, which is on the western shore
of Plum Island. Although one of the
requirements listed in DHS’s request for
EOIs stated that a minimum of 30 acres
would be required, the Plum Island Site
would not require the full 30 acres.
Existing facilities associated with
PIADC would be available for use with
the NBAF and would reduce the amount
of space required. The 24-acre site has
no existing structures. Dense
underbrush and gravel roads are found
within the southwestern and
northeastern portions. The southeastern
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portion of the island has previously
been used for sand mining and is
generally void of vegetation. The
northwestern portion of the island has
minor vegetation. A potable water line
bisects the site from east to west, and an
underground electric service borders the
site on the north side. Based on a review
of the historical information, the Plum
Island Site was formerly utilized as a
landfill area for miscellaneous noninfectious wastes associated with
PIADC, but the site has since been
remediated.
Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner,
North Carolina
This alternative would locate the
NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm
Site in Butner, North Carolina. The site
is currently owned and operated by
North Carolina Department of
Agriculture, Research Farms Division.
The site is located north of the terminus
of Dillon Drive along the northern
property boundary of the C.A. Dillon
Youth Development Center in Butner.
The site is a 249-acre tract of pasture,
grassland, and wooded land that is
zoned as institutional. The site area was
operated from early 1942 to June 1943
as part of Camp Butner, a training
facility for light infantry and artillery
during World War II. Other operations
included ammunition storage, a
redeployment center, and a general and
convalescent hospital. The site has been
undeveloped wooded land since at least
1940, except for one cemetery. The site
has historically been maintained as
undeveloped wooded land; however, in
the fall of 2001, the site and
surrounding area were partially logged.
Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio,
Texas
The Texas Research Park Site in San
Antonio, Texas, extends over the Bexar
County line into a portion of Medina
County. The 100.1-acre site is located
west of Lambda Drive, south of the
proposed extension of Omicron Drive,
and is currently vacant, undeveloped
land covered in dense vegetation
comprised of trees, shrubs, and tall
prairie grasses. The site appears to have
consisted of vacant, undeveloped ranch
land before 1938 to the present. The site
has no zoning category because it is
outside the San Antonio city limits. The
entire Texas Research Park property is
a 1,000-acre industrial district 4 miles
outside the San Antonio city limits.
III. Preferred Alternative
CEQ regulations require an agency to
identify its preferred alternative(s) in
the final environmental impact
statement (40 CFR 1502.14). The
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preferred alternative is the alternative
that the agency believes would best
fulfill its statutory mission, giving
consideration to environmental,
economic, technical, and other factors.
DHS’s Preferred Alternative and the
basis for its selection are described in
Section 2.6 of the NBAF Final EIS.
Additionally, DHS published the
Preferred Alternative Selection
Memorandum in December 2008, which
describes in more detail the basis for the
selection of the Preferred Alternative, on
the DHS Web site at https://
www.dhs.gov/nbaf. DHS’s Preferred
Alternative is to construct and operate
the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site
in Manhattan, Kansas.
DHS developed and implemented a
decision process to identify the
Preferred Alternative in the NBAF Final
EIS. A Steering Committee, comprised
of Federal employees from DHS and
USDA, was convened to lead the
evaluation process and make
recommendations to the DHS Decision
Authority (the DHS Under Secretary for
Science and Technology). The process
involved a qualitative analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of each action
alternative (i.e., site alternative)
followed by an overall data comparison
to develop a relative ranking of each site
alternative. The Steering Committee also
considered the No Action Alternative
and weighed it against the Proposed
Action of constructing and operating the
NBAF at the highest ranked site
alternative.
The Steering Committee updated the
findings from the previously described
second round evaluation of site
alternatives using new and emerging
data collected since July 2007. This data
was contained in the following support
documents, as previously discussed: (1)
Threat and Risk Assessment dated
October 2008, (2) Site Cost Analysis,
dated July 25, 2008, (3) Site
Characterization Study, dated July 25,
2008, and (4) Plum Island Facility
Closure and Transition Cost Study dated
July 2008. Additionally, on February 29,
2008, DHS sent a letter to each
consortium requesting they confirm or
update the details of their site offers (in
response to the December 8, 2006 DHS
letter) and provided a final opportunity
to identify contingences to their offers.
DHS also provided background on the
process it would follow to identify its
preferred site alternative. The February
29, 2008 letter was not a request for
financial proposals, but rather an
opportunity for the consortia to verify
and update their original in-kind offers
received in February 2007 in response
to the December 2006 letter request.
DHS required responses to be
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postmarked by March 30, 2008 (later
changed to March 31, 2008 to fall on a
weekday). The decision to offer land,
funds, or other assets was solely at the
discretion of each consortium. The
amount of the contribution and how the
contribution would be funded (e.g.,
bonds, taxes) was determined by the
consortia and/or the state and local
government officials.
The Steering Committee next
considered the environmental impacts
presented in the NBAF EIS including
the public comments made at the public
meetings and by other means during the
60-day public comment period on the
NBAF Draft EIS, along with the
information in the Threat and Risk
Assessment. The Steering Committee
found that the NBAF EIS and the Threat
and Risk Assessment presented very
little differentiation between the sites.
In fact, the NBAF EIS determined that
the risk of release of a biological
pathogen from the NBAF was
independent of where the NBAF was
located. The Steering Committee also
determined that, based on its review of
the NBAF EIS, the likelihood of a
release of a pathogen was very low,
given appropriate attention to the
design, construction, and operation of
the NBAF with an array of safety
controls. The Steering Committee
further determined that the risk of
release of any identified pathogen
proposed for study within the NBAF
could be mitigated by implementation
of operational protocols, rigid security
measures, and adherence to the U.S.
Government biosecurity guidelines.
With respect to the economic
consequence if a release of FMDV from
the NBAF were to happen, the Steering
Committee found that the Nation’s meat
export trade status would suffer the
greatest impact and that this is
independent of the site of the NBAF.
The World Organization for Animal
Health (OIE) affirms the Steering
Committee’s findings. OIE, created in
1924 by 28 countries, issues standards,
guidelines, and recommendations
which are designated as the
international referenced in the field of
animal diseases and zoonoses. As of
January 2009, the OIE consisted of 172
nations, including the U.S. The OIE’s
determination regarding a country’s
FMD status significantly impacts that
country’s ability to export meat. Dr.
Bernard Vallat, the Director General of
the OIE, in a letter to DHS, dated
November 24, 2008, stated the
following:
‘‘You asked a specific question as to
whether it would make a difference in terms
of the health status of a country if a foot-andmouth (FMD) disease outbreak would occur
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in the mainland or on an off shore island like
Plum Island. My response is based on today’s
international recommendations, as published
in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the
OIE, which constitutes the only
internationally accepted standards. Today’s
international standards provide
recommendations that significantly reduce
the sanitary and economic impact of the
affected country or zone in case of such an
outbreak, provided there is a credible
veterinary infrastructure that can guarantee
the early detection and the rapid response in
accordance with the measures recommended
by the OIE. However, regardless of where in
the territory of a country an outbreak of FMD
occurs, the FMD status of the country is lost
immediately upon the first notification to the
OIE. The difference, in terms of the national
impact of this outbreak, is more related to
how the country’s authorities respond to the
incursion, rather then where the outbreak
occurs.
As was the case in the recent outbreak at
Pirbright, United Kingdom, the veterinary
authorities immediately notified the OIE and
established a ‘‘containment zone’’ as defined
in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code. Once
they could demonstrate that all cases had
been contained within such zone and that no
further cases were detected within a 30-day
period, the entire country regained its FMDfree status, with the only exception of the
containment zone. The necessary and lengthy
period to regain the free status, as described
in the Code is not limited to the containment
zone, something in the past applied to the
entire affected country or zone.’’
Chapter 4.3 of the OIE Terrestrial
Animal Health Code (Zoning and
Compartmentalization) includes
guidance on establishing a containment
zone. Article 4.3.3 of the Code states:
‘‘Establishment of a containment zone
should be based on a rapid response
including appropriate standstill of movement
of animals and commodities upon
notification of suspicion of the specified
disease and the demonstration that the
outbreaks are contained within this zone
through epidemiological investigation (traceback, trace-forward) after confirmation of
infection. The primary outbreak and likely
source of the outbreak should be identified
and all cases shown to be epidemiologically
linked. For the effective establishment of a
containment zone, it is necessary to
demonstrate that there have been no new
cases in the containment zone within a
minimum of two incubation periods from the
last detected case.’’
The Steering Committee determined
that, based on the lack of differentiation
among the sites regarding the risk of a
release and the economic consequences
of a release, that it was most important
to select a location that would optimize
the capability to diagnose and cure large
animal diseases through strong research
programs and expedient diagnostic and
response capabilities. Furthermore, the
Steering Committee found that the
environmental impacts analyzed in the
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EIS and the site specific threats were all
very similar and that there were only
minor differentiators in the EIS and the
Threat and Risk Assessment. Therefore,
the key differentiators among the sites
were DHS’s initial four evaluation
criteria. Because the NBAF is intended
to be the Nation’s preeminent research
facility for foreign animal and zoonotic
disease research, the site’s proximity to
research capabilities that can be linked
to NBAF mission requirements was
emphasized among the four evaluation
criteria. Overall site evaluations were
followed by the ranking of the sites to
determine the recommended site
alternative.
The Steering Committee then
considered the No Action Alternative
and weighed it against the Proposed
Action of constructing and operating the
NBAF at the highest ranked site
alternative to determine the
recommended Preferred Alternative.
Based on numerous strengths in terms
of the evaluation criteria, the Steering
Committee concluded that the
Manhattan Campus Site best met the
purpose and need to site, construct and
operate the NBAF.
The Manhattan Campus Site’s
location near KSU provides proximity to
existing research capabilities that can be
linked to NBAF mission requirements.
Additionally, the site’s proximity to the
KSU College of Veterinary Medicine,
KSU College of Agriculture, and the
Biosecurity Research Institute is
relevant to the NBAF mission and is,
therefore, a significant strength. The
NBAF EIS demonstrated that
construction and operation of the NBAF
at the Manhattan Campus Site would be
environmentally acceptable, because
almost all environmental impacts fell
into the ‘‘no impacts to minor impacts’’
category. As stated in the NBAF EIS, the
risk of release of a pathogen was
independent of where the NBAF was
located. The information presented in
the Threat and Risk Assessment was
found to be comparable to the other site
alternatives. The Manhattan Campus
Site alternative demonstrated very
strong community acceptance from
local, state, and Federal officials and
stakeholders. Additionally, the
consortium offered a substantial,
unconditional offset package, including
the immediate and long-term use of the
existing Biosecurity Research Institute,
an existing Biosecurity Level 3 facility
within close proximity to the Manhattan
Campus Site in which research
pertaining to livestock disease is
conducted. Taking into consideration
the offsets to infrastructure costs and
‘‘in-kind’’ contributions offered by the
consortia, the Manhattan Campus Site is
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among the least expensive location to
construct and operate the NBAF.
Following a comparison of this site with
the No Action Alternative, DHS selected
the Manhattan Campus Site as the
Preferred Alternative for
implementation.
IV. Alternatives Considered But
Dismissed
In developing a range of reasonable
alternatives early in the NEPA process,
DHS considered other potential
alternatives, including suggestions made
by the public during the scoping
process. The following alternatives were
considered but were determined not to
be reasonable alternatives for evaluation
in the NBAF Draft EIS:
Upgrade PIADC. The proposed NBAF
would require BSL–4 capability. PIADC
does not have BSL–4 laboratory space,
and the existing infrastructure is
inadequate to support a BSL–4
laboratory. Refurbishing the existing
facilities and obsolete infrastructure to
allow PIADC to meet the new mission
would be more costly than building the
NBAF on Plum Island. In addition, for
the existing facility to be refurbished,
current research activities might have to
be suspended for extensive periods.
Use Existing Laboratory Facilities. No
existing U.S. facility could meet the
NBAF mission needs as determined by
DHS and USDA. Although a number of
BSL–3 and BSL–4 facilities are located
in the U.S., they do not have the
capacity to conduct the large livestock
research required. Similar facilities in
Winnipeg, Canada, and Geelong,
Australia, do not have the capacity to
address potential outbreak scenarios in
the United States in a timely manner
and cannot guarantee their availability
to meet U.S. research requirements.
Other Locations. Other potential
locations were considered during the
NBAF site selection process, but they
were eliminated based on evaluation by
the DHS evaluation committee. It was
suggested during the scoping process
that the NBAF be constructed in a
remote location such as an island
distant from populated areas or in a
location that would be inhospitable
(e.g., desert or arctic habitat) to escaped
animal hosts or vectors. However, the
evaluation criteria called for proximity
to research programs that could be
linked to the NBAF mission and
proximity to a technical workforce with
applicable skills for the NBAF mission.
The Plum Island Site represents an
isolated location while meeting the
evaluation requirements. It was also
suggested that the NBAF could be
constructed beneath a mountain;
however, the cost and feasibility of such
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a construction project would be
prohibitive.
V. Summary of Environmental Impacts
A sliding-scale approach was the
basis for the environmental impacts
analysis in the NBAF EIS. This
approach reflects CEQ requirements for
implementing NEPA and its instruction
that Federal agencies preparing EISs
‘‘focus on significant environmental
issues and alternatives’’ (40 CFR 1502.1)
and that impacts be discussed ‘‘in
proportion to their significance’’ (40
CFR 1502.2(b)). That is, certain aspects
of the alternatives have a greater
potential for creating environmental
effects than others. Thus, the NBAF EIS
addressed resource areas pertinent to
the sites considered. Impacts were
assessed for land use and visual
resources; infrastructure; air quality;
noise; geology and soils; water
resources; biological resources; cultural
resources; socioeconomics; traffic and
transportation; existing hazardous,
toxic, or radiological waste; waste
management; environmental justice; as
well as operational impacts on human
health and safety and wildlife from
normal operations and accidental
releases of pathogens. Environmental
impacts of current, proposed, and
reasonably foreseeable activities at
candidate sites were included in the
cumulative impacts analysis presented
in the NBAF EIS.
DHS has weighed environmental
impacts as one factor in its decision
making, analyzing existing
environmental impacts and the
potential impacts that might occur for
each reasonable alternative, including
the irreversible or irretrievable
commitments of resources. Under the
No Action Alternative, continued
operations of the PIADC would have
little or no incremental environmental
impacts, except that construction of
ongoing infrastructure upgrades could
have negligible to minor and temporary
effects on such resources as land
resources, geology and soils, and water
resources during construction.
As demonstrated in the NBAF Final
EIS, short term impacts associated with
the construction of the NBAF and
normal facility operations under the
Proposed Action are not expected to
result in any unacceptable
environmental consequences at any of
the site alternatives, though each site
does have its own unique adverse
environmental aspects. Potential
construction impacts have been
minimized through the site selection
process and proposed placement of the
proposed NBAF within the boundaries
of each site alternative, based on the
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conceptual design. There would be little
or no direct effects to wetlands, water
resources, natural biotic communities,
protected species, or cultural and
archaeological resources at any site
alternative. Normal facility operations
were determined to have no potential
for adverse impacts on biological
resources and human health and safety.
The NBAF would provide state-of-theart operating procedures and
biocontainment design features to
minimize the potential for laboratoryacquired infections and accidental
releases of pathogens. Nonetheless,
some minor impacts would occur from
construction and operations and are
unavoidable under the Proposed Action.
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Land Use and Visual Resources
Under each of the site alternatives,
conversion of approximately 30 acres of
open land to the NBAF would occur.
Land use would be consistent with the
local zoning classifications under all
site alternatives, except that an
amendment to the Clarke County,
Georgia comprehensive plan might be
required to allow the NBAF to be
constructed at the South Milledge
Avenue site. Placement of the NBAF on
undeveloped land would alter the
viewshed of each of the sites, although
this effect may be most pronounced at
the South Milledge Avenue Site and
least pronounced at the Manhattan
Campus Site due to the adjoining and
nearby land uses, respectively.
Similarly, during normal operations,
outdoor nighttime lighting would have
impacts at all sites, with the detrimental
effects varying based on adjoining land
uses. Use of shielded fixtures and the
minimum intensity of lighting that are
necessary to provide adequate security
could mitigate the effects.
Infrastructure
Construction of some infrastructure
improvements, including utilities and
roadways would be required at all sites,
and their environmental impacts were
evaluated in the NBAF EIS. The need
for infrastructure improvements would
be greatest for the Umstead Research
Park Site, the South Milledge Avenue
Site, the Plum Island Site, and the Flora
Industrial Park Site with the least for the
Manhattan Campus Site. Utility
requirements would be similar for all
site alternatives. Water use would vary
to some degree for each site, but NBAF
operation would result in use of
approximately 36 million (Plum Island
Site) to 52 million (Texas Research Park
Site) gallons per year. Electric power
demands would be very similar for all
sites ranging from 12.8 to 13.1
megawatts, with connection to existing
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or new substations required at all site
alternatives. A new substation would be
required at the South Milledge Avenue
Site and construction of new
underwater power cables would be
required to provide redundant power to
the Plum Island Site. Operation at all
sites except the Plum Island Site would
use natural gas as the primary fuel for
operating the NBAF. New connecting
lines would be needed at the South
Milledge Avenue Site, the Flora
Industrial Park Site, and the Umstead
Research Farm Site. For sanitary sewer,
the NBAF operation would generate
between 25 million and 30 million
gallons of wastewater per year. Capacity
would be available from all existing or
planned wastewater treatment facilities
serving the alternative sites. Wastewater
discharged by the NBAF would meet all
local wastewater permit requirements
and would be pretreated as necessary.
New sewer lines would be needed at the
Flora Industrial Park Site, the Umstead
Research Farm Site, and the Texas
Research Park Site.
Air Quality and Severe Weather
Air quality effects would occur with
construction and operation of the NBAF
for all sites with similar regulatory air
permitting requirements. Operation of
the NBAF would result in air emissions
from boilers, emergency generators, and
traffic from employees and deliveries.
Additional air emissions would occur
from carcass and pathologic waste
treatment that may include incineration,
alkaline hydrolysis, or rendering.
Conservative estimates of air emissions
indicate that operation of the NBAF
could affect regional air-quality
standards for PM2.5 (particulate matter
with diameter less than or equal to 2.5
microns). The Plum Island Site is in
non-attainment areas for ozone and
PM2.5 therefore, air emissions from the
NBAF would need to comply with the
State Implementation Plan (SIP) to
improve air quality and the requirement
that a conformity analysis be performed.
Following final design, the potential
and actual NBAF air emissions will be
evaluated to demonstrate compliance
with National Ambient Air Quality
Standards and applicable air-quality
permitting requirements.
The NBAF would be designed to
withstand normal meteorological
conditions and the effects of severe
weather events including tornadoes.
Specifically, NBAF would be designed
and constructed to meet or exceed the
wind load standards of the International
Building Code, American Society of
Civil Engineers Standard No. 7,
Minimum Design Loads for Buildings
and Other Structures, and the codes of
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the local jurisdiction, which take into
account the functional use of the facility
as a laboratory.
Noise
Construction of NBAF would result in
some temporary increase in noise levels
near the sites from construction
equipment and activities. As a
consequence of the NBAF operations,
minor increases in noise levels from
employee traffic and heating and
cooling facilities would occur and
operation of emergency generators
would result in sporadic noise increases
during testing. Impacts on adjoining
properties would vary based on the
associated land uses and presence of
sensitive receptors. Potential impacts
could be mitigated by conducting
generator testing during normal
business hours. If blasting is required
during construction, a blasting plan
would be developed to mitigate
potential noise levels.
Geology and Soils
Effects to geology and soils would be
similar for all sites. The NBAF would be
designed to withstand and minimize the
effects of earthquakes including the
seismic design provisions of the
International Building Code, American
Society of Civil Engineers Standard No.
7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings
and Other Structures, and the codes of
the local jurisdiction, which take into
account the functional use of the facility
as a laboratory. Temporary effects to
soils would occur due to excavation and
site clearing, but erosion control
measures would minimize any adverse
effects from construction and operation.
Prime and unique farmland soils would
potentially be affected at all sites. A
detailed geotechnical study would be
performed to guide the final facility
design in order to mitigate the effects of
any geologic hazards on the NBAF to
include identification of fractures,
geologic fault traces, voids or other
solution features, unstable soils, or other
subsurface conditions which could
impact facility construction and
operations.
Water Resources
Potential effects to water resources
could occur with construction activities
and would be similar for all sites.
However, the South Milledge Avenue
Site, the Flora Industrial Park Site, and
the Umstead Research Farm Site are
closer to surface waters so the potential
for effects are greater at these sites.
Runoff from the construction site has
the potential to enter surface or
groundwater sources, but stormwater
management during construction would
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minimize the potential for this to occur.
Similar effects could occur with
operation of the NBAF. Strict
compliance with stormwater pollution
prevention plans and spill management
protocols would minimize the potential
and mitigate the potential effects of a
spill. Wastewater would be collected
and conveyed to existing wastewater
treatment facilities and pretreated as
required to meet all local wastewater
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Biological Resources
Effects to vegetation, wetlands,
wildlife, aquatic life, and threatened or
endangered species would be similar for
all site alternatives with a few
exceptions. Site clearing would remove
approximately 30 acres of vegetation,
although all of the sites have been
previously disturbed to some degree.
Wetlands would be affected at the South
Milledge Avenue Site from road and
utility crossings (less than 0.5 acres),
and approximately 0.2 acres of forested
uplands would be lost. Threatened or
endangered species, aquatic resources,
and wildlife would not be directly
affected by construction or normal
operations at any site. Noise and light
from the NBAF could affect wildlife,
particularly migratory birds, with this
potential determined to be greatest for
the South Milledge Avenue Site and
Umstead Research Farm Site. Mitigation
of potential noise and light impacts
were previously described.
During operation, an accidental
release of pathogens from the NBAF
would adversely affect susceptible
wildlife populations and would be
similar for all sites. To minimize
potential impacts in the unlikely event
of a release, DHS would have sitespecific standard operating procedures
and response plans in place prior to the
initiation of research activities at the
proposed NBAF.
Socioeconomics
Construction activities at all sites
would result in between 1,300 and
1,614 temporary jobs generating
between $138.2 million and $183.9
million in labor income and between
$12.5 million and $24.7 million in state
and local taxes. Population, housing,
and quality of life would not be affected
by construction. Operation of the NBAF
would result in 250 to 350 direct jobs
and an estimated income of between
$26.8 million and $30.4 million
annually. Population growth due to the
NBAF would be a small portion of the
estimated growth in the regions
surrounding all sites. The effect of the
NBAF on the housing market and
quality of life (i.e., schools, law
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enforcement, fire protection, medical
facilities, recreation, and health and
safety) would be negligible. Law
enforcement and fire protection
personnel could be trained by DHS to
respond to incidents at the NBAF.
The risk of an accidental release of a
pathogen is extremely low, but the
economic effect could be substantial for
all sites. The primary economic effect of
an accidental release of FMD virus
would be the banning of exports of U.S.
livestock products regardless of the
location of the accidental release, which
could reach as high as $4.2 billion until
the U.S. was declared foot and mouth
disease (FMD) free. Response measures
to minimize risks and quickly contain
any accidental release would greatly
reduce the potential economic loss.
Traffic and Transportation
Local traffic at all sites would be
temporarily affected by general
construction traffic. Operation of the
NBAF would result in only minor
increases in daily traffic on roads near
all the sites except for roads near the
Umstead Research Farm Site (Range
Road and Old Route 75), which are not
heavily used by local traffic and would
experience a 140% increase in average
daily traffic. Transportation of research
materials would not significantly
increase the risk of a traffic-related
incident.
Existing Hazardous, Toxic, and
Radiological Waste
Recent investigations at the Umstead
Research Farm Site indicate that the
potential for unexploded materials from
past military training is low. The Plum
Island Site was previously used to
dispose of military materials but has
been remediated (cleaned up) and
should not be a safety concern for
workers. Training for construction
workers for either of these sites may be
required prior to initiation of
construction activities to ensure worker
safety. None of the other sites would
require remediation or additional
considerations for the protection of
workers, the public, or the environment.
Waste Management
Waste generation and management
would be similar for all sites, although
the amount of wastewater would vary
somewhat for each site based on total
water use. Wastewater discharged by the
NBAF would be pretreated as required
to meet all local wastewater permit and
acceptance requirements, as previously
described. Construction would generate
construction debris, sanitary solid
waste, and wastewater. Operation of the
NBAF would result in generation of
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wastewater, waste solids, and medical,
hazardous, and industrial solid wastes.
Health and Safety
The effects of the NBAF on health and
safety due to construction and normal
operations would be similar for all sites.
Standard safety protocols would
minimize the likelihood of accidents
and personal injury at the NBAF, and
normal operations pose no threat to the
surrounding communities. An
evaluation was conducted to determine
the potential for an accidental or
intentional (criminal or terrorist) release
of a pathogen from the NBAF and the
potential for the pathogen to spread
from each site alternative. The
evaluation considered the accident
scenarios with and without measures to
prevent and contain a release. The
hazard analysis concluded that the
likelihood of a release of a pathogen was
extremely low, given appropriate
attention to the design, construction and
operation of the NBAF with the array of
safety controls, including a robust
facility that is capable of withstanding
the various analyzed accident
conditions. For all sites the risk of
accidental release was independent of
where the facility was located. The site
specific consequences were shown to be
essentially the same between the sites
located on the mainland and were
slightly lower for the Plum Island Site,
due in part to there being less
opportunity for the pathogen to become
established and spread.
Environmental Justice
No disproportionately high adverse
effects to minority or low-income
populations were evident at any of the
site alternatives. Visual effects and
traffic increases due to construction
would be minimized with proper site
management protocols. Potential traffic
effects would be minimized by limiting
road closures and rerouting traffic.
Economic benefits would potentially
occur to low income or minority
populations within the area due to a rise
in construction-related jobs.
VI. The Environmentally Preferred
Alternative
The environmentally preferred
alternative is the alternative that causes
the least impact to the environment; it
is also the alternative that best protects,
preserves, and enhances historic,
cultural, and natural resources as noted
by the CEQ, in its ‘‘Forty Most Asked
Questions Concerning CEQ’s NEPA
Regulations’’ (46 FR 18026, dated March
23, 1981), with regard to 40 CFR 1505.2.
Under the No Action Alternative,
continued operation of the PIADC
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would have little or no incremental
environmental impacts, except for
minor and temporary effects from
construction of ongoing infrastructure
upgrades. Therefore, DHS has identified
the No Action Alternative as the
environmentally preferred alternative,
because it would have the least
environmental impact in the short term.
However, the No Action Alternative
does not satisfy the purpose of and need
for the Proposed Action and associated
mission drivers.
The NBAF EIS indicated that there
would be very little difference in
environmental impacts among the site
alternatives. There would be impacts
from construction of the NBAF over the
short term and from subsequent normal
facility operations at all sites. The major
discriminator identified would be
associated with a release of a pathogen
where the potential impact would be
slightly less at the Plum Island Site.
This is due to both the water barrier
around the island and the absence of
nearby livestock and susceptible
wildlife species. Regardless, the
probability of a release is very low at all
sites.
Over the longer term, construction
and subsequent operations of the NBAF
at any of the site alternatives would
have potential beneficial effects to
wildlife, because the work performed at
the NBAF could result in development
of vaccines or new diagnostic tools to
protect or contain outbreaks of foreign
animal diseases.
VII. Comments on the NBAF Final EIS
Approximately 3,000 copies of the
NBAF Final EIS and/or NBAF Final EIS
Executive Summary were distributed in
hard copy or on compact disk to
members of Congress and other elected
officials; Federal, state, and local
government agencies; Native American
representatives; public interest groups;
public reading rooms; and to
individuals. In addition, both the NBAF
Final EIS and the Executive Summary
are available online at https://
www.dhs.gov/nbaf and on request.
Following the release of the NBAF
Final EIS, DHS received letters and
other correspondence from
approximately 60 commentors,
including government agencies, elected
officials, organizations, and individuals.
• An internal DHS comment was
received from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV
expressing concerns about the approach
in the NBAF EIS to evaluating flood
risks at the alternative sites. FEMA
suggested that DHS evaluate flood risks
at the Preferred Alternative site in
greater detail and directed DHS to the
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Peer Review Plan, Manhattan, Kansas
Levee—Section 216 Flood Risk
Management Project Feasibility Study
(dated January 2008).
DHS notes that the document
concerning the feasibility study of the
existing Manhattan, Kansas Levee flood
risk management project being
conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Kansas City District is
intended to update and verify data on
the level of flood risk management
provided by the project. DHS is aware
of the project, and the NBAF Final EIS
acknowledges the flood risk
considerations associated with the 1993
flood along the Big Blue and Kansas
Rivers. Further, DHS responded to a
number of comments on the NBAF Draft
EIS relating to concerns about the
failure of the Tuttle Creek Dam from
natural phenomena and other events.
The NBAF would be designed and built
to meet or exceed all applicable
building codes and to include design
provisions sufficient to withstand the
effects of site-specific natural
phenomena events, including flooding.
• The State of Mississippi cited
perceived errors in the NBAF Final EIS
and in DHS’s Preferred Alternative
Selection Memorandum (dated
December 2008) concerning evaluation
of the Flora Industrial Park Site with
regard to its proximity to research
capabilities, ample workforce, and level
of community acceptance as compared
with other alternative sites, including
the Preferred Alternative site. The State
provided DHS with information about
the collaborative university research
and veterinary programs that comprise
the Gulf States Bio and Agro-Defense
Consortium along with Battelle
Memorial Institute, the presence of four
BSL–3 laboratories in the Jackson
metropolitan area, development of the
state’s high-technology and
manufacturing employment business
sectors and associated workforce, among
other information. They also noted
statements made by the DHS Under
Secretary for Science and Technology
relative to the strength afforded to the
Gulf States Bio and Agro-Defense
Consortium’s NBAF proposal by the
participation of Battelle. The State asked
that the NBAF Final EIS be amended to
correct the cited inaccuracies relative to
the Flora Industrial Park Site.
DHS acknowledges the additional
information provided by the State of
Mississippi relative to research
capabilities and workforce availability
in Mississippi and, specifically, in the
greater Jackson area. DHS further
acknowledges exceptionally strong
community support for the Flora
Industrial Site, as well as unwavering
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support by all levels of the State’s
government throughout this process.
This information has been carefully
considered by DHS. In the DHS Final
Selection Memorandum for Site
Selection for the Second Round
Potential Sites for the National Bio and
Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) (dated
July 2007), the Flora, Mississippi site
was included as a site alternative,
because Battelle’s participation in the
consortium provided additional benefits
that had not been initially considered by
the evaluation committees. However, as
part of the Preferred Alternative
selection process, the Steering
Committee again reassessed previous
ratings that included Battelle’s
capabilities and determined that ratings
of ‘‘Does Not Meet Overall Criteria’’
were appropriate for the Proximity to
Research and Workforce criteria. As
discussed in Part I of this ROD, DHS
emphasizes that the Proximity to
Research and Workforce ratings apply
exclusively to the specific research and
workforce needs of the proposed NBAF
facility, and are not a general statement
on the research capability and
workforce expertise in Mississippi or
other proposing States. DHS continues
to believe that the consortium offered a
highly innovative proposal that
included Battelle. Battelle was fully
committed to the consortium and
offered a partnership with experts that
would benefit the NBAF in Mississippi
until such time that a local workforce
with expertise in research and
biocontainment facilities relevant to the
NBAF mission could be developed.
However, given the immediacy of the
need and the highly competitive
package of existing assets offered by the
Preferred Alternative, the Manhattan
Campus Site in Kansas remained the
best alternative of all the strong
candidates.
• The Gulf States Bio and AgroDefense Consortium commented that
the text found in the NBAF Final EIS
did not match the findings presented in
Table ES–3 ‘‘Comparison of
Environmental Effects’’ of the NBAF
Final EIS.
Section 3.13.6.3 of the NBAF EIS
discusses the cumulative impacts in
Madison County due to several public
and private activities proposed or
ongoing that would have potential to
impact resources. DHS originally used
this analysis to apply the ‘‘moderate’’
rating in the ‘‘cumulative effects’’
category in Table ES–3 ‘‘Comparison of
Environmental Effects’’ of the NBAF
Final EIS. Upon further analysis of the
data, DHS acknowledges that this rating
is subject to interpretation and could be
changed to ‘‘minor.’’ DHS reaffirms that
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the NBAF EIS offered very little
differentiation among the sites. The
Flora Industrial Park Site was given the
highest overall EIS rating of ‘‘no to
minor environmental impacts’’ by the
Steering Committee. The changes do not
affect the outcome of the decision
process by the Steering Committee or
the Decision Authority.
• The Greater Jackson Chapter
Partnership, submitted comments on
behalf of the Gulf States Bio and AgroDefense Consortium, in which they
commented on the selection of the
Manhattan Campus Site as the Preferred
Alternative and expressed concerns
about the evaluation process for
selecting the Preferred Alternative.
Comments submitted were similar to
those submitted by the State of
Mississippi. They also cited the
differences in costs between the Flora
Industrial Park Site and the Manhattan
Campus Site as presented in the NBAF
Final EIS; they questioned how
numerical differences in costs could
receive the same qualitative rating by
DHS.
DHS shares concerns about costs in a
time of fiscal uncertainty for the Nation.
As discussed in the Preferred
Alternative Selection Memorandum,
DHS evaluated the total life-cycle costs
of the alternatives and carefully
weighed the cost differences among the
alternatives in selecting a Preferred
Alternative site. The Steering
Committee’s review indicated that the
offsets to infrastructure costs and ‘‘inkind’’ contributions offered by the
Heartland BioAgro Consortium,
including immediate and long-term use
of the existing Biosecurity Research
Institute at KSU, resulted in the
Manhattan Campus Site being rated
among the least expensive sites at which
to construct and operate the NBAF
when all factors were considered.
• U.S. Senator Thad Cochran of
Mississippi expressed his support for
the comments submitted by the Gulf
States Bio and Agro-Defense Consortium
regarding DHS’s selection of the
Preferred Alternative. Senator Cochran
also articulated concerns regarding
information in the DHS Preferred
Alternative Selection Memorandum,
dated December 2008, and in the NBAF
Final EIS analysis of the costs associated
with building at the site alternatives.
Specifically, Senator Cochran expressed
concerns about statements regarding the
estimated costs of building the NBAF at
the Manhattan, Kansas site and at the
Flora, Mississippi site. He noted that the
NBAF Final EIS cites a cost savings of
$65,011,459 if NBAF were built at the
Flora, Mississippi site rather than the
Manhattan, Kansas site. Senator
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Cochran also questioned how ‘‘in-kind’’
contributions were factored into the cost
analysis, noting his understanding that
the in-kind pledges offered by
Mississippi and Kansas were
approximately equal in value, especially
when total life-cycle costs of the
alternatives are considered.
As previously discussed, DHS did
consider the total life-cycle costs of the
alternatives in selecting a Preferred
Alternative. Both the Gulf States Bio
and Agro-Defense Consortium and
Heartland BioAgro Consortium offered
in-kind contribution packages that
completely offset estimated site
development costs and both received
the highest marks for this criterion.
Additionally, the Heartland BioAgro
Consortium’s offer of the immediate and
long-term use of the existing Biosecurity
Research Institute, a Biosafety Level 3
facility within close proximity to the
Manhattan Campus Site in which
research on pathogens threatening large
livestock is conducted, was a very
attractive in-kind contribution which
would further offset the cost of locating
the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus
Site. It is also important to note that the
life-cycle cost of constructing the NBAF
was only one aspect of the evaluation
criteria considered in the final decision.
As discussed in the Preferred
Alternative Selection Memorandum and
in this ROD, other evaluation criteria
were considered and provided
distinguishing factors.
• Congressman Bennie Thompson of
Mississippi expressed support for the
NBAF, while also expressing concern
regarding the site selection process. He
asked that DHS weigh more heavily the
possible effects of a pathogen release at
each site, rather than relying solely on
the tenet that the risk of release is
independent of site location. The
Congressman observed that there is
precedent for placing national
laboratories in rural areas and noted that
remote and rural locations provide an
additional layer of security and reduced
risk. Congressman Thompson also
expressed concerns about perceived
negative references by DHS to
Mississippi’s and the Jackson area’s
research capabilities and workforce and
urged DHS to amend the NBAF Final
EIS for accuracy.
DHS has evaluated the possible effects
of a pathogen release at each site in the
NBAF EIS and commissioned the Threat
and Risk Assessment separate from the
NBAF EIS. The NBAF Steering
Committee, as discussed in the
Preferred Alternative Selection
Memorandum, determined that the risk
of release of any pathogen proposed for
study at the NBAF could be mitigated
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by implementation of operational
protocols, rigid security measures, and
adherence to U.S. biosecurity
guidelines. From the perspective of
economic consequences should a
release of FMDV occur, it was
determined that the major impact would
be loss of meat export trade status
regardless of the site, and that the
government’s response to an FMD
outbreak is the most critical factor
regardless where it occurs.
Consequently, DHS determined that it
was most important to select a location
for the proposed NBAF that would
optimize the capability to diagnose and
cure large animal diseases. Regarding
the comments on perceived negative
ratings, DHS again notes that site
evaluations apply exclusively to the
specific research and workforce needs of
the proposed NBAF facility, and are not
a general statement on the research
capability and workforce availability in
Mississippi. DHS acknowledges that the
consortium offered a highly innovative
package in its partnership with Battelle
and the strengths of many of the
surrounding schools in Mississippi.
However, the selected site was able to
best meet the immediate need of the
research and workforce requirements of
the NBAF mission.
• The office of Congressman Tim
Bishop of New York suggested
consideration of an alternative to keep
PIADC in its current BSL–3Ag state
while placing the proposed NBAF BSL–
4 elsewhere.
This option was considered by DHS,
but it was not analyzed as a separate
alternative, because the environmental
impacts were already considered within
the range of reasonable alternatives
analyzed in the NBAF EIS. When
analyzing this option against DHS’s
purpose and need for action, DHS
concluded that it would not provide
enhanced capabilities to detect and
prevent threats to animal agriculture.
Additionally, the practical
consequences of splitting the NBAF
laboratory functions would produce a
fractured workforce, result in decreased
efficiencies and increased costs and was
found to not meet the purpose and need
as stated in the NBAF EIS. Therefore,
DHS considered but did not select the
option of building a BSL–4 only
laboratory and leaving PIADC in its
current state.
• The Texas Bio and Agro-Defense
Consortium (TBAC) submitted
comments expressing several areas of
concern regarding the analysis in the
NBAF Final EIS and the selection of the
Manhattan Campus Site as the Preferred
Alterative for the siting, construction,
and operation of the NBAF. TBAC’s
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comments were endorsed in a letter
submitted by the State of Texas. Their
concerns focused on the following
issues: (1) The site evaluation criteria;
(2) the cost analysis in the EIS; (3) risks
posed by certain environmental
impacts; and (4) the site selection
process.
TBAC commented that DHS erred in
its evaluation of Texas research
capabilities, construction costs,
workforce, and community acceptance
criteria. They asserted that DHS erred in
its evaluation of construction costs at
the various sites, and that additional
financing requirements were
unreasonably added in an untimely
manner. They expressed concern
regarding the perceived failure of the
EIS to adequately consider risks and
environmental impacts, specifically the
risk of a release of hazardous substances
due to naturally-occurring events such
as tornadoes. TBAC commented on
several aspects of the DHS site selection
procedures such as initial and
subsequent ratings and requests from
DHS for supplemental information.
DHS does not agree with TBAC’s
assertion that the NBAF Final EIS is
flawed because the EIS failed to
consider the evaluation criteria. DHS
did consider the evaluation criteria to
establish the range of reasonable
alternatives analyzed in the EIS. Any
further use of the evaluation criteria in
the EIS is not necessary and is not
required by CEQ’s regulations for
implementing NEPA (40 Code of
Federal Regulation Parts 1500 et seq.).
CEQ regulations state that an EIS
‘‘* * * shall provide full and fair
discussion of significant environmental
impacts and shall inform decision
makers and the public of the reasonable
alternatives * * * An environmental
impact statement is more than a
disclosure document. It shall be used by
Federal officials in conjunction with
other relevant material to plan actions
and make decisions (40 CFR 1502.1).’’
DHS believes that the NBAF Final EIS
has been prepared in full compliance
with NEPA and CEQ regulations.
DHS’s four evaluation criteria,
associated sub-criteria, and preferences
were used, in part, to assist DHS in the
selection of reasonable alternatives for
analysis in the NBAF EIS and in
selection of a Preferred Alternative.
TBAC asserted that DHS unfairly added
additional financing requirements to the
process. As discussed under Part I of
this ROD (Site Selection Process and
Evaluation Criteria), DHS
communicated its initial criteria, subcriteria, and preferences throughout the
process. One of the initial sub-criteria
and then a DHS preference,
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communicated to the consortia in DHS’s
December 8, 2006 letter, was for ‘‘inkind’’ contributions to assist DHS in the
completion of this project. As discussed
previously, DHS sent the consortia a
letter dated February 29, 2008
requesting verification of their final
offers by the due date of March 31,
2008. TBAC submitted the verification
of its final offer by March 31, 2008. The
State of Texas then sent a letter on
September 26, 2008 to DHS stating they
would use their ‘‘best efforts to secure
appropriation of not less than the
additional $56.3 million from the state
funding sources best suited to meet the
NBAF’s project timeline.’’ DHS
responded to this letter stating ‘‘in order
to maintain the fairness and integrity of
DHS’s NBAF Decision Process, the
additional $56.3 million cannot be
considered by the Steering Committee
because it is not a clarification of the
previous offer.’’ While DHS maintains
that this additional offer could not be
considered, it is notable that even if the
additional Texas financial offsets of the
September 26, 2008 letter had been
included, the Manhattan Campus Site
would still be the site offering best value
to the Government.
TBAC stated that the NBAF EIS failed
to assess risks and impacts of releases
resulting from natural phenomena,
specifically tornadoes, and asked that
DHS reevaluate the release threat from
tornado activity. The NBAF Final EIS
adequately evaluates the risks and
impacts from tornadoes and natural
phenomena at all the alternative sites.
DHS received numerous comments from
individuals and organizations regarding
the risks posed to NBAF by natural
phenomena hazards such as tornadoes,
earthquakes, hurricanes, etc at the
Manhattan Campus Site and the other
site alternatives. DHS has responded to
these comments in the NBAF Final EIS
Comment Response Document. As
previously stated in this ROD, the NBAF
would be designed to withstand normal
meteorological conditions as well as the
effects of severe weather events,
including tornadoes and would meet or
exceed the wind load standards of the
International Building Code, American
Society of Civil Engineers Standard No.
7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings
and Other Structures, and the codes of
the local jurisdiction, which take into
account the use of the facility as a
laboratory.
TBAC also questioned the conclusion
in the NBAF EIS that noise effects
would be similar for all sites and
asserted that the noise analysis and
conclusions dismissed the fact that the
Texas Research Park is located in an
unpopulated area. Section 3.5 of the
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NBAF EIS begins by describing the
methodology for evaluating potential
impacts and then describes the acoustic
environment for each site followed by
an assessment of potential impacts. For
the Texas Research Park Site, it is noted
that it is ‘‘* * *currently located in a
rural, undeveloped area west of San
Antonio but has been designated as a
future industrial and research park site.
There are no known sensitive noise
receptors at the site’’ (see Section 3.5.8.1
of the NBAF Final EIS). The EIS clearly
acknowledges the current acoustic
environment of Texas Research Park
Site. As further described in the
methodology section of the NBAF Final
EIS, the noise analysis evaluated noisegenerating sources at each site to assess
potential audible effects from facility
construction and operation. The overall
conclusion was that noise was not an
environmental impact discriminator
and, therefore, all sites received the
same qualitative rating of ‘‘minor’’ as
presented in the Executive Summary to
the NBAF Final EIS.
Finally, TBAC commented that the
text found in the NBAF Final EIS did
not match the findings presented in
Table ES–3 ‘‘Comparison of
Environmental Effects’’ of the NBAF
Final EIS. Table ES–3 is based on the
affected environment and consequence
analysis presented in Chapter 3 of the
NBAF Final EIS and could be perceived
as open to interpretation. Specifically, a
commentor to the NBAF Draft EIS
identified a conflict between the text in
Section 3.11.8.3.1 that indicated minor
effects to traffic at the Texas Research
Park Site, while Table ES–3 in the
Executive Summary indicated a
moderate effect. The comment response
document stated that the ‘‘Moderate’’
would be changed to the correct listing
of ‘‘Minor’’ as is detailed in Section
3.11.8.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS did not
make this modification in the table as
the response indicated. DHS
acknowledges that both the ‘‘traffic and
transportation’’ and ‘‘cumulative
effects’’ category for the Texas Research
Park Site could be changed to ‘‘Minor’’
and is subject to interpretation. DHS
again notes that the NBAF EIS offered
very little differentiation among the
sites. The Texas Research Park Site was
given the highest overall EIS rating of
‘‘no to minor environmental impacts’’
by the Steering Committee. The changes
do not affect the outcome of the
decision process by the Steering
Committee or the Decision Authority.
• A majority of the comments
received on the NBAF Final EIS
expressed opposition to the selection of
the Preferred Alternative and expressed
concerns such as the following:
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• A pathogenic release due to
accidents, natural phenomena such as
tornadoes, and terrorist actions;
• Risks from FMD virus research on
the U.S. mainland or in any areas with
livestock populations;
• Economic and human health effects
of a pathogen release on local and
national livestock industry, ranchers,
and farmers;
• The NBAF site and surrounding
community becoming terrorist targets;
• The absence in the NBAF EIS of
adequate analysis of physical isolation
and water barrier afforded at the Plum
Island Site.
These concerns were addressed by
DHS in the responses to comments on
the NBAF Draft EIS and in the NBAF
Final EIS. Many of the same
commentors who expressed opposition
to the Preferred Alternative also
suggested that instead of construction of
the NBAF, DHS should upgrade the
existing PIADC on Plum Island, New
York.
Commentors are referred to the NBAF
Final EIS and associated Comment
Response Document (Appendix H of the
NBAF Final EIS) for information on
these issues and DHS’s responses to
individual comments.
• Mrs. Susan Hodges reported that
her letter dated August 25, 2008 and
submitted to oppose the selection of the
South Milledge Avenue Site was not
included in the NBAF Final EIS
Comment Response Document, although
her name was listed. DHS regrets this
error. Mrs. Hodges’ letter was one of a
small number of comment documents
that were postmarked before the end of
the comment period (August 25, 2008),
but were not delivered to the NBAF
Program Office in time for publication
in the Comment Response Document.
However, DHS did consider these
comments and posted the comments
and responses on the NBAF Web site as
part of Comment Response Document.
DHS considered all comments
received on the NBAF Final EIS during
the preparation of the ROD. However, in
reviewing and balancing the comments
received against the decision factors
considered in this ROD, DHS
determined that no substantially new,
relevant information was identified.
Therefore, DHS has not changed its
view regarding the Preferred Alternative
as presented in the NBAF Final EIS and
in this ROD.
VIII. Decision Factors
Analysis of the Alternative Sites
As previously described, a DHS
Steering Committee reviewed new and
emerging data relevant to the original
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site evaluation criteria (i.e., Proximity to
Research Capabilities, Proximity to
Workforce, Acquisition/Construction/
Operations (ACO) Requirements, and
Community Acceptance) for selection of
the Preferred Alternative. These same
criteria had been utilized by DHS to
identify the five site alternatives that
were analyzed in the NBAF EIS in
addition to the Plum Island Site. DHS
emphasizes that the Proximity to
Research Capabilities and Workforce
criteria apply exclusively to the specific
research and workforce needs of the
proposed NBAF and are not a general
statement on the research capability and
workforce expertise of the proposing
states and consortia. Using the new and
emerging data contained in supporting
documents, the Steering Committee
reevaluated the strengths and
weaknesses of each site relative to the
initial site ratings as documented in the
Final Selection Memorandum for Site
Selection for the Second Round Sites for
the NBAF, dated July 2007, and the
Plum Island Memorandum for the
Record, dated November 2008, with the
objective of updating the site ratings
relative to the four evaluation criteria.
The Steering Committee also considered
the results of the NBAF Final EIS,
including the public comments made at
the public meetings and by other means
during the 60-day public comment
period on the NBAF Draft EIS.
Overall EIS and Threat and Risk
Assessment Results
As discussed in more detail in Part III
(Preferred Alternative) of this ROD, DHS
determined that the NBAF EIS and the
Threat and Risk Assessment presented
very little differentiation among the
sites. In fact, the NBAF EIS determined
that the risk of release of a biological
pathogen from the NBAF was
independent of where the NBAF was
located. DHS also determined that,
based on its review of the NBAF EIS, the
likelihood of a release of a pathogen was
very low, given appropriate attention to
the design, construction, and operation
of the NBAF with an array of safety
controls. Finally, DHS determined that
the risk of release of any identified
pathogen proposed for study within the
NBAF could be mitigated by
implementation of operational
protocols, rigid security measures, and
adherence to the U.S. Government
biosecurity guidelines.
With respect to the economic
consequence if a release were to
happen, the Steering Committee found
that the major impact of a release was
due to the loss of meat export trade
status and that this is independent of
the site of the NBAF. As excerpted more
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3077
fully in Part III (Preferred Alternative) of
this ROD, the letter DHS received from
Dr. Bernard Vallat, Director General of
The World Organization for Animal
Health (OIE), in which Dr. Vallat stated
that the trade status impact of an
outbreak of foot and mouth disease
(FMD) virus in a country is ‘‘more
related to how the country’s authorities
respond to the incursion, rather than
where the outbreak occurs’’ was
particularly informative.
DHS determined that, based on the
lack of differentiation among the sites
regarding the risk of a release and the
economic consequences of a release,
that it was most important to select a
location that would optimize the
capability to diagnose and cure large
animal diseases through strong research
programs and expedient diagnostic and
response capabilities. Furthermore, DHS
found that the environmental impacts
analyzed in the EIS and the site specific
threats were all very similar and that
there were only minor differentiators in
the EIS and the Threat and Risk
Assessment. Therefore, the key
differentiators among the sites were
DHS’s original initial four evaluation
criteria. Because the NBAF is intended
to be the Nation’s preeminent research
facility for foreign animal and zoonotic
disease research, the site’s proximity to
research capabilities that can be linked
to NBAF mission requirements was
emphasized among the four evaluation
criteria.
South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens,
Georgia
While the South Milledge Avenue
Site demonstrated numerous strengths
against the evaluation criteria, DHS
found that it did not best meet the
purpose and need to site, construct, and
operate the NBAF based on the
Research, Workforce, ACO, and
Community Acceptance criteria. This
site offers proximity to world class
capabilities across disciplines related to
the NBAF and collectively there is
significant expertise in research on
infectious diseases and pathogenesis of
animals and humans, as well as
zoonoses. However, there is no clear
evidence of integration with the
biomedical research community and the
research focus tends to be on poultry
which is not related to the NBAF large
livestock animal disease mission. It is
attractive that the area is rich in high
containment laboratory building
expertise. Additionally, the Emory
BSL3/4 laboratories and Athens
Community College offered training
programs for NBAF workers. The EIS
demonstrated that for the South
Milledge Avenue Site, almost all
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environmental impacts fell in the ‘‘no
impacts to minor impacts’’ category.
However, the NBAF EIS stated the site
may require an amendment to the
Athens-Clarke County Comprehensive
Plan based on the current planned use
for the area where it is located. The
rating for the ACO criterion was further
weakened because the offset package
offered by the consortium offset only a
small percentage of the project cost. The
site continued to experience strong
Federal level, state, and local political
support. However, a well organized,
vocal opposition group expressed
numerous concerns on siting the NBAF
in Athens, Georgia. Additionally,
numerous negative comments about the
project were received at public
meetings. The information presented in
the Threat and Risk Assessment was
found to be comparable to the other site
alternatives. Based on the lack of
proximity to NBAF related research and
workforce in comparison to the
Preferred Alternative, the active
community opposition, and the lack of
a competitive offset package, DHS did
not select the South Milledge Avenue
Site as the Preferred Alternative for
implementation.
Manhattan Campus Site, Manhattan,
Kansas (Preferred Alternative)
Based on the numerous strengths that
were evident when evaluating the
Manhattan Campus Site against the
evaluation criteria, DHS found that this
location best met the purpose and need
to site, construct and operate the NBAF.
Specifically, the site location near KSU
provides site proximity to existing
research capabilities that can be linked
to NBAF mission requirements.
Additionally, the site’s proximity to the
KSU College of Veterinary Medicine,
KSU College of Agriculture, and the
Biosecurity Research Institute is
relevant to the NBAF mission and a
significant strength. The EIS
demonstrated that construction and
operation of the NBAF at the Manhattan
Campus Site would be environmentally
acceptable as almost all environmental
impacts fell into the ‘‘no impacts to
minor impacts’’ category. As stated in
the EIS and agreed to by the Steering
Committee, the risk of release of a
pathogen was independent of where the
NBAF was located. The information
presented in the Threat and Risk
Assessment was found to be comparable
to the other site alternatives. The
Manhattan Campus Site alternative
demonstrated very strong community
acceptance from local, state, and Federal
officials and stakeholders. Additionally,
the consortium offered a substantial,
unconditional offset package, including
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use of the existing Biosecurity Research
Institute. Taking into consideration the
offsets to infrastructure costs and ‘‘inkind’’ contributions offered by the
consortia, the Manhattan Campus Site is
among the least expensive locations to
construct and operate the NBAF.
Following a comparison of this site to
the No Action alternative, DHS selected
this site alternative as the Preferred
Alternative for implementation.
Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora,
Mississippi
While the Flora Industrial Park Site
demonstrated numerous strengths
against the evaluation criteria, DHS
found that it did not best meet the
purpose and need to site, construct, and
operate the NBAF based on the Research
and Workforce criteria. DHS concluded
that the Mississippi consortium’s
inclusion of Battelle would not offset
the Flora Industrial Park Site’s lack of
proximity to a critical mass of NBAF
related research institutions, such as the
lack of a veterinary school and other
research entities that could be linked to
NBAF mission requirements. While
Battelle has strong in-house training
programs for laboratories and animal
research and would assist in bringing
these training programs and expertise to
NBAF, this strength does not overcome
the lack of an established nearby
university or research institution with
related mission areas nor the lack of
nearby BSL–3 laboratory with related
mission areas. The Flora, Mississippi
site was included as a site alternative,
because Battelle’s participation in the
consortium provided additional and
unique benefits. However, as part of the
Preferred Alternative selection process,
the Steering Committee again reassessed
previous ratings that included Battelle’s
capabilities and determined that this
model did not overcome the previously
noted concerns. DHS notes that these
ratings apply exclusively to the specific
research and workforce needs of the
proposed NBAF, and are not a general
statement on the research capability and
workforce expertise in Mississippi.
Battelle was fully committed to the
consortium and offered a partnership
with experts that would benefit the
NBAF in Mississippi until such time
that a local workforce with expertise in
research and biocontainment facilities
relevant to the NBAF mission could be
developed. However, given the
immediacy of the need, DHS concluded
that the lack of existing research and
workforce assets within proximity to the
site and relevant to the NBAF mission
was a weakness. Additionally, the Flora
Industrial Park Site demonstrated
exceptionally strong community
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acceptance from local, state, and Federal
officials and stakeholders. Further, the
consortium offered an offset package
that covered a significant portion of the
project cost and made this site one of
the least expensive upon which to
build. The EIS demonstrated that for the
Flora Industrial Park Site, almost all
environmental impacts fell in the ‘‘no
impacts to minor impacts’’ category.
The information presented in the Threat
and Risk Assessment was found to be
comparable to the other site alternatives.
However, based on the lack of proximity
to NBAF related research and workforce
in comparison to the Preferred
Alternative, DHS did not select the
Flora Industrial Park Site as the
Preferred Alternative for
implementation.
Plum Island Site; Plum Island, New
York
While the Plum Island Site
demonstrated numerous strengths
against the evaluation criteria, DHS
found that it did not best meet the
purpose and need to site, construct, and
operate the NBAF based on the
Research, Workforce, ACO, and
Community Acceptance criteria. DHS
concluded that even though the existing
PIADC has demonstrated the ability to
effectively carry out its Foreign Animal
Disease (FAD) research mission, the
research is focused primarily on FMDV
(compared to the broader NBAF
research mission requirements) and
there is a lack of proximity to medical
and veterinary schools as well as BSL–
3/4 laboratories with related mission
areas. While the current PIADC staff has
experience with large animal research,
there would still need to be a significant
amount of training for working in BSL–
4 spaces. Additionally, even though
there would be a lower cost and risk to
relocate research programs from the
PIADC facility to the NBAF, if the NBAF
were to be constructed on Plum Island,
these cost savings would be
overshadowed by the much higher
construction cost at the Plum Island
Site. There is strong political opposition
at Federal, state, and local levels to
having BSL–4 research on Plum Island.
The EIS demonstrated that for the Plum
Island Site almost all environmental
impacts fell in the ‘‘no impacts to minor
impacts’’ category. The information
presented in the Threat and Risk
Assessment was found to be comparable
to the other site alternatives.
Additionally, in November 2008, the
World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE) stated that, a FMD virus outbreak
on an island would be considered no
different from an FMDV outbreak on the
mainland with respect to the impact
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such an outbreak would have on the
Nation’s meat-export trade status and
that, therefore, it was most important to
optimize the facility to diagnose and
cure large animal diseases. Accordingly,
based on the lack of proximity to NBAF
related research and workforce in
comparison to the Preferred Alternative,
the local public and political opposition
to a BSL–4 laboratory on Plum Island,
and the significant cost to build and
operate on Plum Island, DHS did not
select the Plum Island Site as the
Preferred Alternative for
implementation.
Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner,
North Carolina
While the Umstead Research Farm
Site demonstrated numerous strengths
against the evaluation criteria, DHS
found that it did not best meet the
purpose and need to site, construct, and
operate the NBAF based on the ACO
and Community Acceptance criteria. A
significant strength is the critical mass
of intellectual and scientific capital
(comprised of universities, the private
sector, and pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies) all within
proximity to the site and that can be
linked to NBAF mission requirements.
Three area universities (Duke
University, University of North
Carolina, and North Carolina State
University) offer significant
opportunities to draw and train a skilled
workforce. Additionally, the
biomanufacturing firms and
biotechnology research and
development programs within the area,
coupled with 24 BSL–3’s, provide a
strong base for a skilled workforce.
However, the Umstead Research Farm
Site experienced strong local opposition
to the NBAF with limited Federal, state,
and stakeholder support. The wellorganized and vocal opposition group to
the NBAF grew to such a level that some
federal and state level representatives
withdrew their original support for the
project. Additionally, numerous
negative comments about the project
were received at public meetings. The
North Carolina rating was not
competitive for the ACO criterion
because the North Carolina consortium
offered minimal offsets to site costs. The
EIS demonstrated that for the Umstead
Research Farm Site almost all
environmental impacts fell in the ‘‘no
impacts to minor impacts’’ category.
The information presented in the Threat
and Risk Assessment was found to be
comparable to the other site alternatives.
However, based on the concern for the
active community opposition in
addition to the limited Federal, state,
and local political support and the lack
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of a competitive offset package, DHS did
not select the Umstead Research Farm
Site as the Preferred Alternative for
implementation.
Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio,
Texas
While the Texas Research Park Site
demonstrated numerous strengths
against the evaluation criteria, DHS
found that it did not best meet the
purpose and need to site, construct, and
operate the NBAF based on the Research
and ACO criteria. While a strength is the
site’s proximity to other research
entities, such as a BSL–4 laboratory and
several BSL–3 laboratories, which could
foster research collaboration, this
strength is tempered by the fact that no
Veterinary School or College of
Agriculture is nearby. Site proximity to
workforce is a strength, as there is a
strong military veterinary infrastructure
which possesses significant worldwide
experience with exotic animal diseases.
The Texas Research Park Site also
demonstrated very strong community
acceptance from local, state, and Federal
officials and stakeholders. However, the
rating for the ACO criterion was not as
strong or competitive as the Manhattan
Campus Site. While the Texas
consortium offered a very good offset
package, only a small percentage of this
package was unconditional and could
be used as a direct offset to the project
cost. The EIS demonstrated construction
and operation of the NBAF at the Texas
Research Park Site would be
environmentally acceptable as the
impacts fell in the ‘‘no impacts to minor
impacts’’ category. Finally, the
information presented in the Threat and
Risk Assessment was found to be
comparable to the other site alternatives.
Therefore, based on the site’s lack of
proximity to a Veterinary School or
College of Agriculture and the lack of a
competitive offset package, DHS did not
select the Texas Research Park Site as
the Preferred Alternative for
implementation.
IX. Decision
DHS has considered environmental
impacts, public comments on the NBAF
Draft EIS and the Final EIS, national
policy, evaluation criteria, threat and
risk assessments, costs, site
characterizations, security, and other
programmatic requirements in its
decision to site, construct, and operate
the NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas. It is
also noted that the NBAF Final EIS’s
risk assessment of FMDV impacts to the
mainland allowed for full public and
stakeholder participation. Upon
consultation with the Secretaries of
Homeland Security and Agriculture, the
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3079
Decision Authority (Under Secretary
Cohen) accepted the unanimous
recommendation of the Steering
Committee and selected Manhattan,
Kansas as the site for the NBAF. DHS
has therefore decided, in consultation
with USDA, to implement its Preferred
Alternative to construct and operate the
NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site in
Kansas. DHS determined that the
Manhattan Campus Site offers the best
benefit to the Government based upon
the evaluation criteria and DHS
preferences and, most importantly,
meets the intended purpose and need to
safely and successfully site, construct,
and operate the NBAF. DHS would also
initiate the transition of mission
activities and resources from the Plum
Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC),
located on Plum Island, New York to the
Manhattan Campus Site, including
research related to FMD. DHS
anticipates that construction of NBAF
would begin in fiscal year 2010 with
completion by the end of 2014.
X. Mitigation
As identified in Section 3.15 of the
NBAF Final EIS and as summarized,
where appropriate, in this ROD, DHS
would implement specific mitigation
measures in the design, construction,
and operation of the NBAF. These
include appropriate pollution control
and best management practices during
construction so as to minimize adverse
impacts to the environment and to
incorporate architectural design
features, biocontainment technologies,
operational procedures, training and
protocols, and waste management
technologies and procedures to
minimize environmental impacts during
routine operations. The NBAF would be
designed and constructed to emphasize
strategies for sustainable site
development, water savings, energy
efficiency, material selection, and
indoor environmental quality to include
measures consistent with the lowimpact design (LID) approach. To
minimize potential impacts in the
unlikely event of a release, DHS would
have site-specific standard operating
procedures and response plans in place
prior to the initiation of research
activities at the NBAF. Additionally,
DHS intends, where applicable, to
consider the recommendations of the
Government Accountability Office
(GAO) on perimeter security found in
the September 2008 Report to
Congressional Committees entitled
Biosafety Laboratories: Perimeter
Security Assessment of the Nation’s Five
BSL–4 Laboratories. Upon review of the
site specific Threat and Risk
Assessment, to be developed during the
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design phase, DHS will implement a
comprehensive risk-based physical and
personnel security program for the
NBAF.
All practicable and economically
feasible means to avoid or minimize
environmental harm from the selected
alternative have been adopted and
would, as applicable, be incorporated
into the design of the NBAF. The
mitigation measures described in
Section 3.15 of the NBAF EIS are
incorporated into this ROD and are
considered part of the selected
alternative.
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347 (National
Environmental Policy Act).
Dated: January 12, 2009.
Jay M. Cohen,
Under Secretary, Science & Technology, DHS.
[FR Doc. E9–914 Filed 1–15–09; 8:45 am]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Martha K. Landesberg, Executive
Director, Data Privacy and Integrity
Advisory Committee, Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC
20528, by telephone (703) 235–0780, by
fax (703) 235–0442, or by e-mail
PrivacyCommittee@dhs.gov.
BILLING CODE 4410–10–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
[Docket No. DHS–2009–0022]
DHS Data Privacy and Integrity
Advisory Committee
Privacy Office, DHS.
ACTION: Committee Management; Notice
of Open Teleconference Federal
Advisory Committee Meeting.
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES
SUMMARY: The DHS Data Privacy and
Integrity Advisory Committee will meet
by teleconference on February 3, 2009.
DATES: The teleconference call will take
place on Tuesday, February 3, 2009,
from 1 p.m. to 2 p.m. Eastern Standard
Time.
ADDRESSES: Members of the public are
welcome to listen to the meeting by
calling (800) 320–4330 and entering Pin
Number 215132. The number of
teleconference lines is limited, however,
and lines will be available on a firstcome, first-served basis. Requests to
have written material distributed to
each member of the Committee prior to
the meeting should reach Martha K.
Landesberg, Executive Director, at the
address below by January 29, 2009.
Comments must include the Docket
Number (DHS–2009–0022) and may be
submitted by one of the following
methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• E-mail: PrivacyCommittee@dhs.gov.
Include the docket number in the
subject line of the message.
• Fax: (703) 483–2999
19:02 Jan 15, 2009
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Notice of
this meeting is given under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App.
(Pub. L. 92–463). During the meeting,
the DHS Data Privacy and Integrity
Advisory Committee will deliberate and
vote on a proposed letter to the new
Secretary of Homeland Security and
DHS Chief Privacy Officer outlining the
Committee’s recommendations on
privacy issues and priorities for the
Department. The Committee will
discuss these matters from
approximately 1 p.m. to 2 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time on Tuesday, February 3,
2009. The Chairperson of the Committee
shall conduct the teleconference in a
way that will, in his judgment, facilitate
the orderly conduct of business. Please
note that the teleconference may end
early if all business is completed.
If you wish to submit written
materials to be distributed to each
member of the Committee in advance of
the meeting, please submit them,
preferably in electronic form to facilitate
distribution, to Martha K. Landesberg,
Executive Director, by January 29, 2009.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
AGENCY:
VerDate Nov<24>2008
• Mail: Martha K. Landesberg,
Executive Director, Data Privacy and
Integrity Advisory Committee,
Department of Homeland Security,
20528.
Instructions: All submissions received
must include the words ‘‘Department of
Homeland Security Data Privacy and
Integrity Advisory Committee’’ and the
Docket Number: DHS–2009–0022.
Comments received will also be posted
without alteration at https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received by the DHS Data
Privacy and Integrity Advisory
Committee, go to https://
www.regulations.gov.
Information on Services for Individuals
With Disabilities
For information on services for
individuals with disabilities or to
request special assistance, contact
Martha K. Landesberg, Executive
Director, as soon as possible.
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Dated: January 8, 2009.
John Kropf,
Deputy Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. E9–826 Filed 1–15–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–10–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
Privacy Act of 1974; System of
Records
Privacy Office, DHS.
Notice of removal of one Privacy
Act system of records notice.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
SUMMARY: In accordance with the
Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of
Homeland Security is giving notice that
it will remove one system of records
notice from its inventory of record
systems because Immigration and
Customs Enforcement no longer requires
the system. The obsolete system is:
Treasury/CS.186 Personnel Search
System.
DATES:
Effective Date: February 17,
2009.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer,
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528, by telephone
(703) 235–0780 or facsimile (703) 483–
2999.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant
to the provisions of the Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and as part of its
ongoing integration and management
efforts, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is removing one
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) system of records notice from its
inventory of record systems.
DHS inherited this record system
upon its creation in January of 2003.
Upon review of its inventory of record
systems, DHS has determined it no
longer needs or uses this system of
records and is retiring Treasury/CS.186
Personnel Search System (66 FR 52984
October 18, 2001).
Treasury/CS.186 Personnel Search
System (66 FR 52984 October 18, 2001)
was originally established to collect and
maintain records on individuals
indicating unlawful or suspicious
activity that might result in a Customs
violation.
Eliminating this system of records
notices will have no adverse impact on
individuals, but will promote the
overall streamlining and management of
DHS Privacy Act record systems.
E:\FR\FM\16JAN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 11 (Friday, January 16, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3065-3080]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-914]
=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Science and Technology Directorate; Record of Decision for the
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement
AGENCY: Science and Technology Directorate (Office of National
Laboratories within the Office of Research), DHS.
ACTION: Record of Decision (ROD).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and
Technology Directorate is issuing this ROD on the proposed siting,
construction, and operation of the National Bio and Agro-Defense
Facility (NBAF) (the Proposed Action). This ROD is based on the
information and analysis in the NBAF Final Environmental Impact
Statement (NBAF Final EIS) including public comments, and consideration
of other appropriate factors such as national policy, site evaluation
criteria, threat and risk assessment, costs, security, and other
programmatic requirements. The Notice of Availability for the NBAF
Final EIS was published in the Federal Register (73 FR 75665-75667) on
December 12, 2008.
DHS has decided to implement the Preferred Alternative identified
in Section 2.6 of the NBAF Final EIS. Implementation of this
alternative would result in construction of the NBAF at the Manhattan
Campus Site in Manhattan, Kansas, and initiation of the transition of
mission activities and resources from the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center (PIADC), located on Plum Island, New York, to the Manhattan
Campus Site.
DHS appreciates the significant cost, time, and effort that each
consortium expended during this comprehensive decision process, and DHS
thanks the consortia for their support of the homeland security
mission. The comprehensive and well thought out proposals from states
around the Nation and their consortia reflected the impressive
capabilities of their communities. Each consortium and host state
demonstrated a strong desire to make the Nation safer for animal
agriculture through advanced research on foreign animal and zoonotic
and emerging diseases.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: The NBAF Final EIS (approximately
5,000 pages), Executive Summary, and this ROD are available on the DHS
Web site at https://www.dhs.gov/nbaf. Requests for copies of the NBAF
Final EIS, the Executive Summary, or this ROD should be mailed to Mr.
James V. Johnson: Department of Homeland Security; Science and
Technology Directorate; Office of National Laboratories, Room 10-052,
Mail Stop 2100; 245 Murray Lane, SW., Building 410;
Washington, DC 20528. You may also request copies from: toll-free
facsimile 1-866-508-NBAF (6223); toll-free voice mail 1-866-501-NBAF
(6223); or e-mail at
[[Page 3066]]
nbafprogrammanager@dhs.gov. For more information or general questions
about the NBAF EIS, contact Mr. James V. Johnson at the address given
previously.
Copies of the NBAF Final EIS, Executive Summary, and this ROD are
also available for review at the following public reading rooms:
Georgia
University of Georgia Main Library, 320 South Jackson Street, Athens,
GA 30602.
Oconee County Library, 1080 Experiment Station Road, Watkinsville, GA
30677.
Kansas
Manhattan Public Library, 629 Poyntz Avenue, Manhattan, KS 66502.
Hale Library, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506.
Mississippi
City of Flora Library, 144 Clark Street, Flora, MS 39071.
New York
Acton Public Library, 60 Old Boston Post Road, Old Saybrook, CT 06475.
Southold Free Library, 53705 Main Road, Southold, NY 11971.
North Carolina
Richard H. Thornton Library, 210 Main Street, Oxford NC 27565-0339.
South Branch Library, 1547 South Campus Drive, Creedmoor, NC 27522.
Texas
Central Library, 600 Soledad, San Antonio, TX 78205.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
DHS prepared this ROD pursuant to the regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) for implementing the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and DHS Directive 023-01
(renumbered from management Directive 5100.1), Environmental Planning
Program. This ROD is based on: (1) The site's ability to satisfy the
evaluation criteria published in the ``Public Notice Soliciting
Expressions of Interest (EOIs) for Potential Sites for the NBAF''
(which was published in the Federal Register on January 19, 2006); (2)
the site's ability to satisfy the preferences (including request of
site in-kind contributions to offset infrastructure costs) communicated
to all second round potential NBAF sites (by letter dated December 8,
2006); (3) confirmation of the site offers for site infrastructure
costs (submitted to DHS by March 31, 2008); (4) the environmental
impacts identified in the NBAF Final EIS; and (5) information contained
in the supporting documents (Threat and Risk Assessment, Site Cost
Analysis, Site Characterization Study, and The Plum Island Facility
Closure and Transition Cost Study).
Purpose and Need for Agency Action
DHS is charged with the responsibility and has the national
stewardship mandate for detecting, preventing, protecting against, and
responding to terrorist attacks within the United States. These
responsibilities, as applied to the defense of animal agriculture, are
shared with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and require a
coordinated strategy to adequately protect the Nation against threats
to animal agriculture. Consultations between DHS and USDA on a
coordinated agricultural research strategy, as called for in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-296) and Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), ``Defense of United States
Agriculture and Food,'' dated January 30, 2004, revealed a capability
gap that must be filled by an integrated research, development, test,
and evaluation infrastructure for combating agricultural and public
health threats posed by foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. The DHS
Science and Technology Directorate is responsible for addressing the
identified gap.
Accordingly, to bridge the capability gap and to comply with HSPD-
9, DHS proposed to build the NBAF, an integrated research, development,
test, and evaluation facility.
Co-locating DHS with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service--Veterinary Services (APHIS-VS) and Agricultural Research
Service (ARS) at the NBAF would enable research, diagnostics, and
responses to outbreaks in agricultural animals (i.e. cattle, swine, and
sheep) at a U.S.-based facility. Co-locating these functions in a
single secure facility would maximize synergies and provide enhanced
capabilities for the detection and prevention of foreign animal
diseases in the United States.
The NBAF would meet the capabilities required in HSPD-9 by
providing a domestic, modern, integrated high-containment facility
containing BSL-2, BSL-3E, BSL-3Ag, and BSL-4 laboratories for an
estimated 250 to 350 scientists and support staff to safely and
effectively address the accidental or intentional introduction into the
United States of animal diseases of high consequence.
Currently, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), where
much of the Biosafety Level-3 Agricultural (BSL-3Ag) research on
foreign animal diseases is performed, is an essential component of the
national strategy for protecting U.S. agriculture from threats caused
by intentional attack (i.e., agro-terrorism) or unintentional
introduction of foreign animal disease viruses such as foot and mouth
disease virus (FMDV). However, PIADC was built in the 1950s, is nearing
the end of its lifecycle, and does not contain the necessary biosafety
level facilities to meet the NBAF research requirements. The NBAF would
fulfill the need for a secure U.S. facility that could support
collaborative efforts among researchers from Federal and state
agencies, academia, and international partners to perform necessary
research at the required biosafety levels 3 and 4. Additionally, as
discussed in the recent Report of the Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism (December
2008), the United States should continue to undertake a series of
mutually reinforcing domestic measures to prevent bioterrorism.
Prior to passage of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008
(H.R. 6124 [2008 Farm Bill]) which became law on May 22, 2008, the
United States Code (21 U.S.C. Section 113a) stipulated that live FMDV
could not be studied on the U.S. mainland unless the Secretary of
Agriculture made a determination that such study was necessary and in
the public interest and issued a permit for such research to be
conducted on the mainland. Section 7524 of the 2008 Farm Bill directs
the Secretary of Agriculture to issue a permit to the Secretary of
Homeland Security for work on the live FMDV at any facility that is a
successor to the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and charged with
researching high-consequence biological threats involving zoonotic and
foreign animal diseases. The permit is limited to a single successor
facility. On December 18, 2008, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
Michael Chertoff sent a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture, Ed
Schafer requesting that a permit be issued if a mainland site is
selected. On January 9, 2009 DHS received a letter from Secretary
Schafer that affirmed USDA's intention of complying with Congressional
direction to issue a permit for the movement and use of live FMDV at
the NBAF.
As stated in Section 2.2.2 of the NBAF EIS, the NBAF may be
operated as a
[[Page 3067]]
Government Owned/Government Operated Facility (GOGO) or as a Government
Owned/Contractor Operated Facility (GOCO). The final decision regarding
the operating model for the NBAF will be made at a later date. The
current planning approach is to utilize the Plum Island operating
model, which is a GOGO facility. Should a decision be made to operate
the NBAF as a GOCO facility, procurement of such services would follow
the Federal Acquisition Regulation and applicable DHS procurement
requirements, and a program management plan, which would set forth
management, supervisory, and contracting activities between the Federal
government and a contractor, would be prepared.
Site Selection Process and Evaluation Criteria
DHS conducted a competitive site selection process to identify and
evaluate potential candidate sites for the NBAF; Plum Island was also
included as an alternative site for evaluation, as described in Chapter
2, Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF Final EIS. The site selection process was
initiated by publication of a Notice of Request for EOI submissions for
Potential Sites for the NBAF in the Federal Register on January 19,
2006 (71 FR 3107-3109). DHS requested EOI submissions from Federal
agencies, state and local governments, industry, academia, and
interested parties and organizations for potential locations that would
accommodate the construction and operation of the NBAF.
Twenty-nine EOI submissions were received from consortia comprised
of various governmental, industry, and academic partners by the March
31, 2006 response deadline. DHS developed and implemented a rigorous
process for the first round evaluation of the 29 EOIs received, against
DHS's four evaluation criteria (i.e., Proximity to Research
Capabilities, Proximity to Workforce, Acquisition/Construction/
Operations (ACO) Requirements, and Community Acceptance) and associated
sub-criteria. These criteria and their associated sub-criteria were
developed by an interagency working group to ensure that the NBAF would
meet the interdependent needs of DHS and USDA to adequately protect the
Nation against biological threats to animal agriculture. DHS emphasizes
that the Proximity to Research Capabilities and Workforce ratings apply
exclusively to the specific research and workforce needs of the
proposed NBAF and are not a general statement on the research
capability and workforce expertise of the proposing states and
consortia. For example, the Proximity to Research evaluation criterion
considered existing research programs that could be linked to NBAF
mission requirements pertaining to large livestock diseases studied in
Biosafety Level 3 and 4 facilities and the Proximity to Workforce
evaluation criterion considered site proximity to a local labor force
with expertise in biocontainment facilities relevant to the NBAF
mission. Included within the ACO criterion were sub-criteria in the
areas of: (1) Land acquisition/development potential, (2) environmental
compatibility, including the presence of existing environmental
concerns/contamination or environmentally sensitive areas, and (3)
adequate utility infrastructure. These factors, in part, enabled DHS to
screen candidate sites for significant environmental constraints prior
to initiating the EIS. Three committees comprised of Federal employees
evaluated the EOI submissions, assessing their strengths, weaknesses,
and deficiencies against the four evaluation criteria and associated
sub-criteria. A Steering Committee, also comprised of Federal
employees, made recommendations to the DHS Selection Authority (DHS
Under Secretary for Science and Technology), who then selected those
sites that had sufficient qualifications with regard to the evaluation
criteria, and eliminated others from further consideration. On August
9, 2006, DHS selected 18 sites submitted by 12 consortia for further
review.
Subsequently, on December 8, 2006, DHS sent a letter to the 12
remaining consortia. This letter requested additional information to
complete the next phase of the evaluations, communicated DHS's
``preferences'' within each of the four criteria, provided instructions
on how to submit the requested information, and provided information on
the next steps in the site selection process. DHS stated it would give
strong preference to six specific ``preferences'' in the next phase of
the evaluation. Two examples of these preferences are: (1) For the
proximity to research criterion, that the proposed site is within a
comprehensive research community that has existing research programs in
areas related to the NBAF mission requirements (veterinary, medical and
public health, and agriculture), and (2) for the ACO criterion, any in-
kind contributions [e.g., deeded land at no cost rather than sale, new
utility provisions and/or upgrades (e.g., sewer, electricity, water,
chilled water, steamed water, etc.) and new roadways] would be offered
to DHS (by the consortium, state government, local government, or
private entities). The decision to offer land, financial offsets or
other incentives was solely at the discretion of the consortium. This
letter is posted on the DHS Web site at https://www.dhs.gov/nbaf.
Upon receipt of the requested additional information and in-kind
offers from the consortia in February 2007, an evaluation team of USDA
and DHS Federal employees conducted site visits to 17 sites. The Hinds
County Site, originally proposed by the Mississippi Consortium, was
withdrawn in a letter DHS received on April 5, 2007. The intent of each
site visit was to: (1) Verify the information provided and
representations made in the EOI submissions and the additional
information submitted, (2) enable evaluation committee representatives
to view any observable physical conditions and constraints at the
proposed sites and, if applicable, (3) to view the sites' utilities and
infrastructure. Based on the evaluation team's analysis of the
additional information and observations on the site visits, the team
provided recommendations to the DHS Selection Authority. Additionally
and independently of the evaluation team, the DHS Selection Authority
(DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology) visited each of the 17
sites.
In July 2007, DHS identified five site alternatives that surpassed
others in meeting the DHS evaluation criteria, sub-criteria, and DHS
preferences, and determined that they, along with the Plum Island Site,
would be evaluated in the EIS as reasonable alternatives for the
proposed NBAF. The Final Selection Memorandum for Site Selection for
the Second Round Potential Sites for the National Bio and Agro-Defense
Facility (NBAF) and the Plum Island Memorandum for the Record, which
are available on the DHS--Web site at https://www.dhs.gov/nbaf,
documented the findings of this process. The site alternatives selected
for evaluation in the EIS were:
South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens, Georgia
Manhattan Campus Site; Manhattan, Kansas
Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora, Mississippi
Plum Island Site; Plum Island, New York
Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner, North Carolina
Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio, Texas
[[Page 3068]]
NEPA Process
On July 31, 2007, DHS published a Notice of Intent in the Federal
Register (72 FR 41764-41765) to prepare the NBAF EIS to evaluate the
environmental impacts of constructing and operating the proposed NBAF
at one of the reasonable site alternatives. The 60-day scoping period
for the NBAF EIS ended on September 28, 2007. Scoping meetings were
held in the vicinity of the six site alternatives (Old Saybrook,
Connecticut; Southold, New York; Manhattan, Kansas; Flora, Mississippi;
San Antonio, Texas; Creedmoor, NC; and Athens, Georgia), along with one
regional meeting in Washington, DC.
More than 1,350 people attended the scoping meetings. Nearly 300
people provided oral comments at the public meetings, and more than
3,870 comments were received during the scoping period. Areas of
concern shared by many commentors during scoping were the placement of
the proposed NBAF in a highly populated area or in an area that houses
institutionalized populations. These concerns focused on the public
health risk should an accidental or intentional (criminal or terrorist)
release occur, its potential effects on the population, and the ability
of affected communities to evacuate the area. Other concerns were:
locating the facility near herds or flocks of animals susceptible to
the diseases studied, environmental effects to biological and natural
resources, and resources required for the construction and operation of
the NBAF, particularly water. Details on the scoping process and issues
identified are documented in the February 2008, NBAF EIS Scoping
Report, which is available on the DHS Web site at https://www.dhs.gov/nbaf and in the aforementioned public reading rooms.
The Notice of Availability of the NBAF Draft EIS was published in
the Federal Register on June 27, 2008 (73 FR 36540-36542). The public
comment period extended through August 25, 2008. Thirteen public
meetings were held between late July and mid-August 2008 at the same
locations as the scoping meetings or at nearby alternate locations as
follows: Washington, DC (one meeting); Butner, North Carolina (two
meetings); Manhattan, Kansas (two meetings); Flora, Mississippi (two
meetings); San Antonio, Texas (two meetings); Old Saybrook, Connecticut
(one meeting); Greenport, New York (one meeting); and Athens, Georgia
(two meetings).
During the 60-day public comment period on the NBAF Draft EIS, more
than 1,770 individuals attended the public meetings on the NBAF Draft
EIS, 378 of whom provided oral comments. Analysis of the oral and
written comment documents received, yielded more than 5,400 delineated
comments. Specifically, a number of comments focused on the ability of
DHS to safely operate the NBAF and the potential for a pathogenic
release to occur through accidents, natural phenomena, and terrorist
actions. The majority of the comments related to the following
concerns: (1) Ability of DHS to safely operate a biosafety facility;
(2) the May 2008 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
regarding whether FMD research could be safely conducted on the U.S.
mainland; (3) impacts of natural phenomena such as tornadoes,
earthquakes, and hurricanes on the NBAF resulting in the release of a
pathogen; (4) the possibility that an escaped infected mosquito vector
would cause a pathogen such as Rift Valley fever virus to become
established in the United States; (5) economic effects of a release or
a perceived release on the local, state, and national livestock
industry or on local deer populations and the hunting industry; (6)
accident risk of transportation of infectious agents; (7) the
likelihood that the NBAF and the surrounding community would become a
prime terrorist target that DHS could not adequately protect from
attack; (8) release of a pathogen due to human error or by disgruntled
employee(s); (9) the availability of appropriate funding to safely
construct and operate the NBAF; (10) use of the NBAF to manufacture
bioweapons; (11) the need for and effects of mosquito control and
spraying of insecticides; (12) the site selection process and the
evaluation criteria used to select the Preferred Alternative; (13)
waste management regarding carcass disposal, including identification
of precise methods of disposal, the effects to local sewage treatment
infrastructure, and possible effects to air quality from incineration;
(14) pollution of ground or surface water resources due to spills and
leaks; (15) the amount of water that would be used by the NBAF in light
of the current regional drought in North Carolina and Georgia; (16) in
Georgia, the proximity of the South Milledge Avenue Site to the State
Botanical Gardens, the Audubon-designated Important Bird Area, and the
Oconee River; (17) in North Carolina, concerns that institutionalized
populations were not afforded the appropriate level of analysis; (18)
in New York, the limited routes from an island location should an
accident requiring evacuation occur; and (19) in Kansas, the number of
cattle in the region and the economic effects of a release impacting
them.
All comments received during the public comment period were
considered. DHS's responses to comments are presented in Appendix H of
the NBAF Final EIS, and the NBAF EIS was revised, as necessary, in
response to comments. The Notice of Availability for the NBAF Final EIS
was published in the Federal Register on December 12, 2008 (73 FR
75665-75667).
As identified in the Notice of Availability of the NBAF Draft EIS
and as further discussed in Section 2.6 of the NBAF Final EIS,
additional studies were performed to provide important decision-making
information, and for formulation of this ROD. The supporting documents
considered include: (1) Threat and Risk Assessment dated October 2008,
(2) Site Cost Analysis, dated July 25, 2008 (3) Site Characterization
Study, dated July 25, 2008 (4) Plum Island Facility Closure and
Transition Cost Study dated July 2008; and (5) a prior analysis of the
alternative sites against DHS's four evaluation criteria (i.e., Final
Selection Memorandum for Site Selection for the Second Round Potential
Sites for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) dated July
2007, and The Plum Island Memorandum for the Record dated November
2008). CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.1(e)) encourage agencies to make
ancillary decision documents available to the public before a decision
is made. Accordingly, the Site Cost Analysis, Site Characterization
Study, Plum Island Facility Closure and Transition Cost Study, Final
Selection Memorandum, and other reports were made available in August
2008 on the DHS Web site with redactions to mask certain sensitive
financial and security information. The Threat and Risk Assessment,
which was designated For Official Use Only, was not posted on the Web
site. Relevant information from these reports was used in the
preparation of the NBAF Final EIS.
II. Alternatives Considered
DHS evaluated the potential environmental impacts that could result
from implementation of alternatives for construction and operation of
the NBAF. A No Action Alternative and the six site alternatives were
analyzed in the NBAF EIS.
No Action Alternative
Under the No Action Alternative, consideration of which is required
by NEPA, the NBAF would not be constructed. DHS and USDA would continue
to use the PIADC on Plum
[[Page 3069]]
Island, New York. Plum Island is an 840-acre island located about 12
miles southwest of New London, Connecticut, and 1.5 miles from the
northeast tip of Long Island, New York (i.e., Orient Point). While the
island is technically located in the Village of Greenport, Town of
Southold, Suffolk County, New York, Plum Island is administered wholly
by the Federal government. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 recognized
that protecting the U.S. agricultural infrastructure is a critical
element of homeland security and transferred PIADC from USDA to DHS in
2003. While DHS now has responsibility for operating PIADC, both DHS
and USDA conduct programs there as part of an integrated agro-defense
strategy.
Under the No Action Alternative, investment in necessary facility
upgrades, replacements, and repairs, which are ongoing, would continue
so that PIADC could continue to operate at its current BSL-3Ag
capability. However, PIADC's capabilities would not be expanded to
address the NBAF mission requirements. The BSL-3Ag work at PIADC (large
livestock research on foreign animal diseases and zoonotic diseases in
the United States) would continue, and BSL-4 research would continue to
be performed outside of the United States. This alternative does not
satisfy the purpose of and the need for the Proposed Action.
South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens, Georgia
This alternative would locate the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue
Site located west of the South Milledge Avenue and Whitehall Road
intersection in Clarke County, Georgia. The site is part of the
University of Georgia Whitehall Farm and is located near the University
of Georgia Livestock Instructional Area. The site is a 67-acre tract of
land consisting of open pastureland and wooded land and is utilized by
the University of Georgia Equestrian Team. The topography is rolling
terrain, which slopes towards the southwest. The site has been
undeveloped land since at least 1936 and is currently zoned for
government use.
Manhattan Campus Site; Manhattan, Kansas
This alternative would locate the NBAF on the campus of Kansas
State University (KSU) immediately adjacent to the Biosecurity Research
Institute. The Biosecurity Research Institute, constructed in 2006, is
a KSU BSL-3Ag research facility. The Manhattan Campus Site consists of
approximately 48.4 acres southeast of the intersection of Kimball
Avenue and Denison Avenue. The site has been used for animal research
since the 1970s. The site includes several structures, including five
research buildings, a residential structure, and a storage building for
recycling materials. The site is currently zoned as University District
and was annexed to the City of Manhattan in 1994. The 48.4-acre site
could be expanded to 70 acres.
Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora, Mississippi
This alternative would locate the NBAF at the Flora Industrial Park
Site, which is located in Madison County, Mississippi. The site is
owned by the Madison County Economic Development Authority. Flora
Industrial Park is a mixed-use commercial park 45 miles from the
Jackson-Evers International Airport. Additional land is available
surrounding the site for support facilities. The site is located on the
east side of U.S. Highway 49, north and east of the intersection with
North 1st Street. The Flora Industrial Park Site is approximately 150
acres of idle pasture land with two small ponds and a few scattered
wooded areas. An overhead power transmission line is present through
the south-central and west-central portions of the site. The site is
currently zoned as limited industrial. Based on historical information,
the site had previously been cultivated and was in pasture land and
previously occupied by two small tenant houses and one hay barn.
Adjoining properties appear to have been predominantly agricultural and
rural residential until construction of the southwest-adjoining Primos
Manufacturing Company in the early 2000s.
Plum Island Site; Plum Island, New York
This alternative would locate the NBAF on Plum Island, New York.
The Plum Island Site consists of approximately 24 acres of land located
directly to the east of the existing PIADC, which is on the western
shore of Plum Island. Although one of the requirements listed in DHS's
request for EOIs stated that a minimum of 30 acres would be required,
the Plum Island Site would not require the full 30 acres. Existing
facilities associated with PIADC would be available for use with the
NBAF and would reduce the amount of space required. The 24-acre site
has no existing structures. Dense underbrush and gravel roads are found
within the southwestern and northeastern portions. The southeastern
portion of the island has previously been used for sand mining and is
generally void of vegetation. The northwestern portion of the island
has minor vegetation. A potable water line bisects the site from east
to west, and an underground electric service borders the site on the
north side. Based on a review of the historical information, the Plum
Island Site was formerly utilized as a landfill area for miscellaneous
non-infectious wastes associated with PIADC, but the site has since
been remediated.
Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner, North Carolina
This alternative would locate the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm
Site in Butner, North Carolina. The site is currently owned and
operated by North Carolina Department of Agriculture, Research Farms
Division. The site is located north of the terminus of Dillon Drive
along the northern property boundary of the C.A. Dillon Youth
Development Center in Butner. The site is a 249-acre tract of pasture,
grassland, and wooded land that is zoned as institutional. The site
area was operated from early 1942 to June 1943 as part of Camp Butner,
a training facility for light infantry and artillery during World War
II. Other operations included ammunition storage, a redeployment
center, and a general and convalescent hospital. The site has been
undeveloped wooded land since at least 1940, except for one cemetery.
The site has historically been maintained as undeveloped wooded land;
however, in the fall of 2001, the site and surrounding area were
partially logged.
Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio, Texas
The Texas Research Park Site in San Antonio, Texas, extends over
the Bexar County line into a portion of Medina County. The 100.1-acre
site is located west of Lambda Drive, south of the proposed extension
of Omicron Drive, and is currently vacant, undeveloped land covered in
dense vegetation comprised of trees, shrubs, and tall prairie grasses.
The site appears to have consisted of vacant, undeveloped ranch land
before 1938 to the present. The site has no zoning category because it
is outside the San Antonio city limits. The entire Texas Research Park
property is a 1,000-acre industrial district 4 miles outside the San
Antonio city limits.
III. Preferred Alternative
CEQ regulations require an agency to identify its preferred
alternative(s) in the final environmental impact statement (40 CFR
1502.14). The
[[Page 3070]]
preferred alternative is the alternative that the agency believes would
best fulfill its statutory mission, giving consideration to
environmental, economic, technical, and other factors. DHS's Preferred
Alternative and the basis for its selection are described in Section
2.6 of the NBAF Final EIS. Additionally, DHS published the Preferred
Alternative Selection Memorandum in December 2008, which describes in
more detail the basis for the selection of the Preferred Alternative,
on the DHS Web site at https://www.dhs.gov/nbaf. DHS's Preferred
Alternative is to construct and operate the NBAF at the Manhattan
Campus Site in Manhattan, Kansas.
DHS developed and implemented a decision process to identify the
Preferred Alternative in the NBAF Final EIS. A Steering Committee,
comprised of Federal employees from DHS and USDA, was convened to lead
the evaluation process and make recommendations to the DHS Decision
Authority (the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology). The
process involved a qualitative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses
of each action alternative (i.e., site alternative) followed by an
overall data comparison to develop a relative ranking of each site
alternative. The Steering Committee also considered the No Action
Alternative and weighed it against the Proposed Action of constructing
and operating the NBAF at the highest ranked site alternative.
The Steering Committee updated the findings from the previously
described second round evaluation of site alternatives using new and
emerging data collected since July 2007. This data was contained in the
following support documents, as previously discussed: (1) Threat and
Risk Assessment dated October 2008, (2) Site Cost Analysis, dated July
25, 2008, (3) Site Characterization Study, dated July 25, 2008, and (4)
Plum Island Facility Closure and Transition Cost Study dated July 2008.
Additionally, on February 29, 2008, DHS sent a letter to each
consortium requesting they confirm or update the details of their site
offers (in response to the December 8, 2006 DHS letter) and provided a
final opportunity to identify contingences to their offers. DHS also
provided background on the process it would follow to identify its
preferred site alternative. The February 29, 2008 letter was not a
request for financial proposals, but rather an opportunity for the
consortia to verify and update their original in-kind offers received
in February 2007 in response to the December 2006 letter request. DHS
required responses to be postmarked by March 30, 2008 (later changed to
March 31, 2008 to fall on a weekday). The decision to offer land,
funds, or other assets was solely at the discretion of each consortium.
The amount of the contribution and how the contribution would be funded
(e.g., bonds, taxes) was determined by the consortia and/or the state
and local government officials.
The Steering Committee next considered the environmental impacts
presented in the NBAF EIS including the public comments made at the
public meetings and by other means during the 60-day public comment
period on the NBAF Draft EIS, along with the information in the Threat
and Risk Assessment. The Steering Committee found that the NBAF EIS and
the Threat and Risk Assessment presented very little differentiation
between the sites. In fact, the NBAF EIS determined that the risk of
release of a biological pathogen from the NBAF was independent of where
the NBAF was located. The Steering Committee also determined that,
based on its review of the NBAF EIS, the likelihood of a release of a
pathogen was very low, given appropriate attention to the design,
construction, and operation of the NBAF with an array of safety
controls. The Steering Committee further determined that the risk of
release of any identified pathogen proposed for study within the NBAF
could be mitigated by implementation of operational protocols, rigid
security measures, and adherence to the U.S. Government biosecurity
guidelines.
With respect to the economic consequence if a release of FMDV from
the NBAF were to happen, the Steering Committee found that the Nation's
meat export trade status would suffer the greatest impact and that this
is independent of the site of the NBAF. The World Organization for
Animal Health (OIE) affirms the Steering Committee's findings. OIE,
created in 1924 by 28 countries, issues standards, guidelines, and
recommendations which are designated as the international referenced in
the field of animal diseases and zoonoses. As of January 2009, the OIE
consisted of 172 nations, including the U.S. The OIE's determination
regarding a country's FMD status significantly impacts that country's
ability to export meat. Dr. Bernard Vallat, the Director General of the
OIE, in a letter to DHS, dated November 24, 2008, stated the following:
``You asked a specific question as to whether it would make a
difference in terms of the health status of a country if a foot-and-
mouth (FMD) disease outbreak would occur in the mainland or on an
off shore island like Plum Island. My response is based on today's
international recommendations, as published in the Terrestrial
Animal Health Code of the OIE, which constitutes the only
internationally accepted standards. Today's international standards
provide recommendations that significantly reduce the sanitary and
economic impact of the affected country or zone in case of such an
outbreak, provided there is a credible veterinary infrastructure
that can guarantee the early detection and the rapid response in
accordance with the measures recommended by the OIE. However,
regardless of where in the territory of a country an outbreak of FMD
occurs, the FMD status of the country is lost immediately upon the
first notification to the OIE. The difference, in terms of the
national impact of this outbreak, is more related to how the
country's authorities respond to the incursion, rather then where
the outbreak occurs.
As was the case in the recent outbreak at Pirbright, United
Kingdom, the veterinary authorities immediately notified the OIE and
established a ``containment zone'' as defined in the Terrestrial
Animal Health Code. Once they could demonstrate that all cases had
been contained within such zone and that no further cases were
detected within a 30-day period, the entire country regained its
FMD-free status, with the only exception of the containment zone.
The necessary and lengthy period to regain the free status, as
described in the Code is not limited to the containment zone,
something in the past applied to the entire affected country or
zone.''
Chapter 4.3 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Zoning and
Compartmentalization) includes guidance on establishing a containment
zone. Article 4.3.3 of the Code states:
``Establishment of a containment zone should be based on a rapid
response including appropriate standstill of movement of animals and
commodities upon notification of suspicion of the specified disease
and the demonstration that the outbreaks are contained within this
zone through epidemiological investigation (trace-back, trace-
forward) after confirmation of infection. The primary outbreak and
likely source of the outbreak should be identified and all cases
shown to be epidemiologically linked. For the effective
establishment of a containment zone, it is necessary to demonstrate
that there have been no new cases in the containment zone within a
minimum of two incubation periods from the last detected case.''
The Steering Committee determined that, based on the lack of
differentiation among the sites regarding the risk of a release and the
economic consequences of a release, that it was most important to
select a location that would optimize the capability to diagnose and
cure large animal diseases through strong research programs and
expedient diagnostic and response capabilities. Furthermore, the
Steering Committee found that the environmental impacts analyzed in the
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EIS and the site specific threats were all very similar and that there
were only minor differentiators in the EIS and the Threat and Risk
Assessment. Therefore, the key differentiators among the sites were
DHS's initial four evaluation criteria. Because the NBAF is intended to
be the Nation's preeminent research facility for foreign animal and
zoonotic disease research, the site's proximity to research
capabilities that can be linked to NBAF mission requirements was
emphasized among the four evaluation criteria. Overall site evaluations
were followed by the ranking of the sites to determine the recommended
site alternative.
The Steering Committee then considered the No Action Alternative
and weighed it against the Proposed Action of constructing and
operating the NBAF at the highest ranked site alternative to determine
the recommended Preferred Alternative. Based on numerous strengths in
terms of the evaluation criteria, the Steering Committee concluded that
the Manhattan Campus Site best met the purpose and need to site,
construct and operate the NBAF.
The Manhattan Campus Site's location near KSU provides proximity to
existing research capabilities that can be linked to NBAF mission
requirements. Additionally, the site's proximity to the KSU College of
Veterinary Medicine, KSU College of Agriculture, and the Biosecurity
Research Institute is relevant to the NBAF mission and is, therefore, a
significant strength. The NBAF EIS demonstrated that construction and
operation of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site would be
environmentally acceptable, because almost all environmental impacts
fell into the ``no impacts to minor impacts'' category. As stated in
the NBAF EIS, the risk of release of a pathogen was independent of
where the NBAF was located. The information presented in the Threat and
Risk Assessment was found to be comparable to the other site
alternatives. The Manhattan Campus Site alternative demonstrated very
strong community acceptance from local, state, and Federal officials
and stakeholders. Additionally, the consortium offered a substantial,
unconditional offset package, including the immediate and long-term use
of the existing Biosecurity Research Institute, an existing Biosecurity
Level 3 facility within close proximity to the Manhattan Campus Site in
which research pertaining to livestock disease is conducted. Taking
into consideration the offsets to infrastructure costs and ``in-kind''
contributions offered by the consortia, the Manhattan Campus Site is
among the least expensive location to construct and operate the NBAF.
Following a comparison of this site with the No Action Alternative, DHS
selected the Manhattan Campus Site as the Preferred Alternative for
implementation.
IV. Alternatives Considered But Dismissed
In developing a range of reasonable alternatives early in the NEPA
process, DHS considered other potential alternatives, including
suggestions made by the public during the scoping process. The
following alternatives were considered but were determined not to be
reasonable alternatives for evaluation in the NBAF Draft EIS:
Upgrade PIADC. The proposed NBAF would require BSL-4 capability.
PIADC does not have BSL-4 laboratory space, and the existing
infrastructure is inadequate to support a BSL-4 laboratory.
Refurbishing the existing facilities and obsolete infrastructure to
allow PIADC to meet the new mission would be more costly than building
the NBAF on Plum Island. In addition, for the existing facility to be
refurbished, current research activities might have to be suspended for
extensive periods.
Use Existing Laboratory Facilities. No existing U.S. facility could
meet the NBAF mission needs as determined by DHS and USDA. Although a
number of BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities are located in the U.S., they do
not have the capacity to conduct the large livestock research required.
Similar facilities in Winnipeg, Canada, and Geelong, Australia, do not
have the capacity to address potential outbreak scenarios in the United
States in a timely manner and cannot guarantee their availability to
meet U.S. research requirements.
Other Locations. Other potential locations were considered during
the NBAF site selection process, but they were eliminated based on
evaluation by the DHS evaluation committee. It was suggested during the
scoping process that the NBAF be constructed in a remote location such
as an island distant from populated areas or in a location that would
be inhospitable (e.g., desert or arctic habitat) to escaped animal
hosts or vectors. However, the evaluation criteria called for proximity
to research programs that could be linked to the NBAF mission and
proximity to a technical workforce with applicable skills for the NBAF
mission. The Plum Island Site represents an isolated location while
meeting the evaluation requirements. It was also suggested that the
NBAF could be constructed beneath a mountain; however, the cost and
feasibility of such a construction project would be prohibitive.
V. Summary of Environmental Impacts
A sliding-scale approach was the basis for the environmental
impacts analysis in the NBAF EIS. This approach reflects CEQ
requirements for implementing NEPA and its instruction that Federal
agencies preparing EISs ``focus on significant environmental issues and
alternatives'' (40 CFR 1502.1) and that impacts be discussed ``in
proportion to their significance'' (40 CFR 1502.2(b)). That is, certain
aspects of the alternatives have a greater potential for creating
environmental effects than others. Thus, the NBAF EIS addressed
resource areas pertinent to the sites considered. Impacts were assessed
for land use and visual resources; infrastructure; air quality; noise;
geology and soils; water resources; biological resources; cultural
resources; socioeconomics; traffic and transportation; existing
hazardous, toxic, or radiological waste; waste management;
environmental justice; as well as operational impacts on human health
and safety and wildlife from normal operations and accidental releases
of pathogens. Environmental impacts of current, proposed, and
reasonably foreseeable activities at candidate sites were included in
the cumulative impacts analysis presented in the NBAF EIS.
DHS has weighed environmental impacts as one factor in its decision
making, analyzing existing environmental impacts and the potential
impacts that might occur for each reasonable alternative, including the
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources. Under the No
Action Alternative, continued operations of the PIADC would have little
or no incremental environmental impacts, except that construction of
ongoing infrastructure upgrades could have negligible to minor and
temporary effects on such resources as land resources, geology and
soils, and water resources during construction.
As demonstrated in the NBAF Final EIS, short term impacts
associated with the construction of the NBAF and normal facility
operations under the Proposed Action are not expected to result in any
unacceptable environmental consequences at any of the site
alternatives, though each site does have its own unique adverse
environmental aspects. Potential construction impacts have been
minimized through the site selection process and proposed placement of
the proposed NBAF within the boundaries of each site alternative, based
on the
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conceptual design. There would be little or no direct effects to
wetlands, water resources, natural biotic communities, protected
species, or cultural and archaeological resources at any site
alternative. Normal facility operations were determined to have no
potential for adverse impacts on biological resources and human health
and safety. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating
procedures and biocontainment design features to minimize the potential
for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases of
pathogens. Nonetheless, some minor impacts would occur from
construction and operations and are unavoidable under the Proposed
Action.
Land Use and Visual Resources
Under each of the site alternatives, conversion of approximately 30
acres of open land to the NBAF would occur. Land use would be
consistent with the local zoning classifications under all site
alternatives, except that an amendment to the Clarke County, Georgia
comprehensive plan might be required to allow the NBAF to be
constructed at the South Milledge Avenue site. Placement of the NBAF on
undeveloped land would alter the viewshed of each of the sites,
although this effect may be most pronounced at the South Milledge
Avenue Site and least pronounced at the Manhattan Campus Site due to
the adjoining and nearby land uses, respectively. Similarly, during
normal operations, outdoor nighttime lighting would have impacts at all
sites, with the detrimental effects varying based on adjoining land
uses. Use of shielded fixtures and the minimum intensity of lighting
that are necessary to provide adequate security could mitigate the
effects.
Infrastructure
Construction of some infrastructure improvements, including
utilities and roadways would be required at all sites, and their
environmental impacts were evaluated in the NBAF EIS. The need for
infrastructure improvements would be greatest for the Umstead Research
Park Site, the South Milledge Avenue Site, the Plum Island Site, and
the Flora Industrial Park Site with the least for the Manhattan Campus
Site. Utility requirements would be similar for all site alternatives.
Water use would vary to some degree for each site, but NBAF operation
would result in use of approximately 36 million (Plum Island Site) to
52 million (Texas Research Park Site) gallons per year. Electric power
demands would be very similar for all sites ranging from 12.8 to 13.1
megawatts, with connection to existing or new substations required at
all site alternatives. A new substation would be required at the South
Milledge Avenue Site and construction of new underwater power cables
would be required to provide redundant power to the Plum Island Site.
Operation at all sites except the Plum Island Site would use natural
gas as the primary fuel for operating the NBAF. New connecting lines
would be needed at the South Milledge Avenue Site, the Flora Industrial
Park Site, and the Umstead Research Farm Site. For sanitary sewer, the
NBAF operation would generate between 25 million and 30 million gallons
of wastewater per year. Capacity would be available from all existing
or planned wastewater treatment facilities serving the alternative
sites. Wastewater discharged by the NBAF would meet all local
wastewater permit requirements and would be pretreated as necessary.
New sewer lines would be needed at the Flora Industrial Park Site, the
Umstead Research Farm Site, and the Texas Research Park Site.
Air Quality and Severe Weather
Air quality effects would occur with construction and operation of
the NBAF for all sites with similar regulatory air permitting
requirements. Operation of the NBAF would result in air emissions from
boilers, emergency generators, and traffic from employees and
deliveries. Additional air emissions would occur from carcass and
pathologic waste treatment that may include incineration, alkaline
hydrolysis, or rendering. Conservative estimates of air emissions
indicate that operation of the NBAF could affect regional air-quality
standards for PM2.5 (particulate matter with diameter less
than or equal to 2.5 microns). The Plum Island Site is in non-
attainment areas for ozone and PM2.5 therefore, air
emissions from the NBAF would need to comply with the State
Implementation Plan (SIP) to improve air quality and the requirement
that a conformity analysis be performed. Following final design, the
potential and actual NBAF air emissions will be evaluated to
demonstrate compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards and
applicable air-quality permitting requirements.
The NBAF would be designed to withstand normal meteorological
conditions and the effects of severe weather events including
tornadoes. Specifically, NBAF would be designed and constructed to meet
or exceed the wind load standards of the International Building Code,
American Society of Civil Engineers Standard No. 7, Minimum Design
Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, and the codes of the local
jurisdiction, which take into account the functional use of the
facility as a laboratory.
Noise
Construction of NBAF would result in some temporary increase in
noise levels near the sites from construction equipment and activities.
As a consequence of the NBAF operations, minor increases in noise
levels from employee traffic and heating and cooling facilities would
occur and operation of emergency generators would result in sporadic
noise increases during testing. Impacts on adjoining properties would
vary based on the associated land uses and presence of sensitive
receptors. Potential impacts could be mitigated by conducting generator
testing during normal business hours. If blasting is required during
construction, a blasting plan would be developed to mitigate potential
noise levels.
Geology and Soils
Effects to geology and soils would be similar for all sites. The
NBAF would be designed to withstand and minimize the effects of
earthquakes including the seismic design provisions of the
International Building Code, American Society of Civil Engineers
Standard No. 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other
Structures, and the codes of the local jurisdiction, which take into
account the functional use of the facility as a laboratory. Temporary
effects to soils would occur due to excavation and site clearing, but
erosion control measures would minimize any adverse effects from
construction and operation. Prime and unique farmland soils would
potentially be affected at all sites. A detailed geotechnical study
would be performed to guide the final facility design in order to
mitigate the effects of any geologic hazards on the NBAF to include
identification of fractures, geologic fault traces, voids or other
solution features, unstable soils, or other subsurface conditions which
could impact facility construction and operations.
Water Resources
Potential effects to water resources could occur with construction
activities and would be similar for all sites. However, the South
Milledge Avenue Site, the Flora Industrial Park Site, and the Umstead
Research Farm Site are closer to surface waters so the potential for
effects are greater at these sites. Runoff from the construction site
has the potential to enter surface or groundwater sources, but
stormwater management during construction would
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minimize the potential for this to occur. Similar effects could occur
with operation of the NBAF. Strict compliance with stormwater pollution
prevention plans and spill management protocols would minimize the
potential and mitigate the potential effects of a spill. Wastewater
would be collected and conveyed to existing wastewater treatment
facilities and pretreated as required to meet all local wastewater
permit requirements.
Biological Resources
Effects to vegetation, wetlands, wildlife, aquatic life, and
threatened or endangered species would be similar for all site
alternatives with a few exceptions. Site clearing would remove
approximately 30 acres of vegetation, although all of the sites have
been previously disturbed to some degree. Wetlands would be affected at
the South Milledge Avenue Site from road and utility crossings (less
than 0.5 acres), and approximately 0.2 acres of forested uplands would
be lost. Threatened or endangered species, aquatic resources, and
wildlife would not be directly affected by construction or normal
operations at any site. Noise and light from the NBAF could affect
wildlife, particularly migratory birds, with this potential determined
to be greatest for the South Milledge Avenue Site and Umstead Research
Farm Site. Mitigation of potential noise and light impacts were
previously described.
During operation, an accidental release of pathogens from the NBAF
would adversely affect susceptible wildlife populations and would be
similar for all sites. To minimize potential impacts in the unlikely
event of a release, DHS would have site-specific standard operating
procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of
research activities at the proposed NBAF.
Socioeconomics
Construction activities at all sites would result in between 1,300
and 1,614 temporary jobs generating between $138.2 million and $183.9
million in labor income and between $12.5 million and $24.7 million in
state and local taxes. Population, housing, and quality of life would
not be affected by construction. Operation of the NBAF would result in
250 to 350 direct jobs and an estimated income of between $26.8 million
and $30.4 million annually. Population growth due to the NBAF would be
a small portion of the estimated growth in the regions surrounding all
sites. The effect of the NBAF on the housing market and quality of life
(i.e., schools, law enforcement, fire protection, medical facilities,
recreation, and health and safety) would be negligible. Law enforcement
and fire protection personnel could be trained by DHS to respond to
incidents at the NBAF.
The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low,
but the economic effect could be substantial for all sites. The primary
economic effect of an accidental release of FMD virus would be the
banning of exports of U.S. livestock products regardless of the
location of the accidental release, which could reach as high as $4.2
billion until the U.S. was declared foot and mouth disease (FMD) free.
Response measures to minimize risks and quickly contain any accidental
release would greatly reduce the potential economic loss.
Traffic and Transportation
Local traffic at all sites would be temporarily affected by general
construction traffic. Operation of the NBAF would result in only minor
increases in daily traffic on roads near all the sites except for roads
near the Umstead Research Farm Site (Range Road and Old Route 75),
which are not heavily used by local traffic and would experience a 140%
increase in average daily traffic. Transportation of research materials
would not significantly increase the risk of a traffic-related
incident.
Existing Hazardous, Toxic, and Radiological Waste
Recent investigations at the Umstead Research Farm Site indicate
that the potential for unexploded materials from past military training
is low. The Plum Island Site was previously used to dispose of military
materials but has been remediated (cleaned up) and should not be a
safety concern for workers. Training for construction workers for
either of these sites may be required prior to initiation of
construction activities to ensure worker safety. None of the other
sites would require remediation or additional considerations for the
protection of workers, the public, or the environment.
Waste Management
Waste generation and management would be similar for all sites,
although the amount of wastewater would vary somewhat for each site
based on total water use. Wastewater discharged by the NBAF would be
pretreated as required to meet all local wastewater permit and
acceptance requirements, as previously described. Construction would
generate construction debris, sanitary solid waste, and wastewater.
Operation of the NBAF would result in generation of wastewater, waste
solids, and medical, hazardous, and industrial solid wastes.
Health and Safety
The effects of the NBAF on health and safety due to construction
and normal operations would be similar for all sites. Standard safety
protocols would minimize the likelihood of accidents and personal
injury at the NBAF, and normal operations pose no threat to the
surrounding communities. An evaluation was conducted to determine the
potential for an accidental or intentional (criminal or terrorist)
release of a pathogen from the NBAF and the potential for the pathogen
to spread from each site alternative. The evaluation considered the
accident scenarios with and without measures to prevent and contain a
release. The hazard analysis concluded that the likelihood of a release
of a pathogen was extremely low, given appropriate attention to the
design, construction and operation of the NBAF with the array of safety
controls, including a robust facility that is capable of withstanding
the various analyzed accident conditions. For all sites the risk of
accidental release was independent of where the facility was located.
The site specific consequences were shown to be essentially the same
between the sites located on the mainland and were slightly lower for
the Plum Island Site, due in part to there being less opportunity for
the pathogen to become established and spread.
Environmental Justice
No disproportionately high adverse effects to minority or low-
income populations were evident at any of the site alternatives. Visual
effects and traffic increases due to construction would be minimized
with proper site management protocols. Potential traffic effects would
be minimized by limiting road closures and rerouting traffic. Economic
benefits would potentially occur to low income or minority populations
within the area due to a rise in construction-related jobs.
VI. The Environmentally Preferred Alternative
The environmentally preferred alternative is the alternative that
causes the least impact to the environment; it is also the alternative
that best protects, preserves, and enhances historic, cultural, and
natural resources as noted by the CEQ, in its ``Forty Most Asked
Questions Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations'' (46 FR 18026, dated March
23, 1981), with regard to 40 CFR 1505.2. Under the No Action
Alternative, continued operation of the PIADC
[[Page 3074]]
would have little or no incremental environmental impacts, except for
minor and temporary effects from construction of ongoing infrastructure
upgrades. Therefore, DHS has identified the No Action Alternative as
the environmentally preferred alternative, because it would have the
least environmental impact in the short term. However, the No Action
Alternative does not satisfy the purpose of and need for the Proposed
Action and associated mission drivers.
The NBAF EIS indicated that there would be very little difference
in environmental impacts among the site alternatives. There would be
impacts from construction of the NBAF over the short term and from
subsequent normal facility operations at all sites. The major
discriminator identified would be associated with a release of a
pathogen where the potential impact would be slightly less at the Plum
Island Site. This is due to both the water barrier around the island
and the absence of nearby livestock and susceptible wildlife species.
Regardless, the probability of a release is very low at all sites.
Over the longer term, construction and subsequent operations of the
NBAF at any of the site alternatives would have potential beneficial
effects to wildlife, because the work performed at the NBAF could
result in development of vaccines or new diagnostic tools to protect or
contain outbreaks of foreign animal diseases.
VII. Comments on the NBAF Final EIS
Approximately 3,000 copies of the NBAF Final EIS and/or NBAF Final
EIS Executive Summary were distributed in hard copy or on compact disk
to members of Congress and other elected officials; Federal, state, and
local government agencies; Native American representatives; public
interest groups; public reading rooms; and to individuals. In addition,
both the NBAF Final EIS and the Executive Summary are available online
at https://www.dhs.gov/nbaf and on request.
Following the release of the NBAF Final EIS, DHS received letters
and other correspondence from approximately 60 commentors, including
government agencies, elected officials, organizations, and individuals.
An internal DHS comment was received from the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV expressing concerns about
the approach in the NBAF EIS to evaluating flood risks at the
alternative sites. FEMA suggested that DHS evaluate flood risks at the
Preferred Alternative site in greater detail and directed DHS to the
Peer Review Plan, Manhattan, Kansas Levee--Section 216 Flood Risk
Management Project Feasibility Study (dated January 2008).
DHS notes that the document concerning the feasibility study of the
existing Manhattan, Kan