Lyle E. Craker; Denial of Application, 2101-2133 [E9-521]
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cost) payable to the U.S. Treasury.
Maureen M. Katz,
Assistant Section Chief, Environmental
Enforcement Section, Environment and
Natural Resources Division.
[FR Doc. E9–592 Filed 1–13–09; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree
Under the Clean Water Act
Notice is hereby given that on
December 31, 2008, a proposed consent
decree (the ‘‘Decree’’) in United States
and State of Oregon v. Pacific Northern
Environmental Corp., dba Dedicated
Fuels, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:08–cv–
01513–HU, was lodged with the United
States District Court for the District of
Oregon.
In this action the United States and
State of Oregon sought civil penalties
for Pacific Northern Environmental
Corp.’s (‘‘PNE’’) violation of the Clean
Water Act’s spill prohibition. PNE owns
and operates a heating oil business
located in North Bend, Oregon, as well
as several gas stations in the area. On
July 8, 2006, a tanker truck owned and
operated by Dedicated carrying several
hundred barrels of diesel fuel
overturned while traveling on Highway
38, near Milepost 17, just east of
Scottsburg, Oregon. Approximately 197
barrels of diesel fuel spilled. Diesel fuel
that did not ignite in the ensuing fire
migrated to the Umpqua River. PNE’s
discharge to the Umpqua River violated
the Clean Water Act and Oregon law.
Under the consent decree, PNE will pay
the United States and the State of
Oregon civil penalties of $74,272 and
$20,000, respectively. Additionally,
PNE agrees to perform a supplemental
environmental project (‘‘SEP’’), the cost
of which shall be not less than $47,640.
The Department of Justice will receive
for a period of thirty (30) days from the
date of this publication comments
relating to the consent decree.
Comments should be addressed to the
Assistant Attorney General,
Environment and Natural Resources
Division, and either e-mailed to
pubcomment-ees.enrd@usdoj.gov or
mailed to P.O. Box 7611, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20044–7611, and should refer to United
States and State of Oregon v. Pacific
Environmental Corp., dba Dedicated
Fuels, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:08–cv–
01513–HU, D.J. Ref. 90–5–1–1–09175.
The consent decree may be examined
at the Office of the United States
Attorney, Mark O. Hatfield U.S.
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Courthouse, 1000 SW. Third Avenue,
Suite 600, Portland, OR, 97204, and at
U.S. EPA Region 10, 1200 Sixth Avenue,
Seattle, WA, 98101. During the public
comment period, the consent decree
may also be examined on the following
Department of Justice Web site: https://
www.usdoj.gov/enrd/
Consent_Decrees.html. A copy of the
consent decree may also be obtained by
mail from the Consent Decree Library,
P.O. Box 7611, U.S. Department of
Justice, Washington, DC 20044–7611, or
by faxing or e-mailing a request to Tonia
Fleetwood (tonia.fleetwood@usdoj.gov),
fax no. (202) 514–0097, phone
confirmation number (202) 514–1547. In
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Consent Decree Library at the stated
address.
Robert E. Maher, Jr.,
Assistant Section Chief, Environmental
Enforcement Section.
[FR Doc. E9–579 Filed 1–13–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–15–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Notice of Lodging Proposed Consent
Decree
In accordance with Departmental
Policy, 28 CFR 50.7, notice is hereby
given that a proposed Consent Decree in
United States v. Savoy Senior Housing
Corp., et al., No. 6:06–cv–31 (W.D. Va.),
was lodged with the United States
District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, Lynchburg Division, on
January 7, 2009.
The proposed Consent Decree
concerns a complaint filed by the
United States against Savoy Senior
Housing Corporation, Savoy Liberty
Village, LLC, SDB Construction, Inc.,
Jacob A. Frydman, Best G.C., Inc. (a/k/
a Best Grading), and Acres of Virginia,
Inc., for alleged violations of Section
301(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33
U.S.C. 1311(a). The proposed Consent
Decree resolves all allegations against
the defendants for discharging dredged
or fill material, and/or controlling and
directing such discharges, into waters of
the United States at a 140-acre property
located in Campbell County, Virginia,
without a permit issued by the United
States Army Corps of Engineers. The
proposed Consent Decree also resolves
all allegations against the defendants for
discharging sediment in stormwater,
and/or controlling and directing such
discharges, into waters of the United
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States on or from the same property,
both without a CWA permit and in
violation of such a permit once it was
obtained.
The proposed Consent Decree
requires Savoy Senior Housing
Corporation, Savoy Liberty Village, LLC,
SDB Construction, Inc., Best G.C., Inc.,
and Acres of Virginia, Inc., to pay to the
United States a civil penalty. The
proposed Consent Decree also requires
these defendants to restore certain areas
on and adjacent to the 140-acre site, and
also to fund off-site mitigation through
the purchase of credits from stream and
wetland restoration banks in the region.
The Department of Justice will accept
written comments relating to the
proposed Consent Decree for thirty (30)
days from the date of publication of this
Notice. Please address comments to
Kenneth C. Amaditz, Trial Attorney,
Environmental Defense Section, P.O.
Box 23986, Washington, DC 20026–
3986, and refer to United States v. Savoy
Senior Housing Corp., et al., DJ # 90–5–
1–1–17868.
The proposed Consent Decree may be
examined at the Clerk’s Office, United
States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia in Lynchburg,
Virginia. In addition, the proposed
Consent Decree may be viewed at
https://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/
Consent_Decrees.html.
Russell M. Young,
Assistant Chief, Environmental Defense
Section, Environment & Natural Resources
Division.
[FR Doc. E9–605 Filed 1–13–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–CW–P
DEPARMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 05–16]
Lyle E. Craker; Denial of Application
On December 10, 2004, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Lyle E. Craker, Ph.D.
(Respondent), of Amherst,
Massachusetts. The Show Cause Order
proposed the denial of Respondent’s
pending application for a registration as
a bulk manufacturer of marijuana on
two grounds. Show Cause Order at 1.
First, the Show Cause Order alleged
that Respondent’s ‘‘registration would
not be consistent with the public
interest as that term is used in 21 U.S.C.
823(a).’’ Show Cause Order at 1. Second,
the Show Cause Order alleged that the
Respondent’s registration would be
inconsistent ‘‘with the United States’
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obligations under the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs (Single Convention),
March 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407.’’ Id.
With respect to both of these
contentions, noting that Respondent
sought registration ‘‘to supply
analytical, pre-clinical and clinical
researchers with marijuana,’’ the Show
Cause Order emphasized that the
‘‘National Institute on Drug Abuse
(NIDA), a component [of] the National
Institutes of Health (NIH)’’ and ‘‘the
United States Department of Health and
Human Services [HHS], oversees the
cultivation, production and distribution
of research-grade marijuana on behalf of
the United States Government.’’ Id. at 2.
With respect to the contention that
Respondent’s proposed registration is
inconsistent with the public interest, the
Show Cause Order stated that, under 21
U.S.C. 823(a), ‘‘DEA must limit the
number of producers of research-grade
marijuana to that which can provide an
adequate and uninterrupted supply
under adequately competitive
conditions.’’ Id. at 4. The Show Cause
Order then stated: ‘‘For the past 36
years, the University of Mississippi has
provided such supply under the
foregoing criteria, and there is no
indication that this registrant will fail to
do so throughout the duration of its
current registration. While the
University of Massachusetts is free to
compete with the University of
Mississippi to obtain the next NIDA
contract to produce research-grade
marijuana, there is no basis under
Section 823(a) to add an additional
producer.’’ Id.
With respect to the contention of
Respondent’s sponsor, the
Multidisciplinary Association for
Psychedelic Studies (MAPS), that
marijuana provided by NIDA to
researchers was both qualitatively and
quantitatively inadequate, the Show
Cause Order alleged that marijuana
provided by NIDA was ‘‘of sufficient
quantity and quality to meet’’ the needs
of ‘‘legitimate and authorized
research[ers].’’ Id. at 3.
The Show Cause Order also noted
MAPS’s contentions that ‘‘NIDA is
limited to supplying marijuana for
research purposes and cannot supply
marijuana on a prescription basis,’’ that
‘‘this limitation effectively prohibits a
sponsor * * * from expending the
necessary large amounts of funds to
conduct drug development studies
resulting in [a] marijuana prescription
product,’’ and that granting Respondent
a registration would resolve this
problem. Id. In response to these
contentions, the Show Cause Order
alleged that to obtain approval for the
marketing of a new drug under the
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Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
the safety and effectiveness of the drug
must be demonstrated through three
phases of clinical trials, and that clinical
trials involving marijuana had not
progressed beyond the first phase (phase
1). Id. at 2–4.
The Show Cause Order further noted
that the policy of HHS for approving the
distribution of marijuana to researchers
‘‘has not unduly limited clinical
research with marijuana.’’ Id. at 5. More
specifically, the Show Cause Order
alleged that ‘‘[s]ince the year 2000, there
have been or are eleven approved
clinical trials utilizing smoked
marijuana,’’ and that approved
‘‘marijuana researchers administer
marijuana to almost 500 human
subjects.’’ Id. The Show Cause Order
also alleged that since 2000, there were
‘‘four approved pre-clinical trials in
laboratory and animal modes.’’ Id. at 5.
Relatedly, the Show Cause Order also
asserted that ‘‘DEA has no statutory
authority to overturn HHS’ policy.’’ Id.
With respect to the contention that
Respondent’s registration would be
inconsistent with the United States’
obligations under the Single
Convention, the Show Cause Order
again referenced that HHS, through
NIDA, oversees the cultivation,
production and distribution of researchgrade marijuana on behalf of the United
States Government and alleged that
‘‘[i]n accordance with the Single
Convention, the Federal Government [is
required] to limit marijuana available
for clinical research to [this] source.’’ Id.
at 4.
Respondent timely requested a
hearing. The matter was assigned to
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Mary
Ellen Bittner, who conducted a hearing
on August 22–26 and December 12–14
and 16, 2005. At the hearing, the parties
put on testimonial evidence and
introduced documentary evidence.
Following the hearing, the parties
submitted briefs containing their
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and argument.
On February 12, 2007, the ALJ issued
her recommended decision. Therein, the
ALJ rejected the Government’s
contention that the Single Convention
precluded Respondent’s registration. In
so holding, the ALJ acknowledged that
the Convention requires that its
signatories maintain a ‘‘government
monopoly on importing, exporting,
wholesale trading, and maintaining
stocks.’’ ALJ at 82. The ALJ reasoned,
however, that ‘‘[i]t also appears,
although it is not entirely clear, that the
marijuana grown by the National
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Center 1 or by any other registrant for
utilization in research would qualify as
either ‘medicinal’ * * * or as ‘special
stocks’ within the meaning of’’ the
Convention. Id. at 82 (citing Single
Convention, art. 1, para. (1)(o) & (x)).
The ALJ then turned to whether
Respondent had established that his
registration would be consistent with
the public interest when considering the
six enumerated factors of 21 U.S.C.
823(a). With respect to the first factor,
21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1), the ALJ first recited
the relevant text of this provision,
which requires DEA to consider
maintenance of effective controls
against diversion by limiting the
manufacturing of schedule I or II
controlled substances ‘‘to a number of
establishments which can produce an
adequate and uninterrupted supply of
these substances under adequately
competitive conditions for legitimate
medical, scientific, research, and
industrial purposes.’’ ALJ at 82 (quoting
§ 823(a)(1)). Noting that there is
precedent for the agency to interpret
this provision in two distinct ways
regarding the issue of adequacy of
competition (either by considering or
not considering the issue),2 the ALJ
stated that she would evaluate the issue
in both ways. Id. at 83.
Under the first approach of
interpreting 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1) to allow
DEA to disregard the issue of adequacy
of competition as long as the agency
finds that the applicant for registration
would provide effective controls against
diversion, the ALJ concluded that ‘‘there
is no evidence or contention that either
Respondent or anyone working with
him would be likely to divert the
marijuana from the growing or drying or
storage areas.’’ Id.
The ALJ next rejected the
Government’s contention that there was
a risk of diversion because Mr. Rick
Doblin, the Director of MAPS, would
determine who was to receive the
marijuana. In so holding, the ALJ
reasoned that Mr. Doblin would not
have physical possession of the
marijuana and that Respondent would
only send marijuana to researchers with
DEA registrations and the requisite
approval of HHS. ALJ at 84. The ALJ
thus concluded that ‘‘the research
project has procedures in place to
adequately protect against diversion of
the marijuana’’ and that ‘‘there is
minimal risk of diversion.’’ Id.
1 The National Center is an entity of the
University of Mississippi which currently holds the
contract with NIDA for growing marijuana to
supply United States researchers.
2 The meaning of 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1) and the
competition issue are discussed in detail in part C
of the discussion section of this final order.
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Under the second approach of
interpreting 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1) to
require DEA to consider whether
competition is inadequate, the ALJ first
turned to whether the supply of
marijuana currently available to
researchers through HHS is adequate. In
this regard, the ALJ found that while
‘‘there have been some problems with
the marijuana that the National Center
produces, * * * a preponderance of the
evidence establishes that the quality is
generally adequate.’’ Id. The ALJ further
found, however, that ‘‘NIDA’s system
for evaluating requests for marijuana for
research has resulted in some
researchers who hold DEA registrations
and requisite approval from [HHS] being
unable to conduct their research
because NIDA has refused to provide
them with marijuana.’’ Id. The ALJ thus
concluded ‘‘that the existing supply of
marijuana is not adequate.’’ Id. The ALJ
also concluded that competition is
inadequate within the meaning of 21
U.S.C. 823(a)(1). Id. 3 The ALJ thus held
that the first public interest factor, 21
U.S.C. 823(a)(1), supported granting
Respondent’s application.
Under the second public interest
factor, 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(2), the ALJ
found that there was ‘‘neither evidence
nor contention that Respondent has not
complied with applicable laws’’ and
thus concluded that this factor
supported the granting of Respondent’s
application. See id.
Under the third public interest factor,
21 U.S.C. 823(a)(3), as to whether
granting Respondent’s application
would promote technical advances in
the art of manufacturing controlled
substances, the ALJ found that
Respondent has ‘‘considerable
experience in cultivating medicinal
plants, which might promote technical
advances in the cultivation of marijuana
or developing new medications from it.’’
ALJ at 85–86. The ALJ nonetheless
found that ‘‘there is not sufficient
evidence in the record on which to base
a finding as to whether granting
Respondent’s registration would
promote technical advances.’’ Id. at 86.
Under the fourth public interest
factor, 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(4), the ALJ
3 In so finding, the ALJ rejected the Government’s
contention that because the NIDA contract is open
to competitive bidding, adequate competition
exists. According to the ALJ, ‘‘[t]he question is not
* * * whether the NIDA process addresses that
agency’s needs, but whether marijuana is made
available to all researchers who have a legitimate
need for it in their research. As discussed above, I
answer that question in the negative.’’ Id. at 85.
As further support for her conclusion, the ALJ
reasoned that ‘‘the NIDA contract requires the
contractor to analyze’’ marijuana seized by law
enforcement agencies, and that ‘‘a qualified
cultivator may not be able to fulfill’’ this
requirement.’’Id.
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found that it was ‘‘undisputed that
Respondent has never been convicted of
any violation of any law pertaining to
controlled substances’’ and therefore
this factor weighed in favor of granting
the application. Id.
Under the fifth public interest factor,
21 U.S.C. 823(a)(5), the ALJ considered
Respondent’s ‘‘past experience in
manufacturing controlled substances
and the existence of effective controls
against diversion.’’ Id. The ALJ
acknowledged that ‘‘Respondent has no
experience in manufacturing controlled
substances.’’ Id. Noting that Respondent
‘‘does have experience in growing
medicinal plants’’ and that ‘‘the risk of
diversion is minimal,’’ the ALJ
concluded that this factor supported
granted the application. Id.
Finally, under the sixth public
interest factor, 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(6), in
analyzing such other factors as are
relevant to and consistent with public
health and safety, the ALJ rejected the
Government’s contention that granting
the application would ‘‘circumvent[]’’
HHS’s policy with respect to the
provision of marijuana to researchers.
Id. Reasoning that ‘‘the NIH Guidance
by its own terms applies to marijuana
that [HHS] makes available, [and] not
[to] marijuana that might be available
from some other legitimate source[,]’’
the ALJ concluded that ‘‘the NIH
Guidance is not a factor in determining
whether Respondent’s application
should be granted.’’ Id. The ALJ thus
concluded that granting Respondent’s
application ‘‘would be in the public
interest,’’ and recommended that I grant
his application. Id. at 87.
The Government excepted to the
ALJ’s decision on numerous grounds,
and Respondent filed a response to the
Government’s exceptions. Thereafter,
the record was forwarded to me for final
agency action.
Having considered the record as a
whole, I hereby issue this Decision and
Final Order. For reasons explained more
fully below, I reject the ALJ’s legal
conclusion ‘‘that the Single Convention
does not preclude registering
Respondent.’’ Id. at 82. Moreover, I
reject the ALJ’s finding that the
proposed registration is consistent with
the public interest when considering the
six factors enumerated in 21 U.S.C.
823(a). Id. at 82–86. I therefore reject the
ALJ’s recommendation that the
application be granted. See id. at 87.
Findings
Under Federal Law, marijuana and
tetrahydrocannabinols (THC) are
schedule I controlled substances. 21
U.S.C. 812(c), Schedule I(c)(10) & (17).
Congress placed marijuana and THC in
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schedule I because the substances have
‘‘a high potential for abuse,’’ ‘‘no current
accepted medical use in treatment in the
United States,’’ and ‘‘a lack of accepted
safety for use * * * under medical
supervision.’’ 21 U.S.C. 812(b)(1). See
also 66 FR 20038 (2001) (denying
petition to reschedule marijuana from
schedule I), petition for review
dismissed, Gettman v. DEA, 290 F.3d
430 (D.C. Cir. 2002).4
Marijuana is cultivated from the
cannabis plant, which is recognized as
‘‘a very adaptive plant [whose]
characteristics are even more variable
than most plants.’’ GX 25, at 7.
Marijuana, which consists primarily of
the dried flowering tops and leaves of
the cannabis plant,5 ‘‘is a variable and
complex mixture of biologically active
compounds.’’ Id. As of 2001, 483
different chemical constituents had
been identified in marijuana, including
approximately 66 cannabinoids.6 66 FR
at 20041; Tr. 1142, 1147. ‘‘THC 7 is the
main psychoactive cannabinoid in
marijuana’’; the plant, however, also
contains ‘‘[v]arying proportions of other
cannabinoids, mainly cannabidiol (CBD)
and cannabinol (CBN),’’ which
‘‘sometimes [exist] in quantities that
might modify the pharmacology of THC
or cause effects of their own.’’ Id. at 7–
8.
4 As related in the Notice, the FDA recommended
that marijuana be maintained in schedule I of the
CSA. The FDA based its finding on, inter alia, the
extensive evidence that marijuana has a history and
pattern of abuse, that it is ‘‘[t]he most frequently
used illicit drug,’’ and that it ‘‘has a high potential
for abuse.’’ 66 FR at 20047 & 20051. The FDA also
found that ‘‘[t]here are not FDA-approved medical
products,’’ ‘‘marijuana does not have a currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States or a currently accepted medical use with
severe restrictions,’’ and ‘‘that, even under medical
supervision, marijuana has not been shown to have
an acceptable level of safety.’’ 66 FR at 20052.
5 The legal definition of marijuana, as set forth in
the CSA, 21 U.S.C. 802(16), is as follows: The term
‘‘marihuana’’ means all parts of the plant Cannabis
sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof;
the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and
every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,
mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or
resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks
of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil
or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any
other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,
mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks
(except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or
cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is
incapable of germination.
6 Cannabinoids are chemical compounds that are
unique to the cannabis plant (not found in any
other plant). Tr. 1140–41.
7 While there are numerous isomers of THC (all
of which fall within the listing of
‘‘Tetrahydrocannabinols’’ in schedule I of the CSA
and many of which are found in the cannabis
plant), delta-9-THC is the isomer that is recognized
as the primary psychoactive component in
marijuana and, for this reason the term ‘‘THC’’ is
often used to refer to delta-9-THC. See 66 FR at
20045; Tr. 1146–47.
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The National Center and NIDA’s Drug
Supply Program
Since 1968, the National Center for
Natural Products Research (National
Center), a division of the University of
Mississippi, has held a contract with the
Federal Government to grow marijuana
for research purposes and held the
requisite registrations under the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), as
well as the federal law that preceded the
CSA, authorizing the University to
conduct such activity.8 Tr. 1152–53,
1350–51. See also 21 CFR 1301.13. The
contract, which is open for competitive
bidding at periodic intervals, see GX 15,
is administered by NIDA, a component
of NIH (which is part of HHS), pursuant
to its Drug Supply Program. RX 1, at
231. Since 1999, the term of the contract
has been five years. See GXs 13 & 15;
Tr. 1156.
Under the NIDA contract, the
National Center ‘‘[g]row[s], harvest[s],
store[s], ship[s] and analyze[s] cannabis
of different varieties, as required.’’ GX
13, at 6. The contract requires that the
National Center ‘‘shall serve as NIDA’s
cannabis drug repository,’’ as well as
‘‘develop and produce standardized
marijuana cigarettes within a range of
specified THC content, and placebos for
use in pre-clinical and clinical research
programs,’’ and maintain minimum
stocks of both bulk marijuana and
marijuana cigarettes of various THC
contents, and store them in a DEA
approved facility. Id. at 6–7.
Marijuana potency is primarily based
on the concentration (percentage by
weight) of THC in the plant material. Tr.
1148–49. As of August 25, 2005, the
National Center held on behalf of NIDA
approximately 1055 kilograms (kg) of
marijuana with THC contents ranging
up to 12.26 percent. See RX 53. This
inventory includes six batches of
marijuana with THC contents ranging
from 9.02 to 9.89 percent,9 one batch (of
nearly 19 kg) with a THC content of 10
percent, nearly 25 kg with a THC
content of 11.34 percent, and
approximately 27 kg with a THC content
of 12.26 percent.10 See id. In his
testimony, Mahmoud ElSohly, Ph.D.,
who is the Principal Investigator under
the NIDA contract, and who has
overseen the National Center’s work
with marijuana since 1980, stated that
8 Initially, the National Center obtained a
researcher’s registration; it now also holds a
manufacturer’s registration.
9 These batches range from approximately 12 to
15 kg in size.
10 As of the date of the hearing, more than
920,000 marijuana cigarettes of various THC
concentrations including placebo had been
manufactured pursuant to the NIDA contracts
between 1974 and 2003. GX 27.
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the Center is capable of producing
marijuana with a THC content of 20
percent or more.11 Tr. 1130–31, 1152,
1203, 1254–55.
The contract also requires the
National Center to ‘‘ship to research
investigators as authorized by the
[NIDA] Project Officer upon receipt of a
shipment order.’’ GX 13, at 7. While the
NIDA ‘‘Project Officer may preauthorize any normal recurring requests
that the contractor will then fill once it
has received’’ various assurances,12 the
contract further states that ‘‘[a]ll other
requests should be submitted to the
NIDA Project Officer for approval.’’ Id.
at 8. Moreover, ‘‘[i]f there is a reason to
question a particular request, the
Contractor shall inform the NIDA
Project Officer who will make a final
decision on providing the material and
quantity requested.’’ Id. As these
provisions make clear, the National
Center has no authority to distribute any
of the marijuana it produces pursuant to
the NIDA contract without NIDA’s
approval.13
11 11 As Dr. ElSohly explained, he has grown
numerous strains of marijuana from seeds that have
been obtained from a variety of countries and has
used them to do ‘‘genetic selection to have genetic
material of high potency.’’ Tr. 1255.
12 These include that the researcher have the
appropriate DEA registration and FDA/IND
approvals, provide assurance that the marijuana
‘‘will not be resold’’ and ‘‘will be used only for
research or patient purposes,’’ that the use of the
marijuana will adhere to the appropriate Safety
Standards for research,’’ and that the researcher
agree ‘‘to comply with all Federal, State and Local
Safety requirements for use of the materials.’’ See
GX 13, at 8.
13 Independent of its contract with NIDA, the
National Center holds an additional registration to
manufacture marijuana and THC. GXs 75 & 78. The
National Center was granted this registration under
the terms of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
entered into with DEA in 1999. GX 78. As set forth
in the MOA, the purpose of the registration was ‘‘to
allow the Center to develop a new product
formulation for effecting delivery of [THC] in a
pharmaceutically acceptable dosage form
suppository * * * and to provide crude THC
extract to a DEA-registered manufacturer of THC for
further purification.’’ Id. at 2. The MOA further
stated that, under the terms thereof, the Center
would ‘‘manufacture marijuana for the purpose of
extracting THC therefrom.’’ Id. Subsequently, the
Center submitted a new application for a
registration to bulk manufacture marijuana and
THC ‘‘to prepare marihuana extract for further
purification into bulk active [THC] for use in
launching FDA-approved pharmaceutical
products.’’ 70 FR 47232 (2005). DEA has not yet
issued a final order as to this application. (DEA
publishes in the Federal Register all final orders on
applications for registration to bulk manufacture
schedule I and II controlled substances.)
The MOA further provided that ‘‘[i]n accordance
with articles 23 and 28 of the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs * * * private trade in ‘cannabis’ is
strictly prohibited. Therefore, the Center shall not
distribute any quantity of marijuana to any person
other than an authorized DEA employee.’’ GX 78,
at 2. Continuing, the MOA explained that ‘‘[t]he
Single Convention does not prohibit private trade
in ‘cannabis preparations,’ ’’ and noted that this
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In 1997, the White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy asked the
Institute of Medicine (IOM), a
component of the National Academy of
Sciences, to conduct a review of the
scientific evidence regarding the
potential health benefits and risks of
marijuana and its constituent
cannabinoids. RX 1, at 7. In 1999, the
IOM published its report. The IOM
found, among other things, that
‘‘[d]efined substances, such as purified
cannabinoid compounds, are preferable
to plant products, which are of variable
and uncertain composition. Use of
defined cannabinoids permits a more
precise evaluation of their effects,
whether in combination or alone.’’ RX 1,
at 22. With respect to this issue, the
IOM reached the following conclusion:
‘‘Scientific data indicate the potential
therapeutic value of cannabinoid drugs,
primarily THC, for pain relief, control of
nausea and vomiting, and appetite
stimulation; smoked marijuana,
however, is a crude THC delivery
system that also delivers harmful
substances.’’ Id. The report further
stated:
The therapeutic effects of cannabinoids are
most well established for THC, which is the
primary psychoactive ingredient of
marijuana. But it does not follow from this
that smoking marijuana is good medicine.
Although marijuana smoke delivers THC
and other cannabinoids to the body, it also
delivers harmful substances, including most
of those found in tobacco smoke. In addition,
plants contain a variable mixture of
biologically active compounds and cannot be
expected to provide a precisely defined drug
effect. For those reasons there is little future
in smoked marijuana as a medically
approved medication. If there is any future in
cannabinoid drugs, it lies with agents of more
certain, not less certain, composition.’’ 14
term, ‘‘within the meaning of the Single
Convention, is a mixture, solid or liquid containing
cannabis, cannabis resin, or extracts or tinctures of
cannabis.’’ Id. Because ‘‘[t]he THC that the Center
will extract from marijuana [is] considered such a
‘cannabis preparation[,]’ * * * the Center may, in
accordance with the Single Convention, distribute
the crude THC extract to private entities’’ provided
the Center otherwise complies with the CSA and
DEA regulations. Id. at 2–3. The MOA also set forth
a detailed series of controls to maintain
accountability of the marijuana from acquisition of
the seeds through the extraction of THC from the
harvested material. Id. at 3–7.
14 To similar effect, an ad hoc group of experts,
who were selected by NIH and convened in 1997
as part of a workshop to assess the potential
medical uses of marijuana, issued a report to the
Director of NIH, which noted:
As with any smoked drug (e.g., nicotine or
cocaine), characterizing the pharmacokinetics of
THC and other cannabinoids from smoked
marijuana is a challenge. A person’s smoking
behavior during an experiment is difficult for a
researcher to control. People differ. Smoking
behavior is not easily quantified. An experienced
marijuana smoker can titrate and regulate doses to
obtain the desired acute psychological effects and
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Id. at 195–96. See also GX 53 (letter
from Alice P. Mead, GW
Pharmaceuticals, P.L.C., to Christine V.
Beato, Acting Asst. Sec. for Health, HHS
(Apr. 12, 2005)) (‘‘[H]erbal cannabis
should comprise only the starting
material from which a bona fide
medical product is ultimately derived.
* * * [S]tandardizing herbal starting
material represents only the first of
many steps necessary to create a modern
medicine that is safe and effective for
use in specific medical conditions.
* * * [A] final medical product * * *
must also be delivered in a dosage form
that is consistent in composition and
that allows the patient to obtain an
identifiable and reliable amount of
medication.’’) (emphasis in original).
Accordingly, the IOM recommended
that clinical trials using cannabinoid
drugs should be conducted with ‘‘the
goal of developing rapid-onset, reliable,
and safe delivery systems.’’ Id. at 197.
The IOM also advised that clinical trials
involving smoked marijuana ‘‘should
involve only short-term marijuana use
(less than six months), should be
conducted in patients with conditions
for which there is a reasonable
expectation of efficacy, should be
approved by institutional review boards,
and should collect data about efficacy.’’
Id.
Also in 1999, due in part to an
increased interest in marijuana research
and taking into account the IOM report,
HHS decided to change the procedures
by which it would supply marijuana to
researchers. Tr. 1632–33; GX 24. The
new procedures were announced in a
document released by NIH on May 21,
1999. GX 24, at 1. In the announcement,
‘‘HHS recognize[d] the need for
objective evaluations of the potential
merits of cannabinoids for medical
uses[,]’’ and that ‘‘[i]f a positive benefit
is found, * * * the need to stimulate
development of alternative, safer dosage
forms.’’ Id. at 2. Toward this end, NIH
explained that the new procedures were
to avoid overdose and/or minimize undesired
effects. Each puff delivers a discrete dose of THC
to the body. Puff and inhalation volume changes
with phase of smoking, tending to be highest at the
beginning and lowest at the end of smoking a
cigarette. * * * During smoking, as the cigarette
length shortens, the concentration of THC in the
remaining marijuana increases; thus, each
successive puff contains an increasing
concentration of THC.
One consequence of this complicated process is
that an experienced marijuana smoker can regulate
almost on a puff-by-puff basis the dose of THC
delivered to lungs and thence to brain. A less
experienced smoker is more likely to overdose or
underdose. Thus a marijuana researcher attempting
to control or specify dose in a pharmacologic
experiment with smoked marijuana has only partial
control over the drug dose actually delivered.
See GX 25, at 9–10 (Workshop on the Medical
Utility of Marijuana).
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designed to increase the availability of
marijuana for research purposes by,
among other things, making such
marijuana ‘‘available on a costreimbursable basis.’’ Id. This new
procedure allowed researchers who
were privately funded to obtain
marijuana from HHS by reimbursing the
NIDA contractor for the cost of the
marijuana. Tr. 1633; see also GX 31, at
3. This was a departure from the prior
practice (pre-1999), whereby HHS only
made marijuana available to persons
who received NIH funding. Id. The new
procedures implemented by HHS in
1999 remain in effect today. Tr. 1629.
HHS further stated in 1999 that it
intended through the new procedures
‘‘to make available a sufficient amount
of research-grade marijuana to support
those studies that are the most likely to
yield usable, essential data.’’ GX 24, at
2. With respect to those researchers who
do not have NIH funding, HHS
explained that ‘‘the scientific merits of
each protocol will be evaluated through
a Public Health Service
interdisciplinary review process [which]
will take into consideration a number of
factors, including the scientific quality
of the proposed study, the quality of the
organization’s peer-review process, and
the objective of the proposed research.’’
Id.
HHS then identified the criteria it
would apply in evaluating requests for
marijuana:
The extent to which the protocol
incorporates the elements of good clinical
and laboratory research;
The extent to which the protocol describes
an adequate and well-controlled clinical
study to evaluate the safety and effectiveness
of marijuana and its constituent
cannabinoids in the treatment of a serious or
life threatening condition;
The extent to which the protocol describes
an adequate and well-controlled clinical
study to evaluate the safety and effectiveness
of marijuana and its constituent
cannabinoids for a use for which there are no
alternative therapies;
The extent to which the protocol describes
a biopharmaceutical study designed to
support the development of a dosage form
alternative to smoking; [and]
The extent to which the protocol describes
high-quality research designed to address
basic, unanswered scientific questions about
the effects of marijuana and its constituent
cannabinoids or about the safety or toxicity
of smoked marijuana.
Id. at 3.
HHS further noted that ‘‘[a] clinical
study involving marijuana should
include certain core elements,’’ and that
‘‘[a] study that incorporates the [1997]
NIH Workshop recommendations will
be expected to yield useful data and
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2105
therefore, will be more likely to receive
marijuana under the HHS program.’’ Id.
Finally, HHS explained that the
‘‘proposed protocols must be
determined to be acceptable under
FDA’s standards for authorizing the
clinical study of investigational new
drugs.’’ Id. Relatedly, HHS stated that
‘‘although FDA’s review of Phase 1
submissions will focus on assessing the
safety of Phase 1 investigations, FDA’s
review of Phases 2 & 3 submissions will
also include an assessment of the
scientific quality of the clinical
investigations and the likelihood that
the investigations will yield data
capable of meeting statutory standards
for marketing approval.’’ Id. HHS
further made clear that if a protocol is
approved, ‘‘NIDA will provide the
researcher with authorization to
reference NIDA’s marijuana Drug Master
File.’’ Id. at 4.
At the administrative hearing in this
case, Steven Gust, Ph.D., Special
Assistant to the Director of NIDA,
explained that, in addition to seeking to
facilitate research into the possible
medical utility of marijuana, the new
procedures implemented by HHS in
1999 were intended ‘‘to make the
process more standardized, and to
* * * provide some expertise that did
not really exist at NIDA in terms of
reviewing applications that involved
* * * the use of marijuana * * * for
treatment of diseases.’’ Tr. 1632–33.
Accordingly, HHS ‘‘established a
separate peer review process that * * *
moved the review into the Public Health
Service [a component of HHS] * * *
where additional expertise from other
NIH Institutes and other Federal
agencies’’ could be utilized in reviewing
the scientific merit of the applications.
Id. at 1633–34. Dr. Gust further
explained that the members of the
review committee are drawn from the
various specialty institutes of NIH, and
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA). Id.
at 1692; 1713–15.15 Dr. Gust also
testified that the ‘‘scientific bar has been
set very low, [so] that any project that
has scientific merit is approved,’’ and
that ‘‘anything that gets approved gets
NIDA marijuana.’’ Id. at 1700–01. As of
April 2004, HHS had approved at least
seventeen pre-clinical or clinical studies
of marijuana, which were sponsored by
the California Center for Medical
Cannabis Research (CMCR).16 GX 31, at
15 Dr. Gust initially testified that someone from
FDA sits on the committee but later stated that he
was not exactly sure if this was so. Tr. 1712.
16 The California research studies were conducted
pursuant to a law enacted by California in 1999
known as the Marijuana Research Act of 1999. Cal.
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3. According to one witness who
testified on behalf of Respondent, all of
the CMCR-sponsored researchers who
applied to NIDA for marijuana did in
fact receive marijuana from NIDA. Tr.
694–95.
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Respondent’s Application and
Contentions
Respondent is a Professor in the
Department of Plant, Soil and Insect
Sciences at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst. Tr. 13. On June
28, 2001, Respondent submitted an
application to bulk manufacture the
schedule I controlled substances
marijuana and tetrahydrocannabinols.17
GXs 1 & 3; 21 CFR 1308.11(d).
Respondent’s application is sponsored
by the Multidisciplinary Associations
for Psychedelic Studies (MAPS). GX 3,
at 1.
Because Respondent seeks a
registration to manufacture a schedule I
controlled substance, DEA required that
he complete a questionnaire.18 In
response to the question regarding the
purpose for which he sought
registration, Respondent stated that
‘‘[t]he plant material will be grown for
federally-approved uses only, including
analytical, pre-clinical, and clinical
Health & Safety Code § 11362.9. This state law
established the ‘‘California Marijuana Research
Program’’ to develop and conduct studies on the
potential medical utility of marijuana. Id. (The
program is also referred to as the ‘‘Center for
Medicinal Cannabis Research’’ (CMCR). Tr. 396.)
The state legislature appropriated a total of $9
million for the marijuana research studies. Tr. 397.
The state law was enacted following the passage of
Proposition 215, a ballot initiative otherwise known
as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996. Tr. 395–96;
see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’
Cooperative (‘‘OCBC’’), 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001).
17 On his application for registration (GX 1),
Respondent incorrectly checked the box for ‘‘dosage
form’’ manufacturing when, in fact (based on the
activity in which he proposes to engage), he is
seeking to become registered as a ‘‘bulk’’
manufacturer. In written questions DEA submitted
to Respondent as a follow-up to the application,
DEA properly characterized the activity as ‘‘bulk
manufacture,’’ and Respondent, in his written
answers to these questions, gave no indication that
he disagreed. See GX 3. Also, in his testimony at
the hearing, Respondent acknowledged that his
plan was to send marijuana ‘‘in bulk’’ to others,
who would roll it into cigarettes. Tr. at 243.
Respondent also testified that MAPS President Rick
Doblin ‘‘assisted in the response to the bulk
manufacturer’s questions.’’ Tr. 352 (emphasis
added). Cf. 32 CFR 1300.02(b)(32) (defining ‘‘drug
product’’ as ‘‘an active ingredient in dosage form
that has been approved or otherwise may be
lawfully marketed under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act for distribution in the United States’’);
21 CFR 1301.72(a) & 1304.22(a) (listing ‘‘bulk
materials awaiting further processing’’ separately
from ‘‘finished products’’).
18 As set forth in 21 CFR 1301.15: ‘‘The
Administrator may require an applicant to submit
such documents or written statements of fact
relevant to the application as he/she deems
necessary to determine whether the application
should be granted.’’
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research,’’ and that ‘‘no material is
intended for illegal use or for medical
marijuana patients whose use may be
legal under state, but not federal law.’’
GX 3, at 1.19
Respondent added that ‘‘[t]he
production costs * * * would be
underwritten by a grant’’ from MAPS.
Id. According to Respondent, ‘‘MAPS is
seeking to develop the marijuana plant
into an FDA-approved prescription
medicine,’’ and that ‘‘[t]he growth of
plants at [UMASS] is a necessary step
for supplying quality marijuana for use
in MAPS’ drug development process.’’
Id. Respondent also advised that
‘‘MAPS will sponsor research at other
institutions using smoked marijuana
and marijuana delivered through a
vaporizer device that heats, but does not
burn the plant material, thus reducing
the products of combustion normally
found in smoked marijuana.’’ Id.
Respondent further stated that his
‘‘[c]ustomers would include both
MAPS-sponsored research and research
sponsored by other organizations.’’ Id. at
3. Relatedly, Respondent explained that
‘‘[r]esearchers conducting MAPS
sponsored research would receive
supplies of the plant material free, while
other researchers would either receive
the marijuana free or through a donation
to MAPS.’’ Id. at 1. See also Tr. 225 (‘‘I
may very well be approached by other
people with approved studies who need
a source also.’’).
At the hearing, Mr. Rick Doblin, the
President of MAPS,20 also testified
regarding the purpose of Respondent’s
application. Mr. Doblin, who admitted
that he engages in recreational use of
marijuana on a weekly basis, explained
that ‘‘[t]he reason we need a supply
from Dr. Craker is that we are engaged
in trying to make marijuana into an
FDA-approved prescription medicine,
and * * * we need to establish a drug
master file for a particular product, and
* * * we need to conduct research with
that product, and have that product
available to us for potential marketing
should we get FDA approval.’’ Tr. 603,
718–19. Mr. Doblin testified as to his
‘‘belie[f] that smoked marijuana or
vaporized marijuana in plant form will
successfully compete with marijuana
extracts on price.’’ Id. at 605. He also
testified as to his belief that the
19 Respondent further testified that it was his
intention to simply send bulk marijuana to
researchers who would then roll their own
cigarettes. Tr. at 243.
20 When asked during the hearing about the title
of his organization (Multidisciplinary Association
for Psychedelic Studies) and, in particular the term
‘‘Psychedelic,’’ Mr. Doblin explained, in part, ‘‘it’s
about tools and procedures that bring to the surface
people’s subconscious and unconscious and, you
know, deeper emotions.’’ Tr. 474.
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‘‘efficacy and safety’’ of vaporized plantform marijuana ‘‘will be similar’’ to
drugs containing cannabinoid extracts
and that ‘‘the efficacy will be similar
and safety slightly different with
smoked’’ marijuana than with drugs
containing cannabinoid extracts. Id.
Mr. Doblin further testified that he
‘‘disagree[d]’’ with the Institute of
Medicine’s conclusion that defined and
purified cannabinoid compounds ‘‘are
preferable to plant products, which are
of variable and uncertain composition.’’
Id. at 654. Mr. Doblin also testified that
‘‘what we’re trying to do is get the
Public Health Service and NIDA out of
the picture; they’re only in the picture
just for marijuana only because they
have a monopoly. And that is what is
so obstructing the system.’’ Id. at 666.
Finally, Mr. Doblin testified that
MAPS would only need between $5 to
$10 million ‘‘to make marijuana into a
medicine’’ through the various stages of
the FDA new drug approval (NDA)
process.21 Id. at 701; see also id. at 703.
In his testimony, Mr. Doblin did not,
however, identify a single instance in
which an entity (whether for-profit or
nonprofit) had taken a drug—let alone a
botanical substance with known safety
issues, See, e.g., GX 43, at 9—through
the multi-faceted NDA process for a
similar cost.22 Moreover, while Mr.
21 In a recent Supreme Court decision, Justice
Ginsberg, in a dissenting opinion, summarized the
process by which FDA approves new drugs for
marketing as follows:
The process for approving a new drug begins with
preclinical laboratory and animal testing. The
sponsor of the new drug then submits an
investigational new drug application seeking FDA
approval to test the drug on humans. See 21 U.S.C.
355(i); 21 CFR 312.1 et seq. (2007). Clinical trials
generally proceed in three phases involving
successively larger groups of patients: 20 to 80
subjects in phase I; no more than several hundred
subjects in phase II; and several hundred to several
thousand subjects in phase III. 21 CFR 312.21. After
completing the clinical trials, the sponsor files a
new drug application containing, inter alia, ‘‘full
reports of investigations’’ showing whether the
‘‘drug is safe for use and * * * effective’’; the
drug’s composition; a description of the drug’s
manufacturing, processing, and packaging; and the
proposed labeling for the drug. 21 U.S.C. 355(b)(1).
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999, 1018–19
n.15 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
22 While Respondent produced evidence
establishing that the $800–880 million costs of
bringing a new drug to market includes research
and development costs incurred for drugs that are
not approved, as well as opportunity costs (the cost
of investing in research rather than something else),
see Tr. 161, 734–36, Respondent has not shown a
single instance in which an entity has obtained
FDA approval of a drug through the NDA process
for the cost range which Mr. Doblin claimed would
be sufficient to obtain approval of plant-form
marijuana.
Moreover, the IOM Report states that the average
cost of a Supplemental New Drug Application
(SNDA), which is used when a company seeks to
obtain FDA approval to market a drug (which has
already gone through the three phases of clinical
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Doblin testified that ‘‘the mission
statement [of MAPS] is to develop
psychedelics and marijuana into FDAapproved medicines and then to educate
the public about that’’ (Tr. 478), the
vagaries of his testimony prevent a clear
trials and been approved for marketing) for a new
indication, was $10 to 40 million. RX 1, at 214. It
should be noted, however, that in taking a drug
through the three phases, its sponsor will have
obtained extensive data regarding the drug’s safety
including ‘‘adverse effects of the drug [and]
clinically significant drug/drug interactions.’’ 21
CFR 314.50(d)(5)(vi).
In support of his assertion that MAPS could
obtain FDA approval for only $5 to $10 million, Mr.
Doblin testified that marijuana is different than
other drugs that go through the FDA approval
process. Mr. Doblin based this assertion on his
contentions that: marijuana has been used by ‘‘tens
of millions of people’’ while others drugs going
though the NDA process are only used by a few
thousand; there is ‘‘an enormous body of evidence
about [marijuana’s] safety * * * that we don’t need
to replicate;’’ and sufficient data to satisfy the FDA
as to marijuana’s safety and efficacy could be
obtained by testing only 500 to 600 people. Id. at
737–38.
The FDA’s guidance document for botanical drug
products makes plain that ‘‘[a] botanical drug
product that is not generally recognized as safe and
effective for its therapeutic claims is considered a
new drug under § 201(p) of the [Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic] Act,[]’’ and that ‘‘any person wishing to
market a botanical drug product that is a new drug
is required to obtain FDA approval of an NDA
* * * for that product.’’ GX 92A, at 7. Moreover,
‘‘an NDA must contain substantial evidence of
effectiveness derived from adequate and wellcontrolled clinical studies, evidence of safety, and
adequate CMC [chemistry, manufacturing, and
controls] information.’’ Id. See also GX 92A, at 27–
38 (specifying the information that must be
provided to FDA for phase 3 clinical studies of a
botanical product to meet the requirements of the
FDA regulations governing the contents of INDs).
Finally, with respect to the nonclinical safety
assessment required to support phase 3 clinical
trials, the FDA guidance states:
To support safety for expanded clinical studies or
to support marketing approval of a botanical drug
product, toxicity data from standard toxicology
studies in animals may be needed * * * . A
botanical product submitted for marketing approval
as a drug will be treated like any other new drug
under development. Safety data from previous
clinical trials conducted in foreign countries will be
considered in determining the need for nonclinical
studies. However, previous human experience may
be insufficient to demonstrate the safety of a
botanical product, especially when it is indicated
for chronic therapy. Systematic toxicological
evaluations could be needed to supplement
available knowledge on the general toxicity,
teratogenicity, mutagenecity, and carcinogenicity of
the final drug product.
Id. at 34. While Mr. Doblin asserted that MAPS
would not ‘‘need to replicate all those studies about
the genetics, * * * the effect on reproduction, the
effect in all sorts of bodily systems,’’ Tr. 737, he did
not identify any specific studies performed in other
countries that establish the safety of marijuana for
testing in phase 3 clinical studies. While millions
of people have undoubtedly used marijuana, few
have done so subject to the scientific rigor of a
controlled clinical trial. Nor did Respondent
produce any credible evidence establishing that the
various types of animal studies which FDA usually
requires to support phase 3 clinical trials would not
have to be performed. GX 92A, at 35–37.
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determination of how far along in that
goal he envisions MAPS to be.23
Correspondence Pertaining to the
Application
Subsequent to Respondent’s
submission of his application for a DEA
registration, on March 4, 2003, the Chief
of DEA’s Drug and Chemical Evaluation
Section wrote to Respondent noting that
‘‘it appears that the basis for your
application is the purported need for a
higher potency and higher ’quality’
marijuana product than that currently
available from the National Institute on
Drug Abuse.’’ GX 29, at 1. The DEA
letter further explained that the Agency
had ‘‘contacted NIDA, the Department
of Health and Human Services * * *
and some current researchers’’ and had
‘‘determined that * * * the quality of
marijuana available from NIDA is
acceptable,’’ that a high potency product
with a THC content of 7 to 8 percent
was currently ‘‘available to bona fide
research protocols,’’ and that if ‘‘[i]n the
future, should federally approved
research protocols require a higher
potency marijuana (i.e. 15 percent THC),
all believe that it could be supplied by
NIDA.’’ Id.
Thereafter, on June 2, 2003,
Respondent wrote to DEA
acknowledging that during a visit with
several agency Diversion Investigators,
the discussion had ‘‘primarily
focused[ed] on the need for an
alternative source of plant material to
that grown at the University of
Mississippi under contract to the
National Institute of Drug Abuse
(NIDA).’’ GX 30. Continuing,
Respondent stated that ‘‘[a] second
source of plant material is needed to
facilitate privately-funded, FDAapproved research into medical uses of
marijuana, ensuring a choice of sources
and an adequate supply of quality,
23 As indicated above, based on the record, no
clinical trials involving marijuana have advanced
beyond phase 1. Moreover, each sponsor must
submit to FDA his/her own IND to be authorized
to conduct clinical investigation with a new drug
(such as marijuana). See 21 CFR 312.20, 312.23.
Again, given the vagaries of Mr. Doblin’s testimony,
it cannot be determined whether there is sufficient
existing preclinical laboratory and animal studies
data to support a submission of an IND for whatever
proposed indications that Mr. Doblin has in mind
for his envisioned FDA-approved marijuana
medicine. But even assuming, arguendo, that MAPS
could successfully submit an IND based on existing
data, it would still have to proceed through
extensive clinical trials (see 21 CFR 312.21), and
then—assuming that such trials are fully successful
at demonstrating the basis for safety and efficacy
(which often is not the case with clinical trials)—
MAPS would still have to submit and obtain
approval of an NDA. All of these steps, and the
uncertainties as to the outcomes of each step,
further call into question Mr. Doblin’s estimate of
being able to obtain FDA approval of marijuana for
only $5 to $10 million.
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2107
research-grade marijuana for medicinal
applications.’’ Id. Consistent with these
statements, Respondent has declined to
bid on the NIDA contract. Tr. 252–53.
Respondent further asserted that
while ‘‘the primary researchers now
receiving plant material may openly
state to you that they are satisfied with
the current source, * * * in private
conversations these same researchers
indicate a fear of having the current
supply eliminated if they complain
about the available source material.’’ GX
30. As support for his contention
regarding the level of researcher’s
satisfaction with NIDA’s marijuana,
Respondent attached two items: a
reprint of a newspaper article and a
letter from a Dr. Ethan Russo to the
then-Chief of DEA’s Drug and Chemical
Evaluation Section. See GX 30a & 30b.
At the hearing, Respondent testified
that at the time he filed his application,
he had become concerned, based on
conversations he had with ‘‘other
people,’’ that the marijuana provided by
the National Center ‘‘may have been of
relatively low quality, and that [it] was
not readily available to run the clinical
trials which some people wanted to
run.’’ Tr. 215. When asked to provide
the names of these ‘‘other people’’ who
had told him this, Respondent said he
did not recall. Id.
Respondent’s Contentions Regarding
the Inadequacy of NIDA Marijuana
Respondent makes three principal
claims in support of his contention that
the supply of marijuana currently
available through NIDA is inadequate.
First, he claims that ‘‘NIDA does not
provide medical marijuana to all
legitimate researchers’’ and that ‘‘NIDA
has refused to provide marijuana to at
least three legitimate researchers.’’ Resp.
Prop. Findings at 12. Second, he claims
that ‘‘the quality of the NIDA marijuana
raises concerns for researchers and
patients.’’ Id. at 16. Third, he claims that
‘‘the NIDA supply was inadequate
because a pharmaceutical developer
could not reasonably rely on NIDA
marijuana to take marijuana through the
FDA new drug approval process.’’
Respondent’s Response to Govt.’s
Exceptions (hereafter, ‘‘Respondent’s
Resp.’’) at 16.
HHS’s Denials of Researcher’s Requests
for NIDA Marijuana
Respondent’s first claim is based on
three incidents over a decade-long time
period in which he alleges that
researchers were improperly denied
access to NIDA’s marijuana. The first
incident, which occurred in 1995,
involved an application submitted by
Donald Abrams, M.D., who sought
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marijuana from NIDA to study its effects
on persons with HIV-related wasting
syndrome. RX 15, at 1. NIDA rejected
Dr. Abrams’s application ‘‘based upon
issues of design, scientific merit and
rationale.’’ 24 Dr. Abrams subsequently
submitted a revised research protocol
that NIDA found to be scientifically
meritorious and for which NIDA
supplied marijuana in 1997.25 See GX
21, at 1. NIDA also supplied Dr. Abrams
with marijuana for subsequent studies.
Id.; Tr. 689. In any event, for purposes
of determining the relevance of the 1995
incident in which Dr. Abrams’ original
protocol was rejected by NIDA, it is
notable that this occurred before HHS
adopted its new guidelines for the
provision of marijuana for research
purposes. As Dr. Gust testified, in 1995,
HHS’s practice was to provide
24 That the above-quoted grounds were the bases
upon which NIDA denied Dr. Abrams’ original
application is implicit from the letter that Dr.
Abrams submitted to NIDA in response to the
denial (RX 15). These bases are explicitly stated in
NIDA’s April 19, 1995, letter to Dr. Abrams, which
appears on MAPS’ Web site (at https://
www.maps.org/mmj/leshner.html) and of which I
take official notice. This letter from NIDA stated,
among other things, the following:
Our decision here is based upon issues of design,
scientific merit and rationale. We believe that your
study will not adequately answer the question
posed.
Although the study propose[d] seeks to make a
dose-effect comparison of smoked marijuana to
delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), there is no real
dosing control. The marijuana is to be taken home
and there is no requirement and way to ensure that
the subjects smoke all available materials on any
fixed schedule. Additionally, that they are given a
two-week supply of marijuana at one time further
confounds the study design. Thus, we believe the
dose-effect component is confounded since the
study cannot correlate variability in weight gain
with dosage.
We also believe the study lacks adequate sample
size to make any inferences regarding the doseeffect relationship. . . . Another confounding
variable not adequately controlled for in your
proposed study is diet. Neither the total daily
caloric intake nor the percentages of the
composition of the foodstuffs is assessed.
In accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), an agency ‘‘may take official notice of
facts at any stage in a proceeding—even in the final
decision.’’ U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80
(1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
In accordance with the APA and DEA’s regulations,
Respondent is ‘‘entitled on timely request to an
opportunity to show to the contrary.’’ 5 U.S.C.
556(e); see also 21 CFR 1316.59(e). To allow
Respondent the opportunity to refute the facts of
which I take official notice, Respondent may file a
motion for reconsideration within fifteen days of
service of this order which shall commence with
the mailing of the order.
25 Following the 1996 passage of proposition 215,
NIDA contacted Dr. Abrams and asked him if he
would redesign his study to determine whether
marijuana usage by persons who were HIV-positive
(but who did not have AIDS-wasting syndrome)
increased viral load as well as the interaction of
marijuana with protease inhibitors. Tr. 523–24. Dr.
Abrams agreed to do so and NIDA provided him
with a $1 million grant to fund the study.
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marijuana only to researchers who
obtained NIH funding—a practice that
was abandoned by HHS in 1999 when
the agency adopted its new procedures
for facilitating marijuana research
(allowing privately funded researchers
to also obtain marijuana). Tr. 1749.
The second incident involved an
application by Dr. Ethan Russo, a
neurologist, who sought funding from
NIDA to study the use of marijuana to
treat migraine headaches beginning
around 1996. Tr. 527–28. The precise
dates of the events related to Dr. Russo
are somewhat unclear as Respondent
presented these events through the
testimony of Mr. Doblin. (Dr. Russo did
not testify.) Id. Based on Mr. Doblin’s
testimony, it appears that during 1996–
97, NIDA twice rejected Dr. Russo’s
protocol for reasons which are not
clearly established by the record. Id. at
527, 691–92. However, according to Mr.
Doblin, Dr. Russo conceded that, on
both of these two occasions when NIDA
rejected his protocol, NIDA’s bases for
doing so did include ‘‘some valid
critiques.’’ Tr. 692. Mr. Doblin testified
that Dr. Russo subsequently attempted
for a third time to obtain marijuana from
NIDA, but on this third occasion he
decided not to seek government funding
but to seek private funding to purchase
the marijuana from NIDA. Id. at 692.
According to Mr. Doblin, this third
protocol submitted by Dr. Russo was
approved by both the FDA and Dr.
Russo’s institutional review board, but
NIDA again refused to supply
marijuana. Id. at 692–93. When asked
when this last denial by NIDA occurred,
Mr. Doblin testified: ‘‘I think it was
1999.’’ Id. at 693.
As noted above, NIH announced on
May 21, 1999, HHS’s new procedures
for making marijuana available to
researchers. Bearing in mind that
Respondent had the burden of proving
any proposition of fact that he asserted
in the hearing, 21 CFR 1301.44(a),
nothing in Mr. Doblin’s testimony, or
any other evidence presented by
Respondent, established that HHS
denied Dr. Russo’s request for marijuana
under the new procedures implemented
by the agency in 1999. Indeed,
Respondent produced no evidence
showing that HHS has denied marijuana
to any clinical researcher with an FDAapproved protocol subsequent to the
adoption of the 1999 guidelines.
The third incident involved an
application by Chemic Laboratories
(Chemic), which—at the request of Mr.
Doblin—sought marijuana from NIDA in
2004 26 for a proposed study involving
26 It appears from the record that Chemic initially
applied to HHS for marijuana in 2003 but, at HHS’s
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a device known as the ‘‘Volcano
Vaporizer’’ (hereafter ‘‘Volcano’’). RX 49
& 52B. To understand the nature and
purpose of this proposed study, some
earlier facts that were disclosed at the
hearing need to be considered.
According to Mr. Doblin’s testimony,
prior to this incident (i.e., before
Chemic applied to NIDA for marijuana
in 2004), Mr. Doblin had devised an
elaborate arrangement whereby Chemic
received marijuana to conduct an earlier
study with the Volcano using marijuana
obtained outside of the HHS process
and without the knowledge or approval
of HHS or DEA. Specifically, Mr. Doblin
admitted that he encouraged persons
who obtained marijuana from ‘‘buyers’
clubs’’ in California as well as persons
who obtained their marijuana from
NIDA under HHS’s ‘‘compassionate use
program’’ 27 to anonymously send their
marijuana to a DEA-registered drug
testing laboratory so that MAPS could
compare the potency of the ‘‘buyers’
clubs’’ marijuana with that supplied by
NIDA.28 Tr. 668–82. Acting at the behest
of Mr. Doblin, once the drug testing
laboratory completed its analysis of the
marijuana it received through these
sources, it delivered the ‘‘extra’’
marijuana to Chemic, so that Chemic
could conduct testing on the Volcano.
Id. Chemic did conduct such testing,29
request, Chemic submitted a revised protocol,
which HHS considered to be submitted in 2004. See
GXs 49 & 52B.
27 See Kuromiya v. United States, 78 F.Supp.2d
367 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (describing compassionate use
program under which less than 10 persons
currently receive marijuana from HHS).
28 Because marijuana is a schedule I controlled
substance, human use is limited to ‘‘Governmentapproved research’’ in accordance with 21 U.S.C.
823(f). See OCBC, 532 U.S. at 491–492 and n.5. In
accordance with § 823(f) and the DEA regulations,
where a schedule I controlled substance is used in
research—including the HHS compassionate use
program—the activities involving the substance
must be limited to those authorized in the research
protocol. See 21 CFR 1301.13(e)(1)(v), 1301.18.
Research activities beyond those specified in the
protocol are prohibited absent the submission and
approval of a supplemental protocol. 21 CFR
1301.18(d). Respondent made no attempt to assert
that any of the research protocols associated with
the compassionate use program allow for the
distribution of marijuana to a drug testing
laboratory, as there is no basis for such an assertion.
The CSA prohibits the distribution of any
controlled substance except as authorized by the
Act, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and the Act makes no
allowance for ultimate users (including research
subjects) to distribute their controlled substances to
others.
29 Chemic was not registered with DEA under 21
U.S.C. 823(f) to conduct research with marijuana
and when DEA later learned that Chemic was
seeking to conduct a second marijuana study (when
Chemic subsequently sought to obtain marijuana
directly from NIDA and sought DEA’s authorization
for doing so), the agency so advised Chemic that
this activity required a research registration. See RX
49, at 2. DEA registrants are only authorized to
conduct activities with controlled substances ‘‘to
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which was funded by MAPS and the
California National Organization for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws (CaNORML),
and Chemic published its results in two
reports, one of which was co-authored
by CaNORML.30 See id.
Thus, this ‘‘third incident’’ to which
Respondent points involved an effort by
MAPS to expand upon the research that
Chemic had conducted on the
Volcano—this time using marijuana
directly obtained from NIDA rather than
using marijuana obtained without the
knowledge or approval of HHS or DEA.
Id. Under MAPS sponsorship and
oversight, Chemic so applied to NIDA in
2004. Id.; RX 52B. The protocol
submitted by Chemic proposed to heat
marijuana obtained from NIDA and from
a Dutch ‘‘medical marijuana’’ program
to three different temperature levels
below its combustion temperature and
to then ‘‘compare the quality and
relative percentage of available
cannabinoids’’ in the material obtained
from each source. RX 52B, at 2–3.
By letter dated July 27, 2005, a U.S.
Public Health Service (PHS) committee
of scientists, which evaluated Chemic’s
protocol pursuant to the 1999 Guidance,
rejected it on the grounds that the
‘‘project does not add to the scientific
knowledge base in a significant way.’’ 31
Id. at 4. With respect to the protocol’s
purpose of comparing the cannibinoid
content of NIDA and Dutch marijuana,
the PHS committee found that
‘‘[m]arijuana varies in THC content and
[that] simply demonstrating that this
device can measure those differences is
of little scientific value.’’ Id. at 3. The
PHS committee also found that the
protocol’s other purposes (‘‘to conduct a
reliability study of the device by
analyzing multiple vapor collections’’
and to ‘‘determine the ‘precision,
accuracy, robustness and efficacy’ of the
vaporizing device’’) did ‘‘not appear to
the extent authorized by their registration and in
conformity with other provisions of [the CSA].’’ 21
U.S.C. 822(b).
30 The first report, which was submitted by
Chemic in 2003 to MAPS and CaNORML, is titled
‘‘Evaluation of Volcano(r) Vaporizer for the Efficient
Emission of THC, CBD, CBN and the Significant
Reduction and/or Elimination of PolynuclearAromatic (PNA) Analytes Resultant of Pyrolisis,’’
and is available on MAPS’ Web site at https://
www.maps.org/mmj/vaporizerstudy4.15.03. The
second report, titled ‘‘Cannabis Vaporizer Combines
Efficient Delivery of THC with Effective
Suppression of Pyrolitic Compounds,’’ also appears
on MAPS’ Web site at https://www.maps.org/mmj/
Gieringer-vaporizer.pdf. I take official notice of both
documents. See also https://www.maps.org/newsletters/v13n1/13111gie.pdf (2003 MAPS news letter
discussing Vaporizer studies sponsored by MAPS
and NORML and the Marijuana Policy Project), of
which I take official notice.
31 HHS also noted that there were ‘‘a number of
technical concerns’’ with Chemic’s proposal. RX
52B, at 4.
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be a hypothesis driven research
project,’’ but rather, ‘‘analogous to a
process that is used to ‘validate’ an
analytical method.’’ Id. The PHS
committee thus concluded that the
‘‘overall aims of the project appear to be
descriptions of work that would need to
be conducted as part of good standard
laboratory procedure prior to a clinical
study.’’ Id.
The PHS Committee further noted
that, at that time (2005), a separate,
HHS-approved clinical trial involving
marijuana and the Volcano was already
underway. Id. This then-ongoing
clinical trial was being conducted by Dr.
Abrams and was sponsored by the
CMCR, using NIDA-supplied marijuana.
Id.; Tr. 689. Moreover, as the letter from
the PHS Committee indicates, one of the
documents that Dr. Abrams had
previously submitted in support of his
then-ongoing clinical trial was a report
that Chemic itself had prepared
regarding its prior study of marijuana
and the Volcano.32 GX 52B, at 3. Given
that Dr. Abrams’ clinical trial was
‘‘underway and is examining the
pharmacodynamics and
pharmacokinetics of several different
potencies of marijuana in human
volunteers using the Volcano(c) device,’’
the Committee concluded that ‘‘[i]t is
difficult to see what additional scientific
knowledge will be provided by the
current protocol, considering the prior
work done by the applicant, as
described in the above report, and the
ongoing clinical trial at CMCR.’’ Id.
Respondent also introduced into
evidence a letter from the President of
Chemic to HHS responding to several
points raised by the PHS Committee in
denying Chemic’s application. See RX
55. Respondent’s letter does not,
however, establish that HHS
impermissibly denied Chemic’s
application for marijuana.33 To the
contrary, the evidence supports the
conclusion that HHS (acting through the
PHS Committee) made its determination
not to supply marijuana on this
occasion based on scientific
considerations, finding that Chemic’s
then-latest proposed study was
32 The report, titled ‘‘Evaluation of Volcano®
Vaporizer for the efficient emission of THC, CBD,
CBN and the significant reduction and/or
elimination of polynuclear-aromatic (PNA) analytes
resultant of pyrolysis,’’ appears on MAPS Web site
as discussed in note 30.
33 If Chemic had a valid basis to challenge HHS’s
denial of its request for marijuana, it presumably
had remedies available to challenge that agency
action either within HHS or in the courts. See, e.g.,
5 U.S.C. 702 (‘‘A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action * * * is entitled to
judicial review thereof.’’). Respondent produced no
evidence showing that Chemic has pursued any
such remedies.
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duplicative of prior and ongoing
research and not likely to provide useful
data.
Respondent’s Contention That NIDA’s
Marijuana Is of Poor Quality
Respondent also contends that ‘‘[t]he
quality of the NIDA marijuana raises
concerns for researchers and patients.’’
Resp. Prop. Findings at 16. In this
regard, Respondent asserts that various
researchers have complained that
NIDA’s marijuana is of inconsistent
potency, that NIDA’s marijuana is harsh,
that NIDA’s marijuana is frequently
several years old and not fresh, that the
available product is of low potency, and
that NIDA’s product includes stems and
seeds. See id. at 16–27. Contrary to
Respondent’s view, the evidence does
not ‘‘demonstrate[] serious concerns
about the quality of NIDA’s’’ marijuana
products. Id. at 27. As explained below,
Respondent’s contentions are largely
based on snippets from questionnaires
in which the researchers generally
indicated their overall satisfaction with
the quality of NIDA’s marijuana. As the
ALJ found, ‘‘a preponderance of the
record establishes that the quality is
generally adequate.’’ ALJ at 84.
With respect to the contention that
NIDA’s marijuana is of inconsistent
potency or inadequate potency,
Respondent relies on comments
contained on three questionnaires that
were completed by researchers at DEA’s
request. Resp. Prop. Findings at 17–18.
One of the questions asked: ‘‘Have you
ever had any difficulty obtaining
marijuana from NIDA for all strengths of
cigarettes to meet research
requirements?’’ GX 16, at 8. While Dr.
Grant of the CMCR answered
affirmatively and added that ‘‘having
consistency of 6% -8% [THC] content
have been difficult,’’ he further stated
that NIDA ‘‘ha[s] been accommodating
by trying to produce the high %
products in a timely manner.’’ Id. at 9
(emphasis in original). In response to
another question regarding the adequacy
of NIDA’s products, Dr. Grant noted that
‘‘NIDA has been reliable[,]’’ and ‘‘they
have been easy to work with and
amenable to accommodating for the
requirements of the study.’’ Id. at 6.
It is true that Dr. Grant, in answering
this question, noted the problems with
the range of potency in the higher
potency material. Dr. Grant explained,
however, that the problems he found
regarding the range of potency were
attributable to the cigarettes being
‘‘handrolled and thus difficult to
prepare.’’ Id. Moreover, Dr. Grant
answered ‘‘yes’’ to the question of
whether NIDA’s current products were
‘‘adequate for your research purposes
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with regard to potency?’’ Id. at 15. Also,
in response to the question of whether
‘‘these problems [have] ever
compromised the study?,’’ Dr. Grant
indicated: ‘‘N/A.’’ Id. at 6.
Dr. Grant further indicated that he
had ‘‘no’’ information that ‘‘would lead
[him] to believe that the future supply
of marihuana required for research
would be insufficient or unavailable
through NIDA,’’ id. at 8, and that he had
‘‘no’’ concerns regarding ‘‘the
availability of research-grade marijuana
from NIDA’’ to meet CMCR’s future
needs. Id. at 9. While Dr. Grant also
indicated that it would be clinically
important to evaluate a higher potency
product than the 7–8 percent THC
content marijuana CMCR was currently
using, he also indicated that CMCR had
not sought a higher potency product but
had only discussed with NIDA the
feasibility of such a product. Id. at 16.
On his questionnaire, Ronald Ellis,
M.D., of the University of California,
San Diego, noted that in ‘‘[a]t least two
shipments, [there] was some variability
on stated THC content and the actual
[content] measured.’’ GX 17, at 6. Dr.
Ellis further noted, however, that NIDA
personnel ‘‘have been very responsive.’’
Id. Apparently, Dr. Ellis’s clinical trial
received some marijuana which was
supposed to have a THC content of 8
percent, but only had a content of
approximately 7 percent. Id. at 9. Dr.
Ellis indicated, however, that the
potency of NIDA’s current product was
adequate for research purposes. Id.
Respondent also relies on Dr. Donald
Abrams’ ‘‘no’’ answer regarding the
consistency of the potency of NIDA’s
product. Resp. Prop. Findings at 18
(citing GX 21, at 6). Dr. Abrams further
noted that ‘‘[o]riginally approved for
3.9% THC content, midway through the
‘Short-term effects * * *’ protocol,
NIDA informed [us] that the potency
had been downgraded to 3.5%.
Everything since is said to be at 3.5%.’’
GX 21, at 6. Notably, the ‘‘Short-term
effects’’ study occurred more than a
decade ago, and Dr. Abrams did not
indicate that there had been further
problems with the consistency of the
potency of the marijuana supplied by
NIDA for several later studies he
conducted.
Nor does the evidence support
Respondent’s contention that the
marijuana available through NIDA is of
insufficient potency to satisfy the needs
of legitimate researchers. In his brief,
Respondent relies on the statements of
Drs. Grant and Abrams that it would be
beneficial to evaluate the efficacy of
marijuana cigarettes with a higher THC
content than what was currently being
supplied by NIDA. Resp. Prop. Findings
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at 22–23 (citing GX 16 & 21).
Respondent, however, produced no
evidence establishing that any
researcher has obtained approval of
FDA and other reviewing authorities to
conduct clinical trials using higher THC
content marijuana. As Dr. Abrams
explained, he ‘‘wanted to use a higher
potency product but there were
questions from the [scientific review
board] and the funding agency
[CMCR].’’ GX 21, at 9.
Moreover, as Dr. ElSohly testified, the
National Center has in inventory
substantial quantities of bulk marijuana
material with THC contents of ten to
eleven percent and has some material
with a THC content of fourteen
percent.34 Tr. 1203. Dr. ElSohly also
testified that the National Center could
produce marijuana with a THC content
of up to 20 percent. Id. He further
testified that he had informed ‘‘some of
the investigators that if they want to,
they can order material of a certain
potency’’ and ‘‘roll their own
cigarettes.’’ Id. at 1204–05.
Respondent also maintains that
NIDA’s marijuana is harsh and that
some patients have complained that it
was ‘‘inferior in sensory qualities (taste,
harshness) [to] the marijuana they
smoke outside the laboratory,’’ and that
‘‘it was the worst marijuana they had
ever sampled.’’ Resp. Prop. Findings at
19–21. Yet, as the questionnaires
completed by the researchers indicate,
only a small percentage of study
subjects have complained about the
harshness of NIDA’s marijuana. See GX
18, at 7 (one of ten patients
complained); GX 21, at 8 (four out of
fifty dropped out because of quality);
GX 22, at 7 (‘‘Out of 100 plus subjects,
no more than [three] may have
commented that the product was
harsh.’’).35 Moreover, as one of the
34 Respondent also cites the questionnaire of Prof.
Aron Lichtman, of the Department of
Pharmacology, Virginia Commonwealth University,
who conducted research in animals. Resp. Proposed
Findings at 23 (citing GX 28). On his questionnaire,
Prof. Lichtman indicated that he ‘‘would [have]
prefer[red] something at a higher potency, but at the
time, 3–4% was the highest potency available.’’ GX
28, at 9. Prof. Lichtman’s questionnaire indicated,
however, that his study had last obtained marijuana
in 1999. Prof. Lichtman’s answer is thus not
probative of whether NIDA is currently capable of
providing marijuana of adequate potency to support
legitimate research needs.
Respondent’s evidence regarding the potency of
marijuana distributed by NIDA for patients in the
former Compassionate Investigational New Drug
program likewise dates back to 1999. See Resp.
Prop. Findings at 24 (citing RX 19, at 47–48). As
such, the evidence is not probative of whether
NIDA is currently capable of supplying marijuana
of adequate potency.
35 Dr. ElSohly testified: ‘‘I think you had like 50
subjects, and only three or four complained of the
harshness. That’s a very small percentage. You are
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researchers noted, it was unclear
whether the harshness was related to
the actual marijuana cigarettes or the
placebo material.36 As for Respondent’s
further contention that some patients
complained that NIDA’s marijuana ‘‘was
the worst they had ever sampled,’’ this
evidence does not establish that the
taste of the products rendered them
unsuitable for their intended use.37
Furthermore, Respondent provides no
scientific basis for his suggestion that
the research subjects’ description of the
degree of their subjective satisfaction
with the experience of smoking
marijuana in a research setting should
be a criterion for judging the adequacy
of the quality of marijuana for research
purposes.38
Finally, Respondent contends that
NIDA’s marijuana is frequently ‘‘not
fresh’’ and that it includes stems and
seeds. Resp. Prop. Findings at 21–22;
25–27. While the record contains some
evidence that older marijuana loses
some if its potency, all but one of the
researchers indicated that neither the
lack of freshness nor the existence of
plant parts (stems and seeds) had
adversely impacted their research. See
GX 16, at 13 (CMCR); GX 17, at 7 (Dr.
Ellis); GX 18, at 7 (Dr. Corey-Bloom); GX
19, at 7 (Dr. Israelski); 39 GX 20, at 7 (Dr.
Wallace); GX 22, at 7 (Dr. Polich); GX
28, at 7 (Prof. Lichtman); but see GX 21,
at 7–8 (Dr. Abrams) (indicating that four
going to get that regardless of what you administer.’’
Tr. at 1589.
36 As Dr. Cory-Bloom noted, it was unclear
whether the harshness was attributable to actual
marijuana cigarettes or placebo cigarettes. GX 18, at
7. Relatedly, Dr. ElSohly testified that the
complaints of harshness were likely attributable to
the placebo because ‘‘all of the components have
been extracted out . . . [s]o this will be just like
smoking * * * grass or * * * hay or something like
that or just paper that might have this harshness,
and there’s no soothing effect of the other
components in the plant material.’’ Tr. 1289–90.
37 Respondent also cites to hearsay evidence
regarding the experience of a single patient who
had previously used non-NIDA marijuana (illegally
obtained from California ‘‘buyers’’ clubs’’) without
problems but then purportedly developed
bronchitis upon smoking NIDA marijuana. Resp.
Prop. Findings at 21; Tr. 570. Even if I were to
credit this testimony, the record as a whole
establishes that NIDA’s marijuana was well
tolerated in the great majority of the various studies’
subjects.
38 Marijuana is known to cause, among other
things, ‘‘a distortion in the sense of time associated
with deficits in short-term memory and learning,’’
‘‘difficulty carrying on an intelligible conversation,’’
anxiety, paranoia, panic, depression, dysphoria,
delusions, illusions, and hallucinations. RX 1 (IOM
report), at 101–102. These effects impact the
determination of what, if any, weight to attach to
research subjects’ descriptions of their satisfaction
with the marijuana they have smoked.
39 Dr. Israelski did not recall any complaints
about the ‘‘freshness’’ of NIDA’s marijuana.
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out of fifty patients had ‘‘dropped out
due to quality’’).
Moreover, with respect to the
existence of stems and seeds in NIDA’s
marijuana, Dr. ElSohly acknowledged
that prior to 2001, there may have some
stems and seeds in the marijuana it sent
to the Research Triangle Institute (the
contractor for the manufacture of the
cigarettes). Tr. 1300–01. Dr. ElSohly
further testified, however, that in 2001,
the National Center acquired a special
de-seeding machine which removes all
the seeds and stems from the marijuana
that is used to manufacture cigarettes.
Id. at 1301. Respondent produced no
evidence showing that the marijuana
which the National Center has since
supplied has contained stems and
seeds.40
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
Respondent’s Contention That NIDA’s
Marijuana Is Inadequate To Support
The Development of Plant-Form
Marijuana Into an FDA-Approved
Prescription Drug
Respondent further contends that the
existing supply of NIDA marijuana is
inadequate because ‘‘MAPS seeks to
develop botanical marijuana as an FDAapproved prescription drug.’’ Resp.
Prop. Findings at 8. In support of this
contention, Respondent makes two
primary factual assertions. First, he
claims that ‘‘to develop a
pharmaceutical product, a developer
must have assured access to a reliable,
dependable source of the particular
formulation of the product the
developer needs, both for research, and
for distribution if the product is
approved,’’ and that ‘‘[w]ithout such a
source, there is no development.’’ Id. at
9. Second, he claims that ‘‘even before
the Phase [1] and Phase [2] studies on
a product, the developer must generally
submit a Drug Master File,’’41 and that
the Drug Master File (DMF) for NIDA’s
marijuana contains proprietary
information which NIDA controls. Id.
As for Respondent’s contentions
regarding the need to submit a DMF,
40 In support of its contention that NIDA
marijuana contains stems and seeds which renders
the product’s quality inadequate, Respondent also
cites an article, ‘‘Chronic Cannabis Use in the
Compassionate Investigational New Drug Program.’’
Resp. Prop. Findings at 26 (citing RX 19, at 49–50).
Respondent particularly notes two photographs of
marijuana that was manufactured in April 1999. See
id. This evidence thus predates the National
Center’s 2001 acquisition of a de-seeding machine.
41 I also take official notice of the FDA’s Guideline
For Drug Master Files (Sept. 1989) (available at
https://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/dmf.htm/).
According to this FDA guideline (at 2), ‘‘[a] Drug
Master File (DMF) is a submission to the [FDA] that
may be used to provide confidential detailed
information about facilities, processes, or articles
used in the manufacturing, processing, packaging,
and storing of one or more human drugs.’’
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Respondent asserts that ‘‘there is no
procedure to force [the DMF’s] owner to
make a Drug Master File, or the
information in it, available to a drug
developer.’’ Resp. Prop. Findings at 10
(citing Tr. 447–49; testimony of Dale
Gieringer). While Respondent concedes
that NIDA ‘‘has allowed the researchers
whom it chooses to supply with
marijuana to rely on that file,’’ and that
FDA has approved several Phase 1
studies using NIDA marijuana and the
information contained in the DMF, id. at
10, it contends that because NIDA’s
mission is to study drug abuse, it is not
likely that ‘‘NIDA would authorize
MAPS to rely on the NIDA marijuana
[DMF] currently on file with the FDA.’’
Id. at 45.
The 1999 HHS Guidance makes clear,
however, that if a proposed research
project meets the Department’s criteria
for the provision of research-grade
marijuana, ‘‘NIDA will provide the
researcher with authorization to
reference NIDA’s marijuana Drug Master
File.’’ GX 24, at 4. Moreover, as the FDA
has explained, ‘‘the submission of a
DMF is not required by law or
regulation,’’ but rather, ‘‘is submitted
solely at the discretion of the holder.’’
Guideline For Master Drug Files, at 2.
The FDA regulations provide: ‘‘FDA
ordinarily neither independently
reviews drug master files nor approves
or disapproves submissions to a drug
master file. Instead, the agency
customarily reviews the information
only in the context of an application
under part 312 or part [314].’’ 21 CFR
314.420(a). Accordingly, as the FDA
Guidelines explain, while ‘‘the
information contained in [a] DMF may
be used to support an Investigational
New Drug Application (IND), [or] a New
Drug application (NDA) * * * [a] DMF
is NOT a substitute for an IND [or]
NDA.’’ Guideline For Master Drug Files,
at 3.
Relatedly, David Auslander, M.D., the
Government’s expert witness in
pharmaceutical development, testified
that ‘‘not all companies do Drug Master
Files’’ and that ‘‘FDA does not
necessarily require a Drug Master File to
do a Phase [1] and Phase [2] study in all
cases if the Drug Master File * * *
comes from a producer that’s different
from the sponsor itself.’’ Tr. 2024. Dr.
Auslander also explained that a drug
developer may not even have a Drug
Master File at the time it applies to
conduct Phase 1 or Phase 2 studies. Id.
As Dr. Auslander further testified, the
necessary information can be submitted
in an IND or an NDA. Id. at 2024–25.
As for the contention that NIDA is not
a reliable source of supply, it is
undisputed that a for-profit drug
PO 00000
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Sfmt 4703
2111
developer would be unlikely to take a
drug through the FDA approval process
unless it was ‘‘assured that they would
have a drug supply that is unchanging
and reliable.’’ Tr. 117 (testimony of
Irwin Martin, Ph.D.). Dr. Martin also
testified that ‘‘[o]ne of the biggest
problems in drug development is the
unfortunate need sometimes to repeat
studies. If you have a new formulation
or your drug source has changed, you
many need to repeat years worth of data
because you can no longer assure that
the data you developed with this earlier
version of [the] drug will actually be the
same drug as you now have.’’ Id. at 118.
Dr. Martin further testified that while
‘‘no reasonably business-oriented
company would ever develop a
product’’ if it did not have a reliable and
consistent supply source, he also noted
that if a company had to change its
supply source, a company could try to
show that the new product was
pharmcokinetically equivalent to the
old product. Tr. 120–21; see also Tr.
2027.
Also on this issue, Dr. Auslander
testified further on behalf of the
Government that if the developer’s
source changed, it ‘‘would not
necessarily repeat the Phase [1] and [2]
clinical studies over again, but * * *
would do additional chemical studies,
stability [studies] * * * to show that the
quality of material from source A and
the quality of material acquired from
source B are equivalent.’’ Tr. 2027–28.
Both Respondent’s and the
Government’s experts agreed, however,
that if the developer could not establish
equivalence between the two products,
‘‘it would not be a trivial experience’’
for the developer. Id. at 2029; see also
id. at 121 (testimony of Dr. Martin that
developer would have to start over).
Relatedly, Respondent further asserts
that there is ‘‘overwhelming’’ evidence
that NIDA ‘‘would not be likely to
choose to serve as the supplier to a
medical marijuana pharmaceutical
product developer even if it were
authorized to so.’’ Resp. Prop. Findings
at 10. In support of this assertion,
Respondent extracts two sentences from
a letter in which Nora Volkow, M.D.,
NIDA’s director, responded to Mr.
Doblin’s letter accusing NIDA/HHS of
‘‘seriously obstructing’’ Chemic’s
research involving the Volcano which
MAPS was sponsoring (and whose
application HHS ultimately
denied).42 See id. (quoting RX 13; ‘‘It is
42 In that letter, Mr. Doblin also mentioned that
DEA had indicated that it would not review
Chemic’s application to import ten grams of Dutch
marijuana until NIDA/HHS completed its review of
Chemic’s protocol. RX 14. Mr. Doblin also
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not NIDA’s role to set policy in this area
or to contribute to the DEA licensing
procedures. Moreover, it is also not
NIDA’s mission to study the medicinal
use of marijuana or to advocate for the
establishment of facilities to support
this research.’’). See also RX 14 (letter of
Mr. Doblin; ‘‘NIDA/HHS is seriously
obstructing a privately-funded drug
development program aimed at
evaluating marijuana’s potential use as
an FDA-approved medication.’’).
In that letter, Dr. Volkow declined to
intervene explaining that:
RX 13. As both this letter and the 1999
Guidance make plain, HHS—and not
NIDA—is the policymaker regarding the
criteria for determining who can obtain
research-grade marijuana from NIDA. As
NIDA does not independently control to
whom it may supply marijuana for
legitimate research, the letter is not
indicative of whether NIDA would be a
reliable source of marijuana for an entity
which sought to develop plant-form
marijuana into an FDA-approved
prescription medicine.
Respondent also points to the 1999
Guidance document’s statement that
‘‘[t]he goal of this program must be to
determine whether cannabinoid
components of marijuana administered
through an alternative delivery system
can meet the standards enumerated
under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act for commercial marketing
of a medical product. As the IOM report
stated, ’Therefore, the purpose of
clinical trials of smoked marijuana
would not be to develop marijuana as a
licensed drug, but such trials could be
a first step towards the development of
rapid-onset, nonsmoked cannabinoid
delivery systems.’ ’’ 43 GX 24, at 2.
As found above, the IOM’s
recommendation was based on its
conclusion that ‘‘[a]lthough marijuana
smoke delivers THC and other
cannabinoids to the body, it also
delivers harmful substances, including
most of those found in tobacco smoke.
In addition, plants contain a variable
mixture of biologically active
compounds and cannot be expected to
provide a precisely defined drug effect.
For those reasons there is little future in
smoked marijuana as a medically
approved medication.’’ RX 1, at 195–96.
Moreover, the HHS Guidance does not
address what the Secretary’s response
would be were the current clinical trials
to show that the efficacy/safety profile
of smoked marijuana supported FDA
approval of it as a prescription medicine
for particular indications or patient
populations. Nor does it address what
the Secretary’s response would be if
clinical trials were to show that the
efficacy/safety of vaporized plant form
marijuana for particular indications
supported its approval as a prescription
drug.
Dr. Gust testified that notwithstanding
the stated goal of the 1999 Guidance, a
researcher who ‘‘had an IND from FDA
* * * would not have a problem getting
marijuana.’’ Tr. 1718. Further, in
response to the ALJ’s question as to
whether a researcher whose goal was to
obtain FDA approval of plant-form
marijuana would have more difficulty
obtaining marijuana from HHS than a
researcher who sought to produce an
extract-based product, Dr. Gust testified:
‘‘I don’t believe so.’’ Id. at 1719–20.
Dr. Gust also explained that whether
plant-form marijuana should be
approved as a prescription medicine is
‘‘not a question for the’’ PHS committee
that reviews requests for NIDA
marijuana. Id. at 1720. Rather, ‘‘it’s a
question for the regulation and approval
process that goes on through FDA.’’ Id.
Finally, while Dr. Gust acknowledged
that ‘‘HHS would strongly endorse’’ the
IOM’s view that ‘‘if there’s going to be
an approved medication, it’s going to be
a purified constituent of marijuana that
will be delivered in a non-smokable
form,’’ he further testified that in his
experience, there was no bias against
‘‘the concept of approving marijuana as
a medication’’ at the level of PHS
review. Id. at 1722.44
referenced DEA’s handling of Respondent’s
application.
43 In discussing the content of the HHS Guidance,
Respondent asserts: ‘‘And it expressly states that
‘the purpose of clinical trials of smoked marijuana
would not be to develop marijuana as a licensed
drug.’ ’’ Resp. Proposed Findings at 11 (quoting GX
24, at 2). Notably, Respondent’s quotation edits out
the Guideline’s reference to the IOM Report. The
complete text of the Guidance shows, however,
HHS did not come to this conclusion without
evidentiary support, but rather, relied on the
extensive findings of the IOM.
44 In discussing this testimony, the ALJ noted that
Dr. Gust had acknowledged that a researcher with
an FDA-approved protocol might nonetheless be
denied marijuana by the PHS committee under the
criteria set forth in the guidance. ALJ at 51 (citing
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* * * NIDA is just one of the participants
on the HHS review panel and continues, on
behalf of the U.S. Government, to provide
supplies of well-characterized cannabis for
both NIH and non-NIH-funded research. The
latter is conducted according to the
procedure established in 1999 by HHS for
obtaining access to marijuana for research
purposes. It is not NIDA’s role to set policy
in this area or to contribute to the DEA
licensing procedures. Moreover, it is not
NIDA’s mission to study the medicinal uses
of marijuana or to advocate for the
establishment of facilities to support this
research. Therefore, I am sorry but I do not
believe that we can be of help to you in
resolving these concerns.
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Respondent further asserts that ‘‘it is
not at all clear that NIDA could serve as
a source for a pharmaceutical product.’’
Resp. Prop. Findings at 11 (emphasis in
original). Notwithstanding Mr. Doblin’s
beliefs regarding the likely safety/
efficacy profiles of smoked and
vaporized marijuana, see Tr. at 605, it is
highly speculative whether clinical
trials will ultimately support FDA
approval of plant-form marijuana
through either delivery system.45
As further support for this contention,
Respondent references that Dr. ElSohly
answered ‘‘That’s correct’’ when asked
the following question by Respondent’s
counsel: ‘‘So if somebody wants to
develop a commercial product with
marijuana, they could not use the NIDA
marijuana; is that fair?’’ Resp. Prop.
Findings at 11 (quoting Tr. 1463). It is
not clear exactly what to make of Dr.
ElSohly’s answer to this question.46 In
Tr. 1694). There is, of course, no evidence that any
researcher with an FDA-approved protocol has been
denied marijuana subsequent to the 1999
guidelines. Dr. Gust’s answer was based on a
hypothetical question. Accordingly, this portion of
Dr. Gust’s testimony provides no basis to question
his credibility as to whether in his experience, HHS
(and the PHS review committees) are biased against
researchers who seek to obtain FDA approval for
plant-form marijuana.
45 Given that, as indicated above, marijuana has
been found to contain hundreds of different
chemicals, including a variable mixture of
biologically active compounds that cannot be
expected to provide a precisely defined drug effect,
IOM has expressed the view that, ‘‘if there is any
future in cannabinoid drugs, it lies with agents of
more certain, not less certain, composition.’’ RX 1,
at 195–96.
46 Based on the questions that led up to the abovequoted question, it appears that, in answering
‘‘That’s correct,’’ Dr. ElSohly was confirming that
the marijuana he grows pursuant to the NIDA
contract may not be taken by the University of
Mississippi (without prior authorization from
NIDA) for use in the commercial development of a
THC extract product where such commercial
activity was not authorized by NIDA. See Tr. at
1462–63. Indeed, the following subsequent
exchange between Respondent’s counsel and Dr.
ElSohly suggests that Dr. ElSohly correctly
understood that there was no prohibition on the use
of NIDA marijuana for the development of
commercial products:
Q: Dr. ElSohly, if an organization like MAPS, for
example, a nonprofit or pharmaceutical
organization, wanted to try to develop smoked
marijuana into an FDA-approved medicine, could it
use the marijuana that you grow to the preclinical
and clinical testing if NIDA agreed?
A: I would say yes.
Tr. 1562–63. Moreover, even if Dr. ElSohly was
of the mistaken view that the marijuana he grew for
NIDA could never be used by anyone for
commercial product development, such a
misunderstanding on Dr. ElSohly’s part would not
be controlling for purposes of this proceeding. The
record is clear that it is HHS—not Dr. ElSohly—that
determines the terms of his contract, including to
whom and under what circumstances he may
supply marijuana; and the record is also clear that
Dr. ElSohly follows the instructions he receives
from NIDA as to whom to deliver the marijuana.
Further, as explained above, the record reveals that
HHS’s policy contains no prohibition on the use of
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any event, no provision of the National
Center’s contract with NIDA imposes
any prohibition on the use of the
marijuana produced under the contract
for the purposes of the development of
a commercial product. Indeed, the
language of the contract with NIDA
suggests otherwise. While Article H.13
states that ‘‘contract funds shall not be
used to support activities that promote
the legalization of any drug or other
substance included in schedule I’’ of the
CSA, it further provides that ‘‘[t]his
limitation shall not apply when the
contractor makes known to the
contracting officer that there is
significant medical evidence of a
therapeutic advantage to the use of such
drug or other substance or that federally
sponsored clinical trials are being
conducted to determine therapeutic
advantage.’’ GX 13, at 20 (citing Pub. L.
108–447, § 510, 108 Stat. 2809 (2005)).
Likewise, the new procedures that HHS
announced in 1999 for providing
marijuana for medical research contain
no restriction on using NIDA-supplied
marijuana for the development of
commercial products. GX 24. To the
contrary, by adopting a new procedure
whereby privately funded researchers
could obtain marijuana from NIDA at
cost, HHS made it possible starting in
1999 for a commercially sponsored
researcher to develop a drug product
using NIDA-supplied marijuana. See id.
at 2. Finally, Respondent cites no
provision of law that prohibits NIDA
from serving as a supply source for a
prescription drug approval process.47
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
Evidence Regarding the Remaining
Statutory Factors
There is no evidence that Respondent
has not complied with applicable state
or local laws. See Gov. Proposed
Findings at 139 (discussing 21 U.S.C.
823(a)(2)). Moreover, Respondent has
never been convicted of any controlledsubstance related offense. Tr. 78; see 21
U.S.C. 823(a)(4).
As for factor five, on the
questionnaire, Respondent
acknowledged that he ‘‘has no current
or previous registrations and is unaware
of any registration [having] previously
[been] granted to the university.’’ GX 3,
at 3. While Respondent testified that he
the marijuana grown pursuant to the NIDA contract
for commercial development purposes.
47 As for Respondent’s contention that the
Government did not ‘‘introduce any evidence that
NIDA could or would [serve as a supply source] to
support its claim that NIDA’s supply is adequate to
meet all legitimate medical and scientific
purposes,’’ Resp. Prop. Findings at 11, Respondent,
and not the Government, has the burden of proof
on the issue of whether supply is inadequate within
the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1). See 21 CFR
1301.44(a).
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would meet all ‘‘appropriate security
conditions,’’ he also acknowledged that
‘‘I’ve never grown marijuana or any
other controlled substance.’’ Tr. 79. He
further testified that ‘‘We have not—I
have no experience in the control
against diversion.’’ Id. Relatedly,
Respondent testified that he had no
personal experience in providing
security for plants, id. at 255, and that
both graduate students and technicians
would be used to perform the various
tasks associated with the project. Id. at
254 (‘‘I usually don’t go down and water
the plants in the greenhouse; I usually
have a technician that does that.’’); id.
at 254–55 (‘‘They [the graduate students
and technicians] would probably do the
transplanting[,]’’ and ‘‘a daily check on
any environmental controls we have.’’).
Respondent presented no evidence that
any person who would be involved in
the daily operation of the project would
have experience in the lawful
manufacture or distribution of schedule
I and II controlled substances.48
Finally, Respondent testified that he
believed that granting his application
would promote technical advances in
the art of manufacturing controlled
substances and the development of new
substances. Id. at 74–76. More
specifically, Respondent asserted that
granting his application would advance
‘‘the understanding [of] any possible
clinical use of marijuana if we were able
to supply this to investigators to run
trials.’’ Id. at 75–76. Respondent also
testified that ‘‘we would learn more
about how the environment affects the
constituents in the plant material which
would enable’’ a potential manufacturer,
were marijuana to become approved by
the FDA as a drug, to ‘‘know the
environment it needs to be grown under
to produce a clinical marijuana.’’ Id. at
76. Respondent further opined that
granting his registration would promote
48 Respondent testified that he had performed
classified work on plants for the U.S. Army and that
‘‘there were security systems in place similar to the
security systems you have in this building’’
(referring to DEA Headquarters, where the hearing
took place), and he answered ‘‘Yes’’ when asked by
his counsel whether he recognized ‘‘the importance
of that sort of security in a situation like this
registration application.’’ Tr. 367. It is unclear what
Respondent meant by ‘‘the security systems you
have in this building,’’ since the only security to
which he would have been exposed in entering
DEA Headquarters to testify were the requirements
of passing through a metal detector, being
accompanied by a DEA employee, and wearing a
visitor’s badge. These DEA Headquarters security
measures have nothing to do with the security
measures required of DEA registrants who handle
controlled substances, which are set forth in 21 CFR
1301.71 through 1301.76. Thus, this portion of
Respondent’s testimony was ambiguous and did not
establish, for purposes of 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(5) that,
if his application were granted, there would exist
in his establishment effective controls against
diversion.
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2113
technical advances because part of the
purpose of growing the marijuana was
to allow MAPS to test its vaporizer. Id.
at 77–78. Respondent acknowledged,
however, that he would not personally
be working on MAPS’s vaporizer device
or on any other delivery device. Id. at
230. He also acknowledged that he has
no patents regarding the growing of any
medicinal plants. Id. at 238.
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(a), ‘‘[t]he
Attorney General shall register an
applicant to manufacture controlled
substances in schedule I or II if he
determines that such registration is
consistent with the public interest and
with the United States obligations under
international treaties, conventions, or
protocols in effect on May 1, 1971.’’ 21
U.S.C. 823(a). ‘‘In determining the
public interest,’’ § 823(a) directs the
Attorney General to consider the
following factors:
(1) Maintenance of effective controls
against diversion of particular controlled
substances and any controlled substances in
schedule I or II compounded therefrom into
other than legitimate medical, scientific,
research, or industrial channels, by limiting
the importation and bulk manufacture of
such controlled substances to a number of
establishments which can produce an
adequate and uninterrupted supply of these
substances under adequately competitive
conditions for legitimate medical, scientific,
research, and industrial purposes;
(2) Compliance with applicable State and
local law;
(3) Promotion of technical advances in the
art of manufacturing these substances and the
development of new substances;
(4) Prior conviction record of applicant
under Federal and State laws relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
such substances;
(5) Past experience in the manufacture of
controlled substances, and the existence in
the establishment of effective controls against
diversion; and
(6) Such other factors as may be relevant
to and consistent with public health and
safety.
Id. This Agency’s regulations further
provide that ‘‘[a]t any hearing on an
application to manufacture any
controlled substance listed in Schedule
I or II, the applicant shall have the
burden of proving that the requirements
for such registration pursuant to
[§ 823(a)] are satisfied.’’ 21 CFR
1301.44(a).
As § 823(a) makes plain, even if an
applicant satisfies its burden of proof
with respect to the public interest
inquiry, it cannot be granted a
registration unless its proposed
activities are consistent with the United
States’ obligations under international
treaties. The United States is a party to
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the Single Convention. Accordingly,
whether Respondent’s proposed
activities are consistent with this
Nation’s obligations under the
Convention is a threshold question.
A. Whether Respondent’s Proposed
Registration Is Consistent With the
Single Convention
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The Single Convention imposes a
comprehensive series of measures to
control narcotic drugs and other
substances including marijuana (which
is referred to in the Single Convention
as ‘‘cannabis’’).49 Under the Convention,
cannabis is both a Schedule I and
Schedule IV 50 drug and is subject to the
control measures applicable to each
schedule. Single Convention, art. 2,
para. 5; see also Secretary-General of the
United Nations, Commentary on the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
1961, 65 (1973) (hereinafter,
Commentary). Moreover, under article
28, ‘‘[i]f a Party permits the cultivation
of the cannabis plant for the production
of cannabis or cannabis resin, it shall
apply thereto the system of controls as
provided in article 23 respecting the
opium poppy.’’ Single Convention, art.
28, Para. 1. As the Commentary further
explains:
49 Under the Single Convention, ‘‘ ‘cannabis plant’
means any plant of the genus Cannabis.’’ Article
1(c). The Single Convention defines ‘‘cannabis’’ to
include ‘‘the flowering or fruiting tops of the
cannabis plant (excluding the seeds and leaves
when not accompanied by the tops) from which the
resin has not been extracted, by whatever name
they may be designated.’’ Article 1(b). This
definition of ‘‘cannabis’’ under the Single
Convention is less inclusive than the CSA
definition of ‘‘marihuana.’’ See 21 U.S.C. 802(16).
However, this distinction in inconsequential for
purposes of the matters at issue in this proceeding.
50 The Single Convention’s use of the term
‘‘Schedule IV’’ is not to be confused with the CSA’s
use of the same term. Under the Convention, the
terms ‘‘Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule III and
Schedule IV mean the correspondingly numbered
list of drugs or preparations annexed to this
Convention.’’ Single Convention, art. 1, para. 1(u).
As the Convention further explains, ‘‘[t]he drugs in
Schedule IV shall also be included in Schedule I
and subject to all measures of control applicable to
drugs in the latter Schedule’’ as well as the
additional measures contained in article 2,
paragraph 5. Id. art. 2, para. 5.
Under Article 2, paragraph 5, the Convention
requires that [a] Party shall adopt any special
measures of control which in its opinion are
necessary having regard to the particularly
dangerous properties of a drug so included. Id. art.
2, para. 5(a). The Convention further directs that:
A Party shall, if in its opinion the prevailing
conditions in its country render it the most
appropriate means of protecting the public health
and welfare, prohibit the production, manufacture,
export and import of, trade in, possession or use of
any such drug except for amounts which may be
necessary for medical and scientific research only,
including clinical trials therewith to be conducted
under or subject to the direct supervision and
control of the Party.
Id. art. 2, para. 5(b).
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The system of control over all stages of the
drug economy which the Single Convention
provides has two basic features: limitation of
narcotic supplies of each country * * * to
the quantities that it needs for medical and
scientific purposes, and authorization of each
form of participation in the drug economy,
that is, licensing of producers, manufacturers
and traders. * * * In the case of the
production of opium, coca leaves, cannabis
and cannabis resin, this regime is
supplemented by the requirement of
maintaining government monopolies for the
wholesale and international trade in these
drugs in countries which produce them.
* * *
Commentary at 263.
Amongthese controls is the
requirement that ‘‘[t]he Agency shall
* * * have the exclusive right of
importing, exporting, wholesale trading
and maintaining stocks other than those
held by manufacturers of opium
alkaloids, medicinal opium or opium
preparations.’’ Single Convention art.
23, para. 2(e). The Convention further
provides, however, that the ‘‘Parties
need not extend this exclusive right to
medicinal opium and opium
preparations.’’ 51 Id.
The Commentary to article 28 thus
explains that ‘‘[a] Party permitting the
cultivation of the cannabis plant for
cannabis and cannabis resin must,
pursuant to article 23, paragraph
[2(e)(2)] in connexion with article 28,
paragraph 1, grant its national cannabis
agency the exclusive right of wholesale
* * * trade in these drugs.’’
Commentary at 314 (emphasis added).
The Commentary further explains that
the Government ‘‘need not extend this
exclusive right to extracts and tinctures
of cannabis.’’ Id.
Respondent raises several arguments
as to why his registration would be
consistent with the Single Convention.
First, he argues that ‘‘the Convention
clearly contemplates that more than one
cultivator or bulk manufacturer may be
licensed by the member nation’s
licensing agency.’’ Resp. Prop. Findings
at 66. Second, he argues that because his
‘‘crop would be medical marijuana,
grown and processed to be adapted for
medicinal use, it is not subject to the
agency’s ‘exclusive right’ for
‘maintaining stocks.’ ’’ Id. at 67.
51 Article 23 of the Convention further provides
that ‘‘[a] Party that permits the cultivation of the
opium poppy for the production of opium shall
establish, if it has not already done so, and
maintain, one or more government agencies * * *
to carry out the functions required under this
article.’’ Single Convention art. 23, para. 1.
Moreover, ‘‘[a]ll cultivators of the opium poppy
shall be required to deliver their total crops of
opium to the Agency. The Agency shall purchase
and take physical possession of such crops as soon
as possible, but not later than four months after the
end of the harvest.’’ Id. para. 2(d).
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Relatedly, Respondent argues that
because DEA has granted Dr. ElSohly a
registration to ‘‘grow marijuana for
private purposes’’ and does not require
him to ‘‘turn[] over those stocks to any
government agency,’’ granting his
application will likewise conform with
the Single Convention. Respondent
further contends that Dr. ElSohly has
been able to grow marijuana outside of
the NIDA contract and that ‘‘DEA would
not have issued those licenses had they
violated the Single Convention.’’ Id. at
68. Respondent also argues that the
United Kingdom, which is also Party to
the Convention, has allowed marijuana
to be grown by a private entity (GW
Pharmaceuticals) without its
government taking physical possession.
Id. Likewise, in his Response to the
Government’s exceptions to the ALJ’s
recommended decision, Respondent
argues that the ALJ ‘‘correctly held that
Article 23 [para.] 2(d) does not require
the government to take physical
possession of [his] crop.’’ Respondent’s
Resp. at 9.
In concluding that the ‘‘Single
Convention does not preclude
registering Respondent,’’ the ALJ offered
three reasons. First, based on the United
Kingdom’s regulatory scheme, she
reasoned that ‘‘it appears * * * that the
parties to the Single Convention are free
to construe the term ‘physical
possession’ as they see fit.’’ ALJ 82. As
for the remaining two reasons, the ALJ
explained that ‘‘[i]t also appears,
although it is not entirely clear, that the
marijuana grown by the National Center
or by any other registrant for utilization
in research would qualify as either
‘medicinal’ within the meaning of
article 1, paragraph (1)(o), or a ‘special
stocks’ within the meaning of article 1,
paragraph (1)(x), and that therefore the
government monopoly on importing,
exporting, wholesale trading, and
maintain stocks would not apply.’’ Id.
Neither the ALJ’s rationales nor
Respondent’s arguments are persuasive.
As for the argument that the Single
Convention does not require that the
Government take physical possession,
the argument provides no comfort to
Respondent for two reasons. First, the
argument ignores that taking possession
and engaging in wholesale distribution
are two separate activities under the
Convention. Notably, in his briefs,
Respondent does not even acknowledge
the distinction. See Resp. Proposed
Findings and Conclusion of Law at 64–
70; Respondent’s Resp. at 9–12.
Second, as Respondent’s evidence
makes clear, his purpose for seeking a
registration is not simply to grow
marijuana, but to distribute it outside of
the HHS system. Mr. Doblin’s testimony
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that ‘‘what we’re trying to do is get the
[PHS] and NIDA out of the picture,’’ Tr.
666, makes this plain. See also Tr. 225
(testimony of Respondent; ‘‘I may very
well be approached by other people
with approved studies who need a
source also.’’). Thus, Respondent’s
contention that the Single Convention
does not prohibit multiple cultivators is
beside the point, since his proposed
purpose for gaining authorization to
grow marijuana (so that MAPS—rather
than HHS/NIDA—can control
distribution of the marijuana) would
defy one of the central control
provisions of the Single Convention
with respect to cannabis cultivation. As
the Commentary to the Single
Convention states:
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Countries * * * which produce * * *
cannabis * * * , [i]n so far as they permit
private farmers to cultivate the plants * * *,
cannot establish with sufficient exactitude
the quantities harvested by individual
producers. If they allowed the sale of the
crops to private traders, they would not be
in a position to ascertain with reasonable
exactitude the amounts which enter their
controlled trade. The effectiveness of their
´
control regime would thus be considerably
weakened. In fact, experience has shown that
permitting licensed private traders to
purchase the crops results in diversion of
large quantities of drugs into illicit channels.
* * * [T]he acquisition of the crops and the
wholesale and international trade in these
agricultural products cannot be entrusted to
private traders, but must be undertaken by
governmental authorities in the producing
countries. Article 23 * * * and article 28
* * * therefore require a government
monopoly of the wholesale and international
trade in the agricultural product in question
in the country which authorizes its
production.
Commentary at 278. Indeed, the central
theme of Respondent’s argument—
starting with the opening sentence of his
Proposed Findings and Conclusion of
Law and repeated throughout the
document—is that the very Government
monopoly over the wholesale
distribution of marijuana that the Single
Convention demands is the primary evil
that Respondent seeks to defeat through
obtaining a DEA registration. Thus, from
the outset of the analysis, Respondent’s
proposed registration cannot be
reconciled with United States
obligations under the treaty.
Respondent offers no argument that
his proposed distributions would not
constitute wholesale trading under the
Convention. See, e.g., GX 3, at 3
(‘‘customers would include both MAPSsponsored research and research
sponsored by other organizations.’’).
Respondent’s proposed activity in
distributing to researchers does not
constitute retail trading because his
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customers are not the ultimate users of
the marijuana, but rather researchers,
who would then dispense the drugs to
ultimate users. See Commentary at 329
(A manufacturer’s ‘‘license does not in
any event * * * include the retail trade
in drugs.’’).52
In construing the meaning of ‘‘United
States obligations under [the Single
Convention]’’ in the context of 21 U.S.C.
823(a), any reliance by the ALJ or
Respondent on the United Kingdom’s
practice is misplaced.53 For one, as set
forth in § 823(a), Congress assigned to
the Attorney General sole authority to
determine whether a proposed
registration under this provision is
consistent with United States
obligations under the Single
Convention. Nowhere in the CSA does
Congress call upon the Attorney General
to rely on—or even consider—how other
nations interpret the Single Convention
as a basis for the Attorney General’s
determination of what are the United
States obligations under the treaty.54
Second, the Single Convention contains
provisions that call upon each nation
that is a party to the treaty to determine,
52 Under the CSA and DEA regulations, wholesale
distribution and dispensing (retail distribution) are
independent activities and require separate
registrations. See 21 U.S.C. 802(11) (definition of
‘‘distribute’’ excludes dispensing); compare 21
U.S.C. 823(b) with 823(f) (separate registration
required for distributor versus dispenser); see also
21 CFR 1301.13(e) (listing categories of registration
and authorized activities). Only a practitioner (and
not a manufacturer or distributor) can dispense a
controlled substance to a patient. See id. at
1301.13(e)(1).
Moreover, the Single Convention is a drug-control
regime. The precise economic arrangements
between Respondent, MAPS, and any other
potential customers, are therefore irrelevant in
determining whether his proposed activity would
constitute wholesale trading.
53 There was a dispute between the parties as to
the admissibility of the document Respondent
submitted (attached to RX 26) purporting to set
forth the United Kingdom’s explanation of how it
carried out its obligation under the Single
Convention to establish a national cannabis agency.
Tr. 1812. After having the parties brief the issue, the
ALJ noted, in a ‘‘Memorandum to Counsel and
Ruling,’’ that one of the Government’s objections
was that Respondent did ‘‘not explain how exhibit
26 was issued or under what authority.’’ The ALJ
concluded that ‘‘although the circumstances under
which exhibit 26 came to be promulgated are not
clear, it appears that the document is in effect in
the United Kingdom.’’ Id. The ALJ did not explain
her basis for this conclusion. See id. It is
unnecessary to determine whether this ruling by the
ALJ was proper because, even assuming, arguendo,
that the document accurately represented the
official position of the United Kingdom and was
issued by the appropriate representative of the
British Government, for the reasons explained
above, reliance on this document for determining
how to interpret the Single Convention for purposes
of 21 U.S.C. 823(a) is inappropriate.
54 For this reason, it is unnecessary to expressly
reject the interpretation contained in the document
submitted by Respondent (attached to RX 26) titled
‘‘United Kingdom National Cannabis Agency:
Protocol.’’
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2115
in its own opinion, whether and how to
tailor its control measures
commensurate with the circumstances
particularized to that country. For
example, article 2, paragraph 5, of the
Single Convention states the following
with respect to drugs included in
Schedule IV (including cannabis):
(a) A Party shall adopt any special
measures of control which in its opinion are
necessary having regard to the particularly
dangerous properties of a drug so included;
and
(b) A Party shall, if in its opinion the
prevailing conditions in its country render it
the most appropriate means of protecting the
public health and welfare, prohibit the
production, manufacture, export and import
of, trade in, possession or use of any such
drug except for amounts which may be
necessary for medical and scientific research
only, including clinical trials therewith to be
conducted under or subject to the direct
supervision and control of the Party.
Thus, what the United Kingdom might,
in its opinion, deem to be appropriate
control measures to meet its obligations
under the Single Convention given the
circumstances involving cannabis in
Britain might be distinct from what the
United States finds, in its opinion, to be
the appropriate control measures to fit
the circumstances involving cannabis in
the United States.55
If the United States were to look to
any outside entity for guidance on
compliance with the Single Convention,
that entity would be the International
Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which
is the United Nations organ created by
the Single Convention to implement,
and monitor compliance with, the
Convention. See Single Convention,
articles 5, 9–15, 19–20. In its 2005
Annual Report, the INCB reiterated:
‘‘Articles 23 and 28 of the [Single]
Convention provide for a national
cannabis agency to be established in
countries where the cannabis plant is
cultivated licitly for the production of
cannabis, even if the cannabis produced
is used for research purposes only.’’ 56
Similarly, the INCB issued a statement
in 2008 stating, with respect to the
standards under the Single Convention
55 In any event, there is no evidence that the
British Government has allowed GW to engage in
the type of activity for which Respondent seeks to
become registered—the wholesale distribution of
plant-form marijuana. Rather, as DEA has done with
respect to the National Center and its project to
supply THC extract to Mallinckrodt (GX 78), the
British Government has granted GW a license to
grow marijuana for the limited purpose of
producing extract for a pharmaceutical product. Rx
26, Ex. A at 2.
56 The above-quoted statement appears on page
16, in paragraph 81, of the 2005 INCB Annual
Report, which is available at https://www.incb.org/
pdf/e/ar/2005/incb_report_2005_2.pdf. I take
official notice of the report.
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relating to the control of cannabis, that
‘‘[s]uch standards require, inter alia, the
control of cultivation and production of
cannabis by a national cannabis
agency.’’ 57 As explained above, it is this
control of the cultivation and
production of cannabis by a national
agency of the United States to which
Respondent is fundamentally opposed,
thereby demonstrating the inconsistency
between his application and the Single
Convention.
The ALJ further reasoned that
‘‘although it is not entirely clear,’’ the
marijuana Respondent seeks to grow
would be exempt from the
Government’s exclusive right to engage
in wholesale trading because it would
qualify as either ‘‘medicinal’’ or ‘‘special
stocks.’’ ALJ at 82. As explained below,
the ALJ erred on both counts.
In his response to the Government’s
exceptions, Respondent contends that
the ‘‘[t]he Single Convention defines
‘medicinal’ marijuana as that ‘which has
undergone the process necessary to
adapt it for medicinal use.’ ’’
Respondent Resp. at 10 (quoting art I.
para 1 (o)). The Single Convention,
however, contains no such term.
Rather, the Convention defines only
the term ‘‘[m]edicinal opium.’’ Single
Convention art 1, para.1(o) (defining
‘‘medicinal opium’’ as ‘‘opium which
has undergone the processes necessary
to adapt it for medicinal use.’’).
Accordingly, Respondent’s argument
rests solely on an analogy to the term
‘‘medicinal opium.’’ Respondent’s
reliance is misplaced as it ignores
several critical distinctions between
what was formerly known as ‘‘medicinal
opium’’ and what it contends is
‘‘medicinal marijuana.’’
As the Commentary explains: ‘‘The
Single Convention follows earlier
narcotics treaties in defining ‘medicinal
opium’ as a special form of opium in
which that drug is used in medical
treatment.’’ Commentary at 21–22. The
Commentary goes on to state that
‘‘medicinal opium’’ is a form of opium
powder to which lactose has been added
‘‘to reduce its morphine content to the
standard of about 10 percent prescribed
for ‘medicinal opium.’ ’’ Id. (emphasis
added).
In a footnote, the Commentary further
explains that ‘‘[t]he fifth edition of the
Pharmacop*a Helvetica (1949) * * *
defines ‘medicinal opium’ as opium
powder reduced to a content of 9.2 to
10.2 per cent of anhydrous morphine by
the addition of lactose. This
57 This statement was made in an INCB press
release issued on February 8, 2008, which is
available at https://www.unis.unisvienna.org/unis/
pressrles/2008/usinar1023.html, and of which I take
official notice.
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pharmacop*a calls ‘medicinal opium’
also ‘powdered opium.’ ’’ Commentary
at 22 n.8. The Commentary then notes
that ‘‘[t]he term ‘medicinal opium’ ha[d]
been abandoned in’’ in favor of the
terms ‘‘powdered opium’’ and
‘‘standardized powered opium’’ in
several pharmacop*as which had been
published in the late 1960s. Id. (citing
British Pharmacop*a 686 (1968), and
Pharmacop*a Internationalis 403 (2d
ed. 1967)). Of further note, the term is
not used at all in more recent
pharmacop*as.58 See, e.g., The United
States Pharmacopeia 2008, at 2860–61
(31st Rev. 2007); British Pharmacopoeia
2008, at 1599–1601 (2007).
Thus, the term ‘‘medicinal opium’’ is
now obsolete. The term’s obsolescence
itself provides ample reason to disregard
it in determining the scope of the
United States’ obligations with respect
to marijuana. But even if the term is still
relevant, Respondent ignores that the
term referred to a product which had
not only been extracted from the opium
poppy but had also undergone several
further processes (including the
addition of another substance, lactose)
to prepare it for use in other drugs and
to obtain a specific and standardized
content of morphine, its primary active
ingredient. See British Pharmacopoeia
2008, at 1599 (‘‘Raw opium is intended
only as a starting material for the
manufacture of galenical preparations. It
is not dispensed as such.’’); GX 53, at 3
(letter of GW Pharmaceuticals)
(‘‘[O]pium is a Schedule II substance,
but it merely provides the starting
material for a number of pharmaceutical
dosage forms that are lawfully marketed
in the U.S. Herbal opium is not itself
used directly by patients.’’).
Indeed, the inclusion of ‘‘medicinal
opium’’ in the various older
Pharmacop*as indicates that there were
recognized standards for the substance’s
manufacture and composition and that
the drug had an accepted medical use in
humans. See, e.g., The United States
Pharmacopeia (17th Rev. ed. 1965), at
xxv (noting that federal law
‘‘designate[s] the Pharmacopeia as
establishing the standards of strength,
quality, and purity of medicinal
products recognized therein when sold
in interstate commerce for medicinal
use’’); 59 see also The United States
58 There is also no listing of any opiumcontaining product in the latest edition (2008) of
FDA’s ‘‘Orange Book,’’ which lists each drug
product currently approved for marketing under the
FDCA based on a determination by the FDA that the
drug is safe and effective. See https://www.fda.gov/
cder/orange/obannual.pdf.
59 See also European Pharmacopoeia 1, § 1.1 (4th
ed. 2001) (General Statements) (‘‘The active
ingredients (medicinal substances), excipients
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Pharmacopeia 2008, at v (‘‘USP 31
* * * contains science-based standards
for drugs, biologics, dietary, and
excipients used in dosage forms and
products. With few exceptions, all
articles for which monographs are
provided in USP 31 * * * are legally
marketed in the United States or are
contained in legally marketed
articles.’’); British Pharmacopoeia 2008,
at 4 (‘‘The requirements stated in the
monographs of the Pharmacopoeia
apply to articles that are intended for
medicinal use. * * * An article
intended for medicinal use that is
described by means of an official title
must comply with the requirements of
the relevant monograph.’’).
In contrast, there are no recognized
standards with respect to herbal
marijuana. And consistent with the
recognition in almost every country that
marijuana has no accepted medical use,
neither marijuana, cannabis, nor THC is
listed in the various pharmacopeias. See
The United States Pharmacopeia 2008,
at 1620, 2588–2589, 3366–3367; British
Pharmacopoeia 2008, at 375–376, 1373–
1374, 2111–2112; European
Pharmacopoeia, at 777, 1495, 1997. Cf.
James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265
U.S. 545, 562 (1924) (rejecting
contention that Congress arbitrarily
determined that ‘‘intoxicating malt
liquors possessed no substantial and
essential medicinal properties’’;
‘‘Neither beer nor any other intoxicating
malt liquor is listed as a medicinal
remedy in the United States
Pharmacopeia. They are not generally
recognized as medicinal agents. There is
no consensus of opinion among
physicians and medical authorities that
they have any substantial value as
medical agents. * * * ’’).
Moreover, it is beyond question that,
in the United States, marijuana has no
currently accepted medical use and
there are no FDA-approved medical
products consisting of marijuana. See
OCBC, 532 U.S. at 491 (‘‘for purposes of
the [CSA], marijuana has ‘no currently
accepted medical use’ at all.’’); 66 FR at
20052 (as stated by the FDA, ‘‘[t]here are
no FDA-approved marijuana
products.’’). Thus, by any plausible
application of the term ‘‘medicinal
opium’’ to cannabis, as a factual matter,
there is currently no such thing in the
United States as ‘‘medicinal cannabis.’’
Respondent effectively concedes this
point, by describing the purpose of his
proposed registration as being ‘‘to
develop the marijuana plant into an
(auxiliary substances), pharmaceutical preparations
and other articles described in monographs are
intended for human consumption and veterinary
use (unless explicitly restricted to one of these
uses)’’).
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FDA-approved prescription medicine.’’
GX 3, at 1 (emphasis added).
Finally, even if all the foregoing
considerations were ignored and DEA
were to treat the marijuana that
Respondent seeks to grow as akin to
‘‘medicinal opium’’ for purposes of the
Single Convention, Respondent’s
proposed activity would still be
inconsistent with the Convention for the
following reason. As the Commentary
explains: ‘‘Opium-producing countries
may thus authorize private manufacture
of, and private international and
domestic wholesale trade in, medicinal
opium and opium preparations. The
opium other than medicinal opium
needed for such manufacture must
however be procured from the national
opium agency.’’ Commentary at 284
(emphasis added). Thus, under the
Convention, even if ‘‘medicinal
cannabis’’ may be privately traded, the
treaty requires that the raw material
needed to produce the ‘‘medicinal
cannabis’’ (i.e., the marijuana plant
material) must be obtained from the
national cannabis agency. This again
reflects the central theme of cannabis
control under the Single Convention—
that the national agency must control
the production and distribution of the
raw marijuana material used for
research or any other permissible
purpose. Respondent’s unwillingness to
accept this principle illustrates how his
proposed registration is fundamentally
at odds with the treaty.
The ALJ also reasoned that the
marijuana Respondent seeks to grow
would qualify under the Convention as
‘‘special stocks’’ and thereby be exempt
from the ‘‘exclusive government’s right
to maintain stocks.’’ ALJ at 82. Even
Respondent acknowledges the ALJ’s
error on this point. See Respondent’s
Resp. at 12 (‘‘[I]t is evident that [the
ALJ] simply inadvertently referenced
the wrong term from Article 1.’’). The
term ‘‘special stocks’’ under the
Convention refers to ‘‘drugs held in a
country or territory by the Government
of such country or territory for special
government purposes and to meet
exceptional circumstances.’’ Single
Convention, Art. 1, para. 1(w). Neither
party is suggesting, and there is no basis
to conclude, that the marijuana
Respondent seeks to produce fits into
this definition.60
60 The term ‘‘special stocks’’ is operative in the
Single Convention only in ways that have no
bearing on this adjudication. See art. 19, paras. 1(d)
& 2(d) (requiring parties to furnish the INCB with
annual estimates of, among other things,
‘‘[q]uantities of drugs necessary for addition to
special stocks’’ and amounts taken therefrom); art.
20, para. 3 (parties’ statistical returns to INCB need
not address those relating to special stocks); art. 21,
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While recognizing that the ALJ
misread the term ‘‘special stocks,’’
Respondent argues that the marijuana
he seeks to produce nonetheless
qualifies as retail ‘‘stocks,’’ because it is
marijuana that will be held ‘‘ ‘by
institutions or qualified persons in the
duly authorized exercise of therapeutic
or scientific functions.’ ’’ Id. (quoting
Single Convention, art. 1, para. 1(x)).
Respondent thus contends that the
marijuana he seeks to produce is exempt
from the government monopoly
provisions of article 23, paragraph 2,
subparagraph (e).
Respondent is mistaken. The entire
text of the relevant provision explains
that the marijuana Respondent would
maintain does not fall within the
exception to the definition of ‘‘stocks.’’
What is excluded under the treaty from
the definition of ‘‘stocks’’ are those
drugs held ‘‘[b]y retail pharmacists or
other authorized retail distributors and
by institutions or qualified persons in
the duly authorized exercise of
therapeutic or scientific functions.’’
Single Convention, art. 1, para. 1(x)(iv).
As this provision makes plain, the
exemption applies only to the drugs
held by those persons or entities who
are authorized to dispense to ultimate
users.
Respondent is not, however, a
licensed pharmacist or physician and
obviously cannot legally seek a
practitioner’s registration, which is
required to dispense. See 21 U.S.C.
823(f). Rather, he is seeking to produce
raw cannabis plant material to supply
researchers. His proposed activity thus
does not fall within the exemption for
‘‘qualified persons in the duly
authorized exercise of therapeutic or
scientific functions’’ within the meaning
of the Single Convention.
Moreover, even with respect to
cannabis material acquired for retail
purposes that does fit within the
exception of article 1, paragraph (x)(iv),
the treaty still requires that such
material be obtained via the national
agency. As the Commentary explains
with respect to opium (and therefore
also with respect to cannabis, by virtue
of article 28), while ‘‘[t]he retail trade in,
and other retail distribution of, opium
* * * need not be in the hands of the
monopoly[,] [r]etail traders or
distributors must, however, acquire
their opium from the’’ Government.
Commentary at 284. Respondent’s
arguments repeatedly fail to
acknowledge or accept this concept that
lies at the core of the Single Convention.
para. 2 (explaining how to take into account special
stocks for purposes of countries’ limitations on
manufacture and importation).
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Yet, there is no escaping that, by seeking
through his application to dismantle the
existing Government control over the
distribution of cannabis produced by
growers and turn a share of that control
over to MAPS, Respondent’s goal is
antithetical to the treaty. For the
foregoing reasons, the provision of
article 1, paragraph (x)(iv) exempting
certain material from the definition of
‘‘stocks’’ does not support Respondent.
As for Respondent’s point that DEA
has previously allowed the University of
Mississippi to grow marijuana to
produce ‘‘marijuana extracts that the
University then sells to pharmaceutical
companies to develop products’’ (Resp.
Prop. Findings at 68), it is true that DEA
has previously allowed such activity
under a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) that was entered into in 1999.
GX 78. However, that MOA expressly
states:
In accordance with articles 23 and 28 of
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
1961 (‘‘Single Convention’’), private trade in
‘‘cannabis’’ is strictly prohibited. Therefore,
the Center shall not distribute any quantity
of marijuana to any person other than an
authorized DEA employee.
The Single Convention does not prohibit
private trade in ‘‘cannabis preparations,’’
however. A ‘‘cannabis preparation,’’ within
the meaning of the Single Convention, is a
mixture, solid or liquid containing cannabis,
cannabis resin, or extracts or tinctures of
cannabis. The THC that the Center will
extract from marijuana would be considered
such a ‘‘cannabis preparation.’’ Therefore, the
Center may, in accordance with the Single
Convention, distribute the crude THC extract
to private entities (provided such
distributions of THC by the Center comply
with all requirements set forth in the CSA
and DEA regulations).
Id. at 2–3 (footnote explaining treaty
definition of cannabis omitted). Thus,
the MOA was specifically designed to
ensure that the University of Mississippi
would not be distributing cannabis
outside of the Government-controlled
system required by the Single
Convention. See Single Convention, art.
23, para. 1(e) (exempting ‘‘preparations’’
from government monopoly on
wholesale distribution). In contrast,
Respondent does not seek to distribute
a cannabis extract or any other
processed cannabis material that
constitutes a ‘‘preparation’’ within the
meaning of the Single Convention.
Instead, Respondent seeks to grow and
distribute marijuana plant material that
has undergone no processing other than
drying (and therefore does not come
within the Single Convention definition
of ‘‘preparation’’).61
61 The above-quoted 1999 MOA was issued with
respect to the University of Mississippi’s 1998
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As the foregoing demonstrates, while
the Single Convention does not
necessarily prohibit the registration of
an additional manufacturer, what it
does prohibit is the wholesale
distribution of plant-form marijuana by
any entity other than the United States
Government. Respondent is not under
contract with HHS to supply it with
marijuana and has made clear that the
purpose of his registration is to
distribute marijuana outside of the HHS
system. Because it is clear that
Respondent’s proposed activity is not
within one of the exemptions from the
obligatory government monopoly
imposed by the Convention, he has
failed to show that his proposed
activities would be consistent with the
Single Convention.62 See 21 U.S.C.
application to become registered to manufacture
marijuana for the purposes of product development.
GX 78, at 1–2. In 2005, the University of Mississippi
applied for a new registration to manufacture
marijuana ‘‘to prepare marihuana extract for further
purification into bulk active [THC] for use in
launching FDA-approved pharmaceutical
products.’’ 70 FR 47232; see also Tr. 1521. DEA has
not yet issued a final order as to this application
and the University therefore does not currently
have DEA authorization to undertake such activity.
As with Respondent’s application, DEA may only
grant the pending University of Mississippi
application if the agency determines that the
University has demonstrated that the registration
would be consistent with United States treaty
obligations and the public interest. See GX 79, at
3. In making such determinations, DEA will not
simply rely on the prior issuance of registration
under the 1999 MOA but will consider the
application anew, in view of the current
circumstances and consistent with this final order.
Among other things that must be considered with
respect to the pending University of Mississippi
application, I note that the Commentary to the
Single Convention states the following with respect
to the exemption for ‘‘opium preparations’’ under
Article 23, paragraph (e): ‘‘Opium-producing
countries may thus authorize private manufacture
of, and private international and domestic
wholesale trade in, medicinal opium and opium
preparations. The opium other than medicinal
opium needed for such manufacture must however
be procured from the national opium agency.’’
Commentary at 284 (emphasis added). Whether the
University of Mississippi’s proposed registration
would be consistent with this aspect of the treaty
has not yet been determined by DEA and is not the
subject of this adjudication.
62 Though the above discussion provides ample
basis on which to conclude that Respondent has
failed to meet his burden of proving that his
proposed registration is consistent with United
States obligations under the Single Convention, I
also note briefly the following statement in the
Commentary regarding the obligation of the United
States under article 23, paragraph 2(a) to designate
the areas in which cultivation takes place: ‘‘It is also
suggested that [such areas] should to the greatest
extent possible be located in the same part of the
country, and be contiguous, in order to facilitate
more effective control.’’ Commentary at 280. Thus,
in a situation in which a country that is a party to
the treaty allows for multiple growers of opium or
cannabis with the national agency maintaining
control over the distribution of such material in
accordance with the Single Convention, the
Commentary suggests that proper adherence to the
treaty would result in that country keeping the
growers located as near as possible to one another.
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823(a). Accordingly, his proposed
registration is precluded under Federal
law.
B. Whether Respondent’s Proposed
Registration Is Consistent With the
Public Interest
As explained in the preceding section,
Respondent’s registration is clearly
inconsistent with the United States’
obligations under the Single
Convention. While this ground alone
compels DEA to deny the application, as
explained below, an analysis of the
public interest criteria of 21 U.S.C.
823(a) leads to the conclusion that
Respondent’s registration is inconsistent
with the public interest. This provides
a separate basis—independent of the
treaty consideration—on which the
application must be denied.
As stated above, under § 823(a), there
are six factors that must be evaluated in
determining whether a proposed
registration is consistent with the public
interest. The public interest factors ‘‘are
considered in the disjunctive.’’
Southwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 72 FR
36487, 36497 (2007). I may rely on any
one or a combination of factors and give
each factor the weight I deem
appropriate in determining whether to
deny an application for a registration.
See Green Acre Farms, Inc., 72 FR
24607, 24608 (2007); ALRA
Laboratories, Inc., 59 FR 50620, 50621
(1994). Moreover, I am ‘‘not required to
make findings as to all of the factors.’’
Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th
Cir. 2005); Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165,
173–74 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
1. Public Interest Factor One
The first public interest factor is the:
maintenance of effective controls against
diversion of particular controlled substances
and any controlled substance in schedule I or
II compounded therefrom into other than
legitimate medical, scientific, research, or
industrial channels, by limiting the
importation and bulk manufacture of such
controlled substances to a number of
establishments which can produce an
adequate an uninterrupted supply of these
substances under adequately competitive
conditions for legitimate medical, scientific,
research, and industrial purposes.
21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1) (emphasis added).
As the ALJ observed, DEA has
construed paragraph 823(a)(1) in two
different ways in prior final orders, both
of which were simultaneously upheld in
a case that was reviewed by a United
States Court of Appeals. ALJ at 82–83.
Because of this, I have undertaken an
extensive analysis of this provision,
which is found in part C of this
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discussion.63 For the reasons explained
therein, I believe that the most sound
reading of the text of paragraph
823(a)(1) requires DEA to consider
limiting the number of bulk
manufacturers and importers of a given
schedule I or II controlled substance to
that which can produce an adequate and
uninterrupted supply under adequately
competitive conditions. The
Government so asserted in the Show
Cause Order and throughout the
proceedings. Although Respondent
offered a different interpretation of
paragraph 823(a)(1),64 he asserted that,
under any interpretation, this factor
weighed in favor of finding the
proposed registration consistent with
the public interest.65
As discussed at length in part C of
this discussion, infra, to properly
construe paragraph 823(a)(1), it must be
viewed in comparison with § 823(d)(1).
Whereas § 823(d)(1) contains no
requirement that DEA consider limiting
in any way the total number of
registered manufacturers of controlled
substances in schedules III, IV, and V,
paragraph 823(a)(1) does require DEA to
consider limiting the total number of
bulk manufacturers of schedule I and II
controlled substances. Specifically,
paragraph 823(a)(1) calls upon DEA to
consider ‘‘limiting’’ (i.e., placing an
upper boundary on) the number of
registered bulk manufacturers of a given
schedule I or II controlled substance to
that ‘‘which can produce an adequate
63 For ease of exposition, the detailed analysis of
the meaning of paragraph 823(a)(1) appears in a
separate section of this discussion (part C), due to
its length.
64 See note 65, infra, regarding Respondent’s
proposed interpretation of paragraph 823(a)(1).
65 Because I have concluded, for the reasons set
forth in part C of the discussion, that DEA is
obligated under the text of paragraph 823(a)(1) to
consider limiting the number of bulk manufacturers
and importers of a given schedule I or II controlled
substance to that which can produce an adequate
and uninterrupted supply under adequately
competitive conditions, I reject Respondent’s
alternative reading of paragraph 823(a)(1).
Specifically, I reject the interpretation of paragraph
823(a)(1) under which ‘‘the registration should be
granted without regard to’’ adequacy of competition
and supply so long as the ‘‘registration would not
interfere with DEA’s maintenance of effective
diversion controls.’’ See Respondent’s Resp. at 13.
Respondent cites Noramco v. DEA, 375 F.3d 1148
(D.C. Cir. 2004) in support of this interpretation. Id.;
Resp. Proposed Findings and Conclusion of Law at
36. The Noramco decision is examined at length in
part C of this discussion. Because I interpret
paragraph 823(a)(1) to require consideration of the
adequacy of supply and competition, I decline to
undertake an analysis of the facts of this case
whereby the adequacy of competition and supply
is disregarded. However, as indicated above,
Respondent has alternatively argued that there is a
sufficient basis to grant his application when
construing paragraph 823(a)(1) as requiring a
showing of inadequate competition or supply, and
that argument is addressed at length in this final
order.
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and uninterrupted supply of these
substances under adequately
competitive conditions for legitimate
medical, scientific, research, and
industrial purposes.’’
Thus, an applicant seeking to become
registered to bulk manufacture a
schedule I or II controlled substance
bears the burden of demonstrating that
the existing registered bulk
manufacturers of a given schedule I or
II controlled substance are unable to
produce an adequate and uninterrupted
supply of that substance under
adequately competitive conditions. As a
threshold matter, Respondent
misconstrues this provision as placing
the burden on DEA, whenever someone
applies for registration under 21 U.S.C.
823(a), to demonstrate that competition
is already adequate within the meaning
of paragraph 823(a)(1). See Resp.
Proposed Findings and Conclusion of
Law at 47 (in which Respondent
contends that the ‘‘requirement’’ of
‘‘adequately competitive conditions’’ ‘‘is
not met by the by the current NIDA
monopoly’’). In fact, the DEA
regulations plainly state that every
applicant seeking registration under
§ 823(a) has ‘‘the burden of proving that
the requirements for such registration
pursuant to [this section] are satisfied.’’
21 CFR 1301.44(a).
Accordingly, the analysis under
paragraph 823(a)(1) (and Respondent’s
burdens thereunder) must be divided
into the following parts: (a) an analysis
of the adequacy of supply and (b) an
analysis of the adequacy of competition.
If Respondent can demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that
either supply or competition is
inadequate within the meaning
paragraph 823(a)(1), this weighs heavily
in favor of granting the registration. If,
however, Respondent fails to meet his
burden with respect to both supply and
competition, this weighs heavily against
granting the registration. (See part C of
this discussion.)
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(a) Adequacy of Supply Within the
Meaning of Paragraph 823(a)(1)
The first question under paragraph
823(a)(1) is whether Respondent has
demonstrated that the existing supply of
marijuana is inadequate to meet the
legitimate needs of the United States. As
the parties essentially agree, the
adequacy of supply of marijuana must
be evaluated in two respects: (i) quantity
and (ii) quality.
(i) Adequacy of the Quantity of the
Existing Supply
With respect to the adequacy of the
quantity of supply, the record
establishes that as of the date of the
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hearing, there were approximately 1055
kg of marijuana of various potencies in
the NIDA vault. RX 53. Moreover, some
of this marijuana apparently had been
harvested as early as 1997, and it
appears that as of the date of the
hearing, no marijuana had been grown
since 2001. Id. For the following
reasons, this amount of existing supply
far exceeds any present demand for
research-grade marijuana as well as any
reasonably anticipated demand for such
marijuana in the foreseeable future.
Lawful research involving marijuana
can be divided into two categories: NIHfunded and privately funded. See GX
31, at 3. With respect to NIH-funded
research, Respondent does not contend,
and there is no basis in the record to
conclude, that NIDA has failed to
provide, or is incapable of providing, an
adequate quantity of marijuana. Rather,
to the extent Respondent is claiming
that NIDA is unable to provide an
adequate quantity of marijuana,66 this
claim relates to privately funded
researchers. Yet, even as to this claim,
the evidence indicates otherwise.
The record reflects that since HHS
changed its policies in 1999 to make
marijuana more readily available to
researchers (by, among other things,
allowing privately funded researchers to
obtain marijuana), every one of the 17
CMCR-sponsored pre-clinical or clinical
studies that requested marijuana from
NIDA was provided with marijuana. GX
31, at 3; Tr. 694–95. Significantly,
according to one of the witnesses who
testified on behalf of Respondent, CMCR
funding of research involving marijuana
has currently ended and it appears
doubtful that a resumption of such
funding is ‘‘on the horizon.’’ Tr. at 397–
402, 441. Thus, the witness testified,
once the research projects sponsored by
CMCR that utilize NIDA marijuana
reach their conclusion, ‘‘[i]t’s likely that
the [CMCR] research is done.’’ Id. at
401–02. Other than the CMCRsponsored research, the record reveals
only one other instance in which a
privately funded researcher sought
marijuana from NIDA after HHS
changed its policies in 1999 to make
marijuana more readily available to
researchers. That one other instance was
the MAPS-sponsored request submitted
66 Respondent appears to challenge the process by
which NIDA supplies marijuana to researchers and
the quality of the marijuana, rather than the
quantity. See, e.g., Respondent’s Resp. at 15–16.
The ALJ’s recommendation regarding the adequacy
of supply also focused on the process by which
NIDA supplies marijuana, and she was not of the
opinion actual quantity of marijuana supplied by
NIDA was inadequate. See ALJ at 84. Nonetheless,
for the sake of completeness, and in accordance
with 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1), I am addressing the
adequacy of supply from a quantitative perspective.
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2119
by Chemic to obtain marijuana to
conduct research on the Volcano. See
RX 52B. According to Mr. Doblin,
Chemic ‘‘applied to NIDA to purchase
ten grams’’ of marijuana. Tr. 531; RX 14.
Although, as discussed above, HHS
denied that request on scientific
grounds (see RX 52B), there is no basis
to conclude that NIDA was incapable of
providing Chemic with the quantity of
marijuana it was seeking. Indeed, the
ten grams of marijuana that Chemic
requested is less then one 100,000th of
the amount of marijuana that NIDA has
available to supply researchers. See RX
53.
Accordingly, the evidence
overwhelmingly establishes that NIDA
is capable of providing an adequate
quantity of marijuana to meet all current
and foreseeable research needs of the
United States. And while NIDA’s
existing system for supplying marijuana
is quantitatively adequate regardless of
how much or how little additional
marijuana Respondent seeks to produce,
it is notable that the approximately 1055
kg of marijuana currently on hand is
more than 90 times the amount of
marijuana that Respondent proposes to
grow.
Respondent nonetheless contends that
the process by which HHS provides
marijuana to researchers—which
involves a peer review of the scientific
merits of the research proposal 67—
results in a barrier to research that
effectively renders the supply of
marijuana inadequate. Respondent
points to three prior incidents to
support his contention that the HHS
scientific review process impedes
research. As discussed above, the first
two of these incidents (those involving
Dr. Abrams and Dr. Russo) are irrelevant
as they occurred before HHS adopted its
new procedures in 1999 for making
marijuana more widely available to
researchers.68 The third incident
involved the application of Chemic to
obtain marijuana to conduct research on
the Volcano. As discussed above, HHS
67 Tr. at 1626–28, 1635. In his testimony, Dr. Gust
explained the term ‘‘peer review’’ as follows: ‘‘Peer
review is a process that has been used, certainly by
NIH, and I think in other agencies in the
Department of Health and Human Services, and
probably the Federal Government, where outside
expertise is acquired and outside opinions on the
scientific merit of specific research proposals.’’ Id.
at 1627. Dr. Gust added that the NIH peer review
committees ‘‘review proposals three times a year for
the NIH, and there are—occasionally a Federal
employee participates in one of those reviews, but
probably 90 percent or more of the participants are
researchers who are in the private sector, for the
most part in academic institutions.’’ Id. at 1627–28.
68 Further, as discussed above, the evidence
indicates that the denials involving of Dr. Abrams
and Dr. Russo were based on HHS finding their
protocols to be lacking in scientific merit.
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declined to supply Chemic with
marijuana in 2005 based on scientific
considerations, finding that Chemic’s
then-latest proposed study was
duplicative of prior and ongoing
research and not likely to provide useful
data. Thus, the success of Respondent’s
claim that the HHS scientific review
process renders the existing supply of
marijuana inadequate depends on
whether one accepts Respondent’s
assumption that anyone in the United
States who has a proposed research
project involving marijuana should be
entitled to obtain marijuana—regardless
of whether the competent Government
authority finds the research to be
lacking in scientific merit.69
Respondent’s assumption about who
is entitled to conduct research with
marijuana is directly undercut by the
text of the CSA. As set forth in 21 U.S.C.
823(f), persons seeking to conduct
research with schedule I controlled
substances (such as marijuana) may
only obtain a DEA registration ‘‘for the
purpose of bona fide research’’
(emphasis added), with the Secretary of
HHS being responsible for determining
‘‘the qualifications and competency’’ of
the applicant ‘‘as well as the merits of
the research protocol.’’ The process
HHS has established to assess the
scientific merit of proposed research
studies involving marijuana is that
described in the 1999 HHS
announcement of its new procedures.70
69 It is not even clear whether Respondent
continues to cite the Chemic situation of an
example of supposedly ‘‘legitimate research’’ for
which HHS declined to provide marijuana. While
Respondent did so characterize the Chemic
situation in his proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law (at 14), in his subsequently filed
response to the Government’s exceptions to the ALJ
recommendation, he listed only Dr. Abrams and Dr.
Russo as examples of ‘‘legitimate research’’ for
which marijuana was not supplied. Respondent’s
Resp. at 16. As noted, the incidents involving Dr.
Abrams and Dr. Russo occurred prior to HHS’s
promulgation of the 1999 guidelines. As such, these
incidents are not probative of the current
availability of research-grade marijuana from HHS.
70 Respondent points out that the Secretary of
HHS has delegated to the FDA Commissioner the
Secretary’s functions under 21 U.S.C. 823(f) relating
to research with controlled substances in schedule
I. Respondent’s Resp. at 4–5 (citing FDA Staff
Manual Guides 1410.10). While this is correct as a
general matter for schedule I controlled substances,
the record plainly indicates that with specific
regard to research involving marijuana, HHS has
retained its authority to determine the
qualifications and competency of the researcher, as
well as the merits of the research protocol, for
purposes of § 823(f). See GX 24. Indeed, the 1999
HHS announcement of its policies for providing
marijuana to researchers expressly states: ‘‘To
receive such a registration [under § 823(f)], a
researcher must first be determined by HHS to be
qualified and competent, and the proposed research
must be determined by HHS to have merit.’’ Id. at
1 (emphasis added). Dr. Gust’s testimony confirms
that, in fact, HHS—through its peer review
process—does make these determinations for
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GXs 24 & 31; Tr. at 1626–35. That
Respondent finds this process to be
scientifically rigorous 71—and thereby
not automatically accepting of any
proposed study sponsored by MAPS—
provides no basis for any valid objection
or any contention that the HHS supply
of marijuana is inadequate.72
(ii) Adequacy of the Quality of the
Existing Supply
As for Respondent’s contention that
the quality of marijuana supplied by
NIDA is unsatisfactory and that this
renders the supply of marijuana
inadequate within the meaning of 21
U.S.C. 823(a)(1), the ALJ rejected this
contention, finding that a
preponderance of the evidence
established that ‘‘the quality is generally
adequate.’’ ALJ at 84. In this regard,
Respondent contended that NIDA’s
marijuana was of inconsistent potency,
that it was of too low a potency, that it
included stems and seeds, that it was
not fresh, and that some of the patients
had complained that it ‘‘was the worst
marijuana they had ever sampled.’’
Resp. Proposed Findings at 16–27 & 49.
As found above, Respondent’s
contentions rest largely on snippets
taken from questionnaires which were
completed by a number of researchers.
On balance, however, the researchers
indicated their overall satisfaction with
NIDA’s marijuana and noted that the
agency had been accommodating and
responsive to their concerns. See, e.g.,
GX 16, at 6 & 19. Moreover, most of the
researchers indicated that the potency of
NIDA’s product was adequate and had
not compromised their research. See,
e.g., GX 16, at 6 & 15; GX 17, at 9.
persons seeking to conduct research with
marijuana. Tr. 1626–35.
Moreover, as discussed above, Respondent
produced no evidence showing that HHS has
denied marijuana to any clinical researcher with an
FDA-approved protocol subsequent to the adoption
of the 1999 guidelines. The lone applicant whose
post-1999 request for marijuana was denied
(Chemic) submitted its request to, and had it
reviewed by HHS—not FDA. See GXs 49 & 52B. For
all these reasons, it is unfounded for Respondent to
suggest that the supply of marijuana is somehow
inadequate because HHS has not assigned FDA sole
responsibility for determining what research
proposals involving marijuana are scientifically
meritorious.
71 Any suggestion that the HHS scientific review
process is unduly rigorous is belied by the
testimony of Dr. Gust that the ‘‘scientific bar has
been set very low, [so] that any project that has
scientific merit is approved,’’ and that ‘‘anything
that gets approved gets NIDA marijuana’’ (Tr. at
1700–01) as well as the uncontroverted evidence
that every one of the 17 CMCR-sponsored research
protocols submitted to HHS was deemed
scientifically meritorious by HHS and was supplied
with marijuana (GX 31, at 3; Tr. 694–95).
72 For the same reasons, I find wholly
unpersuasive the ALJ’s recommended finding that
the supply of marijuana is inadequate because of
the HHS scientific review process.
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Furthermore, while Respondent notes
that several researchers stated that it
would be beneficial to evaluate a higher
potency product, he produced no
evidence that any researcher had
obtained approval from FDA and other
reviewing authorities to conduct clinic
trials with such a product. See GX 21,
at 9 (researcher explaining that he
‘‘wanted to use a higher potency
product but there were questions from
the [scientific review board] and the’’
CMCR). In any event, the evidence
establishes that NIDA’s stock includes
substantial quantities of high THC
content marijuana and that its
contractor is capable of producing
marijuana with a THC content of up to
twenty percent.73 Tr. 1203–05.
Related to this argument, Respondent
also contends that NIDA’s marijuana has
stems and seeds and that some patients
complained that ‘‘that the marijuana is
inferior in sensory qualities (taste,
harshness) than the marijuana they
smoke outside the laboratory. Some
have stated it was the worst marijuana
they had ever sampled.’’ Resp. Proposed
Findings at 20 (other citation omitted);
see also id. at 49. The evidence
establishes, however, that the contractor
has rectified the problem with respect to
the stems and seeds. Tr. 1301.
As for the complaints regarding the
sensory qualities of NIDA’s products,
only a small percentage of the numerous
studies’ subjects complained about the
harshness of NIDA’s marijuana, and as
one researcher explained, it is not clear
whether it was placebo or actual
marijuana that was the cause of the
complaints. GX 18, at 7. Relatedly, it
seems a strained argument for
Respondent to make that experienced
73 Despite Respondent’s suggestion that human
research subjects should be given marijuana of
higher potencies than that supplied by NIDA (see,
e.g., Tr. 552, 567 (testimony of Mr. Doblin)), there
is no basis in the record to conclude that it would
be medically or scientifically appropriate to do so.
To the contrary, Dr. ElSohly testified that he was
told by CMCR researchers that they did not want
Dr. ElSohly to supply them with marijuana with a
THC content as high as eight percent because, based
on their prior observations of research subjects
being given NIDA marijuana containing eight
percent THC, ‘‘the subject couldn’t tolerate that,
and if we can make a six percent, that would be
more appropriate.’’ Tr. 1280. Dr. ElSohly also
testified that other scientists expressed the same
opinion that six percent THC content was
preferable because the research subjects ‘‘would not
tolerate’’ marijuana with eight percent THC. Tr.
1295. Large doses of marijuana (in terms of the
amount of THC administered) have been found to
cause adverse mood reactions, including anxiety,
paranoia, panic, depression, dysphoria,
depersonalization, delusions, illusions, and
hallucinations. RX 1, at 102. A primary reason that
researchers are required to submit an IND to FDA
prior to engaging in research with human subjects
is ‘‘to assure the safety and rights of subjects.’’ 21
CFR 312.22(a).
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marijuana smokers reported, after
consuming a hallucinogenic substance,
that they found NIDA’s marijuana to be
less pleasing to their senses than the
marijuana they had illegally obtained
and used. People generally take
medicines—which marijuana is not—for
their therapeutic benefits and not their
taste. And in any event, Respondent has
not established that NIDA’s products
were unsuitable for their intended use.74
For these reasons, I accept the ALJ’s
recommended finding that Respondent
did not meet his burden of
demonstrating that NIDA is incapable of
providing marijuana of sufficient quality
to meet the legitimate research needs of
the United States.
Thus, I conclude that the evidence
does not support Respondent’s
contention that the supply of marijuana
is inadequate—in terms of quantity or
quality—within the meaning of
paragraph 823(a)(1).
(b) Adequacy of Competition Within the
Meaning of Paragraph 823(a)(1)
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The second question under paragraph
823(a)(1) is whether Respondent has
demonstrated that the existing supply of
marijuana is not being produced under
adequately competitive conditions to
meet the legitimate needs of the United
States. Again, as explained below in
part C of this discussion, paragraph
823(a)(1) does not require DEA simply
to register as many bulk manufacturers
of a given schedule I or II controlled
substance as the market will bear. Nor
does paragraph 823(a)(1) require the
registration of an additional bulk
manufacturer based merely on the
assertion the additional registration will
result in some vague, theoretical
incremental increase in competition. If
such a theoretical assertion would
suffice, then the language of paragraph
823(a)(1) requiring DEA to consider
‘‘limiting’’ the number of registered bulk
manufacturers would be rendered
meaningless. This is because every
person seeking to enter the market as a
new bulk manufacturer of a given
schedule I or II controlled substance
could make the theoretical claim that
every new registrant increases the
overall amount of competition.
74 Moreover, Respondent presented no evidence
to show that he is capable of producing marijuana
with any degree of quality control—let alone the
type of evidence that would allow an inference that
he could improve upon the quality of marijuana
produced at the University of Mississippi. To the
contrary, as explained below in the discussion of
public interest factor five, Respondent’s lack of
experience in growing marijuana is in stark contrast
to Dr. ElSohly’s decades of experience in
manufacturing, analyzing, and publishing scientific
articles on the subject.
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Thus, to avoid reading the limiting
language of paragraph 823(a)(1) in a
superfluous manner, in final orders
where DEA has analyzed competition
under paragraph 823(a)(1), DEA has
looked to empirical data; specifically,
DEA has focused on the historical and
present prices charged to those who
lawfully acquire the controlled
substance from the existing registered
bulk manufacturers.75 This approach is
consistent with the following statement
made by the Department of Justice
stated during Congressional hearings
leading up to the enactment of the CSA:
There is no reason to assume that the
Attorney General will prejudice his primary
objectives of effective control by excessive
licensing. Nor will he undertake direct price
control. He will be empowered to take
cognizance of evidence showing that prices
are clearly and persistently excessive. The
criteria for determining whether prices far
exceed that which is reasonable relate to
reasonable costs and reasonable profits.
* * * If evidence indicates that additional
licensing will result in more reasonable
prices with no significant diminution in the
effectiveness of drug control, the Attorney
General should be able to license the
additional manufacturers.76
Here, the evidence demonstrates that
NIDA has always provided marijuana to
researchers at cost or for free—and at no
profit to NIDA. Privately funded
researchers receive marijuana at NIDA’s
cost 77 and HHS-funded researchers
(who have historically comprised the
bulk of the marijuana recipients) receive
the marijuana at no cost. GX 24, at 2; GX
31, at 3; Tr. 1212, 1633, 1670–71. Thus,
there is no basis to suggest that the cost
to any researcher under the existing
supply arrangement is unreasonable.
Respondent himself does not so
contend; nor does he claim that the cost
to any researcher of obtaining marijuana
would be lower if Respondent became
registered to grow marijuana.
Respondent hypothesizes that ‘‘if
another manufacturer could produce
suitable medical marijuana for a lower
cost, competitive conditions would, as
they usually do, benefit the researcherconsumer.’’ Resp. Prop. Findings at 48.
However, Respondent provides no
evidentiary basis for the proposition
that he (or anyone else) could produce
marijuana at a lower cost than NIDA.
75 See Penick Corporation Inc., 68 FR 6947 (2003);
Roxane Laboratories, Inc., 63 FR 55891 (1998).
76 Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 91st Cong. 372
(1969) (discussed more fully in part C of this
discussion).
77 According to Dr. ElSohly, where marijuana is
supplied to privately funded researchers, ‘‘the
researchers would just pay the production costs.’’
RX 5, at 2.
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Moreover, Mr. Doblin acknowledged
that MAPS would have a ‘‘profitmaking’’ motivation as part of its
‘‘operation’’ to supply marijuana for the
purposes of drug development, and that
this would impact ‘‘costs.’’ Tr. 605–606.
In contrast, there is no evidence that
HHS or NIDA is driven in any respect
by a profit motive in deciding to whom
and at what cost to supply marijuana.
Even accepting, arguendo, Mr. Doblin’s
testimony that ‘‘we [MAPS] would
either provide [marijuana] free or at cost
through donations to MAPS to other
researchers who are not doing MAPS
funded projects’’ (Tr. at 589), this would
still not demonstrate a lowering of the
cost to researchers. This is because, if
MAPS were so willing to fund all
researchers, they could do so under the
existing system by paying NIDA on a
cost-reimbursable basis for the
marijuana, allowing the researchers to
obtain the marijuana at no cost to the
researchers. Thus, Respondent has not
demonstrated that competition is
inadequate in the way that other
applicants for registration under § 823(a)
have successfully done in prior final
orders; i.e., by focusing on prices
charged by the existing registrants that
supply the market for the schedule I or
II controlled substance in question and
showing those prices to be
unreasonable.78
Respondent also claims that the
process by which the NIDA contract is
awarded is not adequately competitive
because the contract requires not only
that the contractor manufacture
marijuana, but also that it analyze
marijuana samples sent in by law
enforcement agencies. Id. at 48.
Respondent further contends that the
NIDA process ‘‘does not ensure that
researchers pay a competitive price
[because] NIDA sets the price and there
is no evidence as to how that price is
set.’’ Id. Finally, Respondent rehashes
his argument regarding the quality of
NIDA’s marijuana contending that
granting his application would promote
competition and improvement in the
quality of research marijuana. Id. at 49.
The ALJ agreed with Respondent and
rejected the Government’s contention
that the NIDA process provides for
adequate competition because demand
for research grade marijuana is limited,
the contract is periodically put up for
78 See Penick Corporation, supra; Roxane
Laboratories, supra (both of which are examined in
part C of this discussion). As one DEA scientist
testified in this proceeding, based on his
experience, when the agency has historically
considered the adequacy of competition within the
meaning of paragraph 823(a)(1), the analyses ‘‘all
seem to be geared around the economics.’’ Tr. at
945.
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competitive bidding, and the
Convention requires that the
Government maintain a monopoly on
the wholesale distribution of the
substance. More specifically, the ALJ
reasoned that ‘‘[t]he question is not
* * * whether the NIDA process
addresses that agency’s needs, but
whether marijuana is made available to
all researchers who have a legitimate
need for it in their research.’’ ALJ at 85.
Based on her finding that NIDA denied
marijuana to two researchers, the ALJ
‘‘answer[ed] that question in the
negative.’’ Id.
The ALJ also reasoned that analyzing
marijuana samples was ‘‘a separate
activity from cultivating marijuana for
research purposes and a requirement
that a qualified cultivator may not be
able to fulfill.’’ Id. The ALJ thus
concluded that ‘‘the NIDA contractual
process does not * * * render
competition in the manufacture of
marijuana adequate.’’ Id.
I reject both the ALJ’s legal
conclusions and Respondent’s
arguments. As for the ALJ’s (and
Respondent’s) reasoning that the NIDA
contractual process does not render
competition adequate because the
contract requires the analyzing of
marijuana samples, in executing its
authority under § 823(a), DEA does not
act as a board of contract appeals. In any
event, the contract does not prohibit the
contractor from subcontracting this
function. See GX 15, at 4 (Request for
Proposal) (‘‘As this procurement may
require expertise in several scientific
areas, offerors are encouraged to solicit
subcontractors or expert consultants as
appropriate.’’) (emphasis added).79
Finally, as for the contention that
granting his application would provide
for competition and thereby promote
improvement in the quality of researchgrade marijuana,80 if Respondent
believes that he can produce a higherquality product than the current
contractor, he should bid on the
contract.81 If he prevails, and
79 The University of Mississippi subcontracts to
another entity, Research Triangle Institute (RTI), the
responsibilities under the contract to produce the
marijuana cigarettes (using marijuana supplied by
the University of Mississippi) and deliver them to
authorized recipients. Tr. 1162–65, 1168–69; see
also 72 FR 73369 (notice of registration for RTI).
80 As discussed above, Respondent failed to put
forth any evidence demonstrating that he is capable
of any type of quality control relating the
manufacture of marijuana and his lack of
experience and expertise in this field compared to
that of Dr. ElSohly suggests that he is incapable of
improving on the quality of marijuana produced by
the University of Mississippi.
81 I also note Respondent’s contention that the
NIDA process ‘‘does not ensure that researchers pay
a competitive price [because] NIDA sets the price
and there is no evidence as to how that price is set.’’
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demonstrates that his project will
implement effective controls against
diversion, he can establish that his
registration would be consistent with
the public interest. Respondent,
however, has not been awarded a
contract to supply NIDA, which,
consistent with the Single Convention,
is the only lawfully authorized
wholesale distributor of plant-form
marijuana.
Thus, whether viewing the
competition aspect of paragraph
823(a)(1) by considering the
reasonableness of prices paid by those
who lawfully acquire bulk marijuana for
research or by considering the adequacy
of the competitiveness of the process by
which persons may bid to become the
grower of marijuana for NIDA,
Respondent has failed to meet his
burden. This combined with his failure
to meet his burden of demonstrating
inadequate supply within the meaning
of paragraph 823(a)(1) weighs heavily
against granting his application.
Nonetheless, Respondent raises a host of
arguments under the heading of
paragraph 823(a)(1) which—though not
actually germane to paragraph
823(a)(1)—are addressed below.
(c) Additional Arguments Raised by
Respondent Under the Heading of
Paragraph 823(a)(1)
In lieu of presenting evidence to show
that competition is inadequate by virtue
of unreasonable prices for researchgrade marijuana or any other economic
data, Respondent argues that
competition should be deemed
inadequate within the meaning of
paragraph 823(a)(1) based on his
objection to the to ‘‘government
monopoly’’ whereby HHS distributes
marijuana to researchers. In other
words, the very monopoly over the
wholesale distribution of marijuana that
is mandated by the Single Convention
(indeed, the element that is at the heart
of the structure of cannabis control
under the treaty) is the central basis on
which Respondent relies in attempting
to meet his burden of demonstrating
inadequate competition within the
meaning of paragraph 823(a)(1). This
argument is flawed in the following
respects. As explained above and in part
C of this discussion, the competition
analysis set forth in paragraph 823(a)(1)
must be based on actual economic
considerations in the existing market—
not policy questions about the wisdom
of having the Federal Government
Resp. Prop. Findings at 48. Even if marijuana were
not subject to the Convention’s requirement, I
would still reject the argument because Respondent
had the burden of proving that the prices are
excessive.
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control the wholesale distribution of
marijuana.
In addition, Respondent’s suggestion
that paragraph 823(a)(1) can be used to
defeat the Single Convention’s
requirement of a government monopoly
over wholesale marijuana distribution
mistakenly construes the treaty criterion
§ 823(a) as being in competition with
the public interest criterion. In fact, as
explained above, an applicant for
registration under § 823(a) must
demonstrate that the proposed
registration is consistent with both the
Single Convention and the public
interest—and neither criterion is at odds
with the other. Both the Single
Convention and the United States Code
are the ‘‘supreme law of the land,’’ U.S.
Const. art VI, and in enacting the CSA,
Congress made clear that § 823(a)
should be interpreted in a manner that
is consistent with the United States’
obligations under the Convention. The
Agency’s interpretation of paragraph
823(a)(1) must therefore recognize not
only the Convention’s specific
provisions applicable to marijuana,
which expressly prohibit competition in
the wholesale distribution of the
substance, but also the background
principles which underlie both the
Convention and the CSA. Accordingly,
I reject Respondent’s invitation to
interpret § 823(a) in a manner that
would abrogate the United States’
obligation under the Convention to
maintain a monopoly in the wholesale
trade of marijuana.
While § 823(a) was enacted
subsequent to the Convention—indeed
it implements the Convention 82—it is a
provision of general applicability and
contains no explicit reference to
marijuana. Under settled principles of
statutory construction, while a later
enacted law can sometime repeal an
earlier provision, ‘‘ ‘[r]epeals by
implication are not favored’ and will not
be presumed unless the ‘intention of the
legislature to repeal [is] clear and
manifest.’ ’’ National Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127
S.Ct. 2518, 2532 (2007) (quoting Watt v.
Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981)).
Accordingly, courts ‘‘will not infer a
statutory repeal ‘unless the later statute
expressly contradict[s] the original act’
or unless such a construction is
‘absolutely necessary * * * in order
that [the] words [of the later statute]
shall have any meaning at all.’ ’’ Id.
(quoting Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S.
535, 548 (1988) (int. quotations and
other citations omitted)).
82 See H.R. Rep. 1444 (91st. Cong., 2d Sess.),
reprinted at 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4572.
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Here, this rule applies with added
force for two reasons. First,
Respondent’s construction would
derogate the sovereign authority of the
United States. See, e.g., E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456,
462 (1924) (noting that in taking over
the railroads, ‘‘the United States did so
in its sovereign capacity * * * and it
may not be held to have waived any
sovereign right or privilege unless
plainly so provided’’); cf. Federal Power
Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,
362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960) (quoting United
States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 330 U.S. 258, 272 (1947)
(‘‘There is an old and well-known rule
that statutes which in general terms
divest pre-existing rights or privileges
will not be applied to the sovereign
without express words to that effect.’’);
Sea-Land Service, Inc., v. The Alaska
R.R., 659 F.2d 243, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding that ‘‘[t]he Sherman Act * * *
does not expose United States
instrumentalities to liability, whether
legal or equitable in character, for
conduct alleged to violate antitrust
constraints’’).
Second, Respondent’s construction
would result in the abrogation of the
Convention’s provision. While Congress
may abrogate a treaty, the ‘‘legislation
must be clear to ensure that Congress—
and the President—have considered the
consequences.’’ Roeder v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 238 (D.C.
Cir. 2003). The D.C. Circuit has further
explained that ‘‘[t]he ‘requirement of [a]
clear statement assures that the
legislature has in fact faced, and
intended to bring into issue, the critical
matters involved in the judicial
decision.’ ’’ Id. (quoting Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991)). See
also Vimar Seguros y Reaserguros, S.A.
v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539
(1995) (‘‘If the United States is to be able
to gain the benefits of international
accords and have a role as a trusted
partner in multilateral endeavors, its
courts should be most cautious before
interpreting its domestic legislation in
such manner as to violate international
agreements.’’); George E. Warren Corp.
v. U.S. E.P.A., 159 F.3d 616, 624 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (upholding agency rule which
‘‘avoid[ed] an interpretation that would
put a law of the United States into
conflict with a treaty obligation of the
United States,’’ and observing that that
‘‘[s]ince the days of Chief Justice
Marshall, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that congressional
statutes must be construed wherever
possible in a manner that will not
require the United States to violate the
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law of nations’’) (internal quotations
and other citations omitted).
As explained above, § 823(a) is not
limited to applicants who seek a
registration to manufacture marijuana,
but rather is a provision that applies to
every person who seeks a registration to
manufacture any one of the hundreds of
other controlled substances listed in
schedules I and II. Paragraph 823(a)(1)’s
direction to the Attorney General to
consider the adequacy of competition
does not provide a clear statement of
congressional intent to abrogate the
Convention’s requirement that the
United States Government maintain a
monopoly on the wholesale trade in
marijuana. Absent the requisite clear
statement, I conclude that to the extent
the CSA seeks to promote adequate
competition in the supply of marijuana,
the NIDA process satisfies Congress’
purpose by putting the contract up for
competitive bidding at periodic
intervals then supplying the marijuana
to researchers for free or at NIDA’s cost.
Respondent also contends that the
current NIDA supply is ‘‘inadequate
because a pharmaceutical developer
could not reasonably rely on NIDA
marijuana to take [plant-form] marijuana
through the FDA new drug approval
process.’’ Respondent’s Resp. at 16; see
also Respondent Proposed Findings at
45 (‘‘no rational drug sponsor seeking to
develop botanical marijuana as an FDAapproved product could proceed
without seeking a source of supply
alternative to NIDA’s’’). Of note in this
regard, Mr. Doblin testified that MAPS
could take plant-form marijuana
through the FDA-approval process for a
cost of $5 to $10 million
notwithstanding ample evidence that
the actual costs would be considerably
more, and that he ‘‘disagree[d]’’ with the
IOM’s conclusion that defined and
purified cannabinoid compounds ‘‘are
preferable to plant products, which are
of variable and uncertain composition.’’
Tr. 654; RX 1, at 22. See also GX 53
(letter of GW Pharmaceuticals; ‘‘[H]erbal
cannabis should comprise only the
starting material from which a bona fide
medical product is ultimately
derived.’’). Mr. Doblin also testified that
the safety of smoked marijuana would
be only ‘‘slightly different’’ from that of
drugs containing cannabinoid extracts,
Tr. at 605, notwithstanding the IOM’s
further conclusion that smoking ‘‘is a
crude THC delivery system that also
delivers harmful substances’’ such as
those found in tobacco, and that ‘‘there
is little future in smoked marijuana as
a medically approved medication.’’ RX
1, at 195.
Mr. Doblin’s testimony hardly
suggests that he is a ‘‘rational drug
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2123
developer.’’ But even ignoring his
testimony, Respondent’s argument is
meritless. Respondent’s contention that
‘‘MAPS can have no confidence * * *
that NIDA would authorize MAPS to
rely on’’ NIDA’s Drug Master File, Resp.
Proposed Findings at 44–45, ignores
that under the HHS Guidance, NIDA is
required to ‘‘provide the researcher with
authorization to reference’’ it. GX 24, at
4. Moreover, neither Federal law nor
FDA’s regulations require that a drug
developer submit a Drug Master File.
FDA, Guideline for Drug Master Files, at
2.
Respondent further contends that
NIDA would not be willing to serve as
supplier to a drug developer because
doing so is not part of its mission. It is,
however, HHS, and not NIDA (which is
only a subcomponent therein) which
sets policy on whether to provide
marijuana. As for Respondent’s
insinuation that HHS is biased against
research that seeks to develop plantform marijuana into a prescription
medicine, it is true that Dr. Gust
testified that HHS ‘‘strongly endorse[s]’’
the IOM’s view that if marijuana is to
provide the basis for a prescription
medicine, it will be in a medicine which
uses ‘‘a purified constituent’’ and a nonsmokable delivery system. Tr. 1722. A
view based on science is not bias.
Moreover, Dr. Gust’s testimony made
clear that PHS does not have a bias
against research that is directed at
developing plant-form marijuana, id. at
1719–20, 1722; and that whether plantform marijuana should be approved as
a prescription medicine is a question for
the FDA-approval process. Id. at 1720.
Respondent’s contention to this effect is
therefore rejected.
In sum, under the text of 21 U.S.C.
823(a)(1), to maintain effective controls
against diversion, DEA is obligated to
consider limiting the number of
registered bulk manufacturers of any
given schedule I or II controlled
substance to that which can produce an
adequate and uninterrupted supply of
the substance under adequately
competitive conditions. Thus, every
applicant for registration under § 823(a)
bears the burden of demonstrating that
either the existing supply or
competition is inadequate within the
meaning of paragraph 823(a)(1). For the
reasons provided above, Respondent has
failed to meet this burden. Accordingly,
factor one weighs heavily against
granting his application.
2. Public Interest Factor Two
The second public interest factor is
‘‘compliance with applicable State and
local law.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(2). The ALJ
stated: ‘‘There is neither evidence nor
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contention that Respondent has not
complied with applicable laws and I
therefore find that this factor weighs in
favor of granting Respondent’s
application.’’ ALJ at 85. In view of this
statement, it must be repeated that at
any hearing on an application to
manufacture a schedule I or II
controlled substance, the applicant has
the burden of proving that the
requirements for registration under 21
U.S.C. 823(a) are satisfied. 21 CFR
1301.44(a). Moreover, the issue under
the second public interest factor is not
merely whether an applicant has
complied in the past with applicable
State and local law, but also whether the
applicant will do so if he becomes
registered. Thus, it was imprecise for
the ALJ to suggest that the absence of
evidence regarding past compliance
with applicable State and local law
constitutes a favorable showing on
behalf of the applicant for purposes of
the second public interest factor.
However, the record is not entirely
silent with respect to this factor. As the
ALJ noted (ALJ at 57), and as
Respondent has emphasized (Resp.
Prop. Findings at 57), Respondent did
testify that he met with ‘‘state
investigators’’ who told him that ‘‘a state
permit would depend on a federal
permit being granted.’’ Tr. 45. Given
that the Government did not contest this
part of Respondent’s testimony, I will
give Respondent the benefit of the doubt
by inferring that what he intended to
convey was that Massachusetts state
officials indicated to him that he would
be able to obtain a ‘‘registration’’ under
Massachusetts law to manufacture
marijuana if and when he were to obtain
a DEA registration to do so.83 I do so
despite the fact that Respondent did not
indicate in his testimony or through the
submission of any documentary exhibits
whether he had actually filed an
application with the state and submitted
the appropriate fee for such state
registration. Thus, consistent with the
ALJ’s recommendation, I find
Respondent has put forth some evidence
which (being unrefuted) allows for a
conclusion that his proposed activities
would be in compliance with State and
local law.
83 Analogous to federal law, Massachusetts law
provides that ‘‘every person who manufactures
* * * any controlled substance within the
commonwealth shall upon payment of a fee, * * *
register with the commissioner of public health, in
accordance with his regulations, said registration to
be effective for one year from the date of issuance.’’
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 94C, § 7(a) (West 2008).
Massachusetts has adopted the CSA schedules of
controlled substances, making marijuana a schedule
I controlled substance under state law. See Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 94C, § 2(a).
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The Government took exception,
however, to the ALJ’s recommendation
that this factor (paragraph 823(a)(2)) be
weighed in favor of granting
Respondent’s application. Gov.
Exceptions at 12–13. The Government
argues that this factor ‘‘is most often
relevant’’ in cases in which practitioners
have lost their state controlled
substance authorization. Id. at 13.
Further, the Government contends,
‘‘[w]hile the failure to have a required
state or local license would prove fatal
to an application, * * * an expectation
by Respondent that the required state
license will ineluctably follow the
granting of a DEA registration and a
promise to comply with state and local
law in the future simply renders this
factor irrelevant and does not weigh in
favor of either party.’’ Id. In response
thereto, Respondent asserts that the lack
of evidence of noncompliance with state
or local law should indeed support a
finding that this factor weighs in favor
of registration. Respondent’s Resp. at
18–19.
It is certainly true, as both parties
agree, that the evidence relating to
Respondent’s proposed activities cannot
be deemed as weighing against the
pubic interest for purposes of paragraph
823(a)(2). However, whether one
characterizes the evidence relevant to
this factor as weighing in favor of
granting Respondent’s application or
simply neutral seems somewhat a
matter of semantics. Given the nature of
the evidence here (Respondent’s mere
testimony that he anticipates
authorization from the state and that he
promises to comply with state law), I
accept the characterization that the
evidence is favorable as to the second
public interest factor, with the caveat
that this factor is of limited weight
commensurate with the nature of the
evidence.
3. Public Interest Factor Three
The third public interest factor is
‘‘promotion of technical advances in the
art of manufacturing these substances
and the development of new
substances.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(3). The
ALJ found that Respondent has
‘‘considerable experience in cultivating
medicinal plants, which might promote
technical advances in the cultivation of
marijuana or developing new
medications from it.’’ ALJ at 85–86. The
ALJ nonetheless found that ‘‘there is not
sufficient evidence in the record on
which to base a finding as to whether
granting Respondent’s registration
would promote technical advances.’’ Id.
at 86. When asked by his own counsel
how his registration would promote
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technical advances, Respondent
answered in a vague manner:
Well, I think there is two answers to that
as far as I’m concerned. One is that, yes, it
would make an advance in the understanding
any possible clinical use of marijuana if we
were able to supply this to investigators to
run trials, and, secondly, as I’ve explained to
DEA agents that visited, that we would learn
more about how the environment affects the
constituents in the plant material which
would enable, if this does become at some
stage down the road here, becomes a useful
drug, and that the manufacturer of it has to
be controlled under security conditions, they
would know the environment it needs to be
grown under to produce a clinical marijuana,
medical marijuana.
Tr. at 75–76. In the first part of the
above answer, it appears that
Respondent is simply accepting the
word of his sponsor, Mr. Doblin, that his
obtaining a DEA registration would
result in marijuana being provided to
researchers who would not otherwise
obtain it. If so, Respondent is relying on
a false premise. As discussed at length
above, the evidence demonstrates that
not one bona fide researcher within the
meaning of the CSA (i.e., one whose
protocol has been determined by HHS to
be scientifically meritorious) has ever
been denied marijuana 84 and that,
under the new procedures adopted by
HHS in 1999, the ‘‘scientific bar’’ has
been set relatively low, allowing
marijuana to be provided to 17 privately
funded researchers. As for the second
part of his answer, in which Respondent
attempted to explain how his
registration would result in learning
‘‘more about how the environment
affects the constituents in the plant
material,’’ this explanation is noticeably
lacking in detail and without any
discernable scientific basis. By his own
admission, Respondent is ‘‘not
experienced in growing this plant
(marijuana).’’ Tr. at 40. In comparison,
Dr. ElSohly, who has been the principal
investigator under the NIDA contract
and has overseen the National Center’s
work with marijuana since 1980
(employing a wide variety of
84 Even with respect to Dr. Abrams—who MAPS
seems to believe was improperly denied marijuana
in the pre-1999 era (before HHS changed its policy
for providing marijuana to researchers)—
Respondent produced no evidence that HHS’s
denial was lacking in scientific basis. To the
contrary, as indicated above, the evidence indicates
that NIDA initially denied Dr. Abrams’ request
based on valid concerns about the design and
scientific merit of his protocol. See note 24, supra,
and accompanying text. The record further reflects
that Dr. Abrams corrected these deficiencies to
NIDA’s satisfaction upon submitting a revised
protocol and, as a result, received marijuana from
NIDA in 1997; NIDA also supplied Dr. Abrams with
marijuana for subsequent studies. Id.
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manufacturing techniques),85 has at
least seven patents relating to the
manufacture and identification of
marijuana and its derivatives, and has
authored numerous articles on these
subjects that have been published in
scientific journals. Tr. 1136–38, 1331–
36; GXs 65–71, 93. Respondent’s lack of
experience in growing marijuana does
not preclude a finding under paragraph
823(a)(3) that his proposed activities
would promote technical advances in
the art of manufacturing marijuana and
developing new substances. Nor does
Respondent’s lack of expertise in this
area compared to that of Dr. ElSohly
preclude such a finding as it is
conceivable that a newcomer to a field
could make scientific discoveries that
others have failed to make. However,
Respondent’s lack of experience and
expertise combined with the vagaries of
his testimony as to how he would
promote technical advances in the art of
manufacturing marijuana and
developing new substances do not
support a finding that he would do so.
Thus, I concur with the ALJ’s
recommendation as to this factor and
conclude that Respondent has failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating that
his proposed activities would promote
technical advances in the art of
manufacturing marijuana and
developing new substances.
4. Public Interest Factor Four
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The fourth public interest factor is
‘‘prior conviction record of applicant
under Federal and State laws relating to
the manufacture, distribution, or
dispensing of such substances.’’ 21
U.S.C. 823(a)(4). I adopt the ALJ’s
recommended finding that it was
‘‘undisputed that Respondent has never
been convicted of any violation of any
law pertaining to controlled substances’’
and therefore this factor weighs in favor
of granting the application. I reject the
Government’s contention that the
historical and ongoing activities of Mr.
Doblin and MAPS relating to controlled
85 The National Center grows marijuana both
indoors and outdoors and has done so using
conventional soil planting from seeds and
seedlings, as well as using hydroponics (without
soil), vegetative propagation (using cuttings to
retain the genetic identity of the ‘‘mother plant’’),
and micropropagation (vegetative propagation using
a very small part of plant material rather than a
cutting). Tr. 1187–1263, 1328–30. It has also
utilized a variety of harvesting, drying, fertilization,
and storage methods to affect the THC content of
the marijuana, to promote more effective rolling of
cigarettes, and to isolate certain cannabinoids. Id.
It also has in its inventory seeds from different parts
of the world, which can produce marijuana of
various potencies. Id. Respondent did not identify
any cultivation, harvesting, or other manufacturing
techniques relating to marijuana in which the
National Center lacks expertise.
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substances (which the Government
asserts are improper but for which there
is no evidence in the record of any
criminal convictions) should be
considered under this factor.
5. Public Interest Factor Five
The fifth public interest factor is ‘‘past
experience in the manufacture of
controlled substances, and the existence
in the establishment of effective control
against diversion.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(5).
Both parties and the ALJ agree that
Respondent has no past experience in
the manufacture of controlled
substances, and I so find.86
Consideration of such experience serves
two purposes. First, the review of an
applicant’s track record provides
substantial information as to prior
violations and the likelihood of its
future compliance with the Act and
regulations. See ALRA Laboratories, Inc.
v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995)
(‘‘An agency rationally may conclude
that past performance is the best
predictor of future performance.’’).
Second, the experience factor recognizes
that the regulatory scheme is complex
and that having effective controls
against diversion requires more than
simply having a secure building and a
policy and procedures manual.87
Rather, having effective controls
requires that those controls be properly
performed. Thus, Respondent’s lack of
experience in the manufacture of
controlled substances cannot be
dismissed as inconsequential.88 Indeed,
86 While the ALJ correctly observed that
Respondent has no experience in the in the
manufacture of controlled substances, she stated
that Respondent ‘‘does have experience in growing
medicinal plants.’’ ALJ at 86. It is unclear whether
the ALJ was taking this into account for purposes
of factor 5, or simply noting it in passing, because
she ultimately recommended that I conclude ‘‘there
is not sufficient evidence in the record on which
to base a finding as to whether granting
Respondent’s registration would promote technical
advances.’’ Id. In any event, under the text of
paragraph 823(a)(5), experience in the manufacture
of anything other than ‘‘controlled substances’’ is
immaterial for purposes of factor 5.
87 The CSA and DEA regulations impose a
complex and comprehensive scheme to protect
against diversion. These include not only
requirements pertaining to the physical security of
manufacturing facilities, see 21 CFR 1301.73, and
employee screening procedures, id. 1301.90, but
also extensive inventory, record keeping, and
reporting requirements. See 21 CFR 1304.04
(maintenance of records and inventories); id.
1304.11 (inventory requirements); 1304.22(a)
(records for manufacturers); 1304.33 (ARCOS
reports); 1301.74(c) (reporting of theft).
88 Respondent notes the Government’s argument
that ‘‘ ‘[i]n no case involving applications to handle
controlled substances, has ‘prior experience’ with
non-controlled substances ever been considered as
support for granting an application.’ ’’ Respondent’s
Resp. at 24. Respondent maintains that ‘‘this
argument is simply wrong,’’ and that ‘‘[i]n Chattem
Chemicals, Inc., 71 FR 9834, 9838 (2006) * * * the
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there is agency precedent for
concluding, in appropriate
circumstances, that lack of such
experience can be an independent basis
for denial of registration.89 However, I
find in this case that Respondent’s lack
of experience in handling controlled
substances—while a factor weighing
against granting his application—should
not disqualify him from obtaining a
registration to bulk manufacture
marijuana.
As to whether there would be, within
Respondent’s establishment, effective
control against diversion,90 Respondent
testified that, although he ‘‘did not have
a full-blown plan when [he] applied for
the [DEA registration],’’ when DEA
personnel conducted an on-site
inspection of his premises, he assured
them that he ‘‘understood the need for
security’’ and that they thought that his
proposed room for growing marijuana
‘‘could be made secure with no
problems.’’ Tr. 44–45, 355–56.
Respondent further testified that he
applicant had no prior experience in processing
opium alkaloids, the controlled substance for which
it sought a manufacturer’s registration.’’
Respondent’s Resp. at 24–25. That much is true.
Respondent ignores, however, that Chattem already
held registrations to manufacture schedule II
controlled substances including morphine, codeine
and oxycodone, and to import other controlled
substances. See 71 FR at 9836. In contrast to
Respondent, who has no relevant experience,
Chattem had extensive experience in the regulatory
scheme and the effective implementation of
controls against diversion.
Respondent also notes Dr. ElSohly’s testimony to
the effect that when the University of Mississippi
first applied in 1968 for the contract to grow
marijuana for NIDA’s predecessor, ‘‘he lacked
experience and expertise in security measures
relating to controlled substances.’’ Respondent
Resp. at 27. Respondent ignores, however, that the
registration belongs to the University of Mississippi
and was issued to it 12 years before Dr. ElSohly
took over the project and under a different statutory
scheme and further that Dr. ElSohly had been
working on the marijuana project for four years at
the time he succeeded his predecessor. See Tr. at
1131–32, 1152.
89 Cf. Stephen J. Heldman, 72 FR 4032, 4034
(2007) (noting that even ‘‘[w]ere there no evidence
of Respondent having engaged in illicit activity
* * * his lack of experience bars his registration’’).
90 As explained in part C of the discussion
section, this aspect of paragraph 823(a)(5) requires
DEA to consider, among other things, whether
Respondent has demonstrated that he will have in
place appropriate physical security and employee
screening as required by the DEA regulations and
as confirmed through a DEA on-site inspection of
the premises. Also as explained in part C, this
aspect of paragraph 823(a)(5)—which involves an
evaluation of the applicant’s particular facility,
proposed security measures, and other controls
against diversion to be implemented by the
applicant—is best viewed as being distinguished
from the requirement under paragraph 823(a)(1)
that DEA maintain effective controls against
diversion ‘‘by limiting the importation and bulk
manufacture of such controlled substances to a
number of establishments which can produce an
adequate and uninterrupted supply of these
substances under adequately competitive
conditions.’’
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agreed to meet all DEA security
requirements. Tr. 79. The Government
did not dispute these assertions. I
therefore find that Respondent has met
his burden of demonstrating that, if the
registration were granted, he would
have in place effective controls against
diversion.91 In sum, the evidence
bearing on factor five weighs both in
favor of and against Respondent’s
application: it indicates that he has no
past experience in the manufacture of
controlled substances but that he will
have in the establishment effective
controls against diversion.
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6. Public Interest Factor Six
The sixth and final public interest
factor is ‘‘such other factors as may be
relevant to and consistent with the
public health and safety.’’ 21 U.S.C.
823(a)(6). At the outset, it should be
noted that, because the text of this
provision calls on me to consider ‘‘such
other factors,’’ I will not restate in the
discussion of factor six the evidence
that I have already taken into account
for purposes of the first five public
interest factors—even though such
evidence might be relevant to the
determination of whether Respondent’s
proposed registration would be
consistent with the public health and
safety.
The most notable evidence relevant to
factor six is that relating to Mr. Doblin.92
Before addressing this evidence, it
needs to be made clear that I consider
91 Because the DEA regulations require all
registered manufacturers of controlled substances to
have certain control measures in place at all times
(21 CFR 1301.71–.74, .76), DEA may not issue a
certificate of registration to a new applicant until
the required security measures are actually in place.
Moreover, while I acknowledge that Respondent
testified that he would secure the growing area and
meet ‘‘appropriate security conditions’’ (Tr. 79), and
I find it is highly unlikely that Respondent would
personally divert, this does not establish that the
risk of diversion is minimal. Respondent testified
that he usually does not go down to the greenhouse
to water the plants but leaves this task to a
technician. Tr. at 254. Moreover, the graduate
students and technicians ‘‘would probably do the
transplanting’’ and the ‘‘daily check on any
environmental controls.’’ Id. at 254–55.
Respondent’s testimony begs the question of who
would be supervising these workers. Furthermore,
while Respondent has promised to meet
appropriate security conditions, it is undisputed
that he has no experience in the manufacture of
controlled substances and the regulatory scheme.
As he testified: ‘‘I have no experience in the control
against diversion.’’ Tr. 79.
Thus, my finding under factor five that
Respondent would have in place effective controls
against diversion might be viewed as being
generous toward Respondent.
92 By its terms, paragraph 823(a)(6) is not limited
to conduct on the part of the applicant. Rather, its
broad wording indicates that it is a catchall
provision that calls on the agency to consider ‘‘such
other factors [not covered by factors (a)(1) through
(a)(5)] as may be relevant to and consistent with the
public health and safety.’’
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irrelevant for purposes of this
application whether Mr. Doblin, in the
expression of his political viewpoints,
supports the legalization of marijuana
and other controlled substances. I also
consider irrelevant the political
activities of the organization he heads,
MAPS. The expression of political
viewpoints enjoys the protection of the
first amendment. However, it is
certainly relevant for purposes of factor
six whether a person who might be in
a position to directly influence the
activities of a registrant has engaged in
actual conduct involving controlled
substances that fails to comply with the
federal or state law.
The evidence indicates that Mr.
Doblin has been significantly involved
in Respondent’s application process and
plans to retain a key role in
Respondent’s activities if the
registration is granted. Mr. Doblin came
up with the idea of sponsoring an
applicant for a DEA registration who
would be a supplier of marijuana other
than NIDA, and he selected Respondent
to be that applicant. Tr. 210–12, 219.
Mr. Doblin assisted Respondent in
filling out the application, supplied
answers to DEA’s supplemental written
questions, and agreed, on behalf of
MAPS, to ‘‘cover all the costs’’
associated with the registered activities,
including the costs of equipment,
manufacturing, and security
installations. Tr. 221–22, 351–52; 383,
583; GX 3, at 1. Respondent has agreed
that Mr. Doblin, in his role as head of
MAPS, will take an active role in
deciding to whom Respondent will
supply the marijuana. Tr. 224–26, 358–
360. Respondent described the process
of applying for the DEA registration and
the ‘‘project of developing marijuana’’ as
a ‘‘joint effort’’ by Mr. Doblin and
himself. Tr. 390–91. Indeed, Respondent
testified that his ‘‘understanding’’ of his
‘‘role,’’ as well as that of Mr. Doblin,
was that dictated to him by Mr.
Doblin.93 Id. at 358. Another part of Mr.
Doblin’s role would be to ‘‘route’’ the
93 Further indication that MAPS is the driving
force behind this application is that, when asked to
explain the meaning of one of his written answers
to the questions submitted by DEA as a follow up
to the application, Respondent admitted that he had
‘‘no idea’’ whether he was referring to Chemic when
he answered that one of the proposed recipients of
the marijuana that he seeks to produce would be an
entity that would use ‘‘marijuana delivered through
a vaporizer device.’’ Tr. at 225–26. Nor did
Respondent know if this entity was authorized
under the law to conduct such research or the
amount of marijuana that would be needed for this
research. Id. at 229. Respondent said that such
questions would have to be referred to Mr. Doblin.
Id. at 226. Respondent acknowledged that the only
entity he had in mind as a recipient of the
marijuana he seeks to grow was the researcher that
would test the vaporizer. Tr. at 235.
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‘‘investigators’’ (those seeking marijuana
for research) to Respondent. Id. Mr.
Doblin would also decide for
Respondent the ‘‘strains’’ of marijuana
to produce and ‘‘allocate’’ the marijuana
produced in accordance with MAPS’s
priorities. Tr. 589.
In short, Mr. Doblin has mapped out
and assisted in most acts, if not every
act, that Respondent has taken toward
applying for a registration to
manufacture marijuana and, if the
registration were granted, Mr. Doblin
would continue to maintain
responsibility for managing and
monitoring the activities of the
registrant. Given this level of
involvement by Mr. Doblin—and the
passive, if not subservient, nature of
Respondent’s involvement—it is
appropriate under factor six to consider
the following conduct by Mr. Doblin
relating to controlled substances. First,
Mr. Doblin admits that he smokes
marijuana for ‘‘recreational use’’ on a
weekly basis. Tr. 716, 718–19. Thus, Mr.
Doblin violates federal and state laws
relating to controlled substances on a
weekly basis.94 This demonstrates that
Mr. Doblin has disregard for the
controlled substances laws. It is simply
inconceivable that DEA would—
consistent with its obligations under the
CSA—grant a registration to engage in
certain activities involving controlled
substances where it is clear that a
person who will have any role in the
oversight and management of such
activities routinely engages in the illegal
use of controlled substances. It is still
more untenable where that person has
the level of oversight and management
that Mr. Doblin would have—and where
the controlled substance he illegally
uses is the very controlled substance the
applicant seeks to produce. Indeed, it is
remarkable that Mr. Doblin would—
given his admitted illegal involvement
in controlled substances—ask DEA to
effectively grant him permission to take
on such a prominent role in the
manufacture of the most widely abused
illegal controlled substance in the
United States.
Respondent points to Mr. Doblin’s
testimony that MAPS has previously
sponsored research by DEA registrants
involving schedule I controlled
substances other than marijuana.
Respondent’s Resp. at 23 (citing Tr.
482–491). Respondent characterizes
such research as having taken place ‘‘all
without a hint of * * * diversion.’’ Id.
at 23–24. However, there is nothing in
the record that confirms or refutes this
94 21 U.S.C. 844; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 94C,
§ 34 (West 2008). Mr. Doblin lives in Massachusetts.
Tr. 472.
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characterization; nor does the record
indicate exactly what role Mr. Doblin
played in the prior MAPS-sponsored
research.95 In any event, even assuming
that MAPS has previously sponsored
DEA-registered researchers without
incident, this does not undo the
legitimate concerns that came to light in
this proceeding about Mr. Doblin’s
fitness for directing, at least in part, the
activities of a DEA-registered bulk
manufacturer of marijuana, given Mr.
Doblin’s routine illegal use of
marijuana.
Thus, Mr. Doblin’s ongoing illegal
marijuana use, by itself (i.e., even
putting aside the treaty considerations
and Respondent’s failure to demonstrate
inadequate supply or competition
within the meaning of paragraph
823(a)(1)), provides a sufficient
independent basis upon which DEA
may deny the application.
Accordingly, based on a consideration
of all six pubic interest factors set forth
in 21 U.S.C. 823(a), I conclude the
Respondent has failed to meet his
burden of demonstrating that his
proposed registration is consistent with
the public interest. To the contrary, the
evidence is compelling that the
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest.
C. The Meaning of 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1)
This section of the discussion
contains a far more extensive analysis of
21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1) (hereafter,
‘‘paragraph 823(a)(1)’’) than DEA has
previously published. As indicated
above, for ease of exposition, due to the
length of this analysis, it is being
presented here as a separate section of
the discussion rather than inserting it
directly into the above discussion of the
public interest factors.
1. The Text of the Statute
The appropriate starting point for the
analysis of any statute is the text of the
statute itself. The text of § 823(a)
remains the same today as it was when
the CSA was enacted by Congress in
1970. It states:
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(a) Manufacturers of controlled substances in
schedule I or II
The Attorney General shall register an
applicant to manufacture controlled
substances in schedule I or II if he
determines that such registration is
consistent with the public interest and with
United States obligations under international
treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on
95 Respondent
does not appear to contend that
DEA granted the prior registrations to MAPSsponsored researchers knowing that MAPS was the
sponsor with Mr. Doblin having the same level of
involvement that he seeks here, and he cites no part
of the record for such a proposition.
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May 1, 1971. In determining the public
interest, the following factors shall be
considered:
(1) Maintenance of effective controls
against diversion of particular controlled
substances and any controlled substance in
schedule I or II compounded therefrom into
other than legitimate medical, scientific,
research, or industrial channels, by limiting
the importation and bulk manufacture of
such controlled substances to a number of
establishments which can produce an
adequate and uninterrupted supply of these
substances under adequately competitive
conditions for legitimate medical, scientific,
research, and industrial purposes;
(2) Compliance with applicable State and
local law;
(3) Promotion of technical advances in the
art of manufacturing these substances and the
development of new substances;
(4) Prior conviction record of applicant
under Federal and State laws relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
such substances;
(5) Past experience in the manufacture of
controlled substances, and the existence in
the establishment of effective control against
diversion; and
(6) Such other factors as may be relevant
to and consistent with the public health and
safety.
Thus, the statute allows DEA to
register an applicant to bulk
manufacture a schedule I or II
controlled substance only if the Deputy
Administrator 96 determines that the
proposed registration would be
consistent with both (i) the Single
Convention and (ii) the public interest.
In determining whether the proposed
registration is consistent with the public
interest, the statute requires DEA to
evaluate the above six factors. The first
factor, set forth in 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1)
(referred to in this discussion as
‘‘paragraph 823(a)(1)’’), requires the
Deputy Administrator to consider
‘‘maintenance of effective controls
against diversion * * * by limiting the
* * * bulk manufacture of such
controlled substances to a number of
establishments which can produce an
adequate and uninterrupted supply of
these substances under adequately
competitive conditions for legitimate
medical, scientific, research, and
industrial purposes.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Thus, Congress stated in paragraph
823(a)(1) that—in order to maintain
effective controls against diversion of a
given schedule I or II controlled
substance—DEA must consider limiting
the number of registered bulk
manufactures of the substance to that
96 Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 871(a), functions vested
in the Attorney General by the CSA have been
delegated to the Administrator of DEA. 28 CFR
0.100(b). The function of issuing final orders
regarding applications for registration has been
further delegated to the Deputy Administrator. 28
CFR 0.104, appendix to subpart R, sec. 7(a).
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‘‘which can produce an adequate and
uninterrupted supply of these
substances under adequately
competitive conditions.’’
While the above-quoted text of
paragraph 823(a)(1) is relatively
straightforward, consulting the
dictionary helps to confirm the
meaning. The word ‘‘limiting’’ (or
‘‘limit’’), when used as a verb, is defined
as ‘‘to assign certain limits to;
prescribe,’’ ‘‘to restrict the bounds or
limits of,’’ or ‘‘to curtail or reduce in
quantity or extent.’’ 97 The word ‘‘limit,’’
when used as a noun, is defined as
‘‘something that bounds, restrains or
confines’’ or ‘‘the utmost extent.’’ 98
Thus, the command under paragraph
823(a)(1) that DEA consider ‘‘limiting’’
the number of registered bulk
manufacturers of a given schedule I or
II controlled substance can be construed
to mean that the upper boundary on the
number of such manufacturers is that
‘‘which can produce an adequate and
uninterrupted supply of these
substances under adequately
competitive conditions for legitimate
medical, scientific, research, and
industrial purposes.’’
It is notable that, by requiring DEA to
consider limiting the number of bulk
manufactures of a given schedule I
controlled substance to that ‘‘which can
produce an adequate and uninterrupted
supply * * * under adequately
competitive conditions,’’ paragraph
823(a)(1) does not allow DEA simply to
register as many bulk manufacturers of
a given schedule I or II controlled
substance as the market will bear.
Rather, DEA is obligated under
paragraph 823(a)(1) to consider
disallowing additional entrants into the
schedule I and II bulk manufacturing
market unless DEA concludes that
addition of a particular applicant is
necessary to produce ‘‘an adequate and
uninterrupted supply of [a given
substance] under adequately
competitive conditions.’’
This reading of paragraph 823(a)(1) is
also consistent with the overall
structure of the CSA. The Act places
each controlled substance into one of
five schedules based on: whether the
substance has a currently accepted
medical use in the United States; the
substance’s relative potential for abuse;
and the extent to which abuse of the
substance may lead to psychological or
physical dependence.99 As the United
States Supreme Court has stated, ‘‘[t]he
Act then imposes restrictions on the
97 Merriam-Webster OnLine, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary (2008).
98 Id.
99 21 U.S.C. 812(b).
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manufacturing and distribution of the
substance according to the schedule in
which it has been placed.’’ 100
‘‘Schedule I,’’ as the Court observed, ‘‘is
the most restrictive schedule.’’ This is
commensurate with the fact that
schedule I controlled substances are the
only controlled substances with no
currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States. Schedule
II restrictions are the next most
restrictive (less restrictive than those for
schedule I controls but more restrictive
than those for schedules III, IV, and V)—
commensurate with schedule II
substances having the highest potential
for abuse of those controlled substances
that have a currently accepted medical
use (those in schedules II through V).
Consistent with this basic CSA
principle of applying greater controls to
the substances that are most subject to
abuse and most harmful when abused,
the CSA is structured to apply certain
critical control provisions to schedule I
and II substances but not to those in
schedules III, IV, and V. For example,
the CSA imposes quota restrictions and
order form requirements for schedule I
and II controlled substances but not for
those in schedules III, IV, and V.101
Paragraph 823(a)(1) is another example
of this principle. The required
consideration in paragraph 823(a)(1) of
limiting the number of bulk
manufacturers of schedule I and II
controlled substances (to that which can
produce an adequate and uninterrupted
supply of a given substance under
adequately competitive conditions) is
noticeably absent from paragraph
823(d)(1), which governs the registration
of manufacturers of schedule III, IV, and
V controlled substances. This contrast
between the presence of the ‘‘limiting’’
language in paragraph 823(a)(1) and its
absence from paragraph 823(d)(1)
underscores the importance of this
requirement—particularly in view of
Congress’s overall scheme of placing the
greatest restrictions on substances in
schedules I and II.
Another consideration when
interpreting the language of paragraph
823(a)(1) is a comparison of its terms
with those of paragraph 823(a)(5). As
indicated above, paragraph 823(a)(5) is
one of the six factors DEA must consider
when evaluating an application for
registration to bulk manufacture a
schedule I or II controlled substance.
Paragraph 823(a)(5) requires
consideration of, among other things,
‘‘the existence in the establishment of
effective control against diversion.’’
(Emphasis added.) The plain meaning of
100 OCBC,
101 21
532 U.S. at 492 (2001).
U.S.C. 826 & 828.
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this language is that the Deputy
Administrator must evaluate whether
the particular facility in which the
applicant proposes to manufacture the
schedule I or II controlled substance
will have in place effective safeguards to
prevent diversion. This would include,
among other considerations, appropriate
physical security and employee
screening as required by the DEA
regulations 102 as confirmed through a
DEA on-site inspection of the premises.
That paragraph 823(a)(5) expressly
requires the Deputy Administrator to
consider ‘‘the existence in the
establishment of effective control
against diversion’’ is a further indication
that paragraph 823(a)(1) is not intended
to cover precisely the same
consideration. To restate this
interpretation somewhat, whereas
paragraph 823(a)(1) can be viewed as
preventing diversion on a registrantwide scale (by directing the agency to
consider limiting the total number of
registered bulk manufacturers and
importers of schedule I and II controlled
based on the principle—discussed
below—that fewer registrants decreases
the likelihood of diversion), paragraph
823(a)(5) can be viewed as preventing
diversion on an individual-registrant
basis (by directing the agency to
consider whether the applicant will
have in place, in its particular
establishment, effective controls against
diversion).103
In sum, for the preceding reasons,
examining the text of paragraph
823(a)(1) can lead squarely to the
conclusion that it requires DEA to
maintain effective controls against
diversion by considering ‘‘limiting the
* * * bulk manufacture of [schedule I
and II] controlled substances to a
number of establishments which can
produce an adequate and uninterrupted
supply of these substances under
adequately competitive conditions.’’
2. Legislative History of the Statute
Congress derived paragraph 823(a)(1)
from the Narcotics Manufacturing Act of
1960 104 (which was superseded by the
CSA in 1970). Under the 1960 Act, a
person seeking to manufacture a basic
class of narcotic drugs was required to
obtain a license from the Secretary of
the Treasury Department. Within the
102 See
21 CFR 1301.71–1301.93.
discussed below, some prior DEA final
orders have construed paragraph 823(a)(1) to
require consideration of the existence in the
establishment of effective control against diversion.
While this factor must be considered in evaluating
any application for registration under § 823(a), it is
best considered only for purposes of paragraph
823(a)(5) and not mingled with the analysis under
paragraph 823(a)(1).
104 74 Stat. 55 (1960).
103 As
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Treasury Department, this function was
delegated to the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Narcotics (a predecessor of
DEA). Section 8 of the 1960 Act set forth
the criteria that the Commissioner was
required to consider in determining
whether to issue a narcotics
manufacturing license. Paragraph (a)(1)
of section 8 of the 1960 Act was the
analog to paragraph 823(a)(1) of the
CSA. Paragraph (a)(1) provided that, in
determining whether to issue a license
to an applicant seeking to manufacture
a basic class of narcotic drug, the
Commissioner was required to consider:
Maintenance of effective controls against
the diversion of the particular basic class of
narcotic drug and of narcotic drugs
compounded therefrom into other than
legitimate medical and scientific channels
through limitation of manufacture of the
particular basic class of narcotic drug to the
smallest number of establishments which will
produce an adequate and uninterrupted
supply of narcotic drugs of or derived from
such basis class of narcotic drugs for medical
and scientific purposes, consistent with the
public interest.
(Emphasis added.)
As the italicized language above
indicates, the 1960 Act reflected the
then-policy of the United States to limit
the number of licensed manufacturers
‘‘to the smallest number of
establishments which will produce an
adequate and uninterrupted supply’’—
without regard to whether there was
adequate competition. Plainly, there are
both similarities to and distinctions
between this provision of the 1960 Act
and its counterpart in the CSA. The CSA
carried forward the concept of
‘‘limiting’’ the number of registered
manufacturers (with respect to schedule
I and II controlled substances).
However, the CSA modified this
requirement by providing that this
limitation on the number of
manufacturers be based not only on that
which can produce ‘‘an adequate and
uninterrupted supply,’’ but also on that
which provides for ‘‘adequately
competitive conditions.’’ Put slightly
differently, when Congress enacted the
CSA, it raised the ceiling on the number
of manufacturers from that which can
produce ‘‘an adequate and
uninterrupted supply’’ to a
consideration of that which can produce
‘‘an adequate and uninterrupted supply
* * * under adequately competitive
conditions.’’ 105 The policies underlying
105 To be precise, the text of the CSA (in contrast
to that of the 1960 Act) does not unambiguously
impose an absolute ceiling on the number of
registered manufacturers (that which can produce
an adequate and uninterrupted supply under
adequately competitive conditions). Rather, as
indicated above, the text of the CSA requires DEA
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this change in the law are summarized
in the following exchange during the
Congressional hearings on the
enactment of the CSA. The exchange
was between Senator Hruska (one of the
co-sponsors of the various bills that led
up to the CSA) and then-Attorney
General Mitchell:
Senator Hruska: We have two national
policies involved here. One is the
anticompetitive situation policy. The
antitrust law is a very well-established
concept * * * . We also have another
national policy have we not, Mr. Attorney
General? We have entered into a global series
of agreements in which we undertake in joint
action with other nations the business of
controlling the manufacture and distribution
of the opiates and final derivatives of opium.
Among those agreements is this principle:
That we urge upon nations to keep the
number of producers down to as low a point
as possible to facilitate and to make more
certain their ability to control and supervise
the output and to keep it in normal and
proper legal channels. We have these two
national policies involved here, have we not?
Mr. Mitchell: Yes sir, you have both of
them, and there is no intention on the part
of the Justice Department nor the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs by this
provision to expand beyond necessity, and of
course those are the key words, any
manufacturers in this particular area. We felt
it was necessary to maintain the protection
of the consumer from the price structure
point of view and that is why the additional
provisions have been added.106
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During that same hearing, the
Department of Justice submitted in
writing its position regarding a
proposed version of what would become
paragraph 823(a)(1). In that document,
the Department of Justice stated the
following with respect to the thenpending proposal to deviate in the CSA
from the 1960 Act by adding the
consideration of adequacy of
to ‘‘consider * * * limiting’’ the number of
manufacturers to such a number (along with
considering the other public interest factors). It
should also be noted that, whereas the 1960 Act
referred to allowing only ‘‘the smallest number of
establishments which will produce an adequate and
uninterrupted supply’’ (emphasis added), the CSA
does not contain the term ‘‘smallest’’ in paragraph
823(a)(1). Nonetheless, as explained above, the use
of the term ‘‘limiting’’ in paragraph 823(a)(1) can be
construed to mean that DEA, when evaluating an
application under § 823(a), must consider keeping
as the upper boundary on the number of
manufacturers that which can produce an adequate
and uninterrupted supply under adequately
competitive conditions. In other words, even
though Congress when it enacted the CSA did not
carry forward from the 1960 Act the term
‘‘smallest,’’ because it did carry forward the term
‘‘limiting,’’ it retained the concept of an upper limit
on the number of manufacturers as a factor to be
considered when evaluating an application for
registration under § 823(a).
106 Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 91st Cong. 261–262
(1969).
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competition, and how the Department
would carry out such proposal, if
enacted:
There is no reason to assume that the
Attorney General will prejudice his primary
objectives of effective control by excessive
licensing. Nor will he undertake direct price
control. He will be empowered to take
cognizance of evidence showing that prices
are clearly and persistently excessive. The
criteria for determining whether prices far
exceed that which is reasonable relate to
reasonable costs and reasonable profits. No
explicit statement of criteria is needed. If
evidence indicates that additional licensing
will result in more reasonable prices with no
significant diminution in the effectiveness of
drug control, the Attorney General should be
able to license the additional
manufacturers.107
Consistent with the foregoing
statements made during the Senate
hearings, a subsequent Senate report
contained the following statement,
which echoes the language of what is
now in paragraph 823(a)(1): ‘‘[T]he
Attorney General must limit the
importation and manufacture of
schedules I and II substances to a
number of establishments which can
produce an adequate and uninterrupted
supply under adequately competitive
conditions for legitimate purposes.’’ 108
Thus, the legislative history reaffirms
several principles already evident from
the text of paragraph 823(a)(1) and
expands upon those principles. The
legislative history confirms that
paragraph 823(a)(1) indeed was
designed to require the Attorney
General to take into account limiting the
number of bulk manufacturers (and
importers) of schedule I and II
controlled substances. However, this
limit was not as restrictive as under the
law that preceded the CSA. Whereas
under the 1960 Act, additional
manufacturers could only be added if
supply was inadequate, the CSA added
the consideration of adequacy of
competition. Nonetheless, as the
legislative history reflects, Congress
under the CSA placed the burden on the
applicant seeking to become registered
to bulk manufacture a schedule I or II
controlled substance to put forth
evidence demonstrating either
inadequate supply or inadequate
competition.
107 Id. at 372. Although this statement by the
Department of Justice was commenting on an earlier
version of the bill, the modified version of the bill
that ultimately was enacted retained the same
principles as the earlier version under which the
adequacy of competition would become a
consideration in determining whether to grant
applications to become registered to manufacture
schedule I or II controlled substances.
108 Controlled Dangerous Substances Act of 1969:
Report of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 91st Cong. 7 (1969).
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2129
The legislative history also reflects the
recognition by Congress of a crucial
principle underlying paragraph
823(a)(1): That the risk of diversion
tends to increase with each new
registered bulk manufacturer of a
schedule I or II controlled substance. At
the same time, the language of
paragraph 823(a)(1) reflects the
determination by Congress that—despite
the increased risk of diversion resulting
from the addition of each new registered
manufacturer—it is beneficial to the
public interest to allow the registration
of additional manufacturers where the
Attorney General finds that doing so is
necessary to produce an adequate and
uninterrupted supply of a given
substance under adequately competitive
conditions.109
3. Treaty Considerations
The principle that limiting the
number of producers of narcotics and
other schedule I and II controlled
substances tends to promote more
effective control has long been a part of
United States policy and incorporated
into the international drug control
treaties to which the United States has
been a party and which predate the
CSA. Under the Single Convention,
article 29 addresses the manufacture of
narcotic drugs. Paragraph 2(b) of article
29 requires parties to the treaty to
‘‘[c]ontrol under license the
establishment and premises in which
such manufacture may take place.’’
With respect to this provision, the
Commentary to the Single Convention
states: ‘‘It is suggested that, in order to
facilitate control, the licensing system
under subparagraph (b) should be
employed to ensure that the
manufacture of drugs, their salts and
preparations is restricted to as small a
number of establishments and premises
as is practicable.’’ Commentary at 322
(emphasis added); see also id. at 319
(discussing how the concept of limiting
the number of manufacturers of narcotic
drugs was inherent in the international
drug control treaties that preceded the
Single Convention).110 This is the same
109 As the statute states, an application for
registration under § 823(a) may only be granted if
DEA determines that such registration is consistent
with both the public interest and United States
obligations under the Single Convention. Thus,
even if a proposed registration were found by DEA
to be consistent with the public interest based on
a consideration of the six public interest factors of
§ 823(a), the registration must be denied if DEA
finds it would be inconsistent with United States
obligations under the Single Convention.
110 Also illustrative of this point are the following
statements contained in a 1979 resolution issued by
the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs,
which DEA has cited in a prior Federal Register
publication: ‘‘Recalling the relevant provisions of
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principle as that referred to in the
legislative history of the CSA (in the
above-quoted exchange between Senator
Hruska and the then-Attorney General).
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4. Pertinent Provision of the DEA
Regulations
The only applications for registration
for which the DEA regulations require
the agency to publish notice in the
Federal Register are those by persons
seeking to bulk manufacture and import
schedule I and II controlled substances.
21 CFR 1301.33(a) & 1301.34(a). These
are the applications governed by 21
U.S.C. 823(a). In the cases of such
applications, the regulations further
require DEA to mail (simultaneously
with the publication in the Federal
Register) a copy of the Federal Register
notice to each person registered as a
bulk manufacturer of the particular
schedule I or II controlled substance and
to each person who has submitted a
pending application therefor. Id. Any
such person may also file written
comments or objections to the proposed
registration. Id.
That the regulations provide the
foregoing procedures in the case of
applications filed pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
823(a)—and for no other categories of
applications—is indicative of the
distinction between the statutory factors
for registration contained in subsection
823(a) and those contained in all other
subsections of § 823. As explained
above in the discussion of the text of the
statute, whereas paragraph 823(a)(1)
requires DEA to consider limiting the
number of registered bulk
manufacturers and importers of a given
schedule I or II controlled substance to
that which can produce an adequate and
uninterrupted supply under adequately
competitive conditions, this
consideration appears nowhere else in
§ 823 (i.e., it is inapplicable to all other
applications for registration). Moreover,
the consideration of adequacy of supply
and competition is the only factor that
is unique to subsection 823(a). It is
therefore implicit that the notice-andcomment provisions of the regulations
listed above (those contained in 21 CFR
1301.33(a) and 1301.34(a)) are designed
to effectuate the consideration by DEA
of adequacy of supply and competition.
This implication is also consistent with
the Single Convention * * * to limit cultivation,
production, manufacture and use of narcotic drugs
to an amount required for medical and scientific
purposes * * *’’ and ‘‘Bearing in mind that the
treaties which establish this system are based on the
concept that the number of producers of narcotic
materials for export should be limited in order to
facilitate effective control. * * *’’ Cited in 44 FR
33695 (1979) and available at https://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/
638/29/IMG/NR063829.pdf?OpenElement.
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the view that, in addition to DEA and
the applicant itself, those registrants
that constitute the existing suppliers
(bulk manufacturers) of a given
schedule I or II controlled substance
have the requisite knowledge to
comment on whether the existing
market is capable of producing an
adequate and interrupted supply under
adequately competitive conditions.
Thus, the notice-and-comment
provisions of 21 CFR 1301.33(a) and
1301.34(a) provide further support for
interpreting paragraph 823(a)(1) as
requiring DEA to consider, for purposes
of determining the public interest,
limiting the number of registered bulk
manufacturers and importers of
schedule I and II controlled substances
to that which can produce an adequate
and uninterrupted supply under
adequately competitive conditions.
Another provision of the regulations
that warrants discussion is 21 CFR
1301.33(b), which states:
In order to provide adequate competition,
the Administrator shall not be required to
limit the number of manufacturers in any
basic class to a number less than that
consistent with maintenance of effective
controls against diversion solely because a
smaller number is capable of producing an
adequate and uninterrupted supply.
Although this provision is somewhat
awkwardly phrased, a careful
examination reveals that it is merely a
corollary to paragraph 823(a)(1). In
construing subsection 1301.33(b), it is
important to bear in mind that an
agency regulation cannot deviate from
any mandate imposed by Congress
under the statute that the regulation
implements. Thus, any reading of
subsection 1301.33(b) must be
consistent with Congress’s direction in
paragraph 823(a)(1) that DEA consider
limiting the number of bulk
manufacturers of schedule I and II
controlled substances to that which can
produce an adequate and uninterrupted
supply under adequately competitive
conditions.
With the foregoing principles in
mind, subsection 1301.33(b) can be
broken down into its constituent
elements for purposes of analysis as
follows:
■ ‘‘In order to provide adequate
competition’’; i.e., if it has been
determined under paragraph 823(a)(1)
that granting a particular applicant a
registration to bulk manufacture a given
schedule I or II controlled substance is
necessary to provide an adequate and
uninterrupted supply of that substance
under adequately competitive
conditions,
■ ‘‘The Administrator shall not be
required to limit the number of
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manufacturers in any basic class to a
number less than that consistent with
maintenance of effective controls
against diversion’’; i.e., if granting the
applicant’s registration (based on a
finding of inadequate competition) will
bring the total number of registered bulk
manufacturers of a given schedule I or
II controlled substance to a number
which remains consistent with
maintenance of effective controls
against diversion, DEA is not obligated
to keep the total less than that number,
■ ‘‘Solely because a smaller number is
capable of producing an adequate and
uninterrupted supply’’; i.e., based solely
on the fact that the existing number of
manufacturers already produces an
adequate and uninterrupted supply (but
under inadequately competitive
conditions).
Viewing these elements together, it is
apparent that subsection 1301.33(b)
merely states what are direct outgrowths
of 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1):
(1) That the existence of an adequate
and uninterrupted supply of a given
schedule I or II controlled substance is
not a sufficient basis to deny an
application by a person seeking to
become an additional manufacturer of
that substance (since inadequate
competition may provide an
independent basis for registration under
paragraph 823(a)(1)) and
(2) That DEA need not keep the
number of registered bulk
manufacturers to a number below that
which is consistent with maintenance of
effective controls against diversion
where adding an additional
manufacturer is necessary to provide for
adequate competition.
Thus, 21 CFR 1301.33(b) can be
reconciled with the statutory text
(paragraph 823(a)(1))—as must be the
case for the regulation to be valid.111
111 It is unclear why subsection 1301.33(b) was
written in the manner that it was. Given that the
regulation was promulgated shortly after the
enactment of the CSA in 1970, it is possible that
it was written to emphasize how paragraph
823(a)(1) represented a departure from the
provision it superseded in the 1960 Narcotic
Manufacturing Act. As explained above, the 1960
Act limited the number of licensed manufacturers
‘‘to the smallest number of establishments which
will produce an adequate and uninterrupted
supply’’—without regard to whether there was
adequate competition. In contrast, when Congress
enacted the CSA, it raised the ceiling on the number
manufacturers to that which can produce an
adequate and uninterrupted supply under
adequately competitive conditions. Subsection
1301.33(b) seems to emphasize this distinction
between the 1960 Act and the CSA by pointing out
that, under the latter, DEA may not deny an
application based solely on the existence of an
adequate and uninterrupted supply.
In 2004, the Department of Justice provided
Congress with an explanation of subsection
1301.33(b) that is consistent with the explanation
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5. Prior DEA Statements Regarding the
Meaning of Paragraph 823(a)(1)
As discussed above, I now conclude
that the text of paragraph 823(a)(1)
indicates a directive, which is
confirmed by the legislative history, that
the agency consider limiting the number
of registered bulk manufacturers and
importers of controlled substances in
schedules I and II to that which can
produce an adequate and uninterrupted
supply under adequately competitive
conditions. Yet, in various final orders
and other statements issued by DEA
over the years, the agency has at times
followed this approach and at other
times failed to do so.
For example, in Roxane Laboratories,
Inc., 63 FR 55891 (1998), the agency
applied paragraph 823(a)(1) consistent
with the interpretation that requires the
applicant to demonstrate that the
existing manufacturer of the controlled
substance in question is unable to
provide an adequate and uninterrupted
supply of the substance under
adequately competitive conditions.
Roxane Laboratories, Inc. (Roxane) was
a company that applied to become
registered to import cocaine
hydrochloride, a schedule II controlled
substance, for use in pharmaceutical
products. As § 823(a) states, both an
application to import a schedule I or II
controlled substance and an application
to bulk manufacture such a substance
must be evaluated under the same
criteria set forth in § 823(a).112 Thus, in
provided in the text above. See Marijuana and
Medicine: The Need for a Science-Based Approach:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy and Human Resources, 108th Cong. 208
(2004) (letter from Assistant Attorney General
William Moschella to Subcomm. Chairman Rep.
Souder) (‘‘The meaning of [21 CFR 1301.33(b)] can
be restated as follows: If DEA determines there is
inadequate economic competition among the
existing manufacturers of the particular controlled
substance that the applicant seeks to produce (e.g.,
substantial overcharging by the existing
manufacturers due to an insufficient number of
competing manufacturers of that controlled
substance), and provided further that granting the
applicant’s registration (and thereby increasing the
total number of manufacturers) is consistent with
maintenance of effective controls against diversion,
DEA is not required to deny the application solely
because the number of manufacturers currently
registered can adequately supply the market for that
controlled substance in terms of quantity and
quality of product.’’) (emphasis in original).
112 See also 21 U.S.C. 958(a) (a registration to
import a schedule I or II controlled substance must
be consistent with the public interest, based on
consideration of the six criteria of § 823(a)). Further,
21 U.S.C. 952(a)(2)(B) requires a person seeking to
become registered to import a schedule I or II
controlled substance to demonstrate not only that
competition among domestic manufacturers of the
particular substance is inadequate but also that
competition ‘‘will not be rendered adequate by the
registration of additional [domestic] manufacturers
under section 823.’’ Thus, an applicant to import
a schedule I or II substance must make an
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Roxane, the Acting Deputy
Administrator had to evaluate whether
the proposed registration was consistent
with the public interest in view of the
six public interest factors of § 823(a),
including paragraph 823(a)(1).
Consistent with the interpretation of
paragraph 823(a)(1) under which the
adequacy of supply and competition
must be considered, the parties in
Roxane presented extensive evidence as
to whether there was adequate
competition within the meaning of the
statute.113 Toward that end, much of the
testimony and other evidence
introduced in the proceedings focused
on the historical and prevailing prices
for bulk cocaine hydrochloride charged
by what was then the only registered
importer of that substance. In addition
to presenting factual evidence regarding
such prices, each side presented its own
economic expert to testify whether, in
view of the prices, competition in the
market was adequate within the
meaning of paragraph 823(a)(1).114
Ultimately, the Acting Deputy
Administrator found that the applicant
had met its burden under paragraph
823(a)(1) of demonstrating that
competition was inadequate and, in
view of all the applicable statutory
factors, granted Roxane’s application to
become registered as an importer of
cocaine hydrochloride.
Four years later, in Johnson Matthey,
Inc., 67 FR 39041 (2002), DEA again
addressed the paragraph 823(a)(1) issue.
As in Roxane, Johnson Matthey had
applied to become registered as, among
other things, an importer of schedule II
controlled substances. Thus, as in
Roxane, one of the central issues in
Johnson Matthey was whether granting
the application was necessary to
provide adequate competition within
additional showing beyond that required for an
applicant to bulk manufacture such a substance.
However, as § 823(a) indicates, both the applicant
seeking to import and the applicant seeking to bulk
manufacture are subject to the same 823(a) criteria,
including the same determination under paragraph
823(a)(1) regarding the adequacy of competition.
113 That the existing supply of cocaine
hydrochloride was adequate within the meaning of
paragraph 823(a)(1) was not in dispute in Roxane.
114 As indicated above, because Roxane involved
an application to import a schedule II controlled
substance, the applicant was required demonstrate
that competition was inadequate not only within
the meaning of paragraph 823(a)(1), but also within
the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 952(a)(2)(B). As to the
latter, the DEA regulations require consideration of
the factors set forth in 21 CFR 1301.34(d). These
factors are specifically designed to assess
competition in the context of an import application.
However, as § 823(a) indicates, an application to
import a schedule I or II controlled substance must
also be evaluated under paragraph 823(a)(1)
regarding the adequacy of competition.
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the meaning of paragraph 823(a)(1).115
The application was opposed by two
firms that were already registered as
importers of the same substances that
Johnson Matthey sought to import.
These competing firms contended at the
administrative hearing that they
maintained an adequate and
uninterrupted supply of the substances
under adequately competitive
conditions. The two firms therefore
objected to the proposed registration
under paragraph 823(a)(1), among other
grounds.
The final order in Johnson Matthey
contains no description of the evidence
presented by the parties during the
administrative hearing on the
competition issue as the final order
expressly declared such evidence to be
irrelevant. Nor does the Johnson
Matthey final order contain a recitation
of the text of paragraph 823(a)(1) or an
independent analysis of the statutory
text. Instead, the Johnson Matthey final
order simply adopted a proposed rule
that was published 18 years earlier by
DEA and subsequently withdrawn by
the agency. In that subsequently
withdrawn 1974 proposed rule (39 FR
12138 (1974)), DEA proposed to revise
its regulations to state that, during an
administrative hearing on an
application to manufacture a controlled
substance in schedule I or II, if the ALJ
determines that the registration would
be consistent with maintenance of
effective controls against diversion, he
shall exclude as irrelevant evidence
bearing on whether existing
manufacturers are capable of producing
an adequate and uninterrupted supply
under adequately competitive
conditions.
The Johnson Matthey final order
failed to state that, two months after
DEA published the aforementioned
proposed rule in 1974, the agency
published a notice in the Federal
Register that three firms (which were
then registered bulk manufacturers
under § 823(a)) filed objections to, and
requested a hearing on, the proposed
rule, asserting that ‘‘the Controlled
Substances Act requires a finding
respecting the adequacy of competition
prior to registering any person to engage
in the bulk manufacture of a schedule
I or II substance.’’ 39 FR 20382 (1974).
These objections that were submitted in
response to the 1974 proposed rule
reflect precisely the same conclusion
regarding the meaning of paragraph
823(a)(1) that I find—for the reasons
discussed above—to be most
115 As Johnson Matthey had applied to import
narcotic raw materials, the application also had to
be evaluated under 21 U.S.C. 952(a)(1).
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reconcilable with the text of the statute.
That DEA withdrew the 1974 proposed
rule a month after publishing these
objections (39 FR 26031 (1974)) is
consistent with the conclusion that the
proposed rule could not be firmly
reconciled with the statute.116
Thus, the Johnson Matthey final order
appears to have been flawed both
procedurally (by relying entirely upon a
proposed rule that was withdrawn) and
substantively (by relying on an
interpretation of paragraph 823(a)(1)
that is, in my view, difficult to reconcile
with the statutory text). Nonetheless, it
must be recognized that the Johnson
Matthey final order was upheld on
appeal in Noramco v. DEA, 375 F.3d
1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Examining the
Noramco decision is therefore
warranted. Before doing so, however, it
is necessary to review another DEA final
order that was issued shortly after
Johnson Matthey.
In Penick Corporation Inc., 68 FR
6947 (2003), DEA evaluated the
paragraph 823(a)(1) issue in a different
manner than it had done eight months
earlier in the Johnson Matthey final
order. As in Roxane and Johnson
Matthey, Penick had applied with DEA
to become registered as, among other
things, an importer of schedule II
controlled substances. Also as in
Roxane and Johnson Matthey, the
applicant’s competitors (who were
already in the market as registered
importers of the same substances)
objected to the proposed registration
contending, among other things, that the
applicant had failed to demonstrate the
existence of inadequate competition
within the meaning of paragraph
823(a)(1). However, in contrast to the
Johnson Matthey final order, the Penick
final order did not disregard the
competition issue as irrelevant. Nor did
the Penick final order mention the 1974
proposed rule (that was subsequently
withdrawn), which was relied upon in
Johnson Matthey. Rather, the Penick
final order did examine the evidence
presented on the competition issue and
ultimately concluded: ‘‘Having found
that the market is not adequately
competitive, the Deputy Administrator
concludes that this factor weighs in
favor of granting Penick’s application,
even though Noramco and Mallinckrodt
are capable of maintaining an adequate
116 The notice of withdrawal of the proposed rule
stated that DEA was in the midst of reviewing and
revising all the agency regulations in their entirety
and that the proposed amendments regarding the
competition issue ‘‘are withdrawn so that all
proposed changes to the regulations may be
published together.’’ However, DEA never again
proposed to amend its regulations to eliminate the
consideration—that paragraph 823(a)(1) mandates—
of adequacy of supply and competition.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
21:01 Jan 13, 2009
Jkt 217001
and uninterrupted supply.’’ 117 The
Penick final order did not address the
Johnson Matthey final order or why the
two final orders took a differing
approach as to the competition issue.
Both the Johnson Matthey final order
and the Penick final order were
challenged by a competitor (Noramco)
in Noramco v. DEA. The United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
consolidated Noramco’s two petitions
for review into one appellate
proceeding. With respect to the Johnson
Matthey final order, Noramco contended
that DEA erred by failing to consider the
adequacy of competition and limit the
number of importers to that which can
produce an adequate and uninterrupted
supply under adequately competitive
conditions as paragraph 823(a)(1)
requires. The D.C. Circuit panel
reviewed DEA’s decision ‘‘under the
familiar two-step Chevron
framework.’’ 118 Under this framework,
if the reviewing court finds that the
statute does not directly address ‘‘the
precise question at issue’’ (step one), the
court must sustain the agency’s
interpretation if it is ‘‘based on a
permissible construction of the statute’’
(step two).119 The court of appeals in
Noramco upheld the Johnson Matthey
final order, under Chevron step two,
finding that DEA’s decision to disregard
competition to be a ‘‘permissible
interpretation’’ of paragraph
823(a)(1).120 Simultaneously, the court
of appeals in Noramco upheld the
Penick final order after reciting how
DEA did consider the competition issue
as paragraph 823(a)(1) directs. That the
final orders in Johnson Matthey and
Penick were inconsistent with one
another as to the interpretation of
paragraph 823(a)(1) was rejected by the
court of appeals as a basis for
reversal.121
It is especially important to note here
that, under Chevron step two, ‘‘[t]he
court need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it
permissibly could have adopted to
uphold the construction, or even the
reading the court would have reached if
the question initially had arisen in a
judicial proceeding.’’ 122 Accordingly,
when the court in Noramco upheld the
final order in Johnson Matthey, it was
not offering an opinion whether that
final order had interpreted paragraph
823(a)(1) in the best manner; rather, the
117 68
FR at 6950.
118 375 F.3d at 1152 (citing Chevron U.S.A, Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1983)).
119 Id.
120 375 F.3d at 1153.
121 375 F.3d at 1157 n.8.
122 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.
PO 00000
Frm 00093
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
court was merely stating that DEA
(being owed the measure of Chevron
deference accorded to an agency that
administers a statute) had put forth a
‘‘permissible interpretation’’ of the
statute. This point is underscored by the
fact that the court in Noramco also
upheld the Penick final order, which
interpreted paragraph 823(a)(1) in a
notably different manner than did the
Johnson Matthey final order.
Thus, nothing in the Noramco
decision constrains DEA from
concluding, as I now do, that the most
sound reading of the text of paragraph
823(a)(1) is that which requires the
agency to consider limiting the number
of bulk manufacturers and importers of
schedule I and II controlled substances
to that which can produce an adequate
and uninterrupted supply of a given
substance under adequately competitive
conditions.
In 2006, another final order was
issued involving the competition issue.
In Chattem Chemicals, Inc., 71 FR 9834
(2006), petition for review denied,
Penick Corp., Inc. v. DEA, 491 F3d 483
(D.C. Cir. 2007), the applicant sought to
become registered to import a schedule
II controlled substance, just as Roxane,
Johnson Matthey, and Penick had
previously done. In the final order,
which I issued, I followed the Johnson
Matthey approach of declining to
consider the adequacy of competition or
supply. In doing so, I expressly noted
that this approach had been ‘‘approved
by the appellate court in Noramco.’’ 123
Upon review of the Chattem final order,
the court of appeals likewise reaffirmed
that, under Noramco, this approach of
not considering adequacy of
competition was a permissible reading
of the statute. Penick, 491 F.3d at 491
n.11. However, for the reasons
discussed at length above, I now believe
that this approach—though deemed
permissible upon Chevron review—
must be rejected in favor of that which
more accurately follows the text of the
statute; i.e., the approach that was taken
in Roxane and Penick of considering
limiting the number of bulk
manufacturers and importers of a given
schedule I or II controlled substance to
that which can produce an adequate and
uninterrupted supply under adequately
competitive conditions.124 In addition
123 71
FR at 9838.
it is certainly preferable that an agency
interpret a statutory provision that it administers in
a consistent manner throughout the agency’s
existence, the head of an agency ‘‘is not estopped
from changing a view she believes to have been
grounded upon a mistaken legal interpretation.’’
See Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512
U.S. 504, 517 (1994); cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863
(‘‘The fact that the agency has from time to time
124 While
E:\FR\FM\14JAN1.SGM
14JAN1
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 9 / Wednesday, January 14, 2009 / Notices
to finding this interpretation to be that
which most closely mirrors the text of
the statute, I believe that, upon
consideration of the legislative history
and treaty considerations discussed
above, this interpretation most
effectively achieves the principles
underlying the statutory text: Balancing
the overarching goal of preventing the
United States from being a source of
domestic and international diversion by
limiting the number of bulk
manufacturers of schedule I and II
controlled substances with the desire to
ensure a level of competition adequate
to prevent legitimate purchasers of these
substances from being charged
unreasonable prices.125 The alternative
interpretation, though found to be
permissible, does not give full effect to
these principles and provides no
mechanism to prevent the proliferation
of bulk suppliers of schedule I and II
controlled substances beyond that
necessary to adequately supply the
legitimate United States demand for
these materials under adequately
competitive conditions. It is axiomatic
that the proliferation of suppliers of
bulk schedule I and II controlled
substances heightens the risk of
oversupply, which in turn increases the
risk of diversion. The alternative
interpretation, therefore, does not
effectuate the statute and its underlying
purposes as well as the interpretation
followed in this final order.
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
D. Summary of the Discussion
For the reasons indicated above, I
have determined that Respondent’s
proposed registration is inconsistent
with United States obligations under the
Single Convention and with the public
interest based on a consideration of the
factors set forth in 21 U.S.C. 823(a).
With respect to the Single Convention,
Respondent’s desire to become
registered in order to achieve MAPS’s
goal of ending the Federal Government’s
monopoly on the wholesale distribution
of marijuana cannot be squared with the
requirement under the Convention that
there be precisely such a monopoly.
With respect to the public interest,
Respondent’s failure to demonstrate that
the longstanding existing system in the
United States of producing and
changed its interpretation of [a statutory provision]
does not * * * lead us to conclude that no
deference should be accorded the agency’s
interpretation of the statute.’’).
125 DEA has never invoked the ‘‘limiting’’
language of paragraph 823(a)(1) as a basis to revoke
the registration of an existing bulk manufacturer
that is currently utilizing its registration to supply
the market for a given schedule I or II controlled
substance, and this final order should not be
construed as suggesting a departure from such
practice.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
21:01 Jan 13, 2009
Jkt 217001
distributing research-grade marijuana
under the oversight of HHS and NIDA
is inadequate within the meaning of 21
U.S.C. 823(a)(1) weighs heavily against
granting his application. Also with
respect to the public interest, the
admitted conduct relating to controlled
substances of Respondent’s sponsor, Mr.
Doblin (in particular, Mr. Doblin’s past
and ongoing conduct relating to
marijuana) is unacceptable for anyone
seeking to have a prominent role in
overseeing the controlled substance
activities of a DEA registrant—
especially where the registrant’s
proposed activities are the manufacture
and distribution of the very drug
marijuana. In sum, there are three
independent grounds, any of which,
standing alone, provide a sufficient
(indeed, compelling) legal basis for
denying Respondent’s application.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(a), as well as 28 CFR
0.100(b) & 0.104, appendix to subpart R,
sec. 7(a), I order that the application of
Lyle E. Craker, Ph.D., for a DEA
certificate of registration as a
manufacturer of marijuana be, and
hereby is, denied. This order is effective
February 13, 2009.
Dated: January 7, 2009.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E9–521 Filed 1–13–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission of the United States
Privacy Act of 1974; System of
Records
AGENCY: Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission of the United States.
ACTION: Notice of a New System of
Records.
SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Privacy Act of
1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission (Commission),
Department of Justice, proposes to
establish a new system of records to
enable the Commission to carry out its
statutory responsibility to determine the
validity and amount of the claims
submitted to the Commission against
Libya. The Claims Against Libya System
will include documentation provided by
the claimant as well as background
material that will assist the Commission
in the processing of their claims. The
system will also include the final
Frm 00094
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
decision of the Commission regarding
the claim.
DATES: In accordance with 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(4) and (11), the public is given
a 30-day period in which to comment;
and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), which has oversight
responsibility under the Act, requires a
40-day period in which to conclude its
review of the system. Accordingly,
please submit any comments by
February 17, 2009.
ADDRESSES: The public, OMB, and
Congress are invited to submit any
comments to the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission of the United
States, 600 E Street, NW., Suite 6002,
Washington, DC 20579.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The
Administrative Office, Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission, U.S.
Department of Justice, 600 E Street,
NW., Suite 6002, Washington, DC
20579, or by telephone at 202–616–
6975. In accordance with 5 U.S.C.
552a(r), the Department has provided a
report to OMB and the Congress on the
new system of records.
Dated: January 9, 2009.
Mauricio Tamargo,
Chairman.
JUSTICE/FCSC–29
SYSTEM NAME:
Libya, Claims Against.
SYSTEM LOCATION:
Offices of the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission, 600 E Street,
NW., Suite 6002, Washington, DC
20579.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
PO 00000
2133
CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS COVERED BY THE
SYSTEM:
Persons with claims against Libya
covered by the August 14, 2008 Claims
Settlement Agreement Between the
United States of America and the Great
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya and referred by the
Department of State to the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission.
CATEGORIES OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM:
Claim information, including name
and address of claimant and
representative, if any; date and place of
birth or naturalization; nature of claim;
description of loss or injury including
medical records; and other evidence
establishing entitlement to
compensation.
AUTHORITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE SYSTEM:
Authority to establish and maintain
this system is contained in 5 U.S.C. 301
and 44 U.S.C. 3101, which authorize the
Chairman of the Commission to create
E:\FR\FM\14JAN1.SGM
14JAN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 9 (Wednesday, January 14, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2101-2133]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-521]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 05-16]
Lyle E. Craker; Denial of Application
On December 10, 2004, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, issued an Order to Show Cause to Lyle E. Craker,
Ph.D. (Respondent), of Amherst, Massachusetts. The Show Cause Order
proposed the denial of Respondent's pending application for a
registration as a bulk manufacturer of marijuana on two grounds. Show
Cause Order at 1.
First, the Show Cause Order alleged that Respondent's
``registration would not be consistent with the public interest as that
term is used in 21 U.S.C. 823(a).'' Show Cause Order at 1. Second, the
Show Cause Order alleged that the Respondent's registration would be
inconsistent ``with the United States'
[[Page 2102]]
obligations under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Single
Convention), March 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407.'' Id.
With respect to both of these contentions, noting that Respondent
sought registration ``to supply analytical, pre-clinical and clinical
researchers with marijuana,'' the Show Cause Order emphasized that the
``National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), a component [of] the
National Institutes of Health (NIH)'' and ``the United States
Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], oversees the
cultivation, production and distribution of research-grade marijuana on
behalf of the United States Government.'' Id. at 2.
With respect to the contention that Respondent's proposed
registration is inconsistent with the public interest, the Show Cause
Order stated that, under 21 U.S.C. 823(a), ``DEA must limit the number
of producers of research-grade marijuana to that which can provide an
adequate and uninterrupted supply under adequately competitive
conditions.'' Id. at 4. The Show Cause Order then stated: ``For the
past 36 years, the University of Mississippi has provided such supply
under the foregoing criteria, and there is no indication that this
registrant will fail to do so throughout the duration of its current
registration. While the University of Massachusetts is free to compete
with the University of Mississippi to obtain the next NIDA contract to
produce research-grade marijuana, there is no basis under Section
823(a) to add an additional producer.'' Id.
With respect to the contention of Respondent's sponsor, the
Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies (MAPS), that
marijuana provided by NIDA to researchers was both qualitatively and
quantitatively inadequate, the Show Cause Order alleged that marijuana
provided by NIDA was ``of sufficient quantity and quality to meet'' the
needs of ``legitimate and authorized research[ers].'' Id. at 3.
The Show Cause Order also noted MAPS's contentions that ``NIDA is
limited to supplying marijuana for research purposes and cannot supply
marijuana on a prescription basis,'' that ``this limitation effectively
prohibits a sponsor * * * from expending the necessary large amounts of
funds to conduct drug development studies resulting in [a] marijuana
prescription product,'' and that granting Respondent a registration
would resolve this problem. Id. In response to these contentions, the
Show Cause Order alleged that to obtain approval for the marketing of a
new drug under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the safety and
effectiveness of the drug must be demonstrated through three phases of
clinical trials, and that clinical trials involving marijuana had not
progressed beyond the first phase (phase 1). Id. at 2-4.
The Show Cause Order further noted that the policy of HHS for
approving the distribution of marijuana to researchers ``has not unduly
limited clinical research with marijuana.'' Id. at 5. More
specifically, the Show Cause Order alleged that ``[s]ince the year
2000, there have been or are eleven approved clinical trials utilizing
smoked marijuana,'' and that approved ``marijuana researchers
administer marijuana to almost 500 human subjects.'' Id. The Show Cause
Order also alleged that since 2000, there were ``four approved pre-
clinical trials in laboratory and animal modes.'' Id. at 5. Relatedly,
the Show Cause Order also asserted that ``DEA has no statutory
authority to overturn HHS' policy.'' Id.
With respect to the contention that Respondent's registration would
be inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the Single
Convention, the Show Cause Order again referenced that HHS, through
NIDA, oversees the cultivation, production and distribution of
research-grade marijuana on behalf of the United States Government and
alleged that ``[i]n accordance with the Single Convention, the Federal
Government [is required] to limit marijuana available for clinical
research to [this] source.'' Id. at 4.
Respondent timely requested a hearing. The matter was assigned to
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Mary Ellen Bittner, who conducted a
hearing on August 22-26 and December 12-14 and 16, 2005. At the
hearing, the parties put on testimonial evidence and introduced
documentary evidence. Following the hearing, the parties submitted
briefs containing their proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and argument.
On February 12, 2007, the ALJ issued her recommended decision.
Therein, the ALJ rejected the Government's contention that the Single
Convention precluded Respondent's registration. In so holding, the ALJ
acknowledged that the Convention requires that its signatories maintain
a ``government monopoly on importing, exporting, wholesale trading, and
maintaining stocks.'' ALJ at 82. The ALJ reasoned, however, that ``[i]t
also appears, although it is not entirely clear, that the marijuana
grown by the National Center \1\ or by any other registrant for
utilization in research would qualify as either `medicinal' * * * or as
`special stocks' within the meaning of'' the Convention. Id. at 82
(citing Single Convention, art. 1, para. (1)(o) & (x)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The National Center is an entity of the University of
Mississippi which currently holds the contract with NIDA for growing
marijuana to supply United States researchers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ALJ then turned to whether Respondent had established that his
registration would be consistent with the public interest when
considering the six enumerated factors of 21 U.S.C. 823(a). With
respect to the first factor, 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1), the ALJ first recited
the relevant text of this provision, which requires DEA to consider
maintenance of effective controls against diversion by limiting the
manufacturing of schedule I or II controlled substances ``to a number
of establishments which can produce an adequate and uninterrupted
supply of these substances under adequately competitive conditions for
legitimate medical, scientific, research, and industrial purposes.''
ALJ at 82 (quoting Sec. 823(a)(1)). Noting that there is precedent for
the agency to interpret this provision in two distinct ways regarding
the issue of adequacy of competition (either by considering or not
considering the issue),\2\ the ALJ stated that she would evaluate the
issue in both ways. Id. at 83.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The meaning of 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1) and the competition issue
are discussed in detail in part C of the discussion section of this
final order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the first approach of interpreting 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1) to
allow DEA to disregard the issue of adequacy of competition as long as
the agency finds that the applicant for registration would provide
effective controls against diversion, the ALJ concluded that ``there is
no evidence or contention that either Respondent or anyone working with
him would be likely to divert the marijuana from the growing or drying
or storage areas.'' Id.
The ALJ next rejected the Government's contention that there was a
risk of diversion because Mr. Rick Doblin, the Director of MAPS, would
determine who was to receive the marijuana. In so holding, the ALJ
reasoned that Mr. Doblin would not have physical possession of the
marijuana and that Respondent would only send marijuana to researchers
with DEA registrations and the requisite approval of HHS. ALJ at 84.
The ALJ thus concluded that ``the research project has procedures in
place to adequately protect against diversion of the marijuana'' and
that ``there is minimal risk of diversion.'' Id.
[[Page 2103]]
Under the second approach of interpreting 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1) to
require DEA to consider whether competition is inadequate, the ALJ
first turned to whether the supply of marijuana currently available to
researchers through HHS is adequate. In this regard, the ALJ found that
while ``there have been some problems with the marijuana that the
National Center produces, * * * a preponderance of the evidence
establishes that the quality is generally adequate.'' Id. The ALJ
further found, however, that ``NIDA's system for evaluating requests
for marijuana for research has resulted in some researchers who hold
DEA registrations and requisite approval from [HHS] being unable to
conduct their research because NIDA has refused to provide them with
marijuana.'' Id. The ALJ thus concluded ``that the existing supply of
marijuana is not adequate.'' Id. The ALJ also concluded that
competition is inadequate within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(1).
Id. \3\ The ALJ thus held that the first public interest factor, 21
U.S.C. 823(a)(1), supported granting Respondent's application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ In so finding, the ALJ rejected the Government's contention
that because the NIDA contract is open to competitive bidding,
adequate competition exists. According to the ALJ, ``[t]he question
is not * * * whether the NIDA process addresses that agency's needs,
but whether marijuana is made available to all researchers who have
a legitimate need for it in their research. As discussed above, I
answer that question in the negative.'' Id. at 85.
As further support for her conclusion, the ALJ reasoned that
``the NIDA contract requires the contractor to analyze'' marijuana
seized by law enforcement agencies, and that ``a qualified
cultivator may not be able to fulfill'' this requirement.''Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the second public interest factor, 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(2), the
ALJ found that there was ``neither evidence nor contention that
Respondent has not complied with applicable laws'' and thus concluded
that this factor supported the granting of Respondent's application.
See id.
Under the third public interest factor, 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(3), as to
whether granting Respondent's application would promote technical
advances in the art of manufacturing controlled substances, the ALJ
found that Respondent has ``considerable experience in cultivating
medicinal plants, which might promote technical advances in the
cultivation of marijuana or developing new medications from it.'' ALJ
at 85-86. The ALJ nonetheless found that ``there is not sufficient
evidence in the record on which to base a finding as to whether
granting Respondent's registration would promote technical advances.''
Id. at 86.
Under the fourth public interest factor, 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(4), the
ALJ found that it was ``undisputed that Respondent has never been
convicted of any violation of any law pertaining to controlled
substances'' and therefore this factor weighed in favor of granting the
application. Id.
Under the fifth public interest factor, 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(5), the
ALJ considered Respondent's ``past experience in manufacturing
controlled substances and the existence of effective controls against
diversion.'' Id. The ALJ acknowledged that ``Respondent has no
experience in manufacturing controlled substances.'' Id. Noting that
Respondent ``does have experience in growing medicinal plants'' and
that ``the risk of diversion is minimal,'' the ALJ concluded that this
factor supported granted the application. Id.
Finally, under the sixth public interest factor, 21 U.S.C.
823(a)(6), in analyzing such other factors as are relevant to and
consistent with public health and safety, the ALJ rejected the
Government's contention that granting the application would
``circumvent[]'' HHS's policy with respect to the provision of
marijuana to researchers. Id. Reasoning that ``the NIH Guidance by its
own terms applies to marijuana that [HHS] makes available, [and] not
[to] marijuana that might be available from some other legitimate
source[,]'' the ALJ concluded that ``the NIH Guidance is not a factor
in determining whether Respondent's application should be granted.''
Id. The ALJ thus concluded that granting Respondent's application
``would be in the public interest,'' and recommended that I grant his
application. Id. at 87.
The Government excepted to the ALJ's decision on numerous grounds,
and Respondent filed a response to the Government's exceptions.
Thereafter, the record was forwarded to me for final agency action.
Having considered the record as a whole, I hereby issue this
Decision and Final Order. For reasons explained more fully below, I
reject the ALJ's legal conclusion ``that the Single Convention does not
preclude registering Respondent.'' Id. at 82. Moreover, I reject the
ALJ's finding that the proposed registration is consistent with the
public interest when considering the six factors enumerated in 21
U.S.C. 823(a). Id. at 82-86. I therefore reject the ALJ's
recommendation that the application be granted. See id. at 87.
Findings
Under Federal Law, marijuana and tetrahydrocannabinols (THC) are
schedule I controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. 812(c), Schedule I(c)(10) &
(17). Congress placed marijuana and THC in schedule I because the
substances have ``a high potential for abuse,'' ``no current accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States,'' and ``a lack of
accepted safety for use * * * under medical supervision.'' 21 U.S.C.
812(b)(1). See also 66 FR 20038 (2001) (denying petition to reschedule
marijuana from schedule I), petition for review dismissed, Gettman v.
DEA, 290 F.3d 430 (D.C. Cir. 2002).\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ As related in the Notice, the FDA recommended that marijuana
be maintained in schedule I of the CSA. The FDA based its finding
on, inter alia, the extensive evidence that marijuana has a history
and pattern of abuse, that it is ``[t]he most frequently used
illicit drug,'' and that it ``has a high potential for abuse.'' 66
FR at 20047 & 20051. The FDA also found that ``[t]here are not FDA-
approved medical products,'' ``marijuana does not have a currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or a
currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions,'' and
``that, even under medical supervision, marijuana has not been shown
to have an acceptable level of safety.'' 66 FR at 20052.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marijuana is cultivated from the cannabis plant, which is
recognized as ``a very adaptive plant [whose] characteristics are even
more variable than most plants.'' GX 25, at 7. Marijuana, which
consists primarily of the dried flowering tops and leaves of the
cannabis plant,\5\ ``is a variable and complex mixture of biologically
active compounds.'' Id. As of 2001, 483 different chemical constituents
had been identified in marijuana, including approximately 66
cannabinoids.\6\ 66 FR at 20041; Tr. 1142, 1147. ``THC \7\ is the main
psychoactive cannabinoid in marijuana''; the plant, however, also
contains ``[v]arying proportions of other cannabinoids, mainly
cannabidiol (CBD) and cannabinol (CBN),'' which ``sometimes [exist] in
quantities that might modify the pharmacology of THC or cause effects
of their own.'' Id. at 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The legal definition of marijuana, as set forth in the CSA,
21 U.S.C. 802(16), is as follows: The term ``marihuana'' means all
parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the
seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and
every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or
preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin. Such term does not
include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such
stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of
such mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber,
oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is
incapable of germination.
\6\ Cannabinoids are chemical compounds that are unique to the
cannabis plant (not found in any other plant). Tr. 1140-41.
\7\ While there are numerous isomers of THC (all of which fall
within the listing of ``Tetrahydrocannabinols'' in schedule I of the
CSA and many of which are found in the cannabis plant), delta-9-THC
is the isomer that is recognized as the primary psychoactive
component in marijuana and, for this reason the term ``THC'' is
often used to refer to delta-9-THC. See 66 FR at 20045; Tr. 1146-47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 2104]]
The National Center and NIDA's Drug Supply Program
Since 1968, the National Center for Natural Products Research
(National Center), a division of the University of Mississippi, has
held a contract with the Federal Government to grow marijuana for
research purposes and held the requisite registrations under the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), as well as the federal law that
preceded the CSA, authorizing the University to conduct such
activity.\8\ Tr. 1152-53, 1350-51. See also 21 CFR 1301.13. The
contract, which is open for competitive bidding at periodic intervals,
see GX 15, is administered by NIDA, a component of NIH (which is part
of HHS), pursuant to its Drug Supply Program. RX 1, at 231. Since 1999,
the term of the contract has been five years. See GXs 13 & 15; Tr.
1156.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Initially, the National Center obtained a researcher's
registration; it now also holds a manufacturer's registration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the NIDA contract, the National Center ``[g]row[s],
harvest[s], store[s], ship[s] and analyze[s] cannabis of different
varieties, as required.'' GX 13, at 6. The contract requires that the
National Center ``shall serve as NIDA's cannabis drug repository,'' as
well as ``develop and produce standardized marijuana cigarettes within
a range of specified THC content, and placebos for use in pre-clinical
and clinical research programs,'' and maintain minimum stocks of both
bulk marijuana and marijuana cigarettes of various THC contents, and
store them in a DEA approved facility. Id. at 6-7.
Marijuana potency is primarily based on the concentration
(percentage by weight) of THC in the plant material. Tr. 1148-49. As of
August 25, 2005, the National Center held on behalf of NIDA
approximately 1055 kilograms (kg) of marijuana with THC contents
ranging up to 12.26 percent. See RX 53. This inventory includes six
batches of marijuana with THC contents ranging from 9.02 to 9.89
percent,\9\ one batch (of nearly 19 kg) with a THC content of 10
percent, nearly 25 kg with a THC content of 11.34 percent, and
approximately 27 kg with a THC content of 12.26 percent.\10\ See id. In
his testimony, Mahmoud ElSohly, Ph.D., who is the Principal
Investigator under the NIDA contract, and who has overseen the National
Center's work with marijuana since 1980, stated that the Center is
capable of producing marijuana with a THC content of 20 percent or
more.\11\ Tr. 1130-31, 1152, 1203, 1254-55.
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\9\ These batches range from approximately 12 to 15 kg in size.
\10\ As of the date of the hearing, more than 920,000 marijuana
cigarettes of various THC concentrations including placebo had been
manufactured pursuant to the NIDA contracts between 1974 and 2003.
GX 27.
\11\ 11 As Dr. ElSohly explained, he has grown numerous strains
of marijuana from seeds that have been obtained from a variety of
countries and has used them to do ``genetic selection to have
genetic material of high potency.'' Tr. 1255.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The contract also requires the National Center to ``ship to
research investigators as authorized by the [NIDA] Project Officer upon
receipt of a shipment order.'' GX 13, at 7. While the NIDA ``Project
Officer may pre-authorize any normal recurring requests that the
contractor will then fill once it has received'' various
assurances,\12\ the contract further states that ``[a]ll other requests
should be submitted to the NIDA Project Officer for approval.'' Id. at
8. Moreover, ``[i]f there is a reason to question a particular request,
the Contractor shall inform the NIDA Project Officer who will make a
final decision on providing the material and quantity requested.'' Id.
As these provisions make clear, the National Center has no authority to
distribute any of the marijuana it produces pursuant to the NIDA
contract without NIDA's approval.\13\
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\12\ These include that the researcher have the appropriate DEA
registration and FDA/IND approvals, provide assurance that the
marijuana ``will not be resold'' and ``will be used only for
research or patient purposes,'' that the use of the marijuana will
adhere to the appropriate Safety Standards for research,'' and that
the researcher agree ``to comply with all Federal, State and Local
Safety requirements for use of the materials.'' See GX 13, at 8.
\13\ Independent of its contract with NIDA, the National Center
holds an additional registration to manufacture marijuana and THC.
GXs 75 & 78. The National Center was granted this registration under
the terms of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into with DEA
in 1999. GX 78. As set forth in the MOA, the purpose of the
registration was ``to allow the Center to develop a new product
formulation for effecting delivery of [THC] in a pharmaceutically
acceptable dosage form suppository * * * and to provide crude THC
extract to a DEA-registered manufacturer of THC for further
purification.'' Id. at 2. The MOA further stated that, under the
terms thereof, the Center would ``manufacture marijuana for the
purpose of extracting THC therefrom.'' Id. Subsequently, the Center
submitted a new application for a registration to bulk manufacture
marijuana and THC ``to prepare marihuana extract for further
purification into bulk active [THC] for use in launching FDA-
approved pharmaceutical products.'' 70 FR 47232 (2005). DEA has not
yet issued a final order as to this application. (DEA publishes in
the Federal Register all final orders on applications for
registration to bulk manufacture schedule I and II controlled
substances.)
The MOA further provided that ``[i]n accordance with articles 23
and 28 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs * * * private
trade in `cannabis' is strictly prohibited. Therefore, the Center
shall not distribute any quantity of marijuana to any person other
than an authorized DEA employee.'' GX 78, at 2. Continuing, the MOA
explained that ``[t]he Single Convention does not prohibit private
trade in `cannabis preparations,' '' and noted that this term,
``within the meaning of the Single Convention, is a mixture, solid
or liquid containing cannabis, cannabis resin, or extracts or
tinctures of cannabis.'' Id. Because ``[t]he THC that the Center
will extract from marijuana [is] considered such a `cannabis
preparation[,]' * * * the Center may, in accordance with the Single
Convention, distribute the crude THC extract to private entities''
provided the Center otherwise complies with the CSA and DEA
regulations. Id. at 2-3. The MOA also set forth a detailed series of
controls to maintain accountability of the marijuana from
acquisition of the seeds through the extraction of THC from the
harvested material. Id. at 3-7.
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In 1997, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy
asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM), a component of the National
Academy of Sciences, to conduct a review of the scientific evidence
regarding the potential health benefits and risks of marijuana and its
constituent cannabinoids. RX 1, at 7. In 1999, the IOM published its
report. The IOM found, among other things, that ``[d]efined substances,
such as purified cannabinoid compounds, are preferable to plant
products, which are of variable and uncertain composition. Use of
defined cannabinoids permits a more precise evaluation of their
effects, whether in combination or alone.'' RX 1, at 22. With respect
to this issue, the IOM reached the following conclusion: ``Scientific
data indicate the potential therapeutic value of cannabinoid drugs,
primarily THC, for pain relief, control of nausea and vomiting, and
appetite stimulation; smoked marijuana, however, is a crude THC
delivery system that also delivers harmful substances.'' Id. The report
further stated:
The therapeutic effects of cannabinoids are most well
established for THC, which is the primary psychoactive ingredient of
marijuana. But it does not follow from this that smoking marijuana
is good medicine.
Although marijuana smoke delivers THC and other cannabinoids to
the body, it also delivers harmful substances, including most of
those found in tobacco smoke. In addition, plants contain a variable
mixture of biologically active compounds and cannot be expected to
provide a precisely defined drug effect. For those reasons there is
little future in smoked marijuana as a medically approved
medication. If there is any future in cannabinoid drugs, it lies
with agents of more certain, not less certain, composition.'' \14\
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\14\ To similar effect, an ad hoc group of experts, who were
selected by NIH and convened in 1997 as part of a workshop to assess
the potential medical uses of marijuana, issued a report to the
Director of NIH, which noted:
As with any smoked drug (e.g., nicotine or cocaine),
characterizing the pharmacokinetics of THC and other cannabinoids
from smoked marijuana is a challenge. A person's smoking behavior
during an experiment is difficult for a researcher to control.
People differ. Smoking behavior is not easily quantified. An
experienced marijuana smoker can titrate and regulate doses to
obtain the desired acute psychological effects and to avoid overdose
and/or minimize undesired effects. Each puff delivers a discrete
dose of THC to the body. Puff and inhalation volume changes with
phase of smoking, tending to be highest at the beginning and lowest
at the end of smoking a cigarette. * * * During smoking, as the
cigarette length shortens, the concentration of THC in the remaining
marijuana increases; thus, each successive puff contains an
increasing concentration of THC.
One consequence of this complicated process is that an
experienced marijuana smoker can regulate almost on a puff-by-puff
basis the dose of THC delivered to lungs and thence to brain. A less
experienced smoker is more likely to overdose or underdose. Thus a
marijuana researcher attempting to control or specify dose in a
pharmacologic experiment with smoked marijuana has only partial
control over the drug dose actually delivered.
See GX 25, at 9-10 (Workshop on the Medical Utility of
Marijuana).
[[Page 2105]]
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Id. at 195-96. See also GX 53 (letter from Alice P. Mead, GW
Pharmaceuticals, P.L.C., to Christine V. Beato, Acting Asst. Sec. for
Health, HHS (Apr. 12, 2005)) (``[H]erbal cannabis should comprise only
the starting material from which a bona fide medical product is
ultimately derived. * * * [S]tandardizing herbal starting material
represents only the first of many steps necessary to create a modern
medicine that is safe and effective for use in specific medical
conditions. * * * [A] final medical product * * * must also be
delivered in a dosage form that is consistent in composition and that
allows the patient to obtain an identifiable and reliable amount of
medication.'') (emphasis in original).
Accordingly, the IOM recommended that clinical trials using
cannabinoid drugs should be conducted with ``the goal of developing
rapid-onset, reliable, and safe delivery systems.'' Id. at 197. The IOM
also advised that clinical trials involving smoked marijuana ``should
involve only short-term marijuana use (less than six months), should be
conducted in patients with conditions for which there is a reasonable
expectation of efficacy, should be approved by institutional review
boards, and should collect data about efficacy.'' Id.
Also in 1999, due in part to an increased interest in marijuana
research and taking into account the IOM report, HHS decided to change
the procedures by which it would supply marijuana to researchers. Tr.
1632-33; GX 24. The new procedures were announced in a document
released by NIH on May 21, 1999. GX 24, at 1. In the announcement,
``HHS recognize[d] the need for objective evaluations of the potential
merits of cannabinoids for medical uses[,]'' and that ``[i]f a positive
benefit is found, * * * the need to stimulate development of
alternative, safer dosage forms.'' Id. at 2. Toward this end, NIH
explained that the new procedures were designed to increase the
availability of marijuana for research purposes by, among other things,
making such marijuana ``available on a cost-reimbursable basis.'' Id.
This new procedure allowed researchers who were privately funded to
obtain marijuana from HHS by reimbursing the NIDA contractor for the
cost of the marijuana. Tr. 1633; see also GX 31, at 3. This was a
departure from the prior practice (pre-1999), whereby HHS only made
marijuana available to persons who received NIH funding. Id. The new
procedures implemented by HHS in 1999 remain in effect today. Tr. 1629.
HHS further stated in 1999 that it intended through the new
procedures ``to make available a sufficient amount of research-grade
marijuana to support those studies that are the most likely to yield
usable, essential data.'' GX 24, at 2. With respect to those
researchers who do not have NIH funding, HHS explained that ``the
scientific merits of each protocol will be evaluated through a Public
Health Service interdisciplinary review process [which] will take into
consideration a number of factors, including the scientific quality of
the proposed study, the quality of the organization's peer-review
process, and the objective of the proposed research.'' Id.
HHS then identified the criteria it would apply in evaluating
requests for marijuana:
The extent to which the protocol incorporates the elements of
good clinical and laboratory research;
The extent to which the protocol describes an adequate and well-
controlled clinical study to evaluate the safety and effectiveness
of marijuana and its constituent cannabinoids in the treatment of a
serious or life threatening condition;
The extent to which the protocol describes an adequate and well-
controlled clinical study to evaluate the safety and effectiveness
of marijuana and its constituent cannabinoids for a use for which
there are no alternative therapies;
The extent to which the protocol describes a biopharmaceutical
study designed to support the development of a dosage form
alternative to smoking; [and]
The extent to which the protocol describes high-quality research
designed to address basic, unanswered scientific questions about the
effects of marijuana and its constituent cannabinoids or about the
safety or toxicity of smoked marijuana.
Id. at 3.
HHS further noted that ``[a] clinical study involving marijuana
should include certain core elements,'' and that ``[a] study that
incorporates the [1997] NIH Workshop recommendations will be expected
to yield useful data and therefore, will be more likely to receive
marijuana under the HHS program.'' Id.
Finally, HHS explained that the ``proposed protocols must be
determined to be acceptable under FDA's standards for authorizing the
clinical study of investigational new drugs.'' Id. Relatedly, HHS
stated that ``although FDA's review of Phase 1 submissions will focus
on assessing the safety of Phase 1 investigations, FDA's review of
Phases 2 & 3 submissions will also include an assessment of the
scientific quality of the clinical investigations and the likelihood
that the investigations will yield data capable of meeting statutory
standards for marketing approval.'' Id. HHS further made clear that if
a protocol is approved, ``NIDA will provide the researcher with
authorization to reference NIDA's marijuana Drug Master File.'' Id. at
4.
At the administrative hearing in this case, Steven Gust, Ph.D.,
Special Assistant to the Director of NIDA, explained that, in addition
to seeking to facilitate research into the possible medical utility of
marijuana, the new procedures implemented by HHS in 1999 were intended
``to make the process more standardized, and to * * * provide some
expertise that did not really exist at NIDA in terms of reviewing
applications that involved * * * the use of marijuana * * * for
treatment of diseases.'' Tr. 1632-33. Accordingly, HHS ``established a
separate peer review process that * * * moved the review into the
Public Health Service [a component of HHS] * * * where additional
expertise from other NIH Institutes and other Federal agencies'' could
be utilized in reviewing the scientific merit of the applications. Id.
at 1633-34. Dr. Gust further explained that the members of the review
committee are drawn from the various specialty institutes of NIH, and
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA).
Id. at 1692; 1713-15.\15\ Dr. Gust also testified that the ``scientific
bar has been set very low, [so] that any project that has scientific
merit is approved,'' and that ``anything that gets approved gets NIDA
marijuana.'' Id. at 1700-01. As of April 2004, HHS had approved at
least seventeen pre-clinical or clinical studies of marijuana, which
were sponsored by the California Center for Medical Cannabis Research
(CMCR).\16\ GX 31, at
[[Page 2106]]
3. According to one witness who testified on behalf of Respondent, all
of the CMCR-sponsored researchers who applied to NIDA for marijuana did
in fact receive marijuana from NIDA. Tr. 694-95.
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\15\ Dr. Gust initially testified that someone from FDA sits on
the committee but later stated that he was not exactly sure if this
was so. Tr. 1712.
\16\ The California research studies were conducted pursuant to
a law enacted by California in 1999 known as the Marijuana Research
Act of 1999. Cal. Health & Safety Code Sec. 11362.9. This state law
established the ``California Marijuana Research Program'' to develop
and conduct studies on the potential medical utility of marijuana.
Id. (The program is also referred to as the ``Center for Medicinal
Cannabis Research'' (CMCR). Tr. 396.) The state legislature
appropriated a total of $9 million for the marijuana research
studies. Tr. 397. The state law was enacted following the passage of
Proposition 215, a ballot initiative otherwise known as the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996. Tr. 395-96; see also United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative (``OCBC''), 532 U.S. 483, 486
(2001).
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Respondent's Application and Contentions
Respondent is a Professor in the Department of Plant, Soil and
Insect Sciences at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Tr. 13. On
June 28, 2001, Respondent submitted an application to bulk manufacture
the schedule I controlled substances marijuana and
tetrahydrocannabinols.\17\ GXs 1 & 3; 21 CFR 1308.11(d). Respondent's
application is sponsored by the Multidisciplinary Associations for
Psychedelic Studies (MAPS). GX 3, at 1.
Because Respondent seeks a registration to manufacture a schedule I
controlled substance, DEA required that he complete a
questionnaire.\18\ In response to the question regarding the purpose
for which he sought registration, Respondent stated that ``[t]he plant
material will be grown for federally-approved uses only, including
analytical, pre-clinical, and clinical research,'' and that ``no
material is intended for illegal use or for medical marijuana patients
whose use may be legal under state, but not federal law.'' GX 3, at
1.\19\
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\17\ On his application for registration (GX 1), Respondent
incorrectly checked the box for ``dosage form'' manufacturing when,
in fact (based on the activity in which he proposes to engage), he
is seeking to become registered as a ``bulk'' manufacturer. In
written questions DEA submitted to Respondent as a follow-up to the
application, DEA properly characterized the activity as ``bulk
manufacture,'' and Respondent, in his written answers to these
questions, gave no indication that he disagreed. See GX 3. Also, in
his testimony at the hearing, Respondent acknowledged that his plan
was to send marijuana ``in bulk'' to others, who would roll it into
cigarettes. Tr. at 243. Respondent also testified that MAPS
President Rick Doblin ``assisted in the response to the bulk
manufacturer's questions.'' Tr. 352 (emphasis added). Cf. 32 CFR
1300.02(b)(32) (defining ``drug product'' as ``an active ingredient
in dosage form that has been approved or otherwise may be lawfully
marketed under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for distribution in
the United States''); 21 CFR 1301.72(a) & 1304.22(a) (listing ``bulk
materials awaiting further processing'' separately from ``finished
products'').
\18\ As set forth in 21 CFR 1301.15: ``The Administrator may
require an applicant to submit such documents or written statements
of fact relevant to the application as he/she deems necessary to
determine whether the application should be granted.''
\19\ Respondent further testified that it was his intention to
simply send bulk marijuana to researchers who would then roll their
own cigarettes. Tr. at 243.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent added that ``[t]he production costs * * * would be
underwritten by a grant'' from MAPS. Id. According to Respondent,
``MAPS is seeking to develop the marijuana plant into an FDA-approved
prescription medicine,'' and that ``[t]he growth of plants at [UMASS]
is a necessary step for supplying quality marijuana for use in MAPS'
drug development process.'' Id. Respondent also advised that ``MAPS
will sponsor research at other institutions using smoked marijuana and
marijuana delivered through a vaporizer device that heats, but does not
burn the plant material, thus reducing the products of combustion
normally found in smoked marijuana.'' Id.
Respondent further stated that his ``[c]ustomers would include both
MAPS-sponsored research and research sponsored by other
organizations.'' Id. at 3. Relatedly, Respondent explained that
``[r]esearchers conducting MAPS sponsored research would receive
supplies of the plant material free, while other researchers would
either receive the marijuana free or through a donation to MAPS.'' Id.
at 1. See also Tr. 225 (``I may very well be approached by other people
with approved studies who need a source also.'').
At the hearing, Mr. Rick Doblin, the President of MAPS,\20\ also
testified regarding the purpose of Respondent's application. Mr.
Doblin, who admitted that he engages in recreational use of marijuana
on a weekly basis, explained that ``[t]he reason we need a supply from
Dr. Craker is that we are engaged in trying to make marijuana into an
FDA-approved prescription medicine, and * * * we need to establish a
drug master file for a particular product, and * * * we need to conduct
research with that product, and have that product available to us for
potential marketing should we get FDA approval.'' Tr. 603, 718-19. Mr.
Doblin testified as to his ``belie[f] that smoked marijuana or
vaporized marijuana in plant form will successfully compete with
marijuana extracts on price.'' Id. at 605. He also testified as to his
belief that the ``efficacy and safety'' of vaporized plant-form
marijuana ``will be similar'' to drugs containing cannabinoid extracts
and that ``the efficacy will be similar and safety slightly different
with smoked'' marijuana than with drugs containing cannabinoid
extracts. Id.
Mr. Doblin further testified that he ``disagree[d]'' with the
Institute of Medicine's conclusion that defined and purified
cannabinoid compounds ``are preferable to plant products, which are of
variable and uncertain composition.'' Id. at 654. Mr. Doblin also
testified that ``what we're trying to do is get the Public Health
Service and NIDA out of the picture; they're only in the picture just
for marijuana only because they have a monopoly. And that is what is so
obstructing the system.'' Id. at 666.
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\20\ When asked during the hearing about the title of his
organization (Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies)
and, in particular the term ``Psychedelic,'' Mr. Doblin explained,
in part, ``it's about tools and procedures that bring to the surface
people's subconscious and unconscious and, you know, deeper
emotions.'' Tr. 474.
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Finally, Mr. Doblin testified that MAPS would only need between $5
to $10 million ``to make marijuana into a medicine'' through the
various stages of the FDA new drug approval (NDA) process.\21\ Id. at
701; see also id. at 703. In his testimony, Mr. Doblin did not,
however, identify a single instance in which an entity (whether for-
profit or nonprofit) had taken a drug--let alone a botanical substance
with known safety issues, See, e.g., GX 43, at 9--through the multi-
faceted NDA process for a similar cost.\22\ Moreover, while Mr.
[[Page 2107]]
Doblin testified that ``the mission statement [of MAPS] is to develop
psychedelics and marijuana into FDA-approved medicines and then to
educate the public about that'' (Tr. 478), the vagaries of his
testimony prevent a clear determination of how far along in that goal
he envisions MAPS to be.\23\
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\21\ In a recent Supreme Court decision, Justice Ginsberg, in a
dissenting opinion, summarized the process by which FDA approves new
drugs for marketing as follows:
The process for approving a new drug begins with preclinical
laboratory and animal testing. The sponsor of the new drug then
submits an investigational new drug application seeking FDA approval
to test the drug on humans. See 21 U.S.C. 355(i); 21 CFR 312.1 et
seq. (2007). Clinical trials generally proceed in three phases
involving successively larger groups of patients: 20 to 80 subjects
in phase I; no more than several hundred subjects in phase II; and
several hundred to several thousand subjects in phase III. 21 CFR
312.21. After completing the clinical trials, the sponsor files a
new drug application containing, inter alia, ``full reports of
investigations'' showing whether the ``drug is safe for use and * *
* effective''; the drug's composition; a description of the drug's
manufacturing, processing, and packaging; and the proposed labeling
for the drug. 21 U.S.C. 355(b)(1).
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999, 1018-19 n.15 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
\22\ While Respondent produced evidence establishing that the
$800-880 million costs of bringing a new drug to market includes
research and development costs incurred for drugs that are not
approved, as well as opportunity costs (the cost of investing in
research rather than something else), see Tr. 161, 734-36,
Respondent has not shown a single instance in which an entity has
obtained FDA approval of a drug through the NDA process for the cost
range which Mr. Doblin claimed would be sufficient to obtain
approval of plant-form marijuana.
Moreover, the IOM Report states that the average cost of a
Supplemental New Drug Application (SNDA), which is used when a
company seeks to obtain FDA approval to market a drug (which has
already gone through the three phases of clinical trials and been
approved for marketing) for a new indication, was $10 to 40 million.
RX 1, at 214. It should be noted, however, that in taking a drug
through the three phases, its sponsor will have obtained extensive
data regarding the drug's safety including ``adverse effects of the
drug [and] clinically significant drug/drug interactions.'' 21 CFR
314.50(d)(5)(vi).
In support of his assertion that MAPS could obtain FDA approval
for only $5 to $10 million, Mr. Doblin testified that marijuana is
different than other drugs that go through the FDA approval process.
Mr. Doblin based this assertion on his contentions that: marijuana
has been used by ``tens of millions of people'' while others drugs
going though the NDA process are only used by a few thousand; there
is ``an enormous body of evidence about [marijuana's] safety * * *
that we don't need to replicate;'' and sufficient data to satisfy
the FDA as to marijuana's safety and efficacy could be obtained by
testing only 500 to 600 people. Id. at 737-38.
The FDA's guidance document for botanical drug products makes
plain that ``[a] botanical drug product that is not generally
recognized as safe and effective for its therapeutic claims is
considered a new drug under Sec. 201(p) of the [Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic] Act,[]'' and that ``any person wishing to market a
botanical drug product that is a new drug is required to obtain FDA
approval of an NDA * * * for that product.'' GX 92A, at 7. Moreover,
``an NDA must contain substantial evidence of effectiveness derived
from adequate and well-controlled clinical studies, evidence of
safety, and adequate CMC [chemistry, manufacturing, and controls]
information.'' Id. See also GX 92A, at 27-38 (specifying the
information that must be provided to FDA for phase 3 clinical
studies of a botanical product to meet the requirements of the FDA
regulations governing the contents of INDs). Finally, with respect
to the nonclinical safety assessment required to support phase 3
clinical trials, the FDA guidance states:
To support safety for expanded clinical studies or to support
marketing approval of a botanical drug product, toxicity data from
standard toxicology studies in animals may be needed * * * . A
botanical product submitted for marketing approval as a drug will be
treated like any other new drug under development. Safety data from
previous clinical trials conducted in foreign countries will be
considered in determining the need for nonclinical studies. However,
previous human experience may be insufficient to demonstrate the
safety of a botanical product, especially when it is indicated for
chronic therapy. Systematic toxicological evaluations could be
needed to supplement available knowledge on the general toxicity,
teratogenicity, mutagenecity, and carcinogenicity of the final drug
product.
Id. at 34. While Mr. Doblin asserted that MAPS would not ``need
to replicate all those studies about the genetics, * * * the effect
on reproduction, the effect in all sorts of bodily systems,'' Tr.
737, he did not identify any specific studies performed in other
countries that establish the safety of marijuana for testing in
phase 3 clinical studies. While millions of people have undoubtedly
used marijuana, few have done so subject to the scientific rigor of
a controlled clinical trial. Nor did Respondent produce any credible
evidence establishing that the various types of animal studies which
FDA usually requires to support phase 3 clinical trials would not
have to be performed. GX 92A, at 35-37.
\23\ As indicated above, based on the record, no clinical trials
involving marijuana have advanced beyond phase 1. Moreover, each
sponsor must submit to FDA his/her own IND to be authorized to
conduct clinical investigation with a new drug (such as marijuana).
See 21 CFR 312.20, 312.23. Again, given the vagaries of Mr. Doblin's
testimony, it cannot be determined whether there is sufficient
existing preclinical laboratory and animal studies data to support a
submission of an IND for whatever proposed indications that Mr.
Doblin has in mind for his envisioned FDA-approved marijuana
medicine. But even assuming, arguendo, that MAPS could successfully
submit an IND based on existing data, it would still have to proceed
through extensive clinical trials (see 21 CFR 312.21), and then--
assuming that such trials are fully successful at demonstrating the
basis for safety and efficacy (which often is not the case with
clinical trials)--MAPS would still have to submit and obtain
approval of an NDA. All of these steps, and the uncertainties as to
the outcomes of each step, further call into question Mr. Doblin's
estimate of being able to obtain FDA approval of marijuana for only
$5 to $10 million.
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Correspondence Pertaining to the Application
Subsequent to Respondent's submission of his application for a DEA
registration, on March 4, 2003, the Chief of DEA's Drug and Chemical
Evaluation Section wrote to Respondent noting that ``it appears that
the basis for your application is the purported need for a higher
potency and higher 'quality' marijuana product than that currently
available from the National Institute on Drug Abuse.'' GX 29, at 1. The
DEA letter further explained that the Agency had ``contacted NIDA, the
Department of Health and Human Services * * * and some current
researchers'' and had ``determined that * * * the quality of marijuana
available from NIDA is acceptable,'' that a high potency product with a
THC content of 7 to 8 percent was currently ``available to bona fide
research protocols,'' and that if ``[i]n the future, should federally
approved research protocols require a higher potency marijuana (i.e. 15
percent THC), all believe that it could be supplied by NIDA.'' Id.
Thereafter, on June 2, 2003, Respondent wrote to DEA acknowledging
that during a visit with several agency Diversion Investigators, the
discussion had ``primarily focused[ed] on the need for an alternative
source of plant material to that grown at the University of Mississippi
under contract to the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA).'' GX 30.
Continuing, Respondent stated that ``[a] second source of plant
material is needed to facilitate privately-funded, FDA-approved
research into medical uses of marijuana, ensuring a choice of sources
and an adequate supply of quality, research-grade marijuana for
medicinal applications.'' Id. Consistent with these statements,
Respondent has declined to bid on the NIDA contract. Tr. 252-53.
Respondent further asserted that while ``the primary researchers
now receiving plant material may openly state to you that they are
satisfied with the current source, * * * in private conversations these
same researchers indicate a fear of having the current supply
eliminated if they complain about the available source material.'' GX
30. As support for his contention regarding the level of researcher's
satisfaction with NIDA's marijuana, Respondent attached two items: a
reprint of a newspaper article and a letter from a Dr. Ethan Russo to
the then-Chief of DEA's Drug and Chemical Evaluation Section. See GX
30a & 30b.
At the hearing, Respondent testified that at the time he filed his
application, he had become concerned, based on conversations he had
with ``other people,'' that the marijuana provided by the National
Center ``may have been of relatively low quality, and that [it] was not
readily available to run the clinical trials which some people wanted
to run.'' Tr. 215. When asked to provide the names of these ``other
people'' who had told him this, Respondent said he did not recall. Id.
Respondent's Contentions Regarding the Inadequacy of NIDA Marijuana
Respondent makes three principal claims in support of his
contention that the supply of marijuana currently available through
NIDA is inadequate. First, he claims that ``NIDA does not provide
medical marijuana to all legitimate researchers'' and that ``NIDA has
refused to provide marijuana to at least three legitimate
researchers.'' Resp. Prop. Findings at 12. Second, he claims that ``the
quality of the NIDA marijuana raises concerns for researchers and
patients.'' Id. at 16. Third, he claims that ``the NIDA supply was
inadequate because a pharmaceutical developer could not reasonably rely
on NIDA marijuana to take marijuana through the FDA new drug approval
process.'' Respondent's Response to Govt.'s Exceptions (hereafter,
``Respondent's Resp.'') at 16.
HHS's Denials of Researcher's Requests for NIDA Marijuana
Respondent's first claim is based on three incidents over a decade-
long time period in which he alleges that researchers were improperly
denied access to NIDA's marijuana. The first incident, which occurred
in 1995, involved an application submitted by Donald Abrams, M.D., who
sought
[[Page 2108]]
marijuana from NIDA to study its effects on persons with HIV-related
wasting syndrome. RX 15, at 1. NIDA rejected Dr. Abrams's application
``based upon issues of design, scientific merit and rationale.'' \24\
Dr. Abrams subsequently submitted a revised research protocol that NIDA
found to be scientifically meritorious and for which NIDA supplied
marijuana in 1997.\25\ See GX 21, at 1. NIDA also supplied Dr. Abrams
with marijuana for subsequent studies. Id.; Tr. 689. In any event, for
purposes of determining the relevance of the 1995 incident in which Dr.
Abrams' original protocol was rejected by NIDA, it is notable that this
occurred before HHS adopted its new guidelines for the provision of
marijuana for research purposes. As Dr. Gust testified, in 1995, HHS's
practice was to provide marijuana only to researchers who obtained NIH
funding--a practice that was abandoned by HHS in 1999 when the agency
adopted its new procedures for facilitating marijuana research
(allowing privately funded researchers to also obtain marijuana). Tr.
1749.
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\24\ That the above-quoted grounds were the bases upon which
NIDA denied Dr. Abrams' original application is implicit from the
letter that Dr. Abrams submitted to NIDA in response to the denial
(RX 15). These bases are explicitly stated in NIDA's April 19, 1995,
letter to Dr. Abrams, which appears on MAPS' Web site (at https://
www.maps.org/mmj/leshner.html) and of which I take official notice.
This letter from NIDA stated, among other things, the following:
Our decision here is based upon issues of design, scientific
merit and rationale. We believe that your study will not adequately
answer the question posed.
Although the study propose[d] seeks to make a dose-effect
comparison of smoked marijuana to delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC), there is no real dosing control. The marijuana is to be taken
home and there is no requirement and way to ensure that the subjects
smoke all available materials on any fixed schedule. Additionally,
that they are given a two-week supply of marijuana at one time
further confounds the study design. Thus, we believe the dose-effect
component is confounded since the study cannot correlate variability
in weight gain with dosage.
We also believe the study lacks adequate sample size to make any
inferences regarding the dose-effect relationship. . . . Another
confounding variable not adequately controlled for in your proposed
study is diet. Neither the total daily caloric intake nor the
percentages of the composition of the foodstuffs is assessed.
In accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an
agency ``may take official notice of facts at any stage in a
proceeding--even in the final decision.'' U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80
(1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979). In accordance with
the APA and DEA's regulations, Respondent is ``entitled on timely
request to an opportunity to show to the contrary.'' 5 U.S.C.
556(e); see also 21 CFR 1316.59(e). To allow Respondent the
opportunity to refute the facts of which I take official notice,
Respondent may file a motion for reconsideration within fifteen days
of service of this order which shall commence with the mailing of
the order.
\25\ Following the 1996 passage of proposition 215, NIDA
contacted Dr. Abrams and asked him if he would redesign his study to
determine whether marijuana usage by persons who were HIV-positive
(but who did not have AIDS-wasting syndrome) increased viral load as
well as the interaction of marijuana with protease inhibitors. Tr.
523-24. Dr. Abrams agreed to do so and NIDA provided him with a $1
million grant to fund the study.
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The second incident involved an application by Dr. Ethan Russo, a
neurologist, who sought funding from NIDA to study the use of marijuana
to treat migraine headaches beginning around 1996. Tr. 527-28. The
precise dates of the events related to Dr. Russo are somewhat unclear
as Respondent presented these events through the testimony of Mr.
Doblin. (Dr. Russo did not testify.) Id. Based on Mr. Doblin's
testimony, it appears that during 1996-97, NIDA twice rejected Dr.
Russo's protocol for reasons which are not clearly established by the
record. Id. at 527, 691-92. However, according to Mr. Doblin, Dr. Russo
conceded that, on both of these two occasions when NIDA rejected his
protocol, NIDA's bases for doing so did include ``some valid
critiques.'' Tr. 692. Mr. Doblin testified that Dr. Russo subsequently
attempted for a third time to obtain marijuana from NIDA, but on this
third occasion he decided not to seek government funding but to seek
private funding to purchase the marijuana from NIDA. Id. at 692.
According to Mr. Doblin, this third protocol submitted by Dr. Russo was
approved by both the FDA and Dr. Russo's institutional review board,
but NIDA again refused to supply marijuana. Id. at 692-93. When asked
when this last denial by NIDA occurred, Mr. Doblin testified: ``I think
it was 1999.'' Id. at 693.
As noted above, NIH announced on May 21, 1999, HHS's new procedures
for making marijuana available to researchers. Bearing in mind that
Respondent had the burden of proving any proposition of fact that he
asserted in the hearing, 21 CFR 1301.44(a), nothing in Mr. Doblin's
testimony, or any other evidence presented by Respondent, established
that HHS denied Dr. Russo's request for marijuana under the new
procedures implemented by the agency in 1999. Indeed, Respondent
produced no evidence showing that HHS has denied marijuana to any
clinical researcher with an FDA-approved protocol subsequent to the
adoption of the 1999 guidelines.
The third incident involved an application by Chemic Laboratories
(Chemic), which--at the request of Mr. Doblin--sought marijuana from
NIDA in 2004 \26\ for a proposed study involving a device known as the
``Volcano Vaporizer'' (hereafter ``Volcano''). RX 49 & 52B. To
understand the nature and purpose of this proposed study, some earlier
facts that were disclosed at the hearing need to be considered.
According to Mr. Doblin's testimony, prior to this incident (i.e.,
before Chemic applied to NIDA for marijuana in 2004), Mr. Doblin had
devised an elaborate arrangement whereby Chemic received marijuana to
conduct an earlier study with the Volcano using marijuana obtained
outside of the HHS process and without the knowledge or approval of HHS
or DEA. Specifically, Mr. Doblin admitted that he encouraged persons
who obtained marijuana from ``buyers' clubs'' in California as well as
persons who obtained their marijuana from NIDA under HHS's
``compassionate use program'' \27\ to anonymously send their marijuana
to a DEA-registered drug testing laboratory so that MAPS could compare
the potency of the ``buyers' clubs'' marijuana with that supplied by
NIDA.\28\ Tr. 668-82. Acting at the behest of Mr. Doblin, once the drug
testing laboratory completed its analysis of the marijuana it received
through these sources, it delivered the ``extra'' marijuana to Chemic,
so that Chemic could conduct testing on the Volcano. Id. Chemic did
conduct such testing,\29\
[[Page 2109]]
which was funded by MAPS and the California National Organization for
the Reform of Marijuana Laws (CaNORML), and Chemic published its
results in two reports, one of which was co-authored by CaNORML.\30\
See id.
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\26\ It appears from the record that Chemic initially applied to
HHS for marijuana in 2003 but, at HHS's request, Chemic submitted a
revised protocol, which HHS considered to be submitted in 2004. See
GXs 49 & 52B.
\27\ See Kuromiya v. United States, 78 F.Supp.2d 367 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (describing compassionate use program under which less than 10
persons currently receive marijuana from HHS).
\28\ Because marijuana is a schedule I controlled substance,
human use is limited to ``Government-approved research'' in
accordance with 21 U.S.C. 823(f). See OCBC, 532 U.S. at 491-492 and
n.5. In accordance with Sec. 823(f) and the DEA regulations, where
a schedule I controlled substance is used in research--including the
HHS compassionate use program--the activities involving the
substance must be limited to those authorized in the research
protocol. See 21 CFR 1301.13(e)(1)(v), 1301.18. Research activities
beyond those specified in the protocol are prohibited absent the
submission and approval of a supplemental protocol. 21 CFR
1301.18(d). Respondent made no attempt to assert that any of the
research protocols associated with the compassionate use program
allow for the distribution of marijuana to a drug testing
laboratory, as there is no basis for such an assertion. The CSA
prohibits the distribution of any controlled substance except as
authorized by the Act, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and the Act makes no
allowance for ultimate users (including research subjects) to
distribute their controlled substances to others.
\29\ Chemic was not registered with DEA under 21 U.S.C. 823(f)
to conduct research with marijuana and when DEA later learned that
Chemic was seeking to conduct a second marijuana study (when Chemic
subsequently sought to obtain marijuana directly from NIDA and
sought DEA's authorization for doing so), the agency so advised
Chemic that this activity required a research registration. See RX
49, at 2. DEA registrants are only authorized to conduct activities
with controlled substances ``to the extent authorized by their
registration and in conformity with other provisions of [the CSA].''
21 U.S.C. 822(b).
\30\ The first report, which was submitted by Chemic in 2003 to
MAPS and CaNORML, is titled ``Evaluation of Volcano(r) Vaporizer for
the Efficient Emission of THC, CBD, CBN and the Significant
Reduction and/or Elimination of Po