Nirmal Saran, M.D.; Nisha Saran, D.O.; Affirmance of Suspension Orders, 78827-78837 [E8-30506]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 23, 2008 / Notices
applicable federal, state, and local
government laws, regulations and
policies that may affect the subject
lands, including any required
dedication of lands for public uses. It is
also the buyer’s responsibility to be
aware of existing or prospective uses of
nearby properties. When conveyed out
of federal ownership, the lands will be
subject to any applicable laws,
regulations, and policies of the
applicable local government for
proposed future uses. It will be the
responsibility of the purchaser to be
aware through due diligence of those
laws, regulations, and policies, and to
seek any required local approvals for
future uses. Buyers should also make
themselves aware of any federal or state
law or regulation that may impact the
future use of the property. Any land
lacking access from a public road or
highway will be conveyed as such, and
future access acquisition will be the
responsibility of the buyer.
The proposed SNPLMA sale parcels
were analyzed in the Las Vegas Valley
Disposal Boundary Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS), approved Dec.
23, 2004. Two parcels being offered in
this sale were previously analyzed
through EAs and approved for sale.
Copies of the applicable EAs for N–
81965 and N–81967 are available for
review upon request at the LVFO. The
remaining twelve parcels identified in
this notice are analyzed in an EA for
this sale which tiers to the EIS. On
publication of this notice, this EA is
available for public review and
comment at the LVFO.
Only written comments submitted by
postal service or overnight mail will be
considered properly filed. Electronic
mail, facsimile or telephone comments
will not be considered as properly filed.
Before including your address, phone
number, e-mail address, or other
personal identifying information in your
comment—you should be aware that
your entire comment, including your
personal identifying information—may
be made publicly available at any time.
While you can ask us in your comment
to withhold your personal identifying
information from public review, we
cannot guarantee that we will be able to
do so.
Any adverse comments regarding the
proposed sale will be reviewed by the
BLM Nevada State Director, who may
sustain, vacate, or modify this realty
action. In the absence of any adverse
comments, this realty action will
become the final determination of the
Department of the Interior.
Authority: 43 CFR 2711.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:29 Dec 22, 2008
Jkt 217001
Dated: December 5, 2008.
Kimber Liebhauser,
Assistant Field Manager, Division of Lands.
[FR Doc. E8–30460 Filed 12–22–08; 8:45 am]
78827
acres of real property to which it holds
title, at the government’s option.
The Department of Justice will receive
for a period of thirty (30) days from the
date of this publication comments
BILLING CODE 4310–HC–P
relating to the Decree. Comments should
be addressed to the Assistant Attorney
General, Environmental and Natural
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Resources Division, and either e-mailed
to pubcomment-ees.enrd@usdoj.gov or
Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree
mailed to P.O. Box 7611, U.S.
Under the Comprehensive
Department of Justice, Washington, DC
Environmental Response,
20044–7611, and should refer to United
Compensation, and Liability Act
States, et al. v. Standard Metals
Corporation, Civil Action No. 08–CV–
Notice is hereby given that on
December 17, 2008, a proposed Consent 02741 (D.CO), D.J. Ref. 90–11–3–08831.
The Decree may be examined at U.S.
Decree in United States of America et al.
EPA Region 8, 1595 Wynkoop Street,
v. Standard Metals Corporation, Civil
Denver, Colorado 80202. During the
Action No. 08–CV–02741 was lodged
with the United States District Court for public comment period, the Decree, may
also be examined on the following
the District of Colorado.
Department of Justice Web site, https://
In this action the United States, on
www.usdoj.gov/enrd/
behalf of the Administrator of the
United States Environmental Protection Consent_Decrees.html. A copy of the
Decree may also be obtained by mail
Agency, the Chief of the United States
from the Consent Decree Library, P.O.
Department of Agriculture Forest
Box 7611, U.S. Department of Justice,
Service, and the Secretary of the
Washington, DC 20044–7611 or by
Interior, and the State of Colorado, on
faxing or e-mailing a request to Tonia
behalf of the Executive Director of the
Fleetwood (tonia.fleetwood@usdoj.gov),
Colorado Department of Public Health
fax no. (202) 514–0097, phone
and Environment, the Director of the
confirmation number (202) 514–1547. In
Colorado Department of Natural
requesting a copy from the Consent
Resources, and the Attorney General of
Decree Library, please enclose a check
the State of Colorado (together, the
in the amount of $23.25 (25 cents per
‘‘government’’), sought to recover
page reproduction cost) payable to the
response costs incurred or to be
incurred for response actions taken or to U.S. Treasury or, if by e-mail or fax,
forward a check in that amount to the
be taken at or in connection with the
Consent Decree Library at the stated
release or threatened release of
address.
hazardous substances at the Standard
Mine Site in Gunnison County,
Robert Brook,
Colorado, the Ross Adams Site on
Assistant Chief, Environmental Enforcement
Prince of Wales Island, Alaska, six sites
Section, Environment and Natural Resources
in San Juan County, Colorado, and the
Division.
Antler Mine and Mill Site in Mohave
[FR Doc. E8–30437 Filed 12–22–08; 8:45 am]
County, Arizona (collectively, the
BILLING CODE 4410–15–P
‘‘Sites’’), and to recover damages for
injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources at the Sites and
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
surrounding riparian corridors,
including the reasonable costs of
Drug Enforcement Administration
assessing such injury, destruction or
[Docket Nos. 06–19 & 06–20]
loss, pursuant to Section 107 of the
Comprehensive Environmental
Nirmal Saran, M.D.; Nisha Saran, D.O.;
Response, Compensation, and Liability
Affirmance of Suspension Orders
Act of 1980 (‘‘CERCLA’’), 42 U.S.C.
9607.
On September 19, 2005, I, the Deputy
The Consent Decree resolves the
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
government’s CERCLA response cost
Administration, issued an Order to
claims at the Sites by requiring that
Show Cause and Immediate Suspension
Standard pursue insurance recovery and of Registration to both Nirmal Saran,
pay to the government 50% of the first
M.D., and Nisha Saran, D.O.
$180,000 recovered and 90% of all
(Respondents), of Arlington, Texas. The
recovery thereafter. The Consent Decree Orders immediately suspended each
resolves the government’s CERCLA
Respondent’s DEA Certificate of
natural resource damage claims at the
Registration as a practitioner, on the
Sites by requiring that Standard transfer grounds that each had issued numerous
to the United States approximately 800
controlled-substance prescriptions over
PO 00000
Frm 00107
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
E:\FR\FM\23DEN1.SGM
23DEN1
78828
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 23, 2008 / Notices
the internet without a legitimate
medical purpose and had acted outside
of the course of professional practice,
because they did so without establishing
a bona fide doctor-patient relationship
with the persons they prescribed to, in
violation of 21 CFR 1306.04(a). Nirmal
Saran OTSC at 6; Nisha Saran OTSC at
6–7.
More specifically, the Show Cause
Orders alleged that each Respondent
had participated in a scheme run by Mr.
Johar Saran, the owner of Carrington
Healthcare System/Infiniti Services
Group (CHS/ISG), and the son of
Respondent Nirmal Saran and brother of
Respondent Nisha Saran. See Nirmal
Saran OTSC at 5; Nisha Saran OTSC at
5. The Orders alleged that as part of the
scheme, CHS/ISG operated several
pharmacies and created sham
corporations in order to obtain the DEA
registrations necessary for the
pharmacies to order controlled
substances, and that the drugs were
eventually delivered to CHS/ISG, where
its employees downloaded prescriptions
from several internet sites, filled them,
and shipped them to customers. See
Nirmal Saran OTSC at 5; Nisha Saran
OTSC at 5. The Orders further alleged
that CHS/ISG was shipping 3,000 to
4,000 drug orders a day. See Nirmal
Saran OTSC at 5; Nisha Saran OTSC at
5.
With respect to Nirmal Saran, the
Show Cause Order alleged that his
‘‘primary practice area is
ophthalmology.’’ Nirmal Saran OTSC at
6. The Show Cause Order further
alleged that between May 1 and June 17,
2005, he had prescribed thirty-seven
different controlled substances to
persons in at least forty-four States, and
that between May 18 and June 8, 2005,
he issued 1,248 controlled substance
(cs) prescriptions and had issued as
many as 217 prescriptions in a day to
persons in thirty-four States. Id. at 7.
The Order further alleged that sixty-four
percent of the prescriptions he issued
through the scheme were for schedule
III drugs containing hydrocodone. Id. at
6.
With respect to Nisha Saran, the
Show Cause Order alleged that between
May 27 and June 3, 2005, she had issued
303 cs prescriptions to persons in at
least forty States, and that she had
issued as many as 101 cs prescriptions
to persons in twenty-six States in a
single day. Nisha Saran OTSC at 6.
Relatedly, the Show Cause Order
alleged that fifty-nine percent of the
prescriptions she wrote were for
schedule III drugs containing
hydrocodone. Id.
Both Show Cause Orders further
alleged that each Respondent’s cs
VerDate Aug<31>2005
18:38 Dec 22, 2008
Jkt 217001
prescriptions were not issued ‘‘for a
legitimate medical purpose in the usual
course of professional practice,’’ and
violated 21 CFR 1306.04(a). Id. at 7; see
also Nirmal Saran OTSC at 7. I further
found that the allegations supported the
conclusion that each Respondent’s
‘‘continued registration during the
pendency of [the] proceedings would
constitute an imminent danger to the
public health and safety.’’ Nisha Saran
OTSC at 7; Nirmal Saran OTSC at 7.
On October 20, 2005, counsel for each
Respondent requested a hearing on the
allegations of the respective Show Cause
Orders. ALJ Exs. 3 & 4. The matters were
placed on the docket of Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) Gail Randall, who
consolidated the cases and conducted
pre-hearing procedures.
On March 28–30, 2006, a hearing was
held in Forth Worth, Texas. During the
hearing, both the Government and
Respondents put on testimony and
entered documentary evidence into the
record. Following the hearing, the
parties submitted briefs containing their
proposed findings, conclusion of law,
and argument.
On November 22, 2006, while the
decision of the ALJ was still pending,
the Government moved to terminate
both proceedings on the ground that
each Respondent’s registration had
expired on February 28, 2006, and
neither Respondent had submitted a
renewal application. ALJ Exs. 13a & 13b.
Thereafter, Respondents’ counsel filed
oppositions to both termination
motions. ALJ Exs. 14a & 14b.
In support of her opposition, Nisha
Saran submitted an affidavit
establishing that in February 2006, and
before the expiration of her registration,
she had attempted to renew her
registration electronically at the
Agency’s Web site, but was unable to do
so. ALJ Ex. 14A (attached as RX 1). In
her affidavit, Nisha Saran further stated
that ‘‘I have at no time abandoned my
desire to obtain DEA registration during
the pendency of this case.’’ Id.
In support of his opposition, Nirmal
Saran submitted an affidavit in which
he stated that in February 2006, and
before the expiration of his registration,
he had asked his daughter to renew his
registration at the Agency’s Web site,
but she was unable to do so. ALJ Ex.
14B (attached as RX 1). In his affidavit,
Nirmal Saran also stated that ‘‘I have at
no time abandoned my desire to obtain
DEA Registration during the pendency
of this case.’’ Id.
Thereafter, the Government moved to
withdraw both termination motions
noting my then-recent decision in
William R. Lockridge, 71 FR 77791
(2006), which held, in a case arising
PO 00000
Frm 00108
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
under similar circumstances, that the
proceeding was not moot. In its
withdrawal motions, the Government
acknowledged that each Respondent
had indicated that he/she ‘‘intend[ed] to
continue the practice of medicine and
intend[ed] to obtain a DEA registration
in order to do so.’’ ALJ Exs. 15A at 3;
15B at 3. The Government also
acknowledged the unequivocal
statements of each Respondent that he/
she had not abandoned his/her desire to
obtain a DEA Registration. ALJ Exs. 15A
at 3; 15B at 3.
The ALJ granted the Government’s
motion and further ordered that the
parties brief various issues including
whether ‘‘the record as a whole
establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that the DEA properly
immediately suspended’’ each
Respondent’s registration, because his/
her ‘‘handling of controlled substances
creates an imminent danger to the
public health or safety.’’ ALJ Exs. 16A
at 2–3; 16B at 2–3. The ALJ also ordered
the parties to address what factual
findings were relevant and what legal
standard should be applied in
determining the validity of the
suspension order. ALJ Exs. 16A at 3;
16B at 3.
On March 7, 2007, after the parties
submitted their briefs, the ALJ
submitted a Query to the Deputy
Administrator. ALJ Ex. 22. In the Query,
the ALJ asked whether in light of the
expiration of each Respondent’s
registration she should make findings of
fact, whether she should simply forward
the record to me for a final order, or
whether the Government should
forward the investigative file to me with
the materials contained therein at the
time the immediate suspension orders
were issued. ALJ Ex. at 8.
On April 22, 2007, I answered the
ALJ’s Query. In my ruling, I noted that
both the Government and the
Respondents agreed that the case was
not moot because even though the
Respondents’ registrations had expired,
each Respondent maintained that they
had not ‘‘abandoned their desire to
obtain DEA registrations during the
pendency of this case.’’ ALJ Ex. 23, at
2. I also explained that DEA’s rules do
not prohibit a former holder of a
registration from reapplying
immediately for a new registration and
that ‘‘neither Respondent ha[d] notified
the Agency that [he/she] intended to
permanently cease professional
practice.’’ Id.
In light of these circumstances, I
‘‘conclude[d] that principles of judicial
economy are best served by making
findings of fact and conclusions of law
based on the record established in this
E:\FR\FM\23DEN1.SGM
23DEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 23, 2008 / Notices
proceeding rather than subjecting the
parties to the potential re-litigation of
the same issues in a future proceeding.’’
Id. I further directed that ‘‘[t]he ALJ’s
findings of fact and conclusion of law
should be made based on the factors set
forth in * * * 21 U.S.C. 824(a),’’ as this
section ‘‘applies to all suspensions
regardless of whether a suspension is
imposed before, or after, a hearing.’’ Id.
I further noted that ‘‘my additional
findings that Respondents posed ‘an
imminent danger to public health or
safety’ [was] not reviewable in the
proceeding before’’ the ALJ. Id. at 2–3
(quoting 21 U.S.C. 824(d)).
Thereafter, the ALJ issued her
recommended decisions in each case.
With respect to Respondent Nirmal
Saran, the ALJ concluded that between
May 18 and June 8, 2005, he had issued
over 1,000 prescriptions for controlled
substances to treat pain, and that these
‘‘prescriptions were issued outside the
scope of professional practice, and were
not issued for legitimate medical
purposes’’ in violation of DEA
regulations. In re Nirmal Saran, ALJ
Dec. at 32. In support of her conclusion,
the ALJ noted that Respondent practices
as an ophthalmologist, that he was
licensed to practice medicine only in
Texas and yet issued prescriptions to
patients in other States, and that he
failed to comply with basic standards of
the medical profession for establishing a
doctor-patient relationship. Id. at 31–32.
The ALJ also noted that Respondent
had failed to properly safeguard his
controlled substance prescribing
authority because he ‘‘allow[ed] his
signature to be scanned into a computer
database’’ with the result that ‘‘nonmedical personnel were approving the
dispensing of controlled substances in
[his] name.’’ Id. at 33. Finally, the ALJ
noted that Respondent did not maintain
patient records and that there was ‘‘no
indication that [he] interacted with the
patient[s] to advise [them] concerning
the risks involved in taking the
controlled substances,’’ or that he ‘‘used
any of the available control mechanisms
to ensure these individuals were not
abusing’’ the drugs. Id. Finally, the ALJ
noted that Respondent chose not to
testify and thus offered no assurance
that he would comply with Federal law
and regulations in the future. Id. at 34.
The ALJ thus concluded that
Respondent’s ‘‘registration would be
adverse to the public interest.’’ Id.
With respect to Respondent Nisha
Saran, the ALJ concluded that she too
had issued cs prescriptions ‘‘outside the
scope of professional practice’’ and
without ‘‘legitimate medical purposes.’’
In re Nisha Saran, ALJ Dec. at 30. In
support of her conclusion, the ALJ
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:29 Dec 22, 2008
Jkt 217001
adopted the conclusion of the
Government’s expert that Respondent
issued prescriptions in violation of DEA
regulations based on his review of her
‘‘prescriptions, log sheets, [her] type of
practice, and the vast numbers of
prescriptions that she wrote during a
given period of time.’’ Id. The ALJ also
found that ‘‘non-medical personnel
were approving the dispensing of
controlled substances in [her] name,’’
and that ‘‘Respondent provided these
individuals with the ability to act in
such a manner by allowing her signature
to be scanned into a computer
database.’’ Id. at 30–31. The ALJ thus
concluded that ‘‘[s]uch a cavalier way of
safeguarding her authority to prescribe
controlled substances is certainly
outside the public interest.’’ Id. at 31.
The ALJ further observed that
between May and June 2005,
Respondent had issued ‘‘approximately
220 controlled substance drug orders,’’
but did not ‘‘maintain adequate patient
records.’’ Id. at 31. More specifically,
the ALJ observed that ‘‘the record
contains no charts documenting the
Respondent’s diagnosis for which the
controlled substances were prescribed,
no treatment plan, and no indication
that the Respondent interacted with the
patient to advise the patient concerning
the risks involved in taking the
controlled substances and the need for
the patient to follow her directions
concerning the appropriate quantities to
take.’’ Id. The ALJ also explained that
there was also ‘‘no evidence that * * *
Respondent used any of the available
control mechanisms to ensure these
individuals were not abusing the’’ drugs
she prescribed. Id.
Finally, the ALJ noted that
Respondent chose not to testify and thus
had offered no assurance that she would
comply with Federal law and
regulations in the future. Id. at 32. The
ALJ therefore concluded that
Respondent’s registration would be
‘‘adverse to the public interest.’’ Id.
Thereafter, Respondents’ counsel filed
exceptions to the ALJ’s recommended
decisions in each matter and the record
was forwarded to me for final agency
action. Having considered the entire
record, as well as the exceptions filed in
both matters, I hereby issue this
Decision and these Final Orders. I adopt
the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion of law in
each matter that the respective
Respondent’s registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest. I
make the following findings of fact.
Findings
Respondent Nisha Saran formerly
held DEA Certificate of Registration,
BS8415956, which authorized her to
PO 00000
Frm 00109
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
78829
handle controlled substances as a
practitioner in schedules II through V.
GX 1 (Docket No. 06–19). Respondent’s
registration expired on February 28,
2006. Id. Respondent has not submitted
an application to renew her
registration.1 I further find that
Respondent is licensed to practice
medicine only in the State of Texas. ALJ
Ex. 5, at 2.
Respondent Nirmal Saran formerly
held DEA Certificate of Registration,
AS7091894, which authorized him to
handle controlled substances as a
practitioner in schedules II through V.
GX 1 (Docket No. 06–20). Respondent’s
registration expired on February 28,
2006. Id. Respondent has not submitted
an application to renew his registration.
Respondent is licensed to practice
medicine only in the State of Texas. ALJ
Ex. 6, at 2. Respondent practices as an
ophthalmologist. Tr. 216.
Mr. Johar (a.k.a. Joe) Saran is the son
of Respondent Nirmal Saran and the
brother of Respondent Nisha Saran. Tr.
210; id. at 116. Johar Saran owned
Carrington Health Care System (which
later changed its name to Infiniti
Services Group), a corporate entity
located in Arlington, Texas, which
owned approximately eighteen to
twenty pharmacies. Id. at 55, 60, 421.
Carrington/Infiniti used the pharmacies
to fill orders for controlled substances
and non-controlled drugs on behalf of
‘‘numerous web sites’’ at which persons
could order drugs, including Rx Great
1 According to the Chief of the Registration and
Program Support Section, on February 6, 2006,
someone made several attempts to renew DEA
Registration, BS8415956, through the Agency’s Web
page but was informed that ‘‘[t]he DEA Registration
number you provided is not eligible for online
renewal. Please call the DEA Registration Call
Center if you have any questions.’’ ALJ Ex. 15A,
Appendix I, at 4. The Chief of the Registration Unit
further stated that on November 27, 2006, an
additional attempt was made to renew the
registration which resulted in the same message
that online renewal was not available. Id. at 2.
The Chief of the Registration Unit also testified
that on February 6 and November 27, 2006,
attempts were made to renew Respondent Nirmal
Saran’s DEA Registration #AS7091894; each of
these attempts resulted in the message that online
renewal was not available. Id. at 1–2; see also ALJ
Ex. 15B, Appendix I, at 1–2. According to the Chief
of the Registration Unit, if the registrants had called
the Registration Call Center, they would have been
sent a renewal form and ‘‘the notation ‘Renewal
Notice Sent’ would have been documented in DEA
records but, no such documentation was in the
computer history for either DEA number.’’ Id. at 2–
3.
The Chief of the Registration Unit further
explained that the Respondents were prevented
from renewing their registration online because
their registrations had been immediately
suspended. Id. at 2. I find, however, that the
Respondents could have obtained renewal
applications from the Agency and submitted them
via mail.
E:\FR\FM\23DEN1.SGM
23DEN1
78830
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 23, 2008 / Notices
Prices and Nations Drug Supply.2 Id. at
52.
Rx Great Prices was owned by Gil
Lozano, id. at 617; Lozano also coowned with his wife two limited
liability corporations, Global One
Marketing and First Management. Id. at
623. Lozano’s niece, Tania Lozano, was
the director of marketing for Global One
and Rx Direct. Id. at 611. Rx Great Prices
used Joe Saran’s businesses exclusively
to fill its orders. Id. at 624.
Nations Drug Supply (NDS) was a
Web site owned and operated by Johar
Saran and Infiniti. Id. at 418. The NDS
Web site was developed by Concussion
Interactive and became operational
sometime in May 2005. Id. at 399–400.
The Web site was managed by Tara
Jones.3 Id. at 531 & 535.
The Investigation
In June 2004, a DEA Diversion
Investigator (DI) with the Fort Worth,
Texas Resident Office, initiated an
investigation of Carrington/Infiniti’s
activities. Id. at 58–60. As part of the
investigation, DEA Investigators
conducted trash runs at Infiniti’s
headquarters during which they found
numerous documents including
prescription labels for controlled
substances dispensed by the Triphasic
Pharmacy, a pharmacy owned by Johar
Saran, to out of state persons, which
listed Nirmal Saran as the prescribing
physician. Id. at 75; GX 104 at 2 (Plea
Agreement of Johar Saran); see GXs 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, & 10 (No. 06–20). During
some of the trash runs, the DIs also
recovered several daily reports which
listed hundreds of prescriptions for
schedule III controlled substances
containing hydrocodone which were
dispensed by Triphasic; the reports
listed Nirmal Saran as the prescriber.
See GX 5, at 28–41 (No. 06–20), GX 11,
at 1–161 (No. 06–20).4
2 On September 20, 2005, a federal grand jury
indicted Joe Saran, Gil Lozano, Fred Word, as well
as the various coporations controlled by Saran
including Carrington, Infiniti, and the pharmacies,
on numerous counts including violations of the
Controlled Substances Act. GX 85 (06–20). On
November 14, 2006, Joe Saran entered into a plea
agreement with the United States Attorney for the
North District of Texas in which he pled guilty to,
inter alia, conspiring to distribute controlled
substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1)
& 841(b)(1)(D). GX 104 (06–20) at 1–2.
3 The record also establishes that Colin
McConnell was an employee of Concussion
Interactive, Tr. 112, and Fred Word was Infiniti’s
Chief Financial Officer. Id. at 114.
4 In his exceptions, Respondent notes that while
the daily reports list him as the prescriber, it also
listed ‘‘an incorrect DEA number.’’ Nirmal Saran
Exceptions at 12. Respondent thus contends that
this ‘‘implies that someone attempted to use
Respondent’s name in association with the
incorrect DEA number.’’ Id. at 12–13.
It is acknowledged that the daily reports do not
contain Respondent’s correct DEA number. As
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:29 Dec 22, 2008
Jkt 217001
Thereafter, DEA investigators
obtained a court order under 18 U.S.C.
2516, which authorized them to
intercept electronic communications
from Infiniti’s Internet protocol (IP)
address between April 26 and June 23,
2005.5 Tr. 30–32. According to the DI
who served as a minimizer of the
intercept, Nisha and Nirmal Saran’s
names appeared as approvers of
prescriptions in database files that were
downloaded by persons at Infiniti from
the Nations Drug Supply Web site. Id.
at 35–36. Moreover, their names also
appeared in various e-mails that were
intercepted.6 Id. at 35.
found below, however, Respondent admitted to
investigators that he prescribed over the Internet.
Moreover, Respondent did not testify at the hearing
and thus did not deny that he issued the
prescriptions dispensed by Triphasic. I therefore
reject the exception and find that he did issue the
prescriptions.
Respondent further contends that because the
‘‘labels were all found in the trash * * * they were,
in fact, trash,’’ and thus the probative value of this
evidence is limited to showing that the Government
found his name on pieces of paper ‘‘during a time
period unconnected to the’’ allegations of the Show
Cause Order. Id. at 11–12. According to
Respondent’s argument, the labels are not evidence
of prescriptions at all. I conclude, however, that a
pharmacy’s employees would not prepare
hundreds, if not thousands, of prescription labels
which included the patient’s name and address,
dispensing instructions, and various warnings,
unless they were to be used to dispense the
prescriptions. I therefore reject Respondent’s
contention.
Respondent also objects to the admission of
numerous exhibits on the ground that they pre-date
the events which form the basis of the Show Cause
Order. At the hearing, however, Respondent did not
object to the admission of any of these exhibits on
the ground that they were irrelevant because they
involved prescribings which pre-dated the period
alleged in the Show Cause Order. See Tr. 66 (GX
2), 69 (GX 3), 73 (GX 4), 133 (GX 6), 75 (GX 7), 137
(GX 9), 139 (GX 10), 141 (GX 11) (All exhibit
numbers are from Case No. 06–20). Respondent
objected only to portions of GXs 5 and 8, and did
so on the limited basis that they contained a few
prescriptions written by other doctors. See Tr. 130–
32 (discussing GX 5); id. at 135–36 (discussing GX
8). The prescriptions issued by other doctors were
removed from the exhibits and the exhibits were
entered into the record. See id. at 132–33, 136. I
therefore conclude that Respondent has waived his
objection to the admission of these exhibits.
5 According to a DI, the court also authorized the
interception of Infiniti’s e-mail for an additional
thirty days. Tr. 31.
6 These include an April 6, 2005 e-mail from Tara
Jones, an employee of Joe Saran and Infiniti, to
Colin McConnell, an employee of Concussion
Interactive, the developer of the Nations’ Web site.
GX 75 (06–19). In this e-mail, Ms. Jones provided
Nisha and Nirmal Saran’s addresses, phone
numbers, and medical license numbers. Id. In
concluding the e-mail, Ms. Jones apologized for
taking ‘‘so long,’’ and added that ‘‘Nisha was in LA
and just got back today. She said you were both
playing phone tag, so if you still need to talk to her
* * * try her cell number now.’’ Id.
The record also contains an e-mail (dated 5/27/
2005) from another employee of Concussion
Interactive to Ms. Jones forwarding a username and
password so that Nisha Saran could ‘‘login to the
shopping cart admin.’’ GX 79 (06–19).
PO 00000
Frm 00110
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
After intercepting the database files,
the DI used Microsoft Excel to extract
the data and put it into spreadsheet
form. Id. at 37. The Government
introduced into evidence spreadsheets
listing the prescriptions which were
dispensed by pharmacies that were
controlled by Joe Saran and Infiniti
between May 27 and June 17, 2005. See
GXs 4–58 (06–19).7 The spreadsheets
list numerous controlled substance
prescriptions that were issued by each
Respondent for persons located
throughout the country.8 See generally
id. Among the drugs prescribed by each
Respondent were such highly abused
controlled substances as schedule III
combination drugs containing
hydrocodone, and schedule IV
benzodiazepines such as diazepam and
lorazepam.9
As part of the investigation, a DI went
to the Nations Drug Supply Web site
and made two undercover buys. On
June 2, 2005, the DI, using the name
Dwight E. Anderson and an address in
Forth Worth, Texas, ordered ninety
tablets of hydrocodone/acetaminophen
10/650 mg., for a price of $ 373.50 plus
shipping. GX 89 (06–20). While visiting
the Web site, the DI was able to select
the drug he wanted and place it in his
7 The exhibits are numbered as GXs 14–68 in No.
06–20.
8 According to my review of the record, between
May 19, 2005 and June 8, 2005, Respondent Nirmal
Saran issued the following amounts of controlled
substance prescriptions to persons in these States:
Eighty-six to persons in Florida, eighty-seven to
persons in California, sixty-four to persons in
Tennessee, thirty-two to persons in Ohio, and
twenty-nine to persons in North Carolina.
Moreover, between May 27, 2005 and June 3, 2005,
Nisha Saran issued controlled substance
prescriptions in the following amounts to persons
in these States: Seventeen to persons in Florida,
eleven to persons in California, ten to persons in
North Carolina and four to persons in Ohio.
9 Respondent Nisha Saran contends that ‘‘her
name was used without her permission or
knowledge by NDS employees, most likely Tara
Jones.’’ Nisha Saran Exceptions at 11; see also id.
at 12 (noting that as systems administrator, Jones
could log in ‘‘ ‘as one of the doctors’ and insert a
doctor’s signature and it would appear that a doctor
had approved the prescription’’) (quoting Tr. 420,
testimony of J.B.).
While one of Respondent’s witnesses testified
that Tara Jones had approved an order using Ms.
Saran’s signature, Tr. 547, this witness
subsequently testified that she had observed this
‘‘only the one time,’’ id. at 585, which occurred
toward the ‘‘end of August, beginning of September
2005.’’ Id. at 568. The spreadsheets containing the
intercepted prescriptions show, however, that
Respondent issued numerous prescriptions months
earlier. Moreover, even if Respondent’s name was
used on some prescriptions without her permission,
I note that Respondent did not testify and thus did
not deny that she issued the prescriptions. Nor did
she explain why her signature was found in a hard
drive of a computer at Infiniti, her brother’s
business. Tr. 183–84. Moreover, as explained above,
other evidence links Respondent to the Nations’
and Rx Great Prices’ schemes.
E:\FR\FM\23DEN1.SGM
23DEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 23, 2008 / Notices
shopping cart.10 Tr. 152. While the Web
site used a program that required that a
customer provide information to
establish his identity, the DI testified
that by contacting the site’s customer
service department he was able to
obtain a ‘‘skip code’’ which allowed him
to bypass this process. Id. at 155.
The DI was then required to complete
a patient questionnaire. Id. at 155–56.
The questionnaire asked him about his
height, weight, allergies, past
medications including whether he had
previously taken the requested
medication, and why he was seeking the
medication. Id. at 155–56. With respect
to the latter question, the DI ‘‘simply put
‘[m]y leg hurts.’’ ’ Id. at 157.
After indicating that he would pay for
the drugs by cash on delivery, id., the
Web site displayed an order
confirmation page. Id. at 158; GX 89
(No. 06–20). This page indicated that
the DI’s order number was 817, that the
order was placed on ‘‘2005–06–02’’ at
‘‘15:15:56,’’ that it was sold to and
would be shipped to ‘‘Dwight E.
Anderson’’ with an address of 819
Taylor St. in Forth Worth, that it was for
90 tablets of hydrocodone 10/650 mg.,
and that the drugs cost $ 373.50, plus $
22.00 for overnight shipping for a total
cost of $ 395.50. GX 89.
The following day, the DI received a
prescription vial containing tablets. The
label on the vial indicated that the
prescription had been filled by
‘‘Reliance Pharmacuetical [sic], Inc.,’’
with an address of 2805 W. Arlansas
Lane, Suite 303, Arlington, Texas. GX
91 (No. 06–20). The label provided
instructions for taking the drug,
indicated that the vial contained 90
tablets of ‘‘Hydrocodone (Lorcet)—10/
650,’’ and that the prescribing doctor
was ‘‘Nirmal Saran’’; the label also
included the name ‘‘Dwight E.
Anderson,’’ the prescription number of
‘‘817:10294,’’ and the order number of
‘‘817.’’ Id.
Notably, the information on the order
confirmation page and the vial label
matched the information for order 817
contained in the spreadsheets that were
compiled from the internet files that
were intercepted by the Government.
See GX 43 (06–20) at 8–14 (line 21).11
10 At the hearing, the Government introduced into
evidence a DVD which showed the various Web
pages that the DI visited in ordering the drugs; the
DVD was made using a software program which
records as a video ‘‘anything that happens on the
computer screen.’’ Tr. 145–46.
11 In his exceptions, Respondent argues that ‘‘the
name of Dwight E. Anderson * * * does not appear
on the Government’s spreadsheet evidence, rather,
order number 817 is shown as having been filled
for a ‘Robin Daub,’ and not ‘Dwight E. Anderson.’ ’’
Nirmal Saran Exceptions at 26 (citing GX 87, at
178–80). Relatedly, Respondent argues that ‘‘No
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:29 Dec 22, 2008
Jkt 217001
Moreover, at no time did the DI speak
with Nirmal Saran or any other
physician regarding why he was
ordering the drugs. Tr. 182.
The following day, the DI revisited
the Nations Drug Supply Web site and
ordered sixty tablets of alprazolam 2
mg., a schedule IV benzodiazepine. GX
92 (No. 06–20); Tr. 169. In completing
order no. 953 is reflected on the Government’s
spreadsheet of ‘Nirmal Saran’s Original Rx’s.’ ’’ Id.
at 27. Respondent further argues that ‘‘[i]f the
information on the spreadsheets was in fact
downloaded from the servers and put into an Excel
file as testified to by Government’s agents, and not
manipulated as they testified, there should be no
discrepancies in the tables/spreadsheets showing
different information on them and definitely should
show the undercover buys.’’ Id. Based on the
testimony of one of his witnesses, Respondent
further asserts that ‘‘the IP addresses reflected on
the Government’s exhibit would not instruct a
computer to transfer any data, and that [GX 90] does
not reflect the transmission of an actual customer’s
order.’’ Id. (citing Tr. 426 & 429). Respondent
contends that ‘‘[t]his information * * * suggests
that these purchases were fabricated.’’ Id.
Respondent misrepresents what exhibit (GX 90)
represents. As the DI testified, GX 90 does not
represent the time that the DI purchased the drug,
but rather, the time ‘‘that that file was transferred
that contained the information of the undercover
buy’’ to Infiniti. Tr. 164. Consistent with the DI’s
testimony, the order confirmation that he printed
from the Nations Drug Supply Web site indicates
that the order was place at 15:15:56 (or 3:15:56
p.m.), see GX 89; by contrast, GX 90 indicated that
the file was transferred to Infiniti at 10:37:52 p.m,
Greenwich Mean Time, or 4:37 p.m. Fort Worth
Time. See GX 90; Tr. 164.
To be sure, GX 87, which lists Nirmal Saran’s
prescriptions, indicates that order number 817 was
placed by R.D. and not Dwight E. Anderson. GX 87,
at 178. However, the original spreadsheet listing
order number 817, and which was created following
the intercept, clearly shows that the DI ordered
hydrocodone as he testified to, and that the
prescription was authorized by Nirmal Saran. See
GX 43 (06–20) at 8–14 (line 21). While the person
who created GX 87 testified that she had copied
information from the original spreadsheet files to
this file, Tr. 333, there appear to be other errors in
this document as well. For example, the evidence
shows that the hydrocodone prescription given
order number 817 cost $373.50, yet GX 87 indicates
that the drugs were paid for with a COD in the
amount of $87. GX 87, at 180. Moreover, Dwight
Anderson is nonetheless listed as having purchased
another drug which Nirmal Saran prescribed,
Zydone, a branded drug which also contains
hydrocodone, for a total COD amount of $395.50,
even though the product price is listed at $74.70;
the entries for this prescription also indicate that
the purchase was prepaid while simultaneously
indicating a COD amount. See GX 87 at 106–08
(line entry 598). Given these errors, and the
derivative nature of the exhibit, I do not rely on it.
Based on the great weight of the evidence, which
includes the DI’s testimony, the DVD showing the
DI’s visit to the Web site, the order confirmation,
the evidence showing that the drugs were delivered,
and the original spreadsheet of the intercepted
prescriptions, I reject Respondent’s contention that
the purchase was fabricated. I further conclude that
it is more likely than not that the purchase occurred
and that Nirmal Saran authorized the prescribing.
As for Respondent’s contention regarding order no.
953, no doctor was listed as the prescriber on either
the drug vial’s label, GX 94 (06–20), or on the
spreadsheet. GX 54 (06–20) at 8–10 (line 21). It is
therefore no surprise that the order is not listed on
GX 87.
PO 00000
Frm 00111
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
78831
the questionnaire necessary to order the
drug, the DI indicated that the reason he
needed the drug was because he was
‘‘stressed out from work.’’ Tr. 172. The
DI also indicated that he was not taking
any other drugs although he had already
obtained the hydrocodone that he
purchased the day before. Id. This time,
however, the Web page indicated that
the DI would have to fill out a patient
history form which was to be completed
by his doctor and faxed in. Id. at 173.
The DI testified, however, that he never
sent in the form and yet still was able
to order and obtain the drugs. Id. at
173–74, 176, 178–80; see also GX 92
(No. 06–20). The label on the drug vial
was missing the name of the prescribing
doctor. GX 94 (No. 06–20).
The Government also elicited the
testimony of J.P., a Florida resident,
regarding his obtaining of controlled
substances through the Nations Drug
Supply Web site. According to his
testimony and the intercepted
prescription data, on at least three
separate occasions, J.P. purchased
controlled substances through Nations.
More specifically, on May 30, 2005, J.P.
purchased ninety tablets of Norco 10
mg., a schedule III drug containing
hydrocodone based on a prescription
issued by Respondent Nisha Saran. Tr.
18–19; GX 9 (06–19) at 1–7 (line 10). On
June 2, 2005, J.P. purchased another
ninety tablets of Norco 10 mg., as well
as ninety tablets of Adipex-P 37.5 mg.
(phentermine), a schedule IV stimulant;
both prescriptions were authorized by
Nirmal Saran. GX 30 (06–19) at 17–24
(lines 37 & 38). Finally, on June 6, 2005,
J.P. purchased two orders of ninety
tablets of Norco 10 mg., as well as two
orders of ninety tablets of Valium (10
mg); each of the four prescriptions were
approved by Nirmal Saran. GX 51 (06–
19) at 17–24 (lines 35, 37, 40, & 42).12
J.P. testified that he was not required
to send his medical records to Nations
to purchase the controlled substances,
that he did not speak with anyone to
obtain the drugs, and that he did not
know either Respondent. Tr. 18. J.P.
further testified that at the time he
purchased the drugs, he was not under
the care of a physician, id. at 17, and
that he ‘‘became physically dependent’’
on them. Id. at 22.
On September 21, 2005, law
enforcement authorities executed a
federal search warrant at the residence
12 I have considered and reject the suggestion that
these were duplicate prescriptions. Cf. Nirmal
Saran’s Exceptions at 23. Notably, the two Norco
prescriptions had different order numbers (as did
the two Valium prescriptions). See GX 51 (06–19)
at 17. Moreover, the evidence shows that two
different pharmacies, with different addresses,
filled the prescriptions. Id. at 19.
E:\FR\FM\23DEN1.SGM
23DEN1
78832
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 23, 2008 / Notices
of Joe Saran. Id. at 208. While the search
was proceeding, Nirmal Saran arrived at
his son’s residence, identified himself to
a DI as Joe Saran’s father, and said that
he wanted to talk to the investigators
about what they were doing. Id. at 209–
10. The DI contacted another DI, who
advised him that he needed to serve
Nirmal Saran with the Suspension
Order and that he was willing to talk to
Dr. Saran. Id. at 212.
Following his arrival at the residence,
the other DI served Nirmal Saran with
the Order and after explaining why the
Agency had issued the Order, proceeded
to interview him. Id. at 215. During the
interview, ‘‘Dr. Saran admitted to
prescribing controlled substances via
the [i]nternet for his son’s company,
Nations Drug Supply.’’ Id. at 216. Dr.
Saran explained ‘‘that Nations Drug
Supply had a Web site, and that the
Web site list[ed] all the names and the
information as to why the person
needed the drug, the person’s allergies,
blood pressure, and weight.’’ Id. at 216–
17. Dr. Saran also stated ‘‘that he would
read the questionnaire and he would
prescribe that way.’’ Id. at 217. Dr. Saran
further stated that back in May or June
2005, his son and another employee of
Nations had approached him, and that
his son had given him a password
which allowed him to access the Web
site. Id. Dr. Saran also told the DIs that
his internet prescribing mostly involved
painkillers. Id. at 218.
Dr. Saran further admitted that he did
not know any of the persons he
prescribed to, and that during the entire
period in which he prescribed over the
internet, he telephoned ‘‘approximately
12 to 15 patients.’’ Id. at 219. Dr. Saran
also said that in reviewing the
questionnaires, ‘‘he took the person’s
word for it,’’ id., and that the
‘‘questionnaire with all the information
for the patient was good enough for
him.’’ Id. at 217.
Dr. Saran admitted, however, that in
his practice as an ophthalmologist, ‘‘he
would initially examine the patient,
take their blood pressure and weight,
review their history, and then prescribe
the medication, which [was] totally
opposite of’’ how he prescribed online.
Id. at 219. He also told the DIs that he
did not ‘‘keep any records of whatever
he prescribed.’’ Id. at 220. Finally, he
acknowledged that he was licensed only
in Texas, but ‘‘but felt that [because] the
prescriptions were issued in Texas, it
was okay for him to prescribe’’ to
persons residing in other States. Id. at
221.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:29 Dec 22, 2008
Jkt 217001
Respondents’ Relationship With Rx
Great Prices
During the investigation of Infiniti,
DEA Investigators also intercepted
several e-mails which link both
Respondents to Rx Great Prices, the Web
site owned and operated by Gil Lozano
and the corporations he controlled. Id.
at 613. Moreover, on the same day that
the search warrant was executed at Joe
Saran’s residence, other investigators
executed a search warrant at Lozano’s
residence in Florida.13 Id. at 604–05.
During the search of Lozano’s
residence, the investigators seized two
documents entitled ‘‘EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT.’’ See GX 101 (06–19), GX
101 (06–20). While the header on both
documents stated ‘‘Attorney-Client Draft
Document’’ and ‘‘Discussion: Not for
Execution,’’ each document also stated
that ‘‘THIS EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT * * * is made and
entered into this 20[th] day of January
2005, by and between [each
Respondent] 14 a physician (‘Employee’)
and First Management, LLC, a Florida
Limited Liability Company
(‘Employer’).’’ See GX 101 (06–19) at 1;
GX 101 (06–20) at 1. Each agreement
gave an effective date (March 1, 2005 on
Nisha Saran’s agreement; February 1,
2005 on Nirmal Saran’s agreement),
indicated that each Respondent’s
‘‘Bonus and Additional Compensation’’
was ‘‘To Be Negotiated,’’ and was signed
by the respective Respondent.15 See id.
13 In their exceptions, both Respondents moved to
strike the testimony of the DI and seek to exclude
the documentary evidence which includes the
employment agreements and e-mails linking them
to Gil Lozano and his corporation, First
Management, L.L.C. See Nisha Saran Exceptions at
15, Nirmal Saran Exceptions at 15. At the hearing,
however, Respondents did not object to the
admission of the employment agreements, see Tr.
607–8, or the e-mails which link them to Lozano.
Id. at 614. Respondents have therefore waived any
argument that the employment agreement and emails were improperly admitted into evidence.
The DI also testified regarding an interview he
conducted of Tania Lozano. Respondents objected
to a single question on the ground that the DI’s
testimony was hearsay; the ALJ overruled the
objection. Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
held that hearsay evidence can still constitute
substantial evidence under the Administrative
Procedure Act. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389 (1971). Notably, Respondents did not seek to
subpoena Ms. Lozano. See 21 CFR 1316.52(d). I
therefore deny Respondents’ motions to strike the
DI’s testimony.
14 To clarify, on GX 101 (No. 06–19), ‘‘Nisha M.
Saran, D.O.’’ was listed as ‘‘a physician
(‘Employee’),’’ and party to the agreement; on GX
101 (No. 06–20), ‘‘Nirmal Saran, M.D’’ was listed as
‘‘a physician (‘Employee’)’’ and party.
15 It is acknowledged that neither agreement was
signed by someone on behalf of First Management.
See GX 101 (No. 06–19) at 12; GX 101 (06–20) at
12. Notwithstanding this, for the reasons explained
in the text, I conclude that each Respondent entered
into a contractual arrangement with First
Management to issue Internet prescriptions.
PO 00000
Frm 00112
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
(06–19) at 1, 8, & id. (06–20) at 1, 8 &
12.
Each agreement stated that ‘‘Employer
operated an on-line, Internet pharmacy
business,’’ that the ‘‘Employer hereby
employs Employee, and Employee
accepts such employment, as a
physician to render professional
medical services [on] behalf of
Employer,’’ and that the ‘‘Employee
shall be required to check and receive
patient files for review via the Internet
or facsimile multiple times per days at
least (5) days per week, and spend at
least two—three hours per day
reviewing patient files and/or
supervising nurse practitioners.’’ Id.
(06–19) at 1 & id. (06–2) at 1 & 6.
Moreover, the agreements stated that the
‘‘Employee shall have * * * authority,
in their [sic] sole discretion to reject the
patient’s file for any request for a
prescription or to request further
medical information or history of the
patient prior to making any final
decision as to the issuing of any
prescription to a patient.’’ Id. (06–19) at
6; id. (06–20) at 6.
The record contains several e-mails
which further support the conclusion
that both Respondents entered into a
contractual arrangement with Gil
Lozano and his corporation to prescribe
over the Internet. For example, on
March 21, 2005, Joe Saran sent an e-mail
to Gil Lozano with the subject line
‘‘Malpractice Information’’; the e-mail
also indicated that the matter was of
‘‘High’’ importance. GX 77 (06–19). In
the e-mail, Joe Saran wrote: ‘‘I do hope
that we can get this resolved quickly as
both my father and sister are quite
anxious to get started with you.’’ Id.
Continuing, Joe Saran explained that
‘‘the insurance companies have a few
questions. If you can please answer
these, then I believe that the
underwriters will approve and this will
get done quickly.’’ Id. Saran then listed
five things that were needed, including
‘‘the projected number of prescriptions
on a daily basis,’’ ‘‘a copy of the medical
questionnaire from your Web site,’’ and
‘‘guidelines as to the range of
pharmaceuticals being prescribed.’’ Id.
The record also includes a series of emails which discuss the payment of
malpractice insurance premiums for
Nisha Saran. See GX 99 (06–19). On July
6, 2005, Tania Lozano sent an e-mail to
Gil Lozano with the subject line of
‘‘Nisha info.’’ Id. at 1. This e-mail
related that Nisha Saran had paid
$19,830 for a year of malpractice
insurance, and that the policy was
‘‘[v]alid until December 12, 2005.’’ Id.
Ms. Lozano further stated that Nisha
Saran ‘‘said if you want to cover just for
the months that she has been working
E:\FR\FM\23DEN1.SGM
23DEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 23, 2008 / Notices
for Rxgreatprice, that would be fine.’’ Id.
The e-mail also stated: ‘‘First order
approved on 5/31/2005 at 11:48 p.m.’’
Id.
On July 7, 2005, Tania Lozano emailed Nisha Saran and asked her: ‘‘Can
you please provide me the address of
your bank, as well as your dad’s office
address so that Gil can process the
funds for you[?]’’ Id. at 2. Continuing,
the e-mail stated: ‘‘We will pay 50% of
$ 19,830 for the professional liability
insurance on a monthly basis for the
amount of $ 826.25 per month. I will get
you a precise day of deposit as well
once I get the above info from you.’’ Id.
at 2.
The record also contains a July 18,
2005 (10:13 a.m.) e-mail from Tania
Lozano to Gil Lozano and another
individual at Global One Marketing,
which appears to forward the text of
another e-mail sent by Nisha Saran to
Tania Lozano. Id. The e-mail began:
‘‘Tania * * *. Here is the information
that you requested[,]’’ and gives routing
and account information for Nirmal
Saran’s bank.16 Id. Continuing, the email stated: ‘‘My dad’s office address is
as follows, but please send any and all
correspondence to his home address[,]’’
and appeared to list his office and home
addresses. Id. Next, the e-mail stated:
‘‘Thanks for the info this morning, as
well!’’ Id. The e-mail ended by stating:
‘‘Talk to you soon,’’ and is signed
‘‘Nisha Saran.’’ Id.
Later that day, Tania Lozano sent
another e-mail to Gil Lozano, the subject
being ‘‘Question from Nisha.’’ The text
reads:
Nisha called me to verify that you were
covering 100% of the malpractice insurance
from the months of June 05—Dec 05. If so,
the total due to her from June is 1652.50, not
826.25 as stated in the last invoice. Can we
send her another transfer for just 826.25 to
cover the month of June, then on the
following invoice, she will include 1652.50
to cover the month of July. From there on
out, she will get paid once a month for the
insurance on the 30th of each month. Please
let me know if this is okay or if you want to
handle this another way. Thanks!
Id. at 3.
A DI subsequently interviewed Tania
Lozano. Tr. 615. Among other things,
Ms. Lozano told the DI that in July 2005,
Gil Lozano had told her ‘‘to stop using
the other doctors and [to] direct all of
the requested drug orders through Nisha
and Nirmal Saran,’’ because he ‘‘was
paying the other doctors $25 through a
management company, and it was only
costing $12 a prescription through
Nirmal and Nisha.’’ Id. Ms. Lozano also
16 The e-mail also includes a redacted portion
above Nirmal Saran’s account information. GX 99,
at 2.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:29 Dec 22, 2008
Jkt 217001
told the DI that she talked to Nisha
Saran ‘‘frequently, normally two, three
or four times a day, at least ten times per
week, and that they developed a close
business relationship over the July,
August and September months that they
worked together.’’ Id. at 616.
The DI further testified that Tania
Lozano told him that she would call
Nisha Saran on her cell phone and tell
her: ‘‘We’re having problems getting
these orders approved.’’ Id. Nisha Saran
‘‘would tell’’ Tania: ‘‘You’re going to
have to wait until I get off work; I’m
working at the hospital. My father
approves the orders in the morning; I
approve in the afternoon.’’ Id. Ms.
Lozano further told the DI that she had
discussed with Nisha Saran ‘‘problems
with the pull-down menus that had
instructions’’ for taking a drug, and that
‘‘Nisha was very particular about what
instructions were placed on her drug
orders.’’ Id.17
The Expert Testimony
George J. Van Komen, M.D., testified
on behalf of the Government as an
expert on the standards of medical
practice and the use of the Internet to
prescribe controlled substances. At the
time of the hearing, Dr. Van Komen,
who is board certified in internal
medicine and a Fellow of the American
College of Physicians, had served as an
Assistant Professor of Clinical Medicine
at the University of Utah School of
Medicine for fifteen years and had
practiced medicine for more than thirty
years. Tr. 234; GX 71 (06–20) at 1. From
1995 to 2002, he served on the Board of
Directors of the Federation of State
Medical Boards (FSMB), and was the
Federation’s President in 2001 to 2002.
GX 71 (06–20) at 3. Dr. Van Komen also
was a member of the State of Utah’s
Physicians Licensing Board from 1989
to 1999, and served as the Board’s
17 The DI also testified that he had obtained Ms.
Lozano’s cell phone records ‘‘for the months that
she was involved with Rx Great Prices,’’ and that
both Nisha and Nirmal Saran’s phone numbers
were contained in them. Tr. 617.
The DI further testified that he had interviewed
a third doctor, who had attended a meeting with
Nirmal, Nisha, and Joe Saran, at which Joe Saran
attempted to recruit him to approve orders for his
Web site. Tr. 618. The third doctor related that in
a later discussion, Joe Saran again attempted to
recruit him and told him that he was paying Nisha
and Nirmal $12,000 each per month. Id. at 618–19.
Relatedly, the record contains an exchange of emails on August 16, 2005, between Gil Lozano and
Joe Saran in which the former sought the latter’s
help in recruiting ‘‘one or two more medical doctors
for our sites.’’ GX 78 (06–19) at 2. Later that day,
Joe Saran wrote to Lozano: ‘‘I do know another
doctor who may be interested. I will talk to him and
see what his response may be. Is the payment rate
the same as for my dad and sister? This will be a
question that I will need to answer for him.’’ Id. at
1.
PO 00000
Frm 00113
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
78833
Chairman from 1991 to 1999. Id. Dr. Van
Komen testified that he had a particular
interest in prescription drug abuse and
the proper use of controlled substances
in medical practice. Tr. 234, 236–37.
In his testimony, Dr. Van Komen
acknowledged that the American
Medical Association (AMA) is ‘‘not a
government organization’’ and therefore
does not ‘‘have any authoritative
capabilities.’’ Id. at 238. Dr. Van Komen
explained, however, that the AMA’s
policies and recommendations are ‘‘well
received by government organizations’’
and ‘‘by state legislatures.’’ Id.
Relatedly, Dr. Van Komen testified that
‘‘[t]he Federation of State Medical
Boards has no authority’’ over the
practice of medicine, but that its
membership is comprised of members of
state medical boards and that it does
provide guidance and policy statements
to assist the nation’s state boards on
various issues. Id. at 251.18
Dr. Van Komen further testified,
however, that there is a standard of care
for prescribing controlled substances
that is ‘‘well accepted and recognized
throughout the medical community.’’ Id.
at 268. As Dr. Van Komen testified:
[T]he standard of care is that * * * on any
new patient who comes with a problem that
may require a controlled substance, that the
physician has personal contact with the
patient, that a careful, detailed history is
undertaken, that that careful, detailed history
is utilized in doing a careful physical
examination, and then a carefully outlaid
differential diagnosis or etiology of the
patient’s symptoms is derived, and then from
that, after appropriate testing and evaluation
when further laboratory tests are in, then the
physician may choose to utilize controlled
substances in the treatment of the patient’s
ailment and disease.
Id. at 268–69.
After explaining what telemedicine is,
Dr. Van Komen was asked what is the
standard for ‘‘forming a legitimate
doctor-patient relationship?’’ Id. at 271.
Dr. Van Komen answered:
[W]e feel that there needs to be
documented a face-to-face history and
physical and evaluation of the patient, and
then if this patient chooses to receive further
consultative work or be established with a
physician who practices on the Internet, that
the physician first of all and most formally
needs to be identified, and he needs to have
a license in the state in which the patient
resides. * * *
And we also feel that that primary care
doctor who did the history and physical
needs to stay in touch with the patient, even
18 In light of Dr. Van Komen’s testimony that
neither the AMA nor the FSMB have authority to
promulgate binding standards of medical practice,
I conclude that it is unnecessary to discuss the
contents of the various policy statements that these
organizations have issued.
E:\FR\FM\23DEN1.SGM
23DEN1
78834
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 23, 2008 / Notices
though the patient might be seeking further
consultation from another physician through
the Internet.
records 20 that I reviewed that there
[was] any attempt to appropriately
practice medicine according to even the
minimal standard of care.’’ Id. at 278.21
Id. at 271. Dr. Van Komen’s subsequent
On cross-examination, however, Dr.
testimony suggested, however, that he
Van Komen was asked if he was
was discussing the standard of care as
‘‘familiar with the way the Texas
set forth in policy statements of the
Medical Board deals with this particular
AMA and FSMB. See id. at 272
type of problem?’’ Id. at 302. Dr. Van
(testifying that the policy statement of
Komen answered: ‘‘Not specifically. I
the FSMB and AMA ‘‘absolutely’’
would assume that they have, as many
outline the standard of care for Internet
medical boards, accepted the model
prescribing).
guidelines that have been distributed
After he explained that medical
through the Federation of State Medical
doctors and osteopathic physicians are
22 Id.
19 id. Boards.’’
subject to the same standard of care,
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), I take
at 275, Dr. Van Komen was asked
official notice of the following state
whether he had ‘‘formed an opinion on
standards of medical practice as set
whether the prescriptions issued by Dr.
forth in statutes, regulations, and
Nisha Saran and Dr. Nirmal Saran were
administrative notices: 23 Cal. Bus. &
issued outside the usual course of
Prof. Code §§ 2052 24 (prohibiting
professional practice?’’ Id. at 276. Dr.
Van Komen answered that ‘‘[f]rom the
20 While Nirmal Saran admitted to a DI that he
records that I have seen, there gives me
did not maintain any records on the persons he
no reason to believe that they meet even prescribed to, Tr. 220, there is no evidence as to
whether Nisha Saran also failed to maintain
closely the standard of care that would
records. The Government, however, had the burden
be an acceptable practice of medicine.’’
of proving that Nisha Saran failed to maintain
Id. Dr. Van Komen explained that his
patient records. Because Dr. Van Komen’s opinion
testimony with respect to Nisha Saran was based in
opinions were based on the
part on the alleged absence of documentation to
‘‘prescriptions that were written by
them, as well as log sheets, outlining the support her prescribings, his testimony is rejected
to this extent.
type of practice that they have, the
21 Dr. Van Komen also testified that ‘‘if the patient
number of prescriptions that they wrote asks for a drug by name, you can almost for sure
understand that that individual is going to abuse
during a particular * * * period of
that drug. It’s interesting that on the internet, you
time, and all of those records lead me
allow the patient to pick whatever drug they want
to believe that they are far out from the
exactly by name and order it.’’ Id. at 279–80. He
accepted standard of care.’’ Id.
also explained the importance of monitoring closely
Subsequently, Dr. Van Komen added: those patients to whom he prescribed hydrocodone.
[T]here is no documentation of any doctorpatient contact. There is no indication of any
record being kept. There is no formulation of
a working diagnosis for which the
medications were prescribed, and there is no
indication that the patient understood the
potential of addiction or danger of the drugs
that were prescribed.
Id. at 277.
Next, with respect to Nirmal Saran,
Dr. Van Komen testified that while an
ophthalmologist ‘‘may prescribe * * *
an occasional pain medication * * *
it’s been my understanding that
ophthalmologists rarely prescribe opioid
medication, even after some eye surgery
that they perform.’’ Id. at 277–78.
Finally, Dr. Van Komen stated that he
was ‘‘100 percent sure’’ that the
prescriptions that he reviewed were not
issued for legitimate medical purposes,
and that he was also ‘‘100 percent’’
certain that the prescriptions were
issued outside of the usual course of
professional practice because ‘‘[t]here
[was] no indication * * * from the
19 He also explained that an ophthalmologist
performs eye surgery and treats diseases of the eye.
Tr. 276.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
18:28 Dec 22, 2008
Jkt 217001
Id. Moreover, Dr. Van Komen testified that
reviewing an online questionnaire was ‘‘absolutely
no way’’ for a physician to detect whether a person
who was seeking a controlled substance was a drug
abuser, ‘‘because you have no way of knowing that
the person that filled out the questionnaire filled it
out honestly.’’ Id. at 285.
22 Respondent Nisha Saran also elicited testimony
from Rony Dev, D.O., one of her colleagues at a
hospital where she practiced. Dr. Dev
acknowledged, however, that it would not be
appropriate to prescribe to a patient without
knowing her medical history, what medications the
patient was on, and her vital signs. Tr. 471. While
Dr. Dev testified that in his experience, Nisha Saran
would not prescribe in this manner, id. at 471–72;
he subsequently testified that he had no direct
knowledge of her prescribing over the internet, id.
at 503; and had never discussed her internet
prescribing with her. Id. at 520.
23 In accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), an agency ‘‘may take official
notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding—even
in the final decision.’’ U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons,
Inc., Reprint 1979). In accordance with the APA
and DEA’s regulations, Respondent is ‘‘entitled on
timely request to an opportunity to show to the
contrary.’’ 5 U.S.C. 556(e); see also 21 CFR
1316.59(e). To allow Respondent the opportunity to
refute the facts of which I take official notice,
Respondent may file a motion for reconsideration
within fifteen days of service of this order which
shall commence with the mailing of the order.
24 In Hageseth v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr.3d
385 (Ct. App. 2007), the California Court of Appeal
PO 00000
Frm 00114
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
unlicensed practice of medicine) &
2242.1(a) (‘‘No person * * * may
prescribe * * * dangerous drugs * * *
on the Internet for delivery to any
person in this state, without an
appropriate prior examination and
medical indication. * * *’’). Cal. Health
& Safety Code § 11352(a) (prohibiting
furnishing a controlled substance
‘‘unless upon the written prescription of
a physician * * * licensed to practice
in this state’’); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90–18
(2005) (‘‘prescribing medication by use
of the Internet or a toll-free telephone
number, shall be regarded as practicing
medicine’’ in the State).25
Relatedly, the administrative rules of
the medical boards of Ohio and
Tennessee expressly prohibit—with
only limited exceptions—a physician’s
prescribing to a person he/she has not
personally physically examined. For
example, under the rules of the
Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners:
upheld the State’s jurisdiction to criminally
prosecute an out-of-state physician, who prescribed
a drug to a California resident over the internet, for
the unauthorized practice of medicine.
25 The North Carolina Medical Board has also
issued a Position Statement on the steps which a
physician must take before prescribing a drug. See
North Carolina Medical Board, Position Statement:
Contact With Patients Before Prescribing (Nov.
1999). More specifically, the North Carolina
Medical Board has stated that:
It is the position of the North Carolina Medical
Board that prescribing drugs to an individual the
prescriber has not personally examined is
inappropriate except as noted * * * below. Before
prescribing a drug, a physician should make an
informed medical judgment based on the
circumstances of the situation and on his or her
training and experience. Ordinarily, this will
require that the physician personally perform an
appropriate history and physical examination, make
a diagnosis, and formulate a therapeutic plan, a part
of which might be a prescription. This process must
be documented appropriately.
Id. The exceptions are for ‘‘admission orders for
newly hospitalized patients, prescribing for a
patient of another physician for whom the
prescriber is taking call, or continuing medication
on a short-term basis for a new patient prior to the
patient’s first appointment.’’ Id. The North Carolina
Board has further declared that ‘‘prescribing drugs
to individuals the physician has never met based
solely on answers to a set of questions, as is
common in Internet or toll-free telephone
prescribing, is inappropriate and unprofessional.’’
Id.
Finally, while North Carolina recently amended
the State’s Medical Practice Act, it is a felony
offense ‘‘if the person so practicing without a
license is an out-of-state practitioner who has not
been licensed and registered to practice medicine
* * * in th[e] State.’’ N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90–18(a); see
also id. § 90–1A(5)(f) (defining ‘‘[t]he practice of
medicine’’ as including ‘‘[t]he performance of any
act, within or without this State, described in this
subdivision by use of any electronic or other means,
including the Internet or telephone’’).
E:\FR\FM\23DEN1.SGM
23DEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 23, 2008 / Notices
* * * it shall be a prima facie violation of
T.C.A. § 63–6–214(b) (1), (4), and (12) for a
physician to prescribe or dispense any drug
to any individual, whether in person or by
electronic means or over the Internet or over
telephone lines, unless the physician has first
done and appropriately documented, for the
person to whom a prescription is to be issued
or drugs dispensed, all of the following:
1. Performed an appropriate history and
physical examination; and
2. Made a diagnosis based upon the
examination and all diagnostic and
laboratory tests consistent with good medical
care; and
3. Formulated a therapeutic plan, and
discussed it, along with the basis for it and
the risks and benefits of various treatment
options, a part of which might be the
prescription or dispensed drug, with the
patient; and
4. Insured availability of the physician or
coverage for the patient for appropriate
follow-up care.
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0880–2–.14(7).
See also id. R. 0880–2.16 (requiring
telemedicine license).26 See Ohio
Admin. R. 4731–11–09 (‘‘Except in
institutional settings, on call situations,
cross coverage situations, situations
involving new patients, protocol
situations, and situations involving
nurses practicing in accordance with
standard care arrangements * * * a
physician shall not prescribe, dispense,
or otherwise provide, or cause to be
provided, any controlled substance to a
person who the physician has never
personally physically examined and
diagnosed.’’).27
26 I also take official notice of the Medical Board
of California’s Decision and Order in Jon Steven
Opsahl, M.D., at 3 (Med. Bd. Cal. 2003) (revoking
medical license and finding that ‘‘a physician
cannot do a good faith prior examination based on
a history, a review of medical records, responses to
a questionnaire and a telephone consultation with
the patient, without a physical examination of the
patient’’ and that ‘‘[a] physician cannot determine
whether there is a medical indication for
prescription of a dangerous drug without
performing a physical examination’’); see also id. at
17.
In addition, the Medical Board of California has
issued numerous Citation Orders to out-of-state
physicians for internet prescribing to State
residents. See, e.g., Citation Order Harry Hoff (June
17, 2003); Citation Order Carlos Gustavo Levy (Nov.
30, 2001). It has also issued press releases
announcing its position on the issuance of
prescriptions by physicians who do not hold a
California license. See Medical Board of California,
Record Fines Issued by Medical Board to Physicians
in Internet Prescribing Cases (News Release Feb. 10,
2003) (available at https://www.mbc.ca.gov/
NR_2003_02-10_Internetdrugs.htm). I also take
official notice of these materials.
27 On September 14, 2003, the Florida Board of
Medicine issued Fla. Admin. R. 64B8–9.014,
Standards for Telemedicine Prescribing Practice.
This rule states inter alia that:
Physicians * * * shall not provide treatment
recommendations, including issuing a prescription,
via electronic or other means, unless the following
elements have been met: (a) A documented patient
evaluation, including history and physical
VerDate Aug<31>2005
18:28 Dec 22, 2008
Jkt 217001
Discussion
Section 304(a) of the Controlled
Substance Act (CSA) provides that ‘‘[a]
registration * * * to * * * dispense a
controlled substance * * * may be
suspended or revoked by the Attorney
General upon a finding that the
registrant * * * has committed such
acts as would render his registration
under section 823 of this title
inconsistent with the public interest as
determined under such section.’’ 21
U.S.C. 824(a).28 In determining the
public interest, the CSA directs that the
following factors be considered:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate
State licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant’s experience in
dispensing * * * controlled substances.
(3) The applicant’s conviction record under
Federal or State laws relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to controlled
substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten
the public health and safety.
Id. § 823(f).
[T]hese factors are * * * considered
in the disjunctive.’’ Robert A. Leslie,
M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I ‘‘may
rely on any one or a combination of
factors, and may give each factor the
weight [I] deem appropriate in
determining whether a registration’’ is
consistent with the public interest and
whether a registrant has committed acts
which warranted the suspension of his/
her registration. Id. Moreover, case law
establishes that I am ‘‘not required to
make findings as to all of the factors.’’
Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th
Cir. 2005); see also Morall v. DEA, 412
F.3d 165, 173–74 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
I acknowledge that neither
Respondent’s state license has been the
subject of disciplinary proceedings and
that neither Respondent has been
convicted of an offense under Federal or
State laws related to controlled
substances. I nonetheless conclude that
the evidence as to each Respondent’s
experience in dispensing controlled
examination to establish the diagnosis for which
any legend drug is prescribed. (b) Discussion
between the physician * * * and the patient
regarding treatment options and the risks and
benefits of treatment. (c) Maintenance of
contemporaneous medical records meeting the
requirements of Rule 64B8–9.003, F.A.C.
Fla. Admin Code R. 64B8–9.014(2); see also Fla.
Admin Code R. 64B15–14.008 (adopting similar
rule for osteopathic physicians).
28 Section 304(d) further provides that ‘‘[t]he
Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend
any registration simultaneously with the institution
of proceedings under this section, in cases where
he finds that there is an imminent danger to the
public health or safety.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(d).
PO 00000
Frm 00115
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
78835
substances and compliance with
applicable Federal and State laws
establish that both Respondents
committed acts which rendered their
registrations inconsistent with the
public interest and which justified the
suspension orders.29
Factors Two and Four—Respondents’
Experience in Dispensing Controlled
Substances and Record of Compliance
with Applicable Federal and State Laws
Under a longstanding DEA regulation,
a prescription for a controlled substance
is not ‘‘effective’’ unless it is ‘‘issued for
a legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of his [or her] professional
practice.’’ 21 CFR 1306.04(a). This
regulation further provides that ‘‘an
order purporting to be a prescription
issued not in the usual course of
professional treatment * * * is not a
prescription within the meaning and
intent of [21 U.S.C. 829] and * * * the
person issuing it, shall be subject to the
penalties provided for violations of the
provisions of law relating to controlled
substances.’’ Id. As the Supreme Court
recently explained, ‘‘the prescription
requirement * * * ensures patients use
controlled substances under the
supervision of a doctor so as to prevent
addiction and recreational abuse. As a
corollary, [it] also bars doctors from
peddling to patients who crave the
drugs for those prohibited uses.’’
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274
(2006) (citing Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 135,
143 (1975)).
It is fundamental that a practitioner
must establish a bonafide doctor-patient
relationship in order to be acting ‘‘in the
usual course of * * * professional
practice’’ and to issue a prescription for
a ‘‘legitimate medical purpose.’’ See
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122
(1975). Under numerous state standards
of medical practice, before issuing a
treatment recommendation, a physician
must, inter alia, physically examine a
patient to establish a bona-fide doctor
patient relationship and properly
diagnose his/her patient. See, e.g., Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 2242.1; Cal. Health
& Safety Code § 11352(a); Ohio Admin.
R. 4731–11–09; Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs.
0880–2–.14(7); North Carolina Med. Bd.,
Position Statement: Contact With
Patients Before Prescribing.
29 While each Respondent’s registration has
expired and neither Respondent has submitted a
renewal application, each Respondent asserts that
he/she intends to continue the practice of medicine
and that he/she has not abandoned his/her desire
to obtain a new registration. See ALJ Exs. 14A &
14B. The Government does not dispute these
assertions. For the reasons stated in my answer to
the ALJ’s Query, I hold that neither Respondent’s
case is moot. See ALJ Ex. 23.
E:\FR\FM\23DEN1.SGM
23DEN1
78836
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 23, 2008 / Notices
Furthermore, a physician who
engages in the unauthorized practice of
medicine is not a ‘‘practitioner acting in
the usual course of * * * professional
practice.’’ 21 CFR 1306.04(a). Under the
CSA, the ‘‘[t]he term ‘practitioner’
means a physician * * * licensed,
registered, or otherwise permitted, by
the United States or the jurisdiction in
which he practices * * * to * * *
dispense * * * a controlled substance
in the course of professional practice.’’
21 U.S.C. 802(21). See also 21 U.S.C.
823(f) (‘‘The Attorney General shall
register practitioners * * * to dispense
* * * if the applicant is authorized to
dispense * * * controlled substances
under the laws of the State in which he
practices.’’). As the Supreme Court has
explained: ‘‘In the case of a physician
[the CSA] contemplates that he is
authorized by the State to practice
medicine and to dispense drugs in
connection with his professional
practice.’’ Moore, 423 U.S. at 140–41
(emphasis added). A controlledsubstance prescription issued by a
physician who lacks the license
necessary to practice medicine within a
State is therefore unlawful under the
CSA. Cf. 21 CFR 1306.03(a)(1) (‘‘A
prescription for a controlled substance
may be issued only by an individual
practitioner who is * * * [a]uthorized
to prescribe controlled substances by
the jurisdiction in which he is licensed
to practice his profession[.]’’).30
The record establishes that each
Respondent committed numerous
violations of the CSA and various state
laws by issuing prescriptions which
lacked a legitimate medical purpose and
which were far outside of the course of
professional practice. With respect to
Respondent Nirmal Saran, the evidence
shows that in just the limited period
between May 19 and June 8, 2005, he
issued through internet sites, eightseven controlled substance (cs)
prescriptions to persons in California,
eighty-six cs prescriptions to person in
Florida, sixty-four cs prescriptions to
persons in Tennessee, thirty-two cs
prescriptions to person in Ohio, and
twenty-nine controlled substance
prescriptions to persons in North
Carolina. Nirmal Saran was not licensed
in any of these five States, and admitted
to investigators that he prescribed based
on the questionnaires submitted by the
Web sites’ customers, that he had only
telephoned ‘‘approximately 12 to 15
patients’’ during the entire period he
prescribed over the internet, and
obviously did not perform physical
examinations (as also demonstrated by
the DI’s undercover buy) as required by
the standards of medical practice of the
States of California, Ohio, Tennessee,
and North Carolina, among others.
Moreover, given the limited number
of phone calls he made to patients, it is
also obvious that he violated state rules
requiring that he explain to his
‘‘patients,’’ the risks and benefits of
treatment options including the taking
of controlled substances. Tenn. Comp.
R. & Regs. 0880–2–.14(7), Fla. Admin.
Code R 64B8–9.014(2). Furthermore,
Nirmal Saran admitted that he did not
keep any records of his internet
prescribings and thus violated state
medical practice standards for this
reason as well. See, e.g. , Fla. Admin.
Code R 64B8–9.014(2); N.C. Med. Bd.,
Position Statement. I thus find that
Nirmal Saran did not establish a bona
fide doctor-patient relationship with
those persons he prescribed to over the
internet, that these prescriptions lacked
a legitimate medical purpose, and that
he acted outside of the usual course of
professional practice in issuing them. 21
CFR 1306.04(a). See also Tr. 278
(testimony of Gov. Expert). I further
conclude that Nirmal Saran repeatedly
violated the CSA in issuing
prescriptions over the internet and thus
committed numerous acts which
rendered his registration ‘‘inconsistent
with the public interest,’’ 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4), and which warranted the
suspension of his registration.
The record likewise establishes that
Nisha Saran issued numerous
prescriptions in violation of the CSA
and various state laws. As found above,
in just the limited period between May
27 and June 3, 2005, Nisha Saran issued
over the internet, seventeen cs
prescriptions to persons in Florida,
eleven cs prescriptions to persons in
California, ten cs prescriptions to
persons in North Carolina, and four cs
prescriptions to persons in Ohio.31
Nisha Saran practiced in the State of
Texas and was not licensed to practice
medicine in any of these other States.
30 As the California Court of Appeal has noted:
the ‘‘proscription of the unlicensed practice of
medicine is neither an obscure nor an unusual state
prohibition of which ignorance can reasonably be
claimed, and certainly not by persons * * * who
are licensed health care providers. Nor can such
persons reasonably claim ignorance of the fact that
authorization of a prescription pharmaceutical
constitutes the practice of medicine.’’ Hageseth v.
Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr.3d 385, 403 (Ct. App.
2007).
31 My identification of the specific number of
prescriptions issued by each Respondent in
violation of various state medical practice standards
during a limited time period is not an all inclusive
list of the violations each committed. Each
Respondent also issued prescriptions to persons in
numerous other States; the Agency is not required
to identify each and every instance in which they
violated the CSA and state laws to support the
conclusion that they committed acts inconsistent
with the public interest.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
18:28 Dec 22, 2008
Jkt 217001
PO 00000
Frm 00116
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
For this reason alone, the prescriptions
she issued to these persons were issued
outside of the ‘‘usual course of * * *
professional practice’’ and violated the
CSA. 21 CFR 1306.04(a); Moore, 423
U.S. at 140–41.
With respect to the Nations Drug
Supply Web site (which was owned by
her brother, a now convicted drug
dealer), J.P. testified that on May 30,
2005, he purchased ninety tablets of
Norco (hydrocodone/apap); the
intercepted data shows that Nisha Saran
approved this prescription. GX 9 (06–
19) at 1–7 (line 10). J.P., a Florida
resident, further testified that he never
spoke with anyone in making his
various purchases at Nations, that he
was not required to send in any medical
records, and that he did not know Nisha
Saran (or her father). It is thus clear that
Nisha Saran did not comply with State
of Florida’s standards for telemedicine
practice, see Fla. Admin. Code
R.64B15–14.0088–9.014, and that she
did not establish a bona-fide doctorpatient relationship with J.P. I therefore
conclude that Nisha Saran lacked ‘‘a
legitimate medical purpose’’ and acted
outside of the usual course of
professional practice in issuing the
Norco prescription to J.P. See 21 CFR
1306.04(a).
Moreover, given the extensive
evidence as to the modus operandi used
by the Nations Drug Supply and Rx
Great Prices Web sites, both of which
dispensed controlled substances based
on prescriptions issued by physicians
who had not personally performed a
physical exam on the person seeking the
prescription, I further conclude that
Nisha Saran failed to establish bona-fide
doctor patient relationships with
persons to whom she prescribed
controlled substances as required by the
standards of medical practice adopted
by the States of California, North
Carolina, and Ohio, among others. See,
e.g. , Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 2242.1(a);
Ohio Admin. R. 4731–11–09; N.C. Med.
Bd., Contact With Patients Before
Prescribing. I therefore hold that in
issuing these prescriptions, Nisha Saran
lacked ‘‘a legitimate medical purpose’’
and acted far outside of the ‘‘usual
course of [her] professional practice’’
and therefore violated the CSA. 21 CFR
1306.04(a); see also Tr. 278.
I acknowledge that Nisha Saran
offered the testimony of one of her
colleagues regarding the
appropriateness of her prescribing
practices in a hospital setting. This
evidence is not, however, relevant in
assessing whether her internet
prescribing constituted acts
‘‘inconsistent with the public interest.’’
21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). Because her internet
E:\FR\FM\23DEN1.SGM
23DEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 23, 2008 / Notices
prescribings violated the CSA and
numerous state laws, they were acts that
were inconsistent with the public
interest,’’ 32 and which warranted the
suspension of her registration.33 Id.
Orders
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 824, as well as 28 CFR
0.100(b) & 0.104, I affirm my order
which immediately suspended the nowexpired DEA Certificate of Registration,
AS7091894, issued to Nirmal Saran.
Pursuant to the above cited authority, I
also affirm my order which immediately
suspended the now-expired DEA
Certificate of Registration, BS8415956,
issued to Nisha Saran. These orders are
effective immediately.
Dated: December 12, 2008.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8–30506 Filed 12–22–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
32 As both J.P.’s and Dr. Van Komen’s testimony
shows, the prescribing of controlled substances over
the internet creates a grave threat to public health
and safety. As Dr. Van Komen explained, reviewing
an online questionnaire is ‘‘absolutely no way’’ for
a physician to detect whether a person seeking a
controlled substance has a legitimate medical need
for the drug or is a drug abuser. Tr. 285. This
Agency has discussed the threat to public health
and safety posed by internet prescribing in
numerous cases. See, e.g. , William R. Lockridge, 71
FR 77791 (2006); Mario Alberto Diaz, 71 FR70788
(2006); Mario Avello, 70 FR 11695 (2005).
33 Neither Respondent has an application pending
before the Agency. I note, however, that even if the
Respondents had submitted applications, I would
have denied their applications.
Under agency precedent, where the Government
has proved that a registrant has committed acts
inconsistent with the public interest, a registrant
must ‘‘ ‘present[] sufficient mitigating evidence to
assure the Administrator that [it] can be entrusted
with the responsibility carried by such a
registration.’ ’’ Samuel S. Jackson, 72 FR 23848,
23853 (2007) (quoting Leo R. Miller, 53 FR 21931,
21932 (1988)). Moreover, because ‘‘past
performance is the best predictor of future
performance,’’ ALRA Labs., Inc., v. DEA, 54 F.3d
450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995), this Agency has repeatedly
held that where a registrant has committed acts
inconsistent with the public interest, the registrant
must accept responsibility for his/her actions and
demonstrate that he/she will not engage in future
misconduct. See Jackson, 72 FR at 23853; John H.
Kennedy, 71 FR 35705, 35709 (2006); Prince George
Daniels, 60 FR 62884, 62887 (1995). See also Hoxie
v. DEA, 419 F.3d at 483 (‘‘admitting fault’’ is
‘‘properly consider[ed]’’ by DEA to be an
‘‘important factor[]’’ in the public interest
determination).
Notably, neither Respondent testified in this
proceeding. I therefore further find that neither
Respondent has accepted responsibility for his/her
misconduct.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
18:28 Dec 22, 2008
Jkt 217001
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employee Benefits Security
Administration
Prohibited Transaction Exemptions
and Grant of Individual Exemptions
involving: 2008–15, Popular, Inc.,
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, and
Popular Financial Holdings, Inc.
(collectively, the Applicants), D–11396;
and 2008–16, BlackRock, Inc.
(BlackRock, and The PNC Financial
Services Group, Inc. (PNC)
(collectively, the Applicants), D–11453
AGENCY: Employee Benefits Security
Administration, Labor.
ACTION: Grant of Individual Exemptions.
SUMMARY: This document contains
exemptions issued by the Department of
Labor (the Department) from certain of
the prohibited transaction restrictions of
the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or the Act)
and/or the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 (the Code).
A notice was published in the Federal
Register of the pendency before the
Department of a proposal to grant such
exemption. The notice set forth a
summary of facts and representations
contained in the application for
exemption and referred interested
persons to the application for a
complete statement of the facts and
representations. The application has
been available for public inspection at
the Department in Washington, DC. The
notice also invited interested persons to
submit comments on the requested
exemption to the Department. In
addition the notice stated that any
interested person might submit a
written request that a public hearing be
held (where appropriate). The applicant
has represented that it has complied
with the requirements of the notification
to interested persons. No requests for a
hearing were received by the
Department. Public comments were
received by the Department as described
in the granted exemption.
The notice of proposed exemption
was issued and the exemption is being
granted solely by the Department
because, effective December 31, 1978,
section 102 of Reorganization Plan No.
4 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 1 (1996),
transferred the authority of the Secretary
of the Treasury to issue exemptions of
the type proposed to the Secretary of
Labor.
Statutory Findings
In accordance with section 408(a) of
the Act and/or section 4975(c)(2) of the
Code and the procedures set forth in 29
CFR Part 2570, Subpart B (55 FR 32836,
PO 00000
Frm 00117
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
78837
32847, August 10, 1990) and based upon
the entire record, the Department makes
the following findings:
(a) The exemption is administratively
feasible;
(b) The exemption is in the interests
of the plan and its participants and
beneficiaries; and
(c) The exemption is protective of the
rights of the participants and
beneficiaries of the plan.
Popular, Inc., Banco Popular de Puerto
Rico, and Popular Financial Holdings,
Inc. (collectively, the Applicants)
Located in the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico.
[Prohibited Transaction No. 2008–15;
Exemption Application No: D–11396]
Exemption
Section I: Transactions
(a) The restrictions of sections 406(a),
406(b)(1), 406(b)(2), and 407(a) of the
Act shall not apply, effective November
23, 2005, to:
(1) The acquisition of stock rights (the
Rights) by certain plans, described,
below, in Section I(a)(1)(A) through (D)
of this exemption, in connection with
an offering of such Rights (the Offering)
by Popular, Inc. (Popular), a party in
interest with respect to such plans:
(A) Popular, Inc. Retirement Savings
Plan for Puerto Rico Subsidiaries (the
Popular PR Plan);
(B) Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
Savings and Stock Plan (the BPPR
Savings Plan),
(C) Popular, Inc. U.S.A. Profit
Sharing/401(k) Plan (the Popular USA
Plan),
(D) Popular Financial Holdings, Inc.
Savings and Retirement Plan (the PFH
Savings Plan) 1, and
(2) The holding of the Rights by the
certain plans, described, above, in
Section I(a)(1)(A) through (D) of this
exemption, until the expiration of such
Rights; provided that the conditions in
Section II of this exemption, as set forth,
below, are satisfied and
(b) The sanctions resulting from the
application of section 4975 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the U.S.
Code), by reason of section 4975(c)(1)(A)
through (E) shall not apply, effective
November 23, 2005, to the acquisition of
the Rights by certain plans, described,
above, in Section I(a)(1)(C), and Section
I(a)(1)(D) of this exemption; 2 provided
1 The BPPR Savings Plan, the Popular PR Plan,
the Popular USA Plan, and the PFH Savings Plan
are referred to, herein, collectively, as the
Participant Directed Plans.
2 The Applicants represent that, because the
fiduciaries for the BPPR Savings Plan, and the
Popular PR Plan have not made an election under
E:\FR\FM\23DEN1.SGM
Continued
23DEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 247 (Tuesday, December 23, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78827-78837]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-30506]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket Nos. 06-19 & 06-20]
Nirmal Saran, M.D.; Nisha Saran, D.O.; Affirmance of Suspension
Orders
On September 19, 2005, I, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate
Suspension of Registration to both Nirmal Saran, M.D., and Nisha Saran,
D.O. (Respondents), of Arlington, Texas. The Orders immediately
suspended each Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration as a
practitioner, on the grounds that each had issued numerous controlled-
substance prescriptions over
[[Page 78828]]
the internet without a legitimate medical purpose and had acted outside
of the course of professional practice, because they did so without
establishing a bona fide doctor-patient relationship with the persons
they prescribed to, in violation of 21 CFR 1306.04(a). Nirmal Saran
OTSC at 6; Nisha Saran OTSC at 6-7.
More specifically, the Show Cause Orders alleged that each
Respondent had participated in a scheme run by Mr. Johar Saran, the
owner of Carrington Healthcare System/Infiniti Services Group (CHS/
ISG), and the son of Respondent Nirmal Saran and brother of Respondent
Nisha Saran. See Nirmal Saran OTSC at 5; Nisha Saran OTSC at 5. The
Orders alleged that as part of the scheme, CHS/ISG operated several
pharmacies and created sham corporations in order to obtain the DEA
registrations necessary for the pharmacies to order controlled
substances, and that the drugs were eventually delivered to CHS/ISG,
where its employees downloaded prescriptions from several internet
sites, filled them, and shipped them to customers. See Nirmal Saran
OTSC at 5; Nisha Saran OTSC at 5. The Orders further alleged that CHS/
ISG was shipping 3,000 to 4,000 drug orders a day. See Nirmal Saran
OTSC at 5; Nisha Saran OTSC at 5.
With respect to Nirmal Saran, the Show Cause Order alleged that his
``primary practice area is ophthalmology.'' Nirmal Saran OTSC at 6. The
Show Cause Order further alleged that between May 1 and June 17, 2005,
he had prescribed thirty-seven different controlled substances to
persons in at least forty-four States, and that between May 18 and June
8, 2005, he issued 1,248 controlled substance (cs) prescriptions and
had issued as many as 217 prescriptions in a day to persons in thirty-
four States. Id. at 7. The Order further alleged that sixty-four
percent of the prescriptions he issued through the scheme were for
schedule III drugs containing hydrocodone. Id. at 6.
With respect to Nisha Saran, the Show Cause Order alleged that
between May 27 and June 3, 2005, she had issued 303 cs prescriptions to
persons in at least forty States, and that she had issued as many as
101 cs prescriptions to persons in twenty-six States in a single day.
Nisha Saran OTSC at 6. Relatedly, the Show Cause Order alleged that
fifty-nine percent of the prescriptions she wrote were for schedule III
drugs containing hydrocodone. Id.
Both Show Cause Orders further alleged that each Respondent's cs
prescriptions were not issued ``for a legitimate medical purpose in the
usual course of professional practice,'' and violated 21 CFR
1306.04(a). Id. at 7; see also Nirmal Saran OTSC at 7. I further found
that the allegations supported the conclusion that each Respondent's
``continued registration during the pendency of [the] proceedings would
constitute an imminent danger to the public health and safety.'' Nisha
Saran OTSC at 7; Nirmal Saran OTSC at 7.
On October 20, 2005, counsel for each Respondent requested a
hearing on the allegations of the respective Show Cause Orders. ALJ
Exs. 3 & 4. The matters were placed on the docket of Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) Gail Randall, who consolidated the cases and conducted pre-
hearing procedures.
On March 28-30, 2006, a hearing was held in Forth Worth, Texas.
During the hearing, both the Government and Respondents put on
testimony and entered documentary evidence into the record. Following
the hearing, the parties submitted briefs containing their proposed
findings, conclusion of law, and argument.
On November 22, 2006, while the decision of the ALJ was still
pending, the Government moved to terminate both proceedings on the
ground that each Respondent's registration had expired on February 28,
2006, and neither Respondent had submitted a renewal application. ALJ
Exs. 13a & 13b. Thereafter, Respondents' counsel filed oppositions to
both termination motions. ALJ Exs. 14a & 14b.
In support of her opposition, Nisha Saran submitted an affidavit
establishing that in February 2006, and before the expiration of her
registration, she had attempted to renew her registration
electronically at the Agency's Web site, but was unable to do so. ALJ
Ex. 14A (attached as RX 1). In her affidavit, Nisha Saran further
stated that ``I have at no time abandoned my desire to obtain DEA
registration during the pendency of this case.'' Id.
In support of his opposition, Nirmal Saran submitted an affidavit
in which he stated that in February 2006, and before the expiration of
his registration, he had asked his daughter to renew his registration
at the Agency's Web site, but she was unable to do so. ALJ Ex. 14B
(attached as RX 1). In his affidavit, Nirmal Saran also stated that ``I
have at no time abandoned my desire to obtain DEA Registration during
the pendency of this case.'' Id.
Thereafter, the Government moved to withdraw both termination
motions noting my then-recent decision in William R. Lockridge, 71 FR
77791 (2006), which held, in a case arising under similar
circumstances, that the proceeding was not moot. In its withdrawal
motions, the Government acknowledged that each Respondent had indicated
that he/she ``intend[ed] to continue the practice of medicine and
intend[ed] to obtain a DEA registration in order to do so.'' ALJ Exs.
15A at 3; 15B at 3. The Government also acknowledged the unequivocal
statements of each Respondent that he/she had not abandoned his/her
desire to obtain a DEA Registration. ALJ Exs. 15A at 3; 15B at 3.
The ALJ granted the Government's motion and further ordered that
the parties brief various issues including whether ``the record as a
whole establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the DEA
properly immediately suspended'' each Respondent's registration,
because his/her ``handling of controlled substances creates an imminent
danger to the public health or safety.'' ALJ Exs. 16A at 2-3; 16B at 2-
3. The ALJ also ordered the parties to address what factual findings
were relevant and what legal standard should be applied in determining
the validity of the suspension order. ALJ Exs. 16A at 3; 16B at 3.
On March 7, 2007, after the parties submitted their briefs, the ALJ
submitted a Query to the Deputy Administrator. ALJ Ex. 22. In the
Query, the ALJ asked whether in light of the expiration of each
Respondent's registration she should make findings of fact, whether she
should simply forward the record to me for a final order, or whether
the Government should forward the investigative file to me with the
materials contained therein at the time the immediate suspension orders
were issued. ALJ Ex. at 8.
On April 22, 2007, I answered the ALJ's Query. In my ruling, I
noted that both the Government and the Respondents agreed that the case
was not moot because even though the Respondents' registrations had
expired, each Respondent maintained that they had not ``abandoned their
desire to obtain DEA registrations during the pendency of this case.''
ALJ Ex. 23, at 2. I also explained that DEA's rules do not prohibit a
former holder of a registration from reapplying immediately for a new
registration and that ``neither Respondent ha[d] notified the Agency
that [he/she] intended to permanently cease professional practice.''
Id.
In light of these circumstances, I ``conclude[d] that principles of
judicial economy are best served by making findings of fact and
conclusions of law based on the record established in this
[[Page 78829]]
proceeding rather than subjecting the parties to the potential re-
litigation of the same issues in a future proceeding.'' Id. I further
directed that ``[t]he ALJ's findings of fact and conclusion of law
should be made based on the factors set forth in * * * 21 U.S.C.
824(a),'' as this section ``applies to all suspensions regardless of
whether a suspension is imposed before, or after, a hearing.'' Id. I
further noted that ``my additional findings that Respondents posed `an
imminent danger to public health or safety' [was] not reviewable in the
proceeding before'' the ALJ. Id. at 2-3 (quoting 21 U.S.C. 824(d)).
Thereafter, the ALJ issued her recommended decisions in each case.
With respect to Respondent Nirmal Saran, the ALJ concluded that between
May 18 and June 8, 2005, he had issued over 1,000 prescriptions for
controlled substances to treat pain, and that these ``prescriptions
were issued outside the scope of professional practice, and were not
issued for legitimate medical purposes'' in violation of DEA
regulations. In re Nirmal Saran, ALJ Dec. at 32. In support of her
conclusion, the ALJ noted that Respondent practices as an
ophthalmologist, that he was licensed to practice medicine only in
Texas and yet issued prescriptions to patients in other States, and
that he failed to comply with basic standards of the medical profession
for establishing a doctor-patient relationship. Id. at 31-32.
The ALJ also noted that Respondent had failed to properly safeguard
his controlled substance prescribing authority because he ``allow[ed]
his signature to be scanned into a computer database'' with the result
that ``non-medical personnel were approving the dispensing of
controlled substances in [his] name.'' Id. at 33. Finally, the ALJ
noted that Respondent did not maintain patient records and that there
was ``no indication that [he] interacted with the patient[s] to advise
[them] concerning the risks involved in taking the controlled
substances,'' or that he ``used any of the available control mechanisms
to ensure these individuals were not abusing'' the drugs. Id. Finally,
the ALJ noted that Respondent chose not to testify and thus offered no
assurance that he would comply with Federal law and regulations in the
future. Id. at 34. The ALJ thus concluded that Respondent's
``registration would be adverse to the public interest.'' Id.
With respect to Respondent Nisha Saran, the ALJ concluded that she
too had issued cs prescriptions ``outside the scope of professional
practice'' and without ``legitimate medical purposes.'' In re Nisha
Saran, ALJ Dec. at 30. In support of her conclusion, the ALJ adopted
the conclusion of the Government's expert that Respondent issued
prescriptions in violation of DEA regulations based on his review of
her ``prescriptions, log sheets, [her] type of practice, and the vast
numbers of prescriptions that she wrote during a given period of
time.'' Id. The ALJ also found that ``non-medical personnel were
approving the dispensing of controlled substances in [her] name,'' and
that ``Respondent provided these individuals with the ability to act in
such a manner by allowing her signature to be scanned into a computer
database.'' Id. at 30-31. The ALJ thus concluded that ``[s]uch a
cavalier way of safeguarding her authority to prescribe controlled
substances is certainly outside the public interest.'' Id. at 31.
The ALJ further observed that between May and June 2005, Respondent
had issued ``approximately 220 controlled substance drug orders,'' but
did not ``maintain adequate patient records.'' Id. at 31. More
specifically, the ALJ observed that ``the record contains no charts
documenting the Respondent's diagnosis for which the controlled
substances were prescribed, no treatment plan, and no indication that
the Respondent interacted with the patient to advise the patient
concerning the risks involved in taking the controlled substances and
the need for the patient to follow her directions concerning the
appropriate quantities to take.'' Id. The ALJ also explained that there
was also ``no evidence that * * * Respondent used any of the available
control mechanisms to ensure these individuals were not abusing the''
drugs she prescribed. Id.
Finally, the ALJ noted that Respondent chose not to testify and
thus had offered no assurance that she would comply with Federal law
and regulations in the future. Id. at 32. The ALJ therefore concluded
that Respondent's registration would be ``adverse to the public
interest.'' Id.
Thereafter, Respondents' counsel filed exceptions to the ALJ's
recommended decisions in each matter and the record was forwarded to me
for final agency action. Having considered the entire record, as well
as the exceptions filed in both matters, I hereby issue this Decision
and these Final Orders. I adopt the ALJ's ultimate conclusion of law in
each matter that the respective Respondent's registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest. I make the following findings of
fact.
Findings
Respondent Nisha Saran formerly held DEA Certificate of
Registration, BS8415956, which authorized her to handle controlled
substances as a practitioner in schedules II through V. GX 1 (Docket
No. 06-19). Respondent's registration expired on February 28, 2006. Id.
Respondent has not submitted an application to renew her
registration.\1\ I further find that Respondent is licensed to practice
medicine only in the State of Texas. ALJ Ex. 5, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ According to the Chief of the Registration and Program
Support Section, on February 6, 2006, someone made several attempts
to renew DEA Registration, BS8415956, through the Agency's Web page
but was informed that ``[t]he DEA Registration number you provided
is not eligible for online renewal. Please call the DEA Registration
Call Center if you have any questions.'' ALJ Ex. 15A, Appendix I, at
4. The Chief of the Registration Unit further stated that on
November 27, 2006, an additional attempt was made to renew the
registration which resulted in the same message that online renewal
was not available. Id. at 2.
The Chief of the Registration Unit also testified that on
February 6 and November 27, 2006, attempts were made to renew
Respondent Nirmal Saran's DEA Registration AS7091894; each
of these attempts resulted in the message that online renewal was
not available. Id. at 1-2; see also ALJ Ex. 15B, Appendix I, at 1-2.
According to the Chief of the Registration Unit, if the registrants
had called the Registration Call Center, they would have been sent a
renewal form and ``the notation `Renewal Notice Sent' would have
been documented in DEA records but, no such documentation was in the
computer history for either DEA number.'' Id. at 2-3.
The Chief of the Registration Unit further explained that the
Respondents were prevented from renewing their registration online
because their registrations had been immediately suspended. Id. at
2. I find, however, that the Respondents could have obtained renewal
applications from the Agency and submitted them via mail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent Nirmal Saran formerly held DEA Certificate of
Registration, AS7091894, which authorized him to handle controlled
substances as a practitioner in schedules II through V. GX 1 (Docket
No. 06-20). Respondent's registration expired on February 28, 2006. Id.
Respondent has not submitted an application to renew his registration.
Respondent is licensed to practice medicine only in the State of Texas.
ALJ Ex. 6, at 2. Respondent practices as an ophthalmologist. Tr. 216.
Mr. Johar (a.k.a. Joe) Saran is the son of Respondent Nirmal Saran
and the brother of Respondent Nisha Saran. Tr. 210; id. at 116. Johar
Saran owned Carrington Health Care System (which later changed its name
to Infiniti Services Group), a corporate entity located in Arlington,
Texas, which owned approximately eighteen to twenty pharmacies. Id. at
55, 60, 421. Carrington/Infiniti used the pharmacies to fill orders for
controlled substances and non-controlled drugs on behalf of ``numerous
web sites'' at which persons could order drugs, including Rx Great
[[Page 78830]]
Prices and Nations Drug Supply.\2\ Id. at 52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ On September 20, 2005, a federal grand jury indicted Joe
Saran, Gil Lozano, Fred Word, as well as the various coporations
controlled by Saran including Carrington, Infiniti, and the
pharmacies, on numerous counts including violations of the
Controlled Substances Act. GX 85 (06-20). On November 14, 2006, Joe
Saran entered into a plea agreement with the United States Attorney
for the North District of Texas in which he pled guilty to, inter
alia, conspiring to distribute controlled substances, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(D). GX 104 (06-20) at 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rx Great Prices was owned by Gil Lozano, id. at 617; Lozano also
co-owned with his wife two limited liability corporations, Global One
Marketing and First Management. Id. at 623. Lozano's niece, Tania
Lozano, was the director of marketing for Global One and Rx Direct. Id.
at 611. Rx Great Prices used Joe Saran's businesses exclusively to fill
its orders. Id. at 624.
Nations Drug Supply (NDS) was a Web site owned and operated by
Johar Saran and Infiniti. Id. at 418. The NDS Web site was developed by
Concussion Interactive and became operational sometime in May 2005. Id.
at 399-400. The Web site was managed by Tara Jones.\3\ Id. at 531 &
535.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The record also establishes that Colin McConnell was an
employee of Concussion Interactive, Tr. 112, and Fred Word was
Infiniti's Chief Financial Officer. Id. at 114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Investigation
In June 2004, a DEA Diversion Investigator (DI) with the Fort
Worth, Texas Resident Office, initiated an investigation of Carrington/
Infiniti's activities. Id. at 58-60. As part of the investigation, DEA
Investigators conducted trash runs at Infiniti's headquarters during
which they found numerous documents including prescription labels for
controlled substances dispensed by the Triphasic Pharmacy, a pharmacy
owned by Johar Saran, to out of state persons, which listed Nirmal
Saran as the prescribing physician. Id. at 75; GX 104 at 2 (Plea
Agreement of Johar Saran); see GXs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, & 10 (No.
06-20). During some of the trash runs, the DIs also recovered several
daily reports which listed hundreds of prescriptions for schedule III
controlled substances containing hydrocodone which were dispensed by
Triphasic; the reports listed Nirmal Saran as the prescriber. See GX 5,
at 28-41 (No. 06-20), GX 11, at 1-161 (No. 06-20).\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ In his exceptions, Respondent notes that while the daily
reports list him as the prescriber, it also listed ``an incorrect
DEA number.'' Nirmal Saran Exceptions at 12. Respondent thus
contends that this ``implies that someone attempted to use
Respondent's name in association with the incorrect DEA number.''
Id. at 12-13.
It is acknowledged that the daily reports do not contain
Respondent's correct DEA number. As found below, however, Respondent
admitted to investigators that he prescribed over the Internet.
Moreover, Respondent did not testify at the hearing and thus did not
deny that he issued the prescriptions dispensed by Triphasic. I
therefore reject the exception and find that he did issue the
prescriptions.
Respondent further contends that because the ``labels were all
found in the trash * * * they were, in fact, trash,'' and thus the
probative value of this evidence is limited to showing that the
Government found his name on pieces of paper ``during a time period
unconnected to the'' allegations of the Show Cause Order. Id. at 11-
12. According to Respondent's argument, the labels are not evidence
of prescriptions at all. I conclude, however, that a pharmacy's
employees would not prepare hundreds, if not thousands, of
prescription labels which included the patient's name and address,
dispensing instructions, and various warnings, unless they were to
be used to dispense the prescriptions. I therefore reject
Respondent's contention.
Respondent also objects to the admission of numerous exhibits on
the ground that they pre-date the events which form the basis of the
Show Cause Order. At the hearing, however, Respondent did not object
to the admission of any of these exhibits on the ground that they
were irrelevant because they involved prescribings which pre-dated
the period alleged in the Show Cause Order. See Tr. 66 (GX 2), 69
(GX 3), 73 (GX 4), 133 (GX 6), 75 (GX 7), 137 (GX 9), 139 (GX 10),
141 (GX 11) (All exhibit numbers are from Case No. 06-20).
Respondent objected only to portions of GXs 5 and 8, and did so on
the limited basis that they contained a few prescriptions written by
other doctors. See Tr. 130-32 (discussing GX 5); id. at 135-36
(discussing GX 8). The prescriptions issued by other doctors were
removed from the exhibits and the exhibits were entered into the
record. See id. at 132-33, 136. I therefore conclude that Respondent
has waived his objection to the admission of these exhibits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thereafter, DEA investigators obtained a court order under 18
U.S.C. 2516, which authorized them to intercept electronic
communications from Infiniti's Internet protocol (IP) address between
April 26 and June 23, 2005.\5\ Tr. 30-32. According to the DI who
served as a minimizer of the intercept, Nisha and Nirmal Saran's names
appeared as approvers of prescriptions in database files that were
downloaded by persons at Infiniti from the Nations Drug Supply Web
site. Id. at 35-36. Moreover, their names also appeared in various e-
mails that were intercepted.\6\ Id. at 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ According to a DI, the court also authorized the
interception of Infiniti's e-mail for an additional thirty days. Tr.
31.
\6\ These include an April 6, 2005 e-mail from Tara Jones, an
employee of Joe Saran and Infiniti, to Colin McConnell, an employee
of Concussion Interactive, the developer of the Nations' Web site.
GX 75 (06-19). In this e-mail, Ms. Jones provided Nisha and Nirmal
Saran's addresses, phone numbers, and medical license numbers. Id.
In concluding the e-mail, Ms. Jones apologized for taking ``so
long,'' and added that ``Nisha was in LA and just got back today.
She said you were both playing phone tag, so if you still need to
talk to her * * * try her cell number now.'' Id.
The record also contains an e-mail (dated 5/27/2005) from
another employee of Concussion Interactive to Ms. Jones forwarding a
username and password so that Nisha Saran could ``login to the
shopping cart admin.'' GX 79 (06-19).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After intercepting the database files, the DI used Microsoft Excel
to extract the data and put it into spreadsheet form. Id. at 37. The
Government introduced into evidence spreadsheets listing the
prescriptions which were dispensed by pharmacies that were controlled
by Joe Saran and Infiniti between May 27 and June 17, 2005. See GXs 4-
58 (06-19).\7\ The spreadsheets list numerous controlled substance
prescriptions that were issued by each Respondent for persons located
throughout the country.\8\ See generally id. Among the drugs prescribed
by each Respondent were such highly abused controlled substances as
schedule III combination drugs containing hydrocodone, and schedule IV
benzodiazepines such as diazepam and lorazepam.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The exhibits are numbered as GXs 14-68 in No. 06-20.
\8\ According to my review of the record, between May 19, 2005
and June 8, 2005, Respondent Nirmal Saran issued the following
amounts of controlled substance prescriptions to persons in these
States: Eighty-six to persons in Florida, eighty-seven to persons in
California, sixty-four to persons in Tennessee, thirty-two to
persons in Ohio, and twenty-nine to persons in North Carolina.
Moreover, between May 27, 2005 and June 3, 2005, Nisha Saran issued
controlled substance prescriptions in the following amounts to
persons in these States: Seventeen to persons in Florida, eleven to
persons in California, ten to persons in North Carolina and four to
persons in Ohio.
\9\ Respondent Nisha Saran contends that ``her name was used
without her permission or knowledge by NDS employees, most likely
Tara Jones.'' Nisha Saran Exceptions at 11; see also id. at 12
(noting that as systems administrator, Jones could log in `` `as one
of the doctors' and insert a doctor's signature and it would appear
that a doctor had approved the prescription'') (quoting Tr. 420,
testimony of J.B.).
While one of Respondent's witnesses testified that Tara Jones
had approved an order using Ms. Saran's signature, Tr. 547, this
witness subsequently testified that she had observed this ``only the
one time,'' id. at 585, which occurred toward the ``end of August,
beginning of September 2005.'' Id. at 568. The spreadsheets
containing the intercepted prescriptions show, however, that
Respondent issued numerous prescriptions months earlier. Moreover,
even if Respondent's name was used on some prescriptions without her
permission, I note that Respondent did not testify and thus did not
deny that she issued the prescriptions. Nor did she explain why her
signature was found in a hard drive of a computer at Infiniti, her
brother's business. Tr. 183-84. Moreover, as explained above, other
evidence links Respondent to the Nations' and Rx Great Prices'
schemes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of the investigation, a DI went to the Nations Drug Supply
Web site and made two undercover buys. On June 2, 2005, the DI, using
the name Dwight E. Anderson and an address in Forth Worth, Texas,
ordered ninety tablets of hydrocodone/acetaminophen 10/650 mg., for a
price of $ 373.50 plus shipping. GX 89 (06-20). While visiting the Web
site, the DI was able to select the drug he wanted and place it in his
[[Page 78831]]
shopping cart.\10\ Tr. 152. While the Web site used a program that
required that a customer provide information to establish his identity,
the DI testified that by contacting the site's customer service
department he was able to obtain a ``skip code'' which allowed him to
bypass this process. Id. at 155.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ At the hearing, the Government introduced into evidence a
DVD which showed the various Web pages that the DI visited in
ordering the drugs; the DVD was made using a software program which
records as a video ``anything that happens on the computer screen.''
Tr. 145-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DI was then required to complete a patient questionnaire. Id.
at 155-56. The questionnaire asked him about his height, weight,
allergies, past medications including whether he had previously taken
the requested medication, and why he was seeking the medication. Id. at
155-56. With respect to the latter question, the DI ``simply put `[m]y
leg hurts.'' ' Id. at 157.
After indicating that he would pay for the drugs by cash on
delivery, id., the Web site displayed an order confirmation page. Id.
at 158; GX 89 (No. 06-20). This page indicated that the DI's order
number was 817, that the order was placed on ``2005-06-02'' at
``15:15:56,'' that it was sold to and would be shipped to ``Dwight E.
Anderson'' with an address of 819 Taylor St. in Forth Worth, that it
was for 90 tablets of hydrocodone 10/650 mg., and that the drugs cost $
373.50, plus $ 22.00 for overnight shipping for a total cost of $
395.50. GX 89.
The following day, the DI received a prescription vial containing
tablets. The label on the vial indicated that the prescription had been
filled by ``Reliance Pharmacuetical [sic], Inc.,'' with an address of
2805 W. Arlansas Lane, Suite 303, Arlington, Texas. GX 91 (No. 06-20).
The label provided instructions for taking the drug, indicated that the
vial contained 90 tablets of ``Hydrocodone (Lorcet)--10/650,'' and that
the prescribing doctor was ``Nirmal Saran''; the label also included
the name ``Dwight E. Anderson,'' the prescription number of
``817:10294,'' and the order number of ``817.'' Id.
Notably, the information on the order confirmation page and the
vial label matched the information for order 817 contained in the
spreadsheets that were compiled from the internet files that were
intercepted by the Government. See GX 43 (06-20) at 8-14 (line 21).\11\
Moreover, at no time did the DI speak with Nirmal Saran or any other
physician regarding why he was ordering the drugs. Tr. 182.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ In his exceptions, Respondent argues that ``the name of
Dwight E. Anderson * * * does not appear on the Government's
spreadsheet evidence, rather, order number 817 is shown as having
been filled for a `Robin Daub,' and not `Dwight E. Anderson.' ''
Nirmal Saran Exceptions at 26 (citing GX 87, at 178-80). Relatedly,
Respondent argues that ``No order no. 953 is reflected on the
Government's spreadsheet of `Nirmal Saran's Original Rx's.' '' Id.
at 27. Respondent further argues that ``[i]f the information on the
spreadsheets was in fact downloaded from the servers and put into an
Excel file as testified to by Government's agents, and not
manipulated as they testified, there should be no discrepancies in
the tables/spreadsheets showing different information on them and
definitely should show the undercover buys.'' Id. Based on the
testimony of one of his witnesses, Respondent further asserts that
``the IP addresses reflected on the Government's exhibit would not
instruct a computer to transfer any data, and that [GX 90] does not
reflect the transmission of an actual customer's order.'' Id.
(citing Tr. 426 & 429). Respondent contends that ``[t]his
information * * * suggests that these purchases were fabricated.''
Id.
Respondent misrepresents what exhibit (GX 90) represents. As the
DI testified, GX 90 does not represent the time that the DI
purchased the drug, but rather, the time ``that that file was
transferred that contained the information of the undercover buy''
to Infiniti. Tr. 164. Consistent with the DI's testimony, the order
confirmation that he printed from the Nations Drug Supply Web site
indicates that the order was place at 15:15:56 (or 3:15:56 p.m.),
see GX 89; by contrast, GX 90 indicated that the file was
transferred to Infiniti at 10:37:52 p.m, Greenwich Mean Time, or
4:37 p.m. Fort Worth Time. See GX 90; Tr. 164.
To be sure, GX 87, which lists Nirmal Saran's prescriptions,
indicates that order number 817 was placed by R.D. and not Dwight E.
Anderson. GX 87, at 178. However, the original spreadsheet listing
order number 817, and which was created following the intercept,
clearly shows that the DI ordered hydrocodone as he testified to,
and that the prescription was authorized by Nirmal Saran. See GX 43
(06-20) at 8-14 (line 21). While the person who created GX 87
testified that she had copied information from the original
spreadsheet files to this file, Tr. 333, there appear to be other
errors in this document as well. For example, the evidence shows
that the hydrocodone prescription given order number 817 cost
$373.50, yet GX 87 indicates that the drugs were paid for with a COD
in the amount of $87. GX 87, at 180. Moreover, Dwight Anderson is
nonetheless listed as having purchased another drug which Nirmal
Saran prescribed, Zydone, a branded drug which also contains
hydrocodone, for a total COD amount of $395.50, even though the
product price is listed at $74.70; the entries for this prescription
also indicate that the purchase was prepaid while simultaneously
indicating a COD amount. See GX 87 at 106-08 (line entry 598). Given
these errors, and the derivative nature of the exhibit, I do not
rely on it.
Based on the great weight of the evidence, which includes the
DI's testimony, the DVD showing the DI's visit to the Web site, the
order confirmation, the evidence showing that the drugs were
delivered, and the original spreadsheet of the intercepted
prescriptions, I reject Respondent's contention that the purchase
was fabricated. I further conclude that it is more likely than not
that the purchase occurred and that Nirmal Saran authorized the
prescribing. As for Respondent's contention regarding order no. 953,
no doctor was listed as the prescriber on either the drug vial's
label, GX 94 (06-20), or on the spreadsheet. GX 54 (06-20) at 8-10
(line 21). It is therefore no surprise that the order is not listed
on GX 87.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following day, the DI revisited the Nations Drug Supply Web
site and ordered sixty tablets of alprazolam 2 mg., a schedule IV
benzodiazepine. GX 92 (No. 06-20); Tr. 169. In completing the
questionnaire necessary to order the drug, the DI indicated that the
reason he needed the drug was because he was ``stressed out from
work.'' Tr. 172. The DI also indicated that he was not taking any other
drugs although he had already obtained the hydrocodone that he
purchased the day before. Id. This time, however, the Web page
indicated that the DI would have to fill out a patient history form
which was to be completed by his doctor and faxed in. Id. at 173. The
DI testified, however, that he never sent in the form and yet still was
able to order and obtain the drugs. Id. at 173-74, 176, 178-80; see
also GX 92 (No. 06-20). The label on the drug vial was missing the name
of the prescribing doctor. GX 94 (No. 06-20).
The Government also elicited the testimony of J.P., a Florida
resident, regarding his obtaining of controlled substances through the
Nations Drug Supply Web site. According to his testimony and the
intercepted prescription data, on at least three separate occasions,
J.P. purchased controlled substances through Nations. More
specifically, on May 30, 2005, J.P. purchased ninety tablets of Norco
10 mg., a schedule III drug containing hydrocodone based on a
prescription issued by Respondent Nisha Saran. Tr. 18-19; GX 9 (06-19)
at 1-7 (line 10). On June 2, 2005, J.P. purchased another ninety
tablets of Norco 10 mg., as well as ninety tablets of Adipex-P 37.5 mg.
(phentermine), a schedule IV stimulant; both prescriptions were
authorized by Nirmal Saran. GX 30 (06-19) at 17-24 (lines 37 & 38).
Finally, on June 6, 2005, J.P. purchased two orders of ninety tablets
of Norco 10 mg., as well as two orders of ninety tablets of Valium (10
mg); each of the four prescriptions were approved by Nirmal Saran. GX
51 (06-19) at 17-24 (lines 35, 37, 40, & 42).\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ I have considered and reject the suggestion that these were
duplicate prescriptions. Cf. Nirmal Saran's Exceptions at 23.
Notably, the two Norco prescriptions had different order numbers (as
did the two Valium prescriptions). See GX 51 (06-19) at 17.
Moreover, the evidence shows that two different pharmacies, with
different addresses, filled the prescriptions. Id. at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
J.P. testified that he was not required to send his medical records
to Nations to purchase the controlled substances, that he did not speak
with anyone to obtain the drugs, and that he did not know either
Respondent. Tr. 18. J.P. further testified that at the time he
purchased the drugs, he was not under the care of a physician, id. at
17, and that he ``became physically dependent'' on them. Id. at 22.
On September 21, 2005, law enforcement authorities executed a
federal search warrant at the residence
[[Page 78832]]
of Joe Saran. Id. at 208. While the search was proceeding, Nirmal Saran
arrived at his son's residence, identified himself to a DI as Joe
Saran's father, and said that he wanted to talk to the investigators
about what they were doing. Id. at 209-10. The DI contacted another DI,
who advised him that he needed to serve Nirmal Saran with the
Suspension Order and that he was willing to talk to Dr. Saran. Id. at
212.
Following his arrival at the residence, the other DI served Nirmal
Saran with the Order and after explaining why the Agency had issued the
Order, proceeded to interview him. Id. at 215. During the interview,
``Dr. Saran admitted to prescribing controlled substances via the
[i]nternet for his son's company, Nations Drug Supply.'' Id. at 216.
Dr. Saran explained ``that Nations Drug Supply had a Web site, and that
the Web site list[ed] all the names and the information as to why the
person needed the drug, the person's allergies, blood pressure, and
weight.'' Id. at 216-17. Dr. Saran also stated ``that he would read the
questionnaire and he would prescribe that way.'' Id. at 217. Dr. Saran
further stated that back in May or June 2005, his son and another
employee of Nations had approached him, and that his son had given him
a password which allowed him to access the Web site. Id. Dr. Saran also
told the DIs that his internet prescribing mostly involved painkillers.
Id. at 218.
Dr. Saran further admitted that he did not know any of the persons
he prescribed to, and that during the entire period in which he
prescribed over the internet, he telephoned ``approximately 12 to 15
patients.'' Id. at 219. Dr. Saran also said that in reviewing the
questionnaires, ``he took the person's word for it,'' id., and that the
``questionnaire with all the information for the patient was good
enough for him.'' Id. at 217.
Dr. Saran admitted, however, that in his practice as an
ophthalmologist, ``he would initially examine the patient, take their
blood pressure and weight, review their history, and then prescribe the
medication, which [was] totally opposite of'' how he prescribed online.
Id. at 219. He also told the DIs that he did not ``keep any records of
whatever he prescribed.'' Id. at 220. Finally, he acknowledged that he
was licensed only in Texas, but ``but felt that [because] the
prescriptions were issued in Texas, it was okay for him to prescribe''
to persons residing in other States. Id. at 221.
Respondents' Relationship With Rx Great Prices
During the investigation of Infiniti, DEA Investigators also
intercepted several e-mails which link both Respondents to Rx Great
Prices, the Web site owned and operated by Gil Lozano and the
corporations he controlled. Id. at 613. Moreover, on the same day that
the search warrant was executed at Joe Saran's residence, other
investigators executed a search warrant at Lozano's residence in
Florida.\13\ Id. at 604-05.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ In their exceptions, both Respondents moved to strike the
testimony of the DI and seek to exclude the documentary evidence
which includes the employment agreements and e-mails linking them to
Gil Lozano and his corporation, First Management, L.L.C. See Nisha
Saran Exceptions at 15, Nirmal Saran Exceptions at 15. At the
hearing, however, Respondents did not object to the admission of the
employment agreements, see Tr. 607-8, or the e-mails which link them
to Lozano. Id. at 614. Respondents have therefore waived any
argument that the employment agreement and e-mails were improperly
admitted into evidence.
The DI also testified regarding an interview he conducted of
Tania Lozano. Respondents objected to a single question on the
ground that the DI's testimony was hearsay; the ALJ overruled the
objection. Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that hearsay
evidence can still constitute substantial evidence under the
Administrative Procedure Act. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389 (1971). Notably, Respondents did not seek to subpoena Ms.
Lozano. See 21 CFR 1316.52(d). I therefore deny Respondents' motions
to strike the DI's testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the search of Lozano's residence, the investigators seized
two documents entitled ``EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.'' See GX 101 (06-19), GX
101 (06-20). While the header on both documents stated ``Attorney-
Client Draft Document'' and ``Discussion: Not for Execution,'' each
document also stated that ``THIS EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT * * * is made and
entered into this 20[th] day of January 2005, by and between [each
Respondent] \14\ a physician (`Employee') and First Management, LLC, a
Florida Limited Liability Company (`Employer').'' See GX 101 (06-19) at
1; GX 101 (06-20) at 1. Each agreement gave an effective date (March 1,
2005 on Nisha Saran's agreement; February 1, 2005 on Nirmal Saran's
agreement), indicated that each Respondent's ``Bonus and Additional
Compensation'' was ``To Be Negotiated,'' and was signed by the
respective Respondent.\15\ See id. (06-19) at 1, 8, & id. (06-20) at 1,
8 & 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ To clarify, on GX 101 (No. 06-19), ``Nisha M. Saran, D.O.''
was listed as ``a physician (`Employee'),'' and party to the
agreement; on GX 101 (No. 06-20), ``Nirmal Saran, M.D'' was listed
as ``a physician (`Employee')'' and party.
\15\ It is acknowledged that neither agreement was signed by
someone on behalf of First Management. See GX 101 (No. 06-19) at 12;
GX 101 (06-20) at 12. Notwithstanding this, for the reasons
explained in the text, I conclude that each Respondent entered into
a contractual arrangement with First Management to issue Internet
prescriptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Each agreement stated that ``Employer operated an on-line, Internet
pharmacy business,'' that the ``Employer hereby employs Employee, and
Employee accepts such employment, as a physician to render professional
medical services [on] behalf of Employer,'' and that the ``Employee
shall be required to check and receive patient files for review via the
Internet or facsimile multiple times per days at least (5) days per
week, and spend at least two--three hours per day reviewing patient
files and/or supervising nurse practitioners.'' Id. (06-19) at 1 & id.
(06-2) at 1 & 6. Moreover, the agreements stated that the ``Employee
shall have * * * authority, in their [sic] sole discretion to reject
the patient's file for any request for a prescription or to request
further medical information or history of the patient prior to making
any final decision as to the issuing of any prescription to a
patient.'' Id. (06-19) at 6; id. (06-20) at 6.
The record contains several e-mails which further support the
conclusion that both Respondents entered into a contractual arrangement
with Gil Lozano and his corporation to prescribe over the Internet. For
example, on March 21, 2005, Joe Saran sent an e-mail to Gil Lozano with
the subject line ``Malpractice Information''; the e-mail also indicated
that the matter was of ``High'' importance. GX 77 (06-19). In the e-
mail, Joe Saran wrote: ``I do hope that we can get this resolved
quickly as both my father and sister are quite anxious to get started
with you.'' Id. Continuing, Joe Saran explained that ``the insurance
companies have a few questions. If you can please answer these, then I
believe that the underwriters will approve and this will get done
quickly.'' Id. Saran then listed five things that were needed,
including ``the projected number of prescriptions on a daily basis,''
``a copy of the medical questionnaire from your Web site,'' and
``guidelines as to the range of pharmaceuticals being prescribed.'' Id.
The record also includes a series of e-mails which discuss the
payment of malpractice insurance premiums for Nisha Saran. See GX 99
(06-19). On July 6, 2005, Tania Lozano sent an e-mail to Gil Lozano
with the subject line of ``Nisha info.'' Id. at 1. This e-mail related
that Nisha Saran had paid $19,830 for a year of malpractice insurance,
and that the policy was ``[v]alid until December 12, 2005.'' Id. Ms.
Lozano further stated that Nisha Saran ``said if you want to cover just
for the months that she has been working
[[Page 78833]]
for Rxgreatprice, that would be fine.'' Id. The e-mail also stated:
``First order approved on 5/31/2005 at 11:48 p.m.'' Id.
On July 7, 2005, Tania Lozano e-mailed Nisha Saran and asked her:
``Can you please provide me the address of your bank, as well as your
dad's office address so that Gil can process the funds for you[?]'' Id.
at 2. Continuing, the e-mail stated: ``We will pay 50% of $ 19,830 for
the professional liability insurance on a monthly basis for the amount
of $ 826.25 per month. I will get you a precise day of deposit as well
once I get the above info from you.'' Id. at 2.
The record also contains a July 18, 2005 (10:13 a.m.) e-mail from
Tania Lozano to Gil Lozano and another individual at Global One
Marketing, which appears to forward the text of another e-mail sent by
Nisha Saran to Tania Lozano. Id. The e-mail began: ``Tania * * *. Here
is the information that you requested[,]'' and gives routing and
account information for Nirmal Saran's bank.\16\ Id. Continuing, the e-
mail stated: ``My dad's office address is as follows, but please send
any and all correspondence to his home address[,]'' and appeared to
list his office and home addresses. Id. Next, the e-mail stated:
``Thanks for the info this morning, as well!'' Id. The e-mail ended by
stating: ``Talk to you soon,'' and is signed ``Nisha Saran.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The e-mail also includes a redacted portion above Nirmal
Saran's account information. GX 99, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Later that day, Tania Lozano sent another e-mail to Gil Lozano, the
subject being ``Question from Nisha.'' The text reads:
Nisha called me to verify that you were covering 100% of the
malpractice insurance from the months of June 05--Dec 05. If so, the
total due to her from June is 1652.50, not 826.25 as stated in the
last invoice. Can we send her another transfer for just 826.25 to
cover the month of June, then on the following invoice, she will
include 1652.50 to cover the month of July. From there on out, she
will get paid once a month for the insurance on the 30th of each
month. Please let me know if this is okay or if you want to handle
this another way. Thanks!
Id. at 3.
A DI subsequently interviewed Tania Lozano. Tr. 615. Among other
things, Ms. Lozano told the DI that in July 2005, Gil Lozano had told
her ``to stop using the other doctors and [to] direct all of the
requested drug orders through Nisha and Nirmal Saran,'' because he
``was paying the other doctors $25 through a management company, and it
was only costing $12 a prescription through Nirmal and Nisha.'' Id. Ms.
Lozano also told the DI that she talked to Nisha Saran ``frequently,
normally two, three or four times a day, at least ten times per week,
and that they developed a close business relationship over the July,
August and September months that they worked together.'' Id. at 616.
The DI further testified that Tania Lozano told him that she would
call Nisha Saran on her cell phone and tell her: ``We're having
problems getting these orders approved.'' Id. Nisha Saran ``would
tell'' Tania: ``You're going to have to wait until I get off work; I'm
working at the hospital. My father approves the orders in the morning;
I approve in the afternoon.'' Id. Ms. Lozano further told the DI that
she had discussed with Nisha Saran ``problems with the pull-down menus
that had instructions'' for taking a drug, and that ``Nisha was very
particular about what instructions were placed on her drug orders.''
Id.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The DI also testified that he had obtained Ms. Lozano's
cell phone records ``for the months that she was involved with Rx
Great Prices,'' and that both Nisha and Nirmal Saran's phone numbers
were contained in them. Tr. 617.
The DI further testified that he had interviewed a third doctor,
who had attended a meeting with Nirmal, Nisha, and Joe Saran, at
which Joe Saran attempted to recruit him to approve orders for his
Web site. Tr. 618. The third doctor related that in a later
discussion, Joe Saran again attempted to recruit him and told him
that he was paying Nisha and Nirmal $12,000 each per month. Id. at
618-19.
Relatedly, the record contains an exchange of e-mails on August
16, 2005, between Gil Lozano and Joe Saran in which the former
sought the latter's help in recruiting ``one or two more medical
doctors for our sites.'' GX 78 (06-19) at 2. Later that day, Joe
Saran wrote to Lozano: ``I do know another doctor who may be
interested. I will talk to him and see what his response may be. Is
the payment rate the same as for my dad and sister? This will be a
question that I will need to answer for him.'' Id. at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Expert Testimony
George J. Van Komen, M.D., testified on behalf of the Government as
an expert on the standards of medical practice and the use of the
Internet to prescribe controlled substances. At the time of the
hearing, Dr. Van Komen, who is board certified in internal medicine and
a Fellow of the American College of Physicians, had served as an
Assistant Professor of Clinical Medicine at the University of Utah
School of Medicine for fifteen years and had practiced medicine for
more than thirty years. Tr. 234; GX 71 (06-20) at 1. From 1995 to 2002,
he served on the Board of Directors of the Federation of State Medical
Boards (FSMB), and was the Federation's President in 2001 to 2002. GX
71 (06-20) at 3. Dr. Van Komen also was a member of the State of Utah's
Physicians Licensing Board from 1989 to 1999, and served as the Board's
Chairman from 1991 to 1999. Id. Dr. Van Komen testified that he had a
particular interest in prescription drug abuse and the proper use of
controlled substances in medical practice. Tr. 234, 236-37.
In his testimony, Dr. Van Komen acknowledged that the American
Medical Association (AMA) is ``not a government organization'' and
therefore does not ``have any authoritative capabilities.'' Id. at 238.
Dr. Van Komen explained, however, that the AMA's policies and
recommendations are ``well received by government organizations'' and
``by state legislatures.'' Id. Relatedly, Dr. Van Komen testified that
``[t]he Federation of State Medical Boards has no authority'' over the
practice of medicine, but that its membership is comprised of members
of state medical boards and that it does provide guidance and policy
statements to assist the nation's state boards on various issues. Id.
at 251.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ In light of Dr. Van Komen's testimony that neither the AMA
nor the FSMB have authority to promulgate binding standards of
medical practice, I conclude that it is unnecessary to discuss the
contents of the various policy statements that these organizations
have issued.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Van Komen further testified, however, that there is a standard
of care for prescribing controlled substances that is ``well accepted
and recognized throughout the medical community.'' Id. at 268. As Dr.
Van Komen testified:
[T]he standard of care is that * * * on any new patient who
comes with a problem that may require a controlled substance, that
the physician has personal contact with the patient, that a careful,
detailed history is undertaken, that that careful, detailed history
is utilized in doing a careful physical examination, and then a
carefully outlaid differential diagnosis or etiology of the
patient's symptoms is derived, and then from that, after appropriate
testing and evaluation when further laboratory tests are in, then
the physician may choose to utilize controlled substances in the
treatment of the patient's ailment and disease.
Id. at 268-69.
After explaining what telemedicine is, Dr. Van Komen was asked what
is the standard for ``forming a legitimate doctor-patient
relationship?'' Id. at 271. Dr. Van Komen answered:
[W]e feel that there needs to be documented a face-to-face
history and physical and evaluation of the patient, and then if this
patient chooses to receive further consultative work or be
established with a physician who practices on the Internet, that the
physician first of all and most formally needs to be identified, and
he needs to have a license in the state in which the patient
resides. * * *
And we also feel that that primary care doctor who did the
history and physical needs to stay in touch with the patient, even
[[Page 78834]]
though the patient might be seeking further consultation from
another physician through the Internet.
Id. at 271. Dr. Van Komen's subsequent testimony suggested, however,
that he was discussing the standard of care as set forth in policy
statements of the AMA and FSMB. See id. at 272 (testifying that the
policy statement of the FSMB and AMA ``absolutely'' outline the
standard of care for Internet prescribing).
After he explained that medical doctors and osteopathic physicians
are subject to the same standard of care,\19\ id. at 275, Dr. Van Komen
was asked whether he had ``formed an opinion on whether the
prescriptions issued by Dr. Nisha Saran and Dr. Nirmal Saran were
issued outside the usual course of professional practice?'' Id. at 276.
Dr. Van Komen answered that ``[f]rom the records that I have seen,
there gives me no reason to believe that they meet even closely the
standard of care that would be an acceptable practice of medicine.''
Id. Dr. Van Komen explained that his opinions were based on the
``prescriptions that were written by them, as well as log sheets,
outlining the type of practice that they have, the number of
prescriptions that they wrote during a particular * * * period of time,
and all of those records lead me to believe that they are far out from
the accepted standard of care.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ He also explained that an ophthalmologist performs eye
surgery and treats diseases of the eye. Tr. 276.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequently, Dr. Van Komen added:
[T]here is no documentation of any doctor-patient contact. There
is no indication of any record being kept. There is no formulation
of a working diagnosis for which the medications were prescribed,
and there is no indication that the patient understood the potential
of addiction or danger of the drugs that were prescribed.
Id. at 277.
Next, with respect to Nirmal Saran, Dr. Van Komen testified that
while an ophthalmologist ``may prescribe * * * an occasional pain
medication * * * it's been my understanding that ophthalmologists
rarely prescribe opioid medication, even after some eye surgery that
they perform.'' Id. at 277-78. Finally, Dr. Van Komen stated that he
was ``100 percent sure'' that the prescriptions that he reviewed were
not issued for legitimate medical purposes, and that he was also ``100
percent'' certain that the prescriptions were issued outside of the
usual course of professional practice because ``[t]here [was] no
indication * * * from the records \20\ that I reviewed that there [was]
any attempt to appropriately practice medicine according to even the
minimal standard of care.'' Id. at 278.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ While Nirmal Saran admitted to a DI that he did not
maintain any records on the persons he prescribed to, Tr. 220, there
is no evidence as to whether Nisha Saran also failed to maintain
records. The Government, however, had the burden of proving that
Nisha Saran failed to maintain patient records. Because Dr. Van
Komen's opinion testimony with respect to Nisha Saran was based in
part on the alleged absence of documentation to support her
prescribings, his testimony is rejected to this extent.
\21\ Dr. Van Komen also testified that ``if the patient asks for
a drug by name, you can almost for sure understand that that
individual is going to abuse that drug. It's interesting that on the
internet, you allow the patient to pick whatever drug they want
exactly by name and order it.'' Id. at 279-80. He also explained the
importance of monitoring closely those patients to whom he
prescribed hydrocodone. Id. Moreover, Dr. Van Komen testified that
reviewing an online questionnaire was ``absolutely no way'' for a
physician to detect whether a person who was seeking a controlled
substance was a drug abuser, ``because you have no way of knowing
that the person that filled out the questionnaire filled it out
honestly.'' Id. at 285.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On cross-examination, however, Dr. Van Komen was asked if he was
``familiar with the way the Texas Medical Board deals with this
particular type of problem?'' Id. at 302. Dr. Van Komen answered: ``Not
specifically. I would assume that they have, as many medical boards,
accepted the model guidelines that have been distributed through the
Federation of State Medical Boards.'' \22\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Respondent Nisha Saran also elicited testimony from Rony
Dev, D.O., one of her colleagues at a hospital where she practiced.
Dr. Dev acknowledged, however, that it would not be appropriate to
prescribe to a patient without knowing her medical history, what
medications the patient was on, and her vital signs. Tr. 471. While
Dr. Dev testified that in his experience, Nisha Saran would not
prescribe in this manner, id. at 471-72; he subsequently testified
that he had no direct knowledge of her prescribing over the
internet, id. at 503; and had never discussed her internet
prescribing with her. Id. at 520.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), I take official notice of the
following state standards of medical practice as set forth in statutes,
regulations, and administrative notices: \23\ Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
Sec. Sec. 2052 \24\ (prohibiting unlicensed practice of medicine) &
2242.1(a) (``No person * * * may prescribe * * * dangerous drugs * * *
on the Internet for delivery to any person in this state, without an
appropriate prior examination and medical indication. * * *''). Cal.
Health & Safety Code Sec. 11352(a) (prohibiting furnishing a
controlled substance ``unless upon the written prescription of a
physician * * * licensed to practice in this state''); N.C. Gen. Stat.
Sec. 90-18 (2005) (``prescribing medication by use of the Internet or
a toll-free telephone number, shall be regarded as practicing
medicine'' in the State).\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ In accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
an agency ``may take official notice of facts at any stage in a
proceeding--even in the final decision.'' U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80
(1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979). In accordance with
the APA and DEA's regulations, Respondent is ``entitled on timely
request to an opportunity to show to the contrary.'' 5 U.S.C.
556(e); see also 21 CFR 1316.59(e). To allow Respondent the
opportunity to refute the facts of which I take official notice,
Respondent may file a motion for reconsideration within fifteen days
of service of this order which shall commence with the mailing of
the order.
\24\ In Hageseth v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr.3d 385 (Ct.
App. 2007), the California Court of Appeal upheld the State's
jurisdiction to criminally prosecute an out-of-state physician, who
prescribed a drug to a California resident over the internet, for
the unauthorized practice of medicine.
\25\ The North Carolina Medical Board has also issued a Position
Statement on the steps which a physician must take before
prescribing a drug. See North Carolina Medical Board, Position
Statement: Contact With Patients Before Prescribing (Nov. 1999).
More specifically, the North Carolina Medical Board has stated that:
It is the position of the North Carolina Medical Board that
prescribing drugs to an individual the prescriber has not personally
examined is inappropriate except as noted * * * below. Before
prescribing a drug, a physician should make an informed medical
judgment based on the circumstances of the situation and on his or
her training and experience. Ordinarily, this will require that the
physician personally perform an appropriate history and physical
examination, make a diagnosis, and formulate a therapeutic plan, a
part of which might be a prescription. This process must be
documented appropriately. Id. The exceptions are for ``admission
orders for newly hospitalized patients, prescribing for a patient of
another physician for whom the prescriber is taking call, or
continuing medication on a short-term basis for a new patient prior
to the patient's first appointment.'' Id. The North Carolina Board
has further declared that ``prescribing drugs to individuals the
physician has never met based solely on answers to a set of
questions, as is common in Internet or toll-free telephone
prescribing, is inappropriate and unprofessional.'' Id.
Finally, while North Carolina recently amended the State's
Medical Practice Act, it is a felony offense ``if the person so
practicing without a license is an out-of-state practitioner who has
not been licensed and registered to practice medicine * * * in th[e]
State.'' N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 90-18(a); see also id. Sec. 90-
1A(5)(f) (defining ``[t]he practice of medicine'' as including
``[t]he performance of any act, within or without this State,
described in this subdivision by use of any electronic or other
means, including the Internet or telephone'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Relatedly, the administrative rules of the medical boards of Ohio
and Tennessee expressly prohibit--with only limited exceptions--a
physician's prescribing to a person he/she has not personally
physically examined. For example, under the rules of the Tennessee
Board of Medical Examiners:
[[Page 78835]]
* * * it shall be a prima facie violation of T.C.A. Sec. 63-6-
214(b) (1), (4), and (12) for a physician to prescribe or dispense
any drug to any individual, whether in person or by electronic means
or over the Internet or over telephone lines, unless the physician
has first done and appropriately documented, for the person to whom
a prescription is to be issued or drugs dispensed, all of the
following:
1. Performed an appropriate history and physical examination;
and
2. Made a diagnosis based upon the examination and all
diagnostic and laboratory tests consistent with good medical care;
and
3. Formulated a therapeutic plan, and discussed it, along with
the basis for it and the risks and benefits of various treatment
options, a part of which might be the prescription or dispensed
drug, with the patient; and
4. Insured av