Record of Decision for the Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement-Tritium Research and Development, Flight Test Operations, and Major Environmental Test Facilities, 77656-77663 [E8-30194]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 245 (Friday, December 19, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 77656-77663]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-30194]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of Decision for the Complex Transformation Supplemental 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement--Tritium Research and 
Development, Flight Test Operations, and Major Environmental Test 
Facilities

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of 
Energy.

[[Page 77657]]


ACTION: Record of Decision.

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SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a 
separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 
is issuing this Record of Decision (ROD) for the continued 
transformation of the nuclear weapons complex (Complex). This ROD is 
based on information and analyses contained in the Complex 
Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
(SPEIS) (DOE/EIS-0236-S4) issued on October 24, 2008 (73 FR 63460); 
comments received on the SPEIS; and other factors, including costs, 
technical and security considerations, and the missions of NNSA. The 
SPEIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts of alternatives for 
transforming the nuclear weapons complex into a smaller, more efficient 
enterprise that can respond to changing national security challenges 
and ensure the long-term safety, security, and reliability of the 
nuclear weapons stockpile.
    The alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS are divided into two 
categories: programmatic and project-specific. Programmatic 
alternatives involve the restructuring of facilities that use or store 
significant (i.e., Category I/II) quantities of special nuclear 
material (SNM).\1\ These facilities produce plutonium components 
(commonly called pits \2\), produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
components including secondaries,\3\ fabricate high explosives (HE) 
components and assemble and disassemble nuclear weapons. The decisions 
announced in this ROD relate to the project-specific alternatives. NNSA 
is issuing a separate ROD related to the programmatic alternatives.
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    \1\ As defined in section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
special nuclear material is: (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the 
isotope 233 or in the isotope 235 and any other material which the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines to be special nuclear 
material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the 
foregoing. Special nuclear material is separated into Security 
Categories I, II, III, and IV based on the type, attractiveness 
level, and quantity of the material. Categories I and II require the 
highest level of security.
    \2\ A pit is the central core of a nuclear weapon, principally 
made of plutonium or enriched uranium.
    \3\ A secondary is the component of a nuclear weapon that 
contains elements needed to initiate the fusion reaction in a 
thermonuclear explosion.
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    The project-specific alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS involve the 
possible restructuring of the following missions involving research and 
development (R&D) and testing: (1) Tritium R&D; (2) flight test 
operations; (3) major environmental test facilities (ETFs); (4) high 
explosives R&D; (5) hydrodynamic testing; and (6) weapons support 
functions at Sandia National Laboratories/California (SNL/CA). In this 
ROD, NNSA announces decisions regarding the first three missions.
    NNSA has decided to implement the preferred alternatives for these 
three missions described in the SPEIS and summarized in this ROD. The 
major elements of the decisions announced in this ROD are:
    (1) Consolidate tritium R&D at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in 
South Carolina;
    (2) Conduct flight testing in a campaign mode at Tonopah Test Range 
(TTR) in Nevada under a reduced footprint permit; and
    (3) Consolidate major environmental test facilities at Sandia 
National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM).
    These decisions will best enable NNSA to meet its statutory 
missions while minimizing technical risks, risks to mission objectives, 
costs, and environmental impacts. These decisions continue the 
transformation begun following the end of the Cold War and the 
cessation of nuclear weapons testing, particularly decisions announced 
in the 1996 ROD for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SSM PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0236) (61 FR 
68014; Dec. 26, 1996).
    NNSA will continue its missions involving high explosives R&D, 
hydrodynamic testing, and weapons support functions at SNL/CA as 
described in the No Action Alternative and pursuant to previous NNSA 
decisions. In other words, NNSA is not making any new decisions 
regarding these missions at this time.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the Complex 
Transformation SPEIS or this ROD, or to receive copies of these, 
contact: Ms. Mary E. Martin, NNSA NEPA Compliance Officer, Office of 
Environmental Projects and Operations, NA-56, U.S. Department of 
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, toll free 
1-800-832-0885, ext. 69438. A request for a copy of the document may 
also be sent by facsimile to 1-703-931-9222, or by e-mail to 
complextransformation@nnsa.doe.gov. The Complex Transformation SPEIS, 
this ROD, and additional information regarding complex transformation 
are available on the Internet at https://
www.ComplexTransformationSPEIS.com and https://www.nnsa.doe.gov.
    For information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Ms. Carol M. 
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (GC-20), U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 
20585, 202-586-4600, or leave a message at 1-800-472-2756. Additional 
information regarding DOE NEPA activities and access to many DOE NEPA 
documents are available on the Internet through the DOE NEPA Web site 
at: https://www.gc.energy.gov/NEPA.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    NNSA prepared this ROD pursuant to the regulations of the Council 
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) for implementing the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA 
Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021). This ROD is based on 
information and analyses contained in the Complex Transformation 
Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0236-
S4) issued on October 24, 2008 (73 FR 63460); comments received on the 
SPEIS; other NEPA analyses as noted; and other factors, including cost, 
technical and security considerations, and the missions of NNSA. NNSA 
received approximately 100,000 comment documents on the Draft SPEIS 
from Federal agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; public and 
private organizations; and individuals. In addition, during the 20 
public hearings that NNSA held, more than 600 speakers made oral 
comments.
    National security policies require DOE, through NNSA, to maintain 
the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as the nation's 
core competencies in nuclear weapons. Since completion in 1996 of the 
SSM PEIS and associated ROD, DOE has pursued these objectives through 
the Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program emphasizes development 
and application of greatly improved scientific and technical 
capabilities to assess the safety, security, and reliability of 
existing nuclear warheads without nuclear testing. Throughout the 
1990s, DOE also took steps to consolidate the Complex to its current 
configuration of three national laboratories (plus a flight test range 
operated by Sandia National Laboratories), four industrial plants, and 
a nuclear test site. This Complex enables NNSA to conduct research on 
weapons physics, materials science and engineering to design, develop, 
manufacture, maintain, and repair nuclear weapons; certify their 
safety,

[[Page 77658]]

security, and reliability; conduct surveillance on weapons in the 
stockpile; store Category I/II SNM; and dismantle and disposition 
retired weapons. Sites within the Complex and their current missions 
are described in the following paragraphs.
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, 
California--LLNL conducts research, design, and development of nuclear 
weapons; designs and tests advanced technology concepts; provides 
safety, security, and reliability assessments and certification of 
stockpile weapons; conducts plutonium and tritium R&D, hydrotesting, 
high explosives (HE) R&D and environmental testing; and stores Category 
I/II quantities of SNM. LLNL also conducts destructive and 
nondestructive surveillance evaluations on pits to evaluate their 
reliability. NNSA is currently removing Category I/II SNM from the site 
and by 2012 LLNL will not maintain Category I/II SNM. NNSA is 
constructing the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at LLNL, which will 
allow a wide variety of high-energy-density investigations. NIF is 
scheduled to begin operations in 2009.
    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, New Mexico--LANL 
conducts research, design, and development of nuclear weapons; designs 
and tests advanced technology concepts; provides safety, security, and 
reliability assessments and certification of stockpile weapons; 
maintains production capabilities for limited quantities of plutonium 
components (i.e., pits) for delivery to the stockpile; manufactures 
nuclear weapon detonators for the stockpile; conducts plutonium and 
tritium R&D, hydrotesting, HE R&D, and environmental testing; and 
stores Category I/II quantities of SNM. LANL also conducts destructive 
and nondestructive surveillance evaluations on pits to assess their 
reliability.
    Nevada Test Site (NTS), 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada--
NTS maintains the capability to conduct underground nuclear testing; 
conducts high hazard experiments involving nuclear material and high 
explosives; provides the capability to process and dispose of a damaged 
nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device; conducts non-nuclear 
experiments; conducts hydrodynamic testing and HE testing; conducts 
research and training on nuclear safeguards, criticality safety, and 
emergency response; and stores Category I/II quantities of SNM.
    Pantex Plant (Pantex), Amarillo, Texas--Pantex dismantles retired 
weapons; fabricates HE components, and performs HE R&D; assembles HE, 
nuclear, and non-nuclear components into nuclear weapons; repairs and 
modifies weapons; performs nonintrusive pit modification; \4\ and 
evaluates and performs surveillance of weapons. Pantex stores Category 
I/II quantities of SNM for the weapons program and stores other SNM in 
the form of surplus plutonium pits pending transfer to SRS for 
disposition.
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    \4\ Nonintrusive pit modification is modification to the 
external surfaces and features of a pit.
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    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Albuquerque, New Mexico; 
Livermore, California; and other locations--SNL conducts systems 
engineering of nuclear weapons; conducts research, design, and 
development of non-nuclear components; manufactures non-nuclear 
components including neutron generators for the stockpile; provides 
safety, security, and reliability assessments of stockpile weapons; and 
conducts HE R&D, tritium R&D, and environmental testing. The principal 
laboratory is located in Albuquerque, New Mexico (SNL/NM); a division 
of the laboratory (SNL/CA) is located in Livermore, California. SNL 
also operates TTR near Tonopah, Nevada, for flight testing of gravity 
weapons (including R&D and testing of nuclear weapons components and 
delivery systems). In 2008, SNL/NM completed removal of its Category I/
II SNM. SNL/NM no longer stores or uses Category I/II SNM on a 
permanent basis, although it may use Category I/II SNM for limited 
activities in the future. No SNM is stored at TTR, although some test 
operations have involved SNM.
    Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina--SRS extracts 
tritium and performs loading, unloading, and surveillance of tritium 
reservoirs, and conducts tritium R&D. SRS does not store Category I/II 
quantities of SNM for NNSA's weapons activities, but does store 
Category I/II quantities for other DOE activities. SRS is currently 
receiving Category I/II surplus, non-pit plutonium from LLNL for 
storage pending its disposition.
    The following two sites are part of the Complex but will not be 
affected by decisions announced in this ROD.
    Kansas City Plant (KCP), Kansas City, Missouri--KCP manufactures 
and procures non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons and evaluates 
and tests these components. KCP has no SNM. The General Services 
Administration, as the lead agency and NNSA, as a cooperating agency, 
prepared an Environmental Assessment (DOE/EA-1592, Apr. 2008) regarding 
the potential environmental impacts of modernizing the facilities and 
infrastructure for the non-nuclear production activities conducted by 
the KCP as well as moving these activities to other locations. The 
agencies issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (73 FR 23244; Apr. 
29, 2008) regarding an alternative in the Kansas City area. The SPEIS 
does not assess alternatives for the activities conducted at the KCP.
    Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), Oak Ridge, Tennessee--Y-12 
manufactures uranium components for nuclear weapons, cases, and other 
nuclear weapons components; evaluates and tests these components; 
stores Category I/II quantities of HEU; conducts dismantlement, 
storage, and disposition of HEU; and supplies HEU for use in naval 
reactors.

Alternatives Considered and Decisions

    In order to develop the project-specific alternatives to 
restructure R&D and testing facilities, NNSA identified reasonable 
actions that would reduce or consolidate activities, eliminate excess 
facilities, or otherwise make a mission more efficient and cost 
effective. NNSA assessed the requirements of each mission and methods 
to meet those requirements while making the weapons complex more secure 
and efficient. NNSA also developed alternatives that would restructure 
the facilities where R&D and testing are conducted. In addition to the 
environmental analyses of the impacts of these alternatives, NNSA 
completed detailed business case studies of the alternatives, which are 
available to the public at https://www.ComplexTransformationSPEIS.com. 
NNSA will continue activities in accordance with the No Action 
Alternative for three of the six project-specific missions: High 
explosives R&D, hydrodynamic testing, and weapons support functions at 
SNL/CA. For example, there is a continued need to conduct experiments 
involving weapons quantities of high explosives combined with 
plutonium. These experiments will continue in existing facilities at 
the NTS. For the three other project-specific missions--Tritium R&D, 
Flight Test Operations, and Major Environmental Test Facilities--NNSA 
has decided to make changes in them. NNSA's decisions and its bases for 
these decisions are described in the following paragraphs.
    NNSA prepared a classified appendix to the SPEIS that evaluates the 
potential impacts of intentional destructive acts. Substantive details 
of terrorist attack scenarios, security countermeasures, and potential 
impacts are not released to the public because disclosure of this 
information could be used to plan attacks. Although the results of the

[[Page 77659]]

analyses were not disclosed in the unclassified SPEIS, the following 
general conclusion can be disclosed: the potential consequences of 
intentional destructive acts are highly dependent upon distance to the 
site boundary and size of the surrounding population--the closer and 
higher the surrounding population, the greater the potential 
consequences. In addition, it is generally easier and more cost-
effective to protect new facilities, as modern security features can be 
incorporated into their design. The project-specific activities that 
are the subject of this ROD are not likely targets for intentional 
destructive acts, and therefore the decisions NNSA is making regarding 
these activities would not have significant potential impacts in this 
regard.

A. Tritium R&D

Alternatives Considered
    In addition to analyzing the impacts associated with the No Action 
Alternative that would continue Tritium R&D activities at LLNL, LANL, 
SRS, and SNL/NM,\5\ three other alternatives were evaluated: (1) 
Consolidate at SRS by moving gas transfer system R&D from LLNL \6\ and 
LANL to SRS; (2) consolidate at LANL by moving gas transfer system R&D 
from LLNL to LANL; and (3) reduce activities in-place, which would 
reduce tritium operations at LLNL, LANL and SRS.
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    \5\ Tritium Operations at SNL/NM are primarily associated with 
the Neutron Generator Production Facility, which would be unaffected 
under all alternatives.
    \6\ This consolidation does not include R&D for NIF targets and 
filling these targets. Those operations would remain at LLNL under 
all alternatives.
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Alternatives Considered But Eliminated from Detailed Study
    NNSA considered alternatives for tritium R&D other than those 
described above, but concluded that these alternatives were not 
reasonable and eliminated them from detailed analysis. As explained in 
the SPEIS, the following alternatives were considered but eliminated 
from detailed study: (1) Increasing or decreasing the tritium missions 
at SNL/NM; (2) consolidating tritium R&D at LLNL; and (3) removing the 
tritium target loading for NIF from LLNL.
Preferred Alternative
    The Final SPEIS identified the preferred alternative for tritium as 
consolidating R&D at SRS. SRS would remain the site for tritium supply 
management and provide R&D support to production operations and gas 
transfer system development. Tritium R&D to support gas transfer system 
development currently conducted at LLNL and LANL would be consolidated 
at SRS into the following existing facilities: (1) H-Area New 
Manufacturing Building; (2) H-Area Old Manufacturing Building; and (3) 
Building 773-A. No new construction would be necessary to consolidate 
these missions, although minor upgrades to existing laboratories may be 
required. NNSA would move bulk quantities of tritium from LANL to SRS 
by 2009, and remove tritium materials greater than 30 grams from the 
Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) at LANL by 2014. NNSA would 
then limit the amount of tritium in the WETF to 30 or fewer grams at 
any one time. This alternative would not affect neutron generator 
target loading at SNL/NM or R&D for NIF targets, or filling these 
targets, at LLNL.
Environmental Impacts of Alternatives
    The environmental impacts of the alternatives are presented in 
Section 5.14 of the SPEIS. Under the No Action Alternative there would 
be no changes to impacts currently experienced. The environmental 
impacts of consolidating tritium R&D at SRS would be minor: Tritium 
emissions at SRS would increase by 2.4 percent over current emissions 
and impacts would remain below regulatory limits; tritium emissions at 
LANL would decrease by 42 percent compared to current emissions; about 
25 jobs would be restructured at LANL and about 25 new jobs would be 
created at SRS; doses to workers and the public at SRS would remain 
small and within regulatory limits; and wastes would be managed in 
existing facilities. Transferring the LLNL's tritium R&D (not NIF 
tritium work) to SRS or LANL could be accommodated in existing SRS or 
LANL facilities without any significant changes. Phasing out tritium 
R&D operations at LLNL would have no significant effects.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
    NEPA's Section 101 (42 U.S.C. 4331) establishes a policy that 
Federal agencies have a continuing responsibility to improve and 
coordinate their plans, functions, programs and resources so that, 
among other goals, the nation may fulfill its responsibilities as a 
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations. The Council on 
Environmental Quality, in its ``Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning 
CEQ's NEPA Regulations'' (46 FR 18026; Mar. 23, 1981), defines the 
``environmentally preferable alternative'' as the alternative ``that 
will promote the national environmental policy expressed in NEPA's 
Section 101.''
    The analyses in the SPEIS of the environmental impacts associated 
with the tritium R&D alternatives indicated that the preferred 
alternative--to consolidate tritium R&D at SRS--is environmentally 
preferable. This alternative would result in minor increases in tritium 
emissions at SRS and corresponding reductions in emissions at LANL. At 
SRS, however, the tritium activities would be farther from the site 
boundary than at LANL, resulting in a smaller radiation dose to the 
maximally exposed individual (MEI). The reduction in dose to the 
population around LANL would be about equal to the increase in 
population dose at SRS. For accidents under the preferred alternative, 
there would be a lower potential dose to the maximally exposed 
individual at SRS than at LANL (again, because of the greater distance 
to the MEI at SRS), but, because of conservative assumptions about 
distribution of tritium releases among a larger total population, there 
would be a potentially larger population dose (see Section 5.14.1, 
Volume II of the SPEIS).
Decision on Tritium Research and Development Facilities
    NNSA has decided to implement the preferred alternative to transfer 
tritium R&D in support of gas transfer system development from LLNL and 
LANL to SRS. SRS will continue tritium supply management and R&D 
support for production and gas transfer system filling and handling 
operations. Neutron generator target loading at SNL/NM and production 
of NIF targets at LLNL, which involve small quantities of tritium, will 
continue at those sites. NNSA will remove tritium materials greater 
than 30 grams from the WETF at LANL by 2014. NNSA would then limit the 
amount of tritium in this facility to 30 or fewer grams at any one 
time.
Basis for Decision on Tritium
    NNSA decided to consolidate tritium R&D in support of gas transfer 
system development at SRS and remove tritium materials greater than 30 
grams from the WETF at LANL by 2014 because this consolidation is 
environmentally preferable and furthers NNSA's objective of a smaller, 
more efficient enterprise that can respond to changing national 
security requirements. Transferring tritium R&D from LLNL and LANL to 
SRS allows consolidation of all handling operations involving 
significant quantities of tritium at one

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site. SRS currently has tritium processing, storage, reservoir loading/
unloading, and tritium production R&D missions. SRS also has available 
facility space to accommodate consolidation of R&D for gas transfer 
system development, which will allow NNSA to pursue elimination of 
duplicate capabilities at other sites. Benefits will also result from 
more integrated operations and attention by SRS personnel to this 
primary weapons program mission, which will enable NNSA to improve its 
use of personnel and facilities and to better meet requirements for 
tritium R&D in the future. This consolidation is possible because of 
reductions in the stockpile. Much of the tritium facility 
infrastructure at SRS was built for the much larger stockpile, and it 
can now be modified and used for capabilities that are currently 
located at other sites. Eliminating redundant tritium capabilities also 
enhances a more interdependent enterprise in which personnel from the 
nuclear weapons complex sites must work more effectively together while 
sharing facility capabilities at a single site.
    NNSA has concluded that the benefits of reduced environmental 
impacts and of a smaller, more interdependent enterprise outweigh the 
cost and technical risks of consolidating tritium R&D in support of gas 
transfer system development at SRS. Although the business case study 
for tritium R&D (Tritium R&D Business Case Report, Oct. 17, 2008) 
estimated that the cost for consolidating these activities at SRS will 
be greater than the cost of other alternatives, NNSA believes it can 
minimize the costs and risks of consolidation through effective 
transition planning.
    There would be increased programmatic risk in making this change if 
LANL's WETF operations were discontinued prior to establishing the 
necessary capabilities at SRS. However, the transfer of tritium R&D 
from LANL to SRS is currently estimated to take up to 5 years and, 
during this time, NNSA will maintain the WETF in a functional status 
for experimental purposes to address any unanticipated stockpile issues 
and to support Life Extension Programs for weapons.\7\ NNSA's intention 
is then to close WETF after its functional status is no longer needed 
to support transfer of tritium R&D to SRS.
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    \7\ The Life Extension Program is an NNSA program that ensures 
the Nation's aging nuclear weapons are capable of safely and 
reliably meeting national defense requirements without producing new 
warheads or conducting nuclear tests. The purpose of this program is 
to refurbish existing nuclear weapons to extend their life and 
provide structural enhancements.
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B. Flight Test Operations for Gravity Weapons

Alternatives Considered
    In addition to analyzing the No Action Alternative, NNSA evaluated 
four alternatives for conducting flight test operations: (1) High-tech 
mobile upgrade; (2) operate at TTR in a campaign mode; (3) transfer 
flight test operations to White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New 
Mexico; and (4) transfer flight test operations to the NTS. The 
Campaign Mode Alternative has three options: campaign from the NTS, 
campaign from TTR under the existing land use permit with the U.S. Air 
Force, and campaign from TTR under a new reduced footprint permit (see 
Section 3.10.3 of the Final SPEIS for more information).
    Under the No Action Alternative, High-Tech Mobile Upgrade 
Alternative, and Campaign Mode Alternative (all three options), NNSA 
would continue to conduct flight testing at TTR. There are minor 
differences in most aspects of these alternatives; however, the major 
difference would be staffing levels at TTR and the amount of land under 
NNSA's control.
    NNSA also considered two alternatives that would discontinue flight 
testing at TTR and move the operations to either WSMR or NTS. Both of 
these alternatives would require construction of a concrete target 500 
feet in diameter and 12 inches thick. Under both of these alternatives, 
NNSA and contractor personnel at TTR would either be transferred or 
laid off.
    NNSA has conducted flight tests at test ranges other than TTR when 
specific test requirements could not be met at TTR. Under any of the 
alternatives considered in the SPEIS, NNSA might conduct occasional 
flight tests at different test ranges consistent with the environmental 
reviews for those sites.
Alternatives Considered But Eliminated From Detailed Study
    NNSA considered flight test ranges operated by the Department of 
Defense, including Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, the China Lake 
testing and training range in California, and the Utah Test and 
Training Range. Each of these sites was determined to be unsuitable, 
primarily because the soils, underlying geologic formations, or both 
would make the recovery of deeply buried penetrators infeasible.
Preferred Alternative
    The Final SPEIS identified the preferred alternative for flight 
test operations for gravity weapons as the Campaign Mode Operation of 
Tonopah Test Range (Option 3--Campaign under Reduced Footprint Permit). 
Under this alternative, NNSA would reduce the footprint of its 
activities at TTR, upgrade equipment with mobile capability, and 
operate in campaign mode. NNSA expects it would not use Category I/II 
SNM in future flight tests.
Environmental Impacts of Alternatives
    The environmental impacts of the alternatives are presented in 
Section 5.15 of the SPEIS. Under the No Action Alternative there would 
be no changes to impacts currently experienced and no change to the 
permitted area at TTR (280 square miles). There would be no significant 
change in the workforce at TTR and no impacts to regional employment, 
income, or labor force.
    The environmental impacts of the High-Tech Mobile Upgrade 
Alternative would not differ significantly from the No Action 
Alternative. This alternative would allow for a reduction in the 
operational costs of TTR through the introduction of newer, more 
efficient and technologically advanced equipment. There would be no 
construction required for this alternative. Annual operating 
requirements would be the same as for the No Action Alternative and 
there would be negligible effects to region of influence employment, 
income, and labor force.
    All of the options under the Campaign Mode Alternative would retain 
flight testing operations at TTR, but would have socioeconomic impacts 
of varying levels. The reductions in employment would have secondary 
impacts on the service sector and commercial establishments in the 
region of influence. Because the flight testing operations would be the 
same under this alternative as both No Action and High-Tech Mobile 
Upgrade Alternatives, other environmental impacts would remain about 
the same. Option 1, Campaign from NTS, would result in the loss of 
approximately 92 full-time jobs at TTR, reducing the permanent 
workforce from 135 to 43. Option 2, Campaign under the Existing Land 
Use Permit, would result in the loss of approximately 57 jobs at TTR. 
Option 3, Campaign under a Reduced Footprint Permit, would result in 
the loss of about 70 jobs at TTR. However, for Options 2 and 3, the job 
loss would be partially offset by the addition of about 20 security 
guards as the Air Force assumes

[[Page 77661]]

responsibility for continued contract site security, reducing the net 
job loss to approximately 37 and 50 jobs, respectively. In addition to 
socioeconomic impacts, Option 3 could reduce the area NNSA controls at 
TTR from 280 square miles to potentially less than 1 square mile. The 
reduction in footprint would be coordinated with the Air Force, and 
would not affect ongoing DOE and NNSA environmental restoration 
activities and responsibilities at TTR resulting from past testing by 
the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor of DOE. This reduction in 
footprint would not affect land use because the Air Force would 
continue to use TTR as a test and training range.
    Transferring NNSA's flight testing operations from TTR to either 
WSMR or NTS would result in adverse socioeconomic impacts to the TTR 
region of influence, particularly the city of Tonopah. About 135 jobs 
would be lost at TTR and indirect effects on employment would include 
an additional loss of approximately 108 jobs. The annual impact to the 
income of the region of influence from both of these employment losses 
would be approximately $15.9 million ($10.2 million direct and $5.7 
million indirect). The adverse socioeconomic impacts would extend to 
the housing market, schools, and community services.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
    The analyses in the SPEIS of the environmental impacts of the 
flight testing alternatives revealed that the No Action Alternative is 
environmentally preferable. This alternative would result in no 
increase in impacts to resources over the existing condition and would 
not have the adverse socioeconomic impacts of either the Campaign Mode 
options or of transferring flight test operations to WSMR or NTS.
Decision on Flight Testing
    NNSA has decided to implement a campaign mode of operation at TTR 
as described in Option 3, Campaign under a Reduced Footprint Permit. 
NNSA would reduce the footprint of TTR, upgrade equipment with mobile 
capability, and operate in campaign mode. NNSA expects it would not use 
Category I/II SNM in future flight tests. Prior to making a decision to 
use these categories of SNM in future tests, NNSA would evaluate 
existing NEPA documents to determine if additional analysis would be 
required.
Basis for Decision on Flight Testing
    NNSA decided to implement the preferred alternative, Option 3 of 
Campaign Mode Operation, because it poses the lowest risk to the 
mission, which was NNSA's most important consideration in making this 
decision. As explained in the next paragraph, although the alternative 
of transferring the program to WSMR would potentially result in lower 
costs, the significant risks to the execution of this mission do not 
justify pursuing these possible savings.
    The risks to the mission are a result of the high demand for WSMR. 
WSMR is a national range with many different customers with diverse 
testing needs, and significant schedule coordination is required each 
year to meet these needs. An NNSA flight test program at WSMR would be 
assigned to priority category 4, behind programs such as Global War on 
Terrorism, major and minor research and development, test and 
evaluation programs, foreign military sales activities, and those 
programs that have been designated as documented Force/Activity 
Designator-1 programs. As a lower priority mission, NNSA's flight test 
program would not receive scheduling priority, which would pose risks 
to NNSA's mission it cannot accept. For example, because of the limited 
availability of nuclear certified aircraft, NNSA must generally 
accommodate its testing to times when Air Force aircraft are available. 
The low priority that would be assigned to NNSA flight testing at WSMR 
could limit NNSA's ability to conduct testing when aircraft become 
available. A secondary risk at WSMR is the uncertainty regarding the 
geology of the northern portion of the range and the associated 
uncertainty concerning NNSA's ability to use vertical recovery tools 
and techniques.
    With respect to costs, NNSA conducted a detailed business case 
study of the flight testing alternatives (Independent Business Case 
Analysis of Complex Transformation Flight Test Facilities Phase II, 
Sept. 2008). This study provides a life-cycle cost comparison of the 
alternatives and includes costs associated with construction, 
transition, maintenance, operations, security, decontamination and 
decommissioning, and other activities. Based on this study, NNSA 
determined that conducting flight testing at TTR in a campaign mode 
with a reduced footprint would be the least expensive of the 
alternatives considered except for discontinuing operations at TTR and 
moving to WSMR.
    Although the cost advantage of moving the program to WSMR could be 
as much as several million dollars annually, this is a small percentage 
of the total surveillance program budget. It also appears that the 
savings to the taxpayer might be lost due to the Air Force having to 
pick up new costs (now paid by NNSA) in order to conduct its programs 
at TTR. Additionally, potential scheduling delays and conflicts could 
further reduce or negate these savings.
    Implementation of the campaign mode of operation and reduction of 
NNSA's footprint at TTR will have approximately the same environmental 
impacts as the No Action Alternative for all resources other than 
socioeconomics. The loss of about 70 jobs at TTR will have an adverse 
impact on the economy of the city of Tonopah; however, the impact will 
be less severe than from discontinuing flight testing at TTR and moving 
it to WSMR. In addition, as the Air Force would assume overall 
responsibility for site security, NNSA estimates that the approximately 
20 current contractor security guard jobs would be retained.
    NNSA recognizes that further planning and NEPA analysis may be 
required to implement some aspects of this option. The scope of these 
analyses could include security, facility operations and maintenance, 
environmental restoration, impact mitigation activities, or other 
topics, as appropriate. This could result in additional facility 
closures and demolitions or transfer of specified facilities from the 
NNSA to another user, such as the Air Force.

C. Major Environmental Test Facilities

Alternatives Considered
    In addition to the No Action Alternative, NNSA evaluated two other 
alternatives for major Environmental Test Facilities: (1) Downsize-in-
Place and (2) Consolidation of ETF Capabilities at One Site (either NTS 
or SNL/NM).
    Under the No Action Alternative, NNSA would continue to operate 
redundant and aging ETF facilities at LLNL, LANL, SNL/NM, SNL/CA, and 
NTS. Only normal maintenance to meet safety and security standards 
would take place.
    Under the Downsize-in-Place Alternative, facilities that are 
redundant, in need of major repair to enable continued operations, or 
no longer used, would be closed. This alternative would enable the 
closure of two facilities at LANL, two at LLNL, four at SNL/NM, and one 
at SNL/CA.

[[Page 77662]]

    Under the Consolidation of Major ETF Capabilities at One Site, 
there are two options. One option would consolidate major ETF 
capabilities at NTS. This option would close four facilities at LANL, 
three at LLNL, twenty-one at SNL/NM, and one at SNL/CA. It would also 
require construction of five new facilities at NTS (an Annular Core 
Research Reactor-like facility, an Engineering Test Bay, an Aerial 
Cable Test Facility, a Building 834 Complex, and a sled track) to 
replace several of the capabilities lost through these closures. The 
two environmental test facilities at NTS, the Device Assembly Facility 
(DAF) and the U1a Complex, would remain in operation. The Engineered 
Test Bay (Building 334) at LLNL and three of the facilities at SNL/NM 
(considered to be capabilities critical to the continuance of the ETF 
Program) would remain open until the replacement facilities at NTS were 
operational.
    The second consolidation option would locate major ETF capabilities 
at SNL/NM. This alternative would close four facilities at LANL, three 
at LLNL, four at SNL/NM, and one at SNL/CA. Under this option, NNSA 
would continue operations at DAF and the U1a Complex and at some of the 
facilities at SNL/NM. For this option, the major ETF activities 
presently conducted in Building 334 at LLNL and at the Building 834 
Complex at LLNL's Site 300 would be transferred to either NTS or 
Pantex, or new facilities like these buildings would be constructed at 
SNL/NM.
Alternatives Considered But Eliminated from Detailed Study
    No other alternatives were considered for major ETFs.
Preferred Alternative
    The Final SPEIS identified the preferred alternative for major 
environmental testing as consolidating major environmental testing at 
SNL/NM and, infrequently, conducting operations requiring Category I/II 
SNM in security campaign mode there. NNSA would close LANL's and LLNL's 
major environmental testing facilities by 2010 (except those in LLNL 
Building 334 and the Building 834 Complex). NNSA would move 
environmental testing of nuclear explosive packages and other functions 
currently performed in LLNL Buildings 334 and 834 to Pantex by 2012.
Environmental Impacts of Alternatives
    The environmental impacts of the alternatives are presented in 
Section 5.17 of the SPEIS. Under the No Action Alternative there would 
be no significant changes to impacts currently experienced. There would 
be no change in the workforce conducting major ETF activities at LANL, 
LLNL, NTS, SNL/NM, or SNL/CA. Therefore, there would be no impacts to 
employment, income, or the labor force in the regions of influence.
    The Downsize-in-Place Alternative would close two facilities at 
LANL, two at LLNL, four at SNL/NM, and one at SNL/CA, reducing the 
existing floor space (about 558,000 square feet) by approximately 10 
percent. Closing buildings could result in a reduction in the use of 
electricity and other energy sources, and would eliminate any emissions 
from operations. Although closing these facilities would generate 
wastes, sufficient management capacity exists for these wastes, and no 
major impacts are expected. There would be fewer than 20 jobs lost at 
any site.
    The alternative of consolidating major ETF capabilities at NTS 
would result in closing four facilities at LANL, three at LLNL, 21 at 
SNL/NM, and one at SNL/CA, reducing the existing floor space by nearly 
95 percent (a reduction of approximately 537,000 square feet). Although 
closing these facilities would generate wastes, sufficient management 
capacity exists for these wastes, and no major impacts are expected. 
Approximately 30 jobs at LANL, six at LLNL (including SNL/CA), and 224 
at SNL/NM would be lost. This option would also require construction of 
new facilities at NTS to replace some capabilities lost through 
closures at other sites. Although this would disturb approximately 25 
acres of land, less than 1 percent of available land at NTS would be 
affected. In addition, closing major test facilities at other sites 
would reduce energy demands and emissions associated with operation of 
those facilities.
    The alternative of consolidating major ETF capabilities at SNL/NM 
would result in closing four facilities at LANL, three at LLNL, four at 
SNL/NM, and one at SNL/CA, reducing the existing floor space by nearly 
25 percent (a reduction of approximately 133,000 square feet). Although 
closing these facilities would generate wastes, sufficient management 
capacity exists for these wastes, and no major impacts are expected. 
Approximately 30 jobs at LANL, 6 at LLNL (including SNL/CA) and 16 at 
SNL/NM would be lost. This option would also require the construction 
of new facilities at SNL/NM to replace some capabilities lost through 
closures at other sites. Although this would disturb approximately 2.5 
acres of land, less than 1 percent of available land at SNL/NM would be 
affected.
    The major ETF functions currently performed in Building 334 at LLNL 
and the Building 834 Complex at LLNL's Site 300 would be moved to 
Pantex and located in an existing building or the proposed Weapons 
Surveillance Facility. This would require removal of equipment from 
Building 334 and from the Building 834 Complex and the installation at 
Pantex of a measurement tower, a sealed source storage pit, and a five-
ton bridge crane. This installation would require modification to only 
one building at Pantex; no new construction would be required. These 
changes would result in the addition of two jobs at Pantex. Operations 
would not be expected to generate additional waste other than normal 
office refuse, and waste associated with occasional use of solvents and 
cleaning fluids, and would not use additional water other than the 
sanitary and personal usage of the two additional employees.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
    The analyses in the SPEIS of the environmental impacts associated 
with the alternatives revealed that the No Action Alternative is 
environmentally preferable. This alternative would result in no 
increase in impacts to resources and would not produce any adverse 
socioeconomic impacts at LANL, LLNL, NTS, SNL/NM, or SNL/CA.
Decisions on Major Environmental Test Facilities
    NNSA has decided to implement the preferred alternative to 
consolidate major ETF capabilities at SNL/NM and conduct infrequent 
operations requiring Category I/II SNM in a security campaign mode. 
NNSA will close four facilities at LANL (K Site Environmental Test 
Facility, Weapons Component Test Facility, Pulse Intense X-Ray (PIXY) 
with Sled Track, and Thermo-Conditioning Facility), three at LLNL 
(Engineered Building 834 Complex, Dynamic Testing Facility (836 
Complex), and Building 334), four at SNL/NM (Sandia Pulsed Reactor 
Facility,\8\ Low Dose Rate Gamma Irradiation Facility, Auxiliary Hot 
Cell Facility, and Centrifuge Complex), and one at SNL/CA 
(Environmental Test Complex). In addition, activities presently 
conducted in Building 334 at LLNL and at Building 834 Complex at LLNL's 
Site 300 will be transferred to Pantex and placed either in existing 
buildings or in the proposed Weapons Surveillance Facility. Any new

[[Page 77663]]

construction would be subject to appropriate NEPA review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ The reactor itself has already been moved to NTS.
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Basis for Decision on Major Environmental Test Facilities
    NNSA's decision to consolidate major ETF capabilities at SNL/NM is 
the least costly alternative and poses no greater technical risk than 
other alternatives; cost and technical risk were the most important 
considerations in making this decision. Because the majority of the ETF 
capabilities currently exist at SNL/NM, consolidating these 
capabilities there will require the least construction and will have 
the lowest cost of the consolidation alternatives. Considering life-
cycle costs through the year 2060, this alternative is also the least 
costly, although the business case study showed only minor cost 
differences among the alternatives. All alternatives analyzed were 
found to pose some technical risk; however, no significant differences 
were found among the alternatives. For the alternatives involving 
consolidation at SNL/NM or NTS, the major risk was the potential delay 
in constructing a new facility to house the Building 334 and Building 
834 missions. For these missions, consolidation into an existing 
building at Pantex has the lowest cost, poses the smallest risk, and 
produces the least environmental impacts.
    Considering potential environmental impacts, cost, technical risk 
and schedule, the alternative of consolidating major ETF capabilities 
at SNL/NM, and moving the activities conducted at Building 334 and 
Building 834 to Pantex, is the best alternative.
Mitigation Measures
    As described in the SPEIS, NNSA conducts its missions in compliance 
with environmental laws, regulations, and policies within a framework 
of contractual requirements; many of these requirements mandate actions 
to control and mitigate potential adverse environmental effects. 
Examples include the site environment, safety, and health manuals, site 
security and threat protection plans, emergency plans, Integrated 
Safety Management Systems, pollution prevention and waste minimization 
programs, cultural resource and protected species programs, and energy 
and water conservation programs.

Comments Received on Final SPEIS Related to the Project-Specific 
Alternatives

    During the 30-day period following the EPA's notice of availability 
for the Final SPEIS (73 FR 63460, Oct. 24, 2008), NNSA received written 
comments from the following groups: Alliance for Nuclear 
Accountability, Project on Government Oversight, National Radical 
Women, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Oak Ridge Environmental 
Peace Alliance, Tri-Valley CAREs, the Union of Concerned Scientists, 
Nuclear Watch New Mexico, the Arms and Security Initiative of the New 
America Foundation, Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, Embudo 
Valley Environmental Group, Ecology Ministry, Loretto Community, Aqua 
es Vida Action Team, Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping, 
and Tewa Women United. Written comments were also received from 
approximately 30 individuals. The majority of these comments, which 
focused primarily on policy and programmatic issues, are considered by 
NNSA in the ROD for the programmatic decisions. NNSA did receive 
comments related to two issues regarding the project-specific 
alternatives, though neither has bearing on any of the three missions 
that this ROD concerns. These project-specific comments and NNSA's 
responses follow.
    1. Referring to the Preferred Alternative for Major Hydrodynamic 
Testing as described in the Final SPEIS (Section 3.17.2, Volume I), one 
commenter stated that containing hydrodynamic testing at LLNL in the 
Contained Firing Facility by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2008 implies 
that open-air detonation experiments would cease at LLNL's Site 300 by 
the end of FY 2008. The commenter points out that the Preferred 
Alternative also states that hydrodynamic testing at Site 300 would be 
consolidated to a smaller footprint by 2015. The commenter then states 
that since many of the hydrodynamic testing facilities at Site 300 are 
open-air firing tables, it is not clear whether open-air detonations 
would continue at LLNL Site 300 facilities until 2015, or potentially a 
later date. If NNSA plans to cease open-air detonation experiments at 
Site 300, either by the end of FY 2008 or in 2015, it should express 
this determination in unequivocal language. Another commenter stated 
that all open air tests must be contained and questioned the meaning of 
the following sentence in the Final SPEIS: ``Open-air hydrotests at 
LANL's DARHT [Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test facility], 
excluding SNM, would only occur if needed to meet national security 
requirements.'' (See Section S.3.17.2, Summary.) The commenter 
specifically asked what the phrase ``if needed'' means and asked who 
would make this decision.
    Response: As stated in this ROD, NNSA is not making any new 
decisions regarding hydrodynamic testing activities at this time. These 
activities will continue as described in the No Action Alternative and 
pursuant to previous decisions. If NNSA decides to make significant 
changes to hydrodynamic testing, it would issue a ROD to announce and 
explain the new decision.
    2. In reference to the Preferred Alternative for HE R&D as 
described in the Final SPEIS (Section S.3.17.2 of the Summary), one 
commenter stated that a schedule that defines when LANL would arrive at 
contained HE R&D experimentation must be given. Just stating that LANL 
will ``move towards'' contained HE R&D experimentation is meaningless 
and will continue to impose environmental impacts on the public.
    Response: As stated in this ROD, NNSA is not making any new 
decisions regarding HE R&D activities at this time. These activities 
will continue as described in the No Action Alternative and pursuant to 
previous decisions. If NNSA decides to make significant changes to HE 
R&D activities, it would issue a ROD to announce and explain the new 
decision.

    Issued at Washington, DC, this 15th day of December 2008.
Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
 [FR Doc. E8-30194 Filed 12-18-08; 8:45 am]
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