Record of Decision for the Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement-Operations Involving Plutonium, Uranium, and the Assembly and Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons, 77644-77656 [E8-30193]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 245 (Friday, December 19, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 77644-77656]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-30193]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of Decision for the Complex Transformation Supplemental 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement--Operations Involving 
Plutonium, Uranium, and the Assembly and Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of 
Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a 
separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 
is issuing this Record of Decision (ROD) for the continued 
transformation of the nuclear weapons complex (Complex). This ROD is 
based on information and analyses contained in the Complex 
Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
(SPEIS) (DOE/EIS-0236-S4) issued on October 24, 2008 (73 FR 63460); 
comments received on the SPEIS; other NEPA analyses as noted; and other 
factors, including cost, technical and security considerations, and the 
missions of NNSA. The SPEIS analyzes the potential environmental 
impacts of alternatives for transforming the nuclear weapons complex 
into a smaller, more efficient enterprise that can respond to changing 
national security challenges and ensure the long-term safety, security, 
and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
    The alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS are divided into two 
categories: programmatic and project-specific. Programmatic 
alternatives involve the restructuring of facilities that use or store 
significant (i.e., Category I/II) quantities of special nuclear 
material (SNM).\1\ These facilities produce plutonium components 
(commonly called pits \2\), produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
components (including secondaries \3\), fabricate high explosives (HE) 
components, and assemble and disassemble nuclear weapons. The decisions 
announced in this ROD relate to the programmatic alternatives analyzed 
in the SPEIS. NNSA is issuing a separate ROD relating to the project-
specific alternatives.
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    \1\ As defined in section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
special nuclear material is: (1) Plutonium, uranium enriched in the 
isotope 233 or in the isotope 235 and any other material which the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines to be special nuclear 
material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the 
foregoing. Special nuclear material is separated into Security 
Categories I, II, III, and IV based on the type, attractiveness 
level, and quantity of the material. Categories I and II require the 
highest level of security.
    \2\ A pit is the central core of a nuclear weapon, principally 
made of plutonium or enriched uranium.
    \3\ A secondary is the component of a nuclear weapon that 
contains elements needed to initiate the fusion reaction in a 
thermonuclear explosion.
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    NNSA has decided to implement its preferred programmatic 
alternative as described in the SPEIS and summarized in this ROD. This 
decision will transform the plutonium and uranium manufacturing aspects 
of the complex into smaller and more efficient operations while 
maintaining the capabilities NNSA needs to perform its national 
security missions. The three major elements of the decisions announced 
in this ROD are:
    (1) Manufacturing and research and development (R&D) involving 
plutonium will remain at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in 
New Mexico. To support these activities, NNSA will construct and 
operate the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear 
Facility (CMRR-NF) at LANL as a replacement for portions of the 
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility, a structure that is 
more than 50 years old

[[Page 77645]]

and faces significant safety and seismic challenges to its continued 
operation.
    (2) Manufacturing and R&D involving uranium will remain at the Y-12 
National Security Complex in Tennessee. NNSA will construct and operate 
a Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12 as a replacement for 
existing facilities that are more than 50 years old and face 
significant safety and maintenance challenges to their continued 
operation.
    (3) Assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons and high explosives 
production and manufacturing will remain at the Pantex Plant in Texas.
    These decisions will best enable NNSA to meet its statutory mission 
while minimizing technical risks, risks to mission objectives, costs, 
and environmental impacts. These decisions continue the transformation 
begun following the end of the Cold War and the cessation of nuclear 
weapons testing, particularly decisions announced in the 1996 ROD for 
the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management (SSM PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0236) (61 FR 68014; Dec. 
26, 1996). This ROD explains why NNSA is making these programmatic 
decisions, why it is appropriate to make them at this time, and the 
flexibility NNSA has to adapt these decisions as needed in response to 
any changes in national security requirements that may occur in the 
near term.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the Complex 
Transformation SPEIS or this ROD, or to receive copies of these, 
contact: Ms. Mary E. Martin, NNSA NEPA Compliance Officer, Office of 
Environmental Projects and Operations, NA-56, U.S. Department of 
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, toll free 
1-800-832-0885 ext. 69438. A request for a copy of the SPEIS or this 
ROD may be sent by facsimile to 1-703-931-9222, or by e-mail to 
complextransformation@nnsa.doe.gov. The SPEIS, this ROD, the project-
specific ROD, and additional information regarding complex 
transformation are available at https://
www.ComplexTransformationSPEIS.com and https://www.nnsa.doe.gov.
    For information on DOE's NEPA process, contact: Ms. Carol M. 
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (GC-20), U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 
20585, 202-586-4600, or leave a message at 800-472-2756. Additional 
information regarding DOE NEPA activities and access to many DOE NEPA 
documents are available through the DOE NEPA Web site at: https://
www.gc.energy.gov/NEPA.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    NNSA prepared this ROD pursuant to the regulations of the Council 
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) for implementing the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA 
Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021). This ROD is based on 
information and analyses contained in the Complex Transformation 
Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (SPEIS) (DOE/
EIS-0236-S4) issued on October 24, 2008 (73 FR 63460); comments 
received on the SPEIS; other NEPA analyses as noted; other factors, 
including cost, technical and security considerations, and the missions 
of NNSA. NNSA received approximately 100,000 comment documents on the 
Draft SPEIS from Federal agencies; state, local, and tribal 
governments; public and private organizations; and individuals. In 
addition, during the 20 public hearings that NNSA held, more than 600 
speakers made oral comments.
    National security policies require DOE, through NNSA, to maintain 
the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as the nation's 
core competencies in nuclear weapons. Since completing the SSM PEIS and 
associated ROD in 1996, DOE has pursued these objectives through the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program emphasizes development and 
application of greatly improved scientific and technical capabilities 
to assess the safety, security, and reliability of existing nuclear 
warheads without nuclear testing. Throughout the 1990s, DOE also took 
steps to consolidate the Complex to its current configuration of three 
national laboratories (and a flight test range operated by Sandia 
National Laboratories), four industrial plants, and a nuclear test 
site. This Complex enables NNSA to design, develop, manufacture, 
maintain, and repair nuclear weapons; certify their safety, security, 
and reliability; conduct surveillance on weapons in the stockpile; 
store Category I/II SNM; and dismantle and disposition retired weapons. 
Sites within the Complex and their current weapons program missions are 
described in the following paragraphs.
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, 
California--LLNL conducts research, design, and development of nuclear 
weapons; designs and tests advanced technology concepts; provides 
safety, security, and reliability assessments and certification of 
stockpile weapons; conducts plutonium and tritium R&D, hydrotesting, HE 
R&D and environmental testing; and stores Category I/II quantities of 
SNM. LLNL also conducts destructive and nondestructive surveillance 
evaluations on pits to evaluate their reliability. NNSA is currently 
removing Category I/II SNM from the site and by 2012 LLNL will not 
maintain these categories of SNM. NNSA is constructing the National 
Ignition Facility (NIF) at LLNL, which will allow a wide variety of 
high-energy-density investigations. NIF is scheduled to begin 
operations in 2009.
    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, New Mexico--LANL 
conducts research, design, and development of nuclear weapons; designs 
and tests advanced technology concepts; provides safety, security, and 
reliability assessments and certification of stockpile weapons; 
maintains production capabilities for limited quantities of plutonium 
components (i.e., pits) for delivery to the stockpile; manufactures 
nuclear weapon detonators for the stockpile; conducts plutonium and 
tritium R&D, hydrotesting, HE R&D and environmental testing; and stores 
Category I/II quantities of SNM. LANL also conducts destructive and 
nondestructive surveillance evaluations on pits to assess their 
reliability.
    Nevada Test Site (NTS), 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada--
NTS maintains the capability to conduct underground nuclear testing; 
conducts high hazard experiments involving nuclear material and high 
explosives; provides the capability to process and dispose of a damaged 
nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device; conducts non-nuclear 
experiments; conducts hydrodynamic testing and HE testing; conducts 
research and training on nuclear safeguards, criticality safety, and 
emergency response; and stores Category I/II quantities of SNM.
    Pantex Plant (Pantex), Amarillo, Texas--Pantex dismantles retired 
weapons; fabricates HE components, and performs HE R&D; assembles HE, 
nuclear, and non-nuclear components into nuclear weapons; repairs and 
modifies weapons; performs nonintrusive pit modification; \4\ and 
evaluates and performs surveillance of weapons. Pantex stores Category 
I/II

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quantities of SNM for the weapons program and stores other SNM in the 
form of surplus plutonium pits pending transfer to SRS for disposition.
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    \4\ Nonintrusive pit modification involves changes to the 
external surfaces and features of a pit.
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    Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina--SRS extracts 
tritium and performs loading, unloading, and surveillance of tritium 
reservoirs, and conducts tritium R&D. SRS does not store Category I/II 
quantities of SNM for NNSA's weapons activities, but does store 
Category I/II quantities for other DOE activities. SRS is currently 
receiving Category I/II surplus, non-pit plutonium from LLNL for 
storage pending its disposition.
    Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), Oak Ridge, Tennessee--Y-12 
manufactures uranium components for nuclear weapons, cases, and other 
nuclear weapons components; evaluates and tests these components; 
stores Category I/II quantities of HEU; conducts dismantlement, 
storage, and disposition of HEU; and supplies HEU for use in naval 
reactors.
    The following two sites are part of the Complex but would not be 
affected by decisions announced in this ROD.
    Kansas City Plant (KCP), Kansas City, Missouri--KCP manufactures 
and procures non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons and evaluates 
and tests these components. KCP has no SNM. The General Services 
Administration, as the lead agency, and NNSA, as a cooperating agency, 
prepared an Environmental Assessment (DOE/EA-1592, Apr. 2008) regarding 
the potential environmental impacts of modernizing the facilities and 
infrastructure for the non-nuclear production activities conducted by 
the KCP as well as moving these activities to other locations. The 
agencies issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (73 FR 23244; Apr. 
29, 2008) regarding an alternative site in the Kansas City area. The 
SPEIS does not assess alternatives for the activities conducted at the 
KCP.
    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Albuquerque, New Mexico; 
Livermore, California; and other locations--SNL conducts systems 
engineering of nuclear weapons; conducts research, design, and 
development of non-nuclear components; manufactures non-nuclear 
components, including neutron generators, for the stockpile; provides 
safety, security, and reliability assessments of stockpile weapons; and 
conducts HE R&D, tritium R&D, and environmental testing. The principal 
laboratory is located in Albuquerque, New Mexico (SNL/NM); a division 
of the laboratory (SNL/CA) is located in Livermore, California. SNL 
also operates the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) near Tonopah, Nevada, for 
flight testing of gravity weapons (including R&D and testing of nuclear 
weapons components and delivery systems). In 2008, NNSA completed the 
removal of SNL/NM's Category I/II SNM. SNL/NM no longer stores or uses 
these categories of SNM on an ongoing basis, although it may use 
Category I/II SNM for limited periods in the future. No SNM is stored 
at TTR, although some test operations have involved SNM.

Alternatives Considered

    NNSA has been considering how to continue the transformation of the 
Complex since the Nuclear Posture Review \5\ was transmitted to 
Congress by the Department of Defense in early 2002. NNSA considered 
the Stockpile Stewardship Conference in 2003, the Department of Defense 
Strategic Capabilities Assessment in 2004, the recommendations of the 
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on the Nuclear Weapons 
Complex Infrastructure in 2005, and the Defense Science Board Task 
Force on Nuclear Capabilities in 2006 as to how transformation should 
continue. Based on these studies and other information, NNSA developed 
the range of reasonable alternatives for the Complex that could reduce 
its size, reduce the number of sites with Category I/II SNM (and 
storage locations for these categories of SNM within sites), eliminate 
redundant activities, and improve the responsiveness of the Complex. 
The following programmatic capabilities involving SNM are evaluated in 
the SPEIS:
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    \5\ The Nuclear Posture Review is a comprehensive analysis that 
lays out the direction for the United States' nuclear forces.
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     Plutonium operations, including pit manufacturing; 
Category I/II SNM storage; and related R&D;
     Enriched uranium operations, including canned subassembly 
manufacturing, assembly, and disassembly; Category I/II SNM storage; 
and related R&D; and
     Weapons assembly and disassembly and HE production 
(collectively, A/D/HE).
    The programmatic alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS are discussed 
in the following paragraphs.
    No Action Alternative. NNSA evaluated a No Action Alternative, 
which represents continuation of the status quo including 
implementation of past decisions. Under the No Action Alternative, NNSA 
would not make additional major changes to the SNM missions now 
assigned to its sites.
    Programmatic Alternative 1: Distributed Centers of Excellence. This 
alternative would locate the three major SNM functional capabilities 
(plutonium, uranium, and weapons assembly and disassembly) involving 
Category I/II quantities of SNM at two or three separate sites. This 
alternative would create a consolidated plutonium center (CPC) for R&D, 
storage, processing, and manufacture of pits. Production rates of up to 
125 pits per year for single shift operations and up to 200 pits 
annually for multiple shifts and extended work weeks are assessed for a 
CPC in this alternative. A CPC could consist of new facilities, or 
modifications to existing facilities at LANL, NTS, Pantex, SRS, or Y-
12. The SPEIS also evaluated an option under this alternative that 
would upgrade facilities at LANL to produce up to 80 pits per year. 
This option would involve the construction and operation of the CMRR-
NF. Highly-enriched uranium storage and uranium operations would 
continue at Y-12. Under this alternative, NNSA analyzed two options--
construction of a new UPF and an upgrade of existing facilities at Y-
12. The weapons A/D/HE mission would remain at Pantex under this 
programmatic alternative.
    Programmatic Alternative 2: Consolidated Centers of Excellence. 
NNSA would consolidate the three major SNM functions (plutonium, 
uranium, and weapons assembly and disassembly) involving Category I/II 
quantities of SNM at one or two sites under this alternative. Two 
options were assessed: (1) The single site option (referred to as the 
consolidated nuclear production center [CNPC] option); and (2) the two-
site option (referred to as the consolidated nuclear centers [CNC] 
option). Under the CNPC option, a new CNPC could be established at 
LANL, NTS, Pantex, SRS, or Y-12. Under the CNC option, the plutonium 
and uranium component manufacturing missions would be separate from the 
A/D/HE mission. The Consolidated Centers of Excellence Alternative 
assumed production rates of up to 125 weapons per year for single shift 
operations and up to 200 weapons annually for multiple shifts and 
extended work weeks.
    Programmatic Alternative 3: Capability-Based Alternative. Under 
this alternative, NNSA would maintain a basic capability for 
manufacturing components for all stockpile weapons, as well as 
laboratory and experimental capabilities to support stockpile 
stewardship, but would reduce production facilities in-place such that 
NNSA would produce only a nominal level of replacement components 
(approximately 50 components per year). Within this alternative, NNSA

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also evaluated a No Net Production/Capability-Based Alternative, in 
which NNSA would maintain capabilities to continue surveillance of the 
weapons stockpile, produce limited life components, and dismantle 
weapons, but would not add new types or increased numbers of weapons to 
the stockpile. This alternative involves minimum production (i.e., 
production of 10 sets of components or assembly of 10 weapons per year) 
within facilities with a larger manufacturing capability. Both options 
of this alternative would involve the construction and operation of a 
CMRR-NF.

Preferred Alternative

    The Final SPEIS identified the following preferred alternatives for 
restructuring facilities that use significant quantities of SNM:
     Plutonium R&D and manufacturing: LANL would provide a 
consolidated plutonium research, development, and manufacturing 
capability within TA-55 (the Technical Area at LANL containing 
plutonium processing facilities) enabled by construction and operation 
of the CMRR-NF. The CMRR-NF would replace the existing CMR facility (a 
50-year-old facility that has significant safety issues that cannot be 
addressed in the existing structure), to support transfer of plutonium 
R&D and Category I/II quantities of SNM from LLNL, and consolidation of 
weapons-related plutonium operations, including plutonium R&D and 
storage of Category I/II quantities of SNM, at LANL. Until completion 
of a new Nuclear Posture Review in 2009 or later, the net production at 
LANL would be limited to a maximum of 20 pits per year. Other national 
security actinide missions (e.g., emergency response, material 
disposition, nuclear energy) would continue at TA-55.
     Uranium manufacturing and R&D: Y-12 would continue as the 
uranium center, producing components and canned subassemblies, and 
conducting surveillance and dismantlement. NNSA completed construction 
of the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF) in 2008 and 
will consolidate HEU storage in that facility.\6\ NNSA would build a 
UPF at Y-12 to provide a smaller and modern highly-enriched uranium 
production capability, replacing 50-year-old facilities.
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    \6\ The environmental impacts of HEUMF and its alternatives are 
analyzed in the Site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Y-
12 National Security Complex (DOE/EIS-0309, 2001); NNSA announced 
its decision to construct and operate HEUMF on March 13, 2002 (67 FR 
11296).
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     Assembly/disassembly/high explosives production and 
manufacturing: Pantex would remain the assembly/disassembly/high 
explosives production and manufacturing center. NNSA would consolidate 
non-destructive weapons surveillance operations at Pantex.
     Consolidation of Category I/II SNM: NNSA would continue 
ongoing actions to transfer Category I/II SNM from LLNL under the No 
Action Alternative and phase out Category I/II operations at LLNL by 
the end of 2012.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    Section 101 of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4331) establishes a policy of 
federal agencies having a continuing responsibility to improve and 
coordinate their plans, functions, programs, and resources so that, 
among other goals, the nation may fulfill its responsibilities as a 
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations. The CEQ, in its 
``Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations'' (46 FR 
18026; Mar. 23, 1981), defines the ``environmentally preferable 
alternative'' as the alternative ``that will promote the national 
environmental policy expressed in NEPA's Section 101.''
    The analyses in the SPEIS of the environmental impacts associated 
with the programmatic alternatives indicated that the No Net 
Production/Capability-Based Alternative is environmentally preferable. 
This alternative would result in the minimum infrastructure demands 
(e.g., electricity and water use would be reduced by almost 50 percent 
at some sites); produce the least amount of wastes (radioactive wastes 
would be reduced by approximately 33-50 percent compared to the No 
Action Alternative); reduce worker radiation doses (by approximately 
33-50 percent compared to the No Action Alternative); and require the 
fewest employees (up to 40 percent fewer at some sites). Almost all of 
these reductions in potential impacts result from the reduced 
production levels assumed for this alternative.

Alternatives Considered but Eliminated From Detailed Study

    NNSA considered programmatic alternatives other than those 
described above, but concluded that these alternatives were not 
reasonable and eliminated them from detailed analysis. As discussed in 
the SPEIS, the following alternatives were considered but eliminated 
from detailed study: (1) Consolidate the Three Nuclear Weapons 
Laboratories (LLNL, LANL and SNL); (2) Curatorship Alternative; (3) 
Smaller CNPC Alternative; (4) New CPC with a Smaller Capacity; (5) 
Purchase Pits; (6) Upgrade Building 332 at LLNL to enable pit 
production; (7) Consider Other Sites for the CPC; (8) Redesign Weapons 
to Require Less or No Plutonium; and (9) Do Not Produce New Pits (see 
Section 3.15, Volume I of the SPEIS).

Decisions

    With respect to the three major SNM functional capabilities 
(plutonium, uranium, and weapons assembly and disassembly) involving 
Category I/II quantities of SNM, NNSA has decided to keep these 
functional capabilities at three separate sites:
     Plutonium manufacturing and R&D will remain at LANL, and 
NNSA will construct and operate the CMRR-NF there to support these 
activities;
     Uranium manufacturing and R&D will remain at Y-12 and NNSA 
will construct and operate a UPF there to support these activities;
     Assembly/disassembly/high explosives production and 
manufacturing will remain at Pantex.
    With respect to SNM consolidation, NNSA will continue ongoing 
activities \7\ to transfer Category I/II SNM from LLNL under the No 
Action Alternative and phase out Category I/II operations at LLNL by 
the end of 2012.
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    \7\ In regard to surplus, non-pit, weapons-usable plutonium 
currently at LLNL, transfer to SRS for storage pending disposition 
is being undertaken consistent with decisions announced on September 
11, 2007, in an Amended ROD (72 FR 51807) based on the Storage and 
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic EIS.
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Bases for Decisions

Overview

    NNSA's decision locates the three major functional capabilities 
involving Category I/II quantities of SNM at three separate sites where 
these missions are currently performed. The selected alternative, which 
is a combination of the Distributed Centers of Excellence and 
Capability-Based Alternatives, has the least cost and lowest risk. 
Consolidation or transfer of uranium and plutonium operations to other 
sites (as analyzed in several options under the Distributed and 
Consolidated Centers of Excellence Alternatives) could result in lower 
operational costs and other benefits if and when such an alternative 
were fully implemented. However, movement of any of these three major 
capabilities to another site poses unacceptable programmatic risks and 
would cost far more than the selected alternative for an extended 
period of time. Moving one or more of these capabilities would take 
years to achieve and might be unsuccessful; in the interim, NNSA would 
need to build some new facilities at the sites where these capabilities 
are currently located

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simply to maintain those capabilities during the relocation process.
    Similarly, the No Action Alternative is unacceptable because it 
would require NNSA to continue operations in facilities that are 
outdated, too costly to operate, and not capable of meeting modern 
environment, health and safety (ES&H) or security standards. These 
facilities cannot be relied upon much longer, and must be replaced or 
closed.
    Under NNSA's decision, plutonium operations remain at LANL. It will 
not construct a new pit manufacturing facility such as a CPC or a CNPC 
because it appears unlikely there will be a need to produce more than 
10-80 pits per year in the future and because constructing these 
facilities would be very expensive. Instead, NNSA will upgrade the 
existing plutonium facilities at the laboratory and will construct a 
CMRR-NF.\8\ Construction of this facility is a needed modernization of 
LANL's plutonium capabilities--continued use of the existing CMR 
facility is inefficient and poses ES&H and security issues that cannot 
be addressed by modifying the CMR. Uranium operations remain at Y-12, 
and NNSA will construct a UPF because the existing uranium production 
facilities are also beyond their useful lives, inefficient, and present 
ES&H and security issues similar to those at CMR. CMRR-NF and UPF will 
be safer, seismically robust, and easier to defend from potential 
terrorist attacks. Their size will support production rates appropriate 
for a reasonable range of future stockpile sizes, and would not be much 
smaller if future production rates were much lower than currently 
anticipated.\9\
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    \8\ NNSA prepared an Environmental Impact Statement for the 
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (CMRR EIS) 
(DOE/EIS-0350). The CMRR EIS evaluates potential impacts of the 
proposed relocation of analytical chemistry and materials 
characterization activities and associated R&D to a new CMRR. The 
proposed CMRR consists of a nuclear facility--CMRR-NF--and a 
separate radiological laboratory, administrative office, and support 
building. See also the 2008 Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement 
for Los Alamos National Laboratory (2008 LANL SWEIS, DOE/EIS-0380). 
In deciding to construct the CMRR-NF at LANL, NNSA considered the 
analyses in the CMRR EIS and the 2008 LANL SWEIS, as well as those 
in the SPEIS.
    \9\ NNSA evaluated various sizes for facilities analyzed in the 
SPEIS to determine if smaller facilities should be considered in 
detail for the Distributed and Consolidated Centers of Excellence 
Alternatives. NNSA evaluated the programmatic risk, cost 
effectiveness, and environmental impacts of smaller facilities and 
concluded that smaller facilities were not reasonable for some of 
these alternatives (see Section 3.15 of the SPEIS). Smaller 
facilities were considered for the Capability-Based Alternative.
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Plutonium Operations

    With respect to plutonium manufacturing, NNSA is not making any new 
decisions regarding production capacity until completion of a new 
Nuclear Posture Review in 2009 or later. NNSA does not foresee an 
imminent need to produce more than 20 pits per year to meet national 
security requirements. This production level was established almost 10 
years ago in the ROD (64 FR 50797, Sept. 20, 1999) based on the Site-
wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (1999 LANL SWEIS; DOE/EIS-0238). The ROD 
based on the 2008 LANL SWEIS (DOE/EIS-0380) continued this limit on 
production (73 FR 55833; Sept. 26, 2008). NNSA will continue design of 
a CMRR-NF that would support a potential annual production (in LANL's 
TA-55 facilities) of 20-80 pits. The design activities are sufficiently 
flexible to account for changing national security requirements that 
could result from a new Nuclear Posture Review, further changes to the 
size of stockpile, or future Federal budgets. Furthermore, because 
NNSA's sensitivity analyses have shown that there is little difference 
in the size of a facility needed to support production rates between 1 
and 80 components per year, the future production capacity is not 
anticipated to have a significant impact on the size of the CMRR-
NF.\10\ With a new CMRR-NF providing support, the existing plutonium 
facility at LANL will have sufficient capability to produce between 1 
and 80 pits per year. A new CMRR-NF will also allow NNSA to better 
support national security missions involving plutonium and other 
actinides (including, e.g., the plutonium-238 heat source program 
undertaken for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA); non-proliferation programs, including the sealed source 
recovery program; emergency response; nuclear counter-terrorism; 
nuclear forensics; render safe program (program to disable improvised 
nuclear devices); material disposition; and nuclear fuel research and 
development).
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    \10\ See note 9 supra.
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Uranium Operations

    With respect to uranium manufacturing, NNSA will maintain the 
current capacity in existing facilities at Y-12 as discussed in Section 
3.5 of the SPEIS and within the planning basis discussed in Section 
3.1.2 of the 2001 Site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Y-12 
National Security Complex (2001 Y-12 SWEIS; DOE/EIS-0309). NNSA is 
preparing a new SWEIS for Y-12 (Site-wide Environmental Impact 
Statement for the Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 
(Y-12 SWEIS; DOE/EIS-0387)), which will evaluate site-specific issues 
associated with continued production operations at Y-12, including 
issues related to construction and operation of a UPF such as its 
location and size. The Y-12 SWEIS will consider any new information 
(such as a new Nuclear Posture Review or further changes to the 
stockpile) that becomes available during the preparation of that 
document.
Assembly and Disassembly of Weapons and High Explosives Production
    NNSA will continue to conduct these operations at Pantex as 
announced in the ROD (62 FR 3880; Jan. 27, 1997) for the Environmental 
Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and 
Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components (DOE/EIS-0225, 1996).

Production Rates and New Facilities

    While NNSA is not making any new decisions regarding the production 
rates of plutonium or uranium components, it has decided that a CMRR-NF 
and UPF are essential to its ability to meet national security 
requirements regarding the nation's nuclear deterrent. The existing 
facilities where these operations are now conducted cannot be used much 
longer and cannot be renovated in a manner that is either affordable or 
acceptable (from ES&H, security, and production perspectives). As NNSA 
continues the design and, in the case of a UPF, NEPA analysis of these 
facilities, it can modify them to reflect changing requirements such as 
those resulting from a new Nuclear Posture Review, further changes to 
stockpile size, and future federal budgets. In short, a CMRR-NF and UPF 
are needed for NNSA to maintain its basic nuclear weapons capabilities 
because they would replace outdated and deteriorating facilities. These 
facilities are needed regardless of how many or what types of weapons 
may be called for in the future.

National Security Requirements and Stockpile Size

    In making these decisions, NNSA considered its statutory 
responsibilities to support the nuclear weapons stockpile as determined 
by the President and the Congress. President Bush's goal is to achieve 
a credible nuclear deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear 
warheads consistent with

[[Page 77649]]

national security needs. In 2002, he and Russia's President Putin 
signed the Moscow Treaty, under which the United States and Russia will 
each reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
weapons to 1,700-2,200 by 2012. In 2004, President Bush issued a 
directive to cut the entire U.S. stockpile--both deployed and reserve 
warheads--in half by 2012. This goal was later accelerated and achieved 
in 2007, five years ahead of schedule. At the end of 2007, the total 
stockpile was almost 50 percent below what it was in 2001. On December 
18, 2007, the White House announced the President's decision to reduce 
the entire nuclear weapons stockpile by another 15 percent by 2012. 
This means the U.S. nuclear stockpile will be less than one-quarter its 
size at the end of the Cold War--the smallest stockpile since the 
Eisenhower Administration.
    NNSA's analyses in the SPEIS are based on current national policy 
regarding stockpile size (1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic 
nuclear warheads by 2012) with flexibility to respond to future 
Presidential direction to make further changes in the numbers of 
weapons. Maintaining a stockpile requires the ability to detect aging 
effects and other changes in weapons (a surveillance program), the 
ability to fix identified problems without nuclear testing (the 
stockpile stewardship program), and the ability to produce replacement 
components and reassemble weapons (a fully capable set of production 
facilities).
    NNSA understands that at least two major reviews of the 
requirements for the future nuclear weapons program are expected during 
the next year. These reviews may influence the size and composition of 
the future nuclear weapons stockpile, and the nuclear infrastructure 
required to support that stockpile. First, the Congress has established 
the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United 
States. This commission is to conduct a review of the strategic posture 
of the United States, including a strategic threat assessment and a 
detailed review of nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force 
structure. Its recommendations, currently scheduled for completion in 
the spring of 2009, are expected to address the size and nature of the 
future nuclear weapons stockpile, and the capabilities required to 
support that stockpile. Second, Congress has directed the 
Administration to conduct another Nuclear Posture Review in 2009 to 
clarify the United States' nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for 
the near term (i.e., the next 5-10 years). A report on this Nuclear 
Posture Review is due on December 1, 2009.
    NNSA has structured its programs and plans in a manner that allows 
it to continue transforming the complex and to replace antiquated 
facilities while retaining the flexibility to respond to evolving 
national security requirements, which is essential for a truly 
responsive infrastructure. The decisions in this ROD allow NNSA to 
continue to rely on LANL facilities (with a new CMRR-NF) to provide 
maximum flexibility to respond to future changes in plutonium 
requirements.

Costs, Technical Risks, and Other Factors

    NNSA prepared detailed business case studies of the programmatic 
alternatives. These studies are available at https://
www.ComplexTransformationSPEIS.com. They provide a cost comparison of 
the alternatives and include costs associated with construction, 
transition, operations, maintenance, security, decontamination and 
decommissioning, and other relevant factors.\11\ Based on these 
studies, NNSA determined that the costs through 2030 for the 
consolidation alternatives would be approximately 20-40 percent greater 
than for the alternatives that would maintain the three major 
capabilities--plutonium operations, uranium operations, and A/D/HE 
operations--at their current sites. Additionally, NNSA's analysis found 
that, through 2060, the costs for the consolidation alternatives would 
be greater than those for the alternatives that maintain the three 
capabilities where they are currently located.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ The cost analyses considered both life-cycle costs (i.e., 
the cumulative costs over an approximately 50-year life) and 
discounted cash flows (i.e., a net present value in which all future 
costs are reduced by a common factor (generally the cost of 
capital)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to technical risk, as part of the business case 
studies, NNSA evaluated five types of risk: (1) Engineering and 
construction; (2) implementation; (3) program; (4) safety and 
regulatory; and (5) security. These analyses balance nearer-term risks 
incurred while transitioning to an alternative with longer-term 
operational risks. For example, consolidation alternatives would have 
higher risks during the transition due to the challenges associated 
with mission relocations, but could have lower long-term operational 
risks because of reduced safety, regulatory, or security risks. All 
risk criteria were rated equally (20 percent each); a sensitivity 
analysis determined that the conclusions were not significantly 
affected by adjustments of plus or minus five percent in risk rating 
criteria.
    The risk assessment was performed by a group of NNSA and contractor 
employees who are subject-matter experts, site experts, or both. The 
least risky options are those where the sites have previous experience 
with the mission or the nuclear material used in that mission. 
Alternatives that would locate the plutonium mission at LANL or SRS, 
the uranium mission at Y-12, and the weapons assembly and disassembly 
mission at Pantex, were determined to pose the lowest risk. Overall, 
the consolidation alternatives were judged to have 25-160 percent more 
technical risk than alternatives that would not consolidate or relocate 
missions.
    With respect to plutonium R&D and manufacturing, the cost and risk 
analyses showed that keeping this mission at LANL has the least cost 
and poses the lowest risk. This results primarily from the fact that 
plutonium facilities are very expensive to construct and LANL has 
existing facilities, infrastructure, and trained personnel that can be 
used for this mission.
    The CMRR-NF was analyzed in the Environmental Impact Statement for 
the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (DOE/EIS-0350, 
Nov. 2003). The CMRR EIS evaluated potential environmental impacts of 
the proposed relocation of analytical chemistry and materials 
characterization activities and associated R&D to a new CMRR. Following 
completion of that EIS, NNSA announced its decision to construct and 
operate a CMRR consisting of two main buildings, one of which was the 
CMRR-NF (69 FR 6967; Feb. 12, 2004). The second building--providing 
laboratory, administrative, and support functions--currently is under 
construction at LANL. However, NNSA decided to defer a decision 
regarding construction and operation of the CMRR-NF until it completed 
the Complex Transformation SPEIS (see Section 1.5.2.1, Volume 1 of the 
SPEIS).
    Analyses of the potential impacts of constructing and operating the 
CMRR-NF were updated in the Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement 
for Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, 
New Mexico (2008 LANL SWEIS; DOE/EIS-0380, May 2008) as part of the 
Expanded Operations and the No Action Alternatives. In a ROD based on 
the 2008 LANL SWEIS, NNSA announced its decision to continue to 
implement the No Action Alternative with the

[[Page 77650]]

addition of some elements of the Expanded Operations Alternative. NNSA 
did not make any decision related to the CMRR-NF. It explained in the 
SWEIS ROD that it would not make any decisions regarding proposed 
actions analyzed in the SPEIS prior to completion of the SPEIS (73 FR 
55833; Sept. 26, 2008). NNSA considered the analyses in the CMRR EIS 
and the 2008 LANL SWEIS, as well as those in the SPEIS in deciding to 
construct the CMRR-NF.
    With respect to uranium manufacturing and R&D, the cost analyses 
indicated that building a UPF at Y-12, eliminating excess space, and 
shrinking the security area at the site will significantly reduce 
annual operational costs. The UPF at Y-12 will replace 50-year-old 
facilities, providing a smaller and modern production capability. It 
will enable NNSA to consolidate enriched uranium operations from six 
facilities at Y-12, and to reduce the size of the protected area at 
that site by as much as 90 percent. A new UPF will also allow NNSA to 
better support broader national security missions. These missions 
include providing fuel for Naval Reactors; processing and down-blending 
incoming HEU from the Global Threat Reduction Initiative; down-blending 
HEU for domestic and foreign research reactors in support of 
nonproliferation objectives; providing material for high-temperature 
fuels for space reactors (NASA); and supporting nuclear counter-
terrorism, nuclear forensics, and the render safe program (program to 
disable improvised nuclear devices).
    The life cycle cost analysis predicts an average annual savings 
over the 50-year facility life of approximately $200 million in FY 2007 
dollars. The risk analysis found that moving the uranium mission to a 
site other than Y-12 would more than double the technical risks. The 
site-specific impacts for a UPF, including issues such as its location 
and size, will be analyzed in a new SWEIS for Y-12 that NNSA is 
currently preparing.
    With respect to weapons assembly and disassembly and high 
explosives production, NNSA's decision to keep that mission at Pantex 
will result in the least cost and pose the lowest programmatic risk 
because the facilities necessary to conduct this work safely and 
economically already exist. Although no further NEPA analysis is 
required to continue these missions at Pantex, NNSA will continue to 
evaluate and update site-specific NEPA documentation as required by DOE 
regulations (10 CFR Part 1021).
    With respect to SNM removal from LLNL, transferring Category I/II 
SNM to other sites and limiting LLNL operations to Category III/IV SNM 
will achieve a security savings of approximately $30 million per year 
at LLNL.

Potential Environmental Impacts

    As described in greater detail in the following paragraphs, NNSA 
considered potential environmental impacts in making these decisions. 
It analyzed the potential impacts of each alternative on land use; 
visual resources; site infrastructure; air quality; noise; geology and 
soils; surface and groundwater quality; ecological resources; cultural 
and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health impacts; 
environmental justice; and waste management. NNSA also evaluated the 
impacts of each alternative as to irreversible or irretrievable 
commitments of resources, the relationship between short-term uses of 
the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity, and cumulative impacts. In addition, it evaluated impacts 
of potential accidents on workers and surrounding populations. The 
SPEIS includes a classified appendix that assesses the potential 
environmental impacts of a representative set of credible terrorist 
scenarios.
    The environmental impacts of the alternatives are analyzed in 
Chapter 5 of the SPEIS. The impacts of the alternatives NNSA has 
decided to pursue are summarized as follows:
    Land Use--Minor land disturbance during construction of new 
facilities (approximately 6.5 acres at LANL for a CMRR-NF and 35 acres 
at Y-12 for a UPF); less area would be disturbed after construction is 
complete. At Y-12, construction of a UPF will allow NNSA to reduce the 
protected area by as much as 90 percent, which will improve security 
and reduce costs. At all sites, land uses will remain compatible with 
surrounding areas and with land use plans. At LANL and Y-12, the land 
required for operations will be less than 1 percent of the sites' total 
areas.
    Visual Resources--Changes consistent with currently developed 
areas, with no changes in the Visual Resource Management 
classification. All sites will remain industrialized.
    Infrastructure--Existing infrastructure is adequate to support 
construction and operating requirements at all sites. During 
operations, any changes to power requirements would be less than 10 
percent of the electrical capacity at each site.
    Air Quality--During construction, temporary emissions will result, 
but National Ambient Air Quality Standards will not be exceeded as a 
result of this construction. Operations will not introduce any 
significant new emissions and will not exceed any standards.
    Water Resources--Water use will not change significantly compared 
to existing use and will remain within the amounts of water available 
at the NNSA sites. Annual water use at each site will increase by less 
than 5 percent.
    Biological Resources--No adverse effects on biota and endangered 
species. Consultations with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service have 
been completed for the CMRR-NF. Consultations with the Fish and 
Wildlife Service will be conducted for a UPF during preparation of the 
Y-12 SWEIS.
    Socioeconomics--Short-term employment increases at LANL and Y-12 
during construction activities. The selected alternatives will have the 
least disruptive socioeconomic impacts at all sites. At Y-12, the total 
workforce will be reduced by approximately 750 workers (approximately 
11 percent of the site's workforce) after UPF becomes operational. 
Employment at all other sites will change by less than 1 percent 
compared to any changes expected under the No Action Alternative.
    Environmental Justice--No disproportionately high and adverse 
effects on minority or low-income populations will occur at any 
affected site; therefore, no environmental justice impacts will occur.
    Health and Safety--Radiation doses to workers and the public will 
remain well below regulatory limits at all facilities and at all sites. 
Doses to the public and workers will cause less than one latent cancer 
fatality annually at all sites. Conducting future operations in the 
CMRR-NF and UPF will reduce the dose to workers compared to the doses 
they receive in existing facilities.
    Accidents--The risk of industrial accidents is expected to be low 
during construction of the new facilities. Radiological accident risks 
will be low (i.e., probabilities of less than one latent cancer 
fatality) at all sites. The CMRR-NF and a UPF are expected to reduce 
the probability and impacts of potential accidents.
    Intentional Destructive Acts--Construction of a UPF and CMRR-NF 
will provide better protection to the activities conducted in these 
facilities, as it is generally easier and more cost-effective to 
protect new facilities because modern security features can be 
incorporated into their design. Although the results of the intentional 
destructive acts analyses cannot be disclosed, the following general 
conclusion can be drawn: The potential consequences of

[[Page 77651]]

intentional destructive acts are highly dependent upon distance to the 
site boundary and size of the surrounding population--the closer and 
higher the surrounding population, the higher the potential 
consequences. Removal of SNM from LLNL will reduce the potential 
impacts of intentional destructive acts at that site.
    Waste Management--Waste generation will remain within existing and 
planned management capabilities at all sites. Existing waste management 
facilities are sufficient to manage these wastes and maintain 
compliance with regulatory requirements.
    Cumulative Impacts--The cumulative environmental impacts of the 
alternatives are analyzed in Chapter 6 of the SPEIS. The impacts of the 
alternatives when added to past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
future actions will be within all regulatory standards and not result 
in significant new impacts.

Mitigation Measures

    As described in the SPEIS, NNSA operates in compliance with 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies within a framework of 
contractual requirements; many of these requirements mandate actions to 
control and mitigate potential adverse environmental effects. Examples 
include site security and threat protection plans, emergency plans, 
Integrated Safety Management Systems, pollution prevention and waste 
minimization programs, cultural resource and protected species 
programs, and energy and water conservation programs (e.g., the 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Program). Any 
additional site-specific mitigation actions would be identified in 
site-specific NEPA documents.

Comments Received on the Final SPEIS Related to the Programmatic 
Alternatives

    During the 30-day period following the EPA's notice of availability 
for the Final SPEIS (73 FR 63460; Oct. 24, 2008), NNSA received written 
comments from the following groups: Alliance for Nuclear 
Accountability, Project on Government Oversight, National Radical 
Women, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Oak Ridge Environmental 
Peace Alliance, Tri-Valley CAREs, the Union of Concerned Scientists, 
Nuclear Watch New Mexico, the Arms and Security Initiative of the New 
America Foundation, Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, Embudo 
Valley Environmental Group, Ecology Ministry, Loretto Community, Aqua 
es Vida Action Team, Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping, 
and Tewa Women United. Written comments were also received from 
approximately 30 individuals. The comments NNSA received related to the 
programmatic alternatives and NNSA's responses follow.
    Some commenters substantively reiterated comments that they had 
provided earlier on the Draft SPEIS, including comments that suggested:
    1. NNSA should make no decisions on Complex Transformation until a 
new Nuclear Posture Review has been completed by the newly elected 
administration and the report issued by the Congressional Commission on 
the Strategic Posture of the United States.
    Response: NNSA believes the SPEIS analysis is consistent with and 
supports national security requirements and policies. It is 
unreasonable to assume that nuclear weapons would not be a part of this 
nation's security requirements over the time period analyzed in the 
SPEIS and beyond. The range of alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS 
covers the range of national security requirements that NNSA believes 
could reasonably evolve from any changes to national policy with regard 
to the size and number of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. 
Accordingly, there is no reason to delay the decisions announced in 
this ROD on complex transformation pending a new Nuclear Posture Review 
or the recommendations of the Bipartisan Panel reevaluating the United 
States' Nuclear Strategic Posture (see Comment Response 1.C, Volume 
III, Chapter III of the SPEIS). This ROD fully explains why NNSA is 
making these programmatic decisions, why it is appropriate to make 
these decisions at this time, and the flexibility NNSA has to adapt to 
any changes in national security requirements that may occur in the 
near term.
    2. The United States does not need nuclear weapons or the 
infrastructure that produces and maintains them and should pursue 
disarmament consistent with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
    Response: Decisions on whether the United States should possess 
nuclear weapons and the type and number of those weapons are made by 
the President and the Congress. As long as this nation has nuclear 
weapons, a Complex must exist to ensure their safety, security and 
reliability. NNSA believes the SPEIS analysis is consistent with and 
supports national security requirements and policies (see Comment 
Responses 1.0, 2.K.12, and 3.0, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
    3. There is no need to produce new pits (or no need for certain 
production rates).
    Response: While pits may have extremely long lifetimes and there 
may ultimately be no need to produce many additional ones, prudence 
requires that the nation have the capability to produce pits should the 
need arise. NNSA is not proposing to manufacture any pits unless they 
are needed to meet national security requirements. A need to produce 
pits could arise due to the effects of aging on existing pits or 
changes to our national security policies that could require more pits 
than the few NNSA is currently manufacturing for stockpile surveillance 
(see Comment Responses 2.K.16, 2.K.22, and 5.C.1, Volume III, Chapter 
III of the SPEIS). Until completion of a new Nuclear Posture Review in 
2009 or later, the net production at LANL will be limited to a maximum 
of 20 pits per year.
    4. NNSA should undertake further efforts at compliance with Article 
VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) (or, Complex 
Transformation violates this treaty).
    Response: The United States has made significant progress toward 
achieving the nuclear disarmament goals set forth in the NPT, and is in 
compliance with its Article VI obligations. The NPT does not mandate 
disarmament or specific stockpile reductions by nuclear states, and it 
does not address actions they take to maintain their stockpiles. NNSA 
disagrees with the assertion that Complex Transformation violates the 
NPT (see Comment Response 1.F, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
    5. NNSA should have included Stockpile Curatorship as a reasonable 
alternative fully considered in the SPEIS.
     Response: The Curatorship Alternative as proposed by comments on 
the Draft SPEIS would have required NNSA to give up the capabilities to 
design and develop replacement nuclear components and weapons, forcing 
it to rely solely on the surveillance and non-nuclear testing program 
to maintain weapons and identify when they need repairs. NNSA believes 
it is unreasonable to give up these capabilities in light of the 
uncertainties concerning the aging of weapons and changing national 
security requirements. As explained in the SPEIS in Section 3.15, this 
would impair NNSA's ability to assess and, if necessary, address issues 
regarding the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons (see 
Comment

[[Page 77652]]

Responses 2.H.2, 5.H.2, and 7.O, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
    6. The transformed complex should not support design or production 
of new design or modified nuclear weapons.
     Response: NNSA is required to maintain nuclear weapons 
capabilities, including the capability to design, develop, produce, and 
certify new warheads. Maintenance of the capability to certify weapons' 
safety and reliability requires an inherent capability to design and 
develop new weapons. NNSA has not been directed to produce newly 
designed weapons (see Comment Responses 1.B, Volume III, Chapter III of 
the SPEIS).
    7. NNSA should provide additional information on epidemiological 
studies of radiation health of workers and communities.
     Response: Many of the workers at DOE's 20 major sites have been 
studied epidemiologically, some for decades. The National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health continues to update these studies as 
warranted by public health and scientific considerations. As more 
powerful epidemiological study designs become available, new studies of 
these workers may provide better information about health risks 
associated with radiation exposure (see Comment Responses 14.K.5 and 
14.K.6, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS). Many of the 
epidemiological studies and other related studies are available at 
https://cedr.lbl.gov.
    8. NNSA should focus on clean-up of its sites rather than building 
new facilities to make weapons.
     Response: DOE has a large remediation program and is aggressively 
addressing past contamination issues at each of its sites. This program 
is conducted in accordance with federal and state regulatory 
requirements and includes administrative and engineered controls to 
minimize releases, as well as surveillance monitoring of the 
environment and reporting of exposure assessments. These remediation 
activities are directed by federal and state regulators, have their own 
schedule and funding, and are separate from actions proposed in the 
SPEIS (see Comment Responses 7.J and 9.B, Volume III, Chapter III of 
the SPEIS). It is inaccurate to suggest that cleanup and transformation 
are mutually exclusive.
    9. NNSA should consolidate special nuclear material from LLNL 
faster than its current schedule.
     Response: NNSA has begun the removal of Category I/II SNM from 
LLNL, and plans to complete it by 2012. NNSA will continue to give this 
action the high priority requested by the commenter. Safety, security, 
and logistical issues associated with preparing SNM for shipment; 
shipping the materials; and storage at the receiving sites determine 
the schedule for completing this removal (see Comment Response 5.N.4, 
Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
    10. The modernization of the Kansas City Plant should have been 
included in the SPEIS.
     Response: The activities of the Kansas City Plant were not 
included in the SPEIS because NNSA concluded that decisions regarding 
the consolidation and modernization of the Kansas City Plant's 
activities (the production and procurement of electrical and mechanical 
non-nuclear components) would not affect or limit the programmatic 
alternatives analyzed in the SPEIS, or the decisions NNSA makes 
regarding these alternatives (see Comment Response 12.0, Volume III, 
Chapter III of the SPEIS).
    11. The SPEIS is not written in plain language and lacks a clear 
format.
     Response: NNSA prepared the SPEIS in accordance with the 
requirements of NEPA and the DOE and CEQ NEPA regulations. NNSA 
believes that the SPEIS is clearly written and organized in light of 
the highly technical subject matter and complex nature of the 
alternatives (see Comment Response 2.A, Volume III, Chapter III of the 
SPEIS).
    12. NNSA inadequately addressed the environmental impacts of 
intentional destructive acts. NNSA must disclose the potential impacts 
of successfully executed credible terrorist attack scenarios at sites 
in the nuclear weapons complex and make this information available to 
the public.
     Response: A classified appendix to the Complex Transformation 
SPEIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of credible 
terrorist attacks that NNSA assumed (for purposes of analysis pursuant 
to NEPA) were successful at specific existing and proposed facilities. 
The appendix is classified both because the scenarios evaluated contain 
classified information and because there is a risk that these scenarios 
and their potential impacts could be exploited by terrorists or others 
contemplating harmful acts. Therefore, the SPEIS provides limited 
information about these acts and their potential consequences (see 
``Potential Environmental Impacts'' above and Comment Responses 13.B 
and 13.D, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS).
    13. NNSA failed to consider long-acting consequences of nuclear 
weapons production, including the impacts that result from every year 
of operation. NNSA also failed to consider the deployment or potential 
use of the nation's nuclear arsenal.
     Response: The SPEIS assesses the direct, indirect, and cumulative 
environmental impacts of the No Action Alternative and reasonable 
alternatives for the proposed action. Impacts are assessed for both 
construction and operations. For operations, the SPEIS focuses on the 
steady-state impacts of operations. Those annual operational impacts 
are assumed to occur year-after-year. Now that NNSA has made decisions 
regarding programmatic alternatives, it may need to prepare additional 
NEPA documents such as site- or facility-level analyses (e.g., the 
ongoing Y-12 SWEIS for a UPF now that NNSA has decided to locate it at 
Y-12) (see Comment Response 11.0, Volume III, Chapter III of the 
SPEIS). NNSA does not make decisions concerning the size, deployment or 
potential use of the nation's nuclear arsenal, and therefore the 
consequences of these decisions are not appropriate for analysis in the 
SPEIS.
    14. NNSA inadequately addressed the cumulative impacts of the 
alternatives, including a detailed and careful analysis of the 
cumulative impacts of major nuclear-related facilities in New Mexico. 
Additionally, Comment Response 14.J.4 incorrectly states that Appendix 
C and D include information about an analysis of cumulative impacts 
with an extended region of influence of 100 miles.
     Response: NNSA addressed potential cumulative impacts resulting 
from Complex Transformation and ongoing and reasonably anticipated 
actions of NNSA, other agencies and private developers. In response to 
public comments, NNSA added a detailed analysis of the cumulative 
impacts of major nuclear-related facilities in New Mexico. NNSA thinks 
that analysis is appropriately detailed. The assessment of cumulative 
impacts is in Chapter 6 of Volume II of the SPEIS (see Comment 
Responses 2.I and 14.O, Volume III, Chapter III of the SPEIS). With 
respect to the analysis of cumulative impacts with an extended region 
of influence of 100 miles, NNSA agrees that the Final SPEIS incorrectly 
referred the reader to Appendix C and D. NNSA intended to refer the 
reader to the LANL SWEIS, which shows that extending the region of 
influence out another 50 miles increases the affected population by 300 
percent, while the population dose increases by only 13 percent. NNSA 
regrets this error.
    15. NNSA inadequately addressed Environmental Justice, including a 
more detailed analysis of transportation impacts and waste disp