General Administrative Regulations; Administrative Remedies for Non-Compliance, 76868-76891 [E8-30073]
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consignment will not be allowed to
enter the United States.
(d) Commercial consignments. Baby
squash and baby courgettes from
Zambia may be imported in commercial
consignments only.
(e) Phytosanitary certificate. Each
consignment of baby squash and baby
courgettes must be accompanied by a
phytosanitary certificate of inspection
issued by the Zambian NPPO with an
additional declaration reading as
follows: ‘‘These baby squash or baby
courgettes were produced in accordance
with 7 CFR 319.56–48.’’
(Approved by the Office of Management and
Budget under control number 0579–0347)
Done in Washington, DC, this 12th day of
December 2008.
Kevin Shea,
Acting Administrator, Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service.
[FR Doc. E8–30080 Filed 12–17–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410–34–P
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
7 CFR Part 400, 407, and 457
RIN 0563–AB73
General Administrative Regulations;
Administrative Remedies for NonCompliance
Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation, USDA.
ACTION: Final rule.
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AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation (FCIC) finalizes the General
Administrative Regulations;
Administrative Remedies for NonCompliance to add additional
administrative remedies that are
available as a result of the enactment of
section 515(h) of the Federal Crop
Insurance Act (Act) (7 U.S.C. 1515(h)),
make such other changes as are
necessary to implement the provisions
of section 515(h) of the Act, and to
clarify existing administrative remedies.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule is
effective January 20, 2009.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
further information, contact Cynthia
Simpson, Director, Appeals, Litigation
and Legal Liaison Staff, Risk
Management Agency, United States
Department of Agriculture, 1400
Independence Avenue, SW., Room
4619, Stop 0806, Washington, DC
20250, telephone (202) 720–0642.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Executive Order 12866
The Office of Management and budget
(OMB) has determined that this rule is
non-significant for the purposes of
Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, it
has not been reviewed by OMB.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
This rule does not constitute a
collection of information under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. chapter 35).
E-Government Act Compliance
FCIC is committed to complying with
the E-Government Act of 2002, to
promote the use of the Internet and
other information technologies to
provide increased opportunities for
citizen access to Government
information and services, and for other
purposes.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) establishes
requirements for Federal agencies to
assess the effects of their regulatory
actions on State, local, and tribal
governments and the private sector.
This rule contains no Federal mandates
(under the regulatory provisions of title
II of the UMRA) for State, local, and
tribal governments or the private sector.
Therefore, this rule is not subject to the
requirements of sections 202 and 205 of
UMRA.
Executive Order 13132
It has been determined under section
1(a) of Executive Order 13132,
Federalism, that this rule does not have
sufficient implications to warrant
consultation with the States. The
provisions contained in this rule will
not have a substantial direct effect on
States, on the relationship between the
national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
FCIC certifies that this regulation will
not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities. All similarly situated
participants are required to comply with
the same standard of conduct contained
in the Act, the regulations published at
7 CFR chapter IV, the crop policies, and
the applicable procedures. For example,
any producer, whether growing 10 acres
or 10,000 acres, submits the same
documentation for insurance and for a
claim. All agents, whether selling and
servicing five policies or a hundred and
five policies, are required to perform the
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same tasks for each. The consequences
for failure to comply with the standards
of conduct are also the same for all
participants and other persons
regardless of the size of their business.
A Regulatory Flexibility Analysis has
not been prepared since this regulation
does not have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities,
and, therefore, this regulation is exempt
from the provisions of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605).
Federal Assistance Program
This program is listed in the Catalog
of Federal Domestic Assistance under
No. 10.450.
Executive Order 12372
This program is not subject to the
provisions of Executive Order 12372,
which require intergovernmental
consultation with State and local
officials. See the Notice related to 7 CFR
part 3015, subpart V, published at 48 FR
29115, June 24, 1983.
Executive Order 12988
This proposed rule has been reviewed
in accordance with Executive Order
12988 on civil justice reform. The
provisions of this rule will not have a
retroactive effect. The provisions of this
rule will preempt State and local laws
to the extent such State and local laws
are inconsistent herewith.
Environmental Evaluation
This action is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on the
quality of the human environment,
health, and safety. Therefore, neither an
Environmental Assessment nor an
Environmental Impact Statement is
needed.
Background
This rule finalizes changes made to 7
CFR part 400, subpart R, Administrative
Remedies for Non-Compliance that was
published by FCIC on May 18, 2007, as
a notice of proposed rulemaking in the
Federal Register at 72 FR 27981–27988.
In the Administrative Remedies for
Non-Compliance, FCIC proposed to
include provisions in its regulation that
were enacted with the passage of the
Agricultural Rick Protection Act of 2000
(ARPA). Through the enactment of
section 515(h) of the Act in ARPA,
Congress significantly strengthened
FCIC’s ability to combat fraud, waste
and abuse by establishing a strong
system of administrative actions that are
now applicable to all participants in the
Federal crop insurance program.
Now, producers, agents, loss
adjusters, insurance providers and their
employees and contractors, and any
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other persons who willfully and
intentionally provide any false or
inaccurate information to FCIC or to an
approved insurance provider with
respect to a policy or plan of insurance
or willfully and intentionally failed to
comply with a requirement of FCIC are
subject to remedial administrative
remedies. In addition to disqualification
from participating in the Federal crop
insurance program, producers will be
disqualified from receiving benefits
under other various United States
Department of Agriculture programs. In
addition, civil fines have been
increased. Now a civil fine can be
imposed for each violation and the civil
fine is the greater of $10,000 or the
amount of pecuniary gain obtained as a
result of the false or inaccurate
information provided or the
noncompliance with a requirement of
FCIC.
The public was afforded 30 days to
submit written comments after the
regulation was published in the Federal
Register. A total of 128 comments were
received from 17 commenters. The
commenters were seven insurance
services organizations, one grower
association, four insurance providers,
two law firms, one public citizen, one
agent, and one government employee.
The comments received and FCIC’s
responses are as follows:
Comment: One commenter stated that
FCIC has taken significant actions since
the implementation of the Act in 2000
to reduce fraud, waste and abuse of the
crop insurance program. The
commenter strongly supports FCIC’s
efforts to combat waste, abuse and fraud
in FCIC programs and believes that
those who knowingly and willfully
abuse the program must be punished.
Response: FCIC will continue to take
such actions as are necessary to improve
program integrity.
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Length of Comment Period
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the thirty-day comment period was
inadequate. The commenters asked that
the comment period be extended by
sixty days because of the serious nature
of the proposed rule and in order for
other affected individuals to comment
and to fully understand the legal
exposure they could face under the
proposed rule.
Response: FCIC usually gives 30 or 60
day comment period depending on the
rule. Because this rule is implementing
a law that has been in effect since June
2000, FCIC made the decision not to
extend the comment period.
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Section 400.451
General
Comment: A commenter stated that
‘‘waste’’ and ‘‘abuse’’ are neither
offenses defined by statute or regulation
and that FCIC never has defined in a
regulation, contract, policy, or
procedure, the conduct or actions that
constitute ‘‘waste’’ and ‘‘abuse.’’ The
commenter asked that FCIC define
‘‘waste’’ and ‘‘abuse.’’
Response: Combating fraud, waste
and abuse are the obligation of all
Government agencies. The imposition of
these sanctions is one means to combat
fraud, waste and abuse. However, there
are numerous other actions taken by
FCIC to combat fraud, waste and abuse.
However, in the context of this rule,
fraud, waste and abuse are not grounds
for the imposition of sanctions.
Sanctions are imposed for violations of
section 515(h) of the Act and other
relevant statutory provisions. The terms
fraud, waste and abuse are not used
except in the context of a policy
statement. Therefore, inclusion of
separate definitions may confuse
persons into believing that sanctions
can be imposed for allegations of fraud,
waste and abuse. This is supported by
many of the following comments which
suggest that fraud must be proven before
a sanction under section 515(h) of the
Act can be imposed. No change has
been made.
Comment: A commenter stated that a
person may abuse the crop insurance
program without providing false
information or violating FCIC
procedures.
Response: The crop insurance
program may still be abused by a person
without providing false information or
violating FCIC procedures. Abuse can
occur in any number of ways and FCIC
continuously reviews the program to
tighten program requirements to prevent
other types of abuse. However, this rule
is intended to preclude the specific
abuses associated with the providing of
false or inaccurate information and
failure to comply with a requirement of
FCIC.
Comment: A commenter stated
§ 400.451(b) is overbroad as it expands
the rule to persons outside of the crop
insurance program. For example, an
accountant knowingly falsifies an
insured’s Schedule F and an insurance
provider overpays on an Adjusted Gross
Revenue claim based on that Schedule
F, the commenter asked whether the
accountant is subject to the sanctions of
§ 400.454. The commenter asked that
FCIC precisely identify the persons to be
covered by subpart R.
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act
specifically refers to a producer, agent,
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loss adjuster, insurance provider or
‘‘other person’’ that intentionally
provides false or inaccurate information
to FCIC or to an approved insurance
provider with respect to a policy. In the
example given, an accountant who
knowingly provides false information
on a Schedule F may be subject to
sanction under § 400.454. However,
unless the accountant is otherwise
participating in the crop insurance
program, disqualification would not be
applicable. However, the accountant
could be subject to civil fines. Section
515(h) of the Act was intended to
sanction anyone who willfully and
intentionally provides false or
inaccurate information, not just direct
participants. Therefore, its scope could
encompass any person. For example, an
elevator operator who provides false
weight receipts or the seed dealer who
falsifies a sales receipt would also be
subject to sanctions under section
515(h) of the Act.
Comment: A commenter stated that by
making the proposed rule applicable to
‘‘any other persons who may provide
information to a program participant,’’
the FCIC was improperly expanding the
scope of persons subject to
administrative sanctions beyond what is
authorized in the Act. In addition, the
phrase, ‘‘any other persons who may
provide information’’ was imprecise
and, therefore, subject to ambiguous
construction.
Response: As stated above, section
515(h) of the Act authorizes the scope
of the sanction to apply to other than
just producers, agents, loss adjusters or
insurance providers. Congress expressly
refers to ‘‘other persons.’’ Therefore, the
scope of this rule is authorized and can
apply to virtually anyone who may
provide information that is false or
inaccurate. Therefore, there is no
ambiguity. However, as stated above,
persons who may not be participating in
the crop insurance program or other
United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) programs would likely be
subject to civil fines instead of
disqualification.
Comment: A commenter is concerned
that the proposed rule exposes too many
innocent persons to the threat of civil
fines and sanctions without focusing on
the real wrong-doers. The rule proposes
to cover a vast number of ‘‘participants
in the federal crop insurance program’’
as well as any other persons who may
provide information to a program
participant. In addition, the definitions
of affiliate, participant, person, and
principal are broad and far reaching and
may subject innocent persons to the
threat of civil fines and sanctions. The
commenter recommends these
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definitions exclude those not actively
involved in the submission, purchase or
receipt of benefits of crop insurance
policies.
Response: In order to be subject to the
sanctions under section 515(h) of the
Act, FCIC must be able to prove that the
person willfully and intentionally
provided false or inaccurate information
or willfully and intentionally failed to
comply with a requirement of FCIC.
Therefore, it is not possible for the
sanctions to be imposed on innocent
persons. Further, the standards for the
imputing of improper conduct are the
same as that applied in debarments and
ensures that only those persons
responsible for the violation are
sanctioned. As an additional check and
balance, persons have the right to
contest any sanction before it is
imposed before an Administrative Law
Judge. This will ensure that the burden
of proof has been met.
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the proposed rule made the rule
retroactive in effect. In the preamble,
FCIC states, ‘‘the provisions of this rule
will not have a retroactive effect.’’
However, the proposed rule at
§ 400.451(d) states that the ‘‘failure to
comply with a requirement’’ is
applicable as of the date the proposed
rule become effective. But, the rule with
respect to a false or inaccurate statement
is applicable to any act or omission
occurring after June 20, 2000. The rule
and FCIC’s explanation of it are
inconsistent as to its retroactivity.
Because Congress did not grant FCIC the
authority to promulgate retroactive
rules, they can only be applied
prospectively. To impose penalties for
past conduct is improper and unlawful.
Because it is unclear as to its
retroactivity, the rule violates Executive
Order 12988. The proposed rule should
be changed so that the regulation clearly
has no retroactive effect. The
commenters asked that the rule become
effective on the date rule becomes final.
Response: FCIC has clarified when the
provisions of this rule become effective.
There is confusion because section
515(h) of the Act, which contains the
sanction provisions applicable to false
or inaccurate information that are the
subject of this rule, have been in effect
since June 2000. Further, since that
date, those statutory provisions have
been used to impose sanctions against
persons that have provided false or
inaccurate information after June 2000
because the statutory provisions were
not in conflict with the regulation
sanction provisions that existed during
that time. Therefore, false or inaccurate
information provided between June 20,
2000, and the date this rule becomes
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effective will continue to be processed
under section 515(h) of the Act and the
regulations in effect prior to the date
this rule becomes effective. For false or
inaccurate information provided after
the date this rule is effective will be
processed under this rule.
section 515(h) of the Act and other
statutory provisions. To the extent that
such statutory provision includes some
elements of fraud, waste and abuse, the
prohibited conduct will be specified
therein.
Section 400.452
1. Affiliate
Comment: A commenter stated that
FCIC’s definition of ‘‘affiliate’’ is
inconsistent with the Standard
Reinsurance Agreement’s (SRA)
definition of ‘‘affiliate.’’ The commenter
stated that the definition should be
amended to mirror the SRA’s focus on
the control of management of the book
of business.
Response: While the narrower
definition is appropriate for the SRA,
such a narrow definition is not
appropriate for this rule, which is
intended to determine who a person is
for the purposes of this rule. Under the
definition of ‘‘person’’ affiliates are also
considered as part of the person if the
requirements are met. The main reason
for defining the term ‘‘affiliate’’ in this
rule is to put everyone on notice that the
term may be used differently in this rule
than it is in other rules or agreements.
No change has been made.
Comment: A commenter stated that
the definition of ‘‘affiliate’’ is broad and
ambiguous because it uses the term
‘‘same or similar management’’ when
describing a presumably affiliated
business entity. The commenter
suggested that the ambiguity can be
cured by using either the accepted
definition under federal banking and
securities law or alternatively by
substituting the term ‘‘identical or
substantially identical management’’ for
‘‘same or similar management.’’
Response: The definition was
obtained from the definition of
‘‘affiliate’’ in USDA’s suspension and
debarment regulations published at 7
CFR part 3017. Since a disqualification
has a similar effect to a debarment, it
was determined that the treatment of
affiliates and the definition should be
the same for both remedial sanctions.
No change has been made.
Definitions
A. In General
Comment: A commenter stated that
the proposed rule expanded the
definition of ‘‘person’’ and added 17
more definitions which apply only to
this subpart. FCIC does not describe the
sources of many of the definitions.
Response: FCIC expanded § 400.452
to include terms used in the proposed
rule. Most of the definitions will refer to
terms and definitions contained in other
regulations, such as the Common Crop
Insurance Policy Basic Provisions to
ensure consistency. With respect to the
other definitions, FCIC has defined the
terms in such a manner as to achieve the
purpose of this rule. The rulemaking
procedures do not require that
administrative agencies document the
source of all of its information.
Comment: Several commenters make
statements regarding removing (1) vague
and ambiguous language, and (2)
defining terms FCIC normally or
routinely uses but has failed to define,
such as ‘‘benefit,’’ ‘‘fraud,’’ ‘‘waste and
abuse,’’ ‘‘wrongdoing,’’ and ‘‘knows or
has reason to know.’’ A commenter
stated that the word ‘‘benefit’’ is used in
the regulation but not defined. The
proposed rule suggests benefit is not
limited to monetary gains. The
commenters also stated that if FCIC
intends to impose sanctions for persons
engaged in ‘‘waste and abuse,’’ the terms
must be adequately defined to provide
notice of the prohibited conduct. One
commenter also stated that FCIC should
add the definition of ‘‘knows or has
reason to know’’ contained in 7 CFR
1.302(o) to the proposed rule and make
conforming changes to the balance of
the proposed rule consistent with the
text of this added definition.
Response: FCIC has revised the rule to
add definitions of ‘‘benefit,’’ and
‘‘knows or has reason to know.’’
‘‘Benefit’’ is defined as any advantage,
preference, privilege or favorable
consideration a person receives from
another person in exchange for certain
acts or considerations. A benefit may be
monetary or non-monetary. The
definition of ‘‘knows or should have
known’’ will be the same as that
contained in 7 CFR 1.302(o). Further,
this rule does not sanction persons for
‘‘fraud, waste or abuse.’’ This rule
imposes sanctions for violations of
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B. Revisions to Specific Definitions
2. Participant
Comment: A commenter stated that
the definition of ‘‘participant’’ was
unduly broad in that it contained no
materiality or other threshold test for
determining the extent of benefit that
makes a person a participant. As
written, someone who does not have a
substantial beneficial interest for
purposes of the crop insurance policy
could be subject to a sanction.
Response: Any person, regardless of
his interest for purposes of the crop
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insurance policy, who willfully and
intentionally makes a false statement or
fails to comply with a requirement of
FCIC, may be subject to sanction. As
stated above, such person may have no
connection to the crop insurance
program other than to provide certain
information that is then provided to
FCIC or the insurance provider. If such
person willfully and intentionally
provides false or inaccurate information,
such person can be subject to the
sanctions provided in this rule even if
they derive no benefit from the crop
insurance program. Materiality does not
require monetary damages. The false
information can be material if it
adversely affects program integrity,
including damage to the program’s
reputation. Since the gravity must be
considered in determining whether to
impose a sanction, FCIC has revised the
provision to include a materiality
requirement and added a definition of
‘‘material.’’
Comment: A commenter suggested
that a materiality test, percent interest or
monetary level of benefit be used as a
threshold for defining ‘‘participant.’’
Response: As stated above, materiality
does not require monetary damages or
benefits. The false information can be
material if it adversely affects program
integrity, including damage to its
reputation. Further, FCIC has revised
the provisions to include a materiality
requirement when the gravity of the
violation is taken into consideration and
defined the term ‘‘material.’’
3. Preponderance of the Evidence
Comment: A commenter stated that
intentional, willful conduct and fraud
are subject to special rules regarding
proof in civil litigation. Fraud requires
‘‘clear and convincing proof to establish
liability.’’ This is a higher standard than
that required under the proposed rule
by a preponderance of the evidence.
Because fraud connotes intentional
misconduct the party charging that
conduct is required to prove it to a
greater certainty. The commenter stated
further that it is improper to reduce the
burden of proof by the government
when alleging fraud. No justification has
been given that alters longstanding rules
applicable to civil litigation.
Furthermore, intentional and willful
acts should be defined to make clear
that the person knew the falsity of the
statement when made and intended that
FCIC act on the basis of the intentional
and willful misstatements. Intent and
willfulness also must be established by
clear and convincing evidence.
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act
does not require a showing of fraud. The
standard is whether a person willfully
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and intentionally provided false or
inaccurate information. The standard of
proof was derived from USDA’s
suspension and debarment regulations
because of the similarity of the effects of
disqualification and debarment. Further,
debarment must also show evidence of
willfulness and knowingly, which is
similar to the standards contained in
section 515(h) of the Act. The causes for
debarment need only be established by
a preponderance of the evidence. In
addition, this is not a civil litigation.
This is an administrative action taken to
protect the integrity of the program and
misuse of taxpayer dollars. Further, this
has been the standard of proof that has
been applied since the application of
these sanctions in 1993. Section 515(h)
of the Act does not contain any
requirement that the person who
provides the false information intended
for FCIC to rely on such information.
FCIC does not have to prove fraud. FCIC
only needs to prove that a person
willfully and intentionally provided
false or inaccurate information or failed
to comply with a requirement of FCIC.
Comment: A commenter stated that
the definition of ‘‘preponderance of the
evidence’’ needs to be revised or
clarified to clearly state that FCIC has
the burden of proof to produce evidence
to meet its preponderance of the
evidence.
Response: FCIC has revised
§ 400.454(a) to clarify that FCIC bears
the burden of proving that the person
willfully and intentionally provided
false or inaccurate information or failed
to comply with a requirement of FCIC.
4. Principal
Comment: A commenter stated that
the definition of ‘‘principal’’ was broad,
and includes persons whom the law
does not recognize as a principal. In
addition, while the concept of ‘‘control’’
is defined by case law, the concept of
‘‘critical influence’’ is not.
Theoretically, a data processor has
‘‘critical influence’’ because the
incorrect entry of data may have a
significant impact on liability. The
commenter asked whether FCIC
contends that such persons are
‘‘principals’’ under the rule. The
commenter also questioned who is a
‘‘key employee’’ and what are the
indicia of a ‘‘key employee.’’ The
commenter asked who will determine
whether an employee is a ‘‘key
employee’’—the insurance provider or
FCIC?
Response: The definition of principal
has been broadened in this rule because
insurance providers have routinely
delegated many of their obligations and
responsibilities to persons who would
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not normally have the ability to direct
the activities of the business. The
definition of ‘‘principal’’ is intended to
encompass such persons who may not
have the title, but who have functional
influence or control over some activities
of the insurance provider. This
delegation is not unique to the
insurance providers. Insureds may also
delegate their obligations to other
persons, such as farm managers. The use
of the term ‘‘key employee’’ is intended
to be a catch-all term for employees that
have primary management or
supervisory responsibilities or have the
ability to direct activities or make
decisions regarding the crop insurance
program. FCIC would initially decide
whether an employee is a key employee
based upon the person’s responsibilities
in the entity when determining whether
to file a complaint. However, it would
be an Administrative Law Judge that
will ultimately decide whether the
employee is subject to sanction under
this rule.
Comment: A commenter said that the
definition of ‘‘principal’’ was broad and
ambiguous. This problem is magnified
by the use of ‘‘key employee’’ (an
undefined term with no commonly
accepted legal understanding) and
‘‘critical influence on or substantive
control over the activities of the entity’’
(also undefined and not susceptible to
common legal interpretations from other
bodies of law). The commenter
suggested that FCIC could cure the
ambiguity to defining ‘‘principal’’ by
citing position names commonly used
in business and limiting the scope of the
definition to only certain functions with
the organization. The commenter
suggested the following definition for
‘‘principal’’: ‘‘A person who is an
officer, director, owner or partner
within an entity with primary
management or supervisory
responsibilities over the entity’s Federal
crop insurance activities.’’
Response: FCIC is attempting to avoid
being locked into titles because they do
not fit all the business entities that can
be involved directly or indirectly with
the crop insurance program. This is why
the term ‘‘key employee’’ has been
added. This definition is trying to
identify those persons who perform or
exert some type of management or
control or decision making over at least
some activities related to the crop
insurance program. Those are the
persons who will be treated as
principals. Given the practice of
delegation that occurs in the insurance
and farming industries, the definition
would be too limiting to name the
specific titles.
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5. Requirement of FCIC
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the definition of ‘‘requirement of
FCIC’’ is overly board, ambiguous, and
vague. As written, the rule could
include informal communications, such
as e-mails, from RMA personnel writing
without actual approval by supervisory
or managerial personnel with the
agency. The definition does not define
the form in which the written
communication must take. Thus, a
requirement of FCIC could take the form
of any writing, including an e-mail. The
commenter asked what types of
communications are included in ‘‘other
written communications.’’
Response: FCIC has revised the
definition to specify that requirements
will be contained in formal
communications such as regulations,
procedures, policy provisions,
reinsurance agreements, memorandums,
bulletins, handbooks, manuals, findings,
directives or letters signed or issued by
persons who have been provided the
authority to issue such communications
on behalf of FCIC. The definition is also
revised to clarify that e-mails are not
formal communications although they
can be used to transmit formal
communications.
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the definition of ‘‘Requirement of
FCIC’’ does not specify from whom
within the FCIC the written
communication may come. The written
communication could come from any
FCIC employee, regardless of status or
level, to anyone associated with the
insurance provider.
Response: As stated above, the
provision as been revised to specify that
written communications that will
qualify as a ‘‘requirement of FCIC’’ will
be originated by a FCIC employee that
has been delegated the authority to issue
such communications on behalf of FCIC.
The current delegations are found at
https://www.rma.usda.gov/news/
managers/2000/PDF/mgr-00–016–1.pdf,
https://www.rma.usda.gov/news/
managers/2000/PDF/mgr-00–016–2.pdf,
https://www.rma.usda.gov/news/
managers/2000/PDF/mgr-00–016–3.pdf,
and these delegations include
documents that would qualify as
‘‘requirements of FCIC.’’ To the extent
that other persons may also receive
delegated authority, other bulletins
containing such delegation will be
issued.
Comment: A commenter stated that
no ‘‘other written communication from
FCIC’’ should qualify as a ‘‘Requirement
of FCIC’’ unless FCIC has sent the
communication to the insurance
provider’s designated recipients. The
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commenter pointed out that the SRA, in
Appendix II, paragraph 6, requires each
insurance provider to designate persons
with authority to receive written
communications from FCIC.
Response: To the extent that the
‘‘requirement of FCIC’’ is in the form of
letters and other individual
communications, such documents will
be provided to the designated recipients
of the insurance providers. However,
documents such as regulations,
procedures, bulletins, reinsurance
agreements, etc. may also be considered
requirements of FCIC under certain
circumstances. Such documents will
continue to be released in the customary
manner.
Comment: A commenter suggested the
phrase ‘‘other written communications
from FCIC’’ be removed or at least
restricted to require that the FCIC
official sending the ‘‘other written
communication’’ have express authority
to send the communication and require
that the communication be sent to the
insurance provider’s designee for the
specifically stated type of
communication.
Response: As stated above, FCIC has
previously delegated persons to provide
written communication on behalf of
FCIC. FCIC will issue other bulletins if
other persons will be delegated this
authority. Further, as stated above, to
the extent that such communication is
a letter or other such individual
communication, such communication
will be sent to the insurance provider’s
designee. However, all other
communications will be released in the
customary manner.
Comment: One commenter questioned
whether the Common Crop Insurance
Policy falls within the definition of
requirement of FCIC. The commenter
asked if the Common Crop Insurance
Policy is a requirement of FCIC only for
agents, adjusters, and producers because
the SRA’s remedy applies only to
insurance providers. This same
conundrum exists for various
handbooks and manuals.
Response: As stated in the rule,
documents such as the Common Crop
Insurance Policy are considered a
requirement of FCIC unless such
documents contain their own sanctions
for violations. Further, even if such
documents contain sanctions, they may
still be considered a requirement of
FCIC if there are multiple violations of
the same provision or multiple
violations of different provisions. FCIC
has clarified that the remedial sanction
is in addition to any other remedy
contained in such document. The
requirement of FCIC will only apply the
persons to whom the document applies.
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For example, all regulations, including
the Common Crop Insurance Policy, are
applicable to insurance providers,
agents, loss adjusters, and producers.
However, the SRA is only applicable to
insurance providers. The question will
be whether the person is legally
obligated to comply with the document
through the force of law or contract.
Comment: One commenter asked: (1)
Who is the arbiter of whether the
‘‘breach rises to the level where
remedial action is appropriate;’’ (2)
what standard is used to make a
determination that a breach occurred
under ‘‘requirement of FCIC;’’ and (3)
whether materiality of the breach or
injury to FCIC is a consideration for
‘‘requirement of FCIC.’’
Response: FCIC will initially
determine whether a breach rises to the
level where remedial action should be
taken when it issues the complaint.
However, persons have the ability to
contest any proposed sanction before an
Administrative Law Judge, who will be
the ultimate arbiter. Further, as stated
above, the rule states the standards
applicable. For a document that has its
own remedy for a violation, such
document will only be considered a
requirement of FCIC when there are
multiple violations of the same or
different provisions. If the document is
directed to a specific person or group of
persons, or does not contain a remedy
for a violation, and requires such person
or persons to take or cease from taking
a specific action, the document is
considered a requirement of FCIC. As
stated above, FCIC has revised the
provisions to include materiality, which
applies to both false or inaccurate
statements and failing to comply with a
requirement of FCIC. However, as stated
above materiality does not require
monetary damages. The false
information or the failure to comply can
be material if it adversely affects
program integrity, including damage to
the crop insurance program’s
reputation.
Comment: One commenter stated that
definition of ‘‘requirement of FCIC’’
states that a breach will not be
considered a requirement of FCIC unless
the breach rises to the level where
remedial action is appropriate. The
proposed rule imposes a subjective
standard of reviewing conduct. The
commenter asked at what level does
conduct rise to ‘‘the level where
remedial action is appropriate.’’
Response: The rule makes it clear that
when the communication has its own
remedy there must be multiple
violations before the conduct arises to
the level where remedial action, in
addition to the remedy contained in the
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communication, is necessary. With
respect to other communications, there
is a subjective element. However, as
stated above, the gravity of the violation
must be taken into consideration when
determining whether to impose a
sanction, which would include whether
conduct arises to the level where
remedial action is appropriate. In
addition, the ultimate decision maker
regarding whether the conduct arises to
the level where remedial action is
necessary will be the Administrative
Law Judge. For the purpose of clarity,
FCIC has used the term ‘‘violation’’ in
place of ‘‘breach’’ because breach may
mistakenly imply that the definition
only applies to contracts or agreements
when the definition clearly refers to
other types of documents.
Comment: A few commenters stated
that the definition of ‘‘requirement of
FCIC’’ includes not only regulations and
policy provision, but also procedures
and other written communications from
FCIC. The proposed rule does not
address the potential conflicting nature
of these requirements. It also imposes
the same sanctions for violating nonbinding informal procedures and
communications as for violating binding
rules and regulations. Neither the law
nor the Administrative Procedures Act
gives the same type of formality,
equality or deference to these types of
agency decisions.
Response: To the extent that there is
a conflict between the regulations,
policy provisions, and procedures, the
regulations resolve such conflict in the
order of priority. To the extent that
other written communications may be
in conflict, any provision that has the
force of law, such as statutory or
regulatory provisions, would take
precedence. Further, neither the Act nor
the Administrative Procedures Act
precludes the use of any particular form
of communication to impose
requirements on a person. If FCIC has
the authority to require that certain
action be done or ceased, the Act
provides the authority to provide
sanctions for non-compliance. The
nature of the crop insurance program
makes it impractical to put all
requirements in regulations or
reinsurance agreements. Circumstances
may arise during the year that requires
immediate action and FCIC must have
the means to ensure such action is
taken. In determining whether to
impose a sanction, FCIC must look at
the nature of the violation. If the person
fails to take a specific action required by
FCIC or FCIC mandates that it cease a
specific action, it does not matter the
form of the communication. The person
is required to comply and failure to
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comply can result in the imposition of
sanctions.
Comment: One commenter is
concerned that a person without access
to FCIC’s regulations, policies,
procedures or other written
communications and those who may
have misinterpreted those regulations,
policies and procedures, may be subject
to sanctions. The commenter stated that
the definition should include
regulations, policies, procedures or
other written communications the
person knew or should have known or
had received a specific notice of alleged
violation.
Response: As stated above, sanctions
can only be imposed for a violation of
requirement of FCIC if such requirement
is applicable to the person. If applicable,
the person should have notice of the
requirement. For example, bulletins are
not applicable to producers unless such
bulletin is provided to the producer or
directs the agent or insurance provider
to provide such bulletin to the producer.
In addition, the gravity of the violation
will be taken into consideration before
imposing any sanction. No change has
been made.
Comment: One commenter stated that,
as proposed, the FCIC has virtually
unlimited discretion in determining
what constitutes a ‘‘requirement.’’
Insurance providers are often forced to
make on the spot interpretations of
ambiguous regulations without any
guidance from FCIC, only to have FCIC
later determine that the insurance
provider’s interpretation was incorrect.
Allowing FCIC to go one step further
and disqualify an insurance provider
because it disagrees with the insurance
provider’s interpretation of an
ambiguous ‘‘requirement,’’ is
unreasonable, unworkable, and unfair.
Response: FCIC does not disqualify an
insurance provider because it disagrees
with the FCIC. If FCIC determines that
an insurance provider has made an
incorrect interpretation, it would notify
the insurance provider of its
misinterpretation and request that any
actions taken based on the
misinterpretation be corrected. Sanction
would only be considered if the
insurance provider does not comply
with FCIC’s request. Further, if the
insurance provider believes that FCIC’s
interpretation is incorrect or that it does
not have the authority to require the
specific action, it can always appeal
FCIC’s action to the Civilian Board of
Contract Appeals. No sanction could be
imposed during this appeal process.
6. Violation
Comment: One commenter stated that
the definition of ‘‘violation’’ leaves far
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76873
too much room for interpretation as to
what constitutes a single violation and
what results in multiple violations. For
example, assume that a farmer submits
a single claim under his policy, but that
the claim involves three separate units
of insurance. The farmer submits three
false production worksheets in
connection with the one claim. The
commenter asked whether the farmer
committed one violation or three
violations.
Response: To be subject to a sanction,
the person must have willfully and
intentionally provided false or
inaccurate information. Each false or
inaccurate piece of information would
constitute a violation. Therefore, if in
the acreage report the producer falsely
reports the number of acres in the unit
and the share, this would be two
violations. In the example given, the
farmer has committed four violations.
The proposed rule defines violation as
‘‘each act or omission’’ made by a
person that satisfies all required
elements for a sanction is a violation.
The farmer signed his name on three
separate production worksheets and one
claim, four times he ‘‘certified’’ the
information provided, to the best of his
knowledge to be true and complete;
when in fact, he knew the information
was false.
7. Willful and Intentional
Comment: One commenter stated that
‘‘willful and intentional’’ acts should be
defined to make clear that the person
knew the falsity of the statement when
made and intended that FCIC act on that
misstatement.
Response: A ‘‘willful and intentional’’
act is providing information by a person
who had ‘‘knowledge that the statement
was false or inaccurate at the time.’’ The
requirement that the person ‘‘intended
that FCIC act on that misstatement’’ is
an element of fraud. However, under
section 515(h) of the Act, to impose a
sanction, the person only needs to have
willfully and intentionally provided
false or inaccurate information. The
term ‘‘fraud’’ is not found in section
515(h) of the Act and if Congress
wanted to require reliance by FCIC as an
element, it could have so required. No
change has been made.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the definition ‘‘Willful and intentional’’
is incomplete and inaccurate as a
standard of proof for the conduct under
the proposed rule. Intent and
willfulness must be established by clear
and convincing evidence.
Response: The general standard of
proof in administrative cases is
preponderance of the evidence. This is
consistent with USDA’s suspension and
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debarment regulations, which serve a
similar purpose. Further, this has been
the standard of proof that has been
applied since the application of these
sanctions in 1993. No change has been
made.
Comment: One commenter stated that
FCIC should clearly require that scienter
must be proven with respect to willful
and intentional statements prosecuted
under the rule to ensure that
prosecutions are confined to fraudulent
statements or acts or omissions, rather
than non-malicious acts or omissions.
Response: In the definition of ‘‘willful
and intentional,’’ FCIC has included the
requirement that the person know that
the statement was false or inaccurate at
the time the statement was made or the
person know that the act or omission
was not in compliance with a
requirement of FCIC at the time the act
or omission occurred. Therefore,
sanctions will not be imposed for
innocent mistakes. However,
maliciousness is not a standard required
by the Act. FCIC has structured these
provisions to fully comply with the
requirements imposed in the Act. No
change has been made.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the definition of ‘‘willful and
intentional’’ deviates from the common
law meaning of those terms, and
specifically nullifies a showing of
malicious intent, an element of common
law fraud. The commenter further states
that fraud is the very target of 7 U.S.C.
1515(h) and that FCIC may lack the
authority to expand the definition of
willful and intentional to include
conduct outside the common
understanding of fraud and to impute
knowledge from one individual to
another.
Response: Section 515(h) only
requires that the person willfully and
intentionally provide a false or
inaccurate statement or fail to comply
with a requirement of FCIC before a
sanction can be imposed. Section 515(h)
does not use the term ‘‘fraud’’ and that
term’s other connotations. FCIC has
studiously attempted to stay within the
requirements of the Act. To that end,
FCIC has used the common definitions
and common law to determine the
meaning of ‘‘willful and intentional.’’
This rule contained the same meaning
as has been given the term since FCIC
began doing disqualifications after the
enactment of the Federal Crop Insurance
Reform Act of 1994. With respect to the
imputation of knowledge, FCIC has used
the Department’s debarment regulations
as guidance because the burdens and
consequences are similar.
Comment: One commenter stated that
for the definition of ‘‘willful and
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intentional’’ FCIC does not specifically
define the words separately, and FCIC
does not state the source of this
definition. FCIC also excludes the
showing of malicious intent as
unnecessary. FCIC includes ‘‘the failure
to correct the false or inaccurate
statement when its nature becomes
known to the person who made it’’ and
includes acts of omission. These
additions force agents and agencies to
review information for past years, or
they may be subject to sanctions.
Response: Defining the words
separately would not change the
meaning or bring more clarity. The
terms will be given their common
meaning. The dictionary defines
‘‘willful’’ as ‘‘intentional, or knowing, or
voluntary.’’ ‘‘Intentional’’ is defined as
‘‘done purposely.’’ FCIC has also looked
to the body of established law regarding
the meaning of the terms for the
purposes of this rule. There is no
requirement in the Act for
maliciousness intent. The Act only
requires that a person willfully or
intentionally provide false or inaccurate
information. Therefore, requiring a
person to know the information was
false or misleading and electing to
provide it anyways satisfies the
common meaning of the terms. Further,
agents are not required to review
information for past years. Agents will
only be subject to sanctions if they knew
the information was false or inaccurate
at the time it was provided or if they
discover it later and they fail to do
anything about it. No change has been
made.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the definition of ‘‘Willful and
intentional’’ should be defined to make
clear that the actor knew the falsity of
the statement when made and intended
that FCIC act on the basis of the
intentional misstatements.
Response: As stated above, there is no
requirement that the person intended
FCIC to act on the false information in
section 515(h) of the Act. To be subject
to sanctions, the person only needs to
have willfully and intentionally
provided false or inaccurate information
to FCIC or an approved insurance
provider. Reliance of the misstatement
is an element of fraud, which as stated
above, is a term that is not found in
section 515(h) of the Act.
Comment: One commenter stated that
FCIC must establish a clear indication of
how intent will be established with
respect to demonstrating whether a
statement, act or omission is willful and
intentional. A false or inaccurate
statement or a noncompliant act or
omission alone does not rise to willful
and intentional and additional evidence
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that clearly establishes that a person had
sufficient knowledge is necessary before
imposing sanctions.
Response: The definition of ‘‘willful
and intentional’’ makes it clear that the
person must have knowledge of the
falseness or inaccuracy of the
information. Unless FCIC can establish
the person has such knowledge no
sanction under section 515(h) of the Act
can be imposed. Further, FCIC is not
alone in making these decisions. Any
person subject to a proposed sanction
has a right to contest the sanction before
an Administrative Law Judge. The
Administrative Law Judge will
determine whether FCIC has met its
burden before any sanction is imposed.
Comment: One commenter stated that
with no showing of intent coupled with
the provision that sanctions may be
imposed regardless of whether FCIC or
the insurance provider sustained
monetary losses places all parties in
jeopardy of severe punishment for
seemingly innocuous mistakes that may
have caused little to no harm.
Response: Sanctions cannot be
imposed for innocuous mistakes. There
must be evidence of willfulness and
intent. Further, the fact that no
monetary losses may occur does not
excuse the improper conduct. All false
or inaccurate statements have the
capacity to adversely affect program
integrity.
Comment: One commenter stated that
while the definition may be clear in
regards to willful, it is not clear from the
definition that there is actually a
requirement of intention at all. The
commenter suggested that the definition
should include knowledge of the
inaccuracy and that an intent, malicious
or otherwise be associated with the
inaccuracy. The definition should be
confined to ‘‘material’’
misrepresentations or omissions.
Response: ‘‘Intentional’’ is defined as
‘‘done purposely.’’ FCIC’s definition of
‘‘willful and intentional’’ is consistent
with that definition in that it requires
the person to have provided the
information to FCIC or an approved
insurance provider even though the
person had knowledge that the
information was false or inaccurate at
the time that the statement was made
and still elected to provide the
information to FCIC or the approved
insurance provider. However, as stated
above materiality has been added to the
rule but it does not require monetary
damages.
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Section 400.454
Civil Fines
Disqualification and
A. In General
Comment: One commenter stated that
ARPA required that each policy or plan
of insurance to provide notice of the
sanctions that could be imposed under
ARPA for willfully and intentionally
providing false or inaccurate
information to FCIC or failing to comply
with a requirement of FCIC. FCIC has
failed to comply with 1515(h)(5).
Response: Section 27 of the Common
Crop Insurance Policy Basic Provisions
(Basic Provisions) (7 CFR 457.8) states
that if the producer, or someone
assisting the producer, has intentionally
concealed or misrepresented a material
fact, the producer could be subject to
the remedial sanctions in 7 CFR part
400, subpart R, which includes
disqualification and civil fines.
However, FCIC has revised this rule to
include more specific language in
section 27 of the Basic Provisions and
added a new section 22 to the Group
Risk Plan Common Policy (7 CFR 407.9)
(GRP policy).
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B. Section 400.454(a)
Comment: One commenter has
concerns that FCIC is not providing
producers with the appropriate notice of
sanctions as stated under section
515(h)(5). The commenter stated that
section 454(a) lacks the required notice
to policyholders. Specifically, the
commenter stated that the proposed
language in section 454(a) does not
appear to provide producers the
required notice of the sanctions
available under 7 U.S.C. 1515(h)(3) as
required by 7 U.S.C. 1515(h)(5). That in
its present form section 454(a) does not
notify producers that they can be
disqualified for up to five years from
specific programs or that the potential
fine could be greater than $10,000.
Response: It is not the specific intent
of § 400.454(a) to provide producers
notice of sanctions available under
section 515(h)(3) of the Act. It is
intended to provide all persons of the
possible consequences of willfully and
intentionally provided false or
inaccurate information or willfully and
intentionally failing to comply with a
requirement of FCIC. As stated above,
FCIC has revised the Basic Provisions
and the GRP policy to ensure that
producers receive the required notice.
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the decision to initiate
administrative sanctions should not rest
solely with the FCIC Manager, but that
it should require a determination by the
FCIC Board of Directors.
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Response: Section 515(h) of the Act
confers the authority to impose
sanctions on the Secretary, who has
subsequently authorized the Manager of
FCIC to initiate the process when the
rule was originally promulgated in 1993
(58 FR 53110). Since this process has
been in place since 1993 and there have
not been any allegations that the
Manager has abused this authority, the
Secretary has elected to allow the
authority to initiate sanctions to remain
with the Manager of FCIC. In addition,
although the Manager initiates the
process, it is the Administrative Law
Judge that ultimately decides whether
there is sufficient evidence to impose a
sanction under section 515(h) of the
Act.
Comment: Several commenters stated
that FCIC uses an inappropriate
standard of proof, preponderance of the
evidence, for the imposition of any
penalty. One commenter stated that the
standard of guilt should rest with the
party alleging such violation. Instead of
requiring a mere ‘preponderance of
evidence’ the standard of proof should
be clear and convincing evidence. There
is no justification for holding the crop
insurance industry to a lower standard
of guilt.
Response: As stated above, this is the
same standard applied by the
Department for debarments. Because the
effects are similar and both can require
willful and intentional conduct, it is
appropriate to apply that standard to
sanctions under this rule. Further, this
has been the standard of proof that has
been applied since the application of
these sanctions in 1993. No change has
been made.
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the proposed rule imposes a low
evidentiary threshold for the imposition
of sanctions. The burden of proof
should be clear and convincing
evidence as opposed to a preponderance
of the evidence. The rule only
authorizes sanctions for willful and
intentional conduct. Such a standard
connotes the elements of fraud. In
almost every instance, liability for fraud
cannot be predicated on a mere
preponderance of the evidence; rather, a
finding based on at least clear and
convincing evidence is required.
Therefore, the draft regulations should
be amended to reflect a burden of proof
of clear and convincing evidence.
Commenters stated that FCIC may lack
the authority to adopt a burden of proof
lower than the clear and convincing
standard of proof in fraud cases. One
commenter stated that to establish a
prima facie claim of fraud, the party
alleging it must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that there was a
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76875
false representation or concealment of a
material fact, calculated with the intent
to deceive. One commenter stated that
the rule potentially expands the liability
of actions to a degree not enforceable in
civil litigation.
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act
does not require a finding of fraud.
Sanctions can be imposed for willfully
and intentionally providing false or
inaccurate information. Further, as
stated above, this is the same standard
applied by the Department for
debarments. Because the effects are
similar and both can require willful and
intentional conduct, it is appropriate to
apply that standard to sanctions under
this rule. Further, this has been the
standard of proof that has been applied
since the application of these sanctions
in 1993. No change has been made.
C. Section 400.454(b)
Comment: One commenter stated
FCIC needs to provide a clear indication
of how intent will be established as to
whether a statement, act or omission is
willful and intentional. Further, scienter
must also be established to a statement,
act or omission that is willful and
intentional.
Response: As stated above, FCIC has
defined ‘‘willful and intentional’’ to be
consistent with the common definition
of these terms and case law. Scienter is
not a specific requirement. No change
has been made.
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the proposed rule must be confined
to material misrepresentation or
omissions that cause financial loss. One
commenter stated that it was the intent
of Congress. A commenter stated that
FCIC should confine the proposed rule
to statements, acts or omissions that
cause injury or damages, consistent with
general principles of law relative to
fraud.
Response: FCIC has revised the
provisions to require consideration of
materiality when considering whether
to impose a sanction and defined the
term ‘‘material.’’ However, as stated
above materiality does not require
monetary damages. The false
information can be material if it
adversely affects program integrity,
including damage to the crop insurance
program’s reputation or providing or
potentially providing benefits that
would otherwise not be available.
Further, as stated above, fraud is not
required to be proven before a sanction
can be imposed. There only needs to be
a finding that a person willfully and
intentionally provided false or
inaccurate information or failed to
comply with a requirement of FCIC.
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D. Section 400.454(c)
Comment: One commenter stated that
‘‘gravity’’ is subjective and vague. It did
not tell the public the standard to be
applied by FCIC when measuring the
severity of a violation. The commenter
suggested that FCIC adopt the list of
factors under 7 CFR 1.335(b) or develop
its own list of mitigating factors to be
applied when considering the gravity of
a violation.
Response: FCIC has reviewed the list
of factors used in the assessment of
sanctions in 7 CFR 1.335(b), and has
modified the list to be more applicable
to the crop insurance program and
included it in § 400.454(c).
Comment: One commenter has
concerns that cumulative penalties
could exceed the gravity of the
violation. The commenter urged FCIC to
establish appropriate penalties to
violations that are always
commensurate to the gravity of such
violations.
Response: As stated above, FCIC has
adopted factors, with modification, used
by Department in assessing sanctions.
However, Congress specifically revised
section 515(h) of the Act to allow the
imposition of a separate sanction for
each violation. The gravity of each
violation will be taken into
consideration when imposing a
sanction.
Comment: A commenter stated that
increased penalties demand an equally
elevated system of judgment process
and identification of degree. The rule’s
definition of degree of offense and
penalty extends to others who may be
oblivious to the error of intention to
submit false information. For example,
the agent who forwards an actual
production history (APH) which was
completed and signed by an insured can
be totally unaware of erroneous
information provided by that insured,
unless the submission is blatantly
different from other producers in the
area. Cumulative penalties could result
in disproportionate fines in relation to
the offense. Therefore, a minor
infraction could have a major impact.
Response: An agent that transmits an
APH that is false can only be sanctioned
if the agent knew or should have known
the information was false and
transmitted it anyway. If the agent had
no way to know the information was
false, no sanction can be applied.
However, the producer that provided
the false APH may be sanctioned for
providing the false information to the
agent. In such case, the gravity of the
violation will be considered based on
the factors FCIC has added to the rule
to ensure the sanction is commensurate
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with the violation. Further, FCIC will
consider each person’s conduct as it
pertains to the provision of false or
inaccurate information. Therefore, there
should not be the possibility of
disproportionate sanctions.
Comment: A few commenters stated
that the rule should exclude penalties
and suspensions for conduct that is
already addressed in the SRA.
Response: There is nothing in the
SRA or other contracts that specifically
involves willfully and intentionally
providing false or inaccurate
information or failing to comply with a
requirement of FCIC. Further, there may
be circumstances where the improper
conduct under the SRA is so egregious
that the imposition of sanctions may be
appropriate. The rule explains those
situations. In such cases, the liquidated
damage provisions may be inadequate
given the gravity of the violation.
Further, suspension or termination may
not be viable options and the imposition
of a civil fine may be more appropriate.
However, with respect to any breach of
the SRA, FCIC first will look to the
remedies in the SRA. Because remedies
are available under the SRA, sanctions
can only be imposed if there are
multiple violations of the same or
different provisions.
Comment: Several commenters state
that the proposed rule’s cumulative
penalties violate the excessive fines
provision of the Eighth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. Since its penalties
would be cumulative, the proposed rule
could result in disproportionate fines.
Cumulative penalties are not allowed
under the Act, in addition to those
found in 7 U.S.C. 1515(h)(3). The
commenters stated that the rule should
also be clarified to make it clear that the
penalties and fines are not cumulative
and that if the FCIC chooses to enforce
any existing contract-based or regulatory
remedies, the rule should be expressly
inapplicable. A commenter stated that
while the sanctions in 7 U.S.C.
1515(h)(3) potentially are cumulative,
there is no statutory basis for punishing
the same conduct under other
regulations or agreements. Accordingly,
any fair reading of the FCIA precludes
cumulative penalties in addition to
those found at 7 U.S.C. 1515(h)(3). A
commenter stated that FCIC should not
treat the sanctions as cumulative
relative to other sanctions, as this is not
anywhere provided for in the plain
language or legislative history of the
statute.
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act
expressly authorizes a separate civil fine
for each violation. Therefore, this rule
does not contain cumulative civil fines
for the same conduct. It would not make
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sense to impose the same civil fine on
a person who committed one violation
compared to one who committed two or
more violations. When determining the
civil fine to apply for each violation,
FCIC is to take into consideration the
gravity of that violation. Therefore, this
allows the sanctions to be proportional
to the conduct. However, there is
nothing in the Act that would preclude
FCIC from enforcing section 515(h) of
the Act along with any contractual
remedies. When section 515(h) of the
Act was enacted, Congress was aware
that many contracts and agreements had
remedies for a breach. If it wanted the
sanctions under section 515(h) of the
Act to be the sole remedy for the
conduct it could have so required, but
it did not do so. The application of any
other remedy will be taken into
consideration when assessing the
sanction to be imposed under this rule
so that the result is not
disproportionate. Further, this is most
likely to arise with respect to the willful
and intentional failure to follow a
requirement of FCIC, because there is no
mention of willfully and intentionally
providing false or inaccurate
information in the contract or
agreement. As stated above, there are
situations when the conduct is so
egregious, such as with multiple
violations, that the imposition of
sanctions is appropriate under this rule
in addition to the remedies available in
the contract or agreement. No change
has been made in response to this
comment.
Comment: One commenter states that
the rule states that it is remedial in
nature. However, the rule also states
that fines and disqualifications are in
addition to any other actions taken by
FCIC or others under the terms of the
crop insurance policies, other statutes
and regulations. Recently the U.S.
Supreme Court disregarded its own
long-standing position on the remedial
nature of the federal False Claims Act
and labeled its treble damage provision
as ‘‘punitive.’’ Adding additional
sanctions on top of those recoverable
under the False Claims Act, and other
statutes will undoubtedly be punitive,
and subject the rule to interpretation
and construction consistent with its
punitive aims.
Response: The provisions stating that
the imposition of sanctions under this
rule is in addition to any other sanctions
provided in the agreement or contract is
not new. It was included in § 400.451(c).
Further, it is not FCIC’s decision
regarding whether other sanctions are
imposed. FCIC can only enforce the
sanctions available under the contract or
agreement and section 515(h) of the Act.
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FCIC will take into consideration any
other sanctions that may have been
previously imposed for the conduct to
ensure that the sanctions are not
disproportionate to the conduct. To the
extent that FCIC imposes sanctions
under section 515(h) of the Act, in
addition to the remedies available under
the contract or agreement, the person is
able to challenge such imposition before
the Administrative Law Judge.
Comment: One commenter stated that
because the definition of willful and
intentional is broad and sanctions can
be applied without resulting monetary
damages, it appears that cumulative
penalties could easily result from
simple mistakes that resulted in little to
no damages. Thus, cumulative penalties
could be unconstitutional as it may
constitute excessive fines under the
Eighth Amendment.
Response: Cumulative penalties
cannot be applied for simple mistakes.
Sanctions under section 515(h) of the
Act can only be applied for willfully
and intentionally providing false or
inaccurate information or failing to
comply with a requirement of FCIC.
Further, materiality will be considered
when determining whether to impose a
sanction and a consideration of the
gravity will also be done to determine
the amount of sanction to apply. This
should preclude the imposition of
sanctions that is disproportionate to the
conduct.
Comment: Two commenters stated
that the $100,000 threshold in
§ 400.454(c)(2) may be appropriate for
producers, agents, adjusters, or other
program participants, but it is too low
to impose on insurance providers. A
$100,000 indemnity could represent
only a few hundred thousandths of the
total indemnities paid by insurance
provider. A commenter stated that the
proposed penalty is too harsh. Absent
any intention on the part of Congress to
impose such draconian penalties, the
proposed regulations cannot stand. A
commenter suggested that $500,000 may
be a more appropriate benchmark for
insurance providers.
Response: The $100,000 threshold in
the aggregate may be low given the
amount of indemnities each insurance
provider pays out each year. However,
on an individual basis, a $100,000
indemnity is a significant amount and
the consequences are appropriate,
especially given that insurance
providers are required to review all
claims in excess of $100,000 and
annually report the results. The
commenter is correct that in the case of
multiple violations, a $500,000
threshold is more appropriate.
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Comment: One commenter stated that
the threshold amount for the imposition
of maximum penalties is low and has no
rational basis, especially when applied
to an insurance provider. Without
raising the threshold for imposing the
maximum disqualification term or fine,
the FCIC could run two serious risks.
First, it easily could be imposing civil
fines in amounts disproportionate to
actual losses and will thus be excessive
under the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution. Second, program
disqualification for an insurance
provider which overpays losses based
on such a low threshold is
disproportionate that this remedy, too,
would violate the Eighth Amendment.
Response: The civil fine is no more
than the amount of any pecuniary gain
resulting from the improper conduct for
which such sanction is sought or
$10,000. The $10,000 civil fine is
reasonably related to the amount of time
and resources required to investigate
whether false or inaccurate information
was provided to FCIC or the insurance
provider and whether such information
was provided willfully and
intentionally. The Supreme Court has
held that civil fines reasonably related
to the cost of investigation do not
violate the Eighth Amendment. FCIC is
unsure of the argument that ‘‘program
disqualification for an insurance
provider which overpays losses based
on such a low threshold is
disproportionate that this remedy, too,
would violate the Eighth Amendment.’’
The Supreme Court has held that
occupational debarments, even
permanent ones, are traditionally not
viewed as punishments. Therefore, it is
difficult to see how an occupational
disqualification for a limited term
would be ‘‘cruel and usual.’’ Further,
while FCIC has added a materiality
requirement, it is not dependent on
monetary damages. Further, these
thresholds are related to the maximum
sanctions that can be imposed. Based on
the gravity of the violation, amounts
smaller than the maximum may be
appropriate. No change is made in
response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated the
monetary threshold in § 400.454(c)(2)(ii)
(redesignated as 400.454(c)(3)(ii)) is less
defensible when one recognizes that it
is not tied to a single crop year’s
overpayments. Hypothetically,
disqualification could occur based on
more than $100,000 in errors over
multiple crop years. An insurance
provider could be barred from the
program for errors amounting to less
than 0.009 percent of indemnities paid.
FCIC’s approach violates the Eighth
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Amendment as applied to insurance
providers.
Response: As stated above, FCIC has
left the single violation at $100,000 but
increased the threshold for multiple
violations to $500,000 for the
imposition of the maximum sanction
against insurance providers. The
commenter is correct that since
insurance providers deal with much
larger amounts of claims, the threshold
should be higher for the imposition of
the maximum sanction. However, as
stated above, monetary damages are not
required as a condition of imposing a
sanction under this rule. Sanctions can
be imposed for any willful and
intentional providing of false or
inaccurate information or willful and
intentional failure to comply with a
requirement of FCIC. This means that
under the Act, a single willful and
intentional providing of false or
inaccurate information by an insurance
provider can subject it to
disqualification of a period up to one
year. Although not required, FCIC has
added a materiality requirement but it is
still not conditioned on whether there is
a monetary loss.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the proposed rule states a single
‘violation’ can be the basis for the
imposition of the maximum penalty if
the violation results in an overpayment
of more than $100,000. This $100,000
threshold is immaterial and statistically
insignificant with regard to insurance
providers.
Response: A single violation of
$100,000 is not statistically
insignificant. The average claim paid
over the last three crop years is less than
$5,300. Further, approved insurance
providers have an obligation to verify all
claims in excess of $100,000. Therefore,
there is a heightened duty with respect
to these policies. As a result, FCIC has
not increased the single violation
threshold. However, as stated above,
FCIC has increased the multiple
violation threshold for insurance
providers to $500,000.
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the parameters proposed for the
maximum penalties under
§ 400.454(c)(2) (redesignated as
400.454(c)(3)) were too broadly worded.
The commenter asked what constitutes
‘‘multiple’’ violations. If a single claim
involves the submission of five
fraudulent claims for indemnity, a
commenter asked whether the
participant has committed multiple
violations.
Response: Multiple violations are the
number of each willful and intentional
false or inaccurate statement and each
incident of failing to comply with a
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requirement of FCIC. One false or
inaccurate statement or one incidence of
failing to comply with a requirement of
FCIC is a single violation. More than
one false or inaccurate statement, even
if there is only one claim involved, or
more than one incidence of failing to
comply with a requirement of FCIC
constitutes multiple violations. In the
example given, each fraudulent claim
for indemnity counts as a separate
violation so that five fraudulent claims
would constitute multiple violations.
Comment: One commenter asked if
the multiple violations all have to be of
the same nature, or whether they can be
completely unrelated violations.
Response: Multiple violations do not
all have to be of the same nature.
Multiple violations may be completely
unrelated. An example of multiple
violations of the same nature may be an
insured who falsely certified three
separate production worksheets that the
production was less than the guarantee.
An example of multiple unrelated
violations may be when a producer
falsely reports acreage on an acreage
report and then later falsely reports
production for the unit and claims a
loss.
Comment: One commenter asked how
many years does ‘‘several crop years’’
entail.
Response: ‘‘Several crop years’’ is
commonly defined as a number of more
than two or three, but not many.
‘‘Many’’ is commonly defined as a large
number to infinity. Use of the term
‘‘several’’ means that if the improper
conduct occurred in more than three
crop years, the maximum sanction can
be imposed.
Comment: One commenter asked
under § 400.454(c)(2) (redesignated as
400.454(c)(3)), how many years back can
FCIC look to violations ‘‘over several
crop years.’’
Response: The Act does not limit the
number of years RMA can look at to
discover fraud, waste or abuse.
Comment: One commenter stated that
under the proposed rule one error,
immaterial or not, which does not arise
to negligence much less fraud, can be
mistakenly repeated numerous times.
The maximum penalty would appear to
apply in the case of multiple violations
without materiality or damages.
Response: Sanctions can only be
imposed for proven willful and
intentional acts that monetarily or nonmonetarily harm the program. If the
person knows that he or she is
committing an error and continues to do
so, then this would be willful and
intentional conduct that could lead to
the imposition of sanctions. In addition,
as stated above, FCIC has added a
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provision regarding materiality although
it does not require monetary damages.
Comment: One commenter asked
whether there must have been an actual
adjudication by FCIC or some other
authority of a previous violation.
Response: There is no requirement for
an adjudication of a previous violation.
However, to be a factor in determining
the appropriate length of
disqualification or amount of civil fine
there must be sufficient evidence to
prove that there was a violation and that
it was willful and intentional. The
Administrative Law Judge will consider
whether there is sufficient evidence to
support that a previous violation
occurred.
Comment: One commenter asked for
examples of multiple acts of
wrongdoing.
Response: FCIC has reconsidered this
provision in light of the other provisions
and comments received and realized
that only conduct that is willful and
intentional can be subject to sanctions
and such improper conduct constitutes
a violation. Since redesignated
§ 400.454(c)(3) already covers multiple
violations, FCIC has removed the
provisions relating to multiple acts of
wrongdoing to avoid any ambiguity.
Comment: One commenter asked
what is a wrongdoing. Wrongdoing is
not a defined term in the proposed
regulations. The commenter asked if
wrongdoings equate to a violation.
Response: As stated above, this
provision has been removed because
multiple violations are already covered
under redesignated § 400.454(c)(3)(i).
Comment: One commenter asked if
multiple acts of wrongdoing span more
than one crop year, and if so, how many
crop years.
Response: As stated above, the
provisions regarding wrongdoings have
been removed. Redesignated
§ 400.454(c)(3) already covers multiple
violations.
Comment: One commenter asked
what would constitute ‘‘multiple’’ acts
of wrongdoing. The commenter stated
that ‘‘wrongdoing’’ should be a defined
term. The commenter states that a
similar problem of ‘‘individual’’ or
‘‘multiple’’ violations arises under
§ 400.454(f)(1).
Response: As stated above, the
provisions regarding wrongdoings have
been removed. The term ‘‘individual’’
and ‘‘multiple’’ are given their common
usage meaning and, therefore, a
definition is not necessary. Individual
means one and multiple means more
than one.
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the phrase ‘‘of so serious a nature’’
provides no objective guidance as to
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what conduct rises to this level. The
commenters suggested that FCIC clearly
define precisely what conduct will
result in the maximum penalties.
Response: Conduct ‘‘of so serious a
nature’’ is one of the standards used in
suspension and debarment proceedings
and FCIC intends to use the history of
the imposition of suspensions and
debarments under this standard as
guidance under this rule. Further, this
standard still requires that the
conditions of willful and intentional be
met. However, it is not possible to
define the actual conduct meeting this
standard because each case is based on
its own factual situation. No change has
been made in response to this comment.
E. Section 400.454(d)
Comment: Several commenters
objected to imputation of conduct
between individuals and corporations.
They claim that section 515(h) does not
authorize the imputation of conduct
between individuals and corporations.
In addition, FCIC’s proposed rule
provides no evidence that its board of
directors has authorized the Manager to
impute liability as part of conducting
the ‘business’ of FCIC. One commenter
stated that the provisions for
imputations of conduct of one person to
another are unauthorized by the FCIA,
inappropriate, legally improper, and
both overly broad and vague. One
commenter stated that the most
troubling is the potential to impute
conduct from an individual to an
organization. This provision puts
insurance providers at risk for
unjustified sanctions. However, if RMA
proceeds with its inclusion, the scope of
potentially imputable conduct must be
narrowed.
Response: The Act does not preclude
the imputation of improper conduct.
The purpose of section 515(h) is to
protect the Government from doing
business with persons who have
willfully and intentionally made
misrepresentations. Persons can include
entities or individuals. However, all
entities are operated by individuals who
are responsible for the actions of the
entity. Therefore, those individuals
should be held responsible for those
actions just as much as the entity itself.
Conversely, entities that benefit from
the improper conduct by its associates
should similarly be held responsible.
Without the ability to impute improper
conduct too many people could find
means to shield themselves from their
conduct. Further, the factors that must
be satisfied before the imputation of
conduct should ensure that the truly
innocent are not sanctioned. There must
be knowledge, approval or acquiescence
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before knowledge can be imputed.
Further, as stated more fully below,
FCIC has added provisions to clarify
when improper conduct may be
imputed and that the factors applicable
to determining the gravity of the
violation must also be considered with
respect to the person upon whom
improper conduct is imputed. No
change has been made in response to
this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
FCIC cannot rely on 7 CFR part 3017 for
the imputation of liability. FCIC cannot
rely on 3017 because 3017 provides for
imputation of liability by FCIC only for
‘fraudulent, criminal, or other improper
conduct.’ The first problem with this
concept is that part 3017 was not issued
under the authority of FCIA. The second
problem with relying on part 3017 is
that FCIC has not cited the statutory
authority for that set of regulations as
authority for the proposed rule. Finally,
the rule calls for the imputation of
liability for any violation of
§ 400.454(b), which includes providing
false or inaccurate statements and
failing to adhere to a ‘Requirement of
FCIC.’ A false statement would not be
fraudulent unless made with the
requisite intent. An inaccurate
statement or failure to adhere to a
requirement of FCIC could result simply
from negligence. Thus, the severity of
the conduct embraced by 3017.630 is
significantly greater than the conduct
covered by proposed § 400.454(b).
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act
describes the conduct that is subject to
sanctions under this rule, not 7 CFR
3017. The purpose of the imputation of
conduct provisions is to preclude
individuals from escaping responsibility
for their actions by hiding behind entity
structures. It is not intended to enlarge
the scope of the sanctions or to apply to
conduct that is otherwise not
sanctionable under section 515(h).
However, FCIC must employ all
reasonable measures to protect the
program from any person who has
committed a violation subject to the
sanctions in section 515(h). No change
has been made in response to this
comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the proposed rule improperly expands,
without providing a basis for doing so,
the scope of the allowed imputation
under 7 CFR 3017.630 to include
omissions and failures to act as well as
culpable acts performed with intent.
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act
describes the conduct that is subject to
sanctions under this rule. Section
400.454(d) only seeks to ensure that
those persons involved in the conduct
described in section 515(h) are held
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accountable. One way to do this is to
preclude individuals from shielding
themselves through the use of entities or
from entities shielding themselves by
claiming the conduct was caused by an
individual associated with the entity
even though the entity benefited from
the conduct. No change has been made
in response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated
imputing conduct would be improved
by two fundamental changes. First,
conduct only should be imputed when
the person to whom the conduct is
imputed ‘knows or has reason to know’
of the conduct under the definition
contained in 7 CFR 1.302(o). The
standards contained in that definition
should work for the Federal crop
insurance program. Second, the
imputation scheme could be improved
by revising 400.454(f) to conform to 7
CFR 1.335(b). Providing a nonexhaustive list of aggravating and
mitigating factors would create
appropriate flexibility for dealing with
situations where conduct is imputed.
Response: As stated above, FCIC has
already included the definition of
‘‘knows or has reason to know’’ and
used that term with respect to the
imputation of conduct. Further, FCIC
has added a provision that will require
the review of the factors added to
§ 400.454(c)(2) when imposing a
sanction on a person to whom conduct
was imputed.
Comment: One commenter stated that
to impute the improper conduct of a
person to another person, such person
must know or should have known of the
improper conduct. This statement
indicates that the government will
assess what the knowledge level of an
individual should be and prosecute
them according to their supposed
knowledge. There are many factors that
can influence the knowledge level of an
agent or insurance provider
representative. Not every insured and
agent has the same level of knowledge
or access to every element of
information.
Response: As stated above,
imputation of improper conduct
provides a means to ensure that those
responsible for the improper conduct
are held accountable. It is to prevent
persons from using entities or other
persons as shields against
responsibility. Persons should not be
permitted to turn a blind eye to what is
occurring, while at the same time they
are benefiting from the conduct. While
acceptance of benefits of the improper
conduct can be considered evidence of
knowledge, approval or acquiescence of
the conduct, a person can still rebut
such evidence. If the person can prove
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they were uninvolved and had no way
of knowing of the conduct, there may be
no basis to impute the conduct. No
change has been made in response to
this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
holding an organization responsible for
the acts of an individual is only
reasonable if that individual is a
principal of that organization, and even
then there are perimeters to be
established.
Response: The commenter’s view is
too restrictive. There may be cases
where an entity will allow a subordinate
to commit violations or turn a blind eye
to such conduct in order to obtain the
benefits. For example, an agency may
knowingly allow agents to falsify
records in order to increase premiums
and their commissions. The agents may
not be a principal of the agency, but the
agency by allowing the improper
conduct, would be complicit and should
be held accountable. There are sufficient
parameters in the rule to ensure that
persons who have no way of knowing of
the improper conduct and have no
involvement are not held accountable
for the actions of others. No change has
been made in response to this comment.
Comment: Two commenters stated it
would appear that the rule would hold
a person responsible for the acts of
another even where such statements,
acts or omissions are not fraudulent.
The commenter feels that other persons
could be held to a higher standard than
the person making the statement or
committing the act or omission. If there
is to be any imputation of liability, it
must pertain strictly to fraudulent
statements, acts or omissions and
require actual knowledge or a reason to
know.
Response: Persons to whom conduct
may be imputed are not held to a higher
standard. The rule requires knowledge,
approval or acquiescence before the
conduct can be imputed from an
individual to the organization. Further,
knowledge of or a reason to know is
required before conduct can be imputed
from an entity to an individual. As
stated above, FCIC has added a
definition of ‘‘knows or has reason to
know’’ obtained from 7 CFR 1.302.
While acceptance of benefits of the
improper conduct can be considered
evidence of knowledge, approval or
acquiescence of the conduct, a person
can still rebut such evidence. If the
person can prove they were uninvolved
and had no way of knowing of the
improper conduct, there may be no
basis to impute the improper conduct.
However, as stated above, fraudulent
conduct is not required before a
sanction may be imposed. Section
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515(h) refers to willfully and
intentionally providing false or
inaccurate information or willfully and
intentionally failing to comply with a
requirement of FCIC. If such conduct
occurs and the requirements for the
imputation of such conduct have been
met, these persons will be subject to the
sanctions contained in the rule. No
change has been made in response to
this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
FCIC is proposing to revise § 400.454(d)
to allow FCIC to impute the improper
conduct of a person to another person
if the other person has the power to
direct, manage, control or influence the
activities of the person that is being
cited for improper conduct. Since an
insurance provider employs agents to
sell policies, it follows the entire
organization could potentially be cited
for improper conduct of an agent. Both
could be disqualified from selling crop
insurance.
Response: An insurance provider
could only be at risk of sanction if it is
proven that the insurance provider had
knowledge, approved of or acquiesced
to the conduct of the agent that is the
subject of the sanction. While
acceptance of benefits of the improper
conduct can be considered evidence of
knowledge, approval or acquiescence of
the conduct, a person can still rebut
such evidence. If the person can prove
they were uninvolved and had no way
of knowing of the conduct, there may be
no basis to impute the conduct.
However, there have been instances in
the past where insurance providers have
allowed false information, such as
backdated documents, to be provided by
agents. In such cases, the insurance
provider should be held accountable.
No change has been made in response
to this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the proposed rule seems to indicate that
suspension and/or debarment may
happen without the parties being fully
aware of the reasoning behind the
penalty. The commenter recommends
that this provision be eliminated for
‘participants’ and FCIC fully explain the
process.
Response: FCIC is unsure of the basis
for the comment. FCIC must prove that
a person willfully and intentionally
provided false or inaccurate information
or willfully and intentionally failed to
comply with a requirement of FCIC.
Such conduct cannot be imputed to
another unless there was knowledge,
approval or acquiescence. Further, the
process of imposing disqualifications
and civil fines has been in place since
1993 and, before any sanction is
imposed, the person will have an
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opportunity to hear the evidence against
them and provide evidence in their
defense. An Administrative Law Judge
will determine whether a sanction
under this rule can be imposed.
Therefore, there should never be a
situation where a person would not be
aware of the basis for the sanction. In
addition, by statute, sanctions apply to
participants. Therefore, there is no basis
to remove them from this rule. No
change has been made in response to
this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
at a minimum, the scope of potentially
imputable conduct must be narrowed to
only impute conduct of officers,
directors and conduct of employees that
is specifically ratified or endorsed by
the entity. Moreover, the entity must be
given ‘credit’ for having practices that
attempt to prevent rule violations and
encourage ‘whistleblower complaints’ of
suspected violations. Thus, if an entity
addresses the allegedly ‘bad’ conduct by
its employee or independent contractor
after its officers have been made aware
of the situation, it should not be subject
to any of the penalties under the rule.
Response: The rule requires the
knowledge, approval or acquiescence of
the entity before improper conduct can
be imputed. Unless these standards are
met, no conduct can be imputed to the
entity. However, it is not practical to
limit the imputation of conduct to when
such conduct is ‘‘ratified’’ or
‘‘endorsed’’ by the entity. Such actions
suggest the need for an affirmative
action on the part of the entity.
However, in most cases, there is a
failure of the entity to act when it knew
or should have known of the improper
conduct. If the safeguards put in place
by the entity are working there should
be no risk of the imputation of conduct
to it. Further, one of the factors to be
considered in determining the gravity is
the internal controls in place. However,
FCIC does not know what the
commenter meant by ‘‘addressing’’ the
alleged bad improper conduct. Once the
entity becomes aware of the improper
conduct that is subject to sanction, it
must be reported to FCIC so it can take
the appropriate action against the
wrongdoer. Failure to report such
improper conduct can make the entity at
least appear complicit in the conduct. If
the person rejects the improper conduct
and any benefit derived therefrom, such
as refusal to accept documents that are
backdated, etc., then there may not be
a basis for the imputation of conduct.
Comment: One commenter stated that
clarification concerning imputation of
liability to other persons is needed. It
must be proven that the third party had
actual knowledge or at least a reason to
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know of the fraudulent statement, act or
omission of another.
Response: As stated above, this rule
does require knowledge or at least a
reason to know before conduct can be
imputed. While acceptance of benefits
of the conduct can be considered
evidence of knowledge, approval or
acquiescence of the conduct, a person
can still rebut such evidence. If the
person can prove they were uninvolved
and had no way of knowing of the
conduct, there may be no basis to
impute the conduct. However,
fraudulent is not the standard. If a
person willfully and intentionally
provides a false or inaccurate statement,
the person is subject to the sanctions
contained in this rule.
Comment: One commenter stated that
FCIC has the authority to sanction, even
debar an insurance provider as a result
of the violation of a low level employee.
Response: An insurance provider
cannot be disqualified or assessed a
civil fine unless it is proven that it had
knowledge of or reason to know of the
willful and intentional violation by the
low level employee. While acceptance
of benefits of the improper conduct can
be considered evidence of knowledge,
approval or acquiescence of the
conduct, a person can still rebut such
evidence. If the person can prove they
were uninvolved and had no way of
knowing of the conduct, there may be
no basis to impute the conduct.
However, there have been instances in
the past where the insurance provider
has turned a blind eye to misconduct it
knew about, such as backdated
documents, and in such cases the
insurance provider should be held
accountable.
Comment: One commenter objects to
imputing the conduct of an ‘individual
associated with an organization,’ as
FCIC has not defined what it means to
be ‘associated with an organization.’
The commenter asks whether a
contractor is ‘associated with’ an
insurance provider or whether that
contractor’s subcontractor is associated
with an insurance provider.
Response: Any person that performs
work on behalf of the organization can
be found to be associated with the
organization. However, that does not
necessarily mean that conduct will be
imputed to the organization. The
organization must know or have reason
to know of the improper conduct. While
acceptance of benefits of the improper
conduct can be considered evidence of
knowledge, approval or acquiescence of
the conduct, a person can still rebut
such evidence. If the person can prove
they were uninvolved and had no way
of knowing of the conduct, there may be
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no basis to impute the conduct. No
change has been made in response to
this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
a corporation’s receipt of a benefit from
an individual’s violation does not
‘evidence knowledge, approval or
acquiescence’ unless the corporation
knows or should know of either the
violation or that the benefit resulted
from the violation.
Response: While acceptance of
benefits of the improper conduct can be
considered evidence of knowledge,
approval or acquiescence of the
conduct, a person can still rebut such
evidence. If the person can prove they
were uninvolved and had no way of
knowing of the conduct, there may be
no basis to impute the conduct.
Comment: One commenter stated (1)
the imputation appears to be automatic
if the ‘conduct occurred in connection
with the individual’s performance of
duties for or on behalf of that
organization.’ The commenter stated a
reasonable approach would be to make
conduct by a ‘principal,’ no presumed
imputation should exist with respect to
any person who is not a principal. (2)
While receipt of a benefit can be
‘evidence of knowledge, approval or
acquiescence,’ it only should be
rebuttable evidence. (3) The proposed
rule gives no recognition of the extent
to which the organization’s practices
attempted to preclude such conduct.
USDA elsewhere has recognized the
relevance of this factor. See for example,
7 CFR 1.335(b)(11). (4) Imputing
knowledge in the severe fashion
proposed could chill internal
investigative efforts by insurance
providers and ultimately cooperation
with FCIC in identifying and punishing
misconduct. FCIC should not adopt a
rule that might chill such efforts.
Response: (1) The commenter’s view
is too restrictive. There may be cases
where an entity will allow a subordinate
to commit violations or turn a blind eye
to such conduct in order to obtain the
benefits. For example, an agency may
knowingly allow agents to falsify
records in order to increase premiums
and their commissions. The agents
would not be a principal of the agency,
but the agency by allowing the improper
conduct would be complicit and should
be held accountable. (2) While
acceptance of benefits of the improper
conduct can be considered evidence of
knowledge, approval or acquiescence of
the conduct, a person can still rebut
such evidence. If the person can prove
they were uninvolved and had no way
of knowing of the conduct, there may be
no basis to impute the conduct. (3) As
stated above, having internal controls in
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place is one of the factors to be
considered when determining the
gravity of the violation. (4) This rule
should not chill the investigative efforts
of the entity. If the entity discovers
improper conduct subject to sanction
under this rule, the entity can shield
itself from any imputation of such
conduct by not accepting the benefits
from the conduct and promptly
reporting the improper conduct to FCIC.
No change has been made as a result of
the comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
an insurance provider can be sanctioned
based simply upon the fact that the
conduct occurred in connection with
the individual’s performance of duties
for or on behalf of that organization. If
an insurance provider did not actively
participate in the agent’s or adjuster’s
violation, the agent’s or adjuster’s
conduct should not be imputed to the
insurance provider and the insurance
provider should not be sanctioned
under this rule.
Response: An insurance provider that
did not actively participate in an agent’s
or adjuster’s violation and it is proven
that the insurance provider did not
know or have reason to know of the
violation, the insurance provider should
not be sanctioned. As stated above, the
entity can shield itself from any
imputation of such conduct by not
accepting the benefits from the
improper conduct and promptly
reporting the conduct to FCIC. No
change has been made as a result of this
comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
whether a person had reason to know of
a particular course of conduct is a very
subjective analysis. The commenter
asked how FCIC plans to determine
whether one person had a reason to
know of the conduct of another.
Response: Acceptance of the benefits
of the conduct subject to the sanction is
evidence of knowledge. However, as
stated above, that evidence is rebuttable.
There are other ways to establish a
reason to know, such as an obligation to
review documents that contain the false
statements, etc. In all cases, the person
will have the opportunity to provide
evidence in defense and the issue will
be decided by an independent
Administrative Law Judge.
Comment: Two commenters, citing
41 AM JUR 2d, Independent Contractors
section 2 (2007), stated that liability of
an independent contractor may not be
imputed to a corporation, but it imposes
a virtually impossible standard on large
insurance providers. Under the
proposed regulations, a corporation
with thousands of lower-level
employees and independent contractors
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76881
can be held liable and subject to
disqualification for the rogue actions of
a single independent contractor [or any
other individual ‘associated’ with the
insurance provider], even if that
individual acts in violation of insurance
provider policy unbeknownst to the
insurance provider.
Response: As stated above, the
corporation can only be subject to
sanctions under this rule if it knew of
or could reasonably have known of the
improper conduct. While acceptance of
benefits of the conduct can be
considered evidence of knowledge,
approval or acquiescence of the
improper conduct, a person can still
rebut such evidence. If the corporation
can prove they were uninvolved and
had no way of knowing of the conduct,
there may be no basis to impute the
conduct. Therefore, the corporation is
not liable for the rogue acts of a single
independent contractor that is unknown
or could not have been known by the
corporation. No change has been made
in response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter citing
Federal law stated that absent evidence
that Congress intended to impose such
harsh strict liability standards on
corporations, of which there is none, the
proposed rule cannot stand.
Response: This rule is not imposing
strict liability on corporations. Conduct
can only be imputed if the corporation
knew or reasonably should have known
of the improper conduct. While
acceptance of benefits of the conduct
can be considered evidence of
knowledge, approval or acquiescence of
the conduct, a person can still rebut
such evidence. If the corporation can
prove they were uninvolved and had no
way of knowing of the conduct, there
may be no basis to impute the conduct.
No change is made in response to this
comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
whether an individual had ‘reason to
know’ a specific fact is not equivalent to
whether an individual ‘should have
known’ of the fact and FCIC should
amend the rule to clarify the applicable
standard. USDA’s civil fraud
regulations, under 7 CFR 1.302(o),
already define the phrase ‘knows or has
reason to know’ in the context of fraud
and false statements. Another
commenter stated that the language
‘reason to know’ should be defined to
make clear that this does not create a
‘should have known’ standard. The
commenter stated that the ‘reason to
know’ requires that a person draw
reasonable inferences from information
already ‘known to him’ and does not
give rise to the duty of inquiry that is
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created by a ‘should have known’
standard.
Response: As stated above, FCIC has
added a definition ‘‘knows or has reason
to know’’ for clarity and used the
definition contained in 7 CFR 1.302(o).
However, also as stated above, fraud is
not a prerequisite to the imposition of
sanctions under this rule. Section 515(h)
of the Act only requires that a person
willfully and intentionally provide a
false or inaccurate statement or willfully
or intentionally fail to follow a
requirement of FCIC.
Comment: The commenter, citing
federal law, stated that imputation from
an organization to another organization
is contrary to existing law. The mere
existence of a partnership, joint venture,
joint application, association, or similar
arrangement does not automatically give
rise to shared liability. The commenter
stated that the proposed rule must be
clarified to include additional
prerequisites for imputed liability such
as actual knowledge or reason to know
of the culpable acts.
Response: The issue is not shared
liability. The question is whether a
person can be held accountable for the
actions on another. As stated above, the
rule requires that there be knowledge or
reason to know of the improper
conduct. While acceptance of benefits of
the conduct can be considered evidence
of knowledge, approval or acquiescence
of the conduct, a person can still rebut
such evidence. If the corporation can
prove they were uninvolved and had no
way of knowing of the conduct, there
may be no basis to impute the conduct.
No change has been made in response
to this comment.
F. Section 400.454(e)
Comment: One commenter stated that
the Agricultural Market Transition Act
cited in § 400.454(e)(1)(i)(B) was
replaced by the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002.
Response: The reference to the
Agricultural Market Transition Act in
§ 400.454(e)(1)(i)(B) will be deleted and
replaced with the Farm Security and
Rural Investment Act of 2002 or a
successor statute.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the prohibition contained in
§ 400.454(e)(1)(ii) is neither discussed in
nor implied by section 515(h), therefore
it is an impermissible expansion of the
penalties authorized by ARPA.
Response: FCIC does not understand
this comment. Section 515(h)(1) of the
Act refers to ‘‘producer, agent, loss
adjuster, approved insurance provider,
or any other person.’’ This means that
the sanctions in section 515(h) can
apply to any person who willfully and
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intentionally provides false or
inaccurate information or willfully and
intentionally fails to comply with a
requirement of FCIC. However, section
515(h) provides for different
consequences depending on whether
the person is a producer or other person.
This distinction is carried over into
§ 400.454(e)(1)(ii). That fact that
§ 400.454(e)(1)(ii) refers to participant is
not an expansion of the available
sanction since a participant, as defined
in the rule, just delineates a group of
persons already included under section
515(h). No change is made in response
to this comment.
Comment: One commenter asked if
§ 400.454(e)(1)(i)(I) (redesignated
§ 400.454(e)(1)(i)(H)) applied only to
federal assistance laws and if so, the
rule should be worded to reflect that
fact.
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act
refers to ‘‘any law that provides
assistance to the producer of an
agricultural commodity affected by a
crop loss or decline in the prices of
agricultural commodities.’’ It does not
make any distinction between federal or
any other laws but as a practical matter,
disqualification can only apply to
programs under the auspices of the
Federal Government. Therefore,
redesignated § 400.454(e)(1)(i)(H) will
be revised to read: ‘‘Any federal law that
provides assistance to the producer of
an agricultural commodity affected by a
crop loss or decline in the prices of
agricultural commodities.’’
Comment: One commenter stated that
the requirements were far too broad and
overreaching to be fair and enforceable
and that an insurance provider could be
subject to sanctions even if it strictly
complied with the rule to periodically
check the Ineligible Tracking System
(ITS) and Excluded Parties List System
(EPLS). An insurance provider could be
required to check the ITS and EPLS
daily for not only prospective business
partners, but also for its current
employees, adjusters, and agents. In an
example given, insurance provider A
contracts with an adjuster. Insurance
provider A checks ITS and EPLS and
the adjuster is cleared. The same
adjuster later contracts with insurance
provider B. The adjuster is then
disqualified for conduct associated with
his work for insurance provider B.
However, prior to insurance provider
A’s next periodic check of ITS and
EPLS, the adjuster works several claims
for insurance provider A.
Response: The burden imposed by
this rule is no different than the burden
that exists with respect to suspended or
debarred persons. The Government
wants to preclude such persons from
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circumventing their disqualification by
hiding under the auspices of another
person. Participants in the program have
the responsibility to periodically review
EPLS and ITS to determine whether the
persons it does business with are
included on such lists. FCIC will
examine the reasonableness of the
reviews to determine whether it is
appropriate to disqualify the participant
who does business with a disqualified
person. Such disqualification is not
automatic. No change is made in
response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the rule’s requirement to periodically
review the ITS and EPLS to determine
persons who are disqualified from
participation in the Federal crop
insurance program directly contravenes
the statutory requirement that the
relevant sanctions under the proposed
rule be confined to ‘willful and
intentional’ acts.
Response: There is no contravention
of the statute by imposing
disqualification on persons who elect to
do business with a person that has been
disqualified. Without this requirement,
disqualified persons will be able to hide
their participation by hiding under
another person. FCIC has the authority
to prevent such circumvention and has
elected to adopt the same remedies as is
applicable to persons who do business
with suspended and debarred persons.
Disqualification is not automatic and
FCIC will consider the circumstances on
a case-by-case basis. No change is made
in response to this comment.
Comment: Two commenters stated
that insurance providers have greater
access than individual agencies to
monitor ITS and that agencies don’t
have the system to do an effective job.
Although the insurance providers
monitor ITS, the agency may not receive
notification of ineligibility until several
months have passed or until after an
initial application was accepted and
was detected only when a loss was
submitted.
Response: Persons who are
disqualified are also reported to the
General Services Administration for
inclusion on the EPLS. EPLS is available
to everyone. Therefore, all participants
have the ability to timely determine
whether the persons with whom they
are doing business have been
disqualified. No change is made in
response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter asked if
entity ABC is ineligible, and new entity
DEF is set up, how will agents discover
the new entity, without some elaborate
system. It would appear that FCIC could
have a system which would
automatically detect, in a timely manner
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before insurance attaches, by cross
referencing social security number.
Response: There is no foolproof
method to prevent disqualified persons
from trying to hide their involvement.
The participants’ responsibility is to
review ITS and EPLS to determine
whether it is doing business with a
person listed. If a person is not listed
because it has changed its name,
participants cannot be held accountable
for the knowledge. However, if the
person is required to provide its social
security number or other identification
number in connection with its
participation in the program or
affiliation with the participant, such
persons should be identifiable on ITS or
EPLS. No change is made in response to
this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
spousal tracking would be tedious to
track as there may be multiple entries
for a given last name. The commenter
asked whether this means that it will
have to go through all insureds with that
last name. What if a person retains their
maiden name and their spouse is
ineligible? The commenter asks how
this will be tracked.
Response: If the spouse is disqualified
under this rule, the spouse should be
separately listed in ITS and EPLS.
Therefore, there should be no difficulty
in tracking such persons.
Comment: One commenter was
concerned that an agency could become
a victim if an insured were to testify that
he knowingly took a false report when,
in fact he didn’t; it would be the agent’s
word against the insured’s word. The
commenter asks where the burden of
proof lies.
Response: The burden of proof lies
with FCIC, who must establish that the
agent willfully and intentionally
provided a false or inaccurate statement.
Testimony can provide evidence, but
the agent will have the opportunity to
provide a defense, which will all be
considered by a neutral Administrative
Law Judge.
Comment: One commenter stated that
agents should not be involved in any
aspect of production fact finding as it
could be interpreted as a conflict of
interest. The commenter suggested that
this could be remedied by FCIC making
production fact finding by agents a
conflict of interest.
Response: Agents are precluded from
participating in any aspect of the loss
adjustment process under the conflict of
interest provisions in the SRA. It is the
loss adjuster that would be determining
production. Further, it is the loss
adjuster that should be providing the
production information to the insurance
provider, not the agent. However, if the
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agent knows that false information has
been provided and does nothing, the
agent can be held responsible. No
change is made in response to this
comment.
Comment: One commenter is
concerned that a mistake could be
turned into a ‘‘willful and intentional’’
act due to a person’s misinterpretation.
Response: It is difficult to see how
this could happen. FCIC bears the
burden of proving willful and
intentional conduct and the person will
be provided an opportunity to provide
a defense. The evidence will be
considered by a neutral Administrative
Law Judge, who will determine whether
FCIC has met its burden. This due
process should protect against
misinterpretations. No change is made
in response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter is
concerned about the imposition of
multiple penalties of $100,000 per
occurrence for multiple events. The
commenter recommends that
participants should not be punished for
simple errors or misinterpretation of a
rule, but participants should be
punished for willful and intentional
abuses.
Response: Simple errors or
misinterpretation of a rule are not the
basis for sanctions. There must be
willful and intentional conduct, which
is defined in the rule. Further, the civil
fine is $10,000 per violation, not
$100,000. No change is made in
response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter suggests if
an agent submits an acreage report with
false information it appears to be
shifting the responsibility of acreage
reporting from the insured to the agent.
The agent should not be expected to act
as a law enforcement official. Agents are
not authorized to require hard copy
records from the insured unless the
records are specifically requested by the
insurance provider.
Response: The proposed rule is not
shifting the responsibility of acreage
reporting from the insured to the agent.
The insured is responsible for the
accuracy of the provided information.
However, agents should not provide any
documentation with information it
knows or has reason to know is false. At
a minimum the agent should ask the
insured if the information provided is
correct. If an agent does not know nor
has no reason to know that the
information is false, there is no basis to
sanction the agent. No change is made
in response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter is
concerned about the rule’s reference to
proving willful and intentional error
versus unintentional error.
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76883
Unintentional errors can occur; the most
experienced operator, agent or adjuster
with years of training or coverage, can
make a mistake on a report. Months or
years after the unintentional error, these
mistakes may be construed as
intentional omissions. Specific and
defined consideration of the values and
variables used to determine guilt or
innocence is needed.
Response: Unintentional errors are
not the basis for sanctions. FCIC bears
the burden of proving that the error was
willful and intentional at the time it was
made and the person will have the
opportunity to provide evidence in the
defense. An independent
Administrative Law Judge will decide
whether FCIC has met its burden. No
change is made in response to this
comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the prohibition contained in
§ 400.454(e)(3)(ii) is neither discussed in
nor implied by section 515(h) and
therefore, is an impermissible expansion
of the penalties authorized by ARPA.
Response: Section 400.454(e)(3)(ii)
precludes participants from conducting
business directly related to crop
insurance with disqualified persons or
conducting any other business if such
business would permit the disqualified
person from receiving a benefit under a
program administered under the Act.
Under section 515(h) of the Act, FCIC is
expressly authorized to exclude persons
from participating in the crop insurance
program. Ancillary to this express
authority is the authority to take such
actions as are necessary to ensure that
disqualified persons do not continue to
participate in, or receive benefits from,
the crop insurance program. FCIC
exercised this authority in
§ 400.454(e)(3)(ii). Without this
provision, persons could avoid their
disqualification by affiliating with other
persons. Further, as learned in the
suspension and debarment process, the
only meaningful way to prevent persons
from doing business with disqualified
persons is to make them also subject to
disqualification. No change is made in
response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the penalty imposed under
§ 400.454(e)(3)(iii) is inequitable and
overly broad. For example, if a
disqualified agent also is a chemical
supplier, it is unreasonable for FCIC to
prohibit insureds from purchasing
chemicals from that individual.
Response: Doing business with a
disqualified person does not
automatically subject the participant to
disqualification. The purpose of
§ 400.454(e)(3)(iii) is to preclude
persons from circumventing their
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disqualification. FCIC will have to
evaluate whether the business is related
to the crop insurance program, the
disqualified person will be able to
receive benefits under the crop
insurance program as a result of the
business relationship, or the
disqualified person is using the business
relationship to obtain benefits not
otherwise entitled to because of the
disqualification. No change is made in
response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter asked
what occurs in a situation in which a
participant is unaware that the person
with whom he or she is doing business
was disqualified. The commenter asks
whether a participant has an obligation
to inquire of a prospective business
partner as to its status in the crop
insurance program.
Response: A participant has an
obligation to review ITS and EPLS to
discover whether a person with whom
they are doing business is disqualified.
Therefore, unless there is some
subterfuge on the part of the
disqualified person, such as using
different names, social security
numbers, etc., there should not be any
situation where the participant is
unaware they are doing business with a
disqualified person.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the phrase in § 400.454(e)(3)(iii), ‘may
be subject to disqualification’ seems
selective. The commenter asks what
criteria FCIC will apply in determining
whether to disqualify a participant for
doing business with a disqualified
person.
Response: The purpose of the
provision is to prevent disqualified
persons from circumventing their
disqualification. There may be
situations where the participant does
not know and has no reason to know
that a person has been disqualified,
such as using a slightly different name
or social security number. Under these
circumstances, it is unlikely
disqualification could be imposed on
the participant. There may also be
situations where the business conducted
is in no way related to the crop
insurance program. However, there may
also be situations where the participant
knows the person is disqualified and
elects to do business with them anyway.
Under such circumstances,
disqualification of the participant may
be appropriate. Each case will have to
be considered on its own merits. This
may seem selective, but all cases will
ultimately be determined by a neutral
Administrative Law Judge who will
determine whether FCIC has met its
burden.
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Comment: One commenter stated that
§ 400.454 refers to a person as an
insurance provider and the
disqualification of an insurance
provider is also broad and ambiguous.
The commenter asks if the entire
insurance provider, the individual, or
both are penalized if a qualifying error
occurs. Clarification is needed to
explain the process used when an
insurance provider is disqualified
because of an error.
Response: Insurance providers cannot
be disqualified because of an error
unless such error was committed
willfully and intentionally. If the person
named in the disqualification is the
insurance provider, then the insurance
provider as a business entity is
disqualified. If an individual affiliated
with the insurance provider is
disqualified, the disqualification applies
to the individual, not the insurance
provider unless specifically named. The
process used for disqualification is the
same for all persons, including
individuals and insurance providers. A
complaint is filed seeking
disqualification and the person can
mount a defense before a neutral
Administrative Law Judge.
Comment: One commenter stated that
§ 400.454(e)(3)(ii) states that ‘no
participant may conduct business with
a disqualified participant or other
person * * * if, through the business
relationship, the disqualified participant
or other person will derive any
monetary or non-monetary benefit from
a program administered under the Act.’
It is not clear what ‘program
administered under the Act’ means.
Response: ‘‘Program administered
under the Act’’ means any program
authorized under the Federal Crop
Insurance Act. This would include all
crop insurance programs, education
programs, research and development
programs, expert reviews, etc. It would
not include any program not authorized
under the Act, such as private hail
insurance or other lines of business.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the rule is overbroad in that it could be
interpreted to apply to contractual,
statutory, or other pre-existing legal
rights and obligations that an insurance
provider might have with ‘other
persons,’ i.e., its employees subject to
future disqualification. For example, if
an employee is disqualified for violating
‘FCIC requirements’ and is terminated
for cause, under federal law the
insurance provider must continue to
honor its existing ERISA obligations to
its former employee. As the rule is
written, allowing the disqualified
participant to continue to derive these
monetary benefits, as mandated by
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ERISA, could subject the insurance
provider to disqualification. Another
commenter stated that contractual and
statutory rights that precede
disqualification should not be affected.
If an employee is disqualified, the
employer is still obligated to honor
these pre-existing obligations. The rule
should clarify that honoring contractual
and statutory obligations that precede
the date of disqualification does not
subject an entity to potential
disqualification because of indirectly
providing a ‘monetary or non-monetary
benefit from a program administered
under the FCIA.’
Response: As stated above, the
purpose of this provision is to prevent
disqualified persons from
circumventing their disqualification by
affiliating with other participants. In the
scenario presented, once the participant
severs the relationship with the
disqualified person, FCIC recognizes
that there may be legal obligations that
the participant must continue to fulfill,
such as ERISA. However, such
arrangements may be subject to scrutiny
to ensure that they are not a subterfuge
to continue to channel benefits to a
disqualified person. FCIC has added
provisions to clarify that simply
fulfilling a previous contractual or
statutory obligation after termination of
the relationship with a disqualified
person is not doing business with such
person unless the arrangement is
determined to provide a means of
circumventing the disqualification, for
example, a severance agreement
executed at the time of termination that
provides payments or benefits similar to
what the person was previously
receiving.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the rule has no limitation with respect
to the type of business relationship that
a participant or other person has with a
‘disqualified participant or other
person.’ Thus, the business activity
could be completely unrelated to any
business transaction subject to the FCIA
or to the receipt of any benefit from the
USDA under another Federal program.
Second, such a proposed provision
creates a serious risk of blacklisting
individuals.
Response: There is no limitation with
respect to the type of business because
FCIC does not want to create loopholes
for disqualified persons to be able to
create business opportunities to
circumvent their disqualification.
However, § 400.454(e)(3) expressly
states that the business must directly
relate to the Federal crop insurance
program or allow the person to receive
a benefit from a program administered
under the Act. As stated above, such
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programs would include the contracts,
cooperative agreements and
partnerships for research and
development, educations, etc.
Therefore, there is no possibility of
‘‘blacklisting’’ individuals. FCIC has the
right to elect not to permit disqualified
persons to circumvent their
disqualification by preventing their
ability to obtain benefits related to crop
insurance or another program
administered under the Act. No change
is made in response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the proposed rule proposes routine
review of the ITS and EPLS to ensure
FCIC is not doing business with a
disqualified person. Each insurance
provider handles the flow of
information from RMA systems in a
different manner. This commenter does
not use ITS or EPLS. Agents are notified
if an insured is ineligible, however the
manner and timing of the notification
varies with each insurance provider.
The proposed rule would hold agents
accountable for review of systems of
which they have little or no knowledge.
The commenter recommends that RMA
systems not accept data for ineligible
producers.
Response: The commenter’s
suggestion presupposes that the
disqualified person is an agent or a
producer and this may not be the case.
Therefore, FCIC would have no means
to identify when participants are doing
business with disqualified persons.
Further, all participants are already
under an obligation to check the ITS
and ELPS with respect to persons who
may be suspended or debarred. That
would include agents, loss adjusters,
producers, and any other persons.
Therefore, this rule does not add a new
obligation; it simply reaffirms the
existing obligation and places
participants on notice to also check for
disqualified persons. No change is made
in response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that,
as the rule is written, an agent and
agency could be disqualified from
selling crop insurance for an error that
was not willful or intentional on their
part.
Response: It is difficult to see how
continuing to do business with a
disqualified person is not willful or
intentional unless there is some deceit
on the part of the disqualified person.
The participant has a duty to check the
ITS and ELPS to identify disqualified
persons. The participant knows that it is
precluded from doing business with
such persons. Therefore, the
participant’s continuance of business
with a disqualified person under the
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circumstances can be considered willful
and intentional.
G. Section 400.454(f)
Comment: One commenter stated that
the civil fines were too miniscule and
suggested that the minimum fine should
be $50,000, civil fines should be
imposed against all individuals who
participated in the entire scheme, and
jail time of five years minimum for all
offenders involved in the loan process.
Response: FCIC cannot impose a civil
fine in any amount greater than that
authorized in section 515(h) of the Act.
Further, nothing in the Act authorizes
the imposition of incarceration.
However, to the extent that the conduct
that subjects a person to disqualification
may violate any criminal statutes, there
is no impediment to the prosecution of
such persons. Further, any individual
who participated in the conduct that is
subject to disqualification is also subject
to disqualification provided their
conduct meets the standards contained
in this rule.
Comment: One commenter stated that
although § 400.454(c) requires FCIC to
consider the ‘‘gravity’’ of an offense
when imposing a civil fine, FCIC should
amend subsection (f) to recognize the
concept of materiality.
Response: As stated above, FCIC has
amended the provisions in § 400.454(c)
regarding whether to impose a civil fine
and the amount to include materiality.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the rule improperly fails to recognize
any concept of materiality. The absence
of a materiality test is contrary to FCIA,
which only authorizes sanctions for
material violations. Because the
proposed rule applies to reinsurance
agreements, it clearly sets up a situation
where immaterial conduct is punished
beyond the levels contemplated in the
SRA. The commenter suggested that this
section could be improved by including
the non-exhaustive list of aggravating
and mitigating factors found under 7
CFR 1.335(b).
Response: As stated above, FCIC has
amended the provisions in § 400.454(c)
regarding whether to impose a civil fine
and the amount to include materiality.
Further, FCIC has also added the list of
aggravating and mitigating factors found
in 7 CFR 1.335(b) to § 400.454(c).
Comment: Two commenters stated
that § 400.454(f)(1) imposes a separate
civil fine for each individual action. It
was suggested that FCIC should fully
explain what constitutes an ‘individual
action’.
Response: FCIC has revised the
provision to refer to ‘‘each violation.’’
FCIC has also revised the definition of
‘‘violation’’ in § 400.452 to specifically
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refer to the elements for disqualification
or civil fines contained in § 400.454.
Comment: One commenter asked
what would constitute an individual or
multiple violations.
Response: As stated above, each
willful and intentional false or
inaccurate statement or each act that
would be considered a willful and
intentional failure to comply with a
requirement of FCIC would be
considered an individual violation. For
example, each document that contains a
back-dated date would be an individual
violation. If there is more than one such
document or there are different false
statements on more than one document,
there would be multiple violations.
Comment: One commenter stated that
FCIC proposes to eliminate current
§ 400.454(f), which requires the hearings
to be governed by the Rules of Practice
Governing Formal Adjudicatory
Proceedings Instituted by the Secretary.
Without this section, it is unclear what
rules apply to the hearings. The
commenter suggested that FCIC state
what rules of practice apply to these
proceedings.
Response: The provisions from
current § 400.454(f) that provide for the
rules of practice have not been
eliminated. They were moved to
§ 400.454(a).
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the last sentence of 400.454(f)(3)(i)
should end with the period inside the
end parenthesis and the preceding
sentence should end with a period of its
own; ‘* * * the specified due date. (If
* * * signed by FCIC.)’ instead of
‘* * * the specified due date (if * * *
signed by FCIC).’
Response: Given that these are
independent sentences, FCIC has
removed the parenthesis and added
periods at the end of each sentence.
H. Section 400.454(g)
Comment: Two commenters stated
that the language about insurance
providers’ assumption of the book of
business introduces ambiguity and is
absolutely unnecessary. As a matter of
both fact and law, policies written by an
agent or an agency on behalf of an
insurance provider are already the
direct liability of the insurance
provider, so no assumption would be
required. Adding this provision simply
introduces confusion to an otherwise
clear situation. On the other hand, it is
appropriate for this provision to require
the insurance provider to assign policies
written by a disqualified agent or agency
to a different agent or agency.
Response: The commenter is correct
that when an agent writes a policy for
a particular insurance provider, that
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insurance provider has already assumed
the liability for such policy. Therefore,
this provision is removed. The
requirement that the insurance provider
assign the policies to a different agent or
agency will be retained. However,
ultimately it is the producer that has the
right of selection of which agent will
service their business and may move
their policy to any agent of their choice
that is not disqualified. Therefore, the
provision is revised to allow for this
election.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the proposed rule appears to suggest
that an agent rightfully found in
violation can have his entire business
confiscated, in addition to
disqualification and other pecuniary
fines. This could lead to constitutional
problems.
Response: The agent is precluded
from selling or servicing any policies or
receiving any benefits from the sale or
service of such policies during the
period of disqualification. However, as
the insurer, the insurance provider has
an obligation to ensure that the policies
are sold and serviced in accordance
with the approved policies and
procedures of FCIC. As stated above, it
is the producer that has the right to elect
which agent will sell and service his or
her policy. If the producer fails to make
this election, under the rule, the
insurance provider must assign the
policy to another agent but the
assignment of any policy will only last
for as long as the period of
disqualification. After the
disqualification period, subject to the
election of the producer, the agent is
entitled to get the book of business back.
The provision has been revised to
clarify that after the period of
disqualification, policies that were
assigned by the insurance provider
revert back to the previously
disqualified agent unless the producer
elects another agent.
Comment: One commenter stated that
it appears if an agent is disqualified, the
agency employing the agent would be
subject to disqualification as well. The
rule also states that the insurance
provider would be required to assign the
book to another agent or agency. The
commenter suggests the inclusion of
language that, in the case of one agent
in an agency being sanctioned, would
leave the book of business within the
same agency if that is the agency’s
choice or if one agency within an
organization is sanctioned, would leave
the business within the same
organization if that is the organization’s
choice, unless the agency also
committed a willful and intentional
violation of FCIC requirement.
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Response: If an agent is disqualified,
the agency employing the agent may
only be disqualified if the agency has
been named in a disqualification, it
continues to do business with the agent
or provides any benefits to the agent
under the crop insurance program or
any other program authorized under the
Act during the period of
disqualification. As stated above, it is
the producer that has the first right to
determine who will sell and service his
or her policy. If no such election is
made, it is the responsibility of the
insurance provider to ensure that the
policies are properly serviced. There is
nothing in this rule that would preclude
the insurance provider from electing to
keep the policies in the same agency.
However, there is nothing in the Act
that provides an agency with the right
to take over policies sold and serviced
by one of its agents. The transfer of
policies under such circumstances
should be a contractual matter between
the agent, agency and insurance
provider. No change is made in
response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter had great
concern that an insurance provider
could somehow assign a violating
agent’s book of business to someone
else. The commenter suggested that it
may be legally impossible for an
insurance provider to seize an agent’s
book of business.
Response: Once the agent is
disqualified, that agent can no longer
sell or service the policies in its book of
business or receive any benefits from
the same or service of such policies. As
stated above, the provision has been
revised to provide the producer with the
right to elect a different agent. However,
if no such election is made, as the
insurer of these policies, the insurance
provider has an obligation to sell and
service the policies under the SRA.
FCIC is leaving it to the insurance
provider and agent to determine how
the book of business will be serviced
during the period of disqualification.
However, FCIC has added a provision
clarifying that after the period of
disqualification, the policies that were
assigned by the insurance provider
revert back to the previously
disqualified agent unless the producer
elects another agent.
Comment: One commenter stated the
requirement that the insurance provider
assign them to a different agent or
agency to service during the period of
ineligibility is unfair and is a threat to
the rights of the agent and agency.
Agents and agencies own their books of
business; it is an asset of the agent and
the agency just like any other asset. The
reassignment of that book of business
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would be the transferring of an agent’s
physical assets to another party.
Response: While agents and agencies
may consider the book of business to be
an asset, it is the producer that controls
who sells and services the policy.
Therefore, as stated above, the provision
was revised to give the producer the
election to cancel and rewrite the policy
with another agent or agency. If the
producer does not transfer the policy, it
is the insurance provider that has a
contractual obligation to ensure that the
policies are serviced. As stated above,
FCIC is leaving it to the agent, agency
and insurance provider to determine to
whom policies are moved once the
agent is disqualified. This rule simply
reiterates that such an assignment of the
policies must occur. Further, as stated
above, FCIC has added provisions
clarifying that after the period of
disqualification, the policies that were
assigned by the insurance provider
revert back to the previously
disqualified agent unless the producer
elects another agent.
Comment: One commenter stated that
if a disqualification for an insurance
provider results in a ‘time out of new
sales and renewals, but the ability for
continued service of existing policies,’
they believe that the same standard
should be held to agents and agencies,
and not simply a confiscation of an
agent’s or agency’s book of business.
Response: Given the large number of
policies in an insurance provider’s book
of business, it may not be feasible for
them to be disqualified in the middle of
a crop year without great disruption to
the crop insurance program. All of the
policies must be cancelled and rewritten
with another insurance provider and for
some insurance providers it could
amount to hundreds of thousands of
policies. At the end of the crop year,
policies must be cancelled and rewritten
with another insurance provider.
Therefore, this rule does not allow the
insurance provider to continue doing
business, it simply provides for the
orderly transition of the business. There
is not such a large disruption to the
program when an agent’s or an agency’s
book of business must be moved.
Policies do not have to be cancelled and
rewritten because they will remain
insured with the same insurance
provider. However, as stated above, the
agent’s or agent’s book of business is not
confiscated. During the period of
disqualification, the producer can elect
to move to another agent and only if
such election is not made will the
insurance providers assign policies to
fulfill its contractual obligation under
the SRA. The contract between the agent
and insurance provider can determine
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how the business is sold and serviced if
the agent is disqualified and such
arrangements will not be disturbed by
FCIC unless they violate the provisions
of this rule by permitting the agent to
continue to benefit from the crop
insurance program during the period of
disqualification. The provisions have
also been revised to clarify that after the
period of disqualification, the policies
that were assigned by the insurance
provider revert back to the previously
disqualified agent unless the producer
elects another agent.
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I. Section 400.454(h)
Comment: One commenter stated that
400.454(h) contains the risk of
improperly cumulative and excessive
penalties.
Response: There is nothing in section
515(h) of the Act that states that the
administrative remedies contained
therein are the only remedies for the
proscribed conduct. There are other
civil, criminal and possibly
administrative remedies available. If
multiple remedies are applied to a
person, that person has the right to
challenge the application of those
remedies as unconstitutional.
Section 400.457 Program Fraud Civil
Remedies Act
Comment: One commenter stated that
although the rule does not revise
§ 400.457(a), the proposed rule renders
this section inaccurate. This section is
not in accordance with the Program
Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986,
because the standards set forth in
400.454 differ from those set forth in 7
CFR 1.302 and 1.335.
Response: As stated above, FCIC has
revised this rule to make it consistent
with 7 CFR 1.302 and 1.335 to the
maximum extent practicable. In any
case, before sanctions can be imposed
under both sections 515(h) of the Act
and the Program Fraud Civil Remedies
Act, all the requirements for the
imposition of sanctions under each
must be met.
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the rule must be clear so that
ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and provides
sufficient guidance to those who may be
subject to the penalties. Several
commenters expressed concern with the
broad and ambiguous language of the
rule. Unintentional errors can occur.
Specific and defined consideration of
the factors used to determine guilt or
innocence is needed to be fair to alleged
offenders. One commenter stated that
FCIC must clear up any and all
ambiguities under the proposed rule so
all covered persons receive proper
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notice of their legal responsibilities. One
commenter stated that the rule does not
adequately define certain key terms that
will provide adequate notice of
prohibited conduct in the future. For
example, the rule provides sanctions
against persons who ‘submit’ or
‘provide’ false information related to the
Federal crop insurance program. These
terms do not provide adequate notice of
prohibited conduct to agents or others
who merely forward information or
forms supplied or completed by others,
but who submit the information and
forms to insurance provider.
Response: In response to these and
other comments, FCIC has added
definitions and revised provisions to
increase the clarity of the rule.
Responses to these comments will also
provide guidance. With respect to the
terms ‘‘submit’’ and ‘‘provide,’’ the term
submit is not used in the rule. The rule
only refers to willfully and intentionally
providing false or inaccurate
information, consistent with section
515(h) of the Act, which uses the term
‘‘provides.’’ However, FCIC has revised
the rule to add a definition of
‘‘provides’’ but without other specific
examples, FCIC is unsure of what
ambiguities the commenters are
referring to.
List of Subjects in 7 CFR Parts 400, 407,
and 457
Administrative practice and
procedures; Administrative remedies for
non-compliance.
Final Rule
Accordingly, as set forth in the
preamble, the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation amends 7 CFR parts 400,
407 and 457, as follows:
■
PART 400—GENERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
1. The authority citation for 7 CFR
400, subpart R is revised to read as
follows:
■
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1506(l), 1506(o), and 7
U.S.C. 1515(h)
Subpart R—Administrative Remedies
for Non-Compliance
2. Revise the heading for subpart R to
read as set forth above.
■ 3. Revise § 400.451 to read as follows:
■
§ 400.451
General.
(a) FCIC has implemented a system of
administrative remedies in its efforts to
ensure program compliance and prevent
fraud, waste, and abuse within the
Federal crop insurance program. Such
remedies include civil fines and
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disqualifications under the authority of
section 515(h) of the Act (7 U.S.C.
1515(h)); government-wide suspension
and debarment under the authority of 48
CFR part 9, 48 CFR part 409, and 7 CFR
part 3017; and civil fines and
assessments under the authority of the
Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act (31
U.S.C. 3801–3812).
(b) The provisions of this subpart
apply to all participants in the Federal
crop insurance program, including but
not limited to producers, agents, loss
adjusters, approved insurance providers
and their employees or contractors, as
well as any other persons who may
provide information to a program
participant and meet the elements for
imposition of one or more
administrative remedies contained in
this subpart.
(c) Any remedial action taken
pursuant to this subpart is in addition
to any other actions specifically
provided in applicable crop insurance
policies, contracts, reinsurance
agreements, or other applicable statutes
and regulations.
(d) This rule is applicable to any
violation occurring on and after January
20, 2009.
(e) The purpose of the remedial
actions authorized in this subpart are for
the protection of the public interest
from potential harm from persons who
have abused the Federal crop insurance
program, maintaining program integrity,
and fostering public confidence in the
program.
■ 4. Revise § 400.452 to read as follows:
§ 400.452
Definitions.
For purposes of this subpart:
Act. Has the same meaning as the
term in section 1 of the Common Crop
Insurance Policy Basic Provisions (7
CFR 457.8).
Affiliate. Persons are affiliates of each
other if, directly or indirectly, either one
controls or has the power to control the
other, or, a third person controls or has
the power to control both. Indicia of
control include, but are not limited to:
interlocking management or ownership,
identity of interests among family
members, shared facilities and
equipment, common use of employees,
or a business entity organized following
the disqualification, suspension or
debarment of a person which has the
same or similar management,
ownership, or principal employees as
the disqualified, suspended, debarred,
ineligible, or voluntarily excluded
person.
Agency. The person authorized by an
approved insurance provider, or its
designee, to sell and service a crop
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insurance policy under the Federal crop
insurance program.
Agent. Has the same meaning as the
term in 7 CFR 400.701.
Agricultural commodity. Has the same
meaning as the term in section 1 of the
Common Crop Insurance Policy Basic
Provisions (7 CFR 457.8).
Approved insurance provider. Has the
same meaning as the term in 7 CFR
400.701.
Benefit. Any advantage, preference,
privilege, or favorable consideration a
person receives from another person in
exchange for certain acts or
considerations. A benefit may be
monetary or non-monetary.
FCIC. Has the same meaning as the
term in 7 CFR 400.701.
Key employee. Any person with
primary management or supervisory
responsibilities or who has the ability to
direct activities or make decisions
regarding the crop insurance program.
Knows or has reason to know. When
a person, with respect to a claim or
statement:
(1)(i) Has actual knowledge that the
claim or statement is false, fictitious, or
fraudulent;
(ii) Acts in deliberate ignorance of the
truth or falsity of the claim or statement;
or
(iii) Acts in reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of the claim or statement;
and
(2) No proof of specific intent is
required.
Managing General Agent. Has the
same meaning as the term in 7 CFR
400.701.
Material. A violation that causes or
has the potential to cause a monetary
loss to the crop insurance program or it
adversely affects program integrity,
including but not limited to potential
harm to the program’s reputation or
allowing persons to be eligible for
benefits they would not otherwise be
entitled.
Participant. Any person who obtains
any benefit that is derived in whole or
in part from funds paid by FCIC to the
approved insurance provider or
premium paid by the producer.
Participants include but are not limited
to producers, agents, loss adjusters,
agencies, managing general agencies,
approved insurance providers, and any
person associated with the approved
insurance provider through
employment, contract, or agreement.
Person. An individual, partnership,
association, corporation, estate, trust or
other legal entity, any affiliate or
principal thereof, and whenever
applicable, a State or political
subdivision or agency of a State.
‘‘Person’’ does not include the United
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States Government or any of its
agencies.
Policy. Has the same meaning as the
term in section 1 of the Common Crop
Insurance Policy Basic Provisions (7
CFR 457.8).
Preponderance of the evidence. Proof
by information that, when compared
with the opposing evidence, leads to the
conclusion that the fact at issue is
probably more true than not.
Principal. A person who is an officer,
director, owner, partner, key employee,
or other person within an entity with
primary management or supervisory
responsibilities over the entity’s federal
crop insurance activities; or a person
who has a critical influence on or
substantive control over the federal crop
insurance activities of the entity.
Producer. A person engaged in
producing an agricultural commodity
for a share of the insured crop, or the
proceeds thereof.
Provides. Means to make available,
supply or furnish with. The term
includes any transmission of the
information from one person to another
person. For example, a producer writes
information on forms and gives it to the
agent and the agent transmits that
information to the insurance provider.
In both instances, the information is
‘‘provided’’ for the purpose of this rule.
Reinsurance agreement. Has the same
meaning as the term in 7 CFR 400.161,
except that such agreement is only
between FCIC and the approved
insurance provider.
Requirement of FCIC. Includes, but is
not limited to, formal communications,
such as a regulation, procedure, policy
provision, reinsurance agreement,
memorandum, bulletin, handbook,
manual, finding, directive, or letter,
signed or issued by a person authorized
by FCIC to provide such communication
on behalf of FCIC, that requires a
particular participant or group of
participants to take a specific action or
to cease and desist from a taking a
specific action (e-mails will not be
considered formal communications
although they may be used to transmit
a formal communication). Formal
communications that contain a remedy
in such communication in the event of
a violation of its terms and conditions
will not be considered a requirement of
FCIC unless such violation arises to the
level where remedial action is
appropriate. (For example, multiple
violations of the same provision in
separate policies or procedures or
multiple violations of different
provisions in the same policy or
procedure.)
Violation. Each act or omission by a
person that satisfies all required
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elements for the imposition of a
disqualification or a civil fine contained
in § 400.454.
Willful and intentional. To provide
false or inaccurate information with the
knowledge that the information is false
or inaccurate at the time the information
is provided; the failure to correct the
false or inaccurate information when its
nature becomes known to the person
who made it; or to commit an act or
omission with the knowledge that the
act or omission is not in compliance
with a ‘‘requirement of FCIC’’ at the
time the act or omission occurred. No
showing of malicious intent is
necessary.
■ 5. Revise § 400.454 to read as follows:
§ 400.454
Disqualification and civil fines.
(a) Before any disqualification or civil
fine is imposed, FCIC will provide the
affected participants and other persons
with notice and an opportunity for a
hearing on the record in accordance
with 7 CFR part 1, subpart H.
(1) Proceedings will be initiated when
the Manager of FCIC files a complaint
with the Hearing Clerk, United States
Department of Agriculture.
(2) Disqualifications become effective:
(i) On the date specified in the order
issued by the Administrative Law Judge
or Judicial Officer, as applicable, or if no
date is specified in the order, the date
that the order was issued.
(ii) With respect to a settlement
agreement with FCIC, the date
contained in the settlement agreement
or, if no date is specified, the date that
such agreement is executed by FCIC.
(3) Disqualification and civil fines
may only be imposed if a
preponderance of the evidence shows
that the participant or other person has
met the standards contained in
§ 400.454(b). FCIC has the burden of
proving that the standards in
§ 400.454(b) have been met.
(4) Disqualification and civil fines
may be imposed regardless of whether
FCIC or the approved insurance
provider has suffered any monetary
losses. However, if there is no monetary
loss, disqualification will only be
imposed if the violation is material in
accordance with § 400.454(c).
(b) Disqualification and civil fines
may be imposed on any participant or
person who willfully and intentionally:
(1) Provides any false or inaccurate
information to FCIC or to any approved
insurance provider with respect to a
policy or plan of insurance authorized
under the Act either through action or
omission to act when there is
knowledge that false or inaccurate
information is or will be provided; or
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(2) Fails to comply with a requirement
of FCIC.
(c) When imposing any
disqualification or civil fine:
(1) The gravity of the violation must
be considered when determining:
(i) Whether to disqualify a participant
or other person;
(ii) The amount of time that a
participant or other person should be
disqualified;
(iii) Whether to impose a civil fine;
and
(iv) The amount of a civil fine that
should be imposed.
(2) The gravity of the violation
includes consideration of whether the
violation was material and if it was
material:
(i) The number or frequency of
incidents or duration of the violation;
(ii) Whether there is a pattern or prior
history of violation;
(iii) Whether and to what extent the
person planned, initiated, or carried out
the violation;
(iv) Whether the person has accepted
responsibility for the violation and
recognizes the seriousness of the
misconduct that led to the cause for
disqualification or civil fine;
(v) Whether the person has paid all
civil and administrative liabilities for
the violation;
(vi) Whether the person has
cooperated fully with FCIC (In
determining the extent of cooperation,
FCIC may consider when the
cooperation began and whether the
person disclosed all pertinent
information known to that person at the
time);
(vii) Whether the violation was
pervasive within the organization;
(viii) The kind of positions held by
the persons involved in the violation;
(ix) Whether the organization took
prompt, appropriate corrective action or
remedial measures, such as establishing
ethics training and implementing
programs to prevent recurrence;
(x) Whether the principals of the
organization tolerated the offense;
(xi) Whether the person brought the
violation to the attention of FCIC in a
timely manner;
(xii) Whether the organization had
effective standards of conduct and
internal control systems in place at the
time the violation occurred;
(xiii) Whether the organization has
taken appropriate disciplinary action
against the persons responsible for the
violation;
(xiv) Whether the organization had
adequate time to eliminate the violation
that led to the cause for disqualification
or civil fine;
(xv) Other factors that are appropriate
to the circumstances of a particular case.
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(3) The maximum term of
disqualification and civil fines will be
imposed against:
(i) Participants and other persons,
except insurance providers who:
(A) Commit multiple violations in the
same crop year or over several crop
years; or
(B) Commit a single violation but such
violation results in an overpayment of
more than $100,000;
(ii) Approved insurance providers
who:
(A) Commit a single violation
resulting in an overpayment in excess of
$100,000; and
(B) Commit multiple acts of violations
resulting in an overpayment in excess of
$500,000; and
(iii) Any participant or person who
commits such other action or omission
of so serious a nature that imposition of
the maximum is appropriate.
(d) With respect to the imputing of
conduct:
(1) The conduct of any officer,
director, shareholder, partner,
employee, or other individual
associated with an organization, in
violation of § 400.454(b) may be
imputed to that organization when such
conduct occurred in connection with
the individual’s performance of duties
for or on behalf of that organization, or
with the organization’s knowledge,
approval or acquiescence. The
organization’s acceptance of the benefits
derived from the violation is evidence of
knowledge, approval or acquiescence.
(2) The conduct of any organization in
violation of § 400.454(b) may be
imputed to an individual, or from one
individual to another individual, if the
individual to whom the improper
conduct is imputed either participated
in, knows, or had reason to know of
such conduct.
(3) The conduct of one organization in
violation of § 400.454(b) may be
imputed to another organization when
such conduct occurred in connection
with a partnership, joint venture, joint
application, association or similar
arrangement, or when the organization
to whom the improper conduct is
imputed has the power to direct,
manage, control or influence the
activities of the organization responsible
for the improper conduct. Acceptance of
the benefits derived from the conduct is
evidence of knowledge, approval or
acquiescence.
(4) If such conduct is imputed, the
person to whom the conduct is imputed
to may be subject to the same
disqualification and civil fines as the
person from whom the conduct is
imputed. The factors contained in
§ 400.454(c)(2) will be taken into
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76889
consideration with respect to the person
to whom the conduct is being imputed.
(e) With respect to disqualifications:
(1) If a person is disqualified and that
person is a:
(i) Producer, the producer will be
precluded from receiving any monetary
or non-monetary benefit provided under
all of the following authorities, or their
successors:
(A) The Act;
(B) The Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. 7333
et seq.) or any successor statute;
(C) The Agricultural Act of 1949 (7
U.S.C. 1421 et seq.) or any successor
statute;
(D) The Commodity Credit
Corporation Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 714
et seq.) or any successor statute;
(E) The Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938 (7 U.S.C. 1281 et seq.) or any
successor statute;
(F) Title XII of the Food Security Act
of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3801 et seq.) or any
successor statute;
(G) The Consolidated Farm and Rural
Development Act (7 U.S.C. 1921, et seq.)
or any successor statute; and
(H) Any federal law that provides
assistance to the producer of an
agricultural commodity affected by a
crop loss or decline in the prices of
agricultural commodities.
(ii) Participant or other person, other
than a producer, such participant or
person will be precluded from
participating in any way in the Federal
crop insurance program and receiving
any monetary or non-monetary benefit
under the Act.
(2) With respect to the term of
disqualification:
(i) The minimum term will be not less
than one year from the effective date
determined in § 400.454(a)(2);
(ii) The maximum term will be not
more than five years from the effective
date determined in § 400.454(a)(2); and
(iii) Disqualification is to be imposed
only in one-year increments, up to the
maximum five years.
(3) Once a disqualification becomes
final, the name, address, and other
identifying information of the
participant or other person shall be
entered into the Ineligible Tracking
System (ITS) maintained by FCIC in
accordance with 7 CFR part 400, subpart
U, and this information along with a list
of the programs that the person is
disqualified from shall be promptly
reported to the General Services
Administration for listing in the
Excluded Parties List System (EPLS) in
accordance with 7 CFR part 3017,
subpart E.
(i) It is a participant’s responsibility to
periodically review the ITS and EPLS to
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 244 / Thursday, December 18, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
determine those participants and other
persons who have been disqualified.
(ii) No participant may conduct
business with a disqualified participant
or other person if such business directly
relates to the Federal crop insurance
program, or if, through the business
relationship, the disqualified participant
or other person will derive any
monetary or non-monetary benefit from
a program administered under the Act.
(iii) If a participant or other person
does business with a disqualified
participant or other person, such
participant may be subject to
disqualification under this section.
(iv) Continuing to make payments to
a disqualified person to fulfill preexisting contractual or statutory
obligations after the business
relationship is terminated will not be
considered as doing business with a
disqualified person unless such
payment is used as a means to
circumvent the disqualification process.
(f) With respect to civil fines:
(1) A civil fine may be imposed for
each violation.
(2) The amount of such civil fine shall
not exceed the greater of:
(i) The amount of monetary gain, or
value of the benefit, obtained as a result
of the false or inaccurate information
provided, or the amount obtained as a
result of noncompliance with a
requirement of FCIC; or
(ii) $10,000.
(3) Civil fines are debts owed to FCIC.
(i) A civil fine that is either imposed
under with this subpart, or agreed to
through an executed settlement
agreement with FCIC, must be paid by
the specified due date. If the due date
is not specified in the order issued by
the Administrative Law Judge or
Judicial Officer, as applicable, or the
settlement agreement, it shall be 30 days
after the date the order was issued or the
settlement agreement signed by FCIC.
(ii) Any civil fine imposed under this
section is in addition to any debt that
may be owed to FCIC or to any
approved insurance provider, such an
overpaid indemnity, underpaid
premium, or other amounts owed.
(iii) FCIC, in its sole discretion, may
reduce or otherwise settle any civil fine
imposed under this section whenever it
considers it appropriate or in the best
interest of the USDA.
(4) The ineligibility procedures
established in 7 CFR part 400, subpart
U are not applicable to ineligibility
determinations made under this section
for nonpayment of civil fines.
(5) If a civil fine has been imposed
and the person has not made timely
payment for the total amount due, the
person is ineligible to participate in the
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Jkt 217001
Federal crop insurance program until
the amount due is paid in full.
(g) With respect to any person that has
been disqualified or is otherwise
ineligible due to non-payment of civil
fines in accordance with § 400.454(f):
(1) With respect to producers:
(i) All existing insurance policies will
automatically terminate as of the next
termination date that occurs during the
period of disqualification and while the
civil fine remains unpaid;
(ii) No new policies can be purchased,
and no current policies can be renewed,
between the date that the producer is
disqualified and the date that the
disqualification ends; and
(iii) New application for insurance
cannot be made for any agricultural
commodity until the next sales closing
date after the period of disqualification
has ended and the civil fine is paid in
full.
(2) With respect to all other persons:
(i) Such person may not be involved
in any function related to the Federal
crop insurance program during the
disqualification or ineligibility period
(including the sale, service, adjustment,
data transmission or storage,
reinsurance, etc. of any crop insurance
policy) or receive any monetary or nonmonetary benefit from a program
administered under the Act.
(ii) If the person is an agent or
insurance agency, the producers may
cancel their policies sold and serviced
by the disqualified agent and rewrite the
policy with another agent. If the
producer does not cancel and rewrite
the policy with another agent, the
approved insurance provider must
assign the policies to a different agent or
agency to service during the period of
disqualification or ineligibility. Policies
that have been assigned to another agent
or agency by the insurance provider will
revert back to the disqualified agent or
agency after the period of
disqualification has ended provided all
civil fines are paid in full and the
producer does not cancel and rewrite
the policy with a different agent or
agency;
(iii) If the person is an approved
insurance provider, the approved
insurance provider shall not sell, or
authorize to be sold, any new policies
or may not renew, or authorize the
renewal of, existing policies, as
determined by FCIC, during the period
of disqualification or ineligibility.
Nothing in this provision affects the
approved insurance provider’s
responsibilities with respect to the
service of existing policies.
(h) Imposition of disqualification or a
civil fine under this section is in
addition to any other administrative or
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legal remedies available under this
section or other applicable law
including, but not limited to, debarment
and suspension.
■ 6. Revise § 400.455 to read as follows:
§ 400.455 Governmentwide debarment and
suspension (procurement).
(a) For all transactions undertaken
pursuant to the Federal Acquisition
Regulations, FCIC will proceed under 48
CFR part 9, subpart 9.4 or 48 CFR part
409 when taking action to suspend or
debar persons involved in such
transactions, except that the authority to
suspend or debar under these provisions
will be reserved to the Manager of FCIC,
or the Manager’s designee.
(b) Any person suspended or debarred
under the provisions of 48 CFR part 9,
subpart 9.4 or 48 CFR part 409 will not
be eligible to contract with FCIC or the
Risk Management Agency and will not
be eligible to participate in or receive
any benefit from any program under the
Act during the period of ineligibility.
This includes, but is not limited to,
being employed by or contracting with
any approved insurance provider that
sells, services, or adjusts policies offered
under the authority of the Act. FCIC
may waive this provision if it is satisfied
that the person who employs the
suspended or debarred person has taken
sufficient action to ensure that the
suspended or debarred person will not
be involved, in any way, with FCIC or
receive any benefit from any program
under the Act.
■ 7. Revise § 400.456 to read as follows:
§ 400.456 Governmentwide debarment and
suspension (nonprocurement).
(a) FCIC will proceed under 7 CFR
part 3017 when taking action to suspend
or debar persons involved in nonprocurement transactions.
(b) Any person suspended or debarred
under the provisions of 7 CFR part 3017,
will not be eligible to contract with
FCIC or the Risk Management Agency
and will not be eligible to participate in
or receive any benefit from any program
under the Act during the period of
ineligibility. This includes, but is not
limited to, being employed by or
contracting with any approved
insurance provider, or its contractors,
that sell, service, or adjust policies
either insured or reinsured by FCIC.
FCIC may waive this provision if it is
satisfied that the approved insurance
provider or contractors have taken
sufficient action to ensure that the
suspended or debarred person will not
be involved in any way with the Federal
crop insurance program or receive any
benefit from any program under the Act.
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(c) The Manager, FCIC, shall be the
debarring and suspending official for all
debarment or suspension proceedings
undertaken by FCIC under the
provisions of 7 CFR part 3017.
■ 8. Amend § 400.457 by adding a new
paragraph (d) to read as follows:
§ 400.457
Act.
Program Fraud Civil Remedies
*
*
*
*
*
(d) Civil penalties and assessments
imposed pursuant to this section are in
addition to any other remedies that may
be prescribed by law or imposed under
this subpart.
§ 400.458
PART 407—GROUP RISK PLAN OF
INSURANCE REGULATIONS
11. The authority citation for 7 CFR
part 407 continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1506(l), 1506(o).
12. Amend § 407.9, Group Risk Plan
Common Policy, by adding a new
section 22 at the end to read as follows:
■
Group risk plan common policy.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES
*
*
*
*
*
22. Remedial Sanctions
If you willfully and intentionally
provide false or inaccurate information
to us or FCIC or you fail to comply with
a requirement of FCIC, in accordance
with 7 CFR part 400, subpart R, FCIC
may impose on you:
(a) A civil fine for each violation in an
amount not to exceed the greater of:
(1) The amount of the pecuniary gain
obtained as a result of the false or
inaccurate information provided or the
noncompliance with a requirement of
this title; or
(2) $10,000; and
(b) A disqualification for a period of
up to 5 years from receiving any
monetary or non-monetary benefit
provided under each of the following:
(1) Any crop insurance policy offered
under the Act;
(2) The Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. 7333
et seq.);
(3) The Agricultural Act of 1949 (7
U.S.C. 1421 et seq.);
(4) The Commodity Credit
Corporation Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 714
et seq.);
(5) The Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938 (7 U.S.C. 1281 et seq.);
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14. Amend § 457.8, Common Crop
Insurance Policy Basic Provisions, by
adding a new paragraph (e) at the end
of section 27 to read as follows:
■
The application and policy.
*
[Removed]
10. Remove § 400.459.
§ 407.9
13. The authority citation for 7 CFR
part 457 is revised to read as follows:
■
§ 457.8
Jkt 217001
*
*
*
*
27. Concealment, Misrepresentation
or Fraud.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) If you willfully and intentionally
provide false or inaccurate information
to us or FCIC or you fail to comply with
a requirement of FCIC, in accordance
with 7 CFR part 400, subpart R, FCIC
may impose on you:
(1) A civil fine for each violation in
an amount not to exceed the greater of:
(i) The amount of the pecuniary gain
obtained as a result of the false or
inaccurate information provided or the
noncompliance with a requirement of
this title; or
(ii) $10,000; and
(2) A disqualification for a period of
up to 5 years from receiving any
monetary or non-monetary benefit
provided under each of the following:
(i) Any crop insurance policy offered
under the Act;
(ii) The Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. 7333
et seq.);
(iii) The Agricultural Act of 1949 (7
U.S.C. 1421 et seq.);
(iv) The Commodity Credit
Corporation Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 714
et seq.);
(v) The Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938 (7 U.S.C. 1281 et seq.);
(vi) Title XII of the Food Security Act
of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3801 et seq.);
(vii) The Consolidated Farm and
Rural Development Act (7 U.S.C. 1921
et seq.); and
(viii) Any federal law that provides
assistance to a producer of an
agricultural commodity affected by a
crop loss or a decline in the prices of
agricultural commodities.
*
*
*
*
*
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Signed in Washington, DC on December
12, 2008.
Eldon Gould,
Manager, Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation.
[FR Doc. E8–30073 Filed 12–17–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410–08–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
8 CFR Parts 214, 215 and 274a
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1506(l), 1506(o).
9. Amend § 400.458 by removing
paragraph (b)(2), adding an ‘‘or’’ at the
end of paragraph (b)(1) and
redesignating paragraph (b)(3) as
paragraph (b)(2).
■
PART 457—COMMON CROP
INSURANCE REGULATIONS
[Amended]
■
§ 400.459
(6) Title XII of the Food Security Act
of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3801 et seq.);
(7) The Consolidated Farm and Rural
Development Act (7 U.S.C. 1921 et seq.);
and
(8) Any federal law that provides
assistance to a producer of an
agricultural commodity affected by a
crop loss or a decline in the prices of
agricultural commodities.
76891
[Docket No. USCIS–2007–0055; CIS No.
2428–07]
RIN 1615–AB65
Changes to Requirements Affecting H–
2A Nonimmigrants
AGENCY: U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, DHS.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: This final rule amends
Department of Homeland Security
regulations regarding temporary and
seasonal agricultural workers, and their
U.S. employers, within the H–2A
nonimmigrant classification. The final
rule removes certain limitations on H–
2A employers and adopts streamlining
measures in order to encourage and
facilitate the lawful employment of
foreign temporary and seasonal
agricultural workers. The final rule also
addresses concerns regarding the
integrity of the H–2A program and sets
forth several conditions to prevent fraud
and to protect laborers’ rights. The
purpose of the final rule is to provide
agricultural employers with an orderly
and timely flow of legal workers,
thereby decreasing their reliance on
unauthorized workers, while protecting
the rights of laborers.
The rule revises the current
limitations on agricultural workers’
length of stay including lengthening the
amount of time an agricultural worker
may remain in the United States after
his or her employment has ended and
shortening the time period that an
agricultural worker whose H–2A
nonimmigrant status has expired must
wait before he or she is eligible to obtain
H–2A nonimmigrant status again. This
rule also provides for temporary
employment authorization to
agricultural workers seeking an
extension of their H–2A nonimmigrant
status through a different U.S. employer,
provided that the employer is a
registered user in good standing with
the E-Verify employment eligibility
verification program. In addition, DHS
modifies the current notification and
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 244 (Thursday, December 18, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 76868-76891]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-30073]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
7 CFR Part 400, 407, and 457
RIN 0563-AB73
General Administrative Regulations; Administrative Remedies for
Non-Compliance
AGENCY: Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, USDA.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) finalizes the
General Administrative Regulations; Administrative Remedies for Non-
Compliance to add additional administrative remedies that are available
as a result of the enactment of section 515(h) of the Federal Crop
Insurance Act (Act) (7 U.S.C. 1515(h)), make such other changes as are
necessary to implement the provisions of section 515(h) of the Act, and
to clarify existing administrative remedies.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective January 20, 2009.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, contact
Cynthia Simpson, Director, Appeals, Litigation and Legal Liaison Staff,
Risk Management Agency, United States Department of Agriculture, 1400
Independence Avenue, SW., Room 4619, Stop 0806, Washington, DC 20250,
telephone (202) 720-0642.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Executive Order 12866
The Office of Management and budget (OMB) has determined that this
rule is non-significant for the purposes of Executive Order 12866 and,
therefore, it has not been reviewed by OMB.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
This rule does not constitute a collection of information under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. chapter 35).
E-Government Act Compliance
FCIC is committed to complying with the E-Government Act of 2002,
to promote the use of the Internet and other information technologies
to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government
information and services, and for other purposes.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
establishes requirements for Federal agencies to assess the effects of
their regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal governments and
the private sector. This rule contains no Federal mandates (under the
regulatory provisions of title II of the UMRA) for State, local, and
tribal governments or the private sector. Therefore, this rule is not
subject to the requirements of sections 202 and 205 of UMRA.
Executive Order 13132
It has been determined under section 1(a) of Executive Order 13132,
Federalism, that this rule does not have sufficient implications to
warrant consultation with the States. The provisions contained in this
rule will not have a substantial direct effect on States, on the
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
FCIC certifies that this regulation will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. All
similarly situated participants are required to comply with the same
standard of conduct contained in the Act, the regulations published at
7 CFR chapter IV, the crop policies, and the applicable procedures. For
example, any producer, whether growing 10 acres or 10,000 acres,
submits the same documentation for insurance and for a claim. All
agents, whether selling and servicing five policies or a hundred and
five policies, are required to perform the same tasks for each. The
consequences for failure to comply with the standards of conduct are
also the same for all participants and other persons regardless of the
size of their business. A Regulatory Flexibility Analysis has not been
prepared since this regulation does not have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities, and, therefore, this regulation
is exempt from the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 605).
Federal Assistance Program
This program is listed in the Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance under No. 10.450.
Executive Order 12372
This program is not subject to the provisions of Executive Order
12372, which require intergovernmental consultation with State and
local officials. See the Notice related to 7 CFR part 3015, subpart V,
published at 48 FR 29115, June 24, 1983.
Executive Order 12988
This proposed rule has been reviewed in accordance with Executive
Order 12988 on civil justice reform. The provisions of this rule will
not have a retroactive effect. The provisions of this rule will preempt
State and local laws to the extent such State and local laws are
inconsistent herewith.
Environmental Evaluation
This action is not expected to have a significant economic impact
on the quality of the human environment, health, and safety. Therefore,
neither an Environmental Assessment nor an Environmental Impact
Statement is needed.
Background
This rule finalizes changes made to 7 CFR part 400, subpart R,
Administrative Remedies for Non-Compliance that was published by FCIC
on May 18, 2007, as a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register at 72 FR 27981-27988. In the Administrative Remedies for Non-
Compliance, FCIC proposed to include provisions in its regulation that
were enacted with the passage of the Agricultural Rick Protection Act
of 2000 (ARPA). Through the enactment of section 515(h) of the Act in
ARPA, Congress significantly strengthened FCIC's ability to combat
fraud, waste and abuse by establishing a strong system of
administrative actions that are now applicable to all participants in
the Federal crop insurance program.
Now, producers, agents, loss adjusters, insurance providers and
their employees and contractors, and any
[[Page 76869]]
other persons who willfully and intentionally provide any false or
inaccurate information to FCIC or to an approved insurance provider
with respect to a policy or plan of insurance or willfully and
intentionally failed to comply with a requirement of FCIC are subject
to remedial administrative remedies. In addition to disqualification
from participating in the Federal crop insurance program, producers
will be disqualified from receiving benefits under other various United
States Department of Agriculture programs. In addition, civil fines
have been increased. Now a civil fine can be imposed for each violation
and the civil fine is the greater of $10,000 or the amount of pecuniary
gain obtained as a result of the false or inaccurate information
provided or the noncompliance with a requirement of FCIC.
The public was afforded 30 days to submit written comments after
the regulation was published in the Federal Register. A total of 128
comments were received from 17 commenters. The commenters were seven
insurance services organizations, one grower association, four
insurance providers, two law firms, one public citizen, one agent, and
one government employee. The comments received and FCIC's responses are
as follows:
Comment: One commenter stated that FCIC has taken significant
actions since the implementation of the Act in 2000 to reduce fraud,
waste and abuse of the crop insurance program. The commenter strongly
supports FCIC's efforts to combat waste, abuse and fraud in FCIC
programs and believes that those who knowingly and willfully abuse the
program must be punished.
Response: FCIC will continue to take such actions as are necessary
to improve program integrity.
Length of Comment Period
Comment: Several commenters stated that the thirty-day comment
period was inadequate. The commenters asked that the comment period be
extended by sixty days because of the serious nature of the proposed
rule and in order for other affected individuals to comment and to
fully understand the legal exposure they could face under the proposed
rule.
Response: FCIC usually gives 30 or 60 day comment period depending
on the rule. Because this rule is implementing a law that has been in
effect since June 2000, FCIC made the decision not to extend the
comment period.
Section 400.451 General
Comment: A commenter stated that ``waste'' and ``abuse'' are
neither offenses defined by statute or regulation and that FCIC never
has defined in a regulation, contract, policy, or procedure, the
conduct or actions that constitute ``waste'' and ``abuse.'' The
commenter asked that FCIC define ``waste'' and ``abuse.''
Response: Combating fraud, waste and abuse are the obligation of
all Government agencies. The imposition of these sanctions is one means
to combat fraud, waste and abuse. However, there are numerous other
actions taken by FCIC to combat fraud, waste and abuse. However, in the
context of this rule, fraud, waste and abuse are not grounds for the
imposition of sanctions. Sanctions are imposed for violations of
section 515(h) of the Act and other relevant statutory provisions. The
terms fraud, waste and abuse are not used except in the context of a
policy statement. Therefore, inclusion of separate definitions may
confuse persons into believing that sanctions can be imposed for
allegations of fraud, waste and abuse. This is supported by many of the
following comments which suggest that fraud must be proven before a
sanction under section 515(h) of the Act can be imposed. No change has
been made.
Comment: A commenter stated that a person may abuse the crop
insurance program without providing false information or violating FCIC
procedures.
Response: The crop insurance program may still be abused by a
person without providing false information or violating FCIC
procedures. Abuse can occur in any number of ways and FCIC continuously
reviews the program to tighten program requirements to prevent other
types of abuse. However, this rule is intended to preclude the specific
abuses associated with the providing of false or inaccurate information
and failure to comply with a requirement of FCIC.
Comment: A commenter stated Sec. 400.451(b) is overbroad as it
expands the rule to persons outside of the crop insurance program. For
example, an accountant knowingly falsifies an insured's Schedule F and
an insurance provider overpays on an Adjusted Gross Revenue claim based
on that Schedule F, the commenter asked whether the accountant is
subject to the sanctions of Sec. 400.454. The commenter asked that
FCIC precisely identify the persons to be covered by subpart R.
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act specifically refers to a
producer, agent, loss adjuster, insurance provider or ``other person''
that intentionally provides false or inaccurate information to FCIC or
to an approved insurance provider with respect to a policy. In the
example given, an accountant who knowingly provides false information
on a Schedule F may be subject to sanction under Sec. 400.454.
However, unless the accountant is otherwise participating in the crop
insurance program, disqualification would not be applicable. However,
the accountant could be subject to civil fines. Section 515(h) of the
Act was intended to sanction anyone who willfully and intentionally
provides false or inaccurate information, not just direct participants.
Therefore, its scope could encompass any person. For example, an
elevator operator who provides false weight receipts or the seed dealer
who falsifies a sales receipt would also be subject to sanctions under
section 515(h) of the Act.
Comment: A commenter stated that by making the proposed rule
applicable to ``any other persons who may provide information to a
program participant,'' the FCIC was improperly expanding the scope of
persons subject to administrative sanctions beyond what is authorized
in the Act. In addition, the phrase, ``any other persons who may
provide information'' was imprecise and, therefore, subject to
ambiguous construction.
Response: As stated above, section 515(h) of the Act authorizes the
scope of the sanction to apply to other than just producers, agents,
loss adjusters or insurance providers. Congress expressly refers to
``other persons.'' Therefore, the scope of this rule is authorized and
can apply to virtually anyone who may provide information that is false
or inaccurate. Therefore, there is no ambiguity. However, as stated
above, persons who may not be participating in the crop insurance
program or other United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
programs would likely be subject to civil fines instead of
disqualification.
Comment: A commenter is concerned that the proposed rule exposes
too many innocent persons to the threat of civil fines and sanctions
without focusing on the real wrong-doers. The rule proposes to cover a
vast number of ``participants in the federal crop insurance program''
as well as any other persons who may provide information to a program
participant. In addition, the definitions of affiliate, participant,
person, and principal are broad and far reaching and may subject
innocent persons to the threat of civil fines and sanctions. The
commenter recommends these
[[Page 76870]]
definitions exclude those not actively involved in the submission,
purchase or receipt of benefits of crop insurance policies.
Response: In order to be subject to the sanctions under section
515(h) of the Act, FCIC must be able to prove that the person willfully
and intentionally provided false or inaccurate information or willfully
and intentionally failed to comply with a requirement of FCIC.
Therefore, it is not possible for the sanctions to be imposed on
innocent persons. Further, the standards for the imputing of improper
conduct are the same as that applied in debarments and ensures that
only those persons responsible for the violation are sanctioned. As an
additional check and balance, persons have the right to contest any
sanction before it is imposed before an Administrative Law Judge. This
will ensure that the burden of proof has been met.
Comment: Several commenters stated that the proposed rule made the
rule retroactive in effect. In the preamble, FCIC states, ``the
provisions of this rule will not have a retroactive effect.'' However,
the proposed rule at Sec. 400.451(d) states that the ``failure to
comply with a requirement'' is applicable as of the date the proposed
rule become effective. But, the rule with respect to a false or
inaccurate statement is applicable to any act or omission occurring
after June 20, 2000. The rule and FCIC's explanation of it are
inconsistent as to its retroactivity. Because Congress did not grant
FCIC the authority to promulgate retroactive rules, they can only be
applied prospectively. To impose penalties for past conduct is improper
and unlawful. Because it is unclear as to its retroactivity, the rule
violates Executive Order 12988. The proposed rule should be changed so
that the regulation clearly has no retroactive effect. The commenters
asked that the rule become effective on the date rule becomes final.
Response: FCIC has clarified when the provisions of this rule
become effective. There is confusion because section 515(h) of the Act,
which contains the sanction provisions applicable to false or
inaccurate information that are the subject of this rule, have been in
effect since June 2000. Further, since that date, those statutory
provisions have been used to impose sanctions against persons that have
provided false or inaccurate information after June 2000 because the
statutory provisions were not in conflict with the regulation sanction
provisions that existed during that time. Therefore, false or
inaccurate information provided between June 20, 2000, and the date
this rule becomes effective will continue to be processed under section
515(h) of the Act and the regulations in effect prior to the date this
rule becomes effective. For false or inaccurate information provided
after the date this rule is effective will be processed under this
rule.
Section 400.452 Definitions
A. In General
Comment: A commenter stated that the proposed rule expanded the
definition of ``person'' and added 17 more definitions which apply only
to this subpart. FCIC does not describe the sources of many of the
definitions.
Response: FCIC expanded Sec. 400.452 to include terms used in the
proposed rule. Most of the definitions will refer to terms and
definitions contained in other regulations, such as the Common Crop
Insurance Policy Basic Provisions to ensure consistency. With respect
to the other definitions, FCIC has defined the terms in such a manner
as to achieve the purpose of this rule. The rulemaking procedures do
not require that administrative agencies document the source of all of
its information.
Comment: Several commenters make statements regarding removing (1)
vague and ambiguous language, and (2) defining terms FCIC normally or
routinely uses but has failed to define, such as ``benefit,''
``fraud,'' ``waste and abuse,'' ``wrongdoing,'' and ``knows or has
reason to know.'' A commenter stated that the word ``benefit'' is used
in the regulation but not defined. The proposed rule suggests benefit
is not limited to monetary gains. The commenters also stated that if
FCIC intends to impose sanctions for persons engaged in ``waste and
abuse,'' the terms must be adequately defined to provide notice of the
prohibited conduct. One commenter also stated that FCIC should add the
definition of ``knows or has reason to know'' contained in 7 CFR
1.302(o) to the proposed rule and make conforming changes to the
balance of the proposed rule consistent with the text of this added
definition.
Response: FCIC has revised the rule to add definitions of
``benefit,'' and ``knows or has reason to know.'' ``Benefit'' is
defined as any advantage, preference, privilege or favorable
consideration a person receives from another person in exchange for
certain acts or considerations. A benefit may be monetary or non-
monetary. The definition of ``knows or should have known'' will be the
same as that contained in 7 CFR 1.302(o). Further, this rule does not
sanction persons for ``fraud, waste or abuse.'' This rule imposes
sanctions for violations of section 515(h) of the Act and other
statutory provisions. To the extent that such statutory provision
includes some elements of fraud, waste and abuse, the prohibited
conduct will be specified therein.
B. Revisions to Specific Definitions
1. Affiliate
Comment: A commenter stated that FCIC's definition of ``affiliate''
is inconsistent with the Standard Reinsurance Agreement's (SRA)
definition of ``affiliate.'' The commenter stated that the definition
should be amended to mirror the SRA's focus on the control of
management of the book of business.
Response: While the narrower definition is appropriate for the SRA,
such a narrow definition is not appropriate for this rule, which is
intended to determine who a person is for the purposes of this rule.
Under the definition of ``person'' affiliates are also considered as
part of the person if the requirements are met. The main reason for
defining the term ``affiliate'' in this rule is to put everyone on
notice that the term may be used differently in this rule than it is in
other rules or agreements. No change has been made.
Comment: A commenter stated that the definition of ``affiliate'' is
broad and ambiguous because it uses the term ``same or similar
management'' when describing a presumably affiliated business entity.
The commenter suggested that the ambiguity can be cured by using either
the accepted definition under federal banking and securities law or
alternatively by substituting the term ``identical or substantially
identical management'' for ``same or similar management.''
Response: The definition was obtained from the definition of
``affiliate'' in USDA's suspension and debarment regulations published
at 7 CFR part 3017. Since a disqualification has a similar effect to a
debarment, it was determined that the treatment of affiliates and the
definition should be the same for both remedial sanctions. No change
has been made.
2. Participant
Comment: A commenter stated that the definition of ``participant''
was unduly broad in that it contained no materiality or other threshold
test for determining the extent of benefit that makes a person a
participant. As written, someone who does not have a substantial
beneficial interest for purposes of the crop insurance policy could be
subject to a sanction.
Response: Any person, regardless of his interest for purposes of
the crop
[[Page 76871]]
insurance policy, who willfully and intentionally makes a false
statement or fails to comply with a requirement of FCIC, may be subject
to sanction. As stated above, such person may have no connection to the
crop insurance program other than to provide certain information that
is then provided to FCIC or the insurance provider. If such person
willfully and intentionally provides false or inaccurate information,
such person can be subject to the sanctions provided in this rule even
if they derive no benefit from the crop insurance program. Materiality
does not require monetary damages. The false information can be
material if it adversely affects program integrity, including damage to
the program's reputation. Since the gravity must be considered in
determining whether to impose a sanction, FCIC has revised the
provision to include a materiality requirement and added a definition
of ``material.''
Comment: A commenter suggested that a materiality test, percent
interest or monetary level of benefit be used as a threshold for
defining ``participant.''
Response: As stated above, materiality does not require monetary
damages or benefits. The false information can be material if it
adversely affects program integrity, including damage to its
reputation. Further, FCIC has revised the provisions to include a
materiality requirement when the gravity of the violation is taken into
consideration and defined the term ``material.''
3. Preponderance of the Evidence
Comment: A commenter stated that intentional, willful conduct and
fraud are subject to special rules regarding proof in civil litigation.
Fraud requires ``clear and convincing proof to establish liability.''
This is a higher standard than that required under the proposed rule by
a preponderance of the evidence. Because fraud connotes intentional
misconduct the party charging that conduct is required to prove it to a
greater certainty. The commenter stated further that it is improper to
reduce the burden of proof by the government when alleging fraud. No
justification has been given that alters longstanding rules applicable
to civil litigation. Furthermore, intentional and willful acts should
be defined to make clear that the person knew the falsity of the
statement when made and intended that FCIC act on the basis of the
intentional and willful misstatements. Intent and willfulness also must
be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act does not require a showing of
fraud. The standard is whether a person willfully and intentionally
provided false or inaccurate information. The standard of proof was
derived from USDA's suspension and debarment regulations because of the
similarity of the effects of disqualification and debarment. Further,
debarment must also show evidence of willfulness and knowingly, which
is similar to the standards contained in section 515(h) of the Act. The
causes for debarment need only be established by a preponderance of the
evidence. In addition, this is not a civil litigation. This is an
administrative action taken to protect the integrity of the program and
misuse of taxpayer dollars. Further, this has been the standard of
proof that has been applied since the application of these sanctions in
1993. Section 515(h) of the Act does not contain any requirement that
the person who provides the false information intended for FCIC to rely
on such information. FCIC does not have to prove fraud. FCIC only needs
to prove that a person willfully and intentionally provided false or
inaccurate information or failed to comply with a requirement of FCIC.
Comment: A commenter stated that the definition of ``preponderance
of the evidence'' needs to be revised or clarified to clearly state
that FCIC has the burden of proof to produce evidence to meet its
preponderance of the evidence.
Response: FCIC has revised Sec. 400.454(a) to clarify that FCIC
bears the burden of proving that the person willfully and intentionally
provided false or inaccurate information or failed to comply with a
requirement of FCIC.
4. Principal
Comment: A commenter stated that the definition of ``principal''
was broad, and includes persons whom the law does not recognize as a
principal. In addition, while the concept of ``control'' is defined by
case law, the concept of ``critical influence'' is not. Theoretically,
a data processor has ``critical influence'' because the incorrect entry
of data may have a significant impact on liability. The commenter asked
whether FCIC contends that such persons are ``principals'' under the
rule. The commenter also questioned who is a ``key employee'' and what
are the indicia of a ``key employee.'' The commenter asked who will
determine whether an employee is a ``key employee''--the insurance
provider or FCIC?
Response: The definition of principal has been broadened in this
rule because insurance providers have routinely delegated many of their
obligations and responsibilities to persons who would not normally have
the ability to direct the activities of the business. The definition of
``principal'' is intended to encompass such persons who may not have
the title, but who have functional influence or control over some
activities of the insurance provider. This delegation is not unique to
the insurance providers. Insureds may also delegate their obligations
to other persons, such as farm managers. The use of the term ``key
employee'' is intended to be a catch-all term for employees that have
primary management or supervisory responsibilities or have the ability
to direct activities or make decisions regarding the crop insurance
program. FCIC would initially decide whether an employee is a key
employee based upon the person's responsibilities in the entity when
determining whether to file a complaint. However, it would be an
Administrative Law Judge that will ultimately decide whether the
employee is subject to sanction under this rule.
Comment: A commenter said that the definition of ``principal'' was
broad and ambiguous. This problem is magnified by the use of ``key
employee'' (an undefined term with no commonly accepted legal
understanding) and ``critical influence on or substantive control over
the activities of the entity'' (also undefined and not susceptible to
common legal interpretations from other bodies of law). The commenter
suggested that FCIC could cure the ambiguity to defining ``principal''
by citing position names commonly used in business and limiting the
scope of the definition to only certain functions with the
organization. The commenter suggested the following definition for
``principal'': ``A person who is an officer, director, owner or partner
within an entity with primary management or supervisory
responsibilities over the entity's Federal crop insurance activities.''
Response: FCIC is attempting to avoid being locked into titles
because they do not fit all the business entities that can be involved
directly or indirectly with the crop insurance program. This is why the
term ``key employee'' has been added. This definition is trying to
identify those persons who perform or exert some type of management or
control or decision making over at least some activities related to the
crop insurance program. Those are the persons who will be treated as
principals. Given the practice of delegation that occurs in the
insurance and farming industries, the definition would be too limiting
to name the specific titles.
[[Page 76872]]
5. Requirement of FCIC
Comment: Several commenters stated that the definition of
``requirement of FCIC'' is overly board, ambiguous, and vague. As
written, the rule could include informal communications, such as e-
mails, from RMA personnel writing without actual approval by
supervisory or managerial personnel with the agency. The definition
does not define the form in which the written communication must take.
Thus, a requirement of FCIC could take the form of any writing,
including an e-mail. The commenter asked what types of communications
are included in ``other written communications.''
Response: FCIC has revised the definition to specify that
requirements will be contained in formal communications such as
regulations, procedures, policy provisions, reinsurance agreements,
memorandums, bulletins, handbooks, manuals, findings, directives or
letters signed or issued by persons who have been provided the
authority to issue such communications on behalf of FCIC. The
definition is also revised to clarify that e-mails are not formal
communications although they can be used to transmit formal
communications.
Comment: Several commenters stated that the definition of
``Requirement of FCIC'' does not specify from whom within the FCIC the
written communication may come. The written communication could come
from any FCIC employee, regardless of status or level, to anyone
associated with the insurance provider.
Response: As stated above, the provision as been revised to specify
that written communications that will qualify as a ``requirement of
FCIC'' will be originated by a FCIC employee that has been delegated
the authority to issue such communications on behalf of FCIC. The
current delegations are found at https://www.rma.usda.gov/news/managers/
2000/PDF/mgr-00-016-1.pdf, https://www.rma.usda.gov/news/managers/2000/
PDF/mgr-00-016-2.pdf, https://www.rma.usda.gov/news/managers/2000/PDF/
mgr-00-016-3.pdf, and these delegations include documents that would
qualify as ``requirements of FCIC.'' To the extent that other persons
may also receive delegated authority, other bulletins containing such
delegation will be issued.
Comment: A commenter stated that no ``other written communication
from FCIC'' should qualify as a ``Requirement of FCIC'' unless FCIC has
sent the communication to the insurance provider's designated
recipients. The commenter pointed out that the SRA, in Appendix II,
paragraph 6, requires each insurance provider to designate persons with
authority to receive written communications from FCIC.
Response: To the extent that the ``requirement of FCIC'' is in the
form of letters and other individual communications, such documents
will be provided to the designated recipients of the insurance
providers. However, documents such as regulations, procedures,
bulletins, reinsurance agreements, etc. may also be considered
requirements of FCIC under certain circumstances. Such documents will
continue to be released in the customary manner.
Comment: A commenter suggested the phrase ``other written
communications from FCIC'' be removed or at least restricted to require
that the FCIC official sending the ``other written communication'' have
express authority to send the communication and require that the
communication be sent to the insurance provider's designee for the
specifically stated type of communication.
Response: As stated above, FCIC has previously delegated persons to
provide written communication on behalf of FCIC. FCIC will issue other
bulletins if other persons will be delegated this authority. Further,
as stated above, to the extent that such communication is a letter or
other such individual communication, such communication will be sent to
the insurance provider's designee. However, all other communications
will be released in the customary manner.
Comment: One commenter questioned whether the Common Crop Insurance
Policy falls within the definition of requirement of FCIC. The
commenter asked if the Common Crop Insurance Policy is a requirement of
FCIC only for agents, adjusters, and producers because the SRA's remedy
applies only to insurance providers. This same conundrum exists for
various handbooks and manuals.
Response: As stated in the rule, documents such as the Common Crop
Insurance Policy are considered a requirement of FCIC unless such
documents contain their own sanctions for violations. Further, even if
such documents contain sanctions, they may still be considered a
requirement of FCIC if there are multiple violations of the same
provision or multiple violations of different provisions. FCIC has
clarified that the remedial sanction is in addition to any other remedy
contained in such document. The requirement of FCIC will only apply the
persons to whom the document applies. For example, all regulations,
including the Common Crop Insurance Policy, are applicable to insurance
providers, agents, loss adjusters, and producers. However, the SRA is
only applicable to insurance providers. The question will be whether
the person is legally obligated to comply with the document through the
force of law or contract.
Comment: One commenter asked: (1) Who is the arbiter of whether the
``breach rises to the level where remedial action is appropriate;'' (2)
what standard is used to make a determination that a breach occurred
under ``requirement of FCIC;'' and (3) whether materiality of the
breach or injury to FCIC is a consideration for ``requirement of
FCIC.''
Response: FCIC will initially determine whether a breach rises to
the level where remedial action should be taken when it issues the
complaint. However, persons have the ability to contest any proposed
sanction before an Administrative Law Judge, who will be the ultimate
arbiter. Further, as stated above, the rule states the standards
applicable. For a document that has its own remedy for a violation,
such document will only be considered a requirement of FCIC when there
are multiple violations of the same or different provisions. If the
document is directed to a specific person or group of persons, or does
not contain a remedy for a violation, and requires such person or
persons to take or cease from taking a specific action, the document is
considered a requirement of FCIC. As stated above, FCIC has revised the
provisions to include materiality, which applies to both false or
inaccurate statements and failing to comply with a requirement of FCIC.
However, as stated above materiality does not require monetary damages.
The false information or the failure to comply can be material if it
adversely affects program integrity, including damage to the crop
insurance program's reputation.
Comment: One commenter stated that definition of ``requirement of
FCIC'' states that a breach will not be considered a requirement of
FCIC unless the breach rises to the level where remedial action is
appropriate. The proposed rule imposes a subjective standard of
reviewing conduct. The commenter asked at what level does conduct rise
to ``the level where remedial action is appropriate.''
Response: The rule makes it clear that when the communication has
its own remedy there must be multiple violations before the conduct
arises to the level where remedial action, in addition to the remedy
contained in the
[[Page 76873]]
communication, is necessary. With respect to other communications,
there is a subjective element. However, as stated above, the gravity of
the violation must be taken into consideration when determining whether
to impose a sanction, which would include whether conduct arises to the
level where remedial action is appropriate. In addition, the ultimate
decision maker regarding whether the conduct arises to the level where
remedial action is necessary will be the Administrative Law Judge. For
the purpose of clarity, FCIC has used the term ``violation'' in place
of ``breach'' because breach may mistakenly imply that the definition
only applies to contracts or agreements when the definition clearly
refers to other types of documents.
Comment: A few commenters stated that the definition of
``requirement of FCIC'' includes not only regulations and policy
provision, but also procedures and other written communications from
FCIC. The proposed rule does not address the potential conflicting
nature of these requirements. It also imposes the same sanctions for
violating non-binding informal procedures and communications as for
violating binding rules and regulations. Neither the law nor the
Administrative Procedures Act gives the same type of formality,
equality or deference to these types of agency decisions.
Response: To the extent that there is a conflict between the
regulations, policy provisions, and procedures, the regulations resolve
such conflict in the order of priority. To the extent that other
written communications may be in conflict, any provision that has the
force of law, such as statutory or regulatory provisions, would take
precedence. Further, neither the Act nor the Administrative Procedures
Act precludes the use of any particular form of communication to impose
requirements on a person. If FCIC has the authority to require that
certain action be done or ceased, the Act provides the authority to
provide sanctions for non-compliance. The nature of the crop insurance
program makes it impractical to put all requirements in regulations or
reinsurance agreements. Circumstances may arise during the year that
requires immediate action and FCIC must have the means to ensure such
action is taken. In determining whether to impose a sanction, FCIC must
look at the nature of the violation. If the person fails to take a
specific action required by FCIC or FCIC mandates that it cease a
specific action, it does not matter the form of the communication. The
person is required to comply and failure to comply can result in the
imposition of sanctions.
Comment: One commenter is concerned that a person without access to
FCIC's regulations, policies, procedures or other written
communications and those who may have misinterpreted those regulations,
policies and procedures, may be subject to sanctions. The commenter
stated that the definition should include regulations, policies,
procedures or other written communications the person knew or should
have known or had received a specific notice of alleged violation.
Response: As stated above, sanctions can only be imposed for a
violation of requirement of FCIC if such requirement is applicable to
the person. If applicable, the person should have notice of the
requirement. For example, bulletins are not applicable to producers
unless such bulletin is provided to the producer or directs the agent
or insurance provider to provide such bulletin to the producer. In
addition, the gravity of the violation will be taken into consideration
before imposing any sanction. No change has been made.
Comment: One commenter stated that, as proposed, the FCIC has
virtually unlimited discretion in determining what constitutes a
``requirement.'' Insurance providers are often forced to make on the
spot interpretations of ambiguous regulations without any guidance from
FCIC, only to have FCIC later determine that the insurance provider's
interpretation was incorrect. Allowing FCIC to go one step further and
disqualify an insurance provider because it disagrees with the
insurance provider's interpretation of an ambiguous ``requirement,'' is
unreasonable, unworkable, and unfair.
Response: FCIC does not disqualify an insurance provider because it
disagrees with the FCIC. If FCIC determines that an insurance provider
has made an incorrect interpretation, it would notify the insurance
provider of its misinterpretation and request that any actions taken
based on the misinterpretation be corrected. Sanction would only be
considered if the insurance provider does not comply with FCIC's
request. Further, if the insurance provider believes that FCIC's
interpretation is incorrect or that it does not have the authority to
require the specific action, it can always appeal FCIC's action to the
Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. No sanction could be imposed during
this appeal process.
6. Violation
Comment: One commenter stated that the definition of ``violation''
leaves far too much room for interpretation as to what constitutes a
single violation and what results in multiple violations. For example,
assume that a farmer submits a single claim under his policy, but that
the claim involves three separate units of insurance. The farmer
submits three false production worksheets in connection with the one
claim. The commenter asked whether the farmer committed one violation
or three violations.
Response: To be subject to a sanction, the person must have
willfully and intentionally provided false or inaccurate information.
Each false or inaccurate piece of information would constitute a
violation. Therefore, if in the acreage report the producer falsely
reports the number of acres in the unit and the share, this would be
two violations. In the example given, the farmer has committed four
violations. The proposed rule defines violation as ``each act or
omission'' made by a person that satisfies all required elements for a
sanction is a violation. The farmer signed his name on three separate
production worksheets and one claim, four times he ``certified'' the
information provided, to the best of his knowledge to be true and
complete; when in fact, he knew the information was false.
7. Willful and Intentional
Comment: One commenter stated that ``willful and intentional'' acts
should be defined to make clear that the person knew the falsity of the
statement when made and intended that FCIC act on that misstatement.
Response: A ``willful and intentional'' act is providing
information by a person who had ``knowledge that the statement was
false or inaccurate at the time.'' The requirement that the person
``intended that FCIC act on that misstatement'' is an element of fraud.
However, under section 515(h) of the Act, to impose a sanction, the
person only needs to have willfully and intentionally provided false or
inaccurate information. The term ``fraud'' is not found in section
515(h) of the Act and if Congress wanted to require reliance by FCIC as
an element, it could have so required. No change has been made.
Comment: One commenter stated that the definition ``Willful and
intentional'' is incomplete and inaccurate as a standard of proof for
the conduct under the proposed rule. Intent and willfulness must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.
Response: The general standard of proof in administrative cases is
preponderance of the evidence. This is consistent with USDA's
suspension and
[[Page 76874]]
debarment regulations, which serve a similar purpose. Further, this has
been the standard of proof that has been applied since the application
of these sanctions in 1993. No change has been made.
Comment: One commenter stated that FCIC should clearly require that
scienter must be proven with respect to willful and intentional
statements prosecuted under the rule to ensure that prosecutions are
confined to fraudulent statements or acts or omissions, rather than
non-malicious acts or omissions.
Response: In the definition of ``willful and intentional,'' FCIC
has included the requirement that the person know that the statement
was false or inaccurate at the time the statement was made or the
person know that the act or omission was not in compliance with a
requirement of FCIC at the time the act or omission occurred.
Therefore, sanctions will not be imposed for innocent mistakes.
However, maliciousness is not a standard required by the Act. FCIC has
structured these provisions to fully comply with the requirements
imposed in the Act. No change has been made.
Comment: One commenter stated that the definition of ``willful and
intentional'' deviates from the common law meaning of those terms, and
specifically nullifies a showing of malicious intent, an element of
common law fraud. The commenter further states that fraud is the very
target of 7 U.S.C. 1515(h) and that FCIC may lack the authority to
expand the definition of willful and intentional to include conduct
outside the common understanding of fraud and to impute knowledge from
one individual to another.
Response: Section 515(h) only requires that the person willfully
and intentionally provide a false or inaccurate statement or fail to
comply with a requirement of FCIC before a sanction can be imposed.
Section 515(h) does not use the term ``fraud'' and that term's other
connotations. FCIC has studiously attempted to stay within the
requirements of the Act. To that end, FCIC has used the common
definitions and common law to determine the meaning of ``willful and
intentional.'' This rule contained the same meaning as has been given
the term since FCIC began doing disqualifications after the enactment
of the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994. With respect to the
imputation of knowledge, FCIC has used the Department's debarment
regulations as guidance because the burdens and consequences are
similar.
Comment: One commenter stated that for the definition of ``willful
and intentional'' FCIC does not specifically define the words
separately, and FCIC does not state the source of this definition. FCIC
also excludes the showing of malicious intent as unnecessary. FCIC
includes ``the failure to correct the false or inaccurate statement
when its nature becomes known to the person who made it'' and includes
acts of omission. These additions force agents and agencies to review
information for past years, or they may be subject to sanctions.
Response: Defining the words separately would not change the
meaning or bring more clarity. The terms will be given their common
meaning. The dictionary defines ``willful'' as ``intentional, or
knowing, or voluntary.'' ``Intentional'' is defined as ``done
purposely.'' FCIC has also looked to the body of established law
regarding the meaning of the terms for the purposes of this rule. There
is no requirement in the Act for maliciousness intent. The Act only
requires that a person willfully or intentionally provide false or
inaccurate information. Therefore, requiring a person to know the
information was false or misleading and electing to provide it anyways
satisfies the common meaning of the terms. Further, agents are not
required to review information for past years. Agents will only be
subject to sanctions if they knew the information was false or
inaccurate at the time it was provided or if they discover it later and
they fail to do anything about it. No change has been made.
Comment: One commenter stated that the definition of ``Willful and
intentional'' should be defined to make clear that the actor knew the
falsity of the statement when made and intended that FCIC act on the
basis of the intentional misstatements.
Response: As stated above, there is no requirement that the person
intended FCIC to act on the false information in section 515(h) of the
Act. To be subject to sanctions, the person only needs to have
willfully and intentionally provided false or inaccurate information to
FCIC or an approved insurance provider. Reliance of the misstatement is
an element of fraud, which as stated above, is a term that is not found
in section 515(h) of the Act.
Comment: One commenter stated that FCIC must establish a clear
indication of how intent will be established with respect to
demonstrating whether a statement, act or omission is willful and
intentional. A false or inaccurate statement or a noncompliant act or
omission alone does not rise to willful and intentional and additional
evidence that clearly establishes that a person had sufficient
knowledge is necessary before imposing sanctions.
Response: The definition of ``willful and intentional'' makes it
clear that the person must have knowledge of the falseness or
inaccuracy of the information. Unless FCIC can establish the person has
such knowledge no sanction under section 515(h) of the Act can be
imposed. Further, FCIC is not alone in making these decisions. Any
person subject to a proposed sanction has a right to contest the
sanction before an Administrative Law Judge. The Administrative Law
Judge will determine whether FCIC has met its burden before any
sanction is imposed.
Comment: One commenter stated that with no showing of intent
coupled with the provision that sanctions may be imposed regardless of
whether FCIC or the insurance provider sustained monetary losses places
all parties in jeopardy of severe punishment for seemingly innocuous
mistakes that may have caused little to no harm.
Response: Sanctions cannot be imposed for innocuous mistakes. There
must be evidence of willfulness and intent. Further, the fact that no
monetary losses may occur does not excuse the improper conduct. All
false or inaccurate statements have the capacity to adversely affect
program integrity.
Comment: One commenter stated that while the definition may be
clear in regards to willful, it is not clear from the definition that
there is actually a requirement of intention at all. The commenter
suggested that the definition should include knowledge of the
inaccuracy and that an intent, malicious or otherwise be associated
with the inaccuracy. The definition should be confined to ``material''
misrepresentations or omissions.
Response: ``Intentional'' is defined as ``done purposely.'' FCIC's
definition of ``willful and intentional'' is consistent with that
definition in that it requires the person to have provided the
information to FCIC or an approved insurance provider even though the
person had knowledge that the information was false or inaccurate at
the time that the statement was made and still elected to provide the
information to FCIC or the approved insurance provider. However, as
stated above materiality has been added to the rule but it does not
require monetary damages.
[[Page 76875]]
Section 400.454 Disqualification and Civil Fines
A. In General
Comment: One commenter stated that ARPA required that each policy
or plan of insurance to provide notice of the sanctions that could be
imposed under ARPA for willfully and intentionally providing false or
inaccurate information to FCIC or failing to comply with a requirement
of FCIC. FCIC has failed to comply with 1515(h)(5).
Response: Section 27 of the Common Crop Insurance Policy Basic
Provisions (Basic Provisions) (7 CFR 457.8) states that if the
producer, or someone assisting the producer, has intentionally
concealed or misrepresented a material fact, the producer could be
subject to the remedial sanctions in 7 CFR part 400, subpart R, which
includes disqualification and civil fines. However, FCIC has revised
this rule to include more specific language in section 27 of the Basic
Provisions and added a new section 22 to the Group Risk Plan Common
Policy (7 CFR 407.9) (GRP policy).
B. Section 400.454(a)
Comment: One commenter has concerns that FCIC is not providing
producers with the appropriate notice of sanctions as stated under
section 515(h)(5). The commenter stated that section 454(a) lacks the
required notice to policyholders. Specifically, the commenter stated
that the proposed language in section 454(a) does not appear to provide
producers the required notice of the sanctions available under 7 U.S.C.
1515(h)(3) as required by 7 U.S.C. 1515(h)(5). That in its present form
section 454(a) does not notify producers that they can be disqualified
for up to five years from specific programs or that the potential fine
could be greater than $10,000.
Response: It is not the specific intent of Sec. 400.454(a) to
provide producers notice of sanctions available under section 515(h)(3)
of the Act. It is intended to provide all persons of the possible
consequences of willfully and intentionally provided false or
inaccurate information or willfully and intentionally failing to comply
with a requirement of FCIC. As stated above, FCIC has revised the Basic
Provisions and the GRP policy to ensure that producers receive the
required notice.
Comment: Several commenters stated that the decision to initiate
administrative sanctions should not rest solely with the FCIC Manager,
but that it should require a determination by the FCIC Board of
Directors.
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act confers the authority to impose
sanctions on the Secretary, who has subsequently authorized the Manager
of FCIC to initiate the process when the rule was originally
promulgated in 1993 (58 FR 53110). Since this process has been in place
since 1993 and there have not been any allegations that the Manager has
abused this authority, the Secretary has elected to allow the authority
to initiate sanctions to remain with the Manager of FCIC. In addition,
although the Manager initiates the process, it is the Administrative
Law Judge that ultimately decides whether there is sufficient evidence
to impose a sanction under section 515(h) of the Act.
Comment: Several commenters stated that FCIC uses an inappropriate
standard of proof, preponderance of the evidence, for the imposition of
any penalty. One commenter stated that the standard of guilt should
rest with the party alleging such violation. Instead of requiring a
mere `preponderance of evidence' the standard of proof should be clear
and convincing evidence. There is no justification for holding the crop
insurance industry to a lower standard of guilt.
Response: As stated above, this is the same standard applied by the
Department for debarments. Because the effects are similar and both can
require willful and intentional conduct, it is appropriate to apply
that standard to sanctions under this rule. Further, this has been the
standard of proof that has been applied since the application of these
sanctions in 1993. No change has been made.
Comment: Several commenters stated that the proposed rule imposes a
low evidentiary threshold for the imposition of sanctions. The burden
of proof should be clear and convincing evidence as opposed to a
preponderance of the evidence. The rule only authorizes sanctions for
willful and intentional conduct. Such a standard connotes the elements
of fraud. In almost every instance, liability for fraud cannot be
predicated on a mere preponderance of the evidence; rather, a finding
based on at least clear and convincing evidence is required. Therefore,
the draft regulations should be amended to reflect a burden of proof of
clear and convincing evidence. Commenters stated that FCIC may lack the
authority to adopt a burden of proof lower than the clear and
convincing standard of proof in fraud cases. One commenter stated that
to establish a prima facie claim of fraud, the party alleging it must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a false
representation or concealment of a material fact, calculated with the
intent to deceive. One commenter stated that the rule potentially
expands the liability of actions to a degree not enforceable in civil
litigation.
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act does not require a finding of
fraud. Sanctions can be imposed for willfully and intentionally
providing false or inaccurate information. Further, as stated above,
this is the same standard applied by the Department for debarments.
Because the effects are similar and both can require willful and
intentional conduct, it is appropriate to apply that standard to
sanctions under this rule. Further, this has been the standard of proof
that has been applied since the application of these sanctions in 1993.
No change has been made.
C. Section 400.454(b)
Comment: One commenter stated FCIC needs to provide a clear
indication of how intent will be established as to whether a statement,
act or omission is willful and intentional. Further, scienter must also
be established to a statement, act or omission that is willful and
intentional.
Response: As stated above, FCIC has defined ``willful and
intentional'' to be consistent with the common definition of these
terms and case law. Scienter is not a specific requirement. No change
has been made.
Comment: Several commenters stated that the proposed rule must be
confined to material misrepresentation or omissions that cause
financial loss. One commenter stated that it was the intent of
Congress. A commenter stated that FCIC should confine the proposed rule
to statements, acts or omissions that cause injury or damages,
consistent with general principles of law relative to fraud.
Response: FCIC has revised the provisions to require consideration
of materiality when considering whether to impose a sanction and
defined the term ``material.'' However, as stated above materiality
does not require monetary damages. The false information can be
material if it adversely affects program integrity, including damage to
the crop insurance program's reputation or providing or potentially
providing benefits that would otherwise not be available. Further, as
stated above, fraud is not required to be proven before a sanction can
be imposed. There only needs to be a finding that a person willfully
and intentionally provided false or inaccurate information or failed to
comply with a requirement of FCIC.
[[Page 76876]]
D. Section 400.454(c)
Comment: One commenter stated that ``gravity'' is subjective and
vague. It did not tell the public the standard to be applied by FCIC
when measuring the severity of a violation. The commenter suggested
that FCIC adopt the list of factors under 7 CFR 1.335(b) or develop its
own list of mitigating factors to be applied when considering the
gravity of a violation.
Response: FCIC has reviewed the list of factors used in the
assessment of sanctions in 7 CFR 1.335(b), and has modified the list to
be more applicable to the crop insurance program and included it in
Sec. 400.454(c).
Comment: One commenter has concerns that cumulative penalties could
exceed the gravity of the violation. The commenter urged FCIC to
establish appropriate penalties to violations that are always
commensurate to the gravity of such violations.
Response: As stated above, FCIC has adopted factors, with
modification, used by Department in assessing sanctions. However,
Congress specifically revised section 515(h) of the Act to allow the
imposition of a separate sanction for each violation. The gravity of
each violation will be taken into consideration when imposing a
sanction.
Comment: A commenter stated that increased penalties demand an
equally elevated system of judgment process and identification of
degree. The rule's definition of degree of offense and penalty extends
to others who may be oblivious to the error of intention to submit
false information. For example, the agent who forwards an actual
production history (APH) which was completed and signed by an insured
can be totally unaware of erroneous information provided by that
insured, unless the submission is blatantly different from other
producers in the area. Cumulative penalties could result in
disproportionate fines in relation to the offense. Therefore, a minor
infraction could have a major impact.
Response: An agent that transmits an APH that is false can only be
sanctioned if the agent knew or should have known the information was
false and transmitted it anyway. If the agent had no way to know the
information was false, no sanction can be applied. However, the
producer that provided the false APH may be sanctioned for providing
the false information to the agent. In such case, the gravity of the
violation will be considered based on the factors FCIC has added to the
rule to ensure the sanction is commensurate with the violation.
Further, FCIC will consider each person's conduct as it pertains to the
provision of false or inaccurate information. Therefore, there should
not be the possibility of disproportionate sanctions.
Comment: A few commenters stated that the rule should exclude
penalties and suspensions for conduct that is already addressed in the
SRA.
Response: There is nothing in the SRA or other contracts that
specifically involves willfully and intentionally providing false or
inaccurate information or failing to comply with a requirement of FCIC.
Further, there may be circumstances where the improper conduct under
the SRA is so egregious that the imposition of sanctions may be
appropriate. The rule explains those situations. In such cases, the
liquidated damage provisions may be inadequate given the gravity of the
violation. Further, suspension or termination may not be viable options
and the imposition of a civil fine may be more appropriate. However,
with respect to any breach of the SRA, FCIC first will look to the
remedies in the SRA. Because remedies are available under the SRA,
sanctions can only be imposed if there are multiple violations of the
same or different provisions.
Comment: Several commenters state that the proposed rule's
cumulative penalties violate the excessive fines provision of the
Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Since its penalties would be
cumulative, the proposed rule could result in disproportionate fines.
Cumulative penalties are not allowed under the Act, in addition to
those found in 7 U.S.C. 1515(h)(3). The commenters stated that the rule
should also be clarified to make it clear that the penalties and fines
are not cumulative and that if the FCIC chooses to enforce any existing
contract-based or regulatory remedies, the rule should be expressly
inapplicable. A commenter stated that while the sanctions in 7 U.S.C.
1515(h)(3) potentially are cumulative, there is no statutory basis for
punishing the same conduct under other regulations or agreements.
Accordingly, any fair reading of the FCIA precludes cumulative
penalties in addition to those found at 7 U.S.C. 1515(h)(3). A
commenter stated that FCIC should not treat the sanctions as cumulative
relative to other sanctions, as this is not anywhere provided for in
the plain language or legislative history of the statute.
Response: Section 515(h) of the Act expressly authorizes a separate
civil fine for each violation. Therefore, this rule does not contain
cumulative civil fines for the same conduct. It would not make sense to
impose the same civil fine on a person who committed one violation
compared to one who committed two or more violations. When determining
the civil fine to apply for each violation, FCIC is to take into
consideration the gravity of that violation. Therefore, this allows the
sanctions to be proportional to the conduct. However, there is nothing
in the Act that would preclude FCIC from enforcing section 515(h) of
the Act along with any contractual remedies. When section 515(h) of the
Act was enacted, Congress was aware that many contracts and agreements
had remedies for a breach. If it wanted the sanctions under section
515(h) of the Act to be the sole remedy for the conduct it could have
so required, but it did not do so. The application of any other remedy
will be taken into consideration when assessing the sanction to be
imposed under this rule so that the result is not disproportionate.
Further, this is most likely to arise with respect to the willful and
intentional failure to follow a requirement of FCIC, because there is
no mention of willfully and intentionally providing false or inaccurate
information in the contract or agreement. As stated above, there are
situations when the conduct is so egregious, such as with multiple
violations, that the imposition of sanctions is appropriate under this
rule in addition to the remedies available in the contract or
agreement. No change has been made in response to this comment.
Comment: One commenter states that t