Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; United States Coast Guard Notice of Arrival and Departure System, 75373-75376 [E8-29285]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 239 / Thursday, December 11, 2008 / Proposed Rules
A notice of system of records for
External Investigations is also published
in this issue of the Federal Register.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information; Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, DHS proposes to amend
Chapter I of Title 6, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for Part 5
continues to read as follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135,
6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A
also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552. Subpart B
also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.
2. Add at the end of Appendix C to
Part 5, Exemption of Record Systems
under the Privacy Act, the following
new paragraph ‘‘14’’:
Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of
Records Exempt From the Privacy Act
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14. The DHS/ICE Enforcement External
Investigations system of records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. External
Investigations is a repository of information
held by DHS in connection with its several
and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: The
enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
thereunder; and national security and
intelligence activities. External Investigations
contains information that is collected by, on
behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation
with DHS and its components and may
contain personally identifiable information
collected by other Federal, State, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government
agencies. Pursuant to exemption 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2) of the Privacy Act, portions of this
system are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3)
and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H),and (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g).
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) of the Privacy
Act, this system is exempt from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the
limitations set forth in those subsections: 5
U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), and (f). Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a caseby-case basis to be determined at the time a
request is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4)
(Accounting for Disclosures) because release
of the accounting of disclosures could alert
the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory
violation to the existence of the investigation,
and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law
enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve
national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual
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who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or
apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records)
because access to the records contained in
this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory
violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS or another agency.
Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with
witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection
or apprehension. Amendment of the records
could interfere with ongoing investigations
and law enforcement activities and would
impose an impossible administrative burden
by requiring investigations to be
continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such
information could disclose security-sensitive
information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and
Necessity of Information) because in the
course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of
information obtained or introduced
occasionally may be unclear or the
information may not be strictly relevant or
necessary to a specific investigation. In the
interests of effective law enforcement, it is
appropriate to retain all information that may
aid in establishing patterns of unlawful
activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of
Information from Individuals) because
requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the
subject to the nature or existence of an
investigation, thereby interfering with the
related investigation and law enforcement
activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to
Subjects) because providing such detailed
information would impede law enforcement
in that it could compromise investigations
by: Revealing the existence of an otherwise
confidential investigation and thereby
provide an opportunity for the subject of an
investigation to conceal evidence, alter
patterns of behavior, or take other actions
that could thwart investigative efforts; reveal
the identity of witnesses in investigations,
thereby providing an opportunity for the
subjects of the investigations or others to
harass, intimidate, or otherwise interfere
with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal
the identity of confidential informants,
which would negatively affect the
informant’s usefulness in any ongoing or
future investigations and discourage
members of the public from cooperating as
confidential informants in any future
investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H)
(Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency
Rules) because portions of this system are
exempt from the individual access provisions
of subsection (d) for the reasons noted above,
and therefore DHS is not required to establish
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requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to
individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures
pursuant to which individuals may access
and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative
efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses,
and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of
Information) because in the collection of
information for law enforcement purposes it
is impossible to determine in advance what
information is accurate, relevant, timely, and
complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their
investigative training and exercise of good
judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on
Individuals) because compliance would
interfere with DHS’ ability to obtain, serve,
and issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law
enforcement mechanisms that may be filed
under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and
evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific
subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals’ rights to access and amend their
records contained in the system. Therefore
DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals
may seek a civil remedy for the agency’s:
Refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply
with a request for access to records; failure
to maintain accurate, relevant timely and
complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual’s right to access
or amend records.
Dated: December 2, 2008.
Hugo Teufel III,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. E8–29394 Filed 12–10–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–10–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket Number DHS–2008–0122]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of
Exemptions; United States Coast
Guard Notice of Arrival and Departure
System
Privacy Office, DHS.
Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland
Security is proposing to amend its
regulations to exempt portions of a
system of records from certain
provisions of the Privacy Act.
Specifically, the Department proposes to
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75374
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 239 / Thursday, December 11, 2008 / Proposed Rules
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exempt portions of the United States
Coast Guard Notice of Arrival and
Departure System from one or more
provisions of the Privacy Act because of
criminal, civil, and administrative
enforcement requirements.
DATES: Written comments and related
material must be submitted on or before
January 12, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by docket number DHS–
2008–0122 by one of the following
methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 1–866–466–5370.
• Mail: Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy
Officer, Privacy Office, Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC
20528.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
general questions please contact: David
Roberts (202–475–3521), United States
Coast Guard Privacy Officer, United
States Coast Guard. For privacy issues
please contact: Hugo Teufel III (703–
235–0780), Chief Privacy Officer,
Privacy Office, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC
20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), elsewhere in this
edition of the Federal Register,
published a Privacy Act system of
records notice describing records for
Notice of Arrival and Departure
(NOAD). This information is maintained
within the Ship Arrival Notification
System (SANS), as well as other USCG
systems charged with screening and
vetting of vessels, primarily, but not
exclusively, through Marine Information
for Safety and Law Enforcement
(MISLE, DOT/CG 679, April 11, 2002,
67 FR 19612) and the Maritime
Awareness Global Network (MAGNet,
DHS/USCG–061, May 15, 2008, 73 FR
28143). SANS retrieves information by
vessel and not by a personal identifier;
however, USCG uses the information in
other systems to conduct screening and
vetting pursuant to its mission for
protecting and securing the maritime
sector.
The information that is required to be
collected and submitted through
Electronic Notice of Arrival and
Departure (eNOAD) can be found on
routine arrival/departure documents
that passengers and crewmembers must
provide to DHS, when entering or
departing the United States.
This system, however, may contain
records or information recompiled from
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or created from information contained
in other systems of records, which are
exempt from certain provisions of the
Privacy Act. For these records or
information only, in accordance with 5
U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), and (k)(2), DHS would
also claim the original exemptions for
these records or information from
subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3),
and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I),
(5), and (8); (f), and (g) of the Privacy
Act of 1974, as amended, as necessary
and appropriate to protect such
information. Moreover, DHS would add
these exemptions to Appendix C to 6
CFR Part 5, DHS Systems of Records
Exempt from the Privacy Act. Such
exempt records or information may be
law enforcement or national security
investigation records, law enforcement
activity and encounter records, or
terrorist screening records.
DHS needs these exemptions in order
to protect information relating to law
enforcement investigations from
disclosure to subjects of investigations
and others who could interfere with
investigatory and law enforcement
activities. Specifically, the exemptions
are required to: Preclude subjects of
investigations from frustrating the
investigative process; avoid disclosure
of investigative techniques; protect the
identities and physical safety of
confidential informants and of law
enforcement personnel; ensure DHS’s
and other federal agencies’ ability to
obtain information from third parties
and other sources; protect the privacy of
third parties; and safeguard sensitive
information. The exemptions proposed
here are standard law enforcement
exemptions exercised by a large number
of federal law enforcement agencies.
Nonetheless, DHS would examine
each request on a case-by-case basis,
and, after conferring with the
appropriate component or agency, may
waive applicable exemptions in
appropriate circumstances and where it
would not appear to interfere with or
adversely affect the law enforcement
purposes of the systems from which the
information is recompiled or in which
it is contained.
Regulatory Requirements
A. Regulatory Impact Analyses
Changes to Federal regulations must
undergo several analyses. In conducting
these analyses, DHS has determined:
1. Executive Order 12866 Assessment
This proposed rule is not a significant
regulatory action under Executive Order
12866, ‘‘Regulatory Planning and
Review’’ (as amended). Accordingly,
this proposed rule has not been
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reviewed by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). Nevertheless, DHS
has reviewed this rulemaking, and
concluded that there will not be any
significant economic impact.
2. Regulatory Flexibility Act Assessment
Pursuant to section 605 of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5
U.S.C. 605(b), as amended by the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement and
Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), DHS
certifies that this rule will not have a
significant impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The proposed
rule would impose no duties or
obligations on small entities. Further,
the exemptions to the Privacy Act apply
to individuals, and individuals are not
covered entities under the RFA.
3. International Trade Impact
Assessment
This proposed rule would not
constitute a barrier to international
trade. The exemptions relate to criminal
investigations and agency
documentation and, therefore, do not
create any new costs or barriers to trade.
4. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), (Pub. L.
104–4, 109 Stat. 48), requires Federal
agencies to assess the effects of certain
regulatory actions on State, local, and
tribal governments, and the private
sector. This proposed rule would not
impose an unfunded mandate on State,
local, or tribal governments, or on the
private sector.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) requires
that DHS consider the impact of
paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the
public and, under the provisions of PRA
section 3507(d), obtain approval from
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for each collection of
information it conducts, sponsors, or
requires through regulations. DHS has
determined that there are no current or
new information collection
requirements associated with this
proposed rule.
C. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
This action will not have a substantial
direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government, and therefore will
not have federalism implications.
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D. Environmental Analysis
DHS has reviewed this action for
purposes of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C.
4321–4347) and has determined that
this action will not have a significant
effect on the human environment.
E. Energy Impact
The energy impact of this action has
been assessed in accordance with the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA) Public Law 94–163, as amended
(42 U.S.C. 6362). This proposed rule is
not a major regulatory action under the
provisions of the EPCA.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Privacy, Freedom of information.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, DHS proposes to amend 6
CFR chapter I as follows:
PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for Part 5
continues to read as follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135,
(6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.); 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart
A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552. Subpart B
also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.
2. At the end of Appendix C to Part
5, add the following new paragraph 14:
Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of
Records Exempt From the Privacy Act
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14. DHS/USCG–029, Notice of Arrival and
Departure Information. A portion of the
following system of records is exempt from
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and
(4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (5), and
(8); (f), and (g); however, these exemptions
apply only to the extent that information in
this system of records is recompiled or is
created from information contained in other
systems of records subject to such
exemptions pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2),and (k)(2). After conferring with
the appropriate component or agency, DHS
may waive applicable exemptions in
appropriate circumstances and where it
would not appear to interfere with or
adversely affect the law enforcement
purposes of the systems from which the
information is recompiled or in which it is
contained. Exemptions from the above
particular subsections are justified, on a caseby-case basis to be determined at the time a
request is made, when information in this
system of records is recompiled or is created
from information contained in other systems
of records subject to exemptions for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for
Disclosure) because making available to a
record subject the accounting of disclosures
from records concerning him or her would
specifically reveal any investigative interest
in the individual. Revealing this information
could reasonably be expected to compromise
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ongoing efforts to investigate a violation of
U.S. law, including investigations of a known
or suspected terrorist, by notifying the record
subject that he or she is under investigation.
This information could also permit the
record subject to take measures to impede the
investigation, e.g., destroy evidence,
intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the
area to avoid or impede the investigation.
(b) From subsection (c)(4) (Accounting for
Disclosure, notice of dispute) because
portions of this system are exempt from the
access and amendment provisions of
subsection (d), this requirement to inform
any person or other agency about any
correction or notation of dispute that the
agency made with regard to the record,
should not apply.
(c) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4)
(Access to Records) because these provisions
concern individual access to and amendment
of certain records contained in this system,
including law enforcement, counterterrorism,
and investigatory records. Compliance with
these provisions could alert the subject of an
investigation to the fact and nature of the
investigation, and/or the investigative
interest of intelligence or law enforcement
agencies; compromise sensitive information
related to law enforcement, including matters
bearing on national security; interfere with
the overall law enforcement process by
leading to the destruction of evidence,
improper influencing of witnesses,
fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the
subject; could identify a confidential source
or disclose information which would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of
another’s personal privacy; reveal a sensitive
investigative or intelligence technique; or
constitute a potential danger to the health or
safety of law enforcement personnel,
confidential informants, and witnesses.
Amendment of these records would interfere
with ongoing counterterrorism or law
enforcement investigations and analysis
activities and impose an impossible
administrative burden by requiring
investigations, analyses, and reports to be
continuously reinvestigated and revised.
(d) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and
Necessity of Information) because it is not
always possible for DHS or other agencies to
know in advance what information is
relevant and necessary for it to complete
screening of passengers and crew.
Information relating to known or suspected
terrorists is not always collected in a manner
that permits immediate verification or
determination of relevancy to a DHS purpose.
For example, during the early stages of an
investigation, it may not be possible to
determine the immediate relevancy of
information that is collected—only upon
later evaluation or association with further
information, obtained subsequently, may it
be possible to establish particular relevance
to a law enforcement program. Lastly, this
exemption is required because DHS and
other agencies may not always know what
information about an encounter with a
known or suspected terrorist will be relevant
to law enforcement for the purpose of
conducting an operational response.
(e) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of
Information from Individuals) because
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application of this provision could present a
serious impediment to counterterrorism or
law enforcement efforts in that it would put
the subject of an investigation, study or
analysis on notice of that fact, thereby
permitting the subject to engage in conduct
designed to frustrate or impede that activity.
The nature of counterterrorism, and law
enforcement investigations is such that vital
information about an individual frequently
can be obtained only from other persons who
are familiar with such individual and his/her
activities. In such investigations it is not
feasible to rely solely upon information
furnished by the individual concerning his
own activities.
(f) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to
Subjects), to the extent that this subsection is
interpreted to require DHS to provide notice
to an individual if DHS or another agency
receives or collects information about that
individual during an investigation or from a
third party. Should the subsection be so
interpreted, exemption from this provision is
necessary to avoid impeding
counterterrorism or law enforcement efforts
by putting the subject of an investigation,
study or analysis on notice of that fact,
thereby permitting the subject to engage in
conduct intended to frustrate or impede that
activity.
(g) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I)
(Agency Requirements) because portions of
this system are exempt from the access and
amendment provisions of subsection (d).
(h) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of
Information) because many of the records in
this system coming from other systems of
records are derived from other domestic and
foreign agency record systems and therefore
it is not possible for DHS to vouch for their
compliance with this provision; however, the
DHS has implemented internal quality
assurance procedures to ensure that data
used in its screening processes is as
complete, accurate, and current as possible.
In addition, in the collection of information
for law enforcement and counterterrorism
purposes, it is impossible to determine in
advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. With the
passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or
untimely information may acquire new
significance as further investigation brings
new details to light. The restrictions imposed
by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those
agencies’ trained investigators and
intelligence analysts to exercise their
judgment in conducting investigations and
impede the development of intelligence
necessary for effective law enforcement and
counterterrorism efforts.
(i) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on
Individuals) because to require individual
notice of disclosure of information due to
compulsory legal process would pose an
impossible administrative burden on DHS
and other agencies and could alert the
subjects of counterterrorism or law
enforcement investigations to the fact of
those investigations when not previously
known.
(j) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules)
because portions of this system are exempt
from the access and amendment provisions
of subsection (d).
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(k) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to
the extent that the system is exempt from
other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
Dated: December 2, 2008.
Hugo Teufel III,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. E8–29285 Filed 12–10–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–10–P
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 1
[MM Docket No. 93–177; FCC 08–228]
An Inquiry Into the Commission’s
Policies and Rules Regarding AM
Radio Service Directional Antenna
Performance Verification
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AGENCY: Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: In this document, the
Commission requests comment on
proposed new rules to protect AM
stations from the potential effects of
nearby tower construction. The
Commission seeks comment on new
rules that consolidate disparate rules in
separate sections regarding tower
construction near AM stations, and also
update these rules by incorporating
computer modeling techniques.
DATES: Submit comments on or before
January 12, 2009 and reply comments
on or before February 9, 2009.
ADDRESSES: Secretary, Federal
Communications Commission, 445 12th
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554,
https://www.fcc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Peter H. Doyle, Audio Division, Media
Bureau (202) 418–2700.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
summary of the Commission’s Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making
(Second FNPRM) in MM Docket No. 93–
177, adopted September 24, 2008, and
released September 26, 2008. The
Commission adopted the Second
FNPRM in response to comments
received regarding an earlier Further
Notice of Proposed Rule Making
(FNPRM) in this proceeding [See 66 FR
20779, April 25, 2001]. The complete
text of this Second FNPRM is available
for inspection and copying during
normal business hours in the FCC
Reference Center (Room CY–A257), 445
12th Street, SW., Washington, DC, and
may also be purchased from the
Commission’s copy contractor, Best
Copy and Printing, Inc., (800) 378–3160,
445 12th Street, SW., Room CY–402,
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Washington, DC 20554. The complete
text is also available on the Internet at
https://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-08-228A1.pdf.
Synopsis of Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rule Making
In AM radio, the tower itself functions
as the antenna. Consequently, a nearby
tower may become an unintended part
of the AM antenna system, reradiating
the AM signal and distorting the
authorized AM radiation pattern. Thus,
our rules contain several sections
concerning tower construction near AM
antennas that are intended to protect
AM stations from the effects of such
tower construction, specifically,
§§ 73.1692, 22.371, and 27.63. These
existing rule sections impose differing
requirements on broadcast and wireless
entities, although the issue is the same
regardless of the types of antennas
mounted on a tower. Other rule parts,
such as Part 90 and Part 24, entirely lack
provisions for protecting AM stations
from possible effects of nearby tower
construction. An ad hoc coalition of
radio broadcasters, equipment
manufacturers, and broadcast consulting
engineers (‘‘the Coalition’’) has
proposed that the Commission adopt
rules to ‘‘harmonize the disparate
treatment’’ regarding tower construction
near AM stations, and also to
incorporate moment method techniques
in the analysis of the impact of nearby
structures on the AM station.
Existing AM proximity rules
governing wireless licensees specify
fixed distances within which tower
construction is presumed to affect the
AM station. The Coalition’s proposal, in
contrast, would specify critical
distances from an AM station in terms
of wavelengths at the AM frequency,
albeit limiting the distance to a
maximum of three kilometers, as
specified in existing rules for wireless
licensees. The Coalition’s proposal
designates moment method modeling as
the principal means of determining
whether a nearby tower affects an AM
pattern. The proposal would, however,
allow traditional partial proof
measurements taken before and after
tower construction as an alternative
procedure when the AM station in
question was licensed pursuant to field
strength measurements. The Coalition
proposes to eliminate short towers from
consideration, with critical tower
heights also defined in terms of the AM
wavelength. Existing rules apply to
modification of towers, as well as to
new tower construction near AM
stations. The Coalition’s proposal would
define the types of tower modification
that may affect AM stations, and would
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exclude many routine cases in which
antennas are added to existing towers.
The Second FNPRM seeks comment
on proposed new rules based on those
suggested by the Coalition, and on the
types of towers to which the new rules
would apply. Specifically, the Second
FNPRM asks whether the new rules
should apply to all towers, including
structures that are not otherwise subject
to Commission licensing processes, i.e.,
with regard to structures such as towers
that do not require registration and
which no Commission licensee or
applicant uses or proposes to use. The
Second FNPRM seeks comment on a
number of issues that could establish
limits on the scope of the new rules, and
the technical and/or policy grounds for
such limits. For example, the Second
FNPRM requests comment on the
criteria used for the exclusion of short
towers, and on the incorporation in the
new rule of a provision requiring tower
proponents to protect the AM station
upon submission of a credible
demonstration that the tower affects the
AM pattern.
Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
This document contained proposed
information collection requirements.
The Commission, as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork
burdens, invites the general public and
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to comment on the information
collection requirements contained in
this document, as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of
1995, Public Law 104–13. Public and
agency comments are due February 9,
2009. Comments should address: (a)
Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
Commission, including whether the
information shall have practical utility;
(b) the accuracy of the Commission’s
burden estimates; (c) ways to enhance
the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information collected; and (d) ways to
minimize the burden of the collection of
information on the respondents,
including the use of automated
information collection techniques or
other forms of information technology.
The information collection will be
submitted to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) for review under
Section 3507(d) of the PRA. In addition,
pursuant to the Small Business
Paperwork Relief Act of 202, Public Law
107–198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), the
Commission seeks specific comment on
how it may ‘‘further reduce the
information collection burden for small
business concerns with fewer than 25
employees.’’
E:\FR\FM\11DEP1.SGM
11DEP1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 239 (Thursday, December 11, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 75373-75376]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-29285]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket Number DHS-2008-0122]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; United States
Coast Guard Notice of Arrival and Departure System
AGENCY: Privacy Office, DHS.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security is proposing to amend its
regulations to exempt portions of a system of records from certain
provisions of the Privacy Act. Specifically, the Department proposes to
[[Page 75374]]
exempt portions of the United States Coast Guard Notice of Arrival and
Departure System from one or more provisions of the Privacy Act because
of criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement requirements.
DATES: Written comments and related material must be submitted on or
before January 12, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number DHS-
2008-0122 by one of the following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 1-866-466-5370.
Mail: Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy
Office, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions please contact:
David Roberts (202-475-3521), United States Coast Guard Privacy
Officer, United States Coast Guard. For privacy issues please contact:
Hugo Teufel III (703-235-0780), Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Office,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), elsewhere in this
edition of the Federal Register, published a Privacy Act system of
records notice describing records for Notice of Arrival and Departure
(NOAD). This information is maintained within the Ship Arrival
Notification System (SANS), as well as other USCG systems charged with
screening and vetting of vessels, primarily, but not exclusively,
through Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE, DOT/
CG 679, April 11, 2002, 67 FR 19612) and the Maritime Awareness Global
Network (MAGNet, DHS/USCG-061, May 15, 2008, 73 FR 28143). SANS
retrieves information by vessel and not by a personal identifier;
however, USCG uses the information in other systems to conduct
screening and vetting pursuant to its mission for protecting and
securing the maritime sector.
The information that is required to be collected and submitted
through Electronic Notice of Arrival and Departure (eNOAD) can be found
on routine arrival/departure documents that passengers and crewmembers
must provide to DHS, when entering or departing the United States.
This system, however, may contain records or information recompiled
from or created from information contained in other systems of records,
which are exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. For these
records or information only, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2),
and (k)(2), DHS would also claim the original exemptions for these
records or information from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2),
(3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (5), and (8); (f),
and (g) of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, as necessary and
appropriate to protect such information. Moreover, DHS would add these
exemptions to Appendix C to 6 CFR Part 5, DHS Systems of Records Exempt
from the Privacy Act. Such exempt records or information may be law
enforcement or national security investigation records, law enforcement
activity and encounter records, or terrorist screening records.
DHS needs these exemptions in order to protect information relating
to law enforcement investigations from disclosure to subjects of
investigations and others who could interfere with investigatory and
law enforcement activities. Specifically, the exemptions are required
to: Preclude subjects of investigations from frustrating the
investigative process; avoid disclosure of investigative techniques;
protect the identities and physical safety of confidential informants
and of law enforcement personnel; ensure DHS's and other federal
agencies' ability to obtain information from third parties and other
sources; protect the privacy of third parties; and safeguard sensitive
information. The exemptions proposed here are standard law enforcement
exemptions exercised by a large number of federal law enforcement
agencies.
Nonetheless, DHS would examine each request on a case-by-case
basis, and, after conferring with the appropriate component or agency,
may waive applicable exemptions in appropriate circumstances and where
it would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law
enforcement purposes of the systems from which the information is
recompiled or in which it is contained.
Regulatory Requirements
A. Regulatory Impact Analyses
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several analyses. In
conducting these analyses, DHS has determined:
1. Executive Order 12866 Assessment
This proposed rule is not a significant regulatory action under
Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' (as amended).
Accordingly, this proposed rule has not been reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). Nevertheless, DHS has reviewed this
rulemaking, and concluded that there will not be any significant
economic impact.
2. Regulatory Flexibility Act Assessment
Pursuant to section 605 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5
U.S.C. 605(b), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
and Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), DHS certifies that this rule will
not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The proposed rule would impose no duties or obligations on
small entities. Further, the exemptions to the Privacy Act apply to
individuals, and individuals are not covered entities under the RFA.
3. International Trade Impact Assessment
This proposed rule would not constitute a barrier to international
trade. The exemptions relate to criminal investigations and agency
documentation and, therefore, do not create any new costs or barriers
to trade.
4. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), (Pub.
L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48), requires Federal agencies to assess the
effects of certain regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal
governments, and the private sector. This proposed rule would not
impose an unfunded mandate on State, local, or tribal governments, or
on the private sector.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.)
requires that DHS consider the impact of paperwork and other
information collection burdens imposed on the public and, under the
provisions of PRA section 3507(d), obtain approval from the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for each collection of information it
conducts, sponsors, or requires through regulations. DHS has determined
that there are no current or new information collection requirements
associated with this proposed rule.
C. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
This action will not have a substantial direct effect on the
States, on the relationship between the national Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government, and therefore will not have federalism
implications.
[[Page 75375]]
D. Environmental Analysis
DHS has reviewed this action for purposes of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347) and has
determined that this action will not have a significant effect on the
human environment.
E. Energy Impact
The energy impact of this action has been assessed in accordance
with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Public Law 94-163,
as amended (42 U.S.C. 6362). This proposed rule is not a major
regulatory action under the provisions of the EPCA.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Privacy, Freedom of information.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, DHS proposes to amend 6 CFR
chapter I as follows:
PART 5--DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for Part 5 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, (6 U.S.C. 101 et
seq.); 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.
Subpart B also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.
2. At the end of Appendix C to Part 5, add the following new
paragraph 14:
Appendix C to Part 5--DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy
Act
* * * * *
14. DHS/USCG-029, Notice of Arrival and Departure Information. A
portion of the following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3),
(4)(G) through (I), (5), and (8); (f), and (g); however, these
exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system
of records is recompiled or is created from information contained in
other systems of records subject to such exemptions pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2),and (k)(2). After conferring with the appropriate
component or agency, DHS may waive applicable exemptions in
appropriate circumstances and where it would not appear to interfere
with or adversely affect the law enforcement purposes of the systems
from which the information is recompiled or in which it is
contained. Exemptions from the above particular subsections are
justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a
request is made, when information in this system of records is
recompiled or is created from information contained in other systems
of records subject to exemptions for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosure) because
making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures
from records concerning him or her would specifically reveal any
investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information
could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing efforts to
investigate a violation of U.S. law, including investigations of a
known or suspected terrorist, by notifying the record subject that
he or she is under investigation. This information could also permit
the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation,
e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the
area to avoid or impede the investigation.
(b) From subsection (c)(4) (Accounting for Disclosure, notice of
dispute) because portions of this system are exempt from the access
and amendment provisions of subsection (d), this requirement to
inform any person or other agency about any correction or notation
of dispute that the agency made with regard to the record, should
not apply.
(c) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) (Access to
Records) because these provisions concern individual access to and
amendment of certain records contained in this system, including law
enforcement, counterterrorism, and investigatory records. Compliance
with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation to
the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative
interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise
sensitive information related to law enforcement, including matters
bearing on national security; interfere with the overall law
enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence,
improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or
flight of the subject; could identify a confidential source or
disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion
of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or
intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the
health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential
informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would
interfere with ongoing counterterrorism or law enforcement
investigations and analysis activities and impose an impossible
administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and
reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.
(d) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because it is not always possible for DHS or other
agencies to know in advance what information is relevant and
necessary for it to complete screening of passengers and crew.
Information relating to known or suspected terrorists is not always
collected in a manner that permits immediate verification or
determination of relevancy to a DHS purpose. For example, during the
early stages of an investigation, it may not be possible to
determine the immediate relevancy of information that is collected--
only upon later evaluation or association with further information,
obtained subsequently, may it be possible to establish particular
relevance to a law enforcement program. Lastly, this exemption is
required because DHS and other agencies may not always know what
information about an encounter with a known or suspected terrorist
will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an
operational response.
(e) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because application of this provision could present a
serious impediment to counterterrorism or law enforcement efforts in
that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis
on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in
conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of
counterterrorism, and law enforcement investigations is such that
vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained
only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and
his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to
rely solely upon information furnished by the individual concerning
his own activities.
(f) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects), to the extent
that this subsection is interpreted to require DHS to provide notice
to an individual if DHS or another agency receives or collects
information about that individual during an investigation or from a
third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from
this provision is necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism or
law enforcement efforts by putting the subject of an investigation,
study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the
subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that
activity.
(g) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency
Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the
access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).
(h) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
many of the records in this system coming from other systems of
records are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record
systems and therefore it is not possible for DHS to vouch for their
compliance with this provision; however, the DHS has implemented
internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that data used in
its screening processes is as complete, accurate, and current as
possible. In addition, in the collection of information for law
enforcement and counterterrorism purposes, it is impossible to
determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely,
and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or
untimely information may acquire new significance as further
investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed
by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies' trained
investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment
in conducting investigations and impede the development of
intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and
counterterrorism efforts.
(i) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because to
require individual notice of disclosure of information due to
compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative
burden on DHS and other agencies and could alert the subjects of
counterterrorism or law enforcement investigations to the fact of
those investigations when not previously known.
(j) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this
system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of
subsection (d).
[[Page 75376]]
(k) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
Dated: December 2, 2008.
Hugo Teufel III,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. E8-29285 Filed 12-10-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-10-P