Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 Airplanes, 64892-64894 [E8-25991]

Download as PDF ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with PROPOSALS 64892 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 212 / Friday, October 31, 2008 / Proposed Rules intelligence activities. TTAR contains information that is collected by other federal and foreign government agencies and may contain personally identifiable information. Pursuant to exemption 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) of the Privacy Act, portions of this system are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), this system is exempt from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in those subsections: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f). Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following reasons: (a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the entire investigative process. (b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to homeland security. (c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of investigations into potential violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful activity. (d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with the VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:45 Oct 30, 2008 Jkt 217001 related investigation and law enforcement activities. (e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal evidence, alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that could thwart investigative efforts; reveal the identity of witnesses in investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for the subjects of the investigations or others to harass, intimidate, or otherwise interfere with the collection of evidence or other information from such witnesses; or reveal the identity of confidential informants, which would negatively affect the informant’s usefulness in any ongoing or future investigations and discourage members of the public from cooperating as confidential informants in any future investigations. (f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential informants. (g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on investigations. (h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because compliance would interfere with DHS’ ability to obtain, serve, and issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms that may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence. (i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to individuals’ rights to access and amend their records contained in the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy for the agency’s: refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with a request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate, relevant timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise comply with an individual’s right to access or amend records. PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 Dated: October 24, 2008. Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security. [FR Doc. E8–25972 Filed 10–30–08; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4410–10–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2008–1155; Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–146–AD] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model 717–200 Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). AGENCY: SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717–200 airplanes. This proposed AD would require modifying the wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the right wheel well of the main landing gear (MLG). This proposed AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are proposing this AD to prevent a tire burst when the MLG is in the retracted position from causing damage to the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and subsequent electrical arcing, creating the potential of an ignition source in the center wing tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by December 15, 2008. ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods: • Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments. • Fax: 202–493–2251. • Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. • Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial E:\FR\FM\31OCP1.SGM 31OCP1 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 212 / Friday, October 31, 2008 / Proposed Rules Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1–L5A (D800–0024). Examining the AD Docket You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ken Sujishi, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety/Mechanical and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM–150L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712–4137; telephone (562) 627–5353; fax (562) 627–5210. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with PROPOSALS Comments Invited We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2008–1155; Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–146–AD’’ at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments. We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD. Discussion The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:45 Oct 30, 2008 Jkt 217001 Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’ Amendment 21–78, and subsequent Amendments 21–82 and 21–83). Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews. In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action. We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane. Boeing analysis determined that the existing wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump for Model 717–200 airplanes is routed within the ‘‘tire burst’’ area. Replacing the components in the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump with new components, and routing the wire assembly installation outside of the tire burst area, will minimize the possibility of wire damage and electrical arcing to the center wing fuel tank. A tire burst when the main landing gear (MLG) is in the retracted position might cause damage to the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and subsequent electrical arcing, creating PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 64893 the potential of an ignition source in the center wing tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. Relevant Service Information We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717–29A0009, dated July 31, 2008. The service bulletin describes procedures for modifying the wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the right wheel well of the MLG. The modification includes replacing the components in the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump with new components, and routing the wire assembly installation outside of the tire burst area. FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously. Costs of Compliance We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 8 airplanes of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 11 work-hours per product to comply with this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Required parts cost is minimal. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this proposed AD to the U.S. operators to be $7,040, or $880 per product. Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, section 44701: General requirements.’’ Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. E:\FR\FM\31OCP1.SGM 31OCP1 64894 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 212 / Friday, October 31, 2008 / Proposed Rules Regulatory Findings We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation: 1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety, Incorporated by reference. The Proposed Amendment Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD: McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA–2008– 1155; Directorate Identifier 2008–NM– 146–AD. Comments Due Date (a) We must receive comments by December 15, 2008. ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with PROPOSALS Compliance (e) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. Installation/Re-Routing (f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD: Modify the wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the right wheel well of the MLG by doing all the applicable actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717–29A0009, dated July 31, 2008. Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) (g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, ATTN: Ken Sujishi, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety/ Mechanical and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM–150L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712– 4137; telephone (562) 627–5353; fax (562) 627–5210; has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. (2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO. Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 24, 2008. Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E8–25991 Filed 10–30–08; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 Affected ADs (b) None. Applicability (c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas Model 717–200 airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717–29A0009, dated July 31, 2008. Unsafe Condition (d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent a tire burst when the main landing gear (MLG) is in the retracted position from causing damage to the VerDate Aug<31>2005 wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and subsequent electrical arcing, creating the potential of an ignition source in the center wing tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. 13:45 Oct 30, 2008 Jkt 217001 [Docket No. FAA–2008–1143; Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–136–AD] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, and –900 Series Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). AGENCY: PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to supersede an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Boeing Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, and –900 series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires replacing brackets that hold the P5 panel to the airplane structure, the standby compass bracket assembly, the generator drive and standby power module, and the air conditioning module. The existing AD also currently requires, among other actions, inspecting for wire length and for damage of the connectors and the wire bundles, and doing applicable corrective actions if necessary. This proposed AD would require an additional operational test of the P5–14 panel. This proposed AD results from a report of an electrical burning smell in the flight compartment. We are proposing this AD to prevent wire bundles from contacting the overhead dripshield panel and modules in the P5 overhead panel, which could result in electrical arcing and shorting of the electrical connector and consequent loss of several critical systems essential for safe flight; and to ensure proper operation of the passenger oxygen system. If an improperly functioning passenger oxygen system goes undetected, the passenger oxygen mask could fail to deploy and result in possible incapacitation of passengers during a depressurization event. DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by December 15, 2008. You may send comments by any of the following methods: • Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments. • Fax: 202–493–2251. • Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. • Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. ADDRESSES: Examining the AD Docket You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through E:\FR\FM\31OCP1.SGM 31OCP1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 212 (Friday, October 31, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 64892-64894]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-25991]


=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-1155; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-146-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 
Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 airplanes. This proposed AD 
would require modifying the wire installation of the auxiliary 
hydraulic pump in the right wheel well of the main landing gear (MLG). 
This proposed AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the 
manufacturer. We are proposing this AD to prevent a tire burst when the 
MLG is in the retracted position from causing damage to the wire 
assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and subsequent electrical 
arcing, creating the potential of an ignition source in the center wing 
tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in 
a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by December 15, 
2008.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing 
Commercial

[[Page 64893]]

Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, 
California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A 
(D800-0024).

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory 
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street 
address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the 
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly 
after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ken Sujishi, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin 
Safety/Mechanical and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150L, FAA, Los 
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 
Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5353; fax (562) 
627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2008-1155; 
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-146-AD'' at the beginning of your 
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
this proposed AD because of those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We 
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel 
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the 
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes 
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for 
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a 
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, 
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' 
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards 
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule 
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' 
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
    Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., 
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders 
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition 
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design 
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for 
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to 
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance 
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety 
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to 
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary 
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
    In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four 
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel 
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of 
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable 
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address 
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in 
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure 
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included 
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for 
further action.
    We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are 
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel 
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result 
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
    Boeing analysis determined that the existing wire installation of 
the auxiliary hydraulic pump for Model 717-200 airplanes is routed 
within the ``tire burst'' area. Replacing the components in the wire 
assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump with new components, and 
routing the wire assembly installation outside of the tire burst area, 
will minimize the possibility of wire damage and electrical arcing to 
the center wing fuel tank. A tire burst when the main landing gear 
(MLG) is in the retracted position might cause damage to the wire 
assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and subsequent electrical 
arcing, creating the potential of an ignition source in the center wing 
tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in 
a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

    We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-29A0009, dated 
July 31, 2008. The service bulletin describes procedures for modifying 
the wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the right 
wheel well of the MLG. The modification includes replacing the 
components in the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump with 
new components, and routing the wire assembly installation outside of 
the tire burst area.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

    We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all relevant 
information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is 
likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. 
This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified in 
the service information described previously.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 8 airplanes of U.S. 
registry. We also estimate that it would take about 11 work-hours per 
product to comply with this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 
per work-hour. Required parts cost is minimal. Based on these figures, 
we estimate the cost of this proposed AD to the U.S. operators to be 
$7,040, or $880 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

[[Page 64894]]

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed 
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866,
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of 
compliance in the AD Docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety, Incorporated 
by reference.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA-2008-1155; Directorate Identifier 
2008-NM-146-AD.

Comments Due Date

    (a) We must receive comments by December 15, 2008.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 
airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing 
Alert Service Bulletin 717-29A0009, dated July 31, 2008.

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the 
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent a tire burst when 
the main landing gear (MLG) is in the retracted position from 
causing damage to the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump 
and subsequent electrical arcing, creating the potential of an 
ignition source in the center wing tank, which, in combination with 
flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and 
consequent loss of the airplane.

Compliance

    (e) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

Installation/Re-Routing

    (f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD: Modify 
the wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the right 
wheel well of the MLG by doing all the applicable actions specified 
in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 
717-29A0009, dated July 31, 2008.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 
FAA, ATTN: Ken Sujishi, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety/Mechanical 
and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150L, FAA, Los Angeles 
Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, 
California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5353; fax (562) 627-5210; 
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using 
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
    (2) To request a different method of compliance or a different 
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. 
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC 
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA 
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 
FSDO.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 24, 2008.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. E8-25991 Filed 10-30-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P