Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Trade Transparency Analysis and Research (TTAR) System of Records, 64890-64892 [E8-25972]
Download as PDF
<![CDATA[
64890
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 212 / Friday, October 31, 2008 / Proposed Rules
PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for Part 5
continues to read as follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135,
6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A
also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552. Subpart B
also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.
2. Add at the end of Appendix C to
Part 5, Exemption of Record Systems
under the Privacy Act, the following
new paragraph ‘‘12’’:
Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of
Records Exempt From the Privacy Act
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with PROPOSALS
*
*
*
*
*
12. The Department of Homeland Security/
United States Coast Guard Courts Martial
Records System of Records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS/USCG. DHS/USCG Courts Martial
Records System of Records is a repository of
information held by DHS/USCG in
connection with its several and varied
missions and functions, including, but not
limited to: The enforcement of civil and
criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and
proceedings there under; and national
security and intelligence activities. DHS/
USCG Courts Martial Records contains
information that is collected by, on behalf of,
in support of, or in cooperation with DHS/
USCG and may contain personally
identifiable information collected by other
Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. Pursuant
to exemption 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) of the
Privacy Act, portions of this system are
exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
(e)(4)(I), (e)(5) and (e)(8); (f), and (g). Pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and (2) of the Privacy
Act, this system is exempt from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the
limitations set forth in those subsections: 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f). Exemptions from
these particular subsections are justified, on
a case-by-case basis to be determined at the
time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4)
(Accounting for Disclosures) because release
of the accounting of disclosures could alert
the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory
violation to the existence of the investigation,
and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law
enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve
national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual
who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or
apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records)
because access to the records contained in
this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or
VerDate Aug<31>2005
13:45 Oct 30, 2008
Jkt 217001
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory
violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS or another agency.
Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with
witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection
or apprehension. Amendment of the records
could interfere with ongoing investigations
and law enforcement activities and would
impose an impossible administrative burden
by requiring investigations to be
continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such
information could disclose security-sensitive
information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and
Necessity of Information) because in the
course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of
information obtained or introduced
occasionally may be unclear or the
information may not be strictly relevant or
necessary to a specific investigation. In the
interests of effective law enforcement, it is
appropriate to retain all information that may
aid in establishing patterns of unlawful
activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of
Information from Individuals) because
requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the
subject to the nature or existence of an
investigation, thereby interfering with the
related investigation and law enforcement
activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to
Subjects) because providing such detailed
information would impede law enforcement
in that it could compromise investigations
by: Revealing the existence of an otherwise
confidential investigation and thereby
provide an opportunity for the subject of an
investigation to conceal evidence, alter
patterns of behavior, or take other actions
that could thwart investigative efforts; reveal
the identity of witnesses in investigations,
thereby providing an opportunity for the
subjects of the investigations or others to
harass, intimidate, or otherwise interfere
with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal
the identity of confidential informants,
which would negatively affect the
informant’s usefulness in any ongoing or
future investigations and discourage
members of the public from cooperating as
confidential informants in any future
investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I)
(Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency
Rules) because portions of this system are
exempt from the individual access provisions
of subsection (d) for the reasons noted above,
and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to
individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures
pursuant to which individuals may access
and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative
efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses,
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of
Information) because in the collection of
information for law enforcement purposes it
is impossible to determine in advance what
information is accurate, relevant, timely, and
complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their
investigative training and exercise of good
judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on
Individuals) because compliance would
interfere with DHS’ ability to obtain, serve,
and issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law
enforcement mechanisms that may be filed
under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and
evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific
subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals’ rights to access and amend their
records contained in the system. Therefore
DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals
may seek a civil remedy for the agency’s:
refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply
with a request for access to records; failure
to maintain accurate, relevant timely and
complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual’s right to access
or amend records.
Dated: October 22, 2008.
Hugo Teufel III,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. E8–25966 Filed 10–30–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–10–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. DHS–2008–0107]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of
Exemptions; U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Trade
Transparency Analysis and Research
(TTAR) System of Records
Privacy Office; DHS.
Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is giving concurrent
notice of a new system of records
pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974 for
the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Trade Transparency
Analysis and Research (TTAR) system
and this proposed rulemaking. In this
proposed rulemaking, the Department
proposes to exempt portions of the
system of records from one or more
provisions of the Privacy Act because of
E:\FR\FM\31OCP1.SGM
31OCP1
64891
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 212 / Friday, October 31, 2008 / Proposed Rules
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with PROPOSALS
criminal, civil, and administrative
enforcement requirements.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before December 1, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by docket number DHS–
2008–0107 by one of the following
methods:
• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 1–866–466–5370.
• Mail: Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy
Officer, Privacy Office, Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC
20528.
• Instructions: All submissions
received must include the agency name
and docket number for this rulemaking.
All comments received will be posted
without change to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided.
• Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received go to https://
www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lyn
Rahilly, Privacy Officer, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
425 I Street, NW., Washington, DC
20536, e-mail: ICEPrivacy@dhs.gov, or
Hugo Teufel III (703–235–0780), Chief
Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Trade Transparency Analysis and
Research (TTAR) system of records is
maintained for the purpose of enforcing
criminal laws pertaining to trade by
examining U.S. and foreign trade data to
identify anomalies in patterns of trade
that may indicate trade-based money
laundering or other import-export
crimes that ICE is responsible for
investigating. TTAR contains trade data
collected by other federal agencies and
foreign governments, and financial data
collected by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and the U.S.
Department of the Treasury Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
ICE uses the Data Analysis and
Research Trade Transparency System
(DARTTS), a software application and
data repository, to conduct analysis of
TTAR data. DARTTS does not seek to
predict future behavior or ‘‘profile’’
individuals, i.e., look for individuals or
entities who meet a certain pattern of
behavior that has been pre-determined
to be suspect. Instead, it analyzes and
identifies trade and financial
transactions that are statistically
VerDate Aug<31>2005
13:45 Oct 30, 2008
Jkt 217001
anomalous. Investigators gather
additional facts, verify the accuracy of
the DARTTS data, and use their
judgment and experience to determine if
the anomalous transactions are in fact
suspicious and warrant further
investigation. Not all anomalies lead to
formal investigations. DARTTS can also
identify links (relationships) between
individuals and/or entities based on
commonalities, such as identification
numbers, addresses, or other
information. These commonalities in
and of themselves are not suspicious,
but in the context of additional
information they sometimes help
investigators to identify potentially
criminal activity and identify other
suspicious transactions, witnesses, or
suspects.
II. Privacy Act
In this notice of proposed rulemaking,
DHS now is proposing to exempt TTAR,
in part, from certain provisions of the
Privacy Act. The Privacy Act embodies
fair information principles in a statutory
framework governing the means by
which the United States Government
collects, maintains, uses, and
disseminates personally identifiable
information. The Privacy Act applies to
information that is maintained in a
‘‘system of records.’’ A ‘‘system of
records’’ is a group of any records under
the control of an agency from which
information is retrieved by the name of
the individual or by some identifying
number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual.
Individuals may request their own
records that are maintained in a system
of records in the possession or under the
control of DHS by complying with DHS
Privacy Act regulations, 6 CFR part 5.
The Privacy Act requires each agency
to publish in the Federal Register a
description of the type and character of
each system of records that the agency
maintains, and the routine uses that are
contained in each system in order to
make agency recordkeeping practices
transparent, to notify individuals
regarding the uses to which personally
identifiable information is put, and to
assist individuals in finding such files
within the agency. The Privacy Act also
allows Government agencies to exempt
certain records from the access and
amendment provisions. If an agency
claims an exemption, however, it must
issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to
make clear to the public the reasons
why a particular exemption is claimed.
DHS is claiming exemptions from
certain requirements of the Privacy Act
for TTAR. Some information in TTAR
relates to official DHS national security,
law enforcement, and intelligence
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
activities. These exemptions are needed
to protect information relating to DHS
activities from disclosure to subjects or
others related to these activities.
Specifically, the exemptions are
required to preclude subjects of these
activities from frustrating these
processes; to avoid disclosure of activity
techniques; to protect the identities and
physical safety of confidential
informants and of border management
and law enforcement personnel; to
ensure DHS’s ability to obtain
information from third parties and other
sources; to protect the privacy of third
parties; and to safeguard classified
information. Disclosure of information
to the subject of the inquiry could also
permit the subject to avoid detection or
apprehension.
The exemptions proposed here are
standard law enforcement and national
security exemptions exercised by a large
number of Federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. In appropriate
circumstances, where compliance
would not appear to interfere with or
adversely affect the law enforcement
purposes of this system and the overall
law enforcement process, the applicable
exemptions may be waived on a case by
case basis.
A notice of system of records for the
Department’s TTAR System is also
published in this issue of the Federal
Register.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information; Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, DHS proposes to amend
Chapter I of Title 6, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for Part 5
continues to read as follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135,
6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A
also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.
2. At the end of Appendix C to Part
5, add the following new paragraph 12
to read as follows:
Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of
Records Exempt From the Privacy Act
*
*
*
*
*
12. The Trade Transparency Analysis and
Research (TTAR) System consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used
by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). TTAR is a repository of information
held by DHS in connection with its several
and varied missions and functions,
including, but not limited to: The
enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
there under; and national security and
E:\FR\FM\31OCP1.SGM
31OCP1
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with PROPOSALS
64892
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 212 / Friday, October 31, 2008 / Proposed Rules
intelligence activities. TTAR contains
information that is collected by other federal
and foreign government agencies and may
contain personally identifiable information.
Pursuant to exemption 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2)
of the Privacy Act, portions of this system are
exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d);
(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5)
and (e)(8); (f), and (g). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2), this system is exempt from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act,
subject to the limitations set forth in those
subsections: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f). Exemptions from
these particular subsections are justified, on
a case-by-case basis to be determined at the
time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4)
(Accounting for Disclosures) because release
of the accounting of disclosures could alert
the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory
violation to the existence of the investigation,
and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law
enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve
national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual
who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or
apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records)
because access to the records contained in
this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory
violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS or another agency.
Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to
impede the investigation, to tamper with
witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection
or apprehension. Amendment of the records
could interfere with ongoing investigations
and law enforcement activities and would
impose an impossible administrative burden
by requiring investigations to be
continuously reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such
information could disclose security-sensitive
information that could be detrimental to
homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and
Necessity of Information) because in the
course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of
information obtained or introduced
occasionally may be unclear or the
information may not be strictly relevant or
necessary to a specific investigation. In the
interests of effective law enforcement, it is
appropriate to retain all information that may
aid in establishing patterns of unlawful
activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of
Information from Individuals) because
requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the
subject to the nature or existence of an
investigation, thereby interfering with the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
13:45 Oct 30, 2008
Jkt 217001
related investigation and law enforcement
activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to
Subjects) because providing such detailed
information would impede law enforcement
in that it could compromise investigations
by: Revealing the existence of an otherwise
confidential investigation and thereby
provide an opportunity for the subject of an
investigation to conceal evidence, alter
patterns of behavior, or take other actions
that could thwart investigative efforts; reveal
the identity of witnesses in investigations,
thereby providing an opportunity for the
subjects of the investigations or others to
harass, intimidate, or otherwise interfere
with the collection of evidence or other
information from such witnesses; or reveal
the identity of confidential informants,
which would negatively affect the
informant’s usefulness in any ongoing or
future investigations and discourage
members of the public from cooperating as
confidential informants in any future
investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H)
(Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency
Rules) because portions of this system are
exempt from the individual access provisions
of subsection (d) for the reasons noted above,
and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to
individuals with respect to existence of
records pertaining to them in the system of
records or otherwise setting up procedures
pursuant to which individuals may access
and view records pertaining to themselves in
the system would undermine investigative
efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses,
and potential witnesses, and confidential
informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of
Information) because in the collection of
information for law enforcement purposes it
is impossible to determine in advance what
information is accurate, relevant, timely, and
complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their
investigative training and exercise of good
judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on
Individuals) because compliance would
interfere with DHS’ ability to obtain, serve,
and issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law
enforcement mechanisms that may be filed
under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and
evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific
subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals’ rights to access and amend their
records contained in the system. Therefore
DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals
may seek a civil remedy for the agency’s:
refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply
with a request for access to records; failure
to maintain accurate, relevant timely and
complete records; or failure to otherwise
comply with an individual’s right to access
or amend records.
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
Dated: October 24, 2008.
Hugo Teufel III,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. E8–25972 Filed 10–30–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–10–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2008–1155; Directorate
Identifier 2008–NM–146–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell
Douglas Model 717–200 Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
McDonnell Douglas Model 717–200
airplanes. This proposed AD would
require modifying the wire installation
of the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the
right wheel well of the main landing
gear (MLG). This proposed AD results
from fuel system reviews conducted by
the manufacturer. We are proposing this
AD to prevent a tire burst when the
MLG is in the retracted position from
causing damage to the wire assembly of
the auxiliary hydraulic pump and
subsequent electrical arcing, creating
the potential of an ignition source in the
center wing tank, which, in combination
with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in a fuel tank explosion and consequent
loss of the airplane.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by December 15,
2008.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 202–493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in
this AD, contact Boeing Commercial
E:\FR\FM\31OCP1.SGM
31OCP1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 212 (Friday, October 31, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 64890-64892]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-25972]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. DHS-2008-0107]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Trade Transparency Analysis and
Research (TTAR) System of Records
AGENCY: Privacy Office; DHS.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is giving concurrent
notice of a new system of records pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974
for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Trade Transparency
Analysis and Research (TTAR) system and this proposed rulemaking. In
this proposed rulemaking, the Department proposes to exempt portions of
the system of records from one or more provisions of the Privacy Act
because of
[[Page 64891]]
criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement requirements.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before December 1, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number DHS-
2008-0107 by one of the following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 1-866-466-5370.
Mail: Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy
Office, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528.
Instructions: All submissions received must include the
agency name and docket number for this rulemaking. All comments
received will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov,
including any personal information provided.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background
documents or comments received go to https://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lyn Rahilly, Privacy Officer, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 425 I Street, NW., Washington, DC
20536, e-mail: ICEPrivacy@dhs.gov, or Hugo Teufel III (703-235-0780),
Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC 20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Trade Transparency Analysis and Research (TTAR) system of
records is maintained for the purpose of enforcing criminal laws
pertaining to trade by examining U.S. and foreign trade data to
identify anomalies in patterns of trade that may indicate trade-based
money laundering or other import-export crimes that ICE is responsible
for investigating. TTAR contains trade data collected by other federal
agencies and foreign governments, and financial data collected by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Department of the
Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
ICE uses the Data Analysis and Research Trade Transparency System
(DARTTS), a software application and data repository, to conduct
analysis of TTAR data. DARTTS does not seek to predict future behavior
or ``profile'' individuals, i.e., look for individuals or entities who
meet a certain pattern of behavior that has been pre-determined to be
suspect. Instead, it analyzes and identifies trade and financial
transactions that are statistically anomalous. Investigators gather
additional facts, verify the accuracy of the DARTTS data, and use their
judgment and experience to determine if the anomalous transactions are
in fact suspicious and warrant further investigation. Not all anomalies
lead to formal investigations. DARTTS can also identify links
(relationships) between individuals and/or entities based on
commonalities, such as identification numbers, addresses, or other
information. These commonalities in and of themselves are not
suspicious, but in the context of additional information they sometimes
help investigators to identify potentially criminal activity and
identify other suspicious transactions, witnesses, or suspects.
II. Privacy Act
In this notice of proposed rulemaking, DHS now is proposing to
exempt TTAR, in part, from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. The
Privacy Act embodies fair information principles in a statutory
framework governing the means by which the United States Government
collects, maintains, uses, and disseminates personally identifiable
information. The Privacy Act applies to information that is maintained
in a ``system of records.'' A ``system of records'' is a group of any
records under the control of an agency from which information is
retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number,
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.
Individuals may request their own records that are maintained in a
system of records in the possession or under the control of DHS by
complying with DHS Privacy Act regulations, 6 CFR part 5.
The Privacy Act requires each agency to publish in the Federal
Register a description of the type and character of each system of
records that the agency maintains, and the routine uses that are
contained in each system in order to make agency recordkeeping
practices transparent, to notify individuals regarding the uses to
which personally identifiable information is put, and to assist
individuals in finding such files within the agency. The Privacy Act
also allows Government agencies to exempt certain records from the
access and amendment provisions. If an agency claims an exemption,
however, it must issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to make clear to
the public the reasons why a particular exemption is claimed.
DHS is claiming exemptions from certain requirements of the Privacy
Act for TTAR. Some information in TTAR relates to official DHS national
security, law enforcement, and intelligence activities. These
exemptions are needed to protect information relating to DHS activities
from disclosure to subjects or others related to these activities.
Specifically, the exemptions are required to preclude subjects of these
activities from frustrating these processes; to avoid disclosure of
activity techniques; to protect the identities and physical safety of
confidential informants and of border management and law enforcement
personnel; to ensure DHS's ability to obtain information from third
parties and other sources; to protect the privacy of third parties; and
to safeguard classified information. Disclosure of information to the
subject of the inquiry could also permit the subject to avoid detection
or apprehension.
The exemptions proposed here are standard law enforcement and
national security exemptions exercised by a large number of Federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. In appropriate circumstances,
where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect
the law enforcement purposes of this system and the overall law
enforcement process, the applicable exemptions may be waived on a case
by case basis.
A notice of system of records for the Department's TTAR System is
also published in this issue of the Federal Register.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information; Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, DHS proposes to amend
Chapter I of Title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:
PART 5--DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for Part 5 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 6 U.S.C. 101 et
seq.; 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.
2. At the end of Appendix C to Part 5, add the following new
paragraph 12 to read as follows:
Appendix C to Part 5--DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy
Act
* * * * *
12. The Trade Transparency Analysis and Research (TTAR) System
consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). TTAR is a repository of
information held by DHS in connection with its several and varied
missions and functions, including, but not limited to: The
enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries,
and proceedings there under; and national security and
[[Page 64892]]
intelligence activities. TTAR contains information that is collected
by other federal and foreign government agencies and may contain
personally identifiable information.
Pursuant to exemption 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) of the Privacy Act,
portions of this system are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4);
(d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5) and
(e)(8); (f), and (g). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), this system
is exempt from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject
to the limitations set forth in those subsections: 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f). Exemptions
from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation, to the existence of the
investigation, and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the individual
who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to
tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection or
apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing
investigations and law enforcement activities and would impose an
impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be
continuously reinvestigated. In addition, permitting access and
amendment to such information could disclose security-sensitive
information that could be detrimental to homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not be
strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the
interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain
all information that may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful
activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of an investigation, thereby interfering with
the related investigation and law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information would impede law enforcement in
that it could compromise investigations by: Revealing the existence
of an otherwise confidential investigation and thereby provide an
opportunity for the subject of an investigation to conceal evidence,
alter patterns of behavior, or take other actions that could thwart
investigative efforts; reveal the identity of witnesses in
investigations, thereby providing an opportunity for the subjects of
the investigations or others to harass, intimidate, or otherwise
interfere with the collection of evidence or other information from
such witnesses; or reveal the identity of confidential informants,
which would negatively affect the informant's usefulness in any
ongoing or future investigations and discourage members of the
public from cooperating as confidential informants in any future
investigations.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements),
and (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt
from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the
reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish
requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of records
pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise setting up
procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and view records
pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine investigative
efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and potential
witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS' ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms that
may be filed under seal, and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt
from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act relating to
individuals' rights to access and amend their records contained in
the system. Therefore DHS is not required to establish rules or
procedures pursuant to which individuals may seek a civil remedy for
the agency's: refusal to amend a record; refusal to comply with a
request for access to records; failure to maintain accurate,
relevant timely and complete records; or failure to otherwise comply
with an individual's right to access or amend records.
Dated: October 24, 2008.
Hugo Teufel III,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. E8-25972 Filed 10-30-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-10-P
