Safe Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter: Clarification; Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, 63843-63867 [E8-25544]
Download as PDF
63843
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
Vol. 73, No. 209
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains regulatory documents having general
applicability and legal effect, most of which
are keyed to and codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations, which is published under
50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by
the Superintendent of Documents. Prices of
new books are listed in the first FEDERAL
REGISTER issue of each week.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
8 CFR Part 274a
[DHS Docket No. ICEB–2006–0004; ICE
2377–06]
[RIN 1653–AA50]
Safe Harbor Procedures for Employers
Who Receive a No-Match Letter:
Clarification; Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, DHS.
ACTION: Supplemental final rule.
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is finalizing the
Supplemental Proposed Rule published
on March 26, 2008 and reaffirming
regulations providing a ‘‘safe harbor’’
from liability under section 274A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act for
employers that follow certain
procedures after receiving a notice—
either a ‘‘no-match letter’’ from the
Social Security Administration (SSA),
or a ‘‘notice of suspect document’’ from
DHS—that casts doubt on the
employment eligibility of their
employees. DHS is also correcting a
typographical error in the rule text
promulgated in August 2007.
DATES: This final rule is effective as of
October 28, 2008.
ADDRESSES: The comments on the
supplemental proposed rule and the
proposed rule on docket DHS Docket
No. ICEB–2006–0004, may be reviewed
by one of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov.
• In person at U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, 500 12th St.,
SW., 5th Floor, Washington DC 20024.
Contact Joe Jeronimo, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, Telephone:
202–732–3978 (not a toll-free number)
for an appointment.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
Joe
Jeronimo, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, 500 12th St.,
SW., 5th Floor, Washington DC 20024.
Telephone: 202–732–3978 (not a tollfree number).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Table of Contents
I. Docket
II. Background
A. History of the Rulemaking
B. Purpose of the Rulemaking
C. Supplemental Final Rule
1. Authority to Promulgate the Rule
2. ‘‘Reasoned Analysis’’ Supporting
Perceived Change in Policy Reflected in
the Final Rule
3. Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the
INA
4. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
III. Public Comments and Responses
A. Authority To Promulgate the Rule
B. ‘‘Reasoned Analysis’’ Supporting
Perceived Change in Policy Reflected in
the Final Rule
C. Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the
INA
D. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1. Scope of Regulatory Flexibility Act
Review
2. Direct and Indirect Impact
3. Baseline Costs, Unauthorized Alien
Workers, and the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986
4. Variability of SSA Criteria for Issuing
No-Match Letters
5. Base Assumptions Made in the IRFA and
SEIA
6. Opportunity and Productivity Costs
7. Human Resources and Employee
Tracking
8. Other Costs
9. Rehiring Seasonal Employees
10. Conclusions
E. Further Interpretation of the August
2007 Final Rule
F. Other Comments Received
IV. Changes Made in Republishing the Final
Rule
V. Statutory and Regulatory Reviews
A. Administrative Procedure Act
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
1. Need for, Objectives of, and Reasons
Why the Rule is Being Considered
2. Significant Issues Raised in Public
Comments
3. Description of and Estimate of the
Numbers of Small Entities to Which the
Rule Would Apply
4. Proposed Reporting, Recordkeeping, and
Other Compliance Requirements
5. Significant Alternatives Considered
6. Minimization of Impact
C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
D. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996
E. Executive Order 12,866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review)
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
F. Executive Order 13,132 (Federalism)
G. Executive Order 12,988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
H. Paperwork Reduction Act
PART 274a—CONTROL OF EMPLOYMENT
OF ALIENS
I. Docket
Comments on the supplemental
proposed rule, the proposed rule, and
the Small Entity Impact Analysis may
be viewed online at https://
www.regulations.gov (docket ICEB–
2006–0004), or in person at U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Department of Homeland Security, 500
12th St., SW., 5th Floor, Washington,
DC 20024, by appointment. To make an
appointment to review the docket, call
telephone number 202–732–3979 (not a
toll-free number).
II. Background
A. History of the Rulemaking
DHS published a proposed rule in
June 2006 that proposed a method for
employers to limit the risk of being
found to have knowingly employed
unauthorized aliens after receiving a
letter from the SSA—known as a ‘‘nomatch letter’’—notifying them of
mismatches between names and social
security numbers provided by their
employees and the information in SSA’s
database, or after receiving a letter from
DHS—called a ‘‘notice of suspect
document’’—that casts doubt on their
employees’ eligibility to work. 71 FR
34281 (June 14, 2006). A sixty-day
public comment period ended on
August 14, 2006.
DHS received approximately 5,000
comments on the proposed rule from a
variety of sources, including labor
unions, not-for-profit advocacy
organizations, industry trade groups,
private attorneys, businesses, and other
interested organizations and
individuals. The comments varied
considerably; some commenters
strongly supported the rule as proposed,
and others were critical of the proposed
rule and suggested changes. See https://
www.regulations.gov, docket number
ICEB–2006–0004.
DHS published a final rule on August
15, 2007, setting out safe harbor
procedures for employers that receive
SSA no-match letters or DHS notices. 72
FR 45611 (Aug. 15, 2007). Each
comment received was reviewed and
considered in the preparation of the
August 2007 Final Rule. The August
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
63844
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
2007 Final Rule addressed the
comments by issue rather than by
referring to specific commenters or
comments.
On August 29, 2007, the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations and others filed
suit seeking to enjoin implementation of
the August 2007 Final Rule in the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. AFL–CIO
v. Chertoff, No. 07–4472–CRB, D.E. 1
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007). The district
court granted plaintiffs’ initial motion
for a temporary restraining order, AFL–
CIO v. Chertoff, D.E. 21 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
31, 2007) (order granting motion for
temporary restraining order and setting
schedule for briefing and hearing on
preliminary injunction), and on October
10, 2007 granted plaintiffs’ motion for
preliminary injunction. AFL–CIO v.
Chertoff, 552 F.Supp.2d 999 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (order granting motion for
preliminary injunction).
The district court concluded that
plaintiffs had raised serious questions
about three aspects of the August 2007
Final Rule. Specifically, the court
questioned whether DHS had: (1)
Supplied a reasoned analysis to justify
what the court viewed as a change in
the Department’s position—that a nomatch letter may be sufficient, by itself,
to put an employer on notice, and thus
impart constructive knowledge, that
employees referenced in the letter may
not be work-authorized; (2) exceeded its
authority (and encroached on the
authority of the Department of Justice
(DOJ)) by interpreting the antidiscrimination provisions of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA), Public Law 99–603, 100
Stat. 3359 (1986), 8 U.S.C. 1324b; and
(3) violated the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, 5 U.S.C 601 et seq., by not
conducting a regulatory flexibility
analysis. 552 F.Supp.2d at 1006.
Following its entry of the preliminary
injunction, the district court stayed
proceedings in the litigation. See AFL–
CIO v. Chertoff, D.E. 149 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
14, 2007) (minute entry).
DHS published a supplemental notice
of proposed rulemaking in March 2008
to address the specific issues raised by
the court in the preliminary injunction
order. 73 FR 15944, 45, 46–47 (March
26, 2008). In the supplemental proposed
rulemaking, DHS reviewed past
government communications about SSA
no-match letters to clarify the history of
the Department’s policy on the
significance of those letters, and
supplied additional ‘‘reasoned analysis’’
in support of the policy set forth in the
rule. 73 FR at 15947–50. DHS also
clarified that the authority to interpret
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
and enforce the anti-discrimination
provisions of the IRCA rests with DOJ,
73 FR at 15950–51, and provided an
initial regulatory flexibility analysis, 73
FR at 15951, 52–54, including a small
entities analysis. Docket ICEB–2006–
0004–0233.
The public comment period on the
supplemental proposed rule ended on
April 25, 2008. DHS received
approximately 2,950 comments on the
supplemental proposed rule from a
variety of sources, including labor
unions, not-for-profit advocacy
organizations, industry trade groups,
private attorneys, businesses, and other
interested organizations and
individuals.
A number of public comments were
the product of mass-mailing campaigns,
resulting in DHS receiving identical or
nearly identical electronic filings during
the comment period. Other comments
included multiple-signature petition
drives that presented a specific point of
view. Many comments expressed
opinions on immigration policy
generally but provided little substantive
information or supporting
documentation that DHS could use to
refine its judgment on the efficacy of the
rulemaking or that was pertinent to the
issues raised by the supplemental
proposed rulemaking.
DHS viewed every comment received
from a different source as a separate
comment, notwithstanding similarities
in wording. When multiple comments
were received from the same source but
via different media (e.g. electronic and
mail), DHS attempted to identify and
correlate the comments. DHS reviewed
the substance of every comment and
considered the substance of the
comments in formulating this final rule.
We summarize the substance of the
comments received below.
During the public comment period,
DHS received requests that the comment
period be extended. DHS reviewed these
requests and concluded that they
presented no novel or difficult issues
justifying an extension of the comment
period, particularly in light of the
rulemaking’s extensive history, as well
as the limited number of issues raised
by the district court and addressed in
the supplemental proposed rule.
Accordingly, DHS declines to extend
the comment period.
In developing this supplemental final
rule, DHS has considered the entire
administrative record of the August
2007 Final Rule, as well as the record
of proceedings in the pending litigation,
including arguments made in the
various motions and briefs, and orders
of the district court, that were relevant
to the issues addressed in this action.
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
AFL–CIO v. Chertoff, D.E. 129 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2007) (certified administrative
record); D.E. 146–2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4,
2007 (errata)) (hereinafter
‘‘Administrative Record’’). The docket
of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California is a
public record and the documents
contained therein are available from the
court clerk’s office.
After considering the full record,
including the comments received in
response to the supplemental notice of
proposed rulemaking, DHS has made
adjustments to the cost calculations in
the Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (IRFA) and prepared a Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA),
finalized the additional legal analysis
set out in the supplemental notice of
proposed rulemaking, and determined
that the rule should issue without
change. Therefore this final rule
reaffirms the text of the August 2007
Final Rule without substantive change
and makes one typographical correction.
B. Purpose of the Rulemaking
The Federal Government has been
aware for many years that employment
in the United States is a magnet for
illegal immigration, and that a
comparison of names and social security
numbers submitted by employers
against SSA’s data provides an indicator
of possible illegal employment. In 1997,
the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform found the following:
Reducing the employment magnet is the
linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to deter
unlawful immigration. Economic opportunity
and the prospect of employment remain the
most important draw[s] for illegal migration
to this country. Strategies to deter unlawful
entries and visa overstays require both a
reliable process for verifying authorization to
work and an enforcement capacity to ensure
that employers adhere to all immigrationrelated labor standards.
*
*
*
*
*
The Commission concluded that the most
promising option for verifying work
authorization is a computerized registry
based on the social security number; it
unanimously recommended that such a
system be tested not only for its effectiveness
in deterring the employment of illegal aliens,
but also for its protections against
discrimination and infringements on civil
liberties and privacy.
*
*
*
*
*
The federal government does not have the
capacity to match social security numbers
with [Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS)] work authorization data without some
of the information captured on the I–9.
Congress should provide sufficient time,
resources, and authorities to permit
development of this capability.
U.S. Comm’n on Immigration Reform,
Becoming an American: Immigration
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
and Immigrant Policy 113–14, 117
(1997) (emphasis in original);
Administrative Record at 139–140, 143.
Similarly, the Federal Government
has been long aware of the potential for
abuse of social security numbers by
aliens who are not authorized to work
in the United States. Such abuse has
been the subject of numerous public
reports by the Government
Accountability Office and the SSA’s
Inspector General, as well as
congressional hearings. See, e.g.,
Administrative Record, at 35–661;
Government Accountability Office,
Report to the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Technology and Homeland
Security, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Estimating the
Undocumented Population: A ‘‘Grouped
Answers’’ Approach to Surveying
Foreign-Born Respondents (GAO Rept.
No. GAO–06–775, Sept. 2006) (describes
alternative means of gathering interview
data from undocumented aliens to
reduce the ‘‘question threat’’ to some
respondents because they fear that a
truthful answer could result in negative
consequences); Subcommittee on
Oversight and Subcommittee on Social
Security, Committee on Ways and
Means, U.S. House of Representatives,
Social Security Number and Individual
Taxpayers Identification Number
Mismatches and Misuse, 108th Cong.,
2nd Sess., No. 108–53 (March 10, 2004).
The illegal alien population in the
United States and the number of
unauthorized workers employed in the
United States are both substantial. See,
e.g., J. Passel, Pew Hispanic Center, The
Size and Characteristics of the
Unauthorized Migrant Population in the
U.S. (March 2006), found at https://
pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/17.pdf
(estimating approximately 11.2 million
illegal aliens in the United States;
approximately 7.2 million illegal aliens
in the workforce); M. Hoefer, N. Rytina
& C. Campbell, Office of Immigration
Statistics, Policy Directorate, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security,
Estimates of the Unauthorized
Immigrant Population Residing in the
United States: January 2006 (August
2007) found at https://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/
ill_pe_2006.pdf (estimating
unauthorized population of 11,550,000
as of January 2006).
The scale of the problem that this rule
seeks to address—that is, the unlawful
employment of aliens not authorized to
work in the United States—has become
more well-defined through the
rulemaking and related litigation. The
comments submitted in response to the
initial proposed rule in 2006 by
organizations such as Western Growers,
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
and the public statements by
representatives of such organizations,
have been bracingly frank:
In the midst of the combustive debate over
immigration reform, we in agriculture have
been forthright about the elephant in
America’s living room: Much of our
workforce is in the country illegally—as
much as 70%.
T. Nassif, ‘‘Food for Thought,’’ The Wall
Street Journal, Nov. 20, 2007, at A19.
See also Docket ICEB–2006–0004–0145
(August 14, 2006), Administrative
Record at 1306 (comments of the
National Council of Agricultural
Employers, suggesting over 76% of
agricultural workers are not authorized
to work in the United States). DHS
recognizes this critical fact—that many
employers are aware that a substantial
portion of their workforce is
unauthorized—and has therefore taken
steps within the Department’s existing
authorities to assist employers in
complying with the law.
Public and private studies in the
administrative record of this rulemaking
make clear that social security no-match
letters identify some portion of
unauthorized aliens who are illegally
employed in the United States. One
private study concluded that ‘‘most
workers with unmatched SSNs are
undocumented immigrants.’’ C. Mehta,
N. Theodore & M. Hincapie, Social
Security Administration’s No-Match
Letter Program: Implications for
Immigration Enforcement and Workers’
Rights (2003) at i; Administrative
Record at 309, 313.
Based on the rulemaking record and
the Department’s law enforcement
expertise, DHS finds that there is a
substantial connection between social
security no-match letters and the lack of
work authorization by some employees
whose SSNs are listed in those letters.
While social security no-match letters
do not, by themselves, conclusively
establish that an employee is
unauthorized, DHS’s (and legacy INS’s)
interactions with employers that receive
no-match letters have consistently
shown that employers are also aware
that an employee’s appearance on a nomatch letter may indicate the employee
lacks work authorization. Nevertheless,
as Mehta, Theodore & Hincapie found,
SSA’s no-match letters currently ‘‘do[]
not substantially deter employers from
retaining or hiring undocumented
immigrants. Twenty-three percent of
employers retained workers with
unmatched SSNs who failed to correct
their information with the SSA.’’ C.
Mehta, N. Theodore & M. Hincapie,
supra at ii; Administrative Record at
314.
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
63845
Some employers may fail to respond
to no-match letters because they have
consciously made the illegal
employment of unauthorized aliens a
key part of their business model or
because they conclude that the risk of
an immigration enforcement action is
outweighed by the cost of complying
with the immigration laws by hiring
only legal workers. See C. Mehta, N.
Theodore & M. Hincapie, supra at 2, 20–
30; Administrative Record at 314, 316,
334–44 (noting employer ‘‘complaints’’
over loss of illegal workforce when
employees are asked to correct their
SSN mismatches, as well as the practice
by some employers of encouraging
workers to procure new fraudulent
documents to provide cover for their
continued employment). DHS’s
interactions with employers have also
shown that many law-abiding
employers are unsure of their
obligations under current immigration
law after they receive a no-match letter,
and that some employers fear
allegations of anti-discrimination law
violations if they react inappropriately
to no-match letters.
In light of these facts, DHS has
concluded that additional employer
guidance on how to respond to SSA nomatch letters will help law-abiding
employers to comply with the
immigration laws. Accordingly, in this
final rule, DHS outlines specific steps
that reasonable employers may take in
response to SSA no-match letters, and
offers employers that follow those steps
a safe harbor from ICE’s use of SSA nomatch letters in any future enforcement
action to demonstrate that an employer
has knowingly employed unauthorized
aliens in violation of section 274A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
8 U.S.C. 1324a.
C. Supplemental Final Rule
1. Authority to Promulgate the Rule
Congress has delegated to the
Secretary of Homeland Security the
authority to promulgate regulations that
implement, interpret and fill in the
administrative details of the
immigration laws. INA section 103(a), 8
U.S.C. 1103(a); Homeland Security Act
of 2002, Public Law 107–296, sections
102(a)(3), (b)(1), and (e), 110 Stat. 2135
(Nov. 25, 2002) (HSA), as amended, 6
U.S.C. 112(a)(3), (b)(1), and (e). Under
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842–45 (1983), the courts
afford due deference to agency
interpretations of these laws as reflected
in DHS’s rules. The Executive Branch
may, as appropriate, announce or
change its policies and statutory
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
63846
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
interpretations through rulemaking
actions, so long as the agency’s
decisions rest on a ‘‘rational connection
between the facts found and the choice
made.’’ Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
DHS is authorized by the HSA and the
INA to investigate and pursue sanctions
against employers that knowingly hire
or continue to employ unauthorized
aliens or do not properly verify their
employees’ employment eligibility. HSA
sections 102(a)(3), 202(3), 441, 442, 6
U.S.C. 112(a)(3), 251, 252; INA section
274A(e), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(e). All persons
or entities that hire, recruit or refer
persons for a fee for employment in the
United States must verify the identity
and employment eligibility of all
employees hired to work in the United
States. INA section 274A(a)(1)(B), (b)(1),
(b)(2) 8 U.S.C. 1324a(a)(1)(B), (b)(1),
(b)(2). Under the INA, this verification
is performed by completing an
Employment Eligibility Verification
form (Form I–9) for all employees,
including United States citizens. INA
section 274A(b)(1), (b)(2), 8 U.S.C.
1324a (b)(1), (b)(2); 8 CFR 274a.2. An
employer, or a recruiter or referrer for a
fee, must retain the completed Form I–
9 for three years after hiring, recruiting
or referral, or, where the employment
extends longer, for the life of the
individual’s employment and for one
year following the employee’s
departure. INA section 274A(b)(3), 8
U.S.C. 1324a(b)(3). These forms are not
routinely filed with any government
agency; employers are responsible for
maintaining these records, and they may
be requested and reviewed by DHS
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE). See 71 FR 34510 (June 15, 2006).
DHS’s authority to investigate and
pursue sanctions against employers that
knowingly hire or continue to employ
unauthorized aliens necessarily
includes the authority to decide the
evidence on which it will rely in such
enforcement efforts. It also includes the
authority to decide the probative value
of the available evidence, and the
conditions under which DHS will
commit not to rely on certain evidence.
Under the prior regulations, an
employer who had received an SSA nomatch letter or DHS letter and was
charged with knowing employment of
unauthorized aliens could defend
against an inference that the employer
had constructive knowledge of the
workers’ illegal status by showing that
the employer had concluded, after
exercising reasonable care in response
to the SSA no-match letter or DHS
letter, that the workers were in fact
work-authorized. 8 CFR 274a.1(l)(1)
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
(2007). Those regulations, however,
provided no detailed guidance on what
would constitute ‘‘reasonable care.’’ In
the August 2007 Final Rule—as
supplemented by this final rule—DHS
announces its interpretation of INA
section 274A and limits its law
enforcement discretion by committing
not to use an employer’s receipt of and
response to an SSA no-match letter or
DHS letter as evidence of constructive
knowledge, if the employer follows the
procedures outlined in the rule. This
limitation on DHS’s enforcement
discretion—this safe harbor—is well
within the rulemaking powers of the
Secretary of Homeland Security. See,
e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 240–
41 (2001) (upholding categorical
limitation of agency discretion through
rulemaking). This rule does not affect
the authority of SSA to issue no-match
letters, or the authority of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to impose and
collect taxes, or the authority of DOJ to
enforce the anti-discrimination
provisions of the INA or adjudicate
notices of intent to fine employers.
The ongoing litigation involving the
August 2007 Final Rule does not
constrain DHS’s authority to amend and
reissue the rule. The Executive Branch’s
amendment of regulations in litigation
is a natural evolution in the process of
governance. As the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has noted:
It is both logical and precedented that an
agency can engage in new rulemaking to
correct a prior rule which a court has found
defective. See Center for Science in the
Public Interest v. Regan, 727 F.2d 1161,
1164–65 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Action on Smoking
and Health v. CAB, 713 F.2d 795, 802 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). Where an injunction is based on
an interpretation of a prior regulation, the
agency need not seek modification of that
injunction before it initiates new rulemaking
to change the regulation.
NAACP, Jefferson County Branch v.
Donovan, 737 F.2d 67, 72 (D.C. Cir.
1984). See generally Thorpe v. Housing
Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281–82
(1969).
As noted in the supplemental notice
of proposed rulemaking, the district
court enjoined implementation of the
August 2007 Final Rule and the
issuance of SSA no-match letters
containing an insert drafted by DHS.
AFL–CIO v. Chertoff, D.E. 137 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (preliminary injunction); 73 FR at
15947. The preliminary injunction did
not prohibit further rulemaking by DHS.
The district court subsequently stayed
proceedings in the litigation to allow for
further rulemaking. AFL–CIO v.
Chertoff, D.E. 142 (stay motion); 144
(statement of non-opposition); 149
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
(minute order staying proceedings
pending new rulemaking) (N.D. Cal.
2007). Accordingly, not only does DHS
continue to have the authority to revise
and finalize this rulemaking but the
orders of the district court contemplate
such rulemaking action.
2. ‘‘Reasoned Analysis’’ Supporting
Perceived Change in Policy Reflected in
the Final Rule
An agency action is arbitrary and
capricious if the agency fails to examine
relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action
including a ‘‘rational connection
between the facts found and the choice
made.’’ Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983). In its order granting the
preliminary injunction, the district
court found that ‘‘DHS has sufficiently
articulated a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice
made.’’ 552 F.Supp.2d at 1010. The
district court expressed concerns,
however, that DHS had not sufficiently
articulated a rationale for what the court
saw as DHS’s ‘‘change’’ in position on
the significance of SSA no-match letters
when promulgating that August 2007
Final Rule. While the district court
acknowledged that the preamble to the
August 2007 Final Rule remained
consistent with DHS’s and legacy INS’s
prior informal guidance by ‘‘assur[ing]
employers that ‘an SSA no-match letter
by itself does not impart knowledge that
the identified employees are
unauthorized aliens,’ ’’ 559 F.Supp.2d at
1009 (quoting 72 FR 45616), the court
concluded that ‘‘DHS decided to change
course’’ in the text of the August 2007
Final Rule by ‘‘provid[ing] that
constructive knowledge may be inferred
if an employer fails to take reasonable
steps after receiving nothing more than
a no-match letter.’’ Id. Having identified
what it believed to be a change in DHS’s
position, the court concluded that ‘‘DHS
may well have the authority to change
its position, but because DHS did so
without a reasoned analysis, there is at
least a serious question whether the
agency has ‘casually ignored’ prior
precedent in violation of the APA.’’ 552
F.Supp.2d at 1010.
DHS provided in the supplemental
proposed rule an extensive review of the
non-precedential correspondence and
public reports relating to the value of
SSA no-match letters as an indicator
that individuals listed in a letter may
not be authorized to work in the United
States and the obligations of employers
to respond to such letters. 73 FR at
15947–48. That review showed that
neither the former INS nor DHS had
issued a formal or precedential
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
statement of agency policy regarding the
significance of SSA no-match letters,
and that, therefore, there was no agency
precedent that had been ‘‘casually
ignored’’ in DHS’s promulgation of the
August 2007 Final Rule. It also showed
that DHS’s consistent, if informal, view
of SSA no-match letters has been that
(1) SSA no-match letters do not, by
themselves, establish that an employee
is unauthorized, (2) there are both
innocent and non-innocent reasons for
no-match letters, but (3) an employer
may not safely ignore SSA no-match
letters, and (4) an employer must be
aware of and comply with the antidiscrimination provisions of the INA.
The position reflected in the August
2007 Final Rule—that a no-match letter,
and an employer’s response to such a
letter could, in the totality of the
circumstances, constitute proof of an
employer’s constructive knowledge that
an employee is not authorized to work
in the United States—was consistent
with the informal agency interpretations
offered to employers over the past
decade.
Nevertheless, in light of the court’s
concerns that DHS had changed its
position on these issues in the August
2007 Final Rule, the supplemental
notice of proposed rulemaking set forth
the ‘‘reasoned analysis’’ sought by the
court and identified four significant
reasons for the issuance of this rule: (1)
The need to resolve ambiguity and
confusion among employers regarding
their obligations under the INA
following receipt of an SSA no-match
letter; (2) the growing evidence and
consensus within and outside
government that SSA no-match letters
are a legitimate indicator of possible
illegal work by unauthorized aliens; (3)
DHS’s view that SSA’s criteria for
sending employee no-match letters
helps to focus those letters on
employers that have potentially
significant problems with their
employees’ work authorization; and (4)
the established legal principle that
employers may be found to have
knowingly employed unauthorized
alien workers in violation of INA
section 274A based on a constructive
knowledge theory. 73 F.R. 15949–50.
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
a. Need for Clear Guidance Regarding
No-Match Letters
As was noted in the supplemental
notice of proposed rulemaking, one key
justification for issuance of this rule is
to eliminate ambiguity regarding an
employer’s responsibilities under the
INA upon receipt of a no-match letter.
As one business organization with
nationwide membership commented in
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
response to the initial publication of the
proposed rule in 2006:
Disagreement and confusion [of an
employer’s obligations upon receipt of a nomatch letter] are rampant and well-intended
employers are left without a clear
understanding of their compliance
responsibilities. [Organization] members
have had substantial concerns regarding
whether mismatch letters put them on notice
that they may be in violation of the
employment authorization provisions of the
immigration law, since the Social Security
card is one of the most commonly used
employment authorization documents.
Administrative Record at 1295
(comment from National Council of
Agricultural Employers, Aug. 14, 2006).
See also id. at 849 (comment by the
National Federation of Independent
Business: ‘‘Clarification of the
employer’s obligation on receiving a nomatch letter and the safe harbor
provided for in the proposed rule is
critical.’’).
As noted above, all previous agency
guidance was in letters responding to
individual queries from employers,
members of Congress, or other
interested parties—neither the INS nor
DHS had ever released any formal
statement of agency policy on the issue.
In addition, agency correspondence over
the years was heavily caveated, at times
even equivocal, and although more
recent letters from DHS had articulated
more clearly employers’ obligations
upon receiving a no-match letter, those
letters did not purport to supplant prior
statements by legacy INS. In the absence
of a clear, authoritative agency position
on the significance of no-match letters,
employers and labor organizations were
left free to stake out positions that best
served their parochial interests, by in
some cases misconstruing language in
the no-match letter aimed at preventing
summary firings or discriminatory
practices as instead commanding
employers to turn a blind eye to the
widely-known fact that unauthorized
alien workers would often be listed in
those letters. In the face of this
ambiguity, well-meaning employers’
responses to SSA no-match letters were
also affected by concern about running
afoul of the INA’s antidiscrimination
provisions. Thus, employers concluded
that the risks of inaction in the face of
no-match letters—with the possibility of
being found to have knowingly
employed unauthorized workers in
violation of INA 274A—was outweighed
by the risks of embarking on an
investigation after receiving a no-match
letter only to face charges of
discrimination.
The August 2007 Final Rule was
designed to remedy this confused
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
63847
situation by reminding employers of
their obligation under the INA to
conduct due diligence upon receipt of
SSA no-match letters, and by formally
announcing DHS’s view that employers
that fail to perform reasonable due
diligence upon receipt of SSA no-match
letters or DHS suspect document notices
risk being found to have constructive
knowledge of the illegal work status of
employees whose names or SSNs are
listed. Further, because the constructive
knowledge standard applies a ‘‘totality
of the circumstances’’ test to the facts of
a particular case, and is therefore not
reducible to bright-line rules, the
August 2007 Final Rule sought to
provide greater predictability through a
clear set of recommended actions for
employers to take, and assured
employers that they would not face
charges of constructive knowledge
based on SSA no-match letters or DHS
letters that had been handled according
to DHS’s guidelines.
b. No-Match Letters Are Legitimate
Indicators of Possible Illegal Work by
Unauthorized Aliens
DHS’s reasoned analysis on the
evidentiary value of SSA no-match
letters in the August 2007 Final Rule,
and in this supplemental rulemaking,
also includes the growing evidence and
consensus within and outside
government that SSN no-matches are a
legitimate indicator of possible illegal
work by unauthorized aliens. The SSA
Office of the Inspector General (SSA IG)
has reported, after reviewing earnings
suspense file data for tax years 1999–
2001, that fraudulent use of SSNs 1 was
widespread in the service, restaurant,
and agriculture industries and that such
fraud was a significant cause of SSA nomatches:
[OIG] identified various types of reporting
irregularities, such as invalid, unassigned
and duplicate SSNs and SSNs belonging to
young children and deceased individuals.
While we recognize there are legitimate
reasons why a worker’s name and SSN may
not match SSA files, such as a legal name
change, we believe the magnitude of
incorrect wage reporting is indicative of SSN
misuse. Employees and industry association
representatives acknowledged that
unauthorized noncitizens contribute to SSN
misuse.
Office of the Inspector General, Social
Security Administration, Social Security
Number Misuse in the Service,
Restaurant, and Agriculture Industries,
Report A–08–05–25023, at 2 (April
2005), Administrative Record at 456.
See generally Administrative Record at
35–661.
1 See
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
INA Section 274C, 8 U.S.C. 1324c.
28OCR1
63848
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
SSA no-match letters have also
formed a basis for multiple criminal
investigations by ICE and prosecutions
on charges of harboring or knowingly
hiring unauthorized aliens.2
DHS’s view—that no-match letters
regularly identify unauthorized alien
workers—was also overwhelmingly
affirmed by those who submitted
comments on the proposed rule in 2006.
See, e.g., Administrative Record at 866
(comment by U.S. Chamber of
Commerce: ‘‘It is estimated that
annually 500,000 essential workers
enter the U.S. to perform much needed
labor without work authorization. * * *
The proposed regulation will strip
needed workers from employers without
providing employers with an alternative
legal channel by which to recruit to fill
the gaps. * * *’’); id. at 874 (comment
by Essential Workers Immigration
Coalition including same statement); id.
at 850 (comment by National Federation
of Independent Business: ‘‘a substantial
number of workers identified by nomatch letters are undocumented
immigrants who are unable to provide
legitimate social security numbers’’); id.
at 858 (comment by Western Growers
opposing the rule on grounds that ‘‘it
would have a most devastating effect on
California and Arizona agriculture,
where an estimated 50 to 80 percent of
the workers who harvest fruit,
vegetables and other crops are illegal
immigrants’’); id. at 887 (comment by
American Immigration Lawyers
Association: ‘‘[T]he proposed regulation
admittedly will ‘smoke out’ many
unauthorized workers.’’); id. at 1306
(comment by National Council of
Agricultural Employers suggesting that,
as a conservative estimate, 76% of
agricultural workers are not authorized
to work in the United States, that
‘‘employers would likely lose a
significant part of their workforces,’’
2 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 2008 WL
160636 (N.D. Miss. No. 4:07-CR–140, Jan. 18, 2008)
(finding no-match letters admissible at trial, and
upholding a search warrant obtained on the basis
of information, including copies of social security
no-match letters, received from a confidential
informant, treating no-match letters as
‘‘documentary evidence supporting the allegation’’
of the confidential informant); United States v.
Fenceworks, Inc., No. 3:06–CR–2604 (S.D. Cal.),
D.E. 16 (judgment of probation and forfeiture of
$4,700,000 in case involving multiple Social
Security no-match letters) (related cases Nos. 3:06–
CR–2605 (probation and fine of $100,000); 3:06–
CR–2606 (probation and fine of $200,000)); United
States v. Insolia, No. 1:07–CR–10251 (D. Mass), D.E.
1 (complaint; attachment, ¶¶ 25–32, February 2007
probable cause affidavit detailing history of
employer’s no-match letters from 2002 through
2005 and other investigative methods and facts); 34
(indictment); United States v. Rice, No. 1:07–CR–
109 (N.D.N.Y), D.E. 1 (complaint; attached probable
cause affidavit) (¶¶ 64–66, detailing results of
matching analysis and SSA letters received by
defendant’s employer), D.E. 17 (plea agreement).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
and that ‘‘a substantial number of
workers would not return to work’’
when faced with the requirement to
verify work authorization ‘‘because they
would be unable to do so’’). See also
AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, 552 F.Supp.2d at
1008 (‘‘th[e] Court cannot agree with
plaintiffs’’ fundamental premise that a
no-match letter can never trigger
constructive knowledge, regardless of
the circumstances’’).
c. SSA’s Procedures Better Target NoMatch Letters to Employers With
Potential Workforce Problems
SSA’s criteria for sending employer
no-match letters also inform DHS’s
position in the August 2007 Final Rule
and in this supplementary rulemaking.
SSA does not send employer no-match
letters to every employer with a nomatch. Instead, SSA sends letters only
when an employer submits a wage
report reflecting at least 11 workers with
no-matches, and when the total number
of no-matches in a given wage report
represents more than 0.5% of the
employer’s total Forms W–2 in the
report.
In addition, SSA has continued to
refine the wage reporting process in
ways that help to reduce administrative
error resulting in a no-match letter.
Employers filing more than 250 Forms
W–2 are required to file electronically
(see 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(A); 20 CFR
422.114; 26 CFR 301.6011–2), and
electronic filing of Forms W–2 has risen
from 53% of all employee reports in
FY2003 to over 80% in FY2007—a 51%
increase.3 This direct electronic filing
substantially reduces the likelihood that
SSA errors—such as during data entry
of the information submitted on a paper
Form W–2—would result in
discrepancies in the wage reports.
Employers also have access to SSA’s
system for identifying name-SSN
mismatches at the time they file the
wage reports. That system can only be
used to verify current or former
employees and only for wage reporting
(Form W–2) purposes. Employers who
use SSA’s system are able to eliminate
most no-matches in their reports and
thereby significantly reduce their
likelihood of receiving a no-match
letter.
DHS is also aware that SSA has
developed a series of computerized
error-checking routines to resolve
certain common errors that result in
unmatched name and SSN. These
routines resolve name discrepancies
caused by misspellings, typographical
3 Social Security Administration, Performance
and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2007 at 67–
8.
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
errors, first name and last name
transpositions, and female surname
changes (e.g. marriage or divorce). They
can also resolve discrepancies from the
use of a derivative nickname instead of
a proper name or from scrambling
compound or hyphenated surnames.
The routines can also resolve SSN
discrepancies such as numerical
transpositions.
GAO has reported that approximately
60 percent of no-matches in recent tax
years’ wage reports are corrected by
SSA’s algorithms. See Government
Accountability Office, Social Security:
Better Coordination among Federal
Agencies Could Reduce Unidentified
Earnings Reports (GAO Report 05–154,
2005), Administrative Record at 400.
See also Office of the Inspector General,
Social Security Administration,
Effectiveness of the Single Select Edit
Routine (Audit Report A–03–07–17065,
Sept. 2007). While these routines cannot
resolve all discrepancies, they reduce
the number of inadvertent no-matches
that are reported to employers.
DHS believes that, taken together,
these efforts better direct no-match
letters to employers that have
potentially significant problems with
their employees’ work authorization.
Employers with stray mistakes or de
minimis inaccuracies are much less
likely to receive no-match letters.
d. The Longstanding Principle That
Employers May Be Liable for INA
Violations Based on Constructive
Knowledge
Both pre-existing regulations and
consistent case law demonstrate that an
employer can be found to have violated
INA section 274A(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
1324a(a)(2), by having constructive
rather than actual knowledge that an
employee is unauthorized to work. The
concept of constructive knowledge
appeared in the first regulation that
defined ‘‘knowing’’ for purposes of INA
section 274a, 8 CFR 274A.1(l)(1) (1990);
55 FR 25928 (June 25, 1990). As noted
in the preamble to the original
regulation, that definition of knowledge
is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879
F.2d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that, after receiving information that
employees were suspected of having
presented false documents to show
work authorization, the employer had
constructive knowledge of unauthorized
status because the employer failed to
make inquiries or take appropriate
corrective action). See also New El Rey
Sausage Co. v. INS, 925 F.2d 1153, 1158
(9th Cir. 1991).
The rulemaking record demonstrates
that employers have continued to
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
demand clear guidance on appropriately
responding to SSA no-match letters,
consistent with their obligations under
the INA. It also demonstrates a wellestablished consensus that the
appearance of employees’ SSNs on an
SSA no-match letter may indicate lack
of work authorization. The record also
shows that SSA’s practices in generating
no-match letters helps to focus those
letters on employers that, in DHS’s
view, have non-trivial levels of
employees with SSN mismatches in
their workforce, and existing law clearly
establishes that employers may be
charged with constructive knowledge
when they fail to conduct further
inquiries in the face of information that
would lead a person exercising
reasonable care to learn of an
employee’s unauthorized status.
This reasoned analysis supports
DHS’s position in the August 2007 Final
Rule—that an employer’s failure to
conduct reasonable due diligence upon
receipt of an SSA no-match letter can,
in the totality of the circumstances,
establish constructive knowledge of an
employee’s unauthorized status.
Assuming, as did the district court, that
this position constituted a change from
prior statements in informal agency
correspondence, DHS has now provided
additional—and sufficient—reasoned
analysis to support that change.
3. Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the
INA
The preamble to the August 2007
Final Rule said that employers that
adopt the rule’s safe harbor procedures
to verify employees’ identity and work
authorization must apply them
uniformly to all employees who appear
on employer no-match letters. Failure to
do so, the preamble warned, may violate
the INA’s anti-discrimination
provisions. The preamble further noted
that employers that follow the safe
harbor procedures uniformly and
without regard to perceived national
origin or citizenship status will not be
found to have engaged in unlawful
discrimination. 72 FR 45613–14. The
DHS insert prepared to accompany the
no-match letter had similar language.
AFL–CIO v. Chertoff, D.E. 7, Exh. C.
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007).
The district court questioned DHS’s
authority to offer what the court viewed
as interpretations, rather than mere
restatements, of settled antidiscrimination law, noting that DOJ, not
DHS, has authority for interpretation
and enforcement of the INA’s antidiscrimination provisions. The court
concluded that DHS appeared to have
exceeded its authority. 552 F.Supp.2d at
1011.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
DHS recognizes the jurisdiction of
DOJ over enforcement of the antidiscrimination provisions in section
274B of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1324b). As
stated in the preamble to the August
2007 Final Rule, ‘‘DOJ—through its
Office of Special Counsel for
Immigration-Related Unfair
Employment Practices—is responsible
for enforcing the anti-discrimination
provisions of section 274B of the INA,
8 U.S.C. 1324b.’’ 72 FR 45,614. The
August 2007 Final Rule also stated that
DHS’s rule ‘‘does not affect * * * the
authority of DOJ to enforce the antidiscrimination provisions of the INA or
adjudicate notices of intent to fine
employers.’’ Id. DHS does not have the
authority to obligate the DOJ or the
Office of Special Counsel, and the
August 2007 Final Rule did not purport
to make any such obligation. Whether
an employer has engaged in unlawful
discrimination in violation of INA 274B
is a determination that is made by DOJ
through the Office of Special Counsel. A
statement by one agency about the
authority of another agency does not, in
and of itself, encroach on the authority
of that other agency, and DHS’s
statements in the August 2007 Final
Rule were reviewed through an
interagency process that was created to
improve the internal management of the
Executive Branch. Executive Order
12866, 58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), as
amended by Executive Order 13258, 67
FR 9385 (Feb. 28, 2002), as amended by
Executive Order 13422, 72 FR 2763 (Jan.
23, 2007).
Nevertheless, in light of the district
court’s concerns, DHS rescinds the
statements in the preamble of the
August 2007 Final Rule discussing the
potential for anti-discrimination
liability faced by employers that follow
the safe harbor procedures set forth in
the August 2007 Final Rule.4 DHS has
also revised the language in its insert
letter that will accompany the SSA nomatch letters. These changes do not
alter existing law or require any change
to the rule text.
DHS recognizes the concerns raised
by commenters that discrimination
litigation may be brought against them.
As expressed by one commenter:
One of the greatest potential costs faced by
employers as a result of this rulemaking is
the increased likelihood of discrimination
lawsuits brought about by the required
termination of employees who cannot resolve
‘‘mismatches.’’ DHS’ retraction of the
4 For example, DHS rescinds conclusive
statements from the preamble of the August 2007
Final Rule such as ‘‘employers who follow the safe
harbor procedures * * * will not be found to have
engaged in unlawful discrimination.’’ 73 FR at
15950, citing 72 FR 45613–14.
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
63849
assurances it attempted to provide in the
proposed rule only increases the uncertainty
that employers face. Moreover, even
meritless claims brought by terminated
employees will require significant expenses
in legal fees and related costs to defend, and
unless DHS can remove jurisdiction in all
courts in which such actions might be
brought, it cannot prevent these expenses.
Our reality is that we will be ‘‘attacked’’ by
numerous organizations * * * as we have
been in the past.
ICEB–2006–0004–0498.1 at 1–2
(emphasis in original); see also ICEB–
2006–0004–0571.1 at 2; ICEB–2006–
0004–0679.1 at 2.
While DHS lacks the authority to
announce interpretations of the antidiscrimination provisions of the INA,
DOJ possesses such authority, and
persons seeking guidance regarding
employers’ anti-discrimination
obligations in following the safe harbor
procedures in the August 2007 Final
Rule, as modified by this supplemental
rulemaking, should follow the direction
provided by DOJ published in today’s
edition of the Federal Register, and
available on the Web site of the Office
of Special Counsel for ImmigrationRelated Unfair Employment Practices, at
https://www.usdoj.gov/crt/osc/htm/
Nomatch032008.htm. Employers may
also seek advice on a case-by-case basis
through OSC’s toll-free employer
hotline: 1–800–255-8155. The
Department continues to urge employers
to apply the safe harbor procedures in
this rule to all employees referenced in
an SSA no-match letter or a DHS notice
uniformly and without regard to
perceived national origin or citizenship
status.
4. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
In its decision enjoining
implementation of the August 2007
Final Rule, the district court construed
the safe harbor in the rule as effectively
creating compliance obligations for
employers that received no-match
letters. Doubting the voluntary nature of
the safe harbor rule, the court found it
likely that small businesses would incur
significant costs to enter the safe harbor:
Because failure to comply subjects’
employers to the threat of civil and criminal
liability, the regulation is the practical
equivalent of a rule that obliges an employer
to comply or to suffer the consequences; the
voluntary form of the rule is but a veil for
the threat it obscures. The rule as good as
mandates costly compliance with a new 90day timeframe for resolving mismatches.
Accordingly, there are serious questions
whether DHS violated the RFA by refusing to
conduct a final flexibility analysis.
552 F.Supp.2d at 1013 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). In
light of the district court’s conclusion
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
63850
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
that a regulatory flexibility analysis
would likely be required, DHS
published an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis (IRFA) in the
supplemental proposed rule, 73 FR at
15952–54, and placed on the docket for
public comment the Small Entity Impact
Analysis, Supplemental Proposed Rule:
Safe Harbor Procedures for Employers
Who Receive a No-Match Letter, ICEB–
2006–0004–0233 (hereinafter, the
‘‘SEIA’’).
DHS continues to view the August
2007 Final Rule and this supplemental
rule as interpretive, and does not
believe that these rulemakings bear any
of the hallmarks of a legislative rule. See
Hemp Industries Ass’n v. Drug
Enforcement Admin., 333 F.3d 1082,
1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (identifying three
circumstances in which a rule is
legislative); Syncore Int’l Corp. v.
Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(interpretive rule ‘‘typically reflects an
agency’s construction of a statute that
has been entrusted to the agency to
administer’’ and a statement of policy
‘‘represents an agency position with
respect to how it will treat—typically
enforce—the governing legal norm. By
issuing a policy statement, an agency
simply lets the public know its current
enforcement or adjudicatory
approach.’’). DHS is not invoking its
legislative rulemaking authority to
mandate a specific action upon a certain
event. Instead, this rulemaking informs
the public of DHS’s interpretation of
Section 274A of the INA and describes
how DHS will exercise its discretion in
enforcing the INA’s prohibition on
knowing employment of unauthorized
aliens. Although the district court
questioned whether DHS has changed
its position on the evidentiary force of
no-match letters in enforcement
proceedings against employers, neither
the August 2007 Final Rule nor this
supplemental rulemaking departs from
any prior legislative rule. See Oregon v.
Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1134 (9th Cir.
2004). As noted above, the only record
of the agency’s previous position lies in
correspondence between the agency and
individuals and employers seeking
advice on specific questions.
Thus, although DHS continues to
believe that the Regulatory Flexibility
Act does not mandate the analysis that
has been undertaken here, see Central
Texas Tel. Coop. v. FCC, 402 F.3d 205,
214 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the Department
provided an IRFA and supporting
economic analysis, and has now
prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (FRFA) in response to the
district court’s concerns.
As the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has noted, the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
‘‘imposes no substantive requirements
on an agency; rather, its requirements
are ‘purely procedural’ in nature. * * *
To satisfy the RFA, an agency must only
demonstrate a ‘reasonable, good-faith
effort’ to fulfill its requirements.’’
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund
v. USDA, 415 F.3d 1078, 1101 (9th Cir.
2005). See also Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA,
344 F.3d 832, 879 (9th Cir. 2003) (‘‘Like
the Notice and Comment process
required in administrative rulemaking
by the APA, the analyses required by
the RFA are essentially procedural
hurdles; after considering the relevant
impacts and alternatives, an
administrative agency remains free to
regulate as it sees fit.’’).
The RFA, by definition, does not
apply to individuals. Where it applies,
the RFA requires agencies to analyze the
impact of rulemaking on ‘‘small
entities.’’ Small entities include small
businesses, not-for-profit organizations
that are independently owned and
operated and are not dominant in their
fields, and governmental jurisdictions
with populations of less than 50,000.
5 U.S.C. 601(3), (5)–(6). Small
businesses are defined in regulations
promulgated by the Small Business
Administration. 13 CFR 121.201.
The RFA provides that an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA)
shall contain:
(1) A description of the reasons why action
by the agency is being considered;
(2) A succinct statement of the objectives
of, and legal basis for, the proposed rule;
(3) A description of and, where feasible, an
estimate of the number of small entities to
which the proposed rule will apply;
(4) A description of the projected reporting,
recordkeeping and other compliance
requirements of the proposed rule, including
an estimate of the classes of small entities
which will be subject to the requirement and
the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record;
(5) An identification, to the extent
practicable, of all relevant Federal rules
which may duplicate, overlap or conflict
with the proposed rule.
5 U.S.C. 603(b). Furthermore, an IRFA
must also contain:
a description of any significant alternatives
to the proposed rule which accomplish the
stated objectives of applicable statutes and
which minimize any significant economic
impact of the proposed rule on small entities.
Consistent with the stated objectives of
applicable statutes, the analysis shall discuss
significant alternatives such as—
(1) The establishment of differing
compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the
resources available to small entities;
(2) The clarification, consolidation, or
simplification of compliance and reporting
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
requirements under the rule for such small
entities;
(3) The use of performance rather than
design standards; and
(4) An exemption from coverage of the
rule, or any part thereof, for such small
entities.
5 U.S.C. 603(c). The RFA does not
require that these elements be
considered in a specific manner,
following a prescribed formula or
content. Given the nature of rulemaking,
and its diversity, agencies develop
IRFAs in a manner consistent with the
statute and the rulemaking itself.5
The IRFA provided with the
supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking contained the elements
listed in 5 U.S.C. 603(b) as well as the
discussion of significant regulatory
alternatives required by 5 U.S.C. 603(c).
The supplemental proposed rule
explicitly requested comments on the
economic aspects of the analysis and on
the discussion of regulatory alternatives.
Publication of the supplemental
proposed rule received significant
media coverage. The U.S. Small
Business Administration Office of
Advocacy (Advocacy) hosted a small
business roundtable shortly after
publication of the supplemental
proposed rule to collect comments from
interested small businesses and
submitted a public comment letter
based on this input. The comments
provided by Advocacy are addressed in
the analysis below. As noted above, the
supplemental proposed rule and
accompanying IRFA received nearly
3,000 comments from the public,
including a significant number of
comments specifically addressing the
IRFA and the underlying SEIA.
DHS has reviewed the comments
received on the IRFA and has concluded
that the IRFA complied with the
statutory standards for such an analysis
and provided the public sufficient
information to submit informed
comments regarding the possible impact
of this rule.
5 The Small Business Administration had
provided additional guidance. See Office of
Advocacy, Small Business Administration, A Guide
for Government Agencies: How to Comply with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (2003). It states, in
pertinent part:
The RFA requires agencies to conduct sufficient
analyses to measure and consider the regulatory
impacts of the rule to determine whether there will
be a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. No single definition can
apply to all rules, given the dynamics of the
economy and changes that are constantly occurring
in the structure of small-entity sectors.
Every rule is different. The level, scope, and
complexity of analysis may vary significantly
depending on the characteristics and composition
of the industry or small entity sectors to be
regulated.
Id. at 14.
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
In light of comments that identified
plausible regulatory alternatives or areas
needing further clarification or
adjustments in the economic model
underlying the SEIA, DHS has revised
the analysis and assembled a FRFA. The
RFA requires that a FRFA contain:
(1) A succinct statement of the need for,
and objectives of, the rule;
(2) A summary of the significant issues
raised by the public comments in response to
the initial regulatory flexibility analysis, a
summary of the assessment of the agency of
such issues, and a statement of any changes
made in the proposed rule as a result of such
comments;
(3) A description of and an estimate of the
number of small entities to which the rule
will apply or an explanation of why no such
estimate is available;
(4) A description of the projected reporting,
recordkeeping and other compliance
requirements of the rule, including an
estimate of the classes of small entities which
will be subject to the requirement and the
type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record; and
(5) A description of the steps the agency
has taken to minimize the significant
economic impact on small entities consistent
with the stated objectives of applicable
statutes, including a statement of the factual,
policy, and legal reasons for selecting the
alternative adopted in the final rule and why
each one of the other significant alternatives
to the rule considered by the agency which
affect the impact on small entities was
rejected.
5 U.S.C. 604(a). The discussion below
and in the final SEIA on the docket
addresses specific comments received
on the IRFA and, together with the
FRFA summarized in this supplemental
final rule, provides the statutorily
required agency assessment of
comments received, projections of the
number of affected small entities,
description of the anticipated reporting
and compliance burdens, and
discussion of steps taken to limit any
impact of the rule on small entities. In
this way, DHS has ‘‘demonstrated a
‘reasonable, good-faith effort’ to fulfill’’
the procedural and substantive
requirements of the RFA.
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
III. Public Comments and Responses
A. Authority To Promulgate the Rule
A number of commenters challenged
DHS’s authority to promulgate this rule.
DHS has reanalyzed its jurisdiction and
authority in light of these comments,
and concludes that it has the necessary
authority to promulgate this final rule.
Several commenters suggested that
the rule imposes an affirmative due
diligence obligation on employers that
does not exist in the INA once
employers complete the Form I–9
process. As is explained in section II.C,
supra, the INA’s prohibition on
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
‘‘knowing’’ hiring or continued
employment of unauthorized workers
extends to employers that have
constructive knowledge that an
employee is unauthorized to work. The
concept of constructive knowledge
appeared in the first regulation that
defined ‘‘knowing’’ for purposes of INA
section 274a, 8 CFR 274A.1(l)(1) (1990);
55 FR 25,928. As noted in the preamble
to that original regulation, that
definition of knowledge is consistent
with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561,
567 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that when
an employer who received information
that some employees were suspected of
having presented a false document to
show work authorization, such
employer had constructive knowledge
of their unauthorized status when the
employer failed to make any inquiries or
take appropriate corrective action). See
also New El Rey Sausage Co. v. INS, 925
F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1991).
Contrary to the apparent view of some
commenters, the INA does not absolve
employers of any further responsibility
once they have completed the initial
Form I–9 verification process. The
concept of constructive knowledge—
and employers’ responsibility to
conduct reasonable due diligence in
response to information that could lead
to knowledge of their employees’ illegal
status—flows from the INA as
interpreted in long-standing case law
and federal regulations; it is not an
invention of this rulemaking.
One commenter argued that the rule
would undercut the good faith
compliance defense available to
employers that complete the Form I–9
employment eligibility verification
process, and is therefore contrary to the
INA. DHS disagrees. The affirmative
defense the INA provides to employers
that comply with the Form I–9 process
in good faith remains available as
protection against a charge of knowingly
hiring unauthorized employees in
violation of INA section 274A(a)(1)(A),
but it has no force, by the statute’s plain
language, as a defense against an
allegation of knowingly continuing to
employ an unauthorized alien in
violation of INA section 274A(a)(2).
This rulemaking explains the
evidentiary weight DHS may place on
SSA no-match letters and DHS suspect
document notices in identifying,
investigating, and prosecuting
employers suspected of continuing to
employ unauthorized aliens in violation
of section 274A(a)(2). The commenter’s
concern over the continuing viability of
the good faith I–9 compliance defense is
misplaced.
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
63851
One comment also suggested that
DHS could not promulgate this rule
because it violates the congressional
notification and review requirements of
INA section 274A(d)(3), 8 U.S.C.
1324a(d)(3). That section provides that
the President must notify Congress
before he may make any ‘‘changes in
(including additions to) the
requirements of subsection (b)’’ of INA
section 274A, which established the
I–9 employment verification system.
INA section 274A(d)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.
1324a(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
The August 2007 Final Rule instructs
employers that elect to follow the safe
harbor procedures set out in the rule to
confirm identity and work eligibility by
filling out a new Form I–9 for any
employees unable to resolve their
mismatch through the 90-day process.
This does not, however, constitute a
change to ‘‘the requirements of
subsection (b)’’ of INA section 274A.
The procedures of the safe harbor rule
are not a ‘‘requirement’’; employers are
encouraged to follow these procedures
to limit their legal risk, but they are not
compelled to do so. Moreover, while the
I–9 reverification option in the safe
harbor procedures is based on the I–9
process used at the time of hire, it is
neither part of, nor an addendum to, the
I–9 process that all employers must
follow at the time of hire. Rather, the
safe harbor rule helps employers to
avoid violating the prohibition against
knowingly continuing to employ
unauthorized workers. INA section
274A(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(a)(2).
B. ‘‘Reasoned Analysis’’ Supporting
Perceived Change in Policy Reflected in
the Final Rule
Many commenters argued that DHS
had not provided an adequate ‘‘reasoned
analysis’’ the district court suggested
was necessary to support the perceived
change in agency position. Several
comments suggested that DHS must
establish with certainty, or with some
degree of confidence beyond a rational
basis, that a Social Security no-match
letter establishes that the indicated
employee was an alien not authorized to
work in the United States. Some argued
that the rule would be arbitrary and
capricious unless DHS could refute the
claim ‘‘that the SSA database is not a
certain indicator of one’s right to work’’
in the United States. ICEB 2006–0004–
0732.1 at 3.
The comments suggesting that DHS
must base the rule on evidence that an
SSA no-match is near-conclusive proof
of a listed person’s illegal status
misunderstand the nature of this
rulemaking action. DHS has consistently
stated that an SSA no-match letter,
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
63852
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
standing alone, does not conclusively
establish that any employee identified
in the letter is an unauthorized alien.
Nor does an employer’s receipt of, and
response to, an SSA no-match letter
always prove that the employer had
constructive knowledge that any listed
employees were unauthorized to work
in the United States. Rather, this
rulemaking announces DHS’s view that
a no-match letter, and an employer’s
response to it, may be used as evidence,
evaluated in light of ‘‘the totality of the
circumstances,’’ of an employer’s
constructive knowledge. This
rulemaking also announces DHS’s
commitment that an employer that
follows the safe harbor procedures set
forth in the rule will always be found to
have responded reasonably to the nomatch letter.
As the district court noted in the
pending litigation, DHS does not claim,
and need not prove, that a no-match
letter will always be sufficient evidence
to demonstrate constructive knowledge:
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
The flaw in plaintiffs’ argument is their
assumption that receipt of a no-match letter
triggers a finding of constructive knowledge
in every instance. In fact, the regulation is
written such that whether an employer has
constructive knowledge depends ‘on the
totality of relevant circumstances.’
Depending on the circumstances, a court may
agree with plaintiffs that receipt of a nomatch letter has not put an employer on
notice that his employee is likely to be
unauthorized. But this Court cannot agree
with plaintiffs’ fundamental premise that a
no-match letter can never trigger constructive
knowledge, regardless of the circumstances.
552 F.Supp.2d at 1008.
This safe harbor rule is a rational
response to DHS’s regulatory finding
that a no-match letter can be evidence
of such knowledge—a finding amply
supported in record of this rulemaking
and fairly conceded even by the rule’s
opponents.
Some commenters argued that the
SSA database was fraught with errors,
and that even if SSA no-match letters
were an indicator of possible illegal
employment, they are too unreliable to
support the evidentiary weight DHS
seeks to place on them. DHS disagrees
with the commenters’ suggestion that
SSA’s records are so substantially
incorrect that DHS can not rely on nomatch letters generated from those
records. When attempting to post wages
to its Master Earnings File, SSA
compares the employee names and
SSNs provided by employers on Forms
W–2 to the names and SSNs recorded in
the Agency’s NUMIDENT file. ‘‘Nomatches’’ may result from the number
holder’s failure to provide SSA updated
information, such as a legal name
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
change resulting from marriage. Other
‘‘errors’’ result from typographical
mistakes annotated on the W–2s by
employers. These types of errors are
being reduced by a variety of
programmatic efforts, and, with direct
electronic reporting of over 80% of wage
data, the potential for errors resulting
from the government’s handling of the
information is reduced.6 As discussed
in more detail below, the effective
accuracy of the SSA data from which
no-match letters are derived is estimated
to be 99.5 percent. Moreover, as noted
above, DHS views SSA’s policy of
limiting issuance of no-match letters to
employers whose wage reports contain
a certain level of mismatches as a useful
means for separating employers whose
reports contain a certain non-trivial
number of errors that might reasonably
indicate possible illegal employment or
systematic problems in the employers’
recordkeeping from employers with
trivial errors in their wage reports.
Other commenters noted that the
supplemental proposed rule did not
explicitly limit the applicability of the
safe harbor procedures to the SSA’s
‘‘Employer Correction Request’’ or
‘‘EDCOR’’ letter. DHS is also aware that
the rule text does not explicitly identify
the ‘‘EDCOR’’ letter from SSA—
addressed to employers and containing
more than ten no-match social security
numbers—as the notice from SSA to
which the safe harbor procedures apply.
The rule text is written in general terms
to allow the safe harbor procedures to
apply to notices that SSA may issue in
the future. DHS has made it clear,
however, that the SSA notice to which
the safe harbor rule applies is the
‘‘EDCOR’’ letter listing multiple nomatches, rather than a ‘‘Request for
Employee Information’’ or ‘‘DECOR’’
letter identifying a single employee with
an SSN/name no-match. First, the text
of the rule clearly states that the
procedures may apply where an
employer receives ‘‘written notice to the
employer from the Social Security
Administration reporting earnings on a
Form W–2 that employees’ names and
corresponding social security account
numbers fail to match Social Security
Administration records.’’ The reference
to plural no-matches and to W–2 reports
distinguishes the ‘‘EDCOR’’ letters
addressed to employers that list
multiple no-matches from any notice
unrelated to a W–2 report or from
‘‘DECOR’’ letters addressed to a single
employee or to an employer regarding a
single no-match. Second, DHS
explained above and in the preamble to
6 Social Security Administration, Performance
and Accountability Report, supra n.2, at 190.
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
the supplemental proposed rule that the
letter listing multiple employees with
SSN and name no-matches is the notice
to which the rule’s safe harbor applies.
C. Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the
INA
A significant number of commenters
repeated concerns, previously
summarized and addressed in the
August 2007 Final Rule, that employers
would engage in illegal discrimination
in reaction to this rulemaking. Such
comments regarding the consistency of
this regulation with existing antidiscrimination law and regarding
employers’ continued antidiscrimination obligations were
addressed in detail in the August 2007
Final Rule, 72 FR at 45620–21, and DHS
declines to revisit those issues in this
supplementary rulemaking.
Other commenters objected to DHS’s
rescission of the statements in the
preamble to the August 2007 Final Rule
explaining that employers will not be
engaged in unlawful discrimination
under the anti-discrimination
provisions of the INA if they follow the
safe harbor procedures uniformly for all
employees, without regard to perceived
national origin or citizenship. In their
view, the removal of those assurances
greatly reduced the value of the safe
harbor being offered in this rule, and left
employers exposed to potential
litigation accusing them of illegal
discrimination as a result of their efforts
to follow the safe harbor procedures set
forth in this rulemaking.
DHS agrees that guidance on antidiscrimination compliance is important
to the successful implementation of the
safe harbor procedures. As DHS noted
in the August 2007 Final Rule, the
Department of Justice is responsible for
enforcing the anti-discrimination
provisions of the INA. DHS believes that
the commenters’ concerns are addressed
in the anti-discrimination guidance
from the DOJ Office of Special Counsel
published in today’s edition of the
Federal Register.
D. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Commenters were divided on whether
an initial regulatory flexibility analysis,
and by implication a final regulatory
flexibility analysis, was required. In
light of the district court’s conclusion
that a regulatory flexibility analysis
would likely be required, DHS has
conducted such an analysis, supported
by the small entity impact analysis
(SEIA) accompanying this rulemaking.
Both are summarized in greater detail in
Section V.B.
The bulk of the comments regarding
the RFA argued that the analysis in the
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
IRFA and in the SEIA was flawed.
Commenters argued that the scope of
the analysis conducted by DHS was too
narrow, that the analysis incorrectly
omitted certain costs from the equation,
or that the analysis was based on
inaccurate assumptions about the
behavior of employers and employees
that might be impacted by the rule.
These comments regarding the SEIA and
IRFA are addressed below.
1. Scope of Regulatory Flexibility Act
Review
A number of commenters conflated
the requirements of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
(RFA), with the requirements of other
statutory and administrative reviews.
For example, commenters suggested that
the RFA analysis should include
reviews called for by the Congressional
Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801, the federal
data quality standards guidelines,
Executive Order 12866, and other
statutes and executive orders. No law
requires that DHS combine all of the
elements of these separate reviews, and
DHS declines to do so.
One commenter conceded that these
additional reviews are not required by
the RFA:
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
The DHS Safe-Harbor Rule IRFA presents
estimates of costs to employers associated
with following the safe-harbor procedures set
forth in the proposed rule. It excludes certain
costs that are not cognizable under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act but are crucial for
estimating the full social impact of the rule—
most notably, costs borne by employees.
These costs are not exempt from being
counted under Executive Order 12,866 or the
Congressional Review Act.
ICEB–2006–0004–0637.1 at 4.
Notwithstanding this admission, the
commenter repeatedly drew from
standards outside the RFA to criticize
the content of the IRFA. The law is clear
that no other analysis is bootstrapped
into the RFA. It is the case that the RFA
permits agencies to prepare IRFAs in
conjunction with, or as a part of, other
analyses required by law, so long as the
RFA’s requirements are satisfied. 5
U.S.C. 605(a) (‘‘Any Federal agency may
perform the analyses required by [the
RFA] in conjunction with or as a part of
any other agenda or analysis required by
any other law if such other analysis
satisfies the provisions of such
sections.’’) The fact that the RFA’s
requirements may be managed through
other analyses, however, does not
expand the requirements of the RFA or
compel agencies to conduct such other
analyses as part of an IRFA or a FRFA.
These analyses are not required by the
RFA, nor are they, for the reasons set
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
63853
forth below, mandated for this rule
under any other provision of law.
its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers
or employees, or any other person.
a. Executive Order 12866 and OMB
Circular A–4
(emphasis added). The internal,
managerial nature of this and other
similarly-worded Executive Orders has
been recognized by the courts, and
actions taken by an agency to comply
with the Executive Order are not subject
to judicial review. Cal-Almond, Inc. v.
USDA, 14 F.3d 429, 445 (9th Cir. 1993)
(citing Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d
176, 187 (6th Cir. 1986)).
Executive Order No. 12866, 58 FR
51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), as amended by
Executive Order 13258, 67 FR 9385
(Feb. 28, 2002), as amended by
Executive Order 13422, 72 FR 2763 (Jan.
23, 2007), directs agencies subordinate
to the President to assess all costs and
benefits of available regulatory
alternatives and, when regulation is
necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety,
and other advantages, distributive
impacts, and equity). In implementing
Executive Order 12866, the Office of
Management and Budget has provided
further internal guidance to agencies
through OMB Circular A–4 (Sept. 17,
2003), found at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/
a004/a-4.pdf. OMB Circular A–4 states
that it ‘‘is designed to assist analysts in
the regulatory agencies by defining good
regulatory analysis * * * and
standardizing the way benefits and costs
of Federal regulatory actions are
measured and reported.’’ OMB Circular
A–4, at 3.
Executive Order 12866 is an exercise
of the President’s authority to manage
the Executive Branch of the United
States under Article II of the
Constitution. The implementation of the
Executive Orders and OMB Circulars,
and other internal guidance, is a matter
of Executive Branch consideration and
discretion. The Executive Branch may
utilize its standards under Executive
Order 12866 in analyzing regulations
under the RFA because the standards of
the RFA and Executive Order 12866 do
not conflict, but the RFA does not
require use of those standards internal
to the Executive Branch. The comments
invoking Executive Order 12866 and
OMB Circular A–4 standards to identify
alleged deficiencies in the IRFA are
therefore misplaced.
The fact that preparation of a
regulatory impact analysis (RIA) under
Executive Order 12866 is a matter of
Executive Branch discretion is
underscored by the terms of Executive
Order 12866, section 11:
Nothing in this Executive order shall affect
any otherwise available judicial review of
agency action. This Executive order is
intended only to improve the internal
management of the Federal Government and
does not create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
or equity by a party against the United States,
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
b. Congressional Review Act
Some comments argued that this rule
is a ‘‘major rule’’ for purposes of the
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801
(CRA). The CRA delays implementation,
and provides a mechanism for
congressional disapproval, of
regulations designated as ‘‘major rules’’
by the Administrator of the Office of
Management and Budget. Such a
designation is made where OMB finds
the rule has resulted in or is likely to
result in (a) An annual effect on the
economy of $100,000,000 or more; (b) a
major increase in costs or prices for
consumers, individual industries,
Federal, State, or local government
agencies, or geographic regions; or (c)
significant adverse effects on
competition, employment, investment,
productivity, innovation, or on the
ability of United States-based
enterprises to compete with foreignbased enterprises in domestic and
export markets. 5 U.S.C. 804(2).
Determinations by OMB under the CRA
are not subject to judicial review. 5
U.S.C. 805. OMB has not determined
that this rule is a major rule and,
therefore, the CRA does not apply.
2. Direct and Indirect Impact
A number of comments on the
supplemental proposed rule objected
that the cost estimates presented in the
IRFA did not include estimates for costs
other than for direct compliance with
the rule. Examples of costs commenters
urged DHS to take into account
included potential lost wages for
individuals who take time away from
work to visit an SSA office or another
government office to resolve the nomatch, travel expenses for employees
attempting to resolve a no-match, and
other costs incurred by employers, such
as legal fees associated with lawsuits
that could be filed by work-authorized
employees terminated in response to a
no-match letter.
In addition, many commenters
suggested that DHS’s RFA analysis
should include a number of other
general indirect costs that allegedly
could be borne by society in general—
higher cost of food resulting from the
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
63854
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
disruption of the agricultural labor force
where illegal employment is common,
depressed wages from employers
shifting from direct employment to
greater reliance on temporary
employment agencies, social and
economic cost of unauthorized workers
becoming unemployed, general impact
of the rule on the ‘‘macro economy,’’
economic impact of employers moving
operations to Mexico or other foreign
countries in search of reduced labor
costs and less regulation, and possible
growth in the underground economy
and reduction in tax revenues.
DHS disagrees. All of these comments
overstate the scope of the costs that are
to be considered under the RFA. The
RFA requires consideration only of the
direct costs of a regulation on a small
entity that is required to comply with
the regulation. Mid-Tex Electric Coop. v.
FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 340–343 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (holding indirect impact of a
regulation on small entities that do
business with or are otherwise
dependent on the regulated entities not
considered in RFA analyses). See also
Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA,
255 F.3d 855, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (In
passing the RFA, ‘‘Congress did not
intend to require that every agency
consider every indirect effect that any
regulation might have on small
businesses in any stratum of the
national economy * * * [T]o require an
agency to assess the impact on all of the
nation’s small businesses possibly
affected by a rule would be to convert
every rulemaking process into a massive
exercise in economic modeling, an
approach we have already rejected.’’).
No judicial precedent supports the
commenters’ view that indirect
economic or social impacts must be
considered under the RFA. These costs
can be considered under other analyses
and reviews that DHS and other
agencies may conduct in reaching
decisions on regulatory matters, but
they fall outside the RFA. See, e.g.,
Regulatory Flexibility Improvements
Act, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Commercial and Administrative
Law, Committee on the Judiciary, on
H.R. 682, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2006),
at 13 (Statement of Thomas Sullivan,
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small
Business Administration, criticizing the
RFA by noting that ‘‘the RFA * * *
does not require agencies to analyze
indirect impacts.’’).
3. Baseline Costs, Unauthorized Alien
Workers, and the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986
A number of commenters asserted
that DHS should include in the IRFA
and FRFA the cost of firing
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
unauthorized alien workers and
replacing those unauthorized alien
workers who voluntarily resign or are
terminated by employers when the
workers are unable to confirm their
identity and work authorization in
accordance with the safe harbor
procedures in this rule. In particular
commenters criticized the exclusion
from the IRFA of the costs of complying
with section 274A(a)(2) of the INA. That
section provides:
It is unlawful for a person or other entity
* * * to continue to employ [an] alien in the
United States knowing the alien is (or has
become) an unauthorized alien with respect
to such employment.
The commenters suggested that the cost
of terminating and replacing workers
who an employer learns are not
authorized to work in the United States
should be accounted for as a cost of the
rule, since that knowledge (or
constructive knowledge) results from
the no-match letters, and the
termination and replacement costs must
be borne regardless of whether they are
counted as a cost of the INA or of the
rule. These comments fundamentally
misunderstand the requirements of the
RFA, as well as the INA’s longstanding
prohibition against employment of
unauthorized aliens.
The RFA explicitly requires DHS to
‘‘describe the impact of the proposed
rule on small entities’’ in an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis. 5 U.S.C.
603(a) (emphasis added). The Act also
states that a final regulatory flexibility
analysis ‘‘shall contain * * * a
description of the projected reporting,
recordkeeping and other compliance
requirements of the rule.’’ 5 U.S.C.
604(a)(4) (emphasis added). The RFA
does not require that DHS analyze the
impact of the underlying statutory
provisions in either the initial or final
regulatory flexibility analysis. And it
would be particularly irrational to do so
here, since termination and replacement
costs are already being incurred by
employers attempting to comply with
the INA even before this safe harbor rule
goes into effect. The comments
themselves make this clear: such
terminations have been documented
since at least 2003—three years before
this rule was first proposed. C. Mehta,
N. Theodore & M. Hincapie, supra, at
13–14, Administrative Record at 327–8
(approximately 53.6 percent of surveyed
employers terminated workers with
listed no-matches). See also ICEB–2006–
0004–0688.1 at 2 (‘‘To date, the misuse
of SSA’s no-match letters by employers
has already resulted in countless, unjust
suspensions and/or firings of low-wage,
immigrant workers’’); ICEB–2006–0004–
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
0652.1 at 8 (comment by NFIB, citing
Mehta, Theodore & Hincapie, supra.).
As DHS explained in the
supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking, the Immigration and
Nationality Act expressly prohibits
employers from knowingly hiring or
knowingly continuing to employ an
alien who is not authorized to work in
the United States. INA section
274A(a)(1), (2), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(a)(1), (2).
Employers that have actual or
constructive knowledge of their
employees’ illegal work status are
statutorily obligated to cease their
employment, and any costs that result
are attributable to the INA, not to this
safe harbor rule.
While the cost of terminating or
replacing unauthorized workers cannot
properly be considered a cost of this
rule, some turnover involving legal
workers that are unable or unwilling to
resolve their mismatches through the
procedures outlined in this rule could
be counted as a cost of the rule for any
employer that elects to follow the safe
harbor procedures. Such turnover costs
for legal workers were estimated in the
IRFA, and are discussed in more detail
below.
Several comments also suggested that
employers may summarily discharge
workers rather than giving them an
opportunity to correct records, and
argued that the impact on workauthorized employees who leave their
jobs or are terminated by their
employers should be included in the
RFA analysis as a cost of the rule. As
mentioned above, the RFA instructs
agencies to examine costs and impacts
to ‘‘small entities’’—defined by statute
as ‘‘hav[ing] the same meaning as the
terms ‘small business,’ ‘small
organization’ and ‘small governmental
jurisdiction’ ’’—and which does not
include individuals. Therefore, the
commenters misread the RFA. We also
note that, if an employer were to
summarily terminate legal workers, the
impact on such workers would be
caused not by the rule but by their
employer’s violation of the safe harbor
procedures. Any legal workers who
choose not to correct their records
would effectively be voluntarily
resigning, perhaps calculating that the
opportunity cost of correcting their
records was greater than the cost of
finding alternate work.
4. Variability of SSA Criteria for Issuing
No-Match Letters
A number of commenters suggested
that the criteria used by SSA in
determining whether to issue a nomatch letter was subject to future
change, and that increased costs could
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
be incurred if SSA issues more nomatch letters. DHS recognizes that the
impact on small entities could vary if
SSA alters its matching processes or
changes its criteria for issuing no-match
letters. But the RFA does not require
DHS to speculate about every
contingency that could have some
impact on small entities, such as the
potential for another agency to exercise
its discretion differently. Since DHS is
unaware of any plans to change SSA’s
policies for issuing ‘‘EDCOR’’ no-match
letters, any attempt in the IRFA or FRFA
to analyze hypothetical changes in SSA
policy would be mere speculation.
Some commenters also suggested that
the IRFA and FRFA must cover
historical data to account for the
existing variability in the number of nomatch letters issued from year to year,
even absent any change to SSA’s
policies on issuing no-match letters.
While such variability exists, it is
largely irrelevant to the calculation
under the FRA of the ‘‘impact’’ that may
result to an average ‘‘small entity’’ that
chooses to follow the safe harbor
procedures in the rule. Changes in the
number of no-match letters sent to
employers in a given year may change
the aggregate costs incurred by all
employers that choose to follow the safe
harbor procedures, but DHS has no data
(and commenters have provided none)
that would lead DHS to conclude that
such variations would alter either the
share of all no-match letters in a given
year that would be received by small
entities or the impact felt by a specific
small entity that receives a no-match
letter and decides to follow the safe
harbor procedures. DHS’s reliance on
2007 statistics regarding employers
whose reports would have generated nomatch letters for the analysis in the
IRFA and SEIA was reasonable.
5. Base Assumptions Made in the IRFA
and SEIA
A number of commenters disagreed
with assumptions made in the IRFA and
SEIA regarding the impact of the rule on
small entities. DHS sought to catalog all
of the assumptions underlying the
analysis to make the methodology,
calculations, and findings of the SEIA
transparent, reproducible, and
accessible for public review and
comment. One commenter catalogued
over thirty assumptions underlying the
economic analysis provided by DHS,
and noted that even this list was a
subset of the analytical assumptions
openly disclosed by DHS. See ICEB–
2006–0004–07321.1 at 23–25.
Notwithstanding DHS’s transparency
about the analytical underpinnings of its
analysis, commenters who objected to
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
the substance of DHS’s assumptions
provided little information to call into
question the reasonableness of those
assumptions or even to assist DHS to
evaluate the strength of the commenters’
objections.
The analysis required by the
Regulatory Flexibility Act need not
produce statistical certainty; the law
requires that the DHS ‘‘demonstrate a
‘reasonable, good-faith effort’ to fulfill
[the RFA’s] requirements.’’ Ranchers
Cattlemen Action Legal Fund, 415 F.3d
at 1101. See also Associated Fisheries of
Maine v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 114–15
(1st Cir. 1997). The IRFA and SEIA
produced by DHS in this rulemaking
meet that standard. The assumptions
underlying the SEIA are reasonable, and
DHS has utilized the best data available
to produce the IRFA and the SEIA.
Where data was unavailable, DHS
consistently made analytically
conservative assumptions regarding the
cost to employers that choose to follow
the safe harbor procedures in this rule.
With one exception, the public
comments did not provide better data or
identify additional sources for empirical
data within the scope of the RFA. In
analyzing the comments received and in
preparing the FRFA, DHS attempted
once again to ensure that the best
available data is used. Individual
comments regarding specific
assumptions in DHS’s analysis are
addressed in detail below.
a. Assumptions Regarding Impact on
Legal Workers
i. Accuracy of SSA Records
A number of commenters suggested
that the SSA data used to generate nomatch letters (the Earnings Suspense
File, or ‘‘ESF’’ database) is generated
from an SSA database (the
‘‘NUMIDENT’’ database) that the
commenters allege contains a large
number of errors that will cause workauthorized employees to appear as nomatches, and to have to correct their
discrepancies.7 Many of these
comments cited a report by the SSA
Office of the Inspector General regarding
errors in SSA’s NUMIDENT database,8
to argue that the data used for the nomatch letters has an error rate of 4.1
percent. Some commenters suggested
that DHS not use information derived
from that database for immigration
7 While the Earnings Suspense File is an
electronic repository for wage items that cannot be
matched to an individual worker’s earnings record,
the database that SSA uses to match a wage item
to a worker is the Numident database.
8 Social Security Administration, Office of the
Inspector General, Congressional Response Report:
Accuracy of the Social Security Administration’s
Numident File (No. A–08–06–26100, Dec. 2006).
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
63855
enforcement purposes until the database
achieves a 99.5% accuracy level.
Referring to the same SSA OIG report,
another commenter alleged that SSA
now maintains 17.8 million mismatched
records that could result in no-match
letters to employers.
DHS does not agree with the
commenters’ inference that the overall
4.1% data discrepancy rate estimated by
SSA OIG is relevant to this rulemaking,
or to SSA no-match letters generally, in
the way suggested by the commenters.
The SSA OIG’s report reviewed the
accuracy of four different data fields in
SSA’s system—‘‘Name,’’ ‘‘Date of
Birth,’’ ‘‘Death Indication,’’ and
‘‘Citizenship Status’’—and the study’s
projected 4.1% data discrepancy rate
was based on the cumulative data
discrepancies in all four data fields
sampled. But SSA no-match letters are
generated only when an employee’s
name and SSN submitted by an
employer cannot be matched to SSA
records; discrepancies in the ‘‘Date of
Birth,’’ ‘‘Death Indication,’’ and
‘‘Citizenship Status’’ fields do not cause
an employee to be listed on a no-match
letter because the Forms W–2 from
which no-match letters are generated do
not contain this information. The SSA
OIG report showed that only 0.24% of
native-born U.S. citizens had a name
and number mismatch, while
naturalized citizens and non-citizens
had a 0.49% and 1.7% mismatch rate,
respectively. This yields a projected
overall name and SSN mismatch rate of
0.4% (weighted average) for all records
in the NUMIDENT system. Based on the
SSA OIG report cited by commenters, it
appears that the database that generates
no-match letters already exceeds the
99.5% accuracy level proposed in the
comments.
ii. Turnover Rates
The SEIA assumed that employers
that follow the safe harbor procedures
may face increased turnover of
employees authorized to work in the
United States. To the extent that a workauthorized employee resigns or is
terminated for failing to resolve the nomatch, the employer could be
reasonably expected to incur the cost of
replacing that employee. For purposes
of the SEIA, DHS estimated that 2% of
authorized employees identified in nomatch letters might resign or be
terminated due to failure to resolve a
no-match, and therefore the SEIA
included those turnover costs as a cost
of an employer’s adoption of the safe
harbor procedures in the rule.
It is important to note that this figure
is not, as some commenters have
incorrectly claimed, an estimate of the
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
63856
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
number of legal workers that ‘‘will be
fired’’ as a result of this rule. Nothing in
the August 2007 Final Rule or in this
supplemental rulemaking requires an
employer to terminate an employee at
the end of the 93-day no-match
resolution and reverification schedule if
a no-match remains unresolved. Should
an employer learn in the course of that
process that an employee lacks work
authorization, the INA requires—as it
has for over 20 years—that the
employment relationship be terminated.
While the regulatory safe harbor is only
available if the rule’s procedures are
completed with 93 days, an employer
may still be seen to have acted
reasonably if an employee has taken
longer than 93 days to resolve a nomatch, depending upon the particular
circumstances.
Moreover, the SEIA’s estimate
includes turnover caused by voluntary
departures of employees who decide to
seek employment elsewhere rather than
resolve the no-match with SSA. Neither
the government nor employers can
compel employees to correct nomatches, and DHS does not have
sufficient data to conclude that 100% of
all legal employees will correct their nomatches within the 93-day schedule set
out in the rule. DHS recognizes that it
will cost employers something to
replace workers if (1) some of their
employees decided to leave
employment after day 90, and/or (2)
some employees (a) attempted but failed
to complete the process of resolving
their no-matches in 90 days; (b) those
employees would not or could not
produce alternative documents to
complete a new Employee Verification
Form I–9; and (c) an employer took a
strict approach to terminate every
person with unresolved no-matches
after 93 days. DHS has, therefore,
included these turnover costs in the
SEIA.
Several commenters suggested that
this projected turnover rate of 2% for
legal workers is too low. DHS disagrees.
As section III.J of the SEIA explains,
there are significant economic
incentives for both the employer and
employee to resolve a no-match. A
work-authorized employee has an
incentive to both keep his or her current
employment and to ensure that his or
her name and SSN properly match
SSA’s records so that he or she will
receive full credit for contributions
made into Social Security and maximize
the amount of Social Security benefits
he or she will receive in retirement or
in case of disability. At the same time,
an employer has an incentive to ensure
that employees resolve their no-match
issues to avoid turnover in the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
workforce, and the SEIA assumed that
employers would pay for human
resources staff to assist employees to
resolve a no-match, given the cost to the
employer of replacing those employees.
In light of these incentives, DHS’s
estimate of 2% was reasonable.
Although the commenters did not
provide a basis for changing this
assumption, DHS has added an
alternative scenario in an appendix to
the SEIA to examine how these turnover
costs could change if the legal worker
replacement rate were doubled from 2%
to 4%. That additional analysis did not
result in a material change in the SEIA’s
estimate of the rule’s impact on small
entities or in the reasonable regulatory
alternatives that DHS could consider in
this rulemaking.
iii. No-Match Resolution Process
Some commenters also suggested that
DHS should reconsider the SEIA’s
assumption that 66% of authorized
employees will be able to resolve nomatches without visiting an SSA office.
DHS continues to believe that this
assumption is reasonable for purposes
of the analysis required by the RFA.
The SEIA made specific assumptions
regarding how the employer and
employee would resolve a no-match in
order to estimate the costs on a per
employer basis. DHS believes the cost
that an employer would bear to correct
a no-match typically depends on the
reason for the no-match. For example, if
an employer were able to determine that
the no-match resulted from an internal
clerical error by the employer, the
employer would likely be able to correct
this discrepancy quickly and
inexpensively. If the employer
determined that there was no clerical
error, the SEIA assumed that the
employer would meet with the
employee to verify that the employer’s
records show the correct name and
social security number. If the employee
then determined that the employer had
submitted the correct name and social
security number, the employee would
need to visit SSA to resolve the nomatch. If the employee needs to visit
SSA, the employer may incur a lost
productivity cost for the time the
employee was away from work.
The SEIA stated that no specific data
was available to show what percentage
of no-match issues were clerical errors,
incorrect information submitted by the
employee to the employer, or an issue
that required a visit to SSA.
Accordingly, the SEIA assumed onethird of the authorized employee nomatches would be clerical errors, onethird of the authorized employee nomatches would be resolved when the
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
employer identified an error in an
employer’s records, and one-third of
authorized employees would visit SSA
to attempt to correct the no-match. None
of the comments provided data that
could improve on the SEIA’s estimates.9
Even though DHS does not have hard
data on how many mismatches may be
resolved at each step of the safe harbor
procedures, we can reasonably expect
that a significant number of no-matches
will be corrected internally by the
employer without requiring the
employee to visit SSA. For example,
several comments suggested that workauthorized employees of Latin
American and Asian descent appear on
no-match letters because of compound
naming conventions or inconsistent
transliteration that sometimes results in
inadvertent errors or discrepancies in
employer records. Employers can easily
resolve such inadvertent errors. In
addition, electronic filing of W–2
9 One commenter suggested that a DHS-funded
study of the Basic Pilot or E-Verify program shows
that a larger share of individuals listed in no-match
letters will need to visit SSA, claiming that ‘‘only
in 30% of the time were tentative nonconfirmations caused by either solely an error with
the date of birth or the name.’’ ICEB–2006–0004–
07321.1 at 27 (citing to Westat, Findings of the Web
Basic Pilot Evaluation, supra at 51). After rereviewing the Westat report, DHS disagrees. The
passage of the Westat report cited by the commenter
examines the approximately 5% of individuals who
receive a final non-confirmation from the E-Verify
system and breaks that population down by the
type of mismatch that caused the system to flag
each person with an initial tentative nonconfirmation. That analysis is graphically
represented in Exhibit III–6 of the Westat report,
which shows that 17% of those found unauthorized
to work who claimed U.S. citizenship were flagged
as ‘‘DOB not matched’’ and 13% of those found
unauthorized to work who claimed U.S. citizenship
were flagged as ‘‘Name not matched.’’ It appears
that the commenter added 17% to 13% to arrive at
the claim that ‘‘30%’’ of tentative nonconfirmations are caused solely by errors in date of
birth or name. The comment misses the mark for
a number of reasons. First, the passage of the Westat
report cited by the commenter looks at individuals
who received a final non-confirmation stating that
they were not authorized to work, and sorts
individuals not by actual citizenship status but by
citizenship status claimed by the individual. The
population of unauthorized workers includes large
numbers of individuals who falsely claim U.S.
citizenship. By definition, the population relevant
to the SEIA’s calculation of no-match resolutions is
entirely different, since it is limited to workauthorized persons. The comment also assumes,
without explanation, that the workers with either a
mismatched date of birth or a mismatched name
correlate to the population that will be able to
resolve the mismatch without visiting SSA. The
passage of the Westat report cited by the commenter
does not shed any light on the question of how
many employees listed on a no-match letter will
need to visit a Social Security office to resolve their
mismatches. E-Verify and SSA’s no-match letter
program are distinct programs that rely on different
input data sources and that examine different
things. And the data summarized in Exhibit III–6
of the Westat report is simply not related to the
subset of authorized employees that will choose to
visit SSA.
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
reports limits SSA staff intervention in
wage report data processing and
increases the likelihood that
mismatches originated with—and can
be most readily resolved by—the
employer.
Commenters did not provide
information that would lead DHS to
conclude its estimate was not
reasonable. Nevertheless, as with the
turnover rates discussed above, DHS has
provided an alternative scenario in an
appendix to the SEIA to model how the
no-match resolution costs would change
if the percentage of authorized
employees that must visit a SSA office
increases from 33% to 50%. We
conclude that this alternative
assumption does not materially change
the SEIA’s estimate of the impact on
small entities or point to additional
regulatory alternatives that DHS could
consider in this rulemaking.
b. Percentage of No-Matches Relating to
Unauthorized Aliens
One commenter suggested that the
SEIA was inadequate because it
assumed that the general employee
turnover rate would be the same for
authorized and unauthorized
employees. The commenter believed
that this is significant because the SEIA
concludes that 57% of employees listed
in no-match letters already have left
their jobs by the time the employer
receives the no-match letter. The
commenter suggested that the turnover
rate is likely to be much higher for
unauthorized employees, meaning that
authorized employees are more likely to
be still employed when a no-match
letter arrives and, thus, authorized
employees are more likely to be
impacted by the no-match letter and the
safe harbor rule.
DHS is not aware of any Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), or other data that presents
separate turnover rates for authorized
and unauthorized employees.
Consequently, DHS is using the best
data available for turnover rates. BLS
provides turnover data for the non-farm
sectors and is based on all employees on
the payroll, without distinguishing
between those authorized and
unauthorized to work in the United
States. Therefore, DHS believes the BLS
industry turnover rates presented in the
SEIA should be considered to be
weighted averages of an authorized
employee turnover rate and the
unauthorized employee turnover rate.10
DHS has clarified the SEIA to address
this point. DHS has not found, and the
10 See SEIA, Appendix C: Estimation of Weighted
Average Turnover Rates.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
commenters have not provided, any
empirical evidence that supports a
specific turnover rate or range other
than the weighted average in the BLS
composite rate.
Another commenter suggested that
the errors in the NUMIDENT data
relating to United States citizens would
be less likely to appear in no-match
letters, and that few U.S. citizens would
be affected by no-match letters or face
the possibility of termination. Another
commenter noted that the SEIA
assumed it is possible that only 10% of
employees appearing on no-match
letters are not work-authorized, and
suggested that any particular no-match
letter identifying 11 employees would
likely list only lawful employees.
These comments highlight that DHS
estimated costs based over a broad
range: assuming that between 10% to
80% of employees on no-match letters
were unauthorized. DHS cannot
determine with certainty the rate at
which authorized and unauthorized
employees appear in no-match letters.
Even if DHS could, the percent of
unauthorized workers on any given nomatch letter would likely vary by
employer and by industry.
Consequently, using a broad range, such
as the one in the SEIA, remains the best
way to present the potential economic
impact of the rule on small entities.
c. Specific Wage and Occupational
Assumptions
i. Replacement Costs
One commenter noted that all
employment decisions in small
businesses are made by the principals,
who must take time to search for,
interview, hire, and train new
employees. According to this
commenter, those same principals must
process the employment paperwork and
resolve any no-matches, resulting in
distraction from other managerial
duties. The comment suggests that the
SEIA’s replacement costs estimate does
not account for the possible effect on the
principals’ ability to manage, and is
therefore too low.
DHS disagrees. The SEIA estimated
that replacing an authorized employee
would cost approximately $5,000. In
arriving at this estimate, we reviewed
studies that quantified turnover costs for
businesses large and small, and we
found that $5,000 was a reasonable
estimate of the cost incurred by the
employer to replace each legal
employee. Several of the economic
studies on which this estimate relies are
discussed in section III.J. of the SEIA.
DHS believes this estimate includes
reasonable estimations of the costs of
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
63857
hiring, training new employees, and
processing paperwork.
ii. Occupational Categories
Another commenter suggested that
mismatch resolution requires time and
effort from more than the five
occupational categories stated in the
analysis, and that the SEIA
underestimated the response level of
companies that receive no-match letters.
The commenter suggested that the more
serious consequences articulated by the
no-match rule would likely cause
employers to involve additional
occupations in the process, including
the Chief Operating Officer, Chief
Financial Officer, Chief Executive
Officer, as well as Company Compliance
Officers, senior human resources
managers, paralegals, secretaries, and
other clerical employees.
The SEIA does not attempt to capture
every occupational title that possibly
could be involved with a specific Social
Security no-match letter or DHS notice
of suspect document or the
implementation of steps to adopt a safe
harbor procedure. Rather, the intent of
the SEIA is to capture levels of effort for
different activities and wage levels.
Each listed occupation is representative
of multiple occupations at the
equivalent wage. For example, the
activities listed for the human resources
assistant may actually be carried out by
a payroll assistant.
Nevertheless, the comments correctly
noted that the SEIA assumed that the
most senior person that would
participate in responding to no-match
letters would be a senior human
resources manager, and that more senior
management with broad company-wide
oversight responsibilities would not be
involved. DHS agrees that employers
that appreciate the seriousness of nomatch letters may choose to include
very senior managers in planning for the
appropriate response, and so the final
SEIA adds additional hours for a senior
manager with broad company-wide
oversight responsibilities.
One commenter also suggested that
union representatives and union
attorneys might be involved because
provisions in many collective
bargaining agreements prevent the
termination of employees without
following prescribed steps. The RFA
requires DHS to consider the direct
costs of the supplemental final rule.
There are no requirements within the
rule for the employer to follow any
additional steps that may be contained
within a collective bargaining
agreement. Consequently, to the extent
any additional costs are incurred due to
the existence of collective bargaining
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
63858
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
agreements, such costs are indirect and
outside of the scope of the FRFA.
One comment also pointed out that
the BLS wage data was based upon
surveys almost five years old—surveys
conducted in November 2003, 2004,
2005 and May 2004, 2005 and 2006.
Additionally, the commenter pointed
out that the May 2006 Occupational
Employment Statistics (OES) Estimates
Technical Notes indicate that the data
was collected as a result of mailing
forms to 200,000 establishments, and
questioned whether the BIA survey
contained enough samples of the five
occupations whose wages were
included in the SEIA’s cost calculations
to provide a reliable estimate of the
prevailing wage for each of those five
occupations.
DHS is not persuaded by these
challenges to the reliability and
relevance of the BLS data. As specified
in the OES Technical Notes, the OES
survey consists of six panels that are
surveyed over a three-year period. Each
panel includes 200,000 establishments,
for a total of 1.2 million establishments
surveyed. In addition, the wage data
obtained from the five earliest panels
are all adjusted for inflation to the
current period, so that the average wage
computed from the 1.2 million
establishments represents a wage for the
latest period that was surveyed.11 DHS
continues to believe that the BLS data
is the most reasonable data to use in the
SEIA; the commenter did not suggest an
alternative source of data for
consideration.
d. Sources of Advice Other Than Legal
Counsel
Some commenters, including an
association of immigration attorneys,
suggested DHS underestimated the
share of employers that would seek legal
services in implementing the safe harbor
rule. DHS disagrees. DHS assumed that
one-half of employers would seek
professional legal advice in
implementing the safe harbor rule, and
that employers that did not seek legal
counsel would rely on information
available from trade associations or
other advocacy groups. Trade
associations, in particular, are a
common source for small employers
seeking guidance on best business
practices, as an alternative to seeking
formal legal advice. Even a cursory
search of the Internet and review of
trade publications unearths a number of
professional human resource
associations, publishers, law firms, and
11 See Technical Notes for May 2006 OES
Estimates, ‘‘Estimation methodology’’ at https://
www.bls.gov/oes/2006/may/oes_tec.htm.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
others providing advice on responding
to no-match letters that is generally
consistent with the steps outlined in the
rule. Further, as the district court noted
in the ongoing litigation involving this
rule, business organizations ‘‘such as
the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America, already have begun to
develop costly programs and systems for
ensuring compliance with the safe
harbor framework,’’ AFL–CIO v.
Chertoff, 552 F.Supp.2d at 1014, and it
is reasonable to assume that a
significant number of small businesses
will follow the advice available from
such organizations instead of retaining
legal counsel.
6. Opportunity and Productivity Costs
Several commenters suggested that
DHS include the time away from work
for hourly employees, most of whom
may not be paid for time spent at a
Social Security office or another
agency’s office. Similarly, some
commenters suggested that travel costs
to SSA offices should be included in the
SEIA. As discussed above, the RFA
requires federal agencies to consider the
effects of regulatory action on small
businesses and other ‘‘small entities,’’
and individual employees are not
‘‘small entities’’ as defined by the RFA.
Costs to employees, such as lost wages
from time away from work or travel
expenses, are not properly included in
the analysis for the purposes of the RFA.
A number of commenters suggested
that DHS include lost productivity—
both from the employee being away and
from human resource personnel dealing
with the no-match letter—as part of the
SEIA. The SEIA did include an estimate
of lost productivity due to the time an
employee will spend meeting with
human resource personnel to discuss
the no-match. The SEIA also included
an estimate of the lost productivity
incurred by the employer when an
employee visits SSA to resolve the nomatch. And the SEIA included human
resource labor costs as suggested by the
commenter. See, e.g., sections III.C
Wage Rates, III.G Cost of Employee
Time, III.K Total Compliance Cost
Estimates and Appendix I: Calculation
of Human Resources Labor Cost.
Some commenters asserted that the
rule will be costly to employees and the
economy, suggesting that, because of the
millions of inaccurate records in the
SSA database, hundreds of thousands of
employees will be required to take time
off work to visit SSA field offices to
correct the discrepancies. Commenters
asserted that many of these employees
will be required to make multiple visits,
and specifically asserted that several
lawful employees had contacted the
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
SSA up to five times to correct nomatches.
As previously noted, employees are
not small entities under the RFA and
the RFA does not require agencies to
measure indirect impact to the economy
at large. Even so, some of the
commenter’s assertions warrant specific
response. In analyzing potential lost
productivity, the SEIA estimated the
time an employee might be absent from
work to travel to an SSA office to correct
a no-match. The SEIA cited two
publicly available Westat reports on
which this time estimate was based.12
These reports contain closely analogous
data—that is, the time required to visit
an SSA office to address a ‘‘tentative
non-confirmation’’ received from the EVerify electronic employment
verification system (formerly known as
Basic Pilot).13 The reports suggested that
on average, employees spend
approximately five hours to visit SSA.
For the purpose of the SEIA, DHS
increased that estimate to a full eight
hours of lost work time (a 60% increase
over the reports’ findings) to account for
those employees that might need to
make more than one visit to resolve
their no-match.
The SEIA recognizes that there may
be cases in which more than one trip to
SSA is necessary, and consequently
assumes that employees will spend an
average of eight hours away from work
to resolve the no-match with SSA.
Because no supporting facts are
provided, DHS cannot assess the
validity of the assertion made by the
commenter that some employees were
required to contact SSA up to five times.
Our consultations with SSA suggest that
such an occurrence is highly unlikely.
Another commenter suggested that
the SEIA estimates the opportunity cost
to the employer of a no-match
employee’s time in visiting SSA is the
equivalent of the average employee
wage rate at $27.58. The commenter
suggested that this estimate is wrong,
since few employers pay an employee
the full value of the labor provided, and
the lost production of an individual
employee may be several times greater
than the employee’s hourly wage. The
commenter concluded that the SEIA
underestimates the cost of lost
production.
12 SEIA, at 30–31, citing Institute for Survey
Research, Temple University, and Westat, Findings
of the Basic Pilot Program Evaluation (June 2002)
at 170; Westat, Interim Findings of the Web-Based
Basic Pilot Evaluation (Dec. 2006) at IV–17.
13 A ‘‘tentative non-confirmation’’ can occur
when an employee’s name, date of birth, or social
security number does not match SSA’s records or
if a death indicator is present in SSA’s database.
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
The SEIA did not use average wages
to compute opportunity costs. As
explained in the SEIA, DHS used ‘‘fullyloaded’’ wages to estimate lost
productivity. A fully-loaded wage
includes such benefits as retirement and
savings, paid leave (vacations, holidays,
sick leave, and other leave), insurance
benefits (life, health, and disability),
legally required benefits such as Social
Security and Medicare, and
supplemental pay (overtime and
premium, shift differentials, and
nonproduction bonuses). DHS used data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
government’s source on such statistics,
in order to estimate the fully-loaded
wage.
DHS also assumed the employer
would incur a lost productivity cost of
100% of the time an authorized
employee needed to visit SSA to resolve
the no-match. In practice, DHS believes
that some employers frequently will
incur no lost productivity or
opportunity cost. If employees take paid
leave time to visit SSA, they will have
less leave time for other personal
activities. The employer, however,
incurs no additional productivity losses,
because the employer had already
counted on that employee taking that
paid leave. Lost productivity would also
be minimal in industries where workers’
skills are largely interchangeable. For
example, if a restaurant employee or
retail clerk were away from work to
resolve a no-match issue, the restaurant
or store would normally attempt to
schedule another employee to take that
shift. Given the 90 days available under
the safe harbor procedures to resolve the
no-match, the employer has substantial
flexibility to schedule around an
employee’s planned absence.
Consequently, to the extent employers
have the capability to plan around
known absences and other employees
are available, the productivity loss
estimated in the SEIA is higher than
what employers may see in practice.
DHS understands that some
businesses cannot, through planning,
mitigate productivity losses attributed to
employee absences to resolve
mismatches. No data is available that
suggests how many businesses have the
ability to schedule other employees to
take the place of an absent employee,
and therefore mitigate costs. For this
reason, DHS estimated the highest
possible impact, which is a 100%
productivity loss.
In addition, DHS has attempted to
estimate the cost of the rule on an
‘‘average cost per firm’’ basis. 73 FR at
15953. There may be cases in which the
productivity loss to an employer of an
employee’s visit to SSA is greater than
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
the ‘‘average cost per firm’’ estimate in
the rule. However, given the fact that
the SEIA estimated a lost productivity
cost 100% of the time an authorized
employee needed to visit SSA at the
fully loaded wage rate for a full eight
hour day, DHS does not believe that the
‘‘average cost per firm’’ estimate is
unreasonable. In fact, DHS believes that,
given the conservative assumptions
underlying the analysis, the estimate of
lost productivity due to an employee’s
trip to SSA likely overstates the impact
to employers.
Other commenters took the view that
DHS should consider the lost
productivity or replacement costs
resulting not only from the time
employees spend resolving their
mismatch, but also the lost productivity
cost of employees terminated as a result
of the employer following the no-match
regulations. For instance, one
commenter stated that when Swift & Co.
was subject to a worksite enforcement
action by ICE, the company lost 1,282
employees overnight, and Swift
estimated that the lost production for
one day was $20 million, or about
$1,560 per employee per day.
The commenter did not detail how
lost production costs of $1,560 per
employee per day were calculated, other
than it was Swift’s estimate. Moreover,
the workers lost by Swift were found to
be unauthorized to work in the United
States. These comments appear to be
citing costs incurred by an employer
that discovers—through the no-match
letter or some other process—that large
numbers of his workforce are
unauthorized to work. But those costs
are outside of the scope of the
rulemaking and are attributable to the
immigration laws of the United States.
7. Human Resources and Employee
Tracking
a. Systems Costs
Some commenters suggested that if an
employer does not possess a system that
allows the employer to access an
employee file based on a SSN, it could
take substantial time to resolve large
numbers of no-matches. The
commenters were concerned that
because the no-match letters only
provide a list of SSNs without the
corresponding employee names, the
time and effort required of an employer
to match the SSNs on the list with
employees on the payroll. One
commenter suggested that it would
require a month to match 500+ SSNs to
the correct employee names.
DHS disagrees with these estimates.
The SEIA provided what DHS believes
to be a reasonable estimate for the time
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
63859
and cost needed to match the SSNs
listed on the no-match letter to current
employees. The average number of
mismatched SSNs per letter is
approximately 65,14 well under the
‘‘500+’’ number referenced by the
commenter. Moreover, the scenario
posed by the commenter—in which an
employer would need to identify over
500 employees with mismatched
SSNs—is a logical impossibility for
many small businesses, who have fewer
than 500 total employees. The SEIA’s
estimate, and the resulting analysis in
the IRFA and FRFA of the potential
impact on ‘‘small entities,’’ provided a
reasonable estimate of this cost.
DHS also reasonably assumed that the
majority of social security numbers
would be stored electronically, allowing
for relatively rapid screening. As
discussed above, employers that file
more than 250 W–2s in a given year are
required to do so electronically—so that
only smaller employers, with
correspondingly shorter lists of
mismatched SSNs, could conceivably
need to conduct this matching process
manually—and more than 80 percent of
the FY 2007 W–2 reports were filed
electronically. DHS permits storage of
Employment Eligibility Verification
Form I–9 under the same standards as
applied by the IRS to tax accounting
documentation, 8 CFR 274a.2(e)–(i), 71
FR 34510 (June 15, 2006), and an
employer’s process for checking the
accuracy of their internal records will be
especially rapid for those that keep both
sets of records electronically. DHS
believes, based on the evidence and
commercial availability of computer
systems to comply with wage and tax
reporting requirements, that employers
that do not store their wage, tax and
employment information electronically
would be relatively small and, therefore,
would have fewer social security
numbers to match with names. The
system costs estimated in the SEIA are
reasonable.
b. Reverification Costs
Several comments addressed the time
and cost of the Employment Eligibility
Verification Form I–9 re-verification
process. For example, one commenter
suggested that re-completing Forms I–9
for every employee on a no-match letter
will take a significant amount of time
for employers and could be a massive
undertaking, depending on the number
of employees on the no-match list that
14 This average was calculated from the
information DHS obtained from SSA by dividing
the total number of mismatched SSNs listed in
EDCOR letters by the total number of EDCOR
letters.
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
63860
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
are still current and will need to have
Form I–9 reverified.
DHS disagrees and believes the
commenters overstate the costs. The
proposed rule, the August 2007 Final
Rule, and the supplemental proposed
rule provided a series of steps that DHS
would find to be a reasonable response
to the receipt of a no-match letter. As
DHS explained in the original proposed
rule, the steps are sequential and are
designed to assist employers to confirm
the work authorization of their
employees while encouraging
employees to correct their records with
SSA. DHS’s rule is designed to avoid
interference with the basic purpose of
SSA’s No-Match Letter (EDCOR)
program—which is to solicit corrections
to SSA’s records and reduce the
Earnings Suspense File—and to provide
employers and employees guidance on
how DHS believes they can best comply
with their existing obligations under the
INA. Thus, the rule specifies that
employers and employees should
attempt to resolve the SSN mismatch
with the SSA. Only when that process
has not been completed within 90 days
does the rule anticipate that an
employer would choose to rely on the
reverification process—i.e. completing
parts of a new Form I–9 as set forth in
the rule—to confirm the employee’s
work eligibility and obtain the safe
harbor protection offered by the rule.
As noted above, see section 6.a.ii, the
SEIA makes the reasonable assumption
that only one-third of work-authorized
employees still employed at the
company and listed in a no-match letter
would need to visit SSA to resolve the
no-match.
DHS believes that only a small subset
of these authorized employees will
undergo the reverification process
because most legal employees (citizens
and aliens authorized to work) will
resolve the no-match with SSA, in large
part because it is in employees’ personal
financial interest to do so.
Notwithstanding that financial incentive
for employees to resolve their no-match
and receive credit for retirement
benefits, some employees that are
referred to SSA to resolve their nomatch may decide to complete a new
Form I–9 instead of visiting the SSA. To
the extent that employees might decline
to visit an SSA office and instead
choose to complete a new Form I–9, the
SEIA overestimates the costs that would
be incurred by employers. DHS
estimates that completion of all sections
of a new Form I–9 and preserving that
form pursuant to the INA and
regulations requires 12 minutes. 73 FR
18551 (April 4, 2008). The SEIA
estimates an employee would be
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
required to expend a full eight-hour day
to visit SSA to resolve the no-match.
Given the assumption in the rule that
the re-verification procedure will
function as the last, fall-back step for
employers to confirm an employee’s
work authorization, DHS assumed, for
the purposes of the SEIA, that all
employees who resort to the reverification procedure will first have
visited the SSA. DHS, therefore, will not
lower the estimate of the number of
employees expected to visit an SSA
office. In order to allow for the
possibility that a larger than anticipated
number of legal employees may both
visit SSA offices and use the I–9
reverification procedure, DHS will
revise the SEIA to include additional reverification costs for 3 percent of
employees that might visit SSA and also
complete a new Form I–9 reverification.
Adding the reverification costs for this
3 percent without reducing the number
of employees expected to visit SSA will
likely result in a small overestimate of
the actual costs, but due to limitations
of available data, DHS believes that this
approach is reasonable.
c. Outsourced Staffing Requirements
Several commenters suggested that
many small businesses do not have an
in-house human resources staff or
payroll administrators and instead hire
outside providers for this service. Some
comments also criticized the wage rates
used in the analysis because those rates
do not take into account the difference
between in-house wages and outsourced
wages for the same services. A
commenter pointed out, for example,
that the wage rate of an in-house
attorney cannot be equated with the cost
charged to a client by outside counsel.
These outsourced wage rates would
include different and higher rates to
recover overhead charges for rent,
utilities, taxes, and other costs of doing
business that might not be incurred by
the employer. The commenter further
suggested the cost of out-sourced wages
are estimated to be two to three times
the price of what an employer pays per
hour in in-house wages.
DHS agrees that outsourced work may
be more expensive than work conducted
in-house as the commenter suggests.
DHS also agrees to assume, for the
purposes of the SEIA, that the cost of
hiring services provided by an outside
vendor or contractor is two to three
times more expensive than the wages
paid by the employer for that service
produced by an in-house employee. The
costs in the SEIA have been revised to
take into account the higher costs that
may be incurred when firms use outside
service providers.
PO 00000
Frm 00018
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
8. Other Costs
One commenter noted that while the
SEIA included costs associated with
replacing work-authorized employees
who are terminated as a result of the
rule, it did not include costs associated
with payment of unemployment
benefits to such employees.
Unemployment benefit payments are a
cost incurred by the federal and state
governments, which are not ‘‘small
entities’’ for purposes of the RFA.
Moreover, such benefits are not paid by
an employer as a result of that
employer’s adherence to the safe harbor
procedures in this rule, and this cost is
at best an indirect cost not covered by
the RFA.
9. Rehiring Seasonal Employees
A number of commenters suggested
that the employment of seasonal
employees was not adequately
considered in the IRFA. The two most
common examples may be seasonal
employment of farm employees and
retailer seasonal employment of
additional sales and support personnel
during holiday seasons.
Some comments suggested that
special systems would be needed to
track seasonal employees no longer
employed by the employer at the time
the no-match letter is received. The
rationale for such a tracking system
would be to mitigate an employer’s risk
by ensuring that the employer can
identify and appropriately examine the
work authorization documents for
returning job applicants who were
previously listed on a no-match letter.
The no-match rule does not address this
scenario, and seasonal employers that
hire returning employees could have
had sufficient reason under INA section
274A, 8 U.S.C. 1324a, and the preexisting regulations to compare past nomatch letters against the identity
information provided by all new and
returning hires if employers believe
such a comparison was needed. This
rule provides a safe harbor after an
employer has hired an employee,
receives a no-match letter relating to
that employee, and conducts due
diligence to resolve the no-match letter.
The rule does not address the initial
hiring decision and employment
eligibility verification. As with the costs
that result from an employer’s discovery
of unauthorized workers on the payroll,
the cost of any system that an employer
may adopt to address knowledge
acquired from previous no-match letters
is attributable to the INA, not to this
rule.
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
10. Conclusions
Several commenters noted that the
thrust of the SEIA is that the proposed
regulation will not affect a significant
number of small entities and those small
entities which are impacted will not
incur significant expenses, and
suggested that the IRFA and FRFA
should contain an express statement to
that effect.
The supplemental proposed rule did
express the conclusion that ‘‘DHS does
not believe that the direct costs incurred
by employers that choose to adopt the
safe harbor procedures set forth in this
rule would create a significant economic
impact when considered on an average
cost per firm basis.’’ 73 FR at 15953. The
SEIA, as revised in light of the
comments received in the course of this
rulemaking, continues to support the
conclusion that the direct costs incurred
by those small entities that avail
themselves of the safe harbor are not
expected to be significant on an average
cost per small entity basis.
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
E. Further Interpretation of the August
2007 Final Rule
In this supplemental rulemaking DHS
seeks to further clarify two aspects of
the August 2007 Final Rule. First, the
rule instructs employers seeking the safe
harbor that they must ‘‘promptly’’ notify
an affected employee after the employer
has completed its internal records
checks and has been unable to resolve
the mismatch. After reviewing the
history of the rulemaking, DHS believes
that this obligation for prompt notice
would ordinarily be satisfied if the
employer contacts the employee within
five business days after the employer
has completed its internal records
review. Some commenters suggested
that this timeframe was inadequate,
while others suggested that this
guidance be made explicit in the text of
the rule. DHS understands that too short
a timeline for informing employees of
their need to resolve a no-match may be
unworkable for certain employers and
employees, and so the Department
declines to set a formal limit in the rule
text on the time that an employer may
take in providing ‘‘prompt’’ notice to
affected employees. DHS emphasizes
that an employer does not need to wait
until after completing this internal
review to advise affected employees that
the employer has received the no-match
letter and request that the employees
seek to resolve the mismatch.
Immediately notifying an employee of
the mismatch upon receipt of the letter
may be the most expeditious means of
resolving the mismatch. Prompt notice
to affected employees is important to
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
enable them to take the steps necessary
to resolve the mismatch, and an
employer should not unreasonably
delay such notice.
Second, plaintiffs in the litigation
before the Northern District of California
raised a question as to whether under
the August 2007 Final Rule an employer
could be found liable on a constructive
knowledge theory for failing to conduct
due diligence in response to the
appearance of an employee hired before
November 6, 1986 in an SSA no-match
letter. When Congress enacted INA
section 274A as part of the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act, it
included a grandfather clause stating
that employers’ obligations created in
that Act did not apply to the hiring,
recruitment, or referral for employment
for a fee, or to the continued
employment, of workers hired before
IRCA’s date of enactment. See Public
Law 99–603, section 101(a)(3), 100 Stat.
3359 (1986). Because those statutory
bars against hiring or continuing to
employ individuals without work
authorization do not apply to workers
within that grandfather clause, this rule
does not apply to any such workers that
may be listed in an SSA no-match letter.
A number of commenters argued that
this exclusion should be explicitly
stated in the rule text. But employees
hired before November 1986 are
statutorily excluded from the operation
of INA section 274A(a), and so no
regulatory statement reiterating that
effect is necessary.
F. Other Comments Received
The supplemental proposed rule
made clear that DHS was addressing the
three issues raised by the district court,
73 FR 15944, 45, and DHS did not
reopen other aspects of the rulemaking.
Several commenters understood the
supplemental proposed rule as inviting
comments generally, and they provided
comments on a range of issues
previously covered in the August 2007
Final Rule but not related to the three
issues raised by the district court and
addressed in the supplemental proposed
rule. The August 2007 Final Rule
addressed the substantive issues raised
in these comments, and DHS declines to
address those issues anew.
IV. Changes Made in Republishing the
Final Rule
The final rule does not make any
substantive changes from the August
2007 Final Rule or the Supplemental
Proposed Rule. DHS has corrected a
technical cross-reference in the text of
the final rule and republishes the text of
the regulation for the convenience of the
reader.
PO 00000
Frm 00019
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
63861
V. Statutory and Regulatory Reviews
A. Administrative Procedure Act
DHS published the initial proposed
rule and the supplemental proposed
rule with requests for public comment
in the Federal Register as a matter of
agency discretion. This rule is not a
legislative rule governed by the notice
and comment provisions of 5 U.S.C.
553. DHS is publishing this
supplemental final rule subject to the
preliminary injunction entered by the
district court. A delayed effective date is
not required under the APA. 5 U.S.C.
553(d)(2).
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
On the basis of the analysis in this
preamble, DHS provides below its Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, as
described under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 604. DHS
published an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
603(b), (c), in response to the district
court’s injunction in the supplemental
proposed rule. 73 FR at 15952–54. DHS
published a small entity impact analysis
in the docket of this rulemaking, ICEB–
2006–0004–0233, and summarized that
analysis in the supplemental proposed
rule. DHS invited comments related to
this Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis and the accompanying Small
Entity Impact Analysis, including
comments on the assumptions
underlying that analysis.
1. Need for, Objectives of, and Reasons
Why the Rule Is Being Considered
As discussed more fully in the
supplemental proposed rule, DHS, as
well as private employers in general,
have become increasingly aware of the
potential for abuse of social security
numbers by aliens who are not
authorized to work in the United States.
DHS is responsible for the enforcement
of the statutory prohibition against the
hiring or continued employment of
aliens who are not authorized to work
in the United States. INA section
274A(a)(1), (2), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(a)(1), (2);
HSA section 101, 6 U.S.C. 111. Given
employers’ evident confusion regarding
how to respond to SSA no-match letters,
DHS has concluded that it needs to
clarify employers’ duties under the
immigration laws, and has set forth
guidance for employers that seek to
fulfill their obligation not to hire or
employ aliens who are not authorized to
work in the United States.
The objective of the proposed rule,
the August 2007 Final Rule, the
supplemental proposed rule, and this
final rule is to provide clear guidance
for employers on how to comply with
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
63862
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
the statutory bar against hiring or
continuing employment of aliens who
are not authorized to work in the United
States. INA section 274A(a)(1), (2), 8
U.S.C. 1324a(a)(1), (2). The objective of
this statute is to eliminate the ‘‘magnet’’
effect of employment opportunities that
induces aliens to enter or remain in the
United States illegally. DHS exercises
investigative and prosecutorial
discretion in enforcing this statute, and
this interpretive rule explains how DHS
will exercise that discretion, and
provides guidance to employers that
wish to limit their risk of liability under
the immigration laws.
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
2. Significant Issues Raised in Public
Comments
Significant issues raised by the public
comments relating to the initial
regulatory flexibility analysis and the
small entities impact analysis are
discussed in section III.D of this
preamble.
3. Description of and Estimate of the
Numbers of Small Entities to Which the
Rule Would Apply
To estimate the small entities affected,
DHS uses the generally accepted Office
of Management and Budget, Economic
Classification Policy Committee, North
American Industrial Classification
(NAIC), pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3504(e),
and the size determinations by the
Small Business Administration (SBA)
for SBA and other programs. 13 CFR
121.101(a); 121.201; 121.902 (size
standards promulgated for SBA
programs and applicable to other agency
programs). The definition of what
constitutes a small business varies from
industry to industry and generally
depends on either the number of
employees working for a business or the
amount of annual revenue a business
earns.
DHS requested information from SSA
to assist in better identifying the number
of small entities that could be expected
to establish safe harbor procedures.
Specifically, DHS requested that SSA
provide the names and addresses of the
companies already identified by SSA in
its preparation to release no-match
letters in September 2007. This raw data
would have permitted DHS to conduct
research to determine the North
American Industry Classification
System industry to which the specific
companies belonged, to research the
annual revenue and/or the number of
employees of these companies through
standard sources, and thus to apply the
appropriate small business size
standards. With these analyses, DHS
anticipated that it would be able to
provide a rough estimate of the number
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
of employers expected to receive a nomatch letter that met the SBA’s
definitions of small businesses.
However, SSA informed DHS that it
was unable to provide DHS with the
names and addresses of the employers
expected to receive a no-match letter,
citing the general legal restrictions on
disclosure of taxpayer return
information under section 6103 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26
U.S.C. 6103. DHS also approached the
Government Accountability Office
(GAO) and the Small Business
Administration, Office of Advocacy, to
seek any data that these agencies might
be able to provide, and to consult about
the analysis to be included in this IRFA.
GAO supplied some additional data, but
SBA informed DHS that it had no dataother than general small business
census data-that was relevant to this
rulemaking and that could assist in the
analysis for purposes of this IRFA.
Consequently, DHS does not have the
data necessary to determine the precise
number of small entities expected to
receive a no-match letter.
Nevertheless, SSA was able to provide
some general information. SSA
provided a table showing a distribution
of the number of employers that were
slated to receive a no-match letter for
Tax Year 2006, according to the number
of Form W–2s filed by the employer. As
this data did not exclude small entities,
DHS believes that the universe of small
entities that would have received a nomatch letter for Tax Year 2006 is
contained within the table that SSA
provided. Even though this data did not
provide the number of small entities,
this data was useful to DHS while
conducting the small entity impact
analysis contained in the docket. See
ICEB–2006–0004–0232, Exhibit A.5.
DHS was not able to determine what
share of the affected small entities
would be small businesses, small nonprofit organizations, or small
governmental jurisdictions. Absent
some reason to believe small non-profits
or small governmental jurisdictions
might implement the rule’s safe harbor
procedures differently from private
employers, the cost structure for such
entities would be no different from
small firms. DHS is unaware of any data
to suggest there would be a difference,
and the public comments did not
suggest there would be any difference.
4. Proposed Reporting, Recordkeeping,
and Other Compliance Requirements
The proposed rule suggests, but does
not require, that employers retain
records of their efforts to resolve SSA
no-match letters. This suggestion is
based on the possible need of an
PO 00000
Frm 00020
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
employer to demonstrate the actions
taken to respond to a no-match letter if
and when ICE agents audit or
investigate that employer’s compliance
with INA section 274A, 8 U.S.C. 1324a.
While the rule encourages employers to
document their eligibility for the safe
harbor by keeping a record of their
actions, the rule does not impose any
requirement for an employer to make or
retain any new documentation or
records.
Companies that choose to adopt the
safe harbor procedures in the rule
would reasonably be expected to incur
costs related to administering and
implementing those procedures.
Company-level costs could include the
labor cost for human resources
personnel, certain training costs, legal
services, and lost productivity. A
detailed analysis of safe harbor-related
costs that companies may incur is
contained in the Small Entity Impact
Analysis available in the docket of this
rulemaking. While several commenters
have expressed concerns about the costs
to businesses relating to the termination
and replacement of unauthorized
workers, DHS finds that those costs
cannot properly be considered costs of
this rule. The INA expressly prohibits
employers from knowingly hiring or
knowingly continuing to employ an
alien who is not authorized to work in
the United States. If an employer
performs the due diligence described in
the rule, and loses the services of
unauthorized employees as a result,
those costs of terminating and/or
replacing illegal workers are attributable
to the INA, not to this rule.
Table 1, below, summarizes the
average cost per firm that DHS estimates
will be incurred by businesses that
receive a no-match letter and choose to
adopt the safe harbor procedures set
forth in this rule. Because DHS does not
have adequate data to estimate the
percentage of unauthorized employees
whose SSNs are listed on no-match
letters, for the purpose of this analysis,
DHS estimated costs based on various
ratios of authorized to unauthorized
workers (i.e., 20% unauthorized—80%
authorized). As Table 1 shows, the
expected costs of adopting the safe
harbor procedures in this rule are
relatively small on an average cost per
firm basis. In interpreting these costs,
these estimates were based on a series
of assumptions which are explained in
detail in the small entity impact
analysis included in the docket.
Consequently, the costs a specific firm
incurs may be higher or lower than the
average firm costs estimated in Table 1.
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
63863
TABLE 1—TOTAL COSTS PER FIRM BY EMPLOYMENT SIZE CLASS
Percentage of current no-match employees
assumed to be unauthorized
Employment size class
10
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
5–9 ...........................................................................................................
10–19 .......................................................................................................
20–49 .......................................................................................................
50–99 .......................................................................................................
100–499 ...................................................................................................
500+ .........................................................................................................
Table 1 does not reflect the
termination or replacement costs of
unauthorized workers. The termination
and replacement of unauthorized
employees will impose a burden on
employers, but INA section 274A(a)(1),
(2), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(a)(1), (2), expressly
prohibits employers from knowingly
hiring or knowingly continuing to
employ an alien who is not authorized
to work in the United States.
Accordingly, costs that result from
employers’ knowledge of their workers’
illegal status are attributable to the
Immigration and Nationality Act, not to
the August 2007 Final Rule or this
supplemental proposed rule, and its
provision of a safe harbor. Similarly,
any costs incurred by seasonal
employers that face difficulties in hiring
new employees in the place of
unauthorized workers whose SSNs were
previously listed on SSA no-match
letters are attributable to the
Immigration and Nationality Act bar to
knowingly hiring workers who are not
authorized to work in the United States.
In summary, DHS does not believe
that this safe harbor rule imposes any
mandate that forces employers to incur
‘‘compliance’’ costs for purposes of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. Even
assuming that the safe harbor rule
requires certain action on the part of
employers that receive no-match letters,
DHS does not believe that the direct
costs incurred by employers that choose
to adopt the safe harbor procedures set
forth in this rule would create a
significant economic impact when
considered on an average cost per firm
basis. To the extent that some small
entities incur direct costs that are
substantially higher than the average
estimated costs, however, those
employers could reasonably be expected
to face a significant economic impact.
As discussed above, DHS does not
consider the cost of complying with
preexisting immigration statutes to be a
direct cost of this rulemaking. Thus,
while some employers may find the
costs incurred in replacing employees
that are not authorized to work in the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
20
40
60
80
$4,560
4,847
6,818
8,890
24,785
36,624
$4,454
4,716
6,597
8,582
23,426
34,496
$4,244
4,455
6,155
7,966
20,709
30,239
$4,033
4,194
5,712
7,350
17,992
25,983
$3,822
3,933
5,270
6,734
15,274
21,726
United States to be economically
significant, those costs of complying
with the Immigration and Nationality
Act are not direct costs attributable to
this rule. DHS has not formally certified
the rule as not having a ‘‘significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities’’ as allowed
under section 605(b) of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. Instead, DHS has
prepared this Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis as described in the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 604.
5. Significant Alternatives Considered
DHS has considered several
alternatives to the proposed rule. For
the most part, however, the alternatives
would not provide employers with
necessary guidance and assurances
against liability under the INA, nor
would the alternatives improve
employers’ compliance with INA
section 274A, 8 U.S.C. 1324a.
a. No action. Taking no action to
clarify employers’ responsibilities under
INA section 274A, 8 U.S.C. 1324a, was
considered. Taking no action, however,
would not resolve any of the problems
identified and addressed by this
proposed rule. Employers will remain
confused and unsure how to act to
resolve no-match letters in a manner
consistent with their responsibilities
under current immigration law, and will
continue to face possible liability based
in part on their failure to respond to nomatch letters. Employers would
continue to employ aliens unauthorized
to work under federal immigration law.
b. Specific industry or sector
limitations. DHS considered limiting the
proposed rule to specific industries
previously noted to be at high-risk of
abuse of Social Security numbers in
employment, including agriculture,
services and construction. See, e.g.,
Government Accountability Office,
Social Security: Better Coordination
among Federal Agencies Could Reduce
Unidentified Earnings Reports,
Administrative Record at 400 (GAO
analysis of SSA data noting 17% of ESF
filings by eating and drinking places;
10% by construction, and 7% by
PO 00000
Frm 00021
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
agriculture). DHS also considered
promulgating a rule that applied only to
critical infrastructure employers
because of the increased need to prevent
identity fraud by employees in high-risk
facilities. None of these alternatives was
acceptable because none addresses the
larger population of aliens working
without authorization or the need for
clear guidance for employers in other
sectors of the economy. These
alternatives would also offer unfairly
selective assurances to employers in
certain sectors against liability under
INA section 274A, while depriving
other employers of the same protection.
Focusing on the three economic
sectors with the most egregious
violations of the immigration laws
might have had an impact on a
significant portion of the alien
population that illegally enters the
United States to work. As discussed
more fully in the small entity impact
analysis in the docket, the degree to
which specific industry sectors violate
the bar to employment of unauthorized
aliens is, however, speculative. DHS
does not have access to the data files
indicating the number of employers by
industry sector who would receive nomatch letters under current SSA
policies. DHS requested industry-sectorspecific data from SSA but was
informed that SSA does not possess this
data. Non-empirical, anecdotal
evidence, such as the admissions of the
President of the Western Growers’
Association, supra, that between 50 to
80% of their employees are
unauthorized aliens, is a less reliable
guide for agency action than empirical
evidence. Even if such anecdotal
evidence is sufficient to guide decisions
about investigation and enforcement
priorities, it is not an adequate basis for
limiting the effect of formal agency
guidance to a specific sector of the
economy. Partial enforcement tends,
moreover, as a matter of experience, to
have the effect of redirecting
unauthorized workers into areas where
the law is unenforced or underenforced.
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
63864
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
A critical-infrastructure approach
provided other benefits, focusing on
high-risk facilities and organizations.
Critical infrastructure encompasses,
however, segments of industries that are
not entirely discrete. Focusing on
critical infrastructure would have had
salutary effects in certain areas, but the
inefficiencies and inequities that result
from other types of partial enforcement
would remain unchanged. Moreover,
DHS has already taken, and continues to
take, other steps in working with critical
infrastructure partners to improve
employer compliance with the INA and
reduce the employment of aliens not
authorized to work in the United States.
Another variation suggested that DHS
adopt special provisions for short-term,
seasonal, or intermittent employees and
employers that have high turnover rates.
This variation applies, as the
commenter pointed out and DHS has
previously noted, to the agriculture,
construction, and service sectors (such
as restaurants or hotels). The commenter
particularly noted that agricultural
employers hire many employees for 60day periods and, because SSA sends nomatch letters on an annual W–2 wage
reporting basis, most of these letters will
arrive long after the term of employment
has ended. The commenter further
suggested that, because the employee no
longer works for the employer, the
employer’s responsibilities should end
there. The commenter requested that
DHS clarify that employers are not
required to track and contact past
employees for whom they receive nomatch letters.
DHS agrees with certain points made
by the commenter, but disagrees with
the commenter’s suggested alternative.
The commenter is correct that when an
employee is terminated, the employer
does not have any further responsibility
for tracking down the employee and
resolving the mismatch. DHS does not
agree, however, that this scenario
requires any special rule. The focus of
this rulemaking is on reinforcing the
INA’s prohibition on continued
employment of aliens not authorized to
work in the United States. The issue of
whether an employer acquires
constructive knowledge from receipt of
a no-match letter or possesses
constructive knowledge at a later time
when the employer hires the same
employee for another cycle of work is
not addressed by this rule. Employers’
hiring practices must comply with the
INA, and no safe harbor or specific
guidance is offered by this rule.
Most significantly, none of the
alternatives for limiting or tailoring the
applicability of the rule to specific
industries or sectors would mitigate the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
rule’s impact on small business.
Accordingly, DHS rejected the industryspecific approach as insufficient to
accomplish the goal of improving
overall employer compliance with
immigration law and reducing the
population of aliens illegally working in
the United States, and as ineffective in
limiting the impact on small employers.
c. Phased implementation for small
employers. DHS considered phasing in
the implementation of the rule by
delaying its applicability to small
entities. Comments suggested that by
imposing the rule on large entities first,
many of the errors thought to exist in
the SSA database could be corrected
over time and best practices for
resolving no-matches could be
developed. A commenter suggested that
this experience could then be used to
ease small entities into the process. The
commenter suggested that large entities
(including both private sector and
governmental employers) that receive
no-match letters have sophisticated
human resources departments that are
capable of handling no-match letters,
but that small entities with limited
human resources capacity do not have
this capacity.
DHS has concluded, after further
review, that such an approach would
still harm, not help, small employers.
All employers, including small entities,
are already subject to the legal
obligation not to knowingly employ
unauthorized workers and the
constructive knowledge standard for
employer liability, both of which flow
from the INA. DHS cannot exempt small
entities from the INA, and so delaying
the applicability of this rule for small
entities would not excuse small
employers from their existing legal
obligations. Instead, limiting the
guidance and the safe harbor protection
offered in this rule to large employers
would effectively leave small employers
exposed to greater liability risk and
would not address the illegal
employment of unauthorized aliens by
small employers.
d. Extended time allowance for small
employers. DHS also considered further
extending the time periods in the rule
for small employers that wish to obtain
the protection of the safe harbor to
check their internal records to confirm
the no-matches were not the result of
some administrative error by the
employer. Several commenters
supported this alternative, with some
suggesting that small employers in rural
areas may find their employees have
difficulty resolving their mismatches
with SSA. Proposed alternatives
included providing small entities with
180 days to complete the steps outlined
PO 00000
Frm 00022
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
in the rule, or establishing a tiered
approach with different timeframes
based on the size of the employer (with
smaller employers receiving more time
to comply), or based on the distance to
the local SSA office. One commenter
also suggested that DHS consider
suspending the running of the
timeframes when an employee is
actively working with SSA to correct the
discrepancy. DHS considered each of
these variations, but does not believe
that they would provide meaningful
benefit to small employers or maintain
the rule’s effectiveness.
The timeframes set forth in the
August 2007 Final Rule were extended
significantly from those contained in the
proposed rule published in 2006, in
response to comments from large and
small employers expressing concern
that the timeframes initially proposed
were too short. In particular, the time
allotted for an employer to review its
own records for errors was doubled
from 14 days to 30 days. The
commenters provided no evidence that
small employers, with small payrolls,
would need more time to review their
records than would large organizations
with thousands of employees. Several
comments submitted during this
supplemental rulemaking suggested
DHS extend the timeframe for an
employee to resolve a mismatch with
SSA, citing distance to the nearest SSA
office as a concern for workers in rural
areas. But the comments provided no
evidence or concrete support for the
claim that the 90 days allotted under the
rule would be insufficient. SSA has
approximately 1,300 local offices
nation-wide, and provides public
assistance in locating the closest office
both on-line and by telephone, along
with advice on the documents required
to resolve a mismatch.
Moreover, undue extension of the
time period for an employee to resolve
his or her mismatch would substantially
weaken the effectiveness of the rule by
frustrating employers’ ability to be
confident in the legal status of their
workers. If the timeline in the rule were
extended to 180 days, for example,
unauthorized workers (possibly with
encouragement from unscrupulous
employers) would be more likely to
simply go through the motions of
contacting SSA in order to extend their
time on the job for a full six months,
while law-abiding employers that
suspect, but lack conclusive proof, that
some of their employees are illegally
working without authorization would be
forced to stand by and worry that the
listed employees may leave without
warning or that the employer might be
subject to a worksite enforcement or
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
investigation effort by ICE. The
suggestion to suspend the running of the
timeframes while an employee is
‘‘actively’’ working to resolve his
mismatch suffers from these same flaws
and adds another: There would be no
clear way for either the employer or
DHS to determine whether an employee
had in fact been actively working in
good faith to resolve the mismatch, and
an employer could not be confident that
its conduct met the requirements for the
safe harbor, effectively eviscerating the
value of the rule for law-abiding
employers.
e. Mandatory steps without
assurances of safe harbor. DHS also
considered requiring all employers to
take specific actions whenever they
received a no-match letter and their
records indicated that a social security
number was used in Form I–9
processing. Requiring employers to take
affirmative steps to resolve social
security no-match letters (as outlined as
discretionary steps in the proposed rule)
could result in fuller compliance with
the prohibition against employment of
aliens who are not authorized to work
in the United States. But such a
mandatory scheme implies that the
steps set forth in the rule are the only
reasonable response to a SSA no-match
letter, a conclusion that cannot be
supported by the evidence currently
before DHS. Furthermore, the relative
gains from a mandatory scheme, in the
absence of additional statutory authority
to impose sanctions for violations of
that mandate, are likely to be very small.
Employers that consciously or
recklessly violate the INA will not alter
their behavior under either a mandatory
or voluntary safe harbor regime, while
responsible employers that want to
comply with the INA will benefit from
the guidance provided in the proposed
safe harbor rule and will improve their
hiring and employment practices to
ensure compliance with the INA.
f. Elimination of the time limit for
resolving no-matches. One commenter
suggested that DHS adopt what was
described as a simpler, more
straightforward rule for small entities
that receive a no-match letter, in which
the employer would: (1) Complete an
internal investigation to determine
whether the source of the discrepancy is
the employer’s own clerical error; (2) if
not, inform the affected employee of the
discrepancy; and, (3) if the employee
challenges the discrepancy, require
proof that the employee has been in
contact with SSA to resolve the
discrepancy. Under this scenario, the
commenter suggested that a reasonable
employer could assume that the
employee was resolving the discrepancy
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
with SSA and need not inquire further
unless another no-match letter was
received the following year (or some
other adverse information arose). The
commenter suggested that this approach
would reduce the burden on small
entities. The commenter also believed
that this would eliminate what it
perceived to be a presumption that
receipt of a no-match letter puts the
employer on notice that the employee
may be unauthorized to work in the
United States.
This alternative essentially eliminates
the timeline for an employee to resolve
the mismatch, and deprives the
employer of any assurance that the
questions raised by the no-match letter
have been answered. The comment also
mistakenly assumes that such a rule
would negate the well-established factconceded in the record of this
rulemaking even by this rule’s
opponents and endorsed by the district
court in the ongoing litigation over this
rule-that a no-match letter is a legitimate
indicator of possible illegal work by
unauthorized aliens. Such a rule would
offer a carte blanche safe harbor to
employers without requiring the
employer to take any meaningful steps
to answer the questions raised by the
employees’ appearance on a no-match
letter. DHS cannot give the benefit of a
safe harbor when there is no assurance
that the mismatch has been resolved.
g. DHS resolution of no-matches. A
commenter suggested that DHS, rather
than employers and employees, resolve
mismatches involving the employees of
small entities. The commenter suggested
that small entities could be sent to DHS
for investigation of any mismatches that
remained unresolved after the rule’s
timeframe expired. The commenter
argued that such a system would give
DHS notice of the existence of the nomatch discrepancy, but not require that
the employee be terminated until DHS
has had an opportunity to investigate
the matter. A variation on this
alternative suggested that DHS create a
special office or appoint an
‘‘ombudsman’’ to assist employees in
resolving ‘‘no-matches’’ where the
employee has been unable to resolve
within the requisite timeframe. The
commenter suggested that such an
approach could lead to an intragovernmental correction process with
direct lines of communication to
investigate no-matches and correct the
SSA database, relieving employers and
protect authorized employees from
automatic termination.
This alternative is not practically
feasible. DHS does not have access to
the information contained in no-match
letters, nor does DHS have the personal
PO 00000
Frm 00023
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
63865
information about individual employees
that SSA needs to resolve mismatches.
Taken to its logical end, this is a
proposal to eliminate the SSA no-match
letter program entirely-an undertaking
that is far beyond DHS’s regulatory
competence.
6. Minimization of Impact
The RFA requires that an agency
provide ‘‘a description of the steps the
agency has taken to minimize the
significant economic impact on small
entities consistent with the stated
objectives of applicable statutes * * *’’
5 U.S.C. 604(a)(5). This requirement
presumes that the agency finds that the
rule will have a significant economic
impact on small entities and is normally
treated in conjunction with the
discussion of alternatives (see above)
required by paragraph (a)(5). Although
DHS, after reviewing the record, does
not make a finding that the rule will
have a significant economic impact on
small entities, DHS believes that
explaining the existing means by which
a small entity may minimize any impact
of the rule, and certain additional steps
that DHS is taking to assist them, will
be useful to small entities.
(1) DHS and its subsidiary
components ICE and United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), already provide substantial
support for employers that wish to
ensure the work eligibility of their
workforce. The primary tool DHS makes
available to employers is the E-Verify
program, which is an Internet-based
system for electronically verifying
employment eligibility that is operated
by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), in partnership with
the SSA. The requirements for obtaining
access to E-Verify and procedures for
the use of E-Verify are established by
DHS and USCIS. Before an employer
can participate in the E-Verify program,
the employer must enter into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with DHS that sets out certain features
of the program and enumerates specific
responsibilities of DHS, SSA, and the
employer. This MOU requires
employers to agree to abide by current
legal hiring procedures and to ensure
that no employee will be unfairly
discriminated against as a result of the
E-Verify program. Employers
participating in E-Verify must still
complete an Employment Eligibility
Verification Form (Form I–9) for each
newly hired employee, as required
under current law. Following
completion of the Form I–9, however,
the employer enters the employee’s
information into the E-Verify Web site,
and that information is then checked
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
63866
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
against information contained in SSA
and USCIS databases to confirm the
employee’s work eligibility with much
greater rigor than is possible with the
Form I–9 process alone.
E-Verify first sends the information to
SSA for verification of the name, SSN,
and date of birth, and SSA confirms
these elements as well as U.S.
citizenship based on the information in
SSA records. USCIS also verifies
through database checks that any nonUnited States citizen employee is in an
employment-authorized immigration
status. E-Verify will then confirm the
employee is employment-eligible.
If the information provided by the
employee matches the information in
the SSA and USCIS records, no further
action will generally be required, and
the employee may continue
employment. E-Verify procedures
require only that the employer record on
the Employment Eligibility Verification
Form I–9 the verification ID number and
result obtained from the E-Verify query,
or print a copy of the transaction record
and retain it with the Form I–9.
Verification of the employee’s name and
SSN through E-Verify sharply reduces
the likelihood that individuals checked
through E-Verify will appear on an SSA
no-match letter.15
(2) In addition, the ICE Mutual
Agreement between Government and
Employers (IMAGE) program permits
companies to reduce unauthorized
employment and the use of fraudulent
identity documents, thereby reducing
the likelihood of receiving a no-match
letter. As part of the IMAGE program,
ICE and USCIS provide education and
training on proper hiring procedures,
fraudulent document detection, use of
15 E-Verify also provides a thorough procedure for
contesting and correcting records. If SSA is unable
to verify information presented by the employee,
the employer will receive an ‘‘SSA Tentative
Nonconfirmation’’ notice. Similarly, if USCIS is
unable to verify information presented by the
employee, the employer will receive a ‘‘DHS
Tentative Nonconfirmation’’ notice. Tentative
nonconfirmation notices issues are issued for a
variety of reasons, including mismatches of name,
date of birth, invalid SSNs, mismatches in
citizenship status or alien work authorization status
or if a death indicator is present in SSA’s database.
If the individual’s information does not match the
SSA or USCIS records, the employee may contest
the tentative nonconfirmation. To contest the
tentative nonconfirmation, the employee must
contact SSA or USCIS within eight federal
government work days to try to resolve the
discrepancy. Under the E-Verify program
requirements, the employer is prohibited from
terminating or otherwise taking adverse action
against an employee who has contested a tentative
nonconfirmation while he or she awaits a final
resolution from the federal government. If the
employee fails to contest the tentative
nonconfirmation, or if SSA or USCIS concludes that
the individual is not work authorized, the employer
will receive a notice of final nonconfirmation and
the employee may be terminated.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
the E-Verify employment verification
program, and anti-discrimination
procedures.
ICE provides employers in IMAGE
with an ‘‘I–9 audit.’’ This free audit is
similar to the services commercially
provided by law firms and others for a
fee.
IMAGE also provides employers with
a catalogue of ‘‘best practices’’
including:
• Use of E-Verify for all hiring.
• Establish an internal training
program, with annual updates, on how
to manage completion of Form I–9
(Employee Eligibility Verification
Form), how to detect fraudulent use of
documents in the I–9 process, and how
to use E-Verify.
• Permit the I–9 Employment
Eligibility Verification and E-Verify
process to be conducted only by
individuals who have received this
training—and include a secondary
review as part of each employee’s
verification to minimize the potential
for a single individual to subvert the
process.
• Arrange for annual I–9 audits by an
external auditing firm or a trained
employee not otherwise involved in the
I–9 and electronic verification process.
• Establish a self-reporting procedure
for reporting to ICE any violations or
discovered deficiencies.
• Establish a protocol for responding
to no-match letters received from the
Social Security Administration.
• Establish a Tip Line for employees
to report activity relating to the
employment of unauthorized aliens, and
a protocol for responding to employee
tips.
• Establish and maintain safeguards
against use of the verification process
for unlawful discrimination.
• Establish a protocol for assessing
the adherence to the ‘‘best practices’’
guidelines by the company’s
contractors/subcontractors.
• Submit an annual report to ICE to
track results and assess the effect of
participation in the IMAGE program.
To help ensure the accuracy of their
wage reporting, ICE assists employers
participating in the IMAGE program to
verify the Social Security numbers of
their existing labor force through SSA’s
Social Security Number Verification
Service (SSNVS). IMAGE participants
also verify work eligibility of their new
hires through E-Verify. All of these steps
reduce the potential for employer
created errors in wage submittals to the
IRS and SSA, reducing the potential for
the employer to receive a no-match
letter. See https://www.ice.gov/partners/
opaimage/index.htm.
PO 00000
Frm 00024
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
This rule will not result in the
expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more
in one year, and it would not
significantly or uniquely affect small
governments. Therefore, no actions were
deemed necessary under the provisions
of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995, Public Law 104–4, 109 Stat. 48
(1995), 2 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.
D. Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
This rule is not a major rule as
defined by section 804 of the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Act of
1996, Public Law 104–121, 804, 110
Stat. 847, 872 (1996), 5 U.S.C. 804(2).
This rule has not been found to be likely
to result in an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more; a
major increase in costs or prices; or
significant adverse effects on
competition, employment, investment,
productivity, innovation, or on the
ability of United States-based
companies to compete with foreignbased companies in domestic or foreign
markets.
E. Executive Order 12,866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review)
Because this rule considers interests
of a number of different agencies and
provides guidance to the public as a
statement of policy or interpretive rule,
the final rule was referred to the Office
of Management and Budget pursuant to
Executive Order 12866, as amended.
Multiple agencies reviewed and
considered the draft. This rule reflects
that consultation. OMB has determined
that this rule will not have an effect on
the economy of more than $100 million.
F. Executive Order 13,132 (Federalism)
This rule does not have substantial
direct effects on the States, on the
relationship between the National
Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Therefore, in
accordance with section 6 of Executive
Order No. 13,132, 64 FR 43,255 (Aug. 4,
1999), this rule does not have sufficient
federalism implications to warrant the
preparation of a federalism summary
impact statement.
G. Executive Order 12,988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
This rule meets the applicable
standards set forth in sections 3(a) and
3(b)(2) of Executive Order No.12,988, 61
FR 4729 (Feb. 5, 1996).
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
H. Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq., all
agencies are required to submit to OMB,
for review and approval, any reporting
requirements inherent in a rule. While
employers seeking to establish
eligibility for the safe harbor are
encouraged to keep a record of their
actions, this rule does not impose any
additional information collection
burden or affect information currently
collected by ICE.
List of Subjects in 8 CFR Part 274a
Administrative practice and
procedure, Aliens, Employment,
Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
■ Accordingly, for the reasons stated in
the preamble to this supplemental final
rule, the Department of Homeland
Security reaffirms the text of the final
rule issued on August 15, 2007, 72 FR
45611, and makes one typographical
correction as set forth below:
PART 274a—CONTROL OF
EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS
1. The authority citation for part 274a
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 1324a; 8
CFR part 2.
§ 274a.1
2. In § 274a.1(l)(2)(iii) remove the
phrase ‘‘(l)(2)(i)(B)’’ and add in its place
the phrase ‘‘(l)(2)(i)(C)’’.
■
Michael Chertoff,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8–25544 Filed 10–27–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111–28–P
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service
9 CFR Parts 71, 83, and 93
[Docket No. APHIS–2007–0038]
RIN 0579–AC74
Viral Hemorrhagic Septicemia;
Interstate Movement and Import
Restrictions on Certain Live Fish
Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service, USDA.
ACTION: Interim rule; delay of effective
date.
ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: On September 9, 2008, we
published an interim rule in the Federal
Register (73 FR 52173–52189) to restrict
the interstate movement and
14:54 Oct 27, 2008
Jkt 217001
The effective date for the interim
rule amending 9 CFR parts 71, 83, and
93, published at 73 FR 52173–52189 on
September 9, 2008, is delayed until
January 9, 2009.
DATES:
Dr.
P. Gary Egrie, Senior Staff Veterinary
Medical Officer, National Center for
Animal Health Programs, VS, APHIS,
4700 River Road Unit 46, Riverdale, MD
20737–1231; (301) 734–0695; or Dr.
Peter L. Merrill, Senior Staff
Veterinarian, National Center for Import
and Export, VS, APHIS, 4700 River
Road Unit 39, Riverdale, MD 20737–
1231; (301) 734–8364.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Viral hemorrhagic septicemia (VHS) is
a highly contagious disease of certain
freshwater and saltwater fish, caused by
a rhabdovirus. It is listed as a notifiable
disease by the World Organization for
Animal Health. The pathogen produces
variable clinical signs in fish including
lethargy, skin darkening, exophthalmia,
pale gills, a distended abdomen, and
external and internal hemorrhaging. The
development of the disease in infected
fish can result in substantial mortality.
Other infected fish may not show any
clinical signs or die, but may be lifelong
carriers and shed the virus.
On September 9, 2008, we published
an interim rule in the Federal Register
(73 FR 52173–52189, Docket No.
APHIS–2007–0038) to amend 9 CFR
parts 71, 83, and 93 by establishing
regulations to restrict the interstate
movement and the importation into the
United States of certain live fish species
that are susceptible to VHS. We
announced that the provisions of the
interim rule would become effective
November 10, 2008, and that we would
consider all comments on the interim
rule received on or before November 10,
2008, and all comments on the
environmental assessment for the
interim rule received on or before
October 9, 2008.
PO 00000
Frm 00025
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Delay of Effective Date
Since publication of the interim rule,
we have received comments that
address a variety of issues. These issues
include the feasibility of the
requirement in the interim rule for a
visual inspection of regulated fish 72
hours prior to shipment, the provision
that Interstate Certificates of Inspection
allowing interstate movement of live
fish will be valid for 30 days from the
date of issuance, and the provision that
laboratory testing is valid for 30 days
from the date of sample collection for
fish held in a water source that is not
a secure water source.
Based on our review of the comments
received to date, we consider it
advisable to delay the effective date of
the interim rule from November 10,
2008, until January 9, 2009, while
retaining November 10, 2008, as the
close of the comment period for the
interim rule and October 9, 2008, as the
close of the comment period for the
environmental assessment. This
additional time will allow APHIS to
consider all comments and make some
adjustments to the interim rule that may
be necessary in order to successfully
implement it.
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1622 and 8301–8317;
21 U.S.C. 136 and 136a; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 7
CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.4.
Background
[Amended]
VerDate Aug<31>2005
importation into the United States of
live fish that are susceptible to viral
hemorrhagic septicemia, a highly
contagious disease of certain freshwater
and saltwater fish. That interim rule was
scheduled to become effective on
November 10, 2008. We are delaying the
effective date of the interim rule until
January 9, 2009. This delay will provide
APHIS with time to consider all
comments and make some adjustments
to the interim rule that may be
necessary in order to successfully
implement it.
63867
Done in Washington, DC, this 22nd day of
October 2008.
Kevin Shea,
Acting Administrator, Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service.
[FR Doc. E8–25663 Filed 10–27–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410–34–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 25 and 121
[Docket No. FAA–2006–26722; Amendment
Nos. 25–127, 121–341]
RIN 2120–AI66
Security Related Considerations in the
Design and Operation of Transport
Category Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The rule adopts several
standards of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and
requires manufacturers to incorporate
certain security features in the design of
new transport category airplanes.
Specifically, manufacturers of affected
E:\FR\FM\28OCR1.SGM
28OCR1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 209 (Tuesday, October 28, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 63843-63867]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-25544]
========================================================================
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
Prices of new books are listed in the first FEDERAL REGISTER issue of each
week.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 209 / Tuesday, October 28, 2008 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 63843]]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
8 CFR Part 274a
[DHS Docket No. ICEB-2006-0004; ICE 2377-06]
[RIN 1653-AA50]
Safe Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match
Letter: Clarification; Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
AGENCY: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DHS.
ACTION: Supplemental final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is finalizing the
Supplemental Proposed Rule published on March 26, 2008 and reaffirming
regulations providing a ``safe harbor'' from liability under section
274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act for employers that follow
certain procedures after receiving a notice--either a ``no-match
letter'' from the Social Security Administration (SSA), or a ``notice
of suspect document'' from DHS--that casts doubt on the employment
eligibility of their employees. DHS is also correcting a typographical
error in the rule text promulgated in August 2007.
DATES: This final rule is effective as of October 28, 2008.
ADDRESSES: The comments on the supplemental proposed rule and the
proposed rule on docket DHS Docket No. ICEB-2006-0004, may be reviewed
by one of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
In person at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 500
12th St., SW., 5th Floor, Washington DC 20024. Contact Joe Jeronimo,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Telephone: 202-732-3978 (not
a toll-free number) for an appointment.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe Jeronimo, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, 500 12th St., SW., 5th Floor, Washington DC 20024.
Telephone: 202-732-3978 (not a toll-free number).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Docket
II. Background
A. History of the Rulemaking
B. Purpose of the Rulemaking
C. Supplemental Final Rule
1. Authority to Promulgate the Rule
2. ``Reasoned Analysis'' Supporting Perceived Change in Policy
Reflected in the Final Rule
3. Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the INA
4. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
III. Public Comments and Responses
A. Authority To Promulgate the Rule
B. ``Reasoned Analysis'' Supporting Perceived Change in Policy
Reflected in the Final Rule
C. Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the INA
D. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1. Scope of Regulatory Flexibility Act Review
2. Direct and Indirect Impact
3. Baseline Costs, Unauthorized Alien Workers, and the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
4. Variability of SSA Criteria for Issuing No-Match Letters
5. Base Assumptions Made in the IRFA and SEIA
6. Opportunity and Productivity Costs
7. Human Resources and Employee Tracking
8. Other Costs
9. Rehiring Seasonal Employees
10. Conclusions
E. Further Interpretation of the August 2007 Final Rule
F. Other Comments Received
IV. Changes Made in Republishing the Final Rule
V. Statutory and Regulatory Reviews
A. Administrative Procedure Act
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
1. Need for, Objectives of, and Reasons Why the Rule is Being
Considered
2. Significant Issues Raised in Public Comments
3. Description of and Estimate of the Numbers of Small Entities
to Which the Rule Would Apply
4. Proposed Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements
5. Significant Alternatives Considered
6. Minimization of Impact
C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
D. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
E. Executive Order 12,866 (Regulatory Planning and Review)
F. Executive Order 13,132 (Federalism)
G. Executive Order 12,988 (Civil Justice Reform)
H. Paperwork Reduction Act
PART 274a--CONTROL OF EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS
I. Docket
Comments on the supplemental proposed rule, the proposed rule, and
the Small Entity Impact Analysis may be viewed online at https://
www.regulations.gov (docket ICEB-2006-0004), or in person at U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security,
500 12th St., SW., 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20024, by appointment. To
make an appointment to review the docket, call telephone number 202-
732-3979 (not a toll-free number).
II. Background
A. History of the Rulemaking
DHS published a proposed rule in June 2006 that proposed a method
for employers to limit the risk of being found to have knowingly
employed unauthorized aliens after receiving a letter from the SSA--
known as a ``no-match letter''--notifying them of mismatches between
names and social security numbers provided by their employees and the
information in SSA's database, or after receiving a letter from DHS--
called a ``notice of suspect document''--that casts doubt on their
employees' eligibility to work. 71 FR 34281 (June 14, 2006). A sixty-
day public comment period ended on August 14, 2006.
DHS received approximately 5,000 comments on the proposed rule from
a variety of sources, including labor unions, not-for-profit advocacy
organizations, industry trade groups, private attorneys, businesses,
and other interested organizations and individuals. The comments varied
considerably; some commenters strongly supported the rule as proposed,
and others were critical of the proposed rule and suggested changes.
See https://www.regulations.gov, docket number ICEB-2006-0004.
DHS published a final rule on August 15, 2007, setting out safe
harbor procedures for employers that receive SSA no-match letters or
DHS notices. 72 FR 45611 (Aug. 15, 2007). Each comment received was
reviewed and considered in the preparation of the August 2007 Final
Rule. The August
[[Page 63844]]
2007 Final Rule addressed the comments by issue rather than by
referring to specific commenters or comments.
On August 29, 2007, the American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations and others filed suit seeking to enjoin
implementation of the August 2007 Final Rule in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California. AFL-CIO v.
Chertoff, No. 07-4472-CRB, D.E. 1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007). The
district court granted plaintiffs' initial motion for a temporary
restraining order, AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, D.E. 21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31,
2007) (order granting motion for temporary restraining order and
setting schedule for briefing and hearing on preliminary injunction),
and on October 10, 2007 granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction. AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, 552 F.Supp.2d 999 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(order granting motion for preliminary injunction).
The district court concluded that plaintiffs had raised serious
questions about three aspects of the August 2007 Final Rule.
Specifically, the court questioned whether DHS had: (1) Supplied a
reasoned analysis to justify what the court viewed as a change in the
Department's position--that a no-match letter may be sufficient, by
itself, to put an employer on notice, and thus impart constructive
knowledge, that employees referenced in the letter may not be work-
authorized; (2) exceeded its authority (and encroached on the authority
of the Department of Justice (DOJ)) by interpreting the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA), Public Law 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), 8 U.S.C. 1324b;
and (3) violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C 601 et seq.,
by not conducting a regulatory flexibility analysis. 552 F.Supp.2d at
1006. Following its entry of the preliminary injunction, the district
court stayed proceedings in the litigation. See AFL-CIO v. Chertoff,
D.E. 149 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007) (minute entry).
DHS published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking in March
2008 to address the specific issues raised by the court in the
preliminary injunction order. 73 FR 15944, 45, 46-47 (March 26, 2008).
In the supplemental proposed rulemaking, DHS reviewed past government
communications about SSA no-match letters to clarify the history of the
Department's policy on the significance of those letters, and supplied
additional ``reasoned analysis'' in support of the policy set forth in
the rule. 73 FR at 15947-50. DHS also clarified that the authority to
interpret and enforce the anti-discrimination provisions of the IRCA
rests with DOJ, 73 FR at 15950-51, and provided an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis, 73 FR at 15951, 52-54, including a small entities
analysis. Docket ICEB-2006-0004-0233.
The public comment period on the supplemental proposed rule ended
on April 25, 2008. DHS received approximately 2,950 comments on the
supplemental proposed rule from a variety of sources, including labor
unions, not-for-profit advocacy organizations, industry trade groups,
private attorneys, businesses, and other interested organizations and
individuals.
A number of public comments were the product of mass-mailing
campaigns, resulting in DHS receiving identical or nearly identical
electronic filings during the comment period. Other comments included
multiple-signature petition drives that presented a specific point of
view. Many comments expressed opinions on immigration policy generally
but provided little substantive information or supporting documentation
that DHS could use to refine its judgment on the efficacy of the
rulemaking or that was pertinent to the issues raised by the
supplemental proposed rulemaking.
DHS viewed every comment received from a different source as a
separate comment, notwithstanding similarities in wording. When
multiple comments were received from the same source but via different
media (e.g. electronic and mail), DHS attempted to identify and
correlate the comments. DHS reviewed the substance of every comment and
considered the substance of the comments in formulating this final
rule. We summarize the substance of the comments received below.
During the public comment period, DHS received requests that the
comment period be extended. DHS reviewed these requests and concluded
that they presented no novel or difficult issues justifying an
extension of the comment period, particularly in light of the
rulemaking's extensive history, as well as the limited number of issues
raised by the district court and addressed in the supplemental proposed
rule. Accordingly, DHS declines to extend the comment period.
In developing this supplemental final rule, DHS has considered the
entire administrative record of the August 2007 Final Rule, as well as
the record of proceedings in the pending litigation, including
arguments made in the various motions and briefs, and orders of the
district court, that were relevant to the issues addressed in this
action. AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, D.E. 129 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2007)
(certified administrative record); D.E. 146-2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2007
(errata)) (hereinafter ``Administrative Record''). The docket of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California is
a public record and the documents contained therein are available from
the court clerk's office.
After considering the full record, including the comments received
in response to the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, DHS has
made adjustments to the cost calculations in the Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) and prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (FRFA), finalized the additional legal analysis set out in the
supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, and determined that the
rule should issue without change. Therefore this final rule reaffirms
the text of the August 2007 Final Rule without substantive change and
makes one typographical correction.
B. Purpose of the Rulemaking
The Federal Government has been aware for many years that
employment in the United States is a magnet for illegal immigration,
and that a comparison of names and social security numbers submitted by
employers against SSA's data provides an indicator of possible illegal
employment. In 1997, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform found
the following:
Reducing the employment magnet is the linchpin of a
comprehensive strategy to deter unlawful immigration. Economic
opportunity and the prospect of employment remain the most important
draw[s] for illegal migration to this country. Strategies to deter
unlawful entries and visa overstays require both a reliable process
for verifying authorization to work and an enforcement capacity to
ensure that employers adhere to all immigration-related labor
standards.
* * * * *
The Commission concluded that the most promising option for
verifying work authorization is a computerized registry based on the
social security number; it unanimously recommended that such a
system be tested not only for its effectiveness in deterring the
employment of illegal aliens, but also for its protections against
discrimination and infringements on civil liberties and privacy.
* * * * *
The federal government does not have the capacity to match
social security numbers with [Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS)] work authorization data without some of the information
captured on the I-9. Congress should provide sufficient time,
resources, and authorities to permit development of this capability.
U.S. Comm'n on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration
[[Page 63845]]
and Immigrant Policy 113-14, 117 (1997) (emphasis in original);
Administrative Record at 139-140, 143.
Similarly, the Federal Government has been long aware of the
potential for abuse of social security numbers by aliens who are not
authorized to work in the United States. Such abuse has been the
subject of numerous public reports by the Government Accountability
Office and the SSA's Inspector General, as well as congressional
hearings. See, e.g., Administrative Record, at 35-661; Government
Accountability Office, Report to the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Technology and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
Senate, Estimating the Undocumented Population: A ``Grouped Answers''
Approach to Surveying Foreign-Born Respondents (GAO Rept. No. GAO-06-
775, Sept. 2006) (describes alternative means of gathering interview
data from undocumented aliens to reduce the ``question threat'' to some
respondents because they fear that a truthful answer could result in
negative consequences); Subcommittee on Oversight and Subcommittee on
Social Security, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of
Representatives, Social Security Number and Individual Taxpayers
Identification Number Mismatches and Misuse, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
No. 108-53 (March 10, 2004).
The illegal alien population in the United States and the number of
unauthorized workers employed in the United States are both
substantial. See, e.g., J. Passel, Pew Hispanic Center, The Size and
Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.
(March 2006), found at https://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/17.pdf
(estimating approximately 11.2 million illegal aliens in the United
States; approximately 7.2 million illegal aliens in the workforce); M.
Hoefer, N. Rytina & C. Campbell, Office of Immigration Statistics,
Policy Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Estimates of
the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States:
January 2006 (August 2007) found at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
statistics/publications/ill_pe_2006.pdf (estimating unauthorized
population of 11,550,000 as of January 2006).
The scale of the problem that this rule seeks to address--that is,
the unlawful employment of aliens not authorized to work in the United
States--has become more well-defined through the rulemaking and related
litigation. The comments submitted in response to the initial proposed
rule in 2006 by organizations such as Western Growers, and the public
statements by representatives of such organizations, have been
bracingly frank:
In the midst of the combustive debate over immigration reform,
we in agriculture have been forthright about the elephant in
America's living room: Much of our workforce is in the country
illegally--as much as 70%.
T. Nassif, ``Food for Thought,'' The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 20,
2007, at A19. See also Docket ICEB-2006-0004-0145 (August 14, 2006),
Administrative Record at 1306 (comments of the National Council of
Agricultural Employers, suggesting over 76% of agricultural workers are
not authorized to work in the United States). DHS recognizes this
critical fact--that many employers are aware that a substantial portion
of their workforce is unauthorized--and has therefore taken steps
within the Department's existing authorities to assist employers in
complying with the law.
Public and private studies in the administrative record of this
rulemaking make clear that social security no-match letters identify
some portion of unauthorized aliens who are illegally employed in the
United States. One private study concluded that ``most workers with
unmatched SSNs are undocumented immigrants.'' C. Mehta, N. Theodore &
M. Hincapie, Social Security Administration's No-Match Letter Program:
Implications for Immigration Enforcement and Workers' Rights (2003) at
i; Administrative Record at 309, 313.
Based on the rulemaking record and the Department's law enforcement
expertise, DHS finds that there is a substantial connection between
social security no-match letters and the lack of work authorization by
some employees whose SSNs are listed in those letters. While social
security no-match letters do not, by themselves, conclusively establish
that an employee is unauthorized, DHS's (and legacy INS's) interactions
with employers that receive no-match letters have consistently shown
that employers are also aware that an employee's appearance on a no-
match letter may indicate the employee lacks work authorization.
Nevertheless, as Mehta, Theodore & Hincapie found, SSA's no-match
letters currently ``do[] not substantially deter employers from
retaining or hiring undocumented immigrants. Twenty-three percent of
employers retained workers with unmatched SSNs who failed to correct
their information with the SSA.'' C. Mehta, N. Theodore & M. Hincapie,
supra at ii; Administrative Record at 314.
Some employers may fail to respond to no-match letters because they
have consciously made the illegal employment of unauthorized aliens a
key part of their business model or because they conclude that the risk
of an immigration enforcement action is outweighed by the cost of
complying with the immigration laws by hiring only legal workers. See
C. Mehta, N. Theodore & M. Hincapie, supra at 2, 20-30; Administrative
Record at 314, 316, 334-44 (noting employer ``complaints'' over loss of
illegal workforce when employees are asked to correct their SSN
mismatches, as well as the practice by some employers of encouraging
workers to procure new fraudulent documents to provide cover for their
continued employment). DHS's interactions with employers have also
shown that many law-abiding employers are unsure of their obligations
under current immigration law after they receive a no-match letter, and
that some employers fear allegations of anti-discrimination law
violations if they react inappropriately to no-match letters.
In light of these facts, DHS has concluded that additional employer
guidance on how to respond to SSA no-match letters will help law-
abiding employers to comply with the immigration laws. Accordingly, in
this final rule, DHS outlines specific steps that reasonable employers
may take in response to SSA no-match letters, and offers employers that
follow those steps a safe harbor from ICE's use of SSA no-match letters
in any future enforcement action to demonstrate that an employer has
knowingly employed unauthorized aliens in violation of section 274A of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1324a.
C. Supplemental Final Rule
1. Authority to Promulgate the Rule
Congress has delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security the
authority to promulgate regulations that implement, interpret and fill
in the administrative details of the immigration laws. INA section
103(a), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law
107-296, sections 102(a)(3), (b)(1), and (e), 110 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25,
2002) (HSA), as amended, 6 U.S.C. 112(a)(3), (b)(1), and (e). Under
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-45 (1983), the courts afford due deference to agency
interpretations of these laws as reflected in DHS's rules. The
Executive Branch may, as appropriate, announce or change its policies
and statutory
[[Page 63846]]
interpretations through rulemaking actions, so long as the agency's
decisions rest on a ``rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.'' Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
DHS is authorized by the HSA and the INA to investigate and pursue
sanctions against employers that knowingly hire or continue to employ
unauthorized aliens or do not properly verify their employees'
employment eligibility. HSA sections 102(a)(3), 202(3), 441, 442, 6
U.S.C. 112(a)(3), 251, 252; INA section 274A(e), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(e). All
persons or entities that hire, recruit or refer persons for a fee for
employment in the United States must verify the identity and employment
eligibility of all employees hired to work in the United States. INA
section 274A(a)(1)(B), (b)(1), (b)(2) 8 U.S.C. 1324a(a)(1)(B), (b)(1),
(b)(2). Under the INA, this verification is performed by completing an
Employment Eligibility Verification form (Form I-9) for all employees,
including United States citizens. INA section 274A(b)(1), (b)(2), 8
U.S.C. 1324a (b)(1), (b)(2); 8 CFR 274a.2. An employer, or a recruiter
or referrer for a fee, must retain the completed Form I-9 for three
years after hiring, recruiting or referral, or, where the employment
extends longer, for the life of the individual's employment and for one
year following the employee's departure. INA section 274A(b)(3), 8
U.S.C. 1324a(b)(3). These forms are not routinely filed with any
government agency; employers are responsible for maintaining these
records, and they may be requested and reviewed by DHS Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE). See 71 FR 34510 (June 15, 2006).
DHS's authority to investigate and pursue sanctions against
employers that knowingly hire or continue to employ unauthorized aliens
necessarily includes the authority to decide the evidence on which it
will rely in such enforcement efforts. It also includes the authority
to decide the probative value of the available evidence, and the
conditions under which DHS will commit not to rely on certain evidence.
Under the prior regulations, an employer who had received an SSA no-
match letter or DHS letter and was charged with knowing employment of
unauthorized aliens could defend against an inference that the employer
had constructive knowledge of the workers' illegal status by showing
that the employer had concluded, after exercising reasonable care in
response to the SSA no-match letter or DHS letter, that the workers
were in fact work-authorized. 8 CFR 274a.1(l)(1) (2007). Those
regulations, however, provided no detailed guidance on what would
constitute ``reasonable care.'' In the August 2007 Final Rule--as
supplemented by this final rule--DHS announces its interpretation of
INA section 274A and limits its law enforcement discretion by
committing not to use an employer's receipt of and response to an SSA
no-match letter or DHS letter as evidence of constructive knowledge, if
the employer follows the procedures outlined in the rule. This
limitation on DHS's enforcement discretion--this safe harbor--is well
within the rulemaking powers of the Secretary of Homeland Security.
See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 240-41 (2001) (upholding
categorical limitation of agency discretion through rulemaking). This
rule does not affect the authority of SSA to issue no-match letters, or
the authority of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to impose and
collect taxes, or the authority of DOJ to enforce the anti-
discrimination provisions of the INA or adjudicate notices of intent to
fine employers.
The ongoing litigation involving the August 2007 Final Rule does
not constrain DHS's authority to amend and reissue the rule. The
Executive Branch's amendment of regulations in litigation is a natural
evolution in the process of governance. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted:
It is both logical and precedented that an agency can engage in
new rulemaking to correct a prior rule which a court has found
defective. See Center for Science in the Public Interest v. Regan,
727 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Action on Smoking and
Health v. CAB, 713 F.2d 795, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Where an
injunction is based on an interpretation of a prior regulation, the
agency need not seek modification of that injunction before it
initiates new rulemaking to change the regulation.
NAACP, Jefferson County Branch v. Donovan, 737 F.2d 67, 72 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). See generally Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S.
268, 281-82 (1969).
As noted in the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, the
district court enjoined implementation of the August 2007 Final Rule
and the issuance of SSA no-match letters containing an insert drafted
by DHS. AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, D.E. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (preliminary
injunction); 73 FR at 15947. The preliminary injunction did not
prohibit further rulemaking by DHS. The district court subsequently
stayed proceedings in the litigation to allow for further rulemaking.
AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, D.E. 142 (stay motion); 144 (statement of non-
opposition); 149 (minute order staying proceedings pending new
rulemaking) (N.D. Cal. 2007). Accordingly, not only does DHS continue
to have the authority to revise and finalize this rulemaking but the
orders of the district court contemplate such rulemaking action.
2. ``Reasoned Analysis'' Supporting Perceived Change in Policy
Reflected in the Final Rule
An agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to
examine relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a ``rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.'' Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). In its order granting the preliminary
injunction, the district court found that ``DHS has sufficiently
articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.'' 552 F.Supp.2d at 1010. The district court expressed
concerns, however, that DHS had not sufficiently articulated a
rationale for what the court saw as DHS's ``change'' in position on the
significance of SSA no-match letters when promulgating that August 2007
Final Rule. While the district court acknowledged that the preamble to
the August 2007 Final Rule remained consistent with DHS's and legacy
INS's prior informal guidance by ``assur[ing] employers that `an SSA
no-match letter by itself does not impart knowledge that the identified
employees are unauthorized aliens,' '' 559 F.Supp.2d at 1009 (quoting
72 FR 45616), the court concluded that ``DHS decided to change course''
in the text of the August 2007 Final Rule by ``provid[ing] that
constructive knowledge may be inferred if an employer fails to take
reasonable steps after receiving nothing more than a no-match letter.''
Id. Having identified what it believed to be a change in DHS's
position, the court concluded that ``DHS may well have the authority to
change its position, but because DHS did so without a reasoned
analysis, there is at least a serious question whether the agency has
`casually ignored' prior precedent in violation of the APA.'' 552
F.Supp.2d at 1010.
DHS provided in the supplemental proposed rule an extensive review
of the non-precedential correspondence and public reports relating to
the value of SSA no-match letters as an indicator that individuals
listed in a letter may not be authorized to work in the United States
and the obligations of employers to respond to such letters. 73 FR at
15947-48. That review showed that neither the former INS nor DHS had
issued a formal or precedential
[[Page 63847]]
statement of agency policy regarding the significance of SSA no-match
letters, and that, therefore, there was no agency precedent that had
been ``casually ignored'' in DHS's promulgation of the August 2007
Final Rule. It also showed that DHS's consistent, if informal, view of
SSA no-match letters has been that (1) SSA no-match letters do not, by
themselves, establish that an employee is unauthorized, (2) there are
both innocent and non-innocent reasons for no-match letters, but (3) an
employer may not safely ignore SSA no-match letters, and (4) an
employer must be aware of and comply with the anti-discrimination
provisions of the INA. The position reflected in the August 2007 Final
Rule--that a no-match letter, and an employer's response to such a
letter could, in the totality of the circumstances, constitute proof of
an employer's constructive knowledge that an employee is not authorized
to work in the United States--was consistent with the informal agency
interpretations offered to employers over the past decade.
Nevertheless, in light of the court's concerns that DHS had changed
its position on these issues in the August 2007 Final Rule, the
supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking set forth the ``reasoned
analysis'' sought by the court and identified four significant reasons
for the issuance of this rule: (1) The need to resolve ambiguity and
confusion among employers regarding their obligations under the INA
following receipt of an SSA no-match letter; (2) the growing evidence
and consensus within and outside government that SSA no-match letters
are a legitimate indicator of possible illegal work by unauthorized
aliens; (3) DHS's view that SSA's criteria for sending employee no-
match letters helps to focus those letters on employers that have
potentially significant problems with their employees' work
authorization; and (4) the established legal principle that employers
may be found to have knowingly employed unauthorized alien workers in
violation of INA section 274A based on a constructive knowledge theory.
73 F.R. 15949-50.
a. Need for Clear Guidance Regarding No-Match Letters
As was noted in the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, one
key justification for issuance of this rule is to eliminate ambiguity
regarding an employer's responsibilities under the INA upon receipt of
a no-match letter. As one business organization with nationwide
membership commented in response to the initial publication of the
proposed rule in 2006:
Disagreement and confusion [of an employer's obligations upon
receipt of a no-match letter] are rampant and well-intended
employers are left without a clear understanding of their compliance
responsibilities. [Organization] members have had substantial
concerns regarding whether mismatch letters put them on notice that
they may be in violation of the employment authorization provisions
of the immigration law, since the Social Security card is one of the
most commonly used employment authorization documents.
Administrative Record at 1295 (comment from National Council of
Agricultural Employers, Aug. 14, 2006). See also id. at 849 (comment by
the National Federation of Independent Business: ``Clarification of the
employer's obligation on receiving a no-match letter and the safe
harbor provided for in the proposed rule is critical.'').
As noted above, all previous agency guidance was in letters
responding to individual queries from employers, members of Congress,
or other interested parties--neither the INS nor DHS had ever released
any formal statement of agency policy on the issue. In addition, agency
correspondence over the years was heavily caveated, at times even
equivocal, and although more recent letters from DHS had articulated
more clearly employers' obligations upon receiving a no-match letter,
those letters did not purport to supplant prior statements by legacy
INS. In the absence of a clear, authoritative agency position on the
significance of no-match letters, employers and labor organizations
were left free to stake out positions that best served their parochial
interests, by in some cases misconstruing language in the no-match
letter aimed at preventing summary firings or discriminatory practices
as instead commanding employers to turn a blind eye to the widely-known
fact that unauthorized alien workers would often be listed in those
letters. In the face of this ambiguity, well-meaning employers'
responses to SSA no-match letters were also affected by concern about
running afoul of the INA's antidiscrimination provisions. Thus,
employers concluded that the risks of inaction in the face of no-match
letters--with the possibility of being found to have knowingly employed
unauthorized workers in violation of INA 274A--was outweighed by the
risks of embarking on an investigation after receiving a no-match
letter only to face charges of discrimination.
The August 2007 Final Rule was designed to remedy this confused
situation by reminding employers of their obligation under the INA to
conduct due diligence upon receipt of SSA no-match letters, and by
formally announcing DHS's view that employers that fail to perform
reasonable due diligence upon receipt of SSA no-match letters or DHS
suspect document notices risk being found to have constructive
knowledge of the illegal work status of employees whose names or SSNs
are listed. Further, because the constructive knowledge standard
applies a ``totality of the circumstances'' test to the facts of a
particular case, and is therefore not reducible to bright-line rules,
the August 2007 Final Rule sought to provide greater predictability
through a clear set of recommended actions for employers to take, and
assured employers that they would not face charges of constructive
knowledge based on SSA no-match letters or DHS letters that had been
handled according to DHS's guidelines.
b. No-Match Letters Are Legitimate Indicators of Possible Illegal Work
by Unauthorized Aliens
DHS's reasoned analysis on the evidentiary value of SSA no-match
letters in the August 2007 Final Rule, and in this supplemental
rulemaking, also includes the growing evidence and consensus within and
outside government that SSN no-matches are a legitimate indicator of
possible illegal work by unauthorized aliens. The SSA Office of the
Inspector General (SSA IG) has reported, after reviewing earnings
suspense file data for tax years 1999-2001, that fraudulent use of SSNs
\1\ was widespread in the service, restaurant, and agriculture
industries and that such fraud was a significant cause of SSA no-
matches:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See INA Section 274C, 8 U.S.C. 1324c.
[OIG] identified various types of reporting irregularities, such
as invalid, unassigned and duplicate SSNs and SSNs belonging to
young children and deceased individuals. While we recognize there
are legitimate reasons why a worker's name and SSN may not match SSA
files, such as a legal name change, we believe the magnitude of
incorrect wage reporting is indicative of SSN misuse. Employees and
industry association representatives acknowledged that unauthorized
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
noncitizens contribute to SSN misuse.
Office of the Inspector General, Social Security Administration, Social
Security Number Misuse in the Service, Restaurant, and Agriculture
Industries, Report A-08-05-25023, at 2 (April 2005), Administrative
Record at 456. See generally Administrative Record at 35-661.
[[Page 63848]]
SSA no-match letters have also formed a basis for multiple criminal
investigations by ICE and prosecutions on charges of harboring or
knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 2008 WL 160636 (N.D.
Miss. No. 4:07-CR-140, Jan. 18, 2008) (finding no-match letters
admissible at trial, and upholding a search warrant obtained on the
basis of information, including copies of social security no-match
letters, received from a confidential informant, treating no-match
letters as ``documentary evidence supporting the allegation'' of the
confidential informant); United States v. Fenceworks, Inc., No.
3:06-CR-2604 (S.D. Cal.), D.E. 16 (judgment of probation and
forfeiture of $4,700,000 in case involving multiple Social Security
no-match letters) (related cases Nos. 3:06-CR-2605 (probation and
fine of $100,000); 3:06-CR-2606 (probation and fine of $200,000));
United States v. Insolia, No. 1:07-CR-10251 (D. Mass), D.E. 1
(complaint; attachment, ]] 25-32, February 2007 probable cause
affidavit detailing history of employer's no-match letters from 2002
through 2005 and other investigative methods and facts); 34
(indictment); United States v. Rice, No. 1:07-CR-109 (N.D.N.Y), D.E.
1 (complaint; attached probable cause affidavit) (]] 64-66,
detailing results of matching analysis and SSA letters received by
defendant's employer), D.E. 17 (plea agreement).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS's view--that no-match letters regularly identify unauthorized
alien workers--was also overwhelmingly affirmed by those who submitted
comments on the proposed rule in 2006. See, e.g., Administrative Record
at 866 (comment by U.S. Chamber of Commerce: ``It is estimated that
annually 500,000 essential workers enter the U.S. to perform much
needed labor without work authorization. * * * The proposed regulation
will strip needed workers from employers without providing employers
with an alternative legal channel by which to recruit to fill the gaps.
* * *''); id. at 874 (comment by Essential Workers Immigration
Coalition including same statement); id. at 850 (comment by National
Federation of Independent Business: ``a substantial number of workers
identified by no-match letters are undocumented immigrants who are
unable to provide legitimate social security numbers''); id. at 858
(comment by Western Growers opposing the rule on grounds that ``it
would have a most devastating effect on California and Arizona
agriculture, where an estimated 50 to 80 percent of the workers who
harvest fruit, vegetables and other crops are illegal immigrants'');
id. at 887 (comment by American Immigration Lawyers Association:
``[T]he proposed regulation admittedly will `smoke out' many
unauthorized workers.''); id. at 1306 (comment by National Council of
Agricultural Employers suggesting that, as a conservative estimate, 76%
of agricultural workers are not authorized to work in the United
States, that ``employers would likely lose a significant part of their
workforces,'' and that ``a substantial number of workers would not
return to work'' when faced with the requirement to verify work
authorization ``because they would be unable to do so''). See also AFL-
CIO v. Chertoff, 552 F.Supp.2d at 1008 (``th[e] Court cannot agree with
plaintiffs'' fundamental premise that a no-match letter can never
trigger constructive knowledge, regardless of the circumstances'').
c. SSA's Procedures Better Target No-Match Letters to Employers With
Potential Workforce Problems
SSA's criteria for sending employer no-match letters also inform
DHS's position in the August 2007 Final Rule and in this supplementary
rulemaking. SSA does not send employer no-match letters to every
employer with a no-match. Instead, SSA sends letters only when an
employer submits a wage report reflecting at least 11 workers with no-
matches, and when the total number of no-matches in a given wage report
represents more than 0.5% of the employer's total Forms W-2 in the
report.
In addition, SSA has continued to refine the wage reporting process
in ways that help to reduce administrative error resulting in a no-
match letter. Employers filing more than 250 Forms W-2 are required to
file electronically (see 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(A); 20 CFR 422.114; 26 CFR
301.6011-2), and electronic filing of Forms W-2 has risen from 53% of
all employee reports in FY2003 to over 80% in FY2007--a 51%
increase.\3\ This direct electronic filing substantially reduces the
likelihood that SSA errors--such as during data entry of the
information submitted on a paper Form W-2--would result in
discrepancies in the wage reports. Employers also have access to SSA's
system for identifying name-SSN mismatches at the time they file the
wage reports. That system can only be used to verify current or former
employees and only for wage reporting (Form W-2) purposes. Employers
who use SSA's system are able to eliminate most no-matches in their
reports and thereby significantly reduce their likelihood of receiving
a no-match letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Social Security Administration, Performance and
Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2007 at 67-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS is also aware that SSA has developed a series of computerized
error-checking routines to resolve certain common errors that result in
unmatched name and SSN. These routines resolve name discrepancies
caused by misspellings, typographical errors, first name and last name
transpositions, and female surname changes (e.g. marriage or divorce).
They can also resolve discrepancies from the use of a derivative
nickname instead of a proper name or from scrambling compound or
hyphenated surnames. The routines can also resolve SSN discrepancies
such as numerical transpositions.
GAO has reported that approximately 60 percent of no-matches in
recent tax years' wage reports are corrected by SSA's algorithms. See
Government Accountability Office, Social Security: Better Coordination
among Federal Agencies Could Reduce Unidentified Earnings Reports (GAO
Report 05-154, 2005), Administrative Record at 400. See also Office of
the Inspector General, Social Security Administration, Effectiveness of
the Single Select Edit Routine (Audit Report A-03-07-17065, Sept.
2007). While these routines cannot resolve all discrepancies, they
reduce the number of inadvertent no-matches that are reported to
employers.
DHS believes that, taken together, these efforts better direct no-
match letters to employers that have potentially significant problems
with their employees' work authorization. Employers with stray mistakes
or de minimis inaccuracies are much less likely to receive no-match
letters.
d. The Longstanding Principle That Employers May Be Liable for INA
Violations Based on Constructive Knowledge
Both pre-existing regulations and consistent case law demonstrate
that an employer can be found to have violated INA section 274A(a)(2),
8 U.S.C. 1324a(a)(2), by having constructive rather than actual
knowledge that an employee is unauthorized to work. The concept of
constructive knowledge appeared in the first regulation that defined
``knowing'' for purposes of INA section 274a, 8 CFR 274A.1(l)(1)
(1990); 55 FR 25928 (June 25, 1990). As noted in the preamble to the
original regulation, that definition of knowledge is consistent with
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561,
567 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that, after receiving information that
employees were suspected of having presented false documents to show
work authorization, the employer had constructive knowledge of
unauthorized status because the employer failed to make inquiries or
take appropriate corrective action). See also New El Rey Sausage Co. v.
INS, 925 F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1991).
The rulemaking record demonstrates that employers have continued to
[[Page 63849]]
demand clear guidance on appropriately responding to SSA no-match
letters, consistent with their obligations under the INA. It also
demonstrates a well-established consensus that the appearance of
employees' SSNs on an SSA no-match letter may indicate lack of work
authorization. The record also shows that SSA's practices in generating
no-match letters helps to focus those letters on employers that, in
DHS's view, have non-trivial levels of employees with SSN mismatches in
their workforce, and existing law clearly establishes that employers
may be charged with constructive knowledge when they fail to conduct
further inquiries in the face of information that would lead a person
exercising reasonable care to learn of an employee's unauthorized
status.
This reasoned analysis supports DHS's position in the August 2007
Final Rule--that an employer's failure to conduct reasonable due
diligence upon receipt of an SSA no-match letter can, in the totality
of the circumstances, establish constructive knowledge of an employee's
unauthorized status. Assuming, as did the district court, that this
position constituted a change from prior statements in informal agency
correspondence, DHS has now provided additional--and sufficient--
reasoned analysis to support that change.
3. Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the INA
The preamble to the August 2007 Final Rule said that employers that
adopt the rule's safe harbor procedures to verify employees' identity
and work authorization must apply them uniformly to all employees who
appear on employer no-match letters. Failure to do so, the preamble
warned, may violate the INA's anti-discrimination provisions. The
preamble further noted that employers that follow the safe harbor
procedures uniformly and without regard to perceived national origin or
citizenship status will not be found to have engaged in unlawful
discrimination. 72 FR 45613-14. The DHS insert prepared to accompany
the no-match letter had similar language. AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, D.E. 7,
Exh. C. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007).
The district court questioned DHS's authority to offer what the
court viewed as interpretations, rather than mere restatements, of
settled anti-discrimination law, noting that DOJ, not DHS, has
authority for interpretation and enforcement of the INA's anti-
discrimination provisions. The court concluded that DHS appeared to
have exceeded its authority. 552 F.Supp.2d at 1011.
DHS recognizes the jurisdiction of DOJ over enforcement of the
anti-discrimination provisions in section 274B of the INA (8 U.S.C.
1324b). As stated in the preamble to the August 2007 Final Rule,
``DOJ--through its Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related
Unfair Employment Practices--is responsible for enforcing the anti-
discrimination provisions of section 274B of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324b.''
72 FR 45,614. The August 2007 Final Rule also stated that DHS's rule
``does not affect * * * the authority of DOJ to enforce the anti-
discrimination provisions of the INA or adjudicate notices of intent to
fine employers.'' Id. DHS does not have the authority to obligate the
DOJ or the Office of Special Counsel, and the August 2007 Final Rule
did not purport to make any such obligation. Whether an employer has
engaged in unlawful discrimination in violation of INA 274B is a
determination that is made by DOJ through the Office of Special
Counsel. A statement by one agency about the authority of another
agency does not, in and of itself, encroach on the authority of that
other agency, and DHS's statements in the August 2007 Final Rule were
reviewed through an interagency process that was created to improve the
internal management of the Executive Branch. Executive Order 12866, 58
FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), as amended by Executive Order 13258, 67 FR
9385 (Feb. 28, 2002), as amended by Executive Order 13422, 72 FR 2763
(Jan. 23, 2007).
Nevertheless, in light of the district court's concerns, DHS
rescinds the statements in the preamble of the August 2007 Final Rule
discussing the potential for anti-discrimination liability faced by
employers that follow the safe harbor procedures set forth in the
August 2007 Final Rule.\4\ DHS has also revised the language in its
insert letter that will accompany the SSA no-match letters. These
changes do not alter existing law or require any change to the rule
text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For example, DHS rescinds conclusive statements from the
preamble of the August 2007 Final Rule such as ``employers who
follow the safe harbor procedures * * * will not be found to have
engaged in unlawful discrimination.'' 73 FR at 15950, citing 72 FR
45613-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS recognizes the concerns raised by commenters that
discrimination litigation may be brought against them. As expressed by
one commenter:
One of the greatest potential costs faced by employers as a
result of this rulemaking is the increased likelihood of
discrimination lawsuits brought about by the required termination of
employees who cannot resolve ``mismatches.'' DHS' retraction of the
assurances it attempted to provide in the proposed rule only
increases the uncertainty that employers face. Moreover, even
meritless claims brought by terminated employees will require
significant expenses in legal fees and related costs to defend, and
unless DHS can remove jurisdiction in all courts in which such
actions might be brought, it cannot prevent these expenses. Our
reality is that we will be ``attacked'' by numerous organizations *
* * as we have been in the past.
ICEB-2006-0004-0498.1 at 1-2 (emphasis in original); see also ICEB-
2006-0004-0571.1 at 2; ICEB-2006-0004-0679.1 at 2.
While DHS lacks the authority to announce interpretations of the
anti-discrimination provisions of the INA, DOJ possesses such
authority, and persons seeking guidance regarding employers' anti-
discrimination obligations in following the safe harbor procedures in
the August 2007 Final Rule, as modified by this supplemental
rulemaking, should follow the direction provided by DOJ published in
today's edition of the Federal Register, and available on the Web site
of the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair
Employment Practices, at https://www.usdoj.gov/crt/osc/htm/
Nomatch032008.htm. Employers may also seek advice on a case-by-case
basis through OSC's toll-free employer hotline: 1-800-255-8155. The
Department continues to urge employers to apply the safe harbor
procedures in this rule to all employees referenced in an SSA no-match
letter or a DHS notice uniformly and without regard to perceived
national origin or citizenship status.
4. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
In its decision enjoining implementation of the August 2007 Final
Rule, the district court construed the safe harbor in the rule as
effectively creating compliance obligations for employers that received
no-match letters. Doubting the voluntary nature of the safe harbor
rule, the court found it likely that small businesses would incur
significant costs to enter the safe harbor:
Because failure to comply subjects' employers to the threat of
civil and criminal liability, the regulation is the practical
equivalent of a rule that obliges an employer to comply or to suffer
the consequences; the voluntary form of the rule is but a veil for
the threat it obscures. The rule as good as mandates costly
compliance with a new 90-day timeframe for resolving mismatches.
Accordingly, there are serious questions whether DHS violated the
RFA by refusing to conduct a final flexibility analysis.
552 F.Supp.2d at 1013 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In
light of the district court's conclusion
[[Page 63850]]
that a regulatory flexibility analysis would likely be required, DHS
published an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) in the
supplemental proposed rule, 73 FR at 15952-54, and placed on the docket
for public comment the Small Entity Impact Analysis, Supplemental
Proposed Rule: Safe Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-
Match Letter, ICEB-2006-0004-0233 (hereinafter, the ``SEIA'').
DHS continues to view the August 2007 Final Rule and this
supplemental rule as interpretive, and does not believe that these
rulemakings bear any of the hallmarks of a legislative rule. See Hemp
Industries Ass'n v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th
Cir. 2003) (identifying three circumstances in which a rule is
legislative); Syncore Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (interpretive rule ``typically reflects an agency's
construction of a statute that has been entrusted to the agency to
administer'' and a statement of policy ``represents an agency position
with respect to how it will treat--typically enforce--the governing
legal norm. By issuing a policy statement, an agency simply lets the
public know its current enforcement or adjudicatory approach.''). DHS
is not invoking its legislative rulemaking authority to mandate a
specific action upon a certain event. Instead, this rulemaking informs
the public of DHS's interpretation of Section 274A of the INA and
describes how DHS will exercise its discretion in enforcing the INA's
prohibition on knowing employment of unauthorized aliens. Although the
district court questioned whether DHS has changed its position on the
evidentiary force of no-match letters in enforcement proceedings
against employers, neither the August 2007 Final Rule nor this
supplemental rulemaking departs from any prior legislative rule. See
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004). As noted
above, the only record of the agency's previous position lies in
correspondence between the agency and individuals and employers seeking
advice on specific questions.
Thus, although DHS continues to believe that the Regulatory
Flexibility Act does not mandate the analysis that has been undertaken
here, see Central Texas Tel. Coop. v. FCC, 402 F.3d 205, 214 (D.C. Cir.
2005), the Department provided an IRFA and supporting economic
analysis, and has now prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(FRFA) in response to the district court's concerns.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
noted, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) ``imposes no substantive
requirements on an agency; rather, its requirements are `purely
procedural' in nature. * * * To satisfy the RFA, an agency must only
demonstrate a `reasonable, good-faith effort' to fulfill its
requirements.'' Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund v. USDA, 415 F.3d
1078, 1101 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d
832, 879 (9th Cir. 2003) (``Like the Notice and Comment process
required in administrative rulemaking by the APA, the analyses required
by the RFA are essentially procedural hurdles; after considering the
relevant impacts and alternatives, an administrative agency remains
free to regulate as it sees fit.'').
The RFA, by definition, does not apply to individuals. Where it
applies, the RFA requires agencies to analyze the impact of rulemaking
on ``small entities.'' Small entities include small businesses, not-
for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and
are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with
populations of less than 50,000. 5 U.S.C. 601(3), (5)-(6). Small
businesses are defined in regulations promulgated by the Small Business
Administration. 13 CFR 121.201.
The RFA provides that an initial regulatory flexibility analysis
(IRFA) shall contain:
(1) A description of the reasons why action by the agency is
being considered;
(2) A succinct statement of the objectives of, and legal basis
for, the proposed rule;
(3) A description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the
number of small entities to which the proposed rule will apply;
(4) A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping and
other compliance requirements of the proposed rule, including an
estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to
the requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record;
(5) An identification, to the extent practicable, of all
relevant Federal rules which may duplicate, overlap or conflict with
the proposed rule.
5 U.S.C. 603(b). Furthermore, an IRFA must also contain:
a description of any significant alternatives to the proposed
rule which accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes
and which minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed
rule on small entities. Consistent with the stated objectives of
applicable statutes, the analysis shall discuss significant
alternatives such as--
(1) The establishment of differing compliance or reporting
requirements or timetables that take into account the resources
available to small entities;
(2) The clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small
entities;
(3) The use of performance rather than design standards; and
(4) An exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof,
for such small entities.
5 U.S.C. 603(c). The RFA does not require that these elements be
considered in a specific manner, following a prescribed formula or
content. Given the nature of rulemaking, and its diversity, agencies
develop IRFAs in a manner consistent with the statute and the
rulemaking itself.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The Small Business Administration had provided additional
guidance. See Office of Advocacy, Small Business Administration, A
Guide for Government Agencies: How to Comply with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (2003). It states, in pertinent part:
The RFA requires agencies to conduct sufficient analyses to
measure and consider the regulatory impacts of the rule to determine
whether there will be a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. No single definition can apply to all
rules, given the dynamics of the economy and changes that are
constantly occurring in the structure of small-entity sectors.
Every rule is different. The level, scope, and complexity of
analysis may vary significantly depending on the characteristics and
composition of the industry or small entity sectors to be regulated.
Id. at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The IRFA provided with the supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking contained the elements listed in 5 U.S.C. 603(b) as well as
the discussion of significant regulatory alternatives required by 5
U.S.C. 603(c). The supplemental proposed rule explicitly requested
comments on the economic aspects of the analysis and on the discussion
of regulatory alternatives. Publication of the supplemental proposed
rule received significant media coverage. The U.S. Small Business
Administration Office of Advocacy (Advocacy) hosted a small business
roundtable shortly after publication of the supplemental proposed rule
to collect comments from interested small businesses and submitted a
public comment letter based on this input. The comments provided by
Advocacy are addressed in the analysis below. As noted above, the
supplemental proposed rule and accompanying IRFA received nearly 3,000
comments from the public, including a significant number of comments
specifically addressing the IRFA and the underlying SEIA.
DHS has reviewed the comments received on the IRFA and has
concluded that the IRFA complied with the statutory standards for such
an analysis and provided the public sufficient information to submit
informed comments regarding the possible impact of this rule.
[[Page 63851]]
In light of comments that identified plausible regulatory
alternatives or areas needing further clarification or adjustments in
the economic model underlying the SEIA, DHS has revised the analysis
and assembled a FRFA. The RFA requires that a FRFA contain:
(1) A succinct statement of the need for, and objectives of, the
rule;
(2) A summary of the significant issues raised by the public
comments in response to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis,
a summary of the assessment of the agency of such issues, and a
statement of any changes made in the proposed rule as a result of
such comments;
(3) A description of and an estimate of the number of small
entities to which the rule will apply or an explanation of why no
such estimate is available;
(4) A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping and
other compliance requirements of the rule, including an estimate of
the classes of small entities which will be subject to the
requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record; and
(5) A description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize
the significant economic impact on small entities consistent with
the stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a statement
of the factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the
alternative adopted in the final rule and why each one of the other
significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which
affect the impact on small entities was rejected.
5 U.S.C. 604(a). The discussion below and in the final SEIA on the
docket addresses specific comments received on the IRFA and, together
with the FRFA summarized in this supplemental final rule, provides the
statutorily required agency assessment of comments received,
projections of the number of affected small entities, description of
the anticipated reporting and compliance burdens, and discussion of
steps taken to limit any impact of the rule on small entities. In this
way, DHS has ``demonstrated a `reasonable, good-faith effort' to
fulfill'' the procedural and substantive requirements of the RFA.
III. Public Comments and Responses
A. Authority To Promulgate the Rule
A number of commenters challenged DHS's authority to promulgate
this rule. DHS has reanalyzed its jurisdiction and authority in light
of these comments, and concludes that it has the necessary authority to
promulgate this final rule.
Several commenters suggested that the rule imposes an affirmative
due diligence obligation on employers that does not exist in the INA
once employers complete the Form I-9 process. As is explained in
section II.C, supra, the INA's prohibition on ``knowing'' hiring or
continued employment of unauthorized workers extends to employers that
have constructive knowledge that an employee is unauthorized to work.
The concept of constructive knowledge appeared in the first regulation
that defined ``knowing'' for purposes of INA section 274a, 8 CFR
274A.1(l)(1) (1990); 55 FR 25,928. As noted in the preamble to that
original regulation, that definition of knowledge is consistent with
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mester Mfg