Impact of Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention on Commercial Activities Involving “Schedule 1” Chemicals Through Calendar Year 2008, 63681-63682 [E8-25561]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 208 / Monday, October 27, 2008 / Notices
a false end-user certificate concealing the
actual destination for the radar parts,
Pakistan. The exporter relied on the
information provided in the end-user
certificates in preparing a SED that falsely
stated the country of ultimate destination as
Bangladesh. In so doing, Yasmin Ahmed
committed one violation of section 764.2(h)
of the Regulations.
Finally, in connection with the April 16,
2002, transaction described in Charge 2 of the
charging letter, Yasmin Ahmed took actions
with the intent to evade the provisions of the
Regulations. Specifically, Yasmin Ahmed
took actions, including but not limited to,
obtaining false signatures from a purported
end-user who was actually a representative of
ATS for inclusion on an end-user certificate
submitted to an exporter in connection with
the export of radar parts, items subject to the
Regulations, from the United States to
Pakistan via the UAE. The purpose of
obtaining the false signatures was to prepare
a false end-user certificate concealing the
actual destination for the radar parts,
Pakistan. The exporter relied on the
information provided in the end-user
certificates in preparing a SED which falsely
stated the country of ultimate destination as
Bangladesh. In so doing, Yasmin Ahmed
committed one violation of section 764.2(h)
of the Regulations.
D. Penalty Recommendation
[REDACTED SECTION]
E. Conclusion
Accordingly, I am referring this
Recommended Decision and Order to the
Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry
and Security for review and final action for
the agency, without further notice to the
Respondent, as provided in § 766.7 of the
Regulations.
Within 30 days after receipt of this
Recommended Decision and Order, the
Under Secretary shall issue a written order
affirming, modifying, or vacating the
Recommended Decision and Order. See 15
CFR 766.22(c).
Hon. Joseph N. Ingolia,
Chief Administrative Law Judge, United
States Coast Guard.
Done and Dated 16th September, 2008,
Baltimore, Maryland.
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I have served the
foregoing RECOMMENDED DECISION
AND ORDER upon the following party
in this proceeding at the addresses
indicated below by First Class Mail to:
Parvin R. Huda, Senior Counsel,
Attorneys for Bureau of Industry and
Security, Office of Chief Counsel For
Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Room H–
3839, 14th Street & Constitution
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230,
(202) 482–5301.
Yasmin Ahmed, 612 Business Centre,
Mumtaz Hasan Road, Off I.I
Chundrigar Road, Karachi, Pakistan.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:13 Oct 24, 2008
Jkt 217001
Dated on September 18, 2008, Baltimore,
Maryland.
Debra M. Gundy,
Paralegal Specialist, Administrative Law
Judges Office, U.S. Coast Guard.
[FR Doc. E8–25351 Filed 10–24–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DT–M
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Docket No. 0810071328–81331–01]
Impact of Implementation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention on
Commercial Activities Involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ Chemicals Through
Calendar Year 2008
Bureau of Industry and
Security, Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and
Security (BIS) is seeking public
comments on the impact that
implementation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, through the
Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act and the Chemical
Weapons Convention Regulations, has
had on commercial activities involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals during calendar
year 2008. The purpose of this notice of
inquiry is to collect information to assist
BIS in its preparation of the annual
certification to the Congress, which is
required under Condition 9 of Senate
Resolution 75, April 24, 1997, in which
the Senate gave its advice and consent
to the ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
DATES: Comments must be received by
November 26, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods:
• E-mail: wfisher@bis.doc.gov.
Include the phrase ‘‘Schedule 1 Notice
of Inquiry’’ in the subject line;
• Fax: (202) 482–3355 (Attn: Willard
Fisher);
• Mail or Hand Delivery/Courier:
Willard Fisher, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Industry and
Security, Regulatory Policy Division,
14th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue,
NW., Room 2705, Washington, DC
20230.
For
questions on the Chemical Weapons
Convention requirements for ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemicals, contact James Truske,
Treaty Compliance Division, Office of
Nonproliferation and Treaty
Compliance, Bureau of Industry and
Security, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Phone: (202) 482–1001. For questions
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
63681
on the submission of comments, contact
Willard Fisher, Regulatory Policy
Division, Office of Exporter Services,
Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Phone: (202)
482–2440.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In providing its advice and consent to
the ratification of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling, and Use of
Chemical Weapons and Their
Destruction, commonly called the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
(the Convention), the Senate included,
in Senate Resolution 75 (S. Res. 75,
April 24, 1997), several conditions to its
ratification. Condition 9, titled
‘‘Protection of Advanced
Biotechnology,’’ calls for the President
to certify to Congress on an annual basis
that ‘‘the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
firms in the United States are not being
significantly harmed by the limitations
of the Convention on access to, and
production of, those chemicals and
toxins listed in Schedule 1.’’ On July 8,
2004, President Bush, by Executive
Order 13346, delegated his authority to
make the annual certification to the
Secretary of Commerce.
The CWC is an international arms
control treaty that contains certain
verification provisions. In order to
implement these verification provisions,
the CWC established the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). The CWC imposes
certain obligations on countries that
have ratified the Convention (i.e., States
Parties), among which are the enactment
of legislation to prohibit the production,
storage, and use of chemical weapons,
and the establishment of a National
Authority to serve as the national focal
point for effective liaison with the
OPCW and other States Parties for the
purpose of achieving the object and
purpose of the Convention and the
implementation of its provisions. The
CWC also requires each State Party to
implement a comprehensive data
declaration and inspection regime to
provide transparency and to verify that
both the public and private sectors of
the State Party are not engaged in
activities prohibited under the CWC.
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals consist of
those toxic chemicals and precursors set
forth in the CWC ‘‘Annex on
Chemicals’’ and in Supplement No. 1 to
part 712 of the Chemical Weapons
Convention Regulations (CWCR) (15
CFR parts 710–722). The CWC
identified these toxic chemicals and
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
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63682
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 208 / Monday, October 27, 2008 / Notices
precursors as posing a high risk to the
object and purpose of the Convention.
The CWC restricts the production of
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals for protective
purposes to two facilities per State
Party. The CWC Article-by-Article
Analysis submitted to the Senate in
Treaty Doc. 103–21 defined the term
‘‘protective purposes’’ to mean ‘‘used for
determining the adequacy of defense
equipment and measures.’’ Consistent
with this definition, U.S.
implementation, as authorized via
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)
70, December 17, 1999, assigned the
responsibility to operate these two
facilities to the Department of Defense
(DOD), thereby precluding commercial
production of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals
for protective purposes in the United
States. This action did not establish any
limitations on ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemical
activities that are not prohibited by the
CWC. However, the Department of
Defense maintains strict controls on
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals produced at its
facilities in order to ensure the
accountability and proper use of such
chemicals, consistent with the object
and purpose of the Convention.
The provisions of the CWC that affect
commercial activities involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals are
implemented in the CWCR (see 15 CFR
712) and in the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) (see 15 CFR 742.18
and 15 CFR 745), both of which are
administered by the Bureau of Industry
and Security (BIS). Pursuant to CWC
requirements, the CWCR restrict
commercial production of ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals to research, medical, or
pharmaceutical purposes. The CWCR
also contain other requirements and
prohibitions that apply to ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals and/or ‘‘Schedule 1’’
facilities. Specifically, the CWCR:
(1) Prohibit the import of ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemicals from States not Party to
the Convention (15 CFR 712.2(b));
(2) Require annual declarations by
certain facilities engaged in the
production of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals
in excess of 100 grams aggregate per
calendar year (i.e., declared ‘‘Schedule
1’’ facilities) for purposes not prohibited
by the Convention (15 CFR 712.5(a)(1)
and (a)(2));
(3) Require government approval of
‘‘declared Schedule 1’’ facilities (15 CFR
712.5(f));
(4) Provide that ‘‘declared Schedule
1’’ facilities are subject to initial and
routine inspection by the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (15 CFR 712.5(e) and
716.1(b)(1));
(5) Require 200 days advance
notification of establishment of new
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:13 Oct 24, 2008
Jkt 217001
‘‘Schedule 1’’ production facilities
producing greater than 100 grams
aggregate of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals per
calendar year (15 CFR 712.4);
(6) Require advance notification and
annual reporting of all imports and
exports of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals to, or
from, other States Parties to the
Convention (15 CFR 712.6, 742.18(a)(1)
and 745.1); and
(7) Prohibit the export of ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemicals to States not Party to the
Convention (15 CFR 742.18(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(ii)).
and will be available for public
inspection and copying.
The Office of Administration, Bureau
of Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, displays
public comments on the BIS Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) Web site at
https://www.bis.doc.gov/foia. This office
does not maintain a separate public
inspection facility. If you have technical
difficulties accessing this Web site,
please call BIS’s Office of
Administration, at (202) 482–1093, for
assistance.
Request for Comments
In order to assist in determining
whether the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
firms in the United States are
significantly harmed by the limitations
of the Convention on access to, and
production of, ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals
as described in this notice, BIS is
seeking public comments on any effects
that implementation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, through the
Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act and the Chemical
Weapons Convention Regulations, has
had on commercial activities involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals during calendar
year 2008. To allow BIS to properly
evaluate the significance of any harm to
commercial activities involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals, public
comments submitted in response to this
notice of inquiry should include both a
quantitative and qualitative assessment
of the impact of the CWC on such
activities.
Dated: October 21, 2008.
Christopher R. Wall,
Assistant Secretary for Export
Administration.
[FR Doc. E8–25561 Filed 10–24–08; 8:45 am]
Submission of Comments
All comments must be submitted to
one of the addresses indicated in this
notice. The Department requires that all
comments be submitted in written form.
The Department encourages interested
persons who wish to comment to do so
at the earliest possible time. The period
for submission of comments will close
on November 26, 2008. The Department
will consider all comments received
before the close of the comment period.
Comments received after the end of the
comment period will be considered if
possible, but their consideration cannot
be assured. The Department will not
accept comments accompanied by a
request that a part or all of the material
be treated confidentially because of its
business proprietary nature or for any
other reason. The Department will
return such comments and materials to
the persons submitting the comments
and will not consider them. All
comments submitted in response to this
notice will be a matter of public record
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
BILLING CODE 3510–33–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
A–201–805
Initiation of Antidumping Duty
Changed Circumstances Review:
Circular Welded Non–Alloy Steel Pipe
from Mexico
Import Administration,
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
SUMMARY: In response to a request from
´
Ternium Mexico, S.A. de C.V.
(‘‘Ternium Mexico’’), and pursuant to
section 751(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended (‘‘the Act’’) and 19 CFR
351.216 and 351.221(c)(3), the
Department is initiating a changed
circumstances review of the
antidumping duty order on circular
welded non–alloy steel pipe (‘‘standard
pipe’’) from Mexico. This review will
determine whether Ternium Mexico is
the successor–in-interest to Hylsa, S.A.
de C.V. (‘‘Hylsa’’).
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 27, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John
Drury or Angelica Mendoza, AD/CVD
Operations, Office 7, Import
Administration, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution
Avenue, NW, Room 7866, Washington,
DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482–0195 or
(202) 482–3019, respectively.
AGENCY:
Background
The Department published an
antidumping duty order on standard
pipe from Mexico on November 2, 1992.
See Notice of Antidumping Duty Orders:
Certain Circular Welded Non–Alloy
Steel Pipe from Brazil, the Republic of
Korea (‘‘Korea’’), Mexico, and Venezuela
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 208 (Monday, October 27, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63681-63682]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-25561]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Docket No. 0810071328-81331-01]
Impact of Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention on
Commercial Activities Involving ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals Through
Calendar Year 2008
AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is seeking public
comments on the impact that implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act
and the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations, has had on commercial
activities involving ``Schedule 1'' chemicals during calendar year
2008. The purpose of this notice of inquiry is to collect information
to assist BIS in its preparation of the annual certification to the
Congress, which is required under Condition 9 of Senate Resolution 75,
April 24, 1997, in which the Senate gave its advice and consent to the
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
DATES: Comments must be received by November 26, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
E-mail: wfisher@bis.doc.gov. Include the phrase ``Schedule
1 Notice of Inquiry'' in the subject line;
Fax: (202) 482-3355 (Attn: Willard Fisher);
Mail or Hand Delivery/Courier: Willard Fisher, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Regulatory
Policy Division, 14th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Room 2705,
Washington, DC 20230.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions on the Chemical Weapons
Convention requirements for ``Schedule 1'' chemicals, contact James
Truske, Treaty Compliance Division, Office of Nonproliferation and
Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Phone: (202) 482-1001. For questions on the submission of
comments, contact Willard Fisher, Regulatory Policy Division, Office of
Exporter Services, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Phone: (202) 482-2440.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In providing its advice and consent to the ratification of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction,
commonly called the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (the Convention),
the Senate included, in Senate Resolution 75 (S. Res. 75, April 24,
1997), several conditions to its ratification. Condition 9, titled
``Protection of Advanced Biotechnology,'' calls for the President to
certify to Congress on an annual basis that ``the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
firms in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the
limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those
chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1.'' On July 8, 2004, President
Bush, by Executive Order 13346, delegated his authority to make the
annual certification to the Secretary of Commerce.
The CWC is an international arms control treaty that contains
certain verification provisions. In order to implement these
verification provisions, the CWC established the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The CWC imposes certain
obligations on countries that have ratified the Convention (i.e.,
States Parties), among which are the enactment of legislation to
prohibit the production, storage, and use of chemical weapons, and the
establishment of a National Authority to serve as the national focal
point for effective liaison with the OPCW and other States Parties for
the purpose of achieving the object and purpose of the Convention and
the implementation of its provisions. The CWC also requires each State
Party to implement a comprehensive data declaration and inspection
regime to provide transparency and to verify that both the public and
private sectors of the State Party are not engaged in activities
prohibited under the CWC.
``Schedule 1'' chemicals consist of those toxic chemicals and
precursors set forth in the CWC ``Annex on Chemicals'' and in
Supplement No. 1 to part 712 of the Chemical Weapons Convention
Regulations (CWCR) (15 CFR parts 710-722). The CWC identified these
toxic chemicals and
[[Page 63682]]
precursors as posing a high risk to the object and purpose of the
Convention.
The CWC restricts the production of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals for
protective purposes to two facilities per State Party. The CWC Article-
by-Article Analysis submitted to the Senate in Treaty Doc. 103-21
defined the term ``protective purposes'' to mean ``used for determining
the adequacy of defense equipment and measures.'' Consistent with this
definition, U.S. implementation, as authorized via Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) 70, December 17, 1999, assigned the
responsibility to operate these two facilities to the Department of
Defense (DOD), thereby precluding commercial production of ``Schedule
1'' chemicals for protective purposes in the United States. This action
did not establish any limitations on ``Schedule 1'' chemical activities
that are not prohibited by the CWC. However, the Department of Defense
maintains strict controls on ``Schedule 1'' chemicals produced at its
facilities in order to ensure the accountability and proper use of such
chemicals, consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.
The provisions of the CWC that affect commercial activities
involving ``Schedule 1'' chemicals are implemented in the CWCR (see 15
CFR 712) and in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (see 15 CFR
742.18 and 15 CFR 745), both of which are administered by the Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS). Pursuant to CWC requirements, the CWCR
restrict commercial production of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals to research,
medical, or pharmaceutical purposes. The CWCR also contain other
requirements and prohibitions that apply to ``Schedule 1'' chemicals
and/or ``Schedule 1'' facilities. Specifically, the CWCR:
(1) Prohibit the import of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals from States not
Party to the Convention (15 CFR 712.2(b));
(2) Require annual declarations by certain facilities engaged in
the production of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals in excess of 100 grams
aggregate per calendar year (i.e., declared ``Schedule 1'' facilities)
for purposes not prohibited by the Convention (15 CFR 712.5(a)(1) and
(a)(2));
(3) Require government approval of ``declared Schedule 1''
facilities (15 CFR 712.5(f));
(4) Provide that ``declared Schedule 1'' facilities are subject to
initial and routine inspection by the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (15 CFR 712.5(e) and 716.1(b)(1));
(5) Require 200 days advance notification of establishment of new
``Schedule 1'' production facilities producing greater than 100 grams
aggregate of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals per calendar year (15 CFR 712.4);
(6) Require advance notification and annual reporting of all
imports and exports of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals to, or from, other
States Parties to the Convention (15 CFR 712.6, 742.18(a)(1) and
745.1); and
(7) Prohibit the export of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals to States not
Party to the Convention (15 CFR 742.18(a)(1) and (b)(1)(ii)).
Request for Comments
In order to assist in determining whether the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
firms in the United States are significantly harmed by the limitations
of the Convention on access to, and production of, ``Schedule 1''
chemicals as described in this notice, BIS is seeking public comments
on any effects that implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act and the
Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations, has had on commercial
activities involving ``Schedule 1'' chemicals during calendar year
2008. To allow BIS to properly evaluate the significance of any harm to
commercial activities involving ``Schedule 1'' chemicals, public
comments submitted in response to this notice of inquiry should include
both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the impact of the CWC
on such activities.
Submission of Comments
All comments must be submitted to one of the addresses indicated in
this notice. The Department requires that all comments be submitted in
written form.
The Department encourages interested persons who wish to comment to
do so at the earliest possible time. The period for submission of
comments will close on November 26, 2008. The Department will consider
all comments received before the close of the comment period. Comments
received after the end of the comment period will be considered if
possible, but their consideration cannot be assured. The Department
will not accept comments accompanied by a request that a part or all of
the material be treated confidentially because of its business
proprietary nature or for any other reason. The Department will return
such comments and materials to the persons submitting the comments and
will not consider them. All comments submitted in response to this
notice will be a matter of public record and will be available for
public inspection and copying.
The Office of Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, displays public comments on the BIS Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) Web site at https://www.bis.doc.gov/foia. This
office does not maintain a separate public inspection facility. If you
have technical difficulties accessing this Web site, please call BIS's
Office of Administration, at (202) 482-1093, for assistance.
Dated: October 21, 2008.
Christopher R. Wall,
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.
[FR Doc. E8-25561 Filed 10-24-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P
