Mandatory Reliability Standard for Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination, 63770-63794 [E8-25139]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 208 / Monday, October 27, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM08–3–000; Order No. 716]
Mandatory Reliability Standard for
Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination
Issued October 16, 2008.
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 215 of the
Federal Power Act (FPA), the
Commission approves the Nuclear Plant
Interface Coordination Reliability
Standard developed by the North
American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC). In addition,
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the
FPA, the Commission directs NERC to
develop a modification to the Reliability
Standard to address a specific concern.
The Reliability Standard requires a
nuclear plant generator operator and its
suppliers of back-up power and related
transmission and/or distribution
services to coordinate concerning
nuclear licensing requirements for safe
nuclear plant operation and shutdown
and system operating limits. The
Commission also approves four related
definitions for addition to the NERC
Glossary of Terms, and directs various
changes to proposed violation risk
factors, which measure the potential
impact of violations of the Reliability
Standard on the reliability of the BulkPower System.
DATES: Effective Dates: The final rule
will become effective November 26,
2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Robert Snow (Technical Information),
Office of Electric Reliability, Division
of Reliability Standards, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–6716;
Michael Gandolfo (Technical
Information), Office of Electric
Reliability, Division of Reliability
Standards, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
6817;
Richard M. Wartchow (Legal
Information), Office of the General
Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
8744;
Christy Walsh (Legal Information),
Office of the General Counsel, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–6523.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Paragraph
Nos.
Table of Contents
I. Background ....................................................................................................................................................................................................
A. Proposed Reliability Standard NUC–001–1 ........................................................................................................................................
B. Proposed NERC Glossary Definitions ...................................................................................................................................................
C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ...........................................................................................................................................................
D. Procedural Matters ................................................................................................................................................................................
II. Discussion .....................................................................................................................................................................................................
A. Approval of NUC–001–1 ......................................................................................................................................................................
B. Applicability ..........................................................................................................................................................................................
1. Notification of Parties to Interface Agreements ............................................................................................................................
2. Transmission Entities and Agreements on NPIRs ........................................................................................................................
3. Dispute Resolution .........................................................................................................................................................................
C. Form of Agreements ..............................................................................................................................................................................
D. Enforcement and Conflicts with Other Regulations ...........................................................................................................................
E. Scope of Agreements .............................................................................................................................................................................
1. Commission Questions ...................................................................................................................................................................
2. Other Scope Related Issues ............................................................................................................................................................
F. Coordination ..........................................................................................................................................................................................
1. Coordination Among Transmission Entities .................................................................................................................................
2. Addressing System Changes ..........................................................................................................................................................
G. Violation Risk Factors ...........................................................................................................................................................................
1. General Violation Risk Factor Issues .............................................................................................................................................
2. Requirement-Specific Issues ..........................................................................................................................................................
H. Violation Severity Levels ......................................................................................................................................................................
III. Information Collection Statement ..............................................................................................................................................................
IV. Environmental Analysis .............................................................................................................................................................................
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis ............................................................................................................................................................
VI. Document Availability ................................................................................................................................................................................
Appendix A: List of Comments to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
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Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher,
Chairman; Suedeen G. Kelly, Marc Spitzer,
Philip D. Moeller, and Jon Wellinghoff.
1. Pursuant to section 215 of the
Federal Power Act (FPA),1 the
Commission approves the Nuclear Plant
Interface Coordination Reliability
Standard (NUC–001–1) developed by
the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), the Commission1 16
U.S.C. 824o (2006).
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certified Electric Reliability
Organization (ERO). In addition,
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the
FPA, the Commission directs NERC to
develop a modification to the Reliability
Standard to address a specific concern.2
The Reliability Standard requires a
nuclear plant generator operator and its
suppliers of back-up power and
transmission and/or distribution
2 16
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services to coordinate concerning
nuclear licensing requirements for safe
nuclear plant operation and shutdown
and system operating limits (SOLs).3
3 NERC proposes to define nuclear plant generator
operator as any generator operator or generator
owner that is a nuclear plant licensee responsible
for operation of a nuclear facility licensed to
produce commercial power. See the discussion of
NERC’s proposed Glossary terms below. The
Reliability Standard itself defines those suppliers
who provide such generation, transmission and
distribution services pursuant to agreements under
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The Commission also approves four
related definitions for addition to the
NERC Glossary of Terms,4 and directs
various changes to proposed violation
risk factors, which measure the
potential impact of violations of the
Reliability Standard on the reliability of
the Bulk-Power System.5
I. Background
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A. Proposed Reliability Standard NUC–
001–1
2. On November 19, 2007, NERC filed
its petition for Commission approval of
the Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination
Reliability Standard, designated NUC–
001–1 (November 19, 2007 Petition).6
NERC supplemented the filing on
December 11, 2007 (December 11, 2007
Supplement) to propose four related
NERC Glossary terms: ‘‘Nuclear Plant
Generator Operator,’’ ‘‘Nuclear Plant
Off-site Power Supply (Off-site Power),’’
‘‘Nuclear Plant Licensing Requirements
(NPLRs),’’ and ‘‘Nuclear Plant Interface
Requirements (NPIRs).’’ In the
November 19, 2007 Petition, NERC
stated that the proposed Reliability
Standard addresses the coordination of
interface requirements for two domains:
(i) Bulk-Power System planning and
operations and (ii) nuclear power plant
licensing requirements for off-site power
necessary to enable safe nuclear plant
operation and shutdown.
3. Reliability Standard NUC–001–1
applies to nuclear plant generator
operators and ‘‘transmission entities.’’
To account for the variations in nuclear
plant design and grid interconnection
characteristics, the Reliability Standard
defines transmission entities as ‘‘all
entities that are responsible for
providing services related to Nuclear
Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs)’’
and lists eleven types of functional
NUC–001–1 as ‘‘transmission entities,’’ as discussed
below.
4 See, e.g., Mandatory Reliability Standards for
the Bulk-Power System, Order No. 693, RM06–16–
000, 72 FR 16416, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242, at
P 1893 (Apr. 4, 2007), order on reh’g, Order No.
693–A, 120 FERC ¶ 61,053 (2007) (approving the
NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability
Standards (as revised) (Glossary) originally filed
April 4, 2006).
5 The Commission is not proposing any new or
modified text to its regulations. Rather, as set forth
in 18 CFR Part 40, a proposed Reliability Standard
will not become effective until approved by the
Commission, and the ERO must post on its Web site
each effective Reliability Standard.
6 NUC–001–1 is attached in Appendix A to the
March 20 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR)
in this proceeding, and is available on the
Commission’s eLibrary document retrieval system
in Docket No. RM08–3–000 and also on NERC’s
Web site, https://www.nerc.com. See 18 CFR Part 40,
Mandatory Reliability Standard for Nuclear Plant
Interface Coordination, NOPR, Docket No. RM08–
3–000, 73 FR 16,586 (March 28, 2008), FERC Stats.
and Regs. ¶ 32,629 (2008).
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entities that could provide services
related to NPIRs.7
4. In the November 19, 2007 Petition,
NERC explained that nuclear plant
generator operators and transmission
entities operate according to separate,
established reliability and safety
procedures. To provide for coordination
of these separate procedures, the ERO
developed NUC–001–1 to require a
nuclear plant generator operator to
coordinate operations and planning
with its transmission entities by
developing procedures that reflect
nuclear plant licensing requirements
and SOLs,8 including interconnection
reliability operating limits (IROLs),
affecting nuclear plant operations.9 The
Reliability Standard requires nuclear
plant generator operators and
transmission entities to develop
expectations and procedures for
coordinating operations to meet the
nuclear plant licensing requirements, as
well as SOLs and IROLs, and to develop
agreements or arrangements, which may
include mutually agreed upon
procedures or protocols, reflecting those
expectations and procedures. These
agreements or arrangements are known
as interface agreements. The resulting
operations and planning requirements
developed in the agreements to address
the nuclear plant licensing
requirements, SOLs and IROLs are
called nuclear plant interface
requirements or NPIRs.10 NERC stated
that Requirements R3 through R8,
which state that the interface agreement
parties will address the NPIRs in
planning, operations, and facility
upgrade and outage coordination,
provide additional specificity on these
expectations.
5. In the November 19, 2007 Petition,
NERC noted that nuclear plant generator
operators must already fulfill nuclear
licensing requirements for off-site
power.11 NERC stated that, while
7 The list of functional entities consists of
transmission operators, transmission owners,
transmission planners, transmission service
providers, balancing authorities, reliability
coordinators, planning authorities, distribution
providers, load-serving entities, generator owners
and generator operators. Applicability issues are
addressed in a separate section, below.
8 The NERC Glossary defines system operating
limit or SOL as ‘‘the value * * * that satisfies the
most limiting of the prescribed operating criteria for
a specified system configuration to ensure operation
within acceptable reliability criteria. * * * ’’
9 The NERC Glossary defines IROL as a ‘‘system
operating limit that, if violated, could lead to
instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading
Outages that adversely impact the reliability of the
bulk electric system.’’
10 See NUC–001–1, Requirement R2 and the
proposed NERC Glossary term, Nuclear Plant
Interface Requirements (NPIR).
11 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
which regulates facilities that are associated with
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various forms of agreements exist to
meet the nuclear power plant general
design criterion for off-site power,
NUC–001–1 places a new, mandatory
and enforceable obligation under
section 215 of the FPA on both nuclear
plant generator operators and
transmission entities. NUC–001–1
requires these entities to inform one
another of limits and requirements on
their systems and to enter into
agreements to coordinate and operate
their systems to address nuclear plant
licensing requirements and related
system limits.
6. The nuclear plant licensing
requirements addressed in the
Reliability Standard include
requirements for off-site power to enable
safe operation and shutdown during an
electric system or plant event and
requirements for avoiding nuclear safety
issues as a result of changes in electric
system conditions during a disturbance,
transient, or normal conditions. NERC
cited general design criterion 17 for
nuclear power plants, which requires
nuclear plant generator operators to
obtain off-site electric power that will
provide sufficient capacity to permit
safety systems to function, assure that
reactor coolant design limits are not
exceeded, prevent core cooling, and
maintain containment integrity and
other vital functions.
7. NERC stated that NUC–001–1, in
combination with the nuclear license
general design criteria requirements,
achieves the vital public interest of
assuring safe nuclear power generation.
According to NERC, the Reliability
Standard is beneficial to nuclear plant
generator operators because it will assist
them in meeting nuclear plant licensing
requirements to safely produce nuclear
power. It is also beneficial to BulkPower System users, due to the
significant support that nuclear power
plants provide to the Reliable Operation
of the Bulk-Power System.
8. NERC requested that NUC–001–1
take effect in areas subject to the
Commission’s jurisdiction on the first
day of the first full calendar quarter
falling 15 months after Commission
approval.
B. Proposed NERC Glossary Definitions
9. In the December 11, 2007
Supplement, NERC proposed to add the
following four terms to the NERC
Glossary:
reactor safety or emergency response at a nuclear
generation plant, has regulatory requirements for
offsite power systems, as provided in the NRC
regulations, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A—General
Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, criterion
17.
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Nuclear Plant Generator Operator: Any
Generator Operator or Generator Owner that
is a [n]uclear [p]lant [l]icensee responsible
for operation of a nuclear facility licensed to
produce commercial power.
Nuclear Plant Off-site Power Supply or Offsite Power: The electric power supply
provided from the electric system to the
nuclear power plant distribution system as
required per the nuclear power plant license.
Nuclear Plant Licensing Requirements
(NPLRs): Requirements included in the
design basis of the nuclear plant and
statutorily mandated for the operation of the
plant, including nuclear power plant
licensing requirements for: (1) Off-site power
supply to enable safe shutdown of the plant
during an electric system or plant event; and
(2) Avoiding preventable challenges to
nuclear safety as a result of an electric system
disturbance, transient, or condition.
Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements
(NPIRs): The requirements, based on NPLRs
and Bulk Electric System requirements, that
have been mutually agreed to by the Nuclear
Plant Generator Operator and the applicable
Transmission Entities.
C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
10. On March 20, 2008, the
Commission issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), which
proposed to approve Reliability
Standard NUC–001–1 as mandatory and
enforceable. In the NOPR, the
Commission also raised a number of
concerns and asked for clarification
from the ERO and comments from the
public. The Commission proposed to
approve the NERC definitions and
proposed revisions to the violation risk
factors for NUC–001–1.
11. As described more fully below,
the ERO and other interested parties
provided comments in response to the
NOPR. These comments are
summarized and addressed in the
discussion portion of this Final Rule.
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D. Procedural Matters
12. The NOPR required that
comments be filed within 30 days after
publication in the Federal Register, or
April 28, 2008. On April 16, 2008, the
Commission granted a motion filed by
EEI and NEI extending the comment
date to May 13, 2008. Approximately 23
entities filed comments, including
several late-filed comments. The
Commission accepts these late filed
comments. Appendix A provides a list
of the commenters.
II. Discussion
13. In this Final Rule, the Commission
approves Reliability Standard, NUC–
001–1, effective as proposed by the
ERO. In addition, pursuant to section
215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission
directs the ERO to develop a
modification to one provision,
Requirement R9.3.5, to clarify the
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impact of the Requirement on two
important operating procedures, in
response to comments received. This
Final Rule largely accepts the
explanations and clarifications provided
in the ERO’s comments and addresses
the positions raised by NERC and the
other commenters on the specific issues
raised in the NOPR. As proposed in the
NOPR, this Final Rule does not take any
action on the regional difference,
because it applies outside of the United
States and is not applicable to any
facilities within the Commission’s
jurisdiction.12 The Final Rule directs
modifications to the violation risk
factors for the Reliability Standard, as
discussed below. Finally, the Final Rule
approves the additional Glossary terms.
A. Approval of NUC–001–1
14. NERC and other commenters
generally support the NOPR proposal to
approve Reliability Standard NUC–001–
1.13 EEI, Ameren, Dominion, and
Ontario IESO and Hydro One state that
they support approval of the Reliability
Standard as improving coordination
between nuclear plant generator
operators and transmission entities.
15. In contrast, CenterPoint Energy
asserts that NUC–001–1 is flawed and
unnecessary, arguing that it deals with
contractual matters that should be
addressed through a tariff or standard
agreement, not a Reliability Standard, to
ensure that nuclear plant generator
operators do not receive unreasonable
competitive advantages over other
competitors.14 CenterPoint Energy also
states that the Commission should
mitigate potential market power and
transparency concerns created by the
Reliability Standard in regions where an
independent transmission operator is
not the entity that performs
interconnected operations with the
nuclear plant generator operators.15
CenterPoint Energy is concerned that a
requirement in a NPIR could result in a
change in transmission operations and
cause significant reliability or market
disruptions. According to CenterPoint
Energy, this could be mitigated by a
requirement that nuclear plant generator
operators retain documentation
‘‘whenever a nuclear plant operator
12 NERC proposes to adopt as a regional
difference for Canada a separate definition of
nuclear plant licensing requirements that does not
reference regulatory requirements for off-site power
supply for safe plant shutdown because Canada
does not have regulatory standards for off-site
power comparable to those established by the NRC.
13 See, e.g., Constellation, Detroit Edison,
Dominion, EEI, Entergy, Exelon, Ontario IESO and
Hydro One, Midwest ISO, and Ontario Power
comments.
14 CenterPoint Energy comments at 1.
15 Id. at 3.
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effectively alters transmission operating
decisions of the independent operator
due to alleged NPIR concerns.’’ 16
16. National Grid emphasizes that
NUC–001–1 is intended to address
technical aspects of the interface
between transmission entities and
nuclear plant generator operators as
opposed to the commercial aspects.
According to National Grid, the
proposed Reliability Standard obliges
all responsible entities to work together
on creating NPIRs suitable to each
nuclear power plant, whether the
service provided to the nuclear power
plant is subject to federal or state
jurisdiction. According to National Grid,
execution of an interface agreement and
subsequent compliance with NPIRs
should not change the jurisdictional
status of the services provided. National
Grid also requests that the Commission
direct the ERO and its Regional Entities
to ensure that nuclear plant generator
operators look to the proper
transmission entities for the provision of
NPIR-related services and that they bear
incremental costs of NPIR compliance.
Commission Determination
17. Pursuant to section 215(d) of the
FPA, the Commission approves
Reliability Standard NUC–001–1 as
mandatory and enforceable. The
Commission finds that coordination of
nuclear licensing requirements and grid
operating limits through auditable
interface agreements will ensure that an
important resource is operated safely
and reliably, while minimizing grid
disturbances from separation of nuclear
power plants from the grid, due to the
loss or degradation of auxiliary power
supply. Further, the Commission
disagrees with CenterPoint Energy that
the Reliability Standard is flawed and
unnecessary. Nuclear power plants
represent an important power resource
and provide reliability support
throughout the Bulk-Power System.
Unlike other large units, nuclear power
plants are subject to separate regulatory
oversight that mandates stringent
operating and auxiliary power
requirements, which, if not met, require
the plant to separate from the grid. We
find that NUC–001–1 is an appropriate
means to ensure that the particular
requirements faced by nuclear power
plants are met, maximizing the
reliability support to be provided while
minimizing the potential for grid
disruption caused by separation.
18. CenterPoint Energy provides no
evidence to support its claims that
assertions by nuclear plant generator
operators concerning NPIRs could be
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used to affect grid or market operations.
We note that the NRC oversees a nuclear
power plant’s development of and
compliance with its licensing
requirements related to facilities that are
associated with reactor safety or
emergency response through its
regulatory proceedings. NUC–001–1
supplements NRC oversight of nuclear
plant facilities by providing oversight of
the transmission entities that operate
facilities on the Bulk-Power System
providing off-site power supply and
delivery service to meet nuclear plant
licensing requirements.
19. Neither National Grid nor
CenterPoint Energy has provided any
information on how the NPIRs could
result in undue negative impact on
competition. Because all jurisdictional
tariffs have requirements for the
provision of non-discriminatory service,
the Commission does not anticipate that
transmission entities would agree to
NPIRs that do not provide for
comparable service. While comparable
service includes appropriate cost
allocations, that subject is outside of the
scope of this proceeding.17 In regard to
National Grid’s non-cost-related
comments, National Grid has not
suggested any way in which the
Reliability Standard could change the
jurisdictional status of service provided
to a nuclear plant generator operator,
and therefore, we do not see a need to
address this concern here.
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B. Applicability
20. Reliability Standard NUC–001–1
applies to nuclear plant generator
operators and transmission entities,
such as off-site power suppliers and
entities that provide distribution and
transmission services that affect plant
operations. NERC states that the
Reliability Standard meets the criteria
that it apply to users, owners and
operators of the Bulk-Power System
because it will apply to transmission
entities, which are responsible for
providing NPIR-related services.
Therefore, these entities are subject to
the Reliability Standard and may be
registered pursuant to the NERC
compliance registry process.
21. The Commission approves the
applicability provisions of NUC–001–1
as appropriately identifying the
applicable entities, while providing the
flexibility to accommodate differing
design criteria, grid configurations and
17 See NERC November 19, 2007 Petition, Exhibit
B, Record of Proposed Reliability Standard
Development, ‘‘Consideration of Comments, Draft 2
SAR on Nuclear Plant Offsite Power Reliability,
May 23, 2005’’ at 3 of 25 (agreeing that the Nuclear
Reliability Standard does not address cost recovery
issues).
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services procured by the various nuclear
power plants addressed. The
Commission finds appropriate the
ERO’s use of the term transmission
entities in NUC–001–1 to refer to the
subset of registered entities that provide
services to nuclear plant generator
operators. Similarly, the term nuclear
plant generator operators refers to the
subset of generator owners and
generator operators that are NRC
licensees. While the Commission prefers
that Reliability Standards apply to all
entities within a functional category
defined in the Registry Criteria, it has
approved appropriate limitations
incorporated into an applicability
provision.18 We address the specific
questions raised by the Commission in
the NOPR, as well as responses and
comments, on an issue-by-issue basis
below.
1. Notification of Parties to Interface
Agreements
22. Requirement R1 of NUC–001–1
provides: ‘‘[t]he Nuclear Plant Generator
Operator shall provide the proposed
NPIRs in writing to the applicable
transmission entities and shall verify
receipt.’’ In the NOPR, the Commission
indicates its understanding that
Requirement R1 means that if a nuclear
plant generator operator fails to provide
all appropriate NPIRs to an applicable
transmission entity, the operator will
not be in compliance with the
Reliability Standard.19 Further, the
Commission observed that a nuclear
plant generator operator will know, as a
result of the NRC licensing process,
which applicable entities to contact and
what services are needed to meet NRC
requirements.
a. Comments
23. NERC and Entergy agree that it is
unlikely that a nuclear plant generator
operator would fail to obtain
appropriate services and identify and
contact transmission entities. They
concur that a nuclear plant generator
operator will know the applicable
services it needs through the NRC
licensing process. NERC explains that,
as an NRC licensing requirement, the
nuclear plant generator operator would
have previously coordinated with
transmission entities.
24. Entergy describes the NRC
licensing process and explains that a
nuclear plant generator operator will
18 See, e.g., MOD–010–0 (limiting applicability to
members of NERC functional classes specified in
the MOD–011–0, Requirement R1); and PRC–007–
0 (limiting applicability to members of functional
classes owning and operating an underfrequency
load shedding program).
19 NOPR at P 21.
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know the capability of its offsite power
supplier to supply the power required
during operations as well as situations
that could result in a loss of off-site
power. Entergy concludes that ‘‘it is
very unlikely’’ that a nuclear plant
generator operator would fail to contact
the entities necessary to receive the
appropriate services.
25. NEI agrees with the Commission’s
observation that nuclear plant generator
operators are capable of identifying and
contacting the appropriate transmission
entities. However, NEI opposes any
proposal to expand this notification
requirement into an affirmative
requirement that nuclear plant generator
operators must ‘‘obtain appropriate
services’’ from transmission entities.
NEI requests that the Commission
clarify that this is a notification
requirement, not a requirement to obtain
services (that, according to NEI, should
not be included in the Reliability
Standard).
26. According to NEI, the obligations
of the nuclear plant generator operator
to provide notice to transmission
entities should be limited to those
entities known or reasonably knowable
by the nuclear plant generator operator,
since the identity of some transmission
entities could be proprietary. NEI argues
that transmission entities that have been
notified by the nuclear plant generator
operator that they are responsible for
providing services relating to NPIRs
should then have the obligation to
provide further notice to other
applicable transmission entities that
provide services to the first transmission
entities.
27. ATC proposes replacing the
phrase ‘‘proposed NPIRs’’ with a
reference to nuclear plant licensing
requirements including an explicit
recognition of a transmission entity’s
ability to propose transmission system
operating limits to be addressed as
NPIRs in the interface agreement.
According to ATC, this will remedy the
current conundrum, where a nuclear
power plant is obligated to ‘‘propose
NPIRs,’’ while NPIRs are defined as
having been agreed to by both parties.
b. Commission Determination
28. The Commission accepts NERC’s
proposal to require nuclear plant
generator operators to identify entities
that provide services related to off-site
power supply or delivery. With NERC’s
and other industry representatives’
assurances, the Commission is satisfied
that the appropriate transmission
entities can be identified based on the
nuclear plant generator operators’
historical compliance with NRC
licensing requirements to obtain off-site
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power and develop solutions with grid
operators to avoid service interruptions
from foreseeable grid disturbances.
29. The Commission does not share
the concern expressed by commenters
that Requirement R1 imposes an
affirmative obligation on a nuclear plant
generator operator to obtain appropriate
services. Requirement R1 obligates a
nuclear plant generator operator to
provide proposed NPIRs in writing to
transmission entities. The nuclear plant
generator operator is already obligated
to obtain service to meet NPIRs that are
based on nuclear plant licensing
requirements enforced by the NRC. We
note that Requirement R2 does contain
an affirmative obligation that the
nuclear plant generator operator and
transmission entities develop and
execute an interface agreement to
implement NPIRs. With this
understanding, we find that the nuclear
plant generator operators’ role in
providing notice of proposed NPIRs to
all applicable transmission entities is
appropriate. A nuclear plant generator
operator may be found in
noncompliance for failing to provide
notice to an entity responsible for
providing services relating to its off-site
power-related licensing requirements.
30. NERC and industry
representatives clarify that the entities
that the nuclear plant generator operator
is to provide with proposed NPIRs are
known to the nuclear plant generator
operator based on the nuclear plant
generator operator’s historic need to
obtain service to meet their license
requirements. The Commission does not
share NEI’s concern that the nuclear
plant generator operator may not know
upstream utilities that provide service to
the primary service providers. We note
that Requirement R1 obligates a nuclear
plant generator operator to contact
entities that provide services to meet
NPIRs, which are based on nuclear
licensing requirements for off-site power
supply and avoiding foreseeable grid
disruptions. Any upstream service
providers that provide services related
to NPIRs must be identified by the
nuclear plant generator operator in the
NPIRs. Otherwise there is no obligation
to identify non-primary service
providers.
31. As for ATC’s concern with the use
of the phrase ‘‘proposed NPIRs’’ as
opposed to a reference to nuclear plant
licensing requirements that will form
the basis for NPIRs, the Commission
finds the current Requirements are
sufficiently clear and flexible to
accommodate counterproposals by
transmission entities to address system
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limits during interface agreement
development.20
2. Transmission Entities and
Agreements on NPIRs
32. NUC–001–1 applies to nuclear
plant generator operators and
transmission entities. The Applicability
section of the Reliability Standard (i)
defines transmission entities as ‘‘all
entities that are responsible for
providing services related to Nuclear
Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs),’’
and (ii) lists 11 types of entities,
identified in the NERC registry criteria
based on the NERC Functional Model,21
that may serve as transmission entities.
33. NERC explained in its November
19, 2007 Petition:
Because the relationship of each nuclear
plant generator operator with its provider of
transmission-related services is unique, it
will be important and necessary for the
registration process to identify on a plant-byplant basis the specific transmission entities
required to identify NPIRs and develop the
requisite agreement. Once the agreement
becomes final, all applicable nuclear plant
generator operator and transmission entities
for each agreement will be identified by
name and specific function. The respective
Regional Entity will then be responsible for
ensuring that each nuclear plant generator
operator and transmission entities identified
in the agreement(s) is registered on the NERC
Compliance Registry for the applicable
function(s). NERC will work with the
Regional Entities to ensure that all nuclear
plant generator operator and transmission
entities included in the agreements that
result from the NPIRs are listed in the
Compliance Registry for this specific
reliability standard.22
a. NOPR Proposals
34. In the NOPR, the Commission
proposed to accept the identification
and registration process described by
NERC in the November 19, 2007
Petition with the understanding that
NERC will use its authority under the
compliance registry process to register
all users, owners, and operators of the
Bulk-Power System that provide
transmission or generating services
relating to off-site power supply or
delivery.23 Further, the Commission
requested clarification from the ERO, as
20 The Commission notes that ATC originally
suggested the language ‘‘proposed NPIRs’’ as an
alternative to the original draft language ‘‘current’’
NPIRs. NERC November 19, 2007 Petition, Exhibit
B, ‘‘Consideration of Comments on 1st Draft of
Nuclear Plant Off-site Power Coordination
Standard,’’ at 15 of 69 (Aug. 15, 2006).
21 NERC Statement of Compliance Registry
Criteria (Revision 3), filed with its Supplemental
Information Filing, Docket No. RM06–16–000 (Feb.
6, 2007), approved in Order No. 693 at P 92–96;
NERC Functional Model, Version 3 (approved by
NERC Board of Trustees, Feb. 13, 2007).
22 NERC November 19, 2007 Petition at 12–13.
23 See id. at 12.
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well as public comment, on three issues:
(i) How NERC’s plan to identify
transmission entities on a ‘‘plant-byplant basis’’ in the compliance
registration process relates to the
definition of bulk electric system; (ii)
whether NUC–001–1 is enforceable
against a transmission entity upon
execution of an interface agreement or
some earlier time; and (iii) how the
Reliability Standard will be
implemented for an entity that both
operates a nuclear power plant and is
responsible to provide services related
to NPIRs.
i. Identification of Entities Subject to
NUC–001–1 Through the Compliance
Registry
(1) NOPR
35. As mentioned above, the
Commission proposed in the NOPR to
accept NERC’s Applicability approach
for NUC–001–1 with the understanding
that NERC would use its authority
under the compliance registry process to
register all users, owners and operators
of the Bulk-Power System that provide
transmission or generating services
relating to off-site power supply or
delivery.24 Further, the NOPR noted that
certain auxiliary power suppliers and
transmission service providers may
serve nuclear power plants through
facilities that fall outside the definition
of bulk electric system. The NOPR
stated that:
The Commission understands that NERC
and the Regional Entities will register these
and other service providers that provide
interconnection and/or auxiliary power
facilities vital to nuclear plant operation
through NERC’s authority to register an
owner or operator of an otherwise exempt
facility that is needed for Bulk-Power System
reliability, on a facility-by-facility basis. Once
registered, the transmission entity providing
such services to a nuclear generating plant
may be subject to other Reliability Standards
applicable to the functional class within the
NERC functional model for which the
transmission entity has been registered, as
deemed appropriate through the registration
process. With this understanding, the
Commission proposes to accept the scope of
the definition of transmission entities as
appropriate.25
(2) Comments
36. NERC states that it concurs with
the Commission’s understanding that
NERC will use its authority under the
compliance registry process to register
all users, owners and operators of the
Bulk-Power System that provide
transmission or generating services
relating to off-site power supply or
24 NOPR
25 Id.
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P 26 (footnotes omitted).
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delivery. NERC will register the owner
of an otherwise exempt facility on a
facility-by-facility basis. Further, NERC
agrees that, once registered, the
transmission entity may be subject to
other Reliability Standards applicable to
the functional class within the NERC
Functional Model, as deemed
appropriate through the registration
process, with an exception for lowvoltage facilities, as discussed in section
II(B)(2)(b) below.
37. EEI generally agrees with the
Commission’s conclusion that, once
registered, a transmission entity
providing services to a nuclear
generating plant may be subject to other
Reliability Standards applicable to the
function for which the transmission
entity has been registered. EEI also
supports NERC’s interpretation that
identification as a transmission entity
under NUC–001–1 Requirements should
not change a party’s obligations under
other Reliability Standards.
38. NEI suggests that entities that are
not currently subject to NERC
registration, jurisdiction, and
enforcement authority should be able to
sign an interface agreement without
submitting to NERC jurisdiction. NEI
states that such an entity may be bound
to comply with the interface agreement,
but should not automatically be subject
to all other NERC Reliability Standards
and enforcement authority. NEI predicts
that subjecting entities to NERC
jurisdiction and enforcement authority
will dissuade parties from signing
interface agreements, contrary to the
intent of this Reliability Standard. The
applicability of the other Reliability
Standards should be determined by the
governing statute and regulations, and
the terms of the other Reliability
Standards, and should not be
incorporated through this Reliability
Standard. According to NEI, the
Regional Entity registration process, not
the execution of an interface agreement,
determines whether an entity is subject
to NUC–001–1. NEI asks the
Commission to clarify that entities that
sign an interface agreement are not
automatically subject to NERC
jurisdiction for Reliability Standards
beyond NUC–001–1.
39. Southern suggests that it may not
be appropriate to apply certain
Reliability Standards requirements to
nuclear plant generator operators, in
particular those relating to ‘‘functions of
supplying energy and Interconnected
Operations Services.’’ On the other
hand, entities registered as a generator
owner or generator operator may fulfill
the requirements set forth in NERC’s
definitions of these terms, but may not
be licensed by the NRC and may not be
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‘‘responsible for operation of a nuclear
facility.’’ Southern asks the Commission
to direct NERC to review the application
of its registration requirements to
nuclear plant generator operators.
40. Several commenters object to the
use of the term transmission entities.
Wisconsin Electric suggests that NUC–
001–1 does not follow the NERC
Functional Model, due to use of the
term transmission entities. TVA makes
a similar objection to the term nuclear
plant generator operator, which does not
appear in the NERC functional model,
and suggests use of the term generator
operators of nuclear plants with the
Applicability section only listing
generator operator. Southern suggests
that, under the definition of nuclear
plant generator operator, there may be
licensees that do not meet the definition
of a generator operator or generator
owner, as nuclear plant generator
operator is defined. According to
Southern, some NRC licensees may be
responsible for operating nuclear
facilities but may not meet NERC’s
definitions of a generator owner or
generator operator.
41. Constellation agrees that the
nuclear plant generator operator must
take the lead in identifying transmission
entities, but urges the Commission to
implement a dispute resolution process
to assist the nuclear plant generator
operators. Constellation is concerned
that, under NUC–001–1, the nuclear
plant generator operator will have the
primary burden of ensuring that the
parties enter into NPIR agreements;
however, Constellation also argues that
a transmission entity must be
appropriately identified and have
entered into an NPIR agreement before
it is formally included in the NERC
Compliance Registry.
(3) Commission Determination
42. The Commission accepts NERC’s
approach to determining applicable
entities. The Commission agrees with
the ERO that the identification of
transmission entities, which may fit any
one of 11 functional categories
described in the NERC Functional
Model, provides the ERO with needed
breadth and flexibility in identifying
and registering all users, owners and
operators of the Bulk-Power System that
provide services related to NPIRs.
43. Further, the ERO makes clear that,
in implementation, it plans to register
an owner or operator of an otherwise
exempt facility that is needed for BulkPower System reliability, on a facilityby-facility basis. Once registered, a
transmission entity may be subject to
other applicable Reliability Standards,
as deemed appropriate through the
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63775
registration process. The Commission
agrees that it is appropriate that a
registered transmission entity comply
with other applicable Reliability
Standards for the functional category for
which it is registered. This approach
will support Bulk-Power System
reliability and better assure that a
transmission entity is capable of
satisfying responsibilities set forth in an
interface agreement.
44. NEI requests clarification that
entities that sign an interface agreement
are not automatically subject to ERO
jurisdiction for Reliability Standards
beyond NUC–001–1. As discussed
above, the Commission agrees with the
ERO that Reliability Standards beyond
NUC–001–1 should apply to a newlyregistered transmission entity, for the
functional category for which it is
registered. Further, we observe that the
ERO indicates that it will make this
determination ‘‘as deemed appropriate
through the registration process.’’ We
understand this to mean that the ERO
has reserved some flexibility in
determining which Reliability
Standards are to be applied to a newlyregistered transmission entity, and the
ERO may consider individual
circumstances in the process. The
Commission agrees with NEI that the
applicability of particular Reliability
Standards beyond NUC–001–1 should
not be decided in this proceeding.
Rather, we leave it to the ERO to make
such determinations in the first instance
in the registration process.
45. Southern comments that it may
not be appropriate to require nuclear
plant generator operators to comply
with certain Reliability Standards that
apply to generator owners and generator
operators. The Commission, however, is
not convinced that a blanket waiver is
warranted. Rather, similar to our
explanation immediately above, the
ERO may consider the individual
circumstances of a generator owner or
generator operator and determine
whether, for example, a registered entity
is needed for Bulk-Power System
reliability and operates facilities that are
addressed in a particular Reliability
Standard.
46. Southern has not provided any
specific examples of nuclear plant
licensees that would not meet NERC’s
definition of nuclear plant generator
operator. The Commission addresses
NERC’s registry determinations in
appropriate proceedings on appeal. A
registry proceeding may address
whether a generator owner or operator
meets the NERC registry criteria or
should otherwise be registered based on
a finding that the facility is material to
Bulk-Power System reliability. We also
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reject the concerns raised by Wisconsin
Electric and TVA that the terms
transmission entity and nuclear plant
generator operator do not appear in the
NERC Functional Model. While the
NERC Functional Model is a useful
guidance document, ‘‘the Applicability
section of a particular Reliability
Standard should be the ultimate
determinant of applicability of each
Reliability Standard.’’ 26 Moreover, the
ERO’s definition of transmission entity
is linked to the functional categories set
forth in the NERC Functional Model.27
Likewise, the nuclear plant generator
operator can simply be viewed as a subcategory of the generator operator
function.
b. Applicability to Small Entities and
Low Voltage Facilities
i. NOPR
47. In the NOPR, the Commission
noted that some nuclear power plants
may obtain auxiliary power through
lower voltage facilities that are not
included in a Regional Entity’s
definition of bulk electric system and
that other nuclear power plants may
retain alternate sources of auxiliary
power provided through lower voltage
facilities operated by a small utility or
cooperative that is not included in a
Regional Entity’s definition of bulk
electric system.28 The Commission
sought clarification from NERC on how
it would register such entities and how
this relates to the definition of bulk
electric system.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
ii. Comments
48. NERC clarifies that ‘‘for lower
voltage facilities that provide such
services to a Nuclear Power Plant, the
registration of those entities and the
applicability of the NERC Reliability
Standards therein to that functional
class of entities will be limited to those
facilities identified by the Nuclear Plant
Generator Operator in its NPIRs.’’ 29
49. Constellation anticipates that
some transmission entities, in particular
those that are not previously registered,
may be reluctant to enter into nuclear
interface agreements. Constellation is
concerned that small generators that are
currently exempt from registration may
be unwilling to continue to provide
services or enter into new agreements
for services if provision of such services
causes them to be registered by NERC.
Constellation cites the cost burdens and
risk of penalties as having a chilling
26 Order
No. 693 at P 127.
27 See Reliability Standard NUC–001–1, Section
A.4.2.
28 NOPR at P 26.
29 NERC comments at 8.
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effect on these entities’ willingness to
continue to provide their discrete
services to nuclear power plants.
Constellation suggests that the
curtailment of such services could
impair the ability of nuclear plant
generator operators to meet their license
requirements. To address these
concerns, Constellation requests that the
Commission direct NERC to evaluate
these risks and to propose mechanisms
to ensure that small entities will not be
deterred from providing services.
50. Entergy explains that under the
NRC license requirements, a nuclear
power plant is required to have two
sources of off-site power. For one of
Entergy’s plants, one of those sources
relies, at certain times, on reactive
power support from a small hydropower
facility that generates power at a
distribution level voltage, and Entergy
and the facility have entered into an
agreement for that reactive power
support. According to Entergy, this
facility is not currently registered or part
of the bulk electric system. Entergy
expresses concern that if this entity
becomes subject to NUC–001–1, it may
cancel its current service agreement
with Entergy because the risk of
potential penalties and future
compliance costs could be too high,
thus jeopardizing Entergy’s NRC license.
Therefore, Entergy asks the Commission
to clarify that if an entity does not
currently qualify for inclusion on the
NERC Compliance Registry, provision of
NPIR-related services will not subject
that entity to registration.
iii. Commission Determination
51. The Commission accepts NERC’s
clarification that registration of lower
voltage facilities and the applicability of
NUC–001–1 will be limited to those
facilities identified by the nuclear plant
generator operator in its NPIRs.30 We
would expect that any NPIRs agreed to
between a nuclear plant generator
operator and transmission entity would
include all facilities needed to transmit
offsite power and auxiliary power to the
nuclear facility. The Commission
remains sensitive to the need for NERC
to register operators of lower-voltage
facilities used to deliver off-site
power.31 The NOPR stated the
Commission’s understanding that NERC
would register entities operating
facilities not currently identified in the
Regional Entities’ definition of bulk
30 This approach for lower voltage facilities is
consistent with our determination in prior
proceedings that the ERO may register an entity that
falls below the minimum registry criteria on a
facility-by-facility basis. See Order No. 693–A at P
38.
31 See NOPR at P 22 and 26.
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electric system that are needed for BulkPower System reliability, through
NERC’s authority to register an owner or
operator of an otherwise exempt facility
that is needed for Bulk-Power System
reliability, on a facility-by-facility
basis.32 We note that it is in the best
interest of the nuclear plant generator
operator to have any such facility
identified in the NPIRs.
52. We find that NERC’s approach
should mitigate the concerns of
commenters who speculate that small
entities may wish to cease providing
services rather than become subject to
other Reliability Standards applicable to
the functional class in which they
would be registered. In this manner,
application of the Reliability Standard
to smaller entities operating lower
voltage facilities that were not
previously registered is limited to the
facilities used to provide services to the
nuclear plant generator operator.
Commenters’ other concerns largely
address smaller entities’ potential
reluctance to continue providing
service—that is, so long as these entities
are users, owners or operators of the
Bulk-Power System they may be
registered by NERC and subject to the
Reliability Standard. An entity that has
failed to execute an interface agreement
will be found in violation of the
Reliability Standard.
53. We believe that limited
registration of smaller entities, in
combination with NERC’s use of the
registry process and tying enforceability
to the receipt of a proposed NPIR (rather
than execution of a formal agreement),
should limit the majority of concerns
raised by commenters on behalf of small
entities. Entergy’s concern with
obtaining reactive power is mitigated by
the fact that the Commission’s policies
recognize alternate sources for ancillary
services—reactive power is a required
ancillary service to be provided by
transmission providers—and the
Commission’s policies also provide for
merchant ancillary service sales where
appropriate. However, these issues are
best resolved in appropriate registration
proceedings.
54. The Commission notes that in
addition to smaller, previously
unregistered entities, larger currentlyregistered entities may also provide
service over lower voltage facilities that
may be material to the reliability of the
Bulk-Power System. These entities’
lower-voltage facilities highlight a
potential gap in applicability, because it
could be argued that those facilities are
32 Id. P 26 (citing Order No. 693–A at P 38; NERC
Statement of Compliance Registry, Revision 3.1 at
8).
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not currently subject to the Reliability
Standards since they may fall outside a
Regional Entity’s definition of the bulk
electric system. This potential gap is
illustrated where a larger entity
essentially provides a transmission
service, but the applicability of NUC–
001–1 and other Reliability Standards is
uncertain, because service is provided
over lower voltage facilities. We direct
the ERO to review the impact on the
Bulk-Power System for registration
purposes of any entity providing service
related to NPIRs over a lower-voltage
facility similar to other facilities used to
provide service, regardless of whether
such service is provided by a currentlyregistered entity or a previously
unregistered entity.33
c. Critical Facilities
i. NOPR
55. In the NOPR, the Commission
asked whether NERC would, in
registering entities not otherwise
registered, consider lower voltage
facilities needed to serve NPIRs to be
critical facilities.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
ii. Comments
56. NERC responded that it does not
currently have an approved NERC
Glossary definition for ‘‘critical facility’’
per Order No. 693’s directive.34
Consequently NERC states it will refrain
from using the term in its response and
until such time as the definition is
developed and approved. However,
NERC notes that a nuclear power plant
would be unable to operate without
transmission services from lower
voltage facilities supplying off-site
power, and the absence of such services
would result in the real and reactive
output of the plant being unavailable to
the system. NERC states that the
determination of whether a plant is
material to the reliability of the BulkPower System is determined at the
Regional Entity level, but notes that
nuclear power plants typically provide
both real and reactive power to the
transmission grid.
57. SCE&G states that it finds the
Commission’s reference in the NOPR to
33 The Commission notes, however, that the
NUC–001–1 drafting team has described such cases
of distribution level supply as ‘‘the exception, not
the rule.’’ See NERC Nuclear Reliability Standard
drafting team, Consideration of Comments on 2nd
Draft of Nuclear Off-site Power Supply Standard, at
54 (Feb. 7, 2007), filed in November 19, 2007
Petition, Exhibit B, Record of Development of
Proposed Reliability Standard.
34 Section III.d.2 of the NERC compliance registry
states that the functions transmission owner and
transmission operator shall include an entity ‘‘that
owns/operates a transmission element below 100
kV associated with a facility that is included on a
critical facilities list that is defined by the Regional
Entity.’’
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‘‘critical facilities’’ to be troubling, since
NUC–001–1 should not affect the
characterization of a facility as critical
and such determination should be made
by NERC. According to SCE&G, the
existing NERC definition of ‘‘critical
asset,’’ combined with the methodology
in Reliability Standard CIP–002–1 is the
correct method to determine if a facility
is ‘‘critical’’ to the bulk electric system.
SCE&G also maintains that NUC–001–1
does not affect the characterization of a
critical facility, which is determined
instead by the NERC definition of
critical asset and the methodology
provided in CIP–002–1.
iii. Commission Determination
58. The Commission notes that the
term ‘‘critical facility’’ under Order No.
693 is a facility not otherwise included
in a Regional Entity’s definition of the
bulk electric system but that has been
identified by the Regional Entity as
being critical to the system reliability.35
This is different from the definition of
‘‘critical asset’’ under CIP–002–1. The
Commission accepts NERC’s
explanation of whether it would
consider lower voltage facilities needed
to serve NPIRs to be critical facilities
when it registers new entities and notes
that the definition of the term ‘‘critical
facility’’ will be resolved in a future
proceeding.
d. Timing of NUC–001–1 Enforceability
to Transmission Entities
i. NOPR
59. In the NOPR, the Commission
sought comment on its understanding
that NUC–001–1 would become
applicable to, and enforceable against, a
transmission entity only when the
transmission entity executed an
interface agreement. In other words, the
provider of NPIR-related service would
become a transmission entity, as that
term is defined by NUC–001–1, subject
to NUC–001–1 and other Reliability
Standards, upon execution of the
interface agreement.
ii. Comments
60. In response to the Commission’s
question on timing, NERC clarified that
the interface agreement with a nuclear
plant generator operator is not the
mechanism that determines whether an
entity is a transmission entity subject to
NUC–001–1. Instead, a nuclear plant
generator operator initiates the
identification by proposing an NPIR to
an applicable transmission entity, and,
at this point, the identified transmission
entity is placed on the Compliance
Registry and becomes subject to the
35 Order
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63777
requirements of NUC–001–1, not when
the agreement required in Requirement
R2 is established.36
61. Several commenters support
approaches similar to the NERC
position.37 These commenters generally
agree that NUC–001–1 applies to a
transmission entity once it has been
notified of an NPIR by the nuclear plant
generator operator. EEI, for instance,
states its understanding that the NUC–
001–1 drafting team and NERC staff
intended that a nuclear plant generator
operator would identify the
transmission entities for each nuclear
power plant under NUC–001–1,
whether or not they had already entered
into an agreement. NEI recommends
that a potential transmission entity
should be deemed a transmission entity
subject to the requirements of NUC–
001–1 once it becomes registered as a
transmission entity under NUC–001–1
and receives proposed NPIRs from the
nuclear plant generator operator
pursuant to Requirement R1. NEI states
that transmission entity status should
continue unless and until NERC
determines otherwise, based on a full
and fair analysis of the facts and
evidence presented by the affected
parties.38
62. EEI states that, for a newly
identified entity that is not on the
Compliance Registry, the Regional
Entities should examine whether an
entity is properly classified as a
transmission entity before registering
the entity and thus requiring it to
comply with the Reliability Standard.
Entergy concurs that the NERC
registration process, rather than the
execution of an interface agreement,
determines whether an entity is subject
to NUC–001–1.
63. The commenters supporting the
NERC clarification generally state that
holding that NUC–001–1 is only
applicable to a transmission entity after
it executes an interface agreement
would be inequitable because, in the
event of disagreement, the nuclear plant
generator operator could be held in
violation, while the transmission owner
would not.39 NEI states that the need to
prompt all potential transmission
entities to conform to NUC–001–1 is
particularly important where potential
transmission entities have no corporate
affiliation with the nuclear plant
generator operator, because such an
entity may wish to avoid executing an
36 NERC
comments at 11.
EEI, Exelon, Detroit Edison, and NEI
comments.
38 See also Detroit Edison comments.
39 See EEI, Exelon, and NEI comments; See also
Constellation comments at 8.
37 See
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interface agreement to avoid exposure to
NUC–001–1.
64. EEI notes that, in some cases, the
failure to agree may be the result of
good-faith differences between the
parties such that sanctions should not
be imposed, except as a last resort. NEI
also suggests that no enforcement
action, other than arbitration through a
Regional Entity, should be taken in the
absence of agreement, but asks the
Commission to clarify that while the
Reliability Standard may not be
enforceable by NERC or the Commission
without an agreement, the contractual
service commitments may be
enforceable by other means.
Constellation requests clarification that
only Requirement R1 is enforceable
against the nuclear plant generator
operator until the NPIR agreement is
executed, because the other
requirements involve implementation of
an agreement, which the nuclear plant
generator operator cannot do
unilaterally.
65. NEI emphasizes that licensing
requirements should already be known
to affected transmission entities and
argues that existing procedures must
remain in effect both prior to and after
the effective date of the agreement
under NUC–001–1. According to NEI,
registration based on notification by the
nuclear plant generator operator is
appropriate because nuclear plant
generator operators are in the best
position to interpret nuclear plant
licensing requirements and system
needs affecting operations. According to
NEI, NUC–001–1 should be enforceable
against the transmission service
providers whose commitments to
provide services formed part of the basis
for the original plant license regardless
of whether an interface agreement has
been executed. NEI suggests that
Requirement R3 should be applicable
regardless of the parties’ compliance
efforts to date.
66. According to NEI, the NRC
requires each nuclear license applicant
to perform stability studies for the
transmission grid that delivers offsite
power to the nuclear power plant and
demonstrate that the loss of the largest
operating unit on the grid would not
result in loss of grid stability or affect
the delivery of offsite power to the
nuclear power plant.40 NEI also notes
that the types of studies performed and
the conclusions are documented in the
safety analysis report for each nuclear
power plant. NEI suggests that nuclear
plant licensees and transmission service
providers are already obliged to provide
40 NEI comments at 4 (citing Chapter 8 of the NRC
Standard Review Plan (NUREG 0800)).
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assurances with respect to the capability
and stability of offsite power sources for
the nuclear plant.
67. In contrast, ConEdison, SCE&G,
and ISO/RTO Council argue that NUC–
001–1 should not be enforceable against
transmission entities until an interface
agreement is executed. According to
ISO/RTO Council, representatives of
NERC’s functional classes become
transmission entities by agreeing to
meet an NPIR through an interface
agreement. SCE&G questions whether it
is appropriate to define as a
transmission entity any entity that
enters into an interface agreement with
a nuclear plant generator operator. It
asks the Commission to clarify the
standards which will apply to every
entity entering into an interface
agreement.
iii. Commission Determination
68. Based on the ERO’s and others’
comments, the Commission does not
adopt the understanding put forth in the
NOPR. NERC and others have made
clear that NUC–001–1 was intended to
apply to transmission entities following
receipt of notification from the nuclear
plant generator operator, rather than
after execution of the interface
agreement. The applicability of NUC–
001–1 is determined by the function
performed by the entity—that is, an
entity that provides services relating to
a nuclear plant generator operator’s
nuclear plant licensing requirements is
subject to NUC–001–1 on the latter of
the effective date of the Reliability
Standard or when a proposed NPIR is
provided by the nuclear plant generator
operator. This is consistent with other
Reliability Standards where an entity is
subject to a Reliability Standard based
on the factual determination of whether
it operates certain facilities or provides
a certain service, not based on the
consent of the entity.
69. We believe that this interpretation
resolves the concerns of commenters
who predict that entities supplying
services to enable nuclear plant
generator operators to meet nuclear
plant licensing requirements would balk
at executing an interface agreement if
they become subject to NUC–001–1.
This should not occur since
transmission entities will be identified
as providing services relating to NPIRs
by a nuclear plant generator operator
and will become subject to NUC–001–1
when they receive notice, not when they
finalize an agreement.
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e. Applicability in Integrated Systems
i. NOPR
70. In the NOPR, the Commission
voiced its concerns regarding the
implementation of NUC–001–1 in a
situation where a single entity is both
the nuclear plant generator operator and
the transmission entity, such as a
vertically-integrated utility. We sought
comment on whether an agreement or
arrangement would be required in such
a case and, if so, what type of
arrangement was required to comply
with the Reliability Standard.
ii. Comments
71. In response, NERC states that
NUC–001–1 may accommodate various
industry structures and situations,
including an integrated utility structure.
According to NERC, NUC–001–1
requires appropriate agreements or
arrangements to ensure that mutually
agreed upon NPIRs are established.
Because the necessary agreement or
arrangement can include ‘‘mutually
agreed upon procedures or protocols’’
per Footnote 1 of Requirement R2, they
need not necessarily be in the form of
a formally executed agreement between
officers of separate companies. NERC
notes that compliance measures M3
through M8 ensure that auditable
documentation of such arrangements
exist. NERC concludes that these
requirements may be met by a single
entity.
72. Most commenters addressing the
issue concur that a formal signed
contract between the departments of an
integrated utility is not necessary.41
However, Detroit Edison and Midwest
ISO state that department or business
unit representatives should execute an
interface agreement or other evidence of
participation to comply with NUC–001–
1. Thus, these commenters propose that
compliance could be demonstrated
through agreements featuring varying
degrees of formality. NEI argues instead
that an integrated entity could set forth
in writing the procedures to be followed
by each unit as consistent with
Requirement R2 and such internal
documentation would be provided in an
audit. SCE&G states that compliance
may be achieved through internal
coordination between the generation
and transmission components of an
integrated utility and, where
appropriate, a formal agreement
between an integrated utility and
outside entities.
41 See EEI, Entergy, Southern, NEI, and SCE&G
comments.
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iii. Commission Determination
73. The Commission accepts NERC’s
clarification that NUC–001–1 applies to
nuclear plant generator operators and
transmission entities where both parties
are in a single integrated system. NERC
clarified that a formal agreement is not
necessary to have an agreement,
procedures, or protocols in place that
will comply with Requirement R2.
Based on this clarification and industry
comments, we accept NERC’s
conclusion that the Requirements of
NUC–001–1 can be met by a single
entity that is both the nuclear plant
generator operator and the transmission
entity. The Commission directs the
ERO, in enforcing NUC–001–1, to
require that an integrated entity
provides documentation of its
arrangements, including appropriate
procedures and protocols, ensuring that
its business units perform the functions
under NUC–001–1 that would otherwise
be met by separate entities. This will
ensure that an integrated entity’s
compliance with NUC–001–1 is
auditable in a manner comparable to
other entities that are subject to the
Reliability Standard.
3. Dispute Resolution
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
a. NOPR Proposal
74. In the NOPR, the Commission
sought input on circumstances
involving an off-site power supplier or
other transmission entity that disagrees
with a nuclear plant generator operator
that it needs to execute an interface
agreement. The Commission asked how
NERC should resolve the impasse and
whether NERC should propose to
register the entity (if it was not already
registered) without an executed
interface agreement.
b. Comments
75. NERC states that, if a transmission
entity and nuclear plant generator
operator fail to agree to an NPIR, it may
require mediation or arbitration of the
dispute as part of a mitigation or
remedial action strategy. If a nuclear
plant generator operator and a
transmission entity fail to reach
agreement, NERC clarifies that it
proposes to find each entity in noncompliance with Requirement R2.
According to NERC, the nuclear plant
generator operator and transmission
entity would be subject to penalties,
sanctions, mitigation, and remedial
actions until agreement is reached.
NERC notes that its March 4, 2008
submission of violation severity levels
identified the failure to reach an
agreement under Requirement R2 as a
Severe violation severity level.
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76. Several commenters support use
of a dispute resolution process before
NERC or a Regional Entity in the case
of disagreement over NPIRs.42
Dominion, ISO/RTO Council and
Midwest ISO call for a formal dispute
resolution process to resolve issues if
parties cannot reach agreement.
Constellation expresses concern that the
nuclear plant generator operator would
have the primary burden of ensuring the
parties enter into NPIR agreements,
based on the understanding reflected in
the NOPR, and states that an early
intervention process is essential for
NERC and the Commission to provide
assistance to parties facing difficulty
reaching agreement. Constellation also
asks that the Commission require NERC
to establish and file within 60 days a
proposed dispute resolution process to
assist parties in reaching agreement.
ISO/RTO Council requests the
Commission to define a clear process
with definitive criteria for resolving
disputes between nuclear plant
generator operators and transmission
entities over the scope of the NPIRs.
77. Midwest ISO and National Grid
express additional concerns over
disagreement on individual NPIRs.
Midwest ISO states that it is unclear
what will occur if a named transmission
entity disagrees that it has the role
identified by the nuclear plant generator
operator or if there is disagreement
regarding the necessity for, or impacts
of, the proposed NPIRs. Midwest ISO
anticipates disputes among the various
transmission entities and nuclear plant
generator operators about which tariff,
service agreement, or operating
agreement provisions may be relied on
to meet NUC–001–1 requirements.
78. Midwest ISO cites differing views
as to the exact definition of NPIRs
among nuclear plant generator operators
and other stakeholders and therefore
requests that the definition of NPIRs be
clarified. National Grid states that
disagreement should not forestall
implementation of non-controversial
NPIRs, but that it is nevertheless unclear
whether NPIRs proposed by one side or
the other shall have any force or effect
while subject to a dispute resolution
procedure.
79. NEI proposes that, if the parties
were to fail to reach agreement on an
interface agreement within 30 days, the
Regional Entity could provide a dispute
resolution mechanism. According to
NEI, NERC could provide for
subsequent appeals. However, NEI
states that failure to enter into an
interface agreement should not be
42 See ISO/RTO Council, Ontario Power, Midwest
ISO, and NEI comments.
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63779
considered a violation or failure to
comply, as long as the parties are
negotiating in good faith and following
NERC’s proposed dispute resolution and
appeal processes.
c. Commission Determination
80. The Commission accepts the
ERO’s explanation of its registration and
compliance options when parties fail to
come to an agreement. Should parties
fail to come to an agreement and thus
find themselves in violation of the
requirement that they have such an
agreement in place, NERC states that it
may require mediation or arbitration as
a remedial action. We agree that
ordering such dispute resolution
processes may be an appropriate
response in some instances in which
there is no immediate risk to grid
reliability and support NERC requiring
the use of arbitration or mediation on a
voluntary basis where appropriate.43
81. National Grid’s concerns are
speculative. However, if the parties
cannot agree on proposed NPIRs, then
NERC may require mediation or
arbitration as a remedial action. We do
not see the need at this time for NERC
to develop formal arbitration procedures
to govern all dispute resolution
proceedings. The ERO has the discretion
to adopt such procedures as are
appropriate to the circumstances, in the
event that the parties do not themselves
propose acceptable procedures.44
82. We anticipate that Midwest ISO’s
concerns regarding NPIR negotiations
should be resolved by the parties
themselves. Given that the parties have
already been able to agree to the services
needed to meet NRC licensing
requirements, the same parties should
be able to successfully identify the
services provided, confirm that they
address NRC criteria for off-site power
and system limits, and document such
services in an auditable format
consistent with the NUC–001–1
Requirements.
C. Form of Agreements
1. Comments
83. Several commenters request
clarification that existing arrangements
may be relied on to meet NUC–001–1
requirements to have an interface
43 Where there is an immediate reliability risk, we
direct the ERO to take appropriate action to address
the risk.
44 Should NERC require the parties to engage in
dispute resolution procedures as a remedial action
or in lieu of, or along with, other sanctions upon
a finding that the parties are in violation of the
Reliability Standard, NERC must notify the
Commission as it would for any imposition of a
remedy to a violation. See NERC Rules of
Procedure, section 408.1.
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agreement in place to address NPIRs.45
These commenters suggest that nuclear
plant generator operators and
transmission entities may rely on
existing interface agreements and thus
that NUC–001–1 does not require
execution of a new agreement, and may
incorporate by reference matters
covered in other agreements or tariff
provisions.
84. The ISO/RTO Council, in
particular, asks the Commission to
clarify that any entity designated as a
transmission entity will be allowed to
rely on existing tariffs and contracts to
satisfy the mandates of Requirements R2
and R9 and will not be required to
execute entirely new agreements that
merely duplicate tariff and contractual
arrangements that already are in place,
allowing nuclear power plants to
maintain compliance with existing NRC
license criteria. ISO/RTO Council states:
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
To the extent that an RTO or ISO—or
indeed any other transmission operator—
provides these services to generators, the
services generally are reflected in existing
tariffs and agreements between specific
transmission operators and generators. For
example, in New York, generators and
[NYISO] execute a service agreement under
the NYISO’s Market Administration and
Control Area Services Tariff (‘‘Services
Tariff’’), which governs, among other things,
the NYISO’s ‘‘provision of Control Area
Services * * * including services related to
ensuring the reliable operation of the NYS
Power System.’’ The service agreement
requires the NYISO and its counterparties,
including generators, to follow NYISO tariffs
and procedures. The Services Tariff requires
the NYISO to ‘‘develop, and modify as
appropriate, procedures for the * * *
reliable operation of the NYCA in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the Tariff.’’
These procedures are set forth in detail in the
NYISO manuals, and already cover the core
elements of the agreements mandated
pursuant to R9 of NUC–001–1. The technical
requirements outlined in R9.2, including
identification of system parameters and
configurations and applicable limits, largely
are reflected in the NYISO’s Transmission
and Dispatch Manual. The requirements
outlined in R9.3 with respect to operations
and maintenance coordination largely are
reflected in the NYISO’s Outage Scheduling
manual. These manuals define the NYISO’s
obligations to specific generators, including
nuclear generators, pursuant to the terms of
the Services Tariff.46
85. According to ISO/RTO Council,
new service agreements between
transmission operators and nuclear
plant generator operators under NUC–
001–1 should also be incorporated into
the applicable transmission operator
tariffs or manuals. International
45 See Constellation, Dominion, and ISO/RTO
Council comments.
46 ISO/RTO Council comments at 4–5.
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Transmission requests clarification on
whether parties will be expected already
to have a signed agreement which meets
the requirements of NUC–001–1 in
place on the date on which the
Reliability Standard becomes effective.
Constellation requests confirmation that
multi-party agreements will be
accommodated.
86. EEI also requests that the
Commission clarify that nuclear plant
generator operators and transmission
entities, affiliated and unaffiliated, do
not need to enter into new agreements
if an existing agreement between the
parties is sufficient for compliance with
NUC–001–1. National Grid states that
NERC should provide additional
guidance on what responsible entities
must do to comply with the Reliability
Standard within fifteen months of
regulatory approval. National Grid
characterizes NERC’s position as
proposing that parties establish an
‘‘overall coordination platform’’ to meet
the NPIRs.
2. Commission Determination
87. Based on NERC’s statement that
parties may rely on less formal
procedures and protocols, the
Commission finds that NUC–001–1 does
not dictate any particular format for the
interface agreement. Nuclear plant
generator operators and transmission
entities may rely on pre-existing
arrangements so long as the parties can
document the fact that they have agreed
that the pre-existing arrangements
address all of the NPIRs, cover all
required facilities and otherwise fulfill
the requirements of NUC–001–1.47 This
includes multi-party agreements.
88. In response to ISO/RTO Council’s
request, we clarify that, as with any
transmission entity, a regional service
provider may rely on existing tariff
provisions. However, the Commission
understands that, in a region served by
a regional service provider such as a
regional transmission organization
(RTO) or independent system operator
(ISO), the regional authority will be
required to meet NPIRs that require
service over its system. Within the
geographical boundaries of their service
territory, potential transmission entities
may also provide service over lower
voltage facilities that are not covered by
the RTO or ISO tariff. In such a case, we
direct the ERO to assess whether the
entity providing service over the lower
47 Nuclear plant generator operators and
transmission entities that choose to rely on
generally-applicable tariffs should make provision
to ensure that the tariff terms and conditions
continue to meet the parties’ needs should the tariff
or nuclear licensing requirements change, and
document such an arrangement.
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voltage facilities is also subject to NUC–
001–1, as discussed in section
II(B)(2)(b), above, concerning
Transmission Entities and Agreements
on NPIRs. If such an entity is providing
service that is not covered by the tariff,
the nuclear plant generator operator
would need to take steps to identify
these entities as providing services
related to an NPIR and thereby ensure
compliance with NUC–001–1 on these
lower-voltage facilities pursuant to our
discussion in section II(B)(2)(b) above.
D. Enforcement and Conflicts With
Other Regulations
1. Comments
89. Comments regarding the
enforcement of NUC–001–1 addressed
both potential conflicts with the
Commission’s standards of conduct
rules, and potential conflicts with NRC
requirements.
90. EEI requests clarification that the
communications required to comply
with NUC–001–1 are permitted under
the Commission’s standards of conduct
rules. The Commission previously
clarified that transmission providers
may communicate with affiliated
nuclear power plants regarding certain
matters related to the safety and
reliability of the transmission system
and of the nuclear power plants in order
to comply with requirements of the
NRC. EEI asks the Commission to clarify
that their provisions apply equally to
unaffiliated entities that must comply
with NUC–001–1 and that a
transmission entity is not subject to
enforcement under the standards of
conduct, applicable tariff or other
authority for providing information in
compliance with NUC–001–1.48
91. NEI states that while the NUC–
001–1 requirements are structured to
help identify potential conflicts and
coordinate their resolution through
changes to the NPIRs, unforeseen
situations could arise that are not
adequately covered in the NPIRs and
interface agreements under NUC–001–1.
NEI argues that penalties should not be
imposed if a nuclear plant generator
operator fails to comply with a NUC–
001–1 interface agreement or other
Reliability Standard because the nuclear
plant generator operator complied
instead with NRC requirements. NEI
recommends that NUC–001–1 be
revised to recognize the primary
obligation of nuclear plant generator
operators to protect public health and
safety through compliance with NRC
regulations and the nuclear plant
48 EEI
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license, and proposes revised
language.49
92. Similarly, Duke states that while
it does not object to NUC–001–1, the
Commission should clearly define the
boundary between NRC nuclear safety
requirements and Commission grid
reliability requirements. According to
Duke, because NRC licensing criteria
address health and safety issues, those
criteria should take precedence and a
nuclear plant generator operator should
not be penalized for non-compliance
with a conflicting interface agreement or
other Reliability Standard provision.
Duke cites unforeseen circumstances as
well as specific examples where NRC
safety criteria may take precedence.50
Also, Constellation requests assurance
that, when there are overlapping
requirements, registered entities will be
subject to a single penalty only.
waiver of penalties are beyond the scope
of this proceeding and should be
addressed in an appropriate
enforcement proceeding. The
Commission understands that the NPIRs
are specifically identified to enable a
nuclear plant generator operator to meet
its NRC licensing requirements at all
times. As such, there should be no
question of priority of the NRC criteria
and NUC–001–1 Requirements. As to
Duke’s examples, all of the existing
Reliability Standards have a sound
engineering basis and do not require
exceeding defined power limits, identify
priorities, and account for known
interactions such as separation of any
generating facility due to degraded grid
voltage or frequency.
2. Commission Determination
93. In response to EEI’s request for
clarification that communications
required to comply with this Reliability
Standard are permitted under the
Commission’s standards of conduct
regulations, the Commission notes that
it is addressing this subject through its
rulemaking on standards of conduct in
Docket No. RM07–1–000.51 A number of
commenters in that docket sought
clarification as to whether
communications involving the
Reliability Standards are exempt from
standards of conduct prohibitions. The
Final Rule to adopt revised standards of
conduct, issued by the Commission,
addresses the subject of exemptions.
94. Comments suggesting that
mitigating circumstances may warrant
95. The NOPR noted that the
Requirements of NUC–001–1 specify
various contractual terms, including
certain studies and procedures, to be
addressed through interface agreements
but do not describe specific substantive
terms to be included in the agreements.
In response, the NOPR expressed
concern whether NUC–001–1
established an appropriate scope for the
interface agreements. In its November
19, 2007 Petition, NERC stated that the
NUC–001–1 drafting team adopted a
consensus approach to coordinating
nuclear power plant and transmission
grid operations.52 According to NERC,
the consensus approach provides a
platform for coordination at the
interface that allows both nuclear plant
generator operators and transmission
entities to respect their main system
drivers. Therefore, according to NERC,
the NUC–001–1 drafting team adopted
the interface agreement as a model for
coordination and placed the obligation
on nuclear plant generator operators and
transmission entities to coordinate
operational requirements by consensus.
96. In recognition of the successful
working model of existing interface
agreements, the NOPR proposed to
accept NUC–001–1 and find appropriate
the proposed level of detail defining
substantive provisions to be included in
interface agreements.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
49 NEI
proposes that an additional paragraph be
added to NUC–001–1 to address this potential
conflict between the Commission and the NRC:
‘‘FERC recognizes the necessity of nuclear plant
generator operators to protect the public health and
safety through compliance with NRC regulations
and license obligations. A nuclear power generator
operator’s compliance with NPIRs is excused if
necessary to comply with NRC regulations or
license obligations. Notwithstanding any other
provisions of FERC rules or regulations, any penalty
that might be imposed arising from compliance by
a nuclear plant generator operator arising from
compliance with NRC regulations or license
obligations shall not be imposed.’’ NEI comments
at 11.
50 Duke proposed the following examples: (a) The
inability of a nuclear generator to exceed its license
power limits to respond to underfrequency events,
(b) specific license requirements for support from
the grid, such as priority off site power after a
blackout, and (c) license-required separation in
response to degraded grid voltage or frequency
conditions.
51 Standards of Conduct for Transmission
Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket
No. RM07–1–000, 73 FR 16228 (Mar. 27, 2008),
FERC Stats. and Regs. ¶ 32,630 (2008). Revisions to
the Standards of Conduct for Transmission
Providers, Final Rule, Docket No. RM07–1–000, 125
FERC ¶ 61,062 (2008).
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E. Scope of Agreements
1. NOPR
2. Commission Determination
97. The Commission generally finds
the scope of the Nuclear Reliability
Standard requirements adequate to
address the development and
implementation of interface agreements
between nuclear plant generator
operators and transmission entities,
52 November
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63781
subject to the discussion of particular
issues below.
a. Commission Questions
i. Interim Revisions
(1) NOPR
98. The NOPR proposed to approve
the provisions for updating interface
agreements, but requested comment on
whether NUC–001–1 adequately
provides for revisions to reflect interim
changes.
(2) Comments
99. In response to the NOPR’s inquiry
whether NUC–001–1 includes sufficient
provision for updates outside of the
three-year review process, NERC states
that it believes that the combination of
Requirements R7, R8, R9.3.4, R9.4, and
R9.4.1 adequately provides for the
updating of NPIRs outside the three-year
review window as circumstances
warrant. Entergy concurs, asserting that
NUC–001 adequately provides for
interim updates to interface agreements.
Southern states that it is feasible for
interface agreements ‘‘to provide for
negotiation and amendments to address
emerging transmission and generating
system limits and revised nuclear plant
licensing requirements prior to, or
contemporaneously with, implementing
operations solutions’’ 53 to address
permanent, but not temporary, changes.
Southern indicates that amendment of
the agreement would not be practical in
temporary situations because an
‘‘emerging’’ system limit will be
resolved within a relatively short period
of time.
(3) Commission Determination
100. Based on the comments received,
the Commission finds that NUC–001–1
makes adequate provision for interim
updates. While not all system changes
can be anticipated, the Commission
expects that significant changes to the
parties’ operating relationship would be
formalized and documented in an
auditable format as interim changes in
an addendum or revisions to the
agreement, as appropriate.
b. Amendments to Operational
Procedures
i. NOPR
101. The NOPR noted the
Commission’s preference that new
operational procedures be reflected in
the interface agreements prior to being
implemented upon nuclear power plant
start-up or reauthorization, or shortly
thereafter. The Commission requested
comment whether interface agreements
53 Southern
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could provide for negotiation and
amendments to address emerging
transmission and generating system
limits and revised nuclear plant
licensing requirements prior to, or
contemporaneously with, implementing
operations solutions.
ii. Comments
102. NEI states that NRC regulations
include extensive requirements and
processes for changes to nuclear power
plants and their operations. Thus, NEI
opposes a requirement to revise the
interface agreement prior to making
changes to a nuclear power plant or its
operations. NEI suggests that
implementation details to address
changes in the grid configuration would
be addressed in procedures, and should
not require revisions to an interface
agreement, while Requirements R7 and
R8 require parties to review design
changes to determine their impact on
NPIRs.
103. Entergy responded that NPIRs are
amended on a flexible time horizon
under each individual interface
agreement, and that this approach
provides both entities with the
flexibility to respond to emerging issues.
iii. Commission Determination
104. Based on the comments received,
the Commission finds that NUC–001–1
makes adequate provision for updates to
address changing transmission and
generator limits or revised nuclear plant
licensing requirements before operating
solutions are implemented.
3. Other Scope Related Issues
a. Requirement R9.3.5
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
105. Commenters raise concerns
regarding Requirement R9.3.5, which
were not anticipated in the NOPR.
According to NEI, Requirement R9.3.5
mixes two separate events incorporated
in nuclear power plant design and
license conditions: (i) Coping times for
station blackouts and (ii) restoration of
off-site power.54 NEI explains that
station blackouts include a loss of offsite power and select emergency
alternating current (AC) power sources
(generally on-site). In the case of such
an event, NEI explains that the nuclear
plant generator operator has
responsibility to restore the emergency
54 Requirement R9 establishes a minimum set of
elements to be addressed in interface agreements.
Requirement R9.3.5 states that the operations and
maintenance coordination elements should include
‘‘Provision to consider nuclear plant coping times
required by the nuclear plant licensing
requirements and their relation to the coordination
of grid and nuclear plant restoration following a
nuclear plant loss of off-site power.’’ See also TVA
comments, Enclosure at 1.
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AC power sources within the
demonstrated coping time. NEI states,
however, that a transmission entity
should assign off-site power restoration
priority independent of coping time and
that NERC should clarify Requirement
R9.3.5 references to station blackout and
off-site power restoration priority.
Specifically, NEI recommends
appending the requirement with the
phrase ‘‘to ensure restoration of Off-site
Power is afforded priority reflecting that
reliance on emergency AC power
sources is not preferred.’’ 55
106. Southern states that the phrase
‘‘coping times’’ in Requirement R9.3.5 is
ambiguous because the term has various
meanings in the nuclear context and
does not necessarily equate to a specific
time period. Southern proposes the
following alternative language for NERC
consideration: ‘‘Provision to consider
the [nuclear plant licensing
requirements] related to the
coordination of grid and nuclear plant
restoration following a nuclear plant
loss of Off-site Power.’’ 56
i. Commission Determination
107. Based on the industry comments
received, it appears that the references
in Requirement R9.3.5 to coping times
for station blackouts and restoration of
off-site power are ambiguous—insofar as
commenters suggest that the
relationship between the two issues is
not clear, and thus, is not adequately
addressed as presented in Requirement
R9.3.5. Therefore, we direct the ERO to
modify Requirement 9.3.5 to clarify
references to coping times and off-site
power restoration to address the
concerns raised in the comments
through its Reliability Standards
development process. This approach
permits a full vetting of new suggestions
raised by commenters in NOPR
comments and encourages interested
entities to participate in the ERO
Reliability Standards development
process rather than wait to express their
views until a proposed new or modified
Reliability Standard is filed with the
Commission.57 We agree with
commenters that the provision is
inartfully drafted and needs to be
clarified; however, there does not
appear to be any reason that parties to
an interface agreement should not
coordinate concerning both issues as an
interim measure. The Commission
directs NERC to develop a modification
to Requirement R9.3.5, as discussed
above. In addition, to ensure the matter
is addressed expeditiously, we direct
55 NEI
comments at 11–12.
comments at 8.
57 Order No. 693 at P 188.
56 Southern
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NERC to submit a timeline for
developing and filing the modification
as a compliance filing to be made within
30 days of the date of this Final Rule.
b. Personnel Training
108. International Transmission
requests clarification whether
Requirement R9.4.5 regarding personnel
training applies to the transmission
entity, the nuclear plant generator
operator or both, and whether this
requirement can be satisfied by existing
training programs related to SOLs or
IROLs. Midwest ISO requests that the
Commission require the ERO to modify
Requirement R9.3.6 to clearly provide
that it only requires each entity to train
its own operating personnel on the
content of the applicable agreements,
procedures and other documents related
to NUC–001–1.
i. Commission Determination
109. The Commission clarifies that
employees of nuclear plant generator
operators and transmission entities
should receive the training necessary to
execute the terms of the interface
agreement, and such training should be
specified in the interface agreement
between the parties. In addition,
employees operating facilities used to
provide services to meet NPIRs should
be properly trained to Reliability
Standard training requirements that
apply to those facilities or the function
served by the employees.
c. Planning
110. Midwest ISO proposes that the
type of planning mandated by
Requirement R9.2.3 should be more
specifically defined. According to
Midwest ISO, adherence to NUC–001–1
requires near real-time planning to
support the NPIRs. Midwest ISO notes
that other NERC Reliability Standards
require mid-term and long-term
planning.
i. Commission Determination
111. The Commission declines to
address Midwest ISO’s request to clarify
the planning required under
Requirement R9.2.3. Because NPIRs are
based on NRC licensing requirements,
the scope of planning mandated by
Requirement R9.2.3 will largely be
determined by the nuclear plant
licensing requirements. As such, the
determination is beyond the scope of
this proceeding and is best resolved in
the interface agreement development
process between parties who are
familiar with the facilities involved. In
general, the Commission believes that
the NPIRs needed to ensure the
operation of nuclear power plants must
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be included in the planning process for
all time frames as appropriate.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
d. Requests for Limits on Scope of
Interface Agreements
112. Several commenters request
limits to the scope of nuclear plant
licensing requirements and SOLs that
may become the subject of NPIRs
addressed in an interface agreement.
CenterPoint Energy objects to
Requirements R3 through R9 insofar as
they do not limit the types of
information or actions that are to be
requested and provided. Dominion
states that NUC–001–1 should not
duplicate requirements that are already
stipulated in other Commissionapproved Reliability Standards.
113. Southern is concerned that the
stated purpose of NUC–001–1, together
with certain of its provisions, may
impose operational requirements on a
nuclear plant generator operator beyond
those established in NRC licensing
requirements.58 According to Southern,
the development and implementation of
interface arrangements and any
supplemental procedures should be left
to the discretion and judgment of
transmission entities and nuclear plant
generator operators, operating within
their respective regulatory frameworks.
Southern recommends that the
Commission direct NERC to amend the
proposed Nuclear Reliability Standard,
as appropriate, to avoid conflicts with
NRC licensing requirements, and clarify
that nothing in NUC–001–1 or the
NOPR is intended to create any such
conflict.
114. ConEdison also notes that
transmission entities that provide
services under the agreement should
receive fair compensation. According to
ConEdison, the requirements contained
in the NOPR would require the various
transmission entities provide additional
services or a heightened level of services
already provided to the nuclear plant
generator operator.
i. Commission Determination
115. The Commission declines to
direct the clarification proposed in the
comments. We believe that these
concerns expressed by the commenters
are unfounded. Because NPIRs are based
on NRC licensing requirements, the
scope of procedures to be developed
will largely be limited to procedures
needed to address the nuclear plant
licensing requirements. In addition, by
agreement of the nuclear plant generator
operator and transmission entities,
parties will develop protocols and may
make system improvements to address
58 See
also National Grid comments.
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system limits that present preventable
challenges to off-site power supply
caused by grid disturbances. Thus, the
basis for the NPIRs, and the terms of the
interface agreements, is limited to what
is needed to ensure reliable operation or
safe shutdown of the nuclear power
plant. Because the procedures embodied
in NPIRs are developed by agreement of
the parties, we do not share Southern’s
concern that additional operating
requirements could be imposed on a
nuclear plant generator operator.
116. As previously discussed,
ConEdison’s and others’ arguments that
transmission entities should receive
compensation if they provide services
relating to NPIRs are beyond the scope
of this proceeding. These matters are
appropriately left to the parties to the
interface agreements to resolve.
F. Coordination
117. Requirements R7 and R8 require
communication between nuclear plant
generator operators and transmission
entities regarding significant changes in
design, configuration, operation, or
limits of their facilities:
Requirement R7: Per the Agreements
developed in accordance with this standard,
the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall
inform the applicable Transmission Entities
of actual or proposed changes to nuclear
plant design, configuration, operations,
limits, protection systems, or capabilities that
may impact the ability of the electric system
to meet the NPIRs.
Requirement R8: Per the Agreements
developed in accordance with this standard,
the applicable Transmission Entities shall
inform the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator
of actual or proposed changes to electric
system design, configuration, operations,
limits, protection systems, or capabilities that
may impact the ability of the electric system
to meet the NPIRs.
118. In addition, Requirement R6
obligates interface agreement parties to
coordinate outages and maintenance
activities; Requirement R9.3.6 requires
coordination of physical and cybersecurity protections; and Requirement
R9.3.7 requires coordination of special
protection systems and load shedding.
Thus, these Requirements provide for
communication between a nuclear plant
generator operator and its individual
transmission entities, as well as the
reverse for communication from the
transmission entities to the nuclear
plant generator operator.
1. Coordination Among Transmission
Entities
a. NOPR Proposal
119. The NOPR expressed concern
that NUC–001–1 Requirements do not
explicitly provide for communication
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and coordination among the various
transmission entities that is necessary to
facilitate the provision of generation and
transmission services to support the
nuclear power plant operations. The
NOPR stated the Commission’s
understanding that, historically, control
area operators provided the necessary
coordination and communication with
neighboring entities, including RTOtype grid operators and other
interconnected utilities and load serving
entities, when necessary. The NOPR
stated the Commission’s expectation
that the parties to nuclear plant
interface agreements would continue to
provide for coordination among
transmission entities, pursuant to the
Requirements of NUC–001–1, in
particular the Requirement R9.3.1
obligation to provide for coordination of
interface facilities in the interface
agreement. Interface agreement parties
may continue to designate former
integrated control area operators when
appropriate or may revise their
approach, reflecting changes under
restructuring to grid operations when
necessary, consistent with coordination
responsibilities provided for in existing
Reliability Standards. Based on such an
understanding, the NOPR proposed to
accept the coordination provisions as
requiring all appropriate coordination
among transmission entities and
requested comment.
b. Comments
120. NEI states that NUC–001–1
includes adequate coordination
provisions, in particular through
Requirement R9.4, together with the
other Reliability Standards. NEI notes
that transmission service providers have
historically provided coordination and
NUC–001–1 will not impose new
burdens. Detroit Edison agrees that
transmission entities should coordinate
as necessary to ensure full compliance
with NUC–001–1. According to Entergy,
the proposed Nuclear Reliability
Standard, in conjunction with other
Reliability Standards, ensures that all
necessary parties are involved in the
interface agreements.
121. International Transmission notes
that current practice under existing
coordination agreements is to
communicate when the transmission
system is one event away from violating
a SOL or IROL so that each party is
advised of the possible effects on the
other of responsive actions and the risks
of a contingency. International
Transmission states that clarification is
needed on whether implementation of
communication protocols established in
the interface agreement will constitute
compliance with NUC–001–1.
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International Transmission is concerned
that the occurrence of a contingency
would be treated as a violation of the
NPIRs or NUC–001–1.
122. Southern is concerned that the
NOPR’s general description of certain
coordination provisions 59 may be
interpreted as requiring a nuclear plant
generator operator to actually coordinate
responses on the transmission system.
According to Southern, the nuclear
plant generator operator does not
typically operate the system and,
therefore, it would not be appropriate to
require the nuclear plant generator
operator to be responsible for
coordination of responses on the
transmission system. Southern states
that such an interpretation would be
inappropriate because it would go
beyond the purpose of NUC–001–1 and
the responsibilities of the respective
parties. According to Southern, a
transmission provider will respond to
the issues listed because it actually
operates the system. Therefore, the
Commission should clarify that the
standard does not require nuclear plant
generator operators to coordinate
responses on the transmission system.
123. NEI similarly objects to the
Requirements that require interface
agreements to provide for coordination
of operational and maintenance issues.
According to NEI, coordinating
responses goes beyond the purpose of
NUC–001–1 and the responsibilities of
the respective parties. NEI suggests that
rather than coordinating responses to
unusual circumstances, it is more
accurate to state that an interface
agreement must include elements to
address the operations and maintenance
coordination of unusual conditions.
c. Commission Determination
124. The Commission confirms its
understanding that coordination under
the Reliability Standard includes
coordination among transmission
entities. No party objected to the
Commission’s interpretation that the
coordination required under
Requirement R9.3.1 includes
designating an entity to coordinate
among various transmission entities
providing unbundled services, and that
such a role had been previously filled
by former control area operators.
Therefore, we adopt that proposal.
125. International Transmission’s
request for clarification whether a
contingency may be considered a
violation of an NPIR raises issues
concerning what level of service is
adequate to meet the NPIRs addressed
in an interface agreement. Furthermore,
59 NOPR
at P 14.
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International Transmission has not
stated how communication protocols, as
presented in NUC–001–1, would imply
that the occurrence of a contingency
would violate NUC–001–1. Such issues
are best resolved by those parties during
the development of the agreement.
126. As for Southern’s objection to the
parties to an interface agreement
coordinating responses to system
events, we see nothing objectionable to
the requirement that the parties to an
interface agreement have procedures
and protocols in place to respond to
changing system conditions, consistent
with nuclear license requirements and
SOL procedures, as well as the
remaining Reliability Standards.
Nothing in the Reliability Standard or
the NOPR description suggests that the
nuclear plant generator operator is to be
the party to coordinate transmission
system responses.
127. Similarly, with respect to NEI’s
concern that the parties to an interface
agreement be required to coordinate
operational and maintenance issues
where necessary, we conclude that a
generator and a transmission system
operator may agree to coordinate
maintenance schedules in order to
address system conditions, so long as
the agreement is consistent, in this case,
with the generator’s license
requirements, the Reliability Standards,
and the standards of conduct.60
2. Addressing System Changes
128. Requirements R7 and R8 require
parties to inform each other of design,
configuration, operations, limits,
protection systems, or capabilities that
that may impact their ability to meet
NPIRs.
a. Comments
129. Entergy asks the Commission to
clarify the level of proposed change that
would trigger a Requirement R7 and R8
information exchange. According to
Entergy, proposals to change a plant’s
‘‘design, configuration, operations,
limits, protection systems, or
capabilities’’ are evaluated routinely,
due to the multitude of complex
systems within a nuclear power plant,
and the long lifetimes of such facilities.
Entergy points out that the NRC has
extensive general design criteria and
requirements for changes.61 Entergy
notes that proposals may never be
60 Standards of Conduct for Transmission
Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket
No. RM07–1–000, 73 FR 16228 (Mar. 27, 2008),
FERC Stats. and Regs. ¶ 32,630 (2008). Revisions to
the Standards of Conduct for Transmission
Providers, Final Rule, Docket No. RM07–1–000, 125
FERC ¶ 61,062 (2008).
61 See 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B and 10 CFR
50.59.
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approved, scheduled, or implemented
and suggests that transmission system
and facility proposals may be subject to
similar concerns.
130. Entergy notes the limitations in
the Requirements that the proposed
changes to be reported are those that
‘‘may impact the ability of the electric
system to meet the NPIRs,’’ but claims
that the description lacks clarity.
Entergy suggests that nuclear plant
generator operators and transmission
entities will not be able to implement
the Requirements without a
determination of what changes to
communicate and questions whether
every discussion about a possible design
change, technological improvement, or
sale of facilities must be communicated.
Entergy proposes that the Commission
bypass agreement of the parties to an
interface agreement and establish a
limitation to include proposed changes
that are formally approved, scheduled
for implementation, and could
significantly impact the ability of the
Bulk-Power System to meet the NPIRs.
b. Commission Determination
131. The Commission declines to
direct the clarification requested by
Entergy. The Commission disagrees that
the requirement to communicate
changes that ‘‘may impact the ability of
the electric system to meet the NPIRs’’
is not a clear requirement. It is an
example of ‘‘what’’ is required, not
‘‘how’’ it should be performed which
should be included in the agreements.
The Commission believes that there are
many plant-specific issues and does not
expect they will be individually
addressed in the Reliability Standard.
However, it is clear what is required and
the compliance audits will check that
the entities have sufficiently covered
them in their agreements.
G. Violation Risk Factors
132. As part of its compliance and
enforcement program, NERC must
assign a lower, medium or high
violation risk factor to each
Requirement of each mandatory
Reliability Standard to associate a
violation of the Requirement with its
potential impact on the reliability of the
Bulk-Power System. Violation risk
factors are defined as follows:
High Risk Requirement: (a) Is a
requirement that, if violated, could directly
cause or contribute to Bulk-Power System
instability, separation, or a cascading
sequence of failures, or could place the BulkPower System at an unacceptable risk of
instability, separation, or cascading failures;
or (b) is a requirement in a planning time
frame that, if violated, could, under
emergency, abnormal, or restorative
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conditions anticipated by the preparations,
directly cause or contribute to Bulk-Power
System instability, separation, or a cascading
sequence of failures, or could place the BulkPower System at an unacceptable risk of
instability, separation, or cascading failures,
or could hinder restoration to a normal
condition.
Medium Risk Requirement: (a) Is a
requirement that, if violated, could directly
affect the electrical state or the capability of
the Bulk-Power System, or the ability to
effectively monitor and control the BulkPower System, but is unlikely to lead to
Bulk-Power System instability, separation, or
cascading failures; or (b) is a requirement in
a planning time frame that, if violated, could,
under emergency, abnormal, or restorative
conditions anticipated by the preparations,
directly affect the electrical state or capability
of the Bulk-Power System, or the ability to
effectively monitor, control, or restore the
Bulk-Power System, but is unlikely, under
emergency, abnormal, or restoration
conditions anticipated by the preparations, to
lead to Bulk-Power System instability,
separation, or cascading failures, nor to
hinder restoration to a normal condition.
Lower Risk Requirement: Is administrative
in nature and (a) is a requirement that, if
violated, would not be expected to affect the
electrical state or capability of the BulkPower System, or the ability to effectively
monitor and control the Bulk-Power System;
or (b) is a requirement in a planning time
frame that, if violated, would not, under the
emergency, abnormal, or restorative
conditions anticipated by the preparations,
be expected to affect the electrical state or
capability of the Bulk-Power System, or the
ability to effectively monitor, control, or
restore the Bulk-Power System.62
133. In its November 19, 2007
Petition, NERC identified and proposed
violation risk factors for each
Requirement of Reliability Standard
NUC–001.63 The NOPR reviewed
NERC’s proposal consistent with the
terms proposed in the Violation Risk
Factor Order, in which the Commission
addressed violation risk factors filed by
NERC for Version 0 and Version 1
Reliability Standards.64
NOPR Proposal
134. In the NOPR, the Commission
disagreed with NERC’s suggestion that
NUC–001–1 Requirements were
primarily administrative in nature and
proposed to direct the ERO to raise
violation risk factors for several
Requirements. The NOPR stated the
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62 North
American Electric Reliability Corp., 119
FERC ¶ 61,145, at P 9 (Violation Risk Factor Order),
order on reh’g, 120 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2007) (Violation
Risk Factor Rehearing Order).
63 NERC proposes a lower violation risk factor for
Requirements R1, R2 and R9 and a medium
violation risk factor for Requirements R3 through
R8.
64 See Violation Risk Factor Order at P 19–36
(discussing five guidelines to evaluate the validity
of each violation risk factor assignment).
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Commission’s general view that a
Reliability Standard to ensure safe and
reliable nuclear power plant operation
and shutdown merits medium or high
violation risk factors, rather than lower,
due to the reliability benefits of nuclear
power and the impact of separating a
plant from the grid.
135. The NOPR noted that NUC–001–
1 Requirements co-mingle
administrative tasks with more critical
requirements to ensure safe nuclear
power plant operation and shutdown.
These Requirements also provide for the
safe and reliable operation of the grid,
response to potential emergency
conditions and implementation of
procedures to address changing and
emergency conditions. The NOPR
sought comment on the Commission’s
proposals to raise violation risk factors
for NUC–001–1, Requirements R2 (from
lower to medium), R4, R5, R7, and R8
(medium to high), and R9 (lower to
medium).
136. The NOPR also stated the
Commission’s understanding that NERC
would apply the violation risk factor for
the main Requirement to any violation
of a sub-Requirement, unless separate
violation risk factors are assigned to the
Requirement and the sub-Requirement.
1. General Violation Risk Factor Issues
a. Comments
137. NERC and other commenters
object to what they characterize as the
general basis described in the NOPR for
justifying changes to violation risk
factors.65 They object to the
Commission’s reliance on cited
reliability benefits of nuclear power and
the impact of separating a plant from the
grid to justify raising the risk factors.
NERC and EEI state that, despite the
unique characteristics of nuclear power
generation the reliability benefits of
nuclear power and the impact of
separation from the grid are not
different from the reliability impacts of
a large output fossil generating facility.
EEI further states that these reliability
concerns are addressed in other
Reliability Standards that apply to all
generators, regardless of fuel type.
138. Duke echoes these concerns,
stating that violation risk factors (and
violation severity levels) should
establish penalty ranges that are
proportionate to the potential impact of
violations on the Bulk-Power System
(medium or lower), but should not
expose nuclear plant generator operators
and transmission entities to extreme
65 See generally Ameren, ATC, Detroit Edison,
EEI, Entergy, Exelon, ISO/RTO Council, Ontario
Power, Southern, and SCE&G comments.
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63785
penalties simply because nuclear power
plants are large units.
139. Ameren maintains that NUC–
001–1 is administrative in nature, not
operational and the Commission should
not revise the violation risk factors.
140. Detroit Edison argues that the
Commission’s proposal to increase the
violation risk factors undermines the
integrity and value of the NERC
Reliability Standards development
process and states that the Commission
has not justified its departure from the
determinations reached through that
process.66 EEI similarly believes that
any proposal to change violation risk
factors or other aspects of Reliability
Standards must be considered through
NERC’s ANSI-approved Reliability
Standards development process.67
141. Constellation requests assurance
that when there are overlapping
requirements, registered entities will be
subject to a single penalty only.
142. Finally, EEI comments that any
proposal to change violation risk factors
or other aspects of Reliability Standards
must be considered through NERC’s
Reliability Standard development
process. It points out that the
Commission adopted this approach in
Order No. 706, stating that ‘‘where a
directive for modification appears to be
determinative of the outcome, the
Commission provided guidance to the
ERO standards development process but
permitted consideration of an
equivalent alternative approach that
adequately addresses the Commission’s
underlying goal or concern ‘as
efficiently or effectively as the
Commission proposal.’ 68
b. Commission Determination
143. The Commission declines to
adopt the procedures proposed by the
commenters. The Commission has
previously determined that violation
risk factors are not a part of the
Reliability Standards.69 NERC has had
an opportunity to fully vet the NUC–
001–1 violation risk factors through the
Reliability Standards development
process. The Commission believes that,
for those violation risk factors that do
not comport with the Commission’s
previously-articulated guidelines for
analyzing violation risk factor
66 See also Ontario IESO and Hydro One, and
SCE&G comments.
67 Southern supports the EEI comments on
violation risk factors. Ameren, Exelon, and Ontario
Power support directing revisions through the
Reliability Standards development process.
68 EEI comments at 8.
69 Violation Risk Factor Rehearing Order, 120
FERC ¶ 61,145 at P 11–16, citing North American
Reliability Corp., 118 FERC ¶ 61,030, at P 91, order
on clarification and reh’g, 119 FERC ¶ 61,046
(2007).
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designations, there is little benefit in
once again allowing the Reliability
Standards development process to
reconsider a designation based on the
Commission’s concerns. Therefore, we
will not allow NERC to reconsider the
violation risk factor designations in this
instance but, rather, direct below that
NERC make specific modifications to its
designations. NERC must submit a
compliance filing with the revised
violation risk factors no later than 90
days before the date the relevant
Reliability Standard becomes
enforceable.
144. That being said, NERC may
choose the procedural vehicle to change
the violation risk factors consistent with
the Commission’s directives. NERC may
use the Reliability Standards
development process, so long as it meets
Commission-imposed deadlines.70 In
this instance, the Commission sees no
vital reason to direct the ERO to use
section 1403 of its Rules of Procedure to
revise the violation risk factors
discussed below, so long as the revised
violation risk factors address the
Commission’s concerns and are filed no
less than 90 days before the effective
date of the relevant Reliability Standard.
145. Coordinating operations and
planning between the nuclear power
plant and its transmission entities
serves two purposes; safety of the
nuclear power plant and reliability of
the Bulk-Power System. With regard to
safety, the Blackout Report highlighted
the importance of coordinated
operations and planning between the
Bulk-Power System and nuclear power
plants, stating ‘‘[a]s the design and
operation of the electricity grid is taken
into account when evaluating the safety
analysis of nuclear power plants,
changes to the electricity grid must be
evaluated for the impact on plant
safety.’’ 71 With regard to reliability,
since the NPIR supports many of the
requirements necessary for the nuclear
power plant to operate connected to the
bulk electric system, not having an NPIR
could result in the long-term outage of
one or all nuclear power plants at a
particular site to which the NPIR is
applicable. This is relevant because the
bulk electric system is not required to be
planned to have multiple nuclear power
plants out of service during peak load
periods. As a result, the Commission
disagrees with commenters that object
70 See North American Electric Reliability Corp.,
118 FERC ¶ 61,030, at P 91, order on compliance,
119 FERC ¶ 61,046, at P 33 (2007).
71 See U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task
Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003
Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes
and Recommendations, at 129 (April 2004)
(Blackout Report).
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to its reliance on the impact of a nuclear
power plant separating from the grid to
justify elevating violation risk factors for
requirements of the Reliability
Standard. While the Commission
recognizes that the power produced
from nuclear and non-nuclear power
plants is the same, the conditions under
which nuclear power plants can safely
operate are inherently different than
non-nuclear power plants because a
nuclear power plant must meet all
licensing requirements established by
the NRC to remain connected to the
grid.
146. The Commission is concerned
that a lack of coordination of operations
and planning between a nuclear power
plant and its transmission entities with
respect to the interface capabilities and
requirements has the potential to result
in both the unanticipated separation
and the long term outage of one or all
nuclear power plants at a site from the
Bulk-Power System. The former has the
potential to place the Bulk-Power
System at risk for cascading outages
while the latter may result in inadequate
system capabilities to meet the projected
firm load in either the planning or
operating horizon. For example, once
disconnected, before a nuclear power
plant can reconnect to the Bulk-Power
System, not only must Bulk-Power
System conditions be suitable, but the
nuclear power plant must also complete
certain activities relevant to ensuring
the safety of the plant to resume power
production. Since nuclear power plants
are typically designed as base load
plants, the Commission is concerned
that while the Bulk-Power System may
typically be able to withstand the
disconnection of a nuclear power plant
for a reasonable period until such time
Bulk-Power System conditions allow for
reconnection and the nuclear power
plant is permitted to reconnect, a
prolonged disconnection of a nuclear
power plant because its NPIRs are not
satisfied may not be sustainable without
affecting system capabilities, thus
putting the Bulk-Power System at risk
for instability, separation, or cascading
outages.
147. The Commission also disagrees
with arguments that elevated violation
risk factors for Requirements of the
Reliability Standard are not justified
because the reliability concern of
instability, separation, or cascading
outages are already addressed in other
Reliability Standards. The Commission
agrees with commenters that, as
required by other Reliability Standards,
the Bulk-Power System is planned and
operated such that there will not be any
interruptions of firm transmission
service after one event, such as the loss
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of a generator, nuclear fueled or
otherwise.72 However, the Commission
has previously determined that it is not
appropriate to mitigate perceived
content issues among Reliability
Standards, as suggested by commenters
in this instance as the duplication of
reliability objectives, through the
violation risk factor assignment.73 A
violation risk factor represents the
potential reliability risk a violation of a
requirement presents to the Bulk-Power
System. This assessed reliability risk is
independent of, and not contingent
upon, compliance with other Reliability
Standard requirements. The
Commission recognizes the
complementary nature of some
Reliability Standard Requirements and
the fact that some requirements may
share the same reliability objective. In
fact, the Commission expects the
assignment of a violation risk factor
corresponding to requirements that
address similar reliability goals in
different Reliability Standards to be
treated comparably.74
148. Commenters also argue that
elevated violation risk factors are not
justified because the proposed
Reliability Standard is administrative in
nature, not operational. The
Commission disagrees. While the
Commission recognized in the NOPR
that many of the requirements of the
Nuclear Reliability Standard are
administrative in nature, these same
requirements provide for the
development of procedures to ensure
the safe and reliable operation of the
grid, and responses to potential
emergency conditions.75 As such, we
disagree with arguments that the
proposed standard focuses on nuclear
safety through the administrative
requirement of establishing agreements
and not grid reliability.
149. Constellation’s request for
assurance that, when there are
overlapping requirements, registered
entities will be subject to a single
penalty is a compliance issue and is
thus best addressed on a case-by-case
basis in the context of a compliance
72 See Order No. 693 at P 1794 (‘‘[b]ased on the
record before us, we believe that the transmission
planning Reliability Standard should not allow an
entity to plan for the loss of non-consequential load
in the event of a single contingency’’). The
Commission recognized that load directly
connected to a fault would be removed from
service. See also TPL–001–000, Table 1,
‘‘Transmission Planning Standards—Normal and
Emergency Conditions.’’
73 North American Electric Reliability Corp., 121
FERC ¶ 61,179, at P 16 (2007) (Order on Violation
Risk Factor Compliance Filing).
74 Violation Risk Factor Order, 119 FERC ¶ 61,145
at P 25.
75 NOPR at P 51.
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proceeding. We note that each instance
of non-compliance with a Requirement
is a separate violation. This is consistent
with the FPA which establishes the
statutory maximum penalty amount of
$1 million on a per day, per violation
basis as reflected in the order certifying
NERC as the ERO.76 However, the
Commission approved NERC’s Sanction
Guidelines that allow NERC, in the
context of a compliance proceeding, to
use its discretion in the determination
of monetary penalties for a violation of
a Requirement of a Reliability
Standard.77
150. EEI’s argument that Order No.
706 requires changes to the violation
risk factors to be considered through the
Reliability Standards development
process is flawed. The passages in Order
No. 706 cited by EEI concern
modification of the Reliability Standard
itself. As the Commission has
repeatedly held, the violation risk
factors are not a part of the Reliability
Standards. In fact, in Order No. 706, we
stated that ‘‘we will not allow NERC to
reconsider the violation risk factor
designations in this instance but, rather,
direct below that NERC make specific
modifications to its designations.’’ 78
However, similar to our action in this
order, Order No. 706 allowed NERC to
choose the procedural vehicle to change
the violation risk factors, so long as it
meets Commission-imposed
deadlines.79
2. Requirement-Specific Issues
a. Requirement R2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
i. NOPR
151. The NOPR proposed to direct the
ERO to raise the violation risk factor for
Requirement R2 from lower to medium.
The NOPR justified this proposal
because the Requirement co-mingles the
administrative element of having an
executed agreement in place with the
operational element of determining how
76 16 U.S.C. 825o–1(b) (2006). See also North
American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC
¶ 61,062, at P 412 (Certification Order), order on
reh’g and compliance, 117 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2006).
77 Section 3.10 of the NERC Sanction Guidelines
states in part, ‘‘NERC or the regional entity can
determine and levy a separate penalty or sanction,
or direct remedial action, upon a violator for each
individual violator for each individual violation.
However, in instances of multiple violations related
to a single act or common incidence of
noncompliance, NERC or the regional entity will
generally determine and issue a single aggregate
penalty, sanction, or remedial action directive
bearing reasonable relationship to the aggregate of
the related violations.’’
78 Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical
Infrastructure Protection, Docket No. RM06–22–
000; Order No. 706, 73 FR 7368 (Feb. 7, 2008), 122
FERC ¶ 61,040, at P 757, order on reh’g, Order No.
706–A, 123 FERC ¶ 61,174 (2008).
79 Id.
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the parties to the interface agreement
will address nuclear plant licensing
requirements and SOLs in order to
provide for safe nuclear plant operation
and shutdown. Thus, the operational
requirements established will include
requirements for off-site power to enable
safe operation and shutdown during an
electric system or plant event.
Therefore, the NOPR noted that a
violation of Requirement R2 ‘‘could,
under emergency, abnormal, or
restorative conditions anticipated by the
preparations, directly affect the
electrical state or capability of the BulkPower System’’ and found that a
medium violation risk factor is
appropriate.
ii. Comments
152. Ontario IESO and Hydro One and
SCE&G disagree with the Commission
that Requirement R2 has a direct impact
on the electrical state or capability of
the Bulk-Power System. They argue
that, in the absence of an agreement,
each party would continue to operate its
own system in accordance with all
applicable Reliability Standards.80
Entergy and NEI argue that Requirement
R2 is an administrative requirement,
and state that violations can be quickly
detected and corrected and will not
directly affect the Bulk-Power System.
Entergy also points out that
Requirement R2 takes place in the
planning timeframe and concludes that
a lower violation risk factor is more
appropriate.
iii. Commission Determination
153. The Commission adopts the
NOPR proposal. As the Commission
identified in the NOPR, Requirement R2
co-mingles the administrative element
of having an executed agreement in
place with the operational element of
determining how the parties to the
interface will address nuclear plant
licensing requirements and SOLs.
Consistent with violation risk factor
guideline five, the Commission expects
the assigned violation risk factor to
reflect the highest reliability risk
objective of the requirement.81 A failure
to establish operational and
implementation elements of the NPIRs,
the higher reliability risk objective of
the requirement, has the potential under
emergency, abnormal, or restorative
conditions to directly affect the
80 Detroit Edison states that it agrees with Ontario
IESO and Hydro One on specific violation risk
factor issues, and Ontario Power and SCE&G also
disagree with the Commission’s proposals.
81 Violation Risk Factor Order, 119 FERC ¶ 61,145
at P 32.
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63787
electrical state or capability of the BulkPower System.
154. Arguments that elevating a
violation risk factor is not justified
because Requirement R2 is an
administrative requirement that takes
place in the planning time frame, thus
violations are quickly detected and
corrected are fundamentally flawed.82
NERC contemplates in its definitions of
the violation risk factor levels, the
reliability risk a requirement violation
presents in both the operating and
planning time frames. Consistent with
NERC’s definition, a violation risk factor
represents the potential reliability risk a
violation of a requirement presents to
the Bulk-Power System, regardless of
the time frame.
155. With regard to comments from
Ontario IESO and Hydro One and
SCE&G, as explained previously in this
Final Rule, it is not appropriate to
assign a requirement’s violation risk
factor based on compliance with other
Reliability Standards.
156. Accordingly, the Commission
directs the ERO to revise the violation
risk factor assignment for Requirement
R2 from lower to medium no later then
90 days before the effective date of the
Reliability Standard.
b. Requirements R4.2 and R4.3
i. NOPR
157. The NOPR proposed to direct the
ERO to raise the violation risk factors for
sub-Requirements R4.2 and R4.3 to
high. Sub-Requirements R4.2 and R4.3
require a transmission entity to
incorporate NPIRs into operating
analyses, operate to meet the NPIRs and
inform the nuclear plant generator
operator when the ability to assess
performance to meet the NPIRs is lost.
158. The NOPR states that subRequirement R4.2 obligates a
transmission entity to operate its
electric system to meet NPIRs
established in an interface agreement.
Furthermore, NPIRs are described as
forming the basis for nuclear plant
generator operators and transmission
entities to ‘‘coordinate planning,
assessment, analysis, and operation of
the bulk power system to ensure safe
nuclear plant operations and
shutdowns.’’ Therefore, the NOPR noted
that, under emergency, abnormal, or
restorative conditions, a violation of
Requirement R4.2 could directly cause
or contribute to Bulk-Power System
instability, separation, or a cascading
sequence of failures, or could place the
Bulk-Power System at an unacceptable
risk of instability, separation, or
82 See NEI comments at 8, and Entergy comments
at 15.
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cascading failures,83 and proposed a
high violation risk factor for
Requirement R4.2.
159. The NOPR noted that
Requirement R4.3 obligates a
transmission entity to inform the
nuclear plant generator operator when
the ability to monitor the system and
verify NPIRs is lost. The NOPR noted
that a nuclear plant generator operator
that is not aware that a transmission
entity can no longer guarantee that
NPIRs are met to respond to, would
suffer an impaired ability to anticipate,
emergencies and changing system
conditions. Because such an event could
increase the likelihood that the plant is
separated from the transmission system
and cause significant degradation in
Bulk-Power System reliability,
characterized by instability,
uncontrolled islanding and cascading,
the NOPR proposed to direct the ERO to
raise the violation risk factor for
Requirement R4.3 from medium to high,
and requested comment.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
ii. Comments
160. Several commenters object to the
proposal to raise the violation risk factor
of Requirement R4.2 and R4.3.84 NEI
characterizes Requirement R4.2 as
requiring transmission entities to
operate their electrical systems to meet
the NPIRs incorporated in the interface
agreements and describes Requirement
R4.3 as requiring transmission entities
which lose the ability to monitor their
systems to maintain compliance with
NPIRs to communicate this information
to the affected nuclear plant generator
operators. NEI, ConEdison, and Entergy
state that the Commission’s concerns
regarding the loss of a single generator
are addressed in other NERC Reliability
Standards that minimize the risk of
system instability, separation, or
cascading loss if a generator were to go
offline.
161. NEI states that transmission
planning and operations Reliability
Standards require the transmission
system to be able to withstand threats
from the loss of a single generator.
According to NEI, entities having the
responsibility to meet the Requirements
of these other Reliability Standards
83 See also NERC November 19, 2007 Petition at
20 (‘‘The proposed reliability standard also
acknowledges that the obligation to public safety
relative to nuclear plant operation establishes a
unique set of requirements that other generating
facilities are not subjected to. In order to protect the
common good, the applicable transmission entities
must respect these unique requirements that
maintain and/or restore offsite power adequate to
supply minimum nuclear safety requirements.’’).
84 See ConEdison, Detroit Edison, Entergy,
Ontario IESO and Hydro One, Midwest ISO, NEI,
Ontario Power, and SCE&G comments.
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already incorporate the limitations of
nuclear generating plants into their
studies and analyses and address the
loss of a given generator and limit the
effect of the loss on the grid. NEI states
that NUC–001–1 deals only with the
important interaction and
communication between the nuclear
plant generator operator and
transmission entities to ensure that the
NPIRs are met, while the operation of
the Bulk-Power System and
requirements to prevent instability,
separation, or cascading failures are
adequately addressed by other
Reliability Standards.
162. Ontario IESO and Hydro One
characterize the consequences of a
violation of Requirement R4.2 or R4.3 as
affecting a nuclear plant generator
operator’s license requirements and may
result in a shut down, but argue that
such a result, while significant to the
generator, would not cause significant
degradation in Bulk-Power System.
Ontario IESO and Hydro One state that
the shut down of a power plant is a
controlled process, not a contingency,
and conclude that reliability impacts
such as instability, uncontrolled
islanding and cascading would not
result.
163. Midwest ISO disagrees with the
Commission’s assessment that a high
violation risk factor is necessary for
Requirement R4.2. In most cases, if the
reliability coordinator and transmission
operator are in a condition in which the
bulk electric system cannot support the
off-site power requirements of a nuclear
plant, the nuclear plant is not at risk of
tripping. Normally, in its licensing
requirements, the plant is required after
a period of time (usually two to eight
hours) to begin a controlled shutdown of
the reactor in this situation.
iii. Commission Determination
164. The Commission confirms its
findings proposed in the NOPR and
directs the ERO to revise the violation
risk factor for Requirements R4.2 and
R4.3 from medium to high. We disagree
with the characterization that
Requirements R4.2 and R4.3 deal only
with the ‘‘important interaction and
communication between the nuclear
plant [generator] operator and transition
entities to ensure that the NPIRs are
met.’’ 85 As discussed in the NOPR,
these requirements are directly relevant
to ensuring the continued operation of
a nuclear power plant on the BulkPower System. A failure of the
transmission entity to operate as needed
to provide the NPIR or inform the
nuclear plant generator operator when
85 NEI
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Frm 00020
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its ability to assess the operation of the
electric system is lost, puts the BulkPower System at risk of cascading
outages. We note that most nuclear
plant sites operate more than one
nuclear power plant. If a transmission
entity loses its ability to assess the
operation of the electric system affecting
its NPIRs, it will, in most cases, impact
more than one nuclear power plant
where the result would be the
shutdown, controlled or otherwise, of
the applicable nuclear plant site. As a
result, there could be significant loss of
firm transmission service if not
cascading.
165. The Commission is also not
persuaded by the argument that elevated
violation risk factors are not justified
because the shutdown of a nuclear
power plant is a controlled process and
not a contingency. NERC defines a
contingency as, ‘‘the unexpected failure
or outage of a system component, such
as a generator, transmission line, circuit
breaker, switch or other electrical
element.’’ Although the shut down of a
nuclear power plant is described as a
‘‘controlled’’ process because of the
methodical and orderly operation of
safety systems to disconnect the plant
from the Bulk-Power System, the shut
down is initiated because Bulk-Power
System conditions are unsuitable for the
continued operation of the nuclear
power plant on the Bulk-Power System.
If the shutdown, albeit controlled, of a
nuclear power plant is unexpected in
the course of the operation of the BulkPower System, it is, nonetheless, a
contingency that must be
accommodated in real time operations
without the loss of firm service.
166. Further, not continuously
providing specific NPIRs may result in
the additional loss of one or more
nuclear power plants during single or
multiple contingencies. The
Commission is concerned that an initial
system event near, but unrelated to, one
or more nuclear power plants that
degrades system conditions beyond the
nuclear power plant’s license
requirements could result in the
disconnection of one or more nuclear
power plants from the Bulk-Power
System. In this case, the outages of
multiple nuclear power plants would be
the result of one contingency and would
be considered by the Commission to be
a single event. However, the reliability
impact to the bulk electric system due
to this single event may not be
addressed in operations planning and
long term planning, thus putting the
Bulk-Power System at risk of cascading
outages. Thus, not achieving the NPIRs
could put the Bulk-Power System in
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danger of instability, separation or a
cascading sequence of failures.
167. For the reasons discussed
previously in this Final Rule, the
Commission reiterates that it is not
appropriate to assess a requirement’s
violation risk factor assignment based
on compliance with other Reliability
Standard requirements.
168. Therefore, consistent with the
definition of a high violation risk factor,
for the reasons discussed above, the
Commission directs the ERO to revise
the violation risk factor assignment for
Requirements R4.2 and R4.3 from
medium to high no later then 90 days
before the effective date of the
Reliability Standard.
c. Requirement R5
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
i. NOPR
169. The NOPR proposed to direct the
ERO to raise the violation risk factor for
Requirement R5 from medium to high.
The NOPR noted that Requirement R5
obligates a nuclear plant generator
operator to operate its system consistent
with the interface agreement developed
under NUC–001–1, and that the
separation of a typically large nuclear
power plant from the grid may
significantly affect grid operations.
Because nuclear power plant service
interruptions could be initiated by
incidents occurring on the nuclear
power plant system, including incidents
stemming from a failure to meet
interface agreement terms, a violation of
Requirement R5 could directly affect the
reliability of the system. That possibility
suggested that the violation risk factor
for Requirement R5 should be raised
from medium to high.
ii. Comments
170. Several commenters object to the
proposal to raise the Requirement R5
violation risk factor from medium to
high.86 NEI characterizes Requirement
R5 as ensuring that the nuclear plant
generator operator understands and
implements the interface agreements,
and coordinates with the applicable
transmission entities to ensure nuclear
plant safe operation and shutdown.
According to NEI, the nuclear industry
consensus is that operation of the BulkPower System to prevent instability,
separation, or cascading failures is
adequately addressed by other
Reliability Standards. According to NEI,
the NOPR overstates the significance of
the separation of a nuclear plant from
the Bulk-Power System, because all
Bulk-Power Systems are designed and
86 See Detroit Edison, Ontario IESO and Hydro
One, Entergy, Ontario Power, and SCE&G
comments.
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operated to handle the loss of the largest
generator on the grid as an N–1
contingency, including a large nuclear
power plant, which may not be the
largest generator on the grid. Hence, the
separation of a nuclear power plant
should not be assumed to result in a loss
of Bulk-Power System stability. NEI
states that transmission grids must be
able to withstand the loss of a single
generating unit, including nuclear
power plants and other facilities.87
Thus, according to NEI the tripping of
a large nuclear unit should not directly
cause Bulk-Power System instability,
separation or a cascading sequence of
failures or place the Bulk-Power System
at an unacceptable risk of instability,
separation, or cascading failures. Should
a nuclear generating unit separate from
the grid and the resultant ‘‘post-trip’’
voltage be insufficient to meet the
nuclear offsite power requirements for
the site, it would not result in the
automatic separation of the remaining
nuclear units. Any subsequent
shutdown of the nuclear units should
not introduce grid or nuclear system
transients because the shutdown would
be an operator controlled, orderly
process to ensure compliance with the
requirements of the license.
171. Ontario IESO and Hydro One
concede that failure to meet this
requirement may significantly affect
grid control and operation, but suggest
that the reliability of the power grid will
not be affected in a way that will cause
instability, uncontrolled islanding and
cascading because the separation of the
plant would be coordinated and
implemented in a controlled manner.
Entergy states that the purpose of NUC–
001–1 is to ensure the safe operation of
nuclear power plants by requiring plant
operators and transmission entities to
coordinate to meet NPIRs and that other
Reliability Standards provide for
operation of the Bulk-Power System to
prevent instability, separation, or
cascading failures.
iii. Commission Determination
172. The Commission adopts the
NOPR proposal. Commenters argue that
elevating the violation risk factor
assignment for Requirement R5 is not
justified because: (1) The Commission
overstates the significance of separation
of a nuclear plant from the Bulk-Power
87 NEI cites the NERC ‘‘Category B’’ stability
criteria which it describes as the most restrictive
criteria. See TPL–001–000, Table 1, ‘‘Transmission
Planning Standards.’’ NEI also cites what it
characterizes as more stringent regional criteria that
require that the common mode simultaneous outage
of two generator units (nuclear or otherwise)
connected to the same switchyard shall not result
in cascading, though not addressed by the initiating
events in NERC ‘‘Category C.’’
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63789
System; (2) the reliability concerns
associated with instability, separation,
or cascading outages are already
addressed in other Reliability
Standards, and (3) the shutdown of a
nuclear power plant is a controlled
process and not a contingency.
173. Each of these arguments has been
previously addressed in this Final Rule.
Accordingly, the Commission directs
the ERO to revise the violation risk
factor assignment for Requirement R5
from medium to high no later then 90
days before the effective date of the
Reliability Standard.
d. Requirements R7 and R8
i. NOPR
174. The NOPR proposed to direct the
ERO to raise the violation risk factors for
Requirements R7 and R8 from medium
to high, and sought comment.
Requirements R7 and R8 obligate a
nuclear plant generator operator and its
transmission entities to inform each
other of actual or proposed changes to
their facilities that affect their ability to
meet NPIRs. Because the information to
be exchanged, such as ‘‘limits’’ and
‘‘protection systems,’’ affects the ability
of a plant to remain connected to the
Bulk-Power System, the NOPR stated
that a failure to provide information
could result in a nuclear plant
disconnecting from the Bulk-Power
System, and place the Bulk-Power
System at risk for cascading outages. To
account for such a risk, the NOPR
proposed to direct the ERO to raise the
violation risk factors for Requirements
R7 and R8 from medium to high.
ii. Comments
175. NEI states the violation risk
factors for Requirements R7 and R8
should not be changed. NEI states
Requirements R7 and R8 require nuclear
plant generator operators and their
transmission entities to communicate
with each other regarding any changes
to their facilities that could affect their
capacity to meet their NPIR obligations.
Since violations of these requirements
are not likely to lead to Bulk-Power
System instability, separation, or
cascading failures, the violation risk
factors for Requirements R7 and R8
should not be changed. Entergy also
argues that Requirements R7 and R8
should have a medium violation risk
factor, since a failure of communication
to be avoided under the Requirements is
not likely to lead to significant events
such as Bulk-Power System instability,
separation, or cascading failures, but
only over the parties ability to monitor
and oversee the Bulk-Power System or
cause other unspecified problems.
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176. Ontario IESO and Hydro One
also suggest that the violation risk
factors of Requirements R7 and R8 be
assigned to medium, not high.88 They
agree that failure to meet these
requirements may significantly affect
grid control and operation, but not the
reliability of the power grid
characterized by instability,
uncontrolled islanding and cascading.
Finally, ConEdison believes that the
violation risk factor for Requirement R8
should not be changed because
transmission planners and operators do
not analyze generation from nuclear
power plants differently than other
generators or the requirements are
largely administrative.
iii. Commission Determination
177. The Commission adopts the
NOPR proposal. As discussed in the
NOPR and in additional detail above, if
transmission entities and nuclear plant
generator operators do not provide or
otherwise communicate information
concerning system changes to each
other, their planning and operating
analyses may not include the true
consequences of a single contingency.
As a result, unanticipated events that
could result in the disconnection of one
or more nuclear power plants from the
Bulk-Power System, in addition to the
consequences of the initiating event,
could place the Bulk-Power System at
risk for cascading outages.
178. Arguments that elevating the
violation risk factor assignment for
Requirements R7 and R8 is not justified
because the shutdown of a nuclear
power plant is a controlled process and
transmission planners and operators do
not analyze nuclear power plants
differently than other generation have
been previously addressed in this Final
Rule.
179. Accordingly, consistent with the
definition of a high violation risk factor,
and for the reasons discussed above, the
Commission directs the ERO to revise
the violation risk factor assignment for
Requirements R7 and R8 from medium
to high no later then 90 days before the
effective date of the Reliability
Standard.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
e. Requirement R9
i. NOPR
180. The NOPR proposed to direct the
ERO to raise the violation risk factor for
Requirement R9 from lower to medium,
and sought comment. Requirement R9
describes specific administrative,
technical, operations, maintenance,
coordination, communications, and
88 See also Detroit Edison, Ontario Power, and
SCE&G comments.
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training elements that a nuclear plant
generator operator and its transmission
entities must include in their interface
agreement. The NOPR stated that
Requirement R9 is similar to
Requirement R2, in that it co-mingles an
administrative element of incorporating
the various elements into the interface
agreement with the operational element
of determining how the parties to the
interface agreement will address the
administrative, technical, operations,
maintenance, coordination,
communications, and training issues in
order to provide for safe nuclear power
plant operation and shutdown. The
NOPR stated that a violation of
Requirement R9 could result in an
inability to resolve system conditions in
an emergency because the necessary
operational or emergency planning
elements may not be in place. Therefore,
the NOPR noted that a violation of
Requirement R9 ‘‘could, under
emergency, abnormal, or restorative
conditions anticipated by the
preparations, directly affect the
electrical state or capability of the BulkPower System.’’ In response, the NOPR
proposed to find that a medium
violation risk factor is appropriate for
Requirement R9, but stated that if the
ERO wishes to assign a lower violation
risk factor to the purely administrative
sub-Requirements of Requirement R9, it
could propose appropriate
differentiation in its comments.
ii. Comments
181. Commenters object to raising this
violation risk factor because
Requirement R9 is a planning
requirement that is administrative in
nature. Because generation from nuclear
power plants is not analyzed differently
than other generation by transmission
planners and operators their operations
do not justify higher risk factors.
182. NEI states the violation risk
factor for Requirement R9 should not be
changed. Requirement R9 sets forth the
specific administrative, technical,
operations, maintenance, coordination,
communications, and training elements
that a nuclear plant generator operator
and its transmission entities must
incorporate in the interface agreement.
It argues that, while the implementation
of these elements is substantive,
Requirement R9 is an administrative
requirement to include the specified
provisions. Violations of this
requirement can be readily identified
and corrected; therefore, violations
should not directly affect the BulkPower System.
183. Entergy characterizes
Requirement R9 as addressing the
various elements that parties must
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address in an interface agreement and
supporting the terms in Requirements
R3 through 8. Entergy states that
Requirement R9 is administrative in
nature, occurs in the planning time
frame and violations could be easily
corrected without affecting the
reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
iii. Commission Determination
184. Consistent with the NOPR, the
Commission directs the ERO to revise
the violation risk factor assignment for
Requirement R9 from lower to medium.
The Commission disagrees with
commenters that a lower violation risk
factor is appropriate because
Requirement R9 is an administrative
requirement to include the specified
provisions. While the Commission
recognized in the NOPR that many of
the requirements of the proposed
Reliability Standard are administrative
in nature, these same requirements
provide for the development of
procedures to ensure the safe and
reliable operation of the grid, and
responses to potential emergency
conditions.
185. Further, as identified in the
NOPR, Requirement R9 co-mingles the
administrative element of incorporating
the various elements into the interface
agreement with the operational
elements of determining how the parties
to the interface agreement will address
the administrative, technical,
operations, maintenance, coordination,
communications, and training issues for
safe nuclear power plant operation and
shutdown. Consistent with violation
risk factor Guideline 5, the Commission
expects the assigned violation risk factor
to reflect the highest reliability risk
objective of the requirement. A violation
of the highest reliability risk objectives
of Requirement R9, under emergency,
abnormal, or restorative conditions has
the potential to affect the electrical state
or capability of the Bulk-Power System.
186. As discussed previously in this
Final Rule, arguments that elevating the
violation risk factor assigned to
Requirement R9 are not justified
because the subject requirement takes
place in the planning time frame, thus
violations are quickly detected and
corrected, are fundamentally flawed.
187. Therefore, consistent with the
definition of a medium violation risk
factor, and for the reasons discussed
above, the Commission directs the ERO
to revise the violation risk factor
assignment for Requirement R9 from
lower to medium no later then 90 days
before the effective date of the
Reliability Standard.
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 208 / Monday, October 27, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
H. Violation Severity Levels
188. For each Requirement of a
Reliability Standard, NERC states that it
will also define up to four violation
severity levels—lower, moderate, high
and severe—as measurements of the
degree to which the Requirement was
violated. For a specific violation of a
particular Requirement, NERC or the
Regional Entity will establish the initial
value range for the base penalty amount
by finding the intersection of the
applicable violation risk factor and
violation severity level in the Base
Penalty Amount Table in Appendix A of
the Sanction Guidelines.89
1. NOPR
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189. The NOPR noted that NERC’s
November 19, 2007 Petition proposed
violation severity levels that apply
generally to all violations of the
Requirements of NUC–001–1, rather
than to specific Requirements and subRequirements, but that NERC had
submitted proposed new violation
severity levels for each Requirement and
sub-Requirement of NUC–001–1 in
Docket No. RR08–4–000.90
190. The NOPR stated the
Commission’s intention to address
issues relating to NUC–001–1 violation
severity levels in the Docket No. RR08–
4–000 proceeding, but approve the
proposed undifferentiated violation
severity levels on an interim basis, in
case the revised violation severity levels
are not approved before the NUC–001–
1 effective date. Because the initial
violation severity levels for NUC–001–1
resemble previously proposed levels of
non-compliance by grouping
Requirements in NUC–001–1 rather
than distinguishing on a perRequirement and sub-Requirement
basis, the NOPR proposed to treat the
proposed, undifferentiated violation
severity levels for NUC–001–1
consistent with the treatment adopted
for levels of non-compliance, until the
Requirement and sub-Requirementspecific violation severity levels are
approved.91
89 See North American Electric Reliability Corp.,
119 FERC ¶ 61,248, at P 74 (2007) (directing NERC
to develop up to four violation severity levels
(lower, moderate, high, and severe) as
measurements of the degree of a violation for each
requirement and sub-requirement of a Reliability
Standard).
90 The updated NUC–001–1 violation severity
levels are provided in NERC’s March 4, 2008 filing
of revised Exhibit A, containing the NERC violation
severity level matrix, in Docket No. RR08–4–000.
91 See North American Electric Reliability Corp.,
119 FERC ¶ 61,248 at P 78–80.
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2. Comments
191. NERC concurs with the
Commission’s approach to violation
severity levels.
3. Commission Determination
192. The Commission takes no action
on the violation severity levels in this
Final Rule. The June 19, 2008 Order on
violation severity levels directed the
ERO to assess the violation severity
levels for proposed NUC–001–1 in
accordance with the Commission’s
guidelines set forth in that order.92 As
such, NERC has been directed to resubmit violation severity levels for
NUC–001–1, including appropriate
revisions based on the application of the
Commission’s guidelines, as part of
NERC’s six-month compliance filing
directed in the Violation Severity Level
Order.93
III. Information Collection Statement
193. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) regulations require
approval of certain information
collection requirements imposed by
agency rules.94 Upon approval of a
collection(s) of information, OMB will
assign an OMB control number and an
expiration date. Respondents subject to
the filing requirements of this Final
Rule will not be penalized for failing to
respond to these collections of
information unless the collections of
information display a valid OMB
control number. The Paperwork
Reduction Act (PRA) 95 requires each
federal agency to seek and obtain OMB
approval before undertaking a collection
of information directed to 10 or more
persons, or continuing a collection for
which OMB approval and validity of the
control number are about to expire.96
The PRA defines the phrase ‘‘collection
of information’’ to be the ‘‘obtaining,
causing to be obtained, soliciting, or
requiring the disclosure to third parties
or the public, of facts or opinions by or
for an agency, regardless of form or
format, calling for either—
(i) answers to identical questions posed to,
or identical reporting or recordkeeping
requirements imposed on ten or more
persons, other than agencies,
instrumentalities, or employees of the United
States; or (ii) answers to questions posed to
agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of
92 North American Electric Reliability Corp., 123
FERC ¶ 61,284, at P 14 (2008) (Violation Severity
Level Order).
93 The Commission notes that NERC has sought
rehearing of the Violation Severity Level Order
concerning the scope and timing of the compliance
filing in Docket No. RR08–4–001.
CFR 1320.11.
U.S.C. 3501–20.
96 44 U.S.C. 3502(3)(A)(i), 44 U.S.C. 3507(a)(3).
the United States which are to be used for
general statistical purposes.’’ 97
194. This Final Rule approves the
new Reliability Standard developed by
NERC as the ERO. In addition, the Final
Rule directs the ERO to develop a
modification to one Requirement
through its Reliability Standards
development process. Section 215 of the
FPA authorizes the ERO to develop and
enforce Reliability Standards that
provide for an adequate level of
reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
Pursuant to the statute, the ERO must
submit each Reliability Standard that it
proposes to be made effective to the
Commission for approval.98
195. Reliability Standard NUC–001–1
does not require responsible entities to
file information with the Commission.
Nor, with the exception of a three year
self-certification of compliance, does the
Reliability Standard require responsible
entities to file information with the ERO
or Regional Entities. However, the
Reliability Standard does require
responsible entities to develop and
maintain certain information for a
specified period of time, subject to
inspection by the ERO or Regional
Entities.
196. Reliability Standard NUC–001–1
requires nuclear plant generator
operators and entities that provide
generation, transmission and
distribution services relating to off-site
power (these entities are defined as
‘‘transmission entities’’) to enter into
interface agreements with nuclear plant
generator operators that will govern
certain communication, training,
operational and planning elements for
use in addressing generation and
transmission system limits and nuclear
licensing requirements. The
Commission understands that most
entities subject to this Reliability
Standard already have such agreements
in place. The responsible entities are
also required to retain evidence that
they executed such an agreement and
incorporated its terms into systems
planning and operations. Further, each
nuclear plant generator operator and
transmission entity must self-certify its
compliance to the compliance monitor
once every three years.
197. The Commission is submitting
these reporting and recordkeeping
requirements to OMB for its review and
approval under section 3507(d) of the
PRA. In the NOPR, the Commission
sought comments on the Commission’s
need for this information, whether the
information will have practical utility,
the accuracy of provided burden
94 5
95 44
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63791
97 44
U.S.C. 3502(3)(A).
16 U.S.C. 824o(d).
98 See
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 208 / Monday, October 27, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
estimates, ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected, and any suggested methods
for minimizing the respondent’s burden,
including the use of automated
information techniques.
198. Our estimate below regarding the
number of respondents is based on the
NERC compliance registry as of April
2007 and NERC’s November 19, 2007
Petition that is the subject of this
proceeding. In its Petition, NERC states
that 104 nuclear power plants are
subject to the proposed Reliability
Standard. These plants are run by
approximately 30 different utilities and
are located on 65 different sites. Each
plant must contract with transmission
entities to obtain off-site power, and
coordinate distribution and
transmission services for such power.
199. The Nuclear Reliability Standard
identifies 11 categories of functional
entities that could be a transmission
entity when providing covered services,
including transmission operators,
transmission owners, transmission
planners, transmission service
providers, balancing authorities,
reliability coordinators, planning
authorities, distribution providers, load-
serving entities, generator owners and
generator operators. NERC’s compliance
registry indicates that there is a
significant amount of overlap among the
entities that perform these functions.
Therefore, in some instances, a single
entity may be registered under several of
these functions. The November 19, 2007
Petition includes NERC drafting team
comments which report, ‘‘In many
cases, agreements are not two-party
[agreements]—they are often multi-party
agreements involving RTO/ISO
Protocols, transmission and generation
owners and others.’’ 99 Therefore, this
analysis attempts to account for the
overlap of services to be provided by
entities responsible for the various roles
identified in the Reliability Standard, as
well as the fact that certain plants may
need to coordinate with multiple
entities.
200. Under NUC–001–1, the 104
nuclear power plants must coordinate
with off-site power suppliers and
related transmission and/or distribution
service providers. NUC–001–1 drafting
team reports in its responses to SAR
comments, ‘‘Nuclear plant generators
and most nuclear offsite power supplies
Number of
respondents
Data collection
Number of
responses
FERC–725F:
Nuclear Plant Owners or Operators .......................................
104
1
Investor-Owned Utilities ..........................................................
130
1
Large Municipals, Cooperatives and other agencies .............
130
1
Total .................................................................................
364
....................
interconnect with the bulk electric
system at transmission system voltage
levels. While backup station service for
some plants may be provided via
distribution lines, these cases are the
exception, not the rule.’’ 100 Assuming
conservatively, that not more than half
of the nuclear power plants call for
multi-party coordination and those that
do involve all the types of parties listed
by the drafting team, the Commission
estimates that 52 nuclear power plants
will execute bi-lateral interface
agreements and 52 nuclear power plants
will execute multi-lateral interface
agreements with approximately four
other parties. Thus, the Commission
estimates that the 104 nuclear power
plants will enter into agreements with
an additional 260 parties to bilateral and
multi-party agreements, providing 364
as the total number of entities required
to comply with the information
‘‘reporting’’ or development
requirements of the Nuclear Reliability
Standard.101
201. Burden Estimate: The Public
Reporting burden for the requirements
contained in the Final Rule is as
follows:
Hours per
respondent
Total annual
hours
Reporting: 80 .................
Recordkeeping: 40 .........
Reporting: 80 .................
Recordkeeping: 40 .........
Reporting: 80 .................
Recordkeeping: 40 .........
Reporting: 8,320.
Recordkeeping: 4,160.
Reporting: 10,400.
Recordkeeping: 5,200.
Reporting: 10,400.
Recordkeeping: 5,200.
........................................
43,680.
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Total Hours: (Reporting 29,120 hours
+ Recordkeeping 14,560 hours) = 43,680
hours. (FTE = Full Time Equivalent or
2,080 hours)
Total Annual hours for Collection:
Reporting + Recordkeeping = 43,680
hours.
Information Collection Costs: The
Commission finds the average
annualized cost to be the total annual
hours (Reporting) 29,120 times $120 =
$3,494,400.
Recordkeeping = @ $40/hour = $
582,400, with labor calculated as file/
record clerk @ $17 an hour +
supervisory @ $23 an hour.
Total costs = $4,076,800.
The Commission believes that this
estimate may be conservative because
most if not all of the applicable entities
currently have agreements in place to
provide for coordination between a
nuclear plant generator operator and its
local transmission, distribution and offsite power suppliers. Furthermore,
multiple plants are located on certain
sites, and one entity may operate
multiple plants, providing for potential
economies in updating, drafting and
executing the interface agreements.
Title: FERC–725F, Mandatory
Reliability Standard for Nuclear Plant
Interface Coordination.
Action: Final Rule.
OMB Control No.: [To be determined.]
Respondents: Business or other for
profit, and/or not for profit institutions.
Frequency of Responses: One time to
initially comply with the rule, and then
on occasion as needed to revise or
modify. In addition, annual and threeyear self-certification requirements will
apply.
Necessity of the Information: NUC–
001–1, implements the Congressional
mandate of the Energy Policy Act of
2005 to develop mandatory and
enforceable Reliability Standards to
better ensure the reliability of the
nation’s Bulk-Power System.
Specifically, the Nuclear Reliability
Standard will ensure that system
operating limits or SOLs used in the
99 NERC Nuclear Reliability Standard drafting
team, ‘‘Consideration of Comments, Draft 2—SAR
on Nuclear Plant Offsite Power Reliability’’ at 2
(May 23, 2005), filed in November 19, 2007
Petition, Exh. B, Record of Development of
Proposed Reliability Standard.
100 NERC Nuclear Reliability Standard drafting
team, ‘‘Consideration of Comments on 2nd Draft of
Nuclear Off-site Power Supply Standard’’ at 54
(Feb. 7, 2007), filed in November 19, 2007 Petition,
Exh. B, Record of Development of Proposed
Reliability Standard.
101 Because it is assumed that each plant operator
must ensure that appropriate agreements are in
place for each plant, this analysis assesses the
workload by measuring the work for 104 plants,
rather than for the 30 nuclear plant operators.
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 208 / Monday, October 27, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
reliability planning and operation of the
Bulk-Power System are coordinated
with nuclear licensing requirements in
order to ensure the safe operation and
shut down of nuclear power plants.
Internal review: The Commission has
reviewed the requirements pertaining to
the Nuclear Reliability Standard for the
Bulk-Power System and determined that
the requirements adopted are necessary
to meet the statutory provisions of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005. These
requirements conform to the
Commission’s plan for efficient
information collection, communication
and management within the energy
industry. The Commission has assured
itself, by means of internal review, that
there is specific, objective support for
the burden estimates associated with the
information requirements.
202. Interested persons may obtain
information on the reporting
requirements by contacting: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426
[Attention: Michael Miller, Office of the
Executive Director, Phone: (202) 502–
8415, fax: (202) 273–0873, e-mail:
michael.miller@ferc.gov]. Comments on
the requirements of the Final Rule may
also be sent to the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget, Washington,
DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for
the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission], e-mail:
oira_submission@omb.eop.gov.
IV. Environmental Analysis
203. The Commission is required to
prepare an Environmental Assessment
or an Environmental Impact Statement
for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human
environment.102 The Commission has
categorically excluded certain actions
from this requirement as not having a
significant effect on the human
environment. The actions proposed here
fall within the categorical exclusion in
the Commission’s regulations for rules
that are clarifying, corrective or
procedural, for information gathering,
analysis, and dissemination.103
Accordingly, neither an environmental
impact statement nor environmental
assessment is required.
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
204. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (RFA) 104 generally requires a
description and analysis of Final Rules
that will have significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. Most of the entities, i.e.,
planning authorities, reliability
coordinators, transmission planners and
transmission operators, to which the
requirements of this rule would apply
do not fall within the definition of small
entities.105
205. As indicated above, based on
available information regarding NERC’s
compliance registry, approximately 364
entities, including owners and operators
of 104 nuclear power plants, will be
responsible for compliance with the
new Reliability Standard. It is estimated
that one-third of the responsible
entities, about 130 entities, would be
municipal and cooperative
organizations. In addition to generator
owners and operators and distribution
service providers, the Nuclear
Reliability Standard applies to planning
authorities, transmission planners,
transmission operators and reliability
coordinators, which tend to be larger
entities. Thus, the Commission believes
that only a portion, approximately 30 to
40 of the municipal and cooperative
organizations to which the Reliability
Standard applies, qualify as small
entities.106 The Commission does not
consider this a substantial number of all
municipal and cooperative
organizations. Moreover, as discussed
above, the Nuclear Reliability Standard
will not be a burden on the industry
since most if not all of the applicable
entities currently coordinate operations
and planning with nuclear plant
generator operators and the Nuclear
Reliability Standard will simply provide
a common framework for agreements
63793
governing such coordination and many
of the entities already have agreements
in place to meet prior NRC
requirements.
206. Based on this understanding, the
Commission certifies that this Final
Rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Accordingly,
no regulatory flexibility analysis is
required.
VI. Document Availability
207. In addition to publishing the full
text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the Internet through
FERC’s Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov)
and in FERC’s Public Reference Room
during normal business hours (8:30 a.m.
to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First
Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC
20426.
208. From FERC’s Home Page on the
Internet, this information is available on
eLibrary. The full text of this document
is available on eLibrary in PDF and
Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access
this document in eLibrary, type the
docket number excluding the last three
digits of this document in the docket
number field.
209. User assistance is available for
eLibrary and the FERC’s Web site during
normal business hours from FERC
Online Support at (202) 502–6652 (toll
free at (866) 208–3676) or e-mail at
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the
Public Reference Room at (202) 502–
8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. E-mail the
Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
By the Commission.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
Note: This Appendix will not appear in the
Code of Federal Regulations.
COMMENTS ON NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
Abbreviation
Entity
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Ameren ......................................................................................................
102 Order No. 486, Regulations Implementing the
National Environmental Policy Act, 52 FR 47897
(Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. and Regs. ¶ 30,783
(1987).
103 18 CFR 380.4(a)(5).
104 5 U.S.C. 601–12.
105 The RFA definition of ‘‘small entity’’ refers to
the definition provided in the Small Business Act,
which defines a ‘‘small business concern’’ as a
business that is independently owned and operated
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Ameren Service Co.
and that is not dominant in its field of operation.
See 15 U.S.C. 632 (2006). According to the SBA, a
small electric utility is defined as one that has a
total electric output of less than four million MWh
in the preceding year.
106 According to the DOE’s Energy Information
Administration (EIA), there were 3,284 electric
utility companies in the United States in 2005, and
3,029 of these electric utilities qualify as small
entities under the SBA definition. Among these
3,284 electric utility companies are: (1) 883
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cooperatives of which 852 are small entity
cooperatives; (2) 1,862 municipal utilities, of which
1842 are small entity municipal utilities; (3) 127
political subdivisions, of which 114 are small entity
political subdivisions; and (4) 219 privately owned
utilities, of which 104 could be considered small
entity private utilities. See Energy Information
Administration Database, Form EIA–861, Dept. of
Energy (2005), available at https://www.eia.doe.gov/
cneaf/electricity/page/eia861.html.
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COMMENTS ON NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING—Continued
Abbreviation
Entity
ATC+ .........................................................................................................
CenterPoint Energy ...................................................................................
ConEdison .................................................................................................
Constellation .............................................................................................
Detroit Edison ...........................................................................................
Dominion ...................................................................................................
Duke ..........................................................................................................
EEI ............................................................................................................
Entergy ......................................................................................................
Exelon .......................................................................................................
ISO/RTO Council ......................................................................................
International Transmission ........................................................................
American Transmission Company LLC.
CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC.
Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc.
Constellation Energy Group, Inc.
Detroit Edison Company.
Dominion Resources, Inc.
Duke Energy Corporation.
Edison Electric Institute.
Entergy Services, Inc.
Exelon Corporation.
ISO/RTO Council.
International Transmission Co., Michigan Electric Transmission Co.,
LLC and ITC Midwest.
Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.
National Grid USA.
North American Electric Reliability Corp.
Nuclear Energy Institute.
Independent Electricity System Operator of Ontario and Hydro One
Networks Inc.
Ontario Power Generation Inc.
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company.
Southern Company Services, Inc.
Tennessee Valley Authority.
Wisconsin Electric Power Company.
Midwest ISO ..............................................................................................
National Grid+ ...........................................................................................
NERC ........................................................................................................
NEI+ ...........................................................................................................
Ontario IESO and Hydro One ...................................................................
Ontario Power ...........................................................................................
SCE&G ......................................................................................................
Southern ....................................................................................................
TVA ...........................................................................................................
Wisconsin Electric .....................................................................................
+ Comments
filed out-of-time.
[FR Doc. E8–25139 Filed 10–24–08; 8:45 am]
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 208 (Monday, October 27, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 63770-63794]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-25139]
[[Page 63769]]
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Part II
Department of Energy
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
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18 CFR Part 40
Mandatory Reliability Standard for Nuclear Plant Interface
Coordination; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 208 / Monday, October 27, 2008 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 63770]]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM08-3-000; Order No. 716]
Mandatory Reliability Standard for Nuclear Plant Interface
Coordination
Issued October 16, 2008.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), the
Commission approves the Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination
Reliability Standard developed by the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC). In addition, pursuant to section
215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission directs NERC to develop a
modification to the Reliability Standard to address a specific concern.
The Reliability Standard requires a nuclear plant generator operator
and its suppliers of back-up power and related transmission and/or
distribution services to coordinate concerning nuclear licensing
requirements for safe nuclear plant operation and shutdown and system
operating limits. The Commission also approves four related definitions
for addition to the NERC Glossary of Terms, and directs various changes
to proposed violation risk factors, which measure the potential impact
of violations of the Reliability Standard on the reliability of the
Bulk-Power System.
DATES: Effective Dates: The final rule will become effective November
26, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Robert Snow (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability,
Division of Reliability Standards, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-
6716;
Michael Gandolfo (Technical Information), Office of Electric
Reliability, Division of Reliability Standards, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426,
(202) 502-6817;
Richard M. Wartchow (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8744;
Christy Walsh (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6523.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents Paragraph Nos.
I. Background...................................... 2
A. Proposed Reliability Standard NUC-001-1..... 2
B. Proposed NERC Glossary Definitions.......... 9
C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking............... 10
D. Procedural Matters.......................... 12
II. Discussion..................................... 13
A. Approval of NUC-001-1....................... 14
B. Applicability............................... 20
1. Notification of Parties to Interface 22
Agreements.
2. Transmission Entities and Agreements on 32
NPIRs.
3. Dispute Resolution...................... 74
C. Form of Agreements.......................... 83
D. Enforcement and Conflicts with Other 89
Regulations.
E. Scope of Agreements......................... 95
1. Commission Questions.................... 98
2. Other Scope Related Issues.............. 105
F. Coordination................................ 117
1. Coordination Among Transmission Entities 119
2. Addressing System Changes............... 128
G. Violation Risk Factors...................... 132
1. General Violation Risk Factor Issues.... 137
2. Requirement-Specific Issues............. 151
H. Violation Severity Levels................... 188
III. Information Collection Statement.............. 193
IV. Environmental Analysis......................... 203
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis............. 204
VI. Document Availability.......................... 207
Appendix A: List of Comments to Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking.
Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman; Suedeen G.
Kelly, Marc Spitzer, Philip D. Moeller, and Jon Wellinghoff.
1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),\1\ the
Commission approves the Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination
Reliability Standard (NUC-001-1) developed by the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified
Electric Reliability Organization (ERO). In addition, pursuant to
section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission directs NERC to develop a
modification to the Reliability Standard to address a specific
concern.\2\ The Reliability Standard requires a nuclear plant generator
operator and its suppliers of back-up power and transmission and/or
distribution services to coordinate concerning nuclear licensing
requirements for safe nuclear plant operation and shutdown and system
operating limits (SOLs).\3\
[[Page 63771]]
The Commission also approves four related definitions for addition to
the NERC Glossary of Terms,\4\ and directs various changes to proposed
violation risk factors, which measure the potential impact of
violations of the Reliability Standard on the reliability of the Bulk-
Power System.\5\
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\1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o (2006).
\2\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5).
\3\ NERC proposes to define nuclear plant generator operator as
any generator operator or generator owner that is a nuclear plant
licensee responsible for operation of a nuclear facility licensed to
produce commercial power. See the discussion of NERC's proposed
Glossary terms below. The Reliability Standard itself defines those
suppliers who provide such generation, transmission and distribution
services pursuant to agreements under NUC-001-1 as ``transmission
entities,'' as discussed below.
\4\ See, e.g., Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-
Power System, Order No. 693, RM06-16-000, 72 FR 16416, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ] 31,242, at P 1893 (Apr. 4, 2007), order on reh'g, Order No.
693-A, 120 FERC ] 61,053 (2007) (approving the NERC Glossary of
Terms Used in Reliability Standards (as revised) (Glossary)
originally filed April 4, 2006).
\5\ The Commission is not proposing any new or modified text to
its regulations. Rather, as set forth in 18 CFR Part 40, a proposed
Reliability Standard will not become effective until approved by the
Commission, and the ERO must post on its Web site each effective
Reliability Standard.
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I. Background
A. Proposed Reliability Standard NUC-001-1
2. On November 19, 2007, NERC filed its petition for Commission
approval of the Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination Reliability
Standard, designated NUC-001-1 (November 19, 2007 Petition).\6\ NERC
supplemented the filing on December 11, 2007 (December 11, 2007
Supplement) to propose four related NERC Glossary terms: ``Nuclear
Plant Generator Operator,'' ``Nuclear Plant Off-site Power Supply (Off-
site Power),'' ``Nuclear Plant Licensing Requirements (NPLRs),'' and
``Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs).'' In the November 19,
2007 Petition, NERC stated that the proposed Reliability Standard
addresses the coordination of interface requirements for two domains:
(i) Bulk-Power System planning and operations and (ii) nuclear power
plant licensing requirements for off-site power necessary to enable
safe nuclear plant operation and shutdown.
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\6\ NUC-001-1 is attached in Appendix A to the March 20 Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) in this proceeding, and is available
on the Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No.
RM08-3-000 and also on NERC's Web site, https://www.nerc.com. See 18
CFR Part 40, Mandatory Reliability Standard for Nuclear Plant
Interface Coordination, NOPR, Docket No. RM08-3-000, 73 FR 16,586
(March 28, 2008), FERC Stats. and Regs. ] 32,629 (2008).
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3. Reliability Standard NUC-001-1 applies to nuclear plant
generator operators and ``transmission entities.'' To account for the
variations in nuclear plant design and grid interconnection
characteristics, the Reliability Standard defines transmission entities
as ``all entities that are responsible for providing services related
to Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs)'' and lists eleven
types of functional entities that could provide services related to
NPIRs.\7\
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\7\ The list of functional entities consists of transmission
operators, transmission owners, transmission planners, transmission
service providers, balancing authorities, reliability coordinators,
planning authorities, distribution providers, load-serving entities,
generator owners and generator operators. Applicability issues are
addressed in a separate section, below.
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4. In the November 19, 2007 Petition, NERC explained that nuclear
plant generator operators and transmission entities operate according
to separate, established reliability and safety procedures. To provide
for coordination of these separate procedures, the ERO developed NUC-
001-1 to require a nuclear plant generator operator to coordinate
operations and planning with its transmission entities by developing
procedures that reflect nuclear plant licensing requirements and
SOLs,\8\ including interconnection reliability operating limits
(IROLs), affecting nuclear plant operations.\9\ The Reliability
Standard requires nuclear plant generator operators and transmission
entities to develop expectations and procedures for coordinating
operations to meet the nuclear plant licensing requirements, as well as
SOLs and IROLs, and to develop agreements or arrangements, which may
include mutually agreed upon procedures or protocols, reflecting those
expectations and procedures. These agreements or arrangements are known
as interface agreements. The resulting operations and planning
requirements developed in the agreements to address the nuclear plant
licensing requirements, SOLs and IROLs are called nuclear plant
interface requirements or NPIRs.\10\ NERC stated that Requirements R3
through R8, which state that the interface agreement parties will
address the NPIRs in planning, operations, and facility upgrade and
outage coordination, provide additional specificity on these
expectations.
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\8\ The NERC Glossary defines system operating limit or SOL as
``the value * * * that satisfies the most limiting of the prescribed
operating criteria for a specified system configuration to ensure
operation within acceptable reliability criteria. * * * ''
\9\ The NERC Glossary defines IROL as a ``system operating limit
that, if violated, could lead to instability, uncontrolled
separation, or Cascading Outages that adversely impact the
reliability of the bulk electric system.''
\10\ See NUC-001-1, Requirement R2 and the proposed NERC
Glossary term, Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIR).
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5. In the November 19, 2007 Petition, NERC noted that nuclear plant
generator operators must already fulfill nuclear licensing requirements
for off-site power.\11\ NERC stated that, while various forms of
agreements exist to meet the nuclear power plant general design
criterion for off-site power, NUC-001-1 places a new, mandatory and
enforceable obligation under section 215 of the FPA on both nuclear
plant generator operators and transmission entities. NUC-001-1 requires
these entities to inform one another of limits and requirements on
their systems and to enter into agreements to coordinate and operate
their systems to address nuclear plant licensing requirements and
related system limits.
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\11\ The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which regulates
facilities that are associated with reactor safety or emergency
response at a nuclear generation plant, has regulatory requirements
for offsite power systems, as provided in the NRC regulations, 10
CFR Part 50, Appendix A--General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power
Plants, criterion 17.
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6. The nuclear plant licensing requirements addressed in the
Reliability Standard include requirements for off-site power to enable
safe operation and shutdown during an electric system or plant event
and requirements for avoiding nuclear safety issues as a result of
changes in electric system conditions during a disturbance, transient,
or normal conditions. NERC cited general design criterion 17 for
nuclear power plants, which requires nuclear plant generator operators
to obtain off-site electric power that will provide sufficient capacity
to permit safety systems to function, assure that reactor coolant
design limits are not exceeded, prevent core cooling, and maintain
containment integrity and other vital functions.
7. NERC stated that NUC-001-1, in combination with the nuclear
license general design criteria requirements, achieves the vital public
interest of assuring safe nuclear power generation. According to NERC,
the Reliability Standard is beneficial to nuclear plant generator
operators because it will assist them in meeting nuclear plant
licensing requirements to safely produce nuclear power. It is also
beneficial to Bulk-Power System users, due to the significant support
that nuclear power plants provide to the Reliable Operation of the
Bulk-Power System.
8. NERC requested that NUC-001-1 take effect in areas subject to
the Commission's jurisdiction on the first day of the first full
calendar quarter falling 15 months after Commission approval.
B. Proposed NERC Glossary Definitions
9. In the December 11, 2007 Supplement, NERC proposed to add the
following four terms to the NERC Glossary:
[[Page 63772]]
Nuclear Plant Generator Operator: Any Generator Operator or
Generator Owner that is a [n]uclear [p]lant [l]icensee responsible
for operation of a nuclear facility licensed to produce commercial
power.
Nuclear Plant Off-site Power Supply or Off-site Power: The
electric power supply provided from the electric system to the
nuclear power plant distribution system as required per the nuclear
power plant license.
Nuclear Plant Licensing Requirements (NPLRs): Requirements
included in the design basis of the nuclear plant and statutorily
mandated for the operation of the plant, including nuclear power
plant licensing requirements for: (1) Off-site power supply to
enable safe shutdown of the plant during an electric system or plant
event; and (2) Avoiding preventable challenges to nuclear safety as
a result of an electric system disturbance, transient, or condition.
Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs): The requirements,
based on NPLRs and Bulk Electric System requirements, that have been
mutually agreed to by the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and the
applicable Transmission Entities.
C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
10. On March 20, 2008, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NOPR), which proposed to approve Reliability Standard NUC-
001-1 as mandatory and enforceable. In the NOPR, the Commission also
raised a number of concerns and asked for clarification from the ERO
and comments from the public. The Commission proposed to approve the
NERC definitions and proposed revisions to the violation risk factors
for NUC-001-1.
11. As described more fully below, the ERO and other interested
parties provided comments in response to the NOPR. These comments are
summarized and addressed in the discussion portion of this Final Rule.
D. Procedural Matters
12. The NOPR required that comments be filed within 30 days after
publication in the Federal Register, or April 28, 2008. On April 16,
2008, the Commission granted a motion filed by EEI and NEI extending
the comment date to May 13, 2008. Approximately 23 entities filed
comments, including several late-filed comments. The Commission accepts
these late filed comments. Appendix A provides a list of the
commenters.
II. Discussion
13. In this Final Rule, the Commission approves Reliability
Standard, NUC-001-1, effective as proposed by the ERO. In addition,
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission directs the
ERO to develop a modification to one provision, Requirement R9.3.5, to
clarify the impact of the Requirement on two important operating
procedures, in response to comments received. This Final Rule largely
accepts the explanations and clarifications provided in the ERO's
comments and addresses the positions raised by NERC and the other
commenters on the specific issues raised in the NOPR. As proposed in
the NOPR, this Final Rule does not take any action on the regional
difference, because it applies outside of the United States and is not
applicable to any facilities within the Commission's jurisdiction.\12\
The Final Rule directs modifications to the violation risk factors for
the Reliability Standard, as discussed below. Finally, the Final Rule
approves the additional Glossary terms.
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\12\ NERC proposes to adopt as a regional difference for Canada
a separate definition of nuclear plant licensing requirements that
does not reference regulatory requirements for off-site power supply
for safe plant shutdown because Canada does not have regulatory
standards for off-site power comparable to those established by the
NRC.
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A. Approval of NUC-001-1
14. NERC and other commenters generally support the NOPR proposal
to approve Reliability Standard NUC-001-1.\13\ EEI, Ameren, Dominion,
and Ontario IESO and Hydro One state that they support approval of the
Reliability Standard as improving coordination between nuclear plant
generator operators and transmission entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See, e.g., Constellation, Detroit Edison, Dominion, EEI,
Entergy, Exelon, Ontario IESO and Hydro One, Midwest ISO, and
Ontario Power comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. In contrast, CenterPoint Energy asserts that NUC-001-1 is
flawed and unnecessary, arguing that it deals with contractual matters
that should be addressed through a tariff or standard agreement, not a
Reliability Standard, to ensure that nuclear plant generator operators
do not receive unreasonable competitive advantages over other
competitors.\14\ CenterPoint Energy also states that the Commission
should mitigate potential market power and transparency concerns
created by the Reliability Standard in regions where an independent
transmission operator is not the entity that performs interconnected
operations with the nuclear plant generator operators.\15\ CenterPoint
Energy is concerned that a requirement in a NPIR could result in a
change in transmission operations and cause significant reliability or
market disruptions. According to CenterPoint Energy, this could be
mitigated by a requirement that nuclear plant generator operators
retain documentation ``whenever a nuclear plant operator effectively
alters transmission operating decisions of the independent operator due
to alleged NPIR concerns.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ CenterPoint Energy comments at 1.
\15\ Id. at 3.
\16\ Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. National Grid emphasizes that NUC-001-1 is intended to address
technical aspects of the interface between transmission entities and
nuclear plant generator operators as opposed to the commercial aspects.
According to National Grid, the proposed Reliability Standard obliges
all responsible entities to work together on creating NPIRs suitable to
each nuclear power plant, whether the service provided to the nuclear
power plant is subject to federal or state jurisdiction. According to
National Grid, execution of an interface agreement and subsequent
compliance with NPIRs should not change the jurisdictional status of
the services provided. National Grid also requests that the Commission
direct the ERO and its Regional Entities to ensure that nuclear plant
generator operators look to the proper transmission entities for the
provision of NPIR-related services and that they bear incremental costs
of NPIR compliance.
Commission Determination
17. Pursuant to section 215(d) of the FPA, the Commission approves
Reliability Standard NUC-001-1 as mandatory and enforceable. The
Commission finds that coordination of nuclear licensing requirements
and grid operating limits through auditable interface agreements will
ensure that an important resource is operated safely and reliably,
while minimizing grid disturbances from separation of nuclear power
plants from the grid, due to the loss or degradation of auxiliary power
supply. Further, the Commission disagrees with CenterPoint Energy that
the Reliability Standard is flawed and unnecessary. Nuclear power
plants represent an important power resource and provide reliability
support throughout the Bulk-Power System. Unlike other large units,
nuclear power plants are subject to separate regulatory oversight that
mandates stringent operating and auxiliary power requirements, which,
if not met, require the plant to separate from the grid. We find that
NUC-001-1 is an appropriate means to ensure that the particular
requirements faced by nuclear power plants are met, maximizing the
reliability support to be provided while minimizing the potential for
grid disruption caused by separation.
18. CenterPoint Energy provides no evidence to support its claims
that assertions by nuclear plant generator operators concerning NPIRs
could be
[[Page 63773]]
used to affect grid or market operations. We note that the NRC oversees
a nuclear power plant's development of and compliance with its
licensing requirements related to facilities that are associated with
reactor safety or emergency response through its regulatory
proceedings. NUC-001-1 supplements NRC oversight of nuclear plant
facilities by providing oversight of the transmission entities that
operate facilities on the Bulk-Power System providing off-site power
supply and delivery service to meet nuclear plant licensing
requirements.
19. Neither National Grid nor CenterPoint Energy has provided any
information on how the NPIRs could result in undue negative impact on
competition. Because all jurisdictional tariffs have requirements for
the provision of non-discriminatory service, the Commission does not
anticipate that transmission entities would agree to NPIRs that do not
provide for comparable service. While comparable service includes
appropriate cost allocations, that subject is outside of the scope of
this proceeding.\17\ In regard to National Grid's non-cost-related
comments, National Grid has not suggested any way in which the
Reliability Standard could change the jurisdictional status of service
provided to a nuclear plant generator operator, and therefore, we do
not see a need to address this concern here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See NERC November 19, 2007 Petition, Exhibit B, Record of
Proposed Reliability Standard Development, ``Consideration of
Comments, Draft 2 SAR on Nuclear Plant Offsite Power Reliability,
May 23, 2005'' at 3 of 25 (agreeing that the Nuclear Reliability
Standard does not address cost recovery issues).
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B. Applicability
20. Reliability Standard NUC-001-1 applies to nuclear plant
generator operators and transmission entities, such as off-site power
suppliers and entities that provide distribution and transmission
services that affect plant operations. NERC states that the Reliability
Standard meets the criteria that it apply to users, owners and
operators of the Bulk-Power System because it will apply to
transmission entities, which are responsible for providing NPIR-related
services. Therefore, these entities are subject to the Reliability
Standard and may be registered pursuant to the NERC compliance registry
process.
21. The Commission approves the applicability provisions of NUC-
001-1 as appropriately identifying the applicable entities, while
providing the flexibility to accommodate differing design criteria,
grid configurations and services procured by the various nuclear power
plants addressed. The Commission finds appropriate the ERO's use of the
term transmission entities in NUC-001-1 to refer to the subset of
registered entities that provide services to nuclear plant generator
operators. Similarly, the term nuclear plant generator operators refers
to the subset of generator owners and generator operators that are NRC
licensees. While the Commission prefers that Reliability Standards
apply to all entities within a functional category defined in the
Registry Criteria, it has approved appropriate limitations incorporated
into an applicability provision.\18\ We address the specific questions
raised by the Commission in the NOPR, as well as responses and
comments, on an issue-by-issue basis below.
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\18\ See, e.g., MOD-010-0 (limiting applicability to members of
NERC functional classes specified in the MOD-011-0, Requirement R1);
and PRC-007-0 (limiting applicability to members of functional
classes owning and operating an underfrequency load shedding
program).
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1. Notification of Parties to Interface Agreements
22. Requirement R1 of NUC-001-1 provides: ``[t]he Nuclear Plant
Generator Operator shall provide the proposed NPIRs in writing to the
applicable transmission entities and shall verify receipt.'' In the
NOPR, the Commission indicates its understanding that Requirement R1
means that if a nuclear plant generator operator fails to provide all
appropriate NPIRs to an applicable transmission entity, the operator
will not be in compliance with the Reliability Standard.\19\ Further,
the Commission observed that a nuclear plant generator operator will
know, as a result of the NRC licensing process, which applicable
entities to contact and what services are needed to meet NRC
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ NOPR at P 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Comments
23. NERC and Entergy agree that it is unlikely that a nuclear plant
generator operator would fail to obtain appropriate services and
identify and contact transmission entities. They concur that a nuclear
plant generator operator will know the applicable services it needs
through the NRC licensing process. NERC explains that, as an NRC
licensing requirement, the nuclear plant generator operator would have
previously coordinated with transmission entities.
24. Entergy describes the NRC licensing process and explains that a
nuclear plant generator operator will know the capability of its
offsite power supplier to supply the power required during operations
as well as situations that could result in a loss of off-site power.
Entergy concludes that ``it is very unlikely'' that a nuclear plant
generator operator would fail to contact the entities necessary to
receive the appropriate services.
25. NEI agrees with the Commission's observation that nuclear plant
generator operators are capable of identifying and contacting the
appropriate transmission entities. However, NEI opposes any proposal to
expand this notification requirement into an affirmative requirement
that nuclear plant generator operators must ``obtain appropriate
services'' from transmission entities. NEI requests that the Commission
clarify that this is a notification requirement, not a requirement to
obtain services (that, according to NEI, should not be included in the
Reliability Standard).
26. According to NEI, the obligations of the nuclear plant
generator operator to provide notice to transmission entities should be
limited to those entities known or reasonably knowable by the nuclear
plant generator operator, since the identity of some transmission
entities could be proprietary. NEI argues that transmission entities
that have been notified by the nuclear plant generator operator that
they are responsible for providing services relating to NPIRs should
then have the obligation to provide further notice to other applicable
transmission entities that provide services to the first transmission
entities.
27. ATC proposes replacing the phrase ``proposed NPIRs'' with a
reference to nuclear plant licensing requirements including an explicit
recognition of a transmission entity's ability to propose transmission
system operating limits to be addressed as NPIRs in the interface
agreement. According to ATC, this will remedy the current conundrum,
where a nuclear power plant is obligated to ``propose NPIRs,'' while
NPIRs are defined as having been agreed to by both parties.
b. Commission Determination
28. The Commission accepts NERC's proposal to require nuclear plant
generator operators to identify entities that provide services related
to off-site power supply or delivery. With NERC's and other industry
representatives' assurances, the Commission is satisfied that the
appropriate transmission entities can be identified based on the
nuclear plant generator operators' historical compliance with NRC
licensing requirements to obtain off-site
[[Page 63774]]
power and develop solutions with grid operators to avoid service
interruptions from foreseeable grid disturbances.
29. The Commission does not share the concern expressed by
commenters that Requirement R1 imposes an affirmative obligation on a
nuclear plant generator operator to obtain appropriate services.
Requirement R1 obligates a nuclear plant generator operator to provide
proposed NPIRs in writing to transmission entities. The nuclear plant
generator operator is already obligated to obtain service to meet NPIRs
that are based on nuclear plant licensing requirements enforced by the
NRC. We note that Requirement R2 does contain an affirmative obligation
that the nuclear plant generator operator and transmission entities
develop and execute an interface agreement to implement NPIRs. With
this understanding, we find that the nuclear plant generator operators'
role in providing notice of proposed NPIRs to all applicable
transmission entities is appropriate. A nuclear plant generator
operator may be found in noncompliance for failing to provide notice to
an entity responsible for providing services relating to its off-site
power-related licensing requirements.
30. NERC and industry representatives clarify that the entities
that the nuclear plant generator operator is to provide with proposed
NPIRs are known to the nuclear plant generator operator based on the
nuclear plant generator operator's historic need to obtain service to
meet their license requirements. The Commission does not share NEI's
concern that the nuclear plant generator operator may not know upstream
utilities that provide service to the primary service providers. We
note that Requirement R1 obligates a nuclear plant generator operator
to contact entities that provide services to meet NPIRs, which are
based on nuclear licensing requirements for off-site power supply and
avoiding foreseeable grid disruptions. Any upstream service providers
that provide services related to NPIRs must be identified by the
nuclear plant generator operator in the NPIRs. Otherwise there is no
obligation to identify non-primary service providers.
31. As for ATC's concern with the use of the phrase ``proposed
NPIRs'' as opposed to a reference to nuclear plant licensing
requirements that will form the basis for NPIRs, the Commission finds
the current Requirements are sufficiently clear and flexible to
accommodate counterproposals by transmission entities to address system
limits during interface agreement development.\20\
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\20\ The Commission notes that ATC originally suggested the
language ``proposed NPIRs'' as an alternative to the original draft
language ``current'' NPIRs. NERC November 19, 2007 Petition, Exhibit
B, ``Consideration of Comments on 1st Draft of Nuclear Plant Off-
site Power Coordination Standard,'' at 15 of 69 (Aug. 15, 2006).
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2. Transmission Entities and Agreements on NPIRs
32. NUC-001-1 applies to nuclear plant generator operators and
transmission entities. The Applicability section of the Reliability
Standard (i) defines transmission entities as ``all entities that are
responsible for providing services related to Nuclear Plant Interface
Requirements (NPIRs),'' and (ii) lists 11 types of entities, identified
in the NERC registry criteria based on the NERC Functional Model,\21\
that may serve as transmission entities.
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\21\ NERC Statement of Compliance Registry Criteria (Revision
3), filed with its Supplemental Information Filing, Docket No. RM06-
16-000 (Feb. 6, 2007), approved in Order No. 693 at P 92-96; NERC
Functional Model, Version 3 (approved by NERC Board of Trustees,
Feb. 13, 2007).
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33. NERC explained in its November 19, 2007 Petition:
Because the relationship of each nuclear plant generator
operator with its provider of transmission-related services is
unique, it will be important and necessary for the registration
process to identify on a plant-by-plant basis the specific
transmission entities required to identify NPIRs and develop the
requisite agreement. Once the agreement becomes final, all
applicable nuclear plant generator operator and transmission
entities for each agreement will be identified by name and specific
function. The respective Regional Entity will then be responsible
for ensuring that each nuclear plant generator operator and
transmission entities identified in the agreement(s) is registered
on the NERC Compliance Registry for the applicable function(s). NERC
will work with the Regional Entities to ensure that all nuclear
plant generator operator and transmission entities included in the
agreements that result from the NPIRs are listed in the Compliance
Registry for this specific reliability standard.\22\
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\22\ NERC November 19, 2007 Petition at 12-13.
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a. NOPR Proposals
34. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to accept the
identification and registration process described by NERC in the
November 19, 2007 Petition with the understanding that NERC will use
its authority under the compliance registry process to register all
users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power System that provide
transmission or generating services relating to off-site power supply
or delivery.\23\ Further, the Commission requested clarification from
the ERO, as well as public comment, on three issues: (i) How NERC's
plan to identify transmission entities on a ``plant-by-plant basis'' in
the compliance registration process relates to the definition of bulk
electric system; (ii) whether NUC-001-1 is enforceable against a
transmission entity upon execution of an interface agreement or some
earlier time; and (iii) how the Reliability Standard will be
implemented for an entity that both operates a nuclear power plant and
is responsible to provide services related to NPIRs.
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\23\ See id. at 12.
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i. Identification of Entities Subject to NUC-001-1 Through the
Compliance Registry
(1) NOPR
35. As mentioned above, the Commission proposed in the NOPR to
accept NERC's Applicability approach for NUC-001-1 with the
understanding that NERC would use its authority under the compliance
registry process to register all users, owners and operators of the
Bulk-Power System that provide transmission or generating services
relating to off-site power supply or delivery.\24\ Further, the NOPR
noted that certain auxiliary power suppliers and transmission service
providers may serve nuclear power plants through facilities that fall
outside the definition of bulk electric system. The NOPR stated that:
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\24\ NOPR at P 25-26.
The Commission understands that NERC and the Regional Entities
will register these and other service providers that provide
interconnection and/or auxiliary power facilities vital to nuclear
plant operation through NERC's authority to register an owner or
operator of an otherwise exempt facility that is needed for Bulk-
Power System reliability, on a facility-by-facility basis. Once
registered, the transmission entity providing such services to a
nuclear generating plant may be subject to other Reliability
Standards applicable to the functional class within the NERC
functional model for which the transmission entity has been
registered, as deemed appropriate through the registration process.
With this understanding, the Commission proposes to accept the scope
of the definition of transmission entities as appropriate.\25\
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\25\ Id. P 26 (footnotes omitted).
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(2) Comments
36. NERC states that it concurs with the Commission's understanding
that NERC will use its authority under the compliance registry process
to register all users, owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System
that provide transmission or generating services relating to off-site
power supply or
[[Page 63775]]
delivery. NERC will register the owner of an otherwise exempt facility
on a facility-by-facility basis. Further, NERC agrees that, once
registered, the transmission entity may be subject to other Reliability
Standards applicable to the functional class within the NERC Functional
Model, as deemed appropriate through the registration process, with an
exception for low-voltage facilities, as discussed in section
II(B)(2)(b) below.
37. EEI generally agrees with the Commission's conclusion that,
once registered, a transmission entity providing services to a nuclear
generating plant may be subject to other Reliability Standards
applicable to the function for which the transmission entity has been
registered. EEI also supports NERC's interpretation that identification
as a transmission entity under NUC-001-1 Requirements should not change
a party's obligations under other Reliability Standards.
38. NEI suggests that entities that are not currently subject to
NERC registration, jurisdiction, and enforcement authority should be
able to sign an interface agreement without submitting to NERC
jurisdiction. NEI states that such an entity may be bound to comply
with the interface agreement, but should not automatically be subject
to all other NERC Reliability Standards and enforcement authority. NEI
predicts that subjecting entities to NERC jurisdiction and enforcement
authority will dissuade parties from signing interface agreements,
contrary to the intent of this Reliability Standard. The applicability
of the other Reliability Standards should be determined by the
governing statute and regulations, and the terms of the other
Reliability Standards, and should not be incorporated through this
Reliability Standard. According to NEI, the Regional Entity
registration process, not the execution of an interface agreement,
determines whether an entity is subject to NUC-001-1. NEI asks the
Commission to clarify that entities that sign an interface agreement
are not automatically subject to NERC jurisdiction for Reliability
Standards beyond NUC-001-1.
39. Southern suggests that it may not be appropriate to apply
certain Reliability Standards requirements to nuclear plant generator
operators, in particular those relating to ``functions of supplying
energy and Interconnected Operations Services.'' On the other hand,
entities registered as a generator owner or generator operator may
fulfill the requirements set forth in NERC's definitions of these
terms, but may not be licensed by the NRC and may not be ``responsible
for operation of a nuclear facility.'' Southern asks the Commission to
direct NERC to review the application of its registration requirements
to nuclear plant generator operators.
40. Several commenters object to the use of the term transmission
entities. Wisconsin Electric suggests that NUC-001-1 does not follow
the NERC Functional Model, due to use of the term transmission
entities. TVA makes a similar objection to the term nuclear plant
generator operator, which does not appear in the NERC functional model,
and suggests use of the term generator operators of nuclear plants with
the Applicability section only listing generator operator. Southern
suggests that, under the definition of nuclear plant generator
operator, there may be licensees that do not meet the definition of a
generator operator or generator owner, as nuclear plant generator
operator is defined. According to Southern, some NRC licensees may be
responsible for operating nuclear facilities but may not meet NERC's
definitions of a generator owner or generator operator.
41. Constellation agrees that the nuclear plant generator operator
must take the lead in identifying transmission entities, but urges the
Commission to implement a dispute resolution process to assist the
nuclear plant generator operators. Constellation is concerned that,
under NUC-001-1, the nuclear plant generator operator will have the
primary burden of ensuring that the parties enter into NPIR agreements;
however, Constellation also argues that a transmission entity must be
appropriately identified and have entered into an NPIR agreement before
it is formally included in the NERC Compliance Registry.
(3) Commission Determination
42. The Commission accepts NERC's approach to determining
applicable entities. The Commission agrees with the ERO that the
identification of transmission entities, which may fit any one of 11
functional categories described in the NERC Functional Model, provides
the ERO with needed breadth and flexibility in identifying and
registering all users, owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System
that provide services related to NPIRs.
43. Further, the ERO makes clear that, in implementation, it plans
to register an owner or operator of an otherwise exempt facility that
is needed for Bulk-Power System reliability, on a facility-by-facility
basis. Once registered, a transmission entity may be subject to other
applicable Reliability Standards, as deemed appropriate through the
registration process. The Commission agrees that it is appropriate that
a registered transmission entity comply with other applicable
Reliability Standards for the functional category for which it is
registered. This approach will support Bulk-Power System reliability
and better assure that a transmission entity is capable of satisfying
responsibilities set forth in an interface agreement.
44. NEI requests clarification that entities that sign an interface
agreement are not automatically subject to ERO jurisdiction for
Reliability Standards beyond NUC-001-1. As discussed above, the
Commission agrees with the ERO that Reliability Standards beyond NUC-
001-1 should apply to a newly-registered transmission entity, for the
functional category for which it is registered. Further, we observe
that the ERO indicates that it will make this determination ``as deemed
appropriate through the registration process.'' We understand this to
mean that the ERO has reserved some flexibility in determining which
Reliability Standards are to be applied to a newly-registered
transmission entity, and the ERO may consider individual circumstances
in the process. The Commission agrees with NEI that the applicability
of particular Reliability Standards beyond NUC-001-1 should not be
decided in this proceeding. Rather, we leave it to the ERO to make such
determinations in the first instance in the registration process.
45. Southern comments that it may not be appropriate to require
nuclear plant generator operators to comply with certain Reliability
Standards that apply to generator owners and generator operators. The
Commission, however, is not convinced that a blanket waiver is
warranted. Rather, similar to our explanation immediately above, the
ERO may consider the individual circumstances of a generator owner or
generator operator and determine whether, for example, a registered
entity is needed for Bulk-Power System reliability and operates
facilities that are addressed in a particular Reliability Standard.
46. Southern has not provided any specific examples of nuclear
plant licensees that would not meet NERC's definition of nuclear plant
generator operator. The Commission addresses NERC's registry
determinations in appropriate proceedings on appeal. A registry
proceeding may address whether a generator owner or operator meets the
NERC registry criteria or should otherwise be registered based on a
finding that the facility is material to Bulk-Power System reliability.
We also
[[Page 63776]]
reject the concerns raised by Wisconsin Electric and TVA that the terms
transmission entity and nuclear plant generator operator do not appear
in the NERC Functional Model. While the NERC Functional Model is a
useful guidance document, ``the Applicability section of a particular
Reliability Standard should be the ultimate determinant of
applicability of each Reliability Standard.'' \26\ Moreover, the ERO's
definition of transmission entity is linked to the functional
categories set forth in the NERC Functional Model.\27\ Likewise, the
nuclear plant generator operator can simply be viewed as a sub-category
of the generator operator function.
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\26\ Order No. 693 at P 127.
\27\ See Reliability Standard NUC-001-1, Section A.4.2.
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b. Applicability to Small Entities and Low Voltage Facilities
i. NOPR
47. In the NOPR, the Commission noted that some nuclear power
plants may obtain auxiliary power through lower voltage facilities that
are not included in a Regional Entity's definition of bulk electric
system and that other nuclear power plants may retain alternate sources
of auxiliary power provided through lower voltage facilities operated
by a small utility or cooperative that is not included in a Regional
Entity's definition of bulk electric system.\28\ The Commission sought
clarification from NERC on how it would register such entities and how
this relates to the definition of bulk electric system.
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\28\ NOPR at P 26.
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ii. Comments
48. NERC clarifies that ``for lower voltage facilities that provide
such services to a Nuclear Power Plant, the registration of those
entities and the applicability of the NERC Reliability Standards
therein to that functional class of entities will be limited to those
facilities identified by the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator in its
NPIRs.'' \29\
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\29\ NERC comments at 8.
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49. Constellation anticipates that some transmission entities, in
particular those that are not previously registered, may be reluctant
to enter into nuclear interface agreements. Constellation is concerned
that small generators that are currently exempt from registration may
be unwilling to continue to provide services or enter into new
agreements for services if provision of such services causes them to be
registered by NERC. Constellation cites the cost burdens and risk of
penalties as having a chilling effect on these entities' willingness to
continue to provide their discrete services to nuclear power plants.
Constellation suggests that the curtailment of such services could
impair the ability of nuclear plant generator operators to meet their
license requirements. To address these concerns, Constellation requests
that the Commission direct NERC to evaluate these risks and to propose
mechanisms to ensure that small entities will not be deterred from
providing services.
50. Entergy explains that under the NRC license requirements, a
nuclear power plant is required to have two sources of off-site power.
For one of Entergy's plants, one of those sources relies, at certain
times, on reactive power support from a small hydropower facility that
generates power at a distribution level voltage, and Entergy and the
facility have entered into an agreement for that reactive power
support. According to Entergy, this facility is not currently
registered or part of the bulk electric system. Entergy expresses
concern that if this entity becomes subject to NUC-001-1, it may cancel
its current service agreement with Entergy because the risk of
potential penalties and future compliance costs could be too high, thus
jeopardizing Entergy's NRC license. Therefore, Entergy asks the
Commission to clarify that if an entity does not currently qualify for
inclusion on the NERC Compliance Registry, provision of NPIR-related
services will not subject that entity to registration.
iii. Commission Determination
51. The Commission accepts NERC's clarification that registration
of lower voltage facilities and the applicability of NUC-001-1 will be
limited to those facilities identified by the nuclear plant generator
operator in its NPIRs.\30\ We would expect that any NPIRs agreed to
between a nuclear plant generator operator and transmission entity
would include all facilities needed to transmit offsite power and
auxiliary power to the nuclear facility. The Commission remains
sensitive to the need for NERC to register operators of lower-voltage
facilities used to deliver off-site power.\31\ The NOPR stated the
Commission's understanding that NERC would register entities operating
facilities not currently identified in the Regional Entities'
definition of bulk electric system that are needed for Bulk-Power
System reliability, through NERC's authority to register an owner or
operator of an otherwise exempt facility that is needed for Bulk-Power
System reliability, on a facility-by-facility basis.\32\ We note that
it is in the best interest of the nuclear plant generator operator to
have any such facility identified in the NPIRs.
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\30\ This approach for lower voltage facilities is consistent
with our determination in prior proceedings that the ERO may
register an entity that falls below the minimum registry criteria on
a facility-by-facility basis. See Order No. 693-A at P 38.
\31\ See NOPR at P 22 and 26.
\32\ Id. P 26 (citing Order No. 693-A at P 38; NERC Statement of
Compliance Registry, Revision 3.1 at 8).
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52. We find that NERC's approach should mitigate the concerns of
commenters who speculate that small entities may wish to cease
providing services rather than become subject to other Reliability
Standards applicable to the functional class in which they would be
registered. In this manner, application of the Reliability Standard to
smaller entities operating lower voltage facilities that were not
previously registered is limited to the facilities used to provide
services to the nuclear plant generator operator. Commenters' other
concerns largely address smaller entities' potential reluctance to
continue providing service--that is, so long as these entities are
users, owners or operators of the Bulk-Power System they may be
registered by NERC and subject to the Reliability Standard. An entity
that has failed to execute an interface agreement will be found in
violation of the Reliability Standard.
53. We believe that limited registration of smaller entities, in
combination with NERC's use of the registry process and tying
enforceability to the receipt of a proposed NPIR (rather than execution
of a formal agreement), should limit the majority of concerns raised by
commenters on behalf of small entities. Entergy's concern with
obtaining reactive power is mitigated by the fact that the Commission's
policies recognize alternate sources for ancillary services--reactive
power is a required ancillary service to be provided by transmission
providers--and the Commission's policies also provide for merchant
ancillary service sales where appropriate. However, these issues are
best resolved in appropriate registration proceedings.
54. The Commission notes that in addition to smaller, previously
unregistered entities, larger currently-registered entities may also
provide service over lower voltage facilities that may be material to
the reliability of the Bulk-Power System. These entities' lower-voltage
facilities highlight a potential gap in applicability, because it could
be argued that those facilities are
[[Page 63777]]
not currently subject to the Reliability Standards since they may fall
outside a Regional Entity's definition of the bulk electric system.
This potential gap is illustrated where a larger entity essentially
provides a transmission service, but the applicability of NUC-001-1 and
other Reliability Standards is uncertain, because service is provided
over lower voltage facilities. We direct the ERO to review the impact
on the Bulk-Power System for registration purposes of any entity
providing service related to NPIRs over a lower-voltage facility
similar to other facilities used to provide service, regardless of
whether such service is provided by a currently-registered entity or a
previously unregistered entity.\33\
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\33\ The Commission notes, however, that the NUC-001-1 drafting
team has described such cases of distribution level supply as ``the
exception, not the rule.'' See NERC Nuclear Reliability Standard
drafting team, Consideration of Comments on 2nd Draft of Nuclear
Off-site Power Supply Standard, at 54 (Feb. 7, 2007), filed in
November 19, 2007 Petition, Exhibit B, Record of Development of
Proposed Reliability Standard.
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c. Critical Facilities
i. NOPR
55. In the NOPR, the Commission asked whether NERC would, in
registering entities not otherwise registered, consider lower voltage
facilities needed to serve NPIRs to be critical facilities.
ii. Comments
56. NERC responded that it does not currently have an approved NERC
Glossary definition for ``critical facility'' per Order No. 693's
directive.\34\ Consequently NERC states it will refrain from using the
term in its response and until such time as the definition is developed
and approved. However, NERC notes that a nuclear power plant would be
unable to operate without transmission services from lower voltage
facilities supplying off-site power, and the absence of such services
would result in the real and reactive output of the plant being
unavailable to the system. NERC states that the determination of
whether a plant is material to the reliability of the Bulk-Power System
is determined at the Regional Entity level, but notes that nuclear
power plants typically provide both real and reactive power to the
transmission grid.
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\34\ Section III.d.2 of the NERC compliance registry states that
the functions transmission owner and transmission operator shall
include an entity ``that owns/operates a transmission element below
100 kV associated with a facility that is included on a critical
facilities list that is defined by the Regional Entity.''
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57. SCE&G states that it finds the Commission's reference in the
NOPR to ``critical facilities'' to be troubling, since NUC-001-1 should
not affect the characterization of a facility as critical and such
determination should be made by NERC. According to SCE&G, the existing
NERC definition of ``critical asset,'' combined with the methodology in
Reliability Standard CIP-002-1 is the correct method to determine if a
facility is ``critical'' to the bulk electric system. SCE&G also
maintains that NUC-001-1 does not affect the characterization of a
critical facility, which is determined instead by the NERC definition
of critical asset and the methodology provided in CIP-002-1.
iii. Commission Determination
58. The Commission notes that the term ``critical facility'' under
Order No. 693 is a facility not otherwise included in a Regional
Entity's definition of the bulk electric system but that has been
identified by the Regional Entity as being critical to the system
reliability.\35\ This is different from the definition of ``critical
asset'' under CIP-002-1. The Commission accepts NERC's explanation of
whether it would consider lower voltage facilities needed to serve
NPIRs to be critical facilities when it registers new entities and
notes that the definition of the term ``critical facility'' will be
resolved in a future proceeding.
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\35\ Order No. 693 at P 77.
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d. Timing of NUC-001-1 Enforceability to Transmission Entities
i. NOPR
59. In the NOPR, the Commission sought comment on its understanding
that NUC-001-1 would become applicable to, and enforceable against, a
transmission entity only when the transmission entity executed an
interface agreement. In other words, the provider of NPIR-related
service would become a transmission entity, as that term is defined by
NUC-001-1, subject to NUC-001-1 and other Reliability Standards, upon
execution of the interface agreement.
ii. Comments
60. In response to the Commission's question on timing, NERC
clarified that the interface agreement with a nuclear plant generator
operator is not the mechanism that determines whether an entity is a
transmission entity subject to NUC-001-1. Instead, a nuclear plant
generator operator initiates the identification by proposing an NPIR to
an applicable transmission entity, and, at this point, the identified
transmission entity is placed on the Compliance Registry and becomes
subject to the requirements of NUC-001-1, not when the agreement
required in Requirement R2 is established.\36\
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\36\ NERC comments at 11.
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61. Several commenters support approaches similar to the NERC
position.\37\ These commenters generally agree that NUC-001-1 applies
to a transmission entity once it has been notified of an NPIR by the
nuclear plant generator operator. EEI, for instance, states its
understanding that the NUC-001-1 drafting team and NERC staff intended
that a nuclear plant generator operator would identify the transmission
entities for each nuclear power plant under NUC-001-1, whether or not
they had already entered into an agreement. NEI recommends that a
potential transmission entity should be deemed a transmission entity
subject to the requirements of NUC-001-1 once it becomes registered as
a transmission entity under NUC-001-1 and receives proposed NPIRs from
the nuclear plant generator operator pursuant to Requirement R1. NEI
states that transmission entity status should continue unless and until
NERC determines otherwise, based on a full and fair analysis of the
facts and evidence presented by the affected parties.\38\
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\37\ See EEI, Exelon, Detroit Edison, and NEI comments.
\38\ See also Detroit Edison comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
62. EEI states that, for a newly identified entity that is not on
the Compliance Registry, the Regional Entities should examine whether
an entity is properly classified as a transmission entity before
registering the entity and thus requiring it to comply with the
Reliability Standard. Entergy concurs that the NERC registration
process, rather than the execution of an interface agreement,
determines whether an entity is subject to NUC-001-1.
63. The commenters supporting the NERC clarification generally
state that holding that NUC-001-1 is only applicable to a transmission
entity after it executes an interface agreement would be inequitable
because, in the event of disagreement, the nuclear plant generator
operator could be held in violation, while the transmission owner would
not.\39\ NEI states that the need to prompt all potential transmission
entities to conform to NUC-001-1 is particularly important where
potential transmission entities have no corporate affiliation with the
nuclear plant generator operator, because such an entity may wish to
avoid executing an
[[Page 63778]]
interface agreement to avoid exposure to NUC-001-1.
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\39\ See EEI, Exelon, and NEI comments; See also Constellation
comments at 8.
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64. EEI notes that, in some cases, the failure to agree may be the
result of good-faith differences between the parties such that
sanctions should not be imposed, except as a last resort. NEI also
suggests that no enforcement action, other than arbitration through a
Regional Entity, should be taken in the absence of agreement, but asks
the Commission to clarify that while the Reliability Standard may not
be enforceable by NERC or the Commission without an agreement, the
contractual service commitments may be enforceable by other means.
Constellation requests clarification that only Requirement R1 is
enforceable against the nuclear plant generator operator until the NPIR
agreement is executed, because the other requirements involve
implementation of an agreement, which the nuclear plant generator
operator cannot do unilaterally.
65. NEI emphasizes that licensing requirements should already be
known to affected transmission entities and a