Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses; Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations, 62560-62574 [E8-24896]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 204 (Tuesday, October 21, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62560-62574]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-24896]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility 
Operating Licenses; Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

I. Background

    Pursuant to section 189a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the 
Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. 
The Act requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments 
issued, or proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the 
authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an 
operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such 
amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, 
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a 
hearing from any person.
    This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or 
proposed to be issued from September 25, 2008 to October 8, 2008. The 
last biweekly notice was published on October 7, 2008 (73 FR 58669).

[[Page 62561]]

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating 
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, 
and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under 
the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation 
of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis 
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown 
below.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The 
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the 
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day 
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, 
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the 
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment 
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a 
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after 
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will 
occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rulemaking, 
Directives and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services, 
Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and 
page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also 
be delivered to Room 6D44, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. 
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the Commission's 
Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public 
File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. The filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave 
to intervene is discussed below.
    Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, 
person(s) may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of 
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person 
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to 
participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request 
via electronic submission through the NRC E-Filing system for a hearing 
and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a 
petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the 
Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' 
in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested person(s) should consult a current copy of 
10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the Commission's PDR, located at 
One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike 
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be 
accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's 
(ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web 
site, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request 
for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed within 60 
days, the Commission or a presiding officer designated by the 
Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety 
and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; 
and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an 
appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone 
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the 
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the 
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the 
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must 
also set forth the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor 
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
    Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for 
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinion which supports the contention and on which the petitioner/
requestor intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The 
petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific 
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the 
petitioner/requestor intends to rely to establish those facts or expert 
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that 
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law 
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of 
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if 
proven, would entitle the petitioner/requestor to relief. A petitioner/
requestor who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at 
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing.
    If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the 
Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no 
significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve 
to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that 
the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, 
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately 
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held 
would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final 
determination is that the amendment request involves a significant 
hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the 
issuance of any amendment.
    A request for hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be 
filed in

[[Page 62562]]

accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule, which the NRC promulgated on 
August 28, 2007 (72 FR 49139). The E-Filing process requires 
participants to submit and serve documents over the Internet or in some 
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not 
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek a waiver in 
accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 
five (5) days prior to the filing deadline, the petitioner/requestor 
must contact the Office of the Secretary by e-mail at 
hearingdocket@nrc.gov, or by calling (301) 415-1677, to request (1) a 
digital ID certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or 
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal 
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and/or (2) 
creation of an electronic docket for the proceeding (even in instances 
in which the petitioner/requestor (or its counsel or representative) 
already holds an NRC-issued digital ID certificate). Each petitioner/
requestor will need to download the Workplace Forms ViewerTM 
to access the Electronic Information Exchange (EIE), a component of the 
E-Filing system. The Workplace Forms ViewerTM is free and is 
available at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/install-
viewer.html. Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-
submittals/apply-certificates.html.
    Once a petitioner/requestor has obtained a digital ID certificate, 
had a docket created, and downloaded the EIE viewer, it can then submit 
a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions 
should be in Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC 
guidance available on the NRC public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the 
time the filer submits its documents through EIE. To be timely, an 
electronic filing must be submitted to the EIE system no later than 
11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of a 
transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an e-mail notice confirming receipt of the document.
    The EIE system also distributes an e-mail notice that provides 
access to the document to the NRC Office of the General Counsel and any 
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for 
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition 
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document 
via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically may seek assistance through the 
``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals.html or by calling the NRC technical help line, 
which is available between 8:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Eastern Time, 
Monday through Friday. The help line number is (800) 397-4209 or 
locally, (301) 415-4737.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file a motion, in accordance 
with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing requesting 
authorization to continue to submit documents in paper format. Such 
filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail addressed to the 
Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and 
Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or expedited 
delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One 
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, 
Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants filing a 
document in this manner are responsible for serving the document on all 
other participants. Filing is considered complete by first-class mail 
as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service upon depositing the document with the 
provider of the service.
    Non-timely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be 
entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer, or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition 
and/or request should be granted and/or the contentions should be 
admitted, based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 
2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii). To be timely, filings must be submitted no later 
than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in 
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at 
https://ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp, unless excluded pursuant 
to an order of the Commission, an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, or 
a Presiding Officer. Participants are requested not to include personal 
privacy information, such as social security numbers, home addresses, 
or home phone numbers in their filings. With respect to copyrighted 
works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the 
adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, 
participants are requested not to include copyrighted materials in 
their submission.
    For further details with respect to this amendment action, see the 
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at 
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File 
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible from the ADAMS Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS 
or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, 
contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737 or 
by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-
318, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Calvert 
County, Maryland

    Date of amendments request: August 27, 2008.
    Description of amendments request: The amendment would change the 
containment buffering agent from trisodium phosphate (TSP) to sodium 
tetraborate in order to minimize the potential for sump screen blockage 
due to potential adverse chemical interactions between TSP and certain 
insulation materials used in containment under post loss-of-coolant 
accident conditions. This amendment is one of the remaining 
modifications required for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 
Nos. 1 and 2 to achieve full compliance with the requirements of 
Generic Letter 2004-02, ``Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on 
Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-
Water Reactors'' (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS) Accession Number ML042360586).
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

[[Page 62563]]

    Response-No.
    The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability of an accident previously evaluated because the 
containment buffering agent is not an initiator of any analyzed 
accident. The proposed change does not impact any failure modes that 
could lead to an accident. The proposed amendment does not involve a 
significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated. The buffering agent in Containment is designed to buffer 
the acids expected to be produced after a loss-of-coolant accident 
(LOCA) and is credited in the radiological analysis for iodine 
retention. Utilizing the required quantity of sodium tetraborate 
decahydrate (STB) as a buffering agent ensures the post-LOCA 
containment sump mixture will have a pH >= 7.0. The proposed change 
of replacing trisodium phosphate (TSP) with STB results in the 
radiological consequences remaining within the limits of 10 CFR 
50.67. There is no dose change with the pH >= 7.0.
    Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the 
proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response-No.
    The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated. The STB is a passive component that is proposed to be 
used as a buffering agent to increase the pH of the initially acidic 
post-LOCA containment water to a more neutral pH. Changing the 
proposed buffering agent from TSP to STB does not constitute an 
accident initiator or create a new or different kind of accident 
than previously analyzed. The proposed amendment does not involve 
operation of any required systems, structures, or components in a 
manner or configuration different from those previously recognized 
or evaluated. No new failure mechanisms will be introduced by the 
changes being requested. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not 
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from 
any accident previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response-No.
    The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety. The proposed amendment of changing the 
buffering agent from TSP to STB results in equivalent control of 
maintaining sump pH at >= 7.0, thereby controlling containment 
atmosphere iodine and ensuring the radiological consequences of a 
LOCA are within regulatory limits. The change of buffering agent 
from TSP to STB also reduces the amount of calcium phosphate 
precipitate generated thereby reducing the overall amount of 
precipitate that may be formed in a postulated LOCA. The buffer 
change would minimize the potential chemical effects and should 
enhance the ability of the Emergency Core Cooling System to perform 
the post-LOCA mitigating functions.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendments request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Carey Fleming, Sr. Counsel--Nuclear 
Generation, Constellation Generation Group LLC, 750 East Pratt Street, 
17th Floor, Baltimore, MD 21202.
    NRC Branch Chief: Mark G. Kowal.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 
No. 1, Pope County, Arkansas

    Date of amendment request: July 21, 2008.
    Description of amendment request: The amendment proposes a change 
to the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) Technical Specifications 
(TSs) to support adoption of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 
359, ``Increased Flexibility in Mode Restraints.'' The NRC approved 
adoption of TSTF-359 for ANO-1 in TS Amendment 232. The overall intent 
of TSTF-359 was to eliminate exceptions to Limiting Condition for 
Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 within individual specifications and provide 
requirements within LCO 3.0.4 to control mode changes when TS-required 
equipment is inoperable. Following implementation of TS Amendment 232, 
Entergy discovered that one of the marked-up TS pages which contained 
an LCO 3.0.4 exception was not provided to the NRC for review in the 
original submittal.
    The NRC staff issued a notice of opportunity for comment in the 
Federal Register on August 2, 2002 (67 FR 50475), as part of the 
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP), on possible 
amendments to revise the plant-specific TS to modify requirements for 
model change limitations in LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4.
    The NRC staff subsequently issued a notice of availability of the 
models for Safety Evaluation and No Significant Hazards Consideration 
Determination for referencing in license amendment applications in the 
Federal Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579). The licensee affirmed 
the applicability of the CLIIP, including the model No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, in its application dated October 
22, 2007.
    The proposed TS changes are consistent with NRC-approved Industry 
TSTF STS change, TSTF-359, Revision 8, as modified by 68 FR 16579. 
TSTF-359, Revision 8, was subsequently revised to incorporate the 
modifications discussed in the April 4, 2003, Federal Register notice 
and other minor changes. TSTF-359, Revision 9, was subsequently 
submitted to the NRC on April 28, 2003, and was approved by the NRC on 
May 9, 2003.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the NRC staff analysis 
of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented 
below:

    1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    Response: No.
    The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified 
condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition 
statement and the associated required actions of the TS. Being in a 
TS condition and the associated required actions is not an initiator 
of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of 
an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The 
consequences of an accident while relying on required actions as 
allowed by proposed LCO 3.0.4, are no different than the 
consequences of an accident while entering and relying on the 
required actions while starting in a condition of applicability of 
the TS. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated are not significantly affected by this change. The 
addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced 
by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, 
this change does not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). 
Entering into a mode or other specified condition in the 
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the 
associated required actions of the TS, will not introduce new 
failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other 
unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed 
the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The addition of 
a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this 
change will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, this 
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from an accident previously evaluated.
    3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction 
in the margin of safety.
    Response: No.
    The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified 
condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition

[[Page 62564]]

statement and the associated required actions of the TS. The TS 
allow operation of the plant without the full complement of 
equipment through the conditions for not meeting the TS Limiting 
Conditions for Operation (LCO). The risk associated with this 
allowance is managed by the imposition of required actions that must 
be performed within the prescribed completion times. The net effect 
of being in a TS condition on the margin of safety is not considered 
significant. The proposed change does not alter the required actions 
or completion times of the TS. The proposed change allows TS 
conditions to be entered, and the associated required actions and 
completion times to be used in new circumstances. This use is 
predicated upon the licensee's performance of a risk assessment and 
the management of plant risk. The change also eliminates current 
allowances for utilizing required actions and completion times in 
similar circumstances, without assessing and managing risk. The net 
change to the margin of safety is insignificant. Therefore, this 
change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

    The NRC staff proposes to determine that the request for amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Terence A. Burke, Associate General 
Counsel--Nuclear Entergy Services, Inc., 1340 Echelon Parkway, Jackson, 
Mississippi 39213.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374, LaSalle 
County Station, Units 1 and 2, LaSalle County, Illinois

    Date of amendment request: December 13, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would 
revise the Technical Specifications (TS) Section 4.3.1, 
``Criticality,'' to add a new requirement to use a blocking device in 
spent fuel storage rack cells that cannot maintain the effective 
neutron multiplication factor, Keff, requirements specified 
in TS Section 4.3.1.1.a. In addition, the proposed change revises TS 
Section 4.3.3 to reflect that the LaSalle County Station, Unit 2 spent 
fuel storage capacity is limited to no more than a combination of 4078 
fuel assemblies and blocking devices.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change adds an additional requirement to the TS to 
ensure that the effective neutron multiplication factor 
Keff, is less than or equal to 0.95, if fully flooded 
with borated water. The additional requirement is to insert a 
blocking device into unusable storage rack cell locations. Since the 
proposed change pertains only to the spent fuel pool (SFP), only 
those accidents that are related to movement and storage of fuel 
assemblies in the SFP could be potentially affected by the proposed 
change.
    The probability that a misplaced fuel assembly would result in 
an inadvertent criticality is unchanged since the process and 
procedural controls governing fuel cell movement in the SFP will not 
be changed. The current criticality analysis for the LSCS Unit 2 SFP 
credits the neutron absorbing properties of the Boraflex neutron 
poison material in the spent fuel storage racks. The current 
analysis demonstrates: (1) Adequate margin to criticality for all 
spent fuel storage cells, (2) adequate margin for fuel assemblies 
inadvertently placed into locations adjacent to the spent fuel 
racks, and (3) adequate margin for assemblies accidentally dropped 
onto the spent fuel racks. The dose consequences of the most 
limiting drop of a fuel assembly in the spent fuel pool is limited 
by the number of the fuel rods damaged and other engineered features 
unaffected by the proposed change, including the fuel design, fuel 
decay time, water level in the spent fuel pool, water temperature of 
the spent fuel pool, and the engineering features of the Reactor 
Building Ventilation System.
    The revised analysis does not result in a significant increase 
in the probability of an accident previously analyzed. The revised 
analysis takes no credit for the Boraflex material. The use of a 
blocking device prevents an inadvertent action to insert a spent 
fuel assembly, and prevents an assembly that is accidentally dropped 
to penetrate into the empty spent fuel cell. In addition to this 
blocking device, administrative controls will be implemented to 
prevent insertion of a bundle into a cell that is blocked. The 
probability that a fuel assembly would be inadvertently placed into 
a location adjacent to the racks is unchanged, and the probability 
that a fuel assembly would be dropped is unchanged by the revised 
analysis. These events involve failures of administrative controls, 
human performance, and equipment failures that are unaffected by the 
presence or absence of Boraflex and the blocking devices.
    The revised analysis does not result in a significant increase 
in the consequence of an accident previously analyzed. The revised 
analysis demonstrates adequate margin to criticality for unblocked 
cells in the LSCS Unit 2 SFP, adequate margin for assemblies 
inadvertently placed into locations adjacent to the spent fuel 
racks, and adequate margin for assemblies accidentally dropped onto 
the spent fuel racks. Placing a spent fuel assembly into a location 
containing a blocking device is not a credible event since there are 
diverse and redundant administrative and physical barriers to 
prevent that.
    The revised analysis does not affect the consequences of a 
dropped fuel assembly. The consequences of dropping a fuel assembly 
onto any other fuel assembly or other structure, other than a 
blocking device, are unaffected by the change. The consequences of 
dropping a fuel assembly onto a blocking device are bounded by the 
event of dropping an assembly onto another assembly, both for 
criticality and for radiological consequences. For criticality, the 
blocking device prevents the dropped assembly from entering the 
blocked cell. For radiological consequences, the number of rods 
damaged when a fuel assembly is accidentally dropped onto a blocking 
device is bounded the by the number of rods damaged by an assembly 
dropped onto another assembly. The change does not affect the 
effectiveness of the other engineered design features to limit the 
offsite dose consequences of the limiting fuel assembly drop 
accident.
    The proposed change to clarify that the capacity of the Unit 2 
SFP is limited to no more than a combination of 4078 fuel assemblies 
and blocking devices does not affect the probability or consequences 
of an accident previously analyzed because no physical modifications 
to the storage racks are proposed. The proposed change will reduce 
the number of allowable fuel assembly storage locations.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    Onsite storage of spent fuel assemblies in the SFP is a normal 
activity for which LSCS has been designed and licensed. As part of 
assuring that this normal activity can be performed without 
endangering public health and safety, the ability to safely 
accommodate different possible accidents in the SFP, such as 
dropping a fuel assembly or misloading a fuel assembly, have been 
analyzed. The proposed fuel storage configuration does not change 
the methods of fuel movement or fuel storage. No structural or 
mechanical change to the racks or fuel handling equipment is being 
proposed. The proposed change allows for partial use of storage rack 
locations that have been determined unusable based on the existing 
criticality analysis.
    The blocking devices are passive devices. These devices, when 
inside a spent fuel storage rack cell, perform the same function of 
a spent fuel assembly in that cell. These devices do not add any 
limiting structural loads or affect the removal of decay heat from 
the other assemblies. The devices are resistant to corrosion and 
will maintain their structural integrity over the life of the plant. 
These devices are not under any structural load during normal 
operations. They are only challenged by an accidental fuel assembly 
drop. The existing fuel handling accident, which assumes the drop of 
a fuel bundle, bounds the drop of a blocking device.
    This change does not create the possibility of a misloaded 
assembly into a blocked cell. Placing a spent fuel assembly into a 
location containing a blocking device is not a credible event since 
there are diverse and redundant administrative and physical barriers 
to prevent that.

[[Page 62565]]

    Therefore the proposed change does not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    LSCS TS 4.3.1 .1 requires the spent fuel storage racks to 
maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor, 
Keff, less than or equal to 0.95 when fully flooded with 
unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties. 
Therefore, for criticality, the required safety margin is 5% 
including a conservative margin to account for engineering 
uncertainties.
    The proposed change adds a requirement to use a blocking device 
to ensure that Keff continues to be less than or equal to 
0.95; thus, the required safety margin of 5% is preserved. The 
proposed change also clarifies that the capacity of the Unit 2 SFP 
is limited to no more than a combination of 4078 fuel assemblies and 
blocking devices. This clarification does not impact the required 
safety margin of 5%.
    The current analysis assumes an infinite array of fuel with all 
fuel at the peak reactivity (i.e., the highest combination of 
initial enrichment, gadolinium, and fuel burnup that maximizes the 
reactivity of the fuel). The revised analysis demonstrates the same 
margin to criticality of 5%, including a conservative margin to 
account for engineering uncertainties, is maintained assuming an 
infinite array of fuel with all fuel at the peak reactivity. In 
addition, the margin of safety for radiological consequences of a 
dropped fuel assembly are unchanged because the event involving a 
dropped fuel assembly onto a blocking device is bounded by the 
consequences of a dropped fuel assembly onto another fuel assembly.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. Bradley J. Fewell, Associate General 
Counsel, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 4300 Winfield Road, 
Warrenville, IL 60555.
    NRC Branch Chief: Russell Gibbs.

FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Docket No. 50-331, Duane Arnold Energy 
Center, Linn County, Iowa

    Date of amendment request: May 30, 2008, as supplemented on July 17 
and September 10, 2008.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise Technical Specifications (TS) Table 3.3.8.1-1, ``Loss of Power 
Instrumentation,'' specifically to change the maximum allowable voltage 
of the 4.16-kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage function from less-than-or-
equal to 3899 V to less-than-or-equal-to 3822 V.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed TS change to the maximum allowable voltage for the 
4160 volt Emergency Bus Undervoltage relays affects when an 
Emergency Bus that is experiencing degraded voltage will disconnect 
from offsite power and transfer to an emergency diesel generator. 
While the maximum allowed voltage that initiates this action will be 
lowered, the function remains the same. The maximum allowed voltage 
has been analyzed to ensure spurious trips will be avoided. The 
proposed change will not affect any accident initiators or 
precursors. As a result, the probability of any accident previously 
evaluated is not significantly increased.
    The consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not 
increased since the 4160 volt Emergency Bus Undervoltage relays will 
continue to meet their required function to transfer the 4160 volt 
Emergency Buses to the emergency diesel generators in the event of a 
degraded voltage condition on the offsite power supply. This 
transfer will ensure that the electrical equipment is capable of 
performing its function to meet the requirements of the accident 
analyses.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    No new or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed 
change. The proposed TS change to the maximum allowable voltage for 
the 4160 volt Emergency Bus Undervoltage relays does not affect 
existing or introduce any new accident precursors or modes of 
operation. The relays will continue to detect undervoltage 
conditions and transfer the Emergency Buses to the emergency diesel 
generators at a voltage adequate to ensure proper safety equipment 
performance and to prevent equipment damage. The function of the 
relays remains the same.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed TS change to the maximum allowable voltage for the 
4160 volt Emergency Bus Undervoltage relays will allow all safety 
loads to have sufficient voltage to perform their intended safety 
functions while ensuring spurious trips are avoided. Thus, the 
results of the accident analyses will not be affected as the input 
assumptions are protected.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. R. E. Helfrich, Florida Power & Light 
Company, P. O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420.
    NRC Branch Chief: Lois M. James.

Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear 
Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska

    Date of amendment request: August 19, 2008.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise Technical Specification (TS) requirements for mode change 
limitations in accordance with NRC-approved TS Task Force (TSTF) 
traveler TSTF-359, Revision 9, ``Increase Flexibility in MODE 
Restraints,'' and revise TS Section 1.4, ``Frequency,'' in accordance 
with NRC-approved traveler TSTF-485, Revision 0, ``Correct Example 1.4-
1.''
    The NRC staff issued a ``Notice of Availability of Model 
Application Concerning Technical Specification Improvement To Modify 
Requirements Regarding Mode Change Limitations Using the Consolidated 
Line Item Improvement Process'' in the Federal Register on April 4, 
2003 (68 FR 16579). The notice referenced a model safety evaluation and 
a model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination 
published in the Federal Register on August 2, 2002 (67 FR 50475). In 
its application dated August 19, 2008, the licensee affirmed the 
applicability of the model NSHC determination which is presented below.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of NSHC adopted by the licensee regarding TSTF-359 is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified 
condition in the

[[Page 62566]]

applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the 
associated required actions of the TS. Being in a TS condition and 
the associated required actions is not an initiator of any accident 
previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of an accident 
previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The 
consequences of an accident while relying on required actions as 
allowed by proposed LCO 3.0.4, are no different than the 
consequences of an accident while entering and relying on the 
required actions while starting in a condition of applicability of 
the TS. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated are not significantly affected by this change. The 
addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced 
by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, 
this change does not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated

    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). 
Entering into a mode or other specified condition in the 
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the 
associated required actions of the TS, will not introduce new 
failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other 
unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed 
the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The addition of 
a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this 
change will further minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change 
does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified 
condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition 
statement and the associated required actions of the TS. The TS 
allow operation of the plant without the full complement of 
equipment through the conditions for not meeting the TS Limiting 
Conditions for Operation (LCO). The risk associated with this 
allowance is managed by the imposition of required actions that must 
be performed within the prescribed completion times. The net effect 
of being in a TS condition on the margin of safety is not considered 
significant. The proposed change does not alter the required actions 
or completion times of the TS. The proposed change allows TS 
conditions to be entered, and the associated required actions and 
completion times to be used in new circumstances. This use is 
predicated upon the licensee's performance of a risk assessment and 
the management of plant risk. The change also eliminates current 
allowances for utilizing required actions and completion times in 
similar circumstances, without assessing and managing risk. The net 
change to the margin of safety is insignificant. Therefore, this 
change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

    In its application dated August 19, 2008, the licensee also 
affirmed the applicability of the NSHC approved by the NRC in TSTF-485, 
which is presented below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change revises Section 1.4, Frequency, Example 1.4-
1, to be consistent with Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.4 and 
Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4. This change is 
considered administrative in that it modifies the example to 
demonstrate the proper application of SR 3.0.4 and LCO 3.0.4. The 
requirements of SR 3.0.4 and LCO 3.0.4 are clear and are clearly 
explained in the associated Bases. As a result, modifying the 
example will not result in a change in usage of the Technical 
Specifications (TS). The proposed change does not adversely affect 
accident initiators or precursors, the ability of structures, 
systems, and components (SSCs) to perform their intended function to 
mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed 
acceptance limits, or radiological release assumptions used in 
evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated. Therefore, this change is considered administrative and 
will have no effect on the probability or consequences of any 
accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    No new or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed 
change. The change does not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be 
installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operation. In addition, the change does not impose any new or 
different requirements or eliminate any existing requirements. The 
change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. The 
proposed change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions 
and current plant operating practice.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change is administrative and will have no effect on 
the application of the Technical Specification requirements. 
Therefore, the margin of safety provided by the Technical 
Specification requirements is unchanged.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis adopted by the licensee 
and, based upon this review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine 
that the request for amendment involves NSHC.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. John C. McClure, Nebraska Public Power 
District, Post Office Box 499, Columbus, NE 68602-0499.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, (NMPNS) Docket No. 50-220, Nine 
Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 1 (NMP1), Oswego County, New York

    Date of amendment request: August 15, 2008.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise NMP1 Technical Specification (TS) 6.5.7, ``10 CFR 50 [Part 50 of 
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations] Appendix J Testing Program 
Plan,'' to allow a one-time extension of the Integrated Leak Rate Test 
(ILRT) interval for no more than five (5) years. The proposed amendment 
would allow the next ILRT for NMP1 to be performed within 15 years from 
the last ILRT as opposed to the current 10-year interval.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change involves a one-time extension of the primary 
containment ILRT interval from 10 to 15 years. The proposed change 
does not involve a physical change to the plant or a change in the 
manner in which the plant is operated or controlled. The primary 
containment function is to provide an essentially leak tight barrier 
against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment 
for postulated accidents. As such, the containment itself and the 
testing requirements to periodically demonstrate the integrity of 
the containment exist to ensure the plant's ability to mitigate the 
consequences of an accident, and do not involve any accident 
precursors or initiators. Therefore, the probability of occurrence 
of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased 
by the proposed change.
    Continued containment integrity is assured by the established 
programs for local leak rate testing and inservice/containment

[[Page 62567]]

inspections, which are unaffected by the proposed change. As 
documented in NUREG-1493, ``Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test 
Program,'' dated September 1995, industry experience has shown that 
local leak rate tests (Type B and C) have identified the vast 
majority of containment leakage paths, and that ILRTs detect only a 
small fraction of containment leakage pathways.
    The potential consequences of the proposed change have been 
quantified by analyzing the changes in risk that would result from 
extending the ILRT interval from 10 years to 15 years. The increase 
in risk in terms of person-rem per year within 50 miles resulting 
from design basis accidents was estimated to be of a magnitude that 
NUREG-1493 indicates is imperceptible. NMPNS has also analyzed the 
increase in risk in terms of the frequency of large early releases 
from accidents. The increase in the large early release frequency 
resulting from the proposed change was determined to be within the 
guidelines published in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174. Additionally, 
the proposed change maintains defense-in-depth by preserving a 
reasonable balance among prevention of core damage, prevention of 
containment failure, and consequence mitigation. NMPNS has 
determined that the increase in conditional containment failure 
probability due to the proposed change would be insignificant. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed one-time extension of 
the primary containment ILRT interval from 10 years to 15 years does 
not significantly increase the consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the proposed 
change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change involves a one-time extension of the primary 
containment ILRT interval. The containment and the testing 
requirements to periodically demonstrate the integrity of the 
containment exist to ensure the plant's ability to mitigate the 
consequences of an accident, and do not involve any accident 
precursors or initiators. The proposed change does not involve a 
physical change to the plant (i.e., no new or different type of 
equipment will be installed) or a change in the manner in which the 
plant is operated or controlled.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed one-time extension of the primary containment ILRT 
interval does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting 
safety system setpoints, or limiting conditions for operation are 
determined. The specific requirements and conditions of the 10 CFR 
[Part] 50 Appendix J Testing Program Plan, as defined in the TS, 
exist to ensure that the degree of primary containment structural 
integrity and leak-tightness that is considered in the plant safety 
analyses is maintained. The overall containment leakage rate limit 
specified by the TS is maintained, and Type B and C containment 
leakage tests will continue to be performed at the frequency 
currently required by the TS.
    NMP1 and industry experience strongly support the conclusion 
that Type B and C testing detects a large percentage of containment 
leakage paths and that the percentage of containment leakage paths 
that are detected only by the ILRT is small. Containment inspections 
performed in accordance with other plant programs serve to provide a 
high degree of assurance that the containment will not degrade in a 
manner that is detectable only by an ILRT. Additionally, the on-line 
containment monitoring capability that is inherent to inerted 
boiling[-]water reactor containments allows for the detection of 
gross containment leakage that may develop during power operation. 
This combination of factors ensures that the margin of safety that 
is inherent in plant safety analyses is maintained. Furthermore, a 
risk assessment using the current NMP1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
interval events model concluded that extending the ILRT test 
interval from 10 to 15 years results in a very small change to the 
NMP1 risk profile.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & 
Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006.
    NRC Branch Chief: Mark G. Kowal.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC (NMPNS), Docket No. 50-410, Nine 
Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 2 (NMP2), Oswego County, New York

    Date of amendment request: August 14, 2008.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would (1) 
revise the NMP2 Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 
(SR) frequency in TS 3.1.3, ``Control Rod Operability,'' and (2) revise 
Example 1.4-3 in TS Section 1.4, ``Frequency,'' to clarify the 
applicability of the 1.25 surveillance test interval extension. The 
proposed changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC)-approved Revision 1 to TS Task Force (TSTF) Change Traveler, 
TSTF-475, ``Control Rod Notch Testing Frequency and SRM [Source Range 
Monitor] Insert Control Rod Action.'' The availability of this TS 
improvement was announced in the Federal Register on November 13, 2007 
(72 FR 63943) as part of the consolidated line item improvement 
process. The licensee affirmed the applicability of the model no 
significant hazards consideration determination in its application.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change generically implements TSTF-475, Revision 1, 
``Control Rod Notch Testing Frequency and SRM Insert Control Rod 
Action.'' TSTF-475, Revision 1 modifies NUREG-1433 (BWR/4) and 
NUREG-1434 (BWR/6) STS. The changes: (1) Revise TS testing frequency 
for surveillance requirement (SR) 3.1.3.2 in TS 3.1.3, ``Control Rod 
OPERABILITY,'' (2) clarify the requirement to fully insert all 
insertable control rods for the limiting condition for operation 
(LCO) in TS 3.3.1.2, Required Action E.2, ``Source Range Monitoring 
Instrumentation'' (NUREG-1434 only), and (3) revise Example 1.4-3 in 
Section 1.4 ``Frequency'' to clarify the applicability of the 1.25 
surveillance test interval extension. The consequences of an 
accident after adopting TSTF-475, Revision 1 are no different than 
the consequences of an accident prior to adoption. Therefore, this 
change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) 
or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The 
proposed change will not introduce new failure modes or effects and 
will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an 
accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents 
previously analyzed. Thus, this change does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in [a] Margin of Safety

    TSTF-475, Revision 1 will: (1) [revise the TS SR 3.1.3.2 
frequency in TS 3.1.3, ``Control Rod OPERABILITY,'' (2) clarify the 
requirement to fully insert all insertable control rods for the 
limiting condition for operation (LCO) in TS 3.3.1.2, ``Source Range 
Monitoring Instrumentation,'' and (3)] revise

[[Page 62568]]

Example 1.4-3 in Section 1.4 ``Frequency'' to clarify the 
applicability of the 1.25 surveillance test interval extension. [The 
GE Nuclear Energy Report, ``CRD Notching Surveillance Testing for 
Limerick Generating Station,'' dated November 2006, concludes that 
extending the control rod notch test interval from weekly to monthly 
is not expected to impact the reliability of the scram system and 
that the analysis supports the decision to change the surveillance 
frequency.] Therefore, the proposed changes in TSTF-475, Revision 1 
are acceptable and do not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & 
Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006.
    NRC Branch Chief: Mark G. Kowal.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC (NMPNS) Docket No. 50-220, Nine 
Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 1 (NMP1), Oswego County, New York

    Date of amendment request: August 18, 2008.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise the NMP1 Technical Specification (TS) Section 3/4.1.1, ``Control 
Rod System,'' to increase the Surveillance Requirement (SR) frequency 
associated with control rod exercising. The proposed change would 
revise the required SR frequency from once each week to once every 31 
days. The proposed change is consistent with Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC)-approved Revision 1 to TS Task Force (TSTF) Change 
Traveler, TSTF-475, ``Control Rod Notch Testing Frequency and SRM 
[Source Range Monitor] Insert Control Rod Action,'' and NUREG-1433, 
``Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/4,'' 
Revision 3.1. The availability of the TS improvement was announced in 
the Federal Register on November 13, 2007 (72 FR 63943) as part of the 
consolidated line item improvement process. The licensee affirmed the 
applicability of the model no significant hazards consideration 
determination in its application.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change generically implements TSTF-475, Revision 1, 
``Control Rod Notch Testing Frequency and SRM Insert Control Rod 
Action.'' TSTF-475, Revision 1 modifies NUREG-1433 (BWR/4) and 
NUREG-1434 (BWR/6) STS. The changes: (1) revise TS testing frequency 
for surveillance requirement (SR) 3.1.3.2 in TS 3.1.3, ``Control Rod 
OPERABILITY,'' (2) clarify the requirement to fully insert all 
insertable control rods for the limiting condition for operation 
(LCO) in TS 3.3.1.2, Required Action E.2, ``Source Range Monitoring 
Instrumentation'' (NUREG-1434 only), and (3) revise Example 1.4-3 in 
Section 1.4 ``Frequency'' to clarify the applicability of the 1.25 
surveillance test interval extension. The consequences of an 
accident after adopting TSTF-475, Revision 1 are no different than 
the consequences of an accident prior to adoption. Therefore, this 
change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) 
or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The 
proposed change will not introduce new failure modes or effects and 
will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an 
accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents 
previously analyzed. Thus, this change does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in [a] Margin of Safety

    TSTF-475, Revision 1 will: (1) [revise the TS SR 3.1.3.2 
frequency in TS 3.1.3, ``Control Rod OPERABILITY,'' (2) clarify the 
requirement to fully insert all insertable control rods for the 
limiting condition for operation (LCO) in TS 3.3.1.2, ``Source Range 
Monitoring Instrumentation,'' and (3)] revise Example 1.4-3 in 
Section 1.4 ``Frequency'' to clarify the applicability of the 1.25 
surveillance test interval extension. [The GE Nuclear Energy Report, 
``CRD Notching Surveillance Testing for Limerick Generating 
Station,'' dated November 2006, concludes that extending the control 
rod notch test interval from weekly to monthly is not expected to 
impact the reliability of the scram system and that the analysis 
supports the decision to change the surveillance frequency.] 
Therefore, the proposed changes in TSTF-475, Revision 1 are 
acceptable and do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mark J. Wetter