Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake Systems, 61512-61557 [E8-22549]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Part 232
[Docket No. FRA–2006–26175, Notice No.
4]
RIN 2130–AB84
Electronically Controlled Pneumatic
Brake Systems
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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AGENCY:
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing revisions to
the regulations governing freight power
brakes and equipment by adding a new
subpart addressing electronically
controlled pneumatic (ECP) brake
systems. The revisions are designed to
provide for and encourage the safe
implementation and use of ECP brake
system technologies. These revisions
contains specific requirements relating
to design, interoperability, training,
inspection, testing, handling defective
equipment, and periodic maintenance
related to ECP brake systems. The final
rule also identifies provisions of the
existing regulations and statutes where
FRA is proposing to provide flexibility
to facilitate the voluntary adoption of
this advanced brake system technology.
DATES: This final rule is effective
December 15, 2008. Petitions for
reconsideration must be received on or
before December 15, 2008. Petitions
received after that date will be
considered to the extent possible
without incurring additional expenses
or delays. The incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed
in the rule is approved by the Director
of the Federal Register as of December
15, 2008.
ADDRESSES: Petitions for
reconsideration: Any petitions for
reconsideration related to Docket No.
FRA–2006–26175, may be submitted by
any of the following methods:
• Web site: The Federal eRulemaking
Portal, https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the Web site’s online
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 202–493–2251.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility,
U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200
New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12–140,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: Room W12–140 on
the Ground level of the West Building,
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m. Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
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Instructions: All submissions must
include the agency name and docket
number or Regulatory Identification
Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. Note
that all petitions received will be posted
without change to https://
www.regulations.gov including any
personal information. Please see the
Privacy Act heading in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document for Privacy Act
information related to any submitted
petitions, comments, or materials.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, go to https://
www.regulations.gov or to Room W12–
140 on the Ground level of the West
Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m. Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
James Wilson, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Motive
Power and Equipment Division, RRS–
14, Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad
Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590
(telephone 202–493–6259); or Jason
Schlosberg, Trial Attorney, Office of
Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal
Railroad Administration, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC
20590 (telephone 202–493–6032).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Since the inception of automatic air
brakes by George Westinghouse in the
1870s, brake signal propagation has
been limited by the nature of air and the
speed of sound. Other adjustments have
sought to alleviate this deficiency, but
have left the basic system unaltered. As
early as 1990, the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) began
investigating more advanced braking
concepts for freight railroads, including
ECP brake systems, which promise to
radically improve brake propagation by
using electrical transmissions of the
braking signal through the train while
still using air pressure in the brake
cylinder to apply the force of the brake
shoe against the wheel. During the past
15 years, ECP brake technology has
progressed rapidly and has been field
tested and used on trains operating in
revenue service by various railroads.
FRA has been an active and consistent
advocate of ECP brake system
implementation. In 1997, FRA
participated in an AAR initiative to
develop ECP brake standards and in
1999, FRA funded, through
Transportation Technology Center, Inc.,
a Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality
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Analysis (FMECA) of ECP brake systems
based on the AAR standards. FRA also
took part in programs to develop and
enhance advanced components for ECP
brake systems.
To further assess the benefits and
costs of ECP brakes for the U.S. rail
freight industry, FRA contracted Booz
Allen Hamilton (BAH) in 2005 to
conduct a study. BAH engaged an expert
panel consisting of principle
stakeholders in ECP brake technology
conversion to participate in the study.
The expert panel made various
conclusions relating to technological
standards, safety, and efficiency. In
addition, the final BAH report provided
a comprehensive analysis and
comparison of ECP and conventional air
brake systems. On August 17, 2006, FRA
announced in a press release its
intention to issue a notice of proposed
rulemaking to revise the federal brake
safety standards to encourage railroads
to invest in and deploy ECP brake
technology. In the press release, FRA
encouraged railroads to submit ECP
brake implementation plans before the
proposed rule changes were completed.
In a petition dated November 15,
2006, and filed November 21, 2006, two
railroads—the BNSF Railway Company
(BNSF) and the Norfolk Southern
Corporation (NS)—jointly requested that
FRA waive various sections in parts 229
and 232 as it relates to those railroads’
operation of ECP brake pilot trains. See
Docket No. FRA–2006–26435. FRA held
a public fact-finding hearing on this
matter on January 16, 2007, featuring
testimony from representatives of the
petitioners, air brake manufacturers, and
labor unions and granted a conditional
waiver on March 21, 2007. See id.
On September 4, 2007, FRA published
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) containing proposed revisions
to the power brake regulation. See 72 FR
50820. In the NPRM, FRA proposed
revisions to the regulations governing
freight power brakes and equipment by
adding a new subpart addressing ECP
brake systems. The proposed revisions
were designed to provide for and
encourage the safe implementation and
use of ECP brake system technologies.
The proposed revisions contained
specific requirements relating to design,
interoperability, training, inspection,
testing, handling defective equipment,
and periodic maintenance related to
ECP brake systems. The proposed rule
also identified provisions of the existing
regulations and statutes where FRA
believed flexibility to facilitate the
introduction of this advanced brake
system technology was necessary.
Following publication of the NPRM in
the Federal Register, FRA held a public
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hearing in Washington, DC on October
4, 2007, and a public hearing in
conjunction with a public technical
roundtable in the Chicago, IL area on
October 19, 2007. The purpose of the
hearings was to receive oral comments
regarding the specific provisions
contained in the proposed rule and to
receive evidence and to develop
findings to determine whether FRA
should invoke its discretionary
authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to
provide a limited exemption from
§ 20303 for freight trains and freight cars
operating with ECP brake systems.
Section 20303 requires operators to
transport rail vehicles with defective or
insecure equipment ‘‘from the place at
which the defect or insecurity was first
discovered to the nearest available place
at which the repairs can be made’’ to
avoid incurring civil penalties related to
such movement.
The hearings were attended by
numerous railroads, organizations
representing railroads, labor
organizations, and brake manufacturers.
Although the comment period officially
closed November 5, 2007, FRA
continued to receive comments on the
NPRM into January 2008. FRA received
substantial oral and written testimony at
the hearings and written comments to
the NPRM from the following
organizations, railroads, and brake
manufacturers, listed in alphabetical
order:
• American Association for Justice
(AAJ).
• Association of American Railroads
(AAR).
• Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers and Trainmen (BLET).
• Brotherhood Railway Carmen
Division, TransportationCommunications International Union
(BRC).
• General Electric Transportation and
General Rail Services (collectively, GE).
• New York Airbrake (NYAB).
• Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS).
• Transport Workers Union of
America, AFL–CIO (TWU).
• Union Pacific Railroad Company
(UP).
• United Transportation Union
(UTU).
• Wabtec Railway Electronics
(Wabtec).
UTU supports and incorporates by
reference the comments submitted by
BLET, TCU, TWU, and its other labor
representatives.
FRA carefully considered all the
information, data and proposals
submitted in relation to Docket No.
FRA–2006–26175 when developing this
final rule. In addition to the preceding
information, FRA’s knowledge and
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experience with enforcing the existing
power brake regulations were also relied
upon when developing this final rule.
FRA will address and summarize all
comments in the section-by-section
analysis below and elsewhere as
appropriate or necessary.
Based on the oral and written
comments submitted at the hearing and
in the docket to this proceeding, FRA
makes the following findings: (1) Safety
is not compromised by allowing a train
operating with ECP brakes and having a
minimal number of ineffective or
inoperative defective brakes to travel to
its destination, not to exceed 3,500
miles, without any additional
intermediate brake inspections; (2) the
safety hazards caused by placing cars
equipped with ECP brakes into a train
with an incompatible brake system are
no different than the hazards caused by
placing a car equipped with
conventional brakes with ineffective or
inoperative brakes into a train operated
with conventional brakes; (3) safety is
not compromised by allowing a train
operated with ECP brakes with at least
85 percent effective and operative
brakes to haul a car with defective nonbrake safety appliances to the nearest or
nearest forward repair location; and (4)
requiring strict compliance with the
movement for repair provision
contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 would
constitute a significant disincentive to
the implementation and use of ECP
brake technologies. Based on these
findings, FRA has elected to utilize its
discretionary authority provided under
49 U.S.C. 20306 to provide a limited
exemption for freight trains and freight
cars operating with ECP brake systems
from the requirements contained in 49
U.S.C. 20303.
Subsequent to the close of the
comment period in this proceeding,
AAR modified two of its existing ECP
brake standards, S–4200 and S–4210,
and continued to develop standards
regarding hardware and software
configuration management issues for
ECP brake systems. AAR sought
comments from its members concerning
a proposed standard S–4270 addressing
the configuration management issues.
As FRA is interested in incorporating by
reference the most current standards
into the final rule, FRA reopened the
comment period on April 18, 2008, for
an additional fifteen (15) days for the
limited purpose of receiving comments
on revised standards S–4200 and S–
4210 and newly developed draft S–
4270. FRA continues to believe that
reopening the comment period was the
most efficient method of ensuring that
the most current industry standards
were included in this final rule.
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The NPRM and this subsequent notice
indicated that FRA intended to include
S–4270 in the final rule if it was
finalized by AAR with sufficient time
for inclusion and if its final version
remained substantially similar to the
draft standard reference in the notice
reopening the comment periods.
Ultimately, AAR adopted S–4270
without any changes.
II. Conventional Brake Operations
While the basic operational concept of
the automatic air brake system,
originally conceived by George
Westinghouse in the 1870s, remains the
same, it has seen continuous
improvement in practice. An air
compressor in the locomotive charges a
main reservoir to about 140 pounds per
square inch (psi). With controls located
in the locomotive, the locomotive
engineer uses the main reservoir to
charge the brake pipe—a 11⁄4 inch
diameter pipe—that runs the length of
the train and is connected between cars
with hoses. The brake pipe’s
compressed air—used as the
communication medium to signal brake
operations and the power source for
braking action—then charges each car’s
two-compartment reservoir to a pressure
of 90 psi. Braking occurs through a
reduction of air pressure in the brake
pipe, which signals the valves on each
car to direct compressed air from the
reservoir on each car to its respective
brake cylinder for an application of
brakes. When air pressure is supplied to
the brake cylinder—which is connected
to a series of rods and levers that apply
and release the brakes—the resulting
force presses the brake shoes against the
wheel, retarding the car’s speed.
While brake applications were
initially directed by George
Westinghouse’s triple valve, modern
applications use a control valve, which
directs air from the brake pipe into the
air reservoir when air pressure is rising
in the brake pipe in order to charge the
auxiliary and emergency reservoir and
be ready for a brake application. To
perform a brake application, the
locomotive automatic brake valve
reduces air pressure in the brake pipe by
exhausting air, causing the car’s control
valve to direct air from the auxiliary
reservoir into the brake cylinder. The
increase in air pressure to the brake
cylinder is approximately 21⁄2 times the
drop in brake pipe pressure. A 26 psi
reduction in brake pipe pressure is
equal to a full service brake application
on a fully charged brake pipe, and
should result in a brake cylinder
pressure adequate to achieve a full
service braking effort (brake force).
While the control valve is directing air
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into the brake cylinder, or holding air in
the brake cylinder, it is unable to
recharge the auxiliary reservoir on each
car. The engineer can apply the brakes
in increments, of a few psi at a time, go
directly to a full service application, or
initiate an emergency application of the
brakes.
Unlike a brake application, the
incremental release of brakes on a
typical freight train operating in direct
release cannot be accomplished. Brakes
can only be fully released, called a
direct release, and only with the brakes
released can the auxiliary reservoirs
then begin to recharge. Brake
applications are possible, but are more
complicated, from undercharged brake
pipe and air reservoirs. Recharging takes
more time for a longer train, because the
air has to be sent down the length of the
train’s brake pipe—which can be up to
a mile and a half. In addition, on
extremely long trains, it is often difficult
to fully charge the brake pipe due to
small air leaks throughout the brake
pipe and cold weather.
Brake pipe pressure can be measured
by an end-of-train (EOT) device, which
is pneumatically connected to the rear
of a train equipped with conventional
pneumatic brakes and sends signals
(EOT Beacon) via radio indicating the
brake pipe pressure to the lead
locomotive. Current Federal regulations
specify the design and performance
standards for both one-way and twoway EOT devices. See Part 232, subpart
E. Both EOT device designs comprise of
a rear unit pneumatically connected to
the rear of the train’s last car that
transmits an EOT Beacon to a an EOT
Head End Unit—a device located in the
cab of the lead locomotive displaying
the brake pipe pressure of the rear car
to the locomotive engineer. The twoway EOT device also has the capability
to transmit an electronic signal from the
locomotive to the rear end unit to
initiate an emergency brake application
by venting brake pipe pressure to
atmosphere at the rear end unit.
An emergency brake application can
be initiated in several ways. The
locomotive engineer can initiate the
application by moving the brake handle
to the emergency position, which
depletes brake pipe pressure to zero at
a faster rate than the service application
by exhausting brake pipe air pressure at
the locomotive. Emergency brake
applications can also be initiated by
opening the conductor’s valve, located
in the cab of the locomotive, or by a
break-in-two, where the train separates
between cars and the brake pipe hoses
separate, thereby venting brake pipe
pressure to zero. While performing an
emergency brake application from the
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locomotive, a locomotive engineer can
also use the two-way EOT device to
initiate an emergency brake application
at the rear of the train. This permits the
emergency application to be
simultaneously initiated from both the
front and rear of the trains and ensures
that the brakes on the cars at the rear of
the train apply in the event a brake pipe
blockage occurs.
III. ECP Brake Operations
As early as 1990, AAR began
investigating a more advanced braking
concept for freight railroads, the ECP
brake system. The ECP brake system
radically improves the operation of the
automatic air brake by using electrical
transmissions to signal the application
and release of brakes on each car in a
train while still using compressed air to
supply the air reservoirs on each car,
which will be used to pressurize the
brake cylinders to apply the force of the
brake shoes against the wheels. ECP
brakes also greatly simplify the brake
system by eliminating multiple
pneumatic valves used by conventional
brakes and replacing them with printed
circuit boards, each with a
microprocessor, one electrically
activated application valve, and one
electrically activated release valve, with
feedback on brake cylinder pressure for
uniform control.
ECP brake technology requires
equipping locomotives and cars with
special valves and electronic equipment
that are unique to the operation of ECP
brakes. While this system still requires
a brake pipe to supply compressed air
from the locomotive to each car’s
reservoir in a train, there are currently
two known methods to send the
electronic signal for ECP brake
operations from the locomotive to each
car in the train. These methods include
using a hard wire electrical cable
running the length of the train or a
radio-based technology requiring a
transmitter and a receiver installed on
the cars and locomotives. At this time,
it appears that the railroad industry has
chosen to use a cable-based system for
ECP brake operation.
ECP brake systems still employ the
automatic air brake system’s basic
concept where the locomotive supplies
compressed air to each car’s reservoir
via the conventional brake pipe. Each
car’s brake valve reacts to a signal to
apply the brakes by directing
compressed air from the car’s reservoir
to the brake cylinder or to release the
brakes by releasing air from the brake
cylinder. The similarities between the
conventional pneumatic and ECP brake
systems end here. Instead of utilizing
reductions and increases of the brake
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pipe pressure to convey application and
release signals to each car in the train,
ECP brake technology uses electronic
signals, resulting in an almost
instantaneous application and release of
brakes on each car in the entire train.
Since the brake pipe pressure no longer
serves as the communication medium in
ECP braked trains, the brake pipe is
constantly being supplied or charged
with compressed air from the
locomotive regardless of whether the
brakes are applied or released. In
addition, ECP brake-equipped trains
offer graduated release, where a partial
brake release command provides a
partial, proportional brake release.
The basic ECP brake system is
controlled from the Head End Unit
(HEU) and each car is equipped with a
Car Control Device (CCD), an electronic
control device that replaces the function
of the conventional pneumatic control
valve. The CCD acknowledges and
interprets the electronic signals from the
HEU and controls the car’s service and
emergency braking functions. The CCD
controls charging the car’s air reservoir
and also has diagnostic capabilities to
send a warning signal to the locomotive
in the event any component fails to
appropriately respond to a braking
command. Each CCD has a unique
electronic address located in the Car ID
Module, which is keyed to a car’s
reporting mark and number.
Each car connects to the locomotive
via special connectors and junction
boxes. More specifically, an ECP brakeequipped train’s train line cable—a twoconductor electric cable (#8 A–WG and
a shield)—connects the locomotive and
cars and carries train line power to
operate all CCDs and the ECP brake
system’s end-of-train (ECP–EOT) device
and communicates network signals via
the power voltage. A Power Supply
Controller (PSC)—mounted within the
locomotive and providing 230 VDC of
electricity—interfaces with the train line
cable’s communication network,
provides power to all connected CCDs
and ECP–EOT devices, and controls the
train line power supply as commanded
by the HEU. Under the AAR standards,
a single power supply shall be capable
of supplying power to an ECP brakeequipped train consisting of at least 160
CCDs and an ECP–EOT device.
Under the existing regulations, the
conventional pneumatic brake system’s
EOT device can lose communication for
16 minutes and 30 seconds before the
locomotive engineer is alerted. See 49
CFR 232.407(g). After the message is
displayed, the engineer must restrict the
speed of the train to 30 mph or stop the
train if a defined heavy grade is
involved. Per the regulations, railroads
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must calibrate each conventional twoway EOT device every 365 days and
incur additional maintenance and cost
expenses while replacing its batteries.
By contrast, an ECP–EOT device
uniquely monitors both brake pipe
pressure and operating voltages and
sends an EOT Beacon every second from
its rear unit to its HEU on the
controlling locomotive. The HEU will
initiate a full service brake application
should brake pipe pressure fall below 50
psi or initiate an emergency brake
application should a communication
loss occur for five consecutive seconds
or if there is a break in the train line
electrical cable. An ECP–EOT device
does not require calibration and its
battery, only a back-up for the
computer, is charged by the train line
cable and is much lighter in weight than
the conventional EOT device battery.
Physically the last network node in the
train, the ECP–EOT device also contains
an electronic train line cable circuit—a
50 ohm resistor in series with 0.47
micro-farad capacitor—and must be
connected to the network and transmit
status messages to the HEU before the
train line cable can be initially powered.
ECP brake systems have the great
advantage of real-time monitoring of the
brake system’s health. In normal
operation, the HEU transmits a message/
status down the train line cable to each
car. If an individual car’s brakes do not
respond properly to the HEU’s brake
command, or if air pressures are not
within the specified limits for operation,
a message indicating the problem and
the applicable car number is sent back
to the HEU, which in turn notifies the
locomotive engineer of the problem. The
ECP brake system can identify various
faults, including, but not limited to: low
brake pipe pressure; low reservoir
pressure; low train line cable voltage;
low battery charge; incorrect brake
cylinder pressure; and offline or
inoperative CCDs.
Emergency or full service brake
applications automatically occur when
the ECP brake system’s software detects
certain faults. For instance, if the HEU
detects that the percentage of operative
brakes falls below 85 percent, a full
service brake application will
automatically occur. In addition, the
brakes will automatically apply when
the following occurs: (1) Two CCD’s or
the ECP–EOT report a ‘‘Critical Loss’’
within 5 seconds; (2) the train line cable
indicates low voltage with less than 90
percent operative brakes; (3) the ECP–
EOT reports a low battery charge; (4) the
train moves during set-up; (5) the train
line cable becomes disconnected; or (6)
the train exceeds 20 mph in Switch
Mode. Under the AAR standards, the
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ECP brake system shall also have a
pneumatic back-up system on each car
for an emergency brake application in
the event of a vented brake pipe or a
train separation. These features preserve
and exceed the fail safe features of
conventional pneumatic brake systems.
IV. Interoperability
Due to control methodology
differences, ECP brake systems are not
functionally compatible with
conventional pneumatic air brake
systems. For instance, while
conventional pneumatic air brake
systems command a brake application
by reducing the air pressure in the brake
pipe, ECP brake systems command a
brake application through a digital
communications link transmitted on the
electrical train line cable.
Manufacturers have developed
application strategies to address issues
relating to car and locomotive fleet
interchangeability. In particular, they
have proposed three major schemes of
ECP brake design: stand-alone systems
using only ECP brakes; overlay (dual
mode) systems capable of operating in
either conventional or ECP brake mode;
and emulation systems, also capable of
operating in either conventional or ECP
brake mode.
Since cars with stand-alone ECP brake
systems do not include a fully
pneumatic brake control valve, they are
incompatible with conventionally
braked cars and must be operated in
train sets depending solely upon ECP
brakes. Cars using stand-alone ECP
brake systems cannot intermix in the
same train with cars using conventional
pneumatic brakes unless (1) the train
uses ECP brakes and those cars using
conventional pneumatic brakes are
transported as cars with inoperative
brakes or (2) the train uses conventional
pneumatic brakes and the cars using
ECP brakes are transported as cars with
inoperative brakes. While the standalone ECP brake system is the least
expensive alternative of the three design
types, its incompatibility with
conventional pneumatic brake systems
requires train segregation, potentially
posing significant operational problems
until the entire car fleet is converted to
ECP brakes.
Overlay configurations—cars
equipped with both ECP CCDs and
conventional pneumatic control valve
portions—allow cars to operate with
either ECP or conventional pneumatic
brakes. To operate in ECP brake mode,
compatible ECP equipment must be
installed on the locomotive as well as
on the freight car. While an overlay
system’s dual mode capability provides
significant flexibility, railroad operators
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must purchase, install, and maintain
equipment to support both types of
brake systems for as long as dual mode
capability is required.
Emulation configurations use a CCD
capable of operating in either ECP or
conventional mode without requiring
conventional pneumatic controls. One
manufacturer has provided an
emulation ECP brake valve that
monitors both the digital
communications cable and the brake
pipe for a brake command. If an
electrical signal is present, the ECP
brake valve operates in ECP brake mode.
If the electrical brake command signal is
not present, then the valve will monitor
the changes in the brake pipe pressure
like a conventional pneumatic control
valve and the CCD will use a software
program to emulate the function and
response of a conventional pneumatic
valve. An emulation ECP brake system
can be operated in any train with any
mix of emulation ECP and conventional
brake systems. In a mixed train, the
emulation ECP brake system will
monitor the brake pipe for pressure
changes and set up brake cylinder
pressure like a conventional pneumatic
valve.
In the NPRM, FRA did not propose
any rules uniquely regulating trains or
cars equipped with emulation ECP
brake systems, but sought comments on
whether or how it should regulate such
systems differently than what was
proposed. According to NYAB and
Wabtec (collectively, the brake
manufacturers), the current AAR
standards do not require a pneumatic
emulation mode, and this function
should not be subject to FRA regulation.
In the event future releases of the S–
4200 specifications add pneumatic
emulation as a requirement, the brake
manufacturers suggest that the need for
FRA regulation can be addressed at that
time. FRA concurs and the final rule
does not include regulations uniquely
affecting emulation ECP brake systems.
Manufacturers have also addressed
ECP brake compatibility with
locomotives equipped with
conventional pneumatic brakes, which
must be equipped with an HEU unit to
operate the brakes on cars equipped
with ECP brakes. For instance, one
manufacturer has developed a portable
unit that will allow a locomotive lacking
an ECP brake HEU to operate a train
equipped with ECP brakes by converting
the air pressure changes in the brake
pipe to digital command signals that are
transmitted to the freight cars through
the electrical train line cable. The
locomotive engineer operates the brakes
with the conventional automatic brake
valve in the control cab. The brakes,
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however, will respond instantaneously
and provide all of the benefits of an ECP
brake system. While FRA recognizes
that the technology for such a portable
unit is in development and may provide
a possible solution to the technological
transition, it is not addressed or
authorized by this final rule and the
incorporated AAR standards.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES3
V. Advantages of ECP Brakes Over
Conventional Pneumatic Brakes
ECP brake technology overcomes
many of the physical limitations
inherent in conventional pneumatic
brake technology. Field testing of AAR
compliant ECP brake systems over the
past decade has not revealed any
indication of a catastrophic event that
could be caused by an ECP brake system
malfunctioning. With a high level of
confidence, the ECP brake stake holders
support the implementation of ECP
brake systems on the Nation’s railroads.
FRA concludes that the advantages of
ECP brake technology will significantly
improve the safety and the performance
of train operations. Examples of such
benefits include better train handling
through simultaneous brake
applications, continuous brake pipe
charging, and graduated brake
operation. Derailments are expected to
decline significantly. ECP brake benefits
also include electronic train
management, improved performance,
and real time diagnostics of the train’s
brake system.
A. Simultaneous Brake Application
The conventional pneumatic brake
system uses compressed air as the
source for braking power and as the
medium for communicating brake
application and release commands and
communicates the brake commands by
changing brake pipe pressure through
the use of the locomotive’s automatic
brake valve. These commands begin at
the front of the train and propagate to
the rear of the train at the speed of the
air pressure moving from car to car. This
slow propagation of the brake command
contributes to uneven braking, excessive
in-train and run-in forces, train
handling challenges, longer stopping
distances, safety risks of prematurely
depleting air brake reservoirs, and a
corresponding low brake rate until all
cars in the train receive and fully
respond to the brake command. FRA
recognizes that the slow application and
release of brakes in a train, causes
excessive in-train forces, which have the
potential to cause derailments when
they occur in curves, cross-overs, or
when heavier cars are placed at the rear
of the train or after empty cars. When
the brakes on the rear of the train release
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much more slowly than the brakes on
the front of the train, the potential for
a ‘‘string-line’’ derailment—where the
train stretches out until one or more
wheels are lifted off the inside rail of a
curve—increases.
The ECP brake system reduces these
problems by enabling cars to brake
simultaneously at the command of an
electronic signal. The electronic signal’s
speed ensures an instantaneous,
simultaneous, and even activation of
each car’s brake valves, significantly
reducing braking distances—40 to 60
percent for the longest trains—and
minimizing the consequences of
collisions or derailments by reducing
the collision speed and slowing the nonderailed portion of the train.
release brake application with a
conventional pneumatic brake system,
braking effort can be increased but not
decreased without fully releasing the
brakes. In many cases, direct release
leads to unnecessary train stops or
insufficient initial brake applications.
ECP brake systems overcome this
deficiency by operating in graduated
release, which enables the operator to
reduce braking effort to a lower level
after making a brake application without
fully releasing the brakes. As a result,
the operator can accurately adjust the
braking level as each situation requires,
eliminating the stops required to
recharge and reset the brakes after
excessive brake applications and prior
to negotiating hills and valleys.
B. Continuous Brake Pipe Charging
Propagating a brake command signal
through the reduction or increase of air
pressure in the brake pipe represents a
significant limitation of conventional
pneumatic brakes. The same brake pipe
air used to propagate brake commands
also charges reservoirs on each freight
car. As a result, the brake pipe must be
fully charged to restore full braking
capacity to depleted reservoirs. Partially
depleted air from the brake pipe, which
occurs during the initial stage of
braking, prohibits repeat applications of
brakes until the brake pipe can be
recharged. A brake pipe can only be
recharged once the brakes have been
fully released. This characteristic of
conventional pneumatic brakes
contributes to the risk of run-away
trains caused by prematurely depleted
brake pipe pressure, particularly on
steep grades.
The ECP brake system reduces this
risk by continuously charging the brake
pipe. Since ECP brakes do not use the
brake pipe as a brake command
medium, the brake pipe is constantly
being charged, allowing the locomotive
engineer to operate the brake system
more aggressively. With ECP brake
systems, it is unnecessary to apply hand
brakes on steep grades to recharge the
brake pipe after the train stops on the
grade.
D. Train Management
The use of a train line cable allows
real-time self-diagnostic functions to be
incorporated in the brake system. The
initial check of brake system conditions
on each car and continuous monitoring
of each car’s braking functions provides
immediate communication to the
locomotive engineer of certain brake
failures. The continuous monitoring of
each car’s braking functions and realtime diagnostics of the train’s brake
system is a significant advantage to the
locomotive engineer for the operation of
the train. These technical benefits also
justify elimination of some of the
currently required physical inspections
of the train’s brake system and support
regulatory change to operate cars with
non-functioning brakes out of the initial
terminal. When the ECP brake system
diagnostics detect a serious problem,
including when the brake pipe pressure
falls below 50 psi, the ECP brake system
will automatically command a penalty
brake application. ECP brake systems
also eliminate the conventional
pneumatic brake system’s inability to
apply all brakes in the train when there
is a blockage in the brake pipe, which
is handled through the use of a two-way
EOT telemetry device not required by
all trains. This failure will not affect
brake applications in ECP brake
systems, because each car is provided a
braking command through a train line
cable, not solely through the reduction
of brake pipe pressure, which would not
be propagated through the consist if the
brake pipe is blocked. Therefore, ECP
brake systems incorporate features that
make them inherently safer than
conventional pneumatic brakes. Using
sensor-based technology to maintain a
continuous feedback loop on train
condition for the crew and any
centralized monitoring, the electrical
communication cable network can also
serve as a platform for the gradual
C. Graduated Brake Application and
Release
The conventional pneumatic brake
system’s inability to operate freight
trains in graduated release has long
hampered train operations and has
increased fuel consumption. The
conventional pneumatic brake system
can only operate in direct release,
preventing locomotive engineers from
reducing the braking effort without
completely releasing and resetting the
brakes. In other words, after a direct
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addition of other train performance
monitoring and management controls,
including distributed power locomotive
control, hand brake on/off detection
system, automatic activation and release
of hand brakes, hot bearing detection,
and truck oscillation and vibration.
These and other train management
features will increase the reliability and
overall safety of train operations.
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E. Improved Performance
Ultimately, ECP brake technology also
provides improved performance, which
will contribute to safer train operations
and significant cost savings over time.
Since trains operated with ECP brakes
can operate in graduated release, instead
of direct release, fuel will not be wasted
while pulling trains against a heavy
brake application. Further, because all
of the cars’ ECP brakes release
simultaneously, fuel will not be wasted
on initial start-ups and power-ups after
a brake release.
Operations utilizing ECP brake
systems also promise increased average
train speeds and decreased trip times.
ECP brake systems allow the locomotive
engineer to modulate the brake
applications in territories with
descending grades, thus increasing
overall trip average speeds and reaching
destinations sooner. While the slow
release of the rear cars’ brakes on
conventional pneumatic braked trains
cause drag, the brakes on ECP brakeequipped trains release simultaneously,
improving start-up and acceleration
times. Further, due to their shorter
stopping distances, trains equipped
solely with ECP brake systems may
potentially permit higher train speeds
within existing signal spacing, which
will increase average system velocity, or
permit use of shorter ‘‘blocks’’ between
signals, facilitating greater system
capacity.
The instantaneous application and
release of ECP brakes will result in more
uniform braking, thus improving wheel
wear and increasing brake shoe life. In
a conventional pneumatically braked
train, the brake pipe gradient and slower
response time causes the first third of
the train’s cars to provide the majority
of the braking action, thus applying
additional pressure and heat on those
cars’ wheels. Since ECP brake systems
provide instantaneous braking on all
cars, such pressure will be more
uniformly distributed along the train,
thus eliminating the uneven braking
force on the wheels of those leading
cars. The ECP brake system also selfmonitors each car’s brake cylinder
pressure and maintains the prescribed
pressure, thus reducing the potential for
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creating shelling and flat spots on
wheels.
Due to minimized wheel defects, and
their accompanying vibrations, freight
cars and brake components will enjoy
increased life. Further, instantaneous
braking will also prevent draft gear
assemblies from receiving the constant
pressure caused by trains equipped with
conventional pneumatic brake systems
and will reduce lading damage by
eliminating slack action and in-train
forces caused by uneven braking. ECP
brake systems will also reduce the
number of brake parts and rubber
diaphragms required by conventional
pneumatic brake systems.
VI. Standards, Approval, and Testing
During the past 18 years, FRA has
monitored the progression of ECP brake
technology and has observed field
testing on various revenue trains, both
freight and passenger. In 1997, FRA
participated in an AAR initiative to
develop ECP brake standards and in
1999, FRA funded, through the
Transportation Technology Center, Inc.,
a FMECA of the ECP brake system based
on AAR’s Standards and Recommended
Practices, S–4200 Series. FRA also
participated in programs to develop and
enhance advanced components for ECP
brake systems. After all of these efforts,
FRA has determined that the AAR S–
4200 Series of standards are appropriate
substantively and legally for
incorporation by reference in this rule
and that the AAR Air Brake Systems
Committee is an appropriate vehicle to
rely upon in the implementation of ECP
brake technology for this rule. FRA
acknowledges that ECP brakes are an
attractive, viable, and enabling
technology with the potential to
substantially improve the operational
efficiency of trains and that by
complying with AAR Standard S–4200,
ECP braked trains offer significant safety
and efficiency benefits in freight train
handling, car maintenance, fuel savings,
network capacity, self-monitoring, and
fail-safe operation.
AAR administers the existing industry
ECP brake standards through its Air
Brake Systems Committee—consisting
of representatives from the major
railroads, brake manufacturers, and
FRA—which requires demonstrated
proof of compatibility, safety, and
reliability of air brake systems to receive
AAR approval. FRA is satisfied that the
existing AAR S–4200 Series
specifications, AAR approval
procedures, and continuing oversight by
the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee
will best ensure the safety and
reliability of ECP brake systems. An ECP
brake monitoring system complying
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with AAR Standard S–4200 Series
increases safety by communicating
information on the location and
quantity of defective equipment and by
providing for the safe movement of
equipment over longer distances and
periods of time.
A. AAR Standards and Approval
Process
In order to assure the safety and the
interoperability of ECP brake system
designs, AAR developed the S–4200
Series of standards. The first five
standards (S–4200, S–4210, S–4220, S–
4230, and S–4250)—issued in 1999 and
updated in 2002, 2004, 2006, and
2007—specify the functional,
operational, and interface requirements
for cable-based ECP brake systems. AAR
issued two additional standards in
January 2007, specifying ECP brake
equipment approval procedures (S–
4240) and interoperability testing
requirements (S–4260). In April 2008,
AAR issued a standard for hardware and
software configuration management
plans (S–4270). At this time, AAR has
not completed specifications for radiobased ECP brakes, which it considers
technically immature and unsuitable.
The purposes of the standards are to
ensure that AAR-approved electronic
brake systems are interoperable between
different manufacturers and meet high
standards of safety and reliability. The
analysis of the S–4200 Series of
standards indicates that the
performance specifications for the cablebased ECP brake concept are complete.
The AAR Manual of Standards and
Recommended Practices (MSRP)
contain the following standards for
cable-based ECP brake systems:
• S–4200, ECP Cable-Based Brake
Systems—Performance requirements;
• S–4210, ECP Cable-Based Brake
System Cable, Connectors, and
Junctions Boxes—Performance
Specifications;
• S–4220, ECP Cable-Based Brake DC
Power Supply—Performance
Specification;
• S–4230, Intratrain Communication
Specification for Cable-Based Freight
Train Control System;
• S–4240, ECP Brake Equipment—
Approval Procedure;
• S–4250, Performance Requirements
for ITC Controlled Cable-Based
Distributed Power Systems;
• S–4260, ECP Brake and Wire
Distributed Power Interoperability Test
Procedures; and
• S–4270, ECP Brake System
Configuration Management.
Standard S–4200 ensures that the
functionality and performance of freight
ECP brake systems are uniform and
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consistent among equipment from
different manufacturers, that cars
equipped with AAR-approved ECP
brake systems from different
manufacturers are interoperable, and
that AAR-approved electronic brake
systems meet a high standard of safety
and reliability. This standard defines
ECP brake system elements, specifies
their functionality in different
implementation schemes—such as
stand-alone, overlays, and emulators—
and sets the requirements for all system
functions. It covers all primary
functions of ECP brakes, including
graduated brake application and
releases, continuous reservoir charging,
adjustment of braking level to car load,
continuous fault detection, equipment
status monitoring, and pneumatic
backup. It also specifies requirements
for all modes of train operation and
provides an extensive description of
fault response and recovery functions
for all possible faults of the system
components. The standard also
establishes environmental requirements
for the designed systems, in-service
testing, and rigorous approval
procedures for the certification process
of new ECP brake equipment.
Other standards in the AAR S–4200
Series contain requirements for critical
ECP brake system components and
communication protocols. Standard S–
4210 contains the performance
specifications and qualification test
procedures for ECP brake system cables,
connectors, and end-of-car junction
boxes. The required testing verifies that
the designed components have high
reliability, will withstand harsh
environmental conditions, and will
have at least an 8-year operating life.
Standard S–4220 contains
performance specifications for the DC
power supply system through the hardwired train line cable for ECP brake
controllers and other electronic freight
car components. Since a DC power
supply conductor will also send
communication control commands
between a locomotive and its attached
cars, the standard requires reliable
separation and absence of interference
between the DC power supply and the
communication circuits.
Standard S–4230 contains the
requirements related to intra-train
communication systems on freight
equipment used in revenue interchange
service. The standard facilitates
interoperability between freight cars and
locomotives without limiting the
proprietary design approaches used by
individual suppliers. The
communication protocol was developed
for control of ECP brakes and multiple
remote units, including distributed
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power locomotives, and for safety
reporting of various car and locomotive
components.
Standard S–4250 contains the
methodology and communication flow
requirements for controlling the
operation of multiple locomotives in a
freight consist through the intra-train
communication network that is shared
with ECP brake system. The locomotive
control through the intra-train
communication line is an alternative
method of locomotive control, which
was not available before the
introduction of ECP brake system
technology. The controlled locomotives
can either trail a lead locomotive or be
distributed (i.e., separated by cars) in a
train. The standard establishes protocols
for different types of locomotive
controls through the intra-train line
cable, depending on the location of the
consist’s multiple locomotives. While
the current means of controlling
‘‘distributed power’’ is performed
through radio control—which is
susceptible to a loss of communication
and is not ‘‘fail safe’’ in operation—
locomotives operated with ECP brake
systems can be relied upon to function
as commanded in real time and
automatically apply the brakes in the
event of a communication loss.
Standard S–4260 contains the test
procedures that must be completed by
ECP brake manufacturers to establish
interoperability baselines among ECP
brake and wire distributed power (WDP)
systems in compliance with the S–4200
standards series. The test procedures
validate the functional interoperability
of ECP brake and WDP systems
developed by different manufacturers.
Standard S–4270 defines the
procedures for managing the software
and hardware configuration for AARapproved ECP brake systems.
The AAR approval process and the
work of the Air Brake Systems
Committee has been the primary
method of ensuring the safety and
reliability of railroad brake systems and
components for decades. Through its
participation on the Air Brake Systems
Committee, FRA can monitor any safety
or reliability issues that may develop
with ECP brake systems. In the event of
a serious safety issue with a supplier’s
ECP brake system, FRA can
appropriately respond by invoking its
authority to intervene with additional
rulemaking or an emergency order. FRA
does not expect to use this authority,
because the AAR Air Brake Systems
Committee already has the authority to
rescind AAR approval for brake systems
that do not perform safely or reliably.
Standard S–4240 contains the
acceptance procedure for seeking AAR
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approval of ECP brake equipment. The
standard requires a manufacturer to
apply for approval by submitting certain
information under Administrative
Standard S–060. Following review and
approval of the initial application data
and test plan by the AAR Air Brake
Systems Committee, a manufacturer
maintains the burden of establishing
compliance with Standards S–4200, S–
4210, S–4220, S–4230, S–4250, S–4260,
and S–4270 to obtain conditional
approval.
For laboratory testing, an AAR
representative will select 150 CCDs from
a lot of 200 and will select HEUs, train
power supplying units (TPSs), and ECP–
EOTs from lots of four each. The testing
will be performed on a 150-car test rack
configured in accordance with AAR
specifications. The manufacturer will
provide for AAR evaluation of the test
results, which shall include a
requirements traceability and
compliance matrix for each AAR
standard and all necessary test reports,
and then conduct interoperability
laboratory testing between new ECP
brake equipment and AAR-approved
ECP brake equipment in accordance
with standard S–4260.
Upon satisfactory completion of the
aforementioned laboratory tests, AAR
will consider conditional approval for
field testing of ECP brake equipment. If
conditional approval is granted, 150
ECP brake CCDs shall be selected from
a production lot of 200 test-approved
CCDs, and 100 of those selected, plus at
least two ECP brake-equipped
locomotives and one ECP–EOT device,
must be placed in railroad service for 24
months. Under conditional approval, at
least 1,000 cars must be allotted for use.
Within those 24 months, all in-service
tests must be conducted. After those 24
months, the Air Brake Systems
Committee continues to monitor the
product for reliability and safety
concerns. If a problem with any brake
component is discovered, the
Committee will discuss the issue and
may either demand further tests or
withdraw AAR approval.
Full AAR approval shall be provided
after 4 years if during that time a
manufacturer furnishes AAR at
specified intervals various service
reports, which must include accurate
ECP brake equipment malfunction
records. FRA agrees with AAR’s
assessment that 4 years are needed to
collect a history of reliable data with
minimum failures. In addition, the
manufacturer must provide to AAR a
semiannual report containing any repair
material for the test ECP brake
equipment. Under the standard, AAR
reserves the right to withdraw
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conditional test approval if it
determines that safety is impaired,
reliability degrades, or incompatibility
of ECP brake operation develops, and
may require any additional testing or
performance evaluations it deems
necessary. Standard S–4240 also
contains specific procedures that must
be followed when a manufacturer
intends to change certain ECP brake
equipment physical characteristics,
software, or electronics.
FRA supports this effort as a timely
measure for AAR to strengthen the
regulatory package for ECP brake
systems. Overall, FRA considers AAR
approval a valuable step to ensure the
reliability and safety of ECP brake
systems and a minimum requirement for
initial application of ECP brake systems
on the Nation’s railroads. However, FRA
fully intends to monitor the application
and safety of ECP and may, at its
discretion, require additional safety
analysis to be performed to confirm the
safety of ECP brake systems installed
and operating in revenue service. FRA
reserves the right to witness the AAR
approval testing of the product.
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B. FMECA
AAR Standard S–4200 Series was
developed to support the design of a
safer, more reliable ECP braking system
when compared with conventional air
brakes. Once the standard was created,
the railroad industry identified the need
to perform a safety and reliability
assessment of an ECP brake system built
in accordance with this standard. Since
actual S–4200 Series compliant ECP
brake systems did not yet exist, the
industry decided to conduct a FMECA
for a hypothetical ECP brake system that
satisfied all the requirements of the
standard. At FRA’s insistence, the
FMECA on AAR Standard S–4200 was
performed in 1999 by DEL Engineering
with participation of AAR, FRA and a
number of experts with significant
experience in the development and
application of ECP brake systems.
The FMECA team began the analysis
by identifying all major ECP brake
system components and their intended
functions. The analysis examined each
component and function and identified
associated failure modes and effects.
The failure modes were analyzed to
determine severity, frequency of
occurrence, and effectiveness of
detection. The FMECA team created a
numeric ranking criterion and
determined and prioritized the level of
risk posed by each failure mode. Highrisk failure modes were identified and
appropriate mitigation strategies were
developed to decrease the risk.
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The FMECA team analyzed the failure
modes of all ECP brake components,
including: CCDs with the battery; HEUs
on the head locomotive; ECP–EOT
devices; train line cables,
communication and power supplies;
power supply controllers; head end line
terminators; car ID modules; locomotive
ID modules; and operative brakes. The
analysis included different types of ECP
brake systems, including stand alone,
overlay (dual mode), and emulator and
all system functional requirements and
operating modes, including
Initialization, Switch, Run, and Cut-out.
The FMECA failure log contained about
1,500 failure modes. For each high-risk
failure mode, the FMECA team
identified action items and offered
recommendations on how to mitigate
the consequences of component failures
or system functional failures. The team
primarily examined single-point failures
but also identified and evaluated some
cases of combined failures that had
significant safety consequences.
The FMECA results confirmed that
the ECP brake concept offers the
potential for improved performance,
reliability, and safety over that of
conventional pneumatic brake systems.
The FMECA concluded that no failure
mode of an AAR-compliant ECP brake
system exists that can cause a
catastrophic accident due to singlepoint failure of the system itself. The
AAR standards, as written, eliminate or
mitigate critical outcomes of singlepoint failure of ECP brake systems.
The FMECA team encouraged
manufacturers to pursue ECP brake
technology, because the potential safety
and efficiency benefits will far outweigh
any disadvantages. If designed and
maintained properly, ECP brakes will be
substantially safer and more reliable
than the conventional pneumatic brake
system they are intended to replace.
AAR and the brake manufacturers
indicated that they were completely
satisfied that ECP brake systems are
significantly safer than conventional
pneumatic systems. They accepted the
results of the FMECA and concluded
that no modifications were necessary to
the AAR standards related to ECP brake
systems.
VII. Market Maturity and
Implementation
The U.S. market for ECP brake
systems is mature enough to begin
implementation of ECP brake
technology. The equipment
manufacturers have made a significant
investment in the technology and have
completed the preliminary design work
and field testing of ECP brakes. For
instance, they have provided technical
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solutions for different ECP brake
implementation strategies, enabling
non-ECP and ECP brake-equipped cars
to run in combined trains and, in some
cases, allowing ECP brake-equipped
freight cars to run in ECP brake mode
using locomotives with conventional
pneumatic brake systems. In addition,
they are ready to supply fully
operational stand-alone ECP brake
systems, overlays, and emulators for the
U.S. market, easing the industry’s
migration process. A commitment by
the railroad industry to change over to
ECP brakes is necessary to inspire
additional technological initiatives by
the manufacturers.
ECP brake systems from the main U.S.
manufacturers—all in different stages of
AAR approval and testing in revenue
service—have been built with the
intention of complying with the AAR S–
4200 Series of standards, proven safe
through field testing, designed using
fail-safe principles, and accommodated
the industry’s need for different
implementation schemes. The AAR S–
4200 Series standards are intended to
assure the necessary level of safety,
reliability, interoperability, and
ultimately the applicability of this
equipment in the U.S. market. The
equipment of existing ECP brake
manufacturers incorporates the
conventional pneumatic emergency
brake system as a backup in case of
failure of the ECP brake control. In most
cases, ECP brake systems will support
enhanced safety even if the electronics
fail, because continuous recharging of
the brake pipe will ensure availability of
an emergency application. Therefore,
the ECP brake system reduces the risk
caused by depleted air in the case of an
emergency. There is no instance or
record of a malfunctioning ECP brake
system that resulted in a catastrophic or
critical event.
To assess the benefits and costs of
ECP brakes for the U.S. rail freight
industry, FRA contracted with BAH in
2005 to conduct a study. An ECP brake
expert panel of principal stakeholders in
the conversion of the U.S. freight car
fleet to ECP brake technology, including
suppliers, railroads, private car owners,
AAR, and FRA was assembled to
participate in the study. The expert
panel supported the conclusion that the
AAR standards are sufficient for the ECP
brake system designer to achieve a
system safety level adequate for a safetycritical system. In particular, an AARcompliant system, while providing a
significant increase in safety and
efficiency, does not introduce extra risks
associated with single-point failure of
the ECP system itself.
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The final BAH report provided a
comprehensive analysis and comparison
of ECP and conventional air brake
systems. BAH acknowledged that while
trains with ECP brake systems have
been operated in North America, South
Africa, and Australia, U.S.
implementation has been stalled due to
the absence of an acceptable
implementation plan for conversion and
hard data to support a sound economic
analysis, limited interoperability with
traditionally braked trains, and
insufficient capital investment required
for conversion. It concluded that
although the barriers to implementation
are formidable, ECP brake systems are
economically and technically ripe for
adoption and should be implemented in
phases. BAH suggests that
implementing ECP brakes on 2,800
locomotives and 80,000 cars in the
Powder River Basin (PRB) would cost
the industry approximately $432
million. However, according to BAH,
the annual $157 million in anticipated
benefits—resulting from saved fuel,
improved wheel and brake shoe life,
and a reduction in necessary brake
inspections—will allow railroads to
recover those costs in less than three
years. To justify the investment, the
BAH report says, conversion must be
focused first on the high-mileage, unittrain-type services that would most
benefit from its use.
FRA acknowledges that BAH’s fuel
cost estimates are underestimated due to
subsequently rising prices. It is notable
that BAH did not attempt to quantify
potential savings relating to capacity
increases or emissions decreases due to
the difficulty in arriving at acceptable
values. Accordingly, the report’s
estimated internal rate of return should
be viewed as conservative.
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VIII. Related Proceeding
In a petition dated November 15,
2006, and filed November 21, 2006,
BNSF and NS jointly requested that
FRA waive various sections in parts 229
and 232 as it relates to those railroads’
operation of ECP brake pilot trains. See
Docket No. FRA–2006–26435. The FRA
Safety Board held a fact-finding hearing
on this matter on January 16, 2007,
featuring testimony from representatives
of the petitioners, air brake
manufacturers, and labor unions. On
March 21, 2007, the Safety Board
granted the petitioners’ request, in part,
subject to various conditions designed
to ensure that ECP brake equipped
trains subject to the waiver will be as
safe as trains equipped with
conventional brakes and operated under
the existing rules. See id.
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IX. Legal Impediments and Proposed
Relief
ECP brake operation provides for
continuous electronic monitoring of the
condition of air brake system
components and brake pipe pressure,
potentially limiting the need for certain
physical brake inspections currently
required under part 232. Accordingly,
this final rule modifies, relaxes, and
removes certain requirements, including
intermediate terminal inspections
(§§ 232.207, 232.209, and 232.211),
single-car air brake tests (§ 232.305), and
the required percent of operable brakes
at initial terminal departure
(§ 232.103(d)), as they apply to trains
operating in ECP brake mode. The rail
industry’s implementation of ECP
brakes is frustrated by such inapplicable
and inefficient statutory and regulatory
requirements. Without a large-scale
proliferation and implementation of
ECP brake technologies, the industry
will not be able to enjoy economies of
scale and to overcome the industry-wide
limits caused by interoperability
problems. FRA seeks to improve market
efficiency by providing reliable and
suitable standards and procedures that
will support investments in ECP brake
technology.
The current statutory and regulatory
requirements, however—including
those concerning brake inspections and
the operation of trains with defective
equipment—may reduce or eliminate
incentives for railroads to implement
new ECP brake technology and take
advantage of its operational and safety
benefits. For example, 49 U.S.C. 20303
presents an obstacle to cost-saving, safe,
and efficient long hauls promised by
ECP brakes. To avoid incurring civil
penalties, operators are required under
49 U.S.C. 20303 to transport rail
vehicles with defective or insecure
equipment ‘‘from the place at which the
defect or insecurity was first discovered
to the nearest available place at which
the repairs can be made.’’
The design and operation of ECP
brakes renders strict application of the
existing statutory movement for repair
provision unnecessary as it will reduce
efficiencies and may actually reduce the
safety of such operations. When the
defective equipment is an ECP brake,
stopping for immediate repairs is not
necessary. If more than 15 percent of the
train’s AAR approved ECP brakes
become inoperable, the train
automatically stops. It should be noted
that a train with 85 percent operative
ECP brakes will still have shorter
stopping distances than a train
equipped with conventional pneumatic
brakes that are 100 percent operative.
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Considering the technology’s
continuous self-monitoring and constant
communication with the engineer, it is
highly unlikely that a train equipped
with ECP brakes will ever reach such a
level of inoperability. Further, FRA
continues to believe that a freight train
operated with ECP brakes may travel
non-stop to its destination, not to
exceed 3,500 miles, without
intermediate brake inspections, because
foundation brake rigging and brake
shoes will safely operate this distance
and redundant intermediate brake
inspections within that distance do not
increase ECP brake system safety. As an
added benefit, the increased mileage
allowance would provide for coast-tocoast travel. In the related proceeding,
Docket No. FRA–2006–26435, FRA’s
Safety Board granted the request of
BNSF and NS to allow the non-stop
movement of an ECP brake operated
train to its destination, each not to
exceed 3,500 miles.
Nevertheless, 49 U.S.C. 20303
requires trains with defective safety
appliances, including brakes, to travel to
the nearest location where the necessary
repairs can be made. If the nearest
available location is in a direction other
than that in which the train is traveling,
the train with defective equipment may
be required to switch the defective car
out of the train and add it to another
train traveling in the direction of the
nearest repair location, referred to as a
‘‘backhaul.’’ ECP brake implementation
has been complicated by the ECP brakes
system’s technological incompatibility
with conventional pneumatic brake
systems. To switch a car equipped with
ECP brakes into a technologically
incompatible train operating with
conventional pneumatic brakes will
create additional safety concerns for that
train.
The potential risks involved in
combining cars with incompatible
braking systems coupled with the
hazards normally associated in
switching cars in the field, outweigh the
potential harm of keeping the defective
car in its existing ECP braked train and
traveling to a repair location that is
significantly further away. In
circumstances where the defective
safety appliance is a non-brake defect, it
will often be safer and is certainly more
efficient to allow ECP brake-equipped
trains with non-brake defective
equipment to travel to the nearest
forward repair station. Moreover, due to
the ability of ECP brake systems to
continuously monitor the brakes on
each car in a train and to provide
specific information to the locomotive
engineer regarding the location of any
car with inoperative brakes and the
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design of such systems to prohibit
operation with less than 85 percent
operative brakes in certain situations,
the need to immediately set-out and
handle cars with defective brakes for
repair is unnecessary. There is also no
safety need to require a railroad to incur
the expense and delay involved with
cutting the defective car out of the train
or to run the safety risk of doing so.
Currently, freight cars with defective
mechanical conditions are permitted to
be hauled long distances for repair. See
49 CFR 215.9. In light of the
technological advances provided by ECP
brake systems, it appears logical and
necessary to permit more flexibility in
moving equipment with defective
brakes when equipped with ECP brakes
and hauled in a train operating in ECP
brake mode. However, the language of
49 U.S.C. 20303 prevents FRA from
providing this flexibility.
When drafting the proposed rule in
this proceeding, FRA recognized that
the aforementioned statutory
requirements governing conventional
pneumatic braked trains may offset the
increased safety and efficiency benefits
afforded by ECP brakes, thus
eliminating the incentives for rail
operators to implement ECP brake
technologies. To encourage
implementation without hindering
safety, FRA proposed to invoke its
discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C.
20306 to exempt ECP brake-equipped
trains from the specific statutory
requirements contained in 49 U.S.C.
20303. The requirements for moving
defective equipment were created over a
century ago, during the infancy of
pneumatic brakes and before all cars
were equipped with power brakes. With
many more reasons to stop train
operation along tracks with frequent
repair shops and exponentially more
employees, the legislative drafters of
that time could not have envisioned the
type of safer and more efficient
technologies available today.
Recognizing the importance of
upgrading rail technologies, Congress in
1980 passed the Rock Island Railroad
Transition and Employee Assistance Act
(the ‘‘Rock Island Act’’), which, inter
alia, provides statutory relief for the
implementation of new technologies.
More specifically, when certain
statutory requirements preclude the
development or implementation of more
efficient railroad transportation
equipment or other transportation
innovations, the applicable section of
the Rock Island Act, currently codified
at 49 U.S.C. 20306, provides the
Secretary of Transportation with the
authority to grant an exemption to those
requirements based on evidence
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received and findings developed at a
hearing.
According to Senate Report No. 96–
614, ‘‘This section fosters rail
technological improvements by giving
the Federal Railroad Administration
discretionary authority to grant
exemptions from the Safety Appliance
Acts’ mandatory requirements when
those requirements preclude the
development or implementation of new
rail technology.’’ Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
S. Rep. No. 96–614, at 8–9 (Mar. 4,
1980) (emphases added). The House
version of the bill includes no similar
provision, but the Conference substitute
adds that the authority granted FRA in
this section must be exercised after a
hearing, absent an agreement between
labor representatives and the developers
or operators of the new equipment or
technology. Joint Explanatory Statement
of the Committee of Conference, H.
Conf. Rep. No. 96–1041, § 117, at 30
(May 20, 1980).
Under 49 CFR 1.49(v), the Federal
Railroad Administrator is delegated
authority to carry out the functions
vested in the Secretary by the Rock
Island Act. Under this authority, FRA
held two public oral hearings in
Washington, DC on October 4, 2007, and
near Chicago, IL, on October 19, 2007,
to receive evidence and develop
findings to determine whether FRA
should invoke 49 U.S.C. 20306. While
FRA solicited any information that
would bear on this decision, it also
asked a series of questions in the NPRM
and at the hearing designed to invoke
discussion and gather information
regarding the safety of moving defective
equipment as proposed and to
determine whether existing statutory
provisions impede the implementation
of the technology.
At the hearing, the labor unions
commented on the limitations of the
ECP brake system’s self-monitoring
capabilities. According to the labor
unions, since the technology cannot
monitor a variety of brake defects, it
should not be relied upon to allow a
train to operate 3,500 miles without any
intermediate brake inspections. On the
other hand, the railroads support the
increase in the allowable distance of
3,500 miles between brake inspections,
believing the safety level of trains
operating with ECP brakes that distance
should equal or exceed the safety level
of trains operating with conventional
brakes over 1,000 miles. For the same
reasons, some railroads even suggested
that ECP brake operated trains be
allowed to move 5,000 miles between
Class I brake inspections.
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The labor unions and railroads agree
that a conventional freight car with the
brakes cut out is no different than an
ECP brake-equipped car with the brakes
cut out and that switching a defective
ECP brake-equipped car into a
conventionally braked train will not
increase current safety concerns.
However, the railroads and the labor
unions disagree when the defect is a
non-brake safety appliance on a car
equipped with ECP brakes. According to
the labor unions, if a non-brake defect
requires the car to be set out, there is no
difference between a train operated with
conventional brakes and a train
operated with ECP brakes; the car
should be set out for repair on site or
moved under special circumstances to
the nearest repair point. The railroads
believe that such cars should be left in
the train operated with ECP brakes for
forward movement to a location where
ECP brake repairs can be made instead
of being switched out and hauled in a
different direction. Any switching, says
the railroads, causes the switching and
pick-up crews more risk exposure.
The labor unions assert that the
regulations proposed in this proceeding
provide sufficient incentives for the
implementation of ECP brake systems
and that the restrictions within 49
U.S.C. 20303 do not provide a
disincentive for such implementation.
The railroads, on the other hand, assert
that strict application of 49 U.S.C. 20303
provides a disincentive for the
implementation and use of ECP brake
technologies. According to the railroads,
they are required under section 20303 to
handle cars with defective equipment
more times than necessary, resulting in
lost time and revenue. The resulting
undue and unreasonable financial
burden and significantly negative
financial impact on rail operations, say
the railroads, provides no relief from the
added expense of equipping rail cars
with ECP brakes and is a strong
disincentive for ECP brake system
implementation. The railroads claim
that eliminating the requirements under
49 U.S.C. 20303 would provide a
necessary and significant economic
incentive to the widespread adoption of
ECP braking technology in the U.S.
Based on the comments and
information submitted at those hearings,
FRA has decided to invoke its
discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C.
20306 to exempt application of 49
U.S.C. 20303 as it applies to the
operation of ECP brake operated freight
trains and freight cars. FRA believes that
application of section 20303 will clearly
provide a disincentive towards the
implementation of ECP brake systems, a
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technology that promises safer operation
of trains throughout the U.S.
FRA is confident that this initiative is
consistent with improving railroad
safety. As further discussed below,
through oversight of present train
operations, including extended haul
operations, FRA has observed that
properly inspected trains can proceed
for extended distances without loss of
braking effort due to wear or damage to
foundation brake rigging. FRA further
notes that hauling of cars with defective
safety appliances to the next forward
point where repairs can be
accomplished poses virtually no
incremental risk to employees,
particularly if defects have been
identified and communicated to the
crew of the train. In the great majority
of cases, damaged or insecure safety
appliances pose a risk only during
switching operations, not during line
haul movements. Indeed, back hauling
of safety appliances introduces
additional risk, as the car is first
removed from one road train and then
added to another for the reverse
movement.
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X. Additional Issues
A. Part 229
In the ECP brake waiver proceeding,
Docket No. FRA–2006–26435, BNSF
and NS sought relief from various
provisions of parts 229 and 232. In
relation to part 229, BNSF and NS
sought relief from the requirements
relating to daily locomotive inspections
and electronic record keeping. FRA
sought comments and information
whether this final rule should include
any exceptions to part 229 for
operations using ECP brake systems.
No commenting party supported or
suggested any exceptions to part 229.
On the contrary, UTU and BLET agreed
with the FRA’s proposal not to modify
part 229 in this rulemaking. According
to BLET, there is no basis for relief from
the daily inspection or recordkeeping
requirements of Part 229. FRA continues
to believe that there is insufficient
information available to consider any
exceptions to part 229 for operations
using ECP brake systems. Thus, under
this rulemaking, part 229 remains
unaffected.
In its comments, Wabtec lists a
number of minimum requirements that
it proposes should be added to existing
event recorder parameters, applicable to
the lead locomotive when in ECP brake
operation. BLET filed a supplemental
response in which it responded to this
particular filing, stating that it ‘‘cannot
serve as a basis for FRA requirements
pertaining to event recording of ECP
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data because of [an] omission [relating
to the ‘ECP train brake source’
parameter described in UP’s
comments].’’ The scope of this
proceeding does not include
information relating to event recorder
data. The NPRM did not discuss or seek
comments on this issue. Accordingly,
FRA will not include in this final rule
any modifications to the regulations
governing event recorders, since many
parties interested in event recorders
would not have been put on notice that
the issue was being raised. FRA believes
that these issues would best be resolved
in a separate proceeding concerning part
229.
B. Dynamic Brake Requirements
At the public hearing conducted in
relation to the waiver proceeding, BNSF
requested relief from some of the
dynamic brake requirements contained
in 49 CFR part 232. On this issue, FRA
only received comments from BLET,
which indicated that relief relating to
dynamic brake requirement is not
necessary as it applies to ECP brake
systems. According to BLET, it would
be unwise and unsafe to further erode
braking capacity by diluting the existing
dynamic brake requirements.
FRA remains unsure of what specific
relief BNSF requested regarding
dynamic brakes. Section 232.109
provides for the continued operation of
a locomotive found with inoperative
dynamic brakes for a period of up to 30
calendar days. It appears that railroads
will continue to require locomotive
engineers to rely on extended range
dynamic brakes where they sufficiently
control the braking effort without
introducing excessive buff forces.
Locomotive engineers will need to know
what level of braking effort is available,
particularly in extreme cases operating
over territory with significantly
descending grades. Otherwise, an
engineer may lose control of the train
due to brake fade when the speed
precludes a timely application of the
automatic brake due to insufficient
dynamic brake capacity. FRA recognizes
that this scenario is much less likely to
occur with availability of ECP braking,
but that does not mean it could not
occur. FRA continues to believe that
more flexibility in this area is not
necessary and declines to make any
such modifications in this final rule.
C. Single Car Air Brake Test Approval
Procedures and Single Car Air Brake
Tests
The NPRM included a provision
requiring the submission and approval
of single car air brake test procedures for
cars with ECP brake systems in
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accordance with the special approval
procedures in § 232.17. FRA also
reserved the right to modify § 232.17 to
make clear the applicability of proposed
subpart G, including, but not limited to,
adding cross-references.
Section 232.305(a) provides that a
single car air brake test may be
performed partially in accordance with
‘‘Section 4.0, ‘Special Tests,’ of the
Association of American Railroads
Standard S–486–01, ‘Code of Air Brake
System Tests for Freight Equipment,’
contained in the AAR Manual of
Standards and Recommended Practices,
Section E (January 1, 2001).’’ That
standard has since been amended and
FRA has approved the use of the new
Standard S–486–04 as the procedure to
use when performing a single car air
brake test. Accordingly, FRA proposed
to amend § 232.305(a) by replacing the
directly preceding quoted text with the
following: ‘‘Section 4.0, ‘Special Tests,’
of the Association of American
Railroads Standard S–486–04, ‘Code of
Air Brake System Tests for Freight
Equipment,’ contained in the AAR
Manual of Standards and
Recommended Practices, Section E
(January 1, 2004).’’
BLET submitted comments
supporting FRA’s proposed
amendments to sections 232.17 and
232.305(a). No other comments were
filed on these issues. Consequently, the
final rule amends §§ 232.17 and
232.305(a).
D. Train Handling Information
Section 232.111 requires railroads to
adopt and comply with written
procedures ensuring that railroad train
crews receiving trains are provided
accurate information concerning each
train’s condition. The continuous
monitoring capabilities of ECP brake
systems provide information regarding
the location of equipment with
inoperative or cut out brakes. BLET
commented that none of the information
provided by the ECP brake system
appears to satisfy the requirements of
232.111(b) and that it agrees with FRA
that there is no reason for excepting any
portion of or provision contained in
§ 232.111.
FRA continues to see no reason to
excepting any portion of or provision
contained in § 232.111. FRA continues
to believe that, if anything, ECP brake
systems’ continuous monitoring
capabilities will assist railroads in
complying with the train handling
information rules in § 232.111 by
monitoring defects and potentially
allowing for the manual input of defects
not monitored electronically and then
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electronically providing such
information to subsequent train crews.
E. Piston Travel Limits
For cars equipped with 81⁄2-inch or
10-inch diameter brake cylinders
receiving either a Class I brake test or a
periodic inspection while on a shop or
repair track, §§ 232.205(c)(5) and
232.303(c) currently limit piston travel
to 7 to 9 inches. An industry-wide
waiver currently in effect, however,
permits piston travel limits to range
from 6 to 9 inches on these types of
cylinders. In the NPRM, FRA proposed
the incorporation of that waiver into the
rules by amending §§ 232.205(c)(5) and
232.303(c) accordingly.
BLET, Wabtec, and NYAB concur
with FRA’s proposal to incorporate the
current, industry-wide waiver
permitting piston travel limits to range
from 6 to 9 inches by amending sections
232.205(c)(5) and 232.303(c). Similarly,
AAR states that there is no reason to
refrain from incorporating the industrywide waiver in the regulations.
Consequently, this final rule amends
sections 232.205(c)(5) and 232.303(c) by
revising the piston travel range limit of
7 to 9 inches to a range limit of 6 to 9
inches.
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F. Extended Haul Trains
Section 232.213(a)(6) requires
inbound inspections for extended haul
trains and states that, ‘‘After April 1,
2007, the inbound inspection described
in this paragraph shall not be required
unless FRA provides notification to the
industry extending the requirement to
perform inbound inspections on
extended haul trains.’’ Section
232.213(a)(7) requires railroads to
maintain a record of all defective,
inoperative, or ineffective brakes and all
conditions not in compliance with parts
215 and 231 discovered during train
movement. In addition, that section says
that, ‘‘After April 1, 2007, the records
described in this paragraph need not be
maintained unless FRA provides the
notification required in paragraph (a)(6)
of this section extending the
requirement to conduct inbound
inspections on extended haul trains.’’
In the NPRM, FRA proposed to amend
Part 232 by deleting §§ 232.213(a)(6)
and (a)(7) from the regulations. These
regulations ‘‘sunsetted’’ on April 1,
2007, without further FRA action. Since
this proposal remains uncontested and
the ‘‘sunsetted’’ provisions serve no
purpose by remaining in the CFR, the
final rule deletes § 232.213(a)(6) and
(a)(7).
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G. Part 238
Amtrak informally expressed interest
in potentially using ECP brake system
technology for its Auto Train that runs
from Lorton, Virginia to Sanford,
Florida. Amtrak previously employed
overlay ECP braking on that train, and
presumably would benefit from some
additional flexibility with respect to the
conduct of intermediate inspections.
However, since FRA does not currently
have sufficient information regarding
the use of ECP brake systems on
passenger trains and passenger
equipment, FRA did not propose any
amendment to 49 CFR part 238. FRA
continues to believe that the functions
of freight and passenger trains and cars,
evidenced by the varied rules applicable
to each, are too disparate to provide a
one-size-fits-all solution for ECP brake
integration and use.
In the NPRM, FRA stated that it may
consider Part 238’s applicability to ECP
brake systems in another rulemaking or
in other proceedings and would
consider requests for waivers relating to
the regulation of freight trains and
freight cars equipped with ECP brake
systems for passenger trains on a caseby-case basis. BLET agrees that the issue
of ECP brakes and Part 238 should be
addressed in a separate rulemaking. For
this reason, BLET does not believe that
it is appropriate for FRA to regulate ECP
brakes on passenger trains via the
waiver process or on a case-by-case
basis.
FRA continues to believe that any
regulations affecting the implementation
and use of ECP brake systems on
passenger trains are better left for a
separate rulemaking proceeding relating
to Part 238. FRA will also consider
requests for waivers for such
implementation and use on passenger
trains. Although BLET expresses its
opinion that a rulemaking would be a
better venue for permitting the
implementation and use of ECP brake
systems on passenger trains, it provides
no reasons why it would not be prudent
to allow for the use of waivers to
achieve similar goals.
XI. Section-by-Section Analysis
49 CFR Part 232
Unless otherwise noted, all section
references below refer to sections in title
49 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR). FRA sought comments on all
proposals made in the NPRM to this
proceeding.
Subpart A—General
This subpart contains amendments to
the definitions listed in subpart A of
part 232.
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Section 232.5 Definitions
In the NPRM, FRA proposed the
amendment of section 232.5 by adding
an extensive set of definitions to
introduce the regulatory relief and
regulations applicable to ECP brake
systems. FRA worded these definitions
to mirror, to the extent possible, the
definitions provided in existing AAR
standards. FRA intends these
definitions to clarify the meaning of
important terms that are used in the text
of the proposed rule. The definitions are
carefully worded in an attempt to
minimize the potential for
misinterpretation of the rule. Some of
the definitions introduce new concepts
or new technologies.
These new definitions acknowledge
the two general types of ECP brake
systems—dual mode and stand-alone.
The definition of a dual mode ECP brake
system, which means a brake system
that can work either as a conventional
pneumatic brake system or an ECP brake
system, intends to cover both an overlay
ECP brake system and an ECP brake
system equipped with an emulator CCD.
The definition of CCD is intended to
describe an important and necessary
part of ECP brake system technology.
FRA did not receive any comments on
the proposed definitions. Consequently,
except for reasons set forth below, the
final rule retains the definitions as
proposed.
Subpart G—Electronically Controlled
Pneumatic (ECP) Braking Systems
FRA is adding a new subpart G to part
232. The new subpart contains various
design and operational requirements
that provide both regulatory relief and
regulatory modification to allow
implementation of ECP brake systems
on the Nation’s railroads and to ensure
the safety of such operations.
Section 232.601 Scope
This section contains a formal
statement of the final rule’s purpose and
scope. The final rule contains specific
requirements relating to the operation of
freight trains and freight cars equipped
with ECP brake systems and operating
in ECP brake mode. The final rule also
provides specific exceptions from
various requirements contained in part
232 for ECP brake-equipped freight
trains and freight cars.
Section 232.602 Applicability
As a general matter, this section
makes clear that these rules apply to all
railroads that operate freight trains or
freight cars equipped with ECP brakes
on track which is part of the general
railroad system of transportation. The
final rule applies to freight trains
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operating in ECP brake mode, freight
cars equipped with ECP brake systems,
and conventionally braked freight trains
and freight cars when operated in
conjunction with ECP brake equipment.
The regulatory relief provided in the
final rule and the need to ensure the
safe operation of trains and vehicles
equipped with this advanced
technology requires that exception of
certain existing part 232 provisions be
afforded. Many of the provisions that
the final rule excepts either apply
awkwardly or should otherwise not
apply to ECP brake systems due to the
new technology’s design or additional
safety benefits. Similarly, the addition
of various requirements directly related
to ECP brake systems is necessary to
ensure that the equipment is properly
designed, inspected, tested, maintained,
and safe to operate.
To fulfill these goals and to avoid an
excess of confusing cross-references,
this final rule excepts specific
provisions and an entire subpart of part
232 from application to ECP brake
systems. Each section of subpart G
contains specific exceptions from
various provisions contained in other
portions of part 232 or contain
appropriately rewritten provisions
directly applicable to ECP brake
systems. Those portions and sections of
part 232 not specifically excepted by
this final rule remain applicable to ECP
brake-equipped freight trains and freight
cars.
Section 232.603 Design,
Interoperability, and Configuration
Management Requirements
In order to ensure the safety and
interoperability of ECP brake systems,
this section incorporates by reference
the existing AAR standards and
approval procedures for ECP brake
systems. The AAR, its member
railroads, and various brake
manufacturers have invested
considerable time and effort in
developing the identified industry
standards addressing the design,
performance, and interoperability of
ECP brake systems. FRA has reviewed
the industry standards it intended to
incorporate by reference in this final
rule and has determined that the
standards effectively address and ensure
the safe and proper operation of the
brake system technology. As noted
previously in this preamble, FRA
funded a FMECA, which validated the
safety and applicability of AAR’s ECP
brake system standards for freight
railroads.
FRA believes that compliance with
the AAR standards identified in
paragraph (a) will ensure the safety and
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efficiency of freight trains and freight
cars equipped with ECP brakes.
Implementation of ECP braking systems
complying with these standards will
bring benefits and efficiencies
encompassing train handling, car
maintenance, fuel savings, network
capacity, self-monitoring, fail-safe
operation, accurate and instantaneous
brake commands throughout the train,
and continuous, real-time selfdiagnostics. Paragraph (a) requires all
manufacturers to meet existing AAR
standards when developing and
installing ECP brake systems.
Paragraph (a) incorporates the most
recent AAR standards related to ECP
brake systems. FRA recognizes that ECP
brake systems are a growing technology
and realizes that the existing AAR
standards may need to change as the
technology advances. Accordingly, this
final rule includes two methods by
which the incorporated industry
standards may be changed. Paragraph
(a) permits the submission of an
alternate standard under the special
approval procedures contained in
§ 232.17. In addition, paragraph (f)
permits the AAR or other authorized
representative of the railroad industry to
seek modification of the approved
industry standards through the
modification procedures contained in
§ 232.307. Only the party that initially
submits a standard approved by FRA
pursuant to paragraph (a) may
subsequently seek modification of that
standard under paragraph (f). For
instance, only AAR may seek
modification of its own AAR S–4200
Series Standards already incorporated
by reference into this final rule. If
another authorized representative of the
railroad industry submits an alternative
standard under paragraph (a) and
pursuant to § 232.17, then only that
representative may seek modification of
their alternate standard under paragraph
(f).
The modification procedures in
§ 232.307 were developed to permit
modification of the other incorporated
AAR standards and FRA believes that
the procedures are equally applicable to
the regulations contained in this final
rule. The industry has successfully
utilized both these methods to change or
modify industry standards incorporated
in part 232 and FRA believes it is
appropriate and necessary to provide
this latitude for the standards related to
ECP brake systems and components.
BLET filed comments supporting
§ 232.603(a) and (f) to utilize the
alternate standards of § 232.17 and the
modification procedures of § 232.307,
respectively. GE requests that an
exception be granted to certain stand-
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alone ECP brake systems in
§ 232.603(a)(1)–(6). We will address
GE’s comments below when providing
analysis of § 232.603(e).
FRA recognizes that while most of the
S–4200 Series apply technical standards
concerning the mechanical attributes
and capabilities of ECP brake systems,
S–4240 and S–4270 delegate additional
responsibilities to those manufacturing,
implementing, and using ECP brakes
and have been the subject of various
comments filed in this proceeding.
Thus, FRA believes they require further
discussion.
FRA has reviewed the approval
procedures contained in AAR Standard
S–4240 and believes that they provide
an appropriate review process to ensure
the safe and proper operation of ECP
brake systems. FRA believes that AAR is
in the best position to approve those
ECP brake systems that will be used by
its member railroads and, over time,
other non-member railroads
interchanging traffic on the general rail
system. FRA does not intend this
section to necessarily preclude the
introduction and acceptance of
alterative standards subsequently
approved in accordance with the rules.
FRA recognizes, however, that
enforcement of S–4240 against the
railroads would be difficult without
additional regulatory language.
Accordingly, paragraph (b) requires that
all ECP brake systems developed under
the AAR standards incorporated by
reference in paragraph (a) receive
conditional or final approval under
AAR Standard S–4240 prior to use and
that they maintain such approval while
in use. In this paragraph, FRA prohibits
the use of ECP brake systems developed
under the AAR standards incorporated
in paragraph (a) that do not receive
conditional or final AAR approval or
that cease to comply with the
incorporated AAR standards relating to
ECP brake systems.
BLET filed comments stating that it
does not oppose paragraph (b).
However, BLET believes that FRA’s
Railroad Safety Board should review
petitions for conditional approval via
the waiver process. FRA does not
believe this level of scrutiny is
necessary at this time. Under 232.103(l),
all conventional brake systems must
comply with AAR Standard S–469–47.
Compliance with this standard is
determined by the AAR brake
committee, subject to FRA technical
oversight. There are no more specific
FRA requirements for these systems. For
similar reasons, FRA is incorporating
into the final rule the appropriate ECP
brake standards. FRA has successfully
relied on AAR for approving
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conventional brake standards and there
is nothing suggesting why FRA should
perform a materially different approval
process oversight role for the ECP brake
standards. For the purposes of this
rulemaking, FRA has closely reviewed
and scrutinized the ECP brake design
standards adopted by AAR. FRA also
funded and participated in a FMECA
analysis of the S–4200 series standards.
We feel confident relying on AAR’s
approval process. Just like FRA enforces
Standard S–469–47 after a system is
introduced into service, FRA will
equally enforce the S–4200 series
standards on trains in service with ECP
brake systems.
In paragraph (a), FRA also requires
that all ECP brake systems meet the
configuration management requirements
contained in an industry recognized,
FRA approved standard such as AAR
Standard S–4270. FRA believes that
configuration management of ECP brake
system hardware and software
components is an absolute requirement
to ensure the interchangeability,
interoperability, compatibility and
continued proper and safe operation of
ECP brake systems. Compatibility of
ECP hardware and software will have a
direct affect on the safety and reliability
of ECP brake systems running on the
Nation’s railroads.
In the NPRM, FRA cautioned that the
limited configuration management plan
requirements in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of
AAR Standard S–4240 may not have
been sufficiently robust to adequately
control ECP brake system components.
The more recently developed AAR
Standard S–4270 eliminates this
shortcoming by adequately addressing
issues relating to configuration
management, including a sufficient set
of requirements that properly allocate
the responsible party and necessary
procedures to be followed by this party
to assure proper management of ECP
brake system software and hardware
configurations.
The AAR approval process and Air
Brake Systems Committee requires
various procedures to ensure the
interoperability and interchangeability
of AAR-approved ECP brake systems
and their components. These same
requirements and procedures have been
used for many years to successfully
manage the configuration of
conventional pneumatic AAR approved
air brake valves. Therefore, FRA
believes that responsibility for the
configuration management of AARapproved brake systems and their
components should continue to reside
with AAR and its Air Brake Systems
Committee.
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As discussed above, FRA has
reviewed and approved AAR Standard
S–4270 and has determined that the
standard should be incorporated by
reference into this final rule. In a notice
issued on April 18, 2008, FRA sought
comments and concerns on AAR
Standard S–4270, which at that time
was in draft form, and indicated that it
would consider inclusion of the final
draft if it was timely adopted with no
substantial changes. 73 FR 21092, 94
(Apr. 18, 2008). AAR adopted and
implemented Standard S–4270 on April
30, 2008, without any changes from the
draft referenced in FRA’s public notice
dated April 18, 2008, and placed in the
docket to this proceeding on April 21,
2008.
Since the NPRM was issued prior to
the development of an acceptable
configuration management plan
standard, paragraph (c) as proposed
included language delineating
minimum requirements for acceptance
of a subsequently submitted
configuration management plan
standard. Since paragraph (a)
incorporates by reference AAR Standard
S–4270 and provides for the submission
of alternative standards under § 232.17,
the extraneous text of proposed
paragraph (c) has been removed from
the final rule. However, FRA continues
to believe that alternative configuration
management plans must maintain the
same minimum standards. More
specifically, to receive approval in
accordance with § 232.17, a
configuration management plan must be
structured in accordance with accepted
configuration management standards
and define all of the purposes,
procedures, organizational
responsibilities, and tools to be used for
ECP brake system hardware and
software configuration management
including: The purpose and scope of the
application; control activities to be
performed; responsibilities and
authorities for accomplishing the
activities; implementation schedules;
tools and resources for executing the
plan; and periodic updating of the plan
to maintain currency.
In the NPRM, FRA suggested that any
submitted alternate configuration
management plan be structured in
accordance with accepted configuration
management standards such as IEEE Std
28–1990, IEEE Standard for Software
Configuration Management Plans,
American National Standards Institute,
1990; or IEEE Std 1042–1987, IEEE
Guide to Software Configuration
Management, American National
Standards Institute, 1987. The brake
manufacturers, however, argue that
these IEEE standards are not considered
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appropriate or necessary for achieving
adequate configuration management
control for ECP brake systems. Despite
their promise to recommend
alternatives, nothing on this issue was
subsequently filed.
The NPRM’s references to the various
aforementioned IEEE standards were
provided for use by the railroads in the
event that AAR did not develop its own
configuration management standard. As
previously mentioned, AAR issued a
configuration management standard, S–
4270, subsequent to the initial comment
period in this proceeding. FRA
understands the brake manufacturers to
mean that some items specified in the
IEEE standards may not be applicable
because they are superseded by the
more restrictive standards and processes
developed by the brake manufacturers.
While FRA concedes that this may be
true, it does not speak to the overall
applicability of the IEEE standards to
any alternate configuration management
plan that might be submitted by any
other party. FRA expects all
configuration management plans to be
tailored to the requirements of accepted
IEEE standards or a more restrictive,
proprietary, or industry-specific
standard has been developed and
implemented. FRA believes AAR
Standard S–4270 complies with the
latter expectation.
FRA continues to believe that any
ECP brake configuration management
plan should consider issues beyond
initial approval. For instance, use of
improper or out-of-date software
versions for microprocessor controlled
systems has been an issue in a variety
of industries. Therefore, FRA continues
to caution that any alternate
configuration management plan should
be sufficiently robust to adequately
control ECP brake system components,
especially as more manufacturers apply
for AAR approval of ECP brake systems.
Further, safety or reliability issues may
dictate that hardware or software
configurations be changed once ECP
brake systems are put in service on a
large scale in the U.S. FRA continues to
encourage AAR, railroads, and
manufacturers to ensure their ability to
continually monitor and respond to
hardware and software issues affecting
ECP brake systems after initial approval.
FRA continues to believe that AAR is
capable of setting appropriate
configuration management standards
and related approval procedures and
FRA intends to rely on AAR to monitor
ECP brake component approval,
configuration and compatibility for
systems designed and approved under
its standards incorporated herein.
However, FRA, in its federal oversight
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role, will continue to monitor the
activities of the Air Brake Systems
Committee and the AAR ECP brake
approval process to ensure that any
safety or reliability issues that may
emerge are addressed promptly and
comprehensively. FRA will also issue
additional configuration management
requirements for the operation of ECP
brake systems if, in the sole opinion of
the FRA, the oversight of the AAR and
the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee
proves inadequate for the continued safe
operation of ECP brake systems. In this
case, FRA may take a variety of
approaches including requiring
railroads and car owners to develop
their own configuration management
plans for monitoring ECP brake system
interchangeability, interoperability and
compatibility.
In relation to the issue of ECP brake
system configuration management
plans, FRA received comments from
BLET at the public hearing and written
comments in response to FRA’s notice
seeking comment on AAR Standard S–
4270. At the hearing, BLET stated that
configuration management plans must
conform to the requirements of part 236,
subpart H. According to BLET, ‘‘There
is a strong likelihood that the majority
of the routes over which ECP will be
deployed also will see the
implementation of positive train control
(‘PTC’). Given the manner in which PTC
will enforce speeds and authorities, the
ECP head-end unit and its associated
appurtenances will become a core
element of the PTC system.’’ In its
written comments, BLET added, ‘‘We
continue to believe that—to the extent
ECP-equipped trains operate on routes
where PTC has been or will be
installed—the ECP technology is a
processor-based train control system.
Braking algorithms for speed and
authority enforcement for ECP-equipped
trains will differ significantly from those
utilized for conventionally-braked
trains.’’
FRA understands BLET’s contention
to be that, if an ECP brake system ‘‘is
considered a core element of PTC
system’’ or ‘‘is considered a train control
system,’’ then it must comply with the
configuration management requirements
contained in Part 236, Subpart H,
905(b)(4). While FRA acknowledges the
importance of configuration
management, it does not agree that ECP
brake systems must conform to the
requirements of part 236, subpart H.
Although ECP brakes may have a
significant impact on the safety case
prepared under subpart H of part 236 for
train control systems, FRA does not
consider the brake system, standing
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alone, to constitute a train control
system.
The current implementation of ECP
brake technology and processor based
train control technology are two
independent industry initiatives. FRA
recognizes the potential for the future
use of both technologies onboard a
single locomotive and FRA looks
forward to such integration. Of course,
operations that contemplate using both
PTC and ECP brakes in a common
operation must include the ECP brake
system as an integral part of the Product
Safety Plan for the train control system.
While the ECP brake system itself is not
subject to subpart H of part 236, ECP
brakes may not be utilized with
processor based train control systems
until the impact on their use has been
included in the required analysis of the
train control system under subpart H of
part 236 and that analysis has been
approved by FRA. Given the superior
characteristics of ECP brake systems,
and assuming straightforward
integration with new train control
systems, the use of ECP braking should
be helpful in the formulation of
persuasive safety case documents.
FRA acknowledges BLET’s concern
that ‘‘AAR’s proposed S–4270 Standard
is materially inferior to the other S–4200
standards,’’ and their strong
recommendation to FRA to insist on
‘‘(1) the use of identified, scientificallyproven configuration management
plans, and (2) the delineation of ‘bright
line’ triggers governing the urgency with
which hardware and/or software
changes must be made.’’ FRA further
acknowledges BLET’s concern regarding
‘‘[delegation] to AAR’s Air Brake System
Committee oversight of [ECP brake]
product approval, implementation, and
operations.’’
In the NPRM, FRA recommended the
use of acceptable IEEE software
configuration management standards
such as IEEE–828 and IEEE–1042 for the
development of ECP brake system
configuration management plans. 72 FR
50820, 50831 (Sept. 4, 2007). As BLET
notes, neither of these standards are
referenced in the proposed AAR S–4270
standard, and the proposed standard
passes the responsibility to develop and
maintain the configuration management
plan for the ECP brake product to the
manufacturers. FRA, however, does not
believe that such actions are
inconsistent with either IEEE–828 or
IEEE–1042, since both standards
provide for and encourage tailoring
appropriate to individual products and
the system developers’ operational
needs. For example, IEEE–828 makes
the following provisions:
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This standard permits significant flexibility
in preparing an SCM Plan. A successful Plan
reflects its project environment. It should be
written in terms familiar to its users and
should be consistent with the development
and procurement processes of the project. To
conform to the requirements set forth in other
applicable standards or to accommodate local
practices, a Plan may be tailored upward, to
add information, or tailored to use a specified
format. The Plan may also be tailored
downward, omitting information required by
this standard, when specific standard
requirements are identified as not applicable
to this project. * * * The information may be
presented in the Plan in any sequence or
presentation style deemed suitable for the
Plans users.
Similarly, IEEE–1042 states:
The application (and thus the planning) of
SCM is very sensitive to the context of the
project and the organization being served. If
SCM is applied as a corporate policy, it must
not be done blindly, but rather should be
done in such a way that the details of a
particular SCM application are reexamined
for each project (or phase for very large
projects). It must take into consideration the
size, complexity, and criticality of the
software system being managed, and the
number of individuals, amount of personnel
turnover, and organizational form and
structure that have to interface during the life
of the software system being managed.
The AAR S–4720 standard, particularly
in § 3.3.2, outlines the main
requirements to the ECP brake system
configuration management plan that are
common to the requirements of the IEEE
and other standards referenced in the
NPRM. Section 3.3.2 additionally
requires that ‘‘the manufacturer shall
maintain a readily retrievable record of
all software and hardware changes and
make that record available to the AAR
and FRA at any time.’’ In any event, the
NPRM merely stated that FRA expected
any configuration management plan to
conform to an accepted standard; the
IEEE standards referenced were simply
provided as acceptable examples.
FRA would also like to address
BLET’s concern regarding the
‘‘delineation of ‘triggers’ governing the
urgency of the software/hardware
changes implementation.’’ FRA has
reviewed industry practice regarding
software changes and has determined
that the levels contained in AAR
Standard S–4270 are consistent with the
IEEE 1044 and 1044.1. These standards
differentiate the urgency of software and
hardware implementation schedules in
order to assure gradual implementation
without significantly affecting
operations. FRA considers the use of the
three levels of software and hardware
implementation strategy given in § 3.6
of S–4270 as reasonable and practically
justified.
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To further assure and enforce
compliance of the ECP brake
manufacturers’ configuration
management plans with the final rule
and appropriate standards, FRA makes
vendor and railroad compliance with S–
4270 a regulatory mandate subject to
regulatory oversight in paragraph (c) of
this section in the final rule. AAR
Standard S–4270 places the
responsibility for configuration
management on the brake
manufacturers. Paragraph (c) of this
section, however, requires the railroads
implementing and using ECP brake
technology to ensure that the brake
manufacturers’ configuration
management plans comply with the
existing applicable standards. FRA
believes that the users of rail
technologies are ultimately responsible
for their safe use.
Paragraph (c) also provides for
regulatory oversight of configuration
management plans, which could
include a review of the manufacturer’s
commitment and adherence to the
general requirements of accepted or
scientifically proven configuration
management plans. Based on the
allowances for customization of the
configuration management standards to
support a specific vendor’s mode of
operation, and the inclusion of FRA
regulatory oversight to ensure that
vendor’s standards are appropriate, FRA
considers the content of S–4270
standard sufficient to be incorporated by
reference in this final rule.
Paragraph (d), of this section excepts
a freight car or freight train equipped
with ECP brakes from certain existing
provisions contained in part 232. FRA
recognizes that part 232 requires
compliance with other AAR standards
not applicable to ECP brake systems. For
instance, section 232.103(l) requires
compliance with AAR Standard S–469–
47 (‘‘Performance Specification for
Freight Brakes’’), which specifies a
train’s air brakes must respond to the
decrease and increase of brake pipe
pressure. However, ECP brake systems
respond to an electronic signal, not
brake pipe pressure, rendering S–469–
47 inapplicable to ECP brake systems.
Accordingly, paragraph (d) excepts ECP
brake systems from the requirements of
AAR Standard S–469–47.
In addition, GE requests that an
exception be granted to certain standalone ECP brake systems to the AAR
standards referenced in § 232.603(a)(1)–
(6), where a suitable justification is
provided. To this end, GE supplied
proposed language to be inserted in a
new paragraph of the final rule. While
FRA agrees that the rules should
provide for alternative standards, such
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flexibility is already provided in the
introductory text to paragraph (a) of this
section. If GE or any other potential
brake manufacturer seeks to enter the
marketplace with ECP brakes relying on
standards other than AAR’s, then it may
submit alternative standards for FRA
approval pursuant to § 232.17.
Accordingly, a new paragraph providing
for exception from the incorporated
AAR standards under suitable
justification is unnecessary.
Moreover, paragraph (e), provides
further flexibility for the introduction of
new technologies by providing for the
possible exceptions from the
requirements of subpart F of this part.
BLET objects to exempting railroad
operators from the requirements of
subpart F. According to BLET, the prerevenue service acceptance testing plan
requirements set forth in subpart F
provide data and other information that
is necessary in order to safely regulate
the technology. BLET also asserts that
‘‘FRA does not propose that an
exception be granted if testing or
demonstration is conducted pursuant to
an AAR standard that has been
incorporated by reference after being
subject to public review and comment.
Rather, FRA proposes a lower
requirement, that the testing/
demonstration standard only be FRArecognized.’’ (Emphasis removed.)
Subpart F of part 232 contains general
requirements for introducing new brake
system technologies. More specifically,
it requires a pre-revenue acceptance
testing plan. As FRA views existing ECP
brake system technology to be a fully
mature and well-tested technology, FRA
disagrees with BLET on this issue and
does not believe the provisions
contained in subpart F are applicable to
this existing technology. When subpart
F was originally added to part 232, ECP
brake technology was just beginning to
gain prominence. Since that time,
experience with the technology is far
more developed and the technology is
being used on many different trains
around the world. Moreover, FRA
believes that requiring ECP brake
systems to initially and continually
comply with a FRA approved standard
and to be approved in accordance with
AAR’s approval procedures prior to
being placed in service obviates the
need for existing ECP brake system
technology to comply with the
requirements under subpart F.
Accordingly, paragraph (d)(2) provides
for an exception from the requirements
contained in subpart F freight trains and
freight cars equipped with existing ECP
brake system technology that has been
conditionally or finally approved by
AAR in accordance with its approval
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procedures prior to the effective date of
the final rule in this proceeding. FRA
has limited the exception to ECP brake
system technologies approved by AAR
as of the effective date of a final rule to
provide an incentive to the industry to
move the introduction of the technology
along in a timely fashion.
In anticipation of future ECP brake
technologies not currently contemplated
within the scope of the incorporated
AAR standards or not approved by AAR
prior to the effective date of a final rule
in this proceeding, paragraph (e)
provides a procedure for introducing
such technologies without going
through the pre-revenue testing
procedures contained in subpart F.
Paragraph (e) permits a party interested
in using new ECP brake system
technologies or using an ECP brake
system technology not approved by
AAR prior to the effective date of the
final rule in this matter to file a written
request with the FRA seeking an
exception from subpart F. FRA would
expect any such request to include a
comprehensive narrative statement and
any evidence or facts justifying the
exception of the new ECP brake
technology from the testing and
demonstration requirements of subpart
F. The material should fully explain the
testing or demonstration that will be
conducted pursuant to an FRArecognized industry standard and
ensure that FRA is able to monitor such
testing or demonstration. FRA’s
Associate Administrator may revoke the
exception in writing for any reason after
providing an opportunity for the
affected party or parties to respond.
GE supports the adoption of proposed
§ 232.603(e), but recommends that ‘‘FRA
clarify that ‘new technology’ does not
include functionally equivalent
replacement components, consistent
with past practice.’’ To this end, GE
suggests adding a ‘‘new technology’’
definition to part 232, clarifying this
interpretation in the preamble to the
final rule, or including some additional
clarifying language to paragraph (e),
indicating that in lieu of an FRA
recognized industry standard, testing or
demonstration of new technologies
should be performed in an environment
with a safety equivalent to that in
paragraph (a).
Subpart F, as indicated in § 232.501,
already addresses the issue of new
technology. FRA intends subpart F to
continue to apply to the introduction of
new ECP brake technologies. However,
as previously mentioned, the purpose of
paragraph (e) is to provide a more
liberal alternative to subpart F for the
demonstration and testing of new ECP
brake technologies subject to the
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discretion of the Associate
Administrator on a case-by-case basis.
GE’s suggestion that the final rule
include language requiring some type of
adherence to an FRA approved ECP
brake design standard misses the mark,
since demonstration and testing may
occur before any determination on
design standards. Chronologically
speaking, new ECP brake technologies
can be tested and demonstrated under
paragraph (e) ‘‘right out of the box.’’
Then, if the testing or demonstration
results in an ECP brake technology
worthy of use in revenue service, the
manufacturer of that technology may
need to apply for FRA approval of that
technology’s new design standard under
paragraph (a) or (f). It appears that GE
may have mixed apples (testing and
demonstration) with oranges
(subsequently seeking FRA approval or
new alternative design standards).
During the testing and demonstration
phase, design standards may not even
be contemplated.
Section 232.605 Training
Requirements
The general training requirements for
railroad and contractor employees
performing the inspection, testing, and
maintenance on brake systems under
this part are contained in § 232.203.
Paragraph (a) of this section makes clear
that all of the training requirements
contained in § 232.203 are applicable to
ECP brake system operations and
requires that all railroads operating ECP
brake-equipped trains update their
training, qualification, and designation
programs to include provisions for these
operations. Accordingly, FRA expects
that railroad and contract personnel
responsible for performing brake system
inspections, tests, and maintenance on
ECP brake systems be trained, tested,
and designated in accordance with the
requirements contained in § 232.203 on
the ECP brake systems they will be
required to inspect, test, and maintain.
Section 232.203(c) contains general
requirements or elements which must
be part of any training and qualification
plan adopted by a railroad or contractor.
FRA continues to believe that the
elements contained in this section are
specific enough to ensure high-quality
training and broad enough to permit a
railroad or contractor to adopt a training
plan that is best suited to its particular
operation. FRA continues to believe that
the required training must provide
employees with the necessary
knowledge, skills, and abilities to
perform the tasks required for the
various types of brake systems the
individual employee will be required to
inspect, test, or maintain. Since FRA
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expects only a limited number of
employees will be involved initially
with ECP brake operations, a railroad or
contractor may tailor its training
programs only for those individuals
involved with ECP brake systems, based
on the tasks that employee will be
required to perform on those specific
systems.
Section 232.203(e) contains
recordkeeping requirements, the
cornerstone for training requirements
accountability. FRA continues to believe
that such records should be kept for
employees inspecting, testing, and
maintaining ECP brake-equipped freight
cars and freight trains. Such
documentation will allow FRA to judge
the effectiveness of the training
provided and will provide FRA with the
ability to independently assess whether
the training provided to a specific
individual adequately addresses the
skills and knowledge required to
perform the tasks that the person is
deemed qualified to perform. Moreover,
requiring these records will deter
railroads and contractors from
circumventing the training requirements
and discourage them from attempting to
utilize insufficiently trained personnel
to perform the inspections and tests
required by this rule. The required
records may be maintained either
electronically or on paper in the same
manner as required under section
232.203.
Paragraph (a) of this section also
requires ECP brake operations to comply
with § 232.203(f), which requires that
each railroad or contractor adopt and
comply with a plan to periodically
assess the effectiveness of its training
program. To ensure that affected
employees receive timely, effective
training relating to ECP brake
technology, UTU encourages FRA to
audit the training functions that are
required under § 232.605. BLET agrees
with UTU that FRA should reserve the
right to audit such training programs
and also proposes that training
programs should be submitted to FRA
for approval. AAR argues that the
regulations should not require FRA
approval of railroad training programs,
since it would delay any changes that
railroads might want to make.
FRA currently performs audits on the
training provided to railroad employees
and contractors under § 232.203. These
audits examine the course content,
learning objectives, testing methods,
refresher training, and methods for
ensuring the effectiveness of the
training. FRA intends to continue to
audit these training programs, including
those for transportation and mechanical
employees working with ECP brake
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operations. FRA does not require
submission of training programs relating
to conventional brake operations for
FRA approval and does not see a need
to require a submission of training
programs relating to ECP brake
operations. Accordingly, paragraph (a)
extends this requirement to employees
and contractors utilizing ECP brake
operations.
In addition, FRA continues to believe
that railroads and contractors should
periodically assess the effectiveness of
their training programs that would
include an assessment of the training
related to ECP brake systems. FRA
continues to believe that periodic
assessments may be conducted through
a number of different means and each
railroad or contractor may have a need
to conduct the assessment in a different
manner. By referencing the
requirements contained in § 232.203,
paragraph (a) requires that a railroad or
contractor institute a plan to
periodically assess its training program
regarding ECP brake systems and
permits the use of efficiency tests or
periodic review of employee
performance as methods for conducting
such review. While FRA continues to
believe that many railroads are capable
of assessing the quality of the training
their employees receive by conducting
periodic supervisory spot checks or
efficiency tests of their employees’
performance, FRA also believes that on
larger railroads the periodic assessment
of a training program should involve all
segments of the workforce involved in
the training.
Paragraph (b) of this section requires
each railroad to appropriately amend or
modify its operating rules to include
safe train handling procedures when
utilizing ECP braking systems. The
developed operating rules should
address the equipment and territory
operated by the railroad. FRA insists
that training on proper train handling
procedures is essential to ensuring that
locomotive engineers can properly
handle their trains with or without ECP
braking systems. FRA also continues to
believe that it should not specify the
specific knowledge, skill, and ability
criteria that a railroad must adopt into
its locomotive engineer training
program. Given the considerable
differences among railroads, FRA
believes that each railroad is in the best
position to determine what these criteria
should be and what training is
necessary to provide that knowledge,
skill, and ability to its employees
operating ECP brake-equipped trains.
However, to ensure that the railroads
and contractors provide and complete
training, paragraph (c) of this section
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requires each to adopt and comply with
such criteria and training procedures
and to incorporate them into its
locomotive engineer certification
program required by 49 CFR part 240. In
the final rule, the text of paragraph (c)
has been modified from the proposed
text for clarification purposes.
Section 232.607 Inspection and
Testing Requirements
Except for transfer trains, the existing
part 232 regulations require that each
train operating with conventional brake
systems receive a Class I brake test at its
initial terminal and when certain events
occur en route, a Class IA brake test
every 1,000 miles, and Class III brake
tests when the train consist continuity
is interrupted. When operating as an
extended haul train, the existing
regulations require that a Class I brake
test be performed at the train’s initial
terminal and at the train’s 1,500-mile
location, if operating further than 1,500
miles. In addition, under certain
circumstances, cars and solid blocks of
cars are required to receive either a
Class I or a Class II brake test when they
are added to a train. Each of these
inspections is expensive and timeconsuming.
An ECP brake system’s selfmonitoring capabilities, fail-safe
operation, and enhanced safety and
performance provide railroads the
ability to reduce the number of physical
inspections on a train. In a letter dated
January 26, 2007, filed in the related
ECP brake waiver proceeding, BNSF and
NS assert that ‘‘[t]his performance-based
technology supercedes [sic] the need for
a scheduled inspection based on the
amount of mileage that can be
accumulated within the boundaries of
the U.S. rail system.’’ Docket No. FRA–
2006–26435. Similarly, in the same
docket, two ECP brake manufacturers,
NYAB and Wabtec, state that when an
ECP brake system enters ‘‘Run’’ mode, it
provides diagnostics, continuous
monitoring, and fault reporting to the
locomotive display. According to the
manufacturers, ECP brakes provide to
the locomotive monitoring and feedback
of the most important brake data and
‘‘while it is not economically practical
to monitor for all potential brake system
failures, the increased level of
monitoring and data reporting should
allow safely extending the distance
between inspection points, coupled
with revised railroad procedures.’’
Letter dated January 29, 2007, in Docket
No. FRA–2006–26435.
FRA is convinced that if a train is
properly and thoroughly inspected, with
all of the defective conditions being
eliminated, then the train is capable of
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traveling distances much greater than
1,000 miles between brake inspections.
FRA’s experience with extended haul
trains over the last four years has
established that trains with
conventional pneumatic brake systems
that are inspected by highly qualified
individuals can safely operate up to
1,500 miles between brake inspections.
FRA is not aware of any significant
incident or derailment related to a brake
or mechanical component failure on an
extended haul train. Accordingly, in
paragraph (h) of this section, FRA
excepts trains operating exclusively in
ECP brake mode from the Class IA and
Class II brake inspections currently
required under §§ 232.207 and 232.209.
Paragraph (h) also excepts such trains
from en route Class I inspections
required under § 232.205(a) and (b).
Various comments were submitted
relating to these exceptions of en route
brake inspections. Since the exceptions
in paragraph (h) substantially relate to
the other paragraphs of section 232.607,
we will discuss them as appropriate
below.
Paragraph (a) requires continued
compliance with § 232.205(c)—which
describes the tasks and requirements of
a Class I brake test—for an ECP brakeequipped train at its initial terminal. To
offset safety concerns regarding the
exceptions to intermediate inspections,
FRA requires that Class I brake tests
performed at initial terminals on ECP
brake-operated freight trains be
performed by a qualified mechanical
inspector (QMI). FRA continues to
believe that a Class I brake test
performed on a train at its initial
terminal needs to be as in-depth and
comprehensive as possible and, thus,
should be performed by an individual
possessing the knowledge not only to
identify and detect a defective condition
in all of the brake equipment required
to be inspected, but also to recognize the
interrelated workings of the equipment
and the ability to trouble-shoot and
repair the equipment. Similarly, FRA
will require that all of the mechanical
inspections required to be performed on
a train at its initial terminal be
conducted by an inspector designated
pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11 in order to
ensure that all mechanical components
are in proper condition prior to the
train’s departure.
FRA believes that the regulatory relief
provided by paragraph (h) of this
section is justified by the increased level
of safety provided by ECP brake
technologies and the requirement under
paragraph (a) that a Class I brake test of
car equipped with ECP brakes be
performed by a QMI at its initial
terminal. The exceptions provided in
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paragraph (h), in conjunction with the
requirements of paragraph (a), would
allow most trains equipped and
operated with ECP brakes to travel to
their destinations without stopping for
any required intermediate inspections.
The regulatory relief provided by this
elimination of intermediate brake tests
will significantly reduce operating and
train delay costs.
In its comments, UP argues that it is
not necessary to utilize a QMI to
perform a Class I brake inspection for
movements up to 3,500 miles. UP
instead proposes that a qualified person
(QP) perform Class 1 inspections for
movements up to 3,500 miles and that
a QMI be required to perform
inspections for longer movements. UP
also notes that some trains operated
with ECP brakes may originate at a point
where a QMI is not present and where
train crews containing a QP may
perform the inspections. AAR also
objects to the requirement in paragraph
(a) that Class I inspections on ECP brake
operated trains be performed by a QMI.
AAR asserts that the QMI requirement is
more stringent than the existing
inspection requirements for trains
equipped with conventional brakes.
According to AAR, since a QMI is not
present at all initial terminals, requiring
a QMI to perform Class I brake
inspections would discourage railroads
from implementing ECP brake systems.
BRC supports paragraph (a), stating
that a QMI will help ensure the proper
condition of ECP brake systems prior to
departure. According to BRC, the
leeway requested by AAR and the
carriers to designate any person as
qualified is premature and should not
be considered until data can be
provided showing that inspections by a
QMI are unnecessary. BLET
wholeheartedly concurs that each Class
I brake test at an initial terminal should
be performed by a QMI. According to
BLET, the industry’s objection is
without merit and its two-standard
proposal will produce an oversight
nightmare.
FRA agrees that, at this time, a twotiered approach requiring a QMI for
only some Class I inspections of ECP
brake operations would result in
significant monitoring and enforcement
difficulties. In any event, as discussed
in more detail below, the final rule will
only allow freight trains and freight cars
operated with ECP brakes to operate to
their destination, not to exceed 3,500
miles, or up to 3,500 miles for unit or
cycle trains, before receiving an
additional Class I brake inspection.
Accordingly, there will be no ‘‘longer
movements’’ between Class I brake
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inspections that would allow for such a
two-tiered approach.
FRA also believes that the railroads’
concerns relating to QMIs are without
merit. FRA is not mandating the
railroads to operate with ECP brake
systems. Thus, if the railroads opt to
implement such systems, they will need
to adjust their operations accordingly.
FRA already requires that a QMI
perform Class I brake inspections on
extended haul operations, which are
limited to 1,500 miles between such
inspections. By more than doubling the
allowable distance, FRA insists that
there is an even greater need to require
that a QMI perform the Class I brake
tests on operations traveling further
than the currently allowed distances.
Moreover, the railroads’ concerns are
further mitigated by the reduction of the
number of Class I brake inspections
required en route. Since a QMI is
required for extended haul operations at
only 1,500 miles, it is unclear why AAR
asserts that requiring the use of a QMI
for ECP brake operations at 3,500 miles
would be more stringent.
In light of the significant benefits
provided by the extension of allowable
distance between Class I inspections to
3,500 miles, FRA does not believe that
requiring a QMI to perform a Class I
brake test on for an ECP brake operation
would discourage implementation of
this technology. The railroads have had
little difficulty in ensuring QMI
placement at facilities where Class I
inspections are required on extended
haul trains. Since the number of Class
I inspections for an ECP brake operation
will be less than those for a
conventional brake operation in
extended haul status, FRA does not
foresee this requirement becoming
sufficiently burdensome to effectively
discourage the implementation of ECP
brake system technology.
In paragraph (b), FRA permits a train
operating in ECP brake mode to travel
up to 3,500 miles or to its destination,
whichever is less, without any
additional brake inspections. FRA
believes that 3,500 miles allows
virtually all ECP brake operated trains to
travel to their respective destinations
and provides for coast-to-coast travel.
FRA also bases this mileage amount on
the fact that foundation brake rigging
and brake shoes will safety operate this
distance and redundant intermediate
inspections will not necessarily increase
ECP brake system safety. Because many
unit or cycle trains operate in a
continuous loop with multiple loading
and unloading locations, FRA has not
included the destination of the train as
a limiting factor for them. FRA is
specifically making this distinction in
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order to prevent misinterpretation of the
final rule as it relates to unit or cycle
trains. As these trains may have
multiple destinations, a strict
application of destination could result
in Class I brake tests being performed
more frequently than intended by this
final rule. Thus, in paragraph (b)(2),
FRA treats unit and cycle trains
differently by only requiring them to
receive Class I brake inspections by
qualified mechanical inspectors at least
once every 3,500 miles. To be clear,
under the final rule, no freight car or
freight train equipped with ECP brakes
would be allowed to travel more than
3,500 miles without receiving an
additional Class I brake inspection by a
qualified mechanical inspector.
UTU encourages FRA to continue to
consistently regulate the need for
mechanical inspections and repairs.
UTU asserts that the self-monitoring
feature of ECP brake equipment will
have no effect on monitoring the
mechanical functions of the freight car
involved. According to UTU, ECP brake
equipment will not monitor the
condition of draft gear, brake shoes and
hangers, coupling devices, safety
appliances and grab irons, sill steps,
springs, hopper doors, and the
multitude of items a normal mechanical
inspection is designed to check. UTU
also asserts that a well trained and
qualified mechanical inspector must not
be removed from the safety equation
because of advanced brake equipment
that is only designed to improve the
braking functions.
BLET agrees, asserting that
continuous monitoring capability is not
quite as robust as FRA claims.
According to AAR Standard S–4260,
§ 3.5.4.2, ‘‘CCDs with a low or missing
battery are counted as inoperable, but
may not be displayed as inoperable
until the total inoperable reaches less
than 90% with trainline power OFF, or
less than 85% with trainline power ON,
at which time a penalty brake
application will be commanded.’’
TWU similarly argues that ECP
braking does not have capabilities to
perform the safety critical inspections
indicated in FRA Technical Bulletin
MP&E 98–59. In contrast, says TWU,
ECP brake systems, as designed today,
while having the ability to monitor
certain aspects of the braking system,
are not designed or equipped to monitor
or detect defects on most equipment of
a train braking system, in particular the
complex brake rigging systems on the
various types of equipment. According
to TWU, 122 of the potential 127 brakerelated defects (96%) are not detectable
by ECP brake monitoring, making clear
that the advantages of real-time
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monitoring are both overstated and
misleading. BRC asserts that the ECP
brake system technology cannot detect
65 defects. Moreover, TWU states that
FRA accident data indicates that the
highest percentage of accidents are
caused by brake-related mechanical
defects not monitored by ECP brake
systems.
TWU further asserts that, in addition
to a serious decrease in the level of
safety based on brake system
considerations, the reduction in
inspection frequency will seriously
decrease the level of safety as it relates
to other mechanical systems and
components. ‘‘There should be no
question that reducing the number of
inspections will reduce opportunities to
detect defective equipment. The
reduction in frequency of inspections
will also reduce opportunities for
detecting bent, broken, loose, or missing
safety appliances.’’ TWU points out that
FRA previously noted that ‘‘railroads
have not conducted the excellent initial
terminal inspections that were
contemplated in 1982, when FRA
extended the 500-mile inspection
interval to 1,000 miles.’’ (Citing 66 FR
4113 (Jan. 17, 2001)). TWU also claims
that from January 2005 to July 2007,
FRA accident data includes 24
derailments, 2 collisions, and 3 other
type of accidents resulting from
mechanical defects, including
‘‘Tiedowns, doors, etc.’’ TWU asserts
that a comprehensive mechanical
inspection is critically important, citing
FRA Technical Bulletin MP&E 98–57,
which states, ‘‘In order to conduct a
proper Freight Car Safety Standards
inspection, both sides of a car must be
inspected.’’
AAR counters by questioning the
significance of the brake rigging issue.
According to AAR, from 1990 to 2006,
‘‘the industry averaged five mainline
accidents attributable to brake rigging
down and dragging,’’ identified by FRA
cause code E07C. In addition, says AAR,
U.S. railroads have 2,415 dragging
equipment detectors placed across the
country, which provide immediate radio
feedback to train crews.
FRA understands the concerns
relating to the ECP brake system’s selfmonitoring limitations. FRA
acknowledges that the ECP brake system
developed under the applicable AAR
design standards does not monitor a
number of brake components. However,
FRA believes that the labor unions’
concerns, while relevant, do not take
into account a number of factors. By
requiring a QMI to perform a Class I
brake inspection at initial terminal on
an ECP brake operated freight train, FRA
expects a reduction in all en route brake
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defects. While performing a Class I
brake inspection every 1,000 miles
would provide more opportunities to
detect defective equipment, FRA
believes that such detection is limited to
only obvious en route defects and that
an inspection by a QMI at initial
terminal will significantly reduce those
defects. Based on its experience with
extended haul operations, FRA feels
that a good, quality inspection
conducted by a QMI at the initial
terminal will ensure that the items not
monitored by the ECP brake system
computer will safely travel a distance of
3,500 miles.
For instance, in FRA’s experience, en
route Class IA brake inspections
performed subsequent to Class I brake
inspections performed at initial
terminals by QPs have significantly
higher defect ratios than those found at
en route Class I brake inspections
performed on extended haul operations
that received an earlier Class I brake
inspection performed by a QMI. As
indicated in Technical Bulletin MP&E
07–01, issued on April 3, 2007, in
addition to the numerous regular
inspections of extended haul operations,
FRA performed several formal weeklong audits at various locations to
determine the railroads’ compliance
with the regulations and whether the
quality of the inspections and tests
would justify allowing the inbound
inspections and record-keeping
requirements to sunset in April of 2007.
Most of the non-compliance identified
during the audits included the railroads’
inability to create, maintain, and
produce the required records of defects
found during the inbound inspections.
It was also noted that the railroads
occasionally failed to perform the
necessary inspections on cars picked-up
or set-out of extended haul trains on
certain corridors. Actual defective
conditions found at inbound
inspections were minimal.
FRA further believes that any
remaining concerns relating to en route
defects are offset by the ECP brake
system’s other significant safety
benefits, including increased train
control, a reduction of in-train forces,
shorter stopping distances, and its selfmonitoring capabilities. Moreover,
while some commenters provided data
on what portion of brake parts remain
unmonitored by the ECP brake system,
they did not establish the relationship
between those parts and the quantity
and significance of defects found and
derailments caused. FRA continues to
believe that the ECP brake system
monitors the more crucial aspects of the
brake system.
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FRA believes that TWU’s references to
freight car inspection standards and
guidance are misplaced. Although
freight car defects may be incidentally
detected during a Class I brake
inspection, part 232 does not govern
such issues. Freight car defects should
still be found when cars are added to a
train en route and when they are
otherwise required to receive a freight
car inspection under part 215.
FRA also continues to believe that
ECP brake system self-monitoring is
sufficiently robust. BLET’s citation of
§ 3.5.4.2 of AAR Standard S–4260 is
misplaced. Section 3.5.4.2 sets the limit
for the number of CCDs that report a low
or missing battery. This does not
reference or mean inoperable CCDs. All
CCDs may remain operable when
reporting low or missing batteries. The
ECP brake system is powered by the
train line and § 3.5.4.2 only indicates
that a back-up battery is necessary to
cover for a temporary loss of power.
Accordingly, to have a battery
malfunction is not critical to train brake
system operation. The purpose of the
limitation in § 3.5.4.2 is to eliminate the
possibility of train line power
disappearing when back-up battery
power is unavailable.
FRA recognizes and appreciates the
use of additional wayside detection
equipment, which AAR claims should
reduce concerns relating to brake rigging
malfunctions. However, FRA has not
had an opportunity to review that
equipment with respect to key attributes
such as network coverage, sensitivity,
and availability, and does not require
use of that equipment. Accordingly,
FRA does not feel comfortable relying
on such unreviewed technology, which
can be removed or modified at any time.
However, FRA does recognize that the
combination of on-board and wayside
monitoring does provide an additional
layer of safety for all train operations
and that the use of such technologies
may offer opportunities for further
liberalization of visual inspections
requirements in the future, given proper
safeguards.
UP believes that the allowable
distance between brake inspections
using ECP brake technology should be
extended to 5,000 miles, instead of the
3,500 miles proposed by the FRA, in
order to provide a significant incentive
for the railroad industry to implement
ECP braking in high-mileage services.
For example, says UP, an intermodal
train with ECP braking could be
operated round-trip between Chicago
and any of the west coast ports within
such a 5,000 mile limit. According to
UP, a 5,000 mile limit for ECP brake
operated trains between Class I brake
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61531
inspections with no intermediate
inspections would enable the operation
of sets of intermodal equipment in very
high-mileage, high-utilization, rapid
turnaround service.
To support its request, UP points to
the success of a previous operation. In
April 2004, UP operated a round-trip
test train 4,400 miles at a maximum
speed of 74 MPH between Chicago and
East Los Angeles. Based on that test’s
findings, UP and CSX jointly operated
one pair of high-speed trailer on flat car
(‘‘TOFC’’) trains for UPS between
Kearney, New Jersey and East Los
Angeles, California, a trip that took 59
hours. While there was some economic
penalty involved in this dedication of
equipment, UP says that it proved that
locomotives and cars could be selected,
maintained and operated in high-speed,
high-mileage transcontinental freight
service. In addition to the Class I
inspections performed at Kearney and
East Los Angeles, three Class 1A
inspections occurred en route. UP
asserts that a 3,500 mile limit would
have been extremely valid and useful.
According to UP, the elimination of 3
intermediate brake inspections of 40
minutes each could have potentially
reduced overall one-way transit time by
120 minutes or 2 hours. An ECP brake
operated train resulting in the same
running time as a conventional brake
operated train would require a lower
operating speed and would have
reduced fuel consumption and exhaust
emissions.
AAR also supports a higher limit of
5,000 miles between Class I inspections,
asserting that it would be more
consistent with FRA’s objective in this
proceeding to facilitate conversion to
ECP brake technology and provide
regulatory relief without adversely
affecting safety. According to AAR, a
5,000 mile limit would facilitate the
efficient operation of intermodal trains
in high-mileage, rapid turn-around
service. AAR claims that there is no
technical justification for setting the
limit at 3,500 miles instead of 5,000
miles given the capability of ECP
systems to monitor the critical functions
of the air brakes.
BRC supports paragraph (b), stating
that the proposed distance of 3,500
miles is ‘‘more than generous.’’
According to BRC, AAR and the carriers
have not provided real evidence that the
safety benefits offered by ECP brake
technologies will offset any of the
numerous safety risks that the
technologies cannot detect over long
distances. BRC asserts that without such
data, the railroads’ request for a 5,000
mile allowable distance between Class I
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brake inspections should not be
considered at this time.
After consideration of all the
comments provided and based upon
existing information available to the
agency, FRA is not convinced that the
allowable distance for ECP brake
operations should exceed 3,500 miles
between Class I brake inspections. FRA
believes that an extension of the
allowable distance to 3,500 miles is
justified by the increased safety
promised by ECP brake technology and
provides a suitable incentive for
railroads to implement and use ECP
brake technology. While FRA supports
the railroads’ interest in operational and
fuel efficiency, FRA believes the
extension to 3,500 miles provides such
efficiency. Moreover, based on its
experience and the lack of safety data
supporting a 5,000 mile allowable
distance between Class I brake
inspections for ECP brake operations,
FRA does not feel comfortable further
extending the allowable distance limit
at this time. The only example provided
by UP was a 4,400 mile joint operation
with CSX that received three Class 1A
brake inspections while en route.
Although such demonstrations, with
proper documentation, are helpful,
acquisition of further experience will be
needed to achieve confidence in less
restricted longer hauls.
AAR and UP also commented on FRA
concerns relating to brake shoe wear.
AAR claims that brake shoe wear should
not be a concern in ECP brake
operations moving with up to 5,000
miles between brake inspections.
According to AAR, ECP brakes reduce
brake shoe wear and the AAR
condemning thickness of 3/8’’ provides
an ample safety margin over a 5,000
mile run. UP stated that it would
consider establishing its own minimum
brake shoe criteria to properly configure
the train for the entire round trip.
FRA appreciates UP’s offer to
consider establishing its own minimum
brake shoe criteria for trips involving
more than 3,500 miles between Class I
inspections. However, FRA cannot rely
on that voluntary offer, which would
apply only to one railroad and could be
withdrawn at any time. In any event,
FRA continues to find cars with brake
shoes that are well past the brake shoe
replacement condemning limits for
trains equipped with conventional
brakes. On some trains not permitted to
travel beyond 1,500 miles between Class
I brake inspections, brake shoes have
been found worn into the backing plate.
Accordingly, FRA does not feel
comfortable at this time permitting
trains to operate more than 3,500 miles
between comprehensive brake
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inspections until more data can be
obtained to support such an initiative.
Currently, no extended haul train is
permitted to travel more than 1,500
miles without receiving another
comprehensive brake inspection. For
trains equipped with ECP brakes, FRA
more than doubles the currently
allowed distance to 3,500 miles. FRA
acknowledges that in the related
proceeding, Docket No. FRA–2006–
26435, the Safety Board provided for the
movement of trains equipped with ECP
brakes up to 3,500 miles. During the
pendency of this rulemaking, FRA
closely monitored those trains’
operations and collected information on
the equipment operated in those trains.
FRA reserved the right to make
appropriate modifications in the final
rule based on any further data then
available. Since cars equipped with ECP
brakes have only operated for a limited
time since the recent issuance of the
waiver under Docket FRA–2006–26435
and are not typical of those in the
general fleet with respect to the age of
components, FRA has not received any
data convincing it to modify the rule as
proposed in the NPRM. Accordingly,
paragraph (b) provides for a train
operated with ECP brakes to travel to its
destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles,
between brake inspections.
FRA acknowledges, however, that
notwithstanding the proposed
allowance of a train equipped and
operated with ECP brakes to travel up to
3,500 miles without an additional brake
inspection, instances exist where certain
trains would require the performance of
a Class I brake inspection en route. For
instance, the regulations governing
operations utilizing conventional brake
systems require that certain tests be
performed when a car is off a source of
compressed air for more than 4 hours.
FRA acknowledges that an ECP brakeequipped train’s on board diagnostics
reduce concerns relating to cars
remaining off air for extended periods of
time. Accordingly, in this proceeding’s
NPRM, FRA proposed to extend the
allowable off-air period to 24 hours. For
the purposes of organizational clarity,
the final rule includes the off-air
requirement in paragraph (b).
BLET opposes the 24-hour off-air
limitation. According to BLET, the
allowable off-air period should remain
at 4 hours and the Class I brake
inspections required on ECP brake
operated trains after an off-air period
exceeding 4 hours should be performed
by a QMI, not a qualified person.
AAR, UP, NYAB, and Wabtec all
assert that the allowable off-air period
should be extended to 120 hours (five
days). According to UP, providing for a
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120 hour off-air period will be
especially relevant for equipment such
as grain hoppers and coal cars in unit
train operations serving grain elevators
or electrical generating plants, where
intact train sets may be parked for
several days awaiting either loading or
unloading. UP further asserts that the
self-diagnostic capability of ECP braking
systems, with results displayed in the
locomotive cab upon powering-up the
ECP train line cable, will enable this to
occur without compromising safety.
Moreover, being off-air for up to 120
hours should not result in any
measurable or visually identifiable
deterioration of the non-ECP brake
components in the braking system. The
ECP brake manufacturers see no
technical or safety issues with extending
the allowable off-air period to 120 hours
and state that, when the ECP brake
system initializes, self testing will verify
the car is ready for service, including
the battery charge status.
FRA believes that an expansion of the
time allowed off-air for ECP brake
operations is justified based on the
capabilities of ECP brake systems or the
combination of those capabilities and
protection against vandalism.
Accordingly, FRA will require under
paragraph (b) that an en route Class I
brake inspection be performed by a
qualified person if a train operating in
ECP brake mode is off air for more than
24 hours. However, if such a train is
located within an ‘‘extended-off-air
facility,’’ as more fully described below,
the time limit is extended to 80 hours.
FRA continues to believe that dangers,
although reduced, remain when an ECP
brake-equipped train remains off air for
too long. Thus, the final rule retains the
proposed off-air time limit of 24 hours
since cars moving in service generally
have a dwell time of 24 hours or less
and this limit provides sufficient
flexibility while allowing the industry
to move equipment without impacting
timely inspections and maintaining an
acceptable level of safety.
In light of the comments filed in this
proceeding and upon further internal
deliberation, FRA believes that
extending the off air requirement to 80
hours for trains left in extended-off-air
facilities effectively ensures the safe
operation of ECP brake systems while
providing suitable flexibility for certain
operations. FRA recognizes that
additional flexibility may be reasonable
when a freight train or freight car
operated with ECP brakes is left at a
protected location controlled by the
shipper or consignee and not accessible
to the railroad or potential vandals. For
instance, a train or car equipped with
ECP brakes may be dropped off at a
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consignee’s plant on one morning and
will be inaccessible to the railroad for
several days, such as over the weekend
or a holiday.
Since railroads may not be able to
pick up the equipment from the
extended-off-air facility immediately
when it opens, FRA believes that some
additional operational flexibility should
be provided during this time. FRA also
recognizes that providing a limited
number of hours after the opening of the
facility on a given day may result in
enforcement issues when attempting to
determine the actual number of hours
the train may have been off air or in the
facility.
Accordingly, the final rule provides
for the retrieval of the equipment up
until the close of business on the fourth
day it is at the facility. Assuming the
extended-off-air facility maintains an 8hour work day, this would provide a
time span of up to 80 hours in that
facility. For instance, FRA believes that
the 80-hour time differential between
the facility opening on Friday morning
and closing on the directly subsequent
Monday provides suitable flexibility for
such operations.
From a safety standpoint, FRA
believes that an 80-hour off-air
limitation is justified if the train is left
in an extended-off-air facility. FRA
previously expressed its belief that in
certain circumstances the length of time
that equipment is removed from a
source of compressed air can impact the
integrity and operation of the brake
system on a vehicle or train.
Particularly, FRA indicated that the
potential for vandalism may be high due
to the location where equipment is left
standing. See 66 FR 4122 (Jan. 17, 2001).
While a train remains off air for any
period of time, it may be unattended,
providing an opportunity for vandalism.
FRA continues to believe that the
potential for vandalism is one of various
factors justifying an off-air limitation.
If steps are taken to substantially
reduce the potential for vandalism,
however, FRA believes additional
flexibility is justified. Thus, if a freight
train or freight car operated with ECP
brakes is at an extended-off-air facility
and is not accessible to the carrier or
potential vandals, FRA believes an 80hour off-air limitation is warranted. For
the purposes of this final rule, an
extended-off-air facility is a private
location controlled and access-restricted
by a sole shipper or consignee. The
location must be suitably designed to
effectively and significantly reduce the
possibility of vandalism. For instance, a
suitably fenced-in power plant with
sufficient entry-prohibitive security
would suffice.
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Also for the purposes of this final
rule, the times the equipment enters and
departs the extended-off-air facility
shall presumptively be when the off-air
time period begins and ends,
respectively. Otherwise, enforcement
would be difficult, since FRA would be
unable to ascertain when a train or car
went off and on air within the restricted
area. This presumption, however, may
be rebutted with evidence showing
when the equipment actually went off
air and when it was reconnected to an
air source.
For trains operating in ECP brake
mode and off air for more than 24 hours,
the Class I brake inspection may be
performed by a qualified person. FRA
acknowledges that while a qualified
mechanical inspector must be stationed
at each route’s initial terminal, it is not
reasonable or feasible at this time to
require one at each location a train
operating in ECP brake mode is off air
for more than 24 hours, because many
of those locations will be unpredictable.
Requiring a qualified mechanical
inspector at each point a train is off air
for more than 24 hours would likely
result in a significant disincentive for a
railroad to equip its trains with ECP
brake systems.
FRA also intends for these
requirements to apply to trains
operating in ECP brake mode, located at
their initial terminals, and off air for
more than 24 hours without the train
consist being changed. In other words,
under paragraph (b), if a qualified
mechanical inspector performs a Class I
brake test on a train operating in ECP
brake mode at the train’s initial terminal
and that train then goes off air for more
than 24 hours before departing from the
initial terminal, another Class I brake
test must be performed prior to
departure. However, FRA believes that
requiring a qualified mechanical
inspector at an initial terminal to
perform a Class I brake test twice on the
same train with unmodified consist
would be unnecessary and possibly too
onerous. FRA does not expect this
situation to occur often, since trains
rarely sit off air for more than 24 hours
after receiving a Class I brake test. The
train will not have traveled at all, but if
the same train spent 24 hours off air
after traveling 500 miles, a Class I brake
test by a qualified person would suffice.
Thus, the second Class I brake test may
be performed by a qualified person.
While FRA recognizes that additional
experience with ECP brakes may show
that brake tests are no longer needed
after being off air, FRA does not believe
the evidence suffices to prove that
proposition today. FRA’s intent in
providing these narrow expansions of
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61533
the existing 4 hour rule is not to alter
the tenet that equipment should be
retested when it is removed from a
source of compressed air for any lengthy
period of time. The 24 and 80 hour offair requirements apply to any ECP brake
operated train, regardless of whether it
is a unit or cycle train, and replace the
4 hour off-air requirement under
§ 232.205(a), which is excepted under
paragraph (h), as previously indicated.
The 24 hour allowance gives railroads
the flexibility to perform switching
operations while ECP brake-equipped
trains are en route and provide
flexibility to efficiently move cars from
one ECP brake-equipped train to another
when necessary, yet retain the concept
that such cars or trains be retested when
left disconnected from a source of
compressed air for longer periods of
time. The 24 and 80 hour time frames
are also consistent with the general
dwell time that cars experience while en
route and while in extended-off-air
facilities. FRA further believes that a
limitation on the amount of time that
such equipment may be off air is
necessary for ensuring that such
equipment is inspected in a timely and
predictable manner. If no time limit
were imposed or if too much time was
permitted, an ECP brake-equipped car
could lawfully sit for days or weeks at
various locations while en route to its
destination and be switched in and out
of numerous trains without ever being
reinspected. Such an approach would
drastically reduce the number of times
that the brake systems on such
equipment would ever be given a visual
inspection from what is currently
required and, in FRA’s view, would
seriously degrade the safety of the trains
operating with such equipment in their
consists.
Furthermore, if an ECP brakeequipped train was allowed to be off-air
for an excessive amount of time, it
would be virtually impossible for FRA
to ensure that equipment is being
properly retested as it would be
extremely difficult for FRA to determine
how long a particular piece of
equipment was disconnected from a
source of compressed air. In order to
make such a determination, FRA would
have to maintain observation of the
equipment for days at a time.
Consequently, a 24-hour limit on the
amount of time equipment can be
disconnected from a source of
compressed air as it maintains current
levels of safety and provides an
enforceable and verifiable time limit
that FRA believes provides the railroads
some additional benefit over what is
currently required both in terms of
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operational efficiency and cost savings.
An FRA inspector could monitor a 24
hour off-air period by merely returning
to the same accessible location the very
next day. FRA believes that a limited
extension to 80 hours off air at
extended-off-air locations provides for
further flexibility where the safe
custodianship of the equipment is
ensured and where the amount of off-air
hours can be easily determined.
In paragraph (c), the final rule retains
the proposed requirement that a Class I
brake test be performed by a qualified
person on each ECP brake-equipped car
added en route to a train operating in
ECP brake mode. However, FRA
believes that this requirement may not
be necessary if other safety precautions
are taken. Thus, the final rule will not
require a Class I brake test on such cars
when being added to a train operating
in ECP brake mode if the car had
previously received a timely and proper
Class I brake test by a QMI, the train
crew is provided documentation of that
test, the car has not been off air for more
than what is allowed under the final
rule, and a proper visual inspection is
performed prior to use or departure.
Accordingly, if an ECP brakeequipped car has received a Class I
brake test by a qualified mechanical
inspector within the last 3,500 miles,
documentation of that test is provided
to the train crew, the car has not been
off air for more than the amount of time
allowed by this final rule, and a proper
visual inspection is conducted when the
car is added to the train, FRA believes
that it would be unnecessary to require
an additional Class I brake test when
that car is added to an en route train
operating in ECP brake mode. However,
to account for those cars that have not
received a Class I brake test by a
qualified mechanical inspector within
the last 3,500 miles and that will be
added to a train operating in ECP brake
mode, paragraph (c) requires a new
Class I brake test under those
circumstances. Paragraph (c) is
necessary in light of paragraph (h)
excepting compliance with section
232.205(b). Unless a car operating in
ECP brake mode is off air for more than
the allowable time frame under this
final rule, it would not require a Class
I brake test when it is added to a new
train, since the rules contemplate that
the car would have already received a
Class I brake test within the previous
3,500 miles or at its initial terminal. The
documentation would be required to
ensure that a Class I brake test by a
qualified mechanical inspector will be
performed every 3,500 miles. Under
paragraph (c), any ECP brake-equipped
car being added to a train operating in
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ECP brake mode would require a Class
I brake test when the car has been off
air for more than the allowable amount
of time for the same reasons stated
above concerning paragraph (c).
FRA believes that a visual inspection
of the car’s brake components is a
suitable replacement for an additional
Class I brake test when the car or cars
added in these circumstances have
received a Class I brake test by a
qualified mechanical inspector within
the last 3,500 miles. The visual
inspection required by paragraph (c)
could be performed while the car is off
air and in conjunction with the
mechanical inspection required under
part 215 whenever a car is added to a
train. Thus, FRA believes that the visual
inspection required by paragraph (c)
does not impose any significant burden
on the railroads as they are already
required to visually inspect the
mechanical components on any car
added to a train under part 215. FRA
also acknowledges that the brake
systems on cars not equipped with ECP
brakes would be inoperative after being
added to a train operating in ECP brake
mode. To ensure the safe operation of
such equipment and trains, paragraph
(c)(2) of the final rule requires that cars
equipped solely with conventional
brake systems and placed into trains
operating in ECP brake mode also be
given a visual inspection to ensure their
safe operation and to ensure compliance
with § 232.15 when added to the train.
In the event that a car would be
required to receive a Class I brake test
when added to an en route train, the
final rule requires that the Class I brake
test be performed by a qualified person
for the same reasons stated in the above
analysis. To be clear, although any car
added to a train en route may receive a
Class I inspection by a qualified person,
the entire train’s travel distance is
limited to its destination or the distance
remaining until the train or any
individual car picked up en route has
traveled 3,500 miles since its last Class
I brake inspection performed by a
qualified mechanical inspector,
whichever is less. A Class I brake
inspection by a qualified person does
not reset the mileage clock for the entire
train.
FRA also sought comments on the
application of a Class III brake test to an
ECP brake system. NS expressed its
concern that the specifications outlined
under § 232.211(c) cannot be met.
According to NS, that section relates to
the increase and decrease of brake pipe
pressure as indicated by a rear end
gauge or electronic telemetry device.
ECP braking systems provide for the
constant charge of the brake pipe and
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this rear end value will not reflect the
air pressure differential currently
experienced with conventional braking
systems. NS asserts that since those
brake reductions will be made
electronically rather than pneumatically
from the locomotive, the end of train
device will not display a change in
brake pipe pressure to indicate a brake
application.
A freight train operating with
conventional brakes receives a Class III
brake test at the location where its
configuration is changed in order to
ensure the integrity of the train line.
Basically, a Class III brake test ensures
that the train brake pipe is properly
delivering air to the rear of the train.
Upon further review and consideration
of the comments, FRA recognizes that
for an ECP brake system, a traditional
Class III test may not be completely
applicable.
Accordingly, paragraph (d) requires a
Class III brake test for ECP brake
operated trains with certain
modifications. Paragraph (d)(1) includes
the locations and events that require the
performance of a Class III brake test on
an ECP brake operated train.
Accordingly, § 232.211(a) is being
excepted under paragraph (h).
Paragraph (d)(2) recognizes that the
Class III brake test requirements relating
to using EOT devices to observe brake
pipe pressure changes at the rear of the
train is not practical with ECP brake
operations. The diagnostic capabilities
of ECP brake systems will identify
defective brake conditions on all of the
train’s cars, including the rear car.
Under the applicable AAR standards,
this information should automatically
appear on the ECP brake system
monitor.
Paragraph (e) includes requirements
relating to the sequential initialization
of ECP brake operated trains. The
applicable AAR standards—as defined
in § 4.2.3 and its subsections in AAR
Standard S–4200 and in § 5.2 of AAR
Standard S–4230—provide procedures
for the initialization of the ECP brake
system. The standards provide for the
ECP brake system’s initialization to
occur by car either randomly or
sequentially. FRA believes that the
sequential initialization of an ECP brake
system provides the train crew with the
exact placement of the cars in the train,
which can help satisfy the consist
comparison requirements also under
this paragraph. An electronic version of
the train consist displayed on the
locomotive cab’s ECP brake system
monitor can also help during
emergencies and when identifying the
exact location of cars with brake
problems.
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Due to the possibility of an ECP brake
system not recognizing the inclusion of
cars not equipped with ECP brake
systems, paragraph (e) requires the train
crew compare the total number of cars
indicated by the train consist
documentation with the total number of
cars identified by the ECP brake system.
Under the existing regulations, tests
and inspections include brake pipe
service reductions and designate
specific psi specifications. In the NPRM,
FRA indicated that modifications to the
brake pipe reduction standard are
appropriate to reflect the technological
differences between ECP brakes and
conventional pneumatic brakes. Brake
pipe pressure in ECP brake-equipped
trains remains important, since these
trains still employ a pneumatic
emergency brake application for safety
back-up purposes and rely on the
pneumatic parts when used in an
overlay system. Accordingly, for trains
equipped with ECP brake systems, FRA
proposed to replace the existing brake
pipe service reductions and increases
with an alternative requirement for an
electronic signal that provides an
equivalent application or release of the
brakes. FRA indicated that any
alternative test procedures must
include, at a minimum, either the
electronic equivalent to each existing
test’s brake pipe reduction requirements
or the equivalent of a full service brake
pipe reduction initiated by an electronic
signal.
FRA sought comments on this
proposal, including the appropriate type
of alternative test. In light of how the
brake pipe’s use in an ECP brake train
will be limited to charging brake air
reservoirs, FRA sought comments on
how the existing regulatory brake pipe
leakage limits should be modified, if at
all, for ECP brakes and whether changes
in the leakage requirements will affect
the pneumatic backup capability of the
ECP brake system. In addition, FRA
indicated that comments should address
the need to include the specific
electronic reduction that is to be made
on ECP equipped trains during the
required brake tests and what type of
electronic signals would be suitable
equivalents to the currently mandated
20-psi and 15-psi brake reductions.
NS asserts that compliance with the
brake pipe service reduction
requirements cannot be met with ECP
brake operations. For instance, NS notes
that § 232.211(c) relates to the increase
and decrease of brake pipe pressure as
indicated by a rear end gauge or
electronic telemetry device. According
to NS, ECP braking systems provide for
the constant charge of brake pipe and
this rear end valve will not reflect the
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air pressure differential currently
experienced with conventional braking.
Since those brake reductions will be
made electronically rather than
pneumatically from the locomotive, NS
says that the ECP EOT device will not
display a change in brake pipe pressure
to indicate a brake application.
On the other hand, BLET believes that
there is a need to include both the
specific electronic reduction that is to
be made on ECP brake-equipped trains
during the required brake tests and a
determination of what type of electronic
signals would be suitable equivalents to
20-psi and 15-psi brake reductions
mandated in part 232. BLET believes
that the appropriate alternative would
be one that correlates a particular psi
reduction with its digital percentage
equivalent. According to BLET,
assuming that the train brake command
scale is relatively linear, a 20 psi
reduction represents approximately 77
percent of a full service reduction and
a 15 psi reduction represents
approximately 58 percent of a full
service reduction. Regarding brake pipe
leakage, BLET urges FRA to retain
current regulatory limits, since overlay
and emulator systems permit
conventional pneumatic operations.
Furthermore, AAR Standard S–4200,
§ 3.8, states that a ‘‘pneumatic backup
(PB) system shall be required on each
car to apply emergency brake cylinder
pressure in the event of a vented brake
pipe.’’ Establishing different brake pipe
leakage limits, says BLET, is a
prescription for confusion and
unnecessary risk.
AAR supports retaining the existing
brake pipe leakage limits. NYAB and
Wabtec also commented, suggesting
that, in order to maintain the same
functionality as with conventional
brakes, an ECP train brake command
should be applied in the range of 80 to
85 percent to address both the 15 and
20 psi reduction. According to the brake
manufacturers, the brake pipe
continuity can be verified by a
procedure that requires watching the
end of train brake pipe pressure as
reported to the locomotive.
FRA believes that an electronic or
digital equivalent of the current brake
pipe reduction test should apply during
a Class I brake test on ECP brake
operations. Since the brake
manufacturers are in the best position to
determine that equivalent metric, FRA
will rely on the percentages proposed by
NYAB and Wabtec. Accordingly,
paragraph (f)(1) will remain as proposed
with the understanding that the
electronic equivalents of 80 percent and
85 percent ECP train brake command
shall replace the 15 and 20 psi
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61535
reductions, respectively, when
conducting brake tests on ECP brake
systems.
Further recognizing the disparity
between the requirements of part 232
and the reality of ECP brake technology,
paragraph (f) addresses piston travel
requirements as they apply to ECP brake
operations. Paragraph (f) modifies
certain regulatory requirements related
to piston travel limits and adjustments
during applicable brake inspections
under part 232. For instance, under
§ 232.205(c)(5) a person performing a
Class I brake test must ensure that
piston travel be adjusted to specific
distances. Although FRA believes that
ECP brake operations require specific
piston travel limits, FRA recognizes that
the piston travel limits contained in
§ 232.205(c)(5) may not be fully
applicable to ECP brake systems. Since
the ECP brake system precisely
measures and maintains the amount of
brake cylinder pressure for each
specified brake application, piston
travel tolerances for ECP brakes may not
require the level of specificity as those
for conventional pneumatic brake
operations. Further, FRA acknowledges
that a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ requirement for
ECP brake system piston travel may not
be ideal or applicable. AAR and BLET
support paragraph (f)(1). BLET believes
that paragraph (f) adequately addresses
the subject of nominal piston travel and
AAR believes that manufacturers should
be permitted to establish alternative
minimum piston travel ranges.
Accordingly, paragraph (f) provides
flexibility for the piston travel limits in
§ 232.205(c)(5) as they apply to ECP
brake systems. While FRA limited this
flexibility in the proposed rule to
minimum piston travel limits, the final
rule provides this flexibility to all piston
travel limits in part 232 as applicable to
ECP brake operations. FRA anticipates
that recommended piston travel limits
for each ECP brake system will be
determined by the car’s design, weight,
and engineered brake ratio.
The final rule requires that such
limits be stenciled or marked on the car
or badge plate in the same fashion FRA
requires for systems and equipment
subject to § 232.103(g). FRA believes
that requiring the affixation of a legible
decal, stencil, or sticker or the
equipping of a badge plate displaying
the permissible brake cylinder pistol
travel ranges will effectively
communicate the acceptable ranges to
train crew members and will ensure the
proper operation of a car’s brakes after
being inspected. FRA believes that this
information is essential in order for a
person to properly perform the required
brake inspections. Ultimately, all
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modifications provided under paragraph
(f) apply to part 232 as it relates to ECP
brake operations.
In the preamble to the NPRM, FRA
anticipated that placing a car equipped
with conventional pneumatic brakes
into an ECP brake-equipped train may
be awkward at best, requiring use of an
electrical ‘‘run around cable’’ and
manual inputs into the locomotive
control system. In a letter dated
February 5, 2007, which is part of the
docket to this proceeding, AAR
provided a list of recommended
‘‘enhancements and modifications’’ to
Part 232 to facilitate the use of ECP
brakes. In that communication, the AAR
stated that railroads ‘‘do not plan to
commingle non-ECP equipment in
stand-alone ECP trains.’’ However, FRA
expressed its belief that foreseeable—
though rare—circumstances should be
considered in this rulemaking to the
extent possible. Accordingly, FRA
sought comments and information on
what requirements may be necessary to
safely allow the addition of cars
equipped with conventional pneumatic
brakes into a train equipped with ECP
brakes, including, but not limited to, the
placement and securement of cables
along cars equipped with conventional
pneumatic brakes to preserve their
continuity between non-consecutive
cars equipped with ECP brakes and the
appropriate placement in the consist of
cars equipped with conventional
pneumatic brakes.
AAR asserts that the railroads can
wrap ECP brake cables around the
conventionally braked cars. BLET urges
FRA to adopt a standard similar to that
set forth in § 229.89(a), which requires
that jumpers and cable connections
between locomotives shall be located
and guarded to provide sufficient
vertical clearance.
In response to the comments
provided, FRA has added paragraph (g)
to ensure the safe handling of train line
cables for the same reasons § 229.89
addresses jumpers and cables.
Considering the unique logistical and
operational issues relating to train line
cables—including their placement
between and throughout cars and the
potential need to somehow bypass cars
equipped with only conventional
brakes—FRA has added additional
requirements. For instance, the final
rule intends to ensure that the train line
cable does not drag, catch, or snag and
does not interfere with any human or
train movements. Paragraph (g) also
provides the same electrical related
protections provided under § 229.89(a).
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Section 232.609 Handling of Defective
Equipment With ECP Brake Systems
In § 232.609, FRA modifies certain
part 232 requirements as they apply to
freight cars and freight trains equipped
with ECP brake systems and hauling
defective equipment. In particular, for
such trains and cars, paragraph (k)
excepts certain existing requirements
and paragraphs (a) through (j) provide
alternative requirements.
Under § 232.15 and 49 U.S.C. 20303,
railroads may be immune to civil
penalty liability if a car or train with
certain inoperative or defective
equipment is hauled under certain
conditions. Section 232.15(a) contains
various parameters that must exist in
order for a railroad to be deemed to be
hauling a piece of equipment with
defective brakes for repairs without civil
penalty liability. The vast majority of
the requirements contained in
§ 232.15(a) are a codification of the
existing statutory requirements
contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 and are
based on the voluminous case law
interpreting those provisions. The
statutory provisions require hauling
defective equipment only to the nearest
place where necessary repairs can be
made and require 100 percent operative
brakes from any location where such
repairs can be effectuated. Thus,
because many locations where trains are
initiated with any frequency are also
locations where brake system repairs
can be effectuated, the statutory
provisions essentially require 100
percent operative brakes from a train’s
initial terminal. FRA continues to
believe that the proposed requirements
relating to the movement of equipment
with defective ECP brakes are generally
consistent with the statutory
requirements, ensure the safe and
proper movement of defective
equipment, and clarify the duties
imposed on a railroad when moving
such equipment.
As indicated above, in light of the
increased safety levels produced by ECP
brake systems, FRA has decided to use
its discretionary authority under 49
U.S.C. 20306 to provide an exception
from the rigid statutory provisions and
modify the regulations governing the
movement of defective equipment
concomitant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Under
certain circumstances, the statute and
related regulations provide immunity
from civil penalty when a train with
defective equipment is hauled to the
nearest location where the necessary
repairs can be made, regardless of
direction. Since a train equipped with
an ECP brake system and operating in
ECP brake mode with a minimum
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percentage of cars with defective ECP
brakes is capable of traveling safely for
long distances, the final rule permits the
operation of such a train and any cars
with defective ECP brakes to its
destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles,
for repair without incurring a civil
penalty.
While FRA believes that a train
operating in ECP brake mode with some
ineffective or inoperative ECP brakes
may continue to travel safely, concerns
remain if such a train includes cars with
defective non-brake or conventional
pneumatic brake equipment. ECP brake
systems do not monitor that equipment
and do not otherwise reduce the danger
of traveling with such defects. FRA is
cognizant of the need for logistical
flexibility to efficiently accomplish
repairs during the transition from
conventional pneumatic to ECP brake
operations. Furthermore, requiring strict
adherence to the statutory requirements
related to moving defective equipment
ignores the safety features provided by
ECP brake system technology and could
potentially stifle the industry’s ability
and desire to implement the technology.
The final rule invokes this statutory and
regulatory relief in paragraph (k) of this
document, by excepting application of
§§ 232.15(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7),
(a)(8), and 232.103(d)–(e) as applied to
ECP brake operated trains.
Under § 232.103(d), no train may
depart a location where a Class I brake
test is required to be performed on the
entire train with any inoperative or
ineffective brakes. FRA recognizes that
some trains operated with ECP brakes
may need to include cars equipped with
conventional brakes, especially while a
fleet makes the transition to ECP brake
technology. Under such and similar
circumstances, FRA believes that some
leeway needs to be provided for trains
operating in ECP brake mode. To
provide for such flexibility, and in light
of ECP brake operations’ higher levels of
safety, including shorter stopping
distances and constant real-time
monitoring of the brake system, FRA
believes that a train operated with ECP
brakes may depart its initial terminal
with less than 100% operative brakes.
However, FRA also acknowledges that
allowing a car to depart an initial
terminal with inoperative or ineffective
brakes may permit such equipment to
move indefinitely without receiving the
proper repairs. For this and other
reasons noted below, FRA believes there
needs to be a limit on the types and
number of cars that may depart in a
train operating in ECP brake mode from
a location where the train is required to
receive a Class I brake test.
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Per paragraph (k), a train operating in
ECP brake mode is excepted from
§ 232.103(d), which requires that onehundred percent of the brakes on a train
shall be effective and operative prior to
use or departure from any location
where a Class I brake test is required to
be performed on the train pursuant to
§ 232.205. For ECP brake-equipped
trains, this requirement is replaced by
the ninety-five percent effective and
operative brake requirement contained
in paragraph (a). FRA believes that this
provides flexibility from the rules
governing conventional pneumatic
braking systems while rendering a
sufficient brake failure buffer between
departing an initial terminal with
ninety-five percent effective and
operative brakes and experiencing a
penalty stop upon reaching eighty-five
percent effective and operative brakes,
as required under paragraph (d) of the
final rule.
The one-hundred percent effective
and operative brake requirement
contained in § 232.103(d) is based on
FRA’s long-standing interpretation and
application of AAR’s inspection and
testing standards as they existed in 1958
as well as the statutory provisions
related to the use of power brakes and
the movement of equipment with
defective safety appliances. See 66 FR
4104, 4124, 4128 (Jan. 7, 2001).
However, the design, operation, and
safety benefits derived from the use of
ECP brake systems dictate a need to
modify this long-standing requirement.
Under the AAR standards, if at any time
the ECP brakes on a train become less
than eighty-five percent operative, the
train will automatically stop via a
computer induced penalty brake
application. In addition, it has been
determined that a train with eighty-five
percent operative ECP brakes will still
have better stopping distances than a
conventional pneumatic braked train
with one-hundred percent operative
brakes. Moreover, ECP brake system
technology provides the ability to
continuously monitor the real-time
status of the braking system on each car
in a train. This allows a locomotive
engineer to always know the exact
status of his train’s braking system. In
light of this increased level of safety,
FRA believes that a partial reduction in
the percentage of operative brakes is
justified. Accordingly, for ECP brake
operations, FRA hereby modifies the
requirement to 95 percent effective and
operative brakes, which it believes
strikes a balance between the current
regulation and the need to allow for intransit failures that could compromise
the operation of the train or otherwise
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automatically shut it down when it
reaches 85 percent effective or operative
brakes.
Under paragraph (a), a train can only
leave its initial terminal if a Class I
brake test is performed by a qualified
mechanical inspector and all ECP
braked cars that are known to have
arrived at the location with ineffective
or inoperative brakes are repaired or
handled accordingly. The final rule
intends to ensure that at least 95 percent
of the cars equipped with ECP brakes
have effective and operative brakes prior
to departure from an initial terminal and
that cars are repaired in a timely
fashion. The purpose of the 95 percent
threshold is to prevent the delay or
disassembly of a train for the removal or
repair of a very small percentage of cars
that are discovered to be defective for
the first time while the railroad is
conducting its in-depth inspections
required at a train’s initial terminal. The
95 percent requirement also
acknowledges that some initial
terminals may not initially have the
capabilities of repairing ineffective or
inoperative ECP braking systems.
Accordingly, paragraph (b) allows for
the movement of cars with such defects
known to exist upon arrival at its
destination to be moved only to the
nearest forward location where repairs
may be performed and restricts the car
from being loaded or unloaded while
being so moved. However, to ensure the
safe operation of trains operating in ECP
brake mode, operators are reminded
that, under the final rule, the inclusion
of such defective cars cannot make the
train have less than ninety-five percent
effective or operative brakes.
TWU asserts that the widely
recognized cornerstone of train brake
system safety is a comprehensive train
brake inspection and test at the initial
terminal, which requires 100 percent
effective brakes. According to TWU,
there is no valid basis for extending
inspection intervals to 3,500 miles and
permitting trains to operate out of an
initial terminal without 100 percent
effective brakes. BLET is also strongly
opposed to paragraph (a). According to
BLET, AAR Standard S–4260, § 3.5.4.2,
indicates that the exact status is not
always known. Thus, says BLET, a HEU
display of 95 percent operable brakes
may not reflect all the brakes in the train
that are inoperable, meaning that the
locomotive engineer does not always
know the exact status of the braking
system. FRA notes that BLET’s concern
was based on a misunderstanding of
ECP brake system design, as discussed
previously during the analysis of
§ 232.607(b).
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61537
UTU contends that the overall braking
capacity of each freight car has not
changed with the introduction of ECP
brake technology. According to UTU,
when the number of operable brakes on
an ECP brake-equipped train is reduced
by 5 percent, the train has lost 5 percent
of its total braking capacity. Thus, says
UTU, an ECP brake operated train with
only 95 percent operative brakes is less
safe than a conventional brake operated
train with 100 percent operable brakes.
UTU also asserts that the issue of
allowing ECP brake-equipped trains ‘‘to
operate in and out of terminals, from
one Class IA brake test to another with
only 95 percent of the brakes operable
is also a significant degradation to
safety.’’ If these trains depart an initial
terminal, says UTU, an additional brake
failure en route may occur in potentially
unsafe territory and not in a yard’s
controlled environment.
On the contrary, UP believes that
FRA’s proposed limitation to not allow
less than 95 percent effective ECP
brakes per train is too restrictive. The
current regulations allow a
conventionally braked train to depart
after a Class I brake inspection with 100
percent operative brakes, with a
cumulative failure of up to 15 percent
of the brakes, equivalent to operating a
train with 85 percent operative brakes.
Therefore, says UP, there is no logical
reason to establish a more stringent
requirement on an ECP braked train.
AAR agrees, adding that FRA has
determined that a train can safely
operate with 85 percent operative brakes
and that an ECP brake operated train
with fewer than 85% operative brakes
will engage in a penalty brake
application. According to AAR, no
adverse safety consequences would flow
from such an event. Since the train will
automatically engage in a penalty brake
application when it reaches that 85
percent threshold, the railroads assert
the minimum amount of effective or
operative brakes at departure should be
a business or operational decision by
the railroad.
BRC supports paragraph (a) and
objects to the railroads’ proposal,
arguing that an 85 percent operating
rule ‘‘goes against all the claims of
operating efficiency, convenience, and
incentive for the railroad industry to
employ ECP brakes.’’ According to BRC,
this is especially a concern for ECP
equipped trains traveling long distances
without intermediate inspections. If
these trains are allowed to leave the
initial terminal at 85 percent operating
capacity, the likelihood that these trains
will have to stop and make repairs or set
outs at intermediate locations
significantly increases. UTU adds that,
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if these trains depart an initial terminal,
an additional brake failure en route may
occur in potentially unsafe territory and
not in a yard’s controlled environment.
FRA is not persuaded that it should
modify paragraph (a) from that proposed
in the NPRM. The purpose of paragraph
(a) is to provide operators flexibility in
an environment of technological change.
Although FRA understands TWU’s and
UTU’s concerns about ensuring 100
percent effective and operative brakes
on trains departing from initial
terminals, FRA believes that the ECP
brake system’s self-monitoring system
and significant increase in braking
capabilities provides a level of comfort
to maintain such flexibility without
compromising safety. That comfort level
is also increased by requiring only
limited movement of that train for the
purpose of repair.
UTU also seems to misunderstand
paragraph (a) when it asserts that the
issue of allowing ECP brake-equipped
trains ‘‘to operate in and out of
terminals, from one Class IA brake test
to another with only 95% of the brakes
operable is also a significant
degradation to safety.’’ The final rule
does not require Class IA brake tests on
trains operated with ECP brakes. In any
event, paragraph (b), further discussed
below, requires that each car equipped
with ECP brakes, and known to have
arrived at a location of a train’s initial
terminal or at a location where a Class
I brake test is required, shall not depart
that location with ineffective or
inoperative brakes in a train operating
in ECP brake mode, except when that
initial terminal does not have facilities
capable of repairing defective ECP
brakes. Paragraph (b), however, also
requires the entire train to stop at the
nearest forward repair location, causing
further delays. Thus, FRA expects
paragraph (b) to provide an incentive for
the operator to repair the defective
brakes or set out those cars at the initial
terminal. For these reasons, FRA
expects the railroads to quickly ensure
that all initial terminals and locations
where Class I brake tests are otherwise
performed are fully equipped with ECP
brake repair facilities and that most
repairs would be made at those
locations so that trains will depart with
100 percent effective and operative ECP
brakes.
FRA intends that the only exceptions
are ECP brake-equipped cars whose
brake defects were found after arrival at
the initial terminal and conventional
brake-equipped cars. For instance, if
defects to a car’s ECP brake system were
found during a pre-departure Class I
brake inspection, the ECP brake
operated train may depart and travel to
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destination. While paragraph (a) and (b)
imply this as a possibility, paragraph (e)
makes it clear.
FRA believes that the railroads
misinterpret the existing regulations
under subpart C and this final rule’s
paragraph (a) as they relate to the
minimum number of effective and
operative brakes on a train departing
from its initial terminal. Under
§§ 232.103(d) and (f), trains operated
with conventional brakes cannot move
with any ineffective or inoperative
brakes except under the safe harbor
provisions provided under § 232.15.
Even moving with the immunities
afforded under § 232.15, however,
§ 232.103(e) absolutely prevents such
trains from moving if the level of
operative or effective brakes reaches 85
percent. Accordingly, FRA is not
increasing the 85 percent limitation up
to 95 percent, but is decreasing the 100
percent limitation to 95 percent.
In any event, FRA believes that the 95
percent limitation at initial terminals
provides sufficient flexibility for the
implementation of new technology and
does not feel comfortable further
reducing that amount at this time. While
the railroads contend that the buffer
between departure and the ECP brake
system’s potential penalty brake
application (i.e., an automatic and
immediate emergency or full brake
application made by the ECP brake
system in accordance with the current
AAR standards) at 85 percent should be
a market or operational decision since it
is much safer than conventional brake
operations at that level, FRA believes
that the railroads fail to appreciate the
aforementioned reasons for the 95
percent limitation and the effects no
limitation may have. By further
reducing or eliminating the limitation,
the potential for an automatic
application of the brakes at 85 percent
effective and operative brakes increases.
In such an event, the stopped train may
delay other trains, potentially causing a
serious domino effect of non-movement.
Safety concerns also remain. FRA is
certainly sensitive to UTU’s concern
that such an event may occur in unsafe
territory, putting the train and its crew
at risk. Accordingly, FRA does not think
it reasonable to allow an ECP brake
operated train to depart its initial
terminal with as little as 85 percent
effective and operative brakes.
Paragraph (b)(4) also requires that a
car with ineffective or inoperative ECP
brakes be tagged in accordance with
§ 232.15(b). FRA believes that
§ 232.15(b) should equally apply to
trains operating in ECP brake mode and
should be a prerequisite for the
movement from the initial terminal of
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any car with defective brakes. Section
232.15(b) contains the specific
requirements regarding the tagging of
equipment found with defective brake
components and recognizes that the
industry may attempt to develop some
type of automated tracking system
capable of retaining the information
required by that section and tracking
defective equipment electronically.
Thus, paragraph (b)(4), through
§ 232.15(b), proposes to permit the use
of an automated tracking system in lieu
of directly tagging the equipment if the
automated system is approved for use
by FRA. FRA continues to believe that
these provisions are necessary to ensure
the agency’s ability to monitor such
systems and potentially prohibit the use
of the system if it is found deficient. The
proposed rule makes clear that, by
ensuring application of § 232.15(b) to
ECP brake systems, an automated
tracking system approved for use by
FRA would be capable of being
reviewed and monitored by FRA at any
time. This paragraph also notifies the
railroads that FRA reserves the right to
prohibit the use of a previously
approved automated tracking system if
FRA subsequently finds it to be
insecure, inaccessible, or inadequate.
Such a determination would have to be
in writing and include the basis for
taking such action.
Paragraph (c) permits, with certain
limitations, trains operating in ECP
brake mode to move cars equipped with
conventional pneumatic brakes. If a
freight car equipped with only
conventional pneumatic brakes would
have effective and operable brakes in a
train equipped with a ‘‘stand-alone’’
conventional pneumatic brake system,
the final rule permits a freight train
operating in ECP brake mode to move
such a car. If a car has defective
conventional pneumatic brakes—which
would be ineffective or inoperative in a
train with a ‘‘stand-alone’’ conventional
pneumatic brake system—the final rule
permits its movement by a freight train
operating in ECP brake mode, but only
if the movement is made in accordance
with § 232.15. By referring to § 232.15,
paragraph (c) intends to, amongst other
things, include the exceptions
delineated in paragraph (k) and limit the
movement of such cars to the nearest
location where repairs can be made.
Paragraph (c) also reminds regulated
parties to comply with the tagging
requirements of § 232.15(b) for the same
reasons as paragraph (b). FRA notes that
the inclusion of cars with defective or
non-defective conventional pneumatic
brakes into a train operating in ECP
brake mode shall not cause the train to
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have less than ninety-five percent
effective and operative brakes in
accordance with paragraph (a). FRA
believes that permitting a limited
inclusion of cars equipped with
conventional pneumatic brakes will
provide some flexibility as operators
transition their fleets from conventional
pneumatic to ECP brake systems while
ensuring a satisfactory level of safety.
BLET believes that § 232.15(e) should
apply with respect to placement of cars
equipped with conventional brakes in
trains operated with ECP brakes. As
previously stated, FRA expects that,
except for the sections and paragraphs
specifically excepted and the limitations
modified by the final rule, subpart C
continues to be fully applicable and
enforceable for trains and cars equipped
with ECP brakes. Since the final rule
does not except or modify § 232.15(e),
FRA intends its continued application
and enforcement. While the final rule
may remind the regulated parties that
certain specific existing paragraphs in
subpart C continue to apply (e.g.,
paragraphs (b)(4) and (c) referencing
§ 232.15(b)), this does not imply that
sections and paragraphs not referenced
do not apply. References to more
specific paragraphs may exist for the
purposes of clarity. FRA recognizes that
mixing technology may confuse
application of the existing law. For
instance, while it may be clear to most
how § 232.15 may apply to
conventionally braked cars even in
trains operated with ECP brakes, FRA
foresees confusion when applying
§ 232.15 to ECP braked cars in trains
operated with conventional brakes.
Thus, the final rule includes specific
paragraph references when regulating
the latter under paragraph (g).
Once an ECP brake system detects
that the train has less than eighty-five
percent operative brakes, AAR standard
S–4200 requires an automatic and
immediate full service brake
application. Paragraph (d) mirrors S–
4200 by requiring a train operating in
ECP brake mode to cease moving once
less than eighty-five percent of the
train’s cars have effective and operative
brakes. In other words, under paragraph
(d), no train shall move with more than
fifteen percent of its brakes being
defective or otherwise inoperative or
ineffective until certain conditions are
met. Recognizing, however, that
foundation brake rigging defects may
not be detected by the electronic system,
and that calculation of the percentage
may require an accurate manual entry of
the total cars in the train by the train
crew, FRA proposes paragraph (d) to
continually ensure the safe operation of
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trains operating in ECP brake mode with
ineffective or inoperative brakes.
Although there is no explicit statutory
limit regarding the number of cars with
inoperative brake equipment that may
be hauled in a train, the fifteen percent
limitation is a longstanding industry
and agency interpretation of the
hauling-for-repair provision currently
codified at 49 U.S.C. 20303, and has
withstood the test of time. This
interpretation is extrapolated from
another statutory requirement which
permits a railroad to use a train only if
‘‘at least 50 percent of the vehicles in
the train are equipped with power or
train brakes and the engineer is using
the power or train brakes on those
vehicles and on all other vehicles
equipped with them that are associated
with those vehicles in a train.’’ 49
U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally
enacted in 1903, section 20302, also
granted the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) the authority to
increase this percentage, and in 1910
the ICC issued an order increasing the
minimum percentage to 85 percent. See
49 CFR 232.103(e), which codifies the
ICC order. FRA believes that if the rule
is read in its entirety, there should be no
confusion as to the movement of
defective equipment, and that this
provision merely sets an outside limit
on the percentage of cars that may be
hauled in any train with inoperative
brakes. Consequently, FRA will
continue to require that equipment with
inoperative air brakes make up no more
than 15 percent of any train.
FRA acknowledges that § 232.103(e)
already prevents a train’s movement ‘‘if
less than 85 percent of the cars in that
train have effective and operative
brakes.’’ However, FRA has also stated
that § 232.103(e) ‘‘contains a clear and
absolute prohibition on train movement
if more than 15 percent of the cars in a
train have their brakes cut out or have
otherwise inoperative brakes.’’ Because
ECP brake systems are designed to
automatically stop the train whenever
and wherever the brake system has less
than 15 percent operative brakes, FRA
recognizes that some flexibility is
needed to ensure that such trains are not
stranded on the main track. To provide
flexibility in those rare instances where
a train experiences a penalty brake
application as a result of having less
than 85 percent operative brakes,
paragraph (d) includes requirements to
ensure the safe movement of such
trains. FRA recognizes the need for
some trains operating in ECP brake
mode to continue to an appropriate
repair facility or nearest siding after
experiencing a penalty brake
application. Since ECP brake
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61539
implementation is in its infant stages,
FRA acknowledges that a railroad may
not initially have a significant number
of repair facilities beyond the initial
terminals of ECP equipped cars.
Accordingly, paragraph (d) permits
limited movement of such trains for
repair or consist modification purposes.
In any event, in light of the Class I
inspection required under § 232.607, the
minimum number of ineffective or
inoperative brakes allowed under
§ 232.609, and an ECP brake system’s
continuous monitoring and diagnostics
functions, FRA believes that trains
operating in ECP brake mode will rarely,
if ever, reach fifteen percent inoperative
or ineffective brakes. However, FRA
believes that paragraph (d)—in an
abundance of caution and in
anticipation of such a possibility
occurring—will ensure safe and efficient
operations. In order to move a train
operating in ECP brake mode that
experiences a penalty brake application
due to having less than 85 percent
effective and operative brakes,
paragraph (d) requires the train crew to
perform a visual inspection of the entire
train, ensure the safe operation of the
train, and determine that it is safe to
move the train.
Under the current regulations, visual
inspections are generally performed
when moving defective equipment since
a ‘‘qualified person’’ must determine
that the car is safe to move. It is FRA’s
understanding that most, if not all,
railroads require a crew member to
make a visual inspection of a car when
a problem occurs en route. A proper
visual inspection ensures that the brakes
are cut out on a faulty car and
eliminates the possibility of dragging or
stuck brakes. A dragging or loose part or
piece of equipment can find its way
under a wheel, causing a derailment. A
brake that will not release—due to bent
or fouled brake rigging or a problematic
control valve—will cause the wheel to
slide. A sliding wheel will not properly
traverse a switch or cross-over, setting
up a potential derailment. A sliding
wheel may also cause a severe flat spot
to occur on the wheel, which can also
lead to a derailment and stress on the
rail. By requiring that the train crew
ensure the safe operation of the train
and determine that it is safe to move the
train, FRA intends to make clear that it
is the railroad’s responsibility, through
its crew, to do whatever is necessary to
ensure safe train operation under the
flexibility provided by paragraph (d).
Any deviation from the requirements
under paragraph (d) while moving a
train with less than eighty-five percent
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effective brakes would pose a significant
safety hazard and violate the rule.
In addition, under paragraph (d), the
train’s subsequent movement must be
made in a restricted ECP brake Switch
Mode to the nearest or nearest forward
location where necessary repairs or
changes to the consist can be made.
Under AAR Standard S–4200 § 4.2.6.2.2,
the speed of an ECP brake-equipped
train in Switch Mode shall not exceed
20 mph. The purpose of the 20 mph
limitation, among Switch Mode’s other
restrictions, is to ensure the safe
movement of the train with less than
ideal brake operations while allowing
the train to operate to a location where
defective braking systems can be
repaired or where cars can be added or
removed from the train so that it will
have at least eighty-five percent
effective and operative brakes.
BLET notes that paragraph (d)(4), as
proposed in the NPRM, appeared to
prohibit a railroad from opting to move
an ECP brake operated train with less
than 85% operative brakes in Switch
Mode to the nearest rearward repair
location. If FRA intended to prohibit a
backhaul, BLET expressed interest in
FRA’s rationale. The proposed rule
provided for the movement of defective
equipment to the ‘‘nearest forward’’
repair location and did not intend to
prohibit a backhaul of equipment when
appropriate. The purpose of FRA
invoking its discretionary authority
under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to partially
except application of 49 U.S.C. 20303 to
ECP brake operations was to remove a
disincentive towards ECP brake
implementation by providing
operational flexibility when hauling
defective equipment for the purposes of
repair. FRA intends to allow the
railroads to move defective equipment
to the first suitable location for repairs
in either direction it so chooses.
Accordingly, FRA has clarified the final
rule to provide for such movement to
the ‘‘nearest or nearest forward repair
location.’’ Paragraph (e) permits trains
operating in ECP brake mode with
defective ECP brakes to be used or
hauled without civil penalty liability
under part 232 to its destination, not to
exceed 3,500 miles. Such defects must
be found for the first time during a Class
I brake test or en route. As previously
mentioned, FRA believes that a train
operating in ECP brake mode can safely
continue to its destination with some
ineffective or inoperative brakes.
Accordingly, paragraph (e) proposes
that all such trains be permitted to
travel to its destination, not to exceed
3,500 miles, without incurring civil
penalty liability in relation to the use of
those brakes. Paragraph (e) also
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proposes that this civil penalty
immunity be extended to such trains
with ECP brake defects found at the
initial terminal. If such defects are
found after a train is put together in
preparation for its next departure, it
may be overly burdensome to require
that the train be taken apart for repair.
If a brake repair may be performed
without taking the train apart, FRA
acknowledges that the repair may cause
undue delay. If the ECP brake defect is
found at the location where a Class I
inspection is performed, FRA believes
that such burdens and delays may be
avoided in light of the increased safety
afforded by ECP brake systems.
FRA believes that this flexibility
needs to be afforded differently to
defects that are known to exist upon a
car’s arrival at its destination or at a
location where a Class I brake test will
be required on the train than to defects
found for the first time at the location
where a Class I brake test is performed.
If a freight car equipped with an ECP
brake system is known to have arrived
with ineffective or inoperative brakes at
the location of a train’s initial terminal
or at a location where a Class I brake test
is required under § 232.607(b), that car
is subject to the limitations in paragraph
(b), not paragraph (e). Paragraph (b)
intends to ensure that known defects are
repaired before continued use and to
prevent trains operating in ECP brake
mode from traveling indefinitely
without repairing their defective ECP
brakes. On the other hand, by retaining
paragraph (e) as proposed, FRA
recognizes the burden placed on
operators to comply with such a rule
when it discovers the defect when it is
in the process of putting a train together
or after a train is already put together
and inspected. Paragraph (e) recognizes
that burden by treating the train
similarly to a train that detects a
defective ECP brake while it is en route.
Paragraph (f) provides limited
flexibility for trains operating in ECP
brake mode with a non-brake safety
appliance defect on a car equipped with
ECP brakes. To enjoy such flexibility
under paragraph (f), the car may only be
used or hauled to the nearest or nearest
forward location for repairs. As noted
above, in light of the increased safety
levels afforded by ECP brake system
technologies, the final rule allows trains
operating in ECP brake mode with
defective ECP brakes to travel to its
destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles.
FRA does not believe it prudent to
provide the same level of flexibility to
cars operating in ECP brake-equipped
trains with non-brake safety appliance
defects, since an ECP brake system’s
increased safety level does not reduce
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the dangers of such defects. However,
FRA does believe that flexibility should
be afforded to permit the direct hauling
of such equipment to the nearest or
nearest forward repair location. To
require the hauling of ECP brake
equipment to the nearest location where
necessary repairs can be effectuated,
rather than allowing such to the nearest
forward location, could create
unnecessary safety hazards. As there
initially will only be a limited number
of ECP brake-equipped trains in
operation at any given time, the ability
to switch cars from one ECP train to
another, merely for the purposes of
getting the car to a closer repair facility,
will be severely limited. Rather than
requiring cars equipped with ECP
brakes to be hauled in non-ECP braked
trains, where their brakes will be
inoperative, FRA believes it is safer to
permit the car to continue in the train
equipped with ECP brakes to the next
forward location where the necessary
non-brake safety appliance repairs can
be made.
In the event trains must include cars
equipped with brake systems not
compatible with the train’s brake
system, the final rule includes
requirements to ensure the safe
operation of such trains. Paragraph (g)
allows a train operating with a
conventional pneumatic brake systemregardless of whether it is a train with
‘‘stand-alone’’ conventional pneumatic
brakes or an ECP brake-equipped train
operating in conventional pneumatic
brake mode—to include cars with standalone ECP brake systems. To maintain
an acceptable level of safety, however,
paragraph (g) requires that such trains
must have at least 95 percent effective
and operative brakes at the conclusion
of a Class I brake test, inclusive of all
cars regardless of braking systems.
Further, to meet the same level of safety
intended by 49 CFR 232.103(d),
paragraph (g) also requires that the train
have 100 percent effective and operative
conventional pneumatic brakes at the
Class I brake test site when operating in
conventional pneumatic mode.
Accordingly, paragraph (g) allows
trains equipped with a conventional
pneumatic brake system—or with ECP
brake systems and operating in
conventional pneumatic brake mode—to
operate with freight cars equipped with
stand-alone ECP brake systems under
limited circumstances. Under paragraph
(g), any such train not in compliance
with those circumstances shall not be
operated. The purpose of these
limitations is to ensure the safe
operation of such trains that contain
cars with incompatible stand-alone ECP
brake systems. FRA understands that
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some trains operating with conventional
pneumatic brakes may need to carry
cars with incompatible stand-alone ECP
brake systems, especially when the
implementation of ECP brake system
technology is in its infant stages. For
instance, FRA anticipates that a need
may arise to move a new ECP brakeequipped car in a train operating with
conventional pneumatic brakes from the
car manufacturer’s facility or a repair
shop to a location where the railroad
operates trains equipped with ECP
brakes. FRA also anticipates that a dual
mode ECP brake system operating in
ECP brake mode may incur a
malfunction—such as a broken train
line cable or locomotive controller—
forcing the operator to switch the train’s
operation to conventional pneumatic
brake mode. As long as the train’s total
number of cars with ineffective or
inoperative brakes does not fall below
the threshold percentage contained in
paragraph (g)—via reference to
paragraph (d)—FRA believes that the
train may safely include cars with
incompatible stand-alone ECP brake
systems.
Paragraph (g) includes requirements
for the subject train and each of its
stand-alone ECP brake-equipped cars.
For such a train to operate, it must
comply with the minimum percentage
of operative brakes required by
paragraph (h) when at an initial
terminal—which will be discussed
below—or paragraph (d) when en route
for the same reasons discussed in
paragraph (d). Under paragraph (g), a
stand-alone ECP brake-equipped car in
a train operating with conventional
pneumatic brakes can only be moved for
delivery to a railroad receiving the
equipment or to a location where the car
may be added to a train operating in
ECP brake mode. Otherwise, the
movement of the car is restricted to the
nearest available location where
necessary repairs can be effectuated. In
addition, such cars must be tagged in
accordance with § 232.15(b) for the
same reasons as stated for the analysis
of paragraph (b) and placed in the train
in accordance with § 232.15(e). Section
232.15(e) contains the requirements
regarding the placement of cars in a
train that have inoperative brakes. The
requirements contained in that
paragraph are consistent with the
current industry practice and are part of
almost every major railroad’s operating
rules. By incorporating § 232.15(e) by
reference, paragraph (g) prohibits the
placing of a vehicle with inoperative
brakes at the rear of the train and the
consecutive placing of more than two
vehicles with inoperative brakes, as test
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track demonstrations have indicated
that when three consecutive cars in a
train operating with conventional
pneumatic brakes have their brakes cutout, it is not always possible to obtain
an emergency brake application on
trailing cars. To remain consistent with
existing industry practice, paragraph (g),
by referencing § 232.15(e), requires that
such equipment shall not be placed in
a train if it has more than two
consecutive individual control valves
cut out or if the brakes controlled by the
valve are inoperative.
NS is concerned that § 232.609 does
not adequately allow for the handling of
defective equipment with ECP brake
systems. NS notes that
§ 232.609(g)(2)(iii) requires compliance
with § 232.15(e)(2), which states that
‘‘no more than two freight cars with
either inoperative brakes or not
equipped with power brakes shall be
consecutively placed in the train.’’ Due
to the efficiencies gained in stopping
and the drastically reduced slack action,
says NS, for ECP trains this should be
increased to ‘‘no more than five freight
cars with defective air brakes to being
cut out electronically.’’ NS supports that
no more than five cars that are
electronically cut out shall be placed
consecutively within the train, two of
which may be pneumatically cut out.
ECP brake-equipped cars that have the
brakes electronically cut out, says NS,
will retain the same rapid venting of
brake pipe in order to produce a
pneumatic emergency with no adverse
effects on the braking system. NYAB
and Wabtec make the same proposal.
FRA sees the merit in the proposal of
NS, NYAB, and Wabtec and continues
to believe that § 232.15(e)(1) should
apply to the placement of cars equipped
with ECP brakes in trains operated with
ECP brakes, since it is always dangerous
when the last car in the train is without
braking capacity. FRA also continues to
believe that no more than two
consecutive cars should be placed in a
train with their brakes pneumatically
cut out, since the train’s pneumatic
brake application should remain
available in emergency situations,
especially in trains operating with ECP
overlay systems. FRA recognizes that a
train operated with ECP brakes may
safely initiate an emergency brake
application with up to five ECP brakeequipped cars electronically cut out via
the car’s CCD. Pneumatically cut out
brakes will increase the length of the
brake pipe, which may slow the rapid
venting of brake pipe pressure to the
point where an emergency brake
application cannot be made. However,
all effective and operative ECP brakes
should be able to apply in an ECP brake
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61541
operated train, since the train line cable
continues to carry the emergency
transmission with equal strength and
speed throughout the entire train.
Accordingly, any increase in
consecutive cars equipped with ECP
brakes with ineffective or inoperative
brakes may only affect train handling,
not train line braking communications.
FRA recognizes that a railroad may be
more familiar with each territory it
traverses and may be in a better position
to determine how many consecutive
cars with electronically cut out brakes
may be allowed without causing safety
issues. However, in the interests of
public safety, and in light of the
comments made by the brake
manufacturers and railroads, FRA
believes that the performance
characteristics of the ECP brake system
will safely allow for up to five
consecutive cars to be electronically cut
out in a train.
FRA further recognizes that a one-toone CCD-to-car ratio does not exist for
all cars. Intermodal cars, for example,
have more platforms than CCDs and
control valves. Accordingly, for the
same reasons provided above, the final
rule prevents more than five
consecutive platforms with
electronically cut out brakes on
intermodal trains. Thus, to ensure
sufficient train handling safety, the final
rule also requires that the sets of
consecutive cars with electronically cut
out brakes be sufficiently spaced. FRA
expects the number of cars with
operative brakes buffering between
these sets to differ depending upon a
variety of factors including, but not
limited to, the length of the train, the
weight of the train and certain cars, the
types of cars, and the territory. The
sufficiency of buffer cars, therefore,
must be determined by each railroad
and enforced by FRA on a case-by-case
basis.
Paragraph (h) includes additional
requirements for freight trains equipped
and operating with conventional
pneumatic brakes when departing an
initial terminal with stand-alone ECP
brake-equipped freight cars. On such
trains, paragraph (h) allows the train to
depart its initial terminal with at least
ninety-five percent effective and
operative brakes and up to five percent
of the cars to be equipped with ECP
brakes. However, each car equipped
with conventional pneumatic brake
systems must have effective and
operative brakes and each car equipped
with dual mode ECP brake systems must
operate in conventional pneumatic
brake mode and have effective and
operative conventional pneumatic
brakes. The five percent of cars with
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
potentially defective brakes may only be
cars equipped with stand-alone ECP
brake systems.
Paragraph (i) provides for the
electronic tagging of defective ECP brake
equipment when being moved in a train
operating in ECP brake mode. FRA
recognizes that § 232.15(b) already
provides requirements for electronic
tagging of defective equipment.
However, in view of the ECP brake
system’s unique characteristics, it is not
entirely clear how § 232.15(b) would
appropriately apply to electronic
records developed, retained, and
maintained by ECP brake systems.
Accordingly, paragraph (i) contains the
criteria necessary to determine whether
an ECP brake system complies with
§ 232.15(b).
In the NPRM, FRA stated that, in
order for an ECP brake system to
provide electronic tagging of equipment
with defective safety appliances, the
ECP brake system must provide
appropriate, constant, and accurate
information to the crew via a display in
the cab of the lead locomotive, and
ensure that the information is securely
stored and is accessible to FRA and
appropriate operating and inspection
personnel. To ensure the integrity of
electronic tagging, FRA asserted, the
ECP brake system must securely store
the information. FRA sought comments
on how secure a system must be.
BLET and AAR responded to this
proposal with concerns relating to the
secure storage of information
requirement. According to BLET, any
resolution of electronic recordkeeping
issues should consider the solutions
provided by the RSAC Locomotive
Safety Standards Working Group. AAR
does not believe it likely that an
employee would seek to override the
ECP software. In any event, AAR points
out that since there is no information
security requirement for paper records,
there is no reason to require information
security for electronic records. FRA
agrees with BLET and AAR on this issue
and has not included the information
security requirement in the final rule.
However, the remainder of the proposal
has been retained in the final rule. FRA
continues to believe that the electronic
tag information must be accessible for
safety and oversight purposes.
Paragraph (i) makes clear that an
automated tracking system approved for
use by FRA must be capable of being
reviewed and monitored by FRA at any
time. The information should also be
accessible to subsequent train crews that
require notification of defects.
In the NPRM, FRA acknowledged that
some railroads may also desire to use
the ECP brake system to electronically
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tag defective non-ECP brake equipment.
FRA anticipates that such electronic
tagging would have to be manually
entered into the system, since safety
appliances are not monitored by the
ECP brake system. FRA sought
comments on whether the rule should
include provisions allowing for the
manual input of non-ECP brake defects
into ECP brake systems for electronic
tagging purposes. FRA also sought
comments on what requirements and
allowances should be made in
consideration of that interest, including
means to associate or merge ECP brake
system information with information
not monitored electronically by the ECP
brake system. No comments were
received on this issue. Accordingly,
FRA has not provided for such
electronic tagging capabilities in the
final rule. This does not mean that a
railroad is prevented from bringing an
electronic tagging program to FRA for its
approval under § 232.15(b) when it
pertains to non-ECP brake defects and
utilizes the ECP brake technology to
electronically tag and track such
equipment.
In the NPRM, FRA acknowledged that
locomotive engineers may be distracted
or subjected to information overload by
multiple monitors or displays in the
locomotive cab, thus potentially
endangering the safe operation of the
train. FRA sought comments and
information on this issue. In Wabtec’s
and NYAB’s experience, the additional
display has not been an issue with the
operators. In the event that an
additional display is added, say the
brake manufacturers, the information
displayed is minimal and straight
forward. In the case where ECP brake
system information is integrated into the
existing displays, ECP information
replaces air brake information. BLET
states that Appendix E to Part 236
addresses the issue of human-machine
interface design where positive train
control technology is implemented.
Otherwise, says BLET, this issue is not
ripe for resolution in the final rule. AAR
agrees, stating that information overload
caused by multiple monitors or displays
in the locomotive cab is better suited for
a separate proceeding. In light of the
comments, the final rule does not
include any requirements relating to
ECP brake system monitors and
displays.
Paragraph (j) requires that the
railroads adopt and comply with written
procedures governing the movement of
defective equipment. The procedures
must comply with the related regulatory
requirements, including those in the
final rule. FRA expects each railroad to
develop appropriate procedures
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regarding its handling and repair of
defective equipment containing ECP
brake systems or hauled in trains
operating in ECP brake mode. FRA
acknowledges that many railroads may
already have such procedures in place.
FRA believes that the establishment of
these procedures is the most effective
means by which to minimize the
possibility of future accidents caused by
the movement of defective equipment
on cars and trains equipped with ECP
brake systems or operating in ECP brake
mode. Given the introduction of new
technology and its partial
incompatibility with existing systems,
FRA believes the need for adoption and
compliance with such procedures is
critical for continued safety in the rail
industry.
BLET suggests that the procedures
governed by paragraph (j) should be
filed with, rather than merely be made
available to, FRA. FRA has placed the
burden on the railroads to be custodians
of the information referenced in
paragraph (j)(1). FRA only needs access
to the information in certain situations
and does not require ownership or
custodianship. Accordingly, FRA sees
no need to expend its resources on
receiving and maintaining such files.
In contrast, however, the information
required in paragraph (j)(2) must be
filed with FRA for continual
enforcement purposes. FRA cannot be
expected to enforce its rules relating to
the handling of defective equipment
without this information instantly and
continually available. To ensure
compliance with the requirements
concerning the performance of ECP
brake system repairs, paragraph (j)(2)
requires railroads to submit to FRA,
prior to operating ECP brake systems in
revenue service, a list identifying
locations where such repairs may be
made. FRA believes that the list should
encompass a sufficient number of
locations to ensure that Class I brake
tests are performed at appropriate
intervals and that trains equipped with
ECP brake systems do not travel further
than their destination or 3,500 miles
without being inspected and repaired at
Class I brake test locations and repair
facilities. If a railroad adds or removes
any repair facility from its system,
paragraph (j)(2) requires that the
railroad amend or modify that list by
timely notifying FRA of those changes at
least 15 days in advance.
Paragraph (k) explicitly excepts other
portions of part 232 as they apply to
ECP brake systems. For instance,
paragraph (k) excepts application of
§ 232.15(a)(2) and (a)(5) through (a)(7),
which generally require that equipment
with defective safety appliances be
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repaired at the location where they are
first discovered to be defective or that
they be moved only to the nearest
available location where necessary
repairs can be performed. As noted
above, FRA believes that freight cars
equipped with ECP brakes and freight
trains operating in ECP brake mode
need to be provided some flexibility in
being handled for repair and when
moving equipment with defective safety
appliances. The provisions contained in
§ 232.15(a), if applied, would frequently
frustrate the purpose of FRA’s proposal
and ignore the safety advances provided
by ECP braking systems.
Paragraph (k) also excepts
§ 232.15(a)(8), which prohibits the
movement of a defective car or
locomotive in a train required to receive
a Class I brake test at that location. As
discussed in detail above, paragraph (a)
allows a train operated with ECP brakes
to leave its initial terminal with only
ninety-five percent operative brakes
after a Class I brake test. By doing so,
paragraph (a) implicitly excepts trains
operating in ECP brake mode from
§ 232.103(d), which prohibits a train
from departing from its initial terminal
with any inoperative or ineffective
brakes. Nevertheless, paragraph (k)
intends to clearly and explicitly except
§ 232.103(d). An explicit exception in
this rule does not imply that there are
no independent and implicit exceptions
elsewhere. Finally, § 232.103(e)
‘‘contains a clear and absolute
prohibition on train movement if more
than 15 percent of the cars in a train
have their brakes cut out or have
otherwise inoperative brakes,’’ thus
preventing a train’s movement ‘‘if less
than 85 percent of the cars in that train
have effective and operative brakes.’’
Due to relief proposed by this section,
however, the strict limits imposed by
§ 232.103(e) would no longer be
applicable to trains regulated under
these proposed rules. Accordingly,
paragraph (k) excepts § 232.103(e).
BLET does not support 232.609(k) and
does not believe that FRA should invoke
its discretionary authority under 49
U.S.C. § 20306 to exempt railroads from
the requirements of 20303. As noted
above in the discussion contained in
Section IX of this document, FRA has
considered BLET’s concerns and has
decided to invoke its discretionary
authority.
Section 232.611 Periodic Maintenance
FRA intends that all unexcepted and
unmodified rules under part 232 apply
to ECP brake operations. For the
purposes of further clarity, however,
paragraph (a) of § 232.611 reminds the
operators of equipment with ECP brake
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systems to comply with the
maintenance requirements contained in
§ 232.303(b) through (d), which require
the performance of certain tests and
inspections whenever a car is on a shop
or repair track. FRA continues to believe
that a repair or shop track provides an
ideal setting for railroads to conduct an
individualized inspection on a car’s
brake system to ensure its proper
operation. FRA also continues to believe
that such inspections are necessary to
reduce the potential of overlooking cars
with excessive piston travel during the
performance of ordinary brake
inspections. If any problems are
detected at that location, the personnel
needed to make any necessary
corrections are already present.
Furthermore, performing these
inspections at this time ensures proper
operation of the cars’ brakes and
eliminates the potential of having to cut
cars out of an assembled train and, thus,
should reduce inspection times and
make for more efficient operations.
FRA continues to believe that
§ 232.303(b) and (c) should apply to all
operations, including those with ECP
brake systems. Section 232.303(b)
requires testing of each car on a shop or
repair track to determine that its air
brakes apply and remain applied until
a release is initiated. If the brakes fail to
apply or to remain applied until a
release is initiated, the car must be
repaired and retested. Section
§ 232.303(c) requires piston travel to be
inspected and, if necessary, adjusted.
FRA intends for this to be accomplished
in accordance with the stencil or badge
plate on cars equipped with ECP brakes
in accordance with § 232.607(f)(2).
FRA also continues to believe that
§ 232.303(d) should apply to all
operations, including those with ECP
brake systems. Section 232.303(d) lists
brake system components requiring
inspection prior to releasing a car from
a shop or repair track. This section
requires inspection of a car’s hand
brakes, angle cocks to ensure proper
positioning to allow maximum air flow,
and brake indicators, if equipped, to
ensure their accuracy and proper
operation. A periodic inspection is an
ideal time for the railroad to inspect
these items while imposing the least
burden on the railroad’s inspection and
repair forces.
In addition to requiring continued
compliance with § 232.303(b) through
(d), paragraph (a) requires further
inspection of freight cars equipped with
ECP brake systems prior to release from
a shop or repair track. These additional
requirements afford the inspector the
opportunity to look at each car more
thoroughly and take into consideration
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61543
an ECP brake system’s unique
characteristics. For instance, while
§ 232.303(d) requires inspectors to
ensure that brake pipes are securely
clamped, paragraph (a) provides the
equivalent for ECP brake systems by
requiring the secured clamping of ECP
brake system wires. Accordingly,
paragraph (a) requires inspectors to
check the ECP brake system’s wiring
and brackets, electrical connections,
electrical grounds, and any car mounted
ECP brake system component. During
such inspections, inspectors must look
for problems such as frayed wiring,
loose or damaged brackets, and wires
that have become loose due to a fallen
bracket. FRA believes that a missing
bracket may be overlooked during a
regular train yard inspection or Class I
brake test and the final rule requires
shop or repair track inspections of such
ECP brake related components to ensure
their safe operation.
Paragraph (a)(3) as proposed required
the testing of the train line cable’s
electrical grounds and impedance.
NYAB and Wabtec asserted that
paragraph (a)(3) as proposed should be
removed entirely. According to these
brake manufacturers, train line integrity
tests, which should be performed
subsequent to repairs or replacement of
the ECP brake-equipped train line or as
part of a single car air brake test, do not
require impedance testing, since they
can be performed via resistance and
grounds tests using commonly available
measurements tools. AAR concurs with
the brake manufacturers’ submission,
asserting that an impedance test is
unnecessary. One of the labor
representatives disagrees with the
manufacturers, urging FRA to retain
impedance testing of train line cables in
the final rule.
FRA believes that the main purpose of
cable impedance testing is checking the
integrity of the train line electrical cable
to assure that there is no electrical
shortage between the wires and
electrical current leakage through the
ground connections. Since the current
leakage testing of train line cable is a
routine single car air brake test
procedure and the ECP brake system
continuously monitors the integrity of
the train line cable, the additional
impedance testing of train line cable
wires is redundant and therefore
unnecessary. FRA also believes that
independently testing for grounds (i.e.,
check for the legitimate presence of
cable shield connections to the car
frame) is not necessary since paragraph
(a)(2) already requires that a single car
air brake test include a review and
repair of the ECP brake system electrical
connections. FRA continues to believe
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that the brake manufacturers are in the
best position to determine the level of
testing that can be integrated into a
single car air brake test. Accordingly,
the proposal that periodic testing
include electrical impedance and
grounds testing is not being included in
the final rule.
Paragraph (b) requires railroads to
submit periodic single car air brake test
procedures to FRA for approval and
paragraph (c) requires railroads to
comply with such submitted and
approved procedures whenever they
perform a single car air brake test. FRA
must be given an opportunity to review
and comment on any revision of the
procedures by which these tests are
performed to ensure that there is no
degradation in safety resulting from any
such modification and to ensure
consistency in how the tests are
performed. FRA notes that the review
and approval required by paragraph (b)
are necessary to prevent railroads from
making unilateral changes to the test
procedures. Paragraph (b) requires the
industry to follow the special approval
process contained in § 232.17 in order to
initially submit the procedures to FRA
for approval.
Paragraph (c) requires the
performance of a single car air brake test
on a car equipped with ECP brakes upon
the occurrence of most of the events
identified in § 232.305. Except for the
exceptions provided herein, FRA
continues to believe that § 232.305
adequately covers the parameters and
timeliness of single car air brake tests.
Paragraph (f), however, excepts
application to a car equipped with
stand-alone ECP brakes of
§ 232.305(b)(2), which requires a car
that is on a shop or repair track to
receive a single car air brake test if one
has not been performed on the car
within the previous 12 months. FRA
believes that since the car’s CCD
performs a self-diagnostic of the brake
system each time the car is initialized
and used in a train, there is no need to
perform a single car air brake test on a
car that has not received such a test
within the last 12 months.
FRA acknowledges that railroads may
retrofit ECP brake systems on existing
cars equipped with conventional
pneumatic brake systems. While
§ 232.305(e) requires a single car air
brake test on each new or rebuilt car
prior to placing or using it in revenue
service, it is unclear whether this rule
applies to cars retrofitted with ECP
brake systems. Accordingly, to ensure
the proper and safe operation of cars
with newly installed ECP brake systems,
paragraph (d) requires the performance
of a single car air brake test prior to
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placing the car in revenue service. FRA
believes that it is essential for retrofitted
cars to receive this test prior to
returning to revenue service in order to
ensure the proper operation of the
vehicle’s new brake system. Since this
is a requirement when installing a new
brake system, the cost of this
requirement is minimal and merely
incorporates the industry’s current
practices.
FRA acknowledges that, after
receiving approval of the single car air
brake test standard from FRA in
accordance with paragraph (b), a
railroad or an industry representative
may—through its experience—
subsequently determine better
procedures applicable to single car air
brake tests of cars equipped with ECP
brake systems. Accordingly, FRA
recognizes that the industry may find it
necessary to modify the single car air
brake test procedures from time to time.
Section 232.307 provides regulatory
procedures for those seeking
modification of an approved single car
air brake test procedure. Paragraph (b)
extends the application of § 232.307 to
single car air brake test procedures for
cars equipped with ECP brake systems.
FRA believes that § 232.307 provides
the industry with a quick and efficient
procedure to seek modification of an
incorporated or approved testing
procedure and provides both FRA and
other interested parties an opportunity
to review potential changes prior to
their becoming effective. The process
under § 232.307 permits the industry to
modify the single car air brake test
procedures and permits those
modifications to become effective 75
days from the date that FRA publishes
the requested modification in the
Federal Register, if no objection to the
requested modification is raised by
either FRA or any other interested party.
The process allows FRA and other
interested parties 60 days to review and
raise objections to any proposed
modification requested by the industry
and submitted to FRA. FRA believes the
process established in § 232.307 will
meet the needs of AAR and the industry
to expeditiously modify the single car
air brake test procedures required by
and approved under paragraph (b).
FRA continues to believe that, for the
process to work at optimum efficiency,
AAR and the industry would be best
served if they ensure that there is open
communication regarding any
modifications with both FRA and the
representatives of affected employees
prior to requesting any modification of
the procedures. This will ensure that
interested parties are fully informed of
any potential modification and their
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concerns are addressed or allayed before
a request for modification is submitted
to FRA. This information and dialogue
will eliminate the potential for
objections being submitted when the
requested modification is officially
sought.
As previously noted, for ECP brakeequipped freight cars, the final rule
contemplates replacing application of
the single car air brake test in
§ 232.305(a) with a new single car air
brake test submitted and approved
under § 232.611(b). To make this clear,
paragraph (f) excepts application of
§ 232.305(a) as it applies to all cars
equipped with ECP brakes, regardless of
whether they are dual mode or standalone. To preserve the requirement of
using a qualified person to perform
single car air brake tests on cars
equipped with ECP brakes, however, the
final rule includes appropriate language
in paragraphs (c) and (d).
FRA acknowledges that the selfmonitoring capabilities of ECP brake
systems may eliminate the need to
perform single car air brake tests on a
time-specific basis. Accordingly,
paragraph (f) also excepts
§ 232.305(b)(2) as it applies to single car
air brake tests for cars with stand-alone
ECP brake systems. Since cars with dual
mode ECP brake systems include all of
the components of a conventional
pneumatic brake system and may be
operated in conventional pneumatic
brake mode at any time, paragraph (f)
does not intend to provide those cars
relief from section 232.305(b)(2).
BLET asserts that there should be no
exception from § 232.305(b)(2).
According to BLET, the FMECA
recommends the continuation of
periodic single car testing to assure
power brake functionality. UP states
that it disagrees with the FRA proposal
to require a single car air brake test
whenever an ECP braked car is shopped
for a non-braking defect. Under current
AAR rules, says UP, a conventionally
braked freight car is only subject to a
single car air brake test when the
braking system itself is service or
repaired, or if 5 years have passed since
the last such test or if 8 years had passed
since the equipment was built.
UP apparently misunderstands the
existing rule and the proposed rule. In
addition to the requirements under
§ 232.305(c) and (d) that cars must be
tested every 5 or 8 years, § 232.305(b)(2)
requires a single air brake test when the
car is found on a repair track ‘‘for any
reason’’ and it has not received a single
car air brake test within the previous 12month period. Since this rule was
enacted, it has always applied to all
freight cars. The single car air brake test
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is critical to ensuring the safe and
proper operation of the brake equipment
on the Nation’s fleet of freight cars.
When FRA issued § 232.305(b)(2), the
single car air brake test was the sole
method by which air brake equipment
on freight cars is periodically tested to
identify potential problems before they
result in a brake becoming inoperative.
It will now also apply to dual mode ECP
brake-equipped freight cars.
However, stand-alone ECP brakeequipped freight cars will be exempt
from § 232.305(b)(2) pursuant to
paragraph (f). Accordingly, each standalone ECP brake-equipped car will not
require a single car air brake test each
time it is on a repair track. FRA believes
that a reduction in the frequency of
single car air brake tests is justified for
stand-alone ECP brake-equipped cars in
light of the ECP brake system’s selfmonitoring capabilities. However, the
final rule maintains most of the
requirements under § 232.305. FRA
agrees with BLET and the FMECA that
such periodic testing should continue
and FRA continues to believe that
insufficient information exists at this
time to completely eliminate the need to
conduct periodic single car air brake
tests on ECP brake-equipped cars.
Section 232.305(f) was initially
enacted to allow the continued
operation of cars already in service that
had received a single car air brake test
before a more formal standard was
adopted by the 2001 final power brake
rule. While paragraph (f) of § 232.611 as
proposed also excepted the application
of § 232.305(f), FRA believes that
§ 232.305(f) should actually be removed
from the rules in its entirety, since it no
longer applies to any car, regardless of
its brake system technology.
Accordingly, § 232.305(f) is hereby
deleted.
With the need for the submission and
adoption of a new single car air brake
test for ECP brake systems, FRA
recognizes that the same flexibility
initially afforded by § 232.305(f) may be
necessary to allow for the continued
operation of ECP brake-equipped cars
currently in service under the existing
waivers. New paragraph (g) intends to
provide for such flexibility by
considering the last single car air brake
test performed on any ECP brakeequipped car prior to June 15, 2009,
pursuant to the then existing standards,
to be considered the last single car air
brake test for that car. Accordingly, each
such car would not require an
additional single car air brake test in
accordance with § 232.305(e) and
232.611(d).
Under paragraph (b), no car should be
in service if it has not received a single
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car air brake test under a procedural
standard submitted to and approved by
FRA. Since no such standard has yet
been submitted and approved, all trains
under the existing waiver would be
required to be taken out of service upon
the publication of this rule. To avoid
this unintended consequence and to
provide flexibility for ECP brakeequipped cars already in service,
paragraph (g) provides more time for the
submission and approval of a single car
air brake test standard submitted
pursuant to paragraph (b) and § 232.17.
FRA understands that AAR has
formed a group, which includes AAR
Brake Committee members, the ECP
brake manufacturers, and FRA, for the
purpose of developing single car air
brake test procedures for freight cars
equipped with ECP brakes. FRA expects
these procedures will become part of the
AAR Standards and Recommended
Practices once they are developed and
adopted by the AAR. Accordingly, for
the same reasons FRA implemented
§ 232.305(f) (2001), the date that all cars
equipped with ECP brakes will receive
a single car air brake test under the
existing standard prior to June 15, 2009,
shall be considered the date for the last
single car air brake test for that car.
Section 232.613 End-of-Train Devices
Current FRA regulations specify
design and performance standards for
one-way and two-way EOT telemetry
devices, which, at a minimum, have the
capability of determining rear-of-train
brake pipe pressure and of transmitting
this information by radio to a receiving
unit in the controlling locomotive. Most
EOT units in service are battery
operated and also incorporate a rear end
marker required under 49 CFR part 221.
Optional features include transmission
of information regarding rear end
motion and battery status. Most units
operate on the same ultra high
frequency (UHF), but each rear unit has
a discrete identification code which
must be recognized by the HEU before
the message is acknowledged. The more
modern two-way EOT device, in
addition to the features of the one-way
EOT device, has the ability of activating
the emergency air valve at the rear of the
train upon receiving an emergency
brake application command from the
HEU. This is a desirable feature in event
of a blockage in the brake pipe that
would prevent the pneumatic
transmission of the emergency brake
application throughout the entire train.
Provisions governing the use of oneway EOT telemetry devices were
initially incorporated into the power
brake regulations in 1986. Pursuant to
the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review
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61545
Act, Public Law 102–365 (Sept. 3, 1992),
which amends the Federal Rail Safety
Act (FRSA) of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 421, 431
et seq.), FRA held rulemakings to amend
the power brake regulations, including
those concerning one-way and two-way
EOTs. 62 FR 278 (Jan. 2, 1997); 66 FR
4104 (Jan. 17, 2001). The resulting
regulations, contained in subpart E of
part 232, specify the requirements
related to the performance, operation,
and testing of EOT devices for
conventional pneumatic braking.
The new ECP–EOT devices—which
must comply with AAR standards such
as S–4200 and S–4220—will provide
many of the same functions that
conventional two-way EOT devices use
on trains with conventional pneumatic
brakes. In addition to serving as the
final node on the ECP brake system’s
train line cable termination circuit and
as the system’s ‘‘heart beat’’ monitoring
and confirming train, brake pipe, power
supply line, and digital communications
cable continuity, the ECP–EOT device
transmits to the HEU a status message
that includes the brake pipe pressure,
the train line cable’s voltage, and the
ECP–EOT device’s battery power level.
Since the ECP–EOT device—unlike a
conventional EOT device—will
communicate with the HEU exclusively
through the digital communications
cable and not via a radio signal, it does
not need to perform the function of
venting the brake pipe to atmospheric
pressure to engage an emergency brake
application. However, ECP–EOT devices
do verify the integrity of the train line
cable and provide a means of
monitoring the brake pipe pressure and
gradient, providing the basis for an
automatic- rather than engineercommanded-response if the system is
not adequately charged. In the case of
ECP brakes, the brake pipe becomes a
redundant- rather than primary-path for
sending emergency brake application
commands. Under certain
communication break downs between
the ECP–EOT device, the HEU, and any
number of CCDs, the system will selfinitiate an emergency brake application.
FRA acknowledges that ECP–EOT
devices, with their additional and
changed features, may not comply with
the rules under subpart E. Accordingly,
paragraph (d) excepts trains operating in
ECP brake mode from having to comply
with subpart E of part 232 and the
remainder of section 232.613 provides
alternative requirements. Paragraph (a)
provides for the minimum requirements
under which an ECP–EOT device must
operate. Paragraph (b) requires that each
ECP brake operated includes a properly
connected ECP–EOT device that
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comports with the requirements under
paragraph (a).
AAR and NS noted that, similarly to
trains operating with conventional air
brake systems, a train operated with
ECP brakes may include a locomotive as
the train’s rear vehicle performing the
same function as an EOT device.
According to AAR, a locomotive at the
rear of a train can perform all the
functions performed by an EOT device.
BLET concurs with AAR and NS and
proposes that § 232.613(c) be redrafted
to permit the use of a locomotive in lieu
of an ECP–EOT device. FRA agrees
because a locomotive equipped with
ECP brakes functions the same as an
ECP–EOT device. They both provide the
same feedback loop between the HEU
and end of the train. Accordingly,
paragraph (c) provides for a locomotive
equipped with ECP brakes to be used in
lieu of an ECP–EOT device in a train
operated with ECP brakes.
NYAB and Wabtec state that a
conventional EOT unit is subject to
annual calibration to address issues
relating to its radio and BP pressure
transducer. However, since an ECP–EOT
device does not require a radio and the
ECP brake system continuously
monitors the brake pipe pressure
transducer, the brake manufacturers
contend, it does not require annual
calibration.
FRA agrees with the brake
manufacturers’ comments regarding
annual ECP–EOT device calibration.
Unlike conventional EOT units, ECP–
EOT devices do not require radios.
Annual calibration of the brake pipe
pressure transducer is not necessary in
light of the ECP brake system’s brake
pipe pressure readings at each
individual ECP brake operated car and
ability to confirm train line integrity.
Accordingly, the final rule does not
require annual calibration and testing.
XII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This final rule has been evaluated in
accordance with existing policies and
procedures, and determined to be
significant under both Executive Order
12866 and DOT policies and procedures
(44 FR 11034; Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has
prepared and placed in Docket No.
FRA–2006–26175 a Regulatory Analysis
addressing the economic impact of this
final rule. Document inspection and
copying facilities are available at the
DOT Central Docket Management
Facility located in Room W12–140 on
the Ground level of the West Building,
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590. Access to the
docket may also be obtained
electronically through the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at https://
www.regulations.gov. Photocopies may
also be obtained by submitting a written
request to the FRA Docket Clerk at
Office of Chief Counsel, Stop 10,
Federal Railroad Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington,
DC 20590.
For purposes of analysis, FRA has
assumed that this final rule will support
business decisions by Class I railroads
to convert unit train service, such as
coal and intermodal, to ECP brake
operations over a 10-year period. This
type of service is characterized by
intensive utilization of assets and is
reasonably discrete in terms of
operational requirements. Although
carload service is dispersed over the
national rail network, unit train service
tends to be concentrated in certain
corridors. Locomotives are or could be
dedicated to this service (e.g., as in the
extensive use of high traction
alternating current (AC) locomotives in
coal service). FRA believes that, as costs
and benefits are validated and the
technology’s market enjoys economies
of scale, additional markets will benefit
from ECP brake technology.
The benefits of voluntarily
implementing and using ECP brakes
under this rule substantially exceed the
costs. If the industry were to implement
ECP brakes to the extent estimated in
this final rule, it would cost it
approximately $1.7 billion (discounted
at 7%). The largest portion of these
voluntary costs, $1.2 billion, would be
the cost to convert freight cars to ECP
brakes and the remaining costs relate to
locomotive conversion and training. The
total benefits of the final rule would
total approximately $9.7 billion
(discounted at 7%), if ECP brakes are
adopted as estimated. Of those benefits,
the $1 billion in regulatory relief and
the $1.2 billion in fuel savings together
exceed the costs. The remaining benefits
include accident risk reduction,
environmental cleanup savings, track
out-of-service time reduction, wheel
replacement savings, and network
velocity improvements. The expected
benefits of ECP braking technology
appear to justify the investment,
provided that the conversion is focused
first on the high-mileage, unit and unitlike train services that would most
benefit from its use.
As presented in the following tables,
FRA estimates that the present value
(PV), discounted at 7 percent of the total
20-year benefits and costs which the
industry would be expected to incur if
it elected to comply with the alternative
requirements contained in this rule is
$9.7 billion and $1.7 billion,
respectively:
TOTAL 20-YEAR BENEFITS AND DISCOUNTED BENEFITS
[At 3% and 7%]
Benefits
3% Discount
7% Discount
$25,802,114
286,687,494
113,296,427
10,825,104,763
2,283,662,829
2,745,000,000
1,601,250,000
2,500,000,000
$17,897,484
198,859,081
78,587,395
7,508,769,780
1,586,425,219
1,904,052,986
1,110,697,575
2,101,494,145
$11,513,191
127,923,151
50,554,127
4,830,282,231
1,022,855,259
1,224,849,552
714,495,572
1,698,459,555
Total Benefits ............................................................................................................
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Highway-Rail Accident Risk Reduction ...........................................................................
Rail Equipment Accident Risk Reduction ........................................................................
Environmental Cleanup Savings .....................................................................................
Track Out-of-Service Time for Accidents ........................................................................
Regulatory Relief .............................................................................................................
Fuel Savings ....................................................................................................................
Wheel Replacement Savings ..........................................................................................
Network Velocity Improvement of 1 mph ........................................................................
20,380,803,627
14,506,783,665
9,680,932,638
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61547
TOTAL 20-YEAR COSTS AND DISCOUNTED COSTS
[at 3% and 7%]
Costs
3% Discount
7% Discount
Freight Car Costs ............................................................................................................
Locomotive Costs ............................................................................................................
Employee Training ...........................................................................................................
$1,746,326,400
582,624,000
231,470,835
$1,467,957,882
489,752,370
165,421,968
$1,186,425,904
395,825,320
111,016,540
Total Costs ...............................................................................................................
2,560,421,235
2,123,132,221
1,693,267,763
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B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and
Executive Order 13272
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and Executive Order
13272 require a review of proposed and
final rules to assess their impact on
small entities. FRA has prepared and
placed in Docket No. FRA–2006–26175
an Analysis of Impact on Small Entities
(AISE) that assesses the small entity
impact of this rule. Document
inspection and copying facilities are
available at the Department of
Transportation Central Docket
Management Facility located in Room
W12–140 on the Ground level of the
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590. Docket
material is also available on the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at https://
www.regulations.gov. Photocopies may
also be obtained by submitting a written
request to the FRA Docket Clerk at
Office of Chief Counsel, Stop 10,
Federal Railroad Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington,
DC 20590.
‘‘Small entity’’ is defined in 5 U.S.C.
601 as a small business concern that is
independently owned and operated, and
is not dominant in its field of operation.
The U.S. Small Business Administration
(SBA) has authority to regulate issues
related to small businesses, and
stipulates in its size standards that a
‘‘small entity’’ in the railroad industry is
a railroad business ‘‘line-haul
operation’’ that has fewer than 1,500
employees and a ‘‘switching and
terminal’’ establishment with fewer than
500 employees. SBA’s ‘‘size standards’’
may be altered by Federal agencies, in
consultation with SBA and in
conjunction with public comment.
Pursuant to that authority FRA has
published a final statement of agency
policy that formally establishes ‘‘small
entities’’ as being railroads that meet the
line-haulage revenue requirements of a
Class III railroad. See 68 FR 24891 (May
9, 2003). Currently, the revenue
requirements are $20 million or less in
annual operating revenue. The $20
million limit is based on the Surface
Transportation Board’s threshold of a
Class III railroad carrier, which is
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adjusted by applying the railroad
revenue deflator adjustment (49 CFR
part 1201). The same dollar limit on
revenues is established to determine
whether a railroad, shipper, or
contractor is a small entity. FRA uses
this alternative definition of ‘‘small
entity’’ for this rulemaking.
For this rulemaking, there are
approximately 523 small railroads that
could potentially receive regulatory
relief. However, railroads are not
mandated to convert to ECP brake
technology. Regulatory relief provides
an incentive for most long-haul services
to convert. Smaller railroads do not
operate over 1,000 miles or 1,500 miles
and would not benefit economically by
converting to this technology. Hence,
FRA does not expect this regulation to
impact any small railroads.
The small entity segment of the
railroad industry faces little in the way
of intramodal competition. Small
railroads generally serve as ‘‘feeders’’ to
the larger railroads, collecting carloads
in smaller numbers and at lower
densities than would be economical for
the larger railroads. Smaller railroads
that carry unit and unit-like
commodities often operate the train
with the locomotives and cars without
ownership of the equipment. They
transport those cars over relatively short
distances and then turn them over to the
larger systems, which transport them
relatively long distances to their
ultimate destination, or for handoff back
to a smaller railroad for final delivery.
Although there are situations in which
the relative interests of large and small
railroads may not always coincide, the
relationships between the large and
small entity segments of the railroad
industry are more supportive and codependent than competitive.
It is also extremely rare for small
railroads to compete with each other. As
mentioned above, small railroads
generally serve smaller, lower density
markets and customers. They exist, and
often thrive, doing business in markets
where there is not enough traffic to
attract the larger carriers that are
designed to handle large volumes over
distance at a profit. As there is usually
not enough traffic to attract service by
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a large carrier, there is also not enough
traffic to sustain more than one smaller
carrier. There are also significant
barriers to entry in the railroad industry,
including the need to own rights-ofway, build track, purchase fleets. Thus,
even to the extent that the rule may
have an economic impact, it should
have no impact on the intramodal
competitive position of small railroads.
The AISE developed in connection
with this final rule concludes that this
final rule will only likely impact four
Class I railroads that voluntarily choose
to implement ECP brakes in their
operations and therefore should not
have any economic impact on small
entities. Smaller railroads that carry unit
and unit-like commodities often operate
and transport trains owned by other
parties over relatively short distances
and turn them over to larger systems
that, in turn, transport those trains
relatively long distances to their
ultimate destination or to another small
railroad for final delivery. FRA
recognizes that small entities may, in
some cases, be involved in specific
route segments for trains that originate
or terminate on a Class I railroad. In
these cases, the cars involved are more
likely to be owned or provided by
shippers or a Class I railroad. Mutual
support arrangements and shared power
practices are likely to ensure that the
smaller railroad will not require trains
equipped with ECP brakes for this
service. Further, FRA anticipates that
train operations using ECP brakes will
be limited to long hauls of commodities
such as intermodal, coal, ore, nonmetallic minerals, motor vehicle parts,
and grain for many years. Since small
railroads do not handle such
commodities, they will not likely
receive large blocks of cars equipped
with ECP brakes from Class I railroads.
Since FRA does not expect small
railroads to convert to ECP brake
technology within the period of the
analysis, this final rule is not
anticipated to affect any small entities.
Thus, FRA certifies that this final rule
is not expected to have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities under the
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Regulatory Flexibility Act or Executive
Order 13272.
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
The information collection
requirements in this final rule have been
submitted for approval to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) under
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. The sections that
contain the new information collection
requirements and the estimated time to
fulfill each requirement are as follows:
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES3
CFR section
Respondent universe
Total annual
responses
Average time per
response
229.27—Annual tests .....................................
232.3—Applicability—Export, industrial, &
other cars not owned by railroads-identification.
232.7—Waivers ..............................................
232.11—Penalties—Knowingly falsifying a
record/report.
232.15—Movement of Defective Equipment:
—Tags .............................................
—Written Notification .......................
232.17—Special Approval Procedure:
—Petitions for special approval of
safety-critical revision.
—Petitions for special approval of
pre-revenue service acceptance
plan.
—Service of petitions .......................
—Statement of interest ....................
—Comment ......................................
232.103—Gen’l requirements—all train brake
systems.
232.105—Gen’l requirements for locomotives—Inspection.
232.107—Air source requirements and cold
weather
operations—Monitoring
Plan
(Subsequent Years).
—Amendments to Plan ....................
—Recordkeeping .............................
232.109—Dynamic brake requirements—status.
—Inoperative dynamic brakes .........
—Tag bearing words ‘‘inoperative
dynamic brakes’’.
—Deactivated
dynamic
brakes
(Sub. Yrs.).
—Operating
rules
(Subsequent
Years).
—Amendments ................................
—Requests to increase 5 mph overspeed restriction.
—Knowledge
criteria—locomotive
engineers—Sub Yrs.
232.111—Train information handling .............
—Sub. Yrs.—Amendments ..............
—Report requirements to train crew
232.203—Training requirements—Tr. Prog.:
—Sub Yr ..........................................
—Amendments to written program ..
—Training records ...........................
—Training notifications ....................
—Audit program ...............................
—Amendments to validation/assessment program.
232.205—Class 1 brake test—Notifications/
Records.
232.207—Class 1A brake tests—Subsequent
Years.
—Notification ....................................
232.209—Class II brake tests—intermediate
inspection.
232.213—Extended haul trains ......................
30,000 locomotives ....
559 railroads ..............
30,000 tests ...............
8 cards .......................
15 minutes .................
10 minutes .................
7,500 hours.
1 hour.
559 railroads ..............
559 railroads ..............
20 petitions ................
1 falsified recd/rpt ......
40 hours .....................
10 minutes .................
800 hours.
.17 hour.
1,620,000 cars ...........
1,620,000 cars ...........
128,400 tags ..............
25,000 notices ...........
2.5 minutes ................
3 minutes ...................
5,350 hours.
1,250 hours.
559 railroads ..............
4 petitions ..................
100 hours ...................
400 hours.
559 railroads ..............
2 petitions ..................
100 hours ...................
200 hours.
559 railroads ..............
Public/railroads ..........
Public/railroads ..........
114,000 cars ..............
4 petitions ..................
14 statements ............
13 comments .............
70,000 stickers ...........
40 hours .....................
8 hours .......................
4 hours .......................
10 minutes .................
160 hours.
112 hours.
52 hours.
11,667 hours.
30,000 locomotives ....
30,000 forms ..............
5 minutes ...................
2,500 hours.
10 new railroads ........
1 plan .........................
40 hours .....................
40 hours.
50 railroads/plans ......
50 railroads/plans ......
559 railroads ..............
10 amendments .........
1,150 records .............
1,656,000 records ......
20 hours .....................
20 hours .....................
4 minutes ...................
200 hours.
23,000 hours.
110,400 hours.
30,000 locomotives ....
30,000 locomotives ....
6,358 records .............
6,358 tags ..................
4 minutes ...................
30 seconds ................
424 hours.
53 hours.
8,000 locomotives ......
10 stencilings .............
5 minutes ...................
1 hour.
5 new railroads ..........
5 op. rules ..................
4 hours .......................
20 hours.
559 railroads ..............
559 railroads ..............
15 amendments .........
5 requests ..................
1 hour .........................
30 min/20 hrs. ............
15 hours.
103 hours.
5 new railroads ..........
5 amendments ...........
16 hours .....................
80 hours.
5 new railroads ..........
100 railroads ..............
559 railroads ..............
5 procedures ..............
100 amendments .......
2,112,000 reports .......
40 hours .....................
20 hours .....................
10 minutes .................
200 hours.
2,000 hours.
352,000 hours.
15 railroads ................
559 railroads ..............
559 railroads ..............
559 railroads ..............
559 railroads ..............
559 railroads ..............
5 programs .................
559 amendments .......
67,000 records ...........
67,000 notific .............
1 plan/559 cop ...........
50 amendments .........
100 hours ...................
8 hours .......................
8 minutes ...................
3 minutes ...................
40 hours/1 min ...........
20 hours .....................
500 hours.
4,472 hours.
8,933 hours.
3,350 hours.
49 hours.
1,000 hours.
559 railroads ..............
1,646,000 records ......
45 seconds ................
20,575 hours.
559 railroads ..............
5 des. Lists ................
1 hour .........................
5 hours.
559 railroads ..............
559 railroads ..............
5 amendments ...........
1,597,400 commun ....
1 hour .........................
3 seconds ..................
5 hours.
1,331 hours.
83,000 long dist.
movements.
N/A .............................
100 letters ..................
15 minutes .................
25 hours.
N/A .............................
N/A .............................
N/A.
1,600,000 frgt. cars ....
5,600 tags ..................
5 minutes ...................
467 hours.
—Record of all defective/inoperative
brakes.
232.303—Gen’l requirements—single car
test.
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response
—Last repair track brake test/single
car test.
232.305—Single Car tests .............................
232.307—Modification of Single Car Air
Brake Test Procedures (Old Rqmnt)—Req.
—Affirmation Statement on Mod.
Req. to Employee Representatives.
—Comments on Modification Request.
232.309—Repair track brake test ..................
232.403—Unique Code ..................................
232.407—Operations requiring 2-way EOTs
232.409—Insp. and Testing of EOTs ............
—Telemetry
Equipment—Testing
and Calibration.
232.503—Process to introduce new brake
technology.
—Special approval ...........................
232.505—Pre-revenue svc accept. test
plan—Sub Yr.
—Amendments ................................
—Design description ........................
—Report to FRA Assoc. Admin. for
Safety.
—Brake system technology testing
232.603—Configuration Management—New
Requirements.
—Configuration Management Plan
Submitted to FRA.
—Subsequent Years ........................
—Modification of Standards ............
—Affirmative statement + statement
copies re: modification request.
—Comments on requested modification.
232.605—ECP Brakes: Training—New Requirements.
—Adopt/Developing an ECP Training Prog.—Yr. One.
—Subsequent Years.
—ECP Brakes Training of Employees—Yr. One.
—ECP Brakes Training of Employees—Sub. Yrs.
—ECP Training Records—Yr. One
—ECP Training Records—Subsequent Years.
—Assessment of ECP Training Plan
—Adopt Operating Rules for ECP
Brakes.
—Loco. Engineers—ECP Brakes
Systems: Criteria For Certification.
232.607—ECP Inspection and Testing—New
Requirements:
—Initial Terminal—Inspections and
Notification of Class I Brake Tests.
—Cars added or removed en
route—Class I Br. Test.
—Non-ECP cars added to ECP
Trains—Inspections and Tags for
Defective Cars.
232.609—Handling of Defective Equipment
with ECP Brake Systems—New Requirements:
—Freight Car w/defective conventional brakes moved in train operating in ECP brake mode.
—Inspections/Tagging
for
ECP
Train moving w/less than 85 percent operative/effective brakes.
1,600,000 frgt. cars ....
320,000 stncl .............
5 minutes ...................
26,667 hours.
1,600,000 frgt. cars ....
AAR ............................
320,00 tests/records ..
1 req. + 3 copies .......
45 minutes .................
4 hrs. + 5 min ............
240,000 hours.
4 hours.
AAR ............................
1 statement + 4 copies.
30 min. + 5 min .........
1 hour.
Public/Int. Parties .......
2 comments ...............
60 minutes .................
2 hours.
640
245
245
245
245
shops ..................
railroads ..............
railroads ..............
railroads ..............
railroads ..............
5,000 tests .................
12 requests ................
50,000 comm .............
447,500 comm ...........
32,708 mar. units .......
30 minutes .................
5 minutes ...................
30 seconds ................
30 seconds ................
1 minute .....................
2,500 hours.
1 hour.
417 hours.
3,729 hours.
545 hours.
559 railroads ..............
1 letter ........................
1 hour .........................
1 hour.
559 railroads ..............
559 railroads ..............
1 request ....................
1 procedure ................
3 hours .......................
160 hours ...................
3 hours.
160 hours.
559 railroads ..............
559 railroads ..............
559 railroads ..............
1 procedure ................
1 petition ....................
1 report ......................
40 hours .....................
67 hours .....................
13 hours .....................
40 hours.
67 hours.
13 hours.
559 railroads ..............
5 descriptions .............
40 hours .....................
200 hours.
4 railroads ..................
1 plan .........................
160 hours ...................
160 hours.
4 railroads ..................
4 railroads ..................
4 railroads ..................
60 hours .....................
8 hours + 5 min .........
1 hour + 5 min ...........
60 hours.
8 hours.
6 hours.
Public/Int. Parties .......
1 plan .........................
1 request + 2 copies ..
4 statements + 24
copies.
4 comments ...............
2 hours .......................
8 hours.
4 railroads ..................
4 programs .................
100 hours ...................
400 hours.
4 railroads ..................
2 programs .................
100 hours ...................
200 hours.
4 railroads ..................
6,409 tr. Empl ............
8 hrs/24 hrs ................
105,512 hours.
4 railroads ..................
6,409 tr. Empl ............
1 hour/8 hours ...........
30,264 hours.
4 railroads ..................
4 railroads ..................
6,409 records .............
6,409 records .............
8 minutes ...................
4 minutes ...................
855 hours.
428 hours.
4 railroads ..................
4 railroads ..................
4 plans .......................
4 Op. Rules ................
40 hours .....................
24 hours .....................
160 hours.
96 hours.
4 railroads ..................
4 amended Programs
40 hours .....................
160 hours.
4 railroads ..................
10,000 insp. + 10,000
notific.
1,000 insp. + 500
notific.
200 insp. + 400 tags/
rcds.
90 min. + 45 sec ........
15,125 hours.
60 min. + 45 sec ........
1,006 hours.
5 min. + 2.5 min ........
34 hours.
25 Cars ......................
50 tags .......................
2.5 minutes ................
2 hours.
20 Cars ......................
20 Insp. + 40 tags/
records.
5 min. + 2.5 min ........
3 hours.
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200 Cars ....................
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response
232.609—Freight Car with ECP brake system found with defective non-brake safety
appliance—Tagging.
—Conventional Train with standalone ECP brake equipped
cars—Tagging.
—Procedures for handling ECP
brake system repairs and designation of repair locations.
—List of repair locations ..................
—Notification to FRA Safety Administrator regarding change to repair
location list.
232.611—Periodic Maintenance—New Requirements:
—Inspections before being released
from repair Shop.
—Procedures for ECP Single Car
Tests.
—Single Car Air Brake Tests—
Records.
—Modification of Single Car Test
Standards.
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75 Cars ......................
150 tags .....................
2.5 minutes ................
6 hours.
500 Cars ....................
1,000 tags ..................
2.5 minutes ................
42 hours.
4 railroads ..................
4 procedures ..............
24 hours .....................
96 hours.
4 railroads ..................
4 railroads ..................
4 lists ..........................
1 notification ...............
8 hours .......................
1 hour .........................
32 hours.
1 hour.
500 fr. Cars ................
500 insp. & records ...
10 minutes .................
83 hours.
1 Railroad Rep ...........
24 hours + 5 min .......
24 hours.
2,500 fr. Cars .............
1 procedure + 2 copies.
2,500 tests/rcd ...........
45 minutes .................
1,875 hours.
1 Railroad Rep ...........
1 mod. Proc ...............
40 hours .....................
40 hours.
All estimates include the time for
reviewing instructions; searching
existing data sources; gathering or
maintaining the needed data; and
reviewing the information. For
information or a copy of the paperwork
package submitted to OMB, contact Mr.
Robert Brogan, Information Clearance
Officer, at 202–493–6292, or contact Ms.
Nakia Jackson at 202–493–6073; or via
e-mail at robert.brogan@dot.gov or
nakia.jackson@dot.gov.
OMB is required to make a decision
concerning the collection of information
requirements contained in this final rule
between 30 and 60 days after
publication of this document in the
Federal Register. Therefore, a comment
to OMB is best assured of having its full
effect if OMB receives it within 30 days
of publication. Comments to OMB may
be sent by mail to: The Office of
Management and Budget, 725 17th St.,
NW., Washington, DC 20503, attn: FRA
Desk Officer. Comments may also be
sent to OMB at the following address:
oira_submissions@omb.eop.gov.
FRA is not authorized to impose a
penalty on persons for violating
information collection requirements
which do not display a current OMB
control number, if required. FRA
intends to obtain current OMB control
numbers for any new information
collection requirements resulting from
this rulemaking action prior to the
effective date of this final rule. The
OMB control number, when assigned,
will be announced by separate notice in
the Federal Register.
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D. Federalism Implications
Executive Order 13132, ‘‘Federalism’’
(64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999), requires
FRA to develop an accountable process
to ensure ‘‘meaningful and timely input
by State and local officials in the
development of regulatory policies that
have federalism implications.’’ ‘‘Policies
that have federalism implications’’ are
defined in the Executive Order to
include regulations that have
‘‘substantial direct effects on the States,
on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.’’ Under Executive
Order 13132, the agency may not issue
a regulation with Federalism
implications that imposes substantial
direct compliance costs and that is not
required by statute, unless the Federal
government provides the funds
necessary to pay the direct compliance
costs incurred by State and local
governments, or the agency consults
with State and local government
officials early in the process of
developing the proposed regulation.
Where a regulation has Federalism
implications and preempts State law,
the agency seeks to consult with State
and local officials in the process of
developing the regulation.
In the NPRM, FRA stated that this
proposed rule has preemptive effect.
Subject to a limited exception for
essentially local safety or security
hazards, FRA stated that its
requirements will establish a uniform
Federal safety standard that must be
met, and state requirements covering the
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same subject are displaced, whether
those standards are in the form of state
statutes, regulations, local ordinances,
or other forms of state law, including
state common law. Section 20106 of
Title 49 of the United States Code, FRA
said, provides that all regulations
prescribed by the Secretary related to
railroad safety preempt any State law,
regulation, or order covering the same
subject matter, except a provision
necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety hazard that is not
incompatible with a Federal law,
regulation, or order and that does not
unreasonably burden interstate
commerce. This is consistent with past
practice at FRA and within the
Department of Transportation. In
particular, the notice of proposed
rulemaking did not change the
preemption provision of part 232; this
final rule amends the preemption
provision, § 232.13, to conform to the
recent clarifying amendments to 49
U.S.C. 20106.
AAJ filed comments expressing its
belief that FRA should revise the
‘‘Federalism Implications’’ section of
the preamble to reflect Congress’s
intention that federal rail safety
regulations do not preempt an
individual’s right to pursue a state tort
law claim against a railroad company.
According to AAJ, section 1528 of the
‘‘Implementing Recommendation of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007’’ (the 9/
11 Act) clarifies that 49 U.S.C. 20106
does not preempt State law causes of
action. AAR disagrees, stating that, by
its plain language, section 1528 ‘‘is
intended solely to reject a preemption
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defense where the defendant has
violated the federal standard of care
embodied in a federal regulation or a
plan created pursuant to a federal
regulation.’’ According to AAR, section
1528 does not eliminate preemption of
common law claims, but reaffirms that
state law is preempted whenever the
Secretaries of Transportation and
Homeland Security issue a regulation or
order covering the applicable subject
matter, unless the local safety or
security hazard exception applies.
Normal State negligence standards
apply where there is no Federal action
covering the subject matter. In Section
1528 of Public Law 110–53, Congress
clarified the availability of State law
causes of action under section 20106
where there is Federal action covering
the subject matter. As amended, 49
U.S.C. 20106 provides that issuance of
these regulations preempts any State
law, regulation, or order covering the
same subject matter, except an
additional or more stringent law,
regulation, or order that is necessary to
eliminate or reduce an essentially local
railroad safety or railroad security
hazard; that is not incompatible with a
law, regulation, or order of the United
States Government; and that does not
unreasonably burden interstate
commerce. Section 20106 permits State
tort actions arising from events or
activities occurring on or after January
18, 2002, for the following: (a) A
violation of the Federal standard of care
established by regulation or order issued
by the Secretary of Transportation (with
respect to railroad safety, such as these
regulations) or the Secretary of
Homeland Security (with respect to
railroad security); (b) a party’s violation
of, or failure to comply with, its own
plan, rule, or standard that it created
pursuant to a regulation or order issued
by either of the two Secretaries; and (c)
a party’s violation of a State standard
that is necessary to eliminate or reduce
an essentially local safety or security
hazard, is not incompatible with a law,
regulation, or order of the United States
Government, and does not unreasonably
burden interstate commerce. Nothing in
Section 20106 creates a Federal cause of
action on behalf of an injured party or
confers Federal question jurisdiction for
such State law causes of action.
While this recent amendment has
altered the preemptive reach of Section
20106, it is important to note that there
are limits to this exception allowing
state tort actions under this statute. For
example, Congress provided an
exception only for an action in State
court seeking damages for personal
injury, death, or property damage. The
statute does not provide for the recovery
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of punitive damages in the permitted
common law tort actions. In addition,
the statute permits actions for violation
of an internal plan, rule, or standard
only when such internal plan, rule, or
standard is created pursuant to a
Federal regulation or order issued by
DOT or DHS. While parties are
encouraged to go beyond the minimum
regulatory standard in establishing
internal safety and security standards,
such standards that exceed the
requirements of Federal regulation or
order are not created pursuant to
Federal regulation or order.
Accordingly, there is no clear
authorization of a common law tort
action alleging a violation of those
aspects of such an internal plan, rule, or
standard related to the subject matter of
this regulation that exceed the
minimum required by the Federal
regulation or order.
FRA has analyzed this final rule in
accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order
13132. This final rule will not have a
substantial effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among various levels of
government. FRA concludes that this
final rule will not impose any direct
compliance costs on State and local
governments and has no federalism
implications, other than the preemption
of state laws covering the subject matter
of this final rule, which occurs by
operation of law under 49 U.S.C. 20106
whenever FRA issues a rule or order.
Elements of the final rule dealing with
safety appliances affect an area of safety
that has been pervasively regulated at
the Federal level for over a century.
Accordingly, the final rule amendments
in that area will involve no impacts on
Federal relationships.
E. Environmental Impact
FRA has evaluated this final rule in
accordance with its ‘‘Procedures for
Considering Environmental Impacts’’
(FRA’s Procedures) (64 FR 28545, May
26, 1999) as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.
4321 et seq.), other environmental
statutes, Executive Orders, and related
regulatory requirements. FRA has
determined that this final rule is not a
major FRA action (requiring the
preparation of an environmental impact
statement or environmental assessment)
because it is categorically excluded from
detailed environmental review pursuant
to section 4(c)(20) of FRA’s Procedures.
See 64 FR 28547, May 26, 1999. Section
4(c)(20) reads as follows: (c) Actions
categorically excluded. Certain classes
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61551
of FRA actions have been determined to
be categorically excluded from the
requirements of these Procedures as
they do not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on
the human environment. * * * The
following classes of FRA actions are
categorically excluded: * * * (20)
Promulgation of railroad safety rules
and policy statements that do not result
in significantly increased emissions or
air or water pollutants or noise or
increased traffic congestion in any mode
of transportation.
In accordance with section 4(c) and
(e) of FRA’s Procedures, the agency has
further concluded that no extraordinary
circumstances exist with respect to this
regulation that might trigger the need for
a more detailed environmental review.
As a result, FRA finds that this final rule
is not a major Federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
Pursuant to Section 201 of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104–4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each
Federal agency ‘‘shall, unless otherwise
prohibited by law, assess the effects of
Federal regulatory actions on State,
local, and tribal governments, and the
private sector (other than to the extent
that such regulations incorporate
requirements specifically set forth in
law).’’ Section 202 of the Act (2 U.S.C.
1532) further requires that ‘‘before
promulgating any general notice of
proposed rulemaking that is likely to
result in the promulgation of any rule
that includes any Federal mandate that
may result in expenditure by State,
local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$132,000,000 or more in any 1 year, and
before promulgating any final rule for
which a general notice of proposed
rulemaking was published, the agency
shall prepare a written statement’’
detailing the effect on State, local, and
tribal governments and the private
sector. This final rule may result in the
expenditure, in the aggregate, of
$132,000,000 or more in any one year.
However, those expenses are not
mandated and would only be incurred
by the private sector if it wishes to take
advantage of the regulatory relief
provided by this final rule. Although the
preparation of such a statement is not
required, the analytical requirements
under Executive Order 12866 are similar
to the analytical requirements under the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
and, thus, the same analysis complies
with both analytical requirements.
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G. Energy Impact
§ 232.5
Executive Order 13211 requires
Federal agencies to prepare a Statement
of Energy Effects for any ‘‘significant
energy action.’’ 66 FR 28355 ( May 22,
2001). Under the Executive Order, a
‘‘significant energy action’’ is defined as
any action by an agency (normally
published in the Federal Register) that
promulgates or is expected to lead to the
promulgation of a final rule or
regulation, including notices of inquiry,
advance notices of proposed
rulemaking, and notices of proposed
rulemaking: (1)(i) That is a significant
regulatory action under Executive Order
12866 or any successor order, and (ii) is
likely to have a significant adverse effect
on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy; or (2) that is designated by the
Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs as a
significant energy action. FRA has
evaluated this final rule in accordance
with Executive Order 13211. FRA has
determined that this final rule is not
likely to have a significant adverse effect
on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy. Consequently, FRA has
determined that this regulatory action is
not a ‘‘significant energy action’’ within
the meaning of Executive Order 13211.
*
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 232
Electronically controlled pneumatic
brakes, Incorporation by reference,
Penalties, Railroad power brakes,
Railroad safety, Two-way end-of-train
devices.
The Rule
In consideration of the foregoing, FRA
amends chapter II, subtitle B of title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
■
PART 232—BRAKE SYSTEM SAFETY
STANDARDS FOR FREIGHT AND
OTHER NON-PASSENGER TRAINS
AND EQUIPMENT; END OF TRAIN
DEVICES
1. The authority citation for Part 232
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20107,
20133, 20141, 20301–20303, 20306, 21301–
21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49
CFR 1.49.
2. Section 232.5 is amended by adding
definitions car control device (CCD),
dual mode ECP brake system, ECP, ECP
brake mode, ECP brake system, ECP–
EOT device, emulator CCD, overlay ECP
brake system, stand-alone CCD, standalone ECP brake system, switch mode,
and train line cable; by revising the
definition train, unit or train, cycle and
adding the definition yard limits as
follows in alphabetical order:
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■
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Definitions.
*
*
*
*
Car control device (CCD) means an
electronic control device that replaces
the function of the conventional
pneumatic service and emergency
portions of a car’s air brake control
valve during electronic braking and
provides for electronically controlled
service and emergency brake
applications.
Dual mode ECP brake system means
an ECP brake system that is equipped
with either an emulator CCD or an
overlay ECP brake system on each car
which can be operated in either ECP
brake mode or conventional pneumatic
brake mode.
ECP means ‘‘electronically controlled
pneumatic’’ when applied to a brake or
brakes.
ECP brake mode means operating a
car or an entire train using an ECP brake
system.
ECP brake system means a train
power braking system actuated by
compressed air and controlled by
electronic signals from the locomotive
or an ECP–EOT to the cars in the consist
for service and emergency applications
in which the brake pipe is used to
provide a constant supply of
compressed air to the reservoirs on each
car but does not convey braking signals
to the car. ECP brake systems include
dual mode and stand-alone ECP brake
systems.
ECP–EOT device means an end-oftrain device for an ECP brake system
that is physically the last network node
in the train, pneumatically and
electrically connected at the end of the
train to the train line cable operating
with an ECP brake system.
*
*
*
*
*
Emulator CCD means a CCD that is
capable of optionally emulating the
function of the pneumatic control valve
while in a conventionally braked train.
*
*
*
*
*
Overlay ECP brake system means a
brake system that has both conventional
pneumatic brake valves and ECP brake
components, making it capable of
operating as either a conventional
pneumatic brake system or an ECP brake
system. This brake system can operate
in either a conventionally braked train
using the conventional pneumatic
control valve or in an ECP braked train
using the ECP brake system’s CCD.
*
*
*
*
*
Stand-alone CCD means a CCD that
can operate properly only in a train
operating in ECP brake mode and
cannot operate in a conventional
pneumatically braked train.
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Stand-alone ECP brake system means
a brake system equipped with a CCD
that can only operate the brakes on the
car in ECP brake mode.
*
*
*
*
*
Switch Mode means a mode of
operation of the ECP brake system that
allows operation of that train at 20 miles
per hour or less when the train’s ECP–
EOT device is not communicating with
the lead locomotive’s HEU, the train is
separated during road switching
operations, or the ECP brake system has
stopped the train because the percentage
of operative brakes fell below 85%.
Many of the ECP brake system’s fault
detection/response procedures are
suspended during Switch Mode.
*
*
*
*
*
Train line cable is a two-conductor
electric wire spanning the train and
carrying both electrical power to operate
all CCDs and ECP–EOT devices and
communications network signals.
Train, unit or train, cycle means a
train that, except for the changing of
locomotive power or for the removal or
replacement of defective equipment,
remains coupled as a consist and
operates in a continuous loop or
continuous loops without destination.
*
*
*
*
*
Yard limits means a system of tracks,
not including main tracks and sidings,
used for classifying cars, making-up and
inspecting trains, or storing cars and
equipment.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 3. Section 232.13 is amended by
revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
§ 232.13
Preemptive effect.
(a) Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of
the regulations in this part preempts any
State law, rule, regulation, order or
standard covering the same subject
matter, except for a provision necessary
to eliminate or reduce a local safety
hazard if that provision is not
incompatible with this part and does
not impose an undue burden on
interstate commerce. Nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed to preempt
an action under State law seeking
damages for personal injury, death, or
property damage alleging that a party
has failed to comply with the Federal
standard of care established by this part,
has failed to comply with its own plan,
rule, or standard that it created pursuant
to this part, or has failed to comply with
a State law, regulation, or order that is
not incompatible with the first sentence
of this paragraph.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 4. Section 232.17 is amended by
revising paragraphs (a) and (b) to read
as follows:
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§ 232.17
Special approval procedure.
(a) General. The following procedures
govern consideration and action upon
requests for special approval of a plan
under § 232.15(g); an alternative
standard under § 232.305, § 232.603, or
a single car test procedure under
§ 232.611; and pre-revenue service
acceptance testing plans under subpart
F of this part.
(b) Petitions for special approval of an
alternative standard or test procedure.
Each petition for special approval of a
plan under § 232.15(g); an alternative
standard under § 232.305 or § 232.603;
or a single car test procedure under
§ 232.611 shall contain:
(1) The name, title, address, and
telephone number of the primary person
to be contacted with regard to review of
the petition;
(2) The plan, alternative standard, or
test procedure proposed, in detail, to be
submitted for or to meet the particular
requirement of this part;
(3) Appropriate data or analysis, or
both, for FRA to consider in
determining whether the plan,
alternative standard, or test procedure,
will be consistent with the guidance
under § 232.15(f), if applicable, and will
provide at least an equivalent level of
safety or otherwise meet the
requirements contained in this part; and
(4) A statement affirming that the
railroad has served a copy of the
petition on designated representatives of
its employees, together with a list of the
names and addresses of the persons
served.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 5. Section 232.103 is amended by
revising paragraph (f) to read as follows:
§ 232.103 General requirements for all
train brake systems.
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*
*
*
*
*
(f) Each car in a train shall have its air
brakes in effective operating condition
unless the car is being moved for repairs
in accordance with §§ 232.15 and
232.609. The air brakes on a car are not
in effective operating condition if its
brakes are cut-out or otherwise
inoperative or if the piston travel
exceeds:
(1) 10 1/2 inches for cars equipped
with nominal 12-inch stroke brake
cylinders; or
(2) The piston travel limits indicated
on the stencil, sticker, or badge plate for
the brake cylinder with which the car is
equipped.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 6. Section 232.205 is amended by
revising the first two sentences of
paragraph (c)(5) to read as follows:
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§ 232.205 Class I brake test-initial terminal
inspection.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(5) For cars equipped with 81⁄2-inch or
10-inch diameter brake cylinders, piston
travel shall be within 6 to 9 inches. If
piston travel is found to be less than 6
inches or more than 9 inches, it must be
adjusted to nominally 71⁄2 inches. * * *
*
*
*
*
*
§ 232.213
[Amended]
7. Section 232.213 is amended by
removing paragraphs (a)(6) and (a)(7)
and redsignating paragraphs (a)(8) and
(a)(9) as (a)(6) and (a)(7) respectively.
■ 8. Section 232.303 is amended by
revising the first three sentences of
paragraph (c) to read as follows:
■
§ 232.303
General requirements.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) A car on a shop or repair track
shall have its piston travel inspected.
For cars equipped with 81⁄2-inch or 10inch diameter brake cylinders, piston
travel shall be within 6 to 9 inches. If
piston travel is found to be less than 6
inches or more than 9 inches, it must be
adjusted to nominally 71⁄2 inches. * * *
*
*
*
*
*
■ 9. Section 232.305 is amended by
revising the first sentence of paragraph
(a) and removing paragraph (f); the
revision reads as follows:
§ 232.305
Single car air brake tests.
(a) Single car air brake tests shall be
performed by a qualified person in
accordance with either Section 3.0,
‘‘Tests-Standard Freight Brake
Equipment,’’ and Section 4.0, ‘‘Special
Tests,’’ of the Association of American
Railroads Standard S–486–04, ‘‘Code of
Air Brake System Tests for Freight
Equipment,’’ contained in the AAR
Manual of Standards and
Recommended Practices, Section E
(January 1, 2004); an alternative
procedure approved by FRA pursuant to
§ 232.17; or a modified procedure
approved in accordance with the
provisions contained in § 232.307.
* * *
*
*
*
*
*
■ 10. Part 232 is amended by adding a
new subpart G to read as follows:
Subpart G—Electronically Controlled
Pneumatic (ECP) Braking Systems
Sec.
232.601 Scope.
232.602 Applicability.
232.603 Design, interoperability, and
configuration management requirements.
232.605 Training requirements.
232.607 Inspection and testing
requirements.
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232.609 Handling of defective equipment
with ECP brake systems.
232.611 Periodic maintenance.
232.613 End-of-train devices.
§ 232.601
Scope.
This subpart contains specific
requirements applicable to freight trains
and freight cars equipped with ECP
brake systems. This subpart also
contains specific exceptions from
various requirements contained in this
part for freight trains and freight cars
equipped with ECP brake systems.
§ 232.602
Applicability.
This subpart applies to all railroads
that operate a freight car or freight train
governed by this part and equipped
with an ECP brake system. Unless
specifically excepted or modified in this
section, all of the other requirements
contained in this part are applicable to
a freight car or freight train equipped
with an ECP brake system.
§ 232.603 Design, interoperability, and
configuration management requirements.
(a) General. A freight car or freight
train equipped with an ECP brake
system shall, at a minimum, meet the
Association of American Railroads
(AAR) standards contained in the AAR
Manual of Standards and Recommended
Practices related to ECP brake systems
listed below; an alternate standard
approved by FRA pursuant to § 232.17;
or a modified standard approved in
accordance with the provisions
contained in paragraph (f) of this
section. The incorporation by reference
of the AAR standards identified in this
section was approved by the Director of
the Federal Register in accordance with
5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
Copies of the incorporated documents
may be obtained from the Association of
American Railroads, 50 F Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20001, 202–639–2100,
www.aar.org. You may inspect a copy at
the Federal Railroad Administration,
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC, 202–493–6300 or at
the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call 202–741–6030,
or go to: https://www.archives.gov/
federal_register/
code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html. The applicable
standards, which are incorporated into
this regulation by reference, include the
following:
(1) AAR S–4200, ‘‘Electronically
Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) CableBased Brake Systems—Performance
Requirements,’’ (Adopted 1999;
Revised: 2002, 2004, 2008);
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(2) AAR S–4210, ‘‘ECP Cable-Based
Brake System Cable, Connectors, and
Junction Boxes—Performance
Specifications,’’ (Adopted: 1999;
Revised 2002, 2007);
(3) AAR S–4220, ‘‘ECP Cable-Based
Brake DC Power Supply—Performance
Specification,’’ Version 2.0 (Adopted:
1999; Revised: 2002);
(4) AAR S–4230, ‘‘Intratrain
Communication (ITC) Specification for
Cable-Based Freight Train Control
System,’’ Version 3.0 (Adopted: 1999;
Revised: 2002, 2004);
(5) AAR S–4240, ‘‘ECP Brake
Equipment—Approval Procedure’’
(Adopted: 2007);
(6) AAR S–4250, ‘‘Performance
Requirements for ITC Controlled CableBased Distributed Power Systems,’’
Version 2.0 (Adopted: 2003; Revised:
2004);
(7) AAR S–4260, ‘‘ECP Brake and
Wire Distributed Power Interoperability
Test Procedures’’ (Adopted: 2007); and
(8) AAR S–4270, ‘‘ECP Brake System
Configuration Management’’ (Adopted:
2008).
(b) Approval. A freight train or freight
car equipped with an ECP brake system
and equipment covered by the AAR
standards incorporated by reference in
this section shall not be used without
conditional or final approval by AAR in
accordance with AAR Standard S–4240,
‘‘ECP Brake Equipment—Approval
Procedures’’ (2007).
(c) Configuration management. A
railroad operating a freight train or
freight car equipped with ECP brake
systems shall adopt and comply with
the configuration management plan
developed in accordance with the AAR
standards incorporated by reference in
this section. FRA reserves the right to
audit a manufacturer’s configuration
management plan at any time.
(d) Exceptions. (1) A freight car or
freight train equipped with a standalone ECP brake system shall be
excepted from the requirement in
§ 232.103(l) referencing AAR Standard
S–469–47, ‘‘Performance Specification
for Freight Brakes.’’
(2) The provisions addressing the
introduction of new brake system
technology contained in subpart F of
this part are not applicable to a freight
car or freight train equipped with an
ECP brake system approved by AAR in
accordance with paragraph (b) of this
section, conditionally or otherwise, as of
the effective date of this rule.
(e) New technology. Upon written
request supported by suitable
justification and submitted pursuant to
the special approval procedures in
§ 232.17, the Associate Administrator
may except from the requirements of
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subpart F of this part the testing of new
ECP brake technology, demonstration of
new ECP brake technology, or both,
where testing or demonstration, or both,
will be conducted pursuant to an FRArecognized industry standard and FRA
is invited to monitor the testing or
demonstration, or both.
(f) Modification of standards. The
AAR or other authorized representative
of the railroad industry may seek
modification of the industry standards
identified in or approved pursuant to
paragraph (a) of this section. The
request for modification will be handled
and shall be submitted in accordance
with the modification procedures
contained in § 232.307.
§ 232.605
Training requirements.
(a) Inspection, testing and
maintenance. A railroad that operates a
freight car or freight train equipped with
an ECP brake system and each
contractor that performs inspection,
testing, or maintenance on a freight car
or freight train equipped with an ECP
brake system shall adopt and comply
with a training, qualification, and
designation program for its employees
that perform inspection, testing or
maintenance of ECP brake systems. The
training program required by this
section shall meet the requirements in
§§ 232.203(a), (b), (e), and (f).
(b) Operating rules. A railroad
operating a freight train or freight car
equipped with an ECP brake system
shall amend its operating rules to
govern safe train handling procedures
related to ECP brake systems and
equipment under all operating
conditions and shall tailor its operating
rules to the specific equipment and
territory of the railroad.
(c) Locomotive engineers. A railroad
operating a freight car or freight train
equipped with an ECP brake system
shall adopt and use in its training
program under part 240 specific
knowledge, skill, and ability criteria to
ensure that its locomotive engineers are
fully trained with the operating rules
governing safe train handling
procedures related to ECP brake systems
and equipment under all operating
conditions and tailored to the specific
equipment and territory of the railroad.
§ 232.607 Inspection and testing
requirements.
(a) Trains at initial terminal. A freight
train operating in ECP brake mode shall
receive the following inspections at its
point of origin (initial terminal):
(1) A Class I brake test as described in
§ 232.205(c) by a qualified mechanical
inspector (QMI); and
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(2) A pre-departure inspection
pursuant to part 215 of this chapter by
an inspector designated under § 215.11
of this chapter.
(b) Trains en route. (1) Except for a
unit or cycle train, a train operating in
ECP brake mode shall not operate a
distance that exceeds its destination or
3,500 miles, whichever is less, unless
inspections meeting the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section are
performed on the train.
(2) A unit or cycle train operating in
ECP brake mode shall receive the
inspections required in paragraph (a) of
this section at least every 3,500 miles.
(3) The greatest distance that any car
in a train has traveled since receiving a
Class I brake test by a qualified
mechanical inspector will determine the
distance that the train has traveled.
(4) A freight train operating in ECP
brake mode shall receive a Class I brake
test as described in § 232.205(c) by a
qualified person at a location where the
train is off air for a period of more than:
(i) 24 hours, or
(ii) 80 hours, if the train remains
inaccessible to the railroad and in an
extended-off-air facility. For the purpose
of this section, an extended-off-air
facility means a location controlled by
a sole shipper or consignee which
restricts access to the train and provides
sufficient security to deter vandalism.
(c) Cars added en route. (1) Each
freight car equipped with an ECP brake
system that is added to a freight train
operating in ECP brake mode shall
receive a Class I brake test as described
in § 232.205(c) by a qualified person,
unless all of the following are met:
(i) The car has received a Class I brake
test by a qualified mechanical inspector
within the last 3,500 miles;
(ii) Information identified in
§ 232.205(e) relating to the performance
of the previously received Class I brake
test is provided to the train crew;
(iii) The car has not been off air for
more than 24 hours or for more than 80
hours, if that train remains in an
extended-off-air facility; and
(iv) A visual inspection of the car’s
brake systems is conducted to ensure
that the brake equipment is intact and
properly secured. This may be
accomplished as part of the inspection
required under § 215.13 of this chapter
and may be conducted while the car is
off air.
(2) Each car and each solid block of
cars not equipped with an ECP brake
system that is added to a train operating
in ECP brake mode shall receive a visual
inspection to ensure it is properly
placed in the train and safe to operate
and shall be moved and tagged in
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accordance with the provisions
contained in § 232.15.
(d) Class III brake test (1) A Class III
brake test shall be performed on a
freight train operating in ECP brake
mode by a qualified person, as defined
in § 232.5, to test the train’s brake
system whenever the continuity of the
brake pipe or electrical connection is
broken or interrupted.
(2) In lieu of observing the brake pipe
changes at the rear of a freight train with
the end-of-train telemetry device
referred to in §§ 232.211(c) and (d), the
operator shall verify that the brakes
applied and released on the rear car of
the freight train by observing the ECP
brake system’s display in the locomotive
cab.
(e) Initialization. (1) A freight train
operating in ECP brake mode shall be
initialized as described in paragraph
(e)(2) whenever the following occurs:
(i) Class I brake test.
(ii) Class III brake test.
(iii) Whenever the ECP brake system
is powered on.
(2) Initialization shall, at a minimum:
(i) initialize the ECP brake system
pursuant to AAR Series Standard S–
4200; and
(ii) be performed in the sequential
order of the vehicles in the train.
(3) Whenever an ECP brake system is
initialized pursuant to this paragraph,
the train crew must ensure that the total
number of cars indicated by the ECP
brake system is the same as the total
number of cars indicated on the train
consist.
(f) Modifications to existing brake
inspections. (1) In lieu of the specific
brake pipe service reductions and
increases required in this part, an
electronic signal that provides an
equivalent application and release of the
brakes shall be utilized when
conducting any required inspection or
test on a freight car or freight train
equipped with an ECP brake system and
operating in ECP brake mode.
(2) In lieu of the specific piston travel
ranges contained in this part, the piston
travel on freight cars equipped with ECP
brake systems shall be within the piston
travel limits stenciled or marked on the
car or badge plate consistent with the
manufacturers recommended limits, if
so stenciled or marked.
(g) ECP brake system train line cable.
Each ECP brake system train line cable
shall:
(1) be located and guarded to provide
sufficient vertical clearance;
(2) not cause any tripping hazards;
(3) not hang with one end free
whenever the equipment is used in a
train movement;
(4) not be positioned to interfere with
the use of any safety appliance; or
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(5) not have any of the following
conditions:
(i) Badly chafed or broken insulation.
(ii) Broken plugs, receptacles or
terminals.
(iii) Broken or protruding strands of
wire.
(h) Exceptions. A freight car or a
freight train shall be exempt from the
requirements contained in §§ 232.205(a)
and (b), 232.207, 232.209, and
232.211(a) when it is equipped with an
ECP brake system and operating in ECP
brake mode.
§ 232.609 Handling of defective equipment
with ECP brake systems.
(a) Ninety-five percent of the cars in
a train operating in ECP brake mode
shall have effective and operative brakes
prior to use or departure from the train’s
initial terminal or any location where a
Class I brake test is required to be
performed on the entire train by a
qualified mechanical inspector pursuant
to § 232.607.
(b) A freight car equipped with an
ECP brake system that is known to have
arrived with ineffective or inoperative
brakes at initial terminal of the next
train which the car is to be included or
at a location where a Class I brake test
is required under §§ 232.607(b)(1)
through (b)(3) shall not depart that
location with ineffective or inoperative
brakes in a train operating in ECP brake
mode unless:
(1) The location does not have the
ability to conduct the necessary repairs;
(2) The car is hauled only for the
purpose of repair to the nearest forward
location where the necessary repairs can
be performed consistent with the
guidance contained in § 232.15(f);
(3) The car is not being placed for
loading or unloading while being moved
for repair unless unloading is necessary
for the safe repair of the car; and
(4) The car is properly tagged in
accordance with § 232.15(b).
(c) A freight car equipped with only
conventional pneumatic brakes shall not
move in a freight train operating in ECP
brake mode unless it would otherwise
have effective and operative brakes if it
were part of a conventional pneumatic
brake-equipped train or could be moved
from the location in defective condition
under the provisions contained in, and
tagged in accordance with, § 232.15.
(d) A freight train operating in ECP
brake mode shall not move if less than
85 percent of the cars in the train have
operative and effective brakes. However,
after experiencing a penalty stop for
having less than 85 percent operative
and effective brakes, a freight train
operating in ECP brake mode may be
moved if all of the following are met:
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(1) The train is visually inspected;
(2) Appropriate measures are taken to
ensure that the train is safely operated
to the location where necessary repairs
or changes to the consist can be made;
(3) A qualified person determines that
it is safe to move the train; and
(4) The train is moved in ECP brake
Switch Mode to the nearest or nearest
forward location where necessary
repairs or changes to the consist can be
made.
(e) A freight car or locomotive
equipped with an ECP brake system that
is found with inoperative or ineffective
brakes for the first time during the
performance of a Class I brake test or
while en route may be used or hauled
without civil penalty liability under this
part to its destination, not to exceed
3,500 miles; provided, all applicable
provisions of this section are met and
the defective car or locomotive is hauled
in a train operating in ECP brake mode.
(f) A freight car equipped with an ECP
brake system that is part of a train
operating in ECP brake mode:
(1) that is found with a defective nonbrake safety appliance may be used or
hauled without civil penalty under this
part to the nearest or nearest forward
location where the necessary repairs can
be performed consistent with the
guidelines contained in § 232.15(f).
(2) that is found with an ineffective or
inoperative brake shall be hauled in
accordance with the following:
(i) § 232.15(e)(1).
(ii) No more than two freight cars with
brakes pneumatically cut out or five
freight cars or five units in a multi-unit
articulated piece of equipment with
brakes electronically cut out shall be
consecutively placed in the same train.
(g) A train operating with
conventional pneumatic brakes shall not
operate with freight cars equipped with
stand-alone ECP brake systems unless:
(1) The train has at least the minimum
percentage of operative brakes required
by paragraph (h) of this section when at
an initial terminal or paragraph (d) of
this section when en route; and
(2) The stand-alone ECP brakeequipped cars are:
(i) Moved for the purpose of delivery
to a railroad receiving the equipment or
to a location for placement in a train
operating in ECP brake mode or being
moved for repair to the nearest available
location where the necessary repairs can
be made in accordance with
§§ 232.15(a)(7) and (f);
(ii) Tagged in accordance with
§ 232.15(b); and
(iii) Placed in the train in accordance
with § 232.15(e).
(h) A train equipped and operated
with conventional pneumatic brakes
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may depart an initial terminal with
freight cars that are equipped with
stand-alone ECP brake systems provided
all of the following are met:
(1) The train has 100 percent effective
and operative brakes on all cars
equipped with conventional pneumatic
brake systems;
(2) The train has at least 95 percent
effective and operative brakes when
including the freight cars equipped with
stand-alone ECP brake systems; and
(3) The requirements contained in
paragraph (g) of this section are met.
(i) Tagging of defective equipment. A
freight car equipped with an ECP brake
system that is found with ineffective or
inoperative brakes will be considered
electronically tagged under
§ 232.15(b)(1) and (b)(5) if the car is
used or hauled in a train operating in
ECP brake mode and the ECP brake
system meets the following:
(1) The ECP brake system is able to
display information in the cab of the
lead locomotive regarding the location
and identification of the car with
defective brakes;
(2) The information is stored or
downloaded and is accessible to FRA
and appropriate operating and
inspection personnel; and
(3) An electronic or written record of
the stored or downloaded information is
retained and maintained in accordance
with § 232.15(b)(3).
(j) Procedures for handling ECP brake
system repairs and designation of repair
locations. (1) Each railroad operating
freight cars equipped with ECP brake
systems shall adopt and comply with
specific procedures developed in
accordance with the requirements
related to the movement of defective
equipment contained in this subpart.
These procedures shall be made
available to FRA upon request.
(2) Each railroad operating freight
trains in ECP brake mode shall submit
to FRA’s Associate Administrator for
Safety a list of locations on its system
where ECP brake system repairs will be
performed. A railroad shall notify FRA’s
Associate Administrator for Safety in
writing 30 days prior to any change in
the locations designated for such
repairs. A sufficient number of locations
shall be identified to ensure compliance
with the requirements related to the
handling of defective equipment
contained in this part.
(k) Exceptions: All freight cars and
trains that are specifically identified,
operated, and handled in accordance
with this section are excepted from the
movement of defective equipment
requirements contained in
§ 232.15(a)(2), (a)(5) through (a)(8), and
232.103(d) and (e).
§ 232.611
Periodic maintenance.
(a) In addition to the maintenance
requirements contained in § 232.303(b)
through (d), a freight car equipped with
an ECP brake system shall be inspected
and repaired before being released from
a shop or repair track to ensure the
proper and safe condition of the
following:
(1) ECP brake system wiring and
brackets;
(2) ECP brake system electrical
connections; and
(3) Car mounted ECP brake system
components.
(b) Single car air brake test
procedures. Prior to placing a freight car
equipped with an ECP brake system into
revenue service, a railroad or a duly
authorized representative of the railroad
industry shall submit a procedure for
conducting periodic single car air brake
tests to FRA for its approval pursuant to
§ 232.17.
(c) Except as provided in § 232.303(e),
a single car air brake test conducted in
accordance with the procedure
submitted and approved in accordance
with paragraph (b) of this section shall
be performed by a qualified person on
a freight car equipped with an ECP
brake system whenever any of the
events identified in § 232.305 occur,
except for those paragraphs identified in
paragraph (f) of this section.
(d) A single car air brake test
conducted in accordance with the
procedure submitted and approved in
accordance with paragraph (b) of this
section shall be performed by a
qualified person on each freight car
retrofitted with a newly installed ECP
brake system prior to placing or using
the car in revenue service.
(e) Modification of single car test
standard. A railroad or a duly
authorized representative of the railroad
industry may seek modification of the
single car test standard approved in
accordance with paragraph (b) of this
section. The request for modification
will be handled and shall be submitted
in accordance with the modification
procedures contained in § 232.307.
(f) Exceptions. A freight car equipped
with a stand-alone or dual mode ECP
brake system is excepted from the single
car air brake test procedures contained
in § 232.305(a). A freight car equipped
with a stand-alone ECP brake system is
excepted from the single car test
requirements contained in
§ 232.305(b)(2).
(g) For purposes of paragraphs (c) and
(d) of this section, if a single car air
brake test is conducted on a car prior to
June 15, 2009, pursuant to the then
existing AAR standards, it shall be
considered the last single car air brake
test for that car, if necessary.
§ 232.613
End-of-train devices.
(a) An ECP–EOT device shall, at a
minimum, serve as the final node on the
ECP brake circuit, provide a cable
terminal circuit, and monitor, confirm,
and report train, brake pipe, and train
line cable continuity, cable voltage,
brake pipe pressure, and the status of
the ECP–EOT device battery charge. The
ECP–EOT device shall transmit a status
message (EOT Beacon) at least once per
second, contain a means of
communicating with the HEU, and be
equipped with a brake pipe pressure
transducer and a battery that charges
from the train line cable.
(b) A railroad shall not move or use
a freight train equipped with an ECP
brake system unless that train is
equipped with a functioning ECP–EOT
device designed and operated in
accordance with this subpart. The ECP–
EOT device must be properly connected
to the network and to the train line
cable at the rear of the train.
(c) A locomotive equipped with ECP
brakes can be used in lieu of an ECP–
EOT device, provided it is capable of
performing all of the functions of a
functioning ECP–EOT device.
(d) Exception. A freight train
operating in ECP brake mode is
excepted from the end-of-train device
requirements contained in subpart E of
this part, provided that it is equipped
with an ECP–EOT device complying
with this section.
■ 11. Appendix A to part 232 is
amended by revising footnote 1 and by
adding an entry for subpart G to the end
of the table to read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 232—Schedule of
Civil Penalties 1
1 A penalty may be assessed against an individual
only for a willful violation. Generally when two or
more violations of these regulations are discovered
with respect to a single unit of equipment that is
placed or continued in service by a railroad, the
appropriate penalties set forth above are aggregated
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Section
Violation
*
*
*
*
*
*
Subpart G—Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) Braking Systems
232.603 Design, interoperability, and configuration management requirements:
(a) Failure to meet minimum standards ...................................................................................................................
(b) Using ECP brake equipment without approval ...................................................................................................
(c) Failure to adopt and comply with a proper configuration management plan .....................................................
232.605 Training Requirements:
(a) Failure to adopt and comply with a proper training, qualification, and designation program for employees
that perform inspection, testing or maintenance ..................................................................................................
(b) Failure to amend operating rules ........................................................................................................................
(c) Failure to adopt and comply with proper training criteria for locomotive engineers ...........................................
232.607 Inspection and testing requirements:
(a)(1), (b), (c)(1) Complete or partial failure to perform inspection ..........................................................................
(a)(2) Complete or partial failure to perform pre-departure inspection ....................................................................
(c)(1)(iv), (c)(2) Failure to perform visual inspection on a car added en route ........................................................
(d) Failure to perform inspection ..............................................................................................................................
(e)(1), (2) Failure to properly initialize the train ........................................................................................................
(e)(3) Failure to ensure identical consist and system information ...........................................................................
(f)(1) Failure to apply a proper brake pipe service reduction ..................................................................................
(f)(2) Failure to properly adhere to the proper piston travel ranges ........................................................................
(g)(1)–(4) Improperly located and guarded cable ....................................................................................................
(g)(5) Condition of cable and connections ...............................................................................................................
232.609 Handling of defective equipment with ECP brake systems:
(a) Failure to have proper percentage of operative brakes from Class I brake test ...............................................
(b) Failure to prevent a car known to arrive with defective brakes to depart location where a Class I brake test
is required .............................................................................................................................................................
(c) Improper movement of a car equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes ....................................................
(d) Operating with less than 85 percent operative brakes .......................................................................................
(f)(2)(i) Improper placement of defective conventional brake equipment ................................................................
(f)(2)(ii) Improper placement of defective ECP brake equipment ............................................................................
(g) Improper movement of defective stand-alone ECP brake equipment in a train operating with conventional
pneumatic brakes ..................................................................................................................................................
(h) Improper movement from initial terminal of stand-alone ECP brake equipment in a conventional brake operated train ...............................................................................................................................................................
(i) Failure to tag equipment ......................................................................................................................................
(j)(1) Failure to adopt and comply with procedures for the movement of defective equipment ..............................
(j)(2) Failure to submit list of ECP brake system repair locations ...........................................................................
232.611 Periodic maintenance:
(a) Failure to ensure the proper and safe condition of car ......................................................................................
(b)–(d) Failure to perform test ..................................................................................................................................
232.613 End-of-train devices:
(a) Failure to meet design standards for ECP–EOT devices ..................................................................................
(b) Moving with an improper or improperly connected ECP–EOT device ...............................................................
Willful
violation
*
7,500
7,500
7,500
11,000
11,000
11,000
(1)
12,500
12,500
(1 )
16,000
16,000
( 1)
7,500
4,500
(1)
7,500
7,500
(1 )
(1 )
7,500
7,500
(1 )
11,000
6,500
(1 )
11,000
11,000
(1 )
(1 )
11,000
11,000
(1 )
(1 )
7,500
7,500
(1 )
(1 )
7,500
11,000
11,000
(1 )
( 1)
11,000
(1)
(1 )
(1)
(1)
7,500
7,500
(1 )
( 1)
11,000
11,000
7,500
7,500
11,000
11,000
7,500
9,500
11,000
13,000
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Failure to observe any condition for
movement of defective equipment set forth in
§ 232.15(a) will deprive the railroad of the
benefit of the movement-for-repair provision
and make the railroad and any responsible
individuals liable for penalty under the
particular regulatory section(s) concerning
the substantive defect(s) present on the
equipment at the time of movement.
Failure to provide any of the records or
plans required by this part pursuant to
§ 232.19 will be considered a failure to
maintain or develop the record or plan and
will make the railroad liable for penalty
under the particular regulatory section(s)
concerning the retention or creation of the
document involved.
Failure to properly perform any of the
inspections specifically referenced in
§ 232.209, § 232.213, § 232.217, and subpart
G may be assessed under each section of this
part or this chapter, or both, that contains the
requirements for performing the referenced
inspection.
up to a maximum of $11,000 per day. An exception
to this rule is the $15,000 penalty for willful
violation of § 232.503 (failure to get FRA approval
before introducing new technology) with respect to
a single unit of equipment; if the unit has additional
violative conditions, the penalty may routinely be
aggregated to $15,000. Although the penalties listed
for failure to perform the brake inspections and
tests under § 232.205 through § 232.209 may be
assessed for each train that is not properly
inspected, failure to perform any of the inspections
and tests required under those sections will be
treated as a violation separate and distinct from,
and in addition to, any substantive violative
conditions found on the equipment contained in
the train consist. Moreover, the Administrator
reserves the right to assess a penalty of up to
$27,000 for any violation where circumstances
warrant. See 49 CFR part 209, appendix A.
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Issued in Washington, DC, on September
19, 2008.
Joseph H. Boardman,
Federal Railroad Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8–22549 Filed 10–15–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
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[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 201 (Thursday, October 16, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 61512-61557]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-22549]
[[Page 61511]]
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Part IV
Department of Transportation
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Federal Railroad Administration
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49 CFR Part 232
Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake Systems; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 61512]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Part 232
[Docket No. FRA-2006-26175, Notice No. 4]
RIN 2130-AB84
Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake Systems
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing revisions to the regulations governing freight
power brakes and equipment by adding a new subpart addressing
electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brake systems. The revisions
are designed to provide for and encourage the safe implementation and
use of ECP brake system technologies. These revisions contains specific
requirements relating to design, interoperability, training,
inspection, testing, handling defective equipment, and periodic
maintenance related to ECP brake systems. The final rule also
identifies provisions of the existing regulations and statutes where
FRA is proposing to provide flexibility to facilitate the voluntary
adoption of this advanced brake system technology.
DATES: This final rule is effective December 15, 2008. Petitions for
reconsideration must be received on or before December 15, 2008.
Petitions received after that date will be considered to the extent
possible without incurring additional expenses or delays. The
incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the rule
is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of December 15,
2008.
ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration: Any petitions for
reconsideration related to Docket No. FRA-2006-26175, may be submitted
by any of the following methods:
Web site: The Federal eRulemaking Portal, https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the Web site's online instructions for
submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12-140, Washington, DC
20590.
Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. Note that all petitions received will be posted without
change to https://www.regulations.gov including any personal
information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the Supplementary
Information section of this document for Privacy Act information
related to any submitted petitions, comments, or materials.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov or to Room W12-140
on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Wilson, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Motive Power and Equipment Division, RRS-14,
Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue,
SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6259); or Jason
Schlosberg, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10,
Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6032).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Since the inception of automatic air brakes by George Westinghouse
in the 1870s, brake signal propagation has been limited by the nature
of air and the speed of sound. Other adjustments have sought to
alleviate this deficiency, but have left the basic system unaltered. As
early as 1990, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) began
investigating more advanced braking concepts for freight railroads,
including ECP brake systems, which promise to radically improve brake
propagation by using electrical transmissions of the braking signal
through the train while still using air pressure in the brake cylinder
to apply the force of the brake shoe against the wheel. During the past
15 years, ECP brake technology has progressed rapidly and has been
field tested and used on trains operating in revenue service by various
railroads.
FRA has been an active and consistent advocate of ECP brake system
implementation. In 1997, FRA participated in an AAR initiative to
develop ECP brake standards and in 1999, FRA funded, through
Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a Failure Modes, Effects, and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of ECP brake systems based on the AAR
standards. FRA also took part in programs to develop and enhance
advanced components for ECP brake systems.
To further assess the benefits and costs of ECP brakes for the U.S.
rail freight industry, FRA contracted Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) in 2005
to conduct a study. BAH engaged an expert panel consisting of principle
stakeholders in ECP brake technology conversion to participate in the
study. The expert panel made various conclusions relating to
technological standards, safety, and efficiency. In addition, the final
BAH report provided a comprehensive analysis and comparison of ECP and
conventional air brake systems. On August 17, 2006, FRA announced in a
press release its intention to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to
revise the federal brake safety standards to encourage railroads to
invest in and deploy ECP brake technology. In the press release, FRA
encouraged railroads to submit ECP brake implementation plans before
the proposed rule changes were completed.
In a petition dated November 15, 2006, and filed November 21, 2006,
two railroads--the BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) and the Norfolk Southern
Corporation (NS)--jointly requested that FRA waive various sections in
parts 229 and 232 as it relates to those railroads' operation of ECP
brake pilot trains. See Docket No. FRA-2006-26435. FRA held a public
fact-finding hearing on this matter on January 16, 2007, featuring
testimony from representatives of the petitioners, air brake
manufacturers, and labor unions and granted a conditional waiver on
March 21, 2007. See id.
On September 4, 2007, FRA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) containing proposed revisions to the power brake regulation. See
72 FR 50820. In the NPRM, FRA proposed revisions to the regulations
governing freight power brakes and equipment by adding a new subpart
addressing ECP brake systems. The proposed revisions were designed to
provide for and encourage the safe implementation and use of ECP brake
system technologies. The proposed revisions contained specific
requirements relating to design, interoperability, training,
inspection, testing, handling defective equipment, and periodic
maintenance related to ECP brake systems. The proposed rule also
identified provisions of the existing regulations and statutes where
FRA believed flexibility to facilitate the introduction of this
advanced brake system technology was necessary.
Following publication of the NPRM in the Federal Register, FRA held
a public
[[Page 61513]]
hearing in Washington, DC on October 4, 2007, and a public hearing in
conjunction with a public technical roundtable in the Chicago, IL area
on October 19, 2007. The purpose of the hearings was to receive oral
comments regarding the specific provisions contained in the proposed
rule and to receive evidence and to develop findings to determine
whether FRA should invoke its discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C.
20306 to provide a limited exemption from Sec. 20303 for freight
trains and freight cars operating with ECP brake systems. Section 20303
requires operators to transport rail vehicles with defective or
insecure equipment ``from the place at which the defect or insecurity
was first discovered to the nearest available place at which the
repairs can be made'' to avoid incurring civil penalties related to
such movement.
The hearings were attended by numerous railroads, organizations
representing railroads, labor organizations, and brake manufacturers.
Although the comment period officially closed November 5, 2007, FRA
continued to receive comments on the NPRM into January 2008. FRA
received substantial oral and written testimony at the hearings and
written comments to the NPRM from the following organizations,
railroads, and brake manufacturers, listed in alphabetical order:
American Association for Justice (AAJ).
Association of American Railroads (AAR).
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET).
Brotherhood Railway Carmen Division, Transportation-
Communications International Union (BRC).
General Electric Transportation and General Rail Services
(collectively, GE).
New York Airbrake (NYAB).
Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS).
Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO (TWU).
Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP).
United Transportation Union (UTU).
Wabtec Railway Electronics (Wabtec).
UTU supports and incorporates by reference the comments submitted
by BLET, TCU, TWU, and its other labor representatives.
FRA carefully considered all the information, data and proposals
submitted in relation to Docket No. FRA-2006-26175 when developing this
final rule. In addition to the preceding information, FRA's knowledge
and experience with enforcing the existing power brake regulations were
also relied upon when developing this final rule. FRA will address and
summarize all comments in the section-by-section analysis below and
elsewhere as appropriate or necessary.
Based on the oral and written comments submitted at the hearing and
in the docket to this proceeding, FRA makes the following findings: (1)
Safety is not compromised by allowing a train operating with ECP brakes
and having a minimal number of ineffective or inoperative defective
brakes to travel to its destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles, without
any additional intermediate brake inspections; (2) the safety hazards
caused by placing cars equipped with ECP brakes into a train with an
incompatible brake system are no different than the hazards caused by
placing a car equipped with conventional brakes with ineffective or
inoperative brakes into a train operated with conventional brakes; (3)
safety is not compromised by allowing a train operated with ECP brakes
with at least 85 percent effective and operative brakes to haul a car
with defective non-brake safety appliances to the nearest or nearest
forward repair location; and (4) requiring strict compliance with the
movement for repair provision contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 would
constitute a significant disincentive to the implementation and use of
ECP brake technologies. Based on these findings, FRA has elected to
utilize its discretionary authority provided under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to
provide a limited exemption for freight trains and freight cars
operating with ECP brake systems from the requirements contained in 49
U.S.C. 20303.
Subsequent to the close of the comment period in this proceeding,
AAR modified two of its existing ECP brake standards, S-4200 and S-
4210, and continued to develop standards regarding hardware and
software configuration management issues for ECP brake systems. AAR
sought comments from its members concerning a proposed standard S-4270
addressing the configuration management issues. As FRA is interested in
incorporating by reference the most current standards into the final
rule, FRA reopened the comment period on April 18, 2008, for an
additional fifteen (15) days for the limited purpose of receiving
comments on revised standards S-4200 and S-4210 and newly developed
draft S-4270. FRA continues to believe that reopening the comment
period was the most efficient method of ensuring that the most current
industry standards were included in this final rule.
The NPRM and this subsequent notice indicated that FRA intended to
include S-4270 in the final rule if it was finalized by AAR with
sufficient time for inclusion and if its final version remained
substantially similar to the draft standard reference in the notice
reopening the comment periods. Ultimately, AAR adopted S-4270 without
any changes.
II. Conventional Brake Operations
While the basic operational concept of the automatic air brake
system, originally conceived by George Westinghouse in the 1870s,
remains the same, it has seen continuous improvement in practice. An
air compressor in the locomotive charges a main reservoir to about 140
pounds per square inch (psi). With controls located in the locomotive,
the locomotive engineer uses the main reservoir to charge the brake
pipe--a 1\1/4\ inch diameter pipe--that runs the length of the train
and is connected between cars with hoses. The brake pipe's compressed
air--used as the communication medium to signal brake operations and
the power source for braking action--then charges each car's two-
compartment reservoir to a pressure of 90 psi. Braking occurs through a
reduction of air pressure in the brake pipe, which signals the valves
on each car to direct compressed air from the reservoir on each car to
its respective brake cylinder for an application of brakes. When air
pressure is supplied to the brake cylinder--which is connected to a
series of rods and levers that apply and release the brakes--the
resulting force presses the brake shoes against the wheel, retarding
the car's speed.
While brake applications were initially directed by George
Westinghouse's triple valve, modern applications use a control valve,
which directs air from the brake pipe into the air reservoir when air
pressure is rising in the brake pipe in order to charge the auxiliary
and emergency reservoir and be ready for a brake application. To
perform a brake application, the locomotive automatic brake valve
reduces air pressure in the brake pipe by exhausting air, causing the
car's control valve to direct air from the auxiliary reservoir into the
brake cylinder. The increase in air pressure to the brake cylinder is
approximately 2\1/2\ times the drop in brake pipe pressure. A 26 psi
reduction in brake pipe pressure is equal to a full service brake
application on a fully charged brake pipe, and should result in a brake
cylinder pressure adequate to achieve a full service braking effort
(brake force). While the control valve is directing air
[[Page 61514]]
into the brake cylinder, or holding air in the brake cylinder, it is
unable to recharge the auxiliary reservoir on each car. The engineer
can apply the brakes in increments, of a few psi at a time, go directly
to a full service application, or initiate an emergency application of
the brakes.
Unlike a brake application, the incremental release of brakes on a
typical freight train operating in direct release cannot be
accomplished. Brakes can only be fully released, called a direct
release, and only with the brakes released can the auxiliary reservoirs
then begin to recharge. Brake applications are possible, but are more
complicated, from undercharged brake pipe and air reservoirs.
Recharging takes more time for a longer train, because the air has to
be sent down the length of the train's brake pipe--which can be up to a
mile and a half. In addition, on extremely long trains, it is often
difficult to fully charge the brake pipe due to small air leaks
throughout the brake pipe and cold weather.
Brake pipe pressure can be measured by an end-of-train (EOT)
device, which is pneumatically connected to the rear of a train
equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes and sends signals (EOT
Beacon) via radio indicating the brake pipe pressure to the lead
locomotive. Current Federal regulations specify the design and
performance standards for both one-way and two-way EOT devices. See
Part 232, subpart E. Both EOT device designs comprise of a rear unit
pneumatically connected to the rear of the train's last car that
transmits an EOT Beacon to a an EOT Head End Unit--a device located in
the cab of the lead locomotive displaying the brake pipe pressure of
the rear car to the locomotive engineer. The two-way EOT device also
has the capability to transmit an electronic signal from the locomotive
to the rear end unit to initiate an emergency brake application by
venting brake pipe pressure to atmosphere at the rear end unit.
An emergency brake application can be initiated in several ways.
The locomotive engineer can initiate the application by moving the
brake handle to the emergency position, which depletes brake pipe
pressure to zero at a faster rate than the service application by
exhausting brake pipe air pressure at the locomotive. Emergency brake
applications can also be initiated by opening the conductor's valve,
located in the cab of the locomotive, or by a break-in-two, where the
train separates between cars and the brake pipe hoses separate, thereby
venting brake pipe pressure to zero. While performing an emergency
brake application from the locomotive, a locomotive engineer can also
use the two-way EOT device to initiate an emergency brake application
at the rear of the train. This permits the emergency application to be
simultaneously initiated from both the front and rear of the trains and
ensures that the brakes on the cars at the rear of the train apply in
the event a brake pipe blockage occurs.
III. ECP Brake Operations
As early as 1990, AAR began investigating a more advanced braking
concept for freight railroads, the ECP brake system. The ECP brake
system radically improves the operation of the automatic air brake by
using electrical transmissions to signal the application and release of
brakes on each car in a train while still using compressed air to
supply the air reservoirs on each car, which will be used to pressurize
the brake cylinders to apply the force of the brake shoes against the
wheels. ECP brakes also greatly simplify the brake system by
eliminating multiple pneumatic valves used by conventional brakes and
replacing them with printed circuit boards, each with a microprocessor,
one electrically activated application valve, and one electrically
activated release valve, with feedback on brake cylinder pressure for
uniform control.
ECP brake technology requires equipping locomotives and cars with
special valves and electronic equipment that are unique to the
operation of ECP brakes. While this system still requires a brake pipe
to supply compressed air from the locomotive to each car's reservoir in
a train, there are currently two known methods to send the electronic
signal for ECP brake operations from the locomotive to each car in the
train. These methods include using a hard wire electrical cable running
the length of the train or a radio-based technology requiring a
transmitter and a receiver installed on the cars and locomotives. At
this time, it appears that the railroad industry has chosen to use a
cable-based system for ECP brake operation.
ECP brake systems still employ the automatic air brake system's
basic concept where the locomotive supplies compressed air to each
car's reservoir via the conventional brake pipe. Each car's brake valve
reacts to a signal to apply the brakes by directing compressed air from
the car's reservoir to the brake cylinder or to release the brakes by
releasing air from the brake cylinder. The similarities between the
conventional pneumatic and ECP brake systems end here. Instead of
utilizing reductions and increases of the brake pipe pressure to convey
application and release signals to each car in the train, ECP brake
technology uses electronic signals, resulting in an almost
instantaneous application and release of brakes on each car in the
entire train. Since the brake pipe pressure no longer serves as the
communication medium in ECP braked trains, the brake pipe is constantly
being supplied or charged with compressed air from the locomotive
regardless of whether the brakes are applied or released. In addition,
ECP brake-equipped trains offer graduated release, where a partial
brake release command provides a partial, proportional brake release.
The basic ECP brake system is controlled from the Head End Unit
(HEU) and each car is equipped with a Car Control Device (CCD), an
electronic control device that replaces the function of the
conventional pneumatic control valve. The CCD acknowledges and
interprets the electronic signals from the HEU and controls the car's
service and emergency braking functions. The CCD controls charging the
car's air reservoir and also has diagnostic capabilities to send a
warning signal to the locomotive in the event any component fails to
appropriately respond to a braking command. Each CCD has a unique
electronic address located in the Car ID Module, which is keyed to a
car's reporting mark and number.
Each car connects to the locomotive via special connectors and
junction boxes. More specifically, an ECP brake-equipped train's train
line cable--a two-conductor electric cable (8 A-WG and a
shield)--connects the locomotive and cars and carries train line power
to operate all CCDs and the ECP brake system's end-of-train (ECP-EOT)
device and communicates network signals via the power voltage. A Power
Supply Controller (PSC)--mounted within the locomotive and providing
230 VDC of electricity--interfaces with the train line cable's
communication network, provides power to all connected CCDs and ECP-EOT
devices, and controls the train line power supply as commanded by the
HEU. Under the AAR standards, a single power supply shall be capable of
supplying power to an ECP brake-equipped train consisting of at least
160 CCDs and an ECP-EOT device.
Under the existing regulations, the conventional pneumatic brake
system's EOT device can lose communication for 16 minutes and 30
seconds before the locomotive engineer is alerted. See 49 CFR
232.407(g). After the message is displayed, the engineer must restrict
the speed of the train to 30 mph or stop the train if a defined heavy
grade is involved. Per the regulations, railroads
[[Page 61515]]
must calibrate each conventional two-way EOT device every 365 days and
incur additional maintenance and cost expenses while replacing its
batteries.
By contrast, an ECP-EOT device uniquely monitors both brake pipe
pressure and operating voltages and sends an EOT Beacon every second
from its rear unit to its HEU on the controlling locomotive. The HEU
will initiate a full service brake application should brake pipe
pressure fall below 50 psi or initiate an emergency brake application
should a communication loss occur for five consecutive seconds or if
there is a break in the train line electrical cable. An ECP-EOT device
does not require calibration and its battery, only a back-up for the
computer, is charged by the train line cable and is much lighter in
weight than the conventional EOT device battery. Physically the last
network node in the train, the ECP-EOT device also contains an
electronic train line cable circuit--a 50 ohm resistor in series with
0.47 micro-farad capacitor--and must be connected to the network and
transmit status messages to the HEU before the train line cable can be
initially powered.
ECP brake systems have the great advantage of real-time monitoring
of the brake system's health. In normal operation, the HEU transmits a
message/status down the train line cable to each car. If an individual
car's brakes do not respond properly to the HEU's brake command, or if
air pressures are not within the specified limits for operation, a
message indicating the problem and the applicable car number is sent
back to the HEU, which in turn notifies the locomotive engineer of the
problem. The ECP brake system can identify various faults, including,
but not limited to: low brake pipe pressure; low reservoir pressure;
low train line cable voltage; low battery charge; incorrect brake
cylinder pressure; and offline or inoperative CCDs.
Emergency or full service brake applications automatically occur
when the ECP brake system's software detects certain faults. For
instance, if the HEU detects that the percentage of operative brakes
falls below 85 percent, a full service brake application will
automatically occur. In addition, the brakes will automatically apply
when the following occurs: (1) Two CCD's or the ECP-EOT report a
``Critical Loss'' within 5 seconds; (2) the train line cable indicates
low voltage with less than 90 percent operative brakes; (3) the ECP-EOT
reports a low battery charge; (4) the train moves during set-up; (5)
the train line cable becomes disconnected; or (6) the train exceeds 20
mph in Switch Mode. Under the AAR standards, the ECP brake system shall
also have a pneumatic back-up system on each car for an emergency brake
application in the event of a vented brake pipe or a train separation.
These features preserve and exceed the fail safe features of
conventional pneumatic brake systems.
IV. Interoperability
Due to control methodology differences, ECP brake systems are not
functionally compatible with conventional pneumatic air brake systems.
For instance, while conventional pneumatic air brake systems command a
brake application by reducing the air pressure in the brake pipe, ECP
brake systems command a brake application through a digital
communications link transmitted on the electrical train line cable.
Manufacturers have developed application strategies to address
issues relating to car and locomotive fleet interchangeability. In
particular, they have proposed three major schemes of ECP brake design:
stand-alone systems using only ECP brakes; overlay (dual mode) systems
capable of operating in either conventional or ECP brake mode; and
emulation systems, also capable of operating in either conventional or
ECP brake mode.
Since cars with stand-alone ECP brake systems do not include a
fully pneumatic brake control valve, they are incompatible with
conventionally braked cars and must be operated in train sets depending
solely upon ECP brakes. Cars using stand-alone ECP brake systems cannot
intermix in the same train with cars using conventional pneumatic
brakes unless (1) the train uses ECP brakes and those cars using
conventional pneumatic brakes are transported as cars with inoperative
brakes or (2) the train uses conventional pneumatic brakes and the cars
using ECP brakes are transported as cars with inoperative brakes. While
the stand-alone ECP brake system is the least expensive alternative of
the three design types, its incompatibility with conventional pneumatic
brake systems requires train segregation, potentially posing
significant operational problems until the entire car fleet is
converted to ECP brakes.
Overlay configurations--cars equipped with both ECP CCDs and
conventional pneumatic control valve portions--allow cars to operate
with either ECP or conventional pneumatic brakes. To operate in ECP
brake mode, compatible ECP equipment must be installed on the
locomotive as well as on the freight car. While an overlay system's
dual mode capability provides significant flexibility, railroad
operators must purchase, install, and maintain equipment to support
both types of brake systems for as long as dual mode capability is
required.
Emulation configurations use a CCD capable of operating in either
ECP or conventional mode without requiring conventional pneumatic
controls. One manufacturer has provided an emulation ECP brake valve
that monitors both the digital communications cable and the brake pipe
for a brake command. If an electrical signal is present, the ECP brake
valve operates in ECP brake mode. If the electrical brake command
signal is not present, then the valve will monitor the changes in the
brake pipe pressure like a conventional pneumatic control valve and the
CCD will use a software program to emulate the function and response of
a conventional pneumatic valve. An emulation ECP brake system can be
operated in any train with any mix of emulation ECP and conventional
brake systems. In a mixed train, the emulation ECP brake system will
monitor the brake pipe for pressure changes and set up brake cylinder
pressure like a conventional pneumatic valve.
In the NPRM, FRA did not propose any rules uniquely regulating
trains or cars equipped with emulation ECP brake systems, but sought
comments on whether or how it should regulate such systems differently
than what was proposed. According to NYAB and Wabtec (collectively, the
brake manufacturers), the current AAR standards do not require a
pneumatic emulation mode, and this function should not be subject to
FRA regulation. In the event future releases of the S-4200
specifications add pneumatic emulation as a requirement, the brake
manufacturers suggest that the need for FRA regulation can be addressed
at that time. FRA concurs and the final rule does not include
regulations uniquely affecting emulation ECP brake systems.
Manufacturers have also addressed ECP brake compatibility with
locomotives equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes, which must be
equipped with an HEU unit to operate the brakes on cars equipped with
ECP brakes. For instance, one manufacturer has developed a portable
unit that will allow a locomotive lacking an ECP brake HEU to operate a
train equipped with ECP brakes by converting the air pressure changes
in the brake pipe to digital command signals that are transmitted to
the freight cars through the electrical train line cable. The
locomotive engineer operates the brakes with the conventional automatic
brake valve in the control cab. The brakes,
[[Page 61516]]
however, will respond instantaneously and provide all of the benefits
of an ECP brake system. While FRA recognizes that the technology for
such a portable unit is in development and may provide a possible
solution to the technological transition, it is not addressed or
authorized by this final rule and the incorporated AAR standards.
V. Advantages of ECP Brakes Over Conventional Pneumatic Brakes
ECP brake technology overcomes many of the physical limitations
inherent in conventional pneumatic brake technology. Field testing of
AAR compliant ECP brake systems over the past decade has not revealed
any indication of a catastrophic event that could be caused by an ECP
brake system malfunctioning. With a high level of confidence, the ECP
brake stake holders support the implementation of ECP brake systems on
the Nation's railroads. FRA concludes that the advantages of ECP brake
technology will significantly improve the safety and the performance of
train operations. Examples of such benefits include better train
handling through simultaneous brake applications, continuous brake pipe
charging, and graduated brake operation. Derailments are expected to
decline significantly. ECP brake benefits also include electronic train
management, improved performance, and real time diagnostics of the
train's brake system.
A. Simultaneous Brake Application
The conventional pneumatic brake system uses compressed air as the
source for braking power and as the medium for communicating brake
application and release commands and communicates the brake commands by
changing brake pipe pressure through the use of the locomotive's
automatic brake valve. These commands begin at the front of the train
and propagate to the rear of the train at the speed of the air pressure
moving from car to car. This slow propagation of the brake command
contributes to uneven braking, excessive in-train and run-in forces,
train handling challenges, longer stopping distances, safety risks of
prematurely depleting air brake reservoirs, and a corresponding low
brake rate until all cars in the train receive and fully respond to the
brake command. FRA recognizes that the slow application and release of
brakes in a train, causes excessive in-train forces, which have the
potential to cause derailments when they occur in curves, cross-overs,
or when heavier cars are placed at the rear of the train or after empty
cars. When the brakes on the rear of the train release much more slowly
than the brakes on the front of the train, the potential for a
``string-line'' derailment--where the train stretches out until one or
more wheels are lifted off the inside rail of a curve--increases.
The ECP brake system reduces these problems by enabling cars to
brake simultaneously at the command of an electronic signal. The
electronic signal's speed ensures an instantaneous, simultaneous, and
even activation of each car's brake valves, significantly reducing
braking distances--40 to 60 percent for the longest trains--and
minimizing the consequences of collisions or derailments by reducing
the collision speed and slowing the non-derailed portion of the train.
B. Continuous Brake Pipe Charging
Propagating a brake command signal through the reduction or
increase of air pressure in the brake pipe represents a significant
limitation of conventional pneumatic brakes. The same brake pipe air
used to propagate brake commands also charges reservoirs on each
freight car. As a result, the brake pipe must be fully charged to
restore full braking capacity to depleted reservoirs. Partially
depleted air from the brake pipe, which occurs during the initial stage
of braking, prohibits repeat applications of brakes until the brake
pipe can be recharged. A brake pipe can only be recharged once the
brakes have been fully released. This characteristic of conventional
pneumatic brakes contributes to the risk of run-away trains caused by
prematurely depleted brake pipe pressure, particularly on steep grades.
The ECP brake system reduces this risk by continuously charging the
brake pipe. Since ECP brakes do not use the brake pipe as a brake
command medium, the brake pipe is constantly being charged, allowing
the locomotive engineer to operate the brake system more aggressively.
With ECP brake systems, it is unnecessary to apply hand brakes on steep
grades to recharge the brake pipe after the train stops on the grade.
C. Graduated Brake Application and Release
The conventional pneumatic brake system's inability to operate
freight trains in graduated release has long hampered train operations
and has increased fuel consumption. The conventional pneumatic brake
system can only operate in direct release, preventing locomotive
engineers from reducing the braking effort without completely releasing
and resetting the brakes. In other words, after a direct release brake
application with a conventional pneumatic brake system, braking effort
can be increased but not decreased without fully releasing the brakes.
In many cases, direct release leads to unnecessary train stops or
insufficient initial brake applications. ECP brake systems overcome
this deficiency by operating in graduated release, which enables the
operator to reduce braking effort to a lower level after making a brake
application without fully releasing the brakes. As a result, the
operator can accurately adjust the braking level as each situation
requires, eliminating the stops required to recharge and reset the
brakes after excessive brake applications and prior to negotiating
hills and valleys.
D. Train Management
The use of a train line cable allows real-time self-diagnostic
functions to be incorporated in the brake system. The initial check of
brake system conditions on each car and continuous monitoring of each
car's braking functions provides immediate communication to the
locomotive engineer of certain brake failures. The continuous
monitoring of each car's braking functions and real-time diagnostics of
the train's brake system is a significant advantage to the locomotive
engineer for the operation of the train. These technical benefits also
justify elimination of some of the currently required physical
inspections of the train's brake system and support regulatory change
to operate cars with non-functioning brakes out of the initial
terminal. When the ECP brake system diagnostics detect a serious
problem, including when the brake pipe pressure falls below 50 psi, the
ECP brake system will automatically command a penalty brake
application. ECP brake systems also eliminate the conventional
pneumatic brake system's inability to apply all brakes in the train
when there is a blockage in the brake pipe, which is handled through
the use of a two-way EOT telemetry device not required by all trains.
This failure will not affect brake applications in ECP brake systems,
because each car is provided a braking command through a train line
cable, not solely through the reduction of brake pipe pressure, which
would not be propagated through the consist if the brake pipe is
blocked. Therefore, ECP brake systems incorporate features that make
them inherently safer than conventional pneumatic brakes. Using sensor-
based technology to maintain a continuous feedback loop on train
condition for the crew and any centralized monitoring, the electrical
communication cable network can also serve as a platform for the
gradual
[[Page 61517]]
addition of other train performance monitoring and management controls,
including distributed power locomotive control, hand brake on/off
detection system, automatic activation and release of hand brakes, hot
bearing detection, and truck oscillation and vibration. These and other
train management features will increase the reliability and overall
safety of train operations.
E. Improved Performance
Ultimately, ECP brake technology also provides improved
performance, which will contribute to safer train operations and
significant cost savings over time. Since trains operated with ECP
brakes can operate in graduated release, instead of direct release,
fuel will not be wasted while pulling trains against a heavy brake
application. Further, because all of the cars' ECP brakes release
simultaneously, fuel will not be wasted on initial start-ups and power-
ups after a brake release.
Operations utilizing ECP brake systems also promise increased
average train speeds and decreased trip times. ECP brake systems allow
the locomotive engineer to modulate the brake applications in
territories with descending grades, thus increasing overall trip
average speeds and reaching destinations sooner. While the slow release
of the rear cars' brakes on conventional pneumatic braked trains cause
drag, the brakes on ECP brake-equipped trains release simultaneously,
improving start-up and acceleration times. Further, due to their
shorter stopping distances, trains equipped solely with ECP brake
systems may potentially permit higher train speeds within existing
signal spacing, which will increase average system velocity, or permit
use of shorter ``blocks'' between signals, facilitating greater system
capacity.
The instantaneous application and release of ECP brakes will result
in more uniform braking, thus improving wheel wear and increasing brake
shoe life. In a conventional pneumatically braked train, the brake pipe
gradient and slower response time causes the first third of the train's
cars to provide the majority of the braking action, thus applying
additional pressure and heat on those cars' wheels. Since ECP brake
systems provide instantaneous braking on all cars, such pressure will
be more uniformly distributed along the train, thus eliminating the
uneven braking force on the wheels of those leading cars. The ECP brake
system also self-monitors each car's brake cylinder pressure and
maintains the prescribed pressure, thus reducing the potential for
creating shelling and flat spots on wheels.
Due to minimized wheel defects, and their accompanying vibrations,
freight cars and brake components will enjoy increased life. Further,
instantaneous braking will also prevent draft gear assemblies from
receiving the constant pressure caused by trains equipped with
conventional pneumatic brake systems and will reduce lading damage by
eliminating slack action and in-train forces caused by uneven braking.
ECP brake systems will also reduce the number of brake parts and rubber
diaphragms required by conventional pneumatic brake systems.
VI. Standards, Approval, and Testing
During the past 18 years, FRA has monitored the progression of ECP
brake technology and has observed field testing on various revenue
trains, both freight and passenger. In 1997, FRA participated in an AAR
initiative to develop ECP brake standards and in 1999, FRA funded,
through the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a FMECA of the ECP
brake system based on AAR's Standards and Recommended Practices, S-4200
Series. FRA also participated in programs to develop and enhance
advanced components for ECP brake systems. After all of these efforts,
FRA has determined that the AAR S-4200 Series of standards are
appropriate substantively and legally for incorporation by reference in
this rule and that the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee is an
appropriate vehicle to rely upon in the implementation of ECP brake
technology for this rule. FRA acknowledges that ECP brakes are an
attractive, viable, and enabling technology with the potential to
substantially improve the operational efficiency of trains and that by
complying with AAR Standard S-4200, ECP braked trains offer significant
safety and efficiency benefits in freight train handling, car
maintenance, fuel savings, network capacity, self-monitoring, and fail-
safe operation.
AAR administers the existing industry ECP brake standards through
its Air Brake Systems Committee--consisting of representatives from the
major railroads, brake manufacturers, and FRA--which requires
demonstrated proof of compatibility, safety, and reliability of air
brake systems to receive AAR approval. FRA is satisfied that the
existing AAR S-4200 Series specifications, AAR approval procedures, and
continuing oversight by the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee will best
ensure the safety and reliability of ECP brake systems. An ECP brake
monitoring system complying with AAR Standard S-4200 Series increases
safety by communicating information on the location and quantity of
defective equipment and by providing for the safe movement of equipment
over longer distances and periods of time.
A. AAR Standards and Approval Process
In order to assure the safety and the interoperability of ECP brake
system designs, AAR developed the S-4200 Series of standards. The first
five standards (S-4200, S-4210, S-4220, S-4230, and S-4250)--issued in
1999 and updated in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007--specify the functional,
operational, and interface requirements for cable-based ECP brake
systems. AAR issued two additional standards in January 2007,
specifying ECP brake equipment approval procedures (S-4240) and
interoperability testing requirements (S-4260). In April 2008, AAR
issued a standard for hardware and software configuration management
plans (S-4270). At this time, AAR has not completed specifications for
radio-based ECP brakes, which it considers technically immature and
unsuitable. The purposes of the standards are to ensure that AAR-
approved electronic brake systems are interoperable between different
manufacturers and meet high standards of safety and reliability. The
analysis of the S-4200 Series of standards indicates that the
performance specifications for the cable-based ECP brake concept are
complete.
The AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices (MSRP)
contain the following standards for cable-based ECP brake systems:
S-4200, ECP Cable-Based Brake Systems--Performance
requirements;
S-4210, ECP Cable-Based Brake System Cable, Connectors,
and Junctions Boxes--Performance Specifications;
S-4220, ECP Cable-Based Brake DC Power Supply--Performance
Specification;
S-4230, Intratrain Communication Specification for Cable-
Based Freight Train Control System;
S-4240, ECP Brake Equipment--Approval Procedure;
S-4250, Performance Requirements for ITC Controlled Cable-
Based Distributed Power Systems;
S-4260, ECP Brake and Wire Distributed Power
Interoperability Test Procedures; and
S-4270, ECP Brake System Configuration Management.
Standard S-4200 ensures that the functionality and performance of
freight ECP brake systems are uniform and
[[Page 61518]]
consistent among equipment from different manufacturers, that cars
equipped with AAR-approved ECP brake systems from different
manufacturers are interoperable, and that AAR-approved electronic brake
systems meet a high standard of safety and reliability. This standard
defines ECP brake system elements, specifies their functionality in
different implementation schemes--such as stand-alone, overlays, and
emulators--and sets the requirements for all system functions. It
covers all primary functions of ECP brakes, including graduated brake
application and releases, continuous reservoir charging, adjustment of
braking level to car load, continuous fault detection, equipment status
monitoring, and pneumatic backup. It also specifies requirements for
all modes of train operation and provides an extensive description of
fault response and recovery functions for all possible faults of the
system components. The standard also establishes environmental
requirements for the designed systems, in-service testing, and rigorous
approval procedures for the certification process of new ECP brake
equipment.
Other standards in the AAR S-4200 Series contain requirements for
critical ECP brake system components and communication protocols.
Standard S-4210 contains the performance specifications and
qualification test procedures for ECP brake system cables, connectors,
and end-of-car junction boxes. The required testing verifies that the
designed components have high reliability, will withstand harsh
environmental conditions, and will have at least an 8-year operating
life.
Standard S-4220 contains performance specifications for the DC
power supply system through the hard-wired train line cable for ECP
brake controllers and other electronic freight car components. Since a
DC power supply conductor will also send communication control commands
between a locomotive and its attached cars, the standard requires
reliable separation and absence of interference between the DC power
supply and the communication circuits.
Standard S-4230 contains the requirements related to intra-train
communication systems on freight equipment used in revenue interchange
service. The standard facilitates interoperability between freight cars
and locomotives without limiting the proprietary design approaches used
by individual suppliers. The communication protocol was developed for
control of ECP brakes and multiple remote units, including distributed
power locomotives, and for safety reporting of various car and
locomotive components.
Standard S-4250 contains the methodology and communication flow
requirements for controlling the operation of multiple locomotives in a
freight consist through the intra-train communication network that is
shared with ECP brake system. The locomotive control through the intra-
train communication line is an alternative method of locomotive
control, which was not available before the introduction of ECP brake
system technology. The controlled locomotives can either trail a lead
locomotive or be distributed (i.e., separated by cars) in a train. The
standard establishes protocols for different types of locomotive
controls through the intra-train line cable, depending on the location
of the consist's multiple locomotives. While the current means of
controlling ``distributed power'' is performed through radio control--
which is susceptible to a loss of communication and is not ``fail
safe'' in operation--locomotives operated with ECP brake systems can be
relied upon to function as commanded in real time and automatically
apply the brakes in the event of a communication loss.
Standard S-4260 contains the test procedures that must be completed
by ECP brake manufacturers to establish interoperability baselines
among ECP brake and wire distributed power (WDP) systems in compliance
with the S-4200 standards series. The test procedures validate the
functional interoperability of ECP brake and WDP systems developed by
different manufacturers.
Standard S-4270 defines the procedures for managing the software
and hardware configuration for AAR-approved ECP brake systems.
The AAR approval process and the work of the Air Brake Systems
Committee has been the primary method of ensuring the safety and
reliability of railroad brake systems and components for decades.
Through its participation on the Air Brake Systems Committee, FRA can
monitor any safety or reliability issues that may develop with ECP
brake systems. In the event of a serious safety issue with a supplier's
ECP brake system, FRA can appropriately respond by invoking its
authority to intervene with additional rulemaking or an emergency
order. FRA does not expect to use this authority, because the AAR Air
Brake Systems Committee already has the authority to rescind AAR
approval for brake systems that do not perform safely or reliably.
Standard S-4240 contains the acceptance procedure for seeking AAR
approval of ECP brake equipment. The standard requires a manufacturer
to apply for approval by submitting certain information under
Administrative Standard S-060. Following review and approval of the
initial application data and test plan by the AAR Air Brake Systems
Committee, a manufacturer maintains the burden of establishing
compliance with Standards S-4200, S-4210, S-4220, S-4230, S-4250, S-
4260, and S-4270 to obtain conditional approval.
For laboratory testing, an AAR representative will select 150 CCDs
from a lot of 200 and will select HEUs, train power supplying units
(TPSs), and ECP-EOTs from lots of four each. The testing will be
performed on a 150-car test rack configured in accordance with AAR
specifications. The manufacturer will provide for AAR evaluation of the
test results, which shall include a requirements traceability and
compliance matrix for each AAR standard and all necessary test reports,
and then conduct interoperability laboratory testing between new ECP
brake equipment and AAR-approved ECP brake equipment in accordance with
standard S-4260.
Upon satisfactory completion of the aforementioned laboratory
tests, AAR will consider conditional approval for field testing of ECP
brake equipment. If conditional approval is granted, 150 ECP brake CCDs
shall be selected from a production lot of 200 test-approved CCDs, and
100 of those selected, plus at least two ECP brake-equipped locomotives
and one ECP-EOT device, must be placed in railroad service for 24
months. Under conditional approval, at least 1,000 cars must be
allotted for use. Within those 24 months, all in-service tests must be
conducted. After those 24 months, the Air Brake Systems Committee
continues to monitor the product for reliability and safety concerns.
If a problem with any brake component is discovered, the Committee will
discuss the issue and may either demand further tests or withdraw AAR
approval.
Full AAR approval shall be provided after 4 years if during that
time a manufacturer furnishes AAR at specified intervals various
service reports, which must include accurate ECP brake equipment
malfunction records. FRA agrees with AAR's assessment that 4 years are
needed to collect a history of reliable data with minimum failures. In
addition, the manufacturer must provide to AAR a semiannual report
containing any repair material for the test ECP brake equipment. Under
the standard, AAR reserves the right to withdraw
[[Page 61519]]
conditional test approval if it determines that safety is impaired,
reliability degrades, or incompatibility of ECP brake operation
develops, and may require any additional testing or performance
evaluations it deems necessary. Standard S-4240 also contains specific
procedures that must be followed when a manufacturer intends to change
certain ECP brake equipment physical characteristics, software, or
electronics.
FRA supports this effort as a timely measure for AAR to strengthen
the regulatory package for ECP brake systems. Overall, FRA considers
AAR approval a valuable step to ensure the reliability and safety of
ECP brake systems and a minimum requirement for initial application of
ECP brake systems on the Nation's railroads. However, FRA fully intends
to monitor the application and safety of ECP and may, at its
discretion, require additional safety analysis to be performed to
confirm the safety of ECP brake systems installed and operating in
revenue service. FRA reserves the right to witness the AAR approval
testing of the product.
B. FMECA
AAR Standard S-4200 Series was developed to support the design of a
safer, more reliable ECP braking system when compared with conventional
air brakes. Once the standard was created, the railroad industry
identified the need to perform a safety and reliability assessment of
an ECP brake system built in accordance with this standard. Since
actual S-4200 Series compliant ECP brake systems did not yet exist, the
industry decided to conduct a FMECA for a hypothetical ECP brake system
that satisfied all the requirements of the standard. At FRA's
insistence, the FMECA on AAR Standard S-4200 was performed in 1999 by
DEL Engineering with participation of AAR, FRA and a number of experts
with significant experience in the development and application of ECP
brake systems.
The FMECA team began the analysis by identifying all major ECP
brake system components and their intended functions. The analysis
examined each component and function and identified associated failure
modes and effects. The failure modes were analyzed to determine
severity, frequency of occurrence, and effectiveness of detection. The
FMECA team created a numeric ranking criterion and determined and
prioritized the level of risk posed by each failure mode. High-risk
failure modes were identified and appropriate mitigation strategies
were developed to decrease the risk.
The FMECA team analyzed the failure modes of all ECP brake
components, including: CCDs with the battery; HEUs on the head
locomotive; ECP-EOT devices; train line cables, communication and power
supplies; power supply controllers; head end line terminators; car ID
modules; locomotive ID modules; and operative brakes. The analysis
included different types of ECP brake systems, including stand alone,
overlay (dual mode), and emulator and all system functional
requirements and operating modes, including Initialization, Switch,
Run, and Cut-out. The FMECA failure log contained about 1,500 failure
modes. For each high-risk failure mode, the FMECA team identified
action items and offered recommendations on how to mitigate the
consequences of component failures or system functional failures. The
team primarily examined single-point failures but also identified and
evaluated some cases of combined failures that had significant safety
consequences.
The FMECA results confirmed that the ECP brake concept offers the
potential for improved performance, reliability, and safety over that
of conventional pneumatic brake systems. The FMECA concluded that no
failure mode of an AAR-compliant ECP brake system exists that can cause
a catastrophic accident due to single-point failure of the system
itself. The AAR standards, as written, eliminate or mitigate critical
outcomes of single-point failure of ECP brake systems.
The FMECA team encouraged manufacturers to pursue ECP brake
technology, because the potential safety and efficiency benefits will
far outweigh any disadvantages. If designed and maintained properly,
ECP brakes will be substantially safer and more reliable than the
conventional pneumatic brake system they are intended to replace. AAR
and the brake manufacturers indicated that they were completely
satisfied that ECP brake systems are significantly safer than
conventional pneumatic systems. They accepted the results of the FMECA
and concluded that no modifications were necessary to the AAR standards
related to ECP brake systems.
VII. Market Maturity and Implementation
The U.S. market for ECP brake systems is mature enough to begin
implementation of ECP brake technology. The equipment manufacturers
have made a significant investment in the technology and have completed
the preliminary design work and field testing of ECP brakes. For
instance, they have provided technical solutions for different ECP
brake implementation strategies, enabling non-ECP and ECP brake-
equipped cars to run in combined trains and, in some cases, allowing
ECP brake-equipped freight cars to run in ECP brake mode using
locomotives with conventional pneumatic brake systems. In addition,
they are ready to supply fully operational stand-alone ECP brake
systems, overlays, and emulators for the U.S. market, easing the
industry's migration process. A commitment by the railroad industry to
change over to ECP brakes is necessary to inspire additional
technological initiatives by the manufacturers.
ECP brake systems from the main U.S. manufacturers--all in
different stages of AAR approval and testing in revenue service--have
been built with the intention of complying with the AAR S-4200 Series
of standards, proven safe through field testing, designed using fail-
safe principles, and accommodated the industry's need for different
implementation schemes. The AAR S-4200 Series standards are intended to
assure the necessary level of safety, reliability, interoperability,
and ultimately the applicability of this equipment in the U.S. market.
The equipment of existing ECP brake manufacturers incorporates the
conventional pneumatic emergency brake system as a backup in case of
failure of the ECP brake control. In most cases, ECP brake systems will
support enhanced safety even if the electronics fail, because
continuous recharging of the brake pipe will ensure availability of an
emergency application. Therefore, the ECP brake system reduces the risk
caused by depleted air in the case of an emergency. There is no
instance or record of a malfunctioning ECP brake system that resulted
in a catastrophic or critical event.
To assess the benefits and costs of ECP brakes for the U.S. rail
freight industry, FRA contracted with BAH in 2005 to conduct a study.
An ECP brake expert panel of principal stakeholders in the conversion
of the U.S. freight car fleet to ECP brake technology, including
suppliers, railroads, private car owners, AAR, and FRA was assembled to
participate in the study. The expert panel supported the conclusion
that the AAR standards are sufficient for the ECP brake system designer
to achieve a system safety level adequate for a safety-critical system.
In particular, an AAR-compliant system, while providing a significant
increase in safety and efficiency, does not introduce extra risks
associated with single-point failure of the ECP system itself.
[[Page 61520]]
The final BAH report provided a comprehensive analysis and
comparison of ECP and conventional air brake systems. BAH acknowledged
that while trains with ECP brake systems have been operated in North
America, South Africa, and Australia, U.S. implementation has been
stalled due to the absence of an acceptable implementation plan for
conversion and hard data to support a sound economic analysis, limited
interoperability with traditionally braked trains, and insufficient
capital investment required for conversion. It concluded that although
the barriers to implementation are formidable, ECP brake systems are
economically and technically ripe for adoption and should be
implemented in phases. BAH suggests that implementing ECP brakes on
2,800 locomotives and 80,000 cars in the Powder River Basin (PRB) would
cost the industry approximately $432 million. However, according to
BAH, the annual $157 million in anticipated benefits--resulting from
saved fuel, improved wheel and brake shoe life, and a reduction in
necessary brake inspections--will allow railroads to recover those
costs in less than three years. To justify the investment, the BAH
report says, conversion must be focused first on the high-mileage,
unit-train-type services that would most benefit from its use.
FRA acknowledges that BAH's fuel cost estimates are underestimated
due to subsequently rising prices. It is notable that BAH did not
attempt to quantify potential savings relating to capacity increases or
emissions decreases due to the difficulty in arriving at acceptable
values. Accordingly, the report's estimated internal rate of return
should be viewed as conservative.
VIII. Related Proceeding
In a petition dated November 15, 2006, and filed November 21, 2006,
BNSF and NS jointly requested that FRA waive various sections in parts
229 and 232 as it relates to those railroads' operation of ECP brake
pilot trains. See Docket No. FRA-2006-26435. The FRA Safety Board held
a fact-finding hearing on this matter on January 16, 2007, featuring
testimony from representatives of the petitioners, air brake
manufacturers, and labor unions. On March 21, 2007, the Safety Board
granted the petitioners' request, in part, subject to various
conditions designed to ensure that ECP brake equipped trains subject to
the waiver will be as safe as trains equipped with conventional brakes
and operated under the existing rules. See id.
IX. Legal Impediments and Proposed Relief
ECP brake operation provides for continuous electronic monitoring
of the condition of air brake system components and brake pipe
pressure, potentially limiting the need for certain physical brake
inspections currently required under part 232. Accordingly, this final
rule modifies, relaxes, and removes certain requirements, including
intermediate terminal inspections (Sec. Sec. 232.207, 232.209, and
232.211), single-car air brake tests (Sec. 232.305), and the required
percent of operable brakes at initial terminal departure (Sec.
232.103(d)), as they apply to trains operating in ECP brake mode. The
rail industry's implementation of ECP brakes is frustrated by such
inapplicable and inefficient statutory and regulatory requirements.
Without a large-scale proliferation and implementation of ECP brake
technologies, the industry will not be able to enjoy economies of scale
and to overcome the industry-wide limits caused by interoperability
problems. FRA seeks to improve market efficiency by providing reliable
and suitable standards and procedures that will support investments in
ECP brake technology.
The current statutory and regulatory requirements, however--
including those concerning brake inspections and the operation of
trains with defective equipment--may reduce or eliminate incentives for
railroads to implement new ECP brake technology and take advantage of
its operational and safety benefits. For example, 49 U.S.C. 20303
presents an obstacle to cost-saving, safe, and efficient long hauls
promised by ECP brakes. To avoid incurring civil penalties, operators
are required under 49 U.S.C. 20303 to transport rail vehicles with
defective or insecure equipment ``from the place at which the defect or
insecurity was first discovered to the nearest available place at which
the repairs can be made.''
The design and operation of