Novelty Distributors, Inc.; Revocation of Registration, 52689-52704 [E8-21035]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 176 / Wednesday, September 10, 2008 / Notices
the decree itself,’’ and not to ‘‘effectively
redraft the complaint’’ to inquire into
other matters that the United States did
not pursue. id. at 1459–60. As this Court
recently confirmed in SBC
Communications, courts ‘‘cannot look
beyond the complaint in making the
public interest determination unless the
complaint is drafted so narrowly as to
make a mockery of judicial power.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
In its 2004 amendments, Congress
made clear its intent to preserve the
practical benefits of utilizing consent
decrees in antitrust enforcement, adding
the unambiguous instruction that
‘‘[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to require the court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing or to
require the court to permit anyone to
intervene.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). The
language wrote into the statute what
Congress intended when it enacted the
Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator Tunney
explained: ‘‘[t]he court is nowhere
compelled to go to trial or to engage in
extended proceedings which might have
the effect of vitiating the benefits of
prompt and less costly settlement
through the consent decree process.’’
119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement
of Senator Tunney). Rather, the
procedure for the public interest
determination is left to the discretion of
the court, with the recognition that the
court’s ‘‘scope of review remains
sharply proscribed by precedent and the
nature of Tunney Act proceedings.’’
SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.5
VIII. Determinative Documents
There are no determinative materials
or documents within the meaning of the
APPA that were considered by the
United States in formulating the
proposed Final Judgment.
Dated: August 28, 2008.
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Respectfully submitted,
Ann Marie Blaylock (D.C. Bar No. 967825),
Trial Attorney, United States Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Liberty Square
Building, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4000,
Washington, DC 20530, (202) 616–5932,
5 See 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting
that the ‘‘Tunney Act expressly allows the court to
make its public interest determination on the basis
of the competitive impact statement and response
to comments alone’’); United States v. Mid-Am.
Dairymen, Inc., 1977–1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,508,
at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (‘‘Absent a showing of
corrupt failure of the government to discharge its
duty, the Court, in making its public interest
finding, should * * * carefully consider the
explanations of the government in the competitive
impact statement and its responses to comments in
order to determine whether those explanations are
reasonable under the circumstances.’’); S. Rep. No.
93–298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1973) (‘‘Where
the public interest can be meaningfully evaluated
simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments,
that is the approach that should be utilized.’’).
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Facsimile: (202) 514–7308,
ann.blaylock@usdoj.gov.
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on August 28,
2008, I caused a copy of the foregoing
Competitive Impact Statement to be
served on the defendant in this matter
in the manner set forth below:
By facsimile and U.S. mail:
Counsel for Defendant Raycom Media, Inc.
Everett J. Bowman, Esq.,
Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, 101 North
Tryon St., Suite 1900, Charlotte, NC 28246,
Telephone: (704) 377–8329, Facsimile:
(704) 373–3929, E-mail:
ebowman@rbh.com.
Ann Marie Blaylock (D.C. Bar. No. 967825),
Litigation III Section, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, 450
Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4000, Washington,
DC 20530, (202) 616–5932, Facsimile: (202)
514–7308, ann.blaylock@usdoj.gov.
[FR Doc. E8–20878 Filed 9–9–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–11–M
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 08–33]
Novelty Distributors, Inc.; Revocation
of Registration
On January 17, 2008, I, the Deputy
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause and Immediate Suspension
of Registration to Novelty Distributors,
Inc. (Respondent), of Greenfield,
Indiana. The Order immediately
suspended and proposed the revocation
of Respondent’s DEA Certificate of
Registration, 003563NSY, as a
distributor of the list I chemicals
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, on the
grounds that its ‘‘continued registration
is inconsistent with the public interest,’’
and ‘‘constitute[d] an imminent danger
to public health and safety.’’ Show
Cause Order at 1 (ALJ EX. 1) (citing 21
U.S.C. 823(h), 824(a)(4), and 824(d)).
More specifically, the Show Cause
Order alleged that Respondent was
storing listed chemical products at, and
distributing them from, over 100
unregistered locations throughout the
United States, in violation of Federal
law and regulations. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C.
822(e), 21 CFR 1309.21 and 1309.23(a)).
Next, the Show Cause Order alleged
that Respondent was distributing
quantities of listed chemical products
‘‘to small retail outlets such as
convenience stores’’ in amounts ‘‘far
exceed[ing] what those retail outlets
could be expected to sell for legitimate,
therapeutic purposes.’’ Id. at 2. The
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52689
Order thus alleged that the ‘‘listed
chemical products distributed by
[Respondent] in large quantities have
been, and are likely to continue being,
diverted to the clandestine manufacture
of methamphetamine.’’ Id. (citing cases).
Relatedly, the Show Cause Order
alleged that some ‘‘[s]mall retail outlets
that receive large quantities of * * *
listed chemical products from
[Respondent] sell such products to
individuals in amounts that cannot be
attributed to legitimate individual
needs,’’ that ‘‘some of the retail outlets
allow customers to make multiple
purchases of scheduled listed chemical
products within a single week, and in
some cases, within a single day,’’ and
that ‘‘[s]ome customers of these retail
outlets purchased more than 9 grams of
ephedrine or pseudoephedrine base
within 30 days in violation of 21 U.S.C.
844(a).’’ Id.1
The Show Cause Order further alleged
that between January 1, 2007, and July
9, 2007, Respondent distributed listed
chemical products ‘‘on at least 284
occasions to 35 retail outlets,’’ which
had not self-certified as required under
Federal law. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C.
830(e)(1)(A)(vii)). Id. Moreover, on three
occasions subsequent to February 1,
2007, Respondent allegedly distributed
24-count bottles of listed chemical
products to retailers in violation of
Federal law, which effective April 9,
2006, required that non-liquid form
products be sold only in blister packs.
Id. at 2–3 (citing 21 U.S.C. 830(d)(2)).
Relatedly, the Show Cause Order
alleged that Respondent had distributed
tablet-form products to retailers in
Kentucky and North Carolina in
violation of the laws of these States
which ‘‘prohibit the sale of non-liquid
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine except
in a gel-cap product.’’ Id. at 3.
Finally, the Show Cause Order alleged
that in July 2007, DEA had audited
twenty listed chemical products which
Respondent distributed. Id. at 2. The
Show Cause Order alleged that
Respondent ‘‘could not account for
more than 60,000 dosage units of two
ephedrine products’’ and that it also had
‘‘overages for 16 different * * * listed
chemical products.’’ Id. The Order thus
alleged that Respondent ‘‘failed to
maintain accurate records of its
distributions and receipts of * * *
listed chemical products in violation of
21 U.S.C. 830(a) and 21 CFR 1310.04.’’
Id.
1 The Show Cause Order also alleged that ‘‘[i]n
November 2002, 22 bottles of ephedrine products
distributed by Novelty were found at an illicit
methamphetamine laboratory in Connecticut.’’
Show Cause Order at 2.
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Based on the above allegations, I
made the preliminary finding that the
listed chemical products Respondent
was distributing had been, and were
‘‘likely to continue to be, diverted into
the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine.’’ Id. at 3. I also
found that Respondent’s ‘‘failure to
maintain effective controls against
diversion, including its distribution of
large amounts of * * * listed chemical
products that far exceed legitimate
demand, contribute to the illicit
manufacture of methamphetamine.’’ Id.
I thus came to the ‘‘preliminary
conclusion that [Respondent’s]
continued registration during the
pendency of these proceedings would
constitute an imminent danger to the
public health and safety,’’ and
immediately suspended its registration.
Id.
On February 26, 2008, Respondent
requested a hearing on the allegations.
ALJ Ex. 2. The matter was assigned to
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gail
Randall, who proceeded to conduct prehearing procedures. A hearing was held
on March 24 through March 28, and
March 31 through April 2, 2008, at
which both parties put on extensive
testimony and introduced numerous
documents into evidence.
Moreover, on March 24, 2008,
Respondent filed an interlocutory
appeal in which it challenged the ALJ’s
denial of its motion to remove one of the
Government’s lawyers from
participating in the hearing, on the
ground that he was a necessary and
indispensable witness to the events
surrounding the execution of an
administrative search warrant which
was the subject of its motion to
suppress. See ALJ Exs. 12 and 13. On
March 25, 2008, I denied Respondent’s
appeal on multiple grounds.2 ALJ Ex.
13.
Following the hearing, both parties
submitted briefs containing their
proposed findings, conclusions of law,
and argument. On May 21, 2008, the
ALJ issued her recommended decision
(hereinafter, ALJ).3
2 The grounds included that Respondent had not
established that the Government’s lawyer was a
necessary and indispensable witness, and that
Respondent had not cited a single case to support
its contention that the conduct of the Government
lawyer—even if true—was a violation of its
constitutional rights. Denial of Interlocutory
Appeal, at 2–3 (ALJ Ex. 13.) I also noted that the
Agency had previously held that the exclusionary
rule does not apply to proceedings under 21 U.S.C.
824, and that the Supreme Court had ‘‘repeatedly
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to
proceedings other than criminal trials.’’ Id. (quoting
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S.C.
357, 363 (1998)).
3 The decision was 165 pages in length.
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In her decision, the ALJ found that the
Government’s evidence regarding the
monthly expected sales of combination
ephedrine products at convenience
stores ($14.39) to meet legitimate
demand was ‘‘flawed and not credible.’’
ALJ at 97. Relatedly, while
acknowledging that ‘‘Respondent sells
an approximate monthly average of
$640.00 in SLC products to its
convenience store customers,’’ the ALJ
observed that ‘‘there is no legitimate
sales figure in the record’’ by which the
excessiveness of its sales (and the
likelihood that the products were being
diverted) could be judged. Id.
Regarding the allegation that
Respondent failed to maintain accurate
records of its receipts and distributions,
the ALJ concluded that the evidence
pertaining to the audit did not establish
‘‘preponderating evidence either way to
assist in analyzing the accuracy of
* * * Respondent’s handling’’ of listed
chemical products. Id. at 88. The ALJ
concluded, however, that ‘‘Respondent’s
recordkeeping is not adequate to
conduct an effective audit of its SLC
products.’’ Id.
The ALJ also rejected the allegation
that Respondent had made numerous
distributions to uncertified retailers
based on testimony and documentary
evidence that one of Respondent’s
officials had confirmed that these
‘‘customers were, in fact, self-certified.’’
Id. at 91. The ALJ further found
unproven the allegation that
Respondent had thrice distributed listed
chemical products in bottles in violation
of Federal law, noting that Respondent
had provided ‘‘documentary proof that
the * * * product * * * had not been
illegally distributed.’’ Id. at 86. The ALJ
also found unproven the Government’s
allegation that Respondent had
distributed tablet-form products to
retailers in Kentucky and North
Carolina, noting that ‘‘Respondent
produced credible testimonial evidence
to support a finding that these illegal
sales in fact did not happen.’’ Id.
With respect to the allegation that
Respondent was violating Federal law
because it was distributing from over
100 drop-off points which were not
registered, the ALJ noted that
Respondent had challenged the
Agency’s interpretation in Federal
District Court. Id. at 90–91. The ALJ
found, however, that Respondent had
been advised by a DEA Group
Supervisor (GS) that its practice of
shipping SLCs to numerous storage
units which were not registered was
illegal, that it had continued do so
without even seeking clarification from
the Agency, and that this conduct was
‘‘not consistent with the requirements
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for a participant in a regulated
industry.’’ Id. at 91. However, because
Respondent’s declaratory judgment
action was still ‘‘pending in federal
court,’’ the ALJ ‘‘conclude[d] that [the
district court was] the proper venue for
this issue’’ and declined to address the
statutory question.4 Id. at 91 n.38.
Finally, the ALJ also found that
following the suspension order,
Respondent had attempted to enter into
an agreement with one of its suppliers
(BDI), under which its salespersons
would still take orders for SLCs which
would be shipped by BDI. ALJ at 92.
Here again, the ALJ noted that there was
no evidence that Respondent had asked
the Agency if the arrangement was
lawful. Id.
The ALJ nonetheless concluded that
Respondent had ‘‘demonstrated a
willingness to comply with the laws and
regulations governing the distribution of
SLC products,’’ specifically noting that
it had developed a training program for
its customers, had provided them with
the logbooks required by the CMEA, and
lockable display cases for its products,
and had upgraded its computer system.
Id. at 98–99. The ALJ also noted that
following the implementation of the
CMEA, Respondent had ‘‘acted to
remove * * * non-complying SLC
products from its customers’ shelves
and [to] properly dispose of’’ them. Id.
at 99.
With respect to the audits, the ALJ
observed that while they ‘‘appeare[d] to
reveal significant overages and
shortages,’’ Respondent had ‘‘credibly
and adequately minimized those figures
to a more acceptable margin of
inventory error after analyzing its
records and making its own audit
4 On August 7, 2008, the District Court granted
the Government’s motion for summary judgment
and denied Respondent’s cross-motion for summary
judgment. See Entry on Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment, Novelty, Inc., v. Tandy, No. 1:04–cv–
1502–DFH–TAB (S.D. Ind., Aug. 7, 2008). Notably,
the District Court held that the instructions in the
Group Supervisor’s letter were interpretive and not
legislative rules, and were thus not subject to notice
and comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. 553. Id.
at 2. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), I take official
notice of the District Court’s decision. I also take
official notice of the August 13, 2008 letter
submitted by Respondent’s President. In his letter,
Respondent’s President stated that he has ordered
a change to Respondent’s distribution practices and
‘‘reiterates its previously stated commitment to
cooperate with [this Agency] and adhere to all
conditions specified by [me] for [its] continued
registration.’’ Letter of Todd Green (Aug. 13, 2008).
In his letter, Respondent’s CEO does not state that
Respondent’s will waive its right to appeal the
District Court’s decision. Moreover, I conclude that
in light of the extensive resources that have been
devoted to litigating the issue of the lawfulness of
Respondent’s use of unregistered locations to store
and distribute SLCs, as well as the importance of
the issue to the regulated industry, the issue should
be decided.
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findings.’’ Id. Finally, while the ALJ
noted that Respondent’s continued
distributions to the drop-off points
‘‘cause[s] concern,’’ she further reasoned
that except for the Group Supervisor’s
letter, it ‘‘had no notice from the
[Agency] of any violations until the
* * * Suspension Order was served’’ on
it, and that it ‘‘ha[d] not been given an
opportunity to remedy the flaws
identified by the Agency [in] this
action.’’ Id. at 100. Based on what she
characterized as its ‘‘history of,’’ and
‘‘financial commitment to,’’ compliance,
the ALJ reasoned that revocation would
not be an appropriate sanction. Id. at
100–01. Instead, the ALJ recommended
that I impose compliance requirements
on Respondent to ensure that it operated
in the public interest. Id. at 101.
Thereafter, the Government filed
exceptions to the ALJ’s decision.
Respondent likewise filed a 140 page
brief which supported the ALJ’s
decision while also excepting to certain
findings and conclusions.
Having considered the entire record
in this matter and all of the issues raised
in the parties’ exceptions, I hereby issue
this Decision and Final Order. More
specifically, I reject the allegations that
Respondent distributed SLC products in
violation of the CMEA and the laws of
Kentucky and North Carolina as
unsupported by substantial evidence.
With respect to the allegations that
Respondent engaged in 284
distributions to uncertified retailers, I
conclude that the evidence establishes
only a single instance of distributing to
an uncertified retailer and several
instances of inaccurate recordkeeping in
that Respondent’s records of the
addresses for several stores did not
match the actual addresses of the stores,
and that the Government has not proved
by substantial evidence that the stores
were uncertified on the date of the
distributions.
With respect to the audit, I conclude
that because the ALJ found credible the
testimony of one of Respondent’s
executives that the Agency’s
investigators had excluded certain
transactions and inventory adjustments
which it had provided to them, and the
Government offered no rebuttal
evidence, the allegation that Respondent
had shortages and overages of various
products is not proved. I find, however,
that the evidence shows that
Respondent’s recordkeeping did not
comply with federal law because it
failed to maintain proper records of
regulated transactions as required by
Federal law and DEA regulations. See
21 U.S.C. 830(a); 21 CFR 1310.03, id.
1310.04, id. 1310.06. Because of this, as
well as evidence showing that
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Respondent’s list of shipments included
three shipments of a product with a date
of July 16, 2007, even though it was
then only July 9, 2007, I find that
Respondent does not have adequate
systems for monitoring the receipt and
distribution of SLCs. 21 CFR 1309.71(b).
With respect to the allegation that
Respondent’s sales of SLC were
excessive and consistent with diversion,
I agree with the ALJ that the
Government’s figure as to the expected
monthly sales range is not supported by
substantial evidence. I nonetheless
conclude that Respondent does not
maintain effective controls against
diversion because its own evidence
shows that it distributed SLCs to
numerous stores in quantities that
dwarfed what its average customer
purchases, and that it did so even when
it had previously developed concerns
that a store was purchasing excessive
quantities, and that it does not even
enforce its own sales limit policies.
Next, in contrast to the ALJ, I
conclude that this proceeding is the
appropriate forum to address the
meaning of 21 U.S.C. 822(e) and the
allegation that Respondent has
repeatedly violated Federal law by
distributing from unregistered locations.
Consistent with the statutory text and
purpose, I conclude that Respondent’s
practice of using unregistered selfstorage units to store and distribute SLC
products violated the Controlled
Substances Act and DEA’s regulation.
Finally, for reasons set forth below, I
reject the ALJ’s recommended sanction
that Respondent’s registration be
continued with conditions. As
explained below, because Respondent
repeatedly violated Federal law
notwithstanding that it was advised that
its use of the unregistered self-storage
facilities was unlawful, does not even
enforce its own policies with respect to
limiting sales, and attempted to
circumvent the suspension order, I
conclude that revocation is necessary to
protect the public interest. I make the
following findings of fact.
Findings
Respondent is a corporation which is
solely owned by its President, Mr. Todd
Green. Respondent is a wholesale
distributor of various sundry items to
between 10,000 and 12,000 convenience
stores throughout the United States.
Since 1998, Respondent has held DEA
Certificate of Registration, #003563NSY,
which authorizes it to distribute
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine from
its registered location of 351 W.
Muskegon Drive, Greenfield, Indiana.
GX 1. Respondent’s registration expires
on October 31, 2008. Id.
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Both ephedrine and pseudoephedrine
have FDA approved therapeutic uses.
GX 19, at 3. Ephedrine is lawfully
marketed under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act for OTC use as a
bronchodilator to treat asthma,5 and
pseudoephedrine is lawfully marketed
for OTC use as a decongestant. Id. at 3–
4. Both substances are, however,
regulated as schedule listed chemicals
under the Controlled Substances Act
because they are precursor chemicals
which are frequently diverted into the
illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine, a schedule II
controlled substance, a potent and
highly addictive central nervous system
stimulant. See 21 U.S.C. 802(34); id.
812(c); 21 CFR 1308.12(d). Moreover, in
the course of investigating
methamphetamine trafficking, DEA has
frequently found that the listed
chemicals which are used by smaller
illicit labs have been sold by
convenience stores, gas stations, and
other small retailers. GX 51, at 56, 59,
62, 66; GX 54, at 29–30.6 See also TNT
5 The FDA has, however, issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking which would remove
combination ephedrine-guaifenesin products from
the OTC monograph on the grounds that they are
not ‘‘safe and effective for continued OTC
availability.’’ 70 FR 40232 (2005).
The parties also extensively litigated the medical
appropriateness of using combination ephedrine
products to treat asthma. See ALJ 43–48. I find it
unnecessary to make any findings on this issue as
until the FDA issues a final rule, combination
ephedrine-guaifenesin products can be lawfully
marketed for this purpose.
6 Based on the testimony of a witness whose
experience was limited to the Shenandoah, Virginia
valley, the ALJ found that the street price of a gram
of methamphetamine is ‘‘between $20.00 and
$50.00 per gram.’’ ALJ at 48–49. Based on this, as
well as evidence regarding the yield and conversion
rate, the ALJ found that ‘‘it would cost a
methamphetamine cook between $50.00 and
$144.00 to produce 1 gram of methamphetamine.’’
ALJ at 50. The ALJ thus concluded that ‘‘using the
Respondent’s product to manufacture
methamphetamine makes little monetary sense.’’ Id.
at 96.
I reject the ALJ’s finding regarding the street price
of methamphetamine and her conclusion that using
Respondent’s product ‘‘makes little monetary
sense.’’ Id. As for her findings regarding the street
price of methamphetamine, I note that it is based
on anecdotal evidence and limited to a small region
of the State of Virginia. Respondent does not,
however, limit its distribution of SLCs to this region
of the country. I further note that it runs counter
to the data which this Agency obtains on a periodic
basis, and which show that in most of the country,
methamphetamine prices are substantially higher
than they are in the Shenandoah Valley. See U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, National Illicit Drug Prices—
December 2007, 32–37 (Mar. 2008). In accordance
with 5 U.S.C. 556(e), and 21 CFR 1316.59(e), I take
official notice of the methamphetamine street price
data contained in this publication. Moreover, the
ALJ’s conclusion assumes that methamphetamine
addicts engage in economically rational behavior.
There is, however, no evidence in the record to
support this assumption. I therefore reject the ALJ’s
conclusion.
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Distributors, 70 FR 12729, 12730 (2005)
(noting testimony of Special Agent that
‘‘80 to 90 percent of ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine being used [in
Tennessee] to manufacture
methamphetamine was being obtained
from convenience stores’’).
Prior to the suspension of its
registration, Respondent sold
combination ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine products under the
brand names of Double Action, Mini,
and Ephedrine Plus in package sizes of
two, six, twelve and twenty-four count.
Tr. 561, 692–93. Respondent sold these
products to approximately 3,500 to
4,000 convenience stores in
approximately thirty different States. Id.
at 80–82, 558–60. Respondent does not
carry any other OTC drug products. Id.
at 552.
Respondent employs approximately
150 sales persons, who typically visit
each store every other week.7 Tr. 2046,
1290. Using its own tractor-trailers,
Respondent ships products including
SLCs from its Greenfield warehouse to
each sales person’s ‘‘drop-off point,’’
which is a unit in a commercial selfstorage facility. Id. at 73–75. According
to the testimony of Respondent’s owner
and CEO, Respondent was using
approximately 150 to 180 drop-off
points at the time the immediate
suspension was served on it. Id. at 76.
Both the driver who delivers the
product to the drop-off point and the
route sales person have keys to the
storage unit. Id. While the sales persons
are notified of each arriving shipment,
SLCs can sit in the storage units for
several days before the sales person
retrieves them for delivery to the
stores.8 Id. at 534, 668. Moreover,
I also find that this witness’s testimony that
convenience stores are not the source of precursors
in the Shenandoah Valley (ALJ at 49), to be
anecdotal and contrary to the Agency’s experience
throughout the country. I thus give it no weight.
7 Approximately 90% of the stores are on this
schedule; the remaining stores are visited either
weekly or monthly. Tr. 1290.
8 It is undisputed that the SLCs are not shipped
back to Respondent’s registered location prior to
their being distributed.
At the hearing, an executive of Respondent
insisted that ‘‘we are not storing product in * * *
unregistered locations,’’ and added: ‘‘Now your
coming back into the definition of what is storage.
We’re not storing the product in that location,’’
referring to the drop-off points. Tr. 666–67. See also
id. at 668 (‘‘We’re not storing or keeping or
whatever words you want to try and use, product
in these warehouses, against the law. We’re not
doing it.’’). The executive acknowledged, however,
that products may stay in the storage units for ‘‘a
few days.’’ Id. at 667. I therefore find that
Respondent is storing products in the self-storage
units.
Respondent further asserted that its distribution
system provided more security than shipping the
products via such common carriers as UPS or Fed
Ex. See Tr. 644–45. Yet an executive of Respondent
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according to one of Respondent’s
executives, the SLCs can remain on the
salesperson’s truck for up to nine days
depending upon the demand for the
product. Id. at 1282, 1421.
None of the drop-off points is
registered with the Agency. Tr. 1284.
Moreover, the units do not have
separate cages for storing SLCs, id. at
132, and the facilities have varying
degrees of external security with some
having cameras and requiring access
codes while others have no additional
security. Compare id. at 131, with id. at
538 (former salesperson testifying that
anyone could come off the road and
access the door and padlock to his route
storage unit).9 Moreover, DEA
Investigators could not determine the
addresses of thirty-four of the drop-off
points. Tr. 1196–98.10
In a letter dated May 5, 2004, the
Diversion Group Supervisor of the
Indianapolis, Indiana DEA District
Office, advised Respondent that ‘‘any
storage at, and distribution from, a
location other than the registered
location (including the use of delivery
vehicles for overnight storage) is a
violation of federal law.’’ 11 GX 100.
acknowledged that it uses temporary drivers on a
contract basis. Id. at 693, 697. Relatedly,
Respondent’s CEO offered testimony as to perceived
security inadequacies at UPS, asserting that
‘‘[p]roduct delivered by UPS could easily be stolen
anywhere in the system.’’ Id. at 157.
On cross-examination, however, Respondent’s
CEO admitted that he had not taken a tour of a UPS
facility. Id. at 161. When asked when he had last
‘‘checked into the training that UPS personnel have
with regard to handling [SLCs]?,’’ he answered: ‘‘I
assume they don’t have any training, since they’re
not DEA regulated facilities.’’ Id. at 162. The ALJ
did not address the credibility of the CEO’s
testimony. As ultimate factfinder, I reject it as
lacking foundation.
9 There is no dispute that the security at
Respondent’s Greenfield warehouse is adequate. It
is also undisputed that following the enactment of
the CMEA, Respondent prepared a training video
for its customers and supplied them with logbooks
and cases for storing SLC products. Tr. 1390 & 1422;
RXs 34, 47, & 48.
10 On its list of shipments, Respondent used code
numbers to indicate where products were being
shipped to. Tr. 1196. Moreover, Respondent
initially refused to turn over information
identifying the addresses of the drop-off points for
the sales routes, claiming that it was outside the
scope of the warrant. Id. at 1197.
11 The letter also reviewed three scenarios ‘‘in
case [Respondent was] storing List I chemical
products * * * and distributing them from satellite
locations, such as commercial storage units,
personal residences and or delivery vehicles.’’ GX
100, at 1. The first two scenarios involved sales
representatives who picked up listed chemicals
from a registered location either to fill a pre-placed
order or a ‘‘general order,’’ and could not return the
products ‘‘to the registered location at the end of the
day.’’ Id.
The third scenario was ‘‘a company [that] ships
orders containing List I chemicals to sales
representatives at remote locations.’’ Id. at 2. The
letter further explained that ‘‘DEA considers this to
be freight forwarding and at this time * * * has no
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Upon review of the letter, Respondent
sought a declaratory judgment in
Federal District Court challenging the
interpretation set forth in the letter. Tr.
652–53. At no time, however, did
Respondent change its practice of
distributing to the drop-off points. Id. at
664–65. Nor did Respondent seek a
review of the letter by officials at the
Agency’s headquarters. ALJ at 18.
The record further establishes that at
the time the listed chemical products
are shipped from its Greenfield, Indiana
warehouse (which is its only registered
location) to the drop-off points, the
products have not been sold to a
particular store. Tr. 2079. Indeed, the
amount of SLCs to be sold to a customer
is not known until the route sales
person visits the store and determines
how much product the store needs. Id.
at 1282. The sales person counts the
product on hand, discusses the order
with the store manager, and restocks the
store. Id. at 631; 1422.
Moreover, at the time an SLC order is
placed, only the salesperson—and no
one at Respondent’s headquarters—
knows how much the store has
purchased. Id. at 633. The salesperson is
required to enter the order information
into a handheld computer which
generates an invoice; this information is
later transmitted back to Respondent’s
headquarters. Id. at 634. The
salesperson is also required to return a
paper copy of the invoice, as well as a
shipping document which accompanies
the delivery of the SLCs from the
warehouse, to headquarters. Id. at 688.
Under its system, while Respondent’s
headquarters can determine which
salesperson has received product with a
particular lot number, it cannot identify
the specific store that obtained a
particular lot number of a product. Id.
at 1517.
Respondent’s CEO testified that a
store could purchase up to a case of an
SLC product in each ‘‘service
cycle.’’ 12 Id. at 101. Accordingly, most
stores could purchase two cases per
month of each product. Moreover,
Respondent sold more than ten different
SLC products. Id. at 623.
According to one of its executives, the
company monitors the sales of each SLC
product at each store throughout the
week to determine whether a store ‘‘is
increasing [its] inventory more than
[Respondent] expects [it] to,’’ and if it is,
the company contacts the salesperson to
provisions that would permit freight forwarding for
List I chemical products.’’ Id.
12 With respect to the 24-tablet products, the
record establishes that there were 144 packages in
a case. Tr. 621. The record does not, however,
establish how many packages there were in a case
of the smaller size packages. Id. at 624.
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inquire further. Id. at 2061–62. This
executive also asserted that in this
event, it would send in one of the
salesperson’s supervisors to visit with
the sales person and determine the true
inventory at a store. Id. Moreover,
another executive claimed that he
‘‘receive[s] a computer-generated report
indicating any time that more than one
case has been sold to a single retail
location of a single’’ product and issues
a warning letter to its salespersons. Id.
at 1431. Respondent’s CEO and Owner
further testified that if a customer
obtained more than a case of a product,
he ‘‘would cut them off, [and] stop the
sale of product to them.’’ 13 Tr. 159. See
also RX 10, at 1 (asserting that stores
purchasing ‘‘unusual quantities’’ would
be ‘‘monitored over the following 4
week period,’’ and that ‘‘[i]f further
unusual activity is noted,’’ Respondent
‘‘will discontinue sales of all or part of
the List I products sold to the store’’).
According to one of Respondent’s
executives, between January 17, 2007
and January 17, 2008, that there had
been ‘‘approximately 35 to 45’’
violations of the one case limit, and
most of the violations had occurred
before July 2007, when the Agency
executed the administrative warrant. Id.
at 1433. The ALJ, however, credited the
testimony of a DEA DI who reviewed
Respondent’s sales records for the
period between January and July 2007,
and found that its salespersons
exceeded the one case limit 85 times.
Tr. 1496–1506; GX 68.
The same executive stated that
Respondent had only started issuing
written warnings to its salespersons
after August 2007 because of a computer
‘‘glitch’’ which had resulted in the
reports not being issued as scheduled.
Id. at 1435. Moreover, while Respondent
introduced into evidence a few e-mails
indicating that the company had cut off
supplying 100-count bottles to several
stores, Respondent did not identify a
single store to which it had refused to
sell ephedrine.14 Indeed, according to
13 While the ALJ credited the CEO’s testimony,
the e-mails discussed in note 14 below, show
otherwise. See, e.g., RX 56, at 3. Moreover,
Respondent did not identify a single store which it
had refused to sell SLCs to.
14 The record contains several e-mails indicating
that Respondent directed its employees to not sell
100 count ephedrine to several stores. See RX 56.
While the e-mails expressed concerns about the
excessiveness of these stores’ sales of ephedrine
products, notably, Respondent did not cut off all
sales of the products to any of the stores. See id.
Moreover, while it restricted its sales ‘‘to a
maximum of [one case] every 2 weeks’’ and
prohibited the sale of 100 count ephedrine to store
number BPM55, this store was its leading SLC
customer in the three months prior to the issuance
of the suspension order, during which it purchased
products with an average of retail value of $7317.77
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its own evidence, one of the stores
(BPM55), which it had previously
stopped selling 100-count products to
because of its excessive purchases, was
allowed to purchase products with a
retail value of more than $7300 a month,
in the three months prior to the issuance
of the suspension order. Compare RX
56, at 1, with RX 27a, at 1.
According to one of its executives,
Respondent’s SLC customers purchased
SLCs with an average retail sales value
of $640 per month, with the majority of
the products containing ephedrine. Id.
at 563–64. Moreover, according to one
of Respondent’s exhibits, in the three
months prior to the issuance of the
suspension order, it distributed listed
chemicals products with an average
monthly retail sales value greater than
$2000 to approximately 120 of its
customers. RX 27A. Respondent also
distributed listed chemical products
with an average monthly retail sales
value in excess of $3000 to thirty-four
customers, and product with average
monthly retail sale value greater than
$4000 to nine customers. Id. Finally,
Respondent distributed to its two largest
customers, products with an average
monthly retail sales value of $5056 and
$7314 respectively. Id.
At the hearing, the Government put
forward expert testimony to the effect
that the expected sales range of
ephedrine products at convenience
stores to meet legitimate demand was
$14.39 per month. GX 25, at 8. In his
declaration, the Government’s expert
stated that U.S. Economic Census data
show that only about 31.5% of all
convenience stores (45,077 stores) carry
non-prescription drug products. GX 99,
at 7. According to his declaration, the
Government’s expert then applied
‘‘these statistics’’ to the National
Association of Convenience Stores 2007
Survey revenue data which show that
convenience stores sold a total of
$292,000,000 of cough and cold
remedies during 2006, to calculate the
annual and monthly average sale of
cough and cold products at a
convenience store. Id. According to the
Government’s expert, stores carrying the
HBC line had average annual sales of all
cough and cold products of $4,080.18,
and average monthly sales of $340.01.
Id.; see also id. at Table 2.
The Government’s expert did not
explain, however, why he used the total
number of stores carrying the HBC
line 15 (71,565 stores) rather than the
per month. Compare RX 56, at 1, with RX 27A, at
1.
15 The HBC line includes analgesics, stomach
remedies, vitamins, other OTC drugs, grooming
aids, feminine hygiene, family planning, baby care,
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smaller number of stores that he had
determined carried non-prescription
drug products ( 45,077 stores). See id. at
Table 2. Moreover, the Government did
not rebut the testimony of Respondent’s
expert that because of legislation in
twelve States, convenience stores can no
longer sell ephedrine products and that
the stores in these States comprise 23%
of the nation’s convenience stores. RX
59, at 10. This suggests that at most,
34,709 convenience stores nationwide
carry ephedrine products. Id.16
Next, the Government’s expert
determined the percentage of cough and
cold remedies comprised of ephedrine
products. GX 99, at 8. According to the
Government’s expert, ‘‘[t]his factor was
derived from a tabulation of MRI data
showing asthma remedy usage by retail
channel (in this case, convenience
stores).’’ Id. Based on this data, which
was included at Table 1, the
Government’s expert concluded that
ephedrine products constitute 8.36% of
cough and cold remedies sold at
convenience stores. Id. Multiplying this
figure times the average monthly total
sales of cough and cold products, the
Government’s expert concluded that the
average monthly sale of all ephedrine
products at convenience stores selling
the products was $28.43.17 Id.
Respondent’s expert stated, however,
that the MRI Survey (which is a survey
of 50,000 consumers) does not provide
sufficient information to support the
Government’s expert’s figure that
ephedrine products constitute 8.36% of
cough and cold remedies sold at
convenience stores. RX 59, at 11.
Respondent’s expert noted that the MRI
Survey (which was included as an
attachment to RX 59) ‘‘reports
absolutely no information about any
ephedrine products,’’ and ‘‘reports
absolutely no information on whether
consumers bought either an asthma
remedy or a cough and cold remedy
from convenience stores.’’ Id. (emphasis
deleted).
skin care, cosmetics, and some other unspecified
products.
16 Respondent’s expert also pointed out that some
convenience stores that carry non-prescription drug
products may not sell any ephedrine. RX 59, at 10.
17 As part of its case, the Government entered into
evidence a declaration prepared by its expert in
another matter. See GX 25. In this document, the
expert stated that he had also looked at data which
included ‘‘cumulated observed transactions,’’ such
as scanner data obtained by Information Resources,
Inc. Id. at 7. The Government’s expert also testified
that in preparing GX 25, he had reviewed scanner
data to determine ‘‘the proportion of the
nonprescription drug category that included
preparations for the treatment of asthma containing
ephedrine.’’ Tr. 313 & 500. However, in his rebuttal
declaration, the Government’s expert made no
mention of having used scanner data. See GX 99.
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Respondent’s expert further opined
that the MRI Survey asks three
questions which ‘‘are inadequate to
form an estimate’’ of the percentage of
cough and cold remedies constituting
ephedrine. RX 59, at 11. The first
question is: ‘‘How many times in’’
various time periods has the person
used one of numerous products? See
Survey of the American Consumer 2–
106. While the survey includes a list of
non-prescription cold, sinus, and allergy
remedies, none of the products listed
contain ephedrine. Survey at 12. Nor
does it appear that an ephedrine
product is listed anywhere in the
survey.
As for the remaining two questions,
the survey asks whether a person has
had asthma in the last twelve months,
and whether they have used a
prescription drug, a non-prescription
drug, an herbal remedy, or have not
treated the condition at all. Id. at 15.
The survey does not ask any further
questions regarding the use of nonprescription drugs to treat asthma.
Finally, with respect to the use of
convenience stores, the survey asks only
whether the consumer has purchased a
non-prescription/OTC drug at a
convenience store in the last 30 days. Id.
at 43. Again, the survey does not inquire
further as to what type of drug the
consumer may have purchased at a
convenience store. The Government’s
expert did not explain how the data
obtained in the answers to these
questions supported his conclusion that
ephedrine products constitute 8.36% of
the cough and cold remedies purchased
at convenience stores.18
The Government’s expert further
stated that he used ‘‘[a]nother MRI
tabulation showing the route of the drug
(powder, tablet, liquid, mist, skin patch,
etc., etc.), [which] enabled the estimate
to be further adjusted to reflect tablets
only * * * resulting in the final
estimate of $14.78.’’ Id. The
Government’s expert thus concluded
that 52% of ephedrine users use tablets
rather than inhalers, id. at Table 2;
multiplying this figure times the average
monthly sales of $28.43, the expert
concluded that the average monthly sale
of tablet-form ephedrine products at
18 Respondent’s expert noted that she was
informed by its executives that ephedrine products
constituted 60% of its customers’ SLC sales. RX 59,
at 12. Even if this is an accurate figure with respect
to its customers, Respondent does not allow them
to purchase SLCs from other suppliers, Tr. 626–27,
and it does not sell any nationally-branded OTC
pseudoephedrine remedies such as Sudafed or
Claritin D. The figure is thus based on a biased
sample.
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convenience stores was $14.78. Id. at
8.19
The MRI survey asks, however, only
about the mode of administration with
respect to cold, sinus and allergy
remedies and not asthma remedies.
Survey, at 12. Here again, it is unclear
why this data provides a reliable basis
for estimating the percentage of asthma
sufferers who use tablets versus
inhalers.
I thus agree with the ALJ that the
Government has not proved by
substantial evidence that the monthly
expected retail sales value of ephedrine
products at convenience stores to meet
legitimate demand is $14.39.20 On the
other hand, it is undisputed that no
ephedrine product ranks in the top 200
of over-the-counter and health-andbeauty care products which are sold in
drug stores, supermarkets, and mass
merchandisers. See GX 99, at 4. It is also
undisputed that approximately 97% of
the sales of non-prescription drugs
occurs at pharmacies, supermarkets,
warehouse clubs, department stores,
electronic shopping/mail order houses,
and other general merchandise stores.
GX 25A, at C2. Moreover, convenience
stores (both those with and without
gasoline) account for approximately
1.14% of the total commerce in nonprescription drugs. Id. The Government,
however, produced no evidence as to
the annual sales of combination
ephedrine products such as Primatene
Tablets and Bronkaid, which are sold at
pharmacies, supermarkets, and other
large volume retailers of nonprescription drugs.
Evidence of Diversion
In September 2002, DMD
Pharmaceuticals, a supplier to
19 Because the average retail price for a box of the
two leading brands of ephedrine was $7.19, the
Government’s expert then further reduced the
average monthly sales figure from $14.78 to $14.39
‘‘to reflect the purchase of exactly two boxes of 24
count ephedrine tablets.’’ Id. at 9.
20 The Government offered evidence regarding
visits or telephone contacts made by various
Diversion Investigators (DIs) to eighteen pharmacies
which were apparently located near some of
Respondent’s customers. See ALJ Dec. at 23–33. At
least half the pharmacies did not carry any
ephedrine products. See id. As for the remaining
pharmacies, the Government produced evidence as
to their sales levels of ephedrine products with
respect to only four of the pharmacies. This
evidence showed that the pharmacies were selling
minimal quantities of tablet-form ephedrine
products, with the most that any store sold being
71 boxes in a four-and-a-half month period. See,
e.g., GXs 26, 27, 28 & 29.
The Government did not establish that it used a
statistically valid sampling technique in choosing
the pharmacies the DIs interviewed. The evidence
thus amounts to nothing more than a collection of
anecdotes. To the extent the evidence is offered to
show that there is little demand at pharmacies for
these products, it is of limited probative value.
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Respondent, shipped it an entire lot of
sixty-count bottles of a combination
ephedrine (25 mg.) product.21 Tr. 1079.
Two months later, twenty-two bottles of
this lot were found at an illicit
methamphetamine laboratory in
Thompson, Connecticut. Id. at 1077.
DEA subsequently issued a warning
letter to DMD. Id. at 1077–78.
Several months later, while
completing a previously-commenced
inspection of Respondent, a DI
discussed the matter with two of its
executives. Id. at 1082–83. While the
executives provided the DI with the
names of two salespersons whose
territory included or was near the part
of Connecticut where the lab was found,
they could not identify which specific
stores had obtained the ephedrine. Id. at
1084.
As part of the investigation that gave
rise to this proceeding, DIs based in four
States visited a number of Respondent’s
customers. At a Roadrunner Market in
Bristol, Tennessee, a DI testified that
during the ‘‘time period of July 23rd
through August 23rd’’ of 2007, three
customers had purchased quantities that
far exceeded nine grams.22 Tr. 730–733.
While 439 gel caps in 25 mg. strength
is the dosage form equivalent to the nine
gram limit, M.W. had bought 56 boxes
totaling 1,344 gel caps or approximately
27 grams. GX 46. During the same
period, C.M. purchased 23 boxes
totaling 552 gel caps (approximately
11.3 grams), and E.B. purchased 52
boxes totaling 1,248 gel caps or
approximately 25.6 grams. Id. The DI
also found other evidence of repetitive
purchasing patterns at the stores, but the
logbooks were missing information such
as the number of dosage units and/or
strength of the product. See GX 80.
A different DI visited the Smoker
Friendly No. 4 Store in Little Falls, New
York, and obtained the logbooks. Tr.
785–86, 791–92. The logbooks showed
that between July 27, 2007, and August
21 According to the testimony of a DI, DEA issued
DMD a warning letter. Tr. 1078. Upon receipt of the
letter, DMD’s compliance manager told the DI that
he would look into to whom the product was
shipped. Id. Subsequently, the DI received a phone
call from DMD’s compliance manager and owner
informing her that ‘‘that entire lot had been sold to’’
Respondent in September 2002. Id. at 1079. The
ALJ credited this testimony, see ALJ at 13, as do I.
22 It is noted that the time period which was
reviewed exceeded thirty days. Even assuming that
these persons did not violate Federal law in
purchasing these products, given the dosing
instruction for these products (one tablet every four
hours and no more than six tablets every twentyfour hours), their purchases are not consistent with
the use of the products to treat asthma. See, e.g.,
RX 9, at 1. Moreover, the ‘‘Drug Facts’’ warning
label for Respondent’s Double Action Ephedrine
(25/200 mg.) product further advises to ‘‘Stop use
and ask a doctor if * * * cough persists for more
than 1 week.’’ Id.
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27, 2007, four persons had purchased
more than nine grams. K.S. bought 984
tablets of ephedrine 25 mg. (more than
20 grams), and A.P. bought 768 tablets
of ephedrine 25 mg. (approximately 15.7
grams). GX 45. Moreover, Richard and
Robert R., who had the same last name
and used the same address, respectively
purchased 600 and 696 tablets of
ephedrine 25 mg. Id. These purchases
amounted to 12.3 and 14.25 grams. Id.
Another DI visited the Mason of New
York convenience store of Jamestown,
New York, and obtained the logbook. Tr.
1484. The logbook entries were
frequently missing information as to the
strength of the ephedrine tablets that
had been purchased. Nonetheless, the
logbook showed that there were five
individuals who, even if they had
purchased only 12.5 mg. ephedrine, had
nonetheless purchased more than nine
grams during the period between July 21
and August 21, 2007. More specifically,
M.M. purchased 1,368 tablets (14
grams),23 A.J. purchased 1,014 tablets
(10.4 grams), J.B. purchased 1,548
tablets (15.9 grams), J.H. purchased
1,068 tablets (10.9 grams), and R.B.
purchased 1,002 tablets (10.3 grams).24
GX 49.
A Pennsylvania-based DI likewise
found evidence of purchases that, while
technically not in violation of the
CMEA, raised a strong suspicion that
the ephedrine was being diverted. For
example, at the CoGo of Somerset,
Pennsylvania, a DI found that S.M. had
bought 384 dosage units between
August 16 and 23, 2007. GX 75. At 12.5
mg. strength, this amounted to 3.9
grams. This individual had also bought
three twenty-four count boxes on three
consecutive days.25 Id. Moreover,
another DI visited a CoGos in Midland,
Pennsylvania, and found evidence that
a person had bought 620 dosage units of
12.5 mg. between May 1 and May 31,
2007, and an additional 636 dosage
units between June 1 and June 15, 2007.
Tr. 1486; GX 41.
23 A person named Chris M. (with the same last
name and address as M.M.) purchased an additional
360 tablets. GX 49.
24 All of these calculations assume that these
persons bought 12.5 mg. tablets; if they bought 25
mg., then the amount of ephedrine was double.
Moreover, the DI found that four other persons had
purchased quantities which would exceed nine
grams if the strength of the tablets was 25 mg.
25 At two stores, the DI did not find any evidence
of purchases in excess of the limit and was told by
the managers that the products were primarily
purchased by hospital workers and truck drivers
who used them to stay awake on their jobs. Tr. 872–
73; 886–87.
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The Allegation That Respondent
Distributed Listed Chemicals to
Uncertified Retailers
Effective September 30, 2006, the
CMEA prohibited a retailer from selling
schedule listed chemical products
unless the retailer had self-certified to
the Attorney General that all
‘‘individuals who are responsible for
delivering such products into the
custody of purchasers or who deal
directly with purchasers by obtaining
payment for the products * * * have
* * * undergone training provided by
the seller to ensure that the individuals
understand the requirements that
apply’’ to the sale of the products. 21
U.S.C. 830(e)(1)(VII). As stated above,
the Government alleged that between
January 1, 2007, and July 9, 2007,
Respondent made 284 distributions of
listed chemical products to thirty-five
retailers who were not self-certified.
As support for the allegation, a DEA
DI testified that using a document
supplied by Respondent which listed
the customers by code number, store
name and address, she conducted a spot
check to see if the stores were listed in
the Agency’s database of stores that had
become certified. Tr. 1213–19. The DI
further testified that the results of her
inquiry were reported in a thirteen page
document, which listed the
distributions by Respondent’s store code
number, the date, Respondent’s product
code, and quantity. Id. at 1218, see also
GX 40 (listing stores and transactions).
At the hearing, Respondent produced
numerous documents that refuted the
allegation. For example, the
Government listed twenty-five
Speedway stores that were located in
Indiana and Kentucky which had
obtained SLCs from Respondent
between April 10 and July 9, 2007. GX
40, at 3, 6 & 7. Respondent, however,
introduced into evidence, a letter dated
April 3, 2007 from an executive of
Speedway Super America to DEA’s
registration unit submitting a CD–Rom
with the certification data for the
company’s stores in Indiana and
Kentucky. RX 57. Respondent also
submitted copies of each store’s
certification. See RX 57A. While each of
the certifications was dated July 5, 2007,
the Government did not rebut
Respondent’s evidence that the Agency
considers a chain retailer who submits
information on a CD–Rom to be selfcertified on the date the information is
received by the Agency. Tr. 1335–36.
At most, the evidence suggests that
Respondent made a single distribution
to a single store before it obtained its
certification. Compare GX 40, at 14,
with RX 57, at 18. According to these
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exhibits, Respondent distributed a listed
chemical product on January 18, 2007,
to an independent convenience store
located in Centreville, Virginia, prior to
the store obtaining certification on
March 8, 2007.26
The evidence did show, however,
several instances in which Respondent’s
records contained erroneous
information. For example, Respondent’s
records listed the address of store
XTM7480 as 1451 Dorsey Road,
Hanover, Maryland. GX 39, at 100. The
store’s DEA Certificate states, however,
that its address is 7500 Ridge Road,
Hanover, MD. RX 57, at 14.
Respondent’s records likewise listed the
address of store XTM7520 as 7300
Washington Blvd., Dorsey, MD. GX 39,
at 100. According to its DEA certificate,
the store’s address was 7300
Washington Blvd, Elkridge, MD. RX 57,
at 15. Also, Respondent’s record listed
the address of store MTO102 as 995 Old
Airport Road, Bristol, TN. GX 39, at 33.
The store’s DEA certificate, however,
gives its address as 1001 Airport Road,
Bristol, Va. RX 57, at 16.27
The Allegations That Respondent
Distributed Products in Forms That
Could Not Be Lawfully Sold Under the
CMEA and State Laws
Effective April 9, 2006, the CMEA
prohibited a retailer from selling a listed
chemical ‘‘product in nonliquid form
(including gel caps) at retail unless the
product is packaged in blister packs
* * * containing not more than 2
dosage units, or where the use of blister
packs is technically infeasible, the
product is packaged in unit dose
packets or pouches.’’ 21 U.S.C.
830(d)(2). The Government alleged that
subsequent to February 1, 2007,
Respondent distributed 24-count bottles
of listed chemical product to retailers on
three occasions.
In support of this allegation, the
Government introduced a document
which lists three distributions of
Respondent’s product # 17902, Mini 2
Way 25 mg. gel caps in 24 count bottles,
to three stores (PTR3295, PTR3438, and
PTR3973).28 See GX 66 & 37. A DI
testified that the three transactions were
found in Respondent’s sales records. Tr.
26 The store’s certification shows that it was
completed online at DEA’s self-certification Web
page. RX 57, at 18.
27 Likewise, Respondent’s records list the address
for store BGP1 as 1699 N. Dixie Hwy, Monroe
Michigan. GX 39. The store’s DEA certificate gives
its address as 1488 N. Dixie Hwy., Monroe,
Michigan. RX 57, at 21.
28 According to Respondent’s sales records, two
of the distributions (to stores PTR3295 and
PTR3438) occurred on February 7, 2007; the other
distribution (to store PTR3973) occurred on April
23, 2007. GX 66, Tr. 1442–43.
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1442–45. According to Respondent’s
customer list, each of the stores was
owned by The Pantry chain. See GX 39.
Respondent’s record of shipments
showed, however, that the product had
not been shipped after January 2006. RX
40, at 152. Moreover, Respondent
presented e-mail correspondence
between it and an employee of The
Pantry. More specifically, Respondent
requested that The Pantry check its
scanner data to determine whether it
had sold the bottled product at the three
stores after February 1, 2007. RX 46, at
2–3. In an e-mail, a Pantry employee
reported that she had checked the item
number for the three stores ‘‘from Feb.
2007-Feb. 2008 and [that] there was no
movement at any of the three locations
for this item.’’ RX 46, at 1.29 Based on
the totality of the evidence, I find that
the Government has not proved this
allegation.
The Government also alleged that
Respondent distributed tablet-form
products to retailers in Kentucky and
North Carolina, after these States
prohibited the sale of non-liquid
products other than in gel-cap form at
establishments that are not pharmacies.
In support of the allegation, the
Government introduced a document
which listed four distributions of
Respondent’s product # 017550,
Ephedrine Plus Blister 24 Count. See GX
37 & 65. Three of the distributions were
made to three stores owned by Circle K
Midwest which were located in
Kentucky (CKM 3212, CKM 3247, and
CKM 3248); the other store was owned
by The Pantry and located in North
Carolina (PTR3972). See GX 39, at 10,
11 & 65. According to Respondent’s
records, the distributions occurred on
March 27 and 28, and July 9, 2007.
An executive of Respondent testified
that its records pertaining to the four
distributions were erroneous. Tr. 1347–
50. Moreover, Respondent’s records did
not show any shipments of this product
after December 26, 2005. RX 40, at 159.
Finally, in an e-mail, an employee of
The Pantry reported that ‘‘there was no
movement’’ of the product at store
number 3972. RX 46, at 1.30 Because the
29 Respondent’s CEO attributed the data as
resulting from its salesperson[s] having entered the
wrong product code in their computer. Tr. 68.
Another of Respondent’s testified that that it had
reprogrammed its computer system to prevent a
salesperson from selling an item that was
prohibited. Id. at 1404. Yet even after the
reprogramming, there were several instances in
which salespersons entered the codes for
discontinued products. Id. at 1405. The same
executive acknowledged that he did not know if the
salespersons still had obsolete products in their
storage units. Id.
30 Respondent also submitted an e-mail from an
employee of Circle K., which states that she
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ALJ found credible Respondent’s
explanation and did not produce
sufficient evidence to reject this finding,
I find that Government has proved only
that Respondent’s records were
erroneous and that it did not violate
North Carolina or Kentucky law.
The DEA Audits
On July 9, 2007, as part of an
administrative inspection of its
registered location, DEA Investigators
took a physical count of Respondent’s
listed chemical products then on hand.
Tr. 1163. The DIs also obtained an
initial inventory dated December 25,
2005, from Respondent’s records. Id.;
see GX 4. Both the beginning and
ending inventories were certified as
correct by Ryan Polk, Respondent’s
Chief Financial Officer. GX 4. Pursuant
to an agreement with the DIs, products
which were stored in the returns portion
of Respondent’s storage cage which
included out-of-date products, broken
blister packs, and single loose pills were
not counted. Tr. 1494–95. The products
had not, however, been logged back into
Respondent’s records. Id.
DEA Investigators audited twenty
different products by adding
Respondent’s receipts (including
returns, Tr. 1182) to the beginning
inventory (GX 34) 31 and comparing this
figure with the sum of the closing
inventory and Respondent’s shipments
to its salespersons (GX 35) and returns
to its suppliers. See GX 4, at 3. Of
further note, Respondent’s list of
shipments indicated that it had made
three separate shipments of product #
17121 (totaling more than 2300 units 32)
to three of its salespersons on July 16,
2007, notwithstanding that this date was
a week into the future. GX 35, at 29.
According to the DIs’ calculations,
only one of the products in which there
was activity balanced,33 two of the
products had sizable shortages, and the
remaining had overages. Id. More
specifically, the DI identified
checked the stores’ sales going back to April 30,
2007, and that the stores had not sold the product.
RX 46, at 5. The e-mail is thus not probative of
whether Respondent distributed the products in
violation of Kentucky law.
31 According to the DI, the investigators ‘‘asked to
see receipts for the products audited for a time
period. And we were, instead, given this three-page
summary.’’ Tr. 1170. Relatedly, the DI testified that
while Respondent gave them a 157 page list of its
shipments, the document used product codes and
the Investigators had to ask several times for a
document which identified the products. Id. at
1180–81.
32 This product was a six-count blister pack. See
GX 32, at 1.
33 While two other products balanced, the
computation chart indicates that there was no
beginning or closing inventory of, and no activity
in, these products. GX 3, at 6.
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Respondent’s product code #17902
(Mini 2-Way 25 mg. 24 count gel cap
bottles) as being short nearly 28,000
bottles. Tr. 1186. Moreover, the DI
concluded that Respondent was short
32,913 units of product code # 17903
(Mini 2 Way 12.5 mg. gel cap 6 ct.
blister packs). See GX 4, at 3.
The DI further testified that ‘‘because
we got different numbers when
comparing [Respondent’s] receipts
versus their warehouse documentation,’’
Tr. 1186, she conducted an additional
audit of four products by obtaining
information from Respondent’s
suppliers in order to verify its receipts.
Id. at 1187. According to the DI, for
these four products, there were
substantial differences between the
quantities that were reported by the
suppliers and the information provided
by Respondent. Id. With respect to
product # 17121 (Double Action 6 ct.
ephedrine 25 mg. tablets), Respondent
had represented that its receipts were
656,688, but according to the DI, the
suppliers had claimed to have sold it
only 429,024 units resulting in an
overage of more than 275,000 units. Tr.
1188; GX 4, at 3. The DI also found
overages in the other three products
which were subject to the additional
audit. GX 4, at 3. The DI further testified
that she prepared an additional
document which compared the receipt
information provided on Respondent’s
printouts, the hard copy invoices of
Respondent’s receipts, and the
quantities which the manufacturers of
Respondent’s products reported to the
DI. Tr. 1189–90; GX 69.
According to this document, while
Respondent’s printout of its receipts for
product #17103 (525,240 units of
Double Action 12 ct. Blister 25 mg.)
matched the quantity of the
manufacturer’s report, Respondent had
no hard copy invoices. GX 69. With
respect to product # 17131 (Double
Action Pseudo tablets 12 mg.),
Respondent’s printout indicated it had
received 404,184 units and the
manufacturer reported that it had sold
403,248 units to Respondent. Id.
Respondent did not, however, have any
hard copy invoices for the product. Id.
With respect to product # 17121 (Double
Action 6 ct. ephedrine 25 mg.),
Respondent’s receipts (656,688 units)
matched the number reported by the
manufacturer. Id. Respondent, however,
had hard copy invoices for only 429,024
units. Id.
With respect to product # 17125,
Respondent’s printout indicated it had
received 1,011,901 units, which
matched the total quantity reported by
the two suppliers of this product. Id.
Respondent, however, had invoices only
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for 851,671 units. Id. Apparently,
Respondent was also missing invoices
for other products.34 Id.
Respondent’s CFO testified that upon
being provided with a copy of the
Government’s audit, he proceeded to
conduct his own audit. With respect to
product # 17902, which the Government
had concluded was short, the CFO
testified that the DIs had ‘‘excluded a
transaction for 28,800 units where we
sent that product back to the original
manufacturer’’ because in his words, it
‘‘was an obsolete item.’’ Tr. 2036; RX 36,
at 4. The ALJ further found credible the
CFO’s testimony that he had provided
this information to the DIs as part of
their document request. Id.; see also ALJ
at 42.35 Respondent also introduced into
evidence numerous documents listing
inventory adjustments and data
pertaining to items that had been
removed to the ‘‘obsolete inventory
area’’ which its CFO asserted had been
excluded by the DIs in doing the audit.
Tr. 2037; RX 36. As for Respondent’s
other product (# 17903), which the
Government concluded it was short
nearly 33,000 units, Respondent
introduced into evidence two
documents listing various inventory
adjustments which it contended had not
been considered by the Government and
which would have greatly reduced the
discrepancy. GX 36, at 2. On crossexamination, the CFO maintained that
he had provided these documents no
later than July 18, 2007. Tr. 2085.
Notably, the Government did not rebut
either the CFO’s testimony that the
documents had been provided or that it
had failed to consider them in
performing the audit.
Respondent’s CFO also testified that
the additional audit (performed on the
four products) was flawed, asserting that
with respect to two of the items (#s
17121 and 17125), the Government had
‘‘exclude[d] a very large receipt that’s on
the sales record from those suppliers.’’
Tr. 2038–39. With respect to product #
17121, the CFO testified that the
Government had excluded ‘‘227,664
units [that] were listed on the report as
sold to’’ it. Id. at 2039. As for product
# 17125, which came from two
suppliers, the CFO stated that the
Government had excluded transactions
totaling 160,000 units. Id.
While the purpose of the second audit
was to obtain information from
34 The DI also testified that there were thirty-four
sales routes for which Respondent did not provide
address information indicating where its products
were being shipped to. Tr. 1197–98, GX 67.
35 The ALJ noted that this document shows a
return of 57,600. ALJ at 43. That figure appears,
however, to be the amount of the credit Respondent
was entitled to. RX 36, at 4.
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Respondent’s suppliers and verify it
with Respondent’s reported receipts, in
fact, the audit appeared to have been
based on Respondent’s actual invoices
and not the reported figures (which
appear to have been used in the first
round of audits). Compare GX 69, with
GX 4, at 3.36 In his testimony, however,
Respondent’s CFO did not address the
Government’s contention that
Respondent was missing various
invoices of its receipts and Respondent
does not cite to any specific evidence of
record rebutting the allegation. See Tr.
2042 (CFO testified that ‘‘I think in a
couple of instances—I did not include
the pages in this [exhibit RX 36], for
example, Item 17121 when the
Government excluded the 227,000
units.’’). Accordingly, I find that
Respondent was missing numerous
invoices documenting its purchases
from its suppliers.
Respondent’s Post-Suspension Conduct
Following the issuance of the
suspension order, Respondent engaged
in discussions with BDI, Inc., one of its
suppliers, under which Respondent
proposed to have its sales persons take
orders for SLCs, which would then be
sent back to its headquarters and
forwarded on to BDI, which would fill
the orders by shipping them to its
customer by UPS. GX 48; Tr. 2401–02.
According to a February 8, 2008 letter
which was signed by its CEO, under the
scheme, Respondent’s sales persons
would ‘‘still do all reordering and
stocking of the merchandise as we have
in the past,’’ and when a shipment
arrived at a customer, ‘‘the manager
[would] have the choice of stocking the
OTC cabinet or holding it for our sales
person.’’ GX 48. The letter further
stated: ‘‘This basically keeps the
business the same. The only difference
is a UPS box. All invoices are from
Novelty, Inc.’’ Id.
Respondent’s Vice President of
Product justified the scheme, reasoning
that under his ‘‘definition of sales, we’re
not involved in the distribution of the
product. But our sales people are in that
store functioning as an agent.’’ Tr. 2402.
36 For example, both Respondent and the
manufacturer agreed that Respondent had obtained
656,688 packets of product # 17121, but
Respondent’s invoices only added up to 429,024
units. GX 69. In the first audit, the Government
used the 656,688 figure, and in the second audit,
which was supposedly based on the information it
obtained from the manufacturer, it used the 429,024
figure. See GX 4, at 3. It did the same thing with
respect to product # 17125, using the 1,011,901
figure (which Respondent and the two
manufacturers agreed with) in the first audit. Id.
Again, in the second audit, it used the 851,671
figure, the figure that was based on the actual
invoices produced by Respondent. Id.; see also GX
4, at 3.
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Because BDI refused to participate,
the scheme ‘‘was never implemented.’’
Id. at 2403. However, at the hearing,
Respondent’s VP testified that the
scheme was ‘‘[s]omething that we’re still
continuing to explore.’’ Id.
Discussion
Section 304(a) of the Controlled
Substances Act provides that a
registration to distribute a list I chemical
‘‘may be suspended or revoked * * *
upon a finding that the registrant * * *
has committed such acts as would
render [its] registration under section
823 of this title inconsistent with the
public interest as determined under
such section.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4).
Moreover, under section 303(h), ‘‘[t]he
Attorney General shall register an
applicant to distribute a list I chemical
unless the Attorney General determines
that registration of the applicant is
inconsistent with the public interest.’’
21 U.S.C. 823(h). In making the public
interest determination, Congress
directed that the following factors be
considered:
(1) Maintenance by the applicant of
effective controls against diversion of listed
chemicals into other than legitimate
channels;
(2) Compliance by the applicant with
applicable Federal, State, and local law;
(3) Any prior conviction record of the
applicant under Federal or State laws relating
to controlled substances or to chemicals
controlled under Federal or State law;
(4) Any past experience of the applicant in
the manufacture and distribution of
chemicals; and
(5) Such other factors as are relevant to and
consistent with the public health and safety.
Id. 823(h).
‘‘These factors are considered in the
disjunctive.’’ Joy’s Ideas, 70 FR 33195,
33197 (2005). I may rely on any one or
a combination of factors, and may give
each factor the weight I deem
appropriate in determining whether a
registration should be revoked or an
application for a registration should be
denied. See, e.g., David M. Starr, 71 FR
39367, 39368 (2006); Energy Outlet, 64
FR 14269 (1999). Moreover, I am ‘‘not
required to make findings as to all of the
factors.’’ Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477,
482 (6th Cir. 2005); Morall v. DEA, 412
F.3d 165, 173–74 (DC Cir. 2005).
In this matter, I have considered all of
the statutory factors.37 While I have
found that several of the Government’s
allegations have not been proved, I
nonetheless conclude that Respondent
does not maintain effective controls
against diversion and that its
37 I note that there is no evidence that Respondent
has been convicted of an offense related to
controlled substances or listed chemicals.
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distribution practices and recordkeeping
did not comply with Federal law.
Moreover, while I have carefully
considered the ALJ’s findings regarding
Respondent’s willingness to comply
with Federal law and her
recommendation that I continue its
registration with conditions, I conclude
that on balance, the ALJ did not give
sufficient weight to several factors
including Respondent’s failure to
enforce its own policies, its sustained
conduct in continuing to distribute out
of unregistered storage facilities even
after being advised that its practice was
illegal, and its attempt to circumvent the
suspension order. Accordingly,
Respondent’s registration will be
revoked.
Factor One—Maintenance of Effective
Controls Against Diversion
Under agency decisions, this factor
encompasses a variety of considerations.
Holloway Distributing, Inc., 72 FR
42118, 42123 (2007). These include the
adequacy of the registrant’s/applicant’s
security arrangements, the adequacy of
its recordkeeping and reporting, its
distribution practices, and the
occurrence of diversion. See id.; see also
Rick’s Picks, L.L.C., 72 FR 18275, 18278
(2007); John J. Fotinopoulos, 72 FR
24602, 24605 (2007); D & S Sales, 71 FR
37607, 37610 (2006); Joy’s Ideas, 70 FR
33195, 33197–98 (2005).
In evaluating a registrant’s security
controls and procedures, DEA
regulations direct that the Agency
consider the following eight factors:
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(1) The type, form, and quantity of List I
chemicals handled;
(2) The location of the premises and the
relationship such location bears on the
security needs;
(3) The type of building construction
comprising the facility and the general
characteristics of the building or buildings;
(4) The availability of electronic detection
and alarm systems;
(5) The extent of unsupervised public
access to the facility;
(6) The adequacy of supervision over
employees having access to List I chemicals;
(7) The procedures for handling business
guests, visitors, maintenance personnel, and
nonemployee service personnel in areas
where List I chemicals are processed or
stored;
(8) The adequacy of the registrant’s or
applicant’s systems for monitoring the
receipt, distribution, and disposition of List
I chemicals in its operations.
21 CFR 1309.71.38
38 Under DEA regulations, ‘‘[a]ny registrant or
applicant desiring to determine whether a proposed
system of security controls and procedures is
adequate may submit materials and plans regarding
the proposed security controls and procedures
either to the Special Agent in Charge in the region
in which the security controls and procedures will
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It is undisputed that Respondent
maintains adequate physical security of
the list I chemicals which it stores at its
registered location. The record further
establishes, however, that Respondent
then ships the SLCs to between 150 to
180 self-storage units throughout the
country, where the products may be
kept for up to several days at a time
before the route sales persons retrieve
them. Tr. 534 & 667–68.
As found above, Respondent disputes
that this practice constitutes storage. See
Tr. 666 (Executive testifying that:
‘‘That’s a nonsense question. Now
you’re coming back into the definition
of what is storage. We’re not storing the
product in that location.’’); id. at 672
(‘‘We are not storing or keeping or
whatever words you want to try and
use, product in these warehouses,
against the law.’’). Likewise, in its brief,
Respondent engages in the tortured
argument that it does not store products
in the self-storage units because ‘‘[t]he
definition of ‘store’ focuses on future,
not present use,’’ and it uses the units
only for what it terms is an ‘‘immediate’’
and not a ‘‘future use.’’ Resp. Br. 99.
This argument begs the question of
why Respondent needs to rent storage
units if not to store products in them.
Moreover, the record is clear that the
products are typically not immediately
transferred from the delivery truck to
the route salesperson and that products
may remain in the storage unit for up to
several days before the route sales
person retrieves them. Respondent is
therefore using the self-storage areas for
storage.
Moreover, putting aside momentarily
the issue of whether these storage units
must be registered, it is unlikely that
they could meet the security
requirements of this Agency. Indeed,
DEA has previously rejected
applications of entities that sought to
store SLCs in public storage facilities on
the ground that they present an
unacceptable risk of diversion. See
Stephen J. Heldman, 72 FR 4032, 4034
(2007); see also Sujak Distributors, 71
FR 50102, 50104 (2006).
In these decisions, I have noted a
variety of security concerns which are
raised by these facilities including the
inadequacy of their construction, the
lack of alarm systems, the lack of 24
hour on-site monitoring, the ability of
unauthorized persons to gain access to
the facility and the storage units, and
the fact that the tenant does not control
what other tenants the landlord rents to.
See, e.g., Sujak, 71 FR at 50104. Here,
be used, or to the Chemical Operations Section
Office of Diversion Control’’ at DEA Headquarters.
21 CFR 1309.71(c).
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for example, a former salesperson for
Respondent testified that his storage
unit was in a facility which lacked a
secure perimeter and that anyone could
come off the road and gain access to the
door of his unit. Tr. 538. It also is
undisputed that the storage units did
not have separate cages within them for
securing the products. Id. at 133.
Finally, to this day, the Agency does not
know where thirty-four of the storage
units are located. Tr. 1196–98.
Respondent’s use of these storage
facilities thus does not provide adequate
controls against diversion and provides
reason alone to support the finding that
its continued registration ‘‘is
inconsistent with the public interest.’’
21 U.S.C. 823(h).
The record identified a further serious
deficiency in the security of
Respondent’s distribution practices. As
found above, SLCs may remain on a
salesperson’s truck for up to nine days
before being delivered to a store. This
practice presents a serious security
concern because of the risk that a thief
can steal the vehicle’s cargo. Indeed, by
stealing the entire vehicle with its
cargo—an act which takes but seconds
to perform—a thief does not have to
spend time offloading the SLCs. See
McBride Marketing, 71 FR 35710, 35711
(2006). Moreover, the risk posed by
Respondent’s distribution practice is
exacerbated by the extensive time
period during which the products
remain on its trucks.
Nor are these security concerns the
only manner in which Respondent fails
to maintain effective controls against
diversion. The record also supports the
conclusion that Respondent has serious
recordkeeping deficiencies.
According to the manufacturer’s sales
journal, AAA Pharmaceuticals made
three shipments of product # 17121 to
Respondent: (1) 227,664 dosage units on
August 11, 2006; (2) 228,264 dosage
units on September 1, 2006; and (3)
200,760 dosage units on November 14,
2006. See GX 32 at 7, 8 & 11. Each of
these shipments was also a ‘‘regulated
transaction’’ as each exceeded the 1,000
gram threshold. 21 CFR 1310.04(f)(1)(ii).
Respondent was thus required to keep a
record of the transaction ‘‘for 2 years
after the date of the transaction.’’ Id.
1310.04(a). Yet Respondent was missing
an invoice for the August 11, 2006
shipment of 227,666 units, GX 69, and
the computer-generated records which it
provided to the Agency pursuant to the
warrant did not comply with Federal
law and Agency regulations because
they were missing required information
such as the form of packaging and the
method of transfer. Compare GX 34,
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with 21 U.S.C. 830(a)(2) and 21 CFR
1310.06(a).
With respect to product number
17103, Respondent acquired more than
525,000 units in seven different
shipments between March 29, 2006, and
April 19, 2006. See GX 3 at 2–5.39 Here
again, Respondent engaged in multiple
regulated transactions and was required
to keep records of them. See 21 U.S.C.
802(39); 21 U.S.C. 1310.04(f) (threshold
for regulations transaction is based on
‘‘the cumulative amount for multiple
transactions within a calendar month’’).
Yet it had no invoices for any of the
shipments, GX 69, and the computergenerated records it provided to the
Agency likewise did not comply with
the regulations.40 Respondent was also
missing invoices documenting its
purchases of other products. See id.
Respondent’s failure to maintain
adequate records for the regulated
transactions it engaged in constitutes
not only a violation of Federal law, it
also demonstrates that its systems for
monitoring the receipt of SLCs are
inadequate.
Respondent’s systems for monitoring
the distribution of its products are also
deficient. First, Respondent’s
recordkeeping is deficient in various
ways. According to the shipping records
which Respondent provided to the DIs
on July 9, 2007, it shipped more than
2300 packages of product # 17121 to
three different salespersons on July 16,
2007, even though the date listed was a
week into the future.
The Government also identified
several instances in which Respondent’s
records indicated that it had distributed
products that could not be lawfully sold
under either the CMEA or the laws of
Kentucky and North Carolina. While I
have credited Respondent’s evidence
that the distributions did not occur, the
evidence nonetheless points to further
inadequacies in Respondent’s
recordkeeping and systems for
monitoring the distribution of SLCs.41
Moreover, Respondent’s records
contained a variety of errors related to
the addresses of its customers including
39 On March 29, 2006, AAA shipped Respondent
15,984 and 114,480 units of product number 17103;
a dosage unit of this product contained 25 mg. of
ephedrine hcl. GX 32 at 2–3. This was followed by
a shipment on April 14, 2006 of 113,856 units; a
shipment on April 17, 2006 of 113, 472 units; and
three shipments on April 18, 2006 which totaled
167,328 units. See id.
40 Here again, there were multiple transactions
that fell within the definition of a regulated
transaction.
41 I acknowledge the testimony of Respondent’s
executives that the errors were caused by its
salespersons’ erroneous entry of products codes
into their computers, and that the software has
since been reprogrammed.
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the wrong street address, and in one
case, the wrong state.
Second, Respondent’s procedures for
monitoring the distribution of its
products are deficient. The record
establishes that the placement of an
order and the delivery of the products
occur simultaneously, and at the time,
only the salesperson knows how much
the store has purchased. Tr. 633. While
Respondent asserted that it monitors its
sales of SLC and conducts an inquiry if
a store has acquired more inventory
than is expected, and that another report
is prepared which lists instances in
which more than one case has been sold
per product during a transaction, these
procedures are wholly deficient to
protect against the diversion of SLCs.
Moreover, as the evidence with respect
to the 2002 incident in which
Respondent’s products were found at a
meth. lab shows, under its distribution
model, it can not identify which stores
receive a particular product. Tr. 1517.
Fundamental to its obligation to
maintain effective controls against
diversion, a distributor must review
every order and identify suspicious
transactions. Further, it must do so prior
to shipping the products. Indeed, a
distributor has an affirmative duty to
forgo a transaction if, upon
investigation, it is unable to determine
that the proposed transaction is for
legitimate purposes. See DEA, Chemical
Handler’s Manual 21 (2002).42
Respondent’s procedure of posttransaction review is incompatible with
its obligation to identify and forgo
suspicious transactions.
Respondent further maintains that its
imposition of its one case, per product,
per service cycle limit, and its practice
of issuing warning letters to
salespersons who sell over the limit,
demonstrates that it maintains effective
controls against diversion. However, the
credited testimony establishes that
between January and July 2007,
Respondent’s sales force violated its
case limit policy some 85 times. ALJ at
12. Moreover, one of Respondent’s
senior executives testified that it had
only started issuing written warnings in
August 2007, which, of course, was after
the administrative inspection.
Furthermore, Respondent’s policy is a
meaningless measure because it sells ten
different products and most stores are
serviced every two weeks.
The inadequacy of Respondent’s
control measures is further
demonstrated by its own exhibit
42 Under the Agency’s policy, this manual was
provided to all list I chemical distributors at various
inspections. It is also available through the
Agency’s Web site.
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showing its sales of SLCs in the three
months prior to the issuance of the
suspension order. As found above,
Respondent’s CEO testified that its
average customer sold SLCs with a retail
value of $640 per month. Tr. 563–64.
Yet Respondent’s evidence shows that
during this period, it had sold SLCs
with an average monthly retail value of
more than $2000 (more than three times
its average monthly sale) to
approximately 120 of its customers, and
SLCs with an average monthly retail
value of more than $3000 (4.68 times its
average monthly sales) to thirty-four of
its customers. RX 27A. Moreover,
Respondent sold SLCs with an average
monthly retail sales value greater than
$4000 to nine customers. Id. One of
these customers was purchasing SLCs
with an average monthly retail sales
value of $5056—approximately eight
times its average customer’s purchase.
Id. Finally, its largest customer (Store #
BPM55) was purchasing SLCs with an
average monthly retail sale value of
$7314—more than eleven times its
average customer’s purchase—in the
three months prior to the issuance of the
suspension order.
Moreover, the record establishes that
Respondent had previously determined
that store BPM55 was purchasing
excessive quantities. RX 56. Yet
notwithstanding this store’s history,
Respondent allowed it to purchase
quantities that dwarfed that of its
average customer. Furthermore, upon
reviewing this store’s logbook for the
period July 21 through August 21, 2007,
at least five individuals had purchased
in excess of nine grams within this
period. These customers purchased
quantities which far exceeded the
recommended dosing for the product’s
use as an asthma treatment 43 and are
consistent with diversion.44
43 These five customers had purchased between
1,002 and 1,548 tablets. In contrast, Respondent’s
recommended dosing for its 12.5 mg product was
‘‘2 tablets every 4 hours as needed, not to exceed
12 tablets in 24 hours,’’ and to ‘‘stop use’’ and see
a doctor if ‘‘cough lasts more than 7 days.’’ RX 9,
at 3.
I acknowledge that Respondent cannot review the
logbooks. A registrant cannot, however, ignore other
evidence which is indicative of diversion.
44 At the hearing, Respondent’s Expert testified
that BPM55 is an outlier and that it would not be
appropriate to draw ‘‘a conclusion about
[Respondent’s] customers based on relying on the
. . . highest seller.’’ Tr. 1722. Contrary to the
understanding of Respondent’s Expert, in
evaluating the effectiveness of an entity’s diversion
controls, there are no free passes. Excessive sales to
a single store are sufficient by themselves to
support the conclusion that the registrant does not
maintain effective controls against diversion.
Moreover, as explained above, BPM55 had a history
of excessive sales and had previously come to the
attention of Respondent. Yet Respondent continued
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Contrary to Respondent’s
understanding, while proof that a
distributor is selling quantities in excess
of the national monthly average for sales
of SLCs by convenience stores would be
highly probative of the distributor’s lack
of effective controls against diversion, it
is not the sole measure for evaluating
the effectiveness of those controls. More
specifically, a registrant cannot ignore
evidence that some of its customers are
purchasing quantities that greatly
exceed what its typical customer buys
from it. Significantly, Respondent
introduced this evidence into the
record. Although in some instances
there may be a plausible explanation for
the disparity that does not involve
diversion, Respondent offered no
explanation that was specific to any
store for why it was selling in such
quantities.45
Moreover, while Respondent’s CEO
testified that he would cut off a
customer who purchased more than a
case of a product, Respondent offered
no evidence that it has ever refused to
sell to a customer because the customer
was purchasing excessive amounts of
products. Indeed, Respondent’s
continued sales to BPM55, at a rate that
was more than eleven times what its
average customer was buying, amply
demonstrates that its purported written
policy of monitoring those stores which
to sell to it, and sold massive quantities to it in the
three months which preceded the suspension.
For similar reasons, I find unpersuasive the
testimony of Respondent’s Expert that it would be
error to draw conclusions from the six stores
identified in Government Ex. 38 and 44. See Tr.
1697–1705. Indeed, with the exceptions of BPM 55
and NOC 56, it is not even clear that these stores
were the largest purchasers.
45 As noted above, there was a substantial dispute
between the parties over the various assumptions
necessary to determine what an average
convenience store would sell in legitimate
commerce. Yet even indulging numerous
assumptions favorable to Respondent such as: (1)
That only 31,000 stores sell the products, (2) that
ephedrine products constitute sixty percent of the
SLC market at convenience stores, and (3) that the
NACS survey has an error rate of fifty-five percent
because some stores erroneously report their sales
of ephedrine as general merchandise rather than as
cold and cough products, ALJ Ex. 15; and
concluding that the average monthly sales figure is
$941 a month, more than 100 stores were selling at
levels which were statistically significant according
to Respondent’s expert. See Tr. 1700 (noting that
being outside of two standard deviations is
statistically significant); id. at 1704 (use of two
standard deviations is ‘‘a very appropriate
number’’).
I acknowledge that because two standard
deviations represents ninety-five percent of a
population, by definition 2.5 % of the stores will
fall outside of this point on both sides of the curve.
In concluding that Respondent does not maintain
effective controls against diversion, I do not rely
solely on the Z scores calculated by Respondent’s
expert. See RX 27A. I also consider the disparity
between the size of the purchases of Respondent’s
largest customers and its average customer.
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purchased ‘‘unusual quantities,’’ and
‘‘[i]f further unusual activity is noted
* * *discontinu[ing] sales,’’ RX 10, at
1; is a sham.
I therefore conclude that Respondent
does not maintain effective controls
against diversion. Given the variety of
ways in which Respondent’s controls
are deficient, this factor strongly
supports the conclusion that
Respondent’s continued registration ‘‘is
inconsistent with the public interest.’’
21 U.S.C. 823(h).
Factor Two—Respondent’s Compliance
With Applicable Laws
The Government further argues that
Respondent failed to comply with
Federal law and DEA regulations by
distributing SLCs from the self-storage
units because none of the units were
registered. See Gov. Exceptions 1–6. The
ALJ, while noting that the facts
surrounding Respondent’s use of the
self-storage units were not in dispute,
declined to address the statutory issue,
reasoning that because there was then
litigation pending in the U.S. District
Court, the Court, and not this
proceeding, is the proper forum for
resolving the dispute. ALJ at 91 n.38.46
I conclude, however, that there is no
reason for the Agency to not address
this issue which involves a fundamental
question as to the scope of the CSA’s
registration requirements.47
Under Federal law, ‘‘[e]very person
who * * * distributes any * * * list I
chemical * * * shall obtain annually a
registration issued by the Attorney
General.’’ 21 U.S.C. 822(a)(1). ‘‘Persons
registered by the Attorney General
* * * to distribute * * * list I
chemicals are authorized to possess
[and] distribute * * * such * * *
chemicals * * * to the extent
authorized by their registration and in
conformity with the other provisions of’’
the CSA. Id. § 822(b). The Act further
provides that ‘‘[a] separate registration
shall be required at each principal place
of business * * * where the applicant
* * * distributes list I chemicals.’’ Id.
§ 822(e); see also 21 CFR 1309.23(a) (‘‘A
separate registration is required for each
principal place of business at one
general physical location where List I
chemicals are distributed, imported, or
exported by a person.’’).
46 The ALJ did note, however, that Respondent
ignored the letter of a DEA Group Supervisor which
had informed it that its conduct was illegal. ALJ at
91.
47 Ordinarily, courts defer to agencies when
presented with a legal issue that lies within the
agency’s primary jurisdiction. II Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 917 (4th ed. 2002).
The scope of the CSA’s registration requirements is
such an issue.
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With respect to SLC distributors, DEA
has created by regulation two limited
exceptions to the requirement that each
principal place of business be
registered. The first is for ‘‘[a]
warehouse where List I chemicals are
stored by or on behalf of a registered
person, unless such chemicals are
distributed directly from such
warehouse to locations other than the
registered location from which the
chemicals were originally delivered[.]’’
21 CFR 1309.23(b)(1).48 This regulation
is directly applicable to Respondent’s
use of the storage units.
Notably, at the time this regulation
was promulgated, several commenters
‘‘objected to the requirement * * * that
a separate registration be obtained for
each location at which List I chemical
activities are carried out[,]’’ and
‘‘suggested that DEA allow companies to
obtain a single registration * * * for
multiple locations.’’ Implementation of
the Domestic Chemical Diversion
Control Act of 1993, 60 FR 32447, 32448
(1995). As DEA then explained, ‘‘[t]he
law is specific on this point. The
[Domestic Chemical Diversion Control
Act] requires that a separate registration
be obtained at each location at which
List I chemicals are distributed.’’ Id.
(emphasis added).
Relatedly, several commenters asked
‘‘how the requirement for separate
registrations for separate locations
would apply to [independently owned]
warehouses?’’ Id. DEA explained that
‘‘[t]he person who distributes List I
chemicals from independently owned
warehouses must register at each
location and ensure that the other
chemical control requirements,
including security, record keeping,
reporting, etc., for their products are
met.’’ Id. (emphasis added).
The record here clearly establishes
that the SLCs which Respondent stores
in the self-storage units are not shipped
back to Respondent’s registered location
before being distributed. Rather, the
SLCs are distributed directly from the
self-storage units to Respondent’s
customers. As DEA’s regulation makes
plain, Respondent’s self-storage units
are therefore subject to the registration
requirement. See 21 CFR 1309.23(b)(1).
As explained above, Respondent’s
contention that it was not storing
products at the self-storage units is
48 The regulation also exempts from registration
‘‘[a]n office used by agents of a registrant where
sales of List I chemicals are solicited, made, or
supervised but which neither contains such
chemicals (other than chemicals for display
purposes) nor serves as a distribution point for
filling such sales orders.’’ 21 CFR 1309.23(b)(2).
This provision is not applicable to Respondent’s
use of the self-storage units.
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absurd. The units are warehouses as that
term is understood in common usage.
See Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 2576 (1976) (defining
warehouse as ‘‘a structure or room for
the storage of merchandise or
commodities’’).
Respondent nonetheless argues that
the drop-off points are not required to
be registered because they are not its
‘‘principal place of business.’’ Resp. Br.
at 97–98. Respondent acknowledges that
the term ‘‘principal place of business
[is] not defined in the definition section
[ ] of the CSA.’’ Resp. Br. at 97.
Respondent thus contends that the term
should be given its ‘‘ordinary meaning.’’
Id. Relying on several cases interpreting
the term ‘‘principal place of business’’
for the purpose of determining a
corporation’s citizenship for the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts, see 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1),
Respondent contends that ‘‘[t]he
principal place of business for a
corporation is usually its headquarters,
where day-to-day business is
conducted.’’ Id. (citing Heritage Educ.
Trust v. Katz, 287 F.Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C.
2003) and Masterson-Cook v. Criss Bros.
Iron Works, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 810, 812
(D.D.C. 1989)).
According to Respondent, the Federal
courts apply a ‘‘ ‘nerve center of
operation’ test to establish the principal
place of business of corporations doing
business in multiple states[,]’’ and that
‘‘ [w]hen no one state is clearly the
center of corporate activity or accounts
for a majority of the company income,
the headquarters logically assumes
greater importance in determination of
the principal place of business.’’ Id. at
97–98 (quoting Masterson-Cook, 722 F.
Supp. 812) (other citations omitted). In
Respondent’s view, its Greenfield,
Indiana headquarters ‘‘is clearly the
center of corporate activity,’’ because
‘‘[a]ll transactions with vendors and
customers are handled through the
Greenfield offices.’’ Id. at 98. Relatedly,
Respondent argues that ‘‘[t]he drop off
units are not the ‘center of corporate
activity’ nor do they ‘account for a
majority of the company income.’ ’’ Id.
Respondent’s arguments are not
persuasive.
It is fundamental that statutory terms
take their meaning from the context in
which they are used and the statutory
purpose. See Mid-Con Freight Systems,
Inc., v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
545 U.S. 440, 447 (2005); Tyler v. Cain,
533 U.S. 656, 662 (2001); see also
Pharmaceutical Res. & Mfr’s of America
v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 224 (D.C.
Cir. 2001). Respondent’s reliance on
cases interpreting the diversity statute
ignores the context in which the term
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16:52 Sep 09, 2008
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‘‘each principal place of business’’ is
used in the CSA, as well as the CSA’s
fundamentally different purpose.
Under Respondent’s interpretation, an
entity would be required to obtain a
registration only for a single location—
its headquarters. The text of section 822
demonstrates, however, that Congress
did not limit a registrant’s obligation to
obtain a registration to a single place of
business such as its corporate
headquarters. Rather, Congress imposed
on a registrant the obligation to obtain
a separate registration at ‘‘each principal
place of business * * * where the
applicant * * * distributes * * * List I
chemicals.’’ 21 U.S.C. 822(e) (emphasis
added).
Consistent with the underlying
purposes of the CSA, the statutory text
manifests Congress’s understanding that
an entity can have multiple principal
places of business. A location where
List I chemicals are stored and
distributed from, is a principal place of
business because it plays a
‘‘consequential’’ part in the registrant’s
activity of distributing. See Webster’s
Third New Int’l Dictionary 1802 (1976)
(defining ‘‘principal’’ in part as
‘‘consequential’’). In determining
whether a facility is a principal place of
business within the meaning of the
CSA, the Act looks to the nature of the
activity that occurs at the particular
location and not at the dollar volume of
business that is transacted out of the
facility. See 21 CFR 1309.23(b)(2)
(exempting from registration ‘‘[a]n office
used by agents of a registrant where
sales of List I chemicals are solicited,
made, or supervised but which neither
contains such chemicals * * * nor
serves as a distribution point for filling
sales orders’’).
Respondent’s interpretation would
clearly frustrate the Congressional
purpose. In enacting the CSA’s
registration provisions, Congress’
purpose was to protect against diversion
by requiring that those persons who
propose to engage in the legitimate
distribution of controlled substances
and listed chemicals apply for a
registration, notify this Agency of the
proposed location of their activity, and
submit the facility for inspection by the
Agency to ensure that it has adequate
security controls and procedures. See,
e.g., 21 U.S.C. 822(f) (authorizing the
Attorney General ‘‘to inspect the
establishment of a registrant or
applicant for registration’’). Indeed,
inspection by the Agency of a proposed
facility is fundamental to the CSA’s
mandate to protect the public interest.
Id. 823(h); see also 21 CFR 1309.41.
As the record here establishes,
Respondent has never applied for
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52701
registration for any of its storage units
and has never submitted any of its
storage units for inspection. Indeed,
according to the record, Respondent has
yet to provide information regarding the
location of some 34 of its storage units.
As this case demonstrates, adopting
Respondent’s interpretation would
frustrate Congress’s purpose and render
the Act a nullity.
Respondent’s interpretation would
also create a perverse incentive. While
it is unclear whether under its view an
entity which has only a few warehouses
would have to obtain a registration for
each of them, see Resp. Br. at 97–98,49
what is clear is that an interpretation
which determines whether a facility
must be registered by looking to the
amount of business activity that occurs
out of a facility rather than the nature
of the activity that occurs therein,
would encourage an entity to keep
adding warehouses or storage facilities
so that it could eventually claim that its
warehouses were no longer principal
places of business and were thus not
subject to the registration requirement.
Adopting Respondent’s interpretation
would thus lead to absurd results and
seriously undermine the security of the
Nation’s controlled substances and
listed chemical supplies. I therefore
reject it.
As stated above, the ALJ did not
address this statutory question. She did,
however, conclude that Respondent’s
conduct in continuing to store SLCs at,
and distributing them from, the selfstorage units, even after receiving the
Group Supervisor’s letter, was ‘‘not
consistent with the requirements for a
participant in a regulated industry,’’ and
supported the revocation of its
registration. ALJ at 91. Respondent
excepts to the ALJ’s conclusion,
contending that it was placed in the
‘‘dilemma’’ that if it complied with the
letter, it would have to use common
carriers and that this ‘‘would increase
the risk of diversion.’’ Resp. Exceptions
at 99. Respondent further argues that
because it ‘‘questioned the legal validity
of the letter, and feared adherence to it
would cause [it] to contribute to the risk
of diversion to the illicit
methamphetamine trade, it filed suit’’ in
federal court. Id. at 100.
Respondent’s argument is patently
self-serving and unsupported by the
record. As found above, Respondent’s
evidence as to the perceived security
inadequacies of, and increased risk of
49 Respondent’s argument that ‘‘the principal
place of business for a corporation is usually its
headquarters,’’ Resp. Br. 98, suggests that its view
is that only one registration is required for an entity
no matter the geographic scope of its distribution
activities.
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diversion when shipping via common
carriers, lacked foundation. It presented
no evidence of any diversion of SLCs
when being shipped by common
carriers.50 The argument further ignores
the significant risk of diversion posed
by its own distribution model, both
through its use of the storage units
which do not provide an acceptable
level of security, and its further practice
under which SLCs may be stored on a
salesperson’s truck for up to nine days
at a time.
Finally, Respondent contends that
because it was not sure what the legal
effect of the letter was, it felt obliged to
challenge the letter by filing suit.
Contrary to Respondent’s view, its right
to seek declaratory relief in federal court
is not at issue. Cf. id. at 100. (arguing
that ALJ’s decision ‘‘[c]ondemns the
exercise of’’ its right to seek relief in a
federal court). Rather, what is at issue is
Respondent’s decision to continue to
distribute SLCs—for some forty-four
months—in a manner that violates
Federal law, and its doing so even after
being told that it was violating Federal
law.
Furthermore, even if there was a
legitimate question as to the legal effect
of the letter, the Agency’s regulation
made clear that a warehouse was not
exempt from registration if the SLCs
being stored therein ‘‘are distributed
directly from such warehouse to
locations other than the registered
location from which the chemicals were
originally delivered.’’ 21 CFR
1309.23(a)(1). I thus conclude that the
Agency’s regulation and the letter
provided Respondent with ample notice
that its conduct was illegal.51
Notwithstanding Respondent’s assertion
that it is now willing to comply with
Federal law, its deliberate disregard of
the warning it received and lengthy
failure to comply, strongly support the
revocation of its registration.52
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Factor Four—Past Experience in the
Distribution of Chemicals
In discussing this factor, the ALJ
noted that Respondent has been
50 Respondent also argues that ‘‘the Raber letter
would allow reliance on a system of distribution
(FedEx and UPS unregistered locations) that present
risks of diversion that exceed those of [its] system.’’
Resp. Exceptions at 101. Congress however, has
specifically exempted common carriers from
registration, see 21 U.S.C. 822(c)(2), and has
concluded that their use for shipping controlled
substances and listed chemicals poses an acceptable
risk of diversion. I further note that Respondent
acknowledged in testimony that it has used
common carriers in the past.
51 Nor did Respondent seek review of the Group
Supervisor’s letter within the Agency.
52 As noted under factor one, Respondent also
failed to comply with Federal law because it did not
maintain proper records of regulated transactions.
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registered since 1998 and thus had
extensive experience in distributing
SLCs. ALJ at 92–93. She further
explained that prior to the service of the
Suspension Order, ‘‘Respondent had not
been informed by the [agency] of any
incidents of diversion of its SLC
product,’’ and that with the exception of
the 2004 letter regarding its distribution
practices, it was ‘‘never informed * * *
of any statutory or regulatory
violations.’’ Id. at 93. Finally, the ALJ
noted that the Agency had renewed
‘‘Respondent’s registration annually
between 1998 and 2007.’’ Id. Based on
what she characterized as Respondent’s
‘‘nine year history of compliance,’’ the
ALJ concluded that the evidence on this
factor ‘‘support[ed] a remedy less severe
than revocation.’’ Id.
The ALJ’s conclusion is mistaken for
several reasons. First, the ALJ’s
conclusion that Respondent had not
been informed by the Agency of any
incident of diversion is contrary to the
evidence, which establishes that twentytwo sixty-count bottles of products it
distributed were found at an illicit
laboratory in Connecticut and that a DI
discussed the matter with its executives.
Tr. 1082–84. Whether the subject was
first broached by the DI or Respondent
is beside the point, as is whether the
information was put in a formal warning
letter. The fact remains that products
which it distributed were diverted.
Moreover, while Respondent provided
the investigator with information as to
which of its salespersons had received
the products, it could not identify the
stores to which the products were
distributed. Tr. 1517.
Second, the ALJ gave insufficient
weight to Respondent’s continuation of
its illegal practice of distributing out of
unregistered storage units for more than
three and a half years after having been
advised of the practice’s illegality. Most
significantly, at no point did
Respondent voluntarily cease the
practice.
Moreover, as explained above under
factor two, the registration requirement
is one of the essential features of the
CSA. Respondent’s violations are not
technical violations of the Act.
Respondent’s conduct thus precludes a
finding that Respondent’s experience
establishes a ‘‘history of compliance.’’
ALJ at 93. Respondent’s experience thus
also supports the conclusion that its
registration would be ‘‘inconsistent with
the public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(h).53
53 The ALJ’s further reliance on the Agency’s
renewal of Respondent’s registration was in error.
Under Federal Regulations, in the event the Agency
proposes the denial of a renewal application, it
must issue an Order to Show Cause. 21 CFR
1309.42(a). There are a variety of reasons why the
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Factor Five—Other Factors Relevant to
and Consistent With Public Health and
Safety
As found above, following the service
of the Immediate Suspension,
Respondent contacted one of its
suppliers and attempted to enter into a
scheme under which its sales force
would continue to take orders for SLCs,
which would be sent to its headquarters
and then on to the supplier, which
would ship the products. Under the
scheme, Respondent’s salespersons
would ‘‘still do all reordering and
stocking of the merchandise as [they]
have in the past.’’ GX 48.
At the hearing, one of Respondent’s
vice presidents attempted to justify the
scheme, explaining that under his
‘‘definition of sales, we’re not involved
in the distribution of the product. But
our sales people are in that store
functioning as an agent.’’ Tr. 2402.
While the supplier refused to enter into
the scheme, the VP testified that it was
‘‘[s]omething that were still continuing
to explore.’’ Id. at 2403.
In its Exceptions, Respondent
contends that ‘‘[u]nder 21 CFR 1309.23,
sales agents are not required to be
registered and are lawful.’’ Resp.
Exceptions at 102. Respondent further
argues that because it ‘‘only discerned
select customer’s interest in it serving in
this role,’’ id. at 103, the ALJ’s
conclusion that it ‘‘still does not seem
to understand that it is working in a
highly regulated industry when it
actually handles SLC products,’’ ALJ at
92, condemns it based on ‘‘the mere
expression of interest in a legal option.’’
Resp. Exceptions at 103.
Respondent is correct that because it
never actually entered the scheme, there
is no basis for concluding that its
actions related to the scheme
demonstrate that it failed to comply
with applicable laws. See 21 U.S.C.
823(h)(2). The scope of factor five is,
however, considerably broader than
factor two, and encompasses ‘‘such
other factors as are relevant to and
consistent with the public health and
safety.’’ Id. 823(h)(5).
Respondent’s assertion that it merely
expressed interest in a legal option
mischaracterizes the record.
Respondent’s actions were not limited
Agency may not be prepared to go forward with a
Show Cause Proceeding at a particular time
including, inter alia, a lack of resources, the
complexity of the matters under investigation, and
the need to pursue other enforcement priorities.
Moreover, field personnel may approve the renewal
of a registration based on an erroneous
understanding of the law and regulations. The
decision to renew a registration is thus not
probative of a registrant’s record of compliance with
Federal law and Agency regulations.
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to merely thinking about a legal option
or seeking legal advice about the
scheme. Rather, it affirmatively sought
out one of its suppliers and attempted
to induce it to enter the scheme only to
be rebuffed by the supplier.
While Respondent maintains that it
was pursuing a legal option because an
agent is not required to be registered, it
ignores that this exception applies only
if the ‘‘agent * * * is acting in the usual
course of [its] business.’’ 21 U.S.C.
822(c)(1); 21 CFR 1309.24(a). The usual
course of Respondent’s business with
respect to SLCs did not, however,
involve acting as a sales agent for
another registrant. Rather, the usual
course of its business was distributing
SLCs for its own account. More
significantly, I further hold that an
entity does not act in the usual course
of business when it engages in
distribution-related activities that it has
previously been prohibited from doing
pursuant to an order suspending or
revoking its registration. It would
fundamentally undermine the CSA’s
purpose of protecting against diversion
to allow an entity whose registration has
been suspended or revoked to
subsequently engage in the same or
related activities as an agent.
Respondent’s attempt to circumvent
the suspension order—and the
admission of one its executives at the
hearing that it was still exploring this
option—reflects adversely on its fitness
to engage in the distribution of SLCs. I
thus conclude that this factor also
supports the conclusion that
Respondent’s registration would be
‘‘inconsistent with the public interest.’’
21 U.S.C. 823(h)(5).54
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Sanction
Under DEA precedent, the Agency
considers all of the facts and
circumstances in determining the
appropriate sanction. See Martha
Hernandez, M.D., 62 FR 61,145 (1997).
While the ALJ found that factors one
and two supported revocation, and that
‘‘Respondent’s actions appeared to
blatantly disobey a DEA directive,’’ she
further reasoned that except for this
letter, ‘‘Respondent has not been given
an opportunity to remedy the flaws
identified * * * in this action.’’ ALJ at
100. Based on what she characterized as
its ‘‘history of compliance, as evidenced
by’’ the Agency’s continuing its
registration, as well as ‘‘its financial
commitment to compliance, as
54 As explained above at n. 5, the issue of whether
there is a legitimate medical need for over-thecounter ephedrine products, see ALJ at 94–95, is for
the FDA to decide. The issue in this proceeding is
whether Respondent’s registration is consistent
with the public interest.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:52 Sep 09, 2008
Jkt 214001
evidenced by its rework of its hand-held
computer system to better track
inventory,’’ the ALJ reasoned that
revocation ‘‘does not seem consistent
with prior agency action concerning this
Respondent.’’ ALJ at 100–101. Based on
this view of the record, the ALJ further
opined ‘‘that this is a case where
teamwork between the DEA and this
major distributor would facilitate the
public interest.’’ Id. at 101. The ALJ thus
recommended that I continue
Respondent’s registration while
imposing compliance conditions.
Were the evidence limited to
Respondent’s recordkeeping problems,
imposing compliance conditions might
well protect the public interest. But it is
not. I acknowledge that the evidence
points to some measures which
Respondent voluntarily undertook such
as reprogramming its computer
system,55 providing its customers with
materials on the CMEA and its selfcertification requirement, logbooks, and
plexiglass cabinets. Its customers could
not, however, legally sell its products
without self-certifying and maintaining
logbooks. Moreover, these measures do
not address the serious problems with
its distribution practices that are
established by the record, and which
were either ignored, or discounted by
the ALJ.
First, for more than three and a half
years, Respondent disregarded a DEA
letter specifically warning it that its use
of the 150–180 self-storage units to store
and distribute SLCs violated Federal
law. Moreover, Respondent continued
to violate Federal law up until its
registration was suspended. As
explained above, these are not technical
violations, but rather transgressions of
one of the CSA’s fundamental
provisions. Respondent’s disregard of
the letter and continuation of its
practices for some forty-four months
makes its conduct especially egregious.
Given the sustained nature of the
violations and Respondent’s failure to
voluntarily cease its misconduct, its
assertion that it is now willing to
‘‘modify[] its existing system of
distribution,’’ Resp. Exc. 90, is not
persuasive. Cf. ALRA Laboratories, Inc.,
v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995)
(‘‘[a]n agency rationally may conclude
that past performance is the best
predictor of future performance’’);
Southwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 72 FR
36487, 36503 (2007) (rejecting
company’s claims of reform in light of
the scope and duration of its
55 It is, however, unclear whether the
reprogramming has rectified the problems
identified with the salespersons’ entry of product
codes.
PO 00000
Frm 00064
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
52703
misconduct and failure to heed
information that its activities were
contributing to diversion).
Second, while Respondent asserted
that it imposed sales limits on how
much of each product a store could buy
in a service cycle, and that it monitored
the purchases of each product at each
store throughout the week to determine
whether a store was purchasing
excessive quantities, investigated if it
was, and cutoff sales to those store
which were purchasing excessive
amounts, it is clear that these policies
were frequently ignored. Putting aside
the effectiveness of the one case per
product, per service cycle policy,56 the
credited testimony establishes that its
sales force violated the policy some 85
times in the six months preceding the
July 2007 inspection. Moreover,
Respondent only started issuing
warning letters to its sales force in
August 2007—a month after the warrant
was executed—with one of its
executives offering the lame excuse that
he had not received the reports until
then because of a computer ‘‘glitch.’’
Notably, Respondent’s CEO testified
that if a customer obtained more than a
case of a product in a service cycle, he
‘‘would cut them off, [and] stop the sale
of product to them.’’ Tr.159.
Respondent, however, produced no
evidence that it had ever entirely cut off
a customer.
Indeed, Respondent’s own evidence
with respect to store BPM55—a store at
which five persons purchased quantities
that are grossly inconsistent with use of
the products to treat asthma and are
consistent with diversion—amply
demonstrates the disingenuousness of
its claim that it monitors its customers’
purchases and cuts off sales if a store is
acquiring excessive amounts.
Notwithstanding that it had previously
developed concerns regarding this
store’s excessive purchases, in the three
months prior to the suspension order,
Respondent sold to it products with a
monthly average retail value of more
than $7300, an amount more than
eleven times its average customer’s
purchase.57 Respondent’s sales to this
store amply demonstrate that its policy
of monitoring ‘‘unusual sales activity’’
and cutting off sales if such purchases
56 As explained above, the policy’s limit was
imposed on a per-product and per-service cycle
basis. Most stores were serviced every two weeks
and some were serviced weekly. Moreover,
Respondent sold ten different products.
Accordingly, a store being serviced weekly could
buy up to forty cases every four weeks.
57 As found above, the record also shows
numerous other stores to which Respondent
repeatedly sold quantities that exceeded its average
customer’s purchases by a wide margin.
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 176 / Wednesday, September 10, 2008 / Notices
continue, RX 10, at 1, is a sham and not
a legitimate effort to control diversion.
Respondent’s failure to enforce its
own policies provides reason alone to
conclude that it cannot be trusted to
adhere to compliance conditions. This
conclusion is further supported by
Respondent’s sustained and flagrant
violations of Federal law, as well as its
attempt to circumvent the suspension
order. Indeed, as Respondent’s history
amply demonstrates, its professed
commitment to ‘‘teamwork’’ and ‘‘to
become a compliance model for the
entire industry,’’ Resp. Ex. at 139,
cannot be taken seriously.58 I therefore
conclude that imposing compliance
conditions would not adequately protect
the public interest, and reject the ALJ’s
recommendation.59
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(h) & 824(a), as well as
28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I order that
DEA Certificate of Registration,
003563NSY, issued to Novelty
Distributors, D/B/A/ Greenfield Labs,
be, and it hereby is, revoked. I further
order that any pending application of
Novelty Distributors, D/B/A Greenfield
Labs, for renewal of its registration, be,
and it hereby is, denied. This order is
effective immediately.
Dated: September 3, 2008.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8–21035 Filed 9–9–08; 8:45 am]
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BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
58 For the same reasons, I find unpersuasive the
August 13, 2008 letter from Respondent’s President.
59 Respondent raises a plethora of claims that the
Agency or its personnel have violated its rights
under the First and Fifth Amendments, as well as
statutory provisions including the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Data Quality Act, and 21 U.S.C.
880. See Resp. Br. at 114–39. For example,
Respondent asserts that the DIs violated its First
Amendment rights and engaged in a prior restraint
because they refused to allow its executives to
videotape them as they reviewed Respondent’s
records. See id. at 116. It also alleges that a DI
committed an assault and battery during the
inspection when he grabbed a video recorder from
the hands of one of its executives who was
attempting to set up the camera in order to tape the
investigators while they reviewed Respondent’s
records.
While in my order denying Respondent’s
interlocutory appeal, I adhered to settled Agency
precedent that the exclusionary rule does not apply
in these proceedings, ALJ Ex. 13, at 3; Respondent
now contends that I should discount the testimony
of two DIs who participated in the inspection to
deter future violations. Indeed, Respondent even
contends that I should discount the testimony of
these DIs based on the alleged assault and battery
of the third DI, who did not testify at the hearing.
Having considered the legal and factual bases for
each of Respondent’s claims, I conclude that none
of them presents a substantial question as to the
fundamental fairness of this proceeding and none
warrants further discussion.
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16:52 Sep 09, 2008
Jkt 214001
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Office of the Secretary; Submission for
OMB Review: Comment Request
September 5, 2008.
The Department of Labor (DOL)
hereby announces the submission of the
following public information collection
requests (ICR) to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and approval in accordance with
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104–13, 44 U.S.C. chapter 35).
A copy of each ICR, with applicable
supporting documentation; including
among other things a description of the
likely respondents, proposed frequency
of response, and estimated total burden
may be obtained from the RegInfo.gov
Web site at https://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/PRAMain or by contacting
Darrin King on 202–693–4129 (this is
not a toll-free number)/e-mail:
DOL_PRA_PUBLIC@dol.gov.
Interested parties are encouraged to
send comments to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Attn: OMB Desk Officer for the
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), Office of
Management and Budget, Room 10235,
Washington, DC 20503, Telephone:
202–395–7316/Fax: 202–395–6974
(these are not toll-free numbers), E-mail:
OIRA_submission@omb.eop.gov within
30 days from the date of this publication
in the Federal Register. In order to
ensure the appropriate consideration,
comments should reference the OMB
Control Number (see below).
The OMB is particularly interested in
comments which:
• Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
• Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
• Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
• Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submission of
responses.
Agency: Occupational Safety and
Health Administration.
PO 00000
Frm 00065
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Type of Review: Extension without
change of a previously approved
collection.
Title of Collection: Slings (29 CFR
1910.184).
OMB Control Number: 1218–0223.
Affected Public: Private Sector.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
1,000,000.
Estimated Total Annual Burden
Hours: 17,760.
Estimated Total Annual Costs Burden:
$0.
Description: The provisions of the
standard require that the employer make
a periodic inspection of alloy steel chain
slings at least once a year and to make
and maintain a record of the inspection.
It also requires the employer to ensure
that each new, repaired or
reconditioned alloy steel chain sling is
proof tested and a certification record
maintained. In addition, the standard
requires the employer to maintain a
record of the proof test on wire rope
slings. For additional information, see
related 60-day preclearance notice
published at 73 FR 35412 on June 23,
2008. PRA documentation prepared in
association with the preclearance notice
is available on https://
www.regulations.gov under docket
number OSHA 2008–0020.
Agency: Occupational Safety and
Health Administration.
Type of Review: Extension without
change of a previously approved
collection.
Title of Collection: Forging Machines
(29 CFR 1910.218).
OMB Control Number: 1218–0228.
Affected Public: Private Sector.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
27,700.
Estimated Total Annual Burden
Hours: 187,264.
Estimated Total Annual Costs Burden:
$0.
Description: The Standard requires
employers to establish periodic
inspections of forging machines, guards,
and point-of-operation protection
devices and to mark manually
controlled valves and switches. These
requirements reduce employees’ risk of
death or serious injury by ensuring that
forging machines used by them are in
safe operating condition, and that they
are able to identify manually operated
valves and switches. For additional
information, see related 60-day
preclearance notice published at 73 FR
35414 on June 23, 2008. PRA
documentation prepared in association
with the preclearance notice is available
E:\FR\FM\10SEN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 176 (Wednesday, September 10, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52689-52704]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-21035]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 08-33]
Novelty Distributors, Inc.; Revocation of Registration
On January 17, 2008, I, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate
Suspension of Registration to Novelty Distributors, Inc. (Respondent),
of Greenfield, Indiana. The Order immediately suspended and proposed
the revocation of Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration,
003563NSY, as a distributor of the list I chemicals ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine, on the grounds that its ``continued registration is
inconsistent with the public interest,'' and ``constitute[d] an
imminent danger to public health and safety.'' Show Cause Order at 1
(ALJ EX. 1) (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(h), 824(a)(4), and 824(d)).
More specifically, the Show Cause Order alleged that Respondent was
storing listed chemical products at, and distributing them from, over
100 unregistered locations throughout the United States, in violation
of Federal law and regulations. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 822(e), 21 CFR
1309.21 and 1309.23(a)).
Next, the Show Cause Order alleged that Respondent was distributing
quantities of listed chemical products ``to small retail outlets such
as convenience stores'' in amounts ``far exceed[ing] what those retail
outlets could be expected to sell for legitimate, therapeutic
purposes.'' Id. at 2. The Order thus alleged that the ``listed chemical
products distributed by [Respondent] in large quantities have been, and
are likely to continue being, diverted to the clandestine manufacture
of methamphetamine.'' Id. (citing cases). Relatedly, the Show Cause
Order alleged that some ``[s]mall retail outlets that receive large
quantities of * * * listed chemical products from [Respondent] sell
such products to individuals in amounts that cannot be attributed to
legitimate individual needs,'' that ``some of the retail outlets allow
customers to make multiple purchases of scheduled listed chemical
products within a single week, and in some cases, within a single
day,'' and that ``[s]ome customers of these retail outlets purchased
more than 9 grams of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine base within 30 days
in violation of 21 U.S.C. 844(a).'' Id.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Show Cause Order also alleged that ``[i]n November 2002,
22 bottles of ephedrine products distributed by Novelty were found
at an illicit methamphetamine laboratory in Connecticut.'' Show
Cause Order at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Show Cause Order further alleged that between January 1, 2007,
and July 9, 2007, Respondent distributed listed chemical products ``on
at least 284 occasions to 35 retail outlets,'' which had not self-
certified as required under Federal law. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C.
830(e)(1)(A)(vii)). Id. Moreover, on three occasions subsequent to
February 1, 2007, Respondent allegedly distributed 24-count bottles of
listed chemical products to retailers in violation of Federal law,
which effective April 9, 2006, required that non-liquid form products
be sold only in blister packs. Id. at 2-3 (citing 21 U.S.C. 830(d)(2)).
Relatedly, the Show Cause Order alleged that Respondent had distributed
tablet-form products to retailers in Kentucky and North Carolina in
violation of the laws of these States which ``prohibit the sale of non-
liquid ephedrine and pseudoephedrine except in a gel-cap product.'' Id.
at 3.
Finally, the Show Cause Order alleged that in July 2007, DEA had
audited twenty listed chemical products which Respondent distributed.
Id. at 2. The Show Cause Order alleged that Respondent ``could not
account for more than 60,000 dosage units of two ephedrine products''
and that it also had ``overages for 16 different * * * listed chemical
products.'' Id. The Order thus alleged that Respondent ``failed to
maintain accurate records of its distributions and receipts of * * *
listed chemical products in violation of 21 U.S.C. 830(a) and 21 CFR
1310.04.'' Id.
[[Page 52690]]
Based on the above allegations, I made the preliminary finding that
the listed chemical products Respondent was distributing had been, and
were ``likely to continue to be, diverted into the illicit manufacture
of methamphetamine.'' Id. at 3. I also found that Respondent's
``failure to maintain effective controls against diversion, including
its distribution of large amounts of * * * listed chemical products
that far exceed legitimate demand, contribute to the illicit
manufacture of methamphetamine.'' Id. I thus came to the ``preliminary
conclusion that [Respondent's] continued registration during the
pendency of these proceedings would constitute an imminent danger to
the public health and safety,'' and immediately suspended its
registration. Id.
On February 26, 2008, Respondent requested a hearing on the
allegations. ALJ Ex. 2. The matter was assigned to Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) Gail Randall, who proceeded to conduct pre-hearing
procedures. A hearing was held on March 24 through March 28, and March
31 through April 2, 2008, at which both parties put on extensive
testimony and introduced numerous documents into evidence.
Moreover, on March 24, 2008, Respondent filed an interlocutory
appeal in which it challenged the ALJ's denial of its motion to remove
one of the Government's lawyers from participating in the hearing, on
the ground that he was a necessary and indispensable witness to the
events surrounding the execution of an administrative search warrant
which was the subject of its motion to suppress. See ALJ Exs. 12 and
13. On March 25, 2008, I denied Respondent's appeal on multiple
grounds.\2\ ALJ Ex. 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The grounds included that Respondent had not established
that the Government's lawyer was a necessary and indispensable
witness, and that Respondent had not cited a single case to support
its contention that the conduct of the Government lawyer--even if
true--was a violation of its constitutional rights. Denial of
Interlocutory Appeal, at 2-3 (ALJ Ex. 13.) I also noted that the
Agency had previously held that the exclusionary rule does not apply
to proceedings under 21 U.S.C. 824, and that the Supreme Court had
``repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings
other than criminal trials.'' Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of
Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S.C. 357, 363 (1998)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the hearing, both parties submitted briefs containing
their proposed findings, conclusions of law, and argument. On May 21,
2008, the ALJ issued her recommended decision (hereinafter, ALJ).\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The decision was 165 pages in length.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In her decision, the ALJ found that the Government's evidence
regarding the monthly expected sales of combination ephedrine products
at convenience stores ($14.39) to meet legitimate demand was ``flawed
and not credible.'' ALJ at 97. Relatedly, while acknowledging that
``Respondent sells an approximate monthly average of $640.00 in SLC
products to its convenience store customers,'' the ALJ observed that
``there is no legitimate sales figure in the record'' by which the
excessiveness of its sales (and the likelihood that the products were
being diverted) could be judged. Id.
Regarding the allegation that Respondent failed to maintain
accurate records of its receipts and distributions, the ALJ concluded
that the evidence pertaining to the audit did not establish
``preponderating evidence either way to assist in analyzing the
accuracy of * * * Respondent's handling'' of listed chemical products.
Id. at 88. The ALJ concluded, however, that ``Respondent's
recordkeeping is not adequate to conduct an effective audit of its SLC
products.'' Id.
The ALJ also rejected the allegation that Respondent had made
numerous distributions to uncertified retailers based on testimony and
documentary evidence that one of Respondent's officials had confirmed
that these ``customers were, in fact, self-certified.'' Id. at 91. The
ALJ further found unproven the allegation that Respondent had thrice
distributed listed chemical products in bottles in violation of Federal
law, noting that Respondent had provided ``documentary proof that the *
* * product * * * had not been illegally distributed.'' Id. at 86. The
ALJ also found unproven the Government's allegation that Respondent had
distributed tablet-form products to retailers in Kentucky and North
Carolina, noting that ``Respondent produced credible testimonial
evidence to support a finding that these illegal sales in fact did not
happen.'' Id.
With respect to the allegation that Respondent was violating
Federal law because it was distributing from over 100 drop-off points
which were not registered, the ALJ noted that Respondent had challenged
the Agency's interpretation in Federal District Court. Id. at 90-91.
The ALJ found, however, that Respondent had been advised by a DEA Group
Supervisor (GS) that its practice of shipping SLCs to numerous storage
units which were not registered was illegal, that it had continued do
so without even seeking clarification from the Agency, and that this
conduct was ``not consistent with the requirements for a participant in
a regulated industry.'' Id. at 91. However, because Respondent's
declaratory judgment action was still ``pending in federal court,'' the
ALJ ``conclude[d] that [the district court was] the proper venue for
this issue'' and declined to address the statutory question.\4\ Id. at
91 n.38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ On August 7, 2008, the District Court granted the
Government's motion for summary judgment and denied Respondent's
cross-motion for summary judgment. See Entry on Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment, Novelty, Inc., v. Tandy, No. 1:04-cv-1502-DFH-TAB
(S.D. Ind., Aug. 7, 2008). Notably, the District Court held that the
instructions in the Group Supervisor's letter were interpretive and
not legislative rules, and were thus not subject to notice and
comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. 553. Id. at 2. Pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 556(e), I take official notice of the District Court's
decision. I also take official notice of the August 13, 2008 letter
submitted by Respondent's President. In his letter, Respondent's
President stated that he has ordered a change to Respondent's
distribution practices and ``reiterates its previously stated
commitment to cooperate with [this Agency] and adhere to all
conditions specified by [me] for [its] continued registration.''
Letter of Todd Green (Aug. 13, 2008).
In his letter, Respondent's CEO does not state that Respondent's
will waive its right to appeal the District Court's decision.
Moreover, I conclude that in light of the extensive resources that
have been devoted to litigating the issue of the lawfulness of
Respondent's use of unregistered locations to store and distribute
SLCs, as well as the importance of the issue to the regulated
industry, the issue should be decided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the ALJ also found that following the suspension order,
Respondent had attempted to enter into an agreement with one of its
suppliers (BDI), under which its salespersons would still take orders
for SLCs which would be shipped by BDI. ALJ at 92. Here again, the ALJ
noted that there was no evidence that Respondent had asked the Agency
if the arrangement was lawful. Id.
The ALJ nonetheless concluded that Respondent had ``demonstrated a
willingness to comply with the laws and regulations governing the
distribution of SLC products,'' specifically noting that it had
developed a training program for its customers, had provided them with
the logbooks required by the CMEA, and lockable display cases for its
products, and had upgraded its computer system. Id. at 98-99. The ALJ
also noted that following the implementation of the CMEA, Respondent
had ``acted to remove * * * non-complying SLC products from its
customers' shelves and [to] properly dispose of'' them. Id. at 99.
With respect to the audits, the ALJ observed that while they
``appeare[d] to reveal significant overages and shortages,'' Respondent
had ``credibly and adequately minimized those figures to a more
acceptable margin of inventory error after analyzing its records and
making its own audit
[[Page 52691]]
findings.'' Id. Finally, while the ALJ noted that Respondent's
continued distributions to the drop-off points ``cause[s] concern,''
she further reasoned that except for the Group Supervisor's letter, it
``had no notice from the [Agency] of any violations until the * * *
Suspension Order was served'' on it, and that it ``ha[d] not been given
an opportunity to remedy the flaws identified by the Agency [in] this
action.'' Id. at 100. Based on what she characterized as its ``history
of,'' and ``financial commitment to,'' compliance, the ALJ reasoned
that revocation would not be an appropriate sanction. Id. at 100-01.
Instead, the ALJ recommended that I impose compliance requirements on
Respondent to ensure that it operated in the public interest. Id. at
101.
Thereafter, the Government filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision.
Respondent likewise filed a 140 page brief which supported the ALJ's
decision while also excepting to certain findings and conclusions.
Having considered the entire record in this matter and all of the
issues raised in the parties' exceptions, I hereby issue this Decision
and Final Order. More specifically, I reject the allegations that
Respondent distributed SLC products in violation of the CMEA and the
laws of Kentucky and North Carolina as unsupported by substantial
evidence. With respect to the allegations that Respondent engaged in
284 distributions to uncertified retailers, I conclude that the
evidence establishes only a single instance of distributing to an
uncertified retailer and several instances of inaccurate recordkeeping
in that Respondent's records of the addresses for several stores did
not match the actual addresses of the stores, and that the Government
has not proved by substantial evidence that the stores were uncertified
on the date of the distributions.
With respect to the audit, I conclude that because the ALJ found
credible the testimony of one of Respondent's executives that the
Agency's investigators had excluded certain transactions and inventory
adjustments which it had provided to them, and the Government offered
no rebuttal evidence, the allegation that Respondent had shortages and
overages of various products is not proved. I find, however, that the
evidence shows that Respondent's recordkeeping did not comply with
federal law because it failed to maintain proper records of regulated
transactions as required by Federal law and DEA regulations. See 21
U.S.C. 830(a); 21 CFR 1310.03, id. 1310.04, id. 1310.06. Because of
this, as well as evidence showing that Respondent's list of shipments
included three shipments of a product with a date of July 16, 2007,
even though it was then only July 9, 2007, I find that Respondent does
not have adequate systems for monitoring the receipt and distribution
of SLCs. 21 CFR 1309.71(b).
With respect to the allegation that Respondent's sales of SLC were
excessive and consistent with diversion, I agree with the ALJ that the
Government's figure as to the expected monthly sales range is not
supported by substantial evidence. I nonetheless conclude that
Respondent does not maintain effective controls against diversion
because its own evidence shows that it distributed SLCs to numerous
stores in quantities that dwarfed what its average customer purchases,
and that it did so even when it had previously developed concerns that
a store was purchasing excessive quantities, and that it does not even
enforce its own sales limit policies.
Next, in contrast to the ALJ, I conclude that this proceeding is
the appropriate forum to address the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 822(e) and
the allegation that Respondent has repeatedly violated Federal law by
distributing from unregistered locations. Consistent with the statutory
text and purpose, I conclude that Respondent's practice of using
unregistered self-storage units to store and distribute SLC products
violated the Controlled Substances Act and DEA's regulation.
Finally, for reasons set forth below, I reject the ALJ's
recommended sanction that Respondent's registration be continued with
conditions. As explained below, because Respondent repeatedly violated
Federal law notwithstanding that it was advised that its use of the
unregistered self-storage facilities was unlawful, does not even
enforce its own policies with respect to limiting sales, and attempted
to circumvent the suspension order, I conclude that revocation is
necessary to protect the public interest. I make the following findings
of fact.
Findings
Respondent is a corporation which is solely owned by its President,
Mr. Todd Green. Respondent is a wholesale distributor of various sundry
items to between 10,000 and 12,000 convenience stores throughout the
United States.
Since 1998, Respondent has held DEA Certificate of Registration,
003563NSY, which authorizes it to distribute pseudoephedrine
and ephedrine from its registered location of 351 W. Muskegon Drive,
Greenfield, Indiana. GX 1. Respondent's registration expires on October
31, 2008. Id.
Both ephedrine and pseudoephedrine have FDA approved therapeutic
uses. GX 19, at 3. Ephedrine is lawfully marketed under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act for OTC use as a bronchodilator to treat asthma,\5\
and pseudoephedrine is lawfully marketed for OTC use as a decongestant.
Id. at 3-4. Both substances are, however, regulated as schedule listed
chemicals under the Controlled Substances Act because they are
precursor chemicals which are frequently diverted into the illicit
manufacture of methamphetamine, a schedule II controlled substance, a
potent and highly addictive central nervous system stimulant. See 21
U.S.C. 802(34); id. 812(c); 21 CFR 1308.12(d). Moreover, in the course
of investigating methamphetamine trafficking, DEA has frequently found
that the listed chemicals which are used by smaller illicit labs have
been sold by convenience stores, gas stations, and other small
retailers. GX 51, at 56, 59, 62, 66; GX 54, at 29-30.\6\ See also TNT
[[Page 52692]]
Distributors, 70 FR 12729, 12730 (2005) (noting testimony of Special
Agent that ``80 to 90 percent of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine being
used [in Tennessee] to manufacture methamphetamine was being obtained
from convenience stores'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The FDA has, however, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
which would remove combination ephedrine-guaifenesin products from
the OTC monograph on the grounds that they are not ``safe and
effective for continued OTC availability.'' 70 FR 40232 (2005).
The parties also extensively litigated the medical
appropriateness of using combination ephedrine products to treat
asthma. See ALJ 43-48. I find it unnecessary to make any findings on
this issue as until the FDA issues a final rule, combination
ephedrine-guaifenesin products can be lawfully marketed for this
purpose.
\6\ Based on the testimony of a witness whose experience was
limited to the Shenandoah, Virginia valley, the ALJ found that the
street price of a gram of methamphetamine is ``between $20.00 and
$50.00 per gram.'' ALJ at 48-49. Based on this, as well as evidence
regarding the yield and conversion rate, the ALJ found that ``it
would cost a methamphetamine cook between $50.00 and $144.00 to
produce 1 gram of methamphetamine.'' ALJ at 50. The ALJ thus
concluded that ``using the Respondent's product to manufacture
methamphetamine makes little monetary sense.'' Id. at 96.
I reject the ALJ's finding regarding the street price of
methamphetamine and her conclusion that using Respondent's product
``makes little monetary sense.'' Id. As for her findings regarding
the street price of methamphetamine, I note that it is based on
anecdotal evidence and limited to a small region of the State of
Virginia. Respondent does not, however, limit its distribution of
SLCs to this region of the country. I further note that it runs
counter to the data which this Agency obtains on a periodic basis,
and which show that in most of the country, methamphetamine prices
are substantially higher than they are in the Shenandoah Valley. See
U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Illicit Drug Prices--December 2007,
32-37 (Mar. 2008). In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 556(e), and 21 CFR
1316.59(e), I take official notice of the methamphetamine street
price data contained in this publication. Moreover, the ALJ's
conclusion assumes that methamphetamine addicts engage in
economically rational behavior. There is, however, no evidence in
the record to support this assumption. I therefore reject the ALJ's
conclusion.
I also find that this witness's testimony that convenience
stores are not the source of precursors in the Shenandoah Valley
(ALJ at 49), to be anecdotal and contrary to the Agency's experience
throughout the country. I thus give it no weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to the suspension of its registration, Respondent sold
combination ephedrine and pseudoephedrine products under the brand
names of Double Action, Mini, and Ephedrine Plus in package sizes of
two, six, twelve and twenty-four count. Tr. 561, 692-93. Respondent
sold these products to approximately 3,500 to 4,000 convenience stores
in approximately thirty different States. Id. at 80-82, 558-60.
Respondent does not carry any other OTC drug products. Id. at 552.
Respondent employs approximately 150 sales persons, who typically
visit each store every other week.\7\ Tr. 2046, 1290. Using its own
tractor-trailers, Respondent ships products including SLCs from its
Greenfield warehouse to each sales person's ``drop-off point,'' which
is a unit in a commercial self-storage facility. Id. at 73-75.
According to the testimony of Respondent's owner and CEO, Respondent
was using approximately 150 to 180 drop-off points at the time the
immediate suspension was served on it. Id. at 76. Both the driver who
delivers the product to the drop-off point and the route sales person
have keys to the storage unit. Id. While the sales persons are notified
of each arriving shipment, SLCs can sit in the storage units for
several days before the sales person retrieves them for delivery to the
stores.\8\ Id. at 534, 668. Moreover, according to one of Respondent's
executives, the SLCs can remain on the salesperson's truck for up to
nine days depending upon the demand for the product. Id. at 1282, 1421.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Approximately 90% of the stores are on this schedule; the
remaining stores are visited either weekly or monthly. Tr. 1290.
\8\ It is undisputed that the SLCs are not shipped back to
Respondent's registered location prior to their being distributed.
At the hearing, an executive of Respondent insisted that ``we
are not storing product in * * * unregistered locations,'' and
added: ``Now your coming back into the definition of what is
storage. We're not storing the product in that location,'' referring
to the drop-off points. Tr. 666-67. See also id. at 668 (``We're not
storing or keeping or whatever words you want to try and use,
product in these warehouses, against the law. We're not doing
it.''). The executive acknowledged, however, that products may stay
in the storage units for ``a few days.'' Id. at 667. I therefore
find that Respondent is storing products in the self-storage units.
Respondent further asserted that its distribution system
provided more security than shipping the products via such common
carriers as UPS or Fed Ex. See Tr. 644-45. Yet an executive of
Respondent acknowledged that it uses temporary drivers on a contract
basis. Id. at 693, 697. Relatedly, Respondent's CEO offered
testimony as to perceived security inadequacies at UPS, asserting
that ``[p]roduct delivered by UPS could easily be stolen anywhere in
the system.'' Id. at 157.
On cross-examination, however, Respondent's CEO admitted that he
had not taken a tour of a UPS facility. Id. at 161. When asked when
he had last ``checked into the training that UPS personnel have with
regard to handling [SLCs]?,'' he answered: ``I assume they don't
have any training, since they're not DEA regulated facilities.'' Id.
at 162. The ALJ did not address the credibility of the CEO's
testimony. As ultimate factfinder, I reject it as lacking
foundation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
None of the drop-off points is registered with the Agency. Tr.
1284. Moreover, the units do not have separate cages for storing SLCs,
id. at 132, and the facilities have varying degrees of external
security with some having cameras and requiring access codes while
others have no additional security. Compare id. at 131, with id. at 538
(former salesperson testifying that anyone could come off the road and
access the door and padlock to his route storage unit).\9\ Moreover,
DEA Investigators could not determine the addresses of thirty-four of
the drop-off points. Tr. 1196-98.\10\
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\9\ There is no dispute that the security at Respondent's
Greenfield warehouse is adequate. It is also undisputed that
following the enactment of the CMEA, Respondent prepared a training
video for its customers and supplied them with logbooks and cases
for storing SLC products. Tr. 1390 & 1422; RXs 34, 47, & 48.
\10\ On its list of shipments, Respondent used code numbers to
indicate where products were being shipped to. Tr. 1196. Moreover,
Respondent initially refused to turn over information identifying
the addresses of the drop-off points for the sales routes, claiming
that it was outside the scope of the warrant. Id. at 1197.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a letter dated May 5, 2004, the Diversion Group Supervisor of
the Indianapolis, Indiana DEA District Office, advised Respondent that
``any storage at, and distribution from, a location other than the
registered location (including the use of delivery vehicles for
overnight storage) is a violation of federal law.'' \11\ GX 100. Upon
review of the letter, Respondent sought a declaratory judgment in
Federal District Court challenging the interpretation set forth in the
letter. Tr. 652-53. At no time, however, did Respondent change its
practice of distributing to the drop-off points. Id. at 664-65. Nor did
Respondent seek a review of the letter by officials at the Agency's
headquarters. ALJ at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The letter also reviewed three scenarios ``in case
[Respondent was] storing List I chemical products * * * and
distributing them from satellite locations, such as commercial
storage units, personal residences and or delivery vehicles.'' GX
100, at 1. The first two scenarios involved sales representatives
who picked up listed chemicals from a registered location either to
fill a pre-placed order or a ``general order,'' and could not return
the products ``to the registered location at the end of the day.''
Id.
The third scenario was ``a company [that] ships orders
containing List I chemicals to sales representatives at remote
locations.'' Id. at 2. The letter further explained that ``DEA
considers this to be freight forwarding and at this time * * * has
no provisions that would permit freight forwarding for List I
chemical products.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The record further establishes that at the time the listed chemical
products are shipped from its Greenfield, Indiana warehouse (which is
its only registered location) to the drop-off points, the products have
not been sold to a particular store. Tr. 2079. Indeed, the amount of
SLCs to be sold to a customer is not known until the route sales person
visits the store and determines how much product the store needs. Id.
at 1282. The sales person counts the product on hand, discusses the
order with the store manager, and restocks the store. Id. at 631; 1422.
Moreover, at the time an SLC order is placed, only the
salesperson--and no one at Respondent's headquarters--knows how much
the store has purchased. Id. at 633. The salesperson is required to
enter the order information into a handheld computer which generates an
invoice; this information is later transmitted back to Respondent's
headquarters. Id. at 634. The salesperson is also required to return a
paper copy of the invoice, as well as a shipping document which
accompanies the delivery of the SLCs from the warehouse, to
headquarters. Id. at 688. Under its system, while Respondent's
headquarters can determine which salesperson has received product with
a particular lot number, it cannot identify the specific store that
obtained a particular lot number of a product. Id. at 1517.
Respondent's CEO testified that a store could purchase up to a case
of an SLC product in each ``service cycle.'' \12\ Id. at 101.
Accordingly, most stores could purchase two cases per month of each
product. Moreover, Respondent sold more than ten different SLC
products. Id. at 623.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ With respect to the 24-tablet products, the record
establishes that there were 144 packages in a case. Tr. 621. The
record does not, however, establish how many packages there were in
a case of the smaller size packages. Id. at 624.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to one of its executives, the company monitors the sales
of each SLC product at each store throughout the week to determine
whether a store ``is increasing [its] inventory more than [Respondent]
expects [it] to,'' and if it is, the company contacts the salesperson
to
[[Page 52693]]
inquire further. Id. at 2061-62. This executive also asserted that in
this event, it would send in one of the salesperson's supervisors to
visit with the sales person and determine the true inventory at a
store. Id. Moreover, another executive claimed that he ``receive[s] a
computer-generated report indicating any time that more than one case
has been sold to a single retail location of a single'' product and
issues a warning letter to its salespersons. Id. at 1431. Respondent's
CEO and Owner further testified that if a customer obtained more than a
case of a product, he ``would cut them off, [and] stop the sale of
product to them.'' \13\ Tr. 159. See also RX 10, at 1 (asserting that
stores purchasing ``unusual quantities'' would be ``monitored over the
following 4 week period,'' and that ``[i]f further unusual activity is
noted,'' Respondent ``will discontinue sales of all or part of the List
I products sold to the store'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ While the ALJ credited the CEO's testimony, the e-mails
discussed in note 14 below, show otherwise. See, e.g., RX 56, at 3.
Moreover, Respondent did not identify a single store which it had
refused to sell SLCs to.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to one of Respondent's executives, between January 17,
2007 and January 17, 2008, that there had been ``approximately 35 to
45'' violations of the one case limit, and most of the violations had
occurred before July 2007, when the Agency executed the administrative
warrant. Id. at 1433. The ALJ, however, credited the testimony of a DEA
DI who reviewed Respondent's sales records for the period between
January and July 2007, and found that its salespersons exceeded the one
case limit 85 times. Tr. 1496-1506; GX 68.
The same executive stated that Respondent had only started issuing
written warnings to its salespersons after August 2007 because of a
computer ``glitch'' which had resulted in the reports not being issued
as scheduled. Id. at 1435. Moreover, while Respondent introduced into
evidence a few e-mails indicating that the company had cut off
supplying 100-count bottles to several stores, Respondent did not
identify a single store to which it had refused to sell ephedrine.\14\
Indeed, according to its own evidence, one of the stores (BPM55), which
it had previously stopped selling 100-count products to because of its
excessive purchases, was allowed to purchase products with a retail
value of more than $7300 a month, in the three months prior to the
issuance of the suspension order. Compare RX 56, at 1, with RX 27a, at
1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ The record contains several e-mails indicating that
Respondent directed its employees to not sell 100 count ephedrine to
several stores. See RX 56. While the e-mails expressed concerns
about the excessiveness of these stores' sales of ephedrine
products, notably, Respondent did not cut off all sales of the
products to any of the stores. See id. Moreover, while it restricted
its sales ``to a maximum of [one case] every 2 weeks'' and
prohibited the sale of 100 count ephedrine to store number BPM55,
this store was its leading SLC customer in the three months prior to
the issuance of the suspension order, during which it purchased
products with an average of retail value of $7317.77 per month.
Compare RX 56, at 1, with RX 27A, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to one of its executives, Respondent's SLC customers
purchased SLCs with an average retail sales value of $640 per month,
with the majority of the products containing ephedrine. Id. at 563-64.
Moreover, according to one of Respondent's exhibits, in the three
months prior to the issuance of the suspension order, it distributed
listed chemicals products with an average monthly retail sales value
greater than $2000 to approximately 120 of its customers. RX 27A.
Respondent also distributed listed chemical products with an average
monthly retail sales value in excess of $3000 to thirty-four customers,
and product with average monthly retail sale value greater than $4000
to nine customers. Id. Finally, Respondent distributed to its two
largest customers, products with an average monthly retail sales value
of $5056 and $7314 respectively. Id.
At the hearing, the Government put forward expert testimony to the
effect that the expected sales range of ephedrine products at
convenience stores to meet legitimate demand was $14.39 per month. GX
25, at 8. In his declaration, the Government's expert stated that U.S.
Economic Census data show that only about 31.5% of all convenience
stores (45,077 stores) carry non-prescription drug products. GX 99, at
7. According to his declaration, the Government's expert then applied
``these statistics'' to the National Association of Convenience Stores
2007 Survey revenue data which show that convenience stores sold a
total of $292,000,000 of cough and cold remedies during 2006, to
calculate the annual and monthly average sale of cough and cold
products at a convenience store. Id. According to the Government's
expert, stores carrying the HBC line had average annual sales of all
cough and cold products of $4,080.18, and average monthly sales of
$340.01. Id.; see also id. at Table 2.
The Government's expert did not explain, however, why he used the
total number of stores carrying the HBC line \15\ (71,565 stores)
rather than the smaller number of stores that he had determined carried
non-prescription drug products ( 45,077 stores). See id. at Table 2.
Moreover, the Government did not rebut the testimony of Respondent's
expert that because of legislation in twelve States, convenience stores
can no longer sell ephedrine products and that the stores in these
States comprise 23% of the nation's convenience stores. RX 59, at 10.
This suggests that at most, 34,709 convenience stores nationwide carry
ephedrine products. Id.\16\
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\15\ The HBC line includes analgesics, stomach remedies,
vitamins, other OTC drugs, grooming aids, feminine hygiene, family
planning, baby care, skin care, cosmetics, and some other
unspecified products.
\16\ Respondent's expert also pointed out that some convenience
stores that carry non-prescription drug products may not sell any
ephedrine. RX 59, at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next, the Government's expert determined the percentage of cough
and cold remedies comprised of ephedrine products. GX 99, at 8.
According to the Government's expert, ``[t]his factor was derived from
a tabulation of MRI data showing asthma remedy usage by retail channel
(in this case, convenience stores).'' Id. Based on this data, which was
included at Table 1, the Government's expert concluded that ephedrine
products constitute 8.36% of cough and cold remedies sold at
convenience stores. Id. Multiplying this figure times the average
monthly total sales of cough and cold products, the Government's expert
concluded that the average monthly sale of all ephedrine products at
convenience stores selling the products was $28.43.\17\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ As part of its case, the Government entered into evidence a
declaration prepared by its expert in another matter. See GX 25. In
this document, the expert stated that he had also looked at data
which included ``cumulated observed transactions,'' such as scanner
data obtained by Information Resources, Inc. Id. at 7. The
Government's expert also testified that in preparing GX 25, he had
reviewed scanner data to determine ``the proportion of the
nonprescription drug category that included preparations for the
treatment of asthma containing ephedrine.'' Tr. 313 & 500. However,
in his rebuttal declaration, the Government's expert made no mention
of having used scanner data. See GX 99.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent's expert stated, however, that the MRI Survey (which is
a survey of 50,000 consumers) does not provide sufficient information
to support the Government's expert's figure that ephedrine products
constitute 8.36% of cough and cold remedies sold at convenience stores.
RX 59, at 11. Respondent's expert noted that the MRI Survey (which was
included as an attachment to RX 59) ``reports absolutely no information
about any ephedrine products,'' and ``reports absolutely no information
on whether consumers bought either an asthma remedy or a cough and cold
remedy from convenience stores.'' Id. (emphasis deleted).
[[Page 52694]]
Respondent's expert further opined that the MRI Survey asks three
questions which ``are inadequate to form an estimate'' of the
percentage of cough and cold remedies constituting ephedrine. RX 59, at
11. The first question is: ``How many times in'' various time periods
has the person used one of numerous products? See Survey of the
American Consumer 2-106. While the survey includes a list of non-
prescription cold, sinus, and allergy remedies, none of the products
listed contain ephedrine. Survey at 12. Nor does it appear that an
ephedrine product is listed anywhere in the survey.
As for the remaining two questions, the survey asks whether a
person has had asthma in the last twelve months, and whether they have
used a prescription drug, a non-prescription drug, an herbal remedy, or
have not treated the condition at all. Id. at 15. The survey does not
ask any further questions regarding the use of non-prescription drugs
to treat asthma.
Finally, with respect to the use of convenience stores, the survey
asks only whether the consumer has purchased a non-prescription/OTC
drug at a convenience store in the last 30 days. Id. at 43. Again, the
survey does not inquire further as to what type of drug the consumer
may have purchased at a convenience store. The Government's expert did
not explain how the data obtained in the answers to these questions
supported his conclusion that ephedrine products constitute 8.36% of
the cough and cold remedies purchased at convenience stores.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Respondent's expert noted that she was informed by its
executives that ephedrine products constituted 60% of its customers'
SLC sales. RX 59, at 12. Even if this is an accurate figure with
respect to its customers, Respondent does not allow them to purchase
SLCs from other suppliers, Tr. 626-27, and it does not sell any
nationally-branded OTC pseudoephedrine remedies such as Sudafed or
Claritin D. The figure is thus based on a biased sample.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Government's expert further stated that he used ``[a]nother MRI
tabulation showing the route of the drug (powder, tablet, liquid, mist,
skin patch, etc., etc.), [which] enabled the estimate to be further
adjusted to reflect tablets only * * * resulting in the final estimate
of $14.78.'' Id. The Government's expert thus concluded that 52% of
ephedrine users use tablets rather than inhalers, id. at Table 2;
multiplying this figure times the average monthly sales of $28.43, the
expert concluded that the average monthly sale of tablet-form ephedrine
products at convenience stores was $14.78. Id. at 8.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Because the average retail price for a box of the two
leading brands of ephedrine was $7.19, the Government's expert then
further reduced the average monthly sales figure from $14.78 to
$14.39 ``to reflect the purchase of exactly two boxes of 24 count
ephedrine tablets.'' Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The MRI survey asks, however, only about the mode of administration
with respect to cold, sinus and allergy remedies and not asthma
remedies. Survey, at 12. Here again, it is unclear why this data
provides a reliable basis for estimating the percentage of asthma
sufferers who use tablets versus inhalers.
I thus agree with the ALJ that the Government has not proved by
substantial evidence that the monthly expected retail sales value of
ephedrine products at convenience stores to meet legitimate demand is
$14.39.\20\ On the other hand, it is undisputed that no ephedrine
product ranks in the top 200 of over-the-counter and health-and-beauty
care products which are sold in drug stores, supermarkets, and mass
merchandisers. See GX 99, at 4. It is also undisputed that
approximately 97% of the sales of non-prescription drugs occurs at
pharmacies, supermarkets, warehouse clubs, department stores,
electronic shopping/mail order houses, and other general merchandise
stores. GX 25A, at C2. Moreover, convenience stores (both those with
and without gasoline) account for approximately 1.14% of the total
commerce in non-prescription drugs. Id. The Government, however,
produced no evidence as to the annual sales of combination ephedrine
products such as Primatene Tablets and Bronkaid, which are sold at
pharmacies, supermarkets, and other large volume retailers of non-
prescription drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ The Government offered evidence regarding visits or
telephone contacts made by various Diversion Investigators (DIs) to
eighteen pharmacies which were apparently located near some of
Respondent's customers. See ALJ Dec. at 23-33. At least half the
pharmacies did not carry any ephedrine products. See id. As for the
remaining pharmacies, the Government produced evidence as to their
sales levels of ephedrine products with respect to only four of the
pharmacies. This evidence showed that the pharmacies were selling
minimal quantities of tablet-form ephedrine products, with the most
that any store sold being 71 boxes in a four-and-a-half month
period. See, e.g., GXs 26, 27, 28 & 29.
The Government did not establish that it used a statistically
valid sampling technique in choosing the pharmacies the DIs
interviewed. The evidence thus amounts to nothing more than a
collection of anecdotes. To the extent the evidence is offered to
show that there is little demand at pharmacies for these products,
it is of limited probative value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evidence of Diversion
In September 2002, DMD Pharmaceuticals, a supplier to Respondent,
shipped it an entire lot of sixty-count bottles of a combination
ephedrine (25 mg.) product.\21\ Tr. 1079. Two months later, twenty-two
bottles of this lot were found at an illicit methamphetamine laboratory
in Thompson, Connecticut. Id. at 1077. DEA subsequently issued a
warning letter to DMD. Id. at 1077-78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ According to the testimony of a DI, DEA issued DMD a
warning letter. Tr. 1078. Upon receipt of the letter, DMD's
compliance manager told the DI that he would look into to whom the
product was shipped. Id. Subsequently, the DI received a phone call
from DMD's compliance manager and owner informing her that ``that
entire lot had been sold to'' Respondent in September 2002. Id. at
1079. The ALJ credited this testimony, see ALJ at 13, as do I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several months later, while completing a previously-commenced
inspection of Respondent, a DI discussed the matter with two of its
executives. Id. at 1082-83. While the executives provided the DI with
the names of two salespersons whose territory included or was near the
part of Connecticut where the lab was found, they could not identify
which specific stores had obtained the ephedrine. Id. at 1084.
As part of the investigation that gave rise to this proceeding, DIs
based in four States visited a number of Respondent's customers. At a
Roadrunner Market in Bristol, Tennessee, a DI testified that during the
``time period of July 23rd through August 23rd'' of 2007, three
customers had purchased quantities that far exceeded nine grams.\22\
Tr. 730-733. While 439 gel caps in 25 mg. strength is the dosage form
equivalent to the nine gram limit, M.W. had bought 56 boxes totaling
1,344 gel caps or approximately 27 grams. GX 46. During the same
period, C.M. purchased 23 boxes totaling 552 gel caps (approximately
11.3 grams), and E.B. purchased 52 boxes totaling 1,248 gel caps or
approximately 25.6 grams. Id. The DI also found other evidence of
repetitive purchasing patterns at the stores, but the logbooks were
missing information such as the number of dosage units and/or strength
of the product. See GX 80.
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\22\ It is noted that the time period which was reviewed
exceeded thirty days. Even assuming that these persons did not
violate Federal law in purchasing these products, given the dosing
instruction for these products (one tablet every four hours and no
more than six tablets every twenty-four hours), their purchases are
not consistent with the use of the products to treat asthma. See,
e.g., RX 9, at 1. Moreover, the ``Drug Facts'' warning label for
Respondent's Double Action Ephedrine (25/200 mg.) product further
advises to ``Stop use and ask a doctor if * * * cough persists for
more than 1 week.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A different DI visited the Smoker Friendly No. 4 Store in Little
Falls, New York, and obtained the logbooks. Tr. 785-86, 791-92. The
logbooks showed that between July 27, 2007, and August
[[Page 52695]]
27, 2007, four persons had purchased more than nine grams. K.S. bought
984 tablets of ephedrine 25 mg. (more than 20 grams), and A.P. bought
768 tablets of ephedrine 25 mg. (approximately 15.7 grams). GX 45.
Moreover, Richard and Robert R., who had the same last name and used
the same address, respectively purchased 600 and 696 tablets of
ephedrine 25 mg. Id. These purchases amounted to 12.3 and 14.25 grams.
Id.
Another DI visited the Mason of New York convenience store of
Jamestown, New York, and obtained the logbook. Tr. 1484. The logbook
entries were frequently missing information as to the strength of the
ephedrine tablets that had been purchased. Nonetheless, the logbook
showed that there were five individuals who, even if they had purchased
only 12.5 mg. ephedrine, had nonetheless purchased more than nine grams
during the period between July 21 and August 21, 2007. More
specifically, M.M. purchased 1,368 tablets (14 grams),\23\ A.J.
purchased 1,014 tablets (10.4 grams), J.B. purchased 1,548 tablets
(15.9 grams), J.H. purchased 1,068 tablets (10.9 grams), and R.B.
purchased 1,002 tablets (10.3 grams).\24\ GX 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ A person named Chris M. (with the same last name and
address as M.M.) purchased an additional 360 tablets. GX 49.
\24\ All of these calculations assume that these persons bought
12.5 mg. tablets; if they bought 25 mg., then the amount of
ephedrine was double. Moreover, the DI found that four other persons
had purchased quantities which would exceed nine grams if the
strength of the tablets was 25 mg.
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A Pennsylvania-based DI likewise found evidence of purchases that,
while technically not in violation of the CMEA, raised a strong
suspicion that the ephedrine was being diverted. For example, at the
CoGo of Somerset, Pennsylvania, a DI found that S.M. had bought 384
dosage units between August 16 and 23, 2007. GX 75. At 12.5 mg.
strength, this amounted to 3.9 grams. This individual had also bought
three twenty-four count boxes on three consecutive days.\25\ Id.
Moreover, another DI visited a CoGos in Midland, Pennsylvania, and
found evidence that a person had bought 620 dosage units of 12.5 mg.
between May 1 and May 31, 2007, and an additional 636 dosage units
between June 1 and June 15, 2007. Tr. 1486; GX 41.
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\25\ At two stores, the DI did not find any evidence of
purchases in excess of the limit and was told by the managers that
the products were primarily purchased by hospital workers and truck
drivers who used them to stay awake on their jobs. Tr. 872-73; 886-
87.
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The Allegation That Respondent Distributed Listed Chemicals to
Uncertified Retailers
Effective September 30, 2006, the CMEA prohibited a retailer from
selling schedule listed chemical products unless the retailer had self-
certified to the Attorney General that all ``individuals who are
responsible for delivering such products into the custody of purchasers
or who deal directly with purchasers by obtaining payment for the
products * * * have * * * undergone training provided by the seller to
ensure that the individuals understand the requirements that apply'' to
the sale of the products. 21 U.S.C. 830(e)(1)(VII). As stated above,
the Government alleged that between January 1, 2007, and July 9, 2007,
Respondent made 284 distributions of listed chemical products to
thirty-five retailers who were not self-certified.
As support for the allegation, a DEA DI testified that using a
document supplied by Respondent which listed the customers by code
number, store name and address, she conducted a spot check to see if
the stores were listed in the Agency's database of stores that had
become certified. Tr. 1213-19. The DI further testified that the
results of her inquiry were reported in a thirteen page document, which
listed the distributions by Respondent's store code number, the date,
Respondent's product code, and quantity. Id. at 1218, see also GX 40
(listing stores and transactions).
At the hearing, Respondent produced numerous documents that refuted
the allegation. For example, the Government listed twenty-five Speedway
stores that were located in Indiana and Kentucky which had obtained
SLCs from Respondent between April 10 and July 9, 2007. GX 40, at 3, 6
& 7. Respondent, however, introduced into evidence, a letter dated
April 3, 2007 from an executive of Speedway Super America to DEA's
registration unit submitting a CD-Rom with the certification data for
the company's stores in Indiana and Kentucky. RX 57. Respondent also
submitted copies of each store's certification. See RX 57A. While each
of the certifications was dated July 5, 2007, the Government did not
rebut Respondent's evidence that the Agency considers a chain retailer
who submits information on a CD-Rom to be self-certified on the date
the information is received by the Agency. Tr. 1335-36.
At most, the evidence suggests that Respondent made a single
distribution to a single store before it obtained its certification.
Compare GX 40, at 14, with RX 57, at 18. According to these exhibits,
Respondent distributed a listed chemical product on January 18, 2007,
to an independent convenience store located in Centreville, Virginia,
prior to the store obtaining certification on March 8, 2007.\26\
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\26\ The store's certification shows that it was completed
online at DEA's self-certification Web page. RX 57, at 18.
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The evidence did show, however, several instances in which
Respondent's records contained erroneous information. For example,
Respondent's records listed the address of store XTM7480 as 1451 Dorsey
Road, Hanover, Maryland. GX 39, at 100. The store's DEA Certificate
states, however, that its address is 7500 Ridge Road, Hanover, MD. RX
57, at 14. Respondent's records likewise listed the address of store
XTM7520 as 7300 Washington Blvd., Dorsey, MD. GX 39, at 100. According
to its DEA certificate, the store's address was 7300 Washington Blvd,
Elkridge, MD. RX 57, at 15. Also, Respondent's record listed the
address of store MTO102 as 995 Old Airport Road, Bristol, TN. GX 39, at
33. The store's DEA certificate, however, gives its address as 1001
Airport Road, Bristol, Va. RX 57, at 16.\27\
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\27\ Likewise, Respondent's records list the address for store
BGP1 as 1699 N. Dixie Hwy, Monroe Michigan. GX 39. The store's DEA
certificate gives its address as 1488 N. Dixie Hwy., Monroe,
Michigan. RX 57, at 21.
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The Allegations That Respondent Distributed Products in Forms That
Could Not Be Lawfully Sold Under the CMEA and State Laws
Effective April 9, 2006, the CMEA prohibited a retailer from
selling a listed chemical ``product in nonliquid form (including gel
caps) at retail unless the product is packaged in blister packs * * *
containing not more than 2 dosage units, or where the use of blister
packs is technically infeasible, the product is packaged in unit dose
packets or pouches.'' 21 U.S.C. 830(d)(2). The Government alleged that
subsequent to February 1, 2007, Respondent distributed 24-count bottles
of listed chemical product to retailers on three occasions.
In support of this allegation, the Government introduced a document
which lists three distributions of Respondent's product
17902, Mini 2 Way 25 mg. gel caps in 24 count bottles, to three stores
(PTR3295, PTR3438, and PTR3973).\28\ See GX 66 & 37. A DI testified
that the three transactions were found in Respondent's sales records.
Tr.
[[Page 52696]]
1442-45. According to Respondent's customer list, each of the stores
was owned by The Pantry chain. See GX 39.
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\28\ According to Respondent's sales records, two of the
distributions (to stores PTR3295 and PTR3438) occurred on February
7, 2007; the other distribution (to store PTR3973) occurred on April
23, 2007. GX 66, Tr. 1442-43.
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Respondent's record of shipments showed, however, that the product
had not been shipped after January 2006. RX 40, at 152. Moreover,
Respondent presented e-mail correspondence between it and an employee
of The Pantry. More specifically, Respondent requested that The Pantry
check its scanner data to determine whether it had sold the bottled
product at the three stores after February 1, 2007. RX 46, at 2-3. In
an e-mail, a Pantry employee reported that she had checked the item
number for the three stores ``from Feb. 2007-Feb. 2008 and [that] there
was no movement at any of the three locations for this item.'' RX 46,
at 1.\29\ Based on the totality of the evidence, I find that the
Government has not proved this allegation.
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\29\ Respondent's CEO attributed the data as resulting from its
salesperson[s] having entered the wrong product code in their
computer. Tr. 68. Another of Respondent's testified that that it had
reprogrammed its computer system to prevent a salesperson from
selling an item that was prohibited. Id. at 1404. Yet even after the
reprogramming, there were several instances in which salespersons
entered the codes for discontinued products. Id. at 1405. The same
executive acknowledged that he did not know if the salespersons
still had obsolete products in their storage units. Id.
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The Government also alleged that Respondent distributed tablet-form
products to retailers in Kentucky and North Carolina, after these
States prohibited the sale of non-liquid products other than in gel-cap
form at establishments that are not pharmacies. In support of the
allegation, the Government introduced a document which listed four
distributions of Respondent's product 017550, Ephedrine Plus
Blister 24 Count. See GX 37 & 65. Three of the distributions were made
to three stores owned by Circle K Midwest which were located in
Kentucky (CKM 3212, CKM 3247, and CKM 3248); the other store was owned
by The Pantry and located in North Carolina (PTR3972). See GX 39, at
10, 11 & 65. According to Respondent's records, the distributions
occurred on March 27 and 28, and July 9, 2007.
An executive of Respondent testified that its records pertaining to
the four distributions were erroneous. Tr. 1347-50. Moreover,
Respondent's records did not show any shipments of this product after
December 26, 2005. RX 40, at 159. Finally, in an e-mail, an employee of
The Pantry reported that ``there was no movement'' of the product at
store number 3972. RX 46, at 1.\30\ Because the ALJ found credible
Respondent's explanation and did not produce sufficient evidence to
reject this finding, I find that Government has proved only that
Respondent's records were erroneous and that it did not violate North
Carolina or Kentucky law.
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\30\ Respondent also submitted an e-mail from an employee of
Circle K., which states that she checked the stores' sales going
back to April 30, 2007, and that the stores had not sold the
product. RX 46, at 5. The e-mail is thus not probative of whether
Respondent distributed the products in violation of Kentucky law.
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The DEA Audits
On July 9, 2007, as part of an administrative inspection of its
registered location, DEA Investigators took a physical count of
Respondent's listed chemical products then on hand. Tr. 1163. The DIs
also obtained an initial inventory dated December 25, 2005, from
Respondent's records. Id.; see GX 4. Both the beginning and ending
inventories were certified as correct by Ryan Polk, Respondent's Chief
Financial Officer. GX 4. Pursuant to an agreement with the DIs,
products which were stored in the returns portion of Respondent's
storage cage which included out-of-date products, broken blister packs,
and single loose pills were not counted. Tr. 1494-95. The products had
not, however, been logged back into Respondent's records. Id.
DEA Investigators audited twenty different products by adding
Respondent's receipts (including returns, Tr. 1182) to the beginning
inventory (GX 34) \31\ and comparing this figure with the sum of the
closing inventory and Respondent's shipments to its salespersons (GX
35) and returns to its suppliers. See GX 4, at 3. Of further note,
Respondent's list of shipments indicated that it had made three
separate shipments of product 17121 (totaling more than 2300
units \32\) to three of its salespersons on July 16, 2007,
notwithstanding that this date was a week into the future. GX 35, at
29.
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\31\ According to the DI, the investigators ``asked to see
receipts for the products audited for a time period. And we were,
instead, given this three-page summary.'' Tr. 1170. Relatedly, the
DI testified that while Respondent gave them a 157 page list of its
shipments, the document used product codes and the Investigators had
to ask several times for a document which identified the products.
Id. at 1180-81.
\32\ This product was a six-count blister pack. See GX 32, at 1.
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According to the DIs' calculations, only one of the products in
which there was activity balanced,\33\ two of the products had sizable
shortages, and the remaining had overages. Id. More specifically, the
DI identified Respondent's product code 17902 (Mini 2-Way 25
mg. 24 count gel cap bottles) as being short nearly 28,000 bottles. Tr.
1186. Moreover, the DI concluded that Respondent was short 32,913 units
of product code 17903 (Mini 2 Way 12.5 mg. gel cap 6 ct.
blister packs). See GX 4, at 3.
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\33\ While two other products balanced, the computation chart
indicates that there was no beginning or closing inventory of, and
no activity in, these products. GX 3, at 6.
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The DI further testified that ``because we got different numbers
when comparing [Respondent's] receipts versus their warehouse
documentation,'' Tr. 1186, she conducted an additional audit of four
products by obtaining information from Respondent's suppliers in order
to verify its receipts. Id. at 1187. According to the DI, for these
four products, there were substantial differences between the
quantities that were reported by the suppliers and the information
provided by Respondent. Id. With respect to product 17121
(Double Action 6 ct. ephedrine 25 mg. tablets), Respondent had
represented that its receipts were 656,688, but according to the DI,
the suppliers had claimed to have sold it only 429,024 units resulting
in an overage of more than 275,000 units. Tr. 1188; GX 4, at 3. The DI
also found overages in the other thre