Prohibitions On Market Manipulation and False Information in Subtitle B of Title VIII of The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 48317-48335 [E8-19154]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 161 / Tuesday, August 19, 2008 / Proposed Rules
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on August
12, 2008.
G. Wes Ryan,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E8–19168 Filed 8–18–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
16 CFR Part 317
[Project No. P082900]
RIN 3084-AB12
Prohibitions On Market Manipulation
and False Information in Subtitle B of
Title VIII of The Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007
Federal Trade Commission.
Notice of proposed rulemaking;
request for public comment.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
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SUMMARY: Pursuant to Title VIII, Subtitle
B of the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007 (‘‘EISA’’), the
Federal Trade Commission
(‘‘Commission’’ or ‘‘FTC’’) is proposing
a rule to implement Section 811 of
Subtitle B prohibiting the use or
employment of manipulative or
deceptive devices or contrivances in
wholesale petroleum markets.1 The
Commission invites written comments
on issues raised by the proposed Rule
and seeks answers to the specific
questions set forth in Section II.L of this
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(‘‘NPRM’’).
DATES: Written comments must be
received by September 18, 2008.
ADDRESSES: Interested parties are
invited to submit written comments
electronically or in paper form.
Comments should refer to ‘‘Market
Manipulation Rulemaking, P082900’’ to
facilitate the organization of comments.
Comments containing material for
which confidential treatment is
requested must be filed in paper form,
must be clearly labeled ‘‘Confidential,’’
and must comply with Commission
Rule 4.9(c).2 Comments should not
include any sensitive personal
information, such as an individual’s
1 Section 811 is part of Subtitle B of Title VIII
of EISA, which has been codified at 42 U.S.C.
17301-17305. Hereinafter, citations to EISA sections
shall be made to the United States Code.
2 The comment must be accompanied by an
explicit request for confidential treatment,
including the factual and legal basis for the request,
and must identify the specific portions of the
comment to be withheld from the public record.
The request will be granted or denied by the
Commission’s General Counsel, consistent with
applicable law and the public interest. See
Commission Rule 4.9(c), 16 CFR 4.9(c).
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Social Security Number; date of birth;
driver’s license number or other state
identification number or foreign country
equivalent; passport number; financial
account number; or credit or debit card
number. Comments also should not
include any sensitive health
information, such as medical records
and other individually identifiable
health information.
Because paper mail in the Washington
area, and specifically to the FTC, is
subject to delay due to heightened
security screening, please consider
submitting your comments in electronic
form. Comments filed in electronic form
should be submitted by using the
following weblink: (https://
secure.commentworks.com/ftcmarketmanipulationNPRM/)(and
following the instructions on the webbased form). To ensure that the
Commission considers an electronic
comment, you must file it on the webbased form at the weblink(https://
secure.commentworks.com/ftcmarketmanipulationNPRM/). If this
NPRM appears at (https://
www.regulations.gov/search/index.jsp),
you may also file an electronic comment
through that website. The Commission
will consider all comments that
regulations.gov forwards to it. You may
also visit the FTC website at (https://
www.ftc.gov/os/2008/08/
P082900nprm.pdf) to read the NPRM
and the news release describing it.
A comment filed in paper form
should include the ‘‘Market
Manipulation Rulemaking, P082900’’
reference both in the text and on the
envelope, and should be mailed to the
following address: Federal Trade
Commission, Market Manipulation
Rulemaking, P.O. Box 2846, Fairfax, VA
22031-0846. This address does not
accept courier or overnight deliveries.
Courier or overnight deliveries should
be delivered to: Federal Trade
Commission/Office of the Secretary,
Room H-135 (Annex G), 600
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington,
DC 20580.
The Federal Trade Commission Act
(‘‘FTC Act’’) and other laws the
Commission administers permit the
collection of public comments to
consider and use in this proceeding as
appropriate. The Commission will
consider all timely and responsive
public comments that it receives,
whether filed in paper or electronic
form. Comments received will be
available to the public on the FTC
website, to the extent practicable, at
(https://www.ftc.gov/os/
publiccomments.shtm). As a matter of
discretion, the Commission makes every
effort to remove home contact
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information for individuals from the
public comments it receives before
placing those comments on the FTC
website. More information, including
routine uses permitted by the Privacy
Act, may be found in the FTC’s privacy
policy, at (https://www.ftc.gov/ftc/
privacy.shtm).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
James Mongoven, Deputy Assistant
Director of Policy and Coordination,
Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade
Commission, Market Manipulation
Rulemaking, P.O. Box 2846, Fairfax, VA
22031-0846, (202) 326-3772.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. The Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007
EISA became law on December 19,
2007.3 Subtitle B of Title VIII of the Act
prohibits market manipulation in
connection with the purchase or sale of
crude oil, gasoline, or petroleum
distillates at wholesale, and reporting
false or misleading information related
to the wholesale price of those products.
Specifically, Section 811 prohibits ‘‘any
person’’ from directly or indirectly: (1)
using or employing ‘‘any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance;’’ (2)
‘‘in connection with the purchase or
sale of crude oil gasoline or petroleum
distillates at wholesale;’’ (3) that
violates a rule or regulation that the FTC
‘‘may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of United States
citizens.’’4
Section 812 prohibits ‘‘any person’’
from reporting information that is
‘‘required by law to be reported’’ — and
that is ‘‘related to the wholesale price of
crude oil gasoline or petroleum
distillates’’ — to a Federal department
or agency if the person: (1) ‘‘knew, or
reasonably should have known, [that]
the information [was] false or
misleading;’’ and (2) intended such false
or misleading information ‘‘to affect
data compiled by the department or
agency for statistical or analytical
purposes with respect to the market for
crude oil, gasoline, or petroleum
distillates.’’5
Subtitle B also contains three
additional sections, which address,
respectively, enforcement of the Subtitle
(Section 813),6 penalties for violations
3 Pub. L. No. 110-140, codified at 42 U.S.C.
17001-17386.
4 42 U.S.C. 17301.
5 42 U.S.C. 17302.
6 Section 813 provides that Subtitle B ‘‘shall be
enforced by the [FTC] in the same manner, by the
same means, and with the same jurisdiction as
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of Section 812 or any FTC rule
promulgated pursuant to Section 811
(Section 814),7 and the interplay
between Subtitle B and existing laws
(Section 815).8
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B. Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
On May 1, 2008, the Commission
issued an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (‘‘ANPR’’) that solicited
comments on whether it should
promulgate a rule under Section 811,
and, if so, the appropriate scope and
content of such a rule.9 In particular, the
ANPR requested comment on the
interplay between any proposed FTC
rule and other existing federal rules
prohibiting market manipulation; the
scope of certain definitions; the level of
scienter necessary to establish a
violation of any proposed rule; the
efficacy of the civil penalty authority
provided to the Commission in EISA;
the inclusion or exclusion of certain
conduct from the scope of any proposed
rule; and the potential costs and benefits
of any proposed rule.10 The ANPR set a
deadline of June 6, 2008, by which to
submit comments.11 In response to a
petition from a major trade
association,12 the Commission extended
the comment period until June 23,
2008.13
though all applicable terms’’ of the FTC Act were
incorporated into and made a part of Subtitle B.
42 U.S.C. 17303.
7 Section 814(a) of Subtitle B provides that —
‘‘[i]n addition to any penalty applicable’’ under the
FTC Act — ‘‘any supplier that violates [S]ection 811
or 812 shall be punishable by a civil penalty of not
more than $1,000,000.’’ Further, Section 814(c)
provides that each day of a continuing violation
shall be considered a separate violation.
42 U.S.C. 17304.
8 Section 815(a) provides that nothing in Subtitle
B ‘‘limits or affects’’ Commission authority ‘‘to
bring an enforcement action or take any other
measure’’ under the FTC Act or ‘‘any other
provision of law.’’ Section 815(b) provides that
‘‘[n]othing in [Subtitle B] shall be construed to
modify, impair, or supersede the operation’’ of: (1)
any of the antitrust laws (as defined in Section 1(a)
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12(a)), or (2) Section
5 of the FTC Act ‘‘to the extent that . . . [S]ection
5 applies to unfair methods of competition.’’
Section 815(c) provides that nothing in Subtitle B
‘‘preempts any State law.’’ 42 U.S.C. 17305.
9 FTC, Prohibitions On Market Manipulation and
False Information in Subtitle B of the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, 73 FR
25614 (May 7, 2008). The ANPR was announced in
a press release and made available to the public on
May 1, 2008, available at (https://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2008/05/anpr.shtm).
10 Id. at 25620-25624.
11 Id. at 25614.
12 Letter from the American Petroleum Institute
to FTC Secretary Donald S. Clark, (May 19, 2008),
available at (https://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
marketmanipulation/index.shtm).
13 FTC, Extension of Period to Submit Comments
in Response to the ANPR, 73 FR 32259 (June 6,
2008). The extension was announced in a press
release and made available to the public on May 30,
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In response to the ANPR, the
Commission received 155 comments
from interested parties, including other
federal agencies, state government
agencies, industry members, trade and
bar associations, academics, and
individual members of the public.14 The
comments respond to questions posed
in the ANPR and highlight several
issues of particular concern to
commenters. An overview of the major
themes reflected in the comments
follows.
The overwhelming majority of the
comments submitted in response to the
ANPR were from consumers. These
consumers voice concern about the
rising cost of gasoline, attributing the
increase to many variables, including:
(1) OPEC control over prices;15 (2) price
manipulation by oil companies;16 (3)
speculation by investors;17 (4) corporate
2008, available at (https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/05/
anprfyi.shtm).
14 Attachment A contains a list of commenters
who responded to the ANPR, together with the
acronyms used to identify each commenter in this
NPRM. The full rulemaking record can be found at
(https://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oilgas/), and
electronic versions of the comments can be
accessed at (https://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
marketmanipulation/index.shtm).
15 See, e.g., Bergkamp (‘‘The biggest problem is
that the major OPEC countries are not only
determining the price by controlling out put, they
have also figured out that they can inject millions
of dollars into the futures market and manipulate
the price of oil in that capacity.’’); Noga (‘‘Since we
are an exporter of food products, the price of our
exported food to OPEC members should be tied to
their oil production and prices.’’); Pereira (‘‘I feel
that prices are being manipulated by OPEC.’’); A.
Stark (‘‘Why are we allowing OPEC to get away
with $125.00 per barrel of oil?’’).
16 See, e.g., Bremer (‘‘The big oil companies need
to be investigated for price gouging and
manipulation.’’); McGill (‘‘Oil companies should
not be allowed to ship oil overseas, store it until
the price rises, and then return it to the United
States. That is manipulation.’’); Phillips (‘‘[S]ince
all of the major oil companies have made, and
continue to make record profits (definition: the
monetary surplus left to a producer or employer
after deducting wages, rent, cost of raw materials,
etc.) It is highly likely that they are, together,
manipulating the cost of a gallon of gasoline.’’);
Love (‘‘BIG OIL controls gasoline prices thru the
refineries which stand BETWEEN primary fuel
supplies [including biofuel] and consumers.’’);
Reinecke (‘‘Here in Wichita Ks when gas prices go
up over night all stations go up in price over night,
and they say they don’t talk to each other,’’);
Theisen (‘‘I believe the oil companies should be
severely punished for manipulating the sale and
purchase of oil to boost the price of oil.’’).
17 See, e.g., Barton (‘‘There is no reason gas
should be his high, get rid of the traders and it will
drop $ 3.00/ Dth.’’); Gould (‘‘It seems like the real
manipulation in fuel cost is happening in the
futures markets and not at the oil companies.’’);
Nichols (‘‘[T]he price is now purely speculative and
[completely] out of line with supply and demand.
The problem will be if the price does collapse will
the government bail out the speculators and what
will it cost.’’); Noga (‘‘This like the tech stocks,
housing market bubble, is a market driven by the
greed of speculators and hedge markets.’’); Parker
(‘‘OIL/GAS SPECULATION ON WALL STREET IS
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greed;18 (5) the decreasing value of the
U.S. dollar;19 and (6) increased demand
from China and India.20 Although many
of these consumers urge the United
States government, as a whole, to take
action to address gasoline prices,21 few
expressly support a FTC market
manipulation rule.22 Some of the
consumer commenters, although not
addressing the need for a specific
market manipulation rule, nonetheless
urge the FTC to investigate the
petroleum industry for various types of
alleged misconduct or to take other
action to control increasing prices.23
OUT OF CONTROL, BECAUSE THE HIGHER THE
PRICE THE MORE COMMISSION THEY GET.’’);
Patel (‘‘What has change in the last year to make
the price almost double? SPECULATION BY
ANALYSTS.’’); D. Smith (‘‘As much as 60% of
today’s crude oil price is pure speculation driven
by large trader banks and hedge funds.’’); Van
Hecke (‘‘I also feel there needs to be regulations put
in place to have some sort of control on the way
the stock traders are able to continually drive up
the costs through speculation.’’). See also
Greenberger (arguing that excessive speculation,
fraud, and illegal manipulation are causing higher
gasoline prices).
18 See, e.g., Brownstein (‘‘The oil companies have
used their profits to line their pockets instead of
putting it back into increasing refinery &
exploration.’’); Nenortas (‘‘While I am for
companies making a profit I am NOT for gluttony
which the oil companies seem to be guilty. Their
costs do not justify the outrageous prices they are
demanding.’’).
19 See, e.g., Rubinstein (‘‘Gas/fuel prices are high
because the value of the dollar has fallen. . . .’’).
20 See, e.g., Tanner (‘‘Oil price rises caused from
importing from China and India. Most oil demand
caused by these two countries having 40 percent of
the world’s population.’’).
21 See, e.g., Bergkamp (‘‘[I]f any other business
[construction companies, farmers, etc.] were
working in collusion in a form of bid rigging [and
fundamentally that is what is happening with the
price of oil] the Justice Department would have
them in a court so fast it would boggle the mind.
But we allow the market to be exploited with no
legal recourse what so ever.’’); Berman (‘‘[President
Bush] must call in the executives of the large oil
companies who are making billions and billions in
profits in the current crisis and make them lower
their prices.’’); Love (‘‘Our government seems to be
able to create a BUBBLE for just about every
economic good . . . except fuel. It can be done for
fuel as well and this will bring BIG OIL back to a
levelled playing field.’’); Loucks (‘‘Set some laws
and make the oil companies abide by them. This
hike of gasoline costs is outrageous! Someone needs
to be held accountable. Please hurry!’’); Noga
(‘‘Something needs to be done, the profits are
obscene, the terrorists are the oil companies.’’); A.
Stark (‘‘We need regulation and protection from the
Oil Industry . . . .’’).
22 See, e.g., Bradley (‘‘Put in place a new ban on
market manipulation and giving false information
to the FTC or the Department of Justice. Give the
FTC the authority to levy fines up to $1 million for
each violation of market manipulation.’’); Nenortas
(‘‘IF making federal regulations that will do this on
a permanent basis and NOT be a band-aid or quick
fix to this problem, then I am all for it.’’).
23 See, e.g., Bremer (‘‘The big oil companies need
to be investigated for price gouging and
manipulation.’’); Hudecek (‘‘[T]he FTC should be
able to regulate the price of crude oil prices to stop
all price gauging that is going on in America and
in Europe at this time. The FTC should bring the
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Twenty-nine industry members,
associations, and other organizations
responded to the ANPR. Most
organizational commenters express
concern about the prospect of a FTC
rule.24 In support of their position, these
commenters advance a variety of
arguments, including: (1) a rule is
unnecessary because there is no
empirical evidence that market
manipulation is occurring;25 (2) a rule
price of crude oil back down to a reasonable price
per barrel, that is under $60 a barrel, and set a
reasonable gas price for all gas stations in every
State in America . . . .’’); Kas (‘‘I want to see real
action taken against those who are stealing from the
rest of us.’’); Morris-Ramos (‘‘This is clearly price
gouging by private companies and our government
needs to protect us. This is the clear mission of the
FTC and Congress.’’); A. Stark (‘‘Why hasn’t the
FTC investigated this in earnest?’’); Strickland (‘‘I
believe the FTC should investigate market
manipulation.’’); Warner (‘‘ENOUGH of would of,
should of, could of. Our Government NEEDS to do
something NOW about these gas prices. Don’t say
it can’t be done because it CAN! The government
can do anything it wants to do.’’).
24 Three commenters specifically argue that the
FTC should not promulgate a rule. See API at 1216 (arguing that the Commission should refrain
from promulgating a rule); Flint Hills at 1-2, 8-11
(asserting that a rule is unnecessary in the absence
of any evidence of inefficiencies or anticompetitive
behavior in the U.S. oil refining industry); IER at
1 (arguing that existing statutes provide FTC and
other agencies ‘‘with adequate powers to deal with
legitimately anti-competitive and/or fraudulent
practices in the petroleum and financial markets’’).
Many commenters, without expressly stating
whether they support a rule, urge the Commission
to consider a variety of concerns in drafting a
Section 811 rule. See, e.g., ICE at 1-2
(recommending that the Commission draft a rule
with a ‘‘well defined jurisdictional boundary’’ to
avoid duplicative enforcement); Plains at 1, 3
(recommending that the Commission craft a rule
that will ‘‘avoid any overlap with other regulatory
regimes’’); Sutherland at 8 (urging the Commission
to adopt a rule that avoids any overlap with futures
trading which is the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(‘‘CFTC’’)); AOPL at 1 (seeking clarification from
the Commission that a Section 811 rule will not
apply to crude oil and petroleum products
pipelines); CFDR at 2 (encouraging the FTC to draft
a rule that is clear and easily understood, ‘‘advances
the development of one universal definition of price
manipulation’’ in the markets for petroleum
products, and does not create or alter existing
obligations among market participants); Hess at 12
(urging the Commission to ‘‘consider the entire
spectrum of possible consequences stemming from
the contemplated rulemaking’’); Sutherland at 2, 4
(urging the Commission to avoid adopting
regulations that will have a chilling effect on
legitimate market activities). Cf. Platts at 2
(supporting a FTC rule that encourages the
voluntary reporting of data, such as price, inventory
volumes, and import/export volumes); CAPP at 23 (raising a concern about the FTC’s ability to
construct a market manipulation rule appropriately
in the face of little empirical evidence of market
manipulation).
25 See, e.g., API at 12-13 (stating that a Section
811 rule is unnecessary because there is no
evidence that market manipulation is occurring or
has occurred); CAPP at 2-3 (arguing that little
empirical evidence exists of market manipulation or
any adverse effects on crude oil markets);
Sutherland at 3 (asserting that the FTC has found
U.S. oil markets to be generally free of manipulation
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would be duplicative of existing laws,
including the Commodity Exchange Act
(‘‘CEA’’), existing antitrust laws, and the
FTC Act;26 and (3) a rule could harm the
efficient functioning of petroleum
markets to the detriment of
consumers.27 Many of the
organizational commenters who express
concern about FTC rulemaking in this
area advance the view that if the
Commission promulgates a rule, it
should be narrowly tailored to reach
only fraudulent conduct in the
marketplace.28 Only a few
organizational commenters affirmatively
favor a FTC market manipulation rule.29
A few commenters recommend specific
conduct that a FTC rule should
prohibit.30
in its past investigations). See also Flint Hills at 12, 8-11.
26 See, e.g., Flint Hills at 3-4 (arguing that Section
811 ‘‘overlaps and arguably duplicates authority
conferred by [Section 5 of the FTC Act]’’); AOPL at
1-2 (stating that a FTC rule will overlap with and
be duplicative of other agencies’ regulations). See
also ISDA at 2-3; API at 14-16.
27 See, e.g., IER at 1-2 (arguing that a rule could
interfere with healthy market operations, leading to
higher volatility in oil and gas prices and less
efficiency in distribution); Flint Hills at 2-3 (stating
that a rule would likely be harmful to the industry
and consumers); API at 16 (stating that a Section
811 rule could deter beneficial market activity);
Sutherland at 3-4 (stating that the FTC needs to take
great care not to chill legitimate market activities by
adopting rules that substitute governmentally
created norms for the rules of the marketplace);
CAPP at 5 (stating that it could be damaging to the
petroleum industry to enact rules to prohibit
conduct described in the ANPR).
28 See, e.g., API at 2, 16-17 (recommending that
any FTC rule be drafted narrowly to avoid
duplication with other laws and to avoid deterring
pro-competitive conduct); Flint Hills at 5, 8-9, 15
(stating that a rule should cover ‘‘only conduct that
contains an element of fraud or dishonesty’’); ISDA
at 2-3 (urging the Commission to adopt a rule under
Section 811 that is tailored to target manipulative
schemes involving wholesale, physical petroleum
products); Muris at 13 (advocating that any rule be
limited to fraudulent and deceptive conduct).
ContraNPGA at 5 (urging the FTC to ‘‘view its
mandate broadly’’ and focus ‘‘on practices that are
not a reaction to market forces’’).
29 See, e.g., Greenberger at 21-25 (urging the
Commission to move quickly to adopt a rule);
Gregoire at 1 (recommending that the FTC
promulgate an interim rule so it can commence an
investigation into the oil and gas markets). See also
NPGA at 2 (‘‘[R]apid increase in price levels and
volatility recently . . . raise concerns regarding
potential manipulation and the need for stronger
regulatory oversight.’’). See also MFA at 4-5.
30 See, e.g., IPMA at 3-4; TOMA at 2-3
(recommending that the FTC treat an oil company’s
decision to sell only gasoline blended with ethanol
instead of unblended gasoline at the terminal rack
as a potentially manipulative practice); Navajo
Nation at 3-5 (asking the FTC to treat the denial of
access by terminals and common carrier pipelines
to other suppliers as a manipulative practice); ILMA
at 1 (requesting that the FTC consider as potentially
manipulative a refiner’s decision to increase the
price of base oils sold to others (non-refiner
blenders/marketers) at wholesale faster than the
refiner increases the retail price for its own branded
finished oils).
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Organizational commenters express
differing views regarding the
appropriate legal basis for, and form of,
any such rule. For example, some
commenters argue that the Commission
should model its rule after market
manipulation authority under which
other federal agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(‘‘SEC’’), the CFTC, and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission
(‘‘FERC’’), currently police market
manipulation.31 Other commenters
disagree, questioning whether it is
appropriate to apply approaches
designed for regulated industries to the
comparatively unregulated petroleum
industry.32
Organizational commenters also
advance several significant suggestions
regarding the elements of a cause of
action that they believe the Commission
should employ in enforcing the
proposed Rule. In particular,
commenters express strong views about
the appropriate level of scienter33 and
31 See, e.g., CFDR (advising that the FTC model
its rule after SEC, FERC, and CFTC market
manipulation standards to varying degrees);
Gregoire (recommending that the FTC model a rule
after FERC and SEC market manipulation rules);
Greenberger at 23 (urging the FTC to use FERC’s
market manipulation rule as a template for drafting
a Section 811 rule); ISDA at 7 (encouraging the FTC
to ‘‘propose a rule that draws on the most analogous
aspects of those anti-manipulation standards
already applicable to the commodities markets, in
particular those existing under the [CEA]’’); MFA at
5-6, 21-23 (arguing for the adoption of a CFTC-style
anti-manipulation regulation in the wholesale
energy market because of its relevance to the FTC’s
mission); CAPP at 3-4 (urging the Commission to
adopt CEA’s specific intent standard); Sutherland at
7 (urging the Commission to draw on precedent
developed under the CEA). But see ISDA at 12-14
(urging the FTC not to use FERC and SEC market
manipulation standards as models in determining
what constitutes manipulative behavior); MFA at 56, 19-21 (stating that ‘‘the absence of a securities
law disclosure foundation . . . argues against the
adopting of an SEC-style anti-manipulation
formulation . . . .’’). See also Flint Hills at 10 n.25,
13-14, 22-23.
32 See, e.g., Muris at 2 (‘‘[T]he Commission
should follow its own clear precedents regarding
when a failure to disclose is deceptive, and avoid
importing broad disclosure requirements from
highly regulated markets that simply have no place
in wholesale petroleum markets.’’); PMAA at 3
(‘‘Given the very wide gap between regulated and
unregulated behavior, existing precedents should be
looked to as informational only and not as having
any binding effect upon interpretation of rules
promulgated under Section 811.’’); Flint Hills at 10
n.25, 13-14, 22-23 (stating that FERC and SEC
market manipulation statutes were promulgated in
a different regulatory context than EISA). Cf. API at
18-19, 30 (recognizing the value of FERC and SEC
approaches to an extent).
33 Many commenters urge the Commission to
require specific intent as a prerequisite for finding
liability under Section 811. See, e.g., ISDA at 7
(urging the FTC to require a specific intent to
manipulate prices); Muris at 11 (‘‘In any
manipulation rule, the Commission should require
specific intent, rather than relying solely on the
knowledge standard in the FTC Act.’’); CFDR at 4,
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whether a price effect should be a
prerequisite to a finding of liability.34
Several commenters also respond to
questions and hypotheticals presented
in the ANPR about the types of conduct
that might violate EISA and any
proposed market manipulation rule.35
Other topics that the comments address
include: possible definitions,36 costs
and benefits of a market manipulation
13 (asserting that the FTC should require a specific
intent to affect market prices); MFA at 6, 23-25
(arguing that the Commission should include a
‘‘specific intent to create an artificial price’’
standard to ensure protection of legitimate
commercial conduct); CAPP at 3 (recommending
that the FTC adopt the intent standard set out in
the CEA); API at 28-29 (arguing that the legislative
history of EISA supports inclusion of a scienter
standard); Sutherland at 7 (encouraging the
Commission to follow CEA by requiring proof of
specific intent). Cf. PMAA at 4-5 (‘‘‘[T]he focus is
on practices that intentionally, willfully or
recklessly cause distortion in the market.’’’). But
see, e.g., Flint Hills at 16 (asserting that the
Commission should apply the same standard of
intent under the FTC’s existing authority to address
fraud and deception). One commenter counsels the
Commission against adopting an intent
requirement. NPGA at 5 (arguing that proof of intent
creates an ‘‘impossible burden of proof,’’ which will
‘‘ultimately waste the Commission’s resources and
contribute little to the efficiency of the markets or
the wellbeing of consumers’’).
34 Several commenters support, as an element of
a Section 811 rule violation, a showing of a price
effect. See, e.g., API at 23, 31-32 (stating that, as a
prerequisite to finding liability, the FTC should
require a showing that manipulative conduct
caused the market price to deviate materially from
the price that would have existed but for the
deception or fraud). See also ISDA at 15; Muris at
9; CFDR at 4; Sutherland at 7. But see USDOJ
(‘‘Certainly, there should be no requirement that
one succeed in moving prices . . . the only
requirement should be an attempt to do so . . .
whether successful or not.’’); NPGA at 5 (arguing
that the FTC should focus ‘‘on practices that are not
a reaction to market forces’’).
35 See generally ABA at 6-9 (stating that the
antitrust laws should be the guide for determining
when unilateral supply decisions should be lawful
or when firms may be required to provide
competitors with access to facilities); API at 46-47
(arguing that the Commission should not draft a
rule that imposes an affirmative obligation to
release inventory during a price spike); Plains at 25 (arguing that the decision to release inventory is
complicated, and the FTC should not substitute its
judgment for others); Hess at 8-10 (arguing against
imposing an affirmative obligation to release
inventory during price spikes because such an
obligation would have a negative impact on long
term supply); PMAA at 6-10 (arguing against
restricting common carrier pipelines’
announcements concerning future capacity
constraints); Sutherland at 6 (‘‘To mandate
inventory releases would distort the U.S. oil
markets and is contrary to the healthy structure of
the markets.’’). See also AOPL at 20-33; CAPP at 46; IER at 4-8; ISDA at 17-18; CFDR at 15-16.
36 See generally ISDA at 19 (seeking clarification
of the FTC’s proposed definition of wholesale
distillates products under Section 811); CAPP at 3
(stating that the definition of market manipulation
is appropriate because it reflects the language
contained in EISA); Flint Hills at 15 (stating that the
FTC’s proposed definition of market manipulation
‘‘makes no sense’’); PMAA at 2; Sutherland at 7.
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rule,37 and appropriate penalties for
violations of EISA or any FTC rule.38
C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Pursuant to EISA
Based on the ANPR comments and
the Commission’s extensive experience
studying, analyzing, and investigating
the petroleum industry, the Commission
has determined to propose a rule to
prevent manipulative and deceptive
conduct in the petroleum markets.39
The Commission invites written
comments on the proposed Rule and
answers to the questions in Section II.L,
to assist it in determining whether the
proposed Rule provisions strike an
appropriate balance to maximize
protections for consumers from market
manipulation while avoiding the
imposition of unnecessary compliance
burdens on law-abiding industry
members.
II. Discussion of the Proposed Rule
A. Determination to Promulgate a Rule
to Proscribe Market Manipulation
In considering whether to exercise its
discretionary rulemaking authority
pursuant to Section 811, the
Commission relies upon several sources
of information in addition to the statute,
including its extensive background
knowledge of the petroleum industry,
the ANPR comments, independent
research, and consultation with sister
agencies charged with administering
37 See generally API at 16 (‘‘Without evidence of
significant ‘manipulative’ conduct in the petroleum
industry, the costs of additional enforcement and
their impact on competitive market activity
outweigh any benefit to be gained from the FTC
applying Section 811 to conduct that is already
addressed by other rules.’’); Muris at 7 (‘‘In
addressing market manipulation, the potential costs
of mistakenly regulating are likely to be high
because these are well-functioning, highly
competitive markets crucial to the operation of our
economy.’’).
38 See generally API at 38 (urging the FTC to
adopt Section 5(m)(1)(C) of the FTC Act as the
standard for determining the amount of civil
penalties under Section 811); PMAA at 6 (‘‘The very
large penalty should only be applied, if at all, to the
very largest entities (refiners, trading companies)
who participate in the upstream portion of crude
and finished product, manufacture and sales.’’).
39 In the ANPR, the Commission stated that this
rulemaking proceeding is governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act (‘‘APA’’), 5 U.S.C.
553, and Part 1, Subpart C, of the Commission Rules
of Practice concerning the adoption of non-Section
18 rules, 16 CFR 1.21-1.26. 73 FR 25614, 25615 n.4.
One commenter, however, asserts that this
proceeding should be commenced as a rulemaking
under Section 18 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 57a,
requiring, among other things, more lengthy and
detailed notice and comment procedures. See API
at 58-59. The Commission disagrees. Nothing in the
plain language of EISA requires Section 18
rulemaking, and the use of APA rulemaking
procedures is consistent with Congressional
expectations that this proceeding be conducted
expeditiously.
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similar market manipulation rules.
Based on its findings, the Commission
tentatively concludes that promulgating
a rule to address market manipulation
in connection with the wholesale
purchase or sale of crude oil, gasoline,
or petroleum distillates is appropriate
and in the public interest.40 This
Section of the NPRM sets forth the
Commission’s reasoning for the
proposed Rule. The Commission invites
comment on the issues raised in this
Section.
1. The proposed Rule must meet Section
811’s ‘‘necessary or appropriate’’
standard
Section 811 states that the
Commission ‘‘may prescribe’’ a rule ‘‘as
necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of United
States citizens.’’41 Thus, the
Commission may only promulgate a rule
to prohibit manipulation in the
petroleum industry if, in its discretion,
it finds that a rule under EISA is
‘‘necessary or appropriate’’ and ‘‘in the
public interest or for the protection of
United States citizens.’’ The
Commission has tentatively determined
that promulgating a market
manipulation rule narrowly tailored to
address fraudulent practices would be
appropriate to ensure that the objective
of EISA is carried out, and therefore
would be in the public interest.
The Commission believes that the
initial inquiry in determining whether it
should promulgate a rule requires
understanding the phrase ‘‘necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of United States
citizens.’’42 The use of the disjunctive
‘‘or’’ in the first clause of this phrase
indicates that the Commission would be
within its mandate to promulgate a rule
40 As the Commission stated in the ANPR, the
phrase ‘‘crude oil gasoline or petroleum distillates,’’
without commas, is used in Section 811 (as well as
in the first clause of Section 812), while the phrase
‘‘crude oil, gasoline, or petroleum distillates’’ (with
commas) is used in Section 812(3). This drafting is
presumably a non-substantive typographical error;
therefore, all parts of both sections should be read
to cover all three types of products (that is, crude
oil, gasoline, and petroleum distillates). See 73 FR
at 25621 n.59.
41 42 U.S.C. 17301.
42 Some commenters address the phrase
‘‘necessary or appropriate’’ in their comments;
however, none attempt to define the phrase. See,
e.g., API at 36 (‘‘[T]here are solid grounds to
conclude that adoption of a market manipulation
rule for petroleum wholesale markets is neither
necessary nor appropriate.’’); CAPP at 4 (‘‘In order
to ensure that rules are . . . necessary or appropriate
in the public interest . . . the Commission must set
objective standards as to what these concepts are
and how they will manifest themselves in reality.’’).
See alsoAOPL at 11-12 (‘‘Regulation of oil
[pipelines] . . . would not be ‘necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of the United States citizens.’’’).
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that is either: (1) ‘‘necessary . . . in the
public interest or for the protection of
United States citizens,’’ or (2)
‘‘appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of United States
citizens.’’43 Similarly, the Commission
need only show that a rule would be
either ‘‘in the public interest’’ or ‘‘for
the protection of United States
citizens.’’ Thus, the Commission could
proceed in its rulemaking if, at a
minimum, the endeavor is ‘‘appropriate
. . . in the public interest.’’ The
Commission has determined that a rule
that achieves EISA’s plainly stated
purpose — that is, the prohibition of
market manipulation in the petroleum
industry — would be appropriate.
The Commission carefully considered
concerns raised by organizational
commenters about the necessity or
appropriateness of a rule in determining
whether to move forward in the
rulemaking process. Some of these
commenters argue, for example, that
petroleum markets are competitive, and,
in the absence of specific evidence of
market manipulation, the Commission
should refrain from promulgating a
rule.44 Some point to FTC and CFTC
authority to argue that any rule would
be duplicative of existing laws and lead
to uncertainty and confusion among
market participants about compliance.45
43 42 U.S.C. 17301 (emphasis added). The use of
a disjunctive indicates alternatives and requires that
each be treated separately unless there is clear
legislative intent that indicates otherwise. Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (‘‘Canons
of construction ordinarily suggest that terms
connected by a disjunctive be given separate
meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise . .
. .’’). See also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726, 739-740 (1978); Azure v. Morton, 514 F.2d 897,
900 (9th Cir. 1975) (‘‘As a general rule, the use of
a disjunctive in a statute indicates alternatives and
requires that they be treated separately.’’); Norman
J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 21.14,
at 180-182 (6th ed. rev. vol. 2002) (‘‘Generally,
courts presume that ‘or’ is used in a statute
disjunctively . . . .’’).
44 See, e.g., AOPL at 18 (noting that the
Commission has found little evidence of price
manipulation in previous investigations); API at 1214, 36; Flint Hills at 10 (‘‘[T]he Commission lacks
evidence of ‘manipulation’ in wholesale petroleum
markets that warrants the kind of extensive
regulatory intervention that a proposed rule could
engender.’’); Hess at 10-11; Muris at 2 (asserting that
the petroleum industry is highly competitive). See
also Sutherland at 3 (stating that the Commission
should not ‘‘adopt rules that substitute
governmentally created norms for the rules of the
marketplace.’’).
45 Commenters express the view that a FTC rule
is unnecessary because it would duplicate existing
laws and regulations. See, e.g., API at 40-41
(arguing against a FTC rule that would duplicate the
existing CEA enforcement scheme and antitrust
laws); Flint Hills at 8-9 (asserting that existing
Commission authority under Section 5 of the FTC
Act is sufficient to protect against ‘‘[d]isingenuous
business practices’’); MFA at 17 (‘‘FTC Rules that
purport to overlap with CFTC exclusive jurisdiction
would not serve the public interest.’’). Although it
is true that other agencies have market
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Many commenters also express
concerns about the scope and contours
of a rule and whether any rule that the
Commission promulgates would be
appropriate for petroleum markets.46
EISA targets manipulative and
deceptive conduct in the petroleum
markets, thereby seeking to eliminate
conduct which serves no legitimate
purpose and may in fact harm the
market to the detriment of market
participants and consumers.47 In the
view of the Commission, a rule that
allows the Commission to guard against
conduct that undermines the integrity of
the petroleum market would be in the
public interest.48 The Commission notes
that fraud and deception may occur in
competitive marketplaces. Further, the
Commission notes that Congress
specifically authorized it to determine
whether a rule would be appropriate
and in the public interest despite the
existence of other laws that potentially
manipulation regulations in place already, this fact
was well-known to Congress when it enacted EISA.
Therefore, the Commission disagrees with
commenters that argue that a Commission rule is
unnecessary because it may be redundant with
other regulatory authority.
46 For a general discussion of organizational
commenters’ concerns about a FTC rule, see Section
I.B above.
47 Commenters recognize the negative effects of
fraud and deceit. See, e.g., Greenberger at 1 (arguing
that excessive speculation, fraud, and illegal
manipulation are causing higher gasoline prices);
MFA at 1 (‘‘Price manipulation has a corrosive
effect on the proper functioning of any market.’’);
API at 50 (‘‘We agree that the provision of false or
misleading pricing information to private reporting
entities could be problematic.’’); ISDA at 19 (‘‘ISDA
. . . both supports and encourages the development
of dynamic markets undistorted by manipulative
trading activity.’’); Sutherland at 3 (‘‘[O]il marketers
and traders often are the first victims of unfair
business practices. They, therefore, support efforts
by Congress to deter manipulation and the use of
deceptive devices.’’); Flint Hills at 18
(‘‘[R]estrictions on disclosures that ‘leave customers
in the dark’ may be inimical to the smooth
operations of the relevant markets. Of course, false
or deceptive reports can also raise familiar [sic]
problems.’’); CAPP at 1 (‘‘CAPP recognizes that
fraud and manipulation pose a potential threat to
the successful and efficient functioning of
petroleum markets in North America.’’).
48 Some commenters opine on the meaning of the
language: ‘‘in the public interest or for the
protection of United States citizens.’’ See, e.g.,
CFDR at 4-5 (‘‘The public interest and the
protection of U.S. citizens . . . are best served by
the adoption of a clear legal standard for market
manipulation.’’ CFDR goes on to say that a clear
legal standard ‘‘will allow market participants to
conduct their business with a clear understanding
of the relevant legal boundaries.’’); MFA at 17
(‘‘FTC rules that purport to overlap with CFTC
exclusive jurisdiction would not serve the public
interest.’’). Noting the absence of the phrase ‘‘public
interest’’ from other laws the Commission enforces,
Flint Hills states that Congress must have intended
that the Commission rely upon its experience in
promoting the public interest through enforcement
of the consumer protection and antitrust principles
governed by Section 5 of the FTC Act. See Flint
Hills at 17-18.
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cover fraud or deceit.49 Therefore, as the
agency charged with protecting
consumers and preserving the
competitiveness of markets (such as
petroleum markets), the Commission
believes that it would be appropriate for
it to propose a rule targeting fraudulent
or deceptive conduct in wholesale
petroleum markets under this new
authority.
2. SEC Rule 10b-5 provides an
appropriate regulatory model on which
to base the FTC’s proposed Rule
By its plain language, Section 811
declares unlawful the use of
manipulative or deceptive devices or
contrivances — in connection with the
purchase or sale of crude oil, gasoline,
or petroleum distillates at wholesale —
that violates any FTC rule prohibiting
their use.50 As one commenter observes,
‘‘Section 811 is not discussed in any
Senate, House, or Conference Report,
nor is there any reported Congressional
debate on this provision.’’51
Nevertheless, the statutory language —
especially the use of the phrase
‘‘manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance’’ — reveals its legislative
antecedents.52
In particular, it is instructive that the
language that Congress chose to frame
the conduct prohibition in Section 811
is identical to language found in Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (‘‘SEA’’),53 which prohibits the use
of any ‘‘manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance’’ in contravention
of such rules as the SEC may
prescribe.54 Congress used identical
42 U.S.C. 17301.
42 U.S.C. 17301. The statute itself does not
describe the manipulative or deceptive devices or
contrivances that are illegal. Rather, it vests in the
FTC discretionary rulemaking authority to identify
such conduct.
51 ABA at 3.
52 As the ANPR discusses in detail, the
Commission studied SEC, FERC, and CFTC
enabling statutes, and their respective
implementing regulations, and asked questions in
the ANPR about whether these existing regulatory
schemes should serve as a model for a FTC Rule.
73 FR at 25616-25618.
53 15 U.S.C. 78j(b).
54 See, e.g., ABA at 2 (asserting that ‘‘Section 811
is modeled on FERC and SEC authority to challenge
deceptive conduct’’); Greenberger at 27 (‘‘Congress
modeled the FTC’s new 2007 anti-manipulation
provision on 10(b) of the [SEA] and Rule 10b-5 to
once again make it clear . . . that the FTC must use
the extensive securities precedent to guide its
manipulation investigations in the petroleum
markets.’’); CFDR at 3 (recognizing that the language
of Section 811 is ‘‘effectively identical to the antimanipulation proscriptions found in Section 10(b)
. . . of the [SEA], as amended’’); Sutherland at 4
(‘‘Congress, in fashioning Section 811, used
language similar to that used in the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 . . . which in turn drew upon the
securities laws . . . .’’); Gregoire at 1 (arguing that
the Commission’s ‘‘authority is very similar to the
49
50
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language — ‘‘manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance’’ — when it gave
FERC anti-manipulation authority over
electricity and natural gas under the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (‘‘EPAct
2005’’). In doing so, Congress
specifically instructed FERC to define
the terms ‘‘any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance’’ ‘‘as
those terms are used in [SEA Section
10(b)].’’55 The use of this language
suggests that any proposed FTC Rule
should follow the contours of SEC Rule
10b-5, promulgated by the SEC pursuant
to that agency’s market manipulation
authority.56
Floor statements made in connection
with a predecessor bill to Subtitle B of
EISA57 and correspondence from
Congress regarding EISA58 support the
Commission’s decision to model its
proposed Rule on SEC Rule 10b-5. Thus,
the language of the statute, taken
together with other indicators of
Congressional expectations, suggests
that any proposed FTC market
manipulation rule should be modeled
on SEC Rule 10b-5.
The Commission believes that, in
addition to adhering to the mandate
implied by the statutory language, there
are several advantages to modeling its
proposed Rule on SEC Rule 10b-5. The
authority Congress previously gave the [FERC] . . .
which in turn was based on the statutory authority
of the [SEC]’’). See also Muris at 2 (arguing that ‘‘the
statutory language and the legislative history point
to the SEC, FERC, and CFTC as relevant regulatory
models’’); MFA at 19-20 (acknowledging that the
provisions of Section 811 were modeled after
Section 10(b) of the SEA, but also taking the
position that the Commission should not follow its
statutory precedent). Cf. API at 18 (arguing that
EISA does not require the Commission to follow the
SEC model in every respect, despite an
acknowledgment that Section 811 was modeled
after the SEA).
55 See 15 U.S.C. 717c-1; 16 U.S.C. 824v; FERC,
Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 FR
4244, 4246 (Jan. 19, 2006).
56 17 CFR 240.10b-5.
57 Energy Emergency Consumer Protection Act of
2005, S.1735, 109th Cong. (2005). In these remarks,
Senator Maria Cantwell stated that the market
manipulation provisions in that bill would ensure
‘‘the same kind of anti-manipulation and
transparency rules as those with which electricity
and natural gas industries must comply [under the
EPAct 2005].’’ The FERC rules, to which the
Senator refers, similarly derive from the SEA, and
target fraudulent marketplace conduct. 151 Cong.
Rec. S10238 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2005).
58 An April 2008 letter to the Commission from
Senators Maria Cantwell, Olympia Snowe, Byron
Dorgan, Daniel Inouye, and Gordon Smith also
supports the interpretation that EISA is designed to
provide the FTC with anti-fraud market
manipulation authority similar to that already
vested in the SEC and recently given to FERC in the
EPAct 2005. Letter from Senators Cantwell, Snowe,
Dorgan, Inouye, and Smith to FTC Chairman
Kovacic and Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz,
and Rosch (Apr. 8, 2008), available at (https://
www.ftc.gov/os/comments/marketmanipulation/
congress/080414cantwell.pdf).
See EPAct 2005, 42 U.S.C. 15801-16503.
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Commission believes that using an
existing anti-fraud market manipulation
regulatory scheme as a model for the
proposed Rule is beneficial for market
participants because it leverages the
significant body of legal precedent
interpreting that scheme.59 This
determination is consistent with the
views of some commenters who assert
that SEC Rule 10b-5 provides a welldeveloped framework for the FTC to
follow.60 Moreover, using an established
regulatory scheme as the basis for the
proposed Rule should reduce regulatory
uncertainty and thereby assure greater
compliance.
The structure and scope of SEC Rule
10b-5 also provide a useful model for
the substantive prohibitions of the
proposed Rule. EISA contemplates the
FTC using a new authority — separate
and apart from antitrust law and FTC
Act Section 5 authority — to target
manipulation and deception based on
the SEC anti-fraud model.61 By
mirroring the established SEC Rule 10b5, the Commission believes it strikes at
the core of what EISA explicitly
proscribes — market manipulation.62
3. The provisions of the proposed Rule
appropriately prohibit fraudulent
conduct in wholesale petroleum
markets
The Commission believes that an
appropriate means to achieve this
objective would be to adopt largely the
language and structure of SEC Rule 10b5 in promulgating the proposed Rule.63
59 See, e.g., Greenberger at 23, 25, 27; Gregoire at
1; CFDR at 11, 13; SIGMA at 6.
60 See, e.g., Gregoire at 1; Greenberger at 23-25,
27; CFDR at 11, 13. But see CAPP at 2 (arguing that
EISA was enacted in anticipation of market abuses,
not in response to them, and thus is not analogous
to SEC rules); Sutherland at 4 (arguing that SEC
rules operate in a highly regulated environment and
that modeling a rule that is aimed at the
comparatively unregulated petroleum industry after
SEC rules would be inappropriate).
61 As the Commission noted in the ANPR,
‘‘nothing in connection with this Section 811
Rulemaking, any subsequently enacted rules, or
related efforts should be construed to alter the
standards associated with establishing a deceptive
practice or an unfair practice in a case brought by
the Commission.’’ 73 FR at 25619 n.55.
62 The Commission believes this careful tailoring
addresses concerns that a new rule prohibiting
market manipulation in the petroleum industry
might interfere with legitimate, pro-consumer
business behavior. See generally API at 16 (‘‘New
rules have the potential to over-deter, discouraging
beneficial market activity.’’); Sutherland at 2
(stating that the FTC must not ‘‘deter important and
economically efficient business activities that are
fundamental to the energy markets’’).
63 Several commenters, while not necessarily
advocating a FTC rule, appear to support a rule
based on SEC Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Gregoire at 1
(‘‘The FTC should be similarly informed by the
FERC and SEC rules and model its rules on
theirs.’’); Greenberger at 22 (urging the FTC to
model its rule after FERC’s rule because FERC
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Accordingly, the proposed Rule
contains the following conduct
prohibitions. First, Section 317.3(a)
prohibits the use or employment of any
‘‘device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.’’
Second, proposed Rule Section 317.3(b)
states that it is a violation of the rule for
any person to: ‘‘make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading.’’
Finally, proposed Rule Section 317.3(c)
makes it illegal for any person ‘‘[t]o
engage in any act, practice, or course of
business that operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person.’’64
The Commission believes that adopting
the general conduct prohibitions
embodied in SEC Rule 10b-5 provides
the necessary flexibility for the
Commission to adapt to changing
market conditions in enforcing its
proposed Rule.65
Moreover, the Commission is not
invoking the entire body of SEC law in
this rulemaking, but rather the antifraud provisions of SEC Rule 10b-5.
Thus, the proposed Rule does not
impose affirmative disclosure or recordkeeping obligations, and does not
regulate supply decisions or require that
market participants provide access to
terminals or pipelines.66 In making this
determination, the Commission
considered arguments raised by
commenters who oppose the
promulgation of an SEC-style rule on
the grounds that securities markets are
qualitatively different from petroleum
product markets because securities
markets are subject to a significant
degree of regulation.67 The Commission
resolved its ‘‘major interpretative issues’’ by
‘‘adopting the anti-manipulation definitions within
Section 10(b) of the [SEA]’’); API at 17 (recognizing
the value of FERC and SEC approaches to an
extent). See also CFDR at 3. The determination to
prohibit manipulative and deceptive conduct under
the proposed Rule does not preclude the
Commission from finding that other conduct
violates EISA and any other applicable laws or rules
that the Commission enforces.
64 Proposed Rule 317.3(a)-(c).
65 Any ‘‘laundry list’’ of specifically proscribed
conduct could quickly become out of date,
requiring that the Commission frequently revisit the
rulemaking process. See also Muris at 11 (‘‘Because
defining the specific deceptions that might
manipulate wholesale markets is virtually
impossible, any manipulation rule will of necessity
be more general.’’).
66 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
235 (1980) (stating that SEC Rule 10b-5 did not
create a duty of disclosure; rather, the duty to
disclose was created by a fiduciary relationship
between traders).
67 See, e.g., PMAA at 3 (arguing that given the
differences between regulated and unregulated
markets, ‘‘existing precedents should be looked to
as informational only’’); Sutherland at 4 (stating
that ‘‘as a rule’’ SEC market manipulation standards
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believes that excluding these affirmative
duties should alleviate commenter
concerns and make clear that the
Commission is using only the relevant
portions of the SEC regulatory model in
crafting the proposed Rule.68
In crafting the proposed Rule, the
Commission intends to prohibit
manipulative and deceptive conduct
without discouraging pro-competitive or
otherwise desirable market practices.
Following the example of SEC Rule 10b5, the Commission believes that its
proposed Rule would contribute to wellfunctioning marketplaces. Markets
function best when market participants
can presume that the best available
information relevant to their decisionmaking is not distorted.69 Manipulative
or deceptive conduct distorts the
marketplace signals that guide resource
allocation.70 When market participants
react to distorted market price signals,
short-term purchase and sale decisions
may be altered and long-term capital
investments may be adversely
influenced. Finally, if manipulative or
deceptive conduct recurs, it may
increase the cost of doing business if
market participants are required to
invest in defensive measures.71 The
are not useful precedents for a Section 811 rule);
ISDA at 12 (‘‘Securities precedent is not
illuminating with respect to how to develop a rule
to prosecute manipulation in wholesale, physical
Petroleum Products markets because there are
substantial differences between the market
frameworks.’’). See also API at 19-20, 30; CAPP at
2-3.
68 Many commenters raise concerns about a FTC
rule that would impose affirmative duties or
obligations on persons covered by the rule. For a
discussion of any potential duties or obligations
imposed by the proposed Rule, see Section II.B.4
below.
69 Several commenters discuss the consequences
of manipulative or deceptive conduct on the overall
health of the marketplace and note the importance
of ensuring a legitimate price discovery process.
See, e.g., Muris at 6 (‘‘Fraudulent and deceptive
conduct undermine the market’s competitive
process because they impair efficient price
discovery, which is the process of incorporating
information in the market price.’’); Platts at 2
(‘‘Confidence in price discovery processes is vital
for market participants, regulators and the public
alike . . . .’’); MFA at 1 (‘‘Price manipulation has
a corrosive effect on the proper functioning of any
market.’’).
70 In a market economy, resources are allocated
to productive activities on the basis of impersonal
price signals that reflect both consumer preferences
and profit opportunities. When resources flow to
their highest valued use, social wealth is
maximized. Intentional manipulative or deceptive
conduct impedes this process. See also Milton
Friedman & Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, 14-18
(Harcourt 1980); Friedrich Hayek, The Use of
Knowledge in Society, 35(4) Am. Econ. Rev. 519
(1945). For example, disseminating misinformation
that is relied on by market participants may prevent
wealth-generating exchanges from taking place. If
so, an opportunity cost is imposed on society at
large.
71 Such investments, although perceived as
necessary by the investor, are socially wasteful
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Commission believes eliminating or
reducing these effects is in the public
interest.
The Commission addresses the
elements of a cause of action under the
proposed Rule in Section II.E. This
discussion should provide guidance to
the industry on how the Commission
would enforce the proposed Rule. The
Commission would not likely act except
in cases where an entity: (1) uses a
fraudulent device, scheme or artifice, or
makes a material misrepresentation or a
material omission, or engages in any act,
practice, or course of business that
operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any entity; (2) with scienter;
(3) in connection with the purchase or
sale of crude oil, gasoline, or petroleum
distillates at wholesale.72 For example,
false reporting to private data reporting
services or misleading announcements
by refineries, pipelines, or investment
banks done with the requisite scienter,
in connection with the purchase or sale
of a covered product at wholesale,
would be covered by the proposed Rule.
Similarly, trading practices in physical
or futures markets would also be
covered if the conduct met all the
elements of a cause of action.
In sum, the Commission has paid
careful attention to maximizing the
proposed Rule’s benefits while
minimizing its costs from both a legal
and an economic perspective. The
Commission believes that the proposed
Rule, by specifically targeting
manipulative or deceptive conduct, not
only achieves the goals of Section 811,
but also complements the Commission’s
antitrust and consumer protection
missions. The Commission seeks
comments on the specific formulation of
the proposed Rule, and in particular on
whether using SEC Rule 10b-5 as a
model is appropriate.
B. Section 317.1 - Scope
Section 813 makes clear that the
Commission possesses the same
jurisdiction and power under Subtitle B
as it possesses under the FTC Act.73
Because EISA does not expand or
contract Commission jurisdiction or the
scope of any rule’s coverage, any person
to which Commission jurisdiction under
the FTC Act does not extend would also
lie outside Commission jurisdiction
because they utilize resources that otherwise might
have been allocated to wealth-generating activities.
72 Section II.E of this NPRM also addresses
whether actual price effects should be a required
element of proof.
73 ‘‘This subtitle shall be enforced by the Federal
Trade Commission in the same manner, by the same
means, and with the same jurisdiction as though all
applicable terms of the [FTC] Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et
seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this
subtitle.’’ 42 U.S.C. 17303 (emphasis added).
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under the proposed Rule. Conversely,
any person currently subject to
Commission jurisdiction under the FTC
Act would be covered by the proposed
Rule.74
In response to the ANPR, the
Commission received some comments
requesting that the Commission clarify
the scope of the application of any
proposed rule. One commenter, AOPL,
expresses the belief that Commission
jurisdiction does not extend to
pipelines.75 Another opines that any
rule could not and should not reach any
non-profits or banks.76 Several suggest
that any proposed rule should not, by its
terms or construction, reach futures
trading activities regulated by the CFTC,
including any futures market
manipulation.77
As to pipelines in particular,
Commission jurisdiction under Section
5 of the FTC Act does not extend to
common carriers that are subject to the
ICA and its amendments,78 including
the ICC Termination Act of 1994. Those
acts apply to interstate rail, trucking and
busing; domestic offshore water
carriage; and pipelines carrying
commodities other than water, gas, or
oil.79 Accordingly, oil and gas pipelines
enjoy no exemption from the FTC Act
and would be subject to the proposed
Rule.80
74 Moreover, any person subject to Commission
jurisdiction must comply with Section 812 and
with any rule promulgated under Section 811.
Several commenters asked the FTC to clarify its
proposed definition of ‘‘person.’’ See e.g., ISDA at
4 n.5; AOPL at 1.
75 AOPL at 1 (‘‘Common carrier oil pipelines
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act (‘‘ICA’’) are
exempt from the Commission’s jurisdiction under
the [FTC Act] and thus are also exempt from the
Commission’s jurisdiction under the EISA.’’).
Conversely, Navajo Nation asserts that FERC’s
regulations are not directly applicable to the crude
oil market. Therefore the Commission should tailor
a rule to ‘‘eliminate anticompetitive practices that
[FERC] may have determined are beyond its
jurisdiction . . . .’’ Navajo Nation at 4.
76 DRG at 3-4. Cf. Greenberger at 28-29 (arguing
that the Commission has authority to investigate
banks for manipulation in the crude oil markets).
77 See, e.g., CFTC at 2 (‘‘[W]e urge the FTC to
avoid proposing regulatory measures that could
lead to futures-market manipulation charges based
solely on the downstream effects of futures
exchange prices on off-exchange prices in physical
or cash-market transactions, and that may be
inconsistent or duplicative of CEA provisions.’’);
MFA at 13-14 (‘‘But futures market manipulation
claims do involve both actual futures transactions
and the core price discovery operations of the
futures markets and should be outside the limits of
Section 811 due to the CEA’s exclusive jurisdiction
provision.’’). See also Flint Hills at 12; Sutherland
at 8; Hess at 12 n.10; CFDR at 6 n.4.
78 49 U.S.C. 10101-16106. Section 4 of the FTC
Act defines the ‘‘‘Acts to regulate commerce’’’ to
mean, inter alia, ‘‘subtitle IV of title 49 . . . and all
Acts amendatory thereof and supplementary
thereto.’’ 15 U.S.C. 44.
79 49 U.S.C. 4(c) (emphasis added).
80 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2).
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With respect to banks, Commission
jurisdiction under Section 5 of the FTC
Act does not extend to ‘‘banks, savings
and loan institutions described in
section 57a(f)(3) of this title, [and]
Federal credit unions described in
section 57a(f)(4) of this title.’’81
Nevertheless, the Commission does
have jurisdiction over entities affiliated
with or contracting with banks that are
not themselves banks.82 Whether any
particular person would be exempt from
the FTC Act or the proposed Rule as a
‘‘bank’’ must be assessed on a case-bycase basis.83
As to non-profit organizations,
although Commission jurisdiction under
Section 5 of the FTC Act extends to
‘‘corporations,’’ that term does not cover
any organization that does not carry on
business for its own profit or that of its
members.84 The form of a corporation as
a ‘‘non-profit’’ is not necessarily
determinative, however. Organizations
with both non-profit and for-profit
activities may be subject to the FTC Act.
For example, in California Dental Ass’n
v. FTC,85 the Supreme Court held that
the FTC Act applies to anti-competitive
practices used by non-profit
associations whose activities provide
substantial economic benefits to the
businesses of their for-profit members.
Moreover, the Commission has asserted
that its jurisdiction over ‘‘persons’’
under Section 5 of the FTC Act extends
to nonprofit municipal corporations
such as the City of New Orleans and the
City of Minneapolis.86 Whether any
particular person would be exempt from
the FTC Act or the proposed Rule as a
non-profit must be assessed on a caseby-case basis.
Commenters argue that a safe harbor
provision or other explicit exemption
for the futures markets is necessary to
avoid an overlap with the CFTC’s
exclusive jurisdiction under Section 2 of
Id.
See Minnesota v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 181 F.
Supp. 2d 995, 1000 (D. Minn. 2001).
83 Investment banks (e.g., Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley), many of which are voluntarily
regulated by the SEC, are not necessarily ‘‘banks’’
as that term is typically defined under traditional
banking law. See 12 U.S.C. 1813(a)(1). Therefore,
whether an investment bank would be covered by
the proposed FTC Rule must be determined on a
case-by-case basis.
84 15 U.S.C. 44 (defining ‘‘corporation’’).
85 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
86 See In the Matter of The City of New Orleans,
105 F.T.C. 1, 1-2 (1985); In the Matter of The City
of Minneapolis, 105 F.T.C 304, 305 (1985). In each
complaint, the Commission alleged that the
respondent was a ‘‘municipal corporation’’ and ‘‘a
person or corporation within the meaning of the
[FTC Act], as amended (15 U.S.C. 45).’’ (emphasis
added). See 105 F.T.C. at 5-6; 105 F.T.C. at 308-309.
The Commission subsequently issued orders
dismissing the complaints on other grounds.
81
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the CEA.87 According to commenters,
including the CFTC, such an overlap
potentially would create duplicative or
inconsistent regulatory requirements
and thus undermine a uniform
regulatory scheme that Congress sought
to establish for the futures markets
under the CEA.88 Several other
commenters express concern that even
if the Commission could avoid
inconsistent regulatory requirements,
market participants would still be
unfairly burdened by duplicative
enforcement.89
The Commission does not believe a
safe harbor provision or exemption from
the proposed Rule is warranted. CFTC
authority over manipulation relating to
commodities futures markets is not
exclusive and, moreover, is separate
from CFTC’s exclusive authority under
CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A).90 The
87 Section 2 of the CEA states that ‘‘[t]he
Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . .
with respect to accounts, agreements . . . and
transactions involving contracts of sale of a
commodity for future delivery, traded or executed
on a contract market designated . . . pursuant to
section 7 or 7a of this title’’ of the CEA. See CEA
2(a)(1)(A); 7 U.S.C. 2(a)(1)(A). See e.g., MFA at 5
(‘‘[Requesting] that the Commission propose and
adopt a safe harbor provision or other appropriate
exception from its rules confirming that nothing in
its Section 811 rules would govern or apply . . .
‘with respect to accounts, agreements . . . and
transactions involving’ futures and options markets
and other trading instruments which are subject to
CFTC exclusive jurisdiction.’’); CFTC at 2 (‘‘[T]he
FTC might also consider specifically excluding
from a new rule the trading of futures on registered
entities under the CEA, which are within the
CFTC’s exclusive purview under that statute.’’).
88 See, e.g., MFA at 3-4 (arguing that Congress
enacted the CEA’s ‘‘exclusive jurisdiction’’
provision to ensure that CFTC regulations and the
CEA would be the sole legal standards applied to
U.S. futures trading); CFTC at 1 (‘‘The CFTC’s
exclusive jurisdiction over trading in futures is
based upon the concern that futures markets remain
subject to a single, federal regulatory standard.’’).
See also Flint Hills at 12 (arguing that a rule
overlapping with the CFTC’s broad oversight over
futures trading markets could subject market
participants to ‘‘differing standards of conduct and
multiple levels of liability’’); API at 14 (‘‘It is
unnecessary and undesirable to overlay a parallel
system of FTC regulation to address the same
conduct and markets already subject to oversight by
the CFTC.’’).
89 See, e.g., Sutherland at 8 (arguing that private
parties would be unfairly burdened by ‘‘multiple
enforcement actions by federal agencies examining
identical facts or suffer double jeopardy in terms of
fines and disgorgement orders’’); ICE at 2
(‘‘Duplicative enforcement and regulation is unduly
burdensome and could possibly deprive market
participants of due process.’’); NPGA at 2 (‘‘A
flawed regulatory scheme may result in . . .
penalties being cumulative and ultimately
excessive.’’).
90 See CEA 2(a)(1)(A) (CFTC exclusive
jurisdiction is not intended to remove jurisdiction
conferred to other agencies under other laws); FTC
v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 593 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (holding that the Commission’s authority
under the FTC Act to investigate deceptive
marketing of commodities trading courses did not
conflict with the CFTC’s exclusive authority under
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Commission believes the proper
approach, and the one courts favor, is to
give full effect to all statutory schemes
that may address the conduct at issue
here.91 Nothing in EISA itself indicates
that Congress intended to exempt
conduct in the futures markets from the
reach of any rule that the Commission
might promulgate under Section 811.
Accordingly, the Commission believes
that its proposed Rule proscribes
manipulative or deceptive conduct in
wholesale futures markets and it would
not improperly intrude upon the
jurisdiction of the CFTC or any other
agency whose authority may overlap in
whole or in part with respect to such
activities.92
The proposed Rule is not intended to
impose contradictory requirements on
regulated entities in the futures markets
or otherwise. To the extent, if any, that
the proposed Rule’s requirements could
duplicate requirements already
CEA 2(a)(1)(A)); SEC v. Hopper, No. 04-1054, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17772, at *35 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24,
2006) (allowing the SEC to challenge fraudulent and
deceptive energy trading transactions under Rule
10b-5, despite assertions that the CFTC and FERC
had exclusive jurisdiction to regulate commodities
transactions and interstate wholesale electricity
rates, respectively). Cf. CEA 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C.
13(a)(2) (making it unlawful for ‘‘[a]ny person to
manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of
any commodity in interstate commerce’’); 7 U.S.C.
13b (authorizing the CFTC to issue cease and desist
orders against commodities price manipulation);
United States v. Reliant Energy Serv., 420 F. Supp.
2d 1043, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that FERC’s
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate wholesale
electricity markets did not bar CFTC enforcement
action against commodities price manipulation);
Amaranth Advisors LLC, 120 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,085;
2007 FERC LEXIS 1463, at *52 (July 26, 2007)
(show cause order) (observing that the ‘‘CFTC has
jurisdiction over trading on its regulated exchanges
[under the CEA], we have jurisdiction [under the
EPAct 2005] over certain types of natural gas and
electric markets, and where these markets are
interconnected, both agencies have jurisdiction to
prohibit market manipulation.’’).
91 See Ken Roberts, 276 F.3d at 593 (‘‘[In] ‘an age
of overlapping and concurring regulatory
jurisdiction,’’’ declining to conclude ‘‘that one
agency may not regulate merely because another
may.’’) (citations omitted).
92 Likewise, certain commenters urge the
Commission to avoid any overlap with FERC
authority to regulate certain energy markets. See,
e.g., API at 15 n.26 (noting that a rule reaching oil
pipelines would address conduct and markets
already subject to FERC regulation); Plains at 1
(‘‘FERC has extensive authority over oil pipelines
and the adoption of an anti-manipulation provision
applicable to these same entities by another
regulatory authority creates a risk of conflicting and
inconsistent standards, with resulting
uncertainty.’’); AOPL at 12, 20 (arguing that the
Commission should avoid conflicts of jurisdiction
with FERC because the cost of inconsistent and
overlapping enforcement standards would be
substantial). FERC’s authority with respect to price
manipulation in such markets is not exclusive,
however, and would not preclude the Commission
from promulgating an anti-manipulation rule that
may reach conduct also subject to FERC’s authority.
See United States v. Reliant Energy Serv., 420 F.
Supp. 2d 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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established by other agencies for such
markets, it would not impose additional
compliance costs. Although the
Commission acknowledges that
different agencies could simultaneously
initiate enforcement action with respect
to the same activities, the Commission
has had a longstanding practice of
coordinating its enforcement efforts
with agencies with which it shares
overlapping jurisdiction.93 The
Commission expects that it would
continue that practice here, as feasible
and appropriate, to ensure fairness to
regulated entities and to conserve
enforcement resources and maximize
agency efficiency.94 The Commission
seeks additional comments on the scope
of persons covered by the proposed
Rule.
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C. Section 317.2: Definitions
The proposed Rule sets forth five
definitions, adding precision to the
following terms used in EISA: ‘‘crude
oil;’’ ‘‘gasoline;’’ ‘‘person;’’ ‘‘petroleum
distillates;’’ and ‘‘wholesale.’’ The
proposed definitions establish the scope
of the proposed Rule’s coverage and
provide guidance as to the
Commission’s intended enforcement of
the proposed Rule. It is important to
note, however, that Section 811
prohibits manipulative or deceptive
devices or contrivances ‘‘in connection
with’’ the purchase or sale of the
defined commodities at wholesale. As
discussed in Section II.E.3 below, the
93 One commenter warns that poor coordination
between the Commission and other agencies could
lead to a situation wherein ‘‘multiple agencies may
pursue certain potential violations, while other
violations are left unchecked because each
oversight agency expects or desires another to take
the appropriate action.’’ NPGA at 2. To prevent
such pitfalls of regulatory overlap, NPGA
encourages the issuance of an Executive Order that
clearly draws lines of jurisdiction among agencies.
NPGA at 3.
94 See, e.g., PMAA at 6 (urging the formation of
a standing inter-agency task force on market
manipulation charged with coordination and
information sharing tasks); ISDA at 4 (encouraging
the Commission to work with the CFTC to ensure
that both agencies implement their antimanipulation enforcement programs in a
coordinated and efficient manner); CFDR at 6
(encouraging the Commission to work with the
CFTC and FERC to adopt a clear anti-manipulation
standard for the wholesale crude oil, gasoline and
petroleum distillates markets); ICE at 2 (‘‘The
Commission should coordinate with FERC and the
CFTC to define their respective roles in the energy
markets.’’); SIGMA at 10 (urging the Commission to
coordinate its present rulemaking with the CFTC to
‘‘ensure that regulated parties are governed
appropriately’’); MFA at 22 (stating the Commission
could avoid duplicative efforts if it developed a
formal or informal arrangement to coordinate
investigatory activities and even enforcement
actions with the CFTC); Sutherland at 8 (urging the
Commission and the CFTC to ‘‘develop clear rules
as to which agency will assume jurisdiction when
the futures and financial market conditions are not
in issue’’).
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proposed Rule would also reach
manipulative conduct that extends
beyond the defined terms if that
conduct directly or indirectly impacts
wholesale prices for the covered
products.95 The Commission solicits
comments on these proposed
definitions, as well as any alternative or
additional definitions, or other
comments on this Section of the
proposed Rule.
1. Section 317.2(a): Crude oil
The proposed Rule is intended to
capture the direct or indirect use or
employment of any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in
connection with the wholesale purchase
or sale of enumerated petroleum
products, including crude oil. Section
317.2(a) of the proposed Rule defines
‘‘crude oil’’ to mean: ‘‘the mixture of
hydrocarbons that exist: (1) in liquid
phase in natural underground reservoirs
and which remain liquid at atmospheric
pressure after passing through
separating facilities, or (2) as shale oil or
tar sands requiring further processing
for sale as a refinery feedstock.’’ As
defined, ‘‘crude oil,’’ includes liquid
crude oil and any hydrocarbon form that
can be processed into a refinery
feedstock. ‘‘Crude oil’’ does not include
natural gas, natural gas liquids, or noncrude refinery feedstocks.
2. Section 317.2(b): ‘‘Gasoline’’
The proposed Rule also covers the use
or employment of any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in
connection with the wholesale purchase
or sale of ‘‘gasoline.’’ Section 317.2(b) of
the proposed Rule defines ‘‘gasoline’’ to
mean: ‘‘(1) finished gasoline, including,
but not limited to, conventional,
reformulated, and oxygenated blends,
and (2) conventional and reformulated
gasoline blendstock for oxygenate
blending.’’ The proposed definition of
‘‘gasoline’’ is intended to capture those
commodities regularly traded as
finished products or as products
requiring only oxygenate blending to be
finished.
Manipulative or deceptive conduct
involving non-petroleum based
commodities that directly or indirectly
affect the price of gasoline (e.g., ethanol,
reformate, or alkylate that may be
blended into the finished product) may
95 The Commission does not believe, as some
commenters argue, that the terms in Section 811
preclude the Commission from reaching supply
decisions or services. See, e.g., API at 25-26 (urging
the Commission to avoid construing the language of
Section 811 to apply to supply decisions
unconnected with a wholesale transaction); AOPL
at 10 (arguing that EISA does not expressly cover
‘‘transportation and related services provided by oil
pipelines’’).
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be the subject of Commission
enforcement under the proposed Rule.96
For example, although ethanol is
excluded from the definition of
‘‘gasoline,’’ the Commission believes
that manipulation of ethanol may be
covered under the proposed Rule where
changes in ethanol prices directly or
indirectly affect wholesale gasoline
prices.
3. Section 317.2(c): ‘‘Person’’
The proposed Rule makes it unlawful
for any ‘‘person’’ to engage in
manipulative or deceptive conduct in
connection with the wholesale purchase
or sale of the enumerated petroleum
products. Section 317.2(c) defines the
term ‘‘person’’ to mean: ‘‘any
individual, group, unincorporated
association, limited or general
partnership, corporation, or other
business entity.’’ This definition is
identical to that used in other
Commission rules,97 and is consistent
with the jurisdictional reach of the FTC
Act.98
4. Section 317.2(d): ‘‘Petroleum
distillates’’
The proposed Rule also covers the use
or employment of a manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in
connection with the wholesale purchase
or sale of ‘‘petroleum distillates.’’
Section 317.2(d) of the proposed Rule
defines ‘‘petroleum distillates’’ to mean:
‘‘(1) jet fuels, including, but not limited
to, all commercial and military
specification jet fuels, and (2) diesel
fuels and fuel oils, including, but not
limited to, No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4 diesel
fuel, and No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4 fuel
oil.’’
‘‘Petroleum distillates’’ include the
middle distillate refinery streams from
heavy fuel oils to lighter products such
as on-road diesel, heating oil, and
kerosene-based jet fuels. Similar to the
Commission’s proposed definition of
‘‘gasoline,’’ the definition of ‘‘petroleum
distillates’’ is limited to finished fuel
products, other than ‘‘gasoline’’
produced at a refinery or blended in
tank at a terminal. The proposed
definition of ‘‘petroleum distillates’’
also responds to the request of ANPR
commenters that the Commission
96 Two commenters express concern about
practices involving ethanol. TOMA at 2-3; IPMA at
2-3. But see ISDA at 19 (encouraging the
Commission to ‘‘exclude non-petroleum based
ethanol products from the definition of petroleum
distillates’’).
97 See, e.g., Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 CFR
Part 310; Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Franchising, 16 CFR Part 436.
98 73 FR at 25616 n.14. For a discussion of
comments submitted on the scope of the
application of the proposed rule, see Section II.B.
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specifically define the term ‘‘petroleum
distillates’’ more precisely.99
5. Section 317.2(e): ‘‘Wholesale’’
As previously noted, the proposed
Rule prohibits the use or employment of
a manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in connection with the
wholesale purchase or sale of
enumerated petroleum products —
crude oil, gasoline, and petroleum
distillates. The proposed Rule defines
the term ‘‘wholesale’’ to mean:
‘‘purchases or sales at the terminal rack
level or upstream of the terminal rack
level. Transactions conducted at
wholesale do not include retail gasoline
sales to consumers.’’
This definition is intended to make it
clear that the proposed Rule would
apply to any conduct that directly or
indirectly affects market prices of an
enumerated petroleum product at the
terminal rack level or upstream of the
terminal rack level.100 The proposed
definition of ‘‘wholesale’’ also makes
explicit that the proposed Rule does not
apply to ordinary sales of gasoline or
other covered products to consumers at
gasoline stations or other retail
establishments.
The Commission disagrees with
commenters that define wholesale to
exclude transactions at the terminal rack
level. API, for example, asserts that
wholesale transactions should not
include terminal rack transactions,
Dealer Tankwagon sales to dealers, and
other terminal-level sales.101 The
Department of Energy’s Energy
Information Administration (‘‘EIA’’),
however, defines a ‘‘wholesale price’’ to
include rack prices.102 Moreover, a
common definition of ‘‘wholesale’’ is
‘‘the sale of goods in quantity, as to
retailers or jobbers, for resale.’’103
Accordingly, the Commission believes it
is appropriate for the proposed Rule to
cover transactions at the terminal level.
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D. Section 317.3: Prohibited Practices
The Commission intends its proposed
Rule to prohibit manipulative or
deceptive conduct in connection with
the purchase or sale of crude oil,
99 See, e.g., MFA at 2 n.2 (encouraging the
Commission to define the term ‘‘petroleum
distillate’’); API at 23 n.42 (proposing that the
definition of ‘‘petroleum distillates’’ include diesel,
kerosene, jet fuel, and home heating oil); ISDA at
19 (proposing that the definition of ‘‘petroleum
distillates’’ include diesel, home heating oil, and jet
fuel).
100 See, e.g., CFDR at 3 n.1; PMAA at 4-5.
101 API at 24-25. See also PMAA at 4-5 (urging
the Commission to exclude activities that occur at
the terminal rack level).
102 (https://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/
glossary_w.htm).
103 (https://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
wholesale).
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gasoline, or petroleum distillates at
wholesale. Specifically, Section 317.3
states:
It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, in
connection with the purchase or
sale of crude oil, gasoline, or
petroleum distillates at wholesale,
(a) To use or employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice,
or course of business that operates
or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person.
1. Section 317.3(a): Device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud
Section 317.3(a) prohibits the use or
employment of any ‘‘device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud.’’ As noted before,
this language is derived from SEA
Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5. It is
intended to be a broad anti-fraud
provision that will enable the
Commission to police all forms of fraud
and manipulation that affect wholesale
petroleum markets. At the same time,
the term ‘‘fraud’’ is not intended to
cover every act that happens to affect a
wholesale market for petroleum. Rather,
as discussed in greater detail in the
required elements section of this NPRM,
it covers intentional acts that obstruct or
impair wholesale petroleum markets.104
Determining whether specific conduct
constitutes fraud is a question of fact
that requires a case-by-case
determination in light of all the
circumstances.
2. Section 317.3(b): False material facts
and omissions of material fact
Section 317.3(b) of the proposed Rule
prohibits covered entities from
misrepresenting, and in some instances
omitting, material information in a
wholesale petroleum market. Consistent
with securities law, a fact is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable market participant would
consider it in making its decision to
transact because the material fact
significantly alters the total mix of
information available.105 As the
104 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S.
855, 861 (1966) (noting that fraud within the
meaning of a statute need not be confined to the
common law definition of fraud: any false
statement, misrepresentation or deceit may suffice).
105 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438 (1976) sets forth the ‘‘total mix’’ or ‘‘substantial
likelihood’’ test of materiality: a substantial
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Supreme Court has stated, ‘‘[t]he role of
the materiality requirement is . . . to
filter out essentially useless information
that a reasonable investor would not
consider significant, even as part of a
larger ‘mix’ of factors to consider in
making his investment decision.’’106
Thus, it is often not enough simply to
show that a particular statement is false
or incomplete if the misrepresented fact
is otherwise insignificant.107 However,
under securities law precedent, it is not
necessary to prove that an investor
would have acted differently if he or she
had known the actual truth of the
matter.108
a. Misrepresentations of material fact
One type of misrepresentation of
material fact captured by the proposed
Rule is the reporting of false or
misleading information to government
agencies, to third-party reporting
services, and to the public through
corporate announcements. Many
commenters agree that this type of
behavior is problematic because
industry participants rely on such
market information to conduct business
transactions.109 For example, false or
deceptive announcements by refiners or
pipelines, in particular, are likely to
have an adverse impact on the market
and the pricing of petroleum products,
thereby harming market participants
and ultimately consumers, because of
the close attention paid to even slight
changes in supply or inventory.
Similarly, the reporting of false or
misleading information to private data
reporting services may have an impact
on market prices and supply
decisions.110
b. Omissions of material information
Section 317.3(b) imposes no general
duty upon covered entities to disclose
information such as cost and volume
data. Nonetheless, Section 317.3(b)
prohibits omissions of material fact that
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by a reasonable investor
as having significantly altered the total mix of
information made available. Accord Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-2 (1988) (adopting TSC
Indus. test for materiality in Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 context).
106 Basic, Inc. 485 U.S. at 234.
107 Id. at 238.
108 See Folger Adam Co. v. PMI Indus., Inc., 938
F.2d 1529, 1534 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 983 (1991).
109 API at 50; Plains at 4; PMAA at 7 (urging the
Commission to prohibit the dissemination of false
or misleading information made with the intent to
defraud).
110 Congress recognized the importance of
truthful reporting by adopting Section 812 of EISA,
which prohibits false reporting to the government.
42 U.S.C. 17302. See Platts at 2 (‘‘Confidence in
price discovery processes is vital for market
participants, regulators and the public alike . . . .’’).
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are necessary to ensure that a previously
made statement is not misleading.111
Accordingly, there may be a violation of
Section 317.3(b) if a covered entity
voluntarily provides information — or is
compelled to provide information by
statute, order, or regulation — but then
fails to disclose a material fact, thereby
making the information provided
misleading.
3. Section 317.3(c): Conduct operating
as a fraud or deceit
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Section 317.3(c) of the proposed Rule
prohibits any act, practice, or course of
business that ‘‘operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit.’’ This
provision, also modeled after SEC Rule
10b-5, is intended to be a catch-all
provision that prohibits any other
conduct that constitutes a fraud on
wholesale petroleum markets.
In proposing this language —
‘‘operates as a fraud’’ — the Commission
is mindful of objections raised to the
identical language used in the FERC
market manipulation rulemaking
proceeding. A few commenters to
FERC’s proposed rule questioned
whether the phrase ‘‘would operate as a
fraud’’ implied that no scienter is
required, and some urged FERC
specifically to add a scienter
requirement to this language in the
FERC rule.112 Following FERC’s
analysis, the Commission stresses that
the phrase ‘‘would operate as a fraud’’
is to be read consistently with securities
law precedent, meaning that there can
be no law violation without a showing
of scienter.113 Commenters to the FERC
proceeding also questioned whether this
language in the FERC rule is necessary
in light of the anti-fraud language in the
first section of the FERC rule, which is
the same language used in proposed
Rule Section 317.3(a).114 FERC noted in
its final rule that the SEC brings
numerous cases under this language in
SEC Rule 10b-5, and removing this
language from the FERC rule would
‘‘create uncertainty by distinguishing
the final rule from SEC Rule 10b-5 as to
render analogous securities law
precedent inapplicable.’’115 That same
reasoning applies here as well.
Consequently, the Commission has
tentatively decided to include
subsection (c) (prohibiting conduct
111 Based on securities law precedent, the
relevant time period for determining materiality is
at the time of the statement or omission, and not
in hindsight. See Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228
F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2000).
112 71 FR at 4252.
113 See id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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operating as a fraud or deceit) in the
proposed Rule.
4. Section 317.3 imposes no affirmative
duties or obligations upon covered
entities
Based upon the comments and its
own experience, the Commission
chooses at this time not to propose any
specific conduct obligations, such as a
duty to supply, provide access, or
disclose. The Commission in the ANPR
requested comment on whether specific
types of conduct should be prohibited
by an anti-manipulation rule. In
response, commenters generally oppose
requiring specific conduct standards
and focus their comments instead upon
whether there should be a duty to: (1)
supply product;116 (2) provide access to
terminals or pipelines;117 or (3) disclose
Several commenters state that a firm’s supply
decisions could be considered manipulative or
deceptive, but only under limited circumstances.
For example, IER recommends that the Commission
reach supply decisions only if they are fraudulent,
but it does not recommend new rules. IER at 4.
Sutherland asserts that the only circumstance in
which a firm’s market supply decisions could be
considered manipulative is if there is evidence of
both ‘‘a specific intent to manipulate a properly
defined market [which the Commission can
properly define, ‘‘given its long experience under
the antitrust laws.’’] and the power to do so.’’
Sutherland at 5 & n.9. Likewise, ISDA states that a
rule should reach only supply decisions involving
intentional deceptive or anticompetitive conduct
resulting in manipulated prices. ISDA at 17.
By contrast, many commenters oppose any
attempt to regulate supply decisions. ABA, Flint
Hills, and API contend that regulation of supply
decisions should be beyond the authority of Section
811. ABA at 6-7; API at 47. See also Flint Hills at
19 (‘‘The idea that the Commission can regulate
business decisions about how much petroleum to
sell, to whom to sell it, and at what price is
misguided and potentially dangerous.’’); Plains at 23 (FTC should not impose a duty to supply). ABA
asserts that the antitrust laws are the best vehicle
for determining the circumstances in which
unilateral supply decisions should be lawful or
unlawful. ABA at 6-7. Moreover, ABA, API, and
Flint Hills suggest that it would be difficult for the
Commission to regulate such complex supply
decisions. ABA at 6-7; API at 43-44; Flint Hills at
20.
Similarly, several commenters assert that the
Commission should not regulate supply decisions
after natural disasters or require firms to release
inventory during price spikes. IER, Flint Hills,
ABA, and API describe the need for markets to
respond freely to natural disasters. IER at 8; Flint
Hills at 21; ABA at 7; API at 42-43. ABA and API
note the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
as an example of the petroleum industry’s quick
response to a product shortage after a natural
disaster. They assert that high prices were shortlived due to the industry’s quick response. ABA at
7 n.20; API at 42-43.
117 Several commenters, API, AOPL, and Plains,
oppose any rule imposing a duty to provide access
to terminals or pipelines, because a terminal or
common carrier pipeline operator may have
legitimate business reasons for denying access to
third parties, or because FERC already regulates
such access and terms of access. API at 15 n.26, 5152; AOPL at 25-27; Plains at 3. By contrast, Navajo
Nation contends that a denial of pipeline access or
to ‘‘exchange transportation’’ can result in an
116
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48327
information.118 The Commission agrees
with commenters that the market is
generally the best determiner of supply
and demand decisions. The Commission
does not, however, foreclose the
possibility that facts and circumstances
may lead it to find that a decision to
withhold supply or access that
otherwise meets the requirements of the
proposed Rule violates the proposed
Rule.
The Commission seeks comments on
the foregoing, and specifically on the
use of the SEC 10b-5 Rule as a model
for the conduct prohibitions in the
proposed Rule.
E. Elements of Proof Under a Rule
Promulgated Pursuant to EISA
The Commission believes that
clarifying the elements of a violation
under the proposed Rule will reduce
regulatory uncertainty and assure
greater compliance. In doing so, the
Commission has looked to SEC
precedent for guidance in the
application of the proposed Rule. The
Commission has determined that it
would not likely act except in cases
where an entity: (1) uses a fraudulent
device, scheme or artifice, or makes a
material misrepresentation or a material
omission, or engages in any act,
practice, or course of business that
operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any entity; (2) with scienter;
and (3) in connection with the purchase
or sale of crude oil, gasoline, or
petroleum distillates at wholesale.
These elements track the elements
that courts have prescribed under SEC
artificial limitation on a crude producer’s ability to
reach refineries, which may depress prices, thereby
reducing output and discouraging investment to
expand crude production. Navajo Nation proposes
that the Commission adopt a rule ‘‘prohibiting an
owner-operator of an interstate pipeline from
denying a request for either actual physical
transportation or exchange transportation on the
pipeline when the owner-operator or its affiliate is
an actual or potential purchaser or consumer of the
crude oil supplied by the requesting party,’’ unless
the owner-operator can provide an enumerated
defense. Navajo Nation at 5-7.
118 Some commenters observe that the SEC has
broad authority to regulate the sale of and trade in
securities, including imposing disclosure
requirements. They voice concern that, by basing
the proposed Rule on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5, the Commission is adopting the SEC’s disclosure
requirements as well. Although the proposed Rule
is based on SEC law, the Commission is invoking
only the SEC’s anti-fraud provisions, not the entire
body of SEC law in the proposed Rule. In a similar
vein, the Commission chooses not to include any
record-keeping requirement in the proposed Rule.
See, e.g., API at 20 (arguing that the Commission
‘‘should not create new disclosure obligations
similar to those imposed on securities market
participants by SEC regulations’’).
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Rule 10b-5.119 Specifically, in
enforcement actions under Rule 10b-5,
the SEC must show: (1) a material
misrepresentation; (2) in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security;
(3) scienter; and (4) use of the
jurisdictional means.120 The SEC does
not need to prove investor reliance, loss
causation, or damages (or harm)121
because ‘‘the [SEC’s] duty is to enforce
the remedial and preventive terms of the
statute in the public interest, and not
merely to police those whose plain
violations have already caused
demonstrable loss or injury.’’122
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1. The first element is a showing of
manipulative conduct
Under the first element, the
Commission would need to show a
completed manipulative or deceptive
act. A manipulative or deceptive act is
one that injects information that is
materially false, misleading, or
deceptive into the marketplace. For
example, providing information that is
false or misleading to companies that
report details of transactions to the
industry, such as price reporting
services, would satisfy this element.
Uncompleted acts would not be
119 The elements are also similar to those that
FERC adopted for its final market manipulation
rule. See 71 FR at 4253.
120 Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183, 1192 (10th Cir.
2003); SEC v. C. Jones & Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1375,
1379 (D. Colo. 2004); SEC v. Autocorp Equities, Inc.,
292 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1318 (D. Utah 2003); SEA,
10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b); 17 CFR 240.10b-5.
121 SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 195 F. Supp. 2d
475, 490-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing SEC v. North
Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 84 (2d Cir.
1970)). See also SEC v. Todt, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2087, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000), aff’d, 2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 6042 (2d Cir. 2001); SEC v. Norton,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15167, at * 9 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 3, 1997); 71 FR 4244, 4253; 3 Thomas Lee
Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation
12.1 (5th ed. 2005) (‘‘[A] successful government
prosecution does not depend on a showing the
price was actually driven above or below the
security’s fair value. It is sufficient to establish that
the manipulator engaged in conduct calculated to
artificially affect the security’s price. However, in
the context of private suit, an actual effect on price
must be shown.’’ (emphasis added)).
122 SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 195 F. Supp. 2d
at 491 (quoting Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 143 (2d
Cir. 1963), and citing SEC v. North American
Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 84 (2d Cir.
1970) (reliance not an element of a Rule 10b-5 claim
in the context of an SEC proceeding)). Similarly, the
government need not demonstrate specific reliance
by the investor in a criminal prosecution for
securities fraud, although it must show that the
scheme at issue had some impact on the investor.
See United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 799
(5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d
625, 629 (7th Cir. 1962). Although reliance, loss
causation, and damages are not necessary for a
violation of the proposed Rule, the Commission,
like FERC, has determined that these elements will
inform the assessment of any remedies, such as
disgorgement or civil penalties, that may be
appropriate under the circumstances. See 71 FR at
4253 n.102.
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sufficient, however. For example,
preparing false or misleading data for a
reporting service but not actually
transmitting it would not likely satisfy
this element. Preparing a public
announcement containing false or
misleading information about sales or
available supplies — but not actually
making the announcement — also
would not likely satisfy this element.
2. The second element is a showing of
scienter
Under the second element, the
Commission would need to show
scienter.123 As discussed below, a
scienter requirement parallels securities
law precedent124 and would help to
ensure that the proposed Rule does not
chill competitive behavior. Several
commenters support such a
requirement.125
As an initial matter, the conduct
addressed by Section 811 — use or
employment of a manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance — is
substantially similar to the conduct
prohibited by Section 10(b) of the
SEA.126 The Supreme Court has
Although not explicitly in its rule, FERC
included an intent requirement in its interpretation
of its rule, noting that ‘‘[t]he final rule is not
intended to regulate negligent practices or corporate
mismanagement, but rather to deter or punish fraud
in wholesale energy markets.’’ 71 FR at 4245-4246.
See also, e.g., SIGMA at 6 (asserting that any rule
proposed under Section 811, like the FERC rule,
‘‘cannot ‘regulate negligent practices or . . .
mismanagement but rather [are meant] . . . to deter
or punish fraud.’’’).
124 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
127 S.Ct. 2499, 2507 (June 21, 2007) (quoting Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-194 & n.12
(1976)); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197. In Ernst &
Ernst, the Court continued that the terms
‘‘‘manipulative,’ ‘device,’ and ‘contrivance’ . . .
make unmistakable a congressional intent to
proscribe a type of conduct quite different from
negligence.’’ Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199. See also
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1,
6-7 (1985); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 476 (1977). See, e.g., API at 28 (stating that
‘manipulative’ and ‘deceptive,’ as found in SEA
Section 10(b), are generally understood to denote
conduct that is deliberately intended to deceive);
ISDA at 7-8 (arguing that through Section 10(b),
‘‘Congress intended to prohibit only knowing or
intentional misconduct’’); CFDR at 13 (arguing that
Section 10(b) does not embrace a lesser standard
than specific intent).
125 See, e.g., API at 27 (urging the Commission
to adopt a specific intent standard); CAPP at 3
(stating ‘‘that intent or state of mind should be
made an essential element of prohibited conduct’’);
ISDA at 7 (urging the Commission to require
specific intent); CFDR at 7 (‘‘Manipulation should
require proof of intentionally or recklessly
deceptive conduct.’’); SIGMA at 3 (stating that any
Section 811 rule ‘‘must have a strict scienter
requirement’’); Muris at 11 (‘‘In any manipulation
rule, the Commission should require specific intent
. . . .’’); PMAA at 4 (encouraging the Commission
to include a scienter requirement). But see, e.g.,
NPGA at 4-5 (arguing that the rule should not
include a scienter requirement).
126 See, e.g., SIGMA at 6 (‘‘[T]he Commission’s
authority rests on identical language to that of
123
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Fmt 4702
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determined that this Section 10(b)
language connotes ‘‘intentional or
willful conduct that is designed to
deceive or defraud,’’ and has concluded,
therefore, that a violation of SEA
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires
scienter; that is, ‘‘a mental state
embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.’’127 As several
commenters argue, SEA Section 10(b)
provides the most directly relevant
precedents for analyzing the market
manipulation standard of Section
811.128
Moreover, the Commission believes a
showing of recklessness would satisfy
the scienter element.129 This proposal is
consistent with the legal and regulatory
precedent governing SEC Rule 10b-5. As
the Supreme Court has noted, ‘‘[e]very
Court of Appeals that has considered
the issue [of civil liability under SEA
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] has held
that a plaintiff may meet the scienter
requirement by showing that the
defendant acted intentionally or
recklessly, though the Circuits differ on
the degree of recklessness.’’130
[Section] 10(b) . . . .’’); API at 17 (arguing that
Section 811’s prohibitive language is derived from
Section 10(b)); CFDR at 3 (‘‘[T]he language of
Section 811 is effectively identical to the antimanipulation proscriptions found in Section 10(b)
. . . .’’).
127 Tellabs, Inc., 127 S.Ct. at 2507 (quoting Ernst
& Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193-194 & n.12); accord e.g.,
API at 2, 28-29.
128 Moreover, the legislative materials cited above
support the view that when Congress enacted
Section 811, it chose this language in order to
encourage the Commission to incorporate the
scienter requirement into any rule promulgated
under Section 811. See, e.g., SIGMA at 4 (‘‘As it
regards [Section] 811 of EISA, Congress plainly
chose language that it has previously used in the
context of the securities laws, knowing that the
Court implies such usage to connote a strict scienter
requirement.’’); ISDA at 7 (‘‘In enacting Section 811
. . . Congress used the same language . . . that it
has used in other contexts and that courts
consistently have interpreted to require scienter . .
. .’’); API at 17-18 (arguing that Congress made a
‘‘conscious decision to model Section 811’’ on the
precedents of Section 10(b) and the EPAct 2005).
129 Some commenters note that, although a
recklessness standard makes sense in the highly
regulated securities markets characterized by
fiduciary duties imposed on brokers and issuers
and by a variety of disclosure obligations, it should
not suffice to satisfy the scienter requirement with
respect to transactions in physical commodities
markets such as petroleum wholesale markets that
lack similar disclosure obligations and fiduciary
duties. See, e.g. API at 30 (‘‘Importing a
‘recklessness’ standard from the highly regulated
securities markets into unregulated petroleum
wholesale markets would create new market
uncertainty.’’); ISDA at 9 (stating that a recklessness
standard ‘‘is not appropriate in the wholesale,
physical Petroleum Products markets . . . .’’). See
also, e.g., SIGMA at 5 (arguing that allowing
recklessness to satisfy the scienter requirement of
Section 811 would ‘‘[make] the rule an open ended
invitation to litigate any grievance’’).
130 Tellabs, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2507 n.3 (citing
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12); Ottman v.
Hunger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343
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Indeed, the Courts of Appeals have
adopted a number of different
formulations as to precisely what
constitutes recklessness. Thus, for
example, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has defined reckless
conduct as a
highly unreasonable [act or]
omission, involving not merely
simple, or even inexcusable
negligence, but an extreme
departure from the standards of
ordinary care, and which presents a
danger of misleading buyers or
sellers that is either known to the
defendant or is so obvious that the
actor must have been aware of it.131
More recently, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has
relied upon Sundstrand Corp. to
conclude that establishing recklessness
requires evidence from which it can be
reasonably inferred that the violator
both acted with an extreme departure
from standards of ordinary care and
either knew or must have known that its
conduct created a danger of misleading
buyers or sellers.132 The Commission
believes that a recklessness standard as
articulated by the Seventh and District
of Columbia Circuits would be adequate
to establish scienter for any future
violation.
3. The third element is that a person
engage in conduct ‘‘in connection with’’
the purchase or sale of a covered
commodity at wholesale
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Finally, under the third element, the
Commission would need to show a
nexus between the manipulative
conduct and the purchase or sale of
crude oil, gasoline, or petroleum
distillates at wholesale. Guided by
Supreme Court precedent in the
securities area, the Commission
interprets the phrase ‘‘in connection
with’’ as requiring fraudulent conduct to
coincide with a purchase or sale of
crude oil, gasoline, or petroleum
distillates at wholesale.133 At the same
(4th Cir. 2003) (collecting Court of Appeals cases).
Note, however, the Supreme Court has reserved the
question whether reckless behavior is, in fact,
sufficient for civil liability under SEA Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. See Tellabs. Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2507
n.3.
131 Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553
F. 2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977) (quoting Franke v. Midwestern
Oklahoma Development Authority, CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. [*] 95,786 at 90,850 (W.D. Okl. 1976)).
132 SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641-42 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (citingSundstrand Corp., 553 F.2d at
1045).
133 42 U.S.C. 17301. See SEC v. Zanford, 535 U.S.
813, 820 (2002); Superintendent of Ins. of State of
N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13
(1971) (holding that the ‘‘in connection with’’
requirement was met because the plaintiff had
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time, the Commission does not interpret
the ‘‘in connection with’’ requirement
so broadly as to turn every common law
fraud that happens to touch a purchase
or sale of a covered or uncovered
petroleum product into a rule
violation.134 Specifically, the proposed
Rule would reach manipulative conduct
that extends beyond the defined terms
if that conduct directly or indirectly
impacts wholesale prices for the
covered products.
In response to the ANPR, some
commenters urge the Commission not to
apply the ‘‘in connection with’’
requirement to specific types of
conduct. For example, CAPP suggests
that the Commission not construe ‘‘in
connection with’’ to cover importing
crude oil,135 while API argues that the
Commission not construe ‘‘in
connection with’’ to refer to supply
decisions.136 Other commenters take the
position that the Commission should
interpret ‘‘in connection with’’ to
exempt transactions not within the
Commission’s jurisdiction, specifically
commodity trading, because those
transactions, they assert, are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC.137
The Commission disagrees. The
Commission may enforce the proposed
Rule if the conduct directly or indirectly
affects a covered wholesale petroleum
transaction within the Commissions’s
jurisdiction — in this matter, a purchase
or sale of crude oil, gasoline, or
petroleum distillates. Therefore, any
conduct that is done in connection with
the wholesale purchase or sale of a
covered or uncovered product —
including importing covered or
‘‘suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices
touching its sale of securities.’’). See also Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547
U.S. 71, 85 (2006) (‘‘Moreover, when this court has
sought to give meaning to the phrase [‘in
connection with’] in the context of [Section] 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, it has espoused a broad
interpretation.’’).
134 See Zanford, 535 U.S. at 820.
135 CAPP at 4. Other commenters raise questions
that relate more to wholesale purchase and sale
transactions. See, e.g. API at 26-27 (asserting that
Section 811 should not apply to over-the-counter
derivatives contracts); Hess at 10-11 (arguing that
futures and over-the-counter markets should not be
regulated by the Commission); ISDA at 5 (stating
that a Commission market manipulation rule
should not apply to futures transactions); PMAA at
4-5 (arguing that regulations should not apply to
‘‘participants or activities’’ that occur below the
rack).
136 API at 25 (asserting that ‘‘Section 811 . . .
should not apply to supply decisions that are
unconnected to [wholesale petroleum
transactions]’’). API lists various supply decisions
it does not believe should be covered under the ‘‘in
connection with’’ requirement, including: ‘‘refining
decisions, facility maintenance and upgrades, [and]
the management of inventory levels.’’ API at 25-26.
137 MFA at 6-12; CFDR at 6 n.4; Hess at 12 n.10;
CFTC at 1-2; API at 3, 26-27; ISDA at 5 n.9. These
comments are addressed above in Section II.B.
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uncovered products and making supply
decisions related to covered or
uncovered products — could be subject
to the proposed Rule.
4. A showing of price effects is not an
element of a cause of action
The Commission does not intend to
require proof of effects as an element of
a cause of action. First, a plain reading
of EISA does not require such proof.
Section 811 prohibits the ‘‘use or
employment’’ of any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance.138 The
proposed Rule would be violated at the
stage when the actor uses or employs a
manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance — whether or not those
actions can be shown to result in
discernible price effects. Nothing in the
statute or proposed Rule suggests that
manipulative or deceptive conduct must
result in identifiable price effects before
such conduct is culpable.139
Second, there is no economic
justification for fraud or deception in an
exchange economy. Thus, harm to the
market can be inferred. Fraudulent
behavior interferes with market signals,
reduces transparency in the market, and
casts into doubt the very information
that allows markets to function
properly.140 There is no need to
determine separately whether there is
evidence of harm; therefore, requiring
proof of price effects is unnecessary.141
Third, the Commission believes that
requiring a showing of price effects
raises an unnecessary risk of regulatory
error. Prices of commodity products
such as petroleum are inherently
volatile and are a function of many
factors.142 The Commission’s
138 The enabling statute is clear: ‘‘It is unlawful
. . . to use or employ . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance.’’ 42 U.S.C. 17301.
139 Not requiring proof of effects as an element
is consistent with precedent established under SEC
Rule 10b-5. See generally United States v. Smith,
155 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 1988); see also SEC
v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996).
140 See United States v. Hall, 48 F. Supp. 2d 386,
387 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (‘‘Whether the price of a stock
is ‘artificial’ does not turn on whether the stock is
trading above or below its ‘true worth.’ Rather, the
trading price of a stock is determined by available
information and market forces, and a stock is
trading at an ‘artificial level’ when it is trading at
a level above what market forces would otherwise
dictate.’’). See also CAPP at 1 (‘‘CAPP recognizes
that fraud and manipulation pose a potential threat
to the successful and efficient functioning of
petroleum markets in North America.’’); MFA at 1
(‘‘Price manipulation has a corrosive effect on the
proper functioning of any market.’’).
141 While the Commission does not intend to
require discernible price effects as an element of a
rule violation, it will, nevertheless, consider the
extent of any price effects or other harm resulting
from the market manipulation in assessing a civil
penalty.
142 See, e.g., API at 53 (stating that the artificial
price concept is difficult to apply to petroleum
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experience in investigating petroleum
pricing anomalies demonstrates the
difficulty of identifying price changes
that result directly from any specific act
or conduct.143
Finally, the Commission believes that
the scienter requirement, in addition to
proof of an overt act, should provide
sufficient safeguards against
overbreadth.144 Consequently, the
Commission believes the proposed Rule
addresses commenters’ concerns that,
absent an effects requirement, any rule
would be overbroad and interfere with
pricing signals.145 The Commission
seeks comment on the foregoing,
including in particular whether its
articulation of the appropriate elements
of a cause of action under the Rule
furthers the goals of EISA and the
proposed Rule.
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F. Section 317.4: Preemption
Section 815(c) of EISA states that
‘‘[n]othing in this subtitle preempts any
State law.’’146 To give effect to that
provision, Section 317.4 of the proposed
Rule contains a standard preemption
provision, making clear that the
Commission does not intend to preempt
the laws of any state or local
government, except to the extent of any
conflict. Section 317.4 also explains that
there is no conflict between federal and
markets because petroleum markets, in contrast to
futures markets, use many non-standardized
contracts); ISDA at 15-16 (stating that the artificial
price standard ‘‘has proven to be very difficult to
understand and apply in practice’’).
143 The practical difficulty in discerning
accurately what constitutes an artificial price is
discussed by the ABA. ABA at 7 (‘‘[D]etermining
what supply allocations and price levels would
most benefit consumers over the long run would be
impossible for the FTC or any regulator in this
complex industry.’’); see also IER at 4 (arguing that
regulators should not second-guess the decisions of
market participants in the petroleum industry
because it could lead to ‘‘an inefficient amount of
risk-taking among producers.’’); Muris at 8
(‘‘Judgments about the ‘right’ mix of sales and
distribution are beyond the capacity of any
individual or organization to make accurately. That,
of course, is why our economy relies on markets to
make such decisions, and on the profit motive to
guide the behavior of individual firms.’’).
144 Proof of an overt manipulative or deceptive
act together with proof of requisite intent provide
sufficient safeguards against both regulatory
overreach and judicial error.
145 See Flint Hills at 19 (stating that a market
economy relies on prices and profit motive to
allocate resources efficiently; thus, regulators must
allow market participants to respond to market
signals when making production and product
allocation decisions without ‘‘fear of being second
guessed’’); Muris at 9 (‘‘One way to reduce the risk
of errors is to require a showing of (1) an effect on
price . . . .’’); API at 31 (‘‘Applying Section 811 to
conduct that does not cause a material deviation in
market prices would unduly expand the FTC’s
regulatory oversight and would likely harm
consumer welfare in the long run by chilling
competitive market behavior, thereby potentially
increasing prices.’’).
146 42 U.S.C. 17305.
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state and local law, and therefore no
preemption, if such state or local law
affords equal or greater protection from
the manipulative conduct prohibited by
the proposed Rule.147
G. Section 317.5: Severability
Section 317.5 of the proposed Rule
contains a standard severability
provision. This provision makes clear
that, if any part of the Rule is held
invalid by a court, the remainder of the
Rule will still be in effect.148
H. Invitation to Comment and Advance
Notice of Workshop
All persons are hereby given notice of
the opportunity to submit written data,
views, facts, and arguments addressing
the issues raised in this NPRM. All
comments should be filed as prescribed
in the ADDRESSES Section above, and
must be received by September 18,
2008. In addition, the Commission
anticipates that it may be advantageous
to hold a public workshop to discuss in
greater detail the written comments
submitted by the public in response to
the NPRM, and, in particular, any areas
of significant controversy or divergent
opinion that may arise from the
comments. In order to be eligible to
participate in a workshop, should one
be held, a person must submit a
comment in response to this NPRM. If
it is determined that a workshop is
necessary, details about the event will
be announced in a press release and be
available at (https://www.ftc.gov/ftc/
oilgas/).
I. Communications by Outside Parties to
the Commissioners or Their Advisors
Written communications and
summaries or transcripts of oral
communications respecting the merits
of this proceeding from any outside
party to any Commissioner or
Commissioner’s advisor will be placed
on the public record.149
J. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
(‘‘RFA’’)150 generally requires a
description and analysis of proposed
and final rules that will have significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The RFA
requires an agency to provide an Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(‘‘IRFA’’)151 with a proposed Rule and a
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(‘‘FRFA’’)152 with the final rule, if any.
The Commission is not required to make
such analyses if a rule would not have
such an effect.153
Although the scope of the proposed
Rule may reach a substantial number of
small entities as defined in the RFA, the
Commission does not believe that the
proposed Rule will have a significant
economic impact on those
businesses.154 The Commission
specifically requested comments on the
economic impact of a proposed Rule
and received none.155 Given that there
are no reporting requirements,
document or data retention provisions,
or any other affirmative duties imposed,
it is unlikely that the proposed Rule
imposes costs to comply beyond
standard costs associated with ensuring
that behavior and statements are not
manipulative or deceptive. Therefore,
the Commission believes that the
proposed Rule, if finalized, will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
Notwithstanding this belief, the
Commission provides a full IRFA
analysis to aid in its solicitation for
comments on this topic.
1. Description of the reasons that action
by the agency is being considered
Section 811 grants the Commission
the authority to promulgate a rule that
‘‘is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of
United States citizens.’’156 As discussed
above, the Commission believes that
promulgating the proposed Rule is
appropriate to prevent manipulative
practices affecting wholesale markets for
petroleum products and the
Commission has tailored its proposed
Rule specifically to reach manipulative
behavior that likely impacts those
commodities described in Section 811.
2. Succinct statement of the objectives
of, and the legal basis for, the proposed
Rule
The legal basis of the proposed Rule
is Section 811 of EISA, which makes
illegal manipulative and deceptive
conduct in the purchase or sale of
petroleum products at wholesale in
5 U.S.C. 603.
5 U.S.C. 604.
153 5 U.S.C. 605.
154 The RFA definition of ‘‘small entity’’ refers to
the definition provided in the Small Business Act,
which defines a ‘‘small business concern’’ as a
business that is independently owned and operated
and that is not dominant in its field of operation.
15 U.S.C. 632.
155 73 FR at 25624.
156 42 U.S.C. 17301.
151
See, e.g., Disclosure Requirements and
Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 16 CFR
436.10(b); Disclosure Requirements and
Prohibitions Concerning Business Opportunities, 16
CFR 437 n.2.
148 See, e.g., Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 CFR
310.9; Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule,
16 CFR 455.7.
149 See 16 CFR 1.26(b)(5).
150 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
147
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commodities with the effect of
impacting the covered commodities
contemplated by the proposed Rule. The
Commission seeks comments on
whether the proposed Rule may reach
other small entities and what economic
impact, if any, the proposed Rule would
have on those entities.
3. Description of, and where feasible,
estimate of the number of small entities
to which the proposed Rule will apply
The proposed Rule applies to entities
engaging in the purchase or sale of
crude oil, gasoline, and petroleum
distillates. These potentially include
petroleum refiners, blenders,
wholesalers and dealers (including
terminal operators that sell covered
commodities). Although many of these
entities are large international and
domestic corporations, the Commission
believes that a number of these covered
entities may fall into the category of
small entities.157 According to the SBA
size standards, and utilizing SBA source
data, the Commission estimates that
between approximately 1700 and 5200
covered entities would be classified as
‘‘small entities.’’158
The scope of the proposed Rule could
be broader depending on whether illegal
manipulative conduct impacts covered
commodities directly or other
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contravention of rules, if any, that the
Commission may promulgate. The
proposed Rule is intended to define the
conduct that the law proscribes. If
adopted, such rule will supplement the
Commission’s existing antitrust and
consumer protection law enforcement
tools.
4. Projected reporting, record-keeping,
and other compliance requirements,
including an estimate of the classes of
small entities that will be subject to the
requirement and the type of professional
skills necessary for preparation of the
report or record
The Commission does not propose,
and the proposed Rule does not contain,
any requirement that covered entities
create, retain, submit, or disclose any
information. Accordingly, the proposed
Rule will impose no new record-keeping
or related data retention and
maintenance or disclosure requirements
on any covered entity, including small
entities. The Commission has not
identified additional costs necessary to
comply with the proposed Rule beyond
existing costs associated with behaving
in a nondeceptive, truthful manner. The
Commission seeks comments on
whether the proposed Rule imposes
costs on any covered entities including
a description of specific costs and
estimates of the magnitude of those
costs.
157 Directly covered entities under this proposed
Rule are classified as small businesses under the
Small Business Size Standards component of the
North American Industry Classification System
(‘‘NAICS’’) if they are: petroleum refiners (NAICS
code 324110) with no more than 1,500 employees
nor greater than 125,000 barrels per calendar day
Operable Atmospheric Crude Oil Distillation
capacity; petroleum bulk stations and terminals
(NAICS code 424710) with no more than 100
employees; or petroleum and petroleum products
merchant wholesalers (except bulk stations and
terminals (NAICS code 424720) with no more than
100 employees. See U.S. Small Business
Administration, Table of Small Business Size
Standards Matched to North American Industry
Classification System Codes (Mar. 11, 2008),
available at (https://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/
documents/sba_homepage/serv_sstd_tablepdf.pdf).
158 The SBA publication that provides data on
number of firms and number of employees by firm
does not provide sufficient precision to gauge
accurately the number of small business that may
be impacted by the proposed Rule. The data are
provided in increments of 1-4 employees, fewer
than 20 employees and fewer than 500 employees.
Small Business Administration, Employer Firms, &
Employment by Employment Size of Firm by
NAICS Codes, 2005, available at (https://
www.sba.gov/advo/research/us05_n6.pdf). Thus for
the 177 petroleum refiners listed, 139 show that
they have less than 500 employees. Although the
Commission is unaware of more than 5 refiners
with less than 125,000 barrels of crude distillation
capacity, the data may be kept by refinery, rather
than refiner. Similar problems exist for the bulk
terminal and bulk wholesale categories listed above,
in which the relevant small business cut off is
greater than 100 employees. Thus, the range of
‘‘small’’ entities appears unreliable and the
Commission seeks comment or information
providing better data.
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5. Other duplicative, overlapping, or
conflicting federal rules
As discussed previously, other federal
agencies have regulatory authority to
prohibit in whole or in part
manipulative and deceptive practices
involving petroleum products. The SEC
has authority to stop manipulative and
deceptive practices involving the
securities and securities offerings of
companies involved in the petroleum
industry. The CFTC also has authority
to bring an action against any person
who is manipulating or attempting to
manipulate the petroleum futures
markets.159
159 Commenters such as MFA specifically argue
that the proposed Rule should have a safe harbor
provision or other explicit exemption for the futures
markets in order to avoid an overlap with the
CFTC’s jurisdiction under Section 2 of the CEA.
MFA at 5. According to commenters, including the
CFTC, such an overlap would create potentially
duplicative or inconsistent regulatory requirements,
thus undermining uniform regulatory scheme that
Congress sought to establish for the futures markets
under the CEA. See, e.g., CFTC at 1-2; API at 14,
16, 27; Flint Hills at 12; Hess at 12 n.10; NPGA at
2 (‘‘A flawed regulatory scheme may result in
reporting requirements being duplicative, standards
and definitions of proscribed behavior being
inconsistent . . . .’’); MFA at 13-14 (arguing that any
proposed rule should not reach futures trading
activities regulated by the CFTC). Several other
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48331
As explained in Section II.B, above,
the proposed Rule is not intended to
impose contradictory requirements on
regulated entities in the futures markets
or otherwise. To the extent, if any, that
the proposed Rule’s requirements could
duplicate requirements already
established by other agencies for such
markets, the proposed Rule should not
impose any additional compliance
costs. Although the Commission
acknowledges that different agencies
could simultaneously initiate
enforcement action with respect to the
same activities, the Commission has had
a longstanding practice of coordinating
its enforcement efforts with agencies
that have overlapping jurisdiction.160
The Commission expects to continue
that practice here, as feasible and
appropriate, to ensure fairness to
regulated entities and to conserve
enforcement resources and maximize
agency efficiency.161 However, the
Commission is requesting comment on
the extent to which other federal
standards on manipulation may
duplicate, satisfy, or inform the
proposed Rule’s requirements. In
addition, the Commission seeks
comment and information about any
statutes or rules that may conflict with
the proposed requirements, as well as
any other state, local, or industry rules
or policies that require covered entities
to implement practices that comport
with the requirements of the proposed
Rule.
commenters express concern that even if the
Commission could avoid inconsistent regulatory
requirements, market participants would still be
unfairly burdened by duplicative enforcement. See
Flint Hills at 14; Hess at 12; NPGA at 2.
160 One commenter warned that poor
coordination between the Commission and other
agencies could lead to a situation wherein
‘‘multiple agencies may pursue certain potential
violations, while other violations are left unchecked
because each oversight agency expects or desires
another to take the appropriate action.’’ NPGA at 2.
To prevent such pitfalls of regulatory overlap,
NPGA encouraged the issuance of an Executive
Order that clearly draws lines of jurisdiction among
agencies. Id. at 3.
161 See Section II.B (and footnotes therein) for a
discussion of concerns raised by commenters about
potentially duplicative or inconsistent regulatory
requirements.
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6. Description of any significant
alternatives to the proposed Rule that
would accomplish the stated objectives
of applicable statutes and that minimize
any significant economic impact of the
proposed Rule on small entities,
including alternatives considered, such
as: (1) establishment of differing
compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the
resources available to small entities; (2)
clarification, consolidation, or
simplification of compliance and
reporting requirements under the rule
for such small entities; and (3) any
exemption from coverage of the rule, or
any part thereof, for such small entities
The proposed Rule is narrowly
tailored to reduce compliance burdens
on covered entities, regardless of size. In
formulating the proposed Rule, the
Commission has taken several
significant steps to minimize potential
burdens. Most significantly, the
proposed Rule focuses on preventing
manipulation and deception in
wholesale petroleum markets. The
Commission has declined to include
specific conduct or duty requirements,
such as a duty to supply product or a
duty to provide access to pipelines and
terminals. In addition, the proposed
Rule makes clear that covered entities
need not disclose price, volume, and
other data to the market. Finally, the
proposed Rule contains no recordkeeping requirement.
While the Commission believes that
the proposed Rule imposes no unique
compliance costs, it nonetheless
requests comment on this issue, in
particular, whether the proposed Rule’s
prohibited practices impose a
significant impact upon a substantial
number of small entities, and what
modifications to the Rule the
Commission should consider to
minimize the burden on small entities.
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7. Questions for comment to assist
regulatory flexibility analysis
The Commission requests
commenters to provide information as
to the potential scope and economic
impact of the proposed Rule so that the
Commission may better assess the
economic impact of the language of any
final rule if it determines to promulgate
such rule. Specifically, the Commission
requests comment on:
a. the number and type of small
entities affected by the proposed Rule;
b. any or all of the provisions in the
proposed Rule with regard to: (i) the
impact of the provision(s) (including
benefits and costs to implement and
comply with the Rule or Rule
provision), if any; (ii) what alternatives,
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if any, the Commission should consider,
as well as the costs and benefits of those
alternatives, paying specific attention to
the effect of the proposed Rule on small
entities;
c. ways in which the proposed Rule
could be modified to reduce any costs
or burdens on small entities, including
whether and how technological
developments could further reduce the
costs of implementing and complying
with the proposed Rule for small
entities;
d. any information quantifying the
economic costs and benefits of the
proposed Rule on the entities covered,
including small entities; and
e. the identity of any relevant federal,
state, or local rules that may duplicate,
overlap, or conflict with the proposed
Rule.
K. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Commission does not
contemplate requiring any entity
covered by the Rule to create, retain, or
submit any data. Accordingly, the
proposed Rule does not include any
new information collection
requirements under the provisions of
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(‘‘PRA’’).162
In the ANPR, the Commission
solicited comment on whether covered
entities should report market data, such
as cost and volume data for wholesale
transactions.163 In response, one
commenter notes that Section 812
already addresses the making of false
reports and should not be construed as
giving the Commission authority to
impose new reporting requirements.164
The Commission has determined that
a record retention or submission
requirement is not necessary or
appropriate at this time. However, the
Commission’s experience with any final
162 44 U.S.C. 3501-3521. Under the PRA, federal
agencies must obtain approval from OMB for each
collection of information they conduct or sponsor.
‘‘Collection of information’’ means agency requests
or requirements that members of the public submit
reports, keep records, or provide information to a
third party. 44 U.S.C. 3502(3).
163 73 FR at 25622.
164 ISDA at 16 (‘‘Neither Section 811 nor Section
812 of the EISA authorizes the Commission to
impose new reporting requirements.’’). See, e.g.,
CFDR at 16 (‘‘The Commission should not
promulgate a rule that purports to impose
disclosure obligations on market participants where
no disclosure obligations otherwise exist under
current law.’’); API at 52. But see, e.g., PMAA at 89 (stating that the Commission has authority under
Section 811 to impose new reporting requirements);
NPGA at 3 (‘‘The authority to mandate the
maintenance and submission of [information
regarding wholesale petroleum transactions] is
inherent in the EISA prohibitions against
manipulative activities in Section 811 and the
reporting of false information to Federal authorities
in Section 812.’’).
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rule that may be adopted under Section
811 or pursuant to its investigative and
enforcement role under Section 812 may
suggest a particular need to require
firms to create or maintain particular
information.165 If such a need arises, the
Commission may, in the future, adopt
such rules as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the
protection of United States citizens.
L. Request for Comments
The Commission seeks comment on
various aspects of the proposed Rule.
Without limiting the scope of issues on
which it seeks comment, the
Commission is particularly interested in
receiving comments on the questions
that follow. In responding to these
questions, include detailed, factual
supporting information whenever
possible.
1. General Questions for Comment
Please provide comment on each
proposed aspect of the proposed Rule.
Regarding each proposed provision
commented on, please include answers
to the following questions.
a. What is the effect (including any
benefits and costs), if any, on
consumers?
b. What is the impact (including any
benefits and costs), if any, on individual
firms that must comply with the
proposed Rule?
c. What is the impact (including any
benefits and costs), if any, on industry?
d. What changes, if any, should be
made to the proposed Rule to eliminate
any unnecessary cost to industry or
consumers?
e. How would the proposed Rule
affect small business entities with
respect to costs, profitability,
competitiveness, and employment?
2. Questions on Proposed Specific
Provisions
Rulemaking Standard
a. Is the Commission’s determination
that the proposed Rule meets the
rulemaking standard — that the rule is
‘‘necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of United
States citizens’’ — correct? In what way
is the proposed Rule necessary or
appropriate? In what way does the
proposed Rule fail to be necessary or
appropriate?
Section 317.1 — Scope
b. The Commission did not provide
for safe harbors or exemptions from the
165 Platts at 3 (taking no position on reporting to
government agencies, but ‘‘strongly endors[ing] any
efforts to make more data available on an equal
basis to all market participants’’).
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proposed Rule. Should there be safe
harbors or exemptions? If so, what
should they be? To what should they
apply; that is, what types of acts or
practices should constitute a safe
harbor? Why should that be so? What
types of acts or practices should be
exempt? Why should that be so?
Section 317.2 — Definitions
c. Do the proposed definitions
adequately describe the scope of the
proposed Rule’s coverage? If not, how
should they be modified? Are the
proposed definitions accurate? Are there
alternative definitions that the
Commission should consider? Should
additional terms be defined, and, if so,
how? What would be the costs and
benefits of each suggested definition?
Section 317.3 — Prohibited Practices
d. The proposed Rule uses SEC Rule
10b-5 as a model. Will the Rule 10b-5
model function properly with respect to
wholesale petroleum markets? If not,
why not? What alternative approach
could be used? If an alternative
approach or model could be used here,
what would be the costs and benefits of
using an alternative approach or model?
e. The proposed Rule targets practices
that act as a fraud or deceit. Has the
Commission adequately delineated such
practices? If not, why not? Is there a list
of practices that should be covered by
the proposed Rule? If so, what are they
and why should they be included? Are
there practices that should be excluded
from the proposed Rule? If so, what are
they and why should they be excluded?
f. Has the proposed Rule sufficiently
laid out any affirmative duties or other
obligations upon entities covered under
the proposed Rule? If not, why not?
g. Section 317.3(a) of the proposed
Rule prohibits the use or employment of
any ‘‘device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud.’’ Is this language sufficiently
broad enough to enable the Commission
to police all forms of fraud and
manipulation that affect wholesale
petroleum markets? If not, why not?
How could the proposed Rule be
modified to ensure that all forms of
devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud
are covered?
h. Section 317.3(b) of the proposed
Rule prohibits covered entities from
misrepresenting, and in some instances
from omitting, material information in
wholesale petroleum markets. Is this
prohibition adequate to enable the
Commission to deter and punish
persons who intentionally provide false
or misleading information to
government agencies, third-party
reporting services, or the public through
corporate announcements? Why or why
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not? Does the proposed Rule need to be
modified in anyway to better address
any misrepresentations or omissions,
and if so, what should those
modifications be?
i. What factors should the
Commission consider in weighing
whether, once an announcement is
made by a person subject to the
proposed Rule, an affirmative obligation
may then exist to provide full and
complete disclosure?
j. Section 317.3(b) prohibits omissions
of material fact that are necessary to
ensure that a previously made statement
is not misleading. Will this provision
address the harms that may occur in the
reporting of information in the
wholesale petroleum industry? If not,
why not and how could the proposed
Rule be modified to better address such
harms?
k. Section 317.3(c) of the proposed
Rule prohibits any act, practice, or
course of business that ‘‘operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit.’’
Will this sub-section be useful to the
FTC as a ‘‘catch-all’’ provision that
captures fraud on wholesale petroleum
markets? If not, why not? Is this
provision, in light of the inclusion of the
more specific anti-fraud provision in
proposed Rule Section 317.3(a)? If not,
why not?
l. Does the Rule’s prohibition on
manipulative or deceptive conduct
promote well-functioning market
processes ‘‘in connection with the
purchase or sale of crude oil, gasoline,
or petroleum distillates at wholesale’’? If
so, why not?
m. Does the proposed Rule have
sound bases in economic policy for
prohibiting manipulative and deceptive
conduct? Why or why not?
n. Do additional factual predicates
exist to support a basis for the proposed
Rule to fill a gap in Commission
jurisdiction under Section 5 of the FTC
Act or to support extending Commission
authority beyond the scope of Section 5
of the FTC Act? If so, describe such
factual predicates.
o. Should the Commission consider
any affirmative defenses to rule
violations? If so, what affirmative
defenses should the Commission
consider and how can those defenses be
justified?
p. Is the proposed Rule’s basis for
requiring a showing of scienter as an
element of proof sound? Should a
scienter requirement be part of the text
of Section 317.3 of the proposed Rule?
Is the Commission’s tentative
determination that both intentional and
reckless conduct may satisfy the
scienter requirement appropriate? Why
or why not?
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48333
q. The Commission tentatively has
concluded that the ‘‘in connection
with’’ language in the proposed Rule
would reach manipulative conduct that
extends beyond the defined terms (e.g.,
crude oil, gasoline, petroleum
distillates) if that conduct directly or
indirectly impacts wholesale prices for
the covered products. What would be
the advantage (disadvantage) of this
approach and why?
r. Should the proposed Rule be
available to challenge ‘‘attempted
manipulation,’’ defined as uncompleted
fraudulent or deceptive conduct? Are
there advantages to this approach and
why? Are there disadvantages to this
approach and why? Are there examples
of ‘‘attempted manipulation’’ that
should be covered by the proposed
Rule? If so, what are they and why
should they be covered?
s. The Commission tentatively has
concluded that liability should not
require proof of price effects. What
would be the advantage (disadvantage)
of requiring proof of price effects?
t. The Commission tentatively has
determined that a record retention or
submission requirement is not necessary
or appropriate at this time. Are there
records that the Commission should, in
fact, require companies to retain or
submit? If so, what types of records
should be retained or submitted and
why?
Section 317.4 — Preemption
u. The Commission has determined
that the proposed Rule should not
preempt the laws of any state or local
government, except to the extent that
any such law conflicts with this
proposed Rule. What impact is this
approach likely to have upon the
industry? Individual companies?
Consumers?
Regulatory Flexibility Act
v. Is the Commission estimate that
between approximately 1700 and 5200
‘‘small entities’’ will be covered by the
proposed Rule accurate? Why or why
not?
w. The proposed Rule does not
contain any requirement that covered
entities create, retain, submit, or
disclose any information. Is the
Commission correct in its determination
that, accordingly, the proposed Rule
will impose no record-keeping or
related data retention and maintenance
or disclosure requirements on any
covered entity, including small entities?
Why or why not?
x. Identify any statutes or rules that
may conflict with the proposed Rule
requirements, as well as any other state,
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 161 / Tuesday, August 19, 2008 / Proposed Rules
local, or industry rules or policies that
require covered entities to implement
practices that comport with the
requirements of the proposed Rule.
y. Do the prohibited practices in the
proposed Rule impose a significant
impact upon a substantial number of
small entities? If so, what modifications
to the proposed Rule should the
Commission consider to minimize the
burden on small entities?
List of Subjects in 16 CFR Part 317
Trade practices.
I Accordingly, for the reasons set forth
in the preamble, the Commission
proposes to amend Title 16, Chapter 1,
Subchapter C of the Code of Federal
Regulations by adding Part 317 to read
as follows:
PART 317—PROHIBITION OF ENERGY
MARKET MANIPULATION RULE
Sec.
317.1
317.2
317.3
317.4
317.5
Scope.
Definitions.
Prohibited practices.
Preemption.
Severability.
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 17301-17305; 15
U.S.C. 41-58.
§ 317.1
Scope.
This part implements Subtitle B of
Title VIII of The Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 (‘‘EISA’’), Pub.
L. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1723 (December
19, 2007), codified at 42 U.S.C. 1730117305. This rule applies to any person
over which the Federal Trade
Commission has jurisdiction under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. 41 et seq.
ebenthall on PRODPC60 with PROPOSALS
§ 317.2
Definitions.
The following definitions shall apply
throughout this rule:
(a) Crude oil means the mixture of
hydrocarbons that exist:
(1) in liquid phase in natural
underground reservoirs and which
remain liquid at atmospheric pressure
after passing through separating
facilities, or
(2) as shale oil or tar sands requiring
further processing for sale as a refinery
feedstock.
(b) Gasoline means
(1) finished gasoline, including, but
not limited to, conventional,
reformulated, and oxygenated blends,
and
(2) conventional and reformulated
gasoline blendstock for oxygenate
blending.
(c) Person means any individual,
group, unincorporated association,
limited or general partnership,
corporation, or other business entity.
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(d) Petroleum distillates means
(1) jet fuels, including, but not limited
to, all commercial and military
specification jet fuels, and
(2) diesel fuels and fuel oils,
including, but not limited to, No. 1, No.
2, and No. 4 diesel fuel, and No. 1, No.
2, and No. 4 fuel oil.
(e) Wholesale means purchases or
sales at the terminal rack level or
upstream of the terminal rack level.
Transactions conducted at wholesale do
not include retail gasoline sales to
consumers.
§ 317.3
Prohibited practices.
It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, in connection
with the purchase or sale of crude oil,
gasoline, or petroleum distillates at
wholesale,
(a) To use or employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of
a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business that operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person.
§ 317.4
Preemption.
The Federal Trade Commission does
not intend, through the promulgation of
this Rule, to preempt the laws of any
state or local government, except to the
extent that any such law conflicts with
this Rule. A law is not in conflict with
this Rule if it affords equal or greater
protection from the use or employment,
directly or indirectly, of any deceptive
or manipulative device or contrivance,
in connection with the purchase or sale
of crude oil, gasoline, or petroleum
distillates at wholesale.
§ 317.5
Severability.
The provisions of this Rule are
separate and severable from one
another. If any provision is stayed or
determined to be invalid, it is the
Commission’s intention that the
remaining provisions shall continue in
effect.
By direction of the Commission.
Donald S. Clark,
Secretary.
Note: The following attachment will
not appear in the Code of Federal
Regulations.
Attachment A
ANPR Commenters
American Bar Association/Section of
Antitrust Law (‘‘ABA’’)
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Fmt 4702
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Association of Oil Pipe Lines (‘‘AOPL’’)
American Petroleum Institute and the
National Petrochemical and Refiners
Association (‘‘API’’)
Patrick Barrett (‘‘Barrett’’)
Lawrence Barton (‘‘Barton’’)
Dave Beedle (‘‘Beedle’’)
Stanley Bergkamp (‘‘Bergkamp’’)
Louis Berman (‘‘Berman’’)
Bezdek Associates, Engineers PLLC
(‘‘Bezdek’’)
Katherine Bibish (‘‘Bibish’’)
John Booke (‘‘Booke’’)
Bradley (‘‘Bradley’’)
Jeremy Bradley (‘‘J. Bradley’’)
Charles Bradt (‘‘Bradt’’)
Wendell Branham (‘‘Branham’’)
Lorraine Bremer (‘‘Bremer’’)
Gloria Briscolino (‘‘Briscolino’’)
Rick Brownstein (‘‘Brownstein’’)
Byrum (‘‘Byrum’’)
Canadian Association of Petroleum
Producers (‘‘CAPP’’)
Jeff Carlson (‘‘Carlson’’)
Jacquelynne Catania (‘‘Catania’’)
Marie Cathey (‘‘Cathey’’)
New York City Bar Committee on Futures &
Derivatives Regulation (‘‘CFDR’’)
U.S. Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (‘‘CFTC’’)
Manuel Chavez (‘‘Chavez’’)
Michael Chudzik (‘‘Chudzik’’)
D. Church (‘‘Church’’)
Earl Clemons (‘‘Clemons’’)
Dan Clifton (‘‘Clifton’’)
Kim Cruz (‘‘Cruz’’)
Jerry Davidson (‘‘Davidson’’)
Don Deresz (‘‘Deresz’’)
Charlene Dermond (‘‘Dermond’’)
Kimberly DiPenta (‘‘DiPenta’’)
Penny Donaly (‘‘Donaly1’’)
Penny Donaly (‘‘Donaly2’’)
Penny Donaly (‘‘Donaly3’’)
Penny Donaly (‘‘Donaly4’’)
Harold Ducote (‘‘Ducote’’)
Deep River Group, Inc. (‘‘DRG’’)
Mary Dunaway (‘‘Dunaway’’)
Econ One Research, Inc. (‘‘Econ One’’)
Kevin Egan (‘‘Egan’’)
DJ Ericson (‘‘Ericson’’)
Mark Fish (‘‘Fish’’)
Flint Hills Resources (‘‘Flint Hills’’)
Bob Frain (‘‘Frain’’)
Joseph Fusco ( ‘‘Fusco’’ )
Tricia Glidewell (‘‘Glidewell’’)
Robert Gould (‘‘Gould’’)
James Green (‘‘Green’’)
Michael Greenberger (‘‘Greenberger’’)
Christine Gregoire, Governor, State of
Washington (‘‘Gregoire’’)
Hagan (‘‘Hagan’’)
Charles Hamel (‘‘Hamel’’)
Chris Harris (‘‘Harris’’)
Thomas Herndon (‘‘Herndon’’)
Johnny Herring (‘‘Herring’’)
Hess Corporation (‘‘Hess’’)
David Hill (‘‘Hill’’)
Hopper (‘‘Hopper’’)
Sharon Hudecek (‘‘Hudecek’’)
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (‘‘ICE’’)
Institute for Energy Research (‘‘IER’’)
Independent Lubricant Manufacturers
Association (‘‘ILMA’’)
Illinois Petroleum Marketers Association
(‘‘IPMA’’)
International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, Inc. (‘‘ISDA’’)
E:\FR\FM\19AUP1.SGM
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ebenthall on PRODPC60 with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 161 / Tuesday, August 19, 2008 / Proposed Rules
Micki Jay (‘‘Jay’’)
Kenneth Jensen (‘‘Jensen’’)
Paul Johnson (‘‘Johnson’’)
Tacie Jones (‘‘Jones’’)
Joy (‘‘Joy’’)
John Kaercher (‘‘Kaercher’’)
Kas Kas (‘‘Kas’’)
Kipp (‘‘Kipp’’)
Paola Kipp (‘‘P. Kipp’’)
Jerry LeCompte (‘‘LeCompte’’)
Kurt Lennert (‘‘Lennert’’)
Loucks (‘‘Loucks’’)
Robert Love (‘‘Love’’)
R. Matthews (‘‘Matthews’’)
Catherine May (‘‘May’’)
Mike Mazur (‘‘Mazur’’)
Sean McGill (‘‘McGill’’)
Kathy Meadows (‘‘Meadows’’)
Managed Funds Association; Futures
Industries Association; New York
Mercantile Exchange; and CME Group Inc.
(‘‘MFA’’)
Bret Morris (‘‘Morris’’)
Theresa Morris-Ramos (‘‘Morris-Ramos’’)
Scott Morosini (‘‘Morosini’’)
Timothy J. Muris and J. Howard Beales, III
(‘‘Muris’’)
Navajo Nation Resolute Natural Resources
Company and Navajo Nation Oil and Gas
Company (‘‘Navajo Nation’’)
Laurie Nenortas (‘‘Nenortas’’)
James Nichols (‘‘Nichols’’)
Virgil Noffsinger (‘‘Noffsinger’’)
Noga (‘‘Noga’’)
Richard Nordland (‘‘Nordland’’)
National Propane Gas Association (‘‘NPGA’’)
Kerry O’Shea, (‘‘O’Shea’’)
Jeffery Parker (‘‘Parker’’)
Pamela Parzynski (‘‘Parzynski’’)
Brook Paschkes (‘‘Paschkes’’)
Brijesh Patel (‘‘Patel’’)
Stefanie Patsiavos (‘‘Patsiavos’’)
P D (‘‘PD’’)
Guillermo Pereira (‘‘Pereira’’)
James Persinger (‘‘Persinger’’)
Mary Phillips (‘‘Phillips’’)
Plains All American Pipeline, LLP (‘‘Plains’’)
Platts (‘‘Platts’’)
Betty Pike (‘‘Pike’’)
Petroleum Marketers Association of America
(‘‘PMAA’’)
Joel Poston (‘‘Poston’’)
Radzicki (‘‘Radzicki’’)
Gary Reinecke (‘‘Reinecke’’)
Steve Roberson (‘‘Roberson’’)
Shawn Roberts (‘‘Roberts’’)
Linda Rooney (‘‘Rooney’’)
Mel Rubinstein (‘‘Rubinstein’’)
secret (‘‘secret’’)
Joel Sharkey (‘‘Sharkey’’)
Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of
America (‘‘SIGMA’’)
Daryl Simon (‘‘Simon’’)
David Smith (‘‘D. Smith’’)
Donald Smith (‘‘Do. Smith’’)
Mary Smith (‘‘M. Smith’’)
Donna Spader (‘‘Spader’’)
Stabila (‘‘Stabila’’)
Alan Stark (‘‘A. Stark’’)
Gary Stark (‘‘G. Stark’’)
Robert Stevenson (‘‘Stevenson’’)
Ryan Stine (‘‘Stine’’)
Maurice Strickland (‘‘Strickland’’)
Sutherland, Asbill, and Brennan, LLP
(‘‘Sutherland’’)
L.D. Tanner (‘‘Tanner’’)
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Jkt 214001
Dennis Tapalaga (‘‘Tapalaga’’)
Tennessee Oil Marketers Association
(‘‘TOMA’’)
Theisen (‘‘Theisen’’)
Greg Turner (‘‘Turner’’)
U.S. citizen (‘‘U.S. citizen’’)
U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Fraud
Section (‘‘USDOJ’’)
Jeff Van Hecke (‘‘Van Hecke’’)
Louis Vera (‘‘Vera’’)
Thomas Walker (‘‘Walker’’)
Victoria Warner (‘‘Warner’’)
Lisa Wathen (‘‘Wathen’’)
Watson (‘‘Watson’’)
Gary Watson (‘‘G. Watson’’)
Joseph Weaver (‘‘Weaver’’)
Webb (‘‘Webb’’)
Douglas Willis (‘‘Willis’’)
[FR Doc. E8–19154 Filed 8–18–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750–01–S
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration
29 CFR Parts 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918
and 1926
[Docket No. OSHA–2008–0031]
RIN 1218–AC42
Clarification of Remedy For Violation
of Requirements To Provide Personal
Protective Equipment and Train
Employees
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), U.S.
Department of Labor.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: In this rulemaking, OSHA is
proposing to amend its regulations to
add language clarifying that
noncompliance with the personal
protective equipment (PPE) and training
requirements in safety and health
standards in these parts may expose the
employer to liability on a per-employee
basis. The amendments consist of new
paragraphs added to the introductory
sections of the listed parts and changes
to the language of some existing
respirator and training requirements.
This action, which is in accord with
OSHA’s longstanding position, is
proposed in response to recent
decisions of the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission
indicating that differences in wording
among the various PPE and training
provisions in OSHA safety and health
standards affect the Agency’s ability to
treat an employer’s failure to provide
PPE or training to each covered
employee as a separate violation. The
amendments add no new compliance
obligations. Employers are not required
to provide any new type of PPE or
PO 00000
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48335
training, to provide PPE or training to
any employee not already covered by
the existing requirements, or to provide
PPE or training in a different manner
than that already required. The
amendments simply clarify the remedy
for violations of these requirements.
DATES: Written comments: Comments
must be submitted (postmarked, sent or
received) by September 18, 2008.
Hearing Requests: Any request for a
hearing must also be submitted by
September 18, 2008. See ADDRESSES
section below for special procedures for
submitting hearing requests.
ADDRESSES: Written comments: You may
submit comments, identified by docket
number OSHA–2008–0031, or
regulatory information number (RIN)
1290–AA23, by any of the following
methods:
Electronically: You may submit
comments and attachments
electronically at https://
www.regulations.gov, which is the
Federal eRulemaking Portal. Follow the
instructions on-line for making
electronic submissions.
Fax: If your comments, including
attachments, do not exceed 10 pages,
you may fax them to the OSHA Docket
Office at (202) 693–1648.
Mail, hand delivery, express mail,
messenger or courier service: You must
submit three copies of your comments
and attachments to the OSHA Docket
Office, Docket Number OSHA–2008–
0031, U.S. Department of Labor, Room
N–2625, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202)
693–2350 (OSHA’s TTY number is (877)
889–5627). Deliveries (hand, express
mail, messenger and courier service) are
accepted during the Department of
Labor’s and Docket Office’s normal
business hours, 8:15 a.m.–4:45 p.m., e.t.
Hearing Requests: A hearing request
may only be submitted by one of the
following methods: Electronically, fax,
express mail, hand delivery, messenger
or courier service. OSHA will not
consider hearing requests sent by
regular mail.
Instructions: All submissions must
include the docket number [OSHA–
2008–0031] or the regulatory
information number (RIN) 1290–AA23,
for this rulemaking. All comments,
including any personal information you
provide, are placed in the public
without change and may be made
available online at https://
www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA
cautions you about submitting personal
information such as Social Security
numbers and birthdates. For further
information on submitting comments,
plus additional information on the
E:\FR\FM\19AUP1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 161 (Tuesday, August 19, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 48317-48335]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19154]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
16 CFR Part 317
[Project No. P082900]
RIN 3084-AB12
Prohibitions On Market Manipulation and False Information in
Subtitle B of Title VIII of The Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007
AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; request for public comment.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Pursuant to Title VIII, Subtitle B of the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 (``EISA''), the Federal Trade Commission
(``Commission'' or ``FTC'') is proposing a rule to implement Section
811 of Subtitle B prohibiting the use or employment of manipulative or
deceptive devices or contrivances in wholesale petroleum markets.\1\
The Commission invites written comments on issues raised by the
proposed Rule and seeks answers to the specific questions set forth in
Section II.L of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (``NPRM'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Section 811 is part of Subtitle B of Title VIII of EISA,
which has been codified at 42 U.S.C. 17301-17305. Hereinafter,
citations to EISA sections shall be made to the United States Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DATES: Written comments must be received by September 18, 2008.
ADDRESSES: Interested parties are invited to submit written comments
electronically or in paper form. Comments should refer to ``Market
Manipulation Rulemaking, P082900'' to facilitate the organization of
comments. Comments containing material for which confidential treatment
is requested must be filed in paper form, must be clearly labeled
``Confidential,'' and must comply with Commission Rule 4.9(c).\2\
Comments should not include any sensitive personal information, such as
an individual's Social Security Number; date of birth; driver's license
number or other state identification number or foreign country
equivalent; passport number; financial account number; or credit or
debit card number. Comments also should not include any sensitive
health information, such as medical records and other individually
identifiable health information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The comment must be accompanied by an explicit request for
confidential treatment, including the factual and legal basis for
the request, and must identify the specific portions of the comment
to be withheld from the public record. The request will be granted
or denied by the Commission's General Counsel, consistent with
applicable law and the public interest. See Commission Rule 4.9(c),
16 CFR 4.9(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because paper mail in the Washington area, and specifically to the
FTC, is subject to delay due to heightened security screening, please
consider submitting your comments in electronic form. Comments filed in
electronic form should be submitted by using the following weblink:
(https://secure.commentworks.com/ftc-marketmanipulationNPRM/)(and
following the instructions on the web-based form). To ensure that the
Commission considers an electronic comment, you must file it on the
web-based form at the weblink(https://secure.commentworks.com/ftc-
marketmanipulationNPRM/). If this NPRM appears at (https://
www.regulations.gov/search/index.jsp), you may also file an electronic
comment through that website. The Commission will consider all comments
that regulations.gov forwards to it. You may also visit the FTC website
at (https://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/08/P082900nprm.pdf) to read the NPRM and
the news release describing it.
A comment filed in paper form should include the ``Market
Manipulation Rulemaking, P082900'' reference both in the text and on
the envelope, and should be mailed to the following address: Federal
Trade Commission, Market Manipulation Rulemaking, P.O. Box 2846,
Fairfax, VA 22031-0846. This address does not accept courier or
overnight deliveries. Courier or overnight deliveries should be
delivered to: Federal Trade Commission/Office of the Secretary, Room H-
135 (Annex G), 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20580.
The Federal Trade Commission Act (``FTC Act'') and other laws the
Commission administers permit the collection of public comments to
consider and use in this proceeding as appropriate. The Commission will
consider all timely and responsive public comments that it receives,
whether filed in paper or electronic form. Comments received will be
available to the public on the FTC website, to the extent practicable,
at (https://www.ftc.gov/os/publiccomments.shtm). As a matter of
discretion, the Commission makes every effort to remove home contact
information for individuals from the public comments it receives before
placing those comments on the FTC website. More information, including
routine uses permitted by the Privacy Act, may be found in the FTC's
privacy policy, at (https://www.ftc.gov/ftc/privacy.shtm).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Mongoven, Deputy Assistant
Director of Policy and Coordination, Bureau of Competition, Federal
Trade Commission, Market Manipulation Rulemaking, P.O. Box 2846,
Fairfax, VA 22031-0846, (202) 326-3772.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
EISA became law on December 19, 2007.\3\ Subtitle B of Title VIII
of the Act prohibits market manipulation in connection with the
purchase or sale of crude oil, gasoline, or petroleum distillates at
wholesale, and reporting false or misleading information related to the
wholesale price of those products. Specifically, Section 811 prohibits
``any person'' from directly or indirectly: (1) using or employing
``any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance;'' (2) ``in
connection with the purchase or sale of crude oil gasoline or petroleum
distillates at wholesale;'' (3) that violates a rule or regulation that
the FTC ``may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of United States citizens.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Pub. L. No. 110-140, codified at 42 U.S.C. 17001-17386.
\4\ 42 U.S.C. 17301.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 812 prohibits ``any person'' from reporting information
that is ``required by law to be reported'' -- and that is ``related to
the wholesale price of crude oil gasoline or petroleum distillates'' --
to a Federal department or agency if the person: (1) ``knew, or
reasonably should have known, [that] the information [was] false or
misleading;'' and (2) intended such false or misleading information
``to affect data compiled by the department or agency for statistical
or analytical purposes with respect to the market for crude oil,
gasoline, or petroleum distillates.''\5\
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\5\ 42 U.S.C. 17302.
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Subtitle B also contains three additional sections, which address,
respectively, enforcement of the Subtitle (Section 813),\6\ penalties
for violations
[[Page 48318]]
of Section 812 or any FTC rule promulgated pursuant to Section 811
(Section 814),\7\ and the interplay between Subtitle B and existing
laws (Section 815).\8\
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\6\ Section 813 provides that Subtitle B ``shall be enforced by
the [FTC] in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same
jurisdiction as though all applicable terms'' of the FTC Act were
incorporated into and made a part of Subtitle B.
42 U.S.C. 17303.
\7\ Section 814(a) of Subtitle B provides that -- ``[i]n
addition to any penalty applicable'' under the FTC Act -- ``any
supplier that violates [S]ection 811 or 812 shall be punishable by a
civil penalty of not more than $1,000,000.'' Further, Section 814(c)
provides that each day of a continuing violation shall be considered
a separate violation.
42 U.S.C. 17304.
\8\ Section 815(a) provides that nothing in Subtitle B ``limits
or affects'' Commission authority ``to bring an enforcement action
or take any other measure'' under the FTC Act or ``any other
provision of law.'' Section 815(b) provides that ``[n]othing in
[Subtitle B] shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the
operation'' of: (1) any of the antitrust laws (as defined in Section
1(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12(a)), or (2) Section 5 of the
FTC Act ``to the extent that . . . [S]ection 5 applies to unfair
methods of competition.'' Section 815(c) provides that nothing in
Subtitle B ``preempts any State law.'' 42 U.S.C. 17305.
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B. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
On May 1, 2008, the Commission issued an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (``ANPR'') that solicited comments on whether it should
promulgate a rule under Section 811, and, if so, the appropriate scope
and content of such a rule.\9\ In particular, the ANPR requested
comment on the interplay between any proposed FTC rule and other
existing federal rules prohibiting market manipulation; the scope of
certain definitions; the level of scienter necessary to establish a
violation of any proposed rule; the efficacy of the civil penalty
authority provided to the Commission in EISA; the inclusion or
exclusion of certain conduct from the scope of any proposed rule; and
the potential costs and benefits of any proposed rule.\10\ The ANPR set
a deadline of June 6, 2008, by which to submit comments.\11\ In
response to a petition from a major trade association,\12\ the
Commission extended the comment period until June 23, 2008.\13\
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\9\ FTC, Prohibitions On Market Manipulation and False
Information in Subtitle B of the Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007, 73 FR 25614 (May 7, 2008). The ANPR was announced in a
press release and made available to the public on May 1, 2008,
available at (https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/05/anpr.shtm).
\10\ Id. at 25620-25624.
\11\ Id. at 25614.
\12\ Letter from the American Petroleum Institute to FTC
Secretary Donald S. Clark, (May 19, 2008), available at (https://
www.ftc.gov/os/comments/marketmanipulation/index.shtm).
\13\ FTC, Extension of Period to Submit Comments in Response to
the ANPR, 73 FR 32259 (June 6, 2008). The extension was announced in
a press release and made available to the public on May 30, 2008,
available at (https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/05/anprfyi.shtm).
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In response to the ANPR, the Commission received 155 comments from
interested parties, including other federal agencies, state government
agencies, industry members, trade and bar associations, academics, and
individual members of the public.\14\ The comments respond to questions
posed in the ANPR and highlight several issues of particular concern to
commenters. An overview of the major themes reflected in the comments
follows.
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\14\ Attachment A contains a list of commenters who responded to
the ANPR, together with the acronyms used to identify each commenter
in this NPRM. The full rulemaking record can be found at (https://
www.ftc.gov/ftc/oilgas/), and electronic versions of the
comments can be accessed at (https://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
marketmanipulation/index.shtm).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The overwhelming majority of the comments submitted in response to
the ANPR were from consumers. These consumers voice concern about the
rising cost of gasoline, attributing the increase to many variables,
including: (1) OPEC control over prices;\15\ (2) price manipulation by
oil companies;\16\ (3) speculation by investors;\17\ (4) corporate
greed;\18\ (5) the decreasing value of the U.S. dollar;\19\ and (6)
increased demand from China and India.\20\ Although many of these
consumers urge the United States government, as a whole, to take action
to address gasoline prices,\21\ few expressly support a FTC market
manipulation rule.\22\ Some of the consumer commenters, although not
addressing the need for a specific market manipulation rule,
nonetheless urge the FTC to investigate the petroleum industry for
various types of alleged misconduct or to take other action to control
increasing prices.\23\
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\15\ See, e.g., Bergkamp (``The biggest problem is that the
major OPEC countries are not only determining the price by
controlling out put, they have also figured out that they can inject
millions of dollars into the futures market and manipulate the price
of oil in that capacity.''); Noga (``Since we are an exporter of
food products, the price of our exported food to OPEC members should
be tied to their oil production and prices.''); Pereira (``I feel
that prices are being manipulated by OPEC.''); A. Stark (``Why are
we allowing OPEC to get away with $125.00 per barrel of oil?'').
\16\ See, e.g., Bremer (``The big oil companies need to be
investigated for price gouging and manipulation.''); McGill (``Oil
companies should not be allowed to ship oil overseas, store it until
the price rises, and then return it to the United States. That is
manipulation.''); Phillips (``[S]ince all of the major oil companies
have made, and continue to make record profits (definition: the
monetary surplus left to a producer or employer after deducting
wages, rent, cost of raw materials, etc.) It is highly likely that
they are, together, manipulating the cost of a gallon of
gasoline.''); Love (``BIG OIL controls gasoline prices thru the
refineries which stand BETWEEN primary fuel supplies [including
biofuel] and consumers.''); Reinecke (``Here in Wichita Ks when gas
prices go up over night all stations go up in price over night, and
they say they don't talk to each other,''); Theisen (``I believe the
oil companies should be severely punished for manipulating the sale
and purchase of oil to boost the price of oil.'').
\17\ See, e.g., Barton (``There is no reason gas should be his
high, get rid of the traders and it will drop $ 3.00/ Dth.''); Gould
(``It seems like the real manipulation in fuel cost is happening in
the futures markets and not at the oil companies.''); Nichols
(``[T]he price is now purely speculative and [completely] out of
line with supply and demand. The problem will be if the price does
collapse will the government bail out the speculators and what will
it cost.''); Noga (``This like the tech stocks, housing market
bubble, is a market driven by the greed of speculators and hedge
markets.''); Parker (``OIL/GAS SPECULATION ON WALL STREET IS OUT OF
CONTROL, BECAUSE THE HIGHER THE PRICE THE MORE COMMISSION THEY
GET.''); Patel (``What has change in the last year to make the price
almost double? SPECULATION BY ANALYSTS.''); D. Smith (``As much as
60% of today's crude oil price is pure speculation driven by large
trader banks and hedge funds.''); Van Hecke (``I also feel there
needs to be regulations put in place to have some sort of control on
the way the stock traders are able to continually drive up the costs
through speculation.''). See also Greenberger (arguing that
excessive speculation, fraud, and illegal manipulation are causing
higher gasoline prices).
\18\ See, e.g., Brownstein (``The oil companies have used their
profits to line their pockets instead of putting it back into
increasing refinery & exploration.''); Nenortas (``While I am for
companies making a profit I am NOT for gluttony which the oil
companies seem to be guilty. Their costs do not justify the
outrageous prices they are demanding.'').
\19\ See, e.g., Rubinstein (``Gas/fuel prices are high because
the value of the dollar has fallen. . . .'').
\20\ See, e.g., Tanner (``Oil price rises caused from importing
from China and India. Most oil demand caused by these two countries
having 40 percent of the world's population.'').
\21\ See, e.g., Bergkamp (``[I]f any other business
[construction companies, farmers, etc.] were working in collusion in
a form of bid rigging [and fundamentally that is what is happening
with the price of oil] the Justice Department would have them in a
court so fast it would boggle the mind. But we allow the market to
be exploited with no legal recourse what so ever.''); Berman
(``[President Bush] must call in the executives of the large oil
companies who are making billions and billions in profits in the
current crisis and make them lower their prices.''); Love (``Our
government seems to be able to create a BUBBLE for just about every
economic good . . . except fuel. It can be done for fuel as well and
this will bring BIG OIL back to a levelled playing field.''); Loucks
(``Set some laws and make the oil companies abide by them. This hike
of gasoline costs is outrageous! Someone needs to be held
accountable. Please hurry!''); Noga (``Something needs to be done,
the profits are obscene, the terrorists are the oil companies.'');
A. Stark (``We need regulation and protection from the Oil Industry
. . . .'').
\22\ See, e.g., Bradley (``Put in place a new ban on market
manipulation and giving false information to the FTC or the
Department of Justice. Give the FTC the authority to levy fines up
to $1 million for each violation of market manipulation.'');
Nenortas (``IF making federal regulations that will do this on a
permanent basis and NOT be a band-aid or quick fix to this problem,
then I am all for it.'').
\23\ See, e.g., Bremer (``The big oil companies need to be
investigated for price gouging and manipulation.''); Hudecek
(``[T]he FTC should be able to regulate the price of crude oil
prices to stop all price gauging that is going on in America and in
Europe at this time. The FTC should bring the price of crude oil
back down to a reasonable price per barrel, that is under $60 a
barrel, and set a reasonable gas price for all gas stations in every
State in America . . . .''); Kas (``I want to see real action taken
against those who are stealing from the rest of us.''); Morris-Ramos
(``This is clearly price gouging by private companies and our
government needs to protect us. This is the clear mission of the FTC
and Congress.''); A. Stark (``Why hasn't the FTC investigated this
in earnest?''); Strickland (``I believe the FTC should investigate
market manipulation.''); Warner (``ENOUGH of would of, should of,
could of. Our Government NEEDS to do something NOW about these gas
prices. Don't say it can't be done because it CAN! The government
can do anything it wants to do.'').
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[[Page 48319]]
Twenty-nine industry members, associations, and other organizations
responded to the ANPR. Most organizational commenters express concern
about the prospect of a FTC rule.\24\ In support of their position,
these commenters advance a variety of arguments, including: (1) a rule
is unnecessary because there is no empirical evidence that market
manipulation is occurring;\25\ (2) a rule would be duplicative of
existing laws, including the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA''), existing
antitrust laws, and the FTC Act;\26\ and (3) a rule could harm the
efficient functioning of petroleum markets to the detriment of
consumers.\27\ Many of the organizational commenters who express
concern about FTC rulemaking in this area advance the view that if the
Commission promulgates a rule, it should be narrowly tailored to reach
only fraudulent conduct in the marketplace.\28\ Only a few
organizational commenters affirmatively favor a FTC market manipulation
rule.\29\ A few commenters recommend specific conduct that a FTC rule
should prohibit.\30\
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\24\ Three commenters specifically argue that the FTC should not
promulgate a rule. See API at 12-16 (arguing that the Commission
should refrain from promulgating a rule); Flint Hills at 1-2, 8-11
(asserting that a rule is unnecessary in the absence of any evidence
of inefficiencies or anticompetitive behavior in the U.S. oil
refining industry); IER at 1 (arguing that existing statutes provide
FTC and other agencies ``with adequate powers to deal with
legitimately anti-competitive and/or fraudulent practices in the
petroleum and financial markets''). Many commenters, without
expressly stating whether they support a rule, urge the Commission
to consider a variety of concerns in drafting a Section 811 rule.
See, e.g., ICE at 1-2 (recommending that the Commission draft a rule
with a ``well defined jurisdictional boundary'' to avoid duplicative
enforcement); Plains at 1, 3 (recommending that the Commission craft
a rule that will ``avoid any overlap with other regulatory
regimes''); Sutherland at 8 (urging the Commission to adopt a rule
that avoids any overlap with futures trading which is the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(``CFTC'')); AOPL at 1 (seeking clarification from the Commission
that a Section 811 rule will not apply to crude oil and petroleum
products pipelines); CFDR at 2 (encouraging the FTC to draft a rule
that is clear and easily understood, ``advances the development of
one universal definition of price manipulation'' in the markets for
petroleum products, and does not create or alter existing
obligations among market participants); Hess at 12 (urging the
Commission to ``consider the entire spectrum of possible
consequences stemming from the contemplated rulemaking'');
Sutherland at 2, 4 (urging the Commission to avoid adopting
regulations that will have a chilling effect on legitimate market
activities). Cf. Platts at 2 (supporting a FTC rule that encourages
the voluntary reporting of data, such as price, inventory volumes,
and import/export volumes); CAPP at 2-3 (raising a concern about the
FTC's ability to construct a market manipulation rule appropriately
in the face of little empirical evidence of market manipulation).
\25\ See, e.g., API at 12-13 (stating that a Section 811 rule is
unnecessary because there is no evidence that market manipulation is
occurring or has occurred); CAPP at 2-3 (arguing that little
empirical evidence exists of market manipulation or any adverse
effects on crude oil markets); Sutherland at 3 (asserting that the
FTC has found U.S. oil markets to be generally free of manipulation
in its past investigations). See also Flint Hills at 1-2, 8-11.
\26\ See, e.g., Flint Hills at 3-4 (arguing that Section 811
``overlaps and arguably duplicates authority conferred by [Section 5
of the FTC Act]''); AOPL at 1-2 (stating that a FTC rule will
overlap with and be duplicative of other agencies' regulations). See
also ISDA at 2-3; API at 14-16.
\27\ See, e.g., IER at 1-2 (arguing that a rule could interfere
with healthy market operations, leading to higher volatility in oil
and gas prices and less efficiency in distribution); Flint Hills at
2-3 (stating that a rule would likely be harmful to the industry and
consumers); API at 16 (stating that a Section 811 rule could deter
beneficial market activity); Sutherland at 3-4 (stating that the FTC
needs to take great care not to chill legitimate market activities
by adopting rules that substitute governmentally created norms for
the rules of the marketplace); CAPP at 5 (stating that it could be
damaging to the petroleum industry to enact rules to prohibit
conduct described in the ANPR).
\28\ See, e.g., API at 2, 16-17 (recommending that any FTC rule
be drafted narrowly to avoid duplication with other laws and to
avoid deterring pro-competitive conduct); Flint Hills at 5, 8-9, 15
(stating that a rule should cover ``only conduct that contains an
element of fraud or dishonesty''); ISDA at 2-3 (urging the
Commission to adopt a rule under Section 811 that is tailored to
target manipulative schemes involving wholesale, physical petroleum
products); Muris at 13 (advocating that any rule be limited to
fraudulent and deceptive conduct). ContraNPGA at 5 (urging the FTC
to ``view its mandate broadly'' and focus ``on practices that are
not a reaction to market forces'').
\29\ See, e.g., Greenberger at 21-25 (urging the Commission to
move quickly to adopt a rule); Gregoire at 1 (recommending that the
FTC promulgate an interim rule so it can commence an investigation
into the oil and gas markets). See also NPGA at 2 (``[R]apid
increase in price levels and volatility recently . . . raise
concerns regarding potential manipulation and the need for stronger
regulatory oversight.''). See also MFA at 4-5.
\30\ See, e.g., IPMA at 3-4; TOMA at 2-3 (recommending that the
FTC treat an oil company's decision to sell only gasoline blended
with ethanol instead of unblended gasoline at the terminal rack as a
potentially manipulative practice); Navajo Nation at 3-5 (asking the
FTC to treat the denial of access by terminals and common carrier
pipelines to other suppliers as a manipulative practice); ILMA at 1
(requesting that the FTC consider as potentially manipulative a
refiner's decision to increase the price of base oils sold to others
(non-refiner blenders/marketers) at wholesale faster than the
refiner increases the retail price for its own branded finished
oils).
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Organizational commenters express differing views regarding the
appropriate legal basis for, and form of, any such rule. For example,
some commenters argue that the Commission should model its rule after
market manipulation authority under which other federal agencies, such
as the Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC''), the CFTC, and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (``FERC''), currently police
market manipulation.\31\ Other commenters disagree, questioning whether
it is appropriate to apply approaches designed for regulated industries
to the comparatively unregulated petroleum industry.\32\
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\31\ See, e.g., CFDR (advising that the FTC model its rule after
SEC, FERC, and CFTC market manipulation standards to varying
degrees); Gregoire (recommending that the FTC model a rule after
FERC and SEC market manipulation rules); Greenberger at 23 (urging
the FTC to use FERC's market manipulation rule as a template for
drafting a Section 811 rule); ISDA at 7 (encouraging the FTC to
``propose a rule that draws on the most analogous aspects of those
anti-manipulation standards already applicable to the commodities
markets, in particular those existing under the [CEA]''); MFA at 5-
6, 21-23 (arguing for the adoption of a CFTC-style anti-manipulation
regulation in the wholesale energy market because of its relevance
to the FTC's mission); CAPP at 3-4 (urging the Commission to adopt
CEA's specific intent standard); Sutherland at 7 (urging the
Commission to draw on precedent developed under the CEA). But see
ISDA at 12-14 (urging the FTC not to use FERC and SEC market
manipulation standards as models in determining what constitutes
manipulative behavior); MFA at 5-6, 19-21 (stating that ``the
absence of a securities law disclosure foundation . . . argues
against the adopting of an SEC-style anti-manipulation formulation .
. . .''). See also Flint Hills at 10 n.25, 13-14, 22-23.
\32\ See, e.g., Muris at 2 (``[T]he Commission should follow its
own clear precedents regarding when a failure to disclose is
deceptive, and avoid importing broad disclosure requirements from
highly regulated markets that simply have no place in wholesale
petroleum markets.''); PMAA at 3 (``Given the very wide gap between
regulated and unregulated behavior, existing precedents should be
looked to as informational only and not as having any binding effect
upon interpretation of rules promulgated under Section 811.'');
Flint Hills at 10 n.25, 13-14, 22-23 (stating that FERC and SEC
market manipulation statutes were promulgated in a different
regulatory context than EISA). Cf. API at 18-19, 30 (recognizing the
value of FERC and SEC approaches to an extent).
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Organizational commenters also advance several significant
suggestions regarding the elements of a cause of action that they
believe the Commission should employ in enforcing the proposed Rule. In
particular, commenters express strong views about the appropriate level
of scienter\33\ and
[[Page 48320]]
whether a price effect should be a prerequisite to a finding of
liability.\34\
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\33\ Many commenters urge the Commission to require specific
intent as a prerequisite for finding liability under Section 811.
See, e.g., ISDA at 7 (urging the FTC to require a specific intent to
manipulate prices); Muris at 11 (``In any manipulation rule, the
Commission should require specific intent, rather than relying
solely on the knowledge standard in the FTC Act.''); CFDR at 4, 13
(asserting that the FTC should require a specific intent to affect
market prices); MFA at 6, 23-25 (arguing that the Commission should
include a ``specific intent to create an artificial price'' standard
to ensure protection of legitimate commercial conduct); CAPP at 3
(recommending that the FTC adopt the intent standard set out in the
CEA); API at 28-29 (arguing that the legislative history of EISA
supports inclusion of a scienter standard); Sutherland at 7
(encouraging the Commission to follow CEA by requiring proof of
specific intent). Cf. PMAA at 4-5 (```[T]he focus is on practices
that intentionally, willfully or recklessly cause distortion in the
market.'''). But see, e.g., Flint Hills at 16 (asserting that the
Commission should apply the same standard of intent under the FTC's
existing authority to address fraud and deception). One commenter
counsels the Commission against adopting an intent requirement. NPGA
at 5 (arguing that proof of intent creates an ``impossible burden of
proof,'' which will ``ultimately waste the Commission's resources
and contribute little to the efficiency of the markets or the
wellbeing of consumers'').
\34\ Several commenters support, as an element of a Section 811
rule violation, a showing of a price effect. See, e.g., API at 23,
31-32 (stating that, as a prerequisite to finding liability, the FTC
should require a showing that manipulative conduct caused the market
price to deviate materially from the price that would have existed
but for the deception or fraud). See also ISDA at 15; Muris at 9;
CFDR at 4; Sutherland at 7. But see USDOJ (``Certainly, there should
be no requirement that one succeed in moving prices . . . the only
requirement should be an attempt to do so . . . whether successful
or not.''); NPGA at 5 (arguing that the FTC should focus ``on
practices that are not a reaction to market forces'').
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Several commenters also respond to questions and hypotheticals
presented in the ANPR about the types of conduct that might violate
EISA and any proposed market manipulation rule.\35\ Other topics that
the comments address include: possible definitions,\36\ costs and
benefits of a market manipulation rule,\37\ and appropriate penalties
for violations of EISA or any FTC rule.\38\
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\35\ See generally ABA at 6-9 (stating that the antitrust laws
should be the guide for determining when unilateral supply decisions
should be lawful or when firms may be required to provide
competitors with access to facilities); API at 46-47 (arguing that
the Commission should not draft a rule that imposes an affirmative
obligation to release inventory during a price spike); Plains at 2-5
(arguing that the decision to release inventory is complicated, and
the FTC should not substitute its judgment for others); Hess at 8-10
(arguing against imposing an affirmative obligation to release
inventory during price spikes because such an obligation would have
a negative impact on long term supply); PMAA at 6-10 (arguing
against restricting common carrier pipelines' announcements
concerning future capacity constraints); Sutherland at 6 (``To
mandate inventory releases would distort the U.S. oil markets and is
contrary to the healthy structure of the markets.''). See also AOPL
at 20-33; CAPP at 4-6; IER at 4-8; ISDA at 17-18; CFDR at 15-16.
\36\ See generally ISDA at 19 (seeking clarification of the
FTC's proposed definition of wholesale distillates products under
Section 811); CAPP at 3 (stating that the definition of market
manipulation is appropriate because it reflects the language
contained in EISA); Flint Hills at 15 (stating that the FTC's
proposed definition of market manipulation ``makes no sense''); PMAA
at 2; Sutherland at 7.
\37\ See generally API at 16 (``Without evidence of significant
`manipulative' conduct in the petroleum industry, the costs of
additional enforcement and their impact on competitive market
activity outweigh any benefit to be gained from the FTC applying
Section 811 to conduct that is already addressed by other rules.'');
Muris at 7 (``In addressing market manipulation, the potential costs
of mistakenly regulating are likely to be high because these are
well-functioning, highly competitive markets crucial to the
operation of our economy.'').
\38\ See generally API at 38 (urging the FTC to adopt Section
5(m)(1)(C) of the FTC Act as the standard for determining the amount
of civil penalties under Section 811); PMAA at 6 (``The very large
penalty should only be applied, if at all, to the very largest
entities (refiners, trading companies) who participate in the
upstream portion of crude and finished product, manufacture and
sales.'').
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C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Pursuant to EISA
Based on the ANPR comments and the Commission's extensive
experience studying, analyzing, and investigating the petroleum
industry, the Commission has determined to propose a rule to prevent
manipulative and deceptive conduct in the petroleum markets.\39\ The
Commission invites written comments on the proposed Rule and answers to
the questions in Section II.L, to assist it in determining whether the
proposed Rule provisions strike an appropriate balance to maximize
protections for consumers from market manipulation while avoiding the
imposition of unnecessary compliance burdens on law-abiding industry
members.
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\39\ In the ANPR, the Commission stated that this rulemaking
proceeding is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act
(``APA''), 5 U.S.C. 553, and Part 1, Subpart C, of the Commission
Rules of Practice concerning the adoption of non-Section 18 rules,
16 CFR 1.21-1.26. 73 FR 25614, 25615 n.4. One commenter, however,
asserts that this proceeding should be commenced as a rulemaking
under Section 18 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 57a, requiring, among
other things, more lengthy and detailed notice and comment
procedures. See API at 58-59. The Commission disagrees. Nothing in
the plain language of EISA requires Section 18 rulemaking, and the
use of APA rulemaking procedures is consistent with Congressional
expectations that this proceeding be conducted expeditiously.
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II. Discussion of the Proposed Rule
A. Determination to Promulgate a Rule to Proscribe Market Manipulation
In considering whether to exercise its discretionary rulemaking
authority pursuant to Section 811, the Commission relies upon several
sources of information in addition to the statute, including its
extensive background knowledge of the petroleum industry, the ANPR
comments, independent research, and consultation with sister agencies
charged with administering similar market manipulation rules. Based on
its findings, the Commission tentatively concludes that promulgating a
rule to address market manipulation in connection with the wholesale
purchase or sale of crude oil, gasoline, or petroleum distillates is
appropriate and in the public interest.\40\ This Section of the NPRM
sets forth the Commission's reasoning for the proposed Rule. The
Commission invites comment on the issues raised in this Section.
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\40\ As the Commission stated in the ANPR, the phrase ``crude
oil gasoline or petroleum distillates,'' without commas, is used in
Section 811 (as well as in the first clause of Section 812), while
the phrase ``crude oil, gasoline, or petroleum distillates'' (with
commas) is used in Section 812(3). This drafting is presumably a
non-substantive typographical error; therefore, all parts of both
sections should be read to cover all three types of products (that
is, crude oil, gasoline, and petroleum distillates). See 73 FR at
25621 n.59.
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1. The proposed Rule must meet Section 811's ``necessary or
appropriate'' standard
Section 811 states that the Commission ``may prescribe'' a rule
``as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of United States citizens.''\41\ Thus, the Commission may
only promulgate a rule to prohibit manipulation in the petroleum
industry if, in its discretion, it finds that a rule under EISA is
``necessary or appropriate'' and ``in the public interest or for the
protection of United States citizens.'' The Commission has tentatively
determined that promulgating a market manipulation rule narrowly
tailored to address fraudulent practices would be appropriate to ensure
that the objective of EISA is carried out, and therefore would be in
the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ 42 U.S.C. 17301.
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The Commission believes that the initial inquiry in determining
whether it should promulgate a rule requires understanding the phrase
``necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of United States citizens.''\42\ The use of the disjunctive ``or'' in
the first clause of this phrase indicates that the Commission would be
within its mandate to promulgate a rule
[[Page 48321]]
that is either: (1) ``necessary . . . in the public interest or for the
protection of United States citizens,'' or (2) ``appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of United States citizens.''\43\
Similarly, the Commission need only show that a rule would be either
``in the public interest'' or ``for the protection of United States
citizens.'' Thus, the Commission could proceed in its rulemaking if, at
a minimum, the endeavor is ``appropriate . . . in the public
interest.'' The Commission has determined that a rule that achieves
EISA's plainly stated purpose -- that is, the prohibition of market
manipulation in the petroleum industry -- would be appropriate.
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\42\ Some commenters address the phrase ``necessary or
appropriate'' in their comments; however, none attempt to define the
phrase. See, e.g., API at 36 (``[T]here are solid grounds to
conclude that adoption of a market manipulation rule for petroleum
wholesale markets is neither necessary nor appropriate.''); CAPP at
4 (``In order to ensure that rules are . . . necessary or
appropriate in the public interest . . . the Commission must set
objective standards as to what these concepts are and how they will
manifest themselves in reality.''). See alsoAOPL at 11-12
(``Regulation of oil [pipelines] . . . would not be `necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of the
United States citizens.''').
\43\ 42 U.S.C. 17301 (emphasis added). The use of a disjunctive
indicates alternatives and requires that each be treated separately
unless there is clear legislative intent that indicates otherwise.
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (``Canons of
construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a
disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates
otherwise . . . .''). See also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726, 739-740 (1978); Azure v. Morton, 514 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir.
1975) (``As a general rule, the use of a disjunctive in a statute
indicates alternatives and requires that they be treated
separately.''); Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction 21.14, at 180-182 (6th ed. rev. vol. 2002)
(``Generally, courts presume that `or' is used in a statute
disjunctively . . . .'').
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The Commission carefully considered concerns raised by
organizational commenters about the necessity or appropriateness of a
rule in determining whether to move forward in the rulemaking process.
Some of these commenters argue, for example, that petroleum markets are
competitive, and, in the absence of specific evidence of market
manipulation, the Commission should refrain from promulgating a
rule.\44\ Some point to FTC and CFTC authority to argue that any rule
would be duplicative of existing laws and lead to uncertainty and
confusion among market participants about compliance.\45\ Many
commenters also express concerns about the scope and contours of a rule
and whether any rule that the Commission promulgates would be
appropriate for petroleum markets.\46\
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\44\ See, e.g., AOPL at 18 (noting that the Commission has found
little evidence of price manipulation in previous investigations);
API at 12-14, 36; Flint Hills at 10 (``[T]he Commission lacks
evidence of `manipulation' in wholesale petroleum markets that
warrants the kind of extensive regulatory intervention that a
proposed rule could engender.''); Hess at 10-11; Muris at 2
(asserting that the petroleum industry is highly competitive). See
also Sutherland at 3 (stating that the Commission should not ``adopt
rules that substitute governmentally created norms for the rules of
the marketplace.'').
\45\ Commenters express the view that a FTC rule is unnecessary
because it would duplicate existing laws and regulations. See, e.g.,
API at 40-41 (arguing against a FTC rule that would duplicate the
existing CEA enforcement scheme and antitrust laws); Flint Hills at
8-9 (asserting that existing Commission authority under Section 5 of
the FTC Act is sufficient to protect against ``[d]isingenuous
business practices''); MFA at 17 (``FTC Rules that purport to
overlap with CFTC exclusive jurisdiction would not serve the public
interest.''). Although it is true that other agencies have market
manipulation regulations in place already, this fact was well-known
to Congress when it enacted EISA. Therefore, the Commission
disagrees with commenters that argue that a Commission rule is
unnecessary because it may be redundant with other regulatory
authority.
\46\ For a general discussion of organizational commenters'
concerns about a FTC rule, see Section I.B above.
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EISA targets manipulative and deceptive conduct in the petroleum
markets, thereby seeking to eliminate conduct which serves no
legitimate purpose and may in fact harm the market to the detriment of
market participants and consumers.\47\ In the view of the Commission, a
rule that allows the Commission to guard against conduct that
undermines the integrity of the petroleum market would be in the public
interest.\48\ The Commission notes that fraud and deception may occur
in competitive marketplaces. Further, the Commission notes that
Congress specifically authorized it to determine whether a rule would
be appropriate and in the public interest despite the existence of
other laws that potentially cover fraud or deceit.\49\ Therefore, as
the agency charged with protecting consumers and preserving the
competitiveness of markets (such as petroleum markets), the Commission
believes that it would be appropriate for it to propose a rule
targeting fraudulent or deceptive conduct in wholesale petroleum
markets under this new authority.
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\47\ Commenters recognize the negative effects of fraud and
deceit. See, e.g., Greenberger at 1 (arguing that excessive
speculation, fraud, and illegal manipulation are causing higher
gasoline prices); MFA at 1 (``Price manipulation has a corrosive
effect on the proper functioning of any market.''); API at 50 (``We
agree that the provision of false or misleading pricing information
to private reporting entities could be problematic.''); ISDA at 19
(``ISDA . . . both supports and encourages the development of
dynamic markets undistorted by manipulative trading activity.'');
Sutherland at 3 (``[O]il marketers and traders often are the first
victims of unfair business practices. They, therefore, support
efforts by Congress to deter manipulation and the use of deceptive
devices.''); Flint Hills at 18 (``[R]estrictions on disclosures that
`leave customers in the dark' may be inimical to the smooth
operations of the relevant markets. Of course, false or deceptive
reports can also raise familiar [sic] problems.''); CAPP at 1
(``CAPP recognizes that fraud and manipulation pose a potential
threat to the successful and efficient functioning of petroleum
markets in North America.'').
\48\ Some commenters opine on the meaning of the language: ``in
the public interest or for the protection of United States
citizens.'' See, e.g., CFDR at 4-5 (``The public interest and the
protection of U.S. citizens . . . are best served by the adoption of
a clear legal standard for market manipulation.'' CFDR goes on to
say that a clear legal standard ``will allow market participants to
conduct their business with a clear understanding of the relevant
legal boundaries.''); MFA at 17 (``FTC rules that purport to overlap
with CFTC exclusive jurisdiction would not serve the public
interest.''). Noting the absence of the phrase ``public interest''
from other laws the Commission enforces, Flint Hills states that
Congress must have intended that the Commission rely upon its
experience in promoting the public interest through enforcement of
the consumer protection and antitrust principles governed by Section
5 of the FTC Act. See Flint Hills at 17-18.
\49\ 42 U.S.C. 17301.
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2. SEC Rule 10b-5 provides an appropriate regulatory model on which to
base the FTC's proposed Rule
By its plain language, Section 811 declares unlawful the use of
manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances -- in connection with
the purchase or sale of crude oil, gasoline, or petroleum distillates
at wholesale -- that violates any FTC rule prohibiting their use.\50\
As one commenter observes, ``Section 811 is not discussed in any
Senate, House, or Conference Report, nor is there any reported
Congressional debate on this provision.''\51\ Nevertheless, the
statutory language -- especially the use of the phrase ``manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance'' -- reveals its legislative
antecedents.\52\
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\50\ 42 U.S.C. 17301. The statute itself does not describe the
manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances that are illegal.
Rather, it vests in the FTC discretionary rulemaking authority to
identify such conduct.
\51\ ABA at 3.
\52\ As the ANPR discusses in detail, the Commission studied
SEC, FERC, and CFTC enabling statutes, and their respective
implementing regulations, and asked questions in the ANPR about
whether these existing regulatory schemes should serve as a model
for a FTC Rule. 73 FR at 25616-25618.
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In particular, it is instructive that the language that Congress
chose to frame the conduct prohibition in Section 811 is identical to
language found in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``SEA''),\53\ which prohibits the use of any ``manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance'' in contravention of such rules as the
SEC may prescribe.\54\ Congress used identical
[[Page 48322]]
language -- ``manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance'' -- when
it gave FERC anti-manipulation authority over electricity and natural
gas under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (``EPAct 2005''). In doing so,
Congress specifically instructed FERC to define the terms ``any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance'' ``as those terms are
used in [SEA Section 10(b)].''\55\ The use of this language suggests
that any proposed FTC Rule should follow the contours of SEC Rule 10b-
5, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to that agency's market manipulation
authority.\56\
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\53\ 15 U.S.C. 78j(b).
\54\ See, e.g., ABA at 2 (asserting that ``Section 811 is
modeled on FERC and SEC authority to challenge deceptive conduct'');
Greenberger at 27 (``Congress modeled the FTC's new 2007 anti-
manipulation provision on 10(b) of the [SEA] and Rule 10b-5 to once
again make it clear . . . that the FTC must use the extensive
securities precedent to guide its manipulation investigations in the
petroleum markets.''); CFDR at 3 (recognizing that the language of
Section 811 is ``effectively identical to the anti-manipulation
proscriptions found in Section 10(b) . . . of the [SEA], as
amended''); Sutherland at 4 (``Congress, in fashioning Section 811,
used language similar to that used in the Energy Policy Act of 2005
. . . which in turn drew upon the securities laws . . . .'');
Gregoire at 1 (arguing that the Commission's ``authority is very
similar to the authority Congress previously gave the [FERC] . . .
which in turn was based on the statutory authority of the [SEC]'').
See also Muris at 2 (arguing that ``the statutory language and the
legislative history point to the SEC, FERC, and CFTC as relevant
regulatory models''); MFA at 19-20 (acknowledging that the
provisions of Section 811 were modeled after Section 10(b) of the
SEA, but also taking the position that the Commission should not
follow its statutory precedent). Cf. API at 18 (arguing that EISA
does not require the Commission to follow the SEC model in every
respect, despite an acknowledgment that Section 811 was modeled
after the SEA).
\55\ See 15 U.S.C. 717c-1; 16 U.S.C. 824v; FERC, Prohibition of
Energy Market Manipulation, 71 FR 4244, 4246 (Jan. 19, 2006).
\56\ 17 CFR 240.10b-5.
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Floor statements made in connection with a predecessor bill to
Subtitle B of EISA\57\ and correspondence from Congress regarding
EISA\58\ support the Commission's decision to model its proposed Rule
on SEC Rule 10b-5. Thus, the language of the statute, taken together
with other indicators of Congressional expectations, suggests that any
proposed FTC market manipulation rule should be modeled on SEC Rule
10b-5.
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\57\ Energy Emergency Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S.1735,
109th Cong. (2005). In these remarks, Senator Maria Cantwell stated
that the market manipulation provisions in that bill would ensure
``the same kind of anti-manipulation and transparency rules as those
with which electricity and natural gas industries must comply [under
the EPAct 2005].'' The FERC rules, to which the Senator refers,
similarly derive from the SEA, and target fraudulent marketplace
conduct. 151 Cong. Rec. S10238 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2005).
\58\ An April 2008 letter to the Commission from Senators Maria
Cantwell, Olympia Snowe, Byron Dorgan, Daniel Inouye, and Gordon
Smith also supports the interpretation that EISA is designed to
provide the FTC with anti-fraud market manipulation authority
similar to that already vested in the SEC and recently given to FERC
in the EPAct 2005. Letter from Senators Cantwell, Snowe, Dorgan,
Inouye, and Smith to FTC Chairman Kovacic and Commissioners Harbour,
Leibowitz, and Rosch (Apr. 8, 2008), available at (https://
www.ftc.gov/os/comments/marketmanipulation/congress/
080414cantwell.pdf).
See EPAct 2005, 42 U.S.C. 15801-16503.
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The Commission believes that, in addition to adhering to the
mandate implied by the statutory language, there are several advantages
to modeling its proposed Rule on SEC Rule 10b-5. The Commission
believes that using an existing anti-fraud market manipulation
regulatory scheme as a model for the proposed Rule is beneficial for
market participants because it leverages the significant body of legal
precedent interpreting that scheme.\59\ This determination is
consistent with the views of some commenters who assert that SEC Rule
10b-5 provides a well-developed framework for the FTC to follow.\60\
Moreover, using an established regulatory scheme as the basis for the
proposed Rule should reduce regulatory uncertainty and thereby assure
greater compliance.
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\59\ See, e.g., Greenberger at 23, 25, 27; Gregoire at 1; CFDR
at 11, 13; SIGMA at 6.
\60\ See, e.g., Gregoire at 1; Greenberger at 23-25, 27; CFDR at
11, 13. But see CAPP at 2 (arguing that EISA was enacted in
anticipation of market abuses, not in response to them, and thus is
not analogous to SEC rules); Sutherland at 4 (arguing that SEC rules
operate in a highly regulated environment and that modeling a rule
that is aimed at the comparatively unregulated petroleum industry
after SEC rules would be inappropriate).
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The structure and scope of SEC Rule 10b-5 also provide a useful
model for the substantive prohibitions of the proposed Rule. EISA
contemplates the FTC using a new authority -- separate and apart from
antitrust law and FTC Act Section 5 authority -- to target manipulation
and deception based on the SEC anti-fraud model.\61\ By mirroring the
established SEC Rule 10b-5, the Commission believes it strikes at the
core of what EISA explicitly proscribes -- market manipulation.\62\
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\61\ As the Commission noted in the ANPR, ``nothing in
connection with this Section 811 Rulemaking, any subsequently
enacted rules, or related efforts should be construed to alter the
standards associated with establishing a deceptive practice or an
unfair practice in a case brought by the Commission.'' 73 FR at
25619 n.55.
\62\ The Commission believes this careful tailoring addresses
concerns that a new rule prohibiting market manipulation in the
petroleum industry might interfere with legitimate, pro-consumer
business behavior. See generally API at 16 (``New rules have the
potential to over-deter, discouraging beneficial market
activity.''); Sutherland at 2 (stating that the FTC must not ``deter
important and economically efficient business activities that are
fundamental to the energy markets'').
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3. The provisions of the proposed Rule appropriately prohibit
fraudulent conduct in wholesale petroleum markets
The Commission believes that an appropriate means to achieve this
objective would be to adopt largely the language and structure of SEC
Rule 10b-5 in promulgating the proposed Rule.\63\ Accordingly, the
proposed Rule contains the following conduct prohibitions. First,
Section 317.3(a) prohibits the use or employment of any ``device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud.'' Second, proposed Rule Section
317.3(b) states that it is a violation of the rule for any person to:
``make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.'' Finally, proposed Rule Section 317.3(c) makes it illegal
for any person ``[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of
business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.''\64\ The Commission believes that adopting the general conduct
prohibitions embodied in SEC Rule 10b-5 provides the necessary
flexibility for the Commission to adapt to changing market conditions
in enforcing its proposed Rule.\65\
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\63\ Several commenters, while not necessarily advocating a FTC
rule, appear to support a rule based on SEC Rule 10b-5. See, e.g.,
Gregoire at 1 (``The FTC should be similarly informed by the FERC
and SEC rules and model its rules on theirs.''); Greenberger at 22
(urging the FTC to model its rule after FERC's rule because FERC
resolved its ``major interpretative issues'' by ``adopting the anti-
manipulation definitions within Section 10(b) of the [SEA]''); API
at 17 (recognizing the value of FERC and SEC approaches to an
extent). See also CFDR at 3. The determination to prohibit
manipulative and deceptive conduct under the proposed Rule does not
preclude the Commission from finding that other conduct violates
EISA and any other applicable laws or rules that the Commission
enforces.
\64\ Proposed Rule 317.3(a)-(c).
\65\ Any ``laundry list'' of specifically proscribed conduct
could quickly become out of date, requiring that the Commission
frequently revisit the rulemaking process. See also Muris at 11
(``Because defining the specific deceptions that might manipulate
wholesale markets is virtually impossible, any manipulation rule
will of necessity be more general.'').
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Moreover, the Commission is not invoking the entire body of SEC law
in this rulemaking, but rather the anti-fraud provisions of SEC Rule
10b-5. Thus, the proposed Rule does not impose affirmative disclosure
or record-keeping obligations, and does not regulate supply decisions
or require that market participants provide access to terminals or
pipelines.\66\ In making this determination, the Commission considered
arguments raised by commenters who oppose the promulgation of an SEC-
style rule on the grounds that securities markets are qualitatively
different from petroleum product markets because securities markets are
subject to a significant degree of regulation.\67\ The Commission
[[Page 48323]]
believes that excluding these affirmative duties should alleviate
commenter concerns and make clear that the Commission is using only the
relevant portions of the SEC regulatory model in crafting the proposed
Rule.\68\
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\66\ See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)
(stating that SEC Rule 10b-5 did not create a duty of disclosure;
rather, the duty to disclose was created by a fiduciary relationship
between traders).
\67\ See, e.g., PMAA at 3 (arguing that given the differences
between regulated and unregulated markets, ``existing precedents
should be looked to as informational only''); Sutherland at 4
(stating that ``as a rule'' SEC market manipulation standards are
not useful precedents for a Section 811 rule); ISDA at 12
(``Securities precedent is not illuminating with respect to how to
develop a rule to prosecute manipulation in wholesale, physical
Petroleum Products markets because there are substantial differences
between the market frameworks.''). See also API at 19-20, 30; CAPP
at 2-3.
\68\ Many commenters raise concerns about a FTC rule that would
impose affirmative duties or obligations on persons covered by the
rule. For a discussion of any potential duties or obligations
imposed by the proposed Rule, see Section II.B.4 below.
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In crafting the proposed Rule, the Commission intends to prohibit
manipulative and deceptive conduct without discouraging pro-competitive
or otherwise desirable market practices. Following the example of SEC
Rule 10b-5, the Commission believes that its proposed Rule would
contribute to well-functioning marketplaces. Markets function best when
market participants can presume that the best available information
relevant to their decision-making is not distorted.\69\ Manipulative or
deceptive conduct distorts the marketplace signals that guide resource
allocation.\70\ When market participants react to distorted market
price signals, short-term purchase and sale decisions may be altered
and long-term capital investments may be adversely influenced. Finally,
if manipulative or deceptive conduct recurs, it may increase the cost
of doing business if market participants are required to invest in
defensive measures.\71\ The Commission believes eliminating or reducing
these effects is in the public interest.
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\69\ Several commenters discuss the consequences of manipulative
or deceptive conduct on the overall health of the marketplace and
note the importance of ensuring a legitimate price discovery
process. See, e.g., Muris at 6 (``Fraudulent and deceptive conduct
undermine the market's competitive process because they impair
efficient price discovery, which is the process of incorporating
information in the market price.''); Platts at 2 (``Confidence in
price discovery processes is vital for market participants,
regulators and the public alike . . . .''); MFA at 1 (``Price
manipulation has a corrosive effect on the proper functioning of any
market.'').
\70\ In a market economy, resources are allocated to productive
activities on the basis of impersonal price signals that reflect
both consumer preferences and profit opportunities. When resources
flow to their highest valued use, social wealth is maximized.
Intentional manipulative or deceptive conduct impedes this process.
See also Milton Friedman & Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, 14-18
(Harcourt 1980); Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society,
35(4) Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1945). For example, disseminating
misinformation that is relied on by market participants may prevent
wealth-generating exchanges from taking place. If so, an opportunity
cost is imposed on society at large.
\71\ Such investments, although perceived as nece