Dichlorvos (DDVP); Order Denying NRDC's Objections and Requests for Hearing, 42683-42713 [E8-16617]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 142 / Wednesday, July 23, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
[FR Doc. E8–16833 Filed 7–22–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania
Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20460-0001;
telephone number: 703-603-0065; e-mail
address: bartow.susan@epa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. General Information
40 CFR Part 180
A. Does this Action Apply to Me?
[EPA–HQ–OPP–2002–0302; FRL–8372–5]
Dichlorvos (DDVP); Order Denying
NRDC’s Objections and Requests for
Hearing
Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Final Order.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: In this order, EPA denies
objections to, and requests for hearing
on, a prior order denying a petition
requesting that EPA revoke all pesticide
tolerances for dichlorvos under section
408(d) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act. The objections and
hearing requests were filed on February
1, 2008, by the Natural Resources
Defense Council (‘‘NRDC’’). The
Original petition was also filed by
NRDC.
DATES:
This order is effective July 23,
2008.
EPA has established a
docket for this action under docket
identification (ID) number EPA–HQ–
OPP–2002–0302. To access the
electronic docket, go to https://
www.regulations.gov, and search for the
docket number. Follow the instructions
on the regulations.gov website to view
the docket index or access available
documents. All documents in the docket
are listed in the docket index available
in regulations.gov. Although listed in
the index, some information is not
publicly available, e.g., Confidential
Business Information (CBI) or other
information whose disclosure is
restricted by statute. Certain other
material, such as copyrighted material,
is not placed on the Internet and will be
publicly available only in hard copy
form. Publicly available docket
materials are available in the electronic
docket at https://www.regulations.gov,
or, if only available in hard copy, at the
OPP Regulatory Public Docket in Rm. S4400, One Potomac Yard (South Bldg.),
2777 S. Crystal Dr., Arlington, VA. The
Docket Facility is open from 8:30 a.m.
to 4 p.m., Monday through Friday,
excluding legal holidays. The Docket
Facility telephone number is (703) 3055805.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Susan Bartow, Special Review and
Reregistration Division (7508P), Office
of Pesticide Programs, Environmental
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ADDRESSES:
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In this document EPA denies
objections and hearing requests by the
Natural Resources Defense Council
(‘‘NRDC’’) concerning EPA’s denial of
NRDC’s petition to revoke pesticide
tolerances. This action may also be of
interest to agricultural producers, food
manufacturers, or pesticide
manufacturers. Potentially affected
entities may include, but are not limited
to those engaged in the following
activities:
• Crop production (North American
Industrial Classification System
(‘‘NAICS’’) code 111), e.g., agricultural
workers; greenhouse, nursery, and
floriculture workers; farmers.
• Animal production (NAICS code
112), e.g., cattle ranchers and farmers,
dairy cattle farmers, livestock farmers.
• Food manufacturing (NAICS code
311), e.g., agricultural workers; farmers;
greenhouse, nursery, and floriculture
workers; ranchers; pesticide applicators.
• Pesticide manufacturing (NAICS
code 32532), e.g., agricultural workers;
commercial applicators; farmers;
greenhouse, nursery, and floriculture
workers; residential users.
This listing is not intended to be
exhaustive, but rather to provide a guide
for readers regarding entities likely to be
affected by this action. Other types of
entities not listed in this unit could also
be affected. The NAICS codes have been
provided to assist you and others in
determining whether this action might
apply to certain entities. If you have any
questions regarding the applicability of
this action to a particular entity, consult
the person listed under FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT.
B. How Can I Access Electronic Copies
of this Document?
In addition to accessing an electronic
copy of this Federal Register document
through the electronic docket at https://
www.regulations.gov, you may access
this Federal Register document
electronically through the EPA Internet
under the ‘‘Federal Register’’ listings at
https://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr. You may
also access a frequently updated
electronic version of EPA’s tolerance
regulations at 40 CFR part 180 through
the Government Printing Office’s pilot
e-CFR site at https://www.gpoaccess.gov/
ecfr.
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C. Acronyms
The following is a list of acronyms
used in this order:
CSFII - Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by
Individuals
CNS - Central Nervous System
DDVP - dichlorvos
EDSTAC - Endocrine Disruptor Screening
and Testing Advisory Committee
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
FACA - Federal Advisory Committee Act
FDA - Food and Drug Administration
FIFRA - Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act
FFDCA - Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act
FQPA - Food Quality Protection Act of 1996
HSRB - Human Studies Review Board
IRED - Interim Reregistration Eligibility
Decision
LOAEL - Lowest Observed Adverse Effect
Level
MOE - Margin of Exposure
MRID - Master Record Identification
NOAEL - No Observed Adverse Effect Level
NRDC - Natural Resources Defense Council
OECD - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAD - Population Adjusted Dose
ppm - parts per million
RBC - red blood cell
RED - Reregistration Eligibility Decision
RfD - Reference Dose
SDWA - Safe Drinking Water Act
SOP - Standard Operating Procedure
USDA - United Stated Department of
Agriculture
II. Introduction
A. What Action Is the Agency Taking?
In this order, EPA denies objections,
and requests for a hearing on those
objections, to an earlier EPA order, (72
FR 68662 (December 5, 2007)), denying
a petition to revoke all tolerances
established for the pesticide dichlorvos
(‘‘DDVP’’) under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (‘‘FFDCA’’), 21 U.S.C.
346a. (Refs. 1 and 2). Both the objections
and hearing requests, as well as the
petition, were filed with EPA by NRDC.
NRDC’s petition, filed on June 2,
2006, pursuant to FFDCA section
408(d)(1), asserted numerous grounds as
to why the DDVP tolerances allegedly
fail to meet the FFDCA’s safety
standard. This petition was filed as EPA
was completing its reassessment of the
safety of the DDVP tolerances pursuant
to FFDCA section 408(q). (Ref. 3). In
response to the petition, EPA undertook
an extensive review of its DDVP safety
evaluation in the tolerance reassessment
decision. Based on certain concerns
raised by NRDC, EPA determined it was
necessary to incorporate updated data
on numerous points and to adopt
revised and more conservative
assumptions, in its DDVP risk
assessments. This led to complete
revisions of both EPA’s assessments of
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dietary and residential risks from
exposure to DDVP. (72 FR at 68678,
68687-68691). Nonetheless, EPA
concluded that its revised risk
assessments demonstrated that DDVP
met the FFDCA safety standard and,
therefore, denied the petition. (Id. at
68695). EPA’s denial was issued in the
form of an order under FFDCA section
408(d)(4)(iii). (21 U.S.C. 346a(d)(4)(iii)).
NRDC then filed objections with EPA
to the petition denial order and
requested a hearing on its objections.
These objections and hearing requests
were filed pursuant to the procedures in
the FFDCA section 408(g)(2). (21 U.S.C.
346a(g)(2)). The objections narrowed
NRDC’s claims to two main topics - that,
in assessing the risk to DDVP, EPA
unlawfully reduced the statutory safety
factor for the protection of infants and
children and EPA unlawfully relied on
a human toxicity study. As to these
claims, NRDC largely repeats the
arguments as presented in its petition
without addressing EPA’s substantial
revisions to the DDVP risk assessment
and proffers little to no evidence in
support of its requests for a hearing.
After carefully reviewing the objections
and hearing requests, EPA has
determined that NRDC’s hearing
requests do not satisfy the regulatory
requirements for such requests and that
its substantive objections are without
merit. Therefore, EPA, in this final
order, denies NRDC’s objections and its
requests for a hearing on those
objections.
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B. What Is the Agency’s Authority for
Taking This Action?
NRDC petitioned to revoke the DDVP
tolerances pursuant to the petition
procedures in FFDCA section 408(d)(1).
(21 U.S.C. 346a(d)(1)). Under section
408(d), EPA may respond to such a
petition by either issuing a final or
proposed rule modifying or revoking the
tolerances or issuing an order denying
the petition. (21 U.S.C. 346a(d)(4)).
Here, EPA responded by issuing an
order under section 408(d)(4)(iii)
denying the petition. (72 FR 68622
(December 5, 2007)).
Orders issued under section
408(d)(4)(iii) are subject to a statutorilycreated administrative review process.
(21 U.S.C. 346a(g)(2)). Any person may
file objections to a section 408(d)(4)(iii)
order with EPA and request a hearing on
those objections. (Id.). EPA is required
by section 408(g)(2)(C) to issue a final
order resolving the objections to the
section 408(d)(4)(iii) order. (21 U.S.C.
346a(g)(2)(C)).
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III. Statutory and Regulatory
Background
In this Unit, EPA provides
background on the relevant statutes and
regulations governing NRDC’s
objections and requests for hearing as
well as on pertinent Agency policies
and practices. As noted, NRDC’s
objections and requests for hearing raise
two main claims: (1) that EPA has
unlawfully failed to retain the full
tenfold safety factor for the protection of
infants and children; and (2) that it was
unlawful for EPA to rely on a toxicity
study for DDVP that was conducted
with humans. The children’s safety
factor claim is based on assertions
regarding DDVP’s potential endocrine
effects and the adequacy of EPA’s data
and risk assessments pertaining to
exposure to DDVP in food as a result of
the use of DDVP (and similar pesticides)
in agriculture or food storage and
through use of DDVP in residential
settings. The human studies claim
involves a challenge to the EPA
regulation governing reliance on human
studies as well as to EPA’s application
of that rule to a particular human study.
The human study in question measured
cholinesterase inhibition in humans
resulting from administration of DDVP.
Background information on each of
these topics is included in this Unit.
Unit III.A. summarizes the
requirements and procedures in section
408 of the FFDCA and applicable
regulations pertaining to pesticide
tolerances, including the procedures for
petitioning for revocation of tolerances
and challenging the denial of such
petitions and the substantive standards
for evaluating the safety of pesticide
tolerances. This unit also discusses the
closely-related statute under which EPA
regulates the sale, distribution, and use
of pesticides, the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(‘‘FIFRA’’), (7 U.S.C. 136 et seq.).
Unit III.B. provides an overview of
EPA’s risk assessment process. It
contains an explanation of how EPA
identifies the hazards posed by
pesticides, how EPA determines the
level of exposure to pesticides that pose
a concern (‘‘level of concern’’), how EPA
measures human exposure to pesticides,
and how hazard, level of concern
conclusions, and human exposure
estimates are combined to evaluate risk.
Further, this unit presents background
information on two Agency policies
with particular relevance to this action,
EPA’s policy with regard to the statutory
safety factor for the protection of infants
and children and its policy with regard
to cholinesterase inhibition.
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Unit III.C. summarizes EPA’s program
for implementing the statutory
requirement to screen pesticides for
potential endocrine effects. Unit III.D.
describes the EPA regulation on use of
human studies.
A. FFDCA/FIFRA and Applicable
Regulations
1. In general. EPA establishes
maximum residue limits, or
‘‘tolerances,’’ for pesticide residues in
food under section 408 of the FFDCA.
(21 U.S.C. 346a). Without such a
tolerance or an exemption from the
requirement of a tolerance, a food
containing a pesticide residue is
‘‘adulterated’’ under section 402 of the
FFDCA and may not be legally moved
in interstate commerce. (21 U.S.C. 331,
342). Monitoring and enforcement of
pesticide tolerances are carried out by
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(‘‘FDA’’) and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (‘‘USDA’’). Section 408 was
substantially rewritten by the Food
Quality Protection Act of 1996
(‘‘FQPA’’), which added the provisions
discussed below establishing a detailed
safety standard for pesticides, additional
protections for infants and children, and
the estrogenic substances screening
program. (Public Law 104-170, 110 Stat.
1489 (1996)).
EPA also regulates pesticides under
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (‘‘FIFRA’’), (7 U.S.C.
136 et seq). While the FFDCA authorizes
the establishment of legal limits for
pesticide residues in food, FIFRA
requires the approval of pesticides prior
to their sale and distribution, (7 U.S.C.
136a(a)), and establishes a registration
regime for regulating the use of
pesticides. FIFRA regulates pesticide
use in conjunction with its registration
scheme by requiring EPA review and
approval of pesticide labels and
specifying that use of a pesticide
inconsistent with its label is a violation
of federal law. (7 U.S.C. 136j(a)(2)(G)).
In the FQPA, Congress integrated action
under the two statutes by requiring that
the safety standard under the FFDCA be
used as a criterion in FIFRA registration
actions as to pesticide uses which result
in dietary risk from residues in or on
food, (7 U.S.C. 136(bb)), and directing
that EPA coordinate, to the extent
practicable, revocations of tolerances
with pesticide cancellations under
FIFRA. (21 U.S.C. 346a(l)(1)).
2. Safety standard for pesticide
tolerances. A pesticide tolerance may
only be promulgated by EPA if the
tolerance is ‘‘safe.’’ (21 U.S.C.
346a(b)(2)(A)(i)). ‘‘Safe’’ is defined by
the statute to mean that ‘‘there is a
reasonable certainty that no harm will
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result from aggregate exposure to the
pesticide chemical residue, including
all anticipated dietary exposures and all
other exposures for which there is
reliable information.’’ (21 U.S.C.
346a(b)(2)(A)(ii)). Section 408(b)(2)(D)
directs EPA, in making a safety
determination, to:
consider, among other relevant
factors- ...
(v) available information concerning the
cumulative effects of such residues and other
substances that have a common mechanism
of toxicity;
(vi) available information concerning the
aggregate exposure levels of consumers (and
major identifiable subgroups of consumers)
to the pesticide chemical residue and to other
related substances, including dietary
exposure under the tolerance and all other
tolerances in effect for the pesticide chemical
residue, and exposure from other nonoccupational sources;
(viii) such information as the
Administrator may require on whether the
pesticide chemical may have an effect in
humans that is similar to an effect produced
by a naturally occurring estrogen or other
endocrine effects. ...
(21 U.S.C. 346a(b)(2)(D)(v), (vi) and
(viii)).
EPA must also consider, in evaluating
the safety of tolerances, ‘‘safety factors
which . . . are generally recognized as
appropriate for the use of animal
experimentation data.’’ (21 U.S.C.
346a(b)(2)(D)(ix).
Risks to infants and children are given
special consideration. Specifically,
section 408(b)(2)(C) states that EPA:
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shall assess the risk of the pesticide
chemical based on— ...
(II) available information concerning the
special susceptibility of infants and children
to the pesticide chemical residues, including
neurological differences between infants and
children and adults, and effects of in utero
exposure to pesticide chemicals; and
(III) available information concerning the
cumulative effects on infants and children of
such residues and other substances that have
a common mechanism of toxicity. ...
(21 U.S.C. 346a(b)(2)(C)(i)(II) and (III)).
This provision also creates a
presumptive additional safety factor for
the protection of infants and children.
Specifically, it directs that ‘‘[i]n the case
of threshold effects, ... an additional
tenfold margin of safety for the pesticide
chemical residue and other sources of
exposure shall be applied for infants
and children to take into account
potential pre- and post-natal toxicity
and completeness of the data with
respect to exposure and toxicity to
infants and children.’’ (21 U.S.C.
346a(b)(2)(C)). EPA is permitted to ‘‘use
a different margin of safety for the
pesticide chemical residue only if, on
the basis of reliable data, such margin
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will be safe for infants and children.’’
(Id.). The additional safety margin for
infants and children is referred to
throughout this order as the ‘‘children’s
safety factor.’’
3. Procedures for establishing,
amending, or revoking tolerances.
Tolerances are established, amended, or
revoked by rulemaking under the
unique procedural framework set forth
in the FFDCA. Generally, a tolerance
rulemaking is initiated by the party
seeking to establish, amend, or revoke a
tolerance by means of filing a petition
with EPA. (See 21 U.S.C. 346a(d)(1)).
EPA publishes in the Federal Register a
notice of the petition filing and requests
public comment. (21 U.S.C. 346a(d)(3)).
After reviewing the petition, and any
comments received on it, EPA may issue
a final rule establishing, amending, or
revoking the tolerance, issue a proposed
rule to do the same, or deny the
petition. (21 U.S.C. 346a(d)(4)).
Once EPA takes final action on the
petition by either establishing,
amending, or revoking the tolerance or
denying the petition, any person may
file objections with EPA and seek an
evidentiary hearing on those objections.
(21 U.S.C. 346a(g)(2)). Objections and
hearing requests must be filed within 60
days. (Id.). The statute provides that
EPA shall ‘‘hold a public evidentiary
hearing if and to the extent the
Administrator determines that such a
public hearing is necessary to receive
factual evidence relevant to material
issues of fact raised by the objections.’’
(21 U.S.C. 346a(g)(2)(B). EPA
regulations make clear that hearings will
only be granted where it is shown that
there is ‘‘a genuine and substantial issue
of fact,’’ the requestor has identified
evidence ‘‘which, if established, resolve
one or more of such issues in favor of
the requestor,’’ and the issue is
‘‘determinative’’ with regard to the relief
requested. (40 CFR 178.32(b)). EPA’s
final order on the objections is subject
to judicial review. (21 U.S.C.
346a(h)(1)).
4. Tolerance reassessment and FIFRA
reregistration. The FQPA required that
EPA reassess the safety of all pesticide
tolerances existing at the time of its
enactment. (21 U.S.C. 346a(q)). EPA was
given 10 years to reassess the
approximately 10,000 tolerances in
existence in 1996. In this reassessment,
EPA was required to review existing
pesticide tolerances under the new
‘‘reasonable certainty that no harm will
result’’ standard set forth in section
408(b)(2)(A)(i). (21 U.S.C.
346a(b)(2)(A)(i)). This reassessment was
substantially completed by the August
3, 2006 deadline. Tolerance
reassessment was generally handled in
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conjunction with a similar program
involving reregistration of pesticides
under FIFRA. (7 U.S.C. 136a-1).
Reassessment and reregistration
decisions were generally combined in a
document labeled a Reregistration
Eligibility Decision (‘‘RED’’).
5. Estrogenic substances screening
program. The FQPA also imposed
requirements regarding creation of an
estrogenic substances screening
program. Section 408(p) gives EPA 2
years from enactment of the FQPA to
‘‘develop a screening program ... to
determine whether [pesticide chemicals
and certain other substances] may have
an effect in humans that is similar to an
effect produced by a naturally occurring
estrogen, or such other endocrine effect
as the Administrator may designate.’’
(21 U.S.C. 346a(p)(1)). This screening
program must use ‘‘appropriate
validated test systems and scientifically
relevant information.’’ (Id.). Once the
program is developed, EPA is required
to take public comment and seek
independent scientific review of it.
Following the period for public
comment and scientific review, and not
later than 3 years following enactment
of the FQPA, EPA is directed to
‘‘implement the program.’’ (21 U.S.C.
346a(p)(2)).
The scope of the estrogenic screening
program was expanded by an
amendment to the Safe Drinking Water
Act (‘‘SDWA’’) passed
contemporaneously with the FQPA.
That amendment gave EPA the authority
to provide for the testing, under the
FQPA estrogenic screening program, ‘‘of
any other substance that may be found
in sources of drinking water if the
Administrator determines that a
substantial population may be exposed
to such substance.’’ (42 U.S.C. 300j-17).
B. EPA Risk Assessment for
Tolerances—Policy and Practice
1. The safety determination - risk
assessment. To assess risk of a pesticide
tolerance, EPA combines information on
pesticide toxicity with information
regarding the route, magnitude, and
duration of exposure to the pesticide.
The risk assessment process involves
four distinct steps: (1) Identification of
the toxicological hazards posed by a
pesticide; (2) determination of the ‘‘level
of concern’’ with respect to human
exposure to the pesticide; (3) estimation
of human exposure to the pesticide; and
(4) characterization of risk posed to
humans by the pesticide based on
comparison of human exposure to the
level of concern.
a. Hazard identification. In evaluating
toxicity or hazard, EPA reviews toxicity
studies, primarily in laboratory animals,
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to identify any adverse effects on the
test subjects. Animal studies typically
involve investigating a broad range of
endpoints including gross and
microscopic effects on organs and
tissues, functional effects on bodily
organs and systems, effects on blood
parameters (such as red blood cell
count, hemoglobin concentration,
hematocrit, and a measure of clotting
potential), effects on the concentrations
of normal blood chemicals (including
glucose, total cholesterol, urea nitrogen,
creatinine, total protein, total bilirubin,
albumin, hormones, and enzymes such
as alkaline phosphatase, alanine
aminotransfersase and cholinesterases),
and behavioral or other gross effects
identified through clinical observation
and measurement. EPA examines
whether adverse effects are caused by
either short-term (e.g., ‘‘acute’’) or
longer-term (e.g., ‘‘chronic’’) pesticide
exposure and the effects of pre-natal and
post-natal exposure in animals.
EPA also considers whether the
adverse effect has a threshold - a level
below which exposure has no
appreciable chance of causing the
adverse effect. For non-threshold effects,
EPA assumes that any exposure to the
substance increases the risk that the
adverse effect may occur. At present,
EPA only considers one adverse effect,
the chronic effect of cancer, to
potentially be a non-threshold effect.
(Ref. 4 at 8-9). Not all carcinogens,
however, pose a risk at any exposure
level (i.e., ‘‘a non-threshold effect or
risk’’). Advances in the understanding
of the mode of action of carcinogenesis
have increasingly led EPA to conclude
that some pesticides that cause
carcinogenic effects in animal studies
only cause such effects above a certain
threshold of exposure. EPA has
traditionally considered non-cancer
adverse effects on the endocrine system
to be threshold effects; that
determination is being reexamined in
conjunction with the endocrine
disruptor screening program.
b. Level of concern/dose-response
analysis. Once a pesticide’s potential
hazards are identified, EPA determines
a toxicological level of concern for
evaluating the risk posed by human
exposure to the pesticide. In this step of
the risk assessment process, EPA
essentially evaluates the levels of
exposure to the pesticide at which
effects might occur. An important aspect
of this determination is assessing the
relationship between exposure (dose)
and response (often referred to as the
dose-response analysis). EPA follows
differing approaches to identifying a
level of concern for threshold and nonthreshold hazards.
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i. Threshold effects. In examining the
dose-response relationship for a
pesticide’s threshold effects, EPA
evaluates an array of toxicity studies on
the pesticide. In each of these studies,
EPA attempts to identify the lowest
observed adverse effect level (‘‘LOAEL’’)
and the next lower dose at which there
are no observed adverse affect levels
(‘‘NOAEL’’). Generally, EPA will use the
lowest NOAEL from the available
studies as a starting point (called ‘‘the
Point of Departure’’) in estimating the
level of concern for humans. (Ref. 4 at
9 (The Point of Departure ‘‘is simply the
toxic dose that serves as the ‘starting
point’ in extrapolating a risk to the
human population.’’)). At times,
however, EPA will use a LOAEL from a
study as the Point of Departure when no
NOAEL is identified in that study and
the LOAEL is close to, or lower than,
other relevant NOAELs. The Point of
Departure is in turn used in choosing a
level of concern. EPA will make
separate determinations as to the Points
of Departure, and correspondingly
levels of concern, for both short and
long exposure periods as well as for the
different routes of exposure (oral,
dermal, and inhalation).
In estimating and describing the level
of concern, the Point of Departure is at
times used differently depending on
whether the risk assessment addresses
dietary or non-dietary exposures. For
dietary risks, EPA uses the Point of
Departure to calculate an acceptable
level of exposure or reference dose
(‘‘RfD’’). The RfD is calculated by
dividing the Point of Departure by all
applicable safety or uncertainty factors.
Typically, EPA uses a baseline safety/
uncertainty factor equal to 100. That
value includes a factor of ten (‘‘10X’’)
where EPA is using data from laboratory
animals to reflect potentially greater
sensitivity in humans than animals and
a factor of 10X to account for potential
variations in sensitivity among members
of the human population as well as
other unknowns. Additional safety
factors may be added to address data
deficiencies or concerns raised by the
existing data. Under the FQPA, an
additional safety factor of 10X is
presumptively applied to protect infants
and children, unless reliable data
support selection of a different factor.
This FQPA additional safety factor
largely replaces pre-FQPA EPA practice
regarding additional safety factors. (Ref.
5 at 4-11).
In implementing FFDCA section 408,
EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs, also
calculates a variant of the RfD referred
to as a Population Adjusted Dose
(‘‘PAD’’). A PAD is the RfD divided by
any portion of the FQPA safety factor
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that does not correspond to one of the
traditional additional safety factors used
in general Agency risk assessments.
(Ref. 5 at 13-16). The reason for
calculating PADs is so that other parts
of the Agency, which are not governed
by FFDCA section 408, can, when
evaluating the same or similar
substances, easily identify which
aspects of a pesticide risk assessment
are a function of the particular statutory
commands in FFDCA section 408.
Today, RfDs and PADs are generally
calculated for both acute and chronic
dietary risks although traditionally a
RfD or PAD was only calculated for
chronic dietary risks. Throughout this
document general references to EPA’s
calculated safe dose are denoted as a
RfD/PAD.
For non-dietary, and combined
dietary and non-dietary, risk
assessments of threshold effects, the
toxicological level of concern is not
expressed as a RfD/PAD but rather in
terms of an acceptable (or ‘‘target’’)
margin of exposure (‘‘MOE’’) between
human exposure and the Point of
Departure. The ‘‘margin’’ of interest is
the ratio between human exposure and
the Point of Departure which is
calculated by dividing human exposure
into the Point of Departure. An
acceptable MOE is generally considered
to be a margin at least as high as the
product of all applicable safety factors
for a pesticide. For example, if a
pesticide needs a 10X factor to account
for inter-species differences, 10X factor
for intra-species differences, and 10X
factor for the FQPA children’s safety
provision, the safe or target MOE would
be a MOE of at least 1,000. What that
means is that for the pesticide to meet
the safety standard, human exposure to
the pesticide would have to be at least
1,000 times smaller than the Point of
Departure. Like RfD/PADs, specific
target MOEs are selected for exposures
of different durations. For non-dietary
exposures, EPA typically examines
short-term, intermediate-term, and longterm exposures. Additionally, target
MOEs may be selected based on both
the duration of exposure and the various
routes of non-dietary exposure - dermal,
inhalation, and oral.
ii. Non-threshold effects. For risk
assessments for non-threshold effects,
EPA does not use the RfD/PAD or MOE
approach to choose a level of concern if
quantification of the risk is deemed
appropriate. Rather, EPA calculates the
slope of the dose-response curve for the
non-threshold effects from relevant
studies using a linear, low-dose
extrapolation model that assumes that
any amount of exposure will lead to
some degree of risk. This dose-response
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analysis will be used in the risk
characterization stage to estimate the
risk to humans of the non-threshold
effect. Linear, low-dose extrapolation is
typically used as the default approach
for estimating the risk to carcinogens,
unless there are mode of action data
indicating a threshold response (or
nonlinearity).
c. Estimating human exposure. Risk is
a function of both hazard and exposure.
Thus, equally important to the risk
assessment process as determining the
hazards posed by a pesticide and the
toxicological level of concern for those
hazards is estimating human exposure.
Under FFDCA section 408, EPA is
concerned not only with exposure to
pesticide residues in food but also
exposure resulting from pesticide
contamination of drinking water
supplies and from use of pesticides in
the home or other non-occupational
settings. (See 21 U.S.C.
346a(b)(2)(D)(vi)).
i. Exposure from food. There are two
critical variables in estimating exposure
in food: (1) The types and amount of
food that is consumed; and (2) the
residue level in that food. Consumption
is estimated by EPA based on scientific
surveys of individuals’ food
consumption in the United States
conducted by the USDA. (Ref. 4 at 12).
Information on residue values comes
from a range of sources including crop
field trials, data on pesticide reduction
(or concentration) due to processing,
cooking, and other practices,
information on the extent of usage of the
pesticide, and monitoring of the food
supply. (Id. at 17).
In assessing exposure from pesticide
residues in food, EPA, for efficiency’s
sake, follows a tiered approach in which
it, in the first instance, assesses
exposure using the worst case
assumptions that 100 percent of the
crop in question is treated with the
pesticide and 100 percent of the food
from that crop contains pesticide
residues at the tolerance level. (Id. at
11). When such an assessment shows no
risks of concern, a more complex risk
assessment is unnecessary. By avoiding
a more complex risk assessment, EPA’s
resources are conserved and regulated
parties are spared the cost of any
additional studies that may be needed.
If, however, a first tier assessment
suggests there could be a risk of
concern, EPA then attempts to refine its
exposure assumptions to yield a more
realistic picture of residue values
through use of data on the percent of the
crop actually treated with the pesticide
and data on the level of residues that
may be present on the treated crop.
These latter data are used to estimate
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what has been traditionally referred to
by EPA as ‘‘anticipated residues.’’
Use of percent crop treated data and
anticipated residue information is
appropriate because EPA’s worst-case
assumptions of 100 percent treatment
and residues at tolerance value
significantly overstate residue values.
There are several reasons this is true.
First, all growers of a particular crop
would rarely choose to apply the same
pesticide to that crop; generally, the
proportion of the crop treated with a
particular pesticide is significantly
below 100 percent. (70 FR 46706, 46731
(August 10, 2005)). Second, the
tolerance value represents a high end or
worst case value. Tolerance values are
chosen only after EPA has evaluated
data from experimental crop field trials
in which the pesticide has been used in
a manner, consistent with the draft
FIFRA label, that is likely to produce
the highest residue in the crop in
question (e.g., maximum application
rate, maximum number of applications,
minimum pre-harvest interval between
last pesticide application and harvest).
(Refs. 4 and 6). These crop field trials
are generally conducted in several fields
at several geographical locations. (Id. at
5, 7 and Tables 1 and 5). Several
samples are then gathered from each
field and analyzed. (Id. at 53).
Generally, the results from such field
trials show that the residue levels for a
given pesticide use will vary from as
low as non-detectable to measurable
values in the parts per million (‘‘ppm’’)
range with the majority of the values
falling at the lower part of the range. (70
FR at 46731). EPA uses a statistical
procedure to analyze the field trial
results and identify the upper bound of
expected residue values. This upper
bound value is used as the tolerance
value. (Ref. 7). There may be some
commodities from a treated crop that
approach the tolerance value where the
maximum label rates are followed, but
most generally fall significantly below
the tolerance value. If less than the
maximum legal rate is applied, residues
will be even lower. Third, residue
values in the field do not take into
account the lowering of residue values
that frequently occurs as a result of
degradation over time and through food
processing and cooking.
EPA uses several techniques to refine
residue value estimates. (Ref. 4 at 1728). First, where appropriate, EPA will
take into account all the residue values
reported in the crop field trials, either
through use of an average or
individually. Second, EPA will consider
data showing what portion of the crop
is not treated with the pesticide. Third,
data can be produced showing pesticide
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degradation and decline over time, and
the effect of commercial and consumer
food handling and processing practices.
Finally, EPA can consult monitoring
data gathered by the FDA, the USDA, or
pesticide registrants, on pesticide levels
in food at points in the food distribution
chain distant from the farm, including
retail food establishments.
Another critical component of the
exposure assessment is how data on
consumption patterns are combined
with data on pesticide residue levels in
food. Traditionally, EPA has calculated
exposure by simply multiplying average
consumption by average residue values
for estimating chronic risks and highend consumption by maximum residue
values for estimating acute risks. Using
average residues is a realistic approach
for chronic risk assessment due to the
fact that variations in residue levels and
consumption amounts average out over
time. Using average values is
inappropriate for acute risk assessments,
however, because in assessing acute
exposure situations it matters how
much of each treated food a given
consumer eats and what the residue
levels are in the particular foods
consumed. Yet, using maximum residue
values for acute risk assessment tends to
greatly overstate exposure because it is
unlikely that a person would consume
at a single meal multiple food
components bearing high-end residues.
To take into account the variations in
short-term consumption patterns and
food residue values for acute risk
assessments, EPA has more recently
begun using probabilistic modeling
techniques for estimating exposure
when more simplistic models appear to
show risks of concerns.
All of these refinements to the
exposure assessment process, from use
of food monitoring data through
probabilistic modeling, can have
dramatic effects on the level of exposure
predicted, reducing worst case estimates
by 1 or 2 orders of magnitude or more.
(Ref. 8 at 16-17; 70 FR 46706, 46732
(August 10, 2005).
ii. Exposure from water. EPA may use
either or both field monitoring data and
mathematical water exposure models to
generate pesticide exposure estimates in
drinking water. Monitoring and
modeling are both important tools for
estimating pesticide concentrations in
water and can provide different types of
information. Monitoring data can
provide estimates of pesticide
concentrations in water that are
representative of specific agricultural or
residential pesticide practices and
under environmental conditions
associated with a sampling design.
Although monitoring data can provide a
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direct measure of the concentration of a
pesticide in water, it does not always
provide a reliable estimate of exposure
because sampling may not occur in
areas with the highest pesticide use,
and/or the sampling may not occur
when the pesticides are being used.
In estimating pesticide exposure
levels in drinking water, EPA most
frequently uses mathematical water
exposure models. EPA’s models are
based on extensive monitoring data and
detailed information on soil properties,
crop characteristics, and weather
patterns. (69 FR 30042, 30058-30065
(May 26, 2004)). These models calculate
estimated environmental concentrations
of pesticides using laboratory data that
describe how fast the pesticide breaks
down to other chemicals and how it
moves in the environment. These
concentrations can be estimated
continuously over long periods of time,
and for places that are of most interest
for any particular pesticide. Modeling is
a useful tool for characterizing
vulnerable sites, and can be used to
estimate peak concentrations from
infrequent, large storms.
iii. Residential exposures. Generally,
in assessing residential exposure to
pesticides EPA relies on its Residential
Standard Operating Procedures
(‘‘SOPs’’). (Ref. 9). The SOPs establish
models for estimating application and
post-application exposures in a
residential setting where pesticidespecific monitoring data are not
available. SOPs have been developed for
many common exposure scenarios
including pesticide treatment of lawns,
garden plants, trees, swimming pools,
pets, and indoor surfaces including
crack and crevice treatments. The SOPs
are based on existing monitoring and
survey data including information on
activity patterns, particularly for
children. Where available, EPA relies on
pesticide-specific data in estimating
residential exposures.
d. Risk characterization. The final
step in the risk assessment is risk
characterization. In this step, EPA
combines information from the first
three steps (hazard identification, level
of concern/dose-response analysis, and
human exposure assessment) to
quantitatively estimate the risks posed
by a pesticide. Separate
characterizations of risk are conducted
for different durations of exposure.
Additionally, separate and, where
appropriate, aggregate characterizations
or risk are conducted for the different
routes of exposure (dietary and nondietary).
For threshold risks, EPA estimates
risk in one of two ways. Where EPA has
calculated a RfD/PAD, risk is estimated
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by expressing human exposure as a
percentage of the RfD/PAD. Exposures
lower than 100 percent of the RfD/PAD
are generally not of concern.
Alternatively, EPA may express risk by
comparing the MOE between estimated
human exposure and the Point of
Departure with the acceptable or target
MOE. As described above, the
acceptable or target MOE is the product
of all applicable safety factors. To
calculate the actual MOE for a pesticide,
estimated human exposure to the
pesticide is divided into the Point of
Departure. In contrast to the RfD/PAD
approach, the higher the MOE, the safer
the pesticide. Accordingly, if the target
MOE for a pesticide is 100, MOEs equal
to or exceeding 100 would generally not
be of concern.
As a conceptual matter, the RfD/PAD
and MOE approaches are fundamentally
equivalent. For a given risk and given
exposure of a pesticide, if exposure to
a pesticide were found to be acceptable
under an RfD/PAD analysis it would
also pass under the MOE approach, and
vice-versa. However, for any specific
pesticide, risk assessments for different
exposure durations or routes may yield
different results. This is a function not
of the choice of the RfD/PAD or MOE
approach but of the fact that the levels
of concern and the levels of exposure
may differ depending on the duration
and route of exposure.
For non-threshold risks (generally,
cancer risks), EPA uses the slope of the
dose-response curve for a pesticide in
conjunction with an estimation of
human exposure to that pesticide to
estimate the probability of occurrence of
additional adverse effects. For nonthreshold cancer risks, EPA generally
considers cancer risk to be negligible if
the probability of increased cancer cases
falls within the range of 1 in 1 million.
Risks exceeding values within that
range would raise a risk concern.
2. EPA policy on the children’s safety
factor. As the above brief summary of
EPA’s risk assessment practice
indicates, the use of safety factors plays
a critical role in the process. This is true
for traditional 10X safety factors to
account for potential differences
between animals and humans when
relying on studies in animals (interspecies safety factor) and potential
differences among humans (intraspecies safety factor) as well as the
FQPA’s additional 10X children’s safety
factor.
In applying the children’s safety
factor provision, EPA has interpreted it
as imposing a presumption in favor of
applying an additional 10X safety factor.
(Ref. 5 at 4, 11). Thus, EPA generally
refers to the additional 10X factor as a
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presumptive or default 10X factor. EPA
has also made clear, however, that this
presumption or default in favor of the
additional 10X is only a presumption.
The presumption can be overcome if
reliable data demonstrate that a different
factor is safe for children. (Id.). In
determining whether a different factor is
safe for children, EPA focuses on the
three factors listed in section
408(b)(2)(C) - the completeness of the
toxicity database, the completeness of
the exposure database, and potential
pre- and post-natal toxicity. In
examining these factors, EPA strives to
make sure that its choice of a safety
factor, based on a weight-of-theevidence evaluation, does not
understate the risk to children. (Id. at
24-25, 35).
3. EPA policy on cholinesterase
inhibition as a regulatory endpoint.
Cholinesterase inhibition is a disruption
of the normal process in the body by
which the nervous system chemically
communicates with muscles and glands.
Communication between nerve cells
and a target cell (i.e., another nerve cell,
a muscle fiber, or a gland) is facilitated
by the chemical, acetylcholine. When a
nerve cell is stimulated it releases
acetylcholine into the synapse (or space)
between the nerve cell and the target
cell. The released acetylcholine binds to
receptors in the target cell, stimulating
the target cell in turn. As EPA has
explained, ‘‘the end result of the
stimulation of cholinergic pathway(s)
includes, for example, the contraction of
smooth (e.g., in the gastrointestinal
tract) or skeletal muscle, changes in
heart rate or glandular secretion (e.g.,
sweat glands) or communication
between nerve cells in the brain or in
the autonomic ganglia of the peripheral
nervous system.’’ (Ref. 10 at 10).
Acetylcholinesterase is an enzyme
that breaks down acetylcholine and
terminates its stimulating action in the
synapse between nerve cells and target
cells. When acetylcholinesterase is
inhibited, acetylcholine builds up
prolonging the stimulation of the target
cell. This excessive stimulation
potentially results in a broad range of
adverse effects on many bodily
functions including muscle cramping or
paralysis, excessive glandular
secretions, or effects on learning,
memory, or other behavioral parameters.
Depending on the degree of inhibition
these effects can be serious, even fatal.
EPA’s cholinesterase inhibition policy
statement explains EPA’s approach to
evaluating the risks posed by
cholinesterase-inhibiting pesticides
such as DDVP. (Ref. 10). The policy
focuses on three types of effects
associated with cholinesterase-
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inhibiting pesticides that may be
assessed in animal and human
toxicological studies: (1) Physiological
and behavioral/functional effects; (2)
cholinesterase inhibition in the central
and peripheral nervous system; and (3)
cholinesterase inhibition in red blood
cells and blood plasma. The policy
discusses how such data should be
integrated in deriving an acceptable
dose (RfD/PAD) for a cholinesteraseinhibiting pesticide.
Clinical signs or symptoms of
cholinesterase inhibition in humans, the
policy concludes, provide the most
direct evidence of the adverse
consequences of exposure to
cholinesterase-inhibiting pesticides.
Nonetheless, as the policy notes, due to
strict ethical limitations, studies in
humans are ‘‘quite limited.’’ (Id. at 19).
Although animal studies can also
provide direct evidence of
cholinesterase inhibition effects, animal
studies cannot easily measure cognitive
effects of cholinesterase inhibition such
as effects on perception, learning, and
memory. For these reasons, the policy
recommends that ‘‘functional data
obtained from human and animal
studies should not be relied on solely,
to the exclusion of other kinds of
pertinent information, when weighing
the evidence for selection of the critical
effect(s) that will be used as the basis of
the RfD or RfC.’’ (Id. at 20).
After clinical signs or symptoms,
cholinesterase inhibition in the nervous
system provides the next most
important endpoint for evaluating
cholinesterase-inhibiting pesticides.
Although cholinesterase inhibition in
the nervous system is not itself regarded
as a direct adverse effect, it is ‘‘generally
accepted as a key component of the
mechanism of toxicity leading to
adverse cholinergic effects.’’ (Id. at 25).
As such, the policy states that it should
be treated as ‘‘direct evidence of
potential adverse effects’’ and ‘‘data
showing this response provide valuable
information in assessing potential
hazards posed by anticholinesterase
pesticides.’’ (Id.). Unfortunately, useful
data measuring cholinesterase
inhibition in the central and peripheral
nervous systems has only been
relatively rarely captured by standard
toxicology testing, particularly as to
peripheral nervous system effects. For
central nervous system effects, however,
more recent neurotoxicity studies ‘‘have
sought to characterize the time course of
inhibition in ... [the] brain, including
brain regions, after acute and 90–day
exposures.’’ (Id. at 27).
Cholinesterase inhibition in the blood
is one step further removed from the
direct harmful consequences of
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cholinesterase-inhibiting pesticides.
According to the policy, inhibition of
blood cholinesterases ‘‘is not an adverse
effect, but may indicate a potential for
adverse effects on the nervous system.’’
(Id. at 28). The policy states that ‘‘[a]s
a matter of science policy, blood
cholinesterase data are considered
appropriate surrogate measures of
potential effects on peripheral nervous
system acetylcholinesterase activity in
animals, for central nervous system
(‘‘CNS’’) acetylcholinesterase activity in
animals when CNS data are lacking and
for both peripheral and central nervous
system acetylcholinesterase in
humans.’’ (Id. at 29). The policy notes
that ‘‘there is often a direct relationship
between a greater magnitude of
exposure [to a cholinesterase-inhibiting
pesticide] and an increase in incidence
and severity of clinical signs and
symptoms as well as blood
cholinesterase inhibition.’’ (Id. at 30).
Thus, the policy regards blood
cholinesterase data as ‘‘appropriate
endpoints for derivation of reference
doses or concentrations when
considered in a weight-of-the-evidence
analysis of the entire database ....’’ (Id.
at 29). Between cholinesterase
inhibition measured in red blood cell
(‘‘RBC’’) or blood plasma, the policy
states a preference for reliance on RBC
acetylcholinesterase measurements
because plasma is composed of a
mixture of acetylcholinesterase and
butyrylcholinesterase, and inhibition of
the latter is less clearly tied to inhibition
of acetylcholinesterase in the nervous
system. (Id. at 29, 32).
If a measure of cholinesterase
inhibition (e.g., RBC cholinesterase) is
being considered as a potential adverse
effect or surrogate for an adverse effect,
the policy advises that the level of
inhibition must be critically evaluated
‘‘in the context of both statistical and
biological significance.’’ (Id. at 37)
(emphasis in Original). The policy notes
that ‘‘[n]o fixed percentage of change
(e.g., 20% for cholinesterase enzyme
inhibition) is predetermined to separate
adverse from non-adverse effects.’’ (Id.).
Rather, the policy explains that ‘‘OPP’s
experience with the review of toxicity
studies with cholinesterase-inhibiting
substances shows that differences
between pre- and post-exposure of 20%
or more in enzyme levels is nearly
always statistically significant and
would generally be viewed as
biologically significant.’’ (Id. at 37-38).
The policy recommends that ‘‘[t]he
biological significance of statisticallysignificant changes of less than 20%
would have to be judged on a case-bycase basis, noting, in particular the
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pattern of changes in the enzyme levels
and the presence or absence of
accompanying clinical signs and/or
symptoms.’’ (Id. at 38). The policy notes
that similar or higher levels of
cholinesterase inhibition are used ‘‘in
monitoring workers for occupational
exposures (even in the absence of signs,
symptoms, or other behavioral effects).’’
(Id. at 31). For example, the policy
points out that the California
Department of Health Services requires
that workers exposed to toxic chemicals
such as organophosphate pesticides be
removed from the workplace if ‘‘red
blood cell cholinesterase levels show
30% or greater inhibition,’’ and that the
World Health Organization ‘‘has
guidelines with the same RBC action
levels (i.e., 30% or greater inhibition).’’
(Id.).
C. Endocrine Disruptor Screening
Program
The 1996 FQPA and SWDA
amendments directed EPA to develop
and implement an endocrine screening
program. To aid in the design of this
program called for in the FQPA and
SDWA amendments, EPA created the
Endocrine Disruptor Screening and
Testing Advisory Committee
(‘‘EDSTAC’’), which was comprised of
members representing the commercial
chemical and pesticides industries,
federal and state agencies, worker
protection and labor organizations,
environmental and public health
groups, and research scientists. (63 FR
71542, 71544, Dec. 28, 1998). The
EDSTAC presented a comprehensive
report in August 1998 addressing both
the scope and elements of the endocrine
screening program. (Ref. 11). The
EDSTAC’s recommendations were
largely adopted by EPA.
As recommended by EDSTAC, EPA
expanded the scope of the program from
focusing only on estrogenic effects to
include other effects on the endocrine
system (i.e., androgenic and thyroid
effects). (63 FR at 71545). Further, EPA,
again on the EDSTAC’s
recommendation, chose to include both
human and ecological effects in the
program. (Id.). Finally, based on
EDSTAC’s recommendation, EPA
established the universe of chemicals to
be screened to include not just
pesticides but also a wide range of other
chemical substances. (Id.). As to the
program elements, EPA adopted
EDSTAC’s recommended two-tier
approach with the first tier involving
screening ‘‘to identify substances that
have the potential to interact with the
endocrine system’’ and the second tier
involving testing ‘‘to determine whether
the substance causes adverse effects,
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identify the adverse effects caused by
the substance, and establish a
quantitative relationship between the
dose and the adverse effect.’’ (Id.). Tier
1 screening is limited to evaluating
whether a substance is ‘‘capable of
interacting with’’ the endocrine system,
and is ‘‘not sufficient to determine
whether a chemical substance may have
an effect in humans that is similar to an
effect produced by naturally occurring
hormones.’’ (Id. at 71550). Based on the
results of Tier 1 screening, EPA will
decide whether Tier 2 testing is needed.
Importantly, ‘‘[t]he outcome of Tier 2 is
designed to be conclusive in relation to
the outcome of Tier 1 and any other
prior information. Thus, a negative
outcome in Tier 2 will supersede a
positive outcome in Tier 1.’’ (Id. at
71554-71555).
The EDSTAC provided detailed
recommendations for Tier 1 screening
and Tier 2 testing. The panel of the
EDSTAC that devised these
recommendations was comprised of
distinguished scientists from academia,
government, industry, and the
environmental community. (Ref. 11 at
Appendix B). As suggested by the
EDSTAC, EPA has proposed a battery of
short-term in vitro and in vivo assays for
the Tier 1 screening exercise. (63 FR at
71550-71551). Validation of all but one
of these assays is complete. As to Tier
2 testing, EPA, on the recommendation
of the EDSTAC, has proposed using five
longer-term reproduction studies that,
with one exception, ‘‘are routinely
performed for pesticides with
widespread outdoor exposures that are
expected to affect reproduction.’’ (Id. at
71555). EPA is examining, pursuant to
the suggestion of the EDSTAC,
modifications to these studies to
enhance their ability to detect endocrine
effects.
EPA has published a draft list of the
first group of chemicals that will be
tested under the Agency’s endocrine
disruptor screening program. (72 FR
33486 (June 18, 2007)). The draft list
was produced based solely on the
exposure potential of the chemicals and
EPA has emphasized that ‘‘[n]othing in
the approach for generating the initial
list provides a basis to infer that by
simply being on this list these chemicals
are suspected to interfere with the
endocrine systems of humans or other
species, and it would be inappropriate
to do so.’’ (Id.)
D. EPA’s Human Research Rule
EPA decisions regarding the ethics of
human studies are governed by the
Protection for Subjects in Human
Research final rule (‘‘Human Research
rule’’), which significantly strengthened
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and expanded protections for subjects of
human research. (71 FR 6138 (February
6, 2006)). The framework of the Human
Research rule rests on the basic
principle that EPA will not, in its
actions, rely on data derived from
unethical research. The rule divides
studies involving intentional dosing of
human subjects into two groups: ‘‘new’’
studies - those initiated after April 7,
2006 (the effective date of the rule) - and
‘‘old’’ studies - those initiated before
April 7, 2006. The Human Research
Rule forbids EPA from relying on data
from any ‘‘new’’ study, unless EPA has
adequate information to determine that
the research was conducted in
substantial compliance with the ethical
requirements contained therein. (40
CFR. 26.1705). These ethical rules are
derived primarily from the ‘‘Common
Rule,’’ (40 CFR part 26), a rule setting
ethical parameters for studies conducted
or supported by the federal government.
In addition to requiring informed
consent and protection of the safety of
the subjects, among other things, the
rule specifies that ‘‘[r]isks to subjects
[must be] reasonable in relation to . . .
the importance of the knowledge that
may reasonably be expected to result
[from the study].’’ (40 CFR
26.1111(a)(2)). In other words, a study
would be judged unethical if it did not
have scientific value outweighing any
risks to the test subjects.
As to ‘‘old’’ studies, the Human
Research Rule forbids EPA from relying
on such data if there is clear and
convincing evidence that the conduct of
the research was fundamentally
unethical or significantly deficient with
respect to the ethical standards
prevailing at the time the research was
conducted. (40 CFR 26.1704). EPA has
indicated that in evaluating ‘‘the ethical
standards prevailing at the time the
research was conducted’’ it will
consider the Nuremburg Code, various
editions of the Declaration of Helsinki,
the Belmont Report, and the Common
Rule, as among the standards that may
be applicable to any particular study.
(71 FR at 6161). Further, reflecting the
concern that scientifically invalid data
are ‘‘always unethical,’’ (71 FR at 6160),
the rule limits the human research that
can be relied upon by EPA to
‘‘scientifically valid and relevant data.’’
(40 CFR 26.1701).
Whether the data are ‘‘new’’ or ‘‘old,’’
the Human Research rule forbids EPA
from relying on data from any study
involving intentional exposure of
pregnant women, fetuses, or children
subject to a very limited exception. (40
CFR 26.1703, 1706).
To aid EPA in making scientific and
ethical determinations under the
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Human Research rule, the rule
established an independent Human
Studies Review Board (‘‘HSRB’’) to
review both proposals for new research
(‘‘new’’ studies) and reports of
completed human research (‘‘old’’
studies) on which EPA proposes to rely.
(40 CFR 26.1603). The rule directs that
HSRB shall be comprised of non-EPA
employees ‘‘who have expertise in fields
appropriate for the scientific and ethical
review of human research, including
research ethics, biostatistics, and human
toxicology.’’ (40 CFR 26.1603(a)). If EPA
decides to rely on the results from ‘‘old’’
research conducted to identify or
measure a toxic effect, EPA must submit
the results of its assessment to the HSRB
for evaluation of the ethical and
scientific merit of the research. (40 CFR
26.1602(b)(2)).
EPA has established the HSRB as a
federal advisory committee under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act
(‘‘FACA’’) to take advantage of ‘‘the
benefits of the transparency and
opportunities for public participation’’
that accompany a FACA committee. (71
FR at 6156). The HSRB, as appointed by
EPA, contains approximately 16
distinguished experts in the fields of
bioethics, biostatistics, human health
risk assessment and human toxicology,
primarily from academia. (Ref. 12).
NRDC and other parties have
challenged the legality of the Human
Research rule. (NRDC v. U.S. EPA, No.
06-0820-ag (2d Cir.)). A decision on this
challenge is presently pending before
the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.
IV. Regulatory History of DDVP
A. In General
1. DDVP use. Dichlorvos (2, 2dichlorovinyl dimethyl phosphate), also
known as DDVP, is an insecticide used
in controlling flies, mosquitoes, gnats,
cockroaches, fleas, and other insect
pests. (Ref. 3). DDVP is registered for
use on agricultural sites; commercial,
institutional, and industrial sites; and
for domestic use in and around homes.
Agricultural and other commercial uses
include in greenhouses; mushroom
houses; storage areas for bulk, packaged
and bagged raw and processed
agricultural commodities; food
manufacturing/processing plants;
animal premises; and non-food areas of
food-handling establishments. It is also
registered for treatment of cattle, poultry
and swine. DDVP is not registered for
direct use on any field grown
commodities. Currently, there are 27
tolerances listed in 40 CFR 180.235 for
DDVP on agricultural (food and feed)
crops and animal commodities. DDVP is
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applied with aerosols, fogging
equipment, and spray equipment, and
through use of impregnated materials
such as resin strips which result in slow
release of the pesticide. The current
registrant for the technical active
ingredient, DDVP, is Amvac Chemical
Corporation (‘‘Amvac’’).
2. DDVP risks. The following
information on the assessment of the
risks posed by DDVP is drawn from
EPA’s decision on the reassessment of
DDVP tolerances and its response to
NRDC’s petition.
DDVP is a chlorinated
organophosphate pesticide which
inhibits plasma, RBC, and brain
cholinesterase in a variety of species.
(Ref. 3 at 122-123). Subchronic and
chronic oral DDVP exposures to rats and
dogs as well as chronic inhalation DDVP
exposure to rats resulted in significant
decreases in plasma, RBC and/or brain
cholinesterase activity. However, DDVP
does not cause delayed neurotoxicity in
the hen. Repeated, oral subchronic
DDVP exposures in male humans were
associated with statistically and
biologically significant decreases in RBC
cholinesterase inhibition. There was no
evidence of increased susceptibility to
young animals following in utero DDVP
exposure to rat and rabbit fetuses as
well as pre/post natal DDVP exposure to
rats in developmental, reproduction,
and comparative cholinesterase studies.
Evidence of sensitivity in the young was
seen in one parameter, auditory startle
amplitude, in a developmental
neurotoxicity study; however, the
effects in the rat pups here was at levels
well above levels which result in RBC
cholinesterase inhibition. Cancer
studies with DDVP provide suggestive
evidence of DDVP’s potential human
carcinogenicity; however, following the
advice of numerous independent
scientific panels, EPA has determined
that DDVP poses a negligible cancer risk
to humans due to the lack of relevance
to humans of the tumors identified in
the DDVP cancer studies. (72 FR at
68671-68673).
Inhibition of cholinesterase activity
was the toxicity endpoint selected to
assess hazards for all acute and chronic
dietary exposures, as well as short-,
intermediate-, and long-term (chronic)
dermal, inhalation, and incidental oral
residential exposures. Doses selected for
the Point of Departure in determining
the level of concern - i.e., RfD/PADs and
acceptable MOEs - were based on both
human and animal studies. (Ref. 3 at
130-135). Animal studies were used in
choosing levels of concern for
evaluating risk from acute and chronic
dietary exposure; acute dermal
exposure; and acute and chronic
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inhalation exposure. A human study
was used evaluating risk from shortterm incidental oral exposure; short-,
intermediate-, and long-term dermal
exposure; and short- and intermediateterm inhalation exposure.
Safety factor determinations used in
selecting the level of concern differed
based on whether EPA relied on one of
several different animal studies or a
human study. For levels of concerns
derived from a Point of Departure from
an animal study, EPA generally applied
a 100X safety factor (10X for interspecies variability and 10X for intrahuman variability). EPA removed the
10X children’s safety factor for risk
assessments based on an animal study.
For levels of concerns derived from a
Point of Departure from the human
study, EPA applied a 10X safety factor
for intra-human variability and a 3X
children’s safety factor. (Id.).
EPA based its decision to remove the
children’s safety factor when relying on
animal data on its conclusions that (1)
the toxicity database was complete; (2)
most of the data indicated no sensitivity
in the young and the only evidence of
sensitivity occurred at levels well above
the Points of Departure used for
establishing the levels of concern; and
(3) its estimate of human exposure to
DDVP was not understated. EPA
retained a portion of the children’s
safety factor when relying on the human
study because that study did not
determine a NOAEL. EPA concluded,
however, that reliable data supported
reduction of the 10X factor because the
effect seen at the LOAEL in that study
was so marginal that a lower dose
would have been unlikely to detect any
adverse effect. (72 FR 68694-68695).
EPA has estimated exposure to DDVP
taking into account the potential for
DDVP residues in food, drinking water,
and in the home as the result of the use
of DDVP pest strips. DDVP exposure
may result not only from use of DDVP
but use of two closely-related pesticides,
naled and trichlorfon, which metabolize
or degrade to DDVP in food, water, or
the environment. In assessing the risks
of DDVP, EPA has taken into account
exposure to DDVP resulting from use of
all three of these pesticides. (Ref. 3 at
147-149). Additionally, DDVP, naled,
and trichlorfon are within a family of
pesticides known as the
organophosphates. EPA has classified
the organophosphate pesticides and
their common cholinesterase-inhibiting
degradates as having a common
mechanism of toxicity. Thus, in
addition to assessing the risks posed by
exposure to organophosphate pesticides
individually, EPA has assessed the
potential cumulative effects from
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concurrent exposure to
organophosphate pesticides. (Ref. 13).
As discussed in Unit IV.B.1. below,
taking all of the above information into
account, EPA concluded that the
tolerances for DDVP were safe.
B. FFDCA Tolerance Reassessment and
FIFRA Pesticide Reregistration
1. In general. As required by the
FQPA of 1996, EPA reassessed the
safety of the DDVP tolerances under the
new safety standard established in the
FQPA. EPA released for comment a
preliminary risk assessment for DDVP in
October, 2000. (65 FR 60430 (October
11, 2000)). Subsequently, after
consideration of public comment, EPA,
on June 30, 2006, issued an Interim
Reregistration Eligibility Document
(‘‘IRED’’) for DDVP. In that document,
EPA determined that aggregate exposure
to DDVP as a result of use of DDVP,
naled, and trichlorfon, complied with
the FQPA safety standard. (Ref. 3 ).
Separately, on July 31, 2006, EPA
determined that cumulative ffects from
exposure to all organophosphate
residues were safe. (Ref. 14). In
combination, these findings satisfied
EPA’s obligation to review the DDVP
tolerances under the new safety
standard.
As a result of the FIFRA reregistration
and FFDCA tolerance reassessment
process there were numerous changes
made to DDVP’s registration that affect
non-occupational exposure to DDVP.
Specifically, on May 9, 2006, EPA
received from Amvac, the only
registrant of DDVP as a product for
manufacturing end-use DDVP products,
an irrevocable request to cancel certain
uses and include additional pest strip
label restrictions on the DDVP active
ingredient product labels. Pursuant to
section 6(f) of FIFRA, on June 30, 2006,
the Agency published a notice in the
Federal Register that it had received the
request and sought comment on EPA’s
intention to grant the request and cancel
the specified uses. (71 FR 37570 (June
30, 2006)). On October 20, 2006, EPA
issued the final cancellation order. (71
FR 61968 (October 20, 2006)).
The added restrictions on the use of
the pest strip products were approved
on October 11, 2006, and provided,
among other things, that large pest strips
could no longer be used in homes
except for garages, attics, crawl spaces,
and sheds that are occupied for less
than 4 hours per day. The only pest
strips permitted for use in occupied
areas inside the home were significantly
smaller strips for use in closets,
wardrobes, or cupboards. Additionally,
in early March, 2007, Amvac requested
the voluntary cancellation of all its pet
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collar and bait registrations and deletion
of those uses from its technical label.
Pursuant to section 6(f) of FIFRA,
Amvac’s requests to cancel the pet
collar and bait registrations as well as
deleting such uses from the technical
label were published in the Federal
Register on March 23, 2007. (72 FR
13786 (March 23, 2007)). On June 27,
2007, EPA issued the final cancellation
notice for the pet collar and bait
registrations. (72 FR 35235 (June 27,
2007)).
Cancellation of uses and label
restrictions imposed on Amvac’s
registration apply to all formulated
DDVP end-use products because it is
unlawful to use a pesticide in a manner
inconsistent with its label. (7 U.S.C.
136(ee)). This bar on use inconsistent
with the label applies to the formulation
of end-use pesticide products from
manufacturing use products.
Accordingly, because Amvac holds the
only registration for a DDVP
manufacturing use product, the removal
of uses and the addition of restrictions
with respect to Amvac’s manufacturing
use product label has the effect of
imposing those use cancellations and
label restrictions on all DDVP end-use
products.
2. Review of human study.
Completion of the DDVP IRED was
delayed, in part, by questions regarding
whether it was appropriate for EPA to
rely on several human toxicity studies
conducted with DDVP which were
submitted by Amvac. The study
receiving principal attention was a
study involving repeated dosing over
several days conducted in 1997 by A.J.
Gledhill. (Refs. 3 at 133; and 15). That
study is identified by the Master Record
Identification (‘‘MRID’’) number of
44248801. Amvac also cited
approximately a dozen other human
studies, several of which were also
conducted by Gledhill. (Ref. 16).
Following promulgation of the
Human Research rule, EPA evaluated
whether the human data submitted by
Amvac complied with the rule, and,
pursuant to the rule’s requirements,
presented these data and its
recommendations to the Human Studies
Review Board (‘‘HSRB’’) for review. On
March 9, 2006, the HSRB published a
notice in the Federal Register
announcing that a public meeting would
be held to consider the DDVP studies as
well as human studies for several other
pesticides. (71 FR 12194 (March 9,
2006)). The meeting was scheduled for
April 4-6, 2006. The notice alerted the
public of the opportunity to file both
written comments with the HSRB and to
make oral comments at the April
meeting. The members of the HSRB at
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the time of this meeting are listed in
Appendix 1.
NRDC filed written comments with
the HSRB concerning DDVP, (Ref. 17),
and also presented oral testimony at the
public meeting. (Ref. 18). NRDC’s
comments and oral remarks specifically
focused on whether the Gledhill study
had sufficient statistical power ‘‘to
detect an effect when it may occur’’ and
the fact that the Gledhill study only
used healthy, male test subjects. (Ref. 7
at 13). Other subjects discussed at the
meeting included the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the Gledhill study
such as its repeat dosing regime, the
failure to test blood plasma
cholinesterase, the failure to monitor
subjects after testing, and the study’s
consent form. (Id.; Ref. 18 at 18, 20-23).
On May 23, 2006, the HSRB published
a notice in the Federal Register alerting
the public that it had released a draft
report (dated May 16, 2006) and would
be holding a public teleconference
meeting on June 6, 2006 to discuss its
draft report. (71 FR 29624 (May 23,
2006)). The notice included instructions
on how members of the public could
participate in the teleconference and
explained the procedure for providing
oral and written comments. (Ref. 19).
NRDC did not file comments on the
draft report. (Ref. 20).
On June 26, 2006, the HSRB issued its
finding that reliance on the Gledhill
human study was appropriate given that
the study had scientific value and there
was no clear and convincing evidence
that the study was fundamentally
unethical. (Ref. 21). The HSRB
concluded that the other DDVP human
studies should not be used in the DDVP
risk assessment. These findings were
unchanged from its May 16, 2006 draft
report.
EPA agreed with the findings of the
HSRB and relied upon the HSRB’s
reasoning in using the Gledhill study in
its DDVP risk assessment. (72 FR at
68675).
V. NRDC Petition Regarding DDVP
On June 2, 2006, the NRDC filed a
petition with EPA which, among other
things, requested that EPA: (1) Conclude
the DDVP Special Review by August 3,
2006, with a finding that DDVP causes
unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment; (2) conclude the DDVP
FIFRA reregistration process by August
3, 2006, with a finding that DDVP is not
eligible for reregistration; (3) submit
draft notices of intent to cancel all
DDVP registrations to the FIFRA
Scientific Advisory Panel and USDA by
August 3, 2006, and issue those notices
60 days thereafter; (4) conclude the
DDVP tolerance reassessment process by
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August 3, 2006, with a finding that the
DDVP tolerances do not meet the
FFDCA safety standard; and (5) issue a
final rule by August 3, 2006, revoking
all DDVP tolerances. (Ref. 2). Shortly
after the petition was filed, on June 30,
2006, EPA released the IRED for DDVP
which addressed DDVP’s eligibility for
reregistration under FIFRA and
assessed, in part, whether DDVP’s
tolerances met the new safety standard
enacted by the FQPA. NRDC submitted
comments on the IRED and some of
these comments bore on issues in its
petition. (Ref. 3).
NRDC’s petition contained dozens of
claims as to why DDVP’s registration
under FIFRA should be canceled and its
FFDCA tolerances revoked. These issues
are not presented in detail here because
many raised solely FIFRA concerns and
NRDC has not pursued most of its
tolerance-related claims in its objections
and hearing requests.
EPA published notice of the petition
for comment on October 11, 2006. (71
FR 59784 (October 11, 2006)). EPA
received roughly 1,500 brief comments
in support of the petition. These
comments added no new information
pertaining to whether the tolerances
were in compliance with the FFDCA.
Detailed comments in opposition to the
petition were submitted by Amvac. (Ref.
22).
EPA responded to the petition in
three separate documents: (1) It issued
an order closing out the DDVP Special
Review; (72 FR 72709 (December 21,
2007)); (2) it issued an order denying the
request to cancel DDVP’s FIFRA
registration (72 FR 68581(December 5,
2007)); and (3) it issued an order
pursuant to FFDCA section 408(d)(4)(iii)
denying the request to revoke DDVP’s
FFDCA tolerances (78 FR 68662
(December 5, 2007). Today’s final order
only concerns the objections filed to the
section 408(d)(4)(iii) order denying the
request to revoke tolerances.
VI. EPA Response to the Petition to
Revoke DDVP Tolerances
EPA issued a section 408(d)(4)(iii)
order responding to the petition’s
request to revoke DDVP tolerances on
December 5, 2007 (hereinafter referred
to as EPA’s ‘‘petition response’’ or
‘‘petition denial order’’). (72 FR 68662
(December 5, 2005). That order denied
the petition finding that none of the
grounds asserted by NRDC
demonstrated that the DDVP tolerances
should be revoked. Nonetheless, EPA
did conclude that NRDC raised several
pertinent concerns with EPA’s
assessment of the risks posed by DDVP.
To respond to NRDC’s concerns, EPA
completely revamped both its dietary
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and residential risk assessments. In its
new risk assessments, EPA included
updated information on residue levels
of DDVP in food, the amount of usage
of DDVP and related pesticides in
agriculture, and food consumption
patterns of infants and children. EPA
also adopted modified and more
conservative assumptions regarding
exposure patterns to DDVP in
residential settings and exposure to
DDVP from naled’s use to control
mosquitoes. Because, however, EPA
concluded that the revised risk
assessments still showed that the DDVP
tolerances are safe, EPA denied NRDC’s
petition.
EPA’s specific responses to the claims
in the petition that are relevant to
NRDC’s objections are summarized in
the portion of this order responding to
the objections and hearing requests.
VII. NRDC’s Objections and Requests
for Hearing
On February 1, 2008, NRDC filed,
pursuant to FFDCA section 408(g)(2),
objections to EPA’s denial of its
tolerance revocation petition and
requested a hearing on those objections.
As indicated above, NRDC’s objections
and requests for hearing raise two main
claims: (1) that EPA has unlawfully
failed to retain the full 10X safety factor
for the protection of infants and
children; and (2) that it was unlawful
for EPA to rely on a toxicity study for
DDVP that was conducted with humans.
NRDC cites three grounds for its
assertion that EPA unlawfully lowered
the 10X children’s safety factor: (1) that
EPA lacked adequate data on DDVP’s
potential effects on the endocrine
system; (2) that EPA lacked adequate
data on several matters related to
assessing dietary exposure to DDVP
residues in food; and (3) that EPA has
inadequate data on exposure to DDVP
from its use in residential pest strips. As
to the DDVP human study, NRDC
claimed that EPA’s regulation
concerning use of human studies is
unlawful and that the study is
scientifically flawed and ethically
compromised. In analyzing NRDC’s
claims, EPA has broken NRDC’s two
main claims down into 19 separate subissues. Each sub-issue is described in
detail and responded to separately in
Unit VIII.
In support of its request for hearing,
NRDC proffered the following
documents as evidence that a hearing
would be appropriate:
(1) the Interim Reregistration Eligibility
Determination for DDVP; (2) the entire record
for the IRED and the documents referenced
and cited therein; (3) NRDC’s comments on
the IRED; (4) EPA’s petition denial and the
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references cited in that denial; (5) NRDC’s
petition and all references cited in the
petition; and (6) the arguments, citations, and
attachments contained in these objections.
(Ref. 1 at 3) (citations and references to
attachments omitted).
VIII. Response to Objections and
Requests for Hearing
A. Overview
EPA denies each of NRDC’s objections
as well as its hearing requests. NRDC’s
hearing requests fail to meet the
statutory and regulatory requirements
for holding a hearing. NRDC has failed
to proffer evidence on its hearing
requests which would, if established,
resolve one or more issues in its favor.
Rather, NRDC relies on mere allegations
and general denials and contentions.
Further, many of NRDC’s claims do not
present genuine and substantial issues
of fact and/or are immaterial to the relief
requested. On the merits, NRDC’s
objections are denied for substantially
the same reasons given in EPA’s petition
denial order. NRDC’s objections largely
restate the claims in its petition.
Significantly, NRDC does not
acknowledge or respond to the
substantial revisions to the DDVP
dietary and residential risk assessments
made in response to the NRDC petition.
Similarly, NRDC does not acknowledge
or respond to EPA’s detailed summary
of why it adopted the conclusion by the
independent HSRB that the Gledhill
human study complied with EPA’s
Human Research rule.
The remainder of this Unit is
organized in the following manner. Unit
VIII.B. describes in greater detail the
requirements pertaining to when it is
appropriate to grant a hearing request.
Unit VIII.C. examines the evidence
proffered by NRDC in support of its
hearing requests. Units VIII.D. and E.
provide EPA’s response to the NRDC’s
objections and hearing requests. Unit
VIII.D. addresses NRDC’s claims
regarding the children’s safety factor
and subunit E addresses NRDC’s
arguments concerning reliance on the
Gledhill human study. EPA’s
conclusions on the hearing requests and
objections are summarized in Units
VIII.F. and G., respectively.
EPA has adopted a 4-part format in
Units VIII.D. and E. for explaining its
ruling on each of the 19 sub-issues EPA
identified in the objections. First,
NRDC’s claim and any arguments or
evidence tendered to support that claim
are described. Second, background
information on the claim is provided
including whether and how the claim
was presented in NRDC’s petition and,
if it was presented, EPA’s reasons for
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denying the claim in its earlier petition
denial order. Third, EPA explains its
reasons for denying a hearing on that
claim. Finally, EPA explains its reasons
for denying the claim on the merits.
B. The Standard for Granting an
Evidentiary Hearing
EPA has established regulations
governing objections to tolerance
rulemakings and tolerance petition
denials and requests for hearings on
those objections. (40 CFR Part 178; 55
FR 50291 (December 5, 1990)). Those
regulations prescribe both the form and
content of hearing requests and the
standard under which EPA is to
evaluate requests for an evidentiary
hearing.
As to the form and content of a
hearing request, the regulations specify
that a hearing request must include: (1)
a statement of the factual issues on
which a hearing is requested and the
requestor’s contentions on those issues;
(2) a copy of any report, article, or other
written document ‘‘upon which the
objector relies to justify an evidentiary
hearing;’’ and (3) a summary of any
other evidence relied upon to justify a
hearing. (40 CFR 178.27).
The standard for granting a hearing
request is set forth in section 178.32.
That section provides that a hearing will
be granted if EPA determines that the
‘‘material submitted’’ shows all of the
following:
(1) There is a genuine and substantial issue
of fact for resolution at a hearing. An
evidentiary hearing will not be granted on
issues of policy or law.
(2) There is a reasonable possibility that
available evidence identified by the requestor
would, if established, resolve one or more of
such issues in favor of the requestor, taking
into account uncontested claims or facts to
the contrary. An evidentiary hearing will not
be granted on the basis of mere allegations,
denials, or general descriptions of positions
and contentions, nor if the Administrator
concludes that the data and information
submitted, even if accurate, would be
insufficient to justify the factual
determination urged.
(3) Resolution of the factual issue(s) in the
manner sought by the person requesting the
hearing would be adequate to justify the
action requested. An evidentiary hearing will
not be granted on factual issues that are not
determinative with respect to the action
requested. For example, a hearing will not be
granted if the Administrator concludes that
the action would be the same even if the
factual issue were resolved in the manner
sought.
(40 CFR 178.32(b)).
This provision essentially imposes
four requirements upon a hearing
requestor. First, the requestor must
show it is raising a question of fact, not
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one of law or policy. Hearings are for
resolving factual issues not for debating
law or policy questions. Second, the
requestor must demonstrate that there is
a genuine dispute as to the issue of fact.
If the facts are undisputed or the record
is clear that no genuine dispute exists,
there is no need for a hearing. Third, the
requestor must show that the disputed
factual question is material - i.e., that it
is outcome determinative with regard to
the relief requested in the objections.
Finally, the requestor must make a
sufficient evidentiary proffer to
demonstrate that there is a reasonable
possibility that the issue could be
resolved in favor of the requestor.
Hearings are for the purpose of
providing objectors with an opportunity
to present evidence supporting their
objections; as the regulation states,
hearings will not be granted on the basis
of ‘‘mere allegations, denials, or general
descriptions of positions or
contentions.’’ (40 CFR 178.32(b)(2)).
EPA’s hearing request requirements
are based heavily on FDA regulations
establishing similar requirements for
hearing requests filed under other
provisions of the FFDCA. (53 FR 41126,
41129 (October 19, 1988)). FDA
pioneered the use of summary
judgment-type procedures to limit
hearings to disputed material factual
issues and thereby conserve agency
resources. FDA’s use of such procedures
was upheld by the Supreme Court in
1972, (Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott
& Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973)),
and, in 1975, FDA promulgated generic
regulations establishing the standard for
evaluating hearing requests. (40 FR
22950 (May 27, 1975)). It is these
regulations upon which EPA relied in
promulgating its hearing regulations in
1990.
Unlike EPA, FDA has had numerous
occasions to apply its regulations on
hearing requests. FDA’s summary of the
thrust of its regulations, which has been
repeatedly published in the Federal
Register in orders ruling on hearing
requests over the last 24 years, is
instructive on the proper interpretation
of the regulatory requirements. That
summary states:
A party seeking a hearing is required to
meet a ‘threshold burden of tendering
evidence suggesting the need for a hearing.’
[] An allegation that a hearing is necessary to
‘sharpen the issues’ or ‘fully develop the
facts’ does not meet this test. If a hearing
request fails to identify any evidence that
would be the subject of a hearing, there is no
point in holding one.
A hearing request must not only contain
evidence, but that evidence should raise a
material issue of fact concerning which a
meaningful hearing might be held. [] FDA
need not grant a hearing in each case where
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an objection submits additional information
or posits a novel interpretation of existing
information. [] Stated another way, a hearing
is justified only if the objections are made in
good faith and if they ‘‘draw in question in
a material way the underpinnings of the
regulation at issue.’’ Finally, courts have
uniformly recognized that a hearing need not
be held to resolve questions of law or policy.
(49 FR 6672, 6673 (February 22, 1984);
72 FR 39557, 39558 (July 19, 2007)
(citations omitted)). EPA has been
guided by FDA’s application of its
regulations in this proceeding.
Congress confirmed EPA’s authority
to use summary judgment-type
procedures with hearing requests when
it amended FFDCA section 408 in 1996.
Although the statute had been silent on
this issue previously, the FQPA added
language specifying that when a hearing
is requested, EPA ‘‘shall . . . hold a
public evidentiary hearing if and to the
extent the Administrator determines
that such a public hearing is necessary
to receive factual evidence relevant to
material issues of fact raised by the
objections.’’ (21 U.S.C. 346a(g)(2)(B)).
This language grants EPA broad
discretion to determine whether a
hearing is ‘‘necessary to receive factual
evidence’’ to objections.
C. Evidentiary Proffer by NRDC
As noted above, the purpose for
holding hearings is ‘‘to receive factual
evidence.’’ (U.S.C. 346a(g)(2)(B); 53 FR
41126, 41129 (‘‘Hearings are for the
purpose of gathering evidence on
disputed factual issues . . . .’’)). A
requestor must identify evidence relied
upon to justify a hearing and either
submit copies of that evidence or
summarize it. (40 CFR 178.27). After
reviewing the proffer, EPA must find
that there is a reasonable possibility that
the proffered evidence, if established,
would resolve one or more genuinelydisputed, material factual issues in a
requestor’s favor. (40 CFR 178.32(b)).
Because a substantial portion of NRDC’s
evidentiary proffer is deficient on its
face, EPA finds it most efficient to
preliminarily review the proffer before
turning to the individual issues raised
by NRDC.
As previously mentioned, NRDC
proffered the following items as
evidence supporting its requests for
hearing:
(1) the Interim Reregistration Eligibility
Determination for DDVP; (2) the entire record
for the IRED and the documents referenced
and cited therein; (3) NRDC’s comments on
the IRED; (4) EPA’s petition denial and the
references cited in that denial; (5) NRDC’s
petition and all references cited in the
petition; and (6) the arguments, citations, and
attachments contained in these objections.
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(Ref. 1 at 3). These items can be divided
into two groups: (1) items produced or
assembled by EPA (the IRED; the IRED
record; and EPA’s petition denial); and
(2) items produced by NRDC (NRDC’s
comments on the IRED; NRDC’s
petition; and NRDC’s objections).
The items in the first group - the EPA
documents - clearly do not constitute a
proper proffer. Essentially, this is a nonspecific identification of every
document and piece of data EPA has
considered and relied upon in the
multi-year process of conducting the
FIFRA reregistration and FFDCA
tolerance reassessment for DDVP and in
responding to NRDC’s DDVP petition.
This could easily encompass hundreds,
if not thousands of documents, and tens
of thousands of pages of analysis and
data. EPA’s petition response alone
cited 82 documents and those
documents generally were EPA
analytical papers and not the underlying
data. EPA concludes that NRDC’s
citation to the thousands of pages in the
IRED, the IRED record, and the petition
denial is so vague a proffer as to not
constitute a proffer at all. It would be as
if a lawyer, in responding to a court’s
request for case law authority for a
principle he or she was defending, cited
the court to West’s Federal Reporter, 3rd
Series. While somewhere in those
hundreds of volumes a case may exist
that supports the asserted principle, the
lawyer cannot be said to have identified
it by a vague wave at a substantial
portion of the law library. Further, given
that the purpose of a hearing is to gather
or receive evidence, proffering evidence
already considered and relied upon by
EPA would not seem to be grounds for
holding a hearing. Finally, as a matter
of law, EPA does not understand how it
can be argued that a proffer consisting
of a general reference to a record of
decision which EPA has found
supported one result could constitute
evidence that if established, would
justify the opposite conclusion. At
bottom, the proffer of the items in the
first group fails to ‘‘identify’’ evidence
which would, if established, resolve an
issue in NRDC’s favor.
NRDC’s second group of documents
consists of NRDC’s comments on the
IRED; NRDC’s petition; and NRDC’s
objections. In analyzing this proffer,
EPA has focused on NRDC’s objections
because the objections appear to
contain, almost word-for-word, the
arguments and claims put forward in its
petition and IRED comments with
regard to the children’s safety factor and
reliance on human studies. The
objections reference 16 documents. For
the reasons explained below, 10 of these
documents can be rejected on their face
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as not justifying a hearing. Four of the
documents, however, potentially
include factual evidence supporting a
hearing and are analyzed more
thoroughly in connection with the
specific issue in the hearing request to
which they are tied. The other two
documents that are referenced are
NRDC’s DDVP petition and NRDC’s
comments on the DDVP IRED. As
described above, these documents do
not add anything beyond what is in the
objections.
1. Documents that clearly do not
proffer evidence of a genuinelydisputed, material issue of fact. (10
items)
• Five Newspaper Stories. NRDC cites
to an Associated Press story from 2002
and four Los Angeles Times stories from
2007. These news stories contain basic
background information about DDVP;
general contentions from Amvac, NRDC,
and EPA regarding the safety of DDVP;
and no more than a cursory, passing
reference to any of the issues raised in
the petition. There can be no serious
contention that these articles present
evidence justifying a hearing.
• NRDC comments to HSRB. NRDC
references the comments it submitted to
the HSRB with regard to the HSRB’s
review of the human studies conducted
with DDVP. The comments - three pages
of bulleted talking points and one graph
- are a summary of the slightly more
detailed arguments contained in NRDC’s
objections. This document adds no
justification for a hearing not otherwise
included in NRDC’s objections.
2. Legal Briefs in NRDC v. EPA, No.
06-0820-ag (2d Cir.). NRDC cites to its
opening and reply briefs in NRDC v.
EPA, the case adjudicating NRDC’s
challenge to EPA’s Human Research
rule. These briefs contain legal
arguments regarding the lawfulness of
the Human Research rule. They contain
no factual evidence justifying NRDC’s
DDVP hearing requests.
• Three Law Review Articles. NRDC
references: (1) a short article by a NRDC
attorney summarizing his legal
objections to EPA’s Human Research
rule; (2) an article concerning EPA’s
implementation of the FQPA; and (3) an
article focusing on how tort law might
be used to supplement the FQPA to
protect children. None of these articles
mention DDVP and no serious
contention can be made that they
provide factual evidence justifying a
hearing.
3. Documents which may present
evidence of a genuinely-disputed,
material issue of fact. (4 items)
• Lockwood Articles. NRDC cites two
articles by Dr. Alan Lockwood which
discuss science and ethical issues with
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regard to several human intentional
dosing studies involving pesticides.
Several of the human studies addressed
were DDVP studies, one of which is the
Gledhill human study that is the focus
of this proceeding. Whether the
information presented in these articles
supports NRDC’s hearing requests is
examined in Unit VIII.E.3.a.
• Sass Letters. NRDC cites two letters
published in the journal Environmental
Health Perspectives co-authored by Dr.
Jennifer Sass of NRDC. These letters
discuss science and ethical issues with
regard to two human studies, including
the DDVP human study in question in
this proceeding. Whether the
information presented in these letters
supports NRDC’s hearing requests is
examined in Unit VIII.E.3.a.
D. Response to Specific Issues Raised in
Objections and Hearing Requests Children’s Safety Factor
1. Failure to support children’s safety
factor decision with DDVP-specific
data— a. Objection/hearing request subissue. NRDC asserts that EPA, in
choosing a 3X children’s safety factor
for DDVP, did not rely on reliable data
showing that such a factor was safe for
infants and children because EPA’s
choice of 3X ‘‘is not based on any data
specific to DDVP.’’ (Ref. 1 at 5). NRDC’s
argument is that EPA erred by not
deriving a precise safety factor for DDVP
but instead used a value that EPA
considered to be half of the 10X safety
factor. NRDC claims that ‘‘EPA could
not have determined that ‘such margin’
[i.e., 3X] will be safe, when the
replacement safety factor is simply a
generic stand-in for EPA’s conclusion
that ‘something less than 10X’ is
enough.’’ (Id.). According to NRDC, EPA
should have explained ‘‘what reliable
data supports a 3X safety factor in
particular, as opposed to 4X or some
other number, for DDVP specifically.’’
(Id.).
b. Background. Similar assertions
were made in NRDC’s petition and its
IRED comments. For example, the
petition claimed that ‘‘[t]he Agency did
not explain why it chose 3X as opposed
to 4X or any other factor,’’ (Ref. 2 at 14),
and the IRED comments asserted that
there was a ‘‘complete lack of
explanation’’ for EPA’s safety factor
decisions. (Ref. 23 at 5). Both
documents also alleged there were
inadequacies in the toxicity and
exposure databases. (Refs. 2 at 15, and
38-41; and 23 at 8-9).
In response to these claims by NRDC,
EPA, in the petition response,
comprehensively restated its reasoning
for its decisions on the children’s safety
factor for DDVP in the IRED. (72 FR at
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42695
68694-68695). EPA noted that it had a
complete toxicity database for DDVP
and it carefully reviewed the evidence
regarding the sensitivity of the young to
DDVP and explained why an additional
safety factor was not needed to protect
infants and children. Further, EPA
detailed why it had concluded that its
exposure assessments would not
understate human exposure to DDVP.
For some DDVP risk assessments EPA
chose to remove the children’s safety
factor entirely, and for others EPA
reduced the safety factor to 3X. EPA
explained that it retained a 3X
children’s safety for certain assessments
because the toxicity study which was
relied upon in conducting those risk
assessments had not identified a ‘‘no
adverse effect level’’ (‘‘NOAEL’’) in its
subjects but rather only a ‘‘lowest
adverse effect level’’ (‘‘LOAEL’’).
Despite the failure to identify a NOAEL
in the study, EPA concluded that ‘‘a 3X
factor’’ would be more than adequate to
identify a NOAEL based upon the slight
adverse effect (marginal RBC
cholinesterase inhibition in a human
study) observed at the LOAEL.’’ (72 FR
at 68695). EPA noted that an
independent science review board had
confirmed that lower doses were
unlikely to produce a measurable effect.
Finally, EPA explained why it chose 3X
instead of 4X or some other value. (Id.).
The petition response noted that ‘‘where
the data does not warrant a full 10X,
EPA generally does not attempt to
mathematically derive a precise
replacement safety factor because
regulatory agencies’ traditional use of
10X safety factors (upon which the
FQPA safety factor was modeled) was
based on rough estimates rather than
detailed calculations. Instead, where a
10X factor would clearly overstate the
uncertainty, EPA simply applies a factor
valued at half of 10X.’’ (Id.). EPA
explained that it considers 3X to be half
of 10X assuming a lognormal
distribution of effects. (Id.).
c. Denial of hearing request. In
analyzing whether a hearing would be
appropriate on this sub-issue, it is
helpful to break the sub-issue down into
three separate, but related, questions: (1)
Whether EPA, in selecting a children’s
safety factor lower than 10X, is required
to justify with precision why it chose
one factor over another; (2) whether
EPA offered a justification for the
children’s safety factor it chose; and (3)
whether EPA relied upon DDVP specific
information in choosing a safety factor
or instead relied upon ‘‘generic
assertions.’’ When broken down in this
way, it is clear that none of these
questions meets the standard for a
hearing.
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The first question is a pure question
of law - does FFDCA section 408(c)
require EPA to offer a reasoned
explanation for its choice of a children’s
safety factor, including an explanation
as to why a different factor is not
needed. A question of fact, not of law,
is required to justify a hearing. (40 CFR
178.32(b)(1)).The second and third
questions fail to present a matter of
genuinely-disputed facts because it is
plain on the record that EPA did offer
a reasoned justification for its decision
and, in that justification, relied upon
DDVP-specific facts. EPA’s petition
response to NRDC’s 10X arguments laid
out in careful detail information
regarding the extent of the toxicity and
exposure database on DDVP and the
data bearing on DDVP’s effects on young
animals. (72 FR at 68694-68695
(discussing the completeness of the
DDVP toxicity database, DDVP studies
bearing on pre- and post-natal toxicity,
and the basis for DDVP exposure
estimates)). Further, NRDC proffers no
evidence - because there is none to
proffer - suggesting that EPA did not
consider DDVP-specific information in
making its children’s safety factor
decision. Therefore, this question does
not meet the standard for a hearing both
because there are no genuinely-disputed
facts and NRDC has proffered no
evidence which, if established, could
resolve this issue in its favor. 57 FR
6667, 6672 (February 27, 1992) (‘‘A
hearing must be based on reliable
evidence, not on mere allegations or on
information that is inaccurate and
contradicted by the record.’’)
d. Denial of objection. EPA agrees
with NRDC that general principles of
administrative law require it to provide
a reasoned explanation for its decision
on selection of a children’s safety factor.
(Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC,
462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)). EPA disagrees
with NRDC, however, to the extent it is
suggesting that as part of this reasoned
explanation for its selection of a
children’s safety factor, EPA must show
why it did not choose some other
mathematical value. Rather, the statute
imposes upon EPA, if it decides to vary
from the presumptive 10X children’s
safety factor, the burden to show that
any ‘‘different’’ safety factor is safe.
Once EPA has made that showing, its
obligation to offer a reasoned
explanation is complete. Because EPA
offered a reasoned explanation as to
why the children’s safety factors it
chose protect the safety of infants and
children, (72 FR 68694-68695), EPA
denies NRDC’s objection on this point.
As to the substance of EPA’s
explanation of why it chose a 3X safety
factor for certain DDVP risk
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assessments, NRDC claims that EPA
erred because its choice of 3X is based
on ‘‘a generic assertion not [] on any
data specific to DDVP.’’ (Ref. 1 at 5).
NRDC is wrong. The generic assertion
NRDC mentions is EPA’s explanation of
why 3X is half of 10X. EPA’s choice of
3X, however, is not based on its
conclusion that 3X is half of 10X but on
the data in the DDVP human study at
issue. As noted above, the petition
response explained in detail that a full
10X safety factor was not needed to
address the uncertainty raised by the
failure of the DDVP human study to
identify a NOAEL. The effects seen in
that study at the LOAEL were only
marginally adverse at best, and
therefore, EPA concluded that applying
the full 10X safety factor (i.e., dividing
the LOAEL by another factor of 10X in
addition to the 10X factor for intrahuman variability) was more than was
needed to address the lack of a NOAEL.
The HSRB confirmed as much when it
wrote: ‘‘because the decreased activity
in RBC cholinesterase activity observed
in this study was at or near the limit of
what could be distinguished from
baseline values, it was unlikely that a
lower dose would produce a measurable
effect in RBC cholinesterase activity.’’
(Ref. 21 at 41).
EPA chose a safety factor of 3X for
DDVP based on its conclusion that not
only was 10X overprotective but that 3X
would be protective given the results
seen in the relevant DDVP study. (72 FR
at 68695). As EPA concluded in the
petition denial order: ‘‘a 3X safety factor
would be more than adequate to identify
a NOAEL based upon the slight adverse
effect (marginal RBC cholinesterase
inhibition in a human study) observed
at the LOAEL.’’ (Id.). Generally, EPA
uses a 3X safety factor as the default
value when reducing a 10X safety factor.
(Refs. 5 at 9-10, 26; and 24 at 4-40 - 441; ). A safety factor of 3X is deemed to
be approximately half the value of a
safety factor of an order of magnitude
(10X). As EPA explained in the petition
denial order:
In choosing a safety factor in circumstances
where the data does not warrant a full 10X,
EPA generally does not attempt to
mathematically derive a precise replacement
safety factor because regulatory agencies’
traditional use of 10X safety factors (upon
which the FQPA safety factor was modeled)
was based on rough estimates rather than
detailed calculations. Instead, where a 10X
factor would clearly overstate the
uncertainty, EPA simply applies a factor
valued at half of 10X. In determining half of
a 10X factor, EPA assumes that the
distribution of effects within the range of a
safety factor is distributed lognormally
(which is generally the case for biological
effects), and reduction of a lognormal
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distribution by half is equal to half a log
(10-5) or approximately 3X. A lognormal
distribution is a distribution which if plotted
based on the logarithm of each of its values
would yield a bell-shaped (normal)
distribution but if plotted according to actual
values would be skewed having a clumping
of values along the vertical axis of the plot.
(72 FR at 68695) (citations omitted).
NRDC does not challenge EPA’s
reasoning regarding whether the choice
of 3X is justified based on the results of
a DDVP-specific study and thus, the
merits of EPA’s DDVP-specific
reasoning is not here at issue. Rather,
NRDC denies that EPA engaged in
DDVP-specific reasoning in choosing
3X. Because NRDC’s argument is
contradicted on the face of the petition
response, it is denied.
2. Endocrine effects. As described
below, NRDC claims that EPA cannot
remove the children’s safety factor
because it has not completed the
endocrine screening program for DDVP
under section 408(p) and because EPA
has inadequate endocrine data for
DDVP. Although NRDC did argue in its
petition that EPA cannot make a safety
finding without completing the
endocrine screening program, it did not
assert claims regarding endocrine data
and the children’s safety factor. EPA has
previously ruled that a petitioner may
not raise new issues in filing objections
to EPA’s denial of its Original petition.
(72 FR 39318, 39324 (July 18, 2007)
(‘‘The FFDCA’s tolerance revocation
procedures are not some sort of ‘game,’
whereby a party may petition to revoke
a tolerance on one ground, and then,
after the petition is denied, file
objections to the denial based on an
entirely new ground not relied upon by
EPA in denying the petition.’’)).
Accordingly, NRDC’s objections and
hearing requests as to the children’s
safety factor and endocrine data are
denied.
Even if these claims were properly
presented in these objections, for the
reasons set forth below they neither
entitle NRDC to a hearing nor justify the
relief sought.
a. Endocrine disruptor screening
program—i. Objection/hearing request
sub-issue. NRDC argues that EPA must
retain the 10X children’s safety factor
because EPA has not fulfilled its
obligations under FFDCA section 408(p)
to screen pesticides, including DDVP,
for endocrine disruption potential. (Ref.
1 at 5). Essentially, NRDC argues that
EPA must retain the children’s safety
factor for any pesticide until testing
under the endocrine screening program
is completed for that pesticide.
ii. Background. In its petition, NRDC
claimed that failure to conduct the
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endocrine screening program for DDVP
under section 408(p) made it impossible
for EPA to conclude that the DDVP
tolerances are safe. (Ref. 2 at 49). EPA
responded to this argument by citing its
denial of a petition to revoke various
pesticide tolerances in which the claim
was made that EPA could not remove
the children’s safety factor if endocrine
screening under section 408(p) had not
been conducted. (72 FR at 68676).
There, EPA concluded that the statute
did not impose a mandatory bar upon
removal of the children’s safety factor
until completion of the endocrine
screening program. (71 FR 43906, 43920
(August 2, 2006)). EPA also found in
responding to the prior petition that it
had sufficient data on endocrine
screening for the pesticide in question
to make a safety finding. (71 FR at
43920-43921). After analyzing the
endocrine data for DDVP, EPA
concluded that it had sufficient data to
make a safety finding as to DDVP. (72
FR at 68676 - 68677).
iii. Denial of hearing request. The
question of whether completion of the
endocrine screening program under
FFDCA section 408(p) is a mandatory
prerequisite to removal of the children’s
safety factor is a legal issue. A question
of fact, not of law, is required to justify
a hearing. (40 CFR 178.32(b)(1)).
iv. Denial of objection. In response to
a prior pesticide tolerance revocation
petition, and objections filed as to EPA’s
denial of that petition, EPA has already
rejected the legal claim presented in this
objection. (71 FR at 43920; 72 FR 39318,
39327-39328 (July 18, 2007). After
analyzing the statutory language,
structure, and legislative history, EPA
concluded that section 408(p) does not
override the ‘‘clear and unmistakable
language[] [in section 408(b)(2)(C)]
grant[ing] EPA discretion to make a factbased determination of whether a safety
factor different than the 10X default
value is safe for children.’’ (71 FR at
43920). EPA summarized its reasoning
as follows:
under section 408(b)(2)(C) EPA clearly has
the discretion to determine, in any given
case, whether it has reliable data to choose
a factor different than the 10X default value.
Not only is there no statutory language
supporting the [petitioners’] argument in
favor of automatic retention of the 10X until
completion of the endocrine screening
program but the legislative history is in no
way supportive of construing the enactment
of the program as intended to have such a
dramatic impact. Further, since the
enactment of the FQPA, EPA’s
contemporaneous and consistent approach to
the endocrine screening program has been to
treat that information-gathering exercise as
not imposing some type of statutorilyprescribed, automatic injunction barring
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removal of the children’s safety factor until
completion of information-gathering under
the program.
(Id.). EPA also catalogued the extensive
data requirements already in place for
pesticides that produced information on
a pesticide’s potential endocrine effects.
(71 FR at 43920-43921). EPA concluded
that ‘‘in many instances the totality of
the information gleaned from current
data required for pesticides used on
food will make it possible to develop a
meaningful weight-of-the-evidence
determination on the potential of the
pesticide to adversely affect the
endocrine system.’’ (Id.).
NRDC has done nothing more than
state in a conclusory fashion that
completion of endocrine screening
under section 408(p) is necessary to a
decision to remove the children’s safety
factor. Accordingly, EPA denies this
objection for the reasons stated in its
previous two orders addressing this
claim. (71 FR at 43920 - 43921; 72 FR
at 39327-39328).
b. DDVP endocrine data—i.
Objection/hearing request sub-issue. In
its objections, NRDC argues that EPA
has inadequate data on endocrine effects
to remove the children’s safety factor.
As support for this argument NRDC
asserts: (1) that the studies relied upon
by EPA ‘‘were not designed to detect
endocrine disruption . . . ;’’ and (2) that
the two-generation rat reproduction
study does not meet EPA’s 1998
guideline for such studies and, given
that the reproduction study did show
endocrine effects, a ‘‘[p]roper
histopathology in the two generation rat
reproduction study could have revealed
adverse effects at lower levels than’’ the
levels at which cholinesterase inhibition
was seen in DDVP studies. (Ref. 1 at 6).
ii. Background. As noted above,
NRDC’s petition argued that EPA could
not make a safety finding for DDVP in
the absence of data collected under the
section 408(p) screening program. EPA
responded to this claim by examining
the data on DDVP bearing on its
potential endocrine effects. EPA
concluded that it could make a safety
finding for DDVP in absence of further
endocrine data given that: ‘‘(1) data
bearing on potential endocrine effects
from a two-generation reproduction
study as well as other chronic data in
which effects on reproductive organs
were examined; (2) EPA well
understands DDVP’s most sensitive
mechanism of toxicity (cholinesterase
inhibition); and (3) the potential
endocrine-related effects seen for DDVP
appeared in the presence of significant
cholinesterase inhibition and at levels
nearly two orders of magnitude above
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42697
the most sensitive cholinesterase effects.
. . .’’ (72 FR at 68677).
iii. Denial of hearing request. A
hearing on this sub-issue is not
appropriate because NRDC’s request is
based on mere allegations, general
contentions, and speculation. NRDC
claims that the studies EPA relied upon
were not ‘‘designed’’ to investigate
endocrine effects; however, NRDC
proffers no evidence to support such an
allegation. Further, such a claim has
little, if any, materiality, given that the
important question is not whether the
studies were ‘‘designed’’ to measure
endocrine effects but whether they
actually measure such effects. Notably,
NRDC does not, and cannot upon this
record, make the latter contention. (See
72 FR at 68676 (discussing the
numerous endocrine-related endpoints
assessed in the DDVP database)).
Further, NRDC’s claim that if the DDVP
two-generation rat reproduction study
had been conducted pursuant to the
1998 guidelines it might have shown
endocrine effects at lower doses than
the doses at which DDVP’s
cholinesterase effects were seen is
nothing more than speculation. In
applying its hearing regulations, FDA
has routinely denied hearings on
speculation about what redoing a study
might show. For example, in a
proceeding establishing a food additive
regulation for acesulfame potassium,
FDA denied a hearing to an objector
who challenged FDA’s rejection of a
study for only containing partial
histopathological data. (57 FR 6667
(February 27, 1992)). The objector had
argued that full histopathological data
might have altered FDA’s conclusion.
FDA found such an argument
unconvincing: ‘‘Because complete
histopathological examination of tissues
from all animals in the first rat study
was not done and cannot be done now,
any prediction of the results of such an
examination is simply speculation.
Speculation regarding data that do not
exist cannot serve as the basis for a
hearing.’’ (Id. at 6671). For all of the
above reasons, the hearing request on
this sub-issue is denied.
iv. Denial of objection. EPA denies
NRDC’s objection that EPA does not
have adequate endocrine data on DDVP
to remove the children’s safety factor.
First, NRDC is wrong to imply that
existing, required toxicity studies do not
provide valuable information on
potential endocrine effects. EPA
discussed this issue in detail in an
earlier order involving similar claims
concerning a different pesticide. There,
EPA pointed out that:
The primary proposed Tier 2 study [for the
Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program]
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relevant to endocrine effects on humans is
the 2-generation reproductive toxicity study
in rats. This is one of the core studies
required for all food-use pesticides since
1984. In this reproduction study, potential
hormonal effects can be detected through
behavioral changes, ability to become
pregnant, duration of gestation, signs of
difficult or prolonged parturition, apparent
sex ratio (as ascertained by anogenital
distances) of the offspring, feminization or
masculinization of offspring, number of
pups, stillbirths, gross pathology and
histopathology of the vagina, uterus, ovaries,
testis, epididymis, seminal vesicles, prostate,
and any other identified target organs. In fact,
EPA, in 1998, in discussing this study’s use
in Tier 2, identified 39 endpoints examined
in this study relevant to estrogenic,
androgenic, or thyroid effects. At that time,
EPA noted that it was evaluating whether to
add another 10 endocrine-related endpoints
to the study protocol to enhance the utility
of the study to detect endocrine effects.
Despite the ongoing evaluation of additional
endpoints, EPA has concluded that the
existing 2-generation mammalian assay is
valid for the identification and
characterization of reproductive and
developmental effects, including those due to
endocrine disruption, based on the long
history of its use, the endorsement of the
1998 test guideline by the FIFRA Scientific
Advisory Panel, and acceptance by member
countries of the Organizations for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
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(71 FR 43906, 43921 (August 2, 2006)
(citations omitted)). That order also
catalogued the numerous endocrinerelated endpoints in other chronic
toxicities routinely-required for
pesticides used on agricultural
commodities. (Id.).
Specifically as to DDVP, in its
response to NRDC’s petition, EPA
detailed four long-term DDVP toxicity
studies, submitted under EPA data
requirements that provided data on
numerous effects that are relevant to
potential endocrine disruption. EPA
wrote:
EPA has adequate data on DDVP’s
potential endocrine effects to evaluate
DDVP’s safety. In the 1989 NTP cancer
studies with rats and mice, male and female
reproductive organs (prostate, testes,
epididymis, ovaries, uterus) were examined
and no changes attributable to DDVP were
found. The 52–week dog study with DDVP
also was without effect in the reproductive
organs (testes, prostate, epididymides, cervix,
ovaries, uterus, vagina). EPA also has a 1992
two-generation rat reproduction study with
DDVP (via drinking water) that is similar to
the most recent guidelines (1998) for conduct
of such a study with respect to endocrinerelated endpoints. Although that study did
not include certain evaluations that the 1998
guidelines recommended related to
endocrine-related effects (age of vaginal
opening and preputial separation), it did
incorporate other aspects of the 1998
guidelines such as an examination of
esterous cycling in females and sperm
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number, motility, and morphology in males.
The study did identify an adverse effect on
esterous cycling in females but only at the
high dose (8.3 mg/kg/day). All doses in the
study showed significant cholinesterase
inhibition. Further, the NOAEL and LOAEL
from the esterous cycling endpoint in the
reproduction study are nearly two orders of
magnitude higher than the NOAEL and
LOAEL used as a Point of Departure in
setting the chronic RfD/PAD for DDVP.
(72 FR at 68676 (citations omitted).
Further, the petition response
additionally discussed a DDVP study
from the scientific literature examining
endocrine-related effects. (Id.).
NRDC’s speculation - that further
testing of DDVP might reveal endocrine
effects at levels below those at which
cholinesterase inhibition has been
measured - does not convince EPA that
there is not a reliable basis for removing
the children’s safety factor as regards
endocrine effects. As EPA indicated in
its denial of the NRDC petition, it has
several studies addressing numerous
endpoints bearing on DDVP’s potential
endocrine effects, DDVP’s
cholinesterase inhibition effects are
well-defined by existing data, and the
only endocrine effect seen in the DDVP
data occurred in the presence of
significant cholinesterase inhibition and
at a level two orders of magnitude (i.e.,
100X) greater than the level at which the
most sensitive cholinesterase effects
were seen. As a pesticide, DDVP is
subject to testing under the endocrine
disruptor screening program; however,
EPA expects that that data will confirm
its conclusion regarding DDVP’s
potential endocrine effects. NRDC’s
objection on this point is denied.
3. Dietary exposure—a. Objection/
hearing request sub-issue. NRDC claims
that there are numerous uncertainties in
EPA’s estimate of dietary exposure to
DDVP from food and that these
uncertainties preclude EPA from
departing from the 10X children’s safety
factor. (Ref. 1 at 6). Specifically, NRDC
cites to a list of uncertainties noted by
EPA in a preliminary risk assessment for
DDVP released in 2000. Those
uncertainties involve the number of
infants surveyed for the food
consumption database; foods consumed
from farm stands; use of data on residue
decline from cooking studies; reliance
on the residue sampling from the FDA
Total Diet Study; and lack of monitoring
data, and extensive use of data
translation, for fumigated commodities.
With the exception of the infant
consumption issue, NRDC makes no
claim other than to allege that ‘‘[e]ach of
these shortcomings poses a serious risk
of understating the risks posed by DDVP
contamination of food.’’ (Id.). As to the
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infant consumption data, NRDC offers
various challenges to the size and
representativeness of the group of
infants sampled in conjunction to the
2000 preliminary risk assessment.
NRDC acknowledges that EPA, in its
response to the NRDC petition, states
that it used updated infant consumption
data but NRDC objects that ‘‘EPA does
not assert that these data represent a
statistically adequate or representative
sample.’’ (Id.). Finally, NRDC implies
that EPA thinks the data are not reliable
by citing an EPA statement regarding
the reliability of monitoring data.
b. Background. NRDC made almost
identical claims in its petition to revoke
DDVP tolerances. EPA responded with a
detailed examination of each of the
factors cited by NRDC as well as several
additional factors. (72 FR at 6868468686). Where EPA identified
weaknesses in the exposure database it
either incorporated new, updated data
in its risk assessment (for example,
replacing data from the FDA Total Diet
Study with data from USDA’s Pesticide
Data Program) or explained how that
weakness had been addressed by
conservative assumptions. (72 FR at
68684). This led to an entirely revised
dietary exposure and risk assessment for
DDVP. As to this revised assessment,
EPA concluded that ‘‘its assessment of
exposure to DDVP from food will not
under-estimate but rather over-estimate,
and in all likelihood substantially overestimate, DDVP exposure.’’ (72 FR at
68686). EPA also noted that the largest
‘‘driver’’ or contributor to dietary
exposure of DDVP was DDVP in
drinking water and not DDVP in food.
(Id.). Specifically, as to food
consumption data for infants, EPA
stated that it had incorporated the most
recent consumption data for infants that
is used in all EPA pesticide risk
assessments currently in its revised risk
assessment for DDVP. This most recent
data was collected at the direction of
Congress in the FQPA. (Public Law 104170, sec. 301; 110 Stat. 1489, 1511).
c. Denial of hearing request. NRDC’s
objection and request for a hearing on
this sub-issue suffers from several
infirmities. First, NRDC has objected to
an outdated document, EPA’s
preliminary risk assessment for DDVP.
With the exception of the issue
concerning food consumption data for
infants, NRDC has made no effort to
object to EPA’s current assessment of
the reliability of various factors cited by
NRDC in EPA’s petition response issued
under FFDCA section 408(d)(4)(iii).
When an objector does not challenge
EPA conclusions in the section
408(d)(4)(iii) order but rather challenges
some prior conclusion that was
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superseded by the section 408(d)(4)(iii)
order, the objector has not raised a live
controversy as to an issue material to
the section 408(d)(4)(iii) order. (See 53
FR 53176, 53191 (December 30, 1988)
(where FDA responds to a comment in
the final rule, repetition of the comment
in objections does not present a live
controversy unless the objector proffers
some evidence calling FDA’s conclusion
into question)). In fact, in these
circumstances, it is questionable
whether EPA has jurisdiction to
consider the objection and hearing
request because objections may only be
filed as to a section 408(d)(4)(iii) order
or other statutorily-specified action. (21
U.S.C. 346a(g)(2)(A)).
Second, NRDC has made no proffer of
evidence supporting its claim that each
of the factors cited from EPA’s
preliminary risk assessment ‘‘poses a
serious risk of understating the risks
posed by DDVP contamination of food.’’
(Ref. 1 at 6). NRDC’s entire argument
concerning the effect these factors (other
than the infant food consumption data
issue) would have on the DDVP
exposure assessment is a single
conclusory sentence. A hearing will not
be granted on ‘‘mere allegations’’ or
‘‘general contentions.’’ (40 CFR
178.32(b)(2)). Although NRDC discusses
the infant food consumption data issue
at greater length, this discussion
provides no support for granting a
hearing. NRDC’s discussion is limited
to: (1) a presentation of a short analysis
of the adequacy of the superseded
consumption data as opposed to the
data upon which EPA relied in denying
NRDC’s objection; and (2) a claim that
EPA has not made a finding that the
more recent infant food consumption
data ‘‘represent a statistically adequate
or representative sample.’’ (Ref. 1 at 67). However, the superseded data is
irrelevant to the present proceeding and
the allegation about an absent finding is
framed as a procedural/legal challenge,
not an identification of evidence
supporting factual contentions. (See 53
FR 53176, 53199 (December 30, 1998)
(‘‘Rather than presenting evidence, [the
objector] asserts that FDA did not
adequately justify its conclusions. Such
an assertion will not justify a hearing.’’).
Third, ignoring for a moment the
other serious flaws identified above, a
hearing is inappropriate on this issue
because NRDC has not shown a
disputed factual issue. Rather, NRDC is
essentially arguing about the correct
conclusion that should be drawn from
the factual findings made by EPA in its
preliminary risk assessment. (47 FR
55471, 55474 (December 10, 1982)
(‘‘[Objectors] assertion about this
evidence is, at best, an argument that a
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different inference (i.e., that the pieces
are not ‘reasonably uniform’ and ‘cube
shaped’) should be drawn from
established fact (the dimensions of the
pieces) than the agency has drawn. No
hearing is required in such
circumstances.’’).
Finally, this entire issue suffers a
materiality problem because dietary
exposure to DDVP in food is so small
relative to other DDVP exposures. As
EPA noted in its petition denial, the
‘‘latest dietary assessment shows that,
by a large margin, the biggest driver in
the DDVP dietary risk assessment are
DDVP residues in water not food.’’ (72
FR at 68686). Moreover, in evaluating
aggregate exposure to DDVP from all
sources EPA found that dietary
exposure from food and water was
‘‘insignificant’’ compared to exposures
from pest strips. NRDC has made no
showing that its concerns regarding
dietary exposure to DDVP in food are
material to the overall exposure
assessment. (See 53 FR 53176, 53202
(December 30, 1998) (The objector
claims that radiation causes nutrient
loss but ‘‘to justify a hearing on this
point, it is not enough for [the objector]
to simply assert that some nutrient loss
can occur. [The objector] must present
evidence that suggests that nutrient
losses in food irradiated at doses
permitted by the regulation are
sufficiently large and would so affect
the diet that such food would be
nutritionally unwholesome or unsafe.’’).
For all of the above reasons, NRDC’s
hearing request on the adequacy of the
DDVP dietary exposure assessment are
denied.
d. Denial of objections. EPA questions
whether NRDC’s repetition of EPA’s
statements from a preliminary risk
assessment constitute an objection to a
superseding risk assessment in a section
408(d) petition denial. In any event,
EPA has already explained in great
detail in its petition denial why the
factors cited in its preliminary risk
assessment do not raise a concern that
EPA in its latest assessment has
understated DDVP dietary exposure. To
the contrary, EPA concluded that its
dietary assessment will ‘‘over-estimate,
and in all likelihood substantially overestimate, DDVP exposure.’’ (72 FR at
68686). Accordingly, NRDC’s objections,
to the extent they merely repeat the
claims in the petition, are denied for the
same reasons stated in the petition
denial. (72 FR at 68684-68686).
EPA also denies NRDC’s apparent
objection that the updated infant food
consumption data is unreliable and thus
EPA may not depart from the 10X
children’s safety factor. The only two
grounds NRDC cited for this objection
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42699
were: (1) EPA’s alleged failure to
confirm that these data are ‘‘statistically
adequate or [a] representative sample;’’
and (2) a reference EPA made to
monitoring data. NRDC’s arguments
here are without merit.
EPA has traditionally relied upon
large scale surveys of food consumption
conducted by the USDA in assessing
dietary exposure and risk from
pesticides. USDA generally conducts
these surveys roughly every 10 years.
EPA currently relies primarily on the
Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by
Individuals (‘‘CSFII’’) which was
conducted in 1994-96. Prior surveys
were performed by USDA in 1977-78
and 1989-91. The 1994-96 CSFII was
supplemented in 1998 to expand the
number of data points for infants and
children. As EPA has explained: ‘‘These
surveys were designed to monitor food
use and food consumption patterns in
the U.S. population. The data were
collected as a multistage, stratified,
probability sample that was
representative of the U.S. population. []
The most recent survey (CSFII 19941996/1998) was designed to obtain a
sample that would provide equal
precision over all sex-age domains. The
data are used by a number of federal and
state agencies to improve understanding
of factors that affect food intake and the
nutritional status of the U.S. population.
[EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs]
considers the CSFII data adequate to
model the daily variability in the U.S.
diet.’’ (Ref. 5 at 39).
The 1998 supplemental survey was
collected in response to the mandate in
the FQPA specifying that USDA, in
consultation with EPA, was to
‘‘coordinate the development and
implementation of survey procedures to
ensure that adequate data on food
consumption patterns of infants and
children are collected.’’ (Public Law
104-170, sec. 301; 110 Stat. 1489, 1511).
Congress specified that ‘‘[t]o the extent
practicable, [these] procedures [] shall
include the collection of data on food
consumption patterns of a statistically
valid sample of infants and children.’’
(Id.). Working together, EPA and USDA
adopted a survey plan designed to be
statistically reliable and representative.
(Refs. 25 and 26). The 1998 survey
involved sampling of 5,559 infants and
children. When combined with the
4,253 infants and children from the
1994-96 survey, the total sample size for
infants and children in the two surveys
is near 10,000. EPA and USDA
concluded that that ‘‘the sample sizes
for each sex-age group [from the
combined surveys] provide a sufficient
level of precision to ensure statistical
reliability of the estimates’’ except as to
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certain low consumption items for
individual age groups (e.g., infant
consumption of lettuce). (Ref. 25 at 1).
Comparison of the 1994-96 and 1998
surveys indicated few statistical
differences in nutrient consumption for
the different age groups with the
exception of 3-5 year olds. Even so,
‘‘[t]he differences seen, although
statistically significant, were relatively
small and likely to be of little practical
or biological significance.’’ (Ref. 26 at 23).
Because EPA, in conjunction with
USDA, has taken care to insure that its
surveys of food consumption constitute
a statistically valid and representative
sample of infants and children, NRDC’s
unsupported objection suggesting that
this data is somehow inadequate is
rejected.
NRDC’s reference to an EPA statement
about monitoring data does not in any
way undermine this conclusion. EPA
began a section of the petition denial
which discusses, among other things,
monitoring data of residues in food,
infant food consumption data, and
fumigant monitoring data, with the
broad statement that ‘‘[i]n general, EPA
disagrees that the monitoring data are
unreliable.’’ (72 FR at 68684). While
NRDC highlights the qualifying
language ‘‘in general,’’ it ignores the
critical following sentence that
provides: ‘‘To the contrary, EPA
believes that the monitoring data
provide for an appropriately
conservative risk assessment.’’ (Id.). The
first sentence was qualified by the
phrase ‘‘[i]n general,’’ because in two
instances the EPA’s residue monitoring
data were less than optimal; however, as
noted in the second sentence, EPA
concluded that the risk assessment was
appropriately conservative because
either the data in question were
insignificant or other factors
compensated for any uncertainty in the
data. The first instance involved residue
monitoring data for one minor
commodity (berries not including
strawberries) out of dozens of
commodities where EPA relied on FDA
enforcement monitoring data rather than
its preferred source, data from USDA’s
Pesticide Data Program. EPA prefers
using the USDA data because it is
collected using a sampling plan
designed to capture a representative
sample of food in the United States,
whereas sampling for FDA enforcement
data is targeted at food where violations
are more likely to occur. Such targeted
enforcement data generally overstates,
in comparison to a more representative
sample, both the frequency of finding
pesticide residues in commodities and
the level of the residues detected. In the
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second instance, fumigant monitoring
data was not available for all bagged and
packaged commodities so EPA
translated data across commodities.
Although noting that this translation
introduced some uncertainty, EPA
concluded that ‘‘this uncertainty was
more than offset by other factors,’’
including a testing procedure that
utilized maximum application rates and
sampling within six hours of treatment
and the assumption that all bagged and
packaged commodities would be
treated. Finally, the mention of
‘‘monitoring data’’ is a reference to
studies that ‘‘monitor’’ residues in food
not surveys of people’s food
consumption patterns. The latter topic
was inadvertently included in a section
of the order devoted to ‘‘[f]ood
monitoring data.’’ (72 FR at 68683).
Thus, the sentence cited by NRDC does
not even refer to food consumption
survey data.
4. Pest strip exposure. NRDC claims
that EPA’s assessment of exposure to
DDVP from residential pest strips ‘‘is
based on unsupported assumptions and
inadequate data.’’ (Ref. 1 at 8).
Accordingly, NRDC concludes the EPA
lacks reliable data on DDVP exposure
from pest strips and cannot reduce or
remove the 10X children’s safety factor.
EPA has identified seven separate
allegations made by NRDC and they are
analyzed individually below.
a. Representativeness of Collins and
DeVries study—i. Objection/hearing
request sub-issue. NRDC argues that the
Collins and DeVries study which EPA
used to estimate DDVP exposure from
pest strips had an inadequate sample
size (15 houses). According to NRDC, 15
houses is not adequate to represent the
diversity of housing in the United States
given the variations in housing design
and ventilation characteristics. (Ref. 1 at
7). Additionally, NRDC claims that,
because the study was conducted in a
single geographic area and for a period
no longer than 91 days, it does not
account for the varying weather
conditions which can have differential
effects on the movement and
degradation of airborne residues.
ii. Background. NRDC made the
identical claim in its petition. EPA’s
response in its petition denial order was
two-fold. First, EPA pointed out that the
Collins and DeVries study was not the
only study considered by EPA in
assessing DDVP exposure from pest
strips. EPA reviewed several other
studies involving over 100 homes in the
United States and Europe. The results in
the Collins and DeVries study were
consistent with the results in the other
studies and, thus, EPA concluded that it
was reasonable to use the data from the
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Collins and DeVries study in assessing
DDVP risk. (72 FR at 68692). Second, in
response to this claim (as well as several
of NRDC’s other claims), EPA
substantially revised the DDVP
exposure and risk assessment. (72 FR at
68687-68691). Additional conservative
assumptions were adopted and these
conservative assumptions further offset
any theoretical unrepresentativeness of
the Collins and DeVries study. These
assumptions were that exposed
individuals spent 24 hours per day in a
treated home, that a person spent all of
the 24 hours per day in a room in the
house with a pest strip, and that
inclusion of a pest strip in a closet
resulted in the same exposure as
hanging the strip in the room itself.
Further, EPA no longer averaged the
exposure results from the houses in the
study but evaluated each house
individually.
iii. Denial of hearing request. NRDC’s
request for hearing on this issue is
flawed for two reasons. First, as in its
petition, NRDC proffers no evidence to
support its claim that the Collins and
DeVries study is inadequate due to the
diversity of housing stock and
geographic conditions in the United
States. NRDC merely asserts that to be
the case. However, hearings will not be
granted on the basis of mere allegations
or general contentions. (40 CFR
178.32(b)(2); see also 68 FR 46403,
46406-46407 (8/5/2003) (FDA denied a
hearing involving a challenge to FDA’s
reliance on consumption pattern data
because the objector ‘‘did not present
any specific information to dispute P &
G’s consumption pattern data; instead,
[objector] simply asserted that other
consumption patterns were likely.’’);
accord Community Nutrition Institute v.
Novitch, 773 F.2d 1356, 1363 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (‘‘Mere differences in the weight
or credence given to particular scientific
studies . . . are insufficient [to show a
material issue of fact for a hearing].’’)).
Second, NRDC’s hearing request is
inadequate because NRDC does not
object to the basis EPA asserted in its
petition denial for concluding that the
Collins and DeVries study does provide
a sufficient basis for estimating
residential exposure. Specifically,
NRDC does not challenge EPA’s
conclusion that the Collins and DeVries
study is consistent with several other
pest strip studies and proffer evidence
in support of that challenge. Neither
does NRDC challenge and proffer
evidence regarding EPA’s conservative
use of the Collins and DeVries study in
assessing exposure. Rather, NRDC just
repeats its assertions regarding the
unrepresentativeness of the Collins and
DeVries study from its petition. This
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failure to challenge the basis of EPA’s
petition denial affects the materiality of
the objection and hearing request. Even
if NRDC could demonstrate in a hearing
that the ventilation design of a house,
for example, can affect the rate at which
airborne contaminants are dissipated,
that evidence would not contradict the
fact that the Collins and DeVries study
is consistent with DDVP pest strip
studies in over 100 other homes in
varying locations.
Prior FDA decisions under its
regulations are instructive here.
Objections and hearing requests were
filed in response to a food additive
regulation covering the irradiation of
poultry. (62 FR 64102 (December 3,
1997). The objector argued that the
addition of an anti-oxidant (ethoxyquin)
to irradiated chicken prior to the
chicken’s use in animal feeding studies
compromised the studies because the
ethoxyquin would have decreased the
level of lipid peroxides in the chicken
to levels found in chicken that had not
been irradiated. The FDA noted,
however, that it had considered the
question of ethoxyquin’s effect on lipid
peroxide levels in the final rule and
determined that while ethoxyquin can
retard the normal oxidation of chicken
fat to peroxides, ethoxyquin cannot
reverse oxidation that has already
occurred. FDA denied the hearing
request reasoning that because the
objector did ‘‘not dispute FDA’s
explanation in the final rule as to why
addition of ethoxyquin did not
compromise the CIVO studies, and
provided no information that would
have altered the agency’s conclusion on
this issue . . . there is no factual issue
that can be resolved by available and
specifically identified reliable
evidence.’’ (62 FR at 64105; see also 53
FR 53176, 53191 (December 30, 1988)
(FDA denied a hearing request noting
that given FDA’s prior conclusion that
the studies relied upon by the objector
were unreliable, the ‘‘burden shifted to
[the objector] to maintain the viability of
its objection by proffering some
information that called into question the
agency’s conclusion on this matter.’’)).
Similarly, here, NRDC has not
challenged the basis EPA asserted for
rejecting NRDC’s challenge to EPA’s
reliance on the Collins and DeVries
study and NRDC has not proffered any
information calling into question EPA’s
conclusion.
iv. Denial of objection. Because NRDC
offers no basis for its objection to EPA’s
denial of the challenge in its petition to
EPA’s reliance on the Collins and
DeVries study—other than the claims
made in its petition, itself—EPA denies
the objections for the reasons in the
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petition denial order (i.e., the
consistency of the Collins and DeVries
study with other DDVP pest strip
studies and the conservativeness of the
DDVP pest strip exposure assessment).
b. Sampling location in the Collins
and DeVries study—i. Objection/hearing
request sub-issue. NRDC argues that the
Collins and DeVries study is flawed
because air concentration levels of
DDVP were sampled in only one
location in the house. According to
NRDC, this sampling regime was
inadequate because it ‘‘provides no
information about the movement of
residues from room-to-room and
therefore exposure in other rooms in the
homes.’’ (Ref. 1 at 7).
ii. Background. NRDC repeats this
claim verbatim from its petition. The
petition denial order rejected this
challenge to the Collins and DeVries
study and the manner of EPA’s use of
the study in its exposure assessment
noting that ‘‘the sample location in each
instance was in a room with a pest strip,
pest strips were used in other rooms of
the house, and EPA assumed, for its
calculation of the MOE, that the air
concentration for all areas of a house is
the same as at the sampled location.’’
(72 FR at 68692).
iii. Denial of hearing request. This
objection and hearing request does not
involve a genuine and substantial issue
of disputed fact. There is no dispute
concerning how or where sampling was
done in the Collins and DeVries study
or how EPA used that data in estimating
DDVP exposure from pest strips.
NRDC’s objection attacks EPA’s
conclusion that it is reasonable to assess
residential DDVP exposure from pest
strips using air concentrations of DDVP
from rooms which contained a pest
strip. A challenge to an EPA inference
drawn from undisputed facts does not
qualify as a disputed factual question.
(47 FR 55471, 55474 (December 10,
1982) (‘‘[Objectors] assertion about this
evidence is, at best, an argument that a
different inference (i.e., that the pieces
are not ‘reasonably uniform’ and ‘cube
shaped’) should be drawn from
established fact (the dimensions of the
pieces) than the agency has drawn. No
hearing is required in such
circumstances.’’)). Moreover, NRDC
does not explain why knowledge of the
amount of room-to-room DDVP
movement is relevant given that EPA
based its exposure assumption on the
level of DDVP found in a room with a
pest strip, much less proffer any
evidence to suggest why this issue is
material and should be resolved in its
favor. For all of these reasons, NRDC’s
hearing request on this issue is denied.
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iv. Denial of objection. This objection
is denied for the same reason stated in
the petition denial order: knowledge of
the amount of room-to-room movement
of DDVP is irrelevant if EPA bases its
exposure assessment on a room that
contains a pest strip. In both its petition
and its objections, NRDC cites the
following statement from EPA’s
preliminary risk assessment as
supporting its conclusion regarding the
inadequacy of use of a single air monitor
in the Collins and DeVries study: ‘‘A
more accurate exposure would be
possible if air measurements were
available from different rooms in the
house.’’ (Ref. 1 at 7). NRDC, however,
misunderstands the thrust of this
sentence. EPA was simply pointing out
that monitoring in rooms without pest
strips would have provided a more
accurate and realistic - i.e., lower estimate of exposure than using values
from a room containing a pest strip. The
sentences immediately following the
language quoted by NRDC make this
clear. EPA stated: ‘‘Limited data suggest
that the level of Dichlorvos in the air
declines with distance from the resin
pest strip. There are data from the
Dichlorvos Flea Collar Study that show
Dichlorvos levels are lower some
distance away from the pet flea collar.’’
(Ref. 27 at 53).
c. Averaging DDVP concentrations
over 120 days—i. Objection/hearing
request sub-issue. NRDC objects to
EPA’s assessment of exposure to pest
strips challenging EPA’s alleged use of
a 120–day average of DDVP
concentration levels. NRDC argues that
‘‘[r]ather than using averages, the
Agency should have presented the range
of risks displayed over time, peak
measurements, and the daily monitoring
data so that trends over time could be
determined.’’ (Ref. 1 at 7).
ii. Background. NRDC repeats this
claim verbatim from its petition. In its
petition denial order, EPA agreed with
NRDC and revised its residential
exposure assessment to examine
exposure and risk based on the first day
of exposure after hanging the pest strip,
the first 2 weeks of exposure, and
exposure over a 91 day period. (72 FR
at 68687).
iii. Denial of hearing A hearing can
only be based on a genuine issue of
disputed fact. Where a party’s factual
allegations are contradicted by the
record, there is no genuine dispute. (57
FR 6667, 6672 (February 27, 1992) (‘‘A
hearing must be based on reliable
evidence, not on mere allegations or on
information that is inaccurate and
contradicted by the record.’’).
iv. Denial of objection. NRDC’s
objection is directed at a prior,
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superseded risk assessment, not the risk
assessment relied upon in the petition
denial order. Thus, this objection is not
material to this proceeding and is
denied. (See Unit VIII.D.3.c.).
d. Replacement cycle for pest strips—
i. Objection/hearing request sub-issue.
NRDC objects to EPA’s assumption that
pest strips are replaced no more
frequently than 120 days even though
the pest strip label does not prohibit
more frequent replacement. (Ref.1 at 8).
NRDC argues that EPA has no data to
substantiate this assumption and claims
that homeowners may decide ‘‘to
replace strips sooner ‘for good
measure.’’’ (Id.). Recognizing that EPA
decreased its assumption concerning the
replacement cycle to 91 days in the
revised risk assessment in the petition
denial order, NRDC asserts that this
value is equally arbitrary.
ii. Background. The challenge to the
120–day replacement assumption was
included in NRDC’s petition. EPA
responded to NRDC’s argument in the
petition denial order by decreasing its
assumption as on the replacement cycle
of pest strips to 91 days. (72 FR at
68692).
iii. Denial of hearing. This sub-issue
does not meet the standard for a
hearing. NRDC disputes the
reasonableness of EPA’s choice of a
replacement cycle for pest strips in the
absence of a restriction on the pesticide
label or data documenting consumer
usage. NRDC proffers no evidence
challenging EPA’s use of a 91–day
replacement cycle. Rather, NRDC asserts
a legal argument that in the absence of
specific data on consumer usage, EPA
may not make an assumption about
consumer practices. Hearings are not
appropriate on legal questions. (40 CFR
178.32(b)(1)). Similarly, NRDC’s
speculation about how often
homeowners may replace pest strips
does not constitute an evidentiary
proffer justifying a hearing. (See 57 FR
33244, 33248 (July 27, 1992) (NRDC
claimed that the removal of premix
batch analysis would lead to
misformulation of selenium in feeds. A
hearing was denied because NRDC
‘‘provided no factual information to
support its claim . . . . [A] hearing will
not be granted on the basis of mere
allegations.’’)).
iv. Denial of objection. In its
preliminary risk assessment and in the
IRED, EPA assumed that pest strips
would be replaced no more frequently
than 120 days because the pest strip
label specifies: ‘‘Drafts, weather, and
other conditions may affect the
performance, but treatment usually last
for 4 months. Record the date of
installation and replace with a new,
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fresh, full-strength strip at the end of 4
months or when effectiveness
diminishes.’’ (Ref. 28). Given that the
manufacturer was essentially
designating 120 days as the likely
effective period and that consumers
might leave the pest strips up for either
longer or shorter periods, EPA assumed
that 120 days was a reasonable estimate
of the average replacement cycle for pest
strips. EPA generally uses average
values for chronic exposure scenarios
because over time high and low values
tend to average out. (Ref. 5 at 42).
Nonetheless, in recognition of NRDC’s
contention that homeowners might
replace strips more frequently, EPA
amended its pest strip exposure to
assume a 91–day replacement cycle (the
length of the Collins and DeVries study)
rather than extrapolate the data from the
Collins and DeVries study over 120 days
as was done previously. EPA believes 91
days is a reasonable estimate of the
replacement cycle especially given the
label language and the numerous
conservative assumptions in the risk
assessment such as, for example, the
assumption of 24 hours per day
exposure in a room containing a pest
strip. Accordingly, NRDC’s objection on
this sub-issue is denied.
e. Number of pest strips—i. Objection/
hearing request sub-issue. NRDC claims
that EPA’s assessment of DDVP
exposure from pest strips is not based
on adequate data because EPA does not
have any data on how many strips
people use in their homes. EPA assessed
residential DDVP exposure based on the
Collins and DeVries study which used
3-4 strips per house in each of the
studied houses. NRDC argues that some
homeowners may use more than 3-4
strips because there is no limitation on
the label as to the number of strips per
house.
ii. Background. NRDC repeats this
claim verbatim from its petition. EPA
rejected NRDC’s concern in the petition
denial order reasoning that its
assessment was based on data on the air
concentration of DDVP in a room
containing a pest strip. (72 FR at 68692).
EPA also noted that the only strips
allowed in occupied areas of the home
under the current registration are for
closets, wardrobes, or cupboards and
given that they treat a relatively small
space, compared to the bigger strips
used in the Collins and DeVries study,
they are unlikely to result in significant
DDVP air concentrations in rooms other
than in the room containing the treated
area. (Id.).
iii. Denial of hearing. NRDC has not
alleged and proffered evidence on a
genuine and substantial issue of
disputed fact. NRDC speculates that use
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of pest strips in every, or almost every,
room in a house may lead to higher
residues in a room containing a pest
strip than a room containing a pest strip
in a house which has a pest strip in 34 rooms. Based on this speculation,
NRDC claims that EPA’s exposure
assessment is inadequate because EPA
has not documented how many strips
people use in their houses. A hearing
will not be granted on the basis of mere
allegations or speculation about what
other studies might show. (See 57 FR
33244, 33248 (July 27, 1992) (NRDC
claimed that the removal of premix
batch analysis would lead to
misformulation of selenimum in feeds.
A hearing was denied because NRDC
‘‘provided no factual information to
support its claim . . . . [A] hearing will
not be granted on the basis of mere
allegations.’’)).
iv. Denial of objection. For several
reasons, NRDC’s speculation that a
house containing strips in nearly every
room might lead to greater DDVP
exposures than estimated by EPA must
be rejected. First, EPA based its DDVP
pest strip exposure assessment on a
study (Collins and DeVries) which
measured DDVP concentrations in a
room containing a pest strip. Second,
the Collins and DeVries study did not
involve a house with a single strip but
used pest strips in 3-4 rooms of the
studied houses. Third, the results of the
Collins and DeVries study were
consistent with the results of several
other pest strip studies. Fourth,
although corrected for the smaller size
of current pest strips compared to the
pest strips used in the Collins and
DeVries study, EPA did not adjust its
assessment for the fact that current
strips may not be used for general space
treatment but must be put in closets,
wardrobes, or cupboards. Taking into
account these factors, EPA’s assessment
of exposure from DDVP pest strips was
reasonable and based upon adequate,
reliable data to reduce or remove the
children’s safety factor.
f. Exposure time per day—i.
Objection/hearing request sub-issue.
NRDC objects that it was unreasonable
for EPA to assume that the high end
exposure period in the home is 16 hours
and that a low end exposure period is
2 hours. NRDC argues that some groups
of people may spend significantly
greater amounts of time in their homes.
NRDC asserts that EPA does not
adequately justify these assumptions in
its petition denial order.
ii. Background. NRDC repeats this
claim verbatim from its petition. In
response to NRDC’s petition, EPA
substantially revised its pest strip
exposure assessment. As to exposure
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periods, EPA completely dropped its
prior approach and assessed exposure
assuming a person spent 24 hours per
day in their home in a room containing
a pest strip. (72 FR at 68687).
iii. Denial of hearing. A hearing can
only be based on a genuine issue of
disputed fact. Where a party’s factual
allegations are contradicted by the
record, there is no genuine dispute. (57
FR 6667, 6672 (February 27, 1992) (‘‘A
hearing must be based on reliable
evidence, not on mere allegations or on
information that is inaccurate and
contradicted by the record.’’).
iv. Denial of objection. NRDC’s
objection is directed at a prior,
superseded risk assessment, not the risk
assessment relied upon in the petition
denial order. Thus, this objection is not
material to this proceeding and is
denied. (See Unit VIII.D.3.c.).
g. Movement of DDVP from
unoccupied areas of the home to
occupied areas—i. Objection/hearing
request sub-issue. NRDC claims that
EPA does not have a sufficient basis for
its conclusion that pest strips used in
unoccupied places in a house (garages,
attics, crawl spaces, sheds) will not
migrate to occupied portions of the
house. Thus, NRDC argues EPA does not
have reliable data to reduce or remove
the children’s safety factor.
ii. Background. NRDC made the same
argument in its petition. Additionally,
in the petition, NRDC cited a study with
another pesticide which NRDC claimed
showed that pesticides could migrate
into the house. EPA disagreed with
NRDC’s assertion, pointing out that
migration was unlikely unless the
unoccupied portion was connected to
the air exchange system for the house.
EPA also explained in detail why the
study cited by NRDC was not relevant
to DDVP. NRDC did not renew its
arguments based on this study.
iii. Denial of hearing. NRDC has not
alleged and proffered evidence on a
genuine and substantial issue of
disputed fact. NRDC speculates that use
of pest strips in unoccupied areas of a
house may lead to migration of DDVP
residues to occupied portions of the
house. Based on this speculation, NRDC
claims that EPA’s exposure assessment
is inadequate because EPA has not
documented that such migration does
not occur. A hearing will not be granted
on the basis of mere allegations or
speculation about what other studies
might show. (See 57 FR 33244, 33248
(July 27, 1992) (NRDC claimed that the
removal of premix batch analysis would
lead to misformulation of selenium in
feeds. A hearing was denied because
NRDC ‘‘provided no factual information
to support its claim . . . . [A] hearing will
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not be granted on the basis of mere
allegations.’’)).
iv. Denial of objection. NRDC’s
objection is denied. Given EPA’s
knowledge of the chemical properties of
DDVP, it was reasonable to assume that
DDVP would not migrate from
unoccupied portions of the home to
occupied portions absent some type of
air exchange connection between the
two areas. DDVP is a highly volatile
chemical that quickly degrades once
released to the environment. EPA
reasonably concluded that the low
concentration of airborne DDVP
produced from a DDVP pest strip would
not penetrate the walls of a home in
meaningful amounts.
E. Response to Specific Issues Raised in
Objections and Hearing Requests Reliance on Human Study
1. Background. In making its FFDCA
tolerance reassessment decision and
FIFRA reregistration decision for DDVP,
EPA relied upon one human toxicity
study in deriving an acceptable level of
exposure for several exposure scenarios.
The study in question was conducted in
1997 by A.J. Gledhill. In this study, six
male volunteers were administered 7 mg
of DDVP in corn oil (equivalent to
approximately 0.1 mg/kg/day) via
capsule daily for 21 days. Three control
subjects received corn oil as a placebo.
Baseline values for RBC cholinesterase
activity for each study participant were
determined based upon repeated
measurements prior to the
administration of DDVP. After dosing
started, RBC cholinesterase activity was
monitored on days 2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 14, 16,
and 18, and then on day 25 or 28 postdosing. Although no toxicity
attributable to administration of DDVP
was reported by the test subjects, mean
RBC cholinesterase activity was
statistically significantly reduced in
treated subjects on days 7, 11, 14, 16,
and 18. These values were 8, 10, 14, 14,
and 16 percent below the pre-dose
mean. (Refs. 15 and 16).
EPA’s decision to rely on the Gledhill
study was made pursuant to its Human
Research rule. As explained in Unit
III.D, that rule establishes different
ethical standards for the review of
completed human studies depending on
whether they were initiated before or
after the effective date of the rule on
April 7, 2006. For an intentional human
exposure study such as the Gledhill
study, that was initiated prior to April
7, 2006, EPA is barred, subject to a very
limited exception, from relying on it if
there is clear and convincing evidence
that the conduct of the research was
fundamentally unethical or significantly
deficient with respect to the ethical
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standards prevailing at the time the
research was conducted. (40 CFR
26.1704, 1706). Further, the rule limits
the human research that can be relied
upon by EPA to ‘‘scientifically valid and
relevant data.’’ (40 CFR 26.1701).
Finally, because the Gledhill study was
conducted with the purpose of
identifying or measuring a toxic effect,
EPA is required by the rule to submit its
determination regarding these issues to
an independent expert advisory body
known as the Human Studies Review
Board (‘‘HSRB’’) for review. These
procedures were followed with regard to
the Gledhill study.
Previously, NRDC has challenged the
lawfulness of the Human Research rule.
Following promulgation of the Human
Research Rule, NRDC filed a petition for
judicial review of the rule in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. (NRDC v. U.S. EPA, No. 060820-ag (2d Cir.)). That case has been
briefed and argued and is awaiting
decision.
NRDC also previously challenged the
scientific merit and ethics of the
Gledhill study in comments to EPA and
to the HSRB. Specifically as to the
HSRB, NRDC filed written comments
prior to the HSRB’s review of EPA’s
determination regarding the
appropriateness of relying on the
Gledhill study and also presented oral
testimony at the public hearing the
HSRB held with regard to that study.
Subsequently, the HSRB, after taking
into account the comments of NRDC
and others, advised EPA that reliance on
the Gledhill study was consistent with
the Human Research rule. EPA relied
heavily on the analysis of the HSRB in
denying NRDC’s petition to revoke
DDVP tolerances. (72 FR at 68675).
In its petition to revoke DDVP
tolerances, NRDC repeated its
arguments made to the HSRB as to why
the Gledhill study does not comply with
the Human Research rule. As support,
NRDC cited to a draft HSRB report on
the Gledhill study, released shortly
before NRDC filed its petition, which
noted scientific and ethical deficiencies
in the study. (Ref. 2 at 26). NRDC did
not acknowledge, however, that despite
identifying deficiencies in the Gledhill
study, the HSRB, in its draft report,
stated its agreement with EPA’s
determination that it would be
acceptable to rely on the Gledhill study.
In its objections, NRDC once again
makes the same arguments on the
Gledhill study it made to the HSRB and
in its petition to EPA (including the
misleading reference to a portion of the
draft report of the HSRB). Similar to the
approach taken in the petition, NRDC
does not even acknowledge the
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recommendations made by the HSRB in
its draft and final decisions despite
EPA’s explicit reliance on the HSRB’s
reasoning in EPA’s petition denial
order.
NRDC’s objections also include a
challenge to the legality of the Human
Research rule paralleling the case
pending in the Second Circuit.
2. Challenge to the human research
rule—a. Objection/hearing request subissue. NRDC argues that ‘‘to the extent
[its] facial challenge to the [Human
Research] rule is not proper,’’ it is
renewing its arguments regarding the
legality of the rule in its objections. (Ref.
1 at 9-10). The objections incorporate by
reference NRDC’s legal briefs filed in the
Second Circuit and its comments filed
on the Human Research rule as support
for this objection. In its legal briefs,
NRDC argues that EPA’s rule is
inconsistent with a congressional
funding moratorium in an
Appropriations Act. (Ref. 29). That Act
prohibited EPA from ‘‘accept[ing],
consider[ing] or rely[ing] on third-party
intentional dosing human toxicity
studies for pesticides . . . until [EPA]
issues a final rulemaking on this
subject.’’ (Public Law 109-54, sec. 201,
119 Stat. 499, 531 (August 2, 2005)).
According to NRDC, EPA did not
comply with this legislation’s
requirement that the EPA human testing
rule bar testing on pregnant women,
infants and children and be consistent
with the principles in a 2004 National
Academy of Sciences Report and the
Nuremburg Code on human
experimentation. (Ref. 29 at 23). NRDC
did not specifically lay out the
arguments in its legal briefs in its
objections other than to include a
summary of some of the principles of
the Nuremberg Code. (Ref. 1 at 11-12).
Similar arguments are made in NRDC’s
comments on EPA’s proposed Human
Research rule. (Ref. 30).
b. Background. Arguments concerning
the legality of the Human Research Rule
were not contained in the petition.
c. Denial of hearing request. In this
sub-issue, NRDC presents, by reference,
various arguments that the Human
Research rule is not consistent with
congressional legislation bearing on the
rule. These arguments raise questions
regarding the proper interpretation of
statutory language and hearings are not
appropriate on such issues. (40 CFR
178.32(b)(1)).
d. Denial of objection. To the extent
this matter is not resolved by the
Second Circuit and NRDC has standing
to challenge a rule whose ‘‘primary
concern’’ is the ‘‘[p]rotection of the
health and safety of human test
subjects,’’ (Ref. 1 at 15), EPA denies
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NRDC’s objections to the legality of the
Human Research rule. EPA believes the
Human Research rule is fully consistent
with the Appropriations Act and EPA
has fully explained the basis for this
conclusion in the rulemaking record
(EPA–HQ–OPP–2003–0132) and its
legal brief filed in the Second Circuit
proceeding. (Ref. 31).
3. Challenge to reliance on the
Gledhill Study—a. Statistical power too few subjects to detect an effect—i.
Objection/hearing request sub-issue.
NRDC objects that the number of test
subjects in the Gledhill study was low
and thus there are statistical issues with
extrapolating from the results of the
Gledhill study to the general human
population. (Ref. 1 at 13). In part, NRDC
frames this argument as the Gledhill
study lacks ‘‘statistical power’’ and
NRDC references four published letters
or articles in support of this claim. (Ref.
1 at 15). Further, NRDC claims that the
statistical power issue is particularly
important for studies such as the
Gledhill study which measure
cholinesterase inhibition because of the
variability among individuals of
cholinesterase inhibition over time.
According to NRDC, the ‘‘range of
variability both between and for the
individual test subjects means that even
greater than the customary number of
test subjects would be required to
permit adequate statistical power to
detect effects caused by the test
substance above background
variations.’’ (Ref. 1 at 13). As evidence
of this cholinesterase inhibition
variability in humans, NRDC cites to
another human study by Gledhill (MRID
# 4428802 rather than MRID #
44248801).
NRDC’s objection here appears to be
confusing two separate issues: (1) did
the Gledhill study have sufficient
statistical power to detect an effect
caused by DDVP; and (2) does the
Gledhill study contain sufficient data to
reliably estimate a safe dose for humans.
The first issue is addressed in this Unit
and the second in Unit VIII.E.3.b.
ii. Background. NRDC’s objection
repeats assertions made in its petition to
revoke DDVP tolerances and its
comments on the DDVP IRED. (Ref. 2 at
26-27; Ref. 23 at 14-17). EPA rejected
NRDC’s claims about statistical power,
explaining that ‘‘[a]lthough as a general
matter more subjects would provide
greater ‘statistical power,’ in this case
the use of 6 to 9 subjects with the
appropriate statistical methodology is
acceptable to EPA because a positive
response was seen.’’ (72 FR at 68675).
EPA also noted that the variability
within the cholinesterase inhibition of
the tested subjects ‘‘is not large,
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particularly since the percentage
inhibition in all instances was at the
marginal end of the range.’’ (Id.).
iii. Denial of hearing. A hearing is not
required on NRDC’s statistical power
claim because the concept of statistical
power is simply not applicable to the
conclusions EPA drew with regard to
the Gledhill study and thus this issue is
not material to NRDC’s requested relief.
Further, the evidence proffered by
NRDC would not, if established, resolve
this issue in NRDC’s favor.
To understand EPA’s ruling here,
some basic definitional information on
the concept of ‘‘statistical power’’ and
how it applies in the context of toxicity
studies may be helpful. Toxicity testing
is designed to test the veracity of the
hypothesis that there will be no
differences in health outcomes between
treated and untreated (control) subjects.
Statisticians refer to this hypothesis as
the ‘‘null hypothesis.’’ The ‘‘alternative
hypothesis’’ is that there will be a
difference between treated and control
subjects. In general terms, statistical
power measures the probability that a
toxicological study will find a
treatment-related adverse health
outcome when there is a treatmentrelated adverse effect to be found. (Ref.
32 at 125 and n.144). In the language of
a statistician, statistical power measures
the ‘‘probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis when the alternative
hypothesis is right.’’ (Id.). A study with
a statistical power value of near one (1)
would have a very high chance of
(properly) rejecting the null hypothesis
if the alternative hypothesis is true,
whereas a power value close to zero (0)
would indicate that there is little chance
that the study will identify any true
adverse health outcomes occurring as a
result of treatment.
Statistical power can also be used to
calculate the probability that the study
will falsely find that there is no
difference in the health outcomes
between treated and control subjects,
that is, whether the study will falsely
affirm the null hypothesis. The
probability of such a false negative, is
determined by subtracting the statistical
power of a study from one (1). (Id.).
Thus, the chance that a study will result
in a false negative is directly related to
the chance that the study will identify
any effects present. For example, if a
study has low statistical power, there
will be a low probability that the study
will find an effect if there is one and a
high probability that the study will
falsely affirm that there is no effect.
Statistical power, therefore, is a
important tool in designing studies to
ensure that effects from treatment are
not missed and may play a role in
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evaluating completed studies that
confirm the null hypothesis to
determine the probability that the null
hypothesis was not falsely affirmed (i.e.,
a false negative).
If analysis of a toxicological study
shows that there are treatment-related
effects (i.e., the null hypothesis of no
treatment-related effect is rejected), then
the question of the statistical power of
the study becomes largely irrelevant.
Put another way, if a study shows a
positive outcome, the probability that
the study might have produced a false
negative becomes a moot point.
Importantly, with the Gledhill study,
the null hypothesis of no treatmentrelated effect was rejected: that is, the
HSRB and EPA concluded that there
was a significant difference in
cholinesterase inhibition both between
controls and DDVP-treated subjects and
between the inhibition levels pre- and
post-treatment of the DDVP-treated
subjects.
With that background, the scientific
papers cited by NRDC can be more
easily followed. First, NRDC cites a onepage letter to the Environmental Health
Perspectives journal which was coauthored by Jennifer Sass, a NRDC
senior scientist, and a subsequent letter,
again co-authored by Sass, that
responded to various letters expressing
a different viewpoint. (Ref. 1 at 15, and
Refs. 33 and 34). The topic of both Sass
letters is nicely captured by the title
attached to the first letter: ‘‘Industry
Testing of Toxic Pesticide on Human
Subjects Concluded ‘No Effect,’ Despite
the Evidence.’’ (Ref. 33 ).
The first letter discusses the DDVP
Gledhill study and a second human
study involving a different pesticide.
With regard to the DDVP Gledhill study,
Sass criticizes Amvac’s analysis of that
study. Amvac had concluded that the
Gledhill study demonstrated a NOAEL
arguing that the cholinesterase
inhibition effects seen at the single dose
in that study were not biologically
significant. Sass counters that ‘‘the only
biological end point measured in the
study was cholinesterase inhibition, and
this was significantly inhibited.’’ (Ref.
33 at A150). As to statistical power, Sass
claims that studies involving only a few
human subjects ‘‘often lack enough
subjects to provide adequate statistical
power to detect an effect if it is
present.’’ (Id.).
The second letter repeats this latter
assertion and claims that the statistical
power of human studies then available
have such low statistical power that
they ‘‘practically guarantee[d] a finding
of no effect.’’ (Ref. 34 at A340). Sass
then returns to the Gledhill study and
notes with approval EPA’s conclusion
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that that study demonstrated a LOAEL:
‘‘the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) rejected AMVAC’s
interpretation of the results, instead
concluding that ‘the reduction in RBC
cholinesterase activity was considered
by the Hazard ID [identification]
Committee to be biologically significant,
and the dose tested was considered to
be a lowest observed effect level
(LOEL).’’’ (Id.). EPA’s reversal of the
Amvac conclusion is cited by the letter
as illustrative of bias by chemical
manufacturers in the design and
interpretation of studies.
For at least two reasons, these letters
neither demonstrate the materiality of
NRDC’s statistical power claims nor
constitute a sufficient evidentiary
proffer. First, although they do contain
allegations about low statistical power
of human studies with low numbers of
subjects, they only address the question
of whether such studies can detect an
effect even if an effect is present (i.e.,
are they likely to falsely affirm the null
hypothesis that there are no treatmentrelated adverse effects). In the DDVP
Gledhill study, however, EPA and the
HSRB concluded that the study did
identify an adverse effect. Accordingly,
the letters have little relevance to EPA’s
ultimate finding with regard to the
Gledhill study. Second, these letters do
not challenge EPA’s analysis of the
Gledhill study - rather, they ratify it.
Thus, the letters do not proffer
evidence, which would, if established,
resolve a material issue in NRDC’s favor.
(See 57 FR 33244, 33246 (July 7, 1992)
(Studies cited by NRDC do not provide
a basis for the hearing because they
‘‘support the [FDA] conclusion in
question.’’)).
NRDC also cites two articles by Alan
Lockwood. One is an article in the
American Journal of Public Health
discussing ethical and scientific
considerations with regard to six human
toxicology studies, including the
Gledhill study at issue in this
proceeding. (Refs. 1 at 15; and 35). The
second is a one-page summary of the
earlier article that was published in The
Environmental Forum. (Ref. 36). The
first article contains the following
paragraph discussing statistical power:
A power analysis to define the proper size
of study group(s) is an essential part of the
design. If too many participants are enrolled,
the excess will be subjected to unnecessary
risk. If too few are enrolled, the investigator
risks erroneous acceptance of the null
hypothesis. Underpowered studies are
inconclusive, and all participants in an
underpowered study will have been exposed
to risk unnecessarily. All of these studies
were underpowered.
(Ref. 35 at 1912). There is little to no
explanation provided in the article for
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the ‘‘underpowered’’ conclusion other
than the notation that the six studies
involved young healthy adults. There is
little, if any, discussion of the Gledhill
DDVP study at issue in this proceeding.
The summary article adds nothing new
to the longer article.
Like the Sass letters, therefore, the
Lockwood articles do not constitute a
proffer of evidence that if established
would resolve a material issue in favor
of NRDC. Not only do they not proffer
any evidence, they focus on an issue not
involved here - do human studies, such
as the Gledhill study, have sufficient
statistical power to avoid ‘‘erroneous
acceptance of the null hypothesis.’’ Both
EPA and the HSRB rejected the null
hypothesis as to the Gledhill study (i.e.,
an adverse effect on the treated subjects
was identified). Additionally, these
articles do not advance specific
evidence, or even arguments,
concerning the Gledhill study itself.
(See 53 FR 53176, 53179-53180
(December 30, 1998) (a general assertion
in a letter to Science magazine is not
basis for a hearing); 68 FR 46403, 4640546406 (August 5, 2003) (a hearing was
denied because the cited studies only
contained equivocal statements
supporting the objector’s position)).
NRDC also cites the variable level of
cholinesterase inhibition within
individuals as supporting its statistical
power argument. NRDC references a
different DDVP human study by
Gledhill (MRID # 44248802) to show
variability in cholinesterase inhibition.
This argument and these data also do
not justify a hearing.
Initially, it must be noted that EPA
cannot consider this other Gledhill
study because both EPA and the HSRB
concluded it was without scientific
merit and therefore does not qualify for
EPA consideration under the Human
Research rule. (Ref. 21 at 42-43).
Whether or not the aspect of the study
cited by NRDC is implicated by this
conclusion has not been evaluated;
nonetheless, EPA does not disagree with
NRDC’s assertion that individual
humans have variable levels of
cholinesterase inhibition and thus this
is not a disputed issue of fact. Neither
does EPA dispute that variability of
cholinesterase inhibition should be
taken into account in considering
statistical power and in analyzing the
results of a human study.
However, as discussed above,
statistical power is no longer a relevant
concept once EPA has concluded that a
toxicity study shows that the pesticide
has an adverse effect on treated subjects.
Statistical power is a tool used to
evaluate the possibility of accepting
false negatives. Moreover, the variability
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of cholinesterase inhibition in subjects
is also a factor relating to a concern with
false negatives. Normal variation in the
responses of individual test subjects
may mask treatment-related effects
leading to a false conclusion that there
were no treatment-related effects.
Finally, NRDC’s claims on variability
amount to no more than a mere
allegation that the existence of variable
rates of cholinesterase inhibition
indicate a flaw in the Gledhill study and
EPA’s reliance on it. Without an
evidentiary proffer, however, a hearing
is not appropriate.
iv. Denial of objection. NRDC has
misconstrued the concept of statistical
power. It has little relevance in
circumstances where a positive effect is
found in a toxicological study. NRDC’s
objection that EPA should not have
relied upon the Gledhill study because
it lacked statistical power is denied.
b. Too few test subjects to establish a
NOAEL—i. Objection/hearing request.
NRDC objects to reliance on the Gledhill
study claiming that because it only
involved six treated test subjects it
cannot ‘‘support the establishment of a
reliable NOAEL or dose response curve
. . . .’’ (Ref. 1 at 13).
ii. Background. NRDC’s claim was
contained in both its petition and its
comments on the IRED. (Refs. 1 at 26;
and 23 at 15). In its petition denial
order, EPA responded to these claims by
concurring with the HSRB’s conclusion
that the Gledhill study was ‘‘sufficiently
robust for developing a Point of
Departure for estimating dermal,
incidental oral, and inhalation risk from
exposure to DDVP in a single chemical
assessment.’’ (72 FR at 68675 (quoting
HSRB Report)). The HSRB found the
study to be ‘‘robust’’ based on the
following attributes: ‘‘the repeated dose
approach which allowed examination of
the sustained nature of RBC
cholinesterase inhibition; robust
analysis of RBC cholinesterase
inhibition both in terms of identifying
pre-treatment levels and consistency of
response within and between subjects;
and the observation of a low, but
statistically significant RBC
cholinesterase inhibition response.’’
(Id.; Ref. 21 at 39-41).
iii. Denial of hearing. NRDC has not
met the requirements for a hearing on
this sub-issue. First, NRDC has proffered
no evidence that the six treated subjects
in the Gledhill subject were too few for
EPA to use data from that study as a
Point of Departure. Rather, NRDC does
no more than state ‘‘[w]e are aware of
no statistical test’’ which would support
EPA’s use of the Gledhill data. (Ref. 1
at 13). As EPA’s regulations make clear,
a mere ‘‘denial’’ of an EPA position is
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not sufficient to satisfy the standard for
granting a hearing. (40 CFR
178.32(b)(2)). Second, NRDC does not
confront the reasoning of the HSRB,
which was adopted by EPA, for why the
data from the Gledhill study are
sufficiently robust to justify their use as
a Point of Departure. This failure to
challenge the basis of EPA’s petition
denial affects the materiality of the
objection and hearing request. Even if
NRDC could demonstrate in a hearing
that generally more test subjects are
needed to derive a Point of Departure
for a RfD/PAD, that evidence would not
address the specific factors in the
Gledhill study that EPA and the HSRB
found convincing on this question. (See
Unit VIII.D.4.a.iii).
iv. Denial of objections. EPA does not
agree with NRDC’s undocumented
assertion that the Gledhill study does
not provide an appropriate Point of
Departure for assessing DDVP risk. EPA,
and the HSRB, found that there were
several features of the study and the
statistical analysis of the study that
made it ‘‘sufficiently robust for
developing a Point of Departure . . . .’’
(72 FR at 68675). Important factors cited
by the HSRB, and adopted by EPA,
included: (1) the study design which
involved repeated dosing and repeated
measurement of cholinesterase effects in
individuals; (2) extensive pre-dosing
measurement of the test subjects’
cholinesterase inhibition levels which
showed consistency both within and
between individual test subjects; and (3)
the clear study results which showed a
statistically significant effect on
cholinesterase inhibition was found
(both between controls and treated
subjects and between the tested
subjects’ pre- and post-dosing levels)
that was at or near the lowest level that
could be distinguished from baseline
values. (72 FR at 68675). Further, as
EPA noted in its petition denial order,
a similar number of test subjects (four
per sex) are recommended for a
toxicology study in non-rodents (usually
the dog) routinely required for pesticide
risk assessment. (72 FR at 68675).
In response to EPA’s and the HSRB’s
conclusions as to the Gledhill study,
NRDC does little more than repeat its
allegation that the Gledhill study was
underpowered. NRDC does respond to
EPA’s reference to the chronic dog
study, alleging without providing any
basis that that study is underpowered,
and claiming that ‘‘EPA rarely relies
upon that study.’’ (Ref. 1 at 13). NRDC
is incorrect. The chronic dog study was
added to EPA’s testing requirement
regulations in 1984 and was included in
the revised regulations re-promulgated
just last year, although the length of the
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study was shortened from 1 year to 13
weeks. (72 FR 60934, 60940-60941
(October 26, 2007); 49 FR 42881
(October 24, 1984)). As a standard study
required in evaluating pesticides used
on food, the chronic dog study would
have been considered and relied upon
in virtually every one of the roughly
10,000 FFDCA tolerance reassessments
conducted in the 10 years following
enactment of the FQPA. (Ref. 37). If, by
‘‘rarely relied upon,’’ NRDC means the
results from chronic dog are rarely used
as a Point of Departure, NRDC is still
incorrect. For example, a cursory review
of rules establishing new tolerances in
2005 showed at least eight instances in
which the Point of Departure for
assessment of a pesticide’s risk was
based on the chronic dog study. (70 FR
77363, 77366 (December 30, 2005)
(hexythiazox); 70 FR 74688, 74690
(December 16, 2005) (bifenazate); 70 FR
55740, 55743 (September 23, 2005)
(fenpropathrin); 70 FR 55752, 55757
(September 23, 2005) (amicarbazone); 70
FR 55761, 55764 (September 23, 2005)
(pyridaben); 70 FR 54640, 54644
(September 16, 2005) (fluoxastrobin); 70
FR 53944, 53946 (September 13, 2005);
70 FR 51615, 51617 (August 31, 2005)
(halosulfuron-methyl). A retrospective
analysis performed by EPA in 2005 also
showed that 116 out of 304 chronic RfDs
for pesticides was based on the chronic
dog study. (Ref. 38). Finally, another
example somewhat closer to home
would be DDVP, where the NOAEL
from the chronic dog study is used as
the Point of Departure in assessing
chronic dietary risk. (Ref. 3 at 132).
Further, EPA’s recommendation for
four test subjects per sex per dose in the
sub-chronic and chronic non-rodent
(dog) study is widely followed. The
FDA has a similar recommendation for
conducting non-rodent studies of subchronic and chronic duration as does
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘‘OECD’’),
Canada which has accepted the OECD
guideline on the sub-chronic and
chronic non-rodent (dog) study, and the
European Commission’s Joint Research
Centre of the European Union. (Refs. 39,
40, 41, 42, and 43).
c. Adult males only—i. Objection/
hearing request sub-issue. NRDC objects
to the Gledhill study because it
included as test subjects only adult
males. (Ref. 1 at 14). NRDC claims that
adult males are ‘‘biologically
unrepresentative’’ of the human
population.
ii. Background. NRDC’s objection is
drawn verbatim from its comments on
the DDVP IRED. EPA responded to this
argument by pointing out that ‘‘no sex
differences were observed in the
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comparative cholinesterase studies.’’ (72
FR at 68675). EPA also found no agerelated differences in cholinesterase
inhibition. (72 FR at 68694).
iii. Denial of hearing. A hearing is
denied on this sub-issue because there
is no disputed factual matter for
resolution at a hearing. There is no
dispute concerning the subjects in the
Gledhill study - they were adult males.
Thus, the only question is whether a
human study using only adult males
meets the regulatory requirement of
‘‘scientifically valid and relevant data.’’
(40 CFR 26.1701). Because NRDC has
proffered no evidence regarding the
representativeness of adult males to the
general population, this question
requires the application of a legal
standard to undisputed facts. Hearings
are not appropriate on questions of law
or policy. (40 CFR 178.32(b)(1)). FDA
has repeatedly confirmed that the
application of a legal standard to
undisputed facts is a question of law for
which a hearing is not required. (See,
e.g., 68 FR 46403, 46406 n.18, 46408,
46409 (August 5, 2003) (whether facts in
the record show there is a reasonable
certainty of no harm is a question of
law; whether a particular effect is a
‘‘harm’’ is a question of law)).
NRDC’s hearing request is also flawed
because NRDC does not object to the
basis EPA asserted in its petition denial
for concluding that the Gledhill study
provided scientifically valid data
despite its use of only adult male
subjects. As noted above, EPA thought
representativeness concerns were
addressed by the fact that animal
studies with DDVP showed no
differences in sensitivities between
males and females and adults and the
young. NRDC, however, has not
challenged and proffered evidence to
rebut this conclusion nor has NRDC
challenged or proffered evidence to
rebut EPA’s analysis of the underlying
data. Rather, NRDC just repeats its
assertions regarding the
unrepresentativeness of adult males
generally. This failure to challenge the
basis of EPA’s petition denial affects the
materiality of the objection and hearing
request. Even if NRDC offers evidence to
show sex- and age-related sensitivities
in the population to some toxicants,
such evidence would not rebut the
DDVP-specific data on sensitivity. (53
FR 53176, 53191 (December 30, 1988)
(FDA denied a hearing request noting
that given FDA’s prior conclusion that
the studies relied upon by the objector
were unreliable, the ‘‘burden shifted to
[the objector] to maintain the viability of
its objection by proffering some
information that called into question the
agency’s conclusion on this matter.’’)).
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iv. Denial of objection. EPA concludes
that it was reasonable to use the
Gledhill study despite that fact that it
only examined adult males given that
the animal toxicology data on DDVP’s
cholinesterase effects consistently
showed no differences between males
and females and adults and the young.
Multiple studies involving adult
animals yielded consistent
cholinesterase inhibition results in
males and females. (Ref. 3 at 124-126).
Similarly, Benchmark Dose Method
analysis of the developmental
neurotoxicity data ‘‘did not demonstrate
any substantial numerical differences in
[Benchmark Dose Method Level] values
for either RBC or brain cholinesterase
between young and adult animals.’’ (72
FR at 68694).
d. Plasma—i. Objection/hearing
request. NRDC objects that the Gledhill
study is unreliable because it measured
only RBC cholinesterase inhibition and
not plasma cholinesterase inhibition.
NRDC claims that measuring plasma
cholinesterase might have reduced the
variability measured in RBC
cholinesterase.
ii. Background. In its petition, NRDC
argued that plasma cholinesterase
should have been measured because it
might be a more sensitive indicator of
DDVP’s cholinesterase effects. EPA
responded to the petition by noting that
RBC cholinesterase is the Agency’s
preferred cholinesterase inhibition
endpoint as compared to plasma
cholinesterase. (72 FR at 68676). EPA
explained that ‘‘[s]ince the red blood
cell contains only acetylcholinesterase,
the potential for exerting effects on
neural or neuroeffector
acetylcholinesterase may be better
reflected by changes in red blood cell
acetylcholinesterase than by changes in
plasma cholinesterases which contain
both butyrylcholinesterase and
acetylcholinesterase in varying ratios
depending upon the species.’’ (Id.). EPA
concluded that information on a less
preferred endpoint ‘‘adds little
meaningful information.’’ (Id.).
iii. Denial of hearing. NRDC proffers
no evidence in support of its allegation
that collection of plasma cholinesterase
inhibition data would be useful in
limiting the variability seen in the RBC
cholinesterase inhibition data. Hearings
will not be granted on mere allegations.
(40 CFR 178.32(b)(2)). Further, given
EPA’s conclusion that the variability in
RBC cholinesterase inhibition in the test
subjects was accounted for by pre- and
post-treatment measurement, this issue
is not material to resolution of NRDC’s
claim. Finally, to the extent NRDC is
advocating reliance on plasma
cholinesterase inhibition data over RBC
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42707
cholinesterase inhibition data that is a
policy issue and hearings will not be
held as to policy issues. (40 CFR
178.32(b)(1)).
iv. Denial of objection. EPA’s wellestablished policy when evaluating
blood cholinesterase inhibition is to use
RBC cholinesterase data in preference to
plasma cholinesterase. (Ref. 10 at 32).
EPA’s reasoning here is straightforward.
Blood cholinesterase data is used as an
indicator of possible effects on
acetylcholinesterase in the peripheral
nervous system. RBC cholinesterase is
composed entirely of
acetylcholinesterase, whereas plasma
cholinesterase is a mixture of
acetylcholinesterase and
butyrylcholinesterase, a compound
somewhat similar to
acetylcholinesterase in structure that
nonetheless is ‘‘different in important
ways which often result in it having
binding affinities to anticholinesterase
agents as well as other characteristics
that are quite different from those of
acetylcholinesterase.’’ (Id. at 32). The
ratio of acetylcholinesterase to
butyrylcholinesterase in plasma differs
by species; in humans, plasma ‘‘is
overwhelmingly butyrylcholinesterase
with a ratio of butyrylcholinesterase to
acetyl cholinesterase of 1,000:1.’’ (Id.)
It is preferable to have both RBC and
plasma cholinesterase data from a study
because effects in the RBC may be nonexistent, equivocal, or fail to establish a
clear-dose response pattern. In those
circumstances, plasma cholinesterase
inhibition data may serve as a Point of
Departure or may aid in the
interpretation of the RBC data,
particularly when extrapolating animal
data to humans. In the Gledhill study,
however, the robust RBC cholinesterase
sampling approach in humans (multiple
pre- and post-dosing samples and
sampling after repeat dosing) as well as
the clear pattern on RBC cholinesterase
inhibition means the absence of plasma
cholinesterase inhibition data is of little
to no consequence.
In its objections NRDC claims that
plasma cholinesterase inhibition data
‘‘might have reduced somewhat’’ the
variability in the RBC cholinesterase
data. EPA disagrees both because
plasma cholinesterase in humans is
overwhelmingly composed of
butyrylcholinesterase not
acetylcholinesterase, and because the
robust sampling plan in the Gledhill
study well-characterized the RBC
cholinesterase variability. For all of
these reasons, NRDC’s objection on this
issue are denied.
e. Controls over environment—i.
Objection/hearing request sub-issue.
NRDC argues that because there were
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not controls over the Gledhill test
subjects’ exposure to environmental
factors which might affect
cholinesterase inhibition (e.g., ingestion
of pharmaceuticals), the results of
Gledhill study might be caused
environmental factors and are thus
invalid.
ii. Background. This claim is
contained in NRDC’s petition and was
not specifically addressed by EPA in the
petition denial order other than through
its acceptance of the HSRB’s analysis.
iii. Denial of hearing request. The
control measures used in the Gledhill
study are set forth in the study report
and are not in dispute. The only
question is whether these control
measures make the Gledhill study
scientifically invalid and thus not in
compliance with EPA regulations. Legal
questions such as this are not
appropriate for a hearing. (40 CFR
178.32(b)(1); see, e.g., 68 FR 46403,
46406 n.18, 46408, 46409 (August 5,
2003) (whether facts in the record show
there is a reasonable certainty of no
harm is a question of law and thus is not
a hearing issue; whether a particular
effect is a ‘‘harm’’ is a question of law
not of fact and a hearing will not be held
on issues of law)). Additionally, NRDC
proffers no evidence regarding the effect
of the study’s control measures other
than speculation about how
environmental factors might have
affected the study. A hearing will not be
granted on the basis of mere allegations
or speculation. (40 CFR 178.32(b)(2); (57
FR 6667, 6671 (February 27, 1992)).
Finally, NRDC’s argument here is
immaterial to its claim. As EPA explains
below in denying this objection, the lack
of control measures would only be an
issue if NRDC is arguing that EPA has
wrongfully concluded that the Gledhill
study has not shown a measurable effect
in the treated subjects.
iv. Denial of objection. NRDC’s
objection here might warrant some
consideration if the study results had
shown no pattern and EPA had
concluded that the study established a
NOAEL for DDVP. In those
circumstances, it could be argued that
any effects from DDVP exposure may
have been masked by other factors.
However, the study results here showed
a clear and consistent pattern of
marginal effects on RBC cholinesterase
inhibition in connection with DDVP
dosing. Given these results and the fact
that the test subjects were pre-screened
for environmental factors that might
affect study results (e.g., regular use of
pharmaceuticals; excessive alcohol
consumption; exposure to
organophosphurus compounds),
NRDC’s speculation that environmental
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factors might have affected the study
results is without merit.
f. Consent—i. Objection/hearing
request sub-issue. NRDC asserts that
informed consent was not obtained from
the Gledhill test subjects because the
consent form for the experiment
identified DDVP as a ‘‘drug.’’ (Ref. 1 at
14). NRDC claims that EPA has ignored
this issue. NRDC cites an EPA
memorandum dated March 16, 2006,
examining the ethics of the Gledhill
study and asserts that it ‘‘fails to
mention [the informed consent] issue
when it concludes that the study was
not fundamentally unethical.’’ (Id. at
15). NRDC argues that describing DDVP
as a drug ‘‘constitute[s] ‘fundamentally
unethical’ actions by any reasonable
understanding of that term.’’ (Id.).
ii. Background. This objection comes
verbatim from NRDC’s comments on the
DDVP IRED. EPA responded to this
issue in its denial of NRDC’s petition by
adopting the HSRB’s conclusion that
informed consent was obtained. EPA
explained that ‘‘[t]he HSRB reasoned
that references to DDVP as a drug did
not vitiate informed consent because
‘the consent materials clearly advised
subjects that this was a study involving
consuming an insecticide.’’’ (72 FR at
68675).
iii. Denial of hearing. It is not clear
from NRDC’s objections whether NRDC
is challenging EPA’s conclusion on the
ethics of consent issue based on (1) an
alleged failure of EPA to address this
question; or (2) the legal proposition
that identification of a pesticide as a
drug ‘‘constitute[s] ‘fundamentally
unethical’ actions by any reasonable
understanding of that term.’’ In either
case, a hearing is not appropriate on
NRDC’s objection.
First, NRDC’s allegation that EPA did
not address the consent issue does not
present a genuinely-disputed issue of
fact. It is plain on the face of EPA’s
petition denial order, that EPA adopted
the reasoning of the HSRB on why
references on the consent form to DDVP
as a drug do not constitute clear and
convincing evidence that the Gledhill
study is fundamentally unethical. (72
FR at 68675). After summarizing the
decision of the HSRB on the consent
issue (see quoted language in Unit
VIII.E.3.f.ii. above), EPA stated: ‘‘EPA
adopts the HSRB’s reasoning and finds
it persuasive in rejecting NRDC’s
arguments concerning why the Gledhill
study should not be relied upon.’’ (Id.).
NRDC’s argument that EPA offered no
explanation is based on a memorandum
that predates and is superseded by
EPA’s denial of NRDC’s petition. The
March 16, 2006 memorandum was
finalized more than 20 months before
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issuance of the DDVP petition denial
order and the order contains EPA’s
rationale on the consent issue. As noted
earlier in Unit VIII.D.3.c., when an
objector to a section 408(d)(4)(iii) order
challenges an EPA conclusion that has
been superseded by the section
408(d)(4)(iii) order, the objector has not
raised a live controversy as to a material
issue. (See 53 FR 53176, 53191
(December 30, 1988) (where FDA
responds to a comment in the final rule,
repetition of the comment in objections
does not present a live controversy
unless the objector proffers some
evidence calling FDA’s conclusion into
question)). Moreover, objections, and
hearing requests on objections, may
only be filed as to a section 408(d)(4)(iii)
order or other statutorily-specified
action. (21 U.S.C. 346a(g)(2)(A)).
Second, the informed consent
question as to the Gledhill study is a
legal/policy issue not a factual one.
There are no disputed facts regarding
the consent form. The consent form
used in the Gledhill study is set forth in
the study report and NRDC has not
proffered any other evidence bearing on
consent. Accordingly, the only question
is the legal/policy one of whether use of
the Gledhill study consent form is
‘‘clear and convincing evidence’’ that
the Gledhill study was ‘‘fundamentally
unethical’’ and thus not in compliance
with EPA regulations. (40 CFR 26.1704).
In fact, NRDC has framed the consent
issue as a legal question, arguing that
the undisputed reference to DDVP as a
drug in the consent form for the Gledhill
study ‘‘constitute[s] [a] ‘fundamentally
unethical’ action[] by any reasonable
understanding of that [regulatory]
term.’’ (Ref. 1 at 15). Further, to support
this legal argument, NRDC turns to other
legal authorities arguing that ‘‘[t]he
requirement for obtaining informed
consent is at the core of the [40 CFR]
Part 26 regulations and FIFRA section
12(a)(2)(P),’’ and ‘‘[v]iolation of these
regulations, laws and international
standards in the design and conduct of
human studies is fundamentally
unethical.’’ (Id.). Hearings are not
appropriate on questions of law or
policy. (40 CFR 178.32(b)(1)).
Finally, a hearing is not appropriate
on this sub-issue because NRDC’s
objection does not respond to EPA’s
conclusion, based on the HSRB’s
reasoning, as to why there was not a
problem with consent in the Gledhill
study. As such, NRDC’s objection on
this point is nothing more than a general
denial of EPA’s conclusion and a
hearing cannot be justified on this basis.
(40 CFR 178.32(b)(2)).
iv. Denial of objection. NRDC has
offered no response to EPA’s petition
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denial order which incorporated the
HSRB’s reasoning as to why the
references to DDVP as a drug did not
constitute clear and convincing
evidence that the Gledhill study was
fundamentally unethical. Specifically,
NRDC does not address the HSRB’s
conclusion, adopted by EPA, that the
test subjects’ consent was informed
because ‘‘the consent materials clearly
advised subjects that this was a study
involving consuming an insecticide.’’
(Ref. 21 at 46). Thus, EPA denies the
objection.
g. Protection of health of the test
subjects—i. Objection/hearing request
sub-issue. NRDC differs with EPA’s
conclusion that there was not clear and
convincing evidence that the Gledhill
study was rendered fundamentally
unethical by the failure of the test
conductors to retest the subjects until
their cholinesterase inhibition levels
returned to baseline levels. (Ref. 1 at 1415). According to NRDC, EPA
acknowledged, in a March 16, 2006,
memorandum, that the failure to retest
was inconsistent with the standards in
the Declaration of Helskinki by showing
a lack of concern for the safety of the
test subjects. (Id.). NRDC claims that
EPA has offered no explanation for why
it concluded that the Gledhill study was
not fundamentally unethical despite
this inconsistency with the Declaration
of Helsinki. (Id. at 15).
ii. Background. This objection is
adopted verbatim from the comments
that NRDC filed on the IRED. (Ref. 23 at
16-17). In responding to this claim, EPA
adopted the reasoning of the HSRB that
‘‘[d]eficiencies in monitoring of subjects
were found not to provide clear and
convincing evidence that the study was
ethically deficient by subjecting the test
subjects to the threat of serious harm
because prior studies by this researcher
involving higher doses had only
invoked minimal responses.’’ (72 FR at
68675).
iii. Denial of hearing. As with the
consent issue, it is not clear from
NRDC’s objections whether NRDC is
challenging EPA’s conclusion on the
ethics of not retesting based on (1) an
alleged failure of EPA to offer an
explanation for its conclusion; or (2) the
legal proposition that a study that is
inconsistent with the Declaration of
Helsinki is necessarily ‘‘fundamentally
unethical’’ under the Human Research
rule. In either case, a hearing is not
appropriate on NRDC’s objections.
If NRDC is challenging EPA’s alleged
lack of an explanation, then NRDC has
failed to identify a genuinely-disputed
issue of fact. As with the consent issue,
EPA, in its petition denial order,
summarized and then adopted the
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reasoning of the HSRB on why the
failure to retest does not constitute clear
and convincing evidence that the
Gledhill study is fundamentally
unethical. (72 FR at 68675) (see quoted
language in Unit VIII.E.3.g.ii. above).
NRDC’s argument that EPA offered no
explanation is based on a memorandum
that predates and is superseded by
EPA’s denial of NRDC’s petition. For the
reasons set forth in Unit VIII.D.3.c and
Unit VIII.E.3.f.iii., an objection and
hearing request as to a section
408(d)(4)(iii) order based on a
memorandum superseded by the section
408(d)(4)(iii) order does not constitute a
live controversy on an issue material to
the section 408(d)(4)(iii) order and,
arguably, not even a valid objection
under section 408(g)(2)(A). (21 U.S.C.
346a(g)(2)(A); see 53 FR 53176, 53191
(December 30, 1988) (where FDA
responds to a comment in the final rule,
repetition of the comment in objections
does not present a live controversy
unless the objector proffers some
evidence calling FDA’s conclusion into
question)).
If NRDC is challenging the substance
of EPA’s conclusion on the ethics of the
Gledhill study, this objection also does
not warrant a hearing because NRDC is
making no more than a legal or policy
argument. There is no dispute with
regard to what post-testing was
performed as to the Gledhill subjects.
NRDC admits as much. (Ref. 1 at 15
(‘‘There is nothing in the [EPA] memo
that suggests that there is any
uncertainty or controversy about what
the various study documents said or
what was done in the study in relation
to this ethical ‘inconsistency’ with the
Helsinki Declaration. . . .
Notwithstanding the clear facts of the
case [regarding retesting] . . . .’’). The
only question is whether the failure to
test subjects until cholinesterase
inhibition levels returned to baseline is
‘‘clear and convincing evidence’’ that
the Gledhill study was ‘‘fundamentally
unethical.’’ (40 CFR 26.1704). Like the
consent issue, NRDC, itself, has framed
the issue as involving a legal question
as to which there is only one answer.
According to NRDC, ‘‘these failings [as
to retesting subjects and consent] both
constitute ‘fundamentally unethical’
actions by any reasonable
understanding of that term.’’ (Ref. 1 at
15). Further, NRDC argues categorically
that ‘‘[v]iolation of . . . international
standards in the design and conduct of
human studies is fundamentally
unethical.’’ (Id.). This is a legal/policy
determination regarding application of
an EPA regulatory standard and the
standards of the Declaration of Helsinki
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to undisputed facts. Certainly, NRDC
has proffered no genuine factual issue to
be resolved at a hearing. Hearings are
not appropriate on questions of law or
policy. (40 CFR 178.32(b)(1)).
Finally, a hearing is not appropriate
on this sub-issue because NRDC’s
objection does not respond to EPA’s
conclusion, based on the HSRB’s
reasoning, as to why the failures in
monitoring of subjects following the
conclusion of dosing did not amount to
clear and convincing evidence that the
study was fundamentally unethical. As
such, NRDC’s objection on this point is
nothing more than a general denial of
EPA’s conclusion and a hearing cannot
be justified on this basis. (40 CFR
178.32(b)(2)).
iv. Denial of objection. NRDC has
offered no response to EPA’s petition
denial order which incorporated the
HSRB’s reasoning as to why the failure
to retest subjects did not constitute clear
and convincing evidence that the
Gledhill study was fundamentally
unethical. Specifically, NRDC does not
address the HSRB’s conclusion, adopted
by EPA, that the lack of retesting was
not fundamentally unethical because
‘‘prior studies by this researcher
involving higher doses had only
invoked minimal responses.’’ (72 FR at
68675). Thus, NRDC’s objection on this
point is denied.
F. Summary of Reasons for Denial of
NRDC’s Hearing Requests
EPA denies NRDC’s request for a
hearing on whether reliable data
support EPA’s reduction of the
children’s safety factor and on whether
EPA properly relied on the Gledhill
human study. EPA’s close examination
of each of the 19 sub-issues involved in
these two hearing requests demonstrates
that none of the issues satisfies the
standard for granting a hearing in 40
CFR 178.32. Most fail for multiple
reasons.
Several sub-issues do not present an
issue of genuinely-disputed fact.
Instead, NRDC raises issues presenting
purely legal or policy questions or
questions involving the application of
legal standards to undisputed facts. For
example, with regard to its children’s
safety factor objection, NRDC makes the
legal argument that failure to complete
the mandatory endocrine screening
program compels EPA to retain the
children’s safety factor for DDVP and all
other pesticides. (See Unit VIII.D.2.a.).
In other cases, NRDC’s description of a
factual dispute is clearly contradicted
by the record. An example here is
NRDC’s assertion that EPA failed to
consider acute residential exposure
even though EPA, in response to
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NRDC’s petition, amended its risk
assessment to include examination of
exposure for 1–day and 14–day periods.
(See Unit VIII.D.4.c.)
Many of NRDC’s sub-issues lack
materiality. In some instances that is
due to NRDC’s misunderstanding of a
scientific concept - as when NRDC
raises questions about the statistical
power of the Gledhill study or seeks to
invalidate the Gledhill study based on a
alleged inadequacy to control for
environmental factors. Both of these
concepts have little relevance given the
positive results found in that study. (See
Units VIII.E.3.a. and VIII.E.3.e.). In other
instances, the sub-issues presented by
NRDC lack materiality either because (1)
NRDC objects to aspects of EPA’s risk
assessments that were changed in
response to the petition; (2) NRDC fails
to address the reasons given by EPA for
denying NRDC’s petition; or (3) NRDC
objects to prior conclusions of EPA that
were superseded by the petition denial
order. (See Units VIII.D.3., VIII.E.3.b.,
and VIII.E.3.g.)
Most importantly, as to all of the subissues, NRDC fails to identify and
proffer evidence which, if established,
would resolve one or more questions in
NRDC’s favor. As EPA’s analysis shows,
NRDC essentially proffered no evidence
in support of its hearing requests and
objections and instead relies upon legal
and policy arguments and unsupported
or speculative factual assertions.
NRDC’s attempted evidentiary proffers
are either: (1) so broad as to be
meaningless (e.g., the complete EPA
docket for DDVP); (2) too general to
define a factual issue as to DDVP (e.g.,
newspaper and law review articles); (3)
supportive of scientifically irrelevant
claims (e.g., Sass and Lockwood
articles); or (4) mere allegations or
general denials (e.g., NRDC’s claim that
dietary risk assessment ‘‘poses a serious
risk of understating risks posed by
DDVP;’’ NRDC’s speculation about how
many DDVP pest strips a homeowner
may use). (See Units VIII.C., VIII.D.3.,
and VIII.D.4.e.).
NRDC’s failure to offer evidence in
support of its contentions is a consistent
pattern in this proceeding. NRDC
offered no greater support for its
arguments in its petition, in its
comments on the IRED, or, for that
matter, in its written or oral comments
to the HSRB. In these circumstances,
EPA questions whether granting a
hearing would have been appropriate
even if NRDC had, at this last stage of
the administrative process, suddenly
produced factual evidence in support of
its claims. Presumably, Congress created
a multi-stage administrative process for
resolution of tolerance petitions to give
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EPA the opportunity in the first stage of
the proceeding to resolve factual issues,
where possible, through a notice-andcomment process, prior to requiring
EPA to hold a full evidentiary hearing
- which can involve a substantial
investment of resources by all parties
taking part. While EPA has not held any
pesticide tolerance hearings under the
FFDCA, its experience with pesticide
hearings under FIFRA in the 1970s
indicates the process can be quite
lengthy. (See were e.g., Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998,
1002 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (4 months were
needed for testimony in an expedited
FIFRA suspension proceeding);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (13 months of testimony in a
FIFRA cancellation proceeding);
Environmental Defense Fund v.
Ruckelshaus, 489 F.2d 1247, 1251 n. 24
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (‘‘During seven months
of hearings [in the DDT cancellation
proceeding], 125 witnesses appeared to
testify and 365 exhibits were placed in
evidence. The transcript of the hearings
was over 9,000 pages long.’’); Ref. 44 at
246 (referring to FIFRA cancellation
proceedings in the 1970s as the ‘‘‘100–
years’ pesticide wars’’). Given that in
the ensuing 30 years the pesticide risk
assessment process has become
exponentially more complex, FFDCA
pesticide hearings have the potential for
being even more resource intensive.
Accordingly, if a party were to withhold
evidence from the first stage of a
tolerance petition proceeding and only
produce it as part of a request for a
hearing on an objection, EPA might very
likely determine that such an untimely
submission of supporting evidence
constituted an amendment to the
Original petition requiring a return to
the first stage of the administrative
process (if, consideration of information
that was previously available is
appropriate at all).
Finally, EPA notes that it is denying
NRDC’s hearing requests under 40 CFR
178.32 and does not here rely on the
even broader discretionary authority to
deny hearing requests in FFDCA section
408(g)(2)(B). As recounted previously,
40 CFR 178.32 predates the explicit
addition to the statute by the FQPA of
the grant of authority to EPA to deny
hearings. That language provides that
EPA shall ‘‘hold a public evidentiary
hearing if and to the extent the
Administrator determines that such a
public hearing is necessary to receive
factual evidence relevant to material
issues of fact raised by the objections.’’
(21 U.S.C. 346a(g)(2)(B)). EPA does not
interpret this language as requiring it to
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hold a hearing in any instance where
factual evidence relevant to a material
issue of fact is proffered (essentially the
standard set forth in 40 CFR 178.32);
rather, EPA construes the statutory
language as requiring it to hold a
hearing only where it determines a
hearing is necessary to receive such
proffered evidence. In other words, a
party wishing to obtain a hearing must
not only satisfy the requirements of 40
CFR 178.32, it must also show that an
evidentiary hearing is necessary to
presentation of proffered evidence to the
Agency. Because, however, NRDC has
not satisfied the standard set forth in 40
CFR 178.32, EPA does not need to
address whether a hearing is necessary
to receive NRDC’s ‘‘evidentiary’’ proffer.
G. Summary of Reasons for Denial of
NRDC’s Objections
EPA denies NRDC’s objections to
EPA’s petition denial that EPA lacked
sufficient data to reduce the children’s
safety factor for DDVP, and EPA
unlawfully relied on the Gledhill
intentional human dosing study in
assessing the risk of DDVP exposure.
1. Children’s safety factor objection.
In support of its children’s safety factor
objection, NRDC claims that EPA has
inadequate data on endocrine effects,
dietary exposure to DDVP residues in
food, and exposure from residential pest
strips. On endocrine effects, NRDC
argues that EPA lacks adequate data, as
a legal matter, because it has not
completed the section 408(p) endocrine
screening program, and, as a factual
matter, because DDVP has not been
tested under the most recent twogeneration rat reproduction study. EPA
has previously rejected NRDC’s legal
argument as not consistent with the
statutory language, structure, or history,
and NRDC has offered no arguments as
to why EPA’s previous conclusion was
incorrect. On the factual question of
whether EPA has adequate endocrine
data on DDVP, EPA concluded in the
petition denial that, given the existing
data bearing on DDVP’s potential to
cause endocrine effects and large
difference in sensitivity between
DDVP’s cholinesterase inhibition effects
and potential endocrine effects, EPA
had sufficient reliable data on DDVP’s
potential endocrine effects to vary from
the default children’s safety factor. In its
objections, NRDC offers nothing other
than speculation about what another
two-generation rat reproduction study
might show. NRDC’s speculation does
not convince EPA that its analysis was
incorrect.
As to dietary exposure to DDVP
residues in food, NRDC argues that
EPA’s dietary exposure assessment has
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many shortcomings that may lead to
underestimation of dietary exposure to
DDVP. In support of this claim, NRDC
relies on statements EPA made in 2000
in a preliminary risk assessment of
DDVP. NRDC places particular
emphasis on its claim that EPA’s
database on food consumption by
infants is inadequate. These allegations
by NRDC lack merit because NRDC has
ignored the many revisions to the DDVP
risk assessment since the 2000
preliminary risk assessment. First, EPA
completely revised the dietary exposure
and risk assessment in response to
NRDC’s petition. One of the specific
reasons for revising the risk assessment
was so that EPA’s latest information on
infant food consumption could be
incorporated. Second, also in response
to NRDC’s petition, EPA
comprehensively analyzed its dietary
exposure assessment to evaluate
whether that assessment potentially
underestimated dietary exposure to
DDVP. EPA concluded that ‘‘its
assessment of exposure to DDVP from
food will not under-estimate but rather
over-estimate, and in all likelihood
substantially over-estimate, DDVP
exposure.’’ (72 FR at 68686). NRDC
neither acknowledges nor challenges the
revised dietary exposure assessment or
EPA’s detailed analysis of whether that
assessment under- or over-estimates
DDVP exposure. Finally, EPA questions
the materiality of NRDC’s argument
with regard to DDVP exposure from
food given that DDVP exposure from
this source is trivial compared with
other sources. For all of these reasons,
EPA rejects NRDC’s arguments on the
alleged inadequacy of EPA’s assessment
of human dietary exposure to DDVP in
food.
With regard to DDVP exposure from
residential pest strips, NRDC claims that
the data relied upon by EPA (the Collins
and DeVries study) was inadequate and
EPA’s risk assessment based on that
study was based on inadequatelysupported assumptions. These
arguments, however, are without merit
because not only does NRDC offer
nothing other than general,
undocumented contentions in support
but once again NRDC has ignored clear
evidence and analysis in the record that
contradict its allegations. First, NRDC
ignores the other DDVP pest strip
exposure studies relied upon by EPA to
support the findings in the Collins and
DeVries study. EPA concluded that
these studies confirmed that the
findings in Collins and DeVries were
representative of DDVP concentration
levels from pest strips that could be
expected in houses in other locations.
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Second, NRDC ignores EPA’s complete
revision to the DDVP residential
exposure assessment that was
conducted in response to its petition.
That revision modified numerous
assumptions in the assessment to ensure
that the data from the Collins and
DeVries study were analyzed in a
conservative fashion. NRDC does not
acknowledge the new assessment much
less offer a rebuttal to EPA’s revised
analysis. Most surprisingly, NRDC
repeats challenges to several
assumptions (only examining DDVP
exposure as averaged over a 120–day
period; considering 16 hours per day a
maximum exposure in a home) that
were explicitly modified (adding
consideration of 1–day and 14–day
exposure periods; assuming 24 hours
exposure per day) in the revised risk
assessment in response to NRDC’s
petition. Accordingly, EPA disagrees
with NRDC’s allegations concerning the
inadequacy of the data and assumptions
underlying its residential pest strip risk
assessment.
2. Human study objection. NRDC
challenged EPA’s reliance on the
Gledhill human study arguing that
EPA’s Human Research rule is unlawful
and the study was both scientifically
flawed and unethically conducted.
NRDC relies on its legal briefs filed in
a separate challenge to the Human
Research rule and its comments on that
rule in support of its legal attack on the
rule. Similarly, to the extent NRDC has
standing to challenge a rule whose
‘‘primary concern’’ is the ‘‘[p]rotection
of the health and safety of human test
subjects,’’ (Ref. 1 at 15), EPA relies on
its legal brief in the 2nd Circuit
proceeding and the administrative
record for the rule, in denying NRDC’s
challenge to Human Research Rule.
As to the Gledhill study, itself, NRDC
makes various claims regarding its
scientific validity and ethicality. NRDC
has previously presented these claims in
writing and orally to EPA’s HSRB. The
HSRB is an independent scientific
panel, consisting of experts in bioethics,
biostatistics, human health risk
assessment, and human toxicology,
created specifically for the purpose of
advising EPA on whether human
studies have scientific value and
conform to ethical standards. Although
NRDC’s concerns as to the Gledhill
study were presented to the HSRB, the
HSRB concluded that the Gledhill study
complied with the Human Research rule
and could be considered by EPA in
assessing the risk of DDVP. EPA relied
heavily on the advice by the HSRB in
denying NRDC’s petition. Remarkably,
NRDC, in its objections, proceeds as if
the HSRB review never occurred. NRDC
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neither acknowledges the existence of
the HSRB report nor attempts to refute
its reasoning. In Unit VIII.E. above, EPA
repeats the findings of the HSRB and
EPA’s reasons for accepting the HSRB’s
conclusions with regard to the specific
contentions of NRDC. Based on both the
findings of the HSRB and EPA in its
petition denial, as described above, as
well as NRDC’s failure to meaningfully
dispute those findings, EPA rejects
NRDC’s challenge to EPA’s reliance on
the Gledhill study.
H. Conclusion
For all of the reasons set forth above,
EPA denies NRDC’s objections and its
requests for a hearing on those
objections.
IX. References
1. Natural Resources Defense Council,
‘‘Objection to the Order Denying
NRDC’s Petition to Revoke All
Tolerances for Dichlorvos (DDVP), and
Request for Public Evidentiary Hearing’’
(February 1, 2008).
2. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Petition of Natural Resources Defense
Council To Conclude Special Review,
Reregistration and Tolerance
Reassessment Processes and To Revoke
All Tolerances and Cancel All
Registrations for the Pesticide DDVP
(June 2, 2006).
3. Office of Prevention, Pesticides and
Toxic Substances, EPA, ‘‘Interim
Reregistration Eligibility Decision for
Dichlorvos (DDVP)’’ (June 2006).
4. U.S. EPA, ‘‘A User’s Guide to
Available EPA Information on Assessing
Exposure to Pesticides in Food’’ (June
21, 2000).
5. Office of Pesticide Programs, US
EPA, ‘‘Office of Pesticide Programs’
Policy on the Determination of the
Appropriate FQPA Safety Factor(s) For
Use in the Tolerance Setting Process’’
(February 28, 2002).
6. U.S. EPA, ‘‘Residue Chemistry Test
Guidelines: OPPTS 860.1500 Crop Field
Trials’’ (August 1996).
7. Office of Pesticide Programs, U.S.
EPA and Pest Regulatory Management
Agency, ‘‘Health Canada, NAFTA
Guidance Document for Guidance for
Setting Pesticide Tolerances Based on
Field Trial Data’’ (September 28, 2005).
8. Office of Pesticide Programs, U.S.
EPA, ‘‘Choosing a Percentile of Acute
Dietary Exposure as a Threshold of
Regulatory Concern’’ March 16, 2000).
9. Office of Pesticide Programs, U.S.
EPA,‘‘Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) for Residential Exposure
Assessments’’ (Draft December 19,
1997).
10. Office of Pesticide Programs, U.S.
EPA, ‘‘The Use of Data on
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Cholinesterase Inhibition for Risk
Assessments of Organophosphorous and
Carbamate Pesticides’’ (August 18,
2000).
11. U.S. EPA, ‘‘Endocrine Disruptor
Screening and Testing Advisory
Committee Final Report’’ (August 1998).
12. U.S. EPA, U.S. EPA Charter:
Human Studies Review Board (2008)
(available at https://www.epa.gov/osa/
hsrb/files/dated-hsrb-renewal-chartereffect-030408.pdf).
13. Office of Pesticide Programs, U.S.
EPA, ‘‘Organophosphorus Cumulative
Risk Assessment – 2006 Update’’
(August 2006).
14. Office of Prevention, Pesticides
and Toxic Substances, EPA,
Memorandum from Debra Edwards to
Jim Jones, ‘‘Finalization of Interim
Reregistration Eligibility Decisions
(IREDs) and Interim Tolerance
Reassessment and Risk Management
Decisions (TREDs) for the
Organophosphate Pesticides, and
Completion of the Tolerance
Reassessment and Reregistration
Eligibility Process for the
Organophosphate Pesticides’’ (July 31,
2006).
15. Office of Pesticide Programs, U.S.
EPA, ‘‘Data Evaluation Report:
Dichlorvos: A Single Blind, Placebo
Controlled, Randomized Study to
Investigate the Effects of Multiple Oral
Dosing on Erythrocyte Cholinesterase
Inhibition in Healthy Male Volunteers’’
(March 24, 1998).
16. Office of Prevention, Pesticides
and Toxic Substances, EPA,
Memorandum from Ray Kent/William
Dykstra to Tina Levine, ‘‘Human Studies
Review Board: Final Weight of Evidence
Comparison of Human and Animal
Toxicology Studies and Endpoints for
DDVP Human Health Risk Assessment
and Discussion of Interspecies
Extrapolation in the Organophosphate
Cumulative Risk Assessment’’ (March
20, 2006).
17. Sass, J., Natural Resources Defense
Council, ‘‘NRDC comments for the
HSRB meeting April 4-6, 2006’’
(undated).
18. EPA Human Studies Review
Board, Minutes of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Human Studies Review Board (HSRB)
April 4-6, 2006 Public Meeting Docket
Number: EPA–HQ–ORD–2006–0187
(May 15, 2006).
19. EPA Human Studies Review
Board, Letter from Celia Fisher to
George Gray, April 4-6, 2006 Meeting
EPA Human Studies Review Board
Report — Proposed Final Draft V. 1
(May 16, 2006).
20. EPA Human Studies Review
Board, Minutes of the United States
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Human Studies Review Board (HSRB)
June 8, 2006 Public Teleconference
Docket Number: EPA–HQ–ORD–2006–
0187 (June 19, 2006).
21. EPA Human Studies Review
Board, Letter from Celia Fisher to
George Gray, April 4-6, 2006 Meeting
EPA Human Studies Review Board
Report (June 26, 2006).
22. Amvac Chemical Corporation,
Comments of Amvac Chemical
Corporation in Reponse to EPA’s Notice
of a Petition to Revoke Tolerances
Established for Dichlorvos (November
13, 2006).
23. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Letter submitting comments
Re: Dichlorvos Interim Reregistration
Eligibility Decision, 71 FR 37568 (June
30, 2006) (August 28, 2006).
24. Reference Dose/Reference
Concentration (RfD/RfC) Technical
Panel, Risk Assessment Forum, U.S.
EPA, ‘‘A Review of the Reference Dose
and Reference Concentration Processes’’
(December 2002).
25. USDA, ‘‘Food and Nutrient
Intakes by Children 1994-96, 1998,
Table Set 17’’ (December 1999).
26. USDA, ‘‘Documentation:
Supplemental Children’s Survey (CSFII
1998) to the 1994-96 Continuing Survey
of Food Intakes by Individuals’’ (2000).
27. Office of Prevention, Pesticides
and Toxic Substances, EPA,
Memorandum from Susan V. Hummel
to Kimberly Lowe/Robert McNally,
‘‘Revised Preliminary HED Risk
Assessment for Dichlorvos’’ (August 9,
2000).
28. U.S. EPA, Letter from George T.
LaRocca, Product Manager (13),
Insecticide Branch, Registration
Division, to Jon C. Wood, ‘‘Amvac
Chemical Corp., Dichlorvos (DDVP)
Label Amendments’’ (October 11, 2006).
29. Petitioners’ Brief, NRDC v. EPA,
(2nd Cir. 06-0820-ag) (October 4, 2006).
30. Natural Resources Defense
Council, ‘‘Protections for Subjects in
Human Research; Proposed Rule, 70 FR
53838’’ (Sept. 12, 2005) (December 12,
2005).
31. Respondent’s Brief, NRDC v. EPA,
(2nd Cir. 06-0820-ag) (November 16,
2006).
32. Federal Judicial Center,
‘‘Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence’’ (2d ed. 2000).
33. Sass, J.B., Needleman, H.L.,
‘‘Industry Testing of Toxic Pesticides on
Human Subjects Concluded No Effect,
Despite the Evidence,’’ Environmental
Health Perspectives. 2004 Mar; 112(3)
A150-151.
34. Sass, J.B., Needleman, H.L.,
‘‘Human Testing: Sass and Needleman
Respond to Industry,’’ Environmental
PO 00000
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Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Health Perspectives. 2004 Ma; 112(6)
A340-341.
35. Lockwood, A.H., ‘‘Human Testing
of Pesticides: Ethical and Scientific
Considerations,’’ American Journal of
Public Health 2004 Nov; 94(11) 19081916.
36. Lockwood, A.H., ‘‘The Ethical Bar
Drops to Unacceptable,’’ Environmental
Forum. 2005 Nov/Dec; 48.
37. U.S. EPA, Tolerance Reassessment
(March 6, 2008) (published at https://
www.epa.gov/pesticides/tolerance/
reassessment.htm).
38. Baetcke, K.P., Phang, W., and
Dellarco, V., Health Effects Division,
Office of Pesticide Programs, U.S. EPA,
‘‘A Comparison of the Results of Studies
on Pesticides from 12- or 24-Month Dog
Studies with Dog Studies of Shorter
Duration’’ (April 7, 2005).
39. U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, ‘‘Toxicological
Principles for the Safety Assessment of
Food Ingredients: Redbook 2000,’’ secs.
IV.C.4b and IV.C.5. (November 2003).
40. OECD, ‘‘OECD Guideline For The
Testing Of Chemicals: Repeated Dose
90–day Oral Toxicity Study in NonRodents — 409’’ (September 1998).
41. OECD, ‘‘OECD Guideline For The
Testing Of Chemicals: Chronic Toxicity
Studies — 452’’ (May 1981).
42. OECD Test Guideline No. 452,
‘‘Chronic Toxicity Studies’’ dated May
12, 1981; (CPR 52(a)(iii), 52(b)(ii),
52(c)(ii), 59(a)(iii), 59(b)(ii), 59(c)(ii) and
63) (Can).
43. Council Directive No. 2001/59/EC,
O.J. L 225 (2001) (Annex V of Dir 67/
548/EEC on the Classification,
Packaging and Labeling of Dangerous
Substances (https://ecb.jrc.it/testingmethods/annex5)).
44. William Rodgers, Environmental
Law: Pesticides and Toxic Substances
(1988).
X. Regulatory Assessment
Requirements
As indicated previously, this action
announces the Agency’s final order
regarding objections filed under section
408 of FFDCA. As such, this action is an
adjudication and not a rule. The
regulatory assessment requirements
imposed on rulemaking do not,
therefore, apply to this action.
XI. Submission to Congress and the
Comptroller General
The Congressional Review Act, (5
U.S.C. 801 et seq.), as added by the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996, does not apply
because this action is not a rule for
purposes of 5 U.S.C. 804(3).
E:\FR\FM\23JYR1.SGM
23JYR1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 142 / Wednesday, July 23, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Lois D. Lehman-Mckeeman, Ph.D.,
Distinguished Research Fellow, Discovery
Toxicology, Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company, Princeton, NJ
Appendix 1—United States
Environmental Protection Agency
Human Studies Review Board
Chair
Celia B. Fisher, Ph.D. Marie Ward Doty
Professor of Psychology, Director, Center
for Ethics Education, Fordham University,
Department of Psychology, Bronx, NY
Vice Chair
Robert Nelson, M.D., Ph.D., Associate
Professor of Anesthesiology and Critical
Care, Department of Anesthesiology and
Critical Care, University of Pennsylvania
School of Medicine, The Children’s
Hospital of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA
William S. Brimijoin, Ph.D., Chair and
Professor, Molecular Pharmacology and
Experimental Therapeutics, Mayo
Foundation, Rochester, MN
Members
David C. Bellinger, Ph.D., Professor of
Neurology, Harvard Medical School
Professor in the Department of
Environmental Health, Harvard School of
Public Health Children’s Hospital, Boston,
MA
Alicia Carriquiry, Ph.D., Professor,
Department of Statistics, Iowa State
University Snedecor Hall, Ames, IA
Gary L. Chadwick, PharmD, MPH, CIP,
Associate Provost, Director, Office for
Human Subjects Protection, University of
Rochester, Rochester, NY
Janice Chambers, Ph.D., D.A.B.T., William L.
Giles Distinguished Professor, Director,
Center for Environmental Health Sciences,
College of Veterinary Medicine,
Mississippi State University, Wise Center,
Mississippi State, MS
Richard Fenske, Ph.D., MPH, Professor,
Department of Environmental and
Occupational Health Sciences, University
of Washington, Seattle, WA
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with RULES
Environmental protection,
Administrative practice and procedure,
Agricultural commodities, Pesticides
and pests, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
Dated: July 11, 2008.
Debra Edwards,
Director, Office of Pesticide Programs.
[FR Doc. E8–16617 Filed 7–22–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–S
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
40 CFR Part 180
[EPA–HQ–OPP–2008–0302; FRL–8369–5]
Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Final rule.
Kannan Krishnan, Ph.D., Professor,
´
´
Departement de sante environnementale et
´
´
sante au travail, Faculte de medicine,
´
´
´
Universite de Montreal, Montreal, Canada
KyungMann Kim, Ph.D., CCRP, Professor and
Associate Chair, Department of
Biostatistics and Medical Informatics,
School of Medicine and Public Health,
University of Wisconsin-Madison,
Madison, WI
Michael D. Lebowitz, Ph.D., FCCP, Professor
of Public Health and Medicine. University
of Arizona, Tucson, AZ
Jkt 214001
List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 180
AGENCY:
Suzanne C. Fitzpatrick, Ph.D., DABT, Senior
Science Policy Analyst, Office of the
Commissioner, Office of Science and
Health Coordination, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, Rockville, MD
16:31 Jul 22, 2008
Sean M. Philpott, Ph.D., Research Scientist,
David Axelrod Institute, Wadsworth Center
for Laboratories and Research, New York
State Department of Health, Albany, NY
Fludioxonil; Pesticide Tolerance for
Emergency Exemption
Susan S. Fish, PharmD, MPH, Professor,
Biostatistics and Epidemiology, Boston
University School of Public Health, CoDirector, MA in Clinical Investigation
Boston University School of Medicine,
Boston, MA
VerDate Aug<31>2005
Jerry A. Menikoff, M.D., Associate Professor
of Law, Ethics and Medicine, Director of
the Institute for Bioethics, Law and Public
Policy, University of Kansas Medical
Center, Kansas City, KS
This regulation establishes a
time-limited tolerance for residues of
fludioxonil in or on carambola
(starfruit). This action is in response to
EPA’s granting of an emergency
exemption under section 18 of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) authorizing
use of the pesticide on carambola. This
regulation establishes a maximum
permissible level for residues of
fludioxonil in starfruit. The time-limited
tolerance expires and is revoked on
December 31, 2010.
DATES: This regulation is effective July
23, 2008. Objections and requests for
hearings must be received on or before
September 22, 2008, and must be filed
in accordance with the instructions
provided in 40 CFR part 178 (see also
SUMMARY:
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42713
Unit I.C. of the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION.
EPA has established a
docket for this action under docket
identification (ID) number EPA–HQ–
OPP–2008–0302. To access the
electronic docket, go to https://
www.regulations.gov, select ‘‘Advanced
Search,’’ then ‘‘Docket Search.’’ Insert
the docket ID number where indicated
and select the ‘‘Submit’’ button. Follow
the instructions on the regulations.gov
website to view the docket index or
access available documents. All
documents in the docket are listed in
the docket index available in
regulations.gov. Although listed in the
index, some information is not publicly
available, e.g., Confidential Business
Information (CBI) or other information
whose disclosure is restricted by statute.
Certain other material, such as
copyrighted material, is not placed on
the Internet and will be publicly
available only in hard copy form.
Publicly available docket materials are
available either in the electronic docket
at https://www.regulations.gov, or, if only
available in hard copy, at the Office of
Pesticide Programs (OPP) Regulatory
Public Docket in Rm. S–4400, One
Potomac Yard (South Bldg.), 2777 S.
Crystal Dr., Arlington, VA. The hours of
operation of this Docket Facility are
from 8:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday
through Friday, excluding legal
holidays. The Docket Facility telephone
number is (703) 305–5805.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Andrea Conrath, Registration Division
(7505P), Office of Pesticide Programs,
Environmental Protection Agency, 1200
Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Washington,
DC 20460–0001; telephone number:
(703) 308–9356; e-mail address:
conrath.andrea@epa.gov.
ADDRESSES:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. General Information
A. Does this Action Apply to Me?
You may be potentially affected by
this action if you are an agricultural
producer, food manufacturer, or
pesticide manufacturer. Potentially
affected entities may include, but are
not limited to:
• Crop production (NAICS code 111).
• Animal production (NAICS code
112).
• Food manufacturing (NAICS code
311).
• Pesticide manufacturing (NAICS
code 32532).
This listing is not intended to be
exhaustive, but rather provides a guide
for readers regarding entities likely to be
affected by this action. Other types of
E:\FR\FM\23JYR1.SGM
23JYR1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 142 (Wednesday, July 23, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 42683-42713]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-16617]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
40 CFR Part 180
[EPA-HQ-OPP-2002-0302; FRL-8372-5]
Dichlorvos (DDVP); Order Denying NRDC's Objections and Requests
for Hearing
AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Final Order.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: In this order, EPA denies objections to, and requests for
hearing on, a prior order denying a petition requesting that EPA revoke
all pesticide tolerances for dichlorvos under section 408(d) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The objections and hearing
requests were filed on February 1, 2008, by the Natural Resources
Defense Council (``NRDC''). The Original petition was also filed by
NRDC.
DATES: This order is effective July 23, 2008.
ADDRESSES: EPA has established a docket for this action under docket
identification (ID) number EPA-HQ-OPP-2002-0302. To access the
electronic docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov, and search for the
docket number. Follow the instructions on the regulations.gov website
to view the docket index or access available documents. All documents
in the docket are listed in the docket index available in
regulations.gov. Although listed in the index, some information is not
publicly available, e.g., Confidential Business Information (CBI) or
other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Certain
other material, such as copyrighted material, is not placed on the
Internet and will be publicly available only in hard copy form.
Publicly available docket materials are available in the electronic
docket at https://www.regulations.gov, or, if only available in hard
copy, at the OPP Regulatory Public Docket in Rm. S-4400, One Potomac
Yard (South Bldg.), 2777 S. Crystal Dr., Arlington, VA. The Docket
Facility is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday through Friday,
excluding legal holidays. The Docket Facility telephone number is (703)
305-5805.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan Bartow, Special Review and
Reregistration Division (7508P), Office of Pesticide Programs,
Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW.,
Washington, DC 20460-0001; telephone number: 703-603-0065; e-mail
address: bartow.susan@epa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. General Information
A. Does this Action Apply to Me?
In this document EPA denies objections and hearing requests by the
Natural Resources Defense Council (``NRDC'') concerning EPA's denial of
NRDC's petition to revoke pesticide tolerances. This action may also be
of interest to agricultural producers, food manufacturers, or pesticide
manufacturers. Potentially affected entities may include, but are not
limited to those engaged in the following activities:
Crop production (North American Industrial Classification
System (``NAICS'') code 111), e.g., agricultural workers; greenhouse,
nursery, and floriculture workers; farmers.
Animal production (NAICS code 112), e.g., cattle ranchers
and farmers, dairy cattle farmers, livestock farmers.
Food manufacturing (NAICS code 311), e.g., agricultural
workers; farmers; greenhouse, nursery, and floriculture workers;
ranchers; pesticide applicators.
Pesticide manufacturing (NAICS code 32532), e.g.,
agricultural workers; commercial applicators; farmers; greenhouse,
nursery, and floriculture workers; residential users.
This listing is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to
provide a guide for readers regarding entities likely to be affected by
this action. Other types of entities not listed in this unit could also
be affected. The NAICS codes have been provided to assist you and
others in determining whether this action might apply to certain
entities. If you have any questions regarding the applicability of this
action to a particular entity, consult the person listed under FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
B. How Can I Access Electronic Copies of this Document?
In addition to accessing an electronic copy of this Federal
Register document through the electronic docket at https://
www.regulations.gov, you may access this Federal Register document
electronically through the EPA Internet under the ``Federal Register''
listings at https://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr. You may also access a
frequently updated electronic version of EPA's tolerance regulations at
40 CFR part 180 through the Government Printing Office's pilot e-CFR
site at https://www.gpoaccess.gov/ecfr.
C. Acronyms
The following is a list of acronyms used in this order:
CSFII - Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals
CNS - Central Nervous System
DDVP - dichlorvos
EDSTAC - Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory
Committee
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
FACA - Federal Advisory Committee Act
FDA - Food and Drug Administration
FIFRA - Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
FFDCA - Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
FQPA - Food Quality Protection Act of 1996
HSRB - Human Studies Review Board
IRED - Interim Reregistration Eligibility Decision
LOAEL - Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Level
MOE - Margin of Exposure
MRID - Master Record Identification
NOAEL - No Observed Adverse Effect Level
NRDC - Natural Resources Defense Council
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAD - Population Adjusted Dose
ppm - parts per million
RBC - red blood cell
RED - Reregistration Eligibility Decision
RfD - Reference Dose
SDWA - Safe Drinking Water Act
SOP - Standard Operating Procedure
USDA - United Stated Department of Agriculture
II. Introduction
A. What Action Is the Agency Taking?
In this order, EPA denies objections, and requests for a hearing on
those objections, to an earlier EPA order, (72 FR 68662 (December 5,
2007)), denying a petition to revoke all tolerances established for the
pesticide dichlorvos (``DDVP'') under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (``FFDCA''), 21 U.S.C. 346a. (Refs. 1 and 2). Both the
objections and hearing requests, as well as the petition, were filed
with EPA by NRDC.
NRDC's petition, filed on June 2, 2006, pursuant to FFDCA section
408(d)(1), asserted numerous grounds as to why the DDVP tolerances
allegedly fail to meet the FFDCA's safety standard. This petition was
filed as EPA was completing its reassessment of the safety of the DDVP
tolerances pursuant to FFDCA section 408(q). (Ref. 3). In response to
the petition, EPA undertook an extensive review of its DDVP safety
evaluation in the tolerance reassessment decision. Based on certain
concerns raised by NRDC, EPA determined it was necessary to incorporate
updated data on numerous points and to adopt revised and more
conservative assumptions, in its DDVP risk assessments. This led to
complete revisions of both EPA's assessments of
[[Page 42684]]
dietary and residential risks from exposure to DDVP. (72 FR at 68678,
68687-68691). Nonetheless, EPA concluded that its revised risk
assessments demonstrated that DDVP met the FFDCA safety standard and,
therefore, denied the petition. (Id. at 68695). EPA's denial was issued
in the form of an order under FFDCA section 408(d)(4)(iii). (21 U.S.C.
346a(d)(4)(iii)).
NRDC then filed objections with EPA to the petition denial order
and requested a hearing on its objections. These objections and hearing
requests were filed pursuant to the procedures in the FFDCA section
408(g)(2). (21 U.S.C. 346a(g)(2)). The objections narrowed NRDC's
claims to two main topics - that, in assessing the risk to DDVP, EPA
unlawfully reduced the statutory safety factor for the protection of
infants and children and EPA unlawfully relied on a human toxicity
study. As to these claims, NRDC largely repeats the arguments as
presented in its petition without addressing EPA's substantial
revisions to the DDVP risk assessment and proffers little to no
evidence in support of its requests for a hearing. After carefully
reviewing the objections and hearing requests, EPA has determined that
NRDC's hearing requests do not satisfy the regulatory requirements for
such requests and that its substantive objections are without merit.
Therefore, EPA, in this final order, denies NRDC's objections and its
requests for a hearing on those objections.
B. What Is the Agency's Authority for Taking This Action?
NRDC petitioned to revoke the DDVP tolerances pursuant to the
petition procedures in FFDCA section 408(d)(1). (21 U.S.C. 346a(d)(1)).
Under section 408(d), EPA may respond to such a petition by either
issuing a final or proposed rule modifying or revoking the tolerances
or issuing an order denying the petition. (21 U.S.C. 346a(d)(4)). Here,
EPA responded by issuing an order under section 408(d)(4)(iii) denying
the petition. (72 FR 68622 (December 5, 2007)).
Orders issued under section 408(d)(4)(iii) are subject to a
statutorily-created administrative review process. (21 U.S.C.
346a(g)(2)). Any person may file objections to a section 408(d)(4)(iii)
order with EPA and request a hearing on those objections. (Id.). EPA is
required by section 408(g)(2)(C) to issue a final order resolving the
objections to the section 408(d)(4)(iii) order. (21 U.S.C.
346a(g)(2)(C)).
III. Statutory and Regulatory Background
In this Unit, EPA provides background on the relevant statutes and
regulations governing NRDC's objections and requests for hearing as
well as on pertinent Agency policies and practices. As noted, NRDC's
objections and requests for hearing raise two main claims: (1) that EPA
has unlawfully failed to retain the full tenfold safety factor for the
protection of infants and children; and (2) that it was unlawful for
EPA to rely on a toxicity study for DDVP that was conducted with
humans. The children's safety factor claim is based on assertions
regarding DDVP's potential endocrine effects and the adequacy of EPA's
data and risk assessments pertaining to exposure to DDVP in food as a
result of the use of DDVP (and similar pesticides) in agriculture or
food storage and through use of DDVP in residential settings. The human
studies claim involves a challenge to the EPA regulation governing
reliance on human studies as well as to EPA's application of that rule
to a particular human study. The human study in question measured
cholinesterase inhibition in humans resulting from administration of
DDVP. Background information on each of these topics is included in
this Unit.
Unit III.A. summarizes the requirements and procedures in section
408 of the FFDCA and applicable regulations pertaining to pesticide
tolerances, including the procedures for petitioning for revocation of
tolerances and challenging the denial of such petitions and the
substantive standards for evaluating the safety of pesticide
tolerances. This unit also discusses the closely-related statute under
which EPA regulates the sale, distribution, and use of pesticides, the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (``FIFRA''), (7
U.S.C. 136 et seq.).
Unit III.B. provides an overview of EPA's risk assessment process.
It contains an explanation of how EPA identifies the hazards posed by
pesticides, how EPA determines the level of exposure to pesticides that
pose a concern (``level of concern''), how EPA measures human exposure
to pesticides, and how hazard, level of concern conclusions, and human
exposure estimates are combined to evaluate risk. Further, this unit
presents background information on two Agency policies with particular
relevance to this action, EPA's policy with regard to the statutory
safety factor for the protection of infants and children and its policy
with regard to cholinesterase inhibition.
Unit III.C. summarizes EPA's program for implementing the statutory
requirement to screen pesticides for potential endocrine effects. Unit
III.D. describes the EPA regulation on use of human studies.
A. FFDCA/FIFRA and Applicable Regulations
1. In general. EPA establishes maximum residue limits, or
``tolerances,'' for pesticide residues in food under section 408 of the
FFDCA. (21 U.S.C. 346a). Without such a tolerance or an exemption from
the requirement of a tolerance, a food containing a pesticide residue
is ``adulterated'' under section 402 of the FFDCA and may not be
legally moved in interstate commerce. (21 U.S.C. 331, 342). Monitoring
and enforcement of pesticide tolerances are carried out by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (``FDA'') and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (``USDA''). Section 408 was substantially rewritten by the
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (``FQPA''), which added the
provisions discussed below establishing a detailed safety standard for
pesticides, additional protections for infants and children, and the
estrogenic substances screening program. (Public Law 104-170, 110 Stat.
1489 (1996)).
EPA also regulates pesticides under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (``FIFRA''), (7 U.S.C. 136 et seq).
While the FFDCA authorizes the establishment of legal limits for
pesticide residues in food, FIFRA requires the approval of pesticides
prior to their sale and distribution, (7 U.S.C. 136a(a)), and
establishes a registration regime for regulating the use of pesticides.
FIFRA regulates pesticide use in conjunction with its registration
scheme by requiring EPA review and approval of pesticide labels and
specifying that use of a pesticide inconsistent with its label is a
violation of federal law. (7 U.S.C. 136j(a)(2)(G)). In the FQPA,
Congress integrated action under the two statutes by requiring that the
safety standard under the FFDCA be used as a criterion in FIFRA
registration actions as to pesticide uses which result in dietary risk
from residues in or on food, (7 U.S.C. 136(bb)), and directing that EPA
coordinate, to the extent practicable, revocations of tolerances with
pesticide cancellations under FIFRA. (21 U.S.C. 346a(l)(1)).
2. Safety standard for pesticide tolerances. A pesticide tolerance
may only be promulgated by EPA if the tolerance is ``safe.'' (21 U.S.C.
346a(b)(2)(A)(i)). ``Safe'' is defined by the statute to mean that
``there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will
[[Page 42685]]
result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue,
including all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for
which there is reliable information.'' (21 U.S.C. 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
Section 408(b)(2)(D) directs EPA, in making a safety determination, to:
consider, among other relevant factors- ...
(v) available information concerning the cumulative effects of
such residues and other substances that have a common mechanism of
toxicity;
(vi) available information concerning the aggregate exposure
levels of consumers (and major identifiable subgroups of consumers)
to the pesticide chemical residue and to other related substances,
including dietary exposure under the tolerance and all other
tolerances in effect for the pesticide chemical residue, and
exposure from other non-occupational sources;
(viii) such information as the Administrator may require on
whether the pesticide chemical may have an effect in humans that is
similar to an effect produced by a naturally occurring estrogen or
other endocrine effects. ...
(21 U.S.C. 346a(b)(2)(D)(v), (vi) and (viii)).
EPA must also consider, in evaluating the safety of tolerances,
``safety factors which . . . are generally recognized as appropriate
for the use of animal experimentation data.'' (21 U.S.C.
346a(b)(2)(D)(ix).
Risks to infants and children are given special consideration.
Specifically, section 408(b)(2)(C) states that EPA:
shall assess the risk of the pesticide chemical based on-- ...
(II) available information concerning the special susceptibility
of infants and children to the pesticide chemical residues,
including neurological differences between infants and children and
adults, and effects of in utero exposure to pesticide chemicals; and
(III) available information concerning the cumulative effects on
infants and children of such residues and other substances that have
a common mechanism of toxicity. ...
(21 U.S.C. 346a(b)(2)(C)(i)(II) and (III)).
This provision also creates a presumptive additional safety factor
for the protection of infants and children. Specifically, it directs
that ``[i]n the case of threshold effects, ... an additional tenfold
margin of safety for the pesticide chemical residue and other sources
of exposure shall be applied for infants and children to take into
account potential pre- and post-natal toxicity and completeness of the
data with respect to exposure and toxicity to infants and children.''
(21 U.S.C. 346a(b)(2)(C)). EPA is permitted to ``use a different margin
of safety for the pesticide chemical residue only if, on the basis of
reliable data, such margin will be safe for infants and children.''
(Id.). The additional safety margin for infants and children is
referred to throughout this order as the ``children's safety factor.''
3. Procedures for establishing, amending, or revoking tolerances.
Tolerances are established, amended, or revoked by rulemaking under the
unique procedural framework set forth in the FFDCA. Generally, a
tolerance rulemaking is initiated by the party seeking to establish,
amend, or revoke a tolerance by means of filing a petition with EPA.
(See 21 U.S.C. 346a(d)(1)). EPA publishes in the Federal Register a
notice of the petition filing and requests public comment. (21 U.S.C.
346a(d)(3)). After reviewing the petition, and any comments received on
it, EPA may issue a final rule establishing, amending, or revoking the
tolerance, issue a proposed rule to do the same, or deny the petition.
(21 U.S.C. 346a(d)(4)).
Once EPA takes final action on the petition by either establishing,
amending, or revoking the tolerance or denying the petition, any person
may file objections with EPA and seek an evidentiary hearing on those
objections. (21 U.S.C. 346a(g)(2)). Objections and hearing requests
must be filed within 60 days. (Id.). The statute provides that EPA
shall ``hold a public evidentiary hearing if and to the extent the
Administrator determines that such a public hearing is necessary to
receive factual evidence relevant to material issues of fact raised by
the objections.'' (21 U.S.C. 346a(g)(2)(B). EPA regulations make clear
that hearings will only be granted where it is shown that there is ``a
genuine and substantial issue of fact,'' the requestor has identified
evidence ``which, if established, resolve one or more of such issues in
favor of the requestor,'' and the issue is ``determinative'' with
regard to the relief requested. (40 CFR 178.32(b)). EPA's final order
on the objections is subject to judicial review. (21 U.S.C.
346a(h)(1)).
4. Tolerance reassessment and FIFRA reregistration. The FQPA
required that EPA reassess the safety of all pesticide tolerances
existing at the time of its enactment. (21 U.S.C. 346a(q)). EPA was
given 10 years to reassess the approximately 10,000 tolerances in
existence in 1996. In this reassessment, EPA was required to review
existing pesticide tolerances under the new ``reasonable certainty that
no harm will result'' standard set forth in section 408(b)(2)(A)(i).
(21 U.S.C. 346a(b)(2)(A)(i)). This reassessment was substantially
completed by the August 3, 2006 deadline. Tolerance reassessment was
generally handled in conjunction with a similar program involving
reregistration of pesticides under FIFRA. (7 U.S.C. 136a-1).
Reassessment and reregistration decisions were generally combined in a
document labeled a Reregistration Eligibility Decision (``RED'').
5. Estrogenic substances screening program. The FQPA also imposed
requirements regarding creation of an estrogenic substances screening
program. Section 408(p) gives EPA 2 years from enactment of the FQPA to
``develop a screening program ... to determine whether [pesticide
chemicals and certain other substances] may have an effect in humans
that is similar to an effect produced by a naturally occurring
estrogen, or such other endocrine effect as the Administrator may
designate.'' (21 U.S.C. 346a(p)(1)). This screening program must use
``appropriate validated test systems and scientifically relevant
information.'' (Id.). Once the program is developed, EPA is required to
take public comment and seek independent scientific review of it.
Following the period for public comment and scientific review, and not
later than 3 years following enactment of the FQPA, EPA is directed to
``implement the program.'' (21 U.S.C. 346a(p)(2)).
The scope of the estrogenic screening program was expanded by an
amendment to the Safe Drinking Water Act (``SDWA'') passed
contemporaneously with the FQPA. That amendment gave EPA the authority
to provide for the testing, under the FQPA estrogenic screening
program, ``of any other substance that may be found in sources of
drinking water if the Administrator determines that a substantial
population may be exposed to such substance.'' (42 U.S.C. 300j-17).
B. EPA Risk Assessment for Tolerances--Policy and Practice
1. The safety determination - risk assessment. To assess risk of a
pesticide tolerance, EPA combines information on pesticide toxicity
with information regarding the route, magnitude, and duration of
exposure to the pesticide. The risk assessment process involves four
distinct steps: (1) Identification of the toxicological hazards posed
by a pesticide; (2) determination of the ``level of concern'' with
respect to human exposure to the pesticide; (3) estimation of human
exposure to the pesticide; and (4) characterization of risk posed to
humans by the pesticide based on comparison of human exposure to the
level of concern.
a. Hazard identification. In evaluating toxicity or hazard, EPA
reviews toxicity studies, primarily in laboratory animals,
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to identify any adverse effects on the test subjects. Animal studies
typically involve investigating a broad range of endpoints including
gross and microscopic effects on organs and tissues, functional effects
on bodily organs and systems, effects on blood parameters (such as red
blood cell count, hemoglobin concentration, hematocrit, and a measure
of clotting potential), effects on the concentrations of normal blood
chemicals (including glucose, total cholesterol, urea nitrogen,
creatinine, total protein, total bilirubin, albumin, hormones, and
enzymes such as alkaline phosphatase, alanine aminotransfersase and
cholinesterases), and behavioral or other gross effects identified
through clinical observation and measurement. EPA examines whether
adverse effects are caused by either short-term (e.g., ``acute'') or
longer-term (e.g., ``chronic'') pesticide exposure and the effects of
pre-natal and post-natal exposure in animals.
EPA also considers whether the adverse effect has a threshold - a
level below which exposure has no appreciable chance of causing the
adverse effect. For non-threshold effects, EPA assumes that any
exposure to the substance increases the risk that the adverse effect
may occur. At present, EPA only considers one adverse effect, the
chronic effect of cancer, to potentially be a non-threshold effect.
(Ref. 4 at 8-9). Not all carcinogens, however, pose a risk at any
exposure level (i.e., ``a non-threshold effect or risk''). Advances in
the understanding of the mode of action of carcinogenesis have
increasingly led EPA to conclude that some pesticides that cause
carcinogenic effects in animal studies only cause such effects above a
certain threshold of exposure. EPA has traditionally considered non-
cancer adverse effects on the endocrine system to be threshold effects;
that determination is being reexamined in conjunction with the
endocrine disruptor screening program.
b. Level of concern/dose-response analysis. Once a pesticide's
potential hazards are identified, EPA determines a toxicological level
of concern for evaluating the risk posed by human exposure to the
pesticide. In this step of the risk assessment process, EPA essentially
evaluates the levels of exposure to the pesticide at which effects
might occur. An important aspect of this determination is assessing the
relationship between exposure (dose) and response (often referred to as
the dose-response analysis). EPA follows differing approaches to
identifying a level of concern for threshold and non-threshold hazards.
i. Threshold effects. In examining the dose-response relationship
for a pesticide's threshold effects, EPA evaluates an array of toxicity
studies on the pesticide. In each of these studies, EPA attempts to
identify the lowest observed adverse effect level (``LOAEL'') and the
next lower dose at which there are no observed adverse affect levels
(``NOAEL''). Generally, EPA will use the lowest NOAEL from the
available studies as a starting point (called ``the Point of
Departure'') in estimating the level of concern for humans. (Ref. 4 at
9 (The Point of Departure ``is simply the toxic dose that serves as the
`starting point' in extrapolating a risk to the human population.'')).
At times, however, EPA will use a LOAEL from a study as the Point of
Departure when no NOAEL is identified in that study and the LOAEL is
close to, or lower than, other relevant NOAELs. The Point of Departure
is in turn used in choosing a level of concern. EPA will make separate
determinations as to the Points of Departure, and correspondingly
levels of concern, for both short and long exposure periods as well as
for the different routes of exposure (oral, dermal, and inhalation).
In estimating and describing the level of concern, the Point of
Departure is at times used differently depending on whether the risk
assessment addresses dietary or non-dietary exposures. For dietary
risks, EPA uses the Point of Departure to calculate an acceptable level
of exposure or reference dose (``RfD''). The RfD is calculated by
dividing the Point of Departure by all applicable safety or uncertainty
factors. Typically, EPA uses a baseline safety/uncertainty factor equal
to 100. That value includes a factor of ten (``10X'') where EPA is
using data from laboratory animals to reflect potentially greater
sensitivity in humans than animals and a factor of 10X to account for
potential variations in sensitivity among members of the human
population as well as other unknowns. Additional safety factors may be
added to address data deficiencies or concerns raised by the existing
data. Under the FQPA, an additional safety factor of 10X is
presumptively applied to protect infants and children, unless reliable
data support selection of a different factor. This FQPA additional
safety factor largely replaces pre-FQPA EPA practice regarding
additional safety factors. (Ref. 5 at 4-11).
In implementing FFDCA section 408, EPA's Office of Pesticide
Programs, also calculates a variant of the RfD referred to as a
Population Adjusted Dose (``PAD''). A PAD is the RfD divided by any
portion of the FQPA safety factor that does not correspond to one of
the traditional additional safety factors used in general Agency risk
assessments. (Ref. 5 at 13-16). The reason for calculating PADs is so
that other parts of the Agency, which are not governed by FFDCA section
408, can, when evaluating the same or similar substances, easily
identify which aspects of a pesticide risk assessment are a function of
the particular statutory commands in FFDCA section 408. Today, RfDs and
PADs are generally calculated for both acute and chronic dietary risks
although traditionally a RfD or PAD was only calculated for chronic
dietary risks. Throughout this document general references to EPA's
calculated safe dose are denoted as a RfD/PAD.
For non-dietary, and combined dietary and non-dietary, risk
assessments of threshold effects, the toxicological level of concern is
not expressed as a RfD/PAD but rather in terms of an acceptable (or
``target'') margin of exposure (``MOE'') between human exposure and the
Point of Departure. The ``margin'' of interest is the ratio between
human exposure and the Point of Departure which is calculated by
dividing human exposure into the Point of Departure. An acceptable MOE
is generally considered to be a margin at least as high as the product
of all applicable safety factors for a pesticide. For example, if a
pesticide needs a 10X factor to account for inter-species differences,
10X factor for intra-species differences, and 10X factor for the FQPA
children's safety provision, the safe or target MOE would be a MOE of
at least 1,000. What that means is that for the pesticide to meet the
safety standard, human exposure to the pesticide would have to be at
least 1,000 times smaller than the Point of Departure. Like RfD/PADs,
specific target MOEs are selected for exposures of different durations.
For non-dietary exposures, EPA typically examines short-term,
intermediate-term, and long-term exposures. Additionally, target MOEs
may be selected based on both the duration of exposure and the various
routes of non-dietary exposure - dermal, inhalation, and oral.
ii. Non-threshold effects. For risk assessments for non-threshold
effects, EPA does not use the RfD/PAD or MOE approach to choose a level
of concern if quantification of the risk is deemed appropriate. Rather,
EPA calculates the slope of the dose-response curve for the non-
threshold effects from relevant studies using a linear, low-dose
extrapolation model that assumes that any amount of exposure will lead
to some degree of risk. This dose-response
[[Page 42687]]
analysis will be used in the risk characterization stage to estimate
the risk to humans of the non-threshold effect. Linear, low-dose
extrapolation is typically used as the default approach for estimating
the risk to carcinogens, unless there are mode of action data
indicating a threshold response (or nonlinearity).
c. Estimating human exposure. Risk is a function of both hazard and
exposure. Thus, equally important to the risk assessment process as
determining the hazards posed by a pesticide and the toxicological
level of concern for those hazards is estimating human exposure. Under
FFDCA section 408, EPA is concerned not only with exposure to pesticide
residues in food but also exposure resulting from pesticide
contamination of drinking water supplies and from use of pesticides in
the home or other non-occupational settings. (See 21 U.S.C.
346a(b)(2)(D)(vi)).
i. Exposure from food. There are two critical variables in
estimating exposure in food: (1) The types and amount of food that is
consumed; and (2) the residue level in that food. Consumption is
estimated by EPA based on scientific surveys of individuals' food
consumption in the United States conducted by the USDA. (Ref. 4 at 12).
Information on residue values comes from a range of sources including
crop field trials, data on pesticide reduction (or concentration) due
to processing, cooking, and other practices, information on the extent
of usage of the pesticide, and monitoring of the food supply. (Id. at
17).
In assessing exposure from pesticide residues in food, EPA, for
efficiency's sake, follows a tiered approach in which it, in the first
instance, assesses exposure using the worst case assumptions that 100
percent of the crop in question is treated with the pesticide and 100
percent of the food from that crop contains pesticide residues at the
tolerance level. (Id. at 11). When such an assessment shows no risks of
concern, a more complex risk assessment is unnecessary. By avoiding a
more complex risk assessment, EPA's resources are conserved and
regulated parties are spared the cost of any additional studies that
may be needed. If, however, a first tier assessment suggests there
could be a risk of concern, EPA then attempts to refine its exposure
assumptions to yield a more realistic picture of residue values through
use of data on the percent of the crop actually treated with the
pesticide and data on the level of residues that may be present on the
treated crop. These latter data are used to estimate what has been
traditionally referred to by EPA as ``anticipated residues.''
Use of percent crop treated data and anticipated residue
information is appropriate because EPA's worst-case assumptions of 100
percent treatment and residues at tolerance value significantly
overstate residue values. There are several reasons this is true.
First, all growers of a particular crop would rarely choose to apply
the same pesticide to that crop; generally, the proportion of the crop
treated with a particular pesticide is significantly below 100 percent.
(70 FR 46706, 46731 (August 10, 2005)). Second, the tolerance value
represents a high end or worst case value. Tolerance values are chosen
only after EPA has evaluated data from experimental crop field trials
in which the pesticide has been used in a manner, consistent with the
draft FIFRA label, that is likely to produce the highest residue in the
crop in question (e.g., maximum application rate, maximum number of
applications, minimum pre-harvest interval between last pesticide
application and harvest). (Refs. 4 and 6). These crop field trials are
generally conducted in several fields at several geographical
locations. (Id. at 5, 7 and Tables 1 and 5). Several samples are then
gathered from each field and analyzed. (Id. at 53). Generally, the
results from such field trials show that the residue levels for a given
pesticide use will vary from as low as non-detectable to measurable
values in the parts per million (``ppm'') range with the majority of
the values falling at the lower part of the range. (70 FR at 46731).
EPA uses a statistical procedure to analyze the field trial results and
identify the upper bound of expected residue values. This upper bound
value is used as the tolerance value. (Ref. 7). There may be some
commodities from a treated crop that approach the tolerance value where
the maximum label rates are followed, but most generally fall
significantly below the tolerance value. If less than the maximum legal
rate is applied, residues will be even lower. Third, residue values in
the field do not take into account the lowering of residue values that
frequently occurs as a result of degradation over time and through food
processing and cooking.
EPA uses several techniques to refine residue value estimates.
(Ref. 4 at 17-28). First, where appropriate, EPA will take into account
all the residue values reported in the crop field trials, either
through use of an average or individually. Second, EPA will consider
data showing what portion of the crop is not treated with the
pesticide. Third, data can be produced showing pesticide degradation
and decline over time, and the effect of commercial and consumer food
handling and processing practices. Finally, EPA can consult monitoring
data gathered by the FDA, the USDA, or pesticide registrants, on
pesticide levels in food at points in the food distribution chain
distant from the farm, including retail food establishments.
Another critical component of the exposure assessment is how data
on consumption patterns are combined with data on pesticide residue
levels in food. Traditionally, EPA has calculated exposure by simply
multiplying average consumption by average residue values for
estimating chronic risks and high-end consumption by maximum residue
values for estimating acute risks. Using average residues is a
realistic approach for chronic risk assessment due to the fact that
variations in residue levels and consumption amounts average out over
time. Using average values is inappropriate for acute risk assessments,
however, because in assessing acute exposure situations it matters how
much of each treated food a given consumer eats and what the residue
levels are in the particular foods consumed. Yet, using maximum residue
values for acute risk assessment tends to greatly overstate exposure
because it is unlikely that a person would consume at a single meal
multiple food components bearing high-end residues. To take into
account the variations in short-term consumption patterns and food
residue values for acute risk assessments, EPA has more recently begun
using probabilistic modeling techniques for estimating exposure when
more simplistic models appear to show risks of concerns.
All of these refinements to the exposure assessment process, from
use of food monitoring data through probabilistic modeling, can have
dramatic effects on the level of exposure predicted, reducing worst
case estimates by 1 or 2 orders of magnitude or more. (Ref. 8 at 16-17;
70 FR 46706, 46732 (August 10, 2005).
ii. Exposure from water. EPA may use either or both field
monitoring data and mathematical water exposure models to generate
pesticide exposure estimates in drinking water. Monitoring and modeling
are both important tools for estimating pesticide concentrations in
water and can provide different types of information. Monitoring data
can provide estimates of pesticide concentrations in water that are
representative of specific agricultural or residential pesticide
practices and under environmental conditions associated with a sampling
design. Although monitoring data can provide a
[[Page 42688]]
direct measure of the concentration of a pesticide in water, it does
not always provide a reliable estimate of exposure because sampling may
not occur in areas with the highest pesticide use, and/or the sampling
may not occur when the pesticides are being used.
In estimating pesticide exposure levels in drinking water, EPA most
frequently uses mathematical water exposure models. EPA's models are
based on extensive monitoring data and detailed information on soil
properties, crop characteristics, and weather patterns. (69 FR 30042,
30058-30065 (May 26, 2004)). These models calculate estimated
environmental concentrations of pesticides using laboratory data that
describe how fast the pesticide breaks down to other chemicals and how
it moves in the environment. These concentrations can be estimated
continuously over long periods of time, and for places that are of most
interest for any particular pesticide. Modeling is a useful tool for
characterizing vulnerable sites, and can be used to estimate peak
concentrations from infrequent, large storms.
iii. Residential exposures. Generally, in assessing residential
exposure to pesticides EPA relies on its Residential Standard Operating
Procedures (``SOPs''). (Ref. 9). The SOPs establish models for
estimating application and post-application exposures in a residential
setting where pesticide-specific monitoring data are not available.
SOPs have been developed for many common exposure scenarios including
pesticide treatment of lawns, garden plants, trees, swimming pools,
pets, and indoor surfaces including crack and crevice treatments. The
SOPs are based on existing monitoring and survey data including
information on activity patterns, particularly for children. Where
available, EPA relies on pesticide-specific data in estimating
residential exposures.
d. Risk characterization. The final step in the risk assessment is
risk characterization. In this step, EPA combines information from the
first three steps (hazard identification, level of concern/dose-
response analysis, and human exposure assessment) to quantitatively
estimate the risks posed by a pesticide. Separate characterizations of
risk are conducted for different durations of exposure. Additionally,
separate and, where appropriate, aggregate characterizations or risk
are conducted for the different routes of exposure (dietary and non-
dietary).
For threshold risks, EPA estimates risk in one of two ways. Where
EPA has calculated a RfD/PAD, risk is estimated by expressing human
exposure as a percentage of the RfD/PAD. Exposures lower than 100
percent of the RfD/PAD are generally not of concern. Alternatively, EPA
may express risk by comparing the MOE between estimated human exposure
and the Point of Departure with the acceptable or target MOE. As
described above, the acceptable or target MOE is the product of all
applicable safety factors. To calculate the actual MOE for a pesticide,
estimated human exposure to the pesticide is divided into the Point of
Departure. In contrast to the RfD/PAD approach, the higher the MOE, the
safer the pesticide. Accordingly, if the target MOE for a pesticide is
100, MOEs equal to or exceeding 100 would generally not be of concern.
As a conceptual matter, the RfD/PAD and MOE approaches are
fundamentally equivalent. For a given risk and given exposure of a
pesticide, if exposure to a pesticide were found to be acceptable under
an RfD/PAD analysis it would also pass under the MOE approach, and
vice-versa. However, for any specific pesticide, risk assessments for
different exposure durations or routes may yield different results.
This is a function not of the choice of the RfD/PAD or MOE approach but
of the fact that the levels of concern and the levels of exposure may
differ depending on the duration and route of exposure.
For non-threshold risks (generally, cancer risks), EPA uses the
slope of the dose-response curve for a pesticide in conjunction with an
estimation of human exposure to that pesticide to estimate the
probability of occurrence of additional adverse effects. For non-
threshold cancer risks, EPA generally considers cancer risk to be
negligible if the probability of increased cancer cases falls within
the range of 1 in 1 million. Risks exceeding values within that range
would raise a risk concern.
2. EPA policy on the children's safety factor. As the above brief
summary of EPA's risk assessment practice indicates, the use of safety
factors plays a critical role in the process. This is true for
traditional 10X safety factors to account for potential differences
between animals and humans when relying on studies in animals (inter-
species safety factor) and potential differences among humans (intra-
species safety factor) as well as the FQPA's additional 10X children's
safety factor.
In applying the children's safety factor provision, EPA has
interpreted it as imposing a presumption in favor of applying an
additional 10X safety factor. (Ref. 5 at 4, 11). Thus, EPA generally
refers to the additional 10X factor as a presumptive or default 10X
factor. EPA has also made clear, however, that this presumption or
default in favor of the additional 10X is only a presumption. The
presumption can be overcome if reliable data demonstrate that a
different factor is safe for children. (Id.). In determining whether a
different factor is safe for children, EPA focuses on the three factors
listed in section 408(b)(2)(C) - the completeness of the toxicity
database, the completeness of the exposure database, and potential pre-
and post-natal toxicity. In examining these factors, EPA strives to
make sure that its choice of a safety factor, based on a weight-of-the-
evidence evaluation, does not understate the risk to children. (Id. at
24-25, 35).
3. EPA policy on cholinesterase inhibition as a regulatory
endpoint. Cholinesterase inhibition is a disruption of the normal
process in the body by which the nervous system chemically communicates
with muscles and glands. Communication between nerve cells and a target
cell (i.e., another nerve cell, a muscle fiber, or a gland) is
facilitated by the chemical, acetylcholine. When a nerve cell is
stimulated it releases acetylcholine into the synapse (or space)
between the nerve cell and the target cell. The released acetylcholine
binds to receptors in the target cell, stimulating the target cell in
turn. As EPA has explained, ``the end result of the stimulation of
cholinergic pathway(s) includes, for example, the contraction of smooth
(e.g., in the gastrointestinal tract) or skeletal muscle, changes in
heart rate or glandular secretion (e.g., sweat glands) or communication
between nerve cells in the brain or in the autonomic ganglia of the
peripheral nervous system.'' (Ref. 10 at 10).
Acetylcholinesterase is an enzyme that breaks down acetylcholine
and terminates its stimulating action in the synapse between nerve
cells and target cells. When acetylcholinesterase is inhibited,
acetylcholine builds up prolonging the stimulation of the target cell.
This excessive stimulation potentially results in a broad range of
adverse effects on many bodily functions including muscle cramping or
paralysis, excessive glandular secretions, or effects on learning,
memory, or other behavioral parameters. Depending on the degree of
inhibition these effects can be serious, even fatal.
EPA's cholinesterase inhibition policy statement explains EPA's
approach to evaluating the risks posed by cholinesterase-inhibiting
pesticides such as DDVP. (Ref. 10). The policy focuses on three types
of effects associated with cholinesterase-
[[Page 42689]]
inhibiting pesticides that may be assessed in animal and human
toxicological studies: (1) Physiological and behavioral/functional
effects; (2) cholinesterase inhibition in the central and peripheral
nervous system; and (3) cholinesterase inhibition in red blood cells
and blood plasma. The policy discusses how such data should be
integrated in deriving an acceptable dose (RfD/PAD) for a
cholinesterase-inhibiting pesticide.
Clinical signs or symptoms of cholinesterase inhibition in humans,
the policy concludes, provide the most direct evidence of the adverse
consequences of exposure to cholinesterase-inhibiting pesticides.
Nonetheless, as the policy notes, due to strict ethical limitations,
studies in humans are ``quite limited.'' (Id. at 19). Although animal
studies can also provide direct evidence of cholinesterase inhibition
effects, animal studies cannot easily measure cognitive effects of
cholinesterase inhibition such as effects on perception, learning, and
memory. For these reasons, the policy recommends that ``functional data
obtained from human and animal studies should not be relied on solely,
to the exclusion of other kinds of pertinent information, when weighing
the evidence for selection of the critical effect(s) that will be used
as the basis of the RfD or RfC.'' (Id. at 20).
After clinical signs or symptoms, cholinesterase inhibition in the
nervous system provides the next most important endpoint for evaluating
cholinesterase-inhibiting pesticides. Although cholinesterase
inhibition in the nervous system is not itself regarded as a direct
adverse effect, it is ``generally accepted as a key component of the
mechanism of toxicity leading to adverse cholinergic effects.'' (Id. at
25). As such, the policy states that it should be treated as ``direct
evidence of potential adverse effects'' and ``data showing this
response provide valuable information in assessing potential hazards
posed by anticholinesterase pesticides.'' (Id.). Unfortunately, useful
data measuring cholinesterase inhibition in the central and peripheral
nervous systems has only been relatively rarely captured by standard
toxicology testing, particularly as to peripheral nervous system
effects. For central nervous system effects, however, more recent
neurotoxicity studies ``have sought to characterize the time course of
inhibition in ... [the] brain, including brain regions, after acute and
90-day exposures.'' (Id. at 27).
Cholinesterase inhibition in the blood is one step further removed
from the direct harmful consequences of cholinesterase-inhibiting
pesticides. According to the policy, inhibition of blood
cholinesterases ``is not an adverse effect, but may indicate a
potential for adverse effects on the nervous system.'' (Id. at 28). The
policy states that ``[a]s a matter of science policy, blood
cholinesterase data are considered appropriate surrogate measures of
potential effects on peripheral nervous system acetylcholinesterase
activity in animals, for central nervous system (``CNS'')
acetylcholinesterase activity in animals when CNS data are lacking and
for both peripheral and central nervous system acetylcholinesterase in
humans.'' (Id. at 29). The policy notes that ``there is often a direct
relationship between a greater magnitude of exposure [to a
cholinesterase-inhibiting pesticide] and an increase in incidence and
severity of clinical signs and symptoms as well as blood cholinesterase
inhibition.'' (Id. at 30). Thus, the policy regards blood
cholinesterase data as ``appropriate endpoints for derivation of
reference doses or concentrations when considered in a weight-of-the-
evidence analysis of the entire database ....'' (Id. at 29). Between
cholinesterase inhibition measured in red blood cell (``RBC'') or blood
plasma, the policy states a preference for reliance on RBC
acetylcholinesterase measurements because plasma is composed of a
mixture of acetylcholinesterase and butyrylcholinesterase, and
inhibition of the latter is less clearly tied to inhibition of
acetylcholinesterase in the nervous system. (Id. at 29, 32).
If a measure of cholinesterase inhibition (e.g., RBC
cholinesterase) is being considered as a potential adverse effect or
surrogate for an adverse effect, the policy advises that the level of
inhibition must be critically evaluated ``in the context of both
statistical and biological significance.'' (Id. at 37) (emphasis in
Original). The policy notes that ``[n]o fixed percentage of change
(e.g., 20% for cholinesterase enzyme inhibition) is predetermined to
separate adverse from non-adverse effects.'' (Id.). Rather, the policy
explains that ``OPP's experience with the review of toxicity studies
with cholinesterase-inhibiting substances shows that differences
between pre- and post-exposure of 20% or more in enzyme levels is
nearly always statistically significant and would generally be viewed
as biologically significant.'' (Id. at 37-38). The policy recommends
that ``[t]he biological significance of statistically-significant
changes of less than 20% would have to be judged on a case-by-case
basis, noting, in particular the pattern of changes in the enzyme
levels and the presence or absence of accompanying clinical signs and/
or symptoms.'' (Id. at 38). The policy notes that similar or higher
levels of cholinesterase inhibition are used ``in monitoring workers
for occupational exposures (even in the absence of signs, symptoms, or
other behavioral effects).'' (Id. at 31). For example, the policy
points out that the California Department of Health Services requires
that workers exposed to toxic chemicals such as organophosphate
pesticides be removed from the workplace if ``red blood cell
cholinesterase levels show 30% or greater inhibition,'' and that the
World Health Organization ``has guidelines with the same RBC action
levels (i.e., 30% or greater inhibition).'' (Id.).
C. Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program
The 1996 FQPA and SWDA amendments directed EPA to develop and
implement an endocrine screening program. To aid in the design of this
program called for in the FQPA and SDWA amendments, EPA created the
Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory Committee
(``EDSTAC''), which was comprised of members representing the
commercial chemical and pesticides industries, federal and state
agencies, worker protection and labor organizations, environmental and
public health groups, and research scientists. (63 FR 71542, 71544,
Dec. 28, 1998). The EDSTAC presented a comprehensive report in August
1998 addressing both the scope and elements of the endocrine screening
program. (Ref. 11). The EDSTAC's recommendations were largely adopted
by EPA.
As recommended by EDSTAC, EPA expanded the scope of the program
from focusing only on estrogenic effects to include other effects on
the endocrine system (i.e., androgenic and thyroid effects). (63 FR at
71545). Further, EPA, again on the EDSTAC's recommendation, chose to
include both human and ecological effects in the program. (Id.).
Finally, based on EDSTAC's recommendation, EPA established the universe
of chemicals to be screened to include not just pesticides but also a
wide range of other chemical substances. (Id.). As to the program
elements, EPA adopted EDSTAC's recommended two-tier approach with the
first tier involving screening ``to identify substances that have the
potential to interact with the endocrine system'' and the second tier
involving testing ``to determine whether the substance causes adverse
effects,
[[Page 42690]]
identify the adverse effects caused by the substance, and establish a
quantitative relationship between the dose and the adverse effect.''
(Id.). Tier 1 screening is limited to evaluating whether a substance is
``capable of interacting with'' the endocrine system, and is ``not
sufficient to determine whether a chemical substance may have an effect
in humans that is similar to an effect produced by naturally occurring
hormones.'' (Id. at 71550). Based on the results of Tier 1 screening,
EPA will decide whether Tier 2 testing is needed. Importantly, ``[t]he
outcome of Tier 2 is designed to be conclusive in relation to the
outcome of Tier 1 and any other prior information. Thus, a negative
outcome in Tier 2 will supersede a positive outcome in Tier 1.'' (Id.
at 71554-71555).
The EDSTAC provided detailed recommendations for Tier 1 screening
and Tier 2 testing. The panel of the EDSTAC that devised these
recommendations was comprised of distinguished scientists from
academia, government, industry, and the environmental community. (Ref.
11 at Appendix B). As suggested by the EDSTAC, EPA has proposed a
battery of short-term in vitro and in vivo assays for the Tier 1
screening exercise. (63 FR at 71550-71551). Validation of all but one
of these assays is complete. As to Tier 2 testing, EPA, on the
recommendation of the EDSTAC, has proposed using five longer-term
reproduction studies that, with one exception, ``are routinely
performed for pesticides with widespread outdoor exposures that are
expected to affect reproduction.'' (Id. at 71555). EPA is examining,
pursuant to the suggestion of the EDSTAC, modifications to these
studies to enhance their ability to detect endocrine effects.
EPA has published a draft list of the first group of chemicals that
will be tested under the Agency's endocrine disruptor screening
program. (72 FR 33486 (June 18, 2007)). The draft list was produced
based solely on the exposure potential of the chemicals and EPA has
emphasized that ``[n]othing in the approach for generating the initial
list provides a basis to infer that by simply being on this list these
chemicals are suspected to interfere with the endocrine systems of
humans or other species, and it would be inappropriate to do so.''
(Id.)
D. EPA's Human Research Rule
EPA decisions regarding the ethics of human studies are governed by
the Protection for Subjects in Human Research final rule (``Human
Research rule''), which significantly strengthened and expanded
protections for subjects of human research. (71 FR 6138 (February 6,
2006)). The framework of the Human Research rule rests on the basic
principle that EPA will not, in its actions, rely on data derived from
unethical research. The rule divides studies involving intentional
dosing of human subjects into two groups: ``new'' studies - those
initiated after April 7, 2006 (the effective date of the rule) - and
``old'' studies - those initiated before April 7, 2006. The Human
Research Rule forbids EPA from relying on data from any ``new'' study,
unless EPA has adequate information to determine that the research was
conducted in substantial compliance with the ethical requirements
contained therein. (40 CFR. 26.1705). These ethical rules are derived
primarily from the ``Common Rule,'' (40 CFR part 26), a rule setting
ethical parameters for studies conducted or supported by the federal
government. In addition to requiring informed consent and protection of
the safety of the subjects, among other things, the rule specifies that
``[r]isks to subjects [must be] reasonable in relation to . . . the
importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result
[from the study].'' (40 CFR 26.1111(a)(2)). In other words, a study
would be judged unethical if it did not have scientific value
outweighing any risks to the test subjects.
As to ``old'' studies, the Human Research Rule forbids EPA from
relying on such data if there is clear and convincing evidence that the
conduct of the research was fundamentally unethical or significantly
deficient with respect to the ethical standards prevailing at the time
the research was conducted. (40 CFR 26.1704). EPA has indicated that in
evaluating ``the ethical standards prevailing at the time the research
was conducted'' it will consider the Nuremburg Code, various editions
of the Declaration of Helsinki, the Belmont Report, and the Common
Rule, as among the standards that may be applicable to any particular
study. (71 FR at 6161). Further, reflecting the concern that
scientifically invalid data are ``always unethical,'' (71 FR at 6160),
the rule limits the human research that can be relied upon by EPA to
``scientifically valid and relevant data.'' (40 CFR 26.1701).
Whether the data are ``new'' or ``old,'' the Human Research rule
forbids EPA from relying on data from any study involving intentional
exposure of pregnant women, fetuses, or children subject to a very
limited exception. (40 CFR 26.1703, 1706).
To aid EPA in making scientific and ethical determinations under
the Human Research rule, the rule established an independent Human
Studies Review Board (``HSRB'') to review both proposals for new
research (``new'' studies) and reports of completed human research
(``old'' studies) on which EPA proposes to rely. (40 CFR 26.1603). The
rule directs that HSRB shall be comprised of non-EPA employees ``who
have expertise in fields appropriate for the scientific and ethical
review of human research, including research ethics, biostatistics, and
human toxicology.'' (40 CFR 26.1603(a)). If EPA decides to rely on the
results from ``old'' research conducted to identify or measure a toxic
effect, EPA must submit the results of its assessment to the HSRB for
evaluation of the ethical and scientific merit of the research. (40 CFR
26.1602(b)(2)).
EPA has established the HSRB as a federal advisory committee under
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (``FACA'') to take advantage of
``the benefits of the transparency and opportunities for public
participation'' that accompany a FACA committee. (71 FR at 6156). The
HSRB, as appointed by EPA, contains approximately 16 distinguished
experts in the fields of bioethics, biostatistics, human health risk
assessment and human toxicology, primarily from academia. (Ref. 12).
NRDC and other parties have challenged the legality of the Human
Research rule. (NRDC v. U.S. EPA, No. 06-0820-ag (2d Cir.)). A decision
on this challenge is presently pending before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
IV. Regulatory History of DDVP
A. In General
1. DDVP use. Dichlorvos (2, 2-dichlorovinyl dimethyl phosphate),
also known as DDVP, is an insecticide used in controlling flies,
mosquitoes, gnats, cockroaches, fleas, and other insect pests. (Ref.
3). DDVP is registered for use on agricultural sites; commercial,
institutional, and industrial sites; and for domestic use in and around
homes. Agricultural and other commercial uses include in greenhouses;
mushroom houses; storage areas for bulk, packaged and bagged raw and
processed agricultural commodities; food manufacturing/processing
plants; animal premises; and non-food areas of food-handling
establishments. It is also registered for treatment of cattle, poultry
and swine. DDVP is not registered for direct use on any field grown
commodities. Currently, there are 27 tolerances listed in 40 CFR
180.235 for DDVP on agricultural (food and feed) crops and animal
commodities. DDVP is
[[Page 42691]]
applied with aerosols, fogging equipment, and spray equipment, and
through use of impregnated materials such as resin strips which result
in slow release of the pesticide. The current registrant for the
technical active ingredient, DDVP, is Amvac Chemical Corporation
(``Amvac'').
2. DDVP risks. The following information on the assessment of the
risks posed by DDVP is drawn from EPA's decision on the reassessment of
DDVP tolerances and its response to NRDC's petition.
DDVP is a chlorinated organophosphate pesticide which inhibits
plasma, RBC, and brain cholinesterase in a variety of species. (Ref. 3
at 122-123). Subchronic and chronic oral DDVP exposures to rats and
dogs as well as chronic inhalation DDVP exposure to rats resulted in
significant decreases in plasma, RBC and/or brain cholinesterase
activity. However, DDVP does not cause delayed neurotoxicity in the
hen. Repeated, oral subchronic DDVP exposures in male humans were
associated with statistically and biologically significant decreases in
RBC cholinesterase inhibition. There was no evidence of increased
susceptibility to young animals following in utero DDVP exposure to rat
and rabbit fetuses as well as pre/post natal DDVP exposure to rats in
developmental, reproduction, and comparative cholinesterase studies.
Evidence of sensitivity in the young was seen in one parameter,
auditory startle amplitude, in a developmental neurotoxicity study;
however, the effects in the rat pups here was at levels well above
levels which result in RBC cholinesterase inhibition. Cancer studies
with DDVP provide suggestive evidence of DDVP's potential human
carcinogenicity; however, following the advice of numerous independent
scientific panels, EPA has determined that DDVP poses a negligible
cancer risk to humans due to the lack of relevance to humans of the
tumors identified in the DDVP cancer studies. (72 FR at 68671-68673).
Inhibition of cholinesterase activity was the toxicity endpoint
selected to assess hazards for all acute and chronic dietary exposures,
as well as short-, intermediate-, and long-term (chronic) dermal,
inhalation, and incidental oral residential exposures. Doses selected
for the Point of Departure in determining the level of concern - i.e.,
RfD/PADs and acceptable MOEs - were based on both human and animal
studies. (Ref. 3 at 130-135). Animal studies were used in choosing
levels of concern for evaluating risk from acute and chronic dietary
exposure; acute dermal exposure; and acute and chronic inhalation
exposure. A human study was used evaluating risk from short-term
incidental oral exposure; short-, intermediate-, and long-term dermal
exposure; and short- and intermediate-term inhalation exposure.
Safety factor determinations used in selecting the level of concern
differed based on whether EPA relied on one of several different animal
studies or a human study. For levels of concerns derived from a Point
of Departure from an animal study, EPA generally applied a 100X safety
factor (10X for inter-species variability and 10X for intra-human
variability). EPA removed the 10X children's safety factor for risk
assessments based on an animal study. For levels of concerns derived
from a Point of Departure from the human study, EPA applied a 10X
safety factor for intra-human variability and a 3X children's safety
factor. (Id.).
EPA based its decision to remove the children's safety factor when
relying on animal data on its conclusions that (1) the toxicity
database was complete; (2) most of the data indicated no sensitivity in
the young and the only evidence of sensitivity occurred at levels well
above the Points of Departure used for establishing the levels of
concern; and (3) its estimate of human exposure to DDVP was not
understated. EPA retained a portion of the children's safety factor
when relying on the human study because that study did not determine a
NOAEL. EPA concluded, however, that reliable data supported reduction
of the 10X factor because