Processing of Deposit Accounts in the Event of an Insured Depository Institution Failure, 41170-41180 [E8-15493]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 138 / Thursday, July 17, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 360
RIN 3064–AD26
Processing of Deposit Accounts in the
Event of an Insured Depository
Institution Failure
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Interim rule with request for
comments.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The FDIC is adopting an
interim rule establishing the FDIC’s
practices for determining deposit and
other liability account balances at a
failed insured depository institution.
Except as noted, the FDIC practices
defined in the interim rule represent a
continuation of long-standing FDIC
procedures in processing such balances
at a failed depository institution. The
FDIC is adopting the interim rule
concurrently with its adoption of a
related final rule requiring the largest
insured depository institutions to adopt
mechanisms that would, in the event of
the institution’s failure: Provide the
FDIC with standard deposit account and
other customer information; and allow
the placement and release of holds on
liability accounts, including deposits.
This interim rule applies to all insured
depository institutions.
DATES: This interim rule is effective
August 18, 2008, except for § 360.8(e),
which will be effective July 1, 2009.
Written comments must be received by
the FDIC on or before September 15,
2008.
You may submit comments
by any of the following methods:
• Agency Web Site: https://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal.
Follow instructions for submitting
comments on the Agency Web Site.
• E-mail: Comments@FDIC.gov.
Include ‘‘Processing of Deposit
Accounts’’ in the subject line of the
message.
• Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive
Secretary, Attention: Comments, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: Guard
station at the rear of the 550 17th Street
Building (located on F Street) on
business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
(EST).
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
Public Inspection: All comments
received will be posted without change
to https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
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ADDRESSES:
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federal including any personal
information provided. Comments may
be inspected and photocopied in the
FDIC Public Information Center, 3501
North Fairfax Drive, Room E–1002,
Arlington, VA 22226, between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m. (EST) on business days.
Paper copies of public comments may
be ordered from the Public Information
Center by telephone at (877) 275–3342
or (703) 562–2200.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
James Marino, Project Manager, Division
of Resolutions and Receiverships, (202)
898–7151 or jmarino@fdic.gov; Joseph
A. DiNuzzo, Counsel, Legal Division,
(202) 898–7349 or jdinuzzo@fdic.gov; or
Christopher L. Hencke, Counsel, Legal
Division, (202) 898–8839 or
chencke@fdic.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
In January of this year the FDIC
published a proposed rule composed of
two parts (‘‘proposed rule’’).1 The first
part proposed FDIC practices for
determining deposit and other liability
account balances at a failed insured
depository institution. The second part
proposed requirements for the largest
insured depository institutions to adopt
mechanisms that would, in the event of
the institution’s failure: (1) Provide the
FDIC with standard deposit account and
other customer information; and (2)
allow the placement and release of
holds on liability accounts, including
deposits.
The comment period for the proposed
rule ended on April 14, 2008. The FDIC
received twenty-one comment letters,
all of which may be viewed on the
FDIC’s Web site at https://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/2008/
08comAD26.html.
Based in part on the comments
received on the proposed rule, the FDIC
has decided to finalize the proposed
rule by issuing two separate
rulemakings—(1) the interim rule,
covering part one of the proposed rule
and (2) a separate final rule, covering
part two of the proposed rule (‘‘Large
Bank Modernization Final Rule’’).
Throughout this preamble the terms
‘‘deposit’’ (or ‘‘domestic deposit’’),
‘‘foreign deposit’’ and ‘‘international
banking facility deposit’’ identify
liabilities having different meanings for
deposit insurance purposes. A
‘‘deposit’’ is used as defined in section
3(l) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(12 U.S.C. 1813(l)) (‘‘Section 3(l)’’). A
deposit includes only deposit liabilities
payable in the United States, typically
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FR 2364 (Jan. 14, 2008).
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those deposits maintained in a domestic
office of an insured depository
institution. Only deposits meeting these
criteria are eligible for insurance
coverage. Insured depository
institutions may maintain deposit
liabilities in a foreign branch (‘‘foreign
deposits’’), but these liabilities are not
deposits in the statutory sense (for
insurance or depositor preference
purposes) for the time that they are
payable solely at a foreign branch or
branches. Insured depository
institutions also may maintain liabilities
in an international banking facility
(‘‘IBF’’). An ‘‘international banking
facility deposit,’’ as defined by the
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System in Regulation D (12 CFR
204.8(a)(2)), also is excluded from the
definition of ‘‘deposit’’ in Section 3(l)
and the depositor preference statute (12
U.S.C. 1821(d)(11)).
II. Background
Upon the failure of an FDIC-insured
depository institution, the FDIC must
determine the total insured amount for
each depositor. 12 U.S.C. 1821(f). To
make this determination, the FDIC must
ascertain the balances of all deposit
accounts owned by the same depositor
in the same ownership capacity at a
failed institution as of the day of failure.
The Large Bank Modernization Final
Rule, among other things, requires
certain large depository institutions to
adopt mechanisms that will allow the
FDIC, as receiver, to place holds on
liability accounts, including deposits, in
the event of failure. The amount held
would vary depending on the account
balance, the nature of the liability
(whether or not it is a deposit for
insurance purposes) and the expected
losses resulting from the failure. In
order to calculate these hold amounts,
the rules used by the FDIC to determine
account balances as of the day of failure
must be clearly established.
A deposit account balance can be
affected by transactions 2 presented
during the day. A customer, a third
party or the depository institution can
initiate a deposit account transaction.
All depository institutions process and
post these deposit account transactions
according to a predetermined set of
rules to determine whether to include a
deposit account transaction either in
that day’s end-of-day ledger balances or
in a subsequent day’s balances. These
rules establish cutoff times that vary by
institution and by type of deposit
account transaction—for example, check
2 A deposit account transaction, such as deposits,
withdrawals, transfers and payments, causes funds
to be debited from or credited to the account.
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clearing, Fedwire, ATM, and teller
transactions. Institutions post
transactions initiated before the
respective cutoff time as part of that
day’s business and generally post
transactions initiated after the cutoff
time the following business day.
Further, institutions automatically
execute prearranged ‘‘sweep’’
instructions affecting deposit and other
liability balances at various points
throughout the day. The cutoff rules for
posting deposit account transactions
and the prearranged automated
instructions define the end-of-day
balance for each deposit account on any
given business day.3
In the past, the FDIC usually took over
an institution as receiver after it had
closed on a Friday. For institutions with
a few branches in one state, deposit
account transactions for the day were
completed and determining account
balances on that day was relatively
straightforward. The growth of interstate
banking and branching over the past
two decades and the increasing
complexity of bank products and
practices (such as sweep accounts) has
made the determination of end-of-day
account balances on the day of closing
much more complicated.
III. The Proposed Rule
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Overview
The proposed rule defined the deposit
account balance used for deposit
insurance determination purposes as the
end-of-day ledger balance of the deposit
account on the day of failure. Except as
noted, the FDIC would use the cutoff
times previously applied by the failed
insured depository institution in
establishing the end-of-day ledger
balance for deposit insurance
determination purposes. The use of endof-day ledger balances and the
institution’s normal cutoff times for
insurance determination purposes
continues long-standing FDIC
procedures in processing such balances
at a failed depository institution.
Whether a deposit account transaction
would be included in the end-of-day
ledger balance on the day of failure
would depend generally upon how it
normally would be treated using the
institution’s ordinary cutoff time on that
3 Some depository institutions operate ‘‘realtime’’ deposit systems in which some deposit
account transactions are posted throughout the
business day. Most depository institutions,
however, process at least some deposit account
transactions in a ‘‘batch mode,’’ where deposit
account transactions presented before the cutoff
time are posted that evening or in the early morning
hours of the following day. With either system—
batch or real-time—the institution calculates a
close-of-business deposit balance for each deposit
account on each business day.
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day. Many institutions have different
cutoff times for different kinds of
transactions, such as check clearing,
Fedwire, ATM and teller transactions.
The FDIC proposed establishing an
FDIC Cutoff Point, defined as a point in
time after it takes control of the failed
institution as receiver, to allow the FDIC
to make a final determination of the
ledger balances of the deposit accounts
if the institution’s normal cutoff times
for the accounts would impair the
efficient winding up of the institution.
If the institution’s ordinary cutoff time
on the day of failure for any particular
kind of transaction preceded the FDIC
Cutoff Point, the institution’s ordinary
cutoff time would be used. Otherwise,
the institution’s ordinary cutoff time for
an individual kind of transaction would
be replaced by the FDIC Cutoff Point.
The ‘‘Applicable Cutoff Time’’ used for
any kind of transaction thus would be
the earlier of the institution’s ordinary
cutoff time or the FDIC Cutoff Point. In
practice, there might be several
Applicable Cutoff Times for a given
failed institution, since different kinds
of transactions could have different
cutoff times. No Applicable Cutoff Time
would be later than the FDIC Cutoff
Point established by the FDIC, though
some could be earlier.
Under the proposed rule, transactions
occurring after the Applicable Cutoff
Time would have been posted to the
next day’s business, if the operations of
the failed institution were carried on by
a successor institution. In a depository
institution failure where deposit
operations were not continued by a
successor institution, account
transactions on the day of failure would
have been posted to the applicable
deposit accounts until the FDIC Cutoff
Point. This practice would have been
consistent with the FDIC’s current
practice in handling deposit account
transactions in deposit insurance payout
situations.4
Upon taking control of a failed
institution as receiver, as proposed, the
FDIC would take steps necessary to
limit additional transactions to ensure,
to the extent practicable, that funds
would not be received by or removed
from the failed institution. These steps
might include the suspension of wire
activities and new deposit account
transactions. For example, wire
is when the FDIC handles the resolution of
a failed depository institution by making payments
to insured depositors. More commonly, the FDIC
handles a failed institution by arranging a purchaseand-assumption transaction with a healthy
depository institution. In those cases, insured
depositors’ funds are transferred to the assuming
institution and available at that institution to
depositors.
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transactions not yet executed by the
FDIC Cutoff Point would not be allowed
to occur on the day of closing.
For a failed institution operating in
several time zones, the FDIC Cutoff
Point, which would have set the latest
possible time for any particular
transaction’s Applicable Cutoff Time,
would have been translated into local
time. For example, a 6 p.m. Eastern
Time FDIC Cutoff Point on the day an
institution was closed would have
meant a 5 p.m. FDIC Cutoff Point in the
Central Time zone. As receiver, the
FDIC would have attempted, as it has
customarily done in the past, to close all
offices of the failed institution as soon
as practicable after taking over as
receiver.
Treatment of Uncollected Deposited
Checks
Under the proposed rule, in
determining end-of-day deposit account
balances at a failed insured depository
institution, the FDIC would have
deemed all checks deposited into and
posted to a deposit account by the
Applicable Cutoff Time as part of the
end-of-day deposit account balance for
insurance purposes. This approach
means that the FDIC would have used
the end-of-day ledger balance of the
account for purposes of its deposit
insurance determination, in contrast to
using either end-of-day available or
collected funds balances. The proposed
rule differed from the FDIC’s practices
in an important way. In the past, for a
check that was posted to an account but
not yet collected at the time of failure—
including a check already forwarded by
the failed institution for collection but
not yet collected—the FDIC acted as
agent for the depositor and remitted or
credited payments received on these
checks to the depositor in full. These
checks were not included in deposits on
the day of failure for insurance purposes
and were not subject to deposit
insurance limits.5 In contrast, under the
proposed rule, when a check is posted
to an account at the failed institution by
the Applicable Cutoff Time, the check
would have been included in the endof-day balance and would have been
subject to deposit insurance limits, even
if uncollected.
Prearranged Instructions To ‘‘Sweep’’
Funds
The proposed rule attempted to
distinguish between internal and
external sweep accounts. Internal sweep
arrangements—such as those applying
5 FDIC
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to zero balance accounts 6 or where the
investment vehicle is a deposit in a
foreign branch of the institution or its
international banking facility—were
characterized as arrangements that
sweep funds only within the institution
itself by accounting or bookkeeping
entries. External sweep arrangements—
such as those connected to investments
in money market mutual funds—were
characterized as arrangements that move
funds (usually by wire transfer) outside
the institution and, hence, off its books
altogether.
Under the proposed rule, any
automated internal sweep transaction
from one account at the failed
institution to another account at the
failed institution would have been
completed on the day of failure. The
FDIC as receiver, in effect, would have
recognized the transfer, pursuant to the
account agreement, in determining the
end-of-day balance for deposit
insurance and depositor preference
purposes. Under the proposed rule the
FDIC as receiver would not, however,
complete an external sweep—a sweep in
which funds leave the institution and
another entity assumes liability to the
customer—if funds have not already left
the failed institution by the FDIC Cutoff
Point. An external sweep included, for
example, an account where funds are
swept from a deposit account at the
institution and wired to a third party
money market mutual fund every day.
External sweeps also would have
included an arrangement where funds
are swept from a deposit account at a
depository institution to an account or
product at an affiliate of the institution,
even if the transfer is accomplished
through a book-entry at the depository
institution. In some cases it would not
be practicable to stop an external sweep
from occurring after the FDIC general
cutoff time. In these cases the FDIC
proposed using the pre-sweep deposit
balance for insurance purposes.
The proposed rule would have
applied differently to sweep accounts
involving the transfer of funds outside
the depository institution. In those
situations, the status of the funds as of
the institution’s day of failure would
depend on whether the funds left the
institution (via wire transfer or
6 In the case of a zero balance account ordinarily
a customer has a master account tied to one or more
subsidiary accounts. The institution’s agreement
with the customer calls for the subsidiary account
to have a zero balance at the end of each day. For
example, if funds need to be transferred from the
master account to cover checks presented against
the subsidiary account, this will be done during the
nightly processing cycle. Alternatively, if there are
excess funds in the subsidiary account they will be
transferred to the master account prior to the end
of the day.
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otherwise) before the FDIC Cutoff Point.
Where funds subject to a prearranged,
automated external sweep have been
temporarily transferred to an
intermediate deposit account (or
omnibus account) at the failed
institution awaiting transfer to an
external source, but have not actually
been transferred to the external source
(for example, the mutual fund) by the
FDIC Cutoff Point, those funds would
still have been considered part of the
customer’s deposit account balance for
deposit insurance and receivership
purposes.
The completion of prearranged
internal sweep transactions results in
the calculation of end-of-day deposit
balances for insurance proposes
consistent with how such funds
currently are reported on Call and Thrift
Financial Reports and are treated for
assessment purposes. As detailed in the
proposed rule, the need for the FDIC to
clarify the treatment of internal sweep
arrangements was motivated, in part, by
the decision in Adagio Investment
Holding Ltd. v. FDIC, 338 F. Supp. 2d
71 (D.D.C. 2004) (‘‘Adagio’’).
In that case the FDIC had been
appointed receiver of the failed
Connecticut Bank of Commerce. On the
night of the bank’s failure, in
accordance with its customary practice,
the FDIC ‘‘completed the day’s
business’’ which involved processing
pending transactions, including
approximately $20.2 million which had
been authorized to be swept from a
demand deposit account in the bank to
an account in the bank’s IBF. Because
an IBF account is not a deposit for
purposes of section 3(l) of the FDI Act,
the FDIC issued the holders of the IBF
accounts receivership certificates as
general creditors rather than according
them priority status as depositors
(pursuant to the national deposit
preference statute, described below).
The creditors, claiming that the receiver
did not have authority to permit the
sweeps, sued the FDIC. In the Adagio
case, the court concluded that the sweep
should not have been performed in light
of the lack of ‘‘any provision in either
the statute or regulations that would
permit the sweep that occurred. * * *’’
338 F. Supp. 2d at 81.
Post-Closing Adjustments
Under the proposed rule, the FDIC, as
receiver, would have been able to
correct errors and omissions after the
day of failure and reflect them in the
day-of-closing deposit account balances.
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No New Requirements Would Have
Been Imposed on Open and Operating
Institutions
The proposed rule would not have
required insured institutions to have in
place computer systems capable of
applying the FDIC Cutoff Point to
determine deposit account balances
upon an institution’s day of failure. The
FDIC, however, requested comments on
whether such a requirement should be
imposed for either all institutions or,
alternatively, for ‘‘Covered
Institutions’’—defined in the second
part of the proposed rule as institutions
having at least $2 billion in domestic
deposits and either: More than 250,000
deposit accounts; or total assets over
$20 billion, regardless of the number of
deposit accounts.
Repo Sweep Arrangements
The preamble to the proposed rule
noted that some repurchase sweep
agreements provide for an actual sale of
securities by the depository institution
to a customer (followed by the
institution’s repurchase of the securities
from the customer). Accordingly, when
the customer uses funds in a deposit
account to make the purchase, the
bank’s deposit liability to the customer
is extinguished. There may be other socalled repurchase agreements that do
not provide for the actual sale and
repurchase of securities, but simply
provide for the transfer of the
customer’s claim from a deposit account
at the depository institution to another
liability account, collateralized by either
specific securities or a pool of securities,
at the same institution. In the proposed
rule, the FDIC posed the following
questions:
• Do some or all repurchase
arrangements as actually executed:
(1) Pass title to the customer in a
transaction that is enforceable against
the FDIC? or (2) create perfected
security interests that are enforceable
against the FDIC?
• Does the nature of some or all
repurchase sweep arrangements satisfy
the definition of ‘‘deposit’’ in section
3(l) of the FDI Act?
• What arguments may be made that
repurchase arrangements in which the
institution collateralizes its liability are
permissible, given restrictions on
collateralizing private deposits? See
Texas & Pacific Railway Company v.
Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245 (1934).
Sweeps Alternative
Under the proposed rule, funds
subject to an internal sweep that is to
take place before end-of-day balances
are calculated would not be accorded
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treatment as deposits if they were to be
swept, within the depository institution,
by prearrangement, before the
institution’s end-of-day balances are
determined, from a deposit to a liability
not recognized as a deposit for
insurance purposes. The discussion
noted that under such an arrangement,
no deposit insurance premiums would
have been assessed against these funds
since they would not have been
reported as deposits by the institution.
The FDIC asked whether, if the swept
funds in such arrangements were to be
assessed insurance premiums, they also
should be eligible to be treated as
deposits for purposes of FDIC deposit
insurance and depositor preference. The
FDIC also asked whether or to what
extent such an option would involve
any operational or regulatory burden or
other adverse regulatory consequences.
IV. Comments on the Proposed Rule
As noted, the FDIC received twentyone comments on the proposed rule, the
bulk of which addressed both parts of
the proposed rule. Four of the
comments were from banking industry
trade associations (including one joint
letter), two from bank regulatory
authorities, ten from large insured
depository institutions, one from a law
firm representing broker-dealers who
place brokered funds in insured
depository institutions, one from a
member-owned electronic funds transfer
network and three from individuals.
The following is a summary of the
comments we received on part one of
the proposed rule—determining deposit
and other liability account balances at a
failed insured depository institution.
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Use of End-of-Day Ledger Balances
All of the bank trade association
commenters and many of the large-bank
commenters agreed with the FDIC’s
proposal to define the deposit account
balance on the day of failure as the endof-day ledger balance. Further, these
commenters stated that, upon an
institution’s failure, the FDIC should
use the end-of-day ledger balances
normally calculated by the institution;
thus, such balances should not be
affected by the FDIC Cutoff Point.
FDIC Cutoff Point
The bank trade associations and largebank commenters opposed the use of an
FDIC Cutoff Point, proposing
alternatively that the FDIC should
always use the cutoff times normally
established by the insured depository
institution. They argued that
introducing a new cutoff scheme would
be unfair to customers. Many
commenters expressed a belief that
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FDIC practices should not impinge upon
the contractual arrangements or other
understandings established between the
insured depository institution and its
customers. Further, it was argued that
altering the customer’s understanding of
how deposit transactions will be posted
would create uncertainty and may result
in depositor flight.
Additionally, the implementation of
an FDIC Cutoff Point was largely viewed
as technically infeasible. It was noted
that deposit systems are preprogrammed
to implement cutoff times as established
by the policies of the particular insured
depository institution. Adapting these
systems to accommodate an FDIC Cutoff
Point would be costly, especially since
the FDIC Cutoff Point would not be
known until the day of failure.
Treatment of Sweep Account
Arrangements
In general. Commenters supported at
a very general level the establishment of
a regulation intended to resolve the
legal confusion brought about by the
decision in Adagio. Commenters
recommended that the FDIC limit any
regulation to addressing only the legal
confusion raised in Adagio. One
banking trade group suggested this
could be done by language to ‘‘explicitly
provide that all automated sweep
arrangements that are codified in
contract will be recognized as part of the
day’s business and reflected in end-ofday ledger balances, regardless of when
the transactions are processed.’’ Another
banking trade association noted its
‘‘greatest concerns relate to the FDIC’s
extensive new proposals relating to the
treatment of sweep products. Sweep
transactions have been an extensively
used business practice for decades,
enabling banks to secure substantial
funding at reasonable costs and their
customers to achieve their financial
objectives. Any proposal that disrupts
the existing treatment and expectations
of institutions and their customers vis`
a-vis sweeps would potentially impair
the viability of sweeps with very serious
and unpredictable consequences.’’
Generally, commenters felt the FDIC
should delay a final rule that would go
beyond narrowly addressing the Adagio
concerns. One large bank stated ‘‘the
issues raised and the potential impact to
financial markets that could result from
these proposals are very substantial. All
of the proposals relating to sweeps
warrant further study and consideration
by the FDIC and should be removed
from this rulemaking and should not be
part of any final rule. The FDIC should
consult further with other banking and
financial regulatory agencies and with
financial institutions that are key
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41173
players in this market before finalizing
a rule on sweeps.’’ This commenter
further stated ‘‘the proposed regulation
could have major ripple effects on other
laws and regulations that ultimately rely
upon the same legal definitions of a
deposit as the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, including Regulation D, Regulation
Q, deposit insurance assessments and
the nationwide 10% deposit cap.’’
Repo sweep arrangements. The FDIC’s
questions regarding the nature of funds
swept through arrangements identified
as repurchase agreement sweeps
generally were not addressed, other than
through the overall comment that the
FDIC should only narrowly address
Adagio in any final rule. One large bank
stated that it ‘‘believes the current
sweep structures commonly used in the
industry (including the structures of
securities repos) are appropriately
characterized as not being deposits
under the FDIA. [The bank] further
believes that any proposal to charge
FDIC insurance premiums on the
amounts swept would dramatically
increase costs to banks relating to that
product and could result in the product
no longer being economically viable or
able to be offered on terms that are
competitive with other products offered
by non-bank market participants.’’
Sweeps alternative. In the proposed
rule, the FDIC asked whether, if the
funds involved in certain sweep
arrangements were to be assessed
insurance premiums, they also should
be eligible to be treated as deposits for
purposes of FDIC deposit insurance and
depositor preference. No commenters
addressed this question directly,
although the tenor of the comments
from the large banks and bank trade
associations was that issues such as this
should not be considered as part of this
rulemaking.
Consistent treatment across sweep
transactions. Several commenters
argued that, if the FDIC proceeds with
the rulemaking, it should treat each
sweep transaction the same for claims
purposes. One banking trade association
argued that ‘‘all these products have one
common element—once swept from a
deposit account, and until returned to
the deposit account, none of the bank’s
obligations meets the definition of a
‘deposit’ under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act and are therefore not
covered by deposit insurance in the
event of the bank’s insolvency. This
characterization of sweeps is consistent
with the long-standing practices of
virtually every financial institution and
has been the widely accepted practice
by banking regulators for decades.’’ In
this regard, the commenter noted that,
should the FDIC afford different
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treatment across sweep products, it
‘‘would therefore result in different
(and, to a certain degree, arbitrary)
treatment under the Proposal. Our
members have great concern as to these
potential disparities that could result, in
some cases from nothing more than
differences in the mechanisms used to
execute and arrange sweep
transactions.’’
To provide consistent treatment
among the various sweep products,
several commenters suggested the FDIC
should do away with the internal versus
external distinction between sweep
transactions as well as the Class A
versus Class B distinction. ‘‘We urge the
FDIC to eliminate these unnecessary
distinctions, to the extent that the FDIC
proceeds with rulemaking around
sweeps at all, and treat similar sweep
products the same, despite different
methods used by banks for processing
the necessary transfers and posting the
relevant accounts.’’
V. Rationale for Interim Rulemaking
As noted above, the practices being
adopted in the interim rule were
proposed in part one of the proposed
rule. Hence, the FDIC is adopting those
practices through the usual public
notice-and-comment procedures
pursuant to requirements in the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
553. Before adopting the interim rule as
a permanent rule, however, the FDIC
invites comment on all aspects of the
interim rule, including an aspect of the
proposed rule on which the FDIC had
not requested specific comment.
The interim rule addresses how the
FDIC will treat sweep accounts upon an
insured institution failure. The result is
that, in many cases, the swept funds
will not be treated by the FDIC as
deposit obligations of the failed
institutions. As explained above, that
means the swept funds will not be
eligible for deposit insurance coverage
and will not be afforded status as a
deposit under the depositor preference
statute. Commenters on the proposed
rule indicated that sweep account
customers are aware of this potential
consequence if the institution were to
fail. In order to ensure that sweep
account customers are aware that their
funds will not be treated as deposits if
the insured institution fails, however,
the FDIC will require institutions to
prominently disclose to customers
whether the swept funds are deposits
and the status of the swept funds if the
institution failed. The effective date of
this requirement will be deferred until
July 1, 2009 to allow the FDIC to
consider specific comments on the
disclosure requirement. (Further
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explanation of the disclosure
requirement is provided below under
‘‘Request for Comments.’’)
VI. The Interim Rule
After fully considering the comments
on the proposed rule, FDIC has adopted
the interim rule substantially as
proposed, with some modifications in
connection with the treatment of
‘‘internal and external’’ sweep
transactions, and in other limited areas.
As noted, the interim rule requires
institutions to disclose to customers
whether the swept funds are deposits
and the status of the swept funds if the
institution failed, but the effective date
of this requirement is deferred to allow
for public comment. In addition, the
FDIC will entertain comments on all
other aspects of the interim rule.
Underlying Principles
The interim rule describes the method
for determining the value and nature of
claims against a failed insured
depository institution to be used in the
event of failure. Upon taking control of
a failed insured depository institution it
is the receiver’s responsibility to
construct an ending balance sheet for
the depository institution (which
becomes the beginning balance sheet for
the receivership) and determine the
value and nature of the claims against
the failed institution, including claims
to be made by depositors, general
creditors, subordinated creditors, and
shareholders. Such claims
determinations will be made consistent
with the principles described below,
which for the most part reflect existing
practices and procedures used to
determine account balances in the event
of failure.
• In making deposit insurance
determinations and in determining the
value and nature of claims against the
receivership on the institution’s date of
failure the FDIC, as insurer and receiver,
will treat deposits and other liabilities
of the failed institution according to the
ownership and nature of the underlying
obligations based on end-of-day ledger
balances for each account using, except
as expressly provided otherwise in the
interim rule, the depository institution’s
normal posting procedures.
• In its role as receiver of a failed
insured depository institution, in order
to ensure the proper distribution of the
failed institution’s assets under the FDI
Act (12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(11)) as of the
FDIC Cutoff Point, the FDIC will use its
best efforts to take all steps necessary to
stop the generation, via transactions or
transfers coming from or going outside
the institution, of new liabilities or
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extinguishing existing liabilities for the
depository institution.7
• End-of-day ledger balances are
subject to corrections for posted
transactions that are inconsistent with
the above principles.
End-of-Day Ledger Balances and Cutoff
Points
As proposed, in the interim rule the
deposit or liability account balance used
for deposit insurance determination
purposes is defined as the end-of-day
ledger balance of the deposit or other
liability on the day of failure. Except as
noted, the FDIC will use the cutoff rules
previously applied by the failed insured
depository institution in establishing
the end-of-day ledger balance for
deposit insurance determination
purposes. However, the interim rule
allows the FDIC to establish an FDIC
Cutoff Point, coinciding with the point
in time at which the receiver acts to stop
deposit transactions which might result
in creating new liabilities or
extinguishing existing liabilities. The
FDIC Cutoff Point will facilitate the
orderly winding up of the institution
and the FDIC’s final determination of
the ledger balances of the deposit
accounts in those cases where the
institution’s normal cutoff rules prevent
or impair the FDIC’s ability to promptly
determine the end-of-day ledger balance
of the deposit or other liability. The
intention is to complete internal
postings of transactions presented or
authorized prior to the institution’s
normal cutoff rules or the FDIC Cutoff
Point, as applicable, according to the
depository institution’s normal
procedures—thus, as explained below,
the nature of the liability may change
after the FDIC Cutoff Point. Any
transaction—including sweep
arrangements—would be completed for
that day according to normal procedures
if it involves only the movement of
funds between accounts within the
confines of the depository institution.
Some sweep arrangements shift funds
within the depository institution from a
7 This principle draws a sharp distinction
between transactions involving the transfer of funds
into or out of the failed institution and transactions
intended to move funds between accounts or
otherwise on the books and records of the failed
institution. The receiver will act to stop the inflow
and outflow of cash/assets at the point at which it
takes control of the failed institution; thus
transactions involving the transfer of assets into or
out of the failed institution may be blocked or
suspended. Transactions internal to the failed
institution’s operations initiated prior to the FDIC
Cutoff Point—including those initiated through
prearranged automated instructions—will still be
conducted after the point of failure as part of a
necessary process to arrive at the end-of-day ledger
balances and to establish the nature of the claim
recognized by the receiver.
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deposit account to ownership in a
sweep investment vehicle. The value
and nature of these claims will be
determined as they rest on the books
and records of the depository institution
as reflected in its end-of-day ledger
balances.
If the institution’s ordinary cutoff
time for the day’s business on the day
of failure for any particular kind of
transaction precedes the FDIC Cutoff
Point, the institution’s ordinary cutoff
time will be used. Where the
institution’s ordinary cutoff time for an
individual kind of transaction is later
than the FDIC Cutoff Point, the
institution’s cutoff time will be replaced
by the FDIC Cutoff Point. The
‘‘Applicable Cutoff Time’’ used for any
kind of transaction thus will be the
earlier of the institution’s ordinary
cutoff time or the FDIC Cutoff Point.
Different kinds of transactions may have
different Applicable Cutoff Times.
Transactions occurring after the
Applicable Cutoff Time will be posted
a subsequent day’s business, if the
operations of the failed institution are
carried on by a successor institution or
by the FDIC as receiver or insurer.
The interim rule differs from the
proposed rule in cases where deposit
operations are not continued after
failure in order to provide consistency
in the determination of deposit balances
regardless of whether the deposit
operations were continued. In a
depository institution failure where
deposit operations are not continued by
a successor institution, account
transactions on the day of failure also
will be posted to the applicable
accounts as described above. Since there
is no next business day in this case,
rather than posting transactions
occurring after the Applicable Cutoff
Time as the next day’s business, such
transactions will be handled depending
on the nature of the transaction. In the
case of a cash or other deposit occurring
after the Applicable Cutoff Time, such
funds—which would not be included in
the end-of-day ledger balance used for
claims purposes—would be disbursed to
the account owner. If a cash or other
withdrawal is made after the Applicable
Cutoff Time, such funds—again which
would not be included in the end-of-day
ledger balance used for claims
purposes—could be used by the receiver
to satisfy a claim against the
receivership.8
8 A deposit account withdrawal in the form of an
official check drawn on the failed depository
institution would not be used by the receiver to
satisfy the insured deposit claim. Official items are
considered to be deposits for deposit insurance
purposes; therefore, such official withdrawals
would be treated differently from cash withdrawals.
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The interim rule does not establish
any new operational requirements for
insured institutions relative to the FDIC
Cutoff Point. Also, the interim rule
explicitly authorizes the FDIC, as
receiver, to correct errors and omissions
after the day of failure and reflect them
in the end-of-day ledger balances.
Several commenters argued against
the establishment of an FDIC Cutoff
Point and recommended that the FDIC
use end-of-day balances as normally
calculated by the insured depository
institution. As noted above, the FDIC
will apply the institution’s normal
cutoff times in most cases, but
establishing an FDIC Cutoff Point is
essential to the efficient finalization of
end-of-day ledger balances in some
situations. Strictly applying a
depository institution’s pre-established
cutoff times in all circumstances is
inconsistent with the duties and
responsibilities of the receiver—as
articulated in the principle indicated
above. In the event of failure the
receiver will take control of the failed
institutions and simultaneously will act
to stop deposit or other transactions
involving creating new liabilities or
extinguishing existing liabilities. In
many cases, this can be done consistent
with the institution’s normal cutoff
times, but in others it cannot and the
FDIC will establish an FDIC Cutoff
Point. If the receiver is successful in
stopping these external transactions
after it takes control there will be no
new transactions to be posted affected
by an FDIC Cutoff Point. In this case, the
end-of-day ledger balances on the day of
failure will be calculated using the
failed institution’s pre-established cutoff
points. If the receiver is unsuccessful in
stopping the external transactions, the
FDIC Cutoff Point establishes a basis for
posting these inadvertent transactions
the following day, if that is the course
of action selected by the receiver.
Treatment of Uncollected Deposited
Checks
As proposed, in determining deposit
account balances at a failed insured
depository institution, the FDIC will
deem all checks deposited into and
posted to a deposit account by the
Applicable Cutoff Time as part of the
end-of-day ledger balance for insurance
purposes. As detailed in the proposed
rule, this treatment of uncollected
deposited checks is warranted because:
Depository institutions use and
calculate the ledger balance in a more
consistent way than other balances; it is
consistent with the way that depository
institutions report deposits on Call
Reports and Thrift Financial Reports; it
is the balance the FDIC uses to
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41175
determine an institution’s assessment
base for calculating the institution’s
deposit insurance assessments; 9 it is the
easiest balance for depositors to
understand; and it is the most
frequently used balance on financial
statements provided to customers. Using
ledger balances also is consistent with
the definition of a deposit in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (‘‘FDI Act’’),
which includes balances both
‘‘conditionally’’ or ‘‘unconditionally’’
credited to a deposit account. 12 U.S.C.
1813(l).
Further, especially in a large
depository institution failure, using endof-day ledger balances may be the only
operationally feasible means for the
FDIC to make deposit insurance
determinations timely and
expeditiously. As discussed in more
detail in the Large Bank Modernization
Final Rule, the FDIC is statutorily
obligated to pay insured deposits ‘‘as
soon as possible’’ after an insured
depository institution fails. 12 U.S.C.
1821(f)(1). The FDIC places a high
priority on providing access to insured
deposits promptly and, in the past, has
usually been able to allow most
depositors access to their deposits on
the business day following closing. The
largest insured institutions today are
much bigger than any institution has
been in the past and are growing
increasingly complex. Providing prompt
access to depositors if one of these
institutions were to fail would prove
difficult if adjustments for uncollected
funds were necessary.
This treatment of uncollected
deposited checks, however, will differ
from the FDIC’s past practice in an
important way. In the past, for a check
that was posted to an account but not
yet collected at the time of failure—
including a check already forwarded by
the failed institution for collection but
not yet collected—the FDIC acted as
agent for the depositor and remitted or
credited payments received on these
checks to the depositor in full. These
checks were not included in deposits on
the day of failure for insurance purposes
and were not subject to deposit
9 The FDIC’s recent revisions to the FDIC’s riskbased assessment system have made an institution’s
assessment base, which is used to determine its
deposit insurance assessment, virtually identical
with an institution’s deposits as defined in the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. The revisions
eliminated the ‘‘float’’ deductions previously used
to compute an institution’s assessment base; hence,
deposits posted to a deposit account but not yet
collected are now part of the assessment base. The
stated rationale for eliminating the float deduction
from the calculation of an institution’s assessment
base was that such deductions were small and
decreasing as a result of legal, technological and
system payment changes. 71 Fed. Reg. 69720 (Nov.
30, 2006).
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insurance limits.10 In contrast, under
the interim rule, when a check is posted
to an account at the failed institution as
provided by the Applicable Cutoff Time,
the check will be included in the endof-day ledger balance and will be
subject to deposit insurance limits, even
if uncollected.11
Some depositors may receive less
favorable treatment under the interim
rule than if the FDIC were to continue
to use its past approach to handling
uncollected deposited checks. The
increasing speed with which checks are
processed as a result of electronic check
processing, the use of checking account
debit cards and other developments,
however, should limit the effect of the
final rule in this regard. Moreover, the
past approach would not be feasible in
a larger bank failure, and the FDIC must
plan for all contingencies.
Prearranged Instructions To ‘‘Sweep’’
Funds
The proposed rule distinguished
between internal and external sweep
accounts. This distinction was created
to recognize the receiver’s
responsibility, upon taking control of
the failed institution, to stop the
generation of new deposit or other
transactions which might result in
creating new liabilities or extinguishing
existing liabilities for the depository
institution or its customers to protect
the appropriate distribution to
claimants.
Under the interim rule, any
automated sweep transaction
transferring funds internally from one
deposit account at the failed institution
to a sweep investment vehicle at the
failed institution will be completed on
the day of failure. In the case of sweeps
out of the failed institution into external
investment vehicles, the swept funds
will be treated consistent with their
status in the end-of-day ledger balances.
If an expected transfer to the external
sweep investment vehicle is not
completed prior to the FDIC Cutoff
Point, the external investment will not
be purchased and the funds will remain
in the account identified on the end-ofday ledger balance.
10 FDIC
Adv. Op. 95–2 (Jan. 23, 1995).
FDIC’s treatment of uncollected checks is
subject to the FDIC’s rights and obligations under
the FDI Act. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1822(d); FDIC v.
McKnight, 769 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1985); cert.
denied sub nom., All Souls Episcopal Church v.
FDIC, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986). Although the FDIC will
immediately honor uncollected checks through the
payment of deposit insurance and the issuance of
receivership certificates, if a check is ultimately
uncollectible, the ledger balance of the depositor
will be adjusted accordingly, and the FDIC will seek
reimbursement from the depositor and adjust the
depositor’s receivership claim (if any) as necessary.
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11 The
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Where funds are swept internally to
an investment vehicle at the failed
institution, the FDIC will recognize the
transfer, pursuant to the account
agreement, in determining the end-ofday ledger balance for deposit insurance
and depositor preference purposes. This
approach is consistent with the
principle articulated in the interim rule
that the FDIC will treat deposits and
other liabilities of the failed institution
on the date of failure based on the
ownership and the nature of the
underlying obligations as reflected in
the end-of-day ledger balance. The
completion of prearranged internal
sweep transactions in the calculation of
end-of-day deposit and other balances
for insurance proposes also is consistent
with how such funds currently are
reported on Call and Thrift Financial
Reports and are treated for assessment
purposes.
Eurodollar and IBF accounts are two
examples of internal sweep investment
vehicles. Accounts that include a
Eurodollar or IBF sweep arrangement
typically begin each business day with
balances only in a domestic deposit
account. At the end of the business day,
the customer’s end-of-day ledger
balance is reported as a Eurodollar
account (typically associated with the
bank’s branch in the Cayman Islands or
Bahamas) or an IBF account. At the start
of the next business day, the depository
institution will report the balance as
being back in the domestic deposit
account. The cycle typically repeats
itself daily.
Usually the underlying contract for a
Eurodollar sweep specifies that the
obligation at the foreign branch is not
payable in the United States and, hence,
is not a deposit,12 for deposit insurance
and depositor preference purposes.
Upon an institution’s failure, amounts
in a Eurodollar account in a foreign
branch of the failed institution are
treated as unsecured, non-deposit
liabilities and are not eligible for
insurance or depositor preference status.
The same treatment will apply to
sweeps to IBFs, which by statutory
definition are not deposits. Eurodollar
12 The definition of ‘‘deposit’’ in the FDI Act
expressly excludes: ‘‘Any obligation of a depository
institution which is carried on the books and
records of an office of such bank or savings
association located outside of any State, unless (i)
such obligation would be a deposit if it were carried
on the books and records of the depository
institution, and would be payable at an office
located in any State; and (ii) the contract evidencing
the obligation provides by express terms, and not
by implication, for payment at an office of the
depository institution located in any State.’’ 12
U.S.C. 1813(l)(5)(A). Also, the FDI Act defines IBF
obligations as non-deposits, which are not eligible
for deposit insurance or deposit preference status.
12 U.S.C. 1813(l)(5)(B).
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and IBF accountholders will thus be
accorded general creditor status in the
receivership estate.
It is important for customers to be
aware that whether an account has
deposit status—versus general creditor
status—can be far more important for
large depositors than the question of
whether the account is fully insured. To
illustrate, assume that $5.1 million is
swept from a customer’s checking
account into a Eurodollar account.
Further, assume that the failed
institution’s assets would be worth
approximately eighty percent of its total
deposit liabilities. In this illustration, if
the funds had remained deposits the
customer would have received
approximately $4.1 million ($100,000 in
deposit insurance plus an eighty percent
dividend on the uninsured portion of
the deposit), thus losing $1 million.
However, since Eurodollar accounts are
not deposits for purposes of either FDIC
insurance or depositor preference, in
this situation the customer would lose
the entire $5.1 million upon the
institution’s failure.
Institutions do not pay deposit
insurance assessments on liabilities
denominated, as of an institution’s endof-day ledger balance, as foreign
deposits or IBF deposits. Some of the
commenters who addressed sweep
account issues raised in the proposed
rule acknowledged that sweep products
(particularly those involving the transfer
of funds from deposit accounts to nonU.S. deposits, securities repos, fed funds
and money market mutual funds) result
in obligations of the insured institution
that would not be eligible for insurance
and do not have deposit preference
status. One commenter stated that,
‘‘[m]ost of these products are designed
for and used by corporate and
institutional customers who are
sophisticated enough to understand the
business terms,’’ thus suggesting that
such customers are aware of the
potential consequences in the event of
failure of the institution.
Under the interim rule, the sweep to
an IBF (for example, as described in the
Adagio decision) will be completed for
that day by the receiver on the day of
failure and the account holders, who
hold end-of-day ledger IBF accounts
after the sweep, will be deemed to be
general creditors of the receivership,
rather than depositors, under the
deposit preference statute.13
13 Rights are fixed as reflected in the depository
institution’s end-of-day ledger balances. Those
rights would not be changed if, for example, it was
impractical to reprogram the bank’s computers
before a liability swept to a foreign branch of an
insured institution as of the day of the institution’s
failure and was treated by the computer as having
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Repo sweep arrangements are another
example of sweep arrangements that are
generally conducted via internal
transfers on the institution’s books.
Repo sweeps can differ considerably in
documentation, actual execution, and
timing. The FDIC, to the extent
consistent with the principles
articulated in the interim rule, will carry
out repo sweeps in reaching end-of-day
ledger balances. If as of the end-of-day
ledger balance the repo sweep customer
is the legal owner of identified
securities subject to a repurchase
agreement, the FDIC will acknowledge
that ownership interest.
Based on industry information, as
reflected in some comment letters,
money market mutual fund sweeps may
be structured in a variety of ways. In
some cases the money market mutual
funds shares are held directly in the
name of the sweep account holder, but
in other cases the money market mutual
fund account is either in the name of the
depository institution or in the name of
the transfer agent for the mutual fund.
Shares are sold or allocated to the
individual sweep customer depending
on the particulars of the sweep
arrangement. Further, some money
market mutual fund sweep
arrangements result in a ‘‘same-day’’
purchase of fund shares while ‘‘nextday’’ sweeps delay the purchase of fund
shares by the customer until the day
following the investment decision.
Regardless of the internal mechanics
of the money market mutual fund sweep
arrangement, under the interim rule the
FDIC will treat funds swept in
connection with a money market mutual
fund sweep arrangement consistent with
the account where the funds are
reported as reflected in the end-of-day
ledger balances. The results of this
determination may be affected by
whether the sweep arrangement
contemplated the movement of funds
outside the institution. If an expected
transfer is not completed on the day of
failure due to the application of the
second principle discussed above (that
the receiver will stop the generation of
new deposit or other transactions which
might result in creating new liabilities
or extinguishing existing liabilities for
the depository institution or its
customers), the account holder’s rights
will be fixed based on where the funds
actually reside as of the end-of-day
ledger balance. As with the treatment of
other sweep products, this treatment is
consistent with the principle that the
FDIC will treat deposits and other
been swept back to a deposit account at a bridge
bank or assuming bank serving as the successor to
the failed institution.
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liabilities of the failed institution on the
date of failure based on the ownership
and the nature of the underlying
obligations as reflected in the end-ofday ledger balance.
Money market mutual fund sweeps
are the most prevalent case involving a
sweep investment vehicle designed to
move outside of the depository
institution, and have them come to rest
in a separate legal entity. Another
example is where funds are swept from
a deposit account at a depository
institution to an account or product at
an affiliate of the institution, even if the
transfer is accomplished through a
book-entry at the depository institution.
When the sweep investment vehicle
rests outside the depository institution,
under the interim rule the status of the
funds as of the institution’s day of
failure will depend on whether the
funds have been used to purchase the
sweep investment vehicle prior to the
FDIC Cutoff Point. For some sweep
arrangements the purchase may not be
completed for that day prior to the FDIC
Cutoff Point. For example, an institution
could have an arrangement to transfer
funds from a customer’s demand
deposit account into an account at an
affiliated depository institution, to be
conducted each day late in the evening.
In this case, under the interim rule if the
funds had not been transferred to the
sweep investment vehicle as of the FDIC
Cutoff Point, they still will be
considered to be a deposit for insurance
purposes. This treatment is in
furtherance of the FDIC’s obligation as
receiver to stop the generation of new
deposit or other transactions that might
result in creating new liabilities or
extinguishing existing liabilities for the
depository institution after the
institution has failed.
In some cases it will not be
practicable to stop automatically
generated sweeps from occurring after
the FDIC Cutoff Point, requiring the
necessary adjustments post closing.
Sweeps Alternative
Under the interim rule, the receiver
will establish the value and nature of
claims based on the end-of-day ledger
balance for each account. In the
proposed rule the FDIC asked whether
certain swept funds, if assessed
insurance premiums, also should be
eligible to be treated as deposits for
purposes of FDIC deposit insurance and
depositor preference. Based in part on
the comments received on this issue, the
FDIC has decided not to change current
practices.
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41177
VII. Request for Comments
The FDIC invites interested parties to
submit comments during a 60-day
comment period on all aspects of the
interim rule, including whether insured
depository institutions should be
required to disclose to sweep account
customers that swept funds will not be
treated as deposits if the institution
were to fail. More specifically,
comments are requested on § 360.8(e) of
the interim rule which, as indicated
above, is subject to an extended delayed
effective date:
In all sweep account contracts and account
statements reflecting sweep account
balances, institutions must prominently
disclose whether swept funds are deposits
within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. 1813(l). If
the funds are not deposits, the institution
must further disclose the status such funds
would have if the institution failed—for
example, general creditor status or secured
creditor status. Such disclosures must be
consistent with how the institution reports
such funds on its Call Reports or Thrift
Financial Reports.
As noted above, several commenters
stated that sweep customers generally
are aware of how the swept funds would
be treated in the event of failure. Over
the past year, FDIC staff held meetings
with groups of corporate treasurers to
discuss the potential implications of the
proposed rule. During these meetings,
corporate treasurers stated that many
institutions provided some disclosure to
sweep customers about the potential
consequences of these transactions.
However, it was evident those
disclosures did not result in a consistent
understanding of how these funds
would be treated in the event of failure.
This interim rule clearly states the
FDIC’s intent to use for claims purposes
end-of-day ledger balances as normally
reflected on the books and records of the
insured depository institution. Prior to
this end-of-day ledger balance
calculation, funds could have been
swept from a deposit account into a
sweep investment vehicle. The
movement of funds from a deposit
account into a sweep investment vehicle
not considered to be a deposit for
insurance purposes can have significant
implications for the sweep customers. In
the case of a Eurodollar sweep, for
example, the swept funds would have
general creditor standing with a
considerably higher loss exposure
relative to an uninsured deposit claim.
The FDIC is concerned that the
treatment of swept funds in the event of
failure is not clearly understood by
sweep customers. A better
understanding of this treatment by
sweep customers is important to avoid
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misconceptions which may arise in the
event of failure. While many institutions
currently provide some disclosures to
sweep customers, the FDIC believes the
significance of the consequences to
depositors of some sweep transactions
necessitates consistent disclosures by
institutions providing sweep services. In
this context, it is particularly important
for institutions to disclose to sweep
customers that the completion of some
sweep transactions may result in their
funds being subject to treatment as
general creditor claims.
In the Large Bank Modernization
Final Rule—the companion to this
interim rule—the FDIC discusses several
important objectives including: (1)
Providing liquidity to depositors, (2)
enhancement of market discipline, (3)
equity in the treatment of depositors of
insured institutions and (4) preservation
of franchise value in the event of failure.
These objectives can be undermined if
sweep customers do not have a clear
understanding of the treatment of swept
funds in the event of failure.
Specifically the FDIC is interested in
responses to the following questions:
• What disclosures are currently
being made in connection with sweep
account arrangements which allow the
sweep customer to ascertain the
treatment of such funds in the event of
failure?
• What form do these disclosures
take, when are they provided, and what
is their frequency?
• Are the disclosures consistent with
how such funds are reported on Call or
Thrift Financial Reports?
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VIII. Plain Language
Section 722 of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, Public Law 106–102, 113
Stat. 1338, 1471 (Nov. 12, 1999),
requires the Federal banking agencies to
use plain language in all proposed and
final rules published after January 1,
2000. No commenters suggested that the
proposed rule was unclear, and the
interim rule is substantively similar to
the proposed rule.
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act
OMB Number: New Collection.
Frequency of Response: On occasion.
Affected Public: Insured depository
institutions offering sweep account
products.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
1,170 to 1,970.
Estimated Time per Response: 25–49
hours per respondent.
Estimated Total Annual Burden:
28,870–84,400 hours.
Background/General Description of
Collection: The interim rule contains
collections of information pursuant to
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the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq.) (‘‘PRA’’). In particular, the
interim rule requires, subject to an
extended delayed effective date,
depository institutions offering sweep
products to disclose whether the swept
funds are deposits for insurance
purposes and, if not, how these funds
would be treated in the event of failure.
The collections of information
contained in this section of the interim
rule have been submitted to OMB for
review.
Estimated costs: Compliance with the
disclosure requirement will require
insured depository institutions offering
sweep products, which do not currently
provide adequate disclosures, to modify
their sweep account documentation,
including customer account statements,
to include new language indicating
whether swept funds are a deposit for
insurance purposes and, if not, how
such funds would be treated in the
event of failure. Further, additional
documentation may be provided to
sweep customers as part of a statement
mailing on a one-time basis.
Implementation cost will be mitigated
by the delayed effective date of this
requirement. Sweep account documents
must be reprinted periodically in any
case, and the cost of including the
disclosure requirement should be
minimal. Further, most insured
depository institutions already make
certain disclosures to customers, and
the new requirements would simply
replace these disclosures. After
implementation, on-going cost should
be negligible. Future printings of sweep
account documentation will have to be
conducted in any case to replenish
stock, and the disclosure requirement
should not add to the cost of such
printings given its brief nature.
Customer account statements would
continue to be provided according to
normal business practices. Further, staff
training must be conducted
periodically, and the disclosure
requirement should not materially add
to the length or complexity of this
training.
The exact number of insured
depository institutions offering sweep
products is unknown. It is the FDIC’s
experience that the vast majority of large
institutions offer some sweep
arrangement as part of their cash
management services. The prevalence of
sweep offerings among smaller
community banks is far less prevalent.
This analysis assumes that all insured
depository institutions with total assets
of at least $2 billion offer at least one
sweep product (370 institutions). It is
further assumed that between 10 and 20
percent of the remaining 8,000 insured
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institutions also offer a sweep product
(800 to 1,600 institutions). The total
number of respondents is estimated to
be between 1,170 and 1,970.
Implementation costs will vary based
on the size, nature and scope of the
depository institutions sweep programs.
It is estimated that compliance costs for
the very largest and super-regional
banking organizations are between
$25,000 and $50,000 while smaller
regional organizations were placed at
$10,000 to $20,000. Other large
organizations (those with at least $2
billion in total assets) were assigned a
cost estimate of $1,500 to $3,000. Costs
for community banks were estimated to
be between $1,000 and $2,000. Under
these assumptions, the overall
disclosure costs are estimated to be
between $1.73 million and $3.46
million at the lower end of the number
of institutions believed to be engaging in
sweep operations (1,170). If as many as
1,970 depository institutions maintain
sweep operations the total costs are
estimated to range between $2.53
million and $5.06 million.
Based on the above cost estimates the
number of hours needed to meet the
disclosure requirements per institution
is calculated as follows. $1.73 million ÷
1,170 institutions = $1,480 per
institution. Assuming an hourly cost of
$60 for employee time generates the
minimum time estimate of 25 hours per
institution. The upper range of the cost
estimate is $2,960 which is equivalent
to 49 hours ($3.46 million ÷ 1,170
institutions ÷ $60 hourly employee cost
= 49 hours). Total hours are estimated
at a minimum as: ($1.73 million ÷ $60
hourly employee cost = 28,870 hours)
and at the upper range as: ($5.06 million
÷ $60 hourly employee cost = 84,400
hours).
Comments: In addition to the
questions raised elsewhere in this
Preamble, comment is solicited on: (1)
Whether the collection of information is
necessary for the proper performance of
the functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility; (2) the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used; (3)
the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected; (4) ways to
minimize the burden of the collection of
information on those who are to
respond, including through the use of
appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms of
information technology; e.g., permitting
electronic submission of responses; and
(5) estimates of capital or start-up costs
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and costs of operation, maintenance,
and purchases of services to provide
information.
Addresses: Interested parties are
invited to submit written comments to
the FDIC concerning the Paperwork
Reduction Act implications of this
proposal. Such comments should refer
to ‘‘Processing of Deposit Accounts,
3064–AD26.’’ Comments may be
submitted by any of the following
methods:
• Agency Web Site: https://
www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/federal.
Follow instructions for submitting
comments on the Agency Web Site.
• E-mail: comments@FDIC.gov.
Include ‘‘Processing of Deposit
Accounts, 3064–AD26’’ in the subject
line of the message.
• Mail: Executive Secretary,
Attention: Comments, FDIC, 550 17th
St., NW., Room F–1066, Washington,
DC 20429.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: Comments
may be hand-delivered to the guard
station at the rear of the 550 17th Street
Building (located on F Street), on
business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
(EST).
• A copy of the comments may also
be submitted to the OMB desk officer for
the FDIC, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget, New
Executive Office Building, Room 3208,
Washington, DC 20503.
Public Inspection: All comments
received will be posted without change
to https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal including any personal
information provided. In accordance
with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) the FDIC may not
conduct or sponsor, and a person is not
required to respond to, a collection of
information unless it displays a
currently valid Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) control number.
X. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act
(‘‘RFA’’) requires a federal agency
publishing a notice of proposed
rulemaking to prepare and make
available for public comment an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis that
describes the impact of the proposed
rule on small entities. 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
As defined in regulations issued by the
Small Business Administration (13 CFR
121.201), a ‘‘small entity’’ includes a
bank holding company, commercial
bank or savings association with assets
of $165 million or less (collectively,
small banking organizations). The RFA
provides that an agency is not required
to prepare and publish a regulatory
flexibility analysis if the agency certifies
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that the proposed rule would not have
a significant impact on a substantial
number of small entities. 5 U.S.C.
605(b).
In publishing the proposed rule the
FDIC certified that the proposed rule
would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The rationale for this
certification was that the proposed rule
would establish the FDIC’s practice for
determining deposit account balances at
a failed insured depository institution
and would impose no requirements on
insured depository institutions.
The interim rule imposes a disclosure
requirement on all insured depository
institutions offering one or more sweep
account products. This requirement is
subject to an extended delayed effective
date to allow the FDIC to consider
specific comments on the disclosure
requirement before insured depository
institutions must comply with it.
Preliminarily, the FDIC believes the
disclosure requirement in the interim
rule will not have a substantial impact
on a substantial number of small
banking organizations, mainly because
such entities are much less likely than
larger insured depository institutions to
offer sweep-account products. Such
products are typically offered by
insured depository institutions serving
large commercial and institutional
customers. The FDIC welcomes
comments on whether and, if so, to
what extent small banking organizations
will be affected by the disclosure
requirement in the interim rule.
XI. The Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act,
1999—Assessment of Federal
Regulations and Policies on Families
The FDIC has determined that the
interim rule will not affect family wellbeing within the meaning of section 654
of the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act,
enacted as part of the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1999 (Pub. L. 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681).
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 360
Banks, Banking, Savings associations.
For the reasons stated above, the
Board of Directors of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation hereby
amends part 360 of title 12 of the Code
of Federal Regulations as follows:
I
PART 360—RESOLUTION AND
RECEIVERSHIP RULES
1. The authority citation for part 360
continues to read as follows:
I
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41179
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1819(a) Tenth,
1821(d)(1), 1821(d)(10)(c), 1821(d)(11),
1821(e)(1), 1821(e)(8)(D)(i), 1823(c)(4),
1823(e)(2); Sec. 401(h), Pub. L. 101–73, 103
Stat. 357.
I
2. Add new § 360.8 to read as follows:
§ 360.8. Method for determining deposit
and other liability account balances at a
failed insured depository institution.
(a) Purpose. The purpose of this
section is to describe the process the
FDIC will use to determine deposit and
other liability account balances for
insurance coverage and receivership
purposes at a failed insured depository
institution.
(b) Definitions.—(1) The FDIC cutoff
point means the point in time
established by the FDIC after it has been
appointed receiver of a failed insured
depository institution and takes control
of the failed institution.
(2) The applicable cutoff time for a
specific type of deposit account
transaction means the earlier of either
the failed institution’s normal cutoff
time for that specific type of transaction
or the FDIC cutoff point.
(3) Close-of-business account balance
means the closing end-of-day ledger
balance of a deposit or other liability
account on the day of failure of an
insured depository institution
determined by using the applicable
cutoff times. This balance may be
adjusted to reflect steps taken by the
receiver to ensure that funds are not
received by or removed from the
institution after the FDIC cutoff point.
(c) Principles.—(1) In making deposit
insurance determinations and in
determining the value and nature of
claims against the receivership on the
institution’s date of failure the FDIC, as
insurer and receiver, will treat deposits
and other liabilities of the failed
institution according to the ownership
and nature of the underlying obligations
based on end-of-day ledger balances for
each account using, except as expressly
provided otherwise in this section, the
depository institution’s normal posting
procedures.
(2) In its role as receiver of a failed
insured depository institution, in order
to ensure the proper distribution of the
failed institution’s assets under the FDI
Act (12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(11)) as of the
FDIC Cutoff Point, the FDIC will use its
best efforts to take all steps necessary to
stop the generation, via transactions or
transfers coming from or going outside
the institution, of new liabilities or
extinguishing existing liabilities for the
depository institution.
(3) End-of-day ledger balances are
subject to corrections for posted
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transactions that are inconsistent with
the above principles.
(d) Determining closing day
balances.—(1) In determining account
balances for insurance coverage and
receivership purposes at a failed insured
depository institution, the FDIC will use
close-of-business account balances as
may be adjusted for funds that are
received by or removed from the
institution after the FDIC cutoff point.
(2) A check posted to the close-ofbusiness account balance but not
collected by the depository institution
will be included as part of the balance,
subject to the correction of errors and
omissions and adjustments for
uncollectible items that the FDIC may
make in its role as receiver of the failed
depository institution.
(3) In determining close-of-business
account balances, the FDIC will
recognize contractual, automated
transfers (or sweeps) of funds from a
deposit account to a non-deposit
account or investment vehicle at the
institution scheduled to take place
before the final calculation of the
institution’s end-of-day ledger balances
for that day.
(4) For deposit insurance and
receivership purposes in connection
with the failure of an insured depository
institution, a depositor’s and other
liability-holder’s rights will be
determined as of the point the close-ofbusiness account balance is calculated.
These rights may be adjusted as
necessary to account for funds that are
received by or removed from the
institution after the FDIC cutoff point.
(e) Effective July 1, 2009, in all sweep
account contracts and account
statements reflecting sweep account
balances, institutions must prominently
disclose whether swept funds are
deposits within the meaning of 12
U.S.C. 1813(l). If the funds are not
deposits, the institution must further
disclose the status such funds would
have if the institution failed—for
example, general creditor status or
secured creditor status. Such
disclosures must be consistent with how
the institution reports such funds on its
Call Reports or Thrift Financial Reports.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Dated at Washington, DC, this 17th day of
June, 2008.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8–15493 Filed 7–16–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6714–01–P
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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 360
RIN 3064–AD26
Large-Bank Deposit Insurance
Determination Modernization
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (‘‘FDIC’’).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The FDIC is adopting a final
rule requiring the largest insured
depository institutions to adopt
mechanisms that would, in the event of
the institution’s failure: provide the
FDIC with standard deposit account and
other customer information; and allow
the placement and release of holds on
liability accounts, including deposits.
The final rule applies only to insured
depository institutions having at least
$2 billion in domestic deposits and
either: more than 250,000 deposit
accounts (currently estimated to be 152
institutions); or total assets over $20
billion, regardless of the number of
deposit accounts (currently estimated to
be 7 institutions).
The FDIC is adopting the final rule
concurrently with its adoption of an
interim rule establishing practices for
determining deposit and other liability
account balances at a failed insured
depository institution. With exceptions
indicated in the final rule, institutions
subject to this final rule will have
eighteen months from the effective date
of the final rule to implement its
requirements.
EFFECTIVE DATE:
August 18, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
James Marino, Project Manager, Division
of Resolutions and Receiverships, (202)
898–7151 or jmarino@fdic.gov, Joseph
A. DiNuzzo, Counsel, Legal Division,
(202) 898–7349 or jdinuzzo@fdic.gov; or
Christopher L. Hencke, Counsel, Legal
Division, (202) 898–8839 or
chencke@fdic.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
The final rule requires the largest
insured depository institutions to adopt
mechanisms that would, in the event of
the institution’s failure: (1) Provide the
FDIC with standard deposit account and
other customer information; and (2)
allow the placement and release of
holds on liability accounts, including
deposits. These requirements were
addressed in two advance notices of
proposed rulemaking issued in 2005
and 2006, respectively the ‘‘2005
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
ANPR’’ and the ‘‘2006 ANPR’’.1 Also, in
January of this year the FDIC published
a proposed rule composed of two parts,
addressing in part two the issues
involved in the final rule and
addressing in part one issues involving
the FDIC’s practices for determining
deposit and other liability account
balances at a failed insured depository
institution (‘‘proposed rule’’).2
The FDIC received twenty-one
comments on the proposed rule. (The
comment letters may be viewed on the
FDIC’s Web site at https://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/2008/
08comAD26.html.)
Based in part on those comments, the
FDIC has decided to finalize the
proposed rule by issuing two separate
rulemakings—(1) the final rule, covering
part two of the proposed rule and (2) a
separate interim rule, covering part one
of the proposed rule (‘‘Interim Rule on
Processing Deposit Accounts’’).
Throughout the preamble the terms
‘‘deposit’’ (or ‘‘domestic deposit’’),
‘‘foreign deposit’’ and ‘‘international
banking facility deposit’’ identify
liabilities having different meanings for
deposit insurance purposes. A
‘‘deposit’’ is used as defined in section
3(l) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(12 U.S.C. 1813(l)) (‘‘Section 3(l)’’). A
deposit includes only deposit liabilities
payable in the United States, typically
those deposits maintained in a domestic
office of an insured depository
institution. Only deposits meeting these
criteria are eligible for insurance
coverage. Insured depository
institutions may maintain deposit
liabilities in a foreign branch (‘‘foreign
deposits’’), but these liabilities are not
deposits in the statutory sense (for
insurance or depositor preference
purposes) for the time that they are
payable solely at a foreign branch or
branches. Insured depository
institutions also may maintain liabilities
in an international banking facility
(IBF). An ‘‘international banking facility
deposit,’’ as defined by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System in Regulation D (12 CFR
204.8(a)(2)), also is excluded from the
definition of ‘‘deposit’’ in Section 3(l)
and the depositor preference statute (12
U.S.C. 1821(d)(11)).
The FDIC anticipates questions
regarding implementation of the
functionality required by this rule.
Questions and requests for telephonic
meetings may be submitted via e-mail to
depositclaims@fdic.gov.
1 70 FR 73652 (Dec. 13, 2005) and 71 FR 74857
(Dec. 13, 2006).
2 73 FR 2364 (January 14, 2008).
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 138 (Thursday, July 17, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 41170-41180]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-15493]
[[Page 41169]]
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Part II
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
12 CFR Part 360
Processing of Deposit Accounts in the Event of an Insured Depository
Institution Failure; Large Bank Deposit Insurance Determination
Modernization; Interim and Final Rules
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 138 / Thursday, July 17, 2008 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 41170]]
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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 360
RIN 3064-AD26
Processing of Deposit Accounts in the Event of an Insured
Depository Institution Failure
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Interim rule with request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FDIC is adopting an interim rule establishing the FDIC's
practices for determining deposit and other liability account balances
at a failed insured depository institution. Except as noted, the FDIC
practices defined in the interim rule represent a continuation of long-
standing FDIC procedures in processing such balances at a failed
depository institution. The FDIC is adopting the interim rule
concurrently with its adoption of a related final rule requiring the
largest insured depository institutions to adopt mechanisms that would,
in the event of the institution's failure: Provide the FDIC with
standard deposit account and other customer information; and allow the
placement and release of holds on liability accounts, including
deposits. This interim rule applies to all insured depository
institutions.
DATES: This interim rule is effective August 18, 2008, except for Sec.
360.8(e), which will be effective July 1, 2009. Written comments must
be received by the FDIC on or before September 15, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
Agency Web Site: https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal. Follow instructions for submitting comments on the Agency Web
Site.
E-mail: Comments@FDIC.gov. Include ``Processing of Deposit
Accounts'' in the subject line of the message.
Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention:
Comments, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20429.
Hand Delivery/Courier: Guard station at the rear of the
550 17th Street Building (located on F Street) on business days between
7 a.m. and 5 p.m. (EST).
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Public Inspection: All comments received will be posted without
change to https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal including any
personal information provided. Comments may be inspected and
photocopied in the FDIC Public Information Center, 3501 North Fairfax
Drive, Room E-1002, Arlington, VA 22226, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.
(EST) on business days. Paper copies of public comments may be ordered
from the Public Information Center by telephone at (877) 275-3342 or
(703) 562-2200.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Marino, Project Manager,
Division of Resolutions and Receiverships, (202) 898-7151 or
jmarino@fdic.gov; Joseph A. DiNuzzo, Counsel, Legal Division, (202)
898-7349 or jdinuzzo@fdic.gov; or Christopher L. Hencke, Counsel, Legal
Division, (202) 898-8839 or chencke@fdic.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
In January of this year the FDIC published a proposed rule composed
of two parts (``proposed rule'').\1\ The first part proposed FDIC
practices for determining deposit and other liability account balances
at a failed insured depository institution. The second part proposed
requirements for the largest insured depository institutions to adopt
mechanisms that would, in the event of the institution's failure: (1)
Provide the FDIC with standard deposit account and other customer
information; and (2) allow the placement and release of holds on
liability accounts, including deposits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 73 FR 2364 (Jan. 14, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The comment period for the proposed rule ended on April 14, 2008.
The FDIC received twenty-one comment letters, all of which may be
viewed on the FDIC's Web site at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/2008/08comAD26.html.
Based in part on the comments received on the proposed rule, the
FDIC has decided to finalize the proposed rule by issuing two separate
rulemakings--(1) the interim rule, covering part one of the proposed
rule and (2) a separate final rule, covering part two of the proposed
rule (``Large Bank Modernization Final Rule'').
Throughout this preamble the terms ``deposit'' (or ``domestic
deposit''), ``foreign deposit'' and ``international banking facility
deposit'' identify liabilities having different meanings for deposit
insurance purposes. A ``deposit'' is used as defined in section 3(l) of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(l)) (``Section
3(l)''). A deposit includes only deposit liabilities payable in the
United States, typically those deposits maintained in a domestic office
of an insured depository institution. Only deposits meeting these
criteria are eligible for insurance coverage. Insured depository
institutions may maintain deposit liabilities in a foreign branch
(``foreign deposits''), but these liabilities are not deposits in the
statutory sense (for insurance or depositor preference purposes) for
the time that they are payable solely at a foreign branch or branches.
Insured depository institutions also may maintain liabilities in an
international banking facility (``IBF''). An ``international banking
facility deposit,'' as defined by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System in Regulation D (12 CFR 204.8(a)(2)), also is excluded
from the definition of ``deposit'' in Section 3(l) and the depositor
preference statute (12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(11)).
II. Background
Upon the failure of an FDIC-insured depository institution, the
FDIC must determine the total insured amount for each depositor. 12
U.S.C. 1821(f). To make this determination, the FDIC must ascertain the
balances of all deposit accounts owned by the same depositor in the
same ownership capacity at a failed institution as of the day of
failure.
The Large Bank Modernization Final Rule, among other things,
requires certain large depository institutions to adopt mechanisms that
will allow the FDIC, as receiver, to place holds on liability accounts,
including deposits, in the event of failure. The amount held would vary
depending on the account balance, the nature of the liability (whether
or not it is a deposit for insurance purposes) and the expected losses
resulting from the failure. In order to calculate these hold amounts,
the rules used by the FDIC to determine account balances as of the day
of failure must be clearly established.
A deposit account balance can be affected by transactions \2\
presented during the day. A customer, a third party or the depository
institution can initiate a deposit account transaction. All depository
institutions process and post these deposit account transactions
according to a predetermined set of rules to determine whether to
include a deposit account transaction either in that day's end-of-day
ledger balances or in a subsequent day's balances. These rules
establish cutoff times that vary by institution and by type of deposit
account transaction--for example, check
[[Page 41171]]
clearing, Fedwire, ATM, and teller transactions. Institutions post
transactions initiated before the respective cutoff time as part of
that day's business and generally post transactions initiated after the
cutoff time the following business day. Further, institutions
automatically execute prearranged ``sweep'' instructions affecting
deposit and other liability balances at various points throughout the
day. The cutoff rules for posting deposit account transactions and the
prearranged automated instructions define the end-of-day balance for
each deposit account on any given business day.\3\
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\2\ A deposit account transaction, such as deposits,
withdrawals, transfers and payments, causes funds to be debited from
or credited to the account.
\3\ Some depository institutions operate ``real-time'' deposit
systems in which some deposit account transactions are posted
throughout the business day. Most depository institutions, however,
process at least some deposit account transactions in a ``batch
mode,'' where deposit account transactions presented before the
cutoff time are posted that evening or in the early morning hours of
the following day. With either system--batch or real-time--the
institution calculates a close-of-business deposit balance for each
deposit account on each business day.
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In the past, the FDIC usually took over an institution as receiver
after it had closed on a Friday. For institutions with a few branches
in one state, deposit account transactions for the day were completed
and determining account balances on that day was relatively
straightforward. The growth of interstate banking and branching over
the past two decades and the increasing complexity of bank products and
practices (such as sweep accounts) has made the determination of end-
of-day account balances on the day of closing much more complicated.
III. The Proposed Rule
Overview
The proposed rule defined the deposit account balance used for
deposit insurance determination purposes as the end-of-day ledger
balance of the deposit account on the day of failure. Except as noted,
the FDIC would use the cutoff times previously applied by the failed
insured depository institution in establishing the end-of-day ledger
balance for deposit insurance determination purposes. The use of end-
of-day ledger balances and the institution's normal cutoff times for
insurance determination purposes continues long-standing FDIC
procedures in processing such balances at a failed depository
institution. Whether a deposit account transaction would be included in
the end-of-day ledger balance on the day of failure would depend
generally upon how it normally would be treated using the institution's
ordinary cutoff time on that day. Many institutions have different
cutoff times for different kinds of transactions, such as check
clearing, Fedwire, ATM and teller transactions.
The FDIC proposed establishing an FDIC Cutoff Point, defined as a
point in time after it takes control of the failed institution as
receiver, to allow the FDIC to make a final determination of the ledger
balances of the deposit accounts if the institution's normal cutoff
times for the accounts would impair the efficient winding up of the
institution. If the institution's ordinary cutoff time on the day of
failure for any particular kind of transaction preceded the FDIC Cutoff
Point, the institution's ordinary cutoff time would be used. Otherwise,
the institution's ordinary cutoff time for an individual kind of
transaction would be replaced by the FDIC Cutoff Point. The
``Applicable Cutoff Time'' used for any kind of transaction thus would
be the earlier of the institution's ordinary cutoff time or the FDIC
Cutoff Point. In practice, there might be several Applicable Cutoff
Times for a given failed institution, since different kinds of
transactions could have different cutoff times. No Applicable Cutoff
Time would be later than the FDIC Cutoff Point established by the FDIC,
though some could be earlier.
Under the proposed rule, transactions occurring after the
Applicable Cutoff Time would have been posted to the next day's
business, if the operations of the failed institution were carried on
by a successor institution. In a depository institution failure where
deposit operations were not continued by a successor institution,
account transactions on the day of failure would have been posted to
the applicable deposit accounts until the FDIC Cutoff Point. This
practice would have been consistent with the FDIC's current practice in
handling deposit account transactions in deposit insurance payout
situations.\4\
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\4\ This is when the FDIC handles the resolution of a failed
depository institution by making payments to insured depositors.
More commonly, the FDIC handles a failed institution by arranging a
purchase-and-assumption transaction with a healthy depository
institution. In those cases, insured depositors' funds are
transferred to the assuming institution and available at that
institution to depositors.
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Upon taking control of a failed institution as receiver, as
proposed, the FDIC would take steps necessary to limit additional
transactions to ensure, to the extent practicable, that funds would not
be received by or removed from the failed institution. These steps
might include the suspension of wire activities and new deposit account
transactions. For example, wire transactions not yet executed by the
FDIC Cutoff Point would not be allowed to occur on the day of closing.
For a failed institution operating in several time zones, the FDIC
Cutoff Point, which would have set the latest possible time for any
particular transaction's Applicable Cutoff Time, would have been
translated into local time. For example, a 6 p.m. Eastern Time FDIC
Cutoff Point on the day an institution was closed would have meant a 5
p.m. FDIC Cutoff Point in the Central Time zone. As receiver, the FDIC
would have attempted, as it has customarily done in the past, to close
all offices of the failed institution as soon as practicable after
taking over as receiver.
Treatment of Uncollected Deposited Checks
Under the proposed rule, in determining end-of-day deposit account
balances at a failed insured depository institution, the FDIC would
have deemed all checks deposited into and posted to a deposit account
by the Applicable Cutoff Time as part of the end-of-day deposit account
balance for insurance purposes. This approach means that the FDIC would
have used the end-of-day ledger balance of the account for purposes of
its deposit insurance determination, in contrast to using either end-
of-day available or collected funds balances. The proposed rule
differed from the FDIC's practices in an important way. In the past,
for a check that was posted to an account but not yet collected at the
time of failure--including a check already forwarded by the failed
institution for collection but not yet collected--the FDIC acted as
agent for the depositor and remitted or credited payments received on
these checks to the depositor in full. These checks were not included
in deposits on the day of failure for insurance purposes and were not
subject to deposit insurance limits.\5\ In contrast, under the proposed
rule, when a check is posted to an account at the failed institution by
the Applicable Cutoff Time, the check would have been included in the
end-of-day balance and would have been subject to deposit insurance
limits, even if uncollected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ FDIC Adv. Op. 95-2 (Jan. 23, 1995).
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Prearranged Instructions To ``Sweep'' Funds
The proposed rule attempted to distinguish between internal and
external sweep accounts. Internal sweep arrangements--such as those
applying
[[Page 41172]]
to zero balance accounts \6\ or where the investment vehicle is a
deposit in a foreign branch of the institution or its international
banking facility--were characterized as arrangements that sweep funds
only within the institution itself by accounting or bookkeeping
entries. External sweep arrangements--such as those connected to
investments in money market mutual funds--were characterized as
arrangements that move funds (usually by wire transfer) outside the
institution and, hence, off its books altogether.
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\6\ In the case of a zero balance account ordinarily a customer
has a master account tied to one or more subsidiary accounts. The
institution's agreement with the customer calls for the subsidiary
account to have a zero balance at the end of each day. For example,
if funds need to be transferred from the master account to cover
checks presented against the subsidiary account, this will be done
during the nightly processing cycle. Alternatively, if there are
excess funds in the subsidiary account they will be transferred to
the master account prior to the end of the day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the proposed rule, any automated internal sweep transaction
from one account at the failed institution to another account at the
failed institution would have been completed on the day of failure. The
FDIC as receiver, in effect, would have recognized the transfer,
pursuant to the account agreement, in determining the end-of-day
balance for deposit insurance and depositor preference purposes. Under
the proposed rule the FDIC as receiver would not, however, complete an
external sweep--a sweep in which funds leave the institution and
another entity assumes liability to the customer--if funds have not
already left the failed institution by the FDIC Cutoff Point. An
external sweep included, for example, an account where funds are swept
from a deposit account at the institution and wired to a third party
money market mutual fund every day. External sweeps also would have
included an arrangement where funds are swept from a deposit account at
a depository institution to an account or product at an affiliate of
the institution, even if the transfer is accomplished through a book-
entry at the depository institution. In some cases it would not be
practicable to stop an external sweep from occurring after the FDIC
general cutoff time. In these cases the FDIC proposed using the pre-
sweep deposit balance for insurance purposes.
The proposed rule would have applied differently to sweep accounts
involving the transfer of funds outside the depository institution. In
those situations, the status of the funds as of the institution's day
of failure would depend on whether the funds left the institution (via
wire transfer or otherwise) before the FDIC Cutoff Point. Where funds
subject to a prearranged, automated external sweep have been
temporarily transferred to an intermediate deposit account (or omnibus
account) at the failed institution awaiting transfer to an external
source, but have not actually been transferred to the external source
(for example, the mutual fund) by the FDIC Cutoff Point, those funds
would still have been considered part of the customer's deposit account
balance for deposit insurance and receivership purposes.
The completion of prearranged internal sweep transactions results
in the calculation of end-of-day deposit balances for insurance
proposes consistent with how such funds currently are reported on Call
and Thrift Financial Reports and are treated for assessment purposes.
As detailed in the proposed rule, the need for the FDIC to clarify the
treatment of internal sweep arrangements was motivated, in part, by the
decision in Adagio Investment Holding Ltd. v. FDIC, 338 F. Supp. 2d 71
(D.D.C. 2004) (``Adagio'').
In that case the FDIC had been appointed receiver of the failed
Connecticut Bank of Commerce. On the night of the bank's failure, in
accordance with its customary practice, the FDIC ``completed the day's
business'' which involved processing pending transactions, including
approximately $20.2 million which had been authorized to be swept from
a demand deposit account in the bank to an account in the bank's IBF.
Because an IBF account is not a deposit for purposes of section 3(l) of
the FDI Act, the FDIC issued the holders of the IBF accounts
receivership certificates as general creditors rather than according
them priority status as depositors (pursuant to the national deposit
preference statute, described below). The creditors, claiming that the
receiver did not have authority to permit the sweeps, sued the FDIC. In
the Adagio case, the court concluded that the sweep should not have
been performed in light of the lack of ``any provision in either the
statute or regulations that would permit the sweep that occurred. * *
*'' 338 F. Supp. 2d at 81.
Post-Closing Adjustments
Under the proposed rule, the FDIC, as receiver, would have been
able to correct errors and omissions after the day of failure and
reflect them in the day-of-closing deposit account balances.
No New Requirements Would Have Been Imposed on Open and Operating
Institutions
The proposed rule would not have required insured institutions to
have in place computer systems capable of applying the FDIC Cutoff
Point to determine deposit account balances upon an institution's day
of failure. The FDIC, however, requested comments on whether such a
requirement should be imposed for either all institutions or,
alternatively, for ``Covered Institutions''--defined in the second part
of the proposed rule as institutions having at least $2 billion in
domestic deposits and either: More than 250,000 deposit accounts; or
total assets over $20 billion, regardless of the number of deposit
accounts.
Repo Sweep Arrangements
The preamble to the proposed rule noted that some repurchase sweep
agreements provide for an actual sale of securities by the depository
institution to a customer (followed by the institution's repurchase of
the securities from the customer). Accordingly, when the customer uses
funds in a deposit account to make the purchase, the bank's deposit
liability to the customer is extinguished. There may be other so-called
repurchase agreements that do not provide for the actual sale and
repurchase of securities, but simply provide for the transfer of the
customer's claim from a deposit account at the depository institution
to another liability account, collateralized by either specific
securities or a pool of securities, at the same institution. In the
proposed rule, the FDIC posed the following questions:
Do some or all repurchase arrangements as actually
executed: (1) Pass title to the customer in a transaction that is
enforceable against the FDIC? or (2) create perfected security
interests that are enforceable against the FDIC?
Does the nature of some or all repurchase sweep
arrangements satisfy the definition of ``deposit'' in section 3(l) of
the FDI Act?
What arguments may be made that repurchase arrangements in
which the institution collateralizes its liability are permissible,
given restrictions on collateralizing private deposits? See Texas &
Pacific Railway Company v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245 (1934).
Sweeps Alternative
Under the proposed rule, funds subject to an internal sweep that is
to take place before end-of-day balances are calculated would not be
accorded
[[Page 41173]]
treatment as deposits if they were to be swept, within the depository
institution, by prearrangement, before the institution's end-of-day
balances are determined, from a deposit to a liability not recognized
as a deposit for insurance purposes. The discussion noted that under
such an arrangement, no deposit insurance premiums would have been
assessed against these funds since they would not have been reported as
deposits by the institution. The FDIC asked whether, if the swept funds
in such arrangements were to be assessed insurance premiums, they also
should be eligible to be treated as deposits for purposes of FDIC
deposit insurance and depositor preference. The FDIC also asked whether
or to what extent such an option would involve any operational or
regulatory burden or other adverse regulatory consequences.
IV. Comments on the Proposed Rule
As noted, the FDIC received twenty-one comments on the proposed
rule, the bulk of which addressed both parts of the proposed rule. Four
of the comments were from banking industry trade associations
(including one joint letter), two from bank regulatory authorities, ten
from large insured depository institutions, one from a law firm
representing broker-dealers who place brokered funds in insured
depository institutions, one from a member-owned electronic funds
transfer network and three from individuals. The following is a summary
of the comments we received on part one of the proposed rule--
determining deposit and other liability account balances at a failed
insured depository institution.
Use of End-of-Day Ledger Balances
All of the bank trade association commenters and many of the large-
bank commenters agreed with the FDIC's proposal to define the deposit
account balance on the day of failure as the end-of-day ledger balance.
Further, these commenters stated that, upon an institution's failure,
the FDIC should use the end-of-day ledger balances normally calculated
by the institution; thus, such balances should not be affected by the
FDIC Cutoff Point.
FDIC Cutoff Point
The bank trade associations and large-bank commenters opposed the
use of an FDIC Cutoff Point, proposing alternatively that the FDIC
should always use the cutoff times normally established by the insured
depository institution. They argued that introducing a new cutoff
scheme would be unfair to customers. Many commenters expressed a belief
that FDIC practices should not impinge upon the contractual
arrangements or other understandings established between the insured
depository institution and its customers. Further, it was argued that
altering the customer's understanding of how deposit transactions will
be posted would create uncertainty and may result in depositor flight.
Additionally, the implementation of an FDIC Cutoff Point was
largely viewed as technically infeasible. It was noted that deposit
systems are preprogrammed to implement cutoff times as established by
the policies of the particular insured depository institution. Adapting
these systems to accommodate an FDIC Cutoff Point would be costly,
especially since the FDIC Cutoff Point would not be known until the day
of failure.
Treatment of Sweep Account Arrangements
In general. Commenters supported at a very general level the
establishment of a regulation intended to resolve the legal confusion
brought about by the decision in Adagio. Commenters recommended that
the FDIC limit any regulation to addressing only the legal confusion
raised in Adagio. One banking trade group suggested this could be done
by language to ``explicitly provide that all automated sweep
arrangements that are codified in contract will be recognized as part
of the day's business and reflected in end-of-day ledger balances,
regardless of when the transactions are processed.'' Another banking
trade association noted its ``greatest concerns relate to the FDIC's
extensive new proposals relating to the treatment of sweep products.
Sweep transactions have been an extensively used business practice for
decades, enabling banks to secure substantial funding at reasonable
costs and their customers to achieve their financial objectives. Any
proposal that disrupts the existing treatment and expectations of
institutions and their customers vis-[agrave]-vis sweeps would
potentially impair the viability of sweeps with very serious and
unpredictable consequences.''
Generally, commenters felt the FDIC should delay a final rule that
would go beyond narrowly addressing the Adagio concerns. One large bank
stated ``the issues raised and the potential impact to financial
markets that could result from these proposals are very substantial.
All of the proposals relating to sweeps warrant further study and
consideration by the FDIC and should be removed from this rulemaking
and should not be part of any final rule. The FDIC should consult
further with other banking and financial regulatory agencies and with
financial institutions that are key players in this market before
finalizing a rule on sweeps.'' This commenter further stated ``the
proposed regulation could have major ripple effects on other laws and
regulations that ultimately rely upon the same legal definitions of a
deposit as the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, including Regulation D,
Regulation Q, deposit insurance assessments and the nationwide 10%
deposit cap.''
Repo sweep arrangements. The FDIC's questions regarding the nature
of funds swept through arrangements identified as repurchase agreement
sweeps generally were not addressed, other than through the overall
comment that the FDIC should only narrowly address Adagio in any final
rule. One large bank stated that it ``believes the current sweep
structures commonly used in the industry (including the structures of
securities repos) are appropriately characterized as not being deposits
under the FDIA. [The bank] further believes that any proposal to charge
FDIC insurance premiums on the amounts swept would dramatically
increase costs to banks relating to that product and could result in
the product no longer being economically viable or able to be offered
on terms that are competitive with other products offered by non-bank
market participants.''
Sweeps alternative. In the proposed rule, the FDIC asked whether,
if the funds involved in certain sweep arrangements were to be assessed
insurance premiums, they also should be eligible to be treated as
deposits for purposes of FDIC deposit insurance and depositor
preference. No commenters addressed this question directly, although
the tenor of the comments from the large banks and bank trade
associations was that issues such as this should not be considered as
part of this rulemaking.
Consistent treatment across sweep transactions. Several commenters
argued that, if the FDIC proceeds with the rulemaking, it should treat
each sweep transaction the same for claims purposes. One banking trade
association argued that ``all these products have one common element--
once swept from a deposit account, and until returned to the deposit
account, none of the bank's obligations meets the definition of a
`deposit' under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and are therefore not
covered by deposit insurance in the event of the bank's insolvency.
This characterization of sweeps is consistent with the long-standing
practices of virtually every financial institution and has been the
widely accepted practice by banking regulators for decades.'' In this
regard, the commenter noted that, should the FDIC afford different
[[Page 41174]]
treatment across sweep products, it ``would therefore result in
different (and, to a certain degree, arbitrary) treatment under the
Proposal. Our members have great concern as to these potential
disparities that could result, in some cases from nothing more than
differences in the mechanisms used to execute and arrange sweep
transactions.''
To provide consistent treatment among the various sweep products,
several commenters suggested the FDIC should do away with the internal
versus external distinction between sweep transactions as well as the
Class A versus Class B distinction. ``We urge the FDIC to eliminate
these unnecessary distinctions, to the extent that the FDIC proceeds
with rulemaking around sweeps at all, and treat similar sweep products
the same, despite different methods used by banks for processing the
necessary transfers and posting the relevant accounts.''
V. Rationale for Interim Rulemaking
As noted above, the practices being adopted in the interim rule
were proposed in part one of the proposed rule. Hence, the FDIC is
adopting those practices through the usual public notice-and-comment
procedures pursuant to requirements in the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. 553. Before adopting the interim rule as a permanent
rule, however, the FDIC invites comment on all aspects of the interim
rule, including an aspect of the proposed rule on which the FDIC had
not requested specific comment.
The interim rule addresses how the FDIC will treat sweep accounts
upon an insured institution failure. The result is that, in many cases,
the swept funds will not be treated by the FDIC as deposit obligations
of the failed institutions. As explained above, that means the swept
funds will not be eligible for deposit insurance coverage and will not
be afforded status as a deposit under the depositor preference statute.
Commenters on the proposed rule indicated that sweep account customers
are aware of this potential consequence if the institution were to
fail. In order to ensure that sweep account customers are aware that
their funds will not be treated as deposits if the insured institution
fails, however, the FDIC will require institutions to prominently
disclose to customers whether the swept funds are deposits and the
status of the swept funds if the institution failed. The effective date
of this requirement will be deferred until July 1, 2009 to allow the
FDIC to consider specific comments on the disclosure requirement.
(Further explanation of the disclosure requirement is provided below
under ``Request for Comments.'')
VI. The Interim Rule
After fully considering the comments on the proposed rule, FDIC has
adopted the interim rule substantially as proposed, with some
modifications in connection with the treatment of ``internal and
external'' sweep transactions, and in other limited areas. As noted,
the interim rule requires institutions to disclose to customers whether
the swept funds are deposits and the status of the swept funds if the
institution failed, but the effective date of this requirement is
deferred to allow for public comment. In addition, the FDIC will
entertain comments on all other aspects of the interim rule.
Underlying Principles
The interim rule describes the method for determining the value and
nature of claims against a failed insured depository institution to be
used in the event of failure. Upon taking control of a failed insured
depository institution it is the receiver's responsibility to construct
an ending balance sheet for the depository institution (which becomes
the beginning balance sheet for the receivership) and determine the
value and nature of the claims against the failed institution,
including claims to be made by depositors, general creditors,
subordinated creditors, and shareholders. Such claims determinations
will be made consistent with the principles described below, which for
the most part reflect existing practices and procedures used to
determine account balances in the event of failure.
In making deposit insurance determinations and in
determining the value and nature of claims against the receivership on
the institution's date of failure the FDIC, as insurer and receiver,
will treat deposits and other liabilities of the failed institution
according to the ownership and nature of the underlying obligations
based on end-of-day ledger balances for each account using, except as
expressly provided otherwise in the interim rule, the depository
institution's normal posting procedures.
In its role as receiver of a failed insured depository
institution, in order to ensure the proper distribution of the failed
institution's assets under the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(11)) as of
the FDIC Cutoff Point, the FDIC will use its best efforts to take all
steps necessary to stop the generation, via transactions or transfers
coming from or going outside the institution, of new liabilities or
extinguishing existing liabilities for the depository institution.\7\
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\7\ This principle draws a sharp distinction between
transactions involving the transfer of funds into or out of the
failed institution and transactions intended to move funds between
accounts or otherwise on the books and records of the failed
institution. The receiver will act to stop the inflow and outflow of
cash/assets at the point at which it takes control of the failed
institution; thus transactions involving the transfer of assets into
or out of the failed institution may be blocked or suspended.
Transactions internal to the failed institution's operations
initiated prior to the FDIC Cutoff Point--including those initiated
through prearranged automated instructions--will still be conducted
after the point of failure as part of a necessary process to arrive
at the end-of-day ledger balances and to establish the nature of the
claim recognized by the receiver.
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End-of-day ledger balances are subject to corrections for
posted transactions that are inconsistent with the above principles.
End-of-Day Ledger Balances and Cutoff Points
As proposed, in the interim rule the deposit or liability account
balance used for deposit insurance determination purposes is defined as
the end-of-day ledger balance of the deposit or other liability on the
day of failure. Except as noted, the FDIC will use the cutoff rules
previously applied by the failed insured depository institution in
establishing the end-of-day ledger balance for deposit insurance
determination purposes. However, the interim rule allows the FDIC to
establish an FDIC Cutoff Point, coinciding with the point in time at
which the receiver acts to stop deposit transactions which might result
in creating new liabilities or extinguishing existing liabilities. The
FDIC Cutoff Point will facilitate the orderly winding up of the
institution and the FDIC's final determination of the ledger balances
of the deposit accounts in those cases where the institution's normal
cutoff rules prevent or impair the FDIC's ability to promptly determine
the end-of-day ledger balance of the deposit or other liability. The
intention is to complete internal postings of transactions presented or
authorized prior to the institution's normal cutoff rules or the FDIC
Cutoff Point, as applicable, according to the depository institution's
normal procedures--thus, as explained below, the nature of the
liability may change after the FDIC Cutoff Point. Any transaction--
including sweep arrangements--would be completed for that day according
to normal procedures if it involves only the movement of funds between
accounts within the confines of the depository institution. Some sweep
arrangements shift funds within the depository institution from a
[[Page 41175]]
deposit account to ownership in a sweep investment vehicle. The value
and nature of these claims will be determined as they rest on the books
and records of the depository institution as reflected in its end-of-
day ledger balances.
If the institution's ordinary cutoff time for the day's business on
the day of failure for any particular kind of transaction precedes the
FDIC Cutoff Point, the institution's ordinary cutoff time will be used.
Where the institution's ordinary cutoff time for an individual kind of
transaction is later than the FDIC Cutoff Point, the institution's
cutoff time will be replaced by the FDIC Cutoff Point. The ``Applicable
Cutoff Time'' used for any kind of transaction thus will be the earlier
of the institution's ordinary cutoff time or the FDIC Cutoff Point.
Different kinds of transactions may have different Applicable Cutoff
Times. Transactions occurring after the Applicable Cutoff Time will be
posted a subsequent day's business, if the operations of the failed
institution are carried on by a successor institution or by the FDIC as
receiver or insurer.
The interim rule differs from the proposed rule in cases where
deposit operations are not continued after failure in order to provide
consistency in the determination of deposit balances regardless of
whether the deposit operations were continued. In a depository
institution failure where deposit operations are not continued by a
successor institution, account transactions on the day of failure also
will be posted to the applicable accounts as described above. Since
there is no next business day in this case, rather than posting
transactions occurring after the Applicable Cutoff Time as the next
day's business, such transactions will be handled depending on the
nature of the transaction. In the case of a cash or other deposit
occurring after the Applicable Cutoff Time, such funds--which would not
be included in the end-of-day ledger balance used for claims purposes--
would be disbursed to the account owner. If a cash or other withdrawal
is made after the Applicable Cutoff Time, such funds--again which would
not be included in the end-of-day ledger balance used for claims
purposes--could be used by the receiver to satisfy a claim against the
receivership.\8\
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\8\ A deposit account withdrawal in the form of an official
check drawn on the failed depository institution would not be used
by the receiver to satisfy the insured deposit claim. Official items
are considered to be deposits for deposit insurance purposes;
therefore, such official withdrawals would be treated differently
from cash withdrawals.
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The interim rule does not establish any new operational
requirements for insured institutions relative to the FDIC Cutoff
Point. Also, the interim rule explicitly authorizes the FDIC, as
receiver, to correct errors and omissions after the day of failure and
reflect them in the end-of-day ledger balances.
Several commenters argued against the establishment of an FDIC
Cutoff Point and recommended that the FDIC use end-of-day balances as
normally calculated by the insured depository institution. As noted
above, the FDIC will apply the institution's normal cutoff times in
most cases, but establishing an FDIC Cutoff Point is essential to the
efficient finalization of end-of-day ledger balances in some
situations. Strictly applying a depository institution's pre-
established cutoff times in all circumstances is inconsistent with the
duties and responsibilities of the receiver--as articulated in the
principle indicated above. In the event of failure the receiver will
take control of the failed institutions and simultaneously will act to
stop deposit or other transactions involving creating new liabilities
or extinguishing existing liabilities. In many cases, this can be done
consistent with the institution's normal cutoff times, but in others it
cannot and the FDIC will establish an FDIC Cutoff Point. If the
receiver is successful in stopping these external transactions after it
takes control there will be no new transactions to be posted affected
by an FDIC Cutoff Point. In this case, the end-of-day ledger balances
on the day of failure will be calculated using the failed institution's
pre-established cutoff points. If the receiver is unsuccessful in
stopping the external transactions, the FDIC Cutoff Point establishes a
basis for posting these inadvertent transactions the following day, if
that is the course of action selected by the receiver.
Treatment of Uncollected Deposited Checks
As proposed, in determining deposit account balances at a failed
insured depository institution, the FDIC will deem all checks deposited
into and posted to a deposit account by the Applicable Cutoff Time as
part of the end-of-day ledger balance for insurance purposes. As
detailed in the proposed rule, this treatment of uncollected deposited
checks is warranted because: Depository institutions use and calculate
the ledger balance in a more consistent way than other balances; it is
consistent with the way that depository institutions report deposits on
Call Reports and Thrift Financial Reports; it is the balance the FDIC
uses to determine an institution's assessment base for calculating the
institution's deposit insurance assessments; \9\ it is the easiest
balance for depositors to understand; and it is the most frequently
used balance on financial statements provided to customers. Using
ledger balances also is consistent with the definition of a deposit in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (``FDI Act''), which includes
balances both ``conditionally'' or ``unconditionally'' credited to a
deposit account. 12 U.S.C. 1813(l).
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\9\ The FDIC's recent revisions to the FDIC's risk-based
assessment system have made an institution's assessment base, which
is used to determine its deposit insurance assessment, virtually
identical with an institution's deposits as defined in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act. The revisions eliminated the ``float''
deductions previously used to compute an institution's assessment
base; hence, deposits posted to a deposit account but not yet
collected are now part of the assessment base. The stated rationale
for eliminating the float deduction from the calculation of an
institution's assessment base was that such deductions were small
and decreasing as a result of legal, technological and system
payment changes. 71 Fed. Reg. 69720 (Nov. 30, 2006).
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Further, especially in a large depository institution failure,
using end-of-day ledger balances may be the only operationally feasible
means for the FDIC to make deposit insurance determinations timely and
expeditiously. As discussed in more detail in the Large Bank
Modernization Final Rule, the FDIC is statutorily obligated to pay
insured deposits ``as soon as possible'' after an insured depository
institution fails. 12 U.S.C. 1821(f)(1). The FDIC places a high
priority on providing access to insured deposits promptly and, in the
past, has usually been able to allow most depositors access to their
deposits on the business day following closing. The largest insured
institutions today are much bigger than any institution has been in the
past and are growing increasingly complex. Providing prompt access to
depositors if one of these institutions were to fail would prove
difficult if adjustments for uncollected funds were necessary.
This treatment of uncollected deposited checks, however, will
differ from the FDIC's past practice in an important way. In the past,
for a check that was posted to an account but not yet collected at the
time of failure--including a check already forwarded by the failed
institution for collection but not yet collected--the FDIC acted as
agent for the depositor and remitted or credited payments received on
these checks to the depositor in full. These checks were not included
in deposits on the day of failure for insurance purposes and were not
subject to deposit
[[Page 41176]]
insurance limits.\10\ In contrast, under the interim rule, when a check
is posted to an account at the failed institution as provided by the
Applicable Cutoff Time, the check will be included in the end-of-day
ledger balance and will be subject to deposit insurance limits, even if
uncollected.\11\
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\10\ FDIC Adv. Op. 95-2 (Jan. 23, 1995).
\11\ The FDIC's treatment of uncollected checks is subject to
the FDIC's rights and obligations under the FDI Act. See, e.g., 12
U.S.C. 1822(d); FDIC v. McKnight, 769 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1985);
cert. denied sub nom., All Souls Episcopal Church v. FDIC, 475 U.S.
1010 (1986). Although the FDIC will immediately honor uncollected
checks through the payment of deposit insurance and the issuance of
receivership certificates, if a check is ultimately uncollectible,
the ledger balance of the depositor will be adjusted accordingly,
and the FDIC will seek reimbursement from the depositor and adjust
the depositor's receivership claim (if any) as necessary.
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Some depositors may receive less favorable treatment under the
interim rule than if the FDIC were to continue to use its past approach
to handling uncollected deposited checks. The increasing speed with
which checks are processed as a result of electronic check processing,
the use of checking account debit cards and other developments,
however, should limit the effect of the final rule in this regard.
Moreover, the past approach would not be feasible in a larger bank
failure, and the FDIC must plan for all contingencies.
Prearranged Instructions To ``Sweep'' Funds
The proposed rule distinguished between internal and external sweep
accounts. This distinction was created to recognize the receiver's
responsibility, upon taking control of the failed institution, to stop
the generation of new deposit or other transactions which might result
in creating new liabilities or extinguishing existing liabilities for
the depository institution or its customers to protect the appropriate
distribution to claimants.
Under the interim rule, any automated sweep transaction
transferring funds internally from one deposit account at the failed
institution to a sweep investment vehicle at the failed institution
will be completed on the day of failure. In the case of sweeps out of
the failed institution into external investment vehicles, the swept
funds will be treated consistent with their status in the end-of-day
ledger balances. If an expected transfer to the external sweep
investment vehicle is not completed prior to the FDIC Cutoff Point, the
external investment will not be purchased and the funds will remain in
the account identified on the end-of-day ledger balance.
Where funds are swept internally to an investment vehicle at the
failed institution, the FDIC will recognize the transfer, pursuant to
the account agreement, in determining the end-of-day ledger balance for
deposit insurance and depositor preference purposes. This approach is
consistent with the principle articulated in the interim rule that the
FDIC will treat deposits and other liabilities of the failed
institution on the date of failure based on the ownership and the
nature of the underlying obligations as reflected in the end-of-day
ledger balance. The completion of prearranged internal sweep
transactions in the calculation of end-of-day deposit and other
balances for insurance proposes also is consistent with how such funds
currently are reported on Call and Thrift Financial Reports and are
treated for assessment purposes.
Eurodollar and IBF accounts are two examples of internal sweep
investment vehicles. Accounts that include a Eurodollar or IBF sweep
arrangement typically begin each business day with balances only in a
domestic deposit account. At the end of the business day, the
customer's end-of-day ledger balance is reported as a Eurodollar
account (typically associated with the bank's branch in the Cayman
Islands or Bahamas) or an IBF account. At the start of the next
business day, the depository institution will report the balance as
being back in the domestic deposit account. The cycle typically repeats
itself daily.
Usually the underlying contract for a Eurodollar sweep specifies
that the obligation at the foreign branch is not payable in the United
States and, hence, is not a deposit,\12\ for deposit insurance and
depositor preference purposes. Upon an institution's failure, amounts
in a Eurodollar account in a foreign branch of the failed institution
are treated as unsecured, non-deposit liabilities and are not eligible
for insurance or depositor preference status. The same treatment will
apply to sweeps to IBFs, which by statutory definition are not
deposits. Eurodollar and IBF accountholders will thus be accorded
general creditor status in the receivership estate.
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\12\ The definition of ``deposit'' in the FDI Act expressly
excludes: ``Any obligation of a depository institution which is
carried on the books and records of an office of such bank or
savings association located outside of any State, unless (i) such
obligation would be a deposit if it were carried on the books and
records of the depository institution, and would be payable at an
office located in any State; and (ii) the contract evidencing the
obligation provides by express terms, and not by implication, for
payment at an office of the depository institution located in any
State.'' 12 U.S.C. 1813(l)(5)(A). Also, the FDI Act defines IBF
obligations as non-deposits, which are not eligible for deposit
insurance or deposit preference status. 12 U.S.C. 1813(l)(5)(B).
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It is important for customers to be aware that whether an account
has deposit status--versus general creditor status--can be far more
important for large depositors than the question of whether the account
is fully insured. To illustrate, assume that $5.1 million is swept from
a customer's checking account into a Eurodollar account. Further,
assume that the failed institution's assets would be worth
approximately eighty percent of its total deposit liabilities. In this
illustration, if the funds had remained deposits the customer would
have received approximately $4.1 million ($100,000 in deposit insurance
plus an eighty percent dividend on the uninsured portion of the
deposit), thus losing $1 million. However, since Eurodollar accounts
are not deposits for purposes of either FDIC insurance or depositor
preference, in this situation the customer would lose the entire $5.1
million upon the institution's failure.
Institutions do not pay deposit insurance assessments on
liabilities denominated, as of an institution's end-of-day ledger
balance, as foreign deposits or IBF deposits. Some of the commenters
who addressed sweep account issues raised in the proposed rule
acknowledged that sweep products (particularly those involving the
transfer of funds from deposit accounts to non-U.S. deposits,
securities repos, fed funds and money market mutual funds) result in
obligations of the insured institution that would not be eligible for
insurance and do not have deposit preference status. One commenter
stated that, ``[m]ost of these products are designed for and used by
corporate and institutional customers who are sophisticated enough to
understand the business terms,'' thus suggesting that such customers
are aware of the potential consequences in the event of failure of the
institution.
Under the interim rule, the sweep to an IBF (for example, as
described in the Adagio decision) will be completed for that day by the
receiver on the day of failure and the account holders, who hold end-
of-day ledger IBF accounts after the sweep, will be deemed to be
general creditors of the receivership, rather than depositors, under
the deposit preference statute.\13\
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\13\ Rights are fixed as reflected in the depository
institution's end-of-day ledger balances. Those rights would not be
changed if, for example, it was impractical to reprogram the bank's
computers before a liability swept to a foreign branch of an insured
institution as of the day of the institution's failure and was
treated by the computer as having been swept back to a deposit
account at a bridge bank or assuming bank serving as the successor
to the failed institution.
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[[Page 41177]]
Repo sweep arrangements are another example of sweep arrangements
that are generally conducted via internal transfers on the
institution's books. Repo sweeps can differ considerably in
documentation, actual execution, and timing. The FDIC, to the extent
consistent with the principles articulated in the interim rule, will
carry out repo sweeps in reaching end-of-day ledger balances. If as of
the end-of-day ledger balance the repo sweep customer is the legal
owner of identified securities subject to a repurchase agreement, the
FDIC will acknowledge that ownership interest.
Based on industry information, as reflected in some comment
letters, money market mutual fund sweeps may be structured in a variety
of ways. In some cases the money market mutual funds shares are held
directly in the name of the sweep account holder, but in other cases
the money market mutual fund account is either in the name of the
depository institution or in the name of the transfer agent for the
mutual fund. Shares are sold or allocated to the individual sweep
customer depending on the particulars of the sweep arrangement.
Further, some money market mutual fund sweep arrangements result in a
``same-day'' purchase of fund shares while ``next-day'' sweeps delay
the purchase of fund shares by the customer until the day following the
investment decision.
Regardless of the internal mechanics of the money market mutual
fund sweep arrangement, under the interim rule the FDIC will treat
funds swept in connection with a money market mutual fund sweep
arrangement consistent with the account where the funds are reported as
reflected in the end-of-day ledger balances. The results of this
determination may be affected by whether the sweep arrangement
contemplated the movement of funds outside the institution. If an
expected transfer is not completed on the day of failure due to the
application of the second principle discussed above (that the receiver
will stop the generation of new deposit or other transactions which
might result in creating new liabilities or extinguishing existing
liabilities for the depository institution or its customers), the
account holder's rights will be fixed based on where the funds actually
reside as of the end-of-day ledger balance. As with the treatment of
other sweep products, this treatment is consistent with the principle
that the FDIC will treat deposits and other liabilities of the failed
institution on the date of failure based on the ownership and the
nature of the underlying obligations as reflected in the end-of-day
ledger balance.
Money market mutual fund sweeps are the most prevalent case
involving a sweep investment vehicle designed to move outside of the
depository institution, and have them come to rest in a separate legal
entity. Another example is where funds are swept from a deposit account
at a depository institution to an account or product at an affiliate of
the institution, even if the transfer is accomplished through a book-
entry at the depository institution. When the sweep investment vehicle
rests outside the depository institution, under the interim rule the
status of the funds as of the institution's day of failure will depend
on whether the funds have been used to purchase the sweep investment
vehicle prior to the FDIC Cutoff Point. For some sweep arrangements the
purchase may not be completed for that day prior to the FDIC Cutoff
Point. For example, an institution could have an arrangement to
transfer funds from a customer's demand deposit account into an account
at an affiliated depository institution, to be conducted each day late
in the evening. In this case, under the interim rule if the funds had
not been transferred to the sweep investment vehicle as of the FDIC
Cutoff Point, they still will be considered to be a deposit for
insurance purposes. This treatment is in furtherance of the FDIC's
obligation as receiver to stop the generation of new deposit or other
transactions that might result in creating new liabilities or
extinguishing existing liabilities for the depository institution after
the institution has failed.
In some cases it will not be practicable to stop automatically
generated sweeps from occurring after the FDIC Cutoff Point, requiring
the necessary adjustments post closing.
Sweeps Alternative
Under the interim rule, the receiver will establish the value and
nature of claims based on the end-of-day ledger balance for each
account. In the proposed rule the FDIC asked whether certain swept
funds, if assessed insurance premiums, also should be eligible to be
treated as deposits for purposes of FDIC deposit insurance and
depositor preference. Based in part on the comments received on this
issue, the FDIC has decided not to change current practices.
VII. Request for Comments
The FDIC invites interested parties to submit comments during a 60-
day comment period on all aspects of the interim rule, including
whether insured depository institutions should be required to disclose
to sweep account customers that swept funds will not be treated as
deposits if the institution were to fail. More specifically, comments
are requested on Sec. 360.8(e) of the interim rule which, as indicated
above, is subject to an extended delayed effective date:
In all sweep account contracts and account statements reflecting
sweep account balances, institutions must prominently disclose
whether swept funds are deposits within the meaning of 12 U.S.C.
1813(l). If the funds are not deposits, the institution must further
disclose the status such funds would have if the institution
failed--for example, general creditor status or secured creditor
status. Such disclosures must be consistent with how the institution
reports such funds on its Call Reports or Thrift Financial Reports.
As noted above, several commenters stated that sweep customers
generally are aware of how the swept funds would be treated in the
event of failure. Over the past year, FDIC staff held meetings with
groups of corporate treasurers to discuss the potential implications of
the proposed rule. During these meetings, corporate treasurers stated
that many institutions provided some disclosure to sweep customers
about the potential consequences of these transactions. However, it was
evident those disclosures did not result in a consistent understanding
of how these funds would be treated in the event of failure.
This interim rule clearly states the FDIC's intent to use for
claims purposes end-of-day ledger balances as normally reflected on the
books and records of the insured depository institution. Prior to this
end-of-day ledger balance calculation, funds could have been swept from
a deposit account into a sweep investment vehicle. The movement of
funds from a deposit account into a sweep investment vehicle not
considered to be a deposit for insurance purposes can have significant
implications for the sweep customers. In the case of a Eurodollar
sweep, for example, the swept funds would have general creditor
standing with a considerably higher loss exposure relative to an
uninsured deposit claim.
The FDIC is concerned that the treatment of swept funds in the
event of failure is not clearly understood by sweep customers. A better
understanding of this treatment by sweep customers is important to
avoid
[[Page 41178]]
misconceptions which may arise in the event of failure. While many
institutions currently provide some disclosures to sweep customers, the
FDIC believes the significance of the consequences to depositors of
some sweep transactions necessitates consistent disclosures by
institutions providing sweep services. In this context, it is
particularly important for institutions to disclose to sweep customers
that the completion of some sweep trans