Randall Relyea, D.O.; Denial of Application, 40378-40380 [E8-15923]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 135 / Monday, July 14, 2008 / Notices
whether the information will have
practical utility;
—Evaluate the accuracy of the agencies’
estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
—Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
—Minimize the burden of the collection
of information on those who are to
respond, including through the use of
appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms
of information technology, e.g.,
permitting electronic submission of
responses.
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Overview of This Information
Collection
(1) Type of Information Collection:
Extension of a currently approved
collection.
(2) Title of the Form/Collection:
Certification on Agency Letterhead
Authorizing Purchase of Firearm for
Official Duties of Law Enforcement
Officer.
(3) Agency form number, if any, and
the applicable component of the
Department of Justice sponsoring the
collection: Form Number: None. Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives.
(4) Affected public who will be asked
or required to respond, as well as a brief
abstract: Primary: State, Local or Tribal
Government. Other: None. The letter is
used by a law enforcement officer to
purchase handguns to be used in his/her
official duties from a licensed firearm
dealer anywhere in the country. The
letter shall state that the officer will use
the firearm in official duties and that a
records check reveals that the
purchasing officer has no convictions
for misdemeanor crimes or domestic
violence.
(5) An estimate of the total number of
respondents and the amount of time
estimated for an average respondent to
respond: It is estimated that 50,000
respondents will take 5 seconds to file
the letter.
(6) An estimate of the total public
burden (in hours) associated with the
collection: There are an estimated 69
annual total burden hours associated
with this collection.
If additional information is required
contact: Lynn Bryant, Department
Clearance Officer, Policy and Planning
Staff, Justice Management Division,
Department of Justice, Patrick Henry
Building, Suite 1600, 601 D Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20530.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:08 Jul 11, 2008
Jkt 214001
Dated: July 7, 2008.
Lynn Bryant,
Department Clearance Officer, PRA,
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. E8–15876 Filed 7–11–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–FY–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Randall Relyea, D.O.; Denial of
Application
On July 25, 2007, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Randall Relyea, D.O.
(Respondent), of Price, Utah. The Show
Cause Order proposed the revocation of
Respondent’s DEA Certificate of
Registration, BR8899809, as a
practitioner, on the ground that
Respondent’s ‘‘continued registration is
inconsistent with the public interest.’’
Show Cause Order at 1.
The Show Cause Order specifically
alleged that in February 2007,
Respondent had engaged in a scheme to
have one of his patients obtain narcotic
controlled substances for his personal
use. Show Cause Order at 1. The Show
Cause Order also alleged that during the
previous year, Respondent had engaged
in ‘‘a similar scheme * * * to acquire
narcotics,’’ and that Respondent had
been charged with multiple felony
narcotics offenses under Utah law with
respect to both schemes. Id.
The Show Cause Order further alleged
that in 1999, Respondent had been
‘‘charged with felonies [under Missouri
law] involving [his] obtaining
hydrocodone under a fictitious name.’’
Id. The Show Cause Order alleged that
while these charges were later reduced
to misdemeanors and that Respondent
had surrendered his DEA registration,
he had ‘‘continued to abuse narcotics at
levels indicating recurrent or habitual
use.’’ Id.
The Show Cause Order, which
notified Respondent of his right to a
hearing or to submit a statement in lieu
of a hearing, was served on him by
certified mail to his registered location
as evidenced by the signed return
receipt card.1 Since that time, neither
Respondent nor his counsel has
requested a hearing on the allegations of
the Show Cause Order. Because more
than thirty days have passed since
service of the Show Cause Order and
1 The Return Receipt Card does not indicate the
date of delivery. The card does, however, indicate
that DEA received the card back on August 13,
2007.
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neither Respondent nor his counsel has
requested a hearing, I conclude that
Respondent has waived his right to a
hearing. See 21 CFR 1301.43(d). I
therefore issue this Decision and Final
Order without a hearing based on
relevant material contained in the
investigative file and make the
following findings.
Findings
Respondent was the holder of DEA
Certificate of Registration, #BR8899809,
which authorized him to handle
controlled substances in schedules II
through V as a practitioner.
Respondent’s registration expired on
April 30, 2007, and Respondent did not
file a renewal application until May 30,
2007. I thus find that Respondent did
not file a timely renewal application as
required to maintain his registration and
thus does not have a current registration
with the Agency. See 5 U.S.C. 558(c).
Respondent’s renewal application is,
however, pending before the Agency.
Respondent previously held another
DEA registration. In December 1999,
however, Respondent was arrested in
Brentwood, Missouri, and charged with
fraudulently attempting to obtain
Vicodin Tuss, a schedule III controlled
substance which contains hydrocodone.
Respondent was allowed to plead guilty
to the misdemeanor charge of engaging
in deceptive business practices and
received a suspended sentence. On
November 22, 2000, Respondent also
surrendered his DEA registration.2
According to the investigative file, at
approximately 1 p.m. on February 8,
2007, Respondent contacted one of his
patients and asked her to assist him in
obtaining a narcotic controlled
substance for his wife, who he claimed
had torn her anterior cruciate ligament
(ACL). Respondent asserted that other
area physicians were out to get him and
that he therefore needed to write the
prescription in the patient’s name.
Several hours later, Respondent met
with the patient at her place of
employment (an Albertson’s
supermarket) and gave her a
prescription for 90 pills of oxycodone
30 mg and $100 to pay for the
prescription.
Later that evening, Respondent
returned to the supermarket to obtain
the prescription. The patient told
2 On May 22, 2004, Respondent applied for a new
registration. On his application, Respondent
disclosed the criminal proceeding, his prior drug
abuse, and that he had surrendered his earlier
registration. Respondent also stated that he had
completed inpatient rehab and a four-year
monitoring program. Upon determining that the
State of Utah has issued Respondent both a medical
license and a controlled substance license,
Respondent was granted a new registration.
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 135 / Monday, July 14, 2008 / Notices
Respondent that she did not like the
situation and was scared. Respondent
told her that nothing would happen.
The patient then gave the oxycodone
and $94 to Respondent. The patient
again told Respondent that she did not
feel the situation was right; Respondent
told her ‘‘nothing happened.’’ After a
brief conversation, Respondent left.
Nine days later, another police officer
received information regarding a July
2006 incident involving Respondent
and another of his patients. According
to the investigative file, Respondent had
performed shoulder surgery on this
patient and issued her a prescription for
60 pills of Percocet 10/650, a schedule
II controlled substance which contains
oxycodone. When the patient became ill
taking the Percocet, she saw Respondent
to get a prescription for a different drug.
During this visit, Respondent told the
patient that the pharmacy had given her
the wrong pills. Respondent took the
Percocet from the patient and gave her
a new prescription for a smaller dose.
Subsequently, the patient asked the
pharmacy about the alleged error in the
prescription. The pharmacy told her
that the error was on Respondent’s part.
The pharmacy also told her that the
Percocet should have been returned to
the pharmacy and that the return should
have been documented. The pharmacy,
however, had no documentation of the
Percocet having been returned.
Moreover, according to the
investigative file, on two separate dates
in December 2006, Respondent induced
a physician’s assistant (PA) student to
fill prescriptions for 90 tablets of
oxycodone (30 mg) and 120 tablets of
oxycodone (30 mg). Respondent wrote
the first prescription in his wife’s name
and represented to the student that his
wife had dislocated her patella tendon.
The student filled the prescription and
gave it to Respondent.
The second incident occurred on the
last day of the student’s rotation. During
a conversation in which Respondent
and the student discussed the
possibility of his employing her,
Respondent wrote out a prescription
and gave it to the student. Upon seeing
the prescription, the student remarked
‘‘Oxycodone?’’ Respondent told the
student to ‘‘chill out’’ because it was
Percocet with Tylenol. The student then
commented about the 30 mg strength of
the pills; Respondent stated: ‘‘you’d
think if you double the strength you get
double the effect, but that isn’t the case
at all.’’ When the student also
commented about the number of pills
(120), Respondent stated that ‘‘it would
last him all year.’’ The student
proceeded to fill the prescription and
provided the oxycodone to Respondent.
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Jkt 214001
In late February 2007, Respondent
approached another PA student stating
that his wife had injured her ACL, and
that he was trying to get her in to see
a physician. Over the next several days,
Respondent kept telling the student that
his wife was in pain and that he was
frustrated because he had forgotten to
ask one of his colleagues to write a
prescription. Respondent also stated
that because of bad feelings, he did not
believe that other physicians would
write his wife a prescription for a pain
medication. Respondent eventually
induced the student to fill a prescription
for 60 tablets of oxycodone (30 mg).
Local law enforcement subsequently
interviewed a nurse who worked in the
recovery room at a hospital where
Respondent performed surgeries. In late
July 2006, Respondent approached her,
represented that he had severe knee
pain, and asked her to fill a prescription
for Percocet. The nurse agreed.
Respondent wrote the prescription,
which was for 90 tablets of Percocet (10
mg), in her name. The nurse filled the
prescription and provided the drugs to
Respondent.
Over the ensuing seven months,
Respondent used additional scams to
induce her to fill prescriptions for him
such as stating that he had back pain,
and that his wife had torn her ACL and
that he could not find a doctor to
perform surgery on her. On other
occasions, Respondent told the nurse
that he had wrecked his vehicle and
could barely walk. He also told her that
his wife’s prescription had been stolen
or lost down the drain.
Using this person, Respondent
obtained a total of fifteen prescriptions
for either Percocet (10 mg) or
Oxycodone (30 mg).3 The size of the
prescriptions was either 90 or 120
tablets.
On March 14, 2007, Respondent was
arrested. Thereafter, on May 9, 2007, the
Carbon County Attorney filed six
informations against Respondent. As
relevant here, the County Attorney
charged Respondent with numerous
counts of distributing or arranging the
distribution of a controlled substance, a
felony offense under Utah law. See Utah
Code Ann. § 58–37–8(1)(a)(ii). The state
criminal proceedings remain pending as
of the date of this Order.4
3 In one instance, the strength of the Oxycodone
was 15 mg.
4 The investigative file also includes a copy of the
report of a random drug test performed on
Respondent on March 28, 2006. According to the
report, Respondent tested positive for both
hydrocodone and oxycodone; the levels of both
drugs exceeded 5000 ng./ml. A document, which is
dated March 30, 2007, and which is attached to the
report states: ‘‘excessively high quantitative random
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40379
Discussion
Section 303(f) of the Controlled
Substances Act provides that ‘‘[t]he
Attorney General may deny an
application for [a practitioner’s]
registration if he determines that the
issuance of such registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest.’’
21 U.S.C. § 823(f). In making the public
interest determination, the Act requires
the consideration of the following
factors:
(1) The recommendation of the
appropriate State licensing board or
professional disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant’s experience in
dispensing * * * controlled substances.
(3) The applicant’s conviction record
under Federal or State laws relating to
the manufacture, distribution, or
dispensing of controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to
controlled substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may
threaten the public health and safety.
Id.
‘‘[T]hese factors
are * * * considered in the
disjunctive.’’ Robert A. Leslie M.D., 68
FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I ‘‘may rely on
any one or a combination of factors, and
may give each factor the weight [I]
deem[] appropriate in determining
whether a registration should be
revoked.’’ Id. Moreover, I am ‘‘not
required to make findings as to all of the
factors.’’Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477,
482 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Morall v.
DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173–74 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
Having considered the entire record
and all of the factors, I conclude that
Respondent’s experience in dispensing
controlled substances (factor two) and
his record of non-compliance with
applicable Federal law (factor four)
demonstrate that granting Respondent’s
application for a new registration would
be ‘‘inconsistent with the public
interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(f).5 Accordingly,
Respondent’s application will be
denied.
Respondent’s experience in
dispensing controlled substances is
urine values do not reflect one time use, occasional
use, or one time therapeutic use. Such values are
consistent with long standing use and habituation.’’
While the investigative file establishes that these
documents were provided by a hospital where
Respondent performed surgeries, the file does not
establish the source of the statement. Accordingly,
while I accept the results of the drug test, which
showed that both hydrocodone and oxycodone
were present in Respondent, I do not rely on the
statement as to what the quantitative values
establish.
5 In light of my findings with respect to factors
two and four, I conclude that it is unnecessary to
make findings with respect to the remaining factors.
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40380
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 135 / Monday, July 14, 2008 / Notices
characterized by his criminal behavior
in issuing numerous fraudulent
prescriptions for such highly abused
controlled substances as oxycodone and
Percocet. While the record contains no
information as to whether under Utah
law and regulations, a physician can
ever lawfully prescribe a controlled
substance to a family member or
himself, it is clear that Respondent
issued numerous fraudulent
prescriptions because the prescriptions
were written in the names of persons
who had no medical need for the
controlled substance, and who were,
after filling the prescription, to turn the
drugs over to him.
Moreover, the stories that Respondent
told to induce others to assist him were
so implausible (e.g., that no doctor
would write a prescription for, or
perform surgery on, his wife) or were
consistent with classic scams engaged in
by persons who seek controlled
substances for illicit purposes (e.g., that
his wife’s prescription had been stolen
or lost down the drain), that it is clear
that the prescriptions were written with
fraudulent intent. See Randi M.
Germaine, 72 FR 51665, 61666 (2007)
(noting expert testimony regarding use
of scams by drug abusers seeking
additional drugs such as early refill
attempts and claiming that one’s drugs
have been stolen).
This conduct violated Federal law.
See 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3) (rendering it
‘‘unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally * * * to acquire or obtain
possession of a controlled substance by
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery,
deception, or subterfuge’’); id. § 844(a)
(‘‘It shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to possess a
controlled substance unless such
substance was obtained directly, or
pursuant to a valid prescription or order
from a practitioner, while acting in the
course of his professional practice, or
except as otherwise authorized by this
subchapter * * *.’’). Indeed, it is
particularly disturbing that Respondent
was aided in his schemes by several
health care professionals.
There is also substantial evidence that
Respondent was personally abusing the
drugs he obtained through his various
schemes. The urinalysis results
indicated that Respondent was using
both hydrocodone and oxycodone.
Moreover, when one of the PA students
commented about his seeking
oxycodone, Respondent told her to
‘‘chill out,’’ because it was Percocet
with Tylenol. Moreover, when the
student commented about the strength
of the pills, Respondent stated that
‘‘you’d think if you double the strength
you get double effect, but that isn’t the
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17:08 Jul 11, 2008
Jkt 214001
case,’’ and also said that the 120 pills
‘‘would last him all year.’’ It is thus
clear that Respondent was once again
abusing controlled substances.
Respondent’s experience in
dispensing controlled substances and
his record of non-compliance with
Federal controlled substance laws is
thus characterized by his issuance of
numerous fraudulent prescriptions and
his personal abuse of controlled
substances. These findings amply
demonstrate that Respondent cannot be
entrusted with a new registration and
that granting his application would be
‘‘inconsistent with the public interest.’’
21 U.S.C. 823(f).
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(f), as well as 28 CFR
0.100(b) & 0.104, I order that the
application of Randall Relyea, D.O., for
a DEA Certificate of Registration as a
practitioner be, and it hereby is, denied.
This order is effective August 13, 2008.
Dated: June 27, 2008.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8–15923 Filed 7–11–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Armando B. Figueroa, M.D.;
Revocation of Registration
On November 14, 2007, I, the Deputy
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause and Immediate Suspension
of Registration to Armando B. Figueroa,
M.D. (Respondent), of Washington, DC.
The Order immediately suspended and
proposed the revocation of
Respondent’s DEA Certificate of
Registration, BF0128810, as a
practitioner, on the grounds that his
continued registration was ‘‘inconsistent
with the public interest’’ and
‘‘constitute[d] an imminent danger to
public health and safety.’’ Show Cause
Order at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f) &
824(a)(4)).
The Show Cause Order alleged that
Respondent had ‘‘repeatedly issued
controlled substance prescriptions to
[two individuals, S.S. and G.R.] for
other than a legitimate medical purpose
or while acting outside the usual course
of professional practice in violation of
21 CFR 1306.04(a).’’ Show Cause Order
at 1. More specifically, the Show Cause
Order alleged that on October 17, 2007,
law enforcement authorities had
searched a hotel room occupied by S.S.
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Sfmt 4703
and found 500 dosage units of
oxycodone, 630 dosage units of
OxyContin, 400 dosage units of
methadone, 180 dosage units of
diazepam, and 30 dosage units of
phentermine. Id. at 2. The Order also
alleged that S.S. had in her possession
eleven undated prescriptions for
OxyContin and three prescriptions for
methadone which Respondent had
issued in the names of S.S. and G.R.,
two additional prescriptions for
Oxycontin issued by Respondent on
October 15, 2007 to S.S. and G.R., and
‘‘$7,475.00 in cash.’’ Id. Finally, the
Order alleged that S.S. told law
enforcement officers that she paid
Respondent $100 for each prescription
he issued and that Respondent had not
physically examined her in years. Id.
Based on the above, I found that
Respondent had ‘‘repeatedly issued
controlled substance prescriptions
outside the usual course of professional
practice, and for other than a legitimate
medical purpose, [and was] thereby
facilitating the diversion of controlled
substances.’’ Id. Accordingly, I further
found that Respondent’s ‘‘continued
registration during the pendency of
these proceedings would constitute an
imminent danger to public health and
safety,’’ and ordered the immediate
suspension of his registration. Id. (citing
21 U.S.C. 824(d)).
On November 14, 2007, DEA
Investigators served the Order to Show
Cause and Immediate Suspension 1 by
leaving it at Respondent’s office and
registered location. Later that same day,
Respondent telephoned a DEA
Investigator to complain about the
suspension of his registration.
Subsequently, DEA Investigators
learned that on the days that
Respondent worked at his Washington
office, Respondent stayed at his
daughter’s house. Accordingly, on
November 29, 2007, DEA Investigators
also delivered a copy of the Order to
Show Cause and Immediate Suspension
to Respondent’s daughter at her
residence.
Since the service of the Order to Show
Cause and Immediate Suspension,
neither Respondent, nor any one
purporting to represent him, has
requested a hearing. Because (1) more
than thirty days have passed since the
Order was served, and (2) no request for
a hearing has been received, I conclude
that Respondent has waived his right to
a hearing. See 21 CFR 1301.43(d). I
1 The Order also fully explained that Respondent
had a right to a hearing, the scheduled date of the
hearing, the procedures for requesting a hearing,
and that his failure to timely request a hearing
would be deemed a waiver of his right. Show Cause
Order at 2–3.
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 135 (Monday, July 14, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 40378-40380]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-1]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Randall Relyea, D.O.; Denial of Application
On July 25, 2007, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Randall Relyea, D.O. (Respondent), of Price, Utah. The
Show Cause Order proposed the revocation of Respondent's DEA
Certificate of Registration, BR8899809, as a practitioner, on the
ground that Respondent's ``continued registration is inconsistent with
the public interest.'' Show Cause Order at 1.
The Show Cause Order specifically alleged that in February 2007,
Respondent had engaged in a scheme to have one of his patients obtain
narcotic controlled substances for his personal use. Show Cause Order
at 1. The Show Cause Order also alleged that during the previous year,
Respondent had engaged in ``a similar scheme * * * to acquire
narcotics,'' and that Respondent had been charged with multiple felony
narcotics offenses under Utah law with respect to both schemes. Id.
The Show Cause Order further alleged that in 1999, Respondent had
been ``charged with felonies [under Missouri law] involving [his]
obtaining hydrocodone under a fictitious name.'' Id. The Show Cause
Order alleged that while these charges were later reduced to
misdemeanors and that Respondent had surrendered his DEA registration,
he had ``continued to abuse narcotics at levels indicating recurrent or
habitual use.'' Id.
The Show Cause Order, which notified Respondent of his right to a
hearing or to submit a statement in lieu of a hearing, was served on
him by certified mail to his registered location as evidenced by the
signed return receipt card.\1\ Since that time, neither Respondent nor
his counsel has requested a hearing on the allegations of the Show
Cause Order. Because more than thirty days have passed since service of
the Show Cause Order and neither Respondent nor his counsel has
requested a hearing, I conclude that Respondent has waived his right to
a hearing. See 21 CFR 1301.43(d). I therefore issue this Decision and
Final Order without a hearing based on relevant material contained in
the investigative file and make the following findings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Return Receipt Card does not indicate the date of
delivery. The card does, however, indicate that DEA received the
card back on August 13, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Findings
Respondent was the holder of DEA Certificate of Registration,
BR8899809, which authorized him to handle controlled
substances in schedules II through V as a practitioner. Respondent's
registration expired on April 30, 2007, and Respondent did not file a
renewal application until May 30, 2007. I thus find that Respondent did
not file a timely renewal application as required to maintain his
registration and thus does not have a current registration with the
Agency. See 5 U.S.C. 558(c). Respondent's renewal application is,
however, pending before the Agency.
Respondent previously held another DEA registration. In December
1999, however, Respondent was arrested in Brentwood, Missouri, and
charged with fraudulently attempting to obtain Vicodin Tuss, a schedule
III controlled substance which contains hydrocodone. Respondent was
allowed to plead guilty to the misdemeanor charge of engaging in
deceptive business practices and received a suspended sentence. On
November 22, 2000, Respondent also surrendered his DEA registration.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ On May 22, 2004, Respondent applied for a new registration.
On his application, Respondent disclosed the criminal proceeding,
his prior drug abuse, and that he had surrendered his earlier
registration. Respondent also stated that he had completed inpatient
rehab and a four-year monitoring program. Upon determining that the
State of Utah has issued Respondent both a medical license and a
controlled substance license, Respondent was granted a new
registration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the investigative file, at approximately 1 p.m. on
February 8, 2007, Respondent contacted one of his patients and asked
her to assist him in obtaining a narcotic controlled substance for his
wife, who he claimed had torn her anterior cruciate ligament (ACL).
Respondent asserted that other area physicians were out to get him and
that he therefore needed to write the prescription in the patient's
name. Several hours later, Respondent met with the patient at her place
of employment (an Albertson's supermarket) and gave her a prescription
for 90 pills of oxycodone 30 mg and $100 to pay for the prescription.
Later that evening, Respondent returned to the supermarket to
obtain the prescription. The patient told
[[Page 40379]]
Respondent that she did not like the situation and was scared.
Respondent told her that nothing would happen. The patient then gave
the oxycodone and $94 to Respondent. The patient again told Respondent
that she did not feel the situation was right; Respondent told her
``nothing happened.'' After a brief conversation, Respondent left.
Nine days later, another police officer received information
regarding a July 2006 incident involving Respondent and another of his
patients. According to the investigative file, Respondent had performed
shoulder surgery on this patient and issued her a prescription for 60
pills of Percocet 10/650, a schedule II controlled substance which
contains oxycodone. When the patient became ill taking the Percocet,
she saw Respondent to get a prescription for a different drug.
During this visit, Respondent told the patient that the pharmacy
had given her the wrong pills. Respondent took the Percocet from the
patient and gave her a new prescription for a smaller dose.
Subsequently, the patient asked the pharmacy about the alleged
error in the prescription. The pharmacy told her that the error was on
Respondent's part. The pharmacy also told her that the Percocet should
have been returned to the pharmacy and that the return should have been
documented. The pharmacy, however, had no documentation of the Percocet
having been returned.
Moreover, according to the investigative file, on two separate
dates in December 2006, Respondent induced a physician's assistant (PA)
student to fill prescriptions for 90 tablets of oxycodone (30 mg) and
120 tablets of oxycodone (30 mg). Respondent wrote the first
prescription in his wife's name and represented to the student that his
wife had dislocated her patella tendon. The student filled the
prescription and gave it to Respondent.
The second incident occurred on the last day of the student's
rotation. During a conversation in which Respondent and the student
discussed the possibility of his employing her, Respondent wrote out a
prescription and gave it to the student. Upon seeing the prescription,
the student remarked ``Oxycodone?'' Respondent told the student to
``chill out'' because it was Percocet with Tylenol. The student then
commented about the 30 mg strength of the pills; Respondent stated:
``you'd think if you double the strength you get double the effect, but
that isn't the case at all.'' When the student also commented about the
number of pills (120), Respondent stated that ``it would last him all
year.'' The student proceeded to fill the prescription and provided the
oxycodone to Respondent.
In late February 2007, Respondent approached another PA student
stating that his wife had injured her ACL, and that he was trying to
get her in to see a physician. Over the next several days, Respondent
kept telling the student that his wife was in pain and that he was
frustrated because he had forgotten to ask one of his colleagues to
write a prescription. Respondent also stated that because of bad
feelings, he did not believe that other physicians would write his wife
a prescription for a pain medication. Respondent eventually induced the
student to fill a prescription for 60 tablets of oxycodone (30 mg).
Local law enforcement subsequently interviewed a nurse who worked
in the recovery room at a hospital where Respondent performed
surgeries. In late July 2006, Respondent approached her, represented
that he had severe knee pain, and asked her to fill a prescription for
Percocet. The nurse agreed. Respondent wrote the prescription, which
was for 90 tablets of Percocet (10 mg), in her name. The nurse filled
the prescription and provided the drugs to Respondent.
Over the ensuing seven months, Respondent used additional scams to
induce her to fill prescriptions for him such as stating that he had
back pain, and that his wife had torn her ACL and that he could not
find a doctor to perform surgery on her. On other occasions, Respondent
told the nurse that he had wrecked his vehicle and could barely walk.
He also told her that his wife's prescription had been stolen or lost
down the drain.
Using this person, Respondent obtained a total of fifteen
prescriptions for either Percocet (10 mg) or Oxycodone (30 mg).\3\ The
size of the prescriptions was either 90 or 120 tablets.
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\3\ In one instance, the strength of the Oxycodone was 15 mg.
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On March 14, 2007, Respondent was arrested. Thereafter, on May 9,
2007, the Carbon County Attorney filed six informations against
Respondent. As relevant here, the County Attorney charged Respondent
with numerous counts of distributing or arranging the distribution of a
controlled substance, a felony offense under Utah law. See Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). The state criminal proceedings remain
pending as of the date of this Order.\4\
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\4\ The investigative file also includes a copy of the report of
a random drug test performed on Respondent on March 28, 2006.
According to the report, Respondent tested positive for both
hydrocodone and oxycodone; the levels of both drugs exceeded 5000
ng./ml. A document, which is dated March 30, 2007, and which is
attached to the report states: ``excessively high quantitative
random urine values do not reflect one time use, occasional use, or
one time therapeutic use. Such values are consistent with long
standing use and habituation.'' While the investigative file
establishes that these documents were provided by a hospital where
Respondent performed surgeries, the file does not establish the
source of the statement. Accordingly, while I accept the results of
the drug test, which showed that both hydrocodone and oxycodone were
present in Respondent, I do not rely on the statement as to what the
quantitative values establish.
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Discussion
Section 303(f) of the Controlled Substances Act provides that
``[t]he Attorney General may deny an application for [a practitioner's]
registration if he determines that the issuance of such registration
would be inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. Sec.
823(f). In making the public interest determination, the Act requires
the consideration of the following factors:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or
professional disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant's experience in dispensing * * * controlled
substances.
(3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State laws
relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled
substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws
relating to controlled substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and
safety.
Id.
``[T]hese factors are * * * considered in the disjunctive.'' Robert
A. Leslie M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I ``may rely on any one or a
combination of factors, and may give each factor the weight [I] deem[]
appropriate in determining whether a registration should be revoked.''
Id. Moreover, I am ``not required to make findings as to all of the
factors.''Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); see also
Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173-74 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Having considered the entire record and all of the factors, I
conclude that Respondent's experience in dispensing controlled
substances (factor two) and his record of non-compliance with
applicable Federal law (factor four) demonstrate that granting
Respondent's application for a new registration would be ``inconsistent
with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f).\5\ Accordingly,
Respondent's application will be denied.
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\5\ In light of my findings with respect to factors two and
four, I conclude that it is unnecessary to make findings with
respect to the remaining factors.
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Respondent's experience in dispensing controlled substances is
[[Page 40380]]
characterized by his criminal behavior in issuing numerous fraudulent
prescriptions for such highly abused controlled substances as oxycodone
and Percocet. While the record contains no information as to whether
under Utah law and regulations, a physician can ever lawfully prescribe
a controlled substance to a family member or himself, it is clear that
Respondent issued numerous fraudulent prescriptions because the
prescriptions were written in the names of persons who had no medical
need for the controlled substance, and who were, after filling the
prescription, to turn the drugs over to him.
Moreover, the stories that Respondent told to induce others to
assist him were so implausible (e.g., that no doctor would write a
prescription for, or perform surgery on, his wife) or were consistent
with classic scams engaged in by persons who seek controlled substances
for illicit purposes (e.g., that his wife's prescription had been
stolen or lost down the drain), that it is clear that the prescriptions
were written with fraudulent intent. See Randi M. Germaine, 72 FR
51665, 61666 (2007) (noting expert testimony regarding use of scams by
drug abusers seeking additional drugs such as early refill attempts and
claiming that one's drugs have been stolen).
This conduct violated Federal law. See 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3)
(rendering it ``unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally * *
* to acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance by
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge''); id.
Sec. 844(a) (``It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless such substance
was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order
from a practitioner, while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this subchapter * *
*.''). Indeed, it is particularly disturbing that Respondent was aided
in his schemes by several health care professionals.
There is also substantial evidence that Respondent was personally
abusing the drugs he obtained through his various schemes. The
urinalysis results indicated that Respondent was using both hydrocodone
and oxycodone. Moreover, when one of the PA students commented about
his seeking oxycodone, Respondent told her to ``chill out,'' because it
was Percocet with Tylenol. Moreover, when the student commented about
the strength of the pills, Respondent stated that ``you'd think if you
double the strength you get double effect, but that isn't the case,''
and also said that the 120 pills ``would last him all year.'' It is
thus clear that Respondent was once again abusing controlled
substances.
Respondent's experience in dispensing controlled substances and his
record of non-compliance with Federal controlled substance laws is thus
characterized by his issuance of numerous fraudulent prescriptions and
his personal abuse of controlled substances. These findings amply
demonstrate that Respondent cannot be entrusted with a new registration
and that granting his application would be ``inconsistent with the
public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f).
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f), as well
as 28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I order that the application of Randall
Relyea, D.O., for a DEA Certificate of Registration as a practitioner
be, and it hereby is, denied. This order is effective August 13, 2008.
Dated: June 27, 2008.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8-15923 Filed 7-11-08; 8:45 am]
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