Electronic Prescriptions for Controlled Substances, 36722-36782 [E8-14405]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 125 / Friday, June 27, 2008 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
21 CFR Parts 1300, 1304, 1306, and
1311
[Docket No. DEA–218P]
RIN 1117–AA61
Electronic Prescriptions for Controlled
Substances
Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), Department of
Justice.
ACTION: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: DEA is proposing to revise its
regulations to provide practitioners with
the option of writing prescriptions for
controlled substances electronically.
These regulations would also permit
pharmacies to receive, dispense, and
archive these electronic prescriptions.
These proposed regulations would be an
addition to, not a replacement of, the
existing rules. These regulations provide
pharmacies, hospitals, and practitioners
with the ability to use modern
technology for controlled substance
prescriptions while maintaining the
closed system of controls on controlled
substances dispensing; additionally, the
proposed regulations would reduce
paperwork for DEA registrants who
dispense or prescribe controlled
substances and have the potential to
reduce prescription forgery. The
proposed regulations would also have
the potential to reduce the number of
prescription errors caused by illegible
handwriting and misunderstood oral
prescriptions. Moreover, they would
help both pharmacies and hospitals to
integrate prescription records into other
medical records more directly, which
would increase efficiency, and would
reduce the amount of time patients
spend waiting to have their
prescriptions filled.
DATES: Written comments must be
postmarked, and electronic comments
must be sent, on or before September 25,
2008.
ADDRESSES: To ensure proper handling
of comments, please reference ‘‘Docket
No. DEA–218’’ on all written and
electronic correspondence. Written
comments sent via regular or express
mail should be sent to Drug
Enforcement Administration, Attention:
DEA Federal Register Representative/
ODL, 8701 Morrissette Drive,
Springfield, VA 22152. Comments may
be directly sent to DEA electronically by
sending an electronic message to
dea.diversion.policy@usdoj.gov.
Comments may also be sent
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electronically through https://
www.regulations.gov using the
electronic comment form provided on
that site. An electronic copy of this
document is also available at the https://
www.regulations.gov Web site. DEA will
accept electronic comments containing
MS word, WordPerfect, Adobe PDF, or
Excel files only. DEA will not accept
any file formats other than those
specifically listed here.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mark W. Caverly, Chief, Liaison and
Policy Section, Office of Diversion
Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, 8701 Morrissette Drive,
Springfield, VA 22152, Telephone (202)
307–7297.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Posting of Public Comments: Please
note that all comments received are
considered part of the public record and
made available for public inspection
online at https://www.regulations.gov
and in the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s public docket. Such
information includes personal
identifying information (such as your
name, address, etc.) voluntarily
submitted by the commenter.
If you want to submit personal
identifying information (such as your
name, address, etc.) as part of your
comment, but do not want it to be
posted online or made available in the
public docket, you must include the
phrase ‘‘PERSONAL IDENTIFYING
INFORMATION’’ in the first paragraph
of your comment. You must also place
all the personal identifying information
you do not want posted online or made
available in the public docket in the first
paragraph of your comment and identify
what information you want redacted.
If you want to submit confidential
business information as part of your
comment, but do not want it to be
posted online or made available in the
public docket, you must include the
phrase ‘‘CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS
INFORMATION’’ in the first paragraph
of your comment. You must also
prominently identify confidential
business information to be redacted
within the comment. If a comment has
so much confidential business
information that it cannot be effectively
redacted, all or part of that comment
may not be posted online or made
available in the public docket.
Personal identifying information and
confidential business information
identified and located as set forth above
will be redacted and the comment, in
redacted form, will be posted online and
placed in the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s public docket file.
Please note that the Freedom of
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Information Act applies to all comments
received. If you wish to inspect the
agency’s public docket file in person by
appointment, please see the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
paragraph.
I. Background
Legal Authority
DEA implements the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970, often referred to as the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and
the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act (21 U.S.C. 801–971), as
amended. DEA publishes the
implementing regulations for these
statutes in Title 21 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts 1300 to
1399. These regulations are designed to
ensure an adequate supply of controlled
substances for legitimate medical,
scientific, research, and industrial
purposes, and to deter the diversion of
controlled substances to illegal
purposes. The CSA mandates that DEA
establish a closed system of control for
manufacturing, distributing, and
dispensing controlled substances. Any
person who manufactures, distributes,
dispenses, imports, exports, or conducts
research or chemical analysis with
controlled substances must register with
DEA (unless exempt) and comply with
the applicable requirements for the
activity.
Controlled Substances
Controlled substances are drugs that
have a potential for abuse and
psychological and physical dependence;
these include opiates, stimulants,
depressants, hallucinogens, anabolic
steroids, and drugs that are immediate
precursors of these classes of
substances. DEA lists controlled
substances in 21 CFR part 1308. The
substances are divided into five
schedules: Schedule I substances have a
high potential for abuse and have no
accepted medical use in treatment in the
United States. These substances may
only be used for research, chemical
analysis, or manufacture of other drugs.
Schedule II–V substances have accepted
medical uses and also have potential for
abuse and psychological and physical
dependence. Virtually all Schedule II–V
controlled substances are available only
under a prescription written by a
practitioner licensed by the State and
registered with DEA to dispense the
substances. Overall, controlled
substances constitute between 10
percent and 11 percent of all
prescriptions written in the United
States.
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 125 / Friday, June 27, 2008 / Proposed Rules
History
The CSA and DEA’s regulations were
originally adopted at a time when most
transactions and particularly
prescriptions were done on paper. The
CSA mandates that some records must
be created and kept on forms that DEA
provides and that many controlled
substance prescriptions must be
manually signed. In 1999, in response to
requests from the regulated community,
DEA began to examine how to revise its
regulations to allow the use of electronic
systems within the limits imposed by
the statute and mindful that the records
had to be usable in legal actions. On
April 1, 2005, after extensive
consultation with the regulated
community, DEA published a final rule
that allowed the electronic creation,
signature, transmission, and retention of
records of orders for Schedule I and II
controlled substances, orders that prior
to that time had to be created on
preprinted forms that DEA issued (70
FR 16901, April 1, 2005).
At the same time, DEA began to
examine how to revise its rules to allow
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances. In addition to complying
with the mandates of the CSA,
regulations on electronic prescriptions
must be consistent with other statutory
mandates and Federal regulations. The
Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act of 2000,
commonly known as E-Sign, was signed
into law on June 30, 2000 (Pub. L. 106–
229). It establishes the basic rules for
using electronic signatures and records
in commerce. E-Sign was enacted to
encourage electronic commerce by
giving legal effect to electronic
signatures and records and to protect
consumers. E-Sign provides that, with
respect to any transaction in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce, a
signature may not be denied legal effect
solely because it is in electronic form
(15 U.S.C. 7001(a)). However, E-Sign
further provides that, where a statute or
regulation requires retention of a record,
and an electronic record is used to meet
such requirement, Federal, State, and
local agencies may set performance
standards to ensure accuracy, record
integrity, and accessibility of records (15
U.S.C. 7004(b)(3)(A)). Such performance
standards may be specified in a manner
that requires the implementation of a
specific technology if such requirement
serves an important governmental
objective and is substantially related to
that objective interest (Id.).
In 2003, Congress enacted the
Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act
(MMA) (Pub. L. 108–173). Section
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1860D–4(e) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
1395w–104(e)) contains the requirement
that the electronic transmission of
prescriptions and prescription-related
information for covered Part D drugs
prescribed for Part D eligible
individuals comply with final uniform
standards adopted by the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). One of the
considerations in support of this move
to electronic prescriptions was the view
that using electronic prescriptions in
lieu of written or oral prescriptions
could reduce medical errors that occur
because handwriting is illegible or
phoned in prescriptions are
misunderstood as a result of similar
sounding medication names. Another
consideration is that, if prescription
records are linked to other medical
records, practitioners can be alerted at
the time of prescribing to possible
interactions with other drugs the patient
is taking or allergies a patient might
have. Electronic prescribing systems
also can link to insurance formulary
lists to inform the practitioner prior to
prescribing whether a drug is covered
by a patient’s insurance.
HHS adopted a rule on the
transmission standard for electronic
prescriptions in November 2005 (70 FR
67593, November 7, 2005) and revised
it on June 23, 2006 (71 FR 36023). The
standard focuses on the format for the
transmitted information, not with the
process of creating the prescription or
maintaining the record at the pharmacy.
HHS adopted the National Council of
Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP)
SCRIPT Standard, Implementation
Guide, Version 8.1. The standard
specifies fields (name, date, address,
etc.) and field lengths for certain
transactions including issuing new
prescriptions and refills. The rule
applies to prescriptions issued to
patients under Part D (the prescription
drug program for Medicare patients).
The rule does not require practitioners
or pharmacies to use electronic
prescriptions, but rather requires that
companies that sponsor Part D coverage
establish and maintain an electronic
prescription program that meets the
standard. The purpose of the standard is
to ensure that electronic prescriptions
are created and transmitted in a format
that can be read by the receiving
pharmacy (i.e., that the systems
creating, transmitting, and receiving the
prescriptions are interoperable).
The rule DEA is hereby proposing has
been written to be consistent with the
foregoing HHS standard. However, it
bears emphasis that the context in
which the HHS standard was issued was
not specific to controlled substances
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and therefore not designed to provide
safeguards against the diversion of
controlled substances. The
responsibility for establishing regulatory
safeguards against diversion of
controlled substances falls upon DEA as
the agency charged with administering
and enforcing the CSA. Accordingly,
while the rule being proposed here by
DEA is designed to work in tandem with
the HHS standard, its scope is
necessarily distinct from the HHS
standard.
Prescription records and transmission
are also subject to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), which establishes protection
for health information. Any party to the
creation, transmission, and storage of
prescriptions must meet standards to
ensure that the information is protected
and not revealed to persons who are not
authorized to see it. Health Plans,
Health Care Clearinghouses, and
covered Health Care Providers that are
involved in the transmission of
prescriptions must comply with HIPAA
standards, which are codified at 45 CFR
parts 160, 162, and 164. Because of the
wide variety of healthcare providers
subject to HIPAA, the requirements are
general to allow the providers to adopt
protections that are appropriate for their
situations. For example, the security
steps needed at a one-practitioner office
will be very different from those needed
at a large hospital system or chain
pharmacy system. The DEA rule being
issued here is consistent with HIPAA
security guidance issued by HHS, as
explained later in this document.
Because both DEA and HHS are
involved in addressing electronic
prescriptions, they held a joint public
meeting on July 11 and 12, 2006, to
gather information from the regulated
community (practitioners and
pharmacies) as well as from the
prescription and pharmacy service
providers, technical experts, and
Federal, State, and local law
enforcement. The meeting record is
available at https://
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/ecomm/
e_rx/mtgs/july2006/.
Based on the meeting and on the
requirements of the CSA and the other
applicable provisions of law outlined
above, DEA has developed this
proposed rule. As the proposed rule
illustrates, DEA supports the adoption
of electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances in a manner that will
minimize the risk of diversion. In the
absence of appropriate controls,
allowing electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances could exacerbate
the already increasing problem of
prescription controlled substance abuse
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in the United States, as discussed
further below. It is also essential that the
rules governing the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances do
not undermine the ability of DEA, State,
and local law enforcement to identify
and prosecute those who engage in
diversion.
The remainder of this preamble for
the rule is organized as follows:
Section II discusses the framework of
pertinent provisions of the CSA and
DEA regulations to provide a context for
this proposed rule.
Section III describes the current
requirements for controlled substance
prescriptions.
Section IV discusses the existing
electronic prescription and pharmacy
systems.
Section V discusses potential
vulnerabilities that need to be addressed
to prevent electronic prescribing from
contributing to the diversion of
controlled substances.
Section VI discusses alternatives
considered.
Section VII discusses the risk
assessment DEA conducted regarding
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances.
Section VIII describes the proposed
rule and the rationale for the
requirements DEA is proposing to
impose on prescription and pharmacy
systems that create, process, and archive
controlled substance prescriptions.
Section IX provides a summary of the
proposed rule requirements and their
current implementation status.
Section X is a section-by-section
analysis of the proposed rule.
Section XI describes a system for the
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances that DEA is proposing
specifically for use by Federal health
care agencies (including the United
States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air
Force, Coast Guard, Department of
Veterans Affairs, Public Health Service,
and Bureau of Prisons). These agencies
would be permitted to use either system
for controlled substances prescribing
and dispensing.
Section XII discusses the
incorporation by reference of one
standard published by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
Section XIII presents the required
analyses on the economic and other
impacts of the proposed rule.
II. Framework of the Pertinent
Provisions of the CSA and DEA
Regulations
In enacting the CSA, Congress sought
to control the diversion of
pharmaceutical controlled substances
into illicit markets by establishing a
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‘‘closed system’’ of drug distribution
governing the legitimate handlers of
controlled substances. H. Rep. No. 91–
1444, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4566, 4571–72. Under this closed
system, all legitimate manufacturers,
distributors, and dispensers of
controlled substances must register with
DEA and maintain strict accounting for
all controlled substance transactions
(Id.).
The CSA defines ‘‘dispense’’ to
include, among other things, the
issuance of a prescription by a
practitioner as well as the delivery of a
controlled substance to a patient by a
pharmacy pursuant to a prescription (21
U.S.C. 802(10)). Thus, both practitioners
who prescribe controlled substances
and pharmacies that fill such
prescriptions must obtain a DEA
registration (21 U.S.C. 822(a)(2)). The
CSA definition of practitioner (21 U.S.C.
802(21)) includes, among others,
physicians, dentists, veterinarians,
pharmacies, and, where authorized by
an appropriate State authority,
physician assistants and advance
practice nurses.
It is important to reiterate here that
DEA registers pharmacies, as opposed to
pharmacists. As a rule, pharmacists
themselves do not have the authority to
independently prescribe controlled
substances. Rather, pharmacists rely on
the prescription, as written by the
individual practitioner, for authority to
conduct the dispensing.
Under longstanding Federal law, for a
prescription for a controlled substance
to be valid, it must be issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by a
practitioner acting in the usual course of
professional practice (United States v.
Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975); 21 CFR
1306.04(a)). As the DEA regulations
state: ‘‘The responsibility for the proper
prescribing and dispensing of controlled
substances is upon the prescribing
practitioner, but a corresponding
responsibility rests with the pharmacist
who fills the prescription.’’ (21 CFR
1306.04(a)).
The CSA provides that a controlled
substance in Schedule II may only be
dispensed by a pharmacy pursuant to a
‘‘written prescription,’’ except in
emergency situations (21 U.S.C. 829(a)).
In contrast, for controlled substances in
Schedules III and IV, the CSA provides
that a pharmacy may dispense pursuant
to a ‘‘written or oral prescription.’’ (21
U.S.C. 829(b)). Where an oral
prescription is permitted by the CSA,
the DEA regulations further provide that
a practitioner may transmit to the
pharmacy a facsimile of a written
prescription in lieu of an oral
prescription (21 CFR 1306.21(a)).
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Enforcement of the Controlled
Substances Act
The Controlled Substances Act is
unique among criminal laws in that it
stipulates acts pertaining to controlled
substances that are permissible. That is,
if the CSA does not explicitly permit an
action pertaining to a controlled
substance, then by its lack of explicit
permissibility the act is prohibited.
Violations of the Act can be civil or
criminal in nature, which may result in
administrative, civil, or criminal
proceedings. Remedies under the Act
can range from modification or
revocation of DEA registration, to civil
monetary penalties or imprisonment,
depending on the nature, scope, and
extent of the violation.
Specifically, it is unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance or to possess a
controlled substance with the intent of
manufacturing, distributing, or
dispensing that controlled substance,
except as authorized by the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)).
Further, it is unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to possess a
controlled substance unless such
substance was obtained directly, or
pursuant to a valid prescription or
order, issued for a legitimate medical
purpose, from a practitioner, while
acting in the course of the practitioner’s
professional practice, or except as
otherwise authorized by the CSA (21
U.S.C. 844(a)). It is unlawful for any
person to knowingly or intentionally
acquire or obtain possession of a
controlled substance by
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery,
deception, or subterfuge (21 U.S.C.
843(a)(3)).
It is unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to use a DEA
registration number that is fictitious,
revoked, suspended, expired, or issued
to another person in the course of
dispensing a controlled substance, or for
the purpose of acquiring or obtaining a
controlled substance (21 U.S.C.
843(a)(2)).
Beyond these possession and
dispensing requirements, it is unlawful
for any person to refuse or negligently
fail to make, keep, or furnish any record
(including any record of dispensing)
that is required by the CSA (21 U.S.C.
842(a)(5)). It is also unlawful to furnish
any false or fraudulent material
information in, or omit any information
from, any record required to be made or
kept (21 U.S.C. 843(a)(4)(A)).
Within the CSA’s system of controls,
it is the individual practitioner (e.g.,
physician, dentist, veterinarian, nurse
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practitioner) who issues the prescription
authorizing the dispensing of the
controlled substance. This prescription
must be issued for a legitimate medical
purpose and must be issued in the usual
course of professional practice. The
individual practitioner is responsible for
ensuring that the prescription conforms
to all legal requirements. The
pharmacist, acting under the authority
of the DEA-registered pharmacy, has a
corresponding responsibility to ensure
that the prescription is valid and meets
all legal requirements. The DEAregistered pharmacy does not order the
dispensing. Rather, the pharmacy, and
the dispensing pharmacist, merely rely
on the prescription as written by the
DEA-registered individual practitioner
to conduct the dispensing.
Thus, a prescription is much more
than the mere method of transmitting
dispensing information from a
practitioner to a pharmacy. The
prescription serves both as a record of
the practitioner’s determination of the
legitimate medical need for the drug to
be dispensed, and as a record of the
dispensing, providing the pharmacy
with the legal justification and authority
to dispense the medication prescribed
by the practitioner. The prescription
also provides a record of the actual
dispensing of the controlled substance
to the ultimate user (the patient) and,
therefore, is critical to documenting that
controlled substances held by a
pharmacy have been dispensed legally.
The maintenance by pharmacies of
complete and accurate prescription
records is an essential part of the overall
CSA regulatory scheme established by
Congress, wherein all those within the
legitimate distribution chain must
strictly account for all controlled
substances on hand, as well as those
received, sold, delivered, or otherwise
disposed of (21 U.S.C. 827). The CSA
recordkeeping requirements for
prescriptions are somewhat unusual in
that the practitioner is not required to
maintain a record of prescriptions
written; instead, the record is held only
by the pharmacy.
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Abuse of Controlled Substances
The level of control mandated by
Congress for controlled substances far
exceeds that for other prescription drugs
commensurate with the facts that
controlled substances can cause
physical and psychological dependence
and have historically been abused.
Several studies of drug abuse patterns
indicate that nonmedical use of
prescription controlled substances
(those in Schedules II through V) is an
increasing problem even as the use of
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certain Schedule I substances appears to
have declined somewhat in recent years.
The National Survey on Drug Use and
Health (NSDUH) (formerly the National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse) is an
annual survey of the civilian, noninstitutionalized, population of the
United States aged 12 or older. The
survey is conducted by the Office of
Applied Studies, Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration,
of the Department of Health and Human
Services. Findings from the 2006
NSDUH were released in September
2007 and are the latest year for which
information is currently available.
The 2006 NSDUH 1 estimated that
20.4 million Americans were classified
with substance dependence or abuse
(8.3 percent of the total population aged
12 or older). Further, the 2006 NSDUH
estimated that 6.7 million persons were
current users, i.e., past 30 days, of
psychotherapeutic drugs—pain
relievers, anti-anxiety medications,
stimulants, and sedatives—taken
nonmedically. This represents 2.8
percent of the population aged 12 or
older. Specifically, the NSDUH
estimated that 5.2 million persons used
pain relievers, 1.8 million used
tranquilizers, 1.2 million used
stimulants, and 0.4 million used
sedatives. Except for tranquilizers, these
estimates are increases from the
corresponding estimates for 2005.
According to the NSDUH, more than
20 percent of persons age 12 or older
have used psychotherapeutic drugs
nonmedically in their lifetime. Overall,
33 million Americans are estimated to
have used prescription pain killers for
nonmedical reasons in their lifetime.
Specific pain relievers with statistically
significant increases in lifetime use for
18 to 25 year olds between 2003 and
2006 were the Schedule III controlled
substances Vicodin, Lortab, or
Lorcet (from 15.0 percent to 18
percent); Schedule III controlled
substances containing hydrocodone
(from 16.3 percent to 19.2 percent); the
Schedule II controlled substance
OxyContin (from 3.6 percent to 5.1
percent); and the Schedule II controlled
substances containing oxycodone (from
8.9 percent to 10.8 percent).
Results of a separate study of seventh
through twelfth grade students were
released April 21, 2005, by the
Partnership for a Drug-Free America.
The Partnership Attitude Tracking
1 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration. (2007). Results From the 2006
National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National
Findings (Office of Applied Studies, NSDUH Series
H–32, DHHS Publication No. SMA 07–4293).
Rockville, MD. https://www.oas.samhsa.gov/
nhsda.htm.
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Study 2 tracks consumers’ exposure to
and attitudes about drugs. The study
focuses on perceived risk and social
attitudes. For the first time in its
seventeen-year history, the study found
that teenagers are more likely to have
abused a prescription pain medication
to get high than they are to have
experimented with a variety of illicit
drugs including Ecstasy, cocaine, crack
and LSD. In 2004, the study reported
that nearly one in five teenagers, 18
percent, or 4.3 million teenagers
nationally, indicated they have used the
Schedule III controlled substance
Vicodin without a prescription.
Approximately ten percent of teens, or
2.3 million teens nationally, reported
using the Schedule II controlled
substance OxyContin without a
prescription. Further, the study reported
that ten percent, or 2.3 million teenagers
nationally, reported having used
prescription stimulants, Ritalin and/or
Adderall, without a prescription. The
2005 survey indicated that 50 percent of
the teenagers surveyed indicated that
prescription drugs are widely available;
a third indicated that they were easy to
purchase over the Internet.
The 2006 National Institute of Drug
Abuse survey of drug use by teens in the
eighth, tenth, and twelfth grades,
Monitoring the Future: National Results
on Adolescent Drug Use 3, found that
past-year nonmedical use of Vicodin
(Schedule III) remained high among all
three grades, with nearly one in ten high
school seniors using it in the past year.
Despite a drop from 2005 to 2006 in
past-year abuse of OxyContin among
twelfth graders (from 5.5 percent to 4.3
percent), there has been no such decline
among the eighth and tenth grade
students, and the rate of use among the
youngest students has increased
significantly since it was included in
the survey in 2002.
The consequences of prescription
drug abuse are seen in the data collected
by the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration on
emergency room visits. In the latest
data, Drug Abuse Warning Network
(DAWN), 2005: National Estimates of
Drug-Related Emergency Department
Visits,4 SAMHSA estimates that about
2 Partnership for a Drug-Free America;
Partnership Attitude Tracking study, 2005; https://
www.drugfree.org/Portal/DrugIssue/Research/.
3 Johnston, L. D., O’Malley, P. M., Bachman, J. G.,
and Schulenberg, J. E. (2007). Monitoring the Future
national results on adolescent drug use: Overview
of key findings, 2006. (NIH Publication No. 07–
6202). Bethesda, MD: National Institute on Drug
Abuse; https://www.monitoringthefuture.org/
pubs.html.
4 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, Office of Applied Studies. Drug
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599,000 emergency department visits
involved nonmedical use of prescription
or over-the-counter drugs or dietary
supplements, a 21 percent increase over
2004. Of the 599,000 visits, 172,000
involved benzodiazepines (Schedule IV)
and 196,000 involved opiates (Schedule
II and III). Overall, controlled
substances represented 66 percent of the
estimated emergency department visits.
Between 2004 and 2005, the number of
visits involving opiates increased 24
percent and the number involving
benzodiazepines increased 19 percent.
About a third (200,000) of all visits
involving nonmedical use of
pharmaceuticals resulted in admission
to the hospital; about 66,000 of those
individuals were admitted to critical
care units; 1,365 of the visits ended with
the death of the patient. More than half
of the visits involved patients 35 and
older.
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Means by Which Controlled Substances
Are Diverted
Understanding the means by which
controlled substances are diverted is
critical to determining appropriate
regulatory controls. Diversion of
prescription controlled substances can
occur in a number of ways, including,
but not limited to, the following:
• Prescription pads are stolen from
practitioners’ offices by patients, staff,
or others and illegitimate prescriptions
are written.
• Legitimate prescriptions are altered
to obtain additional amounts of
legitimately prescribed controlled
substances.
• Drug-seeking patients may falsify
symptoms and/or obtain multiple
prescriptions from different
practitioners for their own use or for
resale. In some cases, organized groups
visit practitioners with fake symptoms
to obtain prescriptions, which are filled
and resold. Some patients resell their
legitimately obtained drugs to earn extra
money.
• Prescription pads containing
legitimate practitioner information (e.g.,
name, address, DEA registration
number) are printed with a different call
back number that is answered by an
accomplice to verify the prescription.
• Computers and scanning or copying
equipment are used to create
prescriptions for nonexistent
practitioners or to copy legitimate
practitioners’ prescriptions.
Abuse Warning Network, 2005: National Estimates
of Drug-Related Emergency Department Visits.
DAWN Series D–29, DHHS Publication No. (SMA)
07–4256, Rockville, MD, 2007; https://
dawninfo.samhsa.gov/pubs/edpubs/default.asp.
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• Pharmacies and other locations
where controlled substances are stored
are robbed or burglarized.
Diversion from within the
practitioner’s practice or pharmacy may
also occur, such as in the following
situations:
• Prescriptions are written for other
than a legitimate medical purpose.
Some practitioners knowingly write
prescriptions for nonmedical purposes.
Criminal organizations commonly
referred to as ‘‘rogue Internet
pharmacies’’ often employ practitioners
to issue prescriptions based on online
questionnaires from patients with whom
the practitioner has no legitimate
medical relationship.
• Controlled substances are stolen
from a pharmacy by pharmacy
personnel. Legitimately dispensed
prescriptions may be altered to make the
thefts less detectable.
• Legitimate prescriptions may be
stolen from legitimate patients. The
stolen legitimate prescriptions may be
filled by persons addicted to or abusing
controlled substances.
Given these common methods of
diversion, as well as the alarmingly
increasing extent of prescription
controlled substance abuse in the
United States, many of those at the
DEA/HHS public meeting in 2006,
particularly representatives of Federal
and state law enforcement and
regulatory agencies, emphasized that
any system allowing the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances
must have sufficient safeguards to
prevent contributing further to the
diversion problem in this country.
Indeed, this is true regardless of the
means used to divert controlled
substances in the paper-based system,
because electronic prescribing of
controlled substances could, if not
properly implemented, present another
means of diversion in addition to those
listed above. However, with proper
controls, the risk of diversion can
actually be reduced through the use of
electronic prescriptions. Among the
essential elements of such a system are
ensuring that only DEA registrants
electronically sign and authorize
controlled substance prescriptions and
that the prescription record cannot be
altered without the alteration being
detectable. A system that fails to
provide verification of the signer’s
identity and authority to issue
controlled substance prescriptions, and/
or fails to ensure that alteration of the
record is detectable, would create new
routes of diversion that could be even
harder to prevent and detect.
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III. Current Requirements for
Prescriptions for Controlled Substances
As noted above, the CSA requires
that, except in limited emergency
circumstances, a pharmacist may only
dispense a Schedule II controlled
substance pursuant to a written
prescription from a practitioner (21
U.S.C. 829(a)). For Schedule III and IV
controlled substances, a pharmacist may
dispense the controlled substance
pursuant to a written or oral
prescription from a practitioner (21
U.S.C. 829(b)). Every written
prescription must be signed by the
practitioner in the same way the
practitioner would sign a check or other
legal document, e.g., ‘‘John H. Smith’’ or
‘‘J.H. Smith’’ (21 CFR 1306.05). A
prescription for a controlled substance
may be issued only by an individual
practitioner who is authorized to
prescribe by the State in which he is
licensed to practice and is registered, or
exempted from registration, with DEA
(21 U.S.C. 822, 823). To be valid, a
prescription must be written for a
legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of professional practice; a
corresponding responsibility rests with
the pharmacist who fills the
prescription (21 CFR 1306.04). An order
purporting to be a prescription issued
not in the usual course of professional
treatment is not a prescription within
the meaning and intent of the
Controlled Substances Act, and the
person knowingly filling such a
purported prescription, as well as the
person issuing it, is subject to the
penalties provided for violations of the
provisions of law relating to controlled
substances.
Longstanding DEA regulations specify
that each controlled substance
prescription contain certain information
including the practitioner’s manual
signature (21 CFR 1306.05). The manual
signature affixed to the controlled
substance prescription by the
practitioner serves as formal attestation
by the practitioner that the prescription
has been written for a legitimate
medical purpose and affirms the
practitioner’s authority to prescribe the
controlled substance in question. The
prescribing practitioner is responsible in
case the prescription does not conform
in all essential respects to the law and
regulations. Further, a corresponding
liability rests upon the pharmacist who
fills a prescription not prepared in the
form prescribed by DEA regulations (21
CFR 1306.05).
A prescription may be filled only by
a pharmacist acting in the usual course
of professional practice who is
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employed in a registered pharmacy (21
CFR 1306.06). Except under limited
circumstances, a pharmacist may
dispense a Schedule II controlled
substance only upon receipt of the
original written prescription manually
signed by the practitioner (21 U.S.C.
829, 21 CFR 1306.11). A pharmacist
may dispense a Schedule III or IV
controlled substance only pursuant to a
written and manually signed
prescription from an individual
practitioner, which is presented directly
or transmitted via facsimile to the
pharmacist, or an oral prescription,
which the pharmacist promptly reduces
to writing containing all of the
information required to be in a
prescription, except the signature of the
practitioner (21 U.S.C. 829, 21 CFR
1306.21).
Every prescription must be initialed
and dated by the pharmacist filling the
prescription (21 CFR 1304.22(c)). Under
many circumstances, pharmacists are
required to note certain specific
information regarding dispensing on the
prescription or recorded in a separate
document referencing the prescription
before the prescription is placed in the
pharmacy’s prescription records.
DEA requires the registered pharmacy
to maintain records of each dispensing
for two years from the date of
dispensing of the controlled substance
(21 U.S.C. 827(b), 21 CFR 1304.04).
However, many States require that these
records be maintained for longer periods
of time. These records must be made
available for inspection and copying by
authorized employees of DEA (21 U.S.C.
827(b)). This system of records is unique
in that the prescribing practitioner
creates the prescription, but the
dispensing pharmacy retains the record.
The signature requirement for written
prescriptions for controlled substances
provides DEA with reliable evidence
needed to enforce the CSA in
administrative, civil, and criminal legal
proceedings. In criminal proceedings for
violations of the CSA, the Government
must prove the violation beyond a
reasonable doubt. As the agency
responsible for monitoring compliance
with the regulatory requirements of the
CSA, it is essential that DEA have the
ability to determine whether a given
prescription for a controlled substance
was, in fact, signed by the practitioner
whose name appears on the
prescription. It is likewise essential that
DEA have the ability to determine that
a prescription that has been filled by a
pharmacy was not altered after it was
prepared by the practitioner. Further,
because DEA relies on the records of
these prescriptions in the conduct of
investigations, DEA must also know that
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the prescription has not been altered
after receipt by the pharmacy.
The elements of the prescription that
identify the practitioner (the
practitioner’s name, address, DEA
registration number, and signature) also
serve to enable the pharmacy to
authenticate the prescription. If a
pharmacy is unfamiliar with the
practitioner, it can use the registration
number to verify the identity of the
practitioner through publicly available
records. Those same records would
indicate to the pharmacy whether the
practitioner has the authority to
prescribe the schedule of the controlled
substance in question.
Requiring that the original documents
be maintained in paper form serves to
support both the accuracy and integrity
of each record and, thus, the accuracy
and integrity of the system of records as
a whole. The availability of the original
written and manually signed
prescription provides a level of
document integrity and provides
physical evidence if the record has been
altered: alterations of a hard-copy record
are usually apparent upon close
examination. A forensic examination of
a prescription can prove that a
practitioner signed it or, equally
important, that the practitioner did not
sign it. The maintenance of the paper
record at a pharmacy also ensures that
State and local law enforcement
agencies have access to records they
need for investigations. In addition,
there will be a limited number of
pharmacy employees who will have
annotated the record and can testify that
the prescription is, in fact, the
prescription they received and
dispensed.
IV. Existing Electronic Prescription
Systems
At present, there are more than 110
service providers that offer systems to
generate electronic prescriptions and
approximately 20 that handle the
receipt of prescriptions at pharmacies.5
The electronic capabilities of
practitioners’ offices and pharmacies
and the systems used are considerably
different. Both types of systems,
however, can be classified in the same
ways. Systems may be stand-alone
software that only handle prescriptions
or integrated into larger management
systems. In general, pharmacy systems
are part of larger pharmacy management
systems. Most electronic prescription
systems are now integrated into larger
5 Estimates are based on the number of systems
certified by SureScripts plus the number of
electronic medical record systems certified by the
Certification Commission for Health Information
Technology.
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electronic health records (EHR) systems;
existing stand-alone systems may be
integrated into EHR systems in the
future.6 7
Systems may also be installed on a
practice or pharmacy computers or may
be operated by application service
providers (ASPs). In the ASP model, the
program is retained on the ASP servers
and the user accesses the system using
leased lines or over the Internet. The
ASP retains the records generated. Many
pharmacy systems are installed at the
pharmacy, but larger chains often
operate like an ASP, holding the records
on a central server that any pharmacy in
the chain may access. Many practitioner
stand-alone electronic prescription
systems are ASPs. Because practitioners
want to be able to access the system
when they are out of the office, access
is usually over the Internet.
Practitioners log on to the system using
the same kinds of identification
mechanisms as other online business
sites (passwords, user IDs).
Pharmacy Systems. Almost all
pharmacies have computerized
prescription records, which are
integrated into overall pharmacy
management systems that process
insurance claims and billings. When a
pharmacy receives a prescription on
paper or by phone, the pharmacist or
technician keys the information on the
prescription into the system; if the
patient has had other prescriptions
filled at that pharmacy, the patient’s
personal identifying information is
already in the system and does not have
to be rekeyed.
Many pharmacy systems have been
reprogrammed to be able to capture the
data from electronic prescriptions
directly. Although many pharmacies
have the ability to accept electronic
prescriptions, few such prescriptions
are sent currently. Many of the
‘‘electronic prescriptions’’ generated are
in fact transmitted to the pharmacy as
faxes or simply printed out and given to
6 National Alliance on Health Information
Technology, ‘‘Report to the office of the National
Coordinator on Health Information Technology on
Defining Key Health Information Technology
Terms’’, April 28, 2008. https://www.nahit.org/cms/
images/docs/hittermsfinalreportl051508.pdf.
7 The National Alliance for Health Information
Technology has defined the terms ‘‘electronic
Medical record (EMR),’’ ‘‘electronic health record
(EHR),’’ and ‘‘personal health record (PHR).’’ Both
EMRs and EHRs are defined to be maintained by
practitioners, whereas a PHR is defined to be
maintained by the individual patient. The main
distinction between an EMR and an EHR is the
EHR’s ability to exchange information
interoperably. DEA’s use of the term EHR in this
rule relates to those records maintained by
practitioners, as opposed to a PHR maintained by
an individual patient, regardless of how those
records are maintained.
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the patient. Renewals are more likely to
be handled electronically than original
prescriptions. Nonetheless, the
capability to accept electronic
prescriptions is widespread in the
pharmacy sector.
Practitioner Electronic Prescription
Systems. Electronic prescription
systems for practitioners have existed
for a number of years, but are still not
widely used. A Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) study of
electronic medical record (EMR) system
use in 2006 found that about 12 percent
of physicians have the ability to send
prescriptions electronically using their
EMR system.8 The number of those
systems that are used or that generate
true electronic prescriptions is unclear.
A Rand Health study of 58 electronic
prescribing systems found that only 58
percent allowed electronic transmission
of the prescriptions (as a data file),
while almost all produced printed
prescriptions and most could generate
faxes.9 The CDC study indicated that the
electronic prescribing function is one of
the less used functions of EMRs.
As noted above, many electronic
prescription systems are Web-based
ASPs. The ASP maintains the records,
which reduces the initial cost to the
practice by limiting the investment in
hardware and connections. The ASP
enrolls a practice, issues keys or sets up
other authentication mechanisms,
which allow the practitioner to log onto
the system from any location. Most ASP
systems and some installed systems can
be accessed using PDAs and other
handheld devices. Because many office
staff may need to access the systems,
many service providers also set different
levels of authority so that only
practitioners may sign prescriptions; the
ability to support varying access levels
is a requirement for EHR certification
for systems certified by the Certification
Commission for Healthcare Information
Technology (CCHIT). Over the long
term, it is generally assumed that standalone electronic prescription systems
will be integrated into or replaced by
electronic health record (EHR) systems.
In this way, data on prescriptions will
be automatically added to a patient’s
records. This shift to EHRs is occurring
rapidly. Of the 119 systems certified by
SureScripts or CCHIT at the end of
8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
‘‘Electronic Medical Record Use by Office-Based
Physicians and Their Practices: United States
2006.’’ Advance Data from Vital and Health
Statistics, Number 393, October 26, 2007.
9 Wang, C. Jason et al., ‘‘Functional
Characteristics of Commercial Ambulatory
Electronic Prescribing Systems: A Field Study,’’
Journal of the American Medical Informatics
Association, 2005; 12:346–356.
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2007, 103 were EHRs. DEA welcomes
comments on the protections currently
implemented in the systems referenced
above to protect against noncontrolled
substance prescription forgery, fraud,
and other related crimes, and what riskmitigating controls are in place.
DEA also seeks comment as to
whether up-to-date information or
statistics are available regarding
physicians’ ability to send
noncontrolled substance prescriptions
electronically using their EHR systems
and usage of such system functionality.
When providing comments regarding
this or any other request in this NPRM,
commenters should clearly cite the
source of the information, the origin of
the data, the methodology or analytical
techniques used to derive the
information, and the limitations of the
information, so that DEA may determine
the quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity of any data or information
provided.
Intermediaries. With so many
electronic prescription systems and
pharmacy systems, the issue of
interoperability is critical. Electronic
prescriptions will be of limited value to
pharmacies if their systems cannot read
the prescription and translate the data
directly into their databases. To deal
with this issue, the National Council for
Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP)
has established a standard format for
prescriptions, NCPDP SCRIPT standard
in XML (current version is 10, but
version 8.1 is the standard that
Medicare specifies). Despite the
standard, interoperability problems are
likely to continue as both practitioner
and pharmacy systems may be using
different platforms and different
versions of SCRIPT. At present, the
interoperability problem is solved by
using intermediaries that reformat the
prescription so that the receiving
pharmacy will be able to process it
electronically.
Electronic prescriptions are
transmitted through not one, but a series
of intermediaries. The first recipient,
once the prescription is signed, may be
the ASP or an aggregator that the
electronic prescription system uses.
This recipient assigns a trace number to
the electronic prescription that becomes
part of the prescription record. The ASP
or aggregator generally will transmit it
to SureScripts or a similar intermediary.
SureScripts is a service established by
the pharmacy industry to reformat the
prescriptions so the receiving
pharmacy’s system can process them
without rekeying the information.
SureScripts certifies both pharmacy and
practitioner service providers, to ensure
that the data it receives will be
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translatable into other formats.
SureScripts may transmit the
reformatted electronic prescription
directly to a pharmacy, the central
server of a chain pharmacy, or the ASP
pharmacy management system, which
then routes the prescription to the
pharmacy for ultimate dispensing. DEA
welcomes comments on the protections
currently implemented by
intermediaries to protect against
noncontrolled substance prescription
forgery, fraud, and other related crimes,
and what risk-mitigating controls are in
place. DEA also welcomes comments
regarding the current standards and
practices used by network
intermediaries to route noncontrolled
substance electronic prescriptions and
whether such networks allow or provide
the capability to ‘‘open’’ an electronic
prescription that is en route.
Hospitals. A final complexity to the
electronic prescription network arises
from practitioners who serve on the staff
of hospitals. Two technical issues exist
with any electronic prescriptions these
practitioners may write. First, hospital
electronic record systems are written in
computer languages other than SCRIPT,
often HL7. If a staff practitioner writes
an electronic prescription for a patient
to fill at a pharmacy outside of the
hospital, the intermediaries or
pharmacies have to be able to translate
the electronic prescriptions from HL7 to
their own computer system language.
Second, staff practitioners are not
required to register with DEA. They are
allowed to issue prescriptions under the
hospital DEA registration number with
a hospital-assigned extension that
identifies the specific person issuing the
prescription. DEA does not dictate the
format of the extension. In at least some
cases, pharmacy computer systems have
not been able to handle the extensions.
V. Potential Vulnerabilities That Need
To Be Addressed To Prevent Electronic
Prescribing From Contributing to the
Diversion of Controlled Substances
Many parties in the healthcare
industry are encouraging the adoption
of electronic prescriptions because such
prescriptions have the potential to
improve patient safety by eliminating
medical errors that arise from misread
or misunderstood prescriptions and
eliminating adverse events that result
from drug interactions. They can also
control costs by ensuring that more
drugs prescribed are covered by
formularies or are generic versions.
Although DEA also supports
electronic prescribing, the
Administration faces some challenges as
it moves into an electronic world. A
recent study conducted for HHS by the
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American Health Information
Management Association 10 noted that
‘‘e-prescribing presents a new
vulnerability because of the increased
velocity of authenticated automated
transactions.’’ Unless an electronic
prescription system is properly
designed, DEA’s ability to prevent
diversion and take legal action against
those who violate the CSA could be
seriously undermined.
As discussed above, with the paperbased system, the paper records provide
DEA and other law enforcement
agencies with documents that can be
used in legal actions to prove that a
practitioner has issued prescriptions for
other than legitimate medical purposes,
that others have forged prescriptions, or
that pharmacy records or inventories are
inconsistent with prescriptions
received. The necessity for presenting
prescriptions to pharmacies and picking
up the drugs also limits the scope of
diversion when it occurs. In contrast,
electronic prescriptions can be easy to
create, transmit, and alter, often without
leaving a trail that links the person
forging or altering a prescription to the
record. Not only practice and pharmacy
staff, but also staff at any of the systems
involved in creating, transmitting, and
processing prescriptions could generate
or alter prescriptions. With the Internet
and mail order pharmacies, those bent
on diversion gain the ability to send
prescriptions to a large number of
pharmacies with a few keystrokes.
DEA’s concerns with the existing
electronic prescription system are the
following:
• Service providers do not always
determine whether the people enrolling
are legally permitted to issue
prescriptions, let alone controlled
substance prescriptions. Some service
providers appear to enroll practices over
the Internet; some require submission of
copies of the person’s DEA registration
and State license. Such procedures
provide no assurance that authority to
issue controlled substance electronic
prescriptions will not be granted to
people who are not DEA registrants. The
DEA registrant list, including DEA
registration numbers, is publicly
available. The DEA number also appears
on each controlled substance
prescription and in many cases is
preprinted on prescription pads so that
any patient receiving a prescription for
any drug, regardless of whether it is a
controlled substance, will have access to
the number. State license information is
10 American Health Information Management
Association, ‘‘Report on the Use of Health
Information Technology to Enhance and Expand
Health Care Anti-Fraud Activities,’’ [September
2005] p. 45.
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readily accessible from online State
databases. Office staff may have access
to the originals to copy. Copies of
registration and license certificates
would be easy to generate and submit.
Present service provider procedures do
not protect a practitioner from someone
inside or outside the practitioner’s
practice setting up an account and
creating fraudulent prescriptions in the
practitioner’s name. Moreover, current
system designs could also allow a
practitioner to repudiate prescriptions
written for the purpose of diversion.
• Some systems may not limit who
within a medical practice can ‘‘sign’’
prescriptions. Many staff at practices
may have legitimate needs to access the
system; only some have a legal right to
sign prescriptions. Unless systems limit
the ‘‘signing’’ function to practitioners
with a legal right to issue prescriptions
and provide unique identifiers that
make it possible to determine who
signed the prescription, taking
enforcement action against practitioners
who issue illegal prescriptions will be
impossible because DEA will not be able
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt who
signed the prescription. This problem is
exacerbated because ‘‘signing’’ in an
electronic prescription system is a
function that is usually nothing more
than a keystroke that indicates that the
prescription is complete; there is no
‘‘signature’’ applied to the prescription.
In some cases, there may not be a
‘‘signing’’ function, but simply a
command to transmit. (The SCRIPT
standard does not currently provide a
field for an electronic signature or an
indication that the prescription has been
signed.)
• Access to systems is usually by
means of easily shared or stolen
information (passwords, user IDs). As
William Winsley, Executive Director of
the Ohio Board of Pharmacy testified at
the DEA/HHS July 2006 public meeting,
‘‘Passwords are useless as a means of
computer security in a healthcare
setting.’’ Too many people are in the
vicinity of computers in practice offices
to be certain that a password has not
been compromised. If passwords or
PINs are the only means of
authentication for an electronic
prescription system, law enforcement
agencies will not be able to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt who signed
an electronic prescription. Practitioners
will be able to repudiate prescriptions
by saying that someone must have used
their passwords.
• Once created and signed, electronic
prescriptions pass through several
intermediaries, all of which may open
the record. Although this process is
usually handled without individuals
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accessing the record, there is no
guarantee that they could not do so.
Most identity theft occurs not from
people hacking into systems, but rather
from insiders who know how to
manipulate the system. Paul Donfried of
SAFE BioPharma 11 and Strategic
Identity Group noted at the July 2006,
DEA/HHS public meeting: ‘‘It generally
is not the cryptography or the firewalls
or the audit logs or the data centers that
people attack. It is whatever the weak
link in the chain is, which normally is
the human beings who are responsible
for keeping the stuff running and
operating correctly.’’
• The processing of the prescriptions
by multiple parties could mean that law
enforcement would have to prove that
none of the parties altered the
document. This requirement could
substantially increase the cost of
bringing cases against registrants who
are diverting controlled substances as
well as burden the service providers and
intermediaries, which would have to
produce audit trail records and experts
to testify.
• The records of the prescriptions are
often held by the service providers and
intermediaries, not the pharmacies.
With paper records, DEA and other law
enforcement agencies have the right to
inspect and remove records from
pharmacies. With electronic records
held by service providers and others,
DEA and other agencies would have to
subpoena records from the third
parties—nonregistrants over whom law
enforcement may have limited
jurisdiction. Although this is a lesser
problem for DEA, it could pose a
substantial barrier to State and local law
enforcement, which would be in the
position of having to find other agencies
willing to serve subpoenas on service
providers who were located in other
States.
• Records of electronic prescriptions
at pharmacies and at intermediaries may
be stored as strings of data, not as easily
read text. These records must be able to
be downloaded into a format that is
easily read and manipulated by law
enforcement.
DEA is convinced that its concerns
can be addressed without creating
insurmountable barriers to electronic
prescribing. DEA’s requirements in
developing this proposed rule are the
following:
• The approach must meet DEA’s
statutory mandates. Only DEA
registrants may be granted the authority
11 SAFE BioPharma is an organization ‘‘that
created and manages the SAFE digital identity and
signature standard for the pharmaceutical and
healthcare industries.’’
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to sign controlled substance electronic
prescriptions.
• The method used to authenticate a
practitioner to the electronic prescribing
system must ensure to the greatest
extent possible that the practitioner
cannot repudiate the prescription.
Authentication methods that can be
compromised without the practitioner
being aware of the compromise are not
acceptable.
• Electronic prescriptions must
include all information required for
paper controlled substance
prescriptions.
• The prescription records must be
reliable enough to be used in legal
actions without having to substantially
expand the number of witnesses that
need to be called to verify records.
• The pharmacy system must allow
annotation of the records as required for
paper prescriptions and must indicate
who made each annotation.
• The security systems used by any of
the service providers must, to the
greatest extent possible, prevent the
possibility of insider creation or
alteration of controlled substance
prescriptions.
In addition, DEA wishes to adopt an
approach that is flexible enough that
future changes in technologies will not
make the system obsolete or lock
registrants into more expensive systems.
DEA notes that its requirements do not
relate to most of the functions of
electronic prescribing systems. Other
than requiring that the electronic
prescription contain the basic
information that any controlled
substance prescription must contain
(and that most prescriptions contain),
DEA is not concerned about the format
or transmission standards, or any of the
added functions (formulary checks,
clinical support, medication histories)
available in electronic prescribing
systems.
Further, as DEA notes throughout this
document, the electronic prescribing of
controlled substances is in addition to,
not a replacement of, existing
requirements for written and oral
prescriptions for controlled substances.
This proposed rule would provide a
new option to prescribing practitioners
and pharmacies. It does not change
existing regulatory requirements for
written and oral prescriptions for
controlled substances. Prescribing
practitioners will still be able to write,
and manually sign, prescriptions for
Schedule II, III, IV, and V controlled
substances, and pharmacies will still be
able to dispense controlled substances
based on those written prescriptions
and archive those records of dispensing.
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VI. Alternatives Considered
In developing this rule, DEA
considered a range of alternatives, from
imposing virtually no requirements on
existing systems to requiring systems
using public key infrastructure. This
section discusses the options considered
and why DEA rejected some of them.
Allowing the use of any existing
electronic prescription system without
additional security. DEA considered
whether to permit electronic prescribing
of controlled substances using existing
systems without any additional
requirements. This would be the
alternative most supported by service
providers of existing electronic
prescribing systems, as it would require
no system modifications and would
allow for the electronic prescribing of
controlled substances as soon as a Final
Rule permitting this activity became
effective. Some have suggested that DEA
permit the use of any existing system; if
that system is used for diversion, DEA
could then tighten its regulations later.
In discussing this alternative, and to
understand why DEA rejected it, it first
must be noted that any electronic
prescribing systems currently being
utilized are generally limited to
noncontrolled substances as DEA
regulations currently do not allow for
the electronic prescribing of controlled
substances.12 Thus, any systems
currently in place were not specifically
tailored to the unique concerns relating
to controlled substances—most notably
the heightened need to prevent
diversion of controlled substances as
compared to noncontrolled substances.
It is also important to understand the
following regarding the current systems
used to create, transmit, and process
electronic prescriptions.
As discussed above, there are more
than 100 vendors marketing systems to
practitioners and about 20 marketing
systems to pharmacies. These vendors
range from start-ups with revenues of
less than $1 million to a few very large
corporations. There are at present no
requirements for how these systems
enroll practitioners, no requirements
that they verify that the person enrolling
is who he claims to be or is eligible to
sign prescriptions. Some systems offer
enrollment over the Internet. There are
no requirements that prescriptions be
signed only by someone authorized
under State law to do so.
12 DEA has granted an exception to its regulations
to allow the United States Department of Veterans
Affairs to conduct a pilot program involving the
electronic prescribing of controlled substances
using a system based on public key infrastructure
(PKI) technology. PKI-based systems are discussed
in greater detail later in this document.
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Some systems set access controls;
others appear to grant general access to
everyone in the office; in these systems,
the prescription cannot be linked to a
single practitioner. Many, perhaps most,
of these systems allow access to
prescription signing using nothing more
than a password or a password/user ID,
forms of identification that are easily
compromised, especially in a healthcare
setting where multiple staff use the
same computers. Prescriptions could be
created by anyone and signed by
anyone. Some systems appear to rely on
the good intentions of the practitioners’
staff, a reliance that the high degree of
insider medical identity theft and
insider prescription forgery renders
¨
naıve at best.
There are no standards governing the
security of the transmission of
electronic prescribing systems currently
being utilized. Therefore, while some of
the intermediaries that handle
prescriptions between the practitioner
and pharmacy might have voluntarily
implemented effective security
measures, they are not legally obligated
to do so and—in the absence of binding
regulatory requirements—there is no
way to ensure that they or others who
might enter the market will have
effective measures in the future. The
intermediaries (up to five per
transmission) are not required to keep
records or audit trails although the best
of them do. As ever, the weakest link
can undermine the entire system. At the
pharmacy, there are no requirements for
audit trails or system security. Some
pharmacy systems have good security
practices, but others might not. Records
could be created or altered without
leaving a trace.
The existing system, in short, relies
on the hope that vendors will employ
good security practices; a few vendors
may meet these, but others for
simplicity or for economic reasons may
choose to ignore them. The widespread
reliance on simple passwords stored on
computers available to any staff member
undermines any claim of reasonable
security controls. The existing voluntary
certification bodies may help, but for
transmission they only look at whether
the system can interoperate with them.
There is, in any case, no requirement
that practitioners or pharmacies use
only certified vendors; given the high
costs of some certified systems, it would
be surprising if some practitioners did
not elect less expensive, uncertified
solutions. Overall, the existing system
provides no legal requirements for
identity proofing, assurance of
nonrepudiation, ability to authenticate
the record, and record integrity. It
exposes DEA registrants to the threat of
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identity theft, insider criminal activity,
service provider or intermediary staff
criminal activity, and potential criminal
penalties for the actions of others that
they will find hard to disprove. It
creates a new high-speed route for
widespread prescription forgery and
diversion, which results in drug abuse
and deaths. The idea that DEA should
wait until this occurs before attempting
to impose security requirements cannot
be reconciled with the agency’s
statutory responsibilities and the
magnitude of the harm to the public
health and safety that would result if an
insufficiently secure system were to
cause an increase in diversion of
controlled substances. Such an idea also
fails to properly take into consideration
the length of time required to change
regulations.
For this alternative, the only way for
the pharmacy, dispensing pharmacist,
and DEA to ensure that the prescription
a pharmacy received was, in fact, issued
by the practitioner whose name and
DEA registration number are on the
prescription would be to require the
pharmacy to call the practitioner and
confirm each prescription. For DEA to
allow a controlled substance
prescription to be dispensed without
this check would be to abdicate its
statutorily mandated responsibilities.
Although this alternative would impose
the fewest burdens on service providers,
it would be hugely expensive for
practitioners and pharmacies, requiring
up to 300 million callbacks a year. DEA
has estimated the costs of this
alternative, but DEA does not consider
that the costs could be justified or that
practitioners or pharmacies would
adopt this alternative given the
increased burden that it would
represent.
Public Key Infrastructure. DEA
considered proposing that all electronic
controlled substance prescriptions be
digitally signed using a digital
certificate issued by a recognized
Certification Authority. Under this
approach, the prescription as signed and
the digital signature would be sent to
the pharmacy, which would be required
to validate the prescription to ensure
that it had not been altered after
signature. This alternative would
provide DEA and other law enforcement
agencies with the best forensic
evidence, and it would provide
practitioners and pharmacies with the
best protection against identity theft and
forgeries, reducing their legal exposure.
However, DEA has been advised that
existing systems which follow the
standards adopted by the Secretary of
HHS pursuant to the MMA for
electronic transmission of prescriptions
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and prescription-related information for
covered Part D drugs prescribed for Part
D eligible individuals are incompatible
with the requirement of digitally signed
prescriptions. Electronic prescriptions
are processed through intermediaries
that may reformat the prescriptions to
ensure that the receiving pharmacy can
capture the data; the reformatting makes
validation of the record impossible. In
addition, the intermediaries have
expressed concern about incorporating
the digital signature, which is usually at
least 128 bits, within the current
SCRIPT standard. Consequently, DEA
does not consider this option to be a
viable mandatory approach.
DEA considered and is proposing two
options:
Electronically signed prescriptions
with security controls. Under this
alternative, practitioners would be
required to undergo in-person identity
proofing and submit documentation of
that to a service provider. The identity
proofing would be conducted by a DEAregistered hospital, a State licensing
board, or State or local law enforcement
agency. The service provider would be
required to check the validity of the
DEA registration and State license
before issuing an authentication
protocol to be used to sign controlled
substance prescriptions. The
authentication protocol would have to
be two-factor, with one factor stored on
a hard token (e.g., a PDA, a multifactor
one-time-use password token, a thumb
drive, a smart card). DEA would also
impose certain system requirements
related to the prescription elements and
their presentation; most existing
systems may already meet these
requirements. The prescription would
have to be transmitted immediately
upon being signed and the service
provider would have to digitally sign
and archive the record before
transmitting the plain text prescription
to the intermediaries. The pharmacy
would have to digitally sign and archive
the prescription as received. The
pharmacy system would need an
internal audit trail to record any
attempts to alter a record and conduct
internal checks for such attempts. Both
the electronic prescription service
provider and the pharmacy system
provider would need to obtain annual
third-party audits for security and
processing integrity. The service
provider would have to generate a
monthly log, which practitioners would
be required to check for obvious
anomalies. The rationale for each of the
requirements is presented under the
discussion of the proposed rule below.
Modified digitally signed
prescriptions. Due to the current use of
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36731
digital signatures by Federal health care
systems, and the added security
afforded by such signatures, DEA is
proposing to allow practitioners that
prescribe controlled substances at
Federal health care facilities (e.g.,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Department of Defense) the additional
option of using digital certificates,
issued by such Federal agencies, to sign
controlled substance prescriptions
issued in the course of their official
duties within those facilities. These
Federal agencies would need to
determine that the practitioner is
authorized and registered, or exempted
from the requirement of registration, to
prescribe controlled substances. The
private key would be required to be
stored on a hard token. Federal agencies
will already be meeting this requirement
in issuing Personal Identification
Verification (PIV) cards under Federal
Information Processing Standard 201.
Most of the system requirements would
be the same as in the previous option
except that the Federal agency could
elect to allow the practitioner to
digitally sign and archive the
prescription once the DEA-required
elements are complete and transmit
later when other information has been
added (e.g., retail pharmacy URL). The
Federal agency would not have to
digitally sign the record as transmitted.
The pharmacy requirements would be
the same. The digital signature would
not be transmitted to the pharmacy; the
pharmacy would not have to validate
the record. However, if a Federal agency
wished to include the digital signature
as part of the transmission, DEA is
permitting this alternative. In that case,
the pharmacy would be required to
validate the digital signature, but would
not be required to digitally sign the
prescription as received. Because a
Certification Authority would issue the
digital certificate and because record
integrity is more assured with a digital
signature, DEA would not require a
check of a monthly log or third-party
audits for security. The rationale for
each of the requirements is presented
under the discussion of the proposed
rule below.
VII. Risk Assessment of Electronic
Prescriptions for Controlled Substances
On December 16, 2003, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) issued
guidance to Federal agencies on eauthentication (M–04–04) that directed
agencies to conduct e-authentication
risk assessments to determine the level
of authentication needed. It should be
noted that M–04–04 was primarily
intended to provide guidance to Federal
agencies that utilize services through
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the Internet, not private sector entities
that do so. However, M–04–04 states:
‘‘Private-sector organizations and state,
local, and tribal governments whose
electronic processes require varying
levels of assurance may consider the use
of these standards where appropriate.’’
With this understanding, the document
provides a useful illustration of how to
identify and analyze the risks associated
with the authentication process.
Assurance is the degree of confidence
in the vetting process used to establish
the identity of an individual to whom a
credential was issued, the degree of
confidence that the individual who uses
the credential is the individual to whom
the credential was issued, and the
degree of confidence that a message
when sent is secure. OMB established
four levels of assurance:
Level 1: Little or no confidence in the
asserted identity’s validity.
Level 2: Some confidence in the
asserted identity’s validity.
Level 3: High confidence in the
asserted identity’s validity.
Level 4: Very high confidence in the
asserted identity’s validity.
M–04–04 states that to determine the
appropriate level of assurance in the
user’s asserted identity, agencies must
assess the potential risks and identify
measures to minimize their impact. The
document states that the risk from an
authentication error is a function of two
factors: (a) Potential harm or impact and
(b) the likelihood of such harm or
impact. The document then specifies six
categories of harm that might result
from an authentication error:
• Inconvenience, Distress, or Damage
to Standing or Reputation
• Financial Loss
• Harm to Agency Programs or Public
Interests
• Unauthorized Release of Sensitive
Information
• Personal Safety
• Civil or Criminal Violations
With respect to each of these six
categories, the agency must assess the
potential impact as ‘‘low,’’ ‘‘moderate,’’
or ‘‘high.’’ Table 1 showsOMB’s impact
criteria for each category of harm.13
TABLE 1.—M–04–04 POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF AUTHENTICATION ERRORS
Low impact
Moderate impact
High impact
Potential Impact of Inconvenience,
Distress or Damage to Standing
or Reputation.
At worst, limited short-term inconvenience, distress or embarrassment to any party.
At worst, serious short-term or
limited long-term inconvenience
or damage to the standing or
reputation of any party.
Potential Impact of Financial Loss
At worst, an insignificant or inconsequential unrecoverable financial loss to any party, or at
worst, an insignificant or inconsequential agency liability.
At worst, a limited adverse effect
on organizational operations,
assets, or public interests. Examples of limited adverse effects are: (i) mission capability
degradation to the extent and
duration that the organization is
able to perform its primary functions with noticeably reduced
effectiveness; or (ii) minor damage to organizational assets or
public interests.
At worst, a serious unrecoverable
financial loss to any party, or a
serious agency liability.
Severe or serious long-term inconvenience, distress or damage to the standing or reputation to the party (ordinarily reserved for situations with particularly severe effects or which
may affect many individuals).
Severe or catastrophic unrecoverable financial loss to any party;
or severe or catastrophic agency liability.
At worst, a limited release of personal, U.S. government sensitive, or commercially sensitive
information to unauthorized parties resulting in a loss of confidentiality with a low impact, as
defined in FIPS PUB 199.
At worst, minor injury not requiring medical treatment.
At worst, a release of personal,
U.S. government sensitive, or
commercially sensitive information to unauthorized parties resulting in a loss of confidentiality with a moderate impact,
as defined in FIPS PUB 199.
At worst, moderate risk of minor
injury or limited risk of injury requiring medical treatment.
At worst, a risk of civil or criminal
violations that may be subject
to enforcement efforts.
Potential impact of harm to agency
programs or public interests.
Potential Impact of unauthorized
release of sensitive information.
Potential Impact to Personal Safety.
Potential impact of civil or criminal
violations.
At worst, a risk of civil or criminal
violations of a nature that would
not ordinarily be subject to enforcement efforts.
level of authentication that will cover all of
potential impacts identified. Thus, if five
categories of potential impact are appropriate
for Level 1, and one category of potential
The Memorandum then states:
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
Examples of serious adverse effects are: (i) significant mission
capability degradation to the extent and duration that the organization is able to perform its
primary functions with significantly reduced effectiveness; or
(ii) significant damage to organizational assets or public interests.
Agencies should then tie the potential
impact category outcomes to the
authentication level, choosing the lowest
A severe or catastrophic adverse
effect on organizational operations or assets, or public interests. Examples of severe or
catastrophic effects are: (i) severe mission capability degradation or loss of [sic] to the
extent and duration that the organization is unable to perform
one or more of its primary functions; or (ii) major damage to
organizational assets or public
interests.
At worst, a release of personal,
U.S. government sensitive, or
commercially sensitive information to unauthorized parties resulting in a loss of confidentiality with a high impact, as defined in FIPS PUB 199.
A risk of serious injury or death.
A risk of civil or criminal violations
that are of special importance
to enforcement programs.
impact is appropriate for Level 2, the
transaction would require a Level 2
authentication. For example, if the misuse of
a user’s electronic identity/credentials during
13 Office of Management and Budget. ‘‘EAuthentication Guidance for Federal Agencies’’ M–
04–04. December 16, 2003.
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a medical procedure presents a risk of serious
injury or death, map to the risk profile
identified under Level 4, even if other
consequences are minimal.
Again, with the understanding that
M–04–04 was not specifically designed
to be used by Federal agencies when
issuing regulations governing the
general public, the logic and method of
analysis employed by M–04–04
nonetheless serves as a useful model for
completing DEA’s task of determining
the appropriate level of authentication
for electronic prescribing of controlled
substances. (In fact, DEA is unaware of
any other Government documents that
provide any such particularized
guidance for completing this task.) For
the proposed rule, the two aspects that
are relevant to the e-authentication risk
assessment are the identity-proofing and
the storage of the authentication
36733
protocol or digital certificate. The
following table presents the six
categories of harm and impact using the
three OMB-defined potential impact
values to determine an identity
authentication assurance level for the
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances (see Attachment A of the
memorandum, ‘‘E-Authentication
Guidance for Federal Agencies’’).
TABLE 2.—IMPACT OF HARMS OF ELECTRONIC PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Potential impact of authentication
errors
DEA rating, OMB description
Comment
Inconvenience, Distress, or Damage
to Standing or Reputation.
Moderate—At worst, serious short
term or limited long-term inconvenience, distress, or damage
to the standing or reputation of
any party.
N/A
High—A severe or catastrophic
adverse effect on organizational
operations or assets, or public
interests. Examples of severe or
catastrophic effects are: (i) Severe mission capability degradation or loss of (sic) to the extent
and duration that the organization is unable to perform one or
more of its primary functions; or
(ii) major damage to organizational assets or public interests.
Identity theft, issuing of illegitimate prescriptions in a practitioner’s
name, or alteration of prescriptions could expose practitioners to
legal difficulties and force them to prove that they had not enrolled
in an electronic prescription system or issued specific prescriptions.
Financial Loss ..................................
Harm to Agency Programs or Public
Interests.
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Unauthorized release of Sensitive
Information.
Personal Safety ...............................
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Not to place such strict requirements on authentication protocols
used to sign electronic controlled substances prescriptions would
open the electronic prescribing system for controlled substances to
rampant diversion—diversion which would be very difficult for DEA
to detect because of the breadth of the potential problem. Were
the authentication protocol of a practitioner compromised, and
were controlled substances prescriptions to be diverted for illicit
purposes based on that compromised authentication protocol, such
diversion would undermine the effectiveness of prescription laws
and regulations of the United States. This diversion would, by its
very nature, harm the public health and safety, as any illicit drug
use does. Such diversion would undermine the effectiveness of the
entire closed system of distribution of the United States created by
the CSA and supported by international treaty obligations.
N/A
High—A risk of serious injury or
death.
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Congress expressly declared in enacting the CSA that the ‘‘improper
use of controlled substances [has] a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.’’
(21 U.S.C. 801(2)). Diversion and abuse of controlled substances
results in a large number of deaths and medical visits each year;
facilitating diversion can be expected to increase the level of abuse
and harm.
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TABLE 2.—IMPACT OF HARMS OF ELECTRONIC PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES—Continued
Potential impact of authentication
errors
DEA rating, OMB description
Comment
Civil or Criminal Violations ...............
High—A risk of civil or criminal
violations that are of special importance to enforcement programs.
Given the framework of the CSA and DEA’s core mission to enforce
the Act, there is perhaps nothing of greater importance among
DEA’s administrative responsibilities than ensuring that controlled
substances are dispensed only by registered practitioners. The illicit possession of legitimate (pharmaceutical) controlled substances is a violation of the CSA. The writing of a controlled substance prescription by a person not authorized to do so constitutes
illegal distribution of controlled substances and is a violation under
21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The person writing an illegitimate prescription
could be criminally prosecuted; penalties for such a conviction
could include imprisonment and/or fines. Because of the number of
persons having access to an electronic prescription between the
time it is written and the time it is dispensed, including the practitioner’s office staff, intermediaries who process the prescription,
and the pharmacy staff, the potential for alteration is great. A practitioner whose prescriptions were altered by someone else—office
staff or staff at one of the intermediaries—could be subject to legal
action in which the practitioner would have to prove that he was
not responsible for the prescriptions to avoid civil or criminal liability. If a pharmacy knowingly dispenses a forged or altered prescription, such dispensing constitutes illegal distribution and is a
violation of the CSA. The pharmacy could be subject to administrative, civil, or criminal action under the CSA. A criminal conviction
for unlawful dispensing in violation of the CSA is a felony that
could, depending on the schedule of the controlled substance involved, and the harm resulting, result in a sentence of a lengthy
period of incarceration and substantial fine. Even without a criminal
conviction, civil violations of the CSA can result in substantial fines.
Criminal or civil violations of the CSA might also result in revocation of the pharmacy’s registration to dispense controlled substances.
DEA welcomes comments regarding
its assessment of risk for the six
categories of harm for the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances.
Commenters should frame their
comments in the context of the impacts
of those categories of harm included in
OMB M–04–04 and Table 1 above.
OMB provides the following guidance
in M–04–04 on applying the risk
assessment to assurance levels.
TABLE 3.—MAXIMUM POTENTIAL IMPACTS FOR EACH ASSURANCE LEVEL
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Potential Impact of Inconvenience, Distress, or
Damage to Standing or Reputation.
Potential Impact of Financial Loss ....................
Potential impact of harm to agency programs
or public interests.
Potential Impact of unauthorized release of
sensitive information.
Potential Impact to Personal Safety ..................
Potential impact of civil or criminal violations ...
Low Impact ..................
Moderate Impact .........
Moderate Impact .........
High Impact.
Low Impact ..................
n/a ...............................
Moderate Impact .........
Low Impact ..................
Moderate Impact .........
Moderate Impact .........
High Impact.
High Impact.
n/a ...............................
Low Impact ..................
Moderate Impact .........
High Impact.
n/a ...............................
n/a ...............................
n/a ...............................
Low Impact ..................
Low Impact ..................
Moderate Impact .........
Moderate Impact.
High Impact.
The table below shows the potential
impact as rated by DEA and the
assurance level associated with each.
TABLE 4.—POTENTIAL IMPACT AND ASSOCIATED ASSURANCE LEVELS FOR
ELECTRONIC PRESCRIPTIONS FOR
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
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Potential impact—DEA rating
Inconvenience, Distress, or Damage to Standing or Reputation—Moderate.
Financial Loss—N/A ....................
Harm to Agency Programs or
Public Interests—High.
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Level of
assurance
Level 4
TABLE 4.—POTENTIAL IMPACT AND ASSOCIATED ASSURANCE LEVELS FOR
ELECTRONIC PRESCRIPTIONS FOR
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES—Continued
Potential impact—DEA rating
Level 2.
N/A.
Level 4.
Unauthorized release of Sensitive
Information—N/A.
Personal Safety—High ................
Civil or Criminal Violations—High
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 125 / Friday, June 27, 2008 / Proposed Rules
If any one or more of the potential
impact categories for authentication
errors is found to be high, M–04–04
directs agencies that the appropriate
assurance level must be ‘‘Level 4’’ (the
highest level). Indeed, DEA notes that
M–04–04 specifically lists the following
as an example of a situation for which
Level 4 is appropriate:
A Department of Veteran’s Affairs
pharmacist dispenses a controlled drug. She
would need full assurance that a qualified
doctor prescribed it. She is criminally liable
for any failure to validate the prescription
and dispense the correct drug in the
prescribed amount.14
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The explanation provided in the
above example is no less applicable
where the pharmacist is employed by
the private sector. Even if such risk is
essentially identical for both VA
pharmacies and private sector
pharmacies, the reasoning of M–04–04
indicates that Level 4 assurance is
appropriate in both scenarios.
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800–63,
Electronic Authentication Guideline,
provides guidance on applying the OMB
assurance levels to identity proofing and
authentication. Identity proofing is the
process of determining whether the
person being granted authorization to
use a system is, in fact, the person he
claims to be. Authentication refers to
the method by which the person is then
granted access to a computer system
(e.g., PINs, passwords, biometrics). NIST
SP 800–63 defines the steps needed to
conduct identity proofing and establish
authentication protocols for each OMB
assurance level. DEA has used NIST SP
800–63 as a guideline in developing its
proposed requirements.
Assurance Levels—Identity Proofing.
Identity proofing is the process of
uniquely identifying a person. NIST SP
800–63 specifies a number of
requirements for both remote and inperson identity proofing for each
assurance level.
DEA believes that in-person identity
proofing is critical to the security of the
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances. Ensuring that only licensed
and registered practitioners are granted
the authority to sign electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
is the first step to maintaining the
overall security of the electronic
prescribing system for these substances.
At present, some service providers
14 Although OMB M–04–04 describes a
Department of Veterans Affairs pharmacist needing
‘‘full assurance that a qualified doctor prescribed
[the controlled substance]’’ [emphasis added], DEA
recognizes that in addition to physicians, the
Department of Veterans Affairs also employs
dentists and certain mid-level practitioners who are
authorized to prescribe controlled substances.
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appear to allow enrollment over the
Internet and only require the applicant
to submit a copy of the State license and
DEA registration. This type of
enrollment increases the potential for
identity theft and the creation of
fraudulent identities of prescribing
practitioners and, subsequently, the
potential for issuance of forged
prescriptions. DEA welcomes comment
regarding the enrollment processes
service providers have developed to
adequately determine whether the
people enrolling in such services are
legally permitted to issue noncontrolled
substance prescriptions and whether
and how such processes prevent
noncontrolled substance prescription
forgery, fraud, and other related crimes.
In-person identity proofing protects
individual prescribing practitioners
from identity theft. That is, without inperson identity proofing, it would be
very easy for anyone to claim to be an
individual prescribing practitioner and
gain access to electronic prescribing
systems for controlled substances; the
most likely documents used to
demonstrate identity as a prescribing
practitioner—State license and DEA
registration—can be easily obtained.
Persons who work with prescribing
practitioners have ready access to State
licenses and DEA registration
certificates as those documents are often
stored at the prescriber’s practice
location. A member of the office staff
could alter a practitioner’s registration
certificate or merely submit a copy of a
practitioner’s State license and DEA
registration and begin issuing illegal
prescriptions without the practitioner’s
knowledge. As information regarding
State licensure and DEA registration is
publicly available, people outside the
office could create fraudulent DEA
registration certificates and State
licenses using legitimate numbers and
gain access to the system.
Unlike written prescriptions, once a
fraudulent identity has been
established, electronic prescribing
provides little or no indication of the
potential for fraud. With written
prescriptions, if a person not
knowledgeable of prescription-writing
styles and tendencies writes or alters
prescriptions, those prescriptions are
likely to be noticed by a pharmacist who
may scrutinize them further. In fact, if
the prescription seems out of the
ordinary in any way, e.g., the format is
unusual, the paper is different from
normal, the signature looks wrong, the
directions are not in the usual format,
the drug name is misspelled, the
abbreviations used are not standard, or
the quantity seems high, the pharmacy
has a responsibility to contact the
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prescribing practitioner to verify the
prescription before filling the
prescription. With electronic
prescribing, however, once an identity
is established, all electronic
prescriptions appear the same. Most
information is selected from drop-down
menus, and there is little to distinguish
an electronic prescription written by a
person who is not a legitimate
prescribing practitioner from one that is
written by an individual granted proper
State and DEA authority to prescribe
controlled substances.
Based on DEA’s decision that inperson identity proofing is critical to the
overall security of the electronic
prescribing system, DEA examined
NIST requirements for in-person
identity proofing.
Briefly, at Level 2, in-person identity
proofing requires the applicant to
possess a government-issued
photographic identification that
confirms the address of record or
nationality. Level 2 requires inspection
of the photographic identification, and
the recording of the applicant’s address
or date of birth and the number
associated with the government-issued
photographic identification. If the
identification confirms the address of
record then credentials are issued and
notice is sent to that address; if the
address is not confirmed, then
credentials are issued in a manner that
confirms the address of record.
At Level 3, in-person identity
proofing requires the applicant to
possess a government-issued
photographic identification. Level 3
requires inspection of the photographic
identification and verification, through
the issuing government agency or
through credit bureaus or similar
databases, that the information
contained in the identification (e.g.,
name, address, date of birth) are
consistent with the application. The
applicant’s name, address, and date of
birth are recorded. If the identification
confirms the address of record then
credentials are issued and notice is sent
to that address; if the address is not
confirmed, then credentials are issued
in a manner that confirms the address
of record.
At Level 4, two independent forms of
photographic identification or accounts
must be verified, one of which must be
a government-issued photographic
identification. Further, a new recording
of a biometric of the applicant must be
captured. The government-issued
photographic identification must be
verified with the issuing government
agency. For any form of photographic
identification, the applicant’s name,
address, and date of birth are recorded.
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If the secondary form of identification is
a financial account, the financial
account number must be verified
through record checks sufficient to
identify a unique individual. The
biometric is recorded to ensure that the
applicant cannot repudiate the
application. Credentials must be issued
in a manner that confirms the address
of record.
After careful examination of all levels
of in-person identity proofing, DEA
determined that none of the NIST levels
addressed its unique needs and
requirements. DEA does not believe that
capturing a biometric at the time of
enrollment is necessary, as is required at
Level 4. Further, DEA does not believe
that verification of identity through use
of credit bureaus or other third-party
agencies would be feasible or is
necessary, as is required at Level 3,
given that practitioner’s State licenses
and DEA registrations are also being
examined. DEA believed that such
requirements could be intrusive for
practitioners, who might not want
hospitals, State licensing boards, or law
enforcement agencies—the entities DEA
is proposing to permit conduct inperson identity proofing—to review
sensitive personal information such as
address information retained by credit
bureaus. Finally, DEA did not believe
that the address checks required at
Level 2 were useful for the purpose
served by the in-person identity
proofing DEA believes it must require.
DEA notes that address checks generally
mean address of residence, because that
is the address listed on most forms of
government-issued photographic
identification, whereas prescribing
practitioners will receive information
and authentication protocols at their
offices, which are the addresses listed
on the DEA registration and State
licenses.
Therefore, DEA has decided to
propose in-person identity proofing
consistent with, but not equivalent to,
Level 3, as discussed below, but not link
that in-person identity proofing to any
specific NIST requirements.
DEA could not identify any mitigating
factors that would enable it to propose
remote identity proofing. Remote
identity proofing relies on record
checks, which would not prevent
identity theft and may be more intrusive
than the simple in-person requirements
DEA is proposing. Remote identity
proofing also relies on mailing
credentials to the address of record,
which would not prevent a member of
the office staff from applying for access
to the electronic prescribing system for
controlled substances and intercepting
the confirmation. The electronic world
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allows for far easier identity theft and
can make it more difficult to identify
diversion when it occurs. In contrast,
when DEA or the States have discovered
identity theft in the context of paper
prescriptions, they have been able to
prosecute the criminal using the paper
trail created by fraudulent prescriptions.
The paper prescriptions can prove who
wrote them and, for the innocent
practitioner, who did not write them.
With electronic prescriptions, identities
can be stolen, used to issue a large
number of prescriptions, then dropped
within days, leaving few if any traces,
or worse, traces that link to a
practitioner who then would have to
prove that he or she was an innocent
victim, not a criminal.
DEA is proposing to allow DEAregistered hospitals, State licensing
boards, and State or local law
enforcement agencies to review the
identity documents and sign, with the
applicant, a letter or form that states that
the applicant is who the applicant
claims to be. This approach should
lessen the burden on service providers
and ensure that practitioners will be
able to have their documents checked
locally.
Assurance Level—Authentication
Protocol. NIST SP 800–63 defines
tokens as the means that a person
wishing to gain access to an electronic
system uses to authenticate their
identity. In electronic authentication,
the person wishing to gain access
authenticates to a system or application
over a network by proving that he has
possession of a token. Therefore, a token
must be protected.
Authentication methods are described
as one-factor, two-factor, or three-factor,
or as something you know, something
you have, and something you are. PINs
and passwords are something you know;
cards such as ATM cards are something
you have; biometrics (fingerprints, iris
scans, hand prints) are something you
are.
NIST SP 800–63 describes a singlefactor token as either something the
person knows, something the person
has, or a biometric. Single-factor tokens
include:
• Memorized secret tokens
(passwords, passphrases).
• Pre-registered knowledge tokens:
responses to a question known by the
user (pet’s name, favorite color).
• Look-up secret tokens—the user is
prompted by the system to look up
information stored on a physical or
electronic device (the secret may be
printed on a card or stored in the
computer); the information looked up
has been shared between the user and
the system being authenticated to.
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• Out of band tokens—Receipt of a
secret on a physical device separate
from the system being authenticated to
which is then used to log onto the
system (e.g., a password is sent to a cell
phone; the person who possesses the
cell phone uses the password to log onto
the system).
• Single factor one time password
(OTP) device—a hardware device that
spontaneously generates one time
passwords, which usually change every
60 seconds. The one time passwords are
used to log onto the system.
• Single factor cryptographic
device—a hardware device that uses
embedded cryptographic keys;
authentication occurs by proving
possession of the device.
NIST discussed the vulnerability of
single-factor authentication methods,
specifically passwords, in Special
Publication 800–32:
The traditional method for authenticating
users has been to provide them with a
personal identification number or secret
password, which they must use when
requesting access to a particular system.
Password systems can be effective if managed
properly, but they seldom are.
Authentication that relies solely on
passwords has often failed to provide
adequate protection for computer systems for
a number of reasons. If users are allowed to
make up their own passwords, they tend to
choose ones that are easy to remember and
therefore easy to guess. If passwords are
generated from a random combination of
characters, users often write them down
because they are difficult to remember.
Where password-only authentication is not
adequate for an application, it is often used
in combination with other security
mechanisms.
PINs and passwords do not provide nonrepudiation, confidentiality, or integrity. If
Alice wishes to authenticate to Bob using a
password, Bob must also know it. Since both
Alice and Bob know the password, it is
difficult to prove which of them performed
a particular operation.15
Pre-registered knowledge tokens
usually have answers that may be
known by other people in an office.
Look-up secrets are as vulnerable as
passwords in a medical practice
settings. Out-of-band tokens would take
more time to use. Single factor hard
tokens could be borrowed or stolen and
used easily. No single factor approach,
therefore, would provide the assurance
DEA and the practitioners need.
NIST SP 800–63 describes two-factor
tokens as tokens that use two or more
factors to achieve authentication. Multifactor tokens include:
15 National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Special Publication 800–32
Introduction to Public Key Technology and the
Federal PKI Infrastructure; February 26, 2001.
https://csrc.nist.gov/
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• Multi-factor software cryptographic
tokens—a cryptographic key is stored on
a computer and requires activation
through a second factor of
authentication.
• Multi-factor one time password
device—a software device, (e.g., PDAs)
or a hardware device (e.g., a card, thumb
drive, fob), that generates one time
passwords for use in authentication and
requires activation through a second
factor of authentication, usually a
password.
• Multi-factor cryptographic
hardware device—hardware device that
contains a protected cryptographic key
and requires activation through a
second authentication factor.
As NIST points out, the use of more
than one factor for authentication to a
system raises the difficulty of an
attacker successfully attacking a system.
The more factors used, the more effort
it takes to break the system to gain
entry.
Briefly, at Level 2, single-factor
authentication is allowed. Some
combinations of single-factor
authentication are still considered Level
2 (e.g., passwords plus pre-registered
knowledge tokens are still rated as Level
2).
At Level 3, some combinations of
single-factor tokens are acceptable (e.g.,
a password plus a single-factor one time
password device). In addition, a multifactor software cryptographic device is
considered Level 3; this device allows
for the storage of the cryptographic key
on a disk (e.g., a hard drive of a personal
computer).
At Level 4, only two types of tokens
are acceptable—a multi-factor one time
password device or a multi-factor
cryptographic device that is stored on a
hard token (e.g., a smart card, a thumb
drive).
DEA is proposing that the
authentication protocol meet Level 4,
which requires two factors, one of
which is stored on a hard token, which
could be a PDA, a cell phone, a smart
card, a thumb drive, or multi-factor one
time password token. DEA has
determined that only Level 4 meets its
requirements based on the risk
assessment and on the problems that
arise with Level 3, where one of the
factors can be stored on a computer
rather than a hardware device that the
practitioner can possess, or Level 2,
where only a single factor is required.
NIST describes Level 4 tokens as
follows: ‘‘To achieve Level 4 with a
single token or token combination, one
of the tokens needs to be usable with an
authentication mechanism that strongly
resists man-in-the-middle attacks—this
entails an electronic interface which
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may be placed under access control by
the Claimant’s (the person seeking to
gain access to the system) operating
system.’’ 16 17 DEA would like public
comment on the present state of multifactor tokens as implemented through
multi-function devices such as PDAs,
cell phones, smart cards, thumb drives
and laptop computers.
As DEA is not proposing specific
controls regarding the authentication
process or the transmission of the
prescription information, DEA believes
that the security of the authentication
itself is critical to bind the practitioner
to the prescribing transaction. Level 4
authentication protocols protect the
practitioner from the most likely
‘‘attack,’’ the use of his password or
other token to access the system and
issue prescriptions. Because Level 3
allows the storage of authentication
protocols on office computers, the
practitioner has no assurance that his
authentication protocol will be safe or
that he will be aware if it is
compromised. From a law enforcement
perspective, an authentication protocol
stored on a computer to which others
have access makes linking a
prescription to a practitioner or to a staff
member who has illegally issued
prescriptions all but impossible. Level
4, where the practitioner can retain
possession of the hard token, protects
the practitioner and provides law
enforcement with the necessary
nonrepudiation.
Because of the attributes of medical
practices, DEA could identify no
mitigating factors that could overcome
the vulnerabilities that exist and allow
a lower level of assurance. In medical
practices, most staff members have
access to any of the computers in the
office. Practitioners and nurses see
patients in multiple examination rooms,
moving from room to room; of necessity,
practitioners must leave their offices
and computers unattended for long
periods of time. Passwords, which are
usually part of two-factor authentication
protocols to access the system, are
vulnerable to attack because (1) many
people write them down; (2) most
people choose passwords that are easy
16 National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Special Publication 800–63–1
Electronic Authentication Guideline draft; February
20, 2008. p. 52.
17 DEA notes that in the course of drafting this
rulemaking, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology issued a new draft Special Publication
800–63, which revises some guidelines regarding
electronic authentication. DEA has taken these new
guidelines into account in drafting this Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking recognizing, however, that
this Special Publication is a draft and subject to
revision by NIST when the final SP 800–63–1 is
issued.
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to guess; and (3) in medical settings,
with multiple people working in the
vicinity of a computer, it is easy for
someone else to watch a password being
keyed into the system. If both parts of
a multi-factor identification protocol
can be stored on an office computer, or
if there is only one factor needed (Level
2), the practitioner will have no
assurance that someone in the office is
not issuing prescriptions in his name.
The practitioner will also be able to
repudiate any prescription written in
his name; law enforcement officials will
not be able to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal proceeding that his
authentication protocol had not been
compromised. Storing one of the factors
on a hard token means that the
practitioner can retain possession of the
device and ensures that it is not
misused. The practitioner will not be
able to repudiate prescriptions issued in
his name; the practitioner will either
have written the prescription,
knowingly given the hard token to
someone else, or, if the token was lost,
stolen, or compromised, have taken
appropriate actions (such as ensuring
that the authentication protocol has
been revoked to prevent its misuse).
The hard token protects the
practitioner in the same way a manually
signed written prescription does. If a
written prescription is forged, a
practitioner can prove that he did not
write it by comparing handwriting. By
maintaining sole possession of the hard
token, the practitioner can eliminate the
risk of fraudulent prescriptions and, if
the token is lost, stolen, or
compromised, he will be immediately
alerted to the threat and have the
authentication protocol revoked. This
assurance that only a legitimate
practitioner issued the prescription also
protects the pharmacy. As discussed
above, with a paper prescription there
are potentially many indications that
the prescription was not written by a
practitioner. If the prescription seems
out of the ordinary in any way the
pharmacy has a responsibility to verify
the prescription before filling the
prescription. With electronic
prescriptions, it will be much more
difficult to identify these potentially
telltale characteristics because the
software fills in items from a menu of
acceptable options; unless the quantity
is high, the pharmacist will have little
reason to question an electronic
prescription.
The requirement for two-factor
authentication (something you know
and something you have) has been
implemented by a number of healthcare
systems. One system with almost 300
hospitals and clinics is using a
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combination of PINs (something you
know) and a one-time-password token
or software tokens (PDAs) for almost
30,000 users. Another medical center
uses the same approach for more than
4,500 users. A third health care system
with a variety of treatment centers has
deployed this approach to 8,000 people
at more than 40 sites. These
deployments indicate that the
requirement is feasible in healthcare
settings and that it is flexible enough to
provide access and access control as
practitioners move among settings in
which they practice.
Although the electronic prescribing of
controlled substances plainly fits in the
categories of transactions for which
Level 4 assurance is warranted, DEA has
decided, following interagency
discussions, not to propose all of the
authentication requirements that NIST
SP 800–63 indicates are appropriate for
Level 4. Among other things, as
explained below, DEA is not proposing
that practitioners digitally sign
prescriptions or that pharmacies
routinely validate prescriptions that are
digitally signed because doing so would
be incompatible with many existing
systems currently in use for the
electronic prescribing of noncontrolled
substances. Nonetheless, DEA is
proposing here an alternative
authentication system that comes as
close as reasonably possible to the level
of security called for in NIST SP 800–
63 while remaining compatible with
existing systems used for noncontrolled
substance prescriptions and, at the same
time, adhering to DEA’s overarching
obligation to minimize the likelihood of
diversion of controlled substances.
Assurance Level—Authentication
Process. The authentication process
addresses security between the creator
of a message and its recipient. At Level
4, the authentication process involves
strong cryptographic authentication of
all parties and all sensitive data
transfers. A variety of technologies can
meet Level 2 and 3; the levels are
defined by their resistance to certain
forms of attack. Level 2 can be met with
an encrypted TLS protocol session.
Level 3 can be met with authenticated
TLS and public key certificates.
DEA is not proposing to set any
standards for the authentication process.
The NIST requirements apply primarily
to the transmission of information. DEA
is concerned about the possibility that
an electronic prescription could be
altered during transmission, but the
agency is not proposing specific
regulations in this area at this time. DEA
is proposing to address the
vulnerabilities that exist by having the
prescription digitally signed by the
service provider prior to transmission
and on receipt at the pharmacy. These
requirements will not prevent alteration
during transmission, but they will allow
DEA to identify that it has occurred and
protects registrants from being accused
of issuing a fraudulent prescription or
altering a legitimate prescription. DEA
also notes that the security of these
records during transmission is subject to
HIPAA.
Summary. In conclusion, although the
risk of electronic prescribing of
controlled substances maps to
Assurance Level 4 using the criteria of
M–04–04, DEA is not proposing all of
the requirements associated with that
level. Instead, DEA is proposing inperson identity proofing specific to its
needs; these requirements are consistent
with, but not equivalent to, Level 3, and
address concerns specific to DEA.
Further, DEA is proposing use of a hard
token, with that hard token meeting the
requirements of Level 4. Finally, DEA is
not proposing any requirements
regarding the authentication process
and transmission of the electronic
prescriptions. The table below provides
a summary of DEA’s conclusions
regarding its risk assessment of systems
to permit the electronic prescribing of
controlled substances.
TABLE 5.—SUMMARY OF RISK ASSESSMENT FOR ELECTRONIC PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
M–04–04 Assurance Level .................................
NIST identity proofing .........................................
NIST authentication protocol ..............................
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
NIST authentication process ..............................
As has been discussed, DEA is
proposing in-person identity proofing
requirements consistent with, but not
equivalent to, Level 3; authentication
protocol requirements, use of a hard
token and two-factor authentication,
meeting the requirements of Level 4;
and no requirements regarding the
authentication process. DEA welcomes
comments and information regarding
alternative solutions for the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances
employing security controls that are as
effective as those being proposed in this
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and also
would meet DEA statutory and
regulatory obligations under the
Controlled Substances Act. Information
provided should be as specific and
detailed as possible to provide the
Administration with an understanding
of how the commenter believes the
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Level 4—High potential impact of harm to agency programs or public interests, personal safety, civil or criminal violations.
In-person identity proofing requirements specific to DEA; requirements consistent with, but not
equivalent to, NIST Level 3 in-person identity proofing.
Level 4—Use of hard token or multifactor one-time-use password token is necessary to bind
the prescriber to the prescription.
N/A—DEA is not proposing any requirements in this area.
alternative solution could be
implemented to satisfy the foregoing
considerations. Any person providing
such comments should discuss the
specific risks being addressed and how
any such risk-mitigating controls are
incorporated into the alternative being
discussed, and should state why the
commenter believes such controls are
adequate to address DEA’s concerns.
Any person providing such comments
should also discuss the system
vulnerabilities, risks, and weaknesses of
any alternatives provided.
If a commenter believes that any
proposed requirement is either too
stringent or too lax, the commenter
should so state, providing a detailed
explanation of how the controls mitigate
the identified risks, or how the lack of
controls aggravate or fail to address the
risks involved in the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances
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and, thus, why the commenter’s
alternative warrants consideration as an
alternative to the requirement being
proposed. Hence all comments should
clearly identify how all risk-mitigating
compensating controls adequately
address each security concern outlined
in the proposed rule.
For example, DEA welcomes
comments on the following topics:
• Whether in-person identity proofing
requirements consistent with, but not
equivalent to, Level 3, are sufficient to
address DEA’s concerns, or whether (a)
more stringent requirements, such as
those required under Level 4, are
necessary, or (b) DEA’s concerns could
be addressed with Level 2 requirements
combined with risk-mitigating controls.
• Whether authentication protocol
requirements, use of a hard token and
two-factor authentication, meeting the
requirements of Level 4 are sufficient to
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address DEA’s concerns, or whether (a)
more stringent requirements, such as
those imposed in a public key
infrastructure system, are necessary, or
(b) DEA’s concerns could be addressed
with Level 3 requirements combined
with risk-mitigating controls.
• Whether no requirements regarding
the authentication process, as proposed
in this rule, should cause DEA concern,
such that imposing requirements is
necessary.
VIII. Proposed Standards for Electronic
Prescription Systems for Controlled
Substances
The following discussion relates to
requirements DEA is proposing
regarding the creation, signature,
transmission, processing and dispensing
of controlled substance prescriptions.
As discussed below, practitioners and
pharmacies—DEA registrants—must use
systems and service providers which
comply with all requirements DEA may
finalize. While these requirements
pertain specifically to prescriptions for
controlled substances, nothing in this
rule precludes practitioners,
pharmacies, or service providers from
using these same standards for
prescriptions for noncontrolled
substances, if they so desire. However,
DEA notes that any references
throughout the following discussion
relate solely to prescriptions for
controlled substances.
In this rule, DEA is proposing various
security requirements for systems and
service providers that market software
and services to practitioners and
pharmacies to create, sign, transmit,
process and dispense electronic
controlled substance prescriptions. It is
incumbent upon DEA registrants—
practitioners and pharmacies—the
entities regulated by DEA, to use
systems and service providers that
comply with DEA security requirements
for the electronic prescribing and
dispensing of controlled substances.
DEA recognizes that its registrants may
not be able to evaluate a service
provider’s compliance and so is
establishing third-party audit and other
requirements to assist registrants in
determining whether a system or service
provider they currently use, or are
considering using, meets DEA security
requirements. While this preamble and
rule require actions of service providers,
it is the DEA-registered practitioner or
pharmacy DEA will look to if the system
or service provider that practitioner is
using is not in compliance with DEA
regulations. It is, ultimately, the DEAregistered individual practitioner and
pharmacy who are responsible for the
prescribing and dispensing of any
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controlled substance prescription, and
the requirements of this rule do not
change that longstanding responsibility
and liability.
DEA is proposing the following
requirements for the use of electronic
systems to create, sign, dispense, and
archive controlled substance
prescriptions, which are discussed in
detail below:
• The electronic prescription service
provider must receive a document
prepared by an entity permitted to
conduct in-person identity proofing of
prescribing practitioners regarding the
conduct of the in-person identity
proofing. The document may be
prepared on the identity proofing
entity’s letterhead or other official form
of correspondence, or the service
provider may design a form for use by
the identity proofing entity. Regardless
of the format, the document must
contain certain information required by
DEA. Entities DEA is proposing to
permit conduct in-person identity
proofing of prescribing practitioners
include:
Æ The entity within a DEA-registered
hospital that has previously granted the
practitioner privileges at the hospital
(e.g., a hospital credentialing office);
Æ The State professional or licensing
board, or State controlled substances
authority, that has authorized the
practitioner to prescribe controlled
substances;
Æ A State or local law enforcement
agency.
Æ The service provider must check
both the practitioner’s State license and
DEA registration to determine that both
are current and in good standing.
• Authentication: Access to the
electronic prescribing system for the
purposes of signing prescriptions must
meet the standards for Level 4
authentication in NIST SP 800–63. That
is, the system must require at least twofactor authentication to access the
system; one factor must be a
cryptographic key stored on a hard
token that meets the requirements for
Level 4 authentication in NIST SP 800–
63 or a multi-factor one time password
token. The hard token must be a
hardware device that meets the
following criteria:
Æ The token must require entry of a
password or biometric to activate the
authentication key.
Æ The token is not able to export the
authentication key.
Æ The token must be validated under
Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS) 140–2 as follows:
I Overall validation at Level 2 or
higher.
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I Physical security at Level 3 or
higher.
• The security of the system must be
audited annually using a third-party
audit that meets the requirements of a
SysTrust or WebTrust audit for security
and processing integrity.
• The system must limit signing
authority to those practitioners that
have a legal right to sign prescriptions
for controlled substances (i.e., the
system must set varying levels of access
to the system based on responsibilities).
• The system must have an automatic
lock out if the system is unused for
more than 2 minutes.
• The prescription must contain all of
the required data (date of issuance of the
prescription; patient name and address;
registrant full name, address, DEA
registration number; drug name, dosage
form, quantity prescribed, and
directions for use; and any other
information specific to certain
controlled substances prescriptions
mandated by law or DEA regulations).
Prior to signing the controlled substance
prescription, the system must show the
prescribing practitioner at least the
patient name and address, drug name,
dosage unit and strength, quantity,
directions for use, and the DEA number
of the prescriber whose identity is being
used to sign the prescription.
• Where more than one prescription
has been prepared for signing, prior to
authenticating to the system the
practitioner must positively indicate
which prescription(s) are to be signed.
• The practitioner must authenticate
himself to the system immediately
before signing a prescription.
• After authenticating to the system
but prior to transmitting the
prescription, the system must present
the practitioner with a statement
indicating that the practitioner
understands that he is signing the
prescription being transmitted. If the
practitioner does not so indicate, by
performing the signature function, the
prescription cannot be transmitted.
• The system must transmit the
electronic prescription immediately
upon signature. The system must not
transmit a controlled substance
prescription unless it is signed by a
practitioner authorized to sign such
prescriptions.
• The electronic data file must
include an indication that the
prescription was signed.
• The system must not allow printing
of prescriptions that have been
transmitted; if a prescription is printed,
it must not be transmitted.
• The system must generate a
monthly log of controlled substance
prescriptions and transmit it to the
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practitioner for his review. The
practitioner must indicate that the log
was reviewed. A record of that
indication must be maintained for five
years.
• The first recipient of the
prescription must digitally sign the
prescription and archive the digitally
signed version of the prescription as
received.
• The first pharmacy system that
receives the prescription must digitally
sign and archive a copy of the
prescription as received. Alternatively,
the intermediary that transmits the
prescription to the pharmacy may
digitally sign the transmitted
prescription and transmit both the
record and the digitally signed copy for
the pharmacy to archive.
• The digital signatures must meet
the requirements of FIPS 180–2 and
186–2.
• The pharmacy system must check
to determine whether the DEA
registration of the prescribing
practitioner is valid. (Alternatively, any
of the intermediary systems may
conduct this check provided that the
record indicates that the check has been
conducted. The CSA database may be
cached for one week from the date of
issuance by DEA of the most current
database.)
• The pharmacy system must be able
to store the complete DEA number
including extensions.
• The pharmacy system must have an
audit trail that identifies each person
who annotates or alters the record. The
pharmacy system must conduct daily
internal audits to identify any auditable
events.
• The system must have a backup
system of records stored at a separate
location.
• The pharmacy system must have a
third-party audit that meets the
requirements of SysTrust or SAS 70
audits for security and processing
integrity.
• The contents of a controlled
substance prescription must not be
altered, other than by reformatting,
during transmission.
• A prescription created
electronically for a controlled substance
must remain in its electronic form
throughout the transmission process to
the pharmacy; electronic prescriptions
may not be converted to other
transmission methods, e.g., facsimile, at
any time during transmission.
DEA would like the public to
comment on the ability of those
members of industry currently
providing electronic prescribing systems
for noncontrolled substances to meet the
requirements set forth in this proposed
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rule, and whether there might be
entrepreneurs not currently providing
electronic prescribing systems who
would be willing and able to develop
innovative systems that would meet the
requirements proposed here.
Other Requirements
In addition to the system
requirements, DEA is proposing to
require the following:
• A registrant must have separate
password/keys for each DEA registration
he holds and uses to issue prescriptions.
Multiple keys may be stored on the
same hard token.
• The registrant must use the
appropriate DEA registration for
prescriptions issued. Practitioners
holding multiple registrations in a
single State may use just one for any
prescription written in that State.
• The registrant must retain sole
possession of the hard token. If a token
is lost or compromised and the
registrant fails to notify the service
provider within 12 hours of discovery,
the registrant will be held responsible
for any prescriptions written using the
token.
• The pharmacy must annotate the
record with the same information
required for a paper prescription.
• The practitioner and pharmacist
must notify DEA and the service
provider if they identify problems in the
logs they review that indicate that
prescriptions have been created without
their knowledge or altered.
Discussion of the Proposed Rule System
Requirements
As noted previously, electronic
prescribing is in addition to existing
prescribing methods for controlled
substances. DEA’s goal is to impose as
few new requirements on electronic
prescription systems as possible while
retaining the ability to enforce the
Controlled Substances Act and its
implementing regulations. Many of the
requirements listed above exist in at
least some systems currently in use. The
Certification Commission for Health
Information Technology EHR
certification standards for security cover
many of the access and authentication
requirements DEA is proposing here.
DEA believes that the proposed
requirements will protect both
practitioners and pharmacies by
ensuring that they can meet their legal
obligations and lessen the threat of
someone misusing their authorities to
divert controlled substances. DEA
emphasizes that its electronic
prescription requirements do not alter
the responsibilities of the practitioner
and pharmacy in regard to controlled
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substance prescriptions. Both the
prescribing practitioner and the
dispensing pharmacy have a legal
responsibility to ensure that only
prescriptions issued for legitimate
medical purposes by DEA registrants
acting in the usual course of their
professional practice are dispensed. A
practitioner who knowingly allows
someone to issue prescriptions in the
practitioner’s name is legally
responsible for those prescriptions. A
pharmacy that fails to check the validity
of a controlled substance prescription
before dispensing is legally responsible
if the prescription is invalid.
In-person identity proofing. DEA
considered requiring service providers
to conduct in-person identity proofing
of prescribing practitioners as part of
their enrollment process. However, after
careful consideration, DEA determined
that in-person identity proofing by
service providers created certain
vulnerabilities which could not be
overcome. Specifically, DEA was
concerned that by requiring service
providers to both identity proof
practitioners and issue practitioners
access to the electronic prescribing
system to prescribe controlled
substances, the entire system was
vulnerable to compromise. Without
separation of the identity and
enrollment tasks, it could be quite easy
for service provider staff to create a
fraudulent identity and enroll that
identity in the electronic prescribing
system. While some service providers
have asserted that their staffs are
trustworthy, DEA did not want to
establish a system which could be easily
subverted for the diversion of controlled
substances. Further, DEA was
concerned that such a system may prove
to be inconvenient for prescribing
practitioners and service providers
alike. Although DEA believes that many
service providers would be on site at
practitioners’ offices routinely due to
the complexity of the EHR systems of
which electronic prescribing is often a
part, DEA recognizes that conducting
enrollment activities at that time may be
inconvenient. Practitioners may not be
at the practice location when the service
provider staff is present. If enrollment
could not occur, service providers’ staff
would have to make separate trips
specifically for in-person identity
proofing. Such trips could be difficult
depending on the location of the service
provider as compared to the
practitioner.
To address DEA’s concerns that the
identity proofing and enrollment
functions not reside within the same
entity, and to ensure that practitioners
have ready access to the entities
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permitted to conduct in-person identity
proofing, DEA is proposing that the
following entities may conduct inperson identity proofing:
• The entity within a DEA-registered
hospital that has previously granted that
practitioner privileges at the hospital
(e.g., a hospital credentialing office);
• The State professional or licensing
board, or State controlled substances
authority, that has authorized the
practitioner to prescribe controlled
substances;
• A State or local law enforcement
agency.
DEA is proposing that before a service
provider grants access to the electronic
prescription system for the prescribing
of controlled substances, the service
provider must receive a document
prepared by one of the above-listed
entities regarding the conduct of the inperson identity proofing. DEA is
proposing two alternatives for the
format of the identity proofing
document: The document may be
prepared on the identity proofing
entity’s letterhead or other official form
of correspondence, or the service
provider may design a form for use by
the identity proofing entity. Regardless
of the format, the document must
contain all of the following information:
• The name and DEA registration
number, where applicable, of the entity
which conducted the in-person identity
proofing of the practitioner;
• The name of the person within the
entity who conducted the in-person
identity proofing of the practitioner;
• The name and address of the
practitioner whose identity is being
verified;
• For each State in which the
practitioner wishes to prescribe
controlled substances electronically, the
name of the State licensing authority
and State license number of the
practitioner whose identity is being
verified;
• Except for individual practitioners
who prescribe controlled substances
using the DEA registration of the
institutional practitioner, for each State
in which the practitioner wishes to
prescribe controlled substances
electronically, the DEA registration
number and date of expiration of DEA
registration of the practitioner whose
identity is being verified;
• For individual practitioners who
prescribe controlled substances using
the DEA registration of the institutional
practitioner, a statement by the
institutional practitioner acknowledging
the authority of the individual
practitioner to prescribe controlled
substances using the institution’s DEA
registration, and the specific internal
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code number assigned to the individual
practitioner;
• The type of government-issued
photographic identification checked
(e.g., the practitioner’s driver’s license,
passport) and a statement that the
photograph on the identification
matched the person presenting the
photographic identification;
• The date on which the
practitioner’s in-person identity
proofing was conducted;
• The signature of the person within
the entity who conducted the in-person
identity proofing;
• The signature of the practitioner
who is the subject of the in-person
identity proofing.
Before granting the practitioner access
to the system to sign controlled
substances prescriptions, the service
provider must check with each State
and DEA to determine that the
practitioner’s State license to practice
medicine is current and in good
standing. In those States in which a
separate controlled substance
registration is required to prescribe
controlled substances, the service
provider must also check with the
appropriate State authority to determine
that the practitioner’s State license is
current and in good standing. Finally, to
ensure that the application to gain
access to sign controlled substances is
legitimate, the service provider must
contact the prescribing practitioner at
the practitioner’s registered location by
telephone to confirm the practitioner’s
intent to apply to prescribe controlled
substances using the service provider’s
system. The service provider must
obtain the telephone number from a
public source other than the application
received from the practitioner.
Alternatively, the service provider may
confirm the practitioner’s intent in
person at the practitioner’s registered
location.
The service provider must retain the
document regarding identity proofing in
its files for five years. DEA recognizes
that in-person identity proofing will add
a step to enrollment, but anything less
would make it easy to steal a
practitioner’s identity and issue
fraudulent prescriptions. In-person
identity proofing will protect
practitioners from this type of abuse.
The records may be maintained
electronically.
DEA seeks comments on in-person
identity proofing requirements, and
those requirements’ effects, if any, on
practitioners, including those practicing
at multiple locations. DEA also seeks
comments regarding alternatives to inperson identity proofing that achieve
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36741
the same or higher level of assurance as
that which DEA is proposing here.
Authentication. As explained above
in the risk assessment, DEA is proposing
that the authentication protocol must be
two-factor and meet NIST SP 800–63
Level 4 criteria. One factor must be
stored on a hard token that meets the
FIPS 140–2 standard for the
cryptographic module.
The HIPAA Security Guidance issued
by HHS on December 28, 2006, also
recommends two-factor authentication,
beyond a combination of password and
user ID, although it does not detail how
this should be implemented.18 The
standards for electronic health records
system security developed by the
Certification Commission for Healthcare
Information Technology (CCHIT)
require systems to support two-factor
identification.19 Consequently, all of the
EHR systems certified by CCHIT
(approximately 85 systems) already
support two-factor authentication. The
requirement to store the key on a token
will not impose an incremental cost for
these systems.
The highest form of protection would
be three-factor authentication
(something you know, something you
have, and something you are), but given
the difficulties that still exist in
ensuring that biometric readers function
accurately at all times, DEA decided not
to require a biometric password. DEA
notes that biometric authentication is
not prohibited in this rule; DEA
supports this method of authentication,
but is not requiring it at this time.
Practitioners may decide to use a
biometric as one of the passwords; some
systems, including some PDAs, have, or
support the use of, a fingerprint reader
for access control.
Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS) 140–1/140–2 is a
standard entitled ‘‘Security
Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules.’’ 20 The standard is issued by
NIST to lay out general requirements for
cryptographic modules for computer
and telecommunications systems. These
standards ensure that cryptographic
modules, which protect information
such as passwords and other records,
18 HIPAA Security Guidance for Remote Use of
and Access to Electronic Protected Health
Information December 28, 2006; https://www.cms
.hhs.gov/SecurityStandard/Downloads/Security
GuidanceforRemoteUseFinal122806.pdf.
19 CCHIT Security Criteria 2007 Final 16 Mar 07;
criteria S21. https://www.cchit.org/files/
AmbulatorylDomain/CCHIT
_Ambulatory_SECURITY_Criteria_2007_Final_
16Mar07.pdf.
20 National Institute of Standards and
Technology. FIPS 140–2 ‘‘Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules’’, May, 2001. https://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html.
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are robust enough that ‘‘breaking’’ the
encryption is generally not feasible. The
FIPS standards have been adopted by
the United States government and are
required for all cryptographic-based
security systems that are used by, or
approved by, Federal agencies to protect
unclassified information. DEA,
therefore, must require that the software
modules used comply with these
standards. A list of vendors whose
cryptographic modules have been
validated as FIPS 140–2 compliant may
be obtained from the NIST Web site at
https://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140–1/
1401val.htm. As of March 2008, more
than 900 modules have been certificated
as compliant. The vendors include
providers of PDAs, cell phones (Palm,
Blackberry, Nokia), one time password
tokens, as well as network and software
providers. (When the FIPS 140–1
standard was updated to 140–2, all
modules approved under the 140–1
standard were grandfathered and are
considered compliant under 140–2.)
DEA notes that practitioners are not
required to learn cryptographic keys; a
password entered into a hard token
accesses the key, which the service
provider then recognizes. From the
practitioner’s perspective, the only
difference from the common security
controls on computer systems is that
one of the keys is stored on a token. If
that token is a PDA, the practitioner
may not see a difference from the
existing electronic prescription systems
except when the practitioner wants to
use a personal computer, when he
would need to connect the PDA to the
computer to access the system.
Authentication protocol expiration
and revocation. The practitioner’s
authentication protocol to sign
controlled substances prescriptions is
based on the validity of the
practitioner’s DEA registration and on
the security of the hard token and
password. DEA would require the
service provider to revoke the
practitioner’s authentication protocol if
the practitioner’s DEA registration
expires (unless the service provider
determines that the registration has been
renewed), is revoked, suspended, or
terminated. DEA will make available to
service providers information regarding
the registration status of prescribing
practitioners, including practitioners’
names, addresses, DEA registration
numbers, and dates of expiration for
those DEA registrations. The service
provider must check the DEA
registration database at least once a
week to ensure that the service provider
has the most current DEA registration
information. DEA will permit service
providers to cache this information for
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one week from the date of issuance by
DEA of the most current database. DEA
seeks comment regarding the interval
for updating by DEA of registration
information to service providers.
Further, DEA is proposing to require
the service provider to revoke the
authentication protocol used to sign
controlled substance prescriptions
immediately upon receiving notification
from the practitioner that a password or
token has been compromised, lost, or
stolen. In such cases, the service
provider may issue a new
authentication protocol to the
practitioner.
DEA is interested in receiving
comment regarding the current industry
practices used to authenticate
practitioners who use electronic
prescribing systems for noncontrolled
substances and whether and how such
practices prevent noncontrolled
substance prescription forgery, fraud,
and other related crimes.
Access limitations and signing. DEA
is proposing a series of requirements
related to the creation, signing, and
transmitting of controlled substance
prescriptions:
• After authenticating to the system
but prior to signing the controlled
substance prescription, the system must
present the practitioner with a statement
indicating that the practitioner
understands he is signing the
prescription being transmitted. If he
does not so indicate, the prescription
must not be transmitted.
• The electronic prescription system
must include a function that requires a
practitioner to electronically ‘‘sign’’ the
completed prescription prior to
transmission. The prescription file must
include an indication that the
prescription was signed.
• The system must limit access to the
signing function for controlled
substances to practitioners authorized to
sign controlled substance prescriptions.
• The system must transmit the
prescription immediately upon
signature.
• The system must not transmit the
prescription unless it has been signed.
DEA wishes to ensure that the act of
signing controlled substances
prescriptions is clearly understood by
the practitioner. Therefore, DEA is
proposing to require that, after
authenticating to the system but prior to
signing the controlled substance
prescription, the system must present to
the practitioner certain information
regarding controlled substances
prescriptions being transmitted.
Specifically, the system must display for
the practitioner the patient’s name and
address; the name of the drug being
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prescribed; the dosage strength and
form, quantity, and directions for use;
and the DEA registration number under
which the prescription will be
authorized. While this information is
displayed, the practitioner must be
presented with the following statement
(or its substantial equivalent): ‘‘I, the
prescribing practitioner whose name
and DEA registration number appear on
the controlled substance prescription(s)
being transmitted, have reviewed all of
the prescription information listed
above and have confirmed that the
information for each prescription is
accurate. I further declare that by
transmitting the prescription(s)
information, I am indicating my intent
to sign and legally authorize the
prescription(s).’’ The practitioner must
positively indicate agreement with this
statement. Such agreement can be
accomplished through a check box or
other means determined by the system.
If the practitioner does not indicate
agreement to this statement, the
controlled substances prescriptions may
not be transmitted.
DEA believes that such a statement is
necessary to help to positively bind the
practitioner to the prescription. DEA
believes that this requirement is similar
to many banking and online billing
systems that require the user to agree to
certain terms and conditions before
billing or other financial transactions
are permitted to occur. This statement
will help to provide nonrepudiation of
the prescriptions; that is, the inclusion
of this statement will make it more
difficult for the practitioner to deny
having signed the controlled substance
prescriptions.
Although the requirement for signing
may seem obvious, signing is not
currently an automatic part of electronic
prescriptions. The standard that the
industry has developed and HHS has
adopted for the transmission of
electronic prescriptions (the National
Council for Prescription Drug Programs
(NCPDP) SCRIPT) does not include a
field that indicates that the prescription
has been signed. Signing an electronic
prescription does not create a record of
the act of signing; it is simply a function
that usually is linked to transmission.
The SCRIPT fields clearly provide for
cases where someone other than the
practitioner creates and transmits a
prescription under the practitioner’s
supervision. Although this approach
may be legal for prescriptions for
noncontrolled substances, it is not legal
for controlled substance prescriptions.
Agents of a practitioner may prepare the
prescription at the practitioner’s
direction, as they can with paper
prescriptions, but only the registered
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practitioner may sign and issue the
prescription. As noted above, the
signature represents the practitioner’s
attestation of the validity of the
prescription and legally binds the
practitioner to the prescription.
Another scenario that the SCRIPT
standard allows is for two DEA
registration numbers associated with
two practitioners to appear on a single
prescription; the standard allows a
practitioner and supervisor to be
identified with DEA registration
numbers. This scenario is not acceptable
for controlled substance prescriptions.
The prescribing registrant is solely
responsible for issuing the prescription;
approval by a supervisor does not alter
the legal liability of the prescribing
practitioner for the validity of the
prescription. Identifying two registrants
on a prescription could lead to
confusion about which registrant was
legally responsible and create confusion
in pharmacy record systems.
To ensure that only authorized
practitioners sign controlled substance
prescriptions, the service provider must
ensure that only DEA-registered
practitioners are allowed to sign
prescriptions for controlled substances
and that each practitioner is uniquely
identified. Specifically, the system must
require that the DEA registrant whose
DEA number is listed on the
prescription sign the prescription. The
system must not allow any other person
to sign the prescription. Many office
staff may have legitimate reasons to
access the system, particularly when the
electronic prescription capability is part
of an EHR system. Some service
providers now explicitly place limits on
the level of access granted to various
members of a practice. CCHIT Security
Criteria require that EHR systems set
access controls for specific tasks. DEA
would require that all service providers
do this if their systems will be used to
issue controlled substance
prescriptions. Nurses or other members
of a practice staff may prepare the
prescription, as they may with paper
prescriptions, but the systems must
allow only a practitioner authorized by
the State and DEA to issue controlled
substance prescriptions to sign and
transmit the prescription.
This requirement is necessary to
prevent others with access to the system
from creating and signing prescriptions.
In a recent discussion of an electronic
prescription system, the service
provider indicated that the illegality of
a staff member issuing a prescription
was a sufficient deterrent to prevent this
from happening just, the service
provider stated, as it prevents staff from
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stealing prescription pads.21 Office staff
have stolen prescription pads to create
fraudulent paper prescriptions and
called in fraudulent prescriptions. That
they can do so with paper prescriptions
is not a reason to facilitate their illegal
activities with electronic prescriptions.
DEA also notes that medical identity
theft—where patient records are sold or
misused—is a crime that often involves
insiders. The Report on the Use of
Health IT to Enhance and Expand
Health and Anti-Fraud Activities cited a
study that found that 70 percent of
identity theft cases involved insider
theft of data.22
This requirement will protect
practitioners by eliminating the
possibility that a staff member will be
able to issue controlled substance
prescriptions unless the practitioner
grants them access to his authentication
methods, which would make the
practitioner legally responsible for any
prescriptions that staff created. This
requirement is also consistent with the
HIPAA Security Guidance, issued on
December 28, 2006, which
recommended setting authorization
levels particularly for portable devices
and health record systems that can be
remotely accessed.
DEA notes that role-based access
control lists may need to be modified to
comply with this requirement. Not
every physician is a DEA registrant; not
every DEA registrant is allowed to
prescribe all Schedule II–V controlled
substances. Authorizations for mid-level
practitioners (e.g., nurse practitioners,
physicians’ assistants) vary across
States. Service providers will need to
ensure that their access control process
reflects the actual authorizations of
individuals and does not rely solely on
roles.
To ensure that a prescription cannot
be altered once it is ‘‘signed,’’ DEA is
proposing that the prescription must be
transmitted immediately on signing.
Practitioners would be able to create a
group of prescriptions and store them to
be signed later. Agents of the
practitioner (e.g., nurses) could also, at
the practitioner’s direction, enter some
or all of the data into an electronic
prescription as they can do for paper
prescriptions. The practitioner,
however, must authenticate to the
system to sign the prescription because
the practitioner is the ultimate authority
21 https://www.nationalerx.com/pdf/NEPSI-eRxfaq.pdf.
22 The Report on the Use of Health IT to Enhance
and Expand Health Care Anti-Fraud Activities,
prepared for the Office of the National Coordinator,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
September 30, 2005. https://www.hhs.gov/healthit/
hithca.html.
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for the prescription. If others prepare all
or part of prescriptions, the practitioner
could authenticate to the system and
sign one or more prescriptions
simultaneously depending on the
system. If the system allows a
practitioner to sign multiple
prescriptions at once, DEA would
require that the practitioner be required
to indicate separately that he or she
intends to sign each controlled
substance prescription listed; this can
be done by checking a box as some
systems currently do. The critical
requirement is that once the
prescription is signed, it must be
immediately transmitted so that there
can be no question that someone else at
the office had the opportunity to alter it.
Many existing systems already have this
feature. DEA notes that systems may
apply varying labels to the signing
function (e.g., sign, transmit); DEA does
not think it is necessary to change these
labels. The critical element is that the
practitioners understand that when they
use the function, they are exercising
their authority to issue a controlled
substance prescription and that they are
responsible for accuracy, completeness,
and validity of the prescription.
The other part of this requirement is
that a controlled substance prescription
must not be transmitted unless it has
been ‘‘signed.’’ The system must be
designed to prevent any transmission
until the practitioner has ‘‘signed’’ the
prescription. In addition, the system
must not allow a prescription to be
printed once it has been transmitted or
to be transmitted if it was printed. These
conditions are necessary to prevent a
single prescription being used to
generate multiple copies to be filled.
As noted above, the NCPDP SCRIPT
standard does not currently include a
field for a ‘‘signature’’ or for any
indication that the prescription has been
signed. DEA would require that
controlled substance prescriptions
include an indication that the
prescription was signed; this indication
could be a single character field. The
industry has indicated that this
alteration is feasible. It will provide
pharmacies with additional assurance
that the prescription was issued legally.
DEA welcomes comment on the
current industry practices used to
‘‘sign’’ electronic prescriptions for
noncontrolled substances and whether
and how such practices prevent
noncontrolled substance prescription
forgery, fraud, and other related crimes.
Prescription data. Electronic
prescriptions must contain the same
information that DEA requires for paper
prescriptions (21 CFR 1306.05): The
date of issuance of the prescription;
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practitioner’s full name and address;
practitioner’s DEA registration number;
patient’s full name and address; drug
name, strength, quantity, dosage form,
and directions for use. DEA notes that
for military or Public Health Service
practitioners exempt from registration,
the prescription must include the
practitioner’s service identification
number or Social Security Number as
required by 21 CFR 1306.05(h). This
information may not be altered once the
practitioner signs the prescription other
than to reformat. The current version of
NCPDP SCRIPT provides fields and
codes for all of the required data
elements, but not all of them are
mandatory. For a controlled substance
prescription, however, all of this
information must be included. Other
practitioner identifiers (State license
number or National Provider Identifier)
may not substitute for the DEA
registration number. A system that
completes practitioner and patient name
and address only by linking to a
National Provider Identifier (NPI)
number and insurance records is not
sufficient for DEA purposes for two
reasons. First, practitioners will have a
single NPI, but they may have multiple
DEA registrations, particularly if they
practice in more than one State. A
prescription must have the correct DEA
registration and location. Second, a
system that assumes that details on the
patient will be filled in by linking to
insurance files will not account for the
part of the population that does not
have prescription drug insurance. As
discussed above, multiple prescribers
and their DEA registration numbers on
a single prescription are also not
acceptable. Electronic prescription
systems would not be allowed to
transmit a prescription for a controlled
substance unless all of the required
elements are complete.
DEA is also proposing to require that
the system show the practitioner all of
the DEA-required prescription
information before the prescription is
signed to ensure that a practitioner does
not inadvertently misprescribe a
controlled substance or sign a
prescription created by an agent for his
signature without having been
presented with the contents. Although
many systems do this, the RAND study
indicated that some do not. In those
cases, the practitioner sees only the
drop down menus sequentially and may
not have the opportunity to review the
completed prescription. Where an agent
enters the data for the prescription, it is
particularly important that the
practitioner be able to see the details to
ensure that diversion is not occurring.
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DEA notes that the data may be
presented in any format the system
devises (e.g., arrayed like a paper
prescription, a single line with the data
selected shown); the essential items are
the patient name and address, drug
name, dosage form and units, quantity
prescribed, directions for use, and the
DEA registration number of the
prescribing practitioner. DEA recognizes
that systems may not routinely display
the patient’s address and seeks
comments on whether displaying this
information would pose technical
problems.
DEA believes it is important to allow
the signing and transmission of more
than one prescription simultaneously.
However, it is critical that the
practitioner know, and positively
indicate, which prescriptions are to be
signed and transmitted. Where more
than one prescription has been prepared
at any one time, DEA is proposing to
require that, prior to authenticating to
the system, the practitioner indicate
which prescription(s) are to be signed
and transmitted. Such indication could
be as simple as checking a box
associated with each prescription the
practitioner wishes to sign and transmit.
DEA is not proposing any requirements
to address a circumstance in which a
prescription is not indicated for
signature and transmission.
DEA would not allow alteration of
any of the required information after the
prescription is signed except to
reformat. DEA does not believe that the
intermediaries are altering the data
because formulary checks appear to
occur prior to signing. If, however, there
are cases where the content of the
required elements is altered (e.g., to
change the prescribed drug to a generic
drug) after signing, DEA would consider
the prescription invalid and the parties
that changed the data to have issued a
prescription without being authorized to
do so, a violation of the Controlled
Substances Act.
Automatic timeout. For security
reasons, many computer systems now
lock the computer if it is not used for
a period of time, often 5 or 10 minutes.
The user must then reauthenticate
himself to the system before being able
to use the computer again. This feature
ensures that there is a very limited
possibility that someone else could use
the computer or PDA after the
practitioner authenticates to the system.
This requirement is unlikely to be a
problem for electronic prescription
systems run by ASPs; if the feature does
not exist in installed systems, it will
require some reprogramming. DEA notes
that automatic timeout after system
inactivity is required under the CCHIT
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security criteria for EHRs, so should not
impose a burden on those system
providers. DEA is proposing that if the
system is inactive for 2 minutes after the
practitioner authenticates to the system
to sign controlled substances
prescriptions, the system must require
the practitioner to reauthenticate
himself to the system. DEA notes that it
is not proposing that practitioners
authenticate themselves to the system
before creating the prescription, but
only when the practitioner is ready to
sign and transmit the prescriptions.
Practitioners may create multiple
prescriptions or have staff create the
prescriptions for one or more patients,
then authenticate to the system and sign
the entire set at one time if the system
allows this.
Digitally Signed Records. DEA is
proposing that when an electronic
prescription is signed and transmitted
the first recipient would have to
digitally sign and archive the digitally
signed copy for five years from the date
of issuance by the practitioner. Some
electronic prescription systems already
do this. In one case, the practitioner
applies the service provider’s digital
signature when the practitioner signs
the prescription; this is an acceptable
practice under the proposed rule.
Similarly, the first pharmacy system to
receive the prescription (or the last
intermediary transmitting it to the
pharmacy) would have to digitally sign
and archive a copy of the record as
received. If the last intermediary
digitally signs the record, it must
forward both the record and the
digitally signed copy to the pharmacy
for dispensing. DEA notes that the
service providers already have digital
certificates.
As explained in detail below, digitally
signing a record ensures that DEA and
other law enforcement agencies can
prove that the record is the prescription
that the practitioner signed and the
record that the pharmacy received.
Industry representatives have stated that
their internal audit trails provide similar
evidence of record integrity; audit trails
are computer functions that record each
time a record is opened or altered. DEA
has two concerns with relying on such
audit trails for proof of record integrity.
First, insiders will know how to turn off
or erase audit trails. If they want to alter
a prescription or insert fraudulent new
prescriptions, they may be able to do so
without leaving a trace. Second, DEA
and other law enforcement agencies
cannot be in the position of having to
prove that such alterations did not occur
each time they have to prove that a
practitioner signed fraudulent
prescriptions or a pharmacy altered a
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record. The standard for criminal cases
is ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ If DEA
relied on audit trails, it would have to
subpoena both records and technical
experts from each system and
intermediary that handled each suspect
prescription and hope that the
possibility of insider action did not
create a reasonable doubt. (As discussed
in more detail below, insider threats to
computer systems are relatively
common.)
The burden of relying on intermediary
and service provider audit trails would
fall on the service providers and
intermediaries as well. Even a simple
case against a single practitioner could
require substantial time for each service
provider and intermediary as they
would need to produce records and
experts to explain the systems to grand
juries, attorneys on both sides, and petit
juries. Many diversion cases are not
simple. For example, in February 2007,
a county district attorney in New York
filed charges against a Florida pharmacy
and at least six practitioners in a case
involving diversion of steroids
(Schedule III). The investigation
involved at least 20 branch offices of
State, local, and Federal agencies in four
States with connected investigations in
two other States. If the prescriptions had
been electronic, each service provider
and intermediary could have been
required to make records and experts
available to each investigating agency.
Neither the service providers,
intermediaries, nor law enforcement
would be well served by a system that
demanded the industry prove the
integrity of its systems every time a case
is brought against a practitioner or
pharmacy.
Digital Signatures. Digital signatures,
as opposed to electronic signatures, are
created as part of a public key
infrastructure. A trusted party, a
certification authority, conducts identity
proofing and provides the subscriber
with the means to generate an
asymmetric pair of cryptographic keys.
The subscriber retains control of the
private key; the public key is available
to anyone. What one of the keys
encrypts only the other key can decrypt.
When a person digitally signs a
record, the text of the record is run
through an algorithm that produces a
fixed-length digest (known as the hash).
The private key is used to encrypt the
digest. The encrypted digest is the
digital signature. When the record is
sent to someone else, both the plain text
and the digital signature are sent along
with the signer’s digital certificate,
which includes the public key. If the
recipient wants to confirm that the
record has not been altered during
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transmission, the recipient can use the
public key to decrypt the digest. This
step confirms who sent the message
(i.e., no one other than the holder of the
private key could have sent the message
and the holder cannot repudiate the
message). The recipient’s system can
run the plain text received through the
same hashing algorithm. If the two
digests match, the recipient knows that
the message sent has not been altered.
The advantage of digital signatures is
that they provide, in a single step, what
other systems do not: a straightforward
means of determining record integrity. If
the first recipient of an electronic
prescription signs it digitally, DEA will
be able to prove what the practitioner
signed. If the prescription is altered after
that point, the practitioner will be able
to demonstrate that he did not issue the
altered prescription. Similarly, if the
contents of the prescription sent and
prescription received match, DEA and
the intermediaries will be able to prove
that the contents of the record were not
altered in transit.
DEA is not proposing that
practitioners digitally sign prescriptions
or that pharmacies routinely validate
prescriptions that are digitally signed
because the existing system of
intermediaries makes this requirement
infeasible. As explained above,
electronic prescriptions often need to be
reformatted during transmission. This
reformatting makes it impossible to
validate the digitally signed record. That
is, the digest generated for the
prescription signed will not match the
digest generated for the prescription
received if even a single space is
changed. DEA is, therefore, proposing
only that the prescription as sent by the
prescribing practitioner and as received
by the dispensing pharmacy be digitally
signed and archived. This approach will
enable DEA and other law enforcement
agencies to prove what the practitioner
signed and what the pharmacy received.
The approach also allows the service
providers to apply their digital
signatures, which most of them already
have, rather than requiring the 1.2
million DEA-registered practitioners to
obtain digital certificates. Digital
signatures are an integral component of
secure transmission systems in use by
businesses that use the Internet.
The requirements for the digital
signatures that the service providers or
pharmacies apply are based on NIST
FIPS standards for digital signatures and
the hashing algorithm. Specifically, the
signature would have to comply with
FIPS 186–2, the digital signature
standard. The algorithm used to process
the record would have to comply with
FIPS 180–2, the secure hash standard.
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Compliance with FIPS 186–2 requires
compliance with FIPS 180–2. These
standards are commonly used in the
technology industry and, therefore,
should not impose a burden on service
providers; specifying the standards
ensures the security of the digitally
signed record.
Check on validity of the DEA
registration. DEA is proposing that the
validity of the DEA registration must be
checked prior to dispensing a
prescription. For paper prescriptions,
this responsibility rests with the
pharmacy. If a pharmacist has reason to
doubt the validity of a prescription, he
is required to, among other things,
check the registration of the prescribing
practitioner to determine whether, in
fact, the practitioner is authorized to
prescribe controlled substances in the
schedule of the prescription. Chain
pharmacies sometimes purchase the
CSA registration database to conduct
these checks. To parallel the paper
system, DEA would require that prior to
dispensing the pharmacy verifies that
the practitioner is authorized by DEA to
issue the prescription. DEA recognizes,
however, that any of the service
providers or intermediaries could offer
this check as part of their service.
Therefore, DEA is proposing simply that
the registration be checked at some
point prior to dispensing; if the check
occurs before the prescription is
delivered to the pharmacy, the record
must indicate that the check has
occurred and that the prescription is
valid. If an electronic prescription
service provider chooses to check the
validity before transmitting the
prescription and indicate that the check
has occurred and the registration is
valid, that would meet the requirement
as would checks by any intermediary or
pharmacy service provider. This
requirement will give pharmacies
greater assurance than they now have
that the prescription is legitimate. DEA
notes that regardless of which party
checks the validity of the prescribing
practitioner’s DEA registration, the
pharmacy is solely responsible and
liable for the dispensing of the
controlled substance. A pharmacy that
relies on an intermediary or its own
service provider to conduct the check
must ensure that the reliance is
warranted.
Pharmacy system record
requirements. The pharmacy system
must archive and retain the digitally
signed prescription as received for five
years from the date of receipt. The
pharmacy system must require that each
annotation include the information
needed for paper prescription
annotation (what was dispensed, by
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whom, and when). The annotated
record or linked records must be
maintained for five years.
System security requirements. Beyond
the requirements for handling
controlled substance prescriptions at the
point of origin, DEA is concerned about
the security of the service providers’
systems and whether that security
protects against both insider and
outsider threats. As noted above, insider
threats may be a greater threat. Two FBI
surveys on computer crime indicate that
42 to 44 percent of the companies
surveyed reported insider misuse of
their computer systems.23 The 2006
survey also found that the most
commonly used security technologies
were directed toward outsiders. The
Secret Service and Carnegie Mellon
Institute have conducted studies of
insider threats. They found that across
all industries insiders who ‘‘attacked’’
company systems were likely to be
disgruntled technology employees or
former technology employees. In the
financial sector, however, insiders did
not hold technical positions. These
insiders, who were usually acting for
personal gain, attacked the system
during work hours (70 percent) and in
the work place (83 percent). In the
financial sector, 78 percent of the cases
involved modification or deletion of
information.24
DEA is particularly concerned about
insider threats. Although it is possible
for hackers to break into computer
systems, most service providers have
invested in security technologies to
protect against outsider attacks. It would
also be possible for someone to create
identity documents good enough to
convince a service provider that the
person was a DEA registrant, but this
could be a costly exercise that could
involve setting up a fictitious office. It
is more likely that someone outside or
inside a service provider organization
will find an insider willing to create a
fictitious subscriber, using a real
practitioner’s name and DEA
registration number, who can then issue
fraudulent prescriptions that the system,
intermediaries and pharmacies will
assume are genuine. Staff at
intermediaries could also create and
transmit fictitious prescriptions. The
profits to be made from such action
would be sufficient to bribe service
provider insiders or to tempt them to
take action on their own. In addition,
with 10 percent of the adult population
23 2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey and the 2006
CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey.
24 Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in
the Banking and Financial Sector, August 2004;
Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in
Critical Infrastructure Sectors, May 2005.
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abusing prescription drugs at some
time,25 it is likely that some insiders or
their family members or friends may be
addicted to prescription drugs that they
cannot obtain as easily elsewhere. DEA
does not question the good intentions of
service providers or intermediaries, but
¨
it would be naıve to think that they are
immune from the threat of insider
action when it is so widespread across
all industries.
Pharmacy internal audits. For
pharmacies, DEA is proposing that the
pharmacy system include an internal
audit trail; at the July 2006 public
meeting regarding electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances,
the industry indicated that audit trails
are a common feature of existing
systems. The system operator would be
required to define and implement a list
of auditable events and conduct a daily
analysis of the system to identify if any
auditable events have occurred. The list
of auditable events would have to
include, at a minimum, attempted or
successful unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, modification, or destruction
of information or interference with
system operations in the controlled
substances prescription system. The
minimum list is based on the HIPAA
definition of a security incident (45 CFR
164.304) and should, therefore, impose
no new requirements on pharmacy
systems, which are already subject to
HIPAA. If the daily audit report
identifies any events that indicate that
the prescription system has been, or
could have been, compromised, the
pharmacy would be required to report
this to DEA.
Pharmacy backup storage system.
DEA is also proposing that the
pharmacy system have a backup storage
system for the prescription records
required to be maintained by DEA. The
backup system would have to be at
another location so that it would not be
subject to the same hazards (e.g., fires,
power surges) as the main server. Such
backup systems are common features
provided by pharmacy system ASPs.
DEA believes that pharmacies will
generally need such systems for normal
business reasons, particularly as their
records become solely electronic.
Backup systems will prevent the loss of
records that DEA has seen when
pharmacies have fires or power surges
25 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration. (2007). Results from the 2006
National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National
Findings detailed tables (Office of Applied Studies,
NSDUH Series H–32, DHHS Publication No. SMA
07–4293. Rockville, MD. Table 1.18B—Nonmedical
Use of Pain Relievers in Lifetime, Past Year, and
Past Month by Detailed Age Category: Percentages,
2005 and 2006. https://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/
2k6nsduh/2k6Results.cfm#TOC.
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between the time DEA, or another law
enforcement agency, serves a subpoena
and the time the records must be
delivered.
Third-party audits. DEA realizes that
its registrants would not be able to
determine, on their own, whether a
particular service provider or system
meets DEA’s requirements. In addition,
the security of the service provider’s
operations is critical to preventing
insider threats and outsider attacks on
the system. A registrant would have no
way to determine whether a service
provider had adequate protection
against the range of potential security
threats. It can be argued that service
providers’ primary goal is to sell their
systems; the assertions that any service
provider makes about its system cannot
be accepted at face value. The accepted
way for demonstrating that a system or
a company is meeting a standard is to
have a qualified third party audit the
system or program and make a
determination regarding the system’s
compliance. A qualified third party
allows the party relying on the
information the assurance that the
determination is impartial and
complete.
DEA considered developing a series of
security requirements derived from
NIST SP 800–53, which details security
requirements for Federal information
technology systems, and mandating that
compliance with the requirements be
verified through a third-party audit.
DEA has concluded, however, that
separate detailed standards were not
warranted because an alternative
approach would provide equivalent
assurance of security practices at a
lower cost. Detailed requirements based
on NIST SP 800–53 could limit the
flexibility of service providers to
develop different procedures and
practices that meet the need for security.
Many service providers may already
have adequate security practices and
procedures in place, which might have
to be altered to meet a NIST SP 800–53
requirement. DEA is aware that most
private sector companies are unfamiliar
with NIST SP 800–53. In addition,
auditors would have to develop new
protocols, a cost that would be passed
on to the service providers. Because
there are relatively few service
providers, it is possible that there would
not be an incentive for auditors to
develop a common protocol that could
be applied nationally. Another Federal
agency that created third-party audit
standards based on NIST SP 800–53
indicates that audits of compliance with
a NIST SP 800–53-derived standard cost
at least $250,000.
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DEA, therefore, is proposing that
rather than attempting to dictate
security requirements, the
Administration would require electronic
prescribing system service providers
and pharmacies to obtain a third-party
audit that addresses security and
processing integrity. The third-party
audit would also give practitioners and
pharmacies a basis for determining if
their systems meet DEA’s standards.
DEA seeks comments on this approach
and whether this approach is preferable
to a NIST SP 800–53-based audit
approach.
Specifically, DEA is proposing that
any system that will be used to create
controlled substance prescriptions must
have a third-party audit prior to
accepting controlled substances
prescriptions for processing and
annually thereafter that meets the
criteria for a SysTrust or WebTrust audit
for security and processing integrity. For
pharmacies, a SAS 70 audit would also
be acceptable. As discussed below,
SysTrust, WebTrust, and SAS 70 audits
are professional services provided by
qualified certified public accounting
firms. For security, the audit determines
whether the system is protected against
unauthorized access (physical and
logical); for processing integrity, the
audit determines if the system
processing is complete, accurate, timely,
and authorized. SysTrust and WebTrust
audits may also address issues of system
availability, privacy, and
confidentiality. Although practitioners
and pharmacies may well be interested
in these aspects of their systems, DEA
does not believe that they are directly
connected to the authentication and
integrity of prescription records and,
therefore, is not proposing to require
audits that address these elements.
Third-party audits are frequently used
by companies to prove compliance with
standards and regulations.
Organizations such as the International
Standards Organization (ISO) routinely
require third-party audits to
demonstrate compliance and continuing
compliance with its standards. Industry
organizations, such as the American
Chemistry Council, require third-party
audits for their members to prove
compliance with industry programs
(e.g., Responsible Care in the chemical
industry). The FDA recommends thirdparty audits for food processors and
medical device manufacturers. The
Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC), an
interagency body that prescribes
uniform principles, standards, and
report forms for the Federal examination
of financial institutions, allows thirdparty audits of technology service
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providers. Specifically, the Council cites
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Statement of
Auditing Standards (SAS) 70 and Trust
Services audits as providing the
examination and information needed by
Federally regulated financial
institutions. FFIEC states that:
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business practices and policies, Trust
Services Principles and Criteria used to
examine the site, the report of the
independent accountant, as well as links to
other sites with active WebTrust seals.27
SysTrust—In this type of review, a licensed
CPA provides independent verification that a
TSP has effective controls in place so that the
system can function reliably. The institution
prepares a description of the aspects of the
system subject to be reviewed so that the
scope of the review is clear to readers of the
report. This system description is attached to
the CPA’s report. The auditor determines the
presence of system controls and tests the
effectiveness of the controls during the
period covered by the SysTrust report. If the
review is an attest-level engagement, the CPA
firm’s attestation is represented by the report
to management and may also be represented
by a SysTrust seal on the institution’s Web
site.
WebTrust—The objective of a WebTrust
engagement is for a licensed CPA to provide
independent verification that an institution’s
Web site complies with the Trust Services
Principles and Criteria in the particular
subject matter reviewed (i.e., confidentiality,
security, etc.). If the engagement is an attestlevel review, assurance is represented by the
CPA’s report to management. An institution
whose Web site has met the Trust Services
Principles and Criteria in a particular subject
matter area is eligible to display the
WebTrust seal for that area to provide
independent verification that an institution’s
Web site is in compliance. Clicking on the
WebTrust seal reveals the date the seal was
granted and the date it expires, the site’s
Some electronic prescription systems
already obtain these audits and display
the seals on their Web sites.
Because the AICPA Trust audits are
already in use and widely recognized,
DEA is proposing to specify their use.
DEA, however, seeks comments on
whether other recognized audit
protocols exist that provide similar
services to those covered by the
SysTrust/WebTrust/SAS 70 systems.
DEA recognizes that audits can be
expensive; SysTrust audits can cost
from $15,000 to $250,000 depending on
the size of the company and complexity
of the information technology system.
These recognized audits, however,
provide assurance to the service
providers’ customers and investors that
the systems will protect them and their
information.
For prescribing systems, DEA is
proposing that service providers must
make the audit report available to any
practitioner currently using the service
provider’s system and any practitioner
considering use of the system. DEA
believes that, at a minimum, the service
provider must make the report available
on its Web site, although a service
provider may choose to make the report
available through other means as well.
If the third-party audit determines that
the system does not meet one or more
of DEA’s regulatory requirements
regarding the electronic prescribing of
controlled substances, or does not
provide adequate security against
insider and outsider threats, the service
provider must not accept for
transmission any controlled substance
prescription. The service provider
would be required to notify
practitioners that they should not use
the system to generate and transmit
controlled substance prescriptions. The
service provider must also notify DEA of
the adverse audit report and provide the
report to DEA. For service providers that
install the prescription-writing system
on a practitioner’s computers and that
are not involved in the subsequent
transmission of the prescription, the
service provider must notify its DEA
registrant customers of the results of any
third-party audit that finds that the
system does not meet one or more of
DEA’s regulatory requirements
regarding the electronic prescribing of
controlled substances. The service
provider must also notify DEA of the
26 https://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/booklets/
audit/audit_06_3_party.html.
27 https://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/booklets/
audit/audit_06_3_party.html.
SAS 70 provides a uniform reporting
format for third-party reviews of technology
service providers (TSP) to facilitate the
description and disclosure of the service
provider’s processes and controls to
customers and their auditors. SAS 70 is a
widely recognized standard and indicates
that a service provider has had its control
objectives and activities examined by an
independent accounting and auditing firm. A
formal report including the auditor’s opinion
(service auditor’s report) is issued to the TSP
at the conclusion of the SAS 70 process. The
report contains a detailed description of the
TSP’s controls and an independent
assessment of whether the controls are in
place and suitably designed for the service
provider’s operations. The independent
assessment of controls is based on testing
certain controls to determine whether they
are designed and operating with sufficient
effectiveness to achieve the related control
objective for the specified time period.26
SAS 70 audits are intended for the
company’s internal use. AICPA has
developed two Trust Services audits to
provide information to external users.
FFIEC describes them as follows:
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adverse audit report and provide the
report to DEA.
The practitioner must determine
initially and at least annually thereafter
that the third-party audit report of the
service provider indicates that the
system and service provider meet DEA’s
regulatory requirements regarding the
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances. If the third-party audit
report indicates that the system or the
service provider does not meet the
requirements of this part, or the service
provider notifies the practitioner that
the system does not meet the
requirements of this part, DEA is
proposing to require that the
practitioner must immediately cease
issuance of electronic controlled
substance prescriptions using the
system. As DEA has discussed
throughout this rule, electronic
prescribing of controlled substances is
in addition to existing methods for
prescribing of these substances.
Therefore, DEA believes that this
requirement will not impede the
prescribing of controlled substances by
practitioners.
For pharmacy systems, DEA is
proposing that service providers must
make the audit report available to any
pharmacy currently using the service
provider’s system. DEA believes that, at
a minimum, the service provider must
make the report available on its Web
site, although a service provider may
choose to make the report available
through other means as well. If the
third-party audit determines that the
system does not meet one or more of
DEA’s regulatory requirements
regarding the dispensing of electronic
controlled substances prescriptions, or
does not provide adequate security
against insider and outsider threats, the
service provider must not accept or
process any controlled substance
prescription. The service provider
would be required to notify pharmacies
that they should not use the system to
accept and process controlled substance
prescriptions. The service provider must
also notify DEA of the adverse audit
report and provide the report to DEA.
For service providers that install the
prescription-processing system on a
pharmacy’s computers and that are not
involved in the subsequent processing
of the prescription, the service provider
must notify its DEA registrant customers
of the results of any third-party audit
that finds that the system does not meet
one or more of DEA’s regulatory
requirements regarding the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances.
The service provider must also notify
DEA of the adverse audit report and
provide the report to DEA.
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Prescribing logs. DEA is proposing
that electronic prescription service
providers generate and send
practitioners a log of all controlled
substance prescriptions the practitioner
has written in the previous month. The
practitioner would be required to review
the log and indicate to the service
provider that the practitioner has
reviewed it. A record of the indication
that the review has occurred must be
retained for five years. Further, DEA is
proposing that the service provider must
make available, at the practitioner’s
request, a record of all controlled
substance prescriptions transmitted by
the practitioner over the previous five
years, the length of time for which the
service provider is required to retain the
digitally signed archive of the controlled
substance prescriptions. DEA is not
proposing that the pharmacy system
generate dispensing logs, as they are
required to do for refills under 21 CFR
1306.22. The internal audit trail and
daily check for auditable events will
serve to identify problem records
without the need for a daily printout of
the daily dispensing record. DEA
recognizes that audit trails are not
perfect and that insiders can subvert
them. Diversion from pharmacies,
however, usually involves pharmacy
staff altering records to cover diversion
or knowingly filling fraudulent
prescriptions. Most pharmacists and
other pharmacy staff are unlikely to be
knowledgeable enough to be able to
manipulate audit system controls. DEA
seeks comments regarding these record
requirements.
Discussion of Other Proposed Rule
Requirements
A. Practitioner Requirements
DEA emphasizes that the use of
electronic prescriptions is voluntary. No
registrant would be required by DEA to
issue controlled substance prescriptions
electronically. Those registrants that
wish to do so, however, would have to
comply with the rules governing
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances.
DEA would require that practitioners
who are registered in more than one
State have a separate key to sign
prescriptions for their registration in
each State. Some practitioners hold
multiple registrations within a single
State because they administer or
dispense controlled substances directly
to patients at multiple locations. As a
practical matter, however, they may
issue prescriptions in the State under a
single registration (see 71 FR 69478,
December 1, 2006 for further discussion
of this). Consequently, DEA is proposing
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that practitioners would need to have
multiple access keys only when they
practice in more than one State. The
‘‘keys’’ could be stored on the same hard
token. The practitioner would be
responsible for selecting the correct
DEA registration to use to sign the
prescription.
The practitioner must ensure that
only the practitioner uses the hard token
and must not share the password with
any other person. The practitioner must
adopt procedures and controls to (1)
secure the hard token and password
against loss, theft, or unauthorized use,
and (2) clearly identify any attempt to
compromise the private key. In practice,
a practitioner can secure the hard token
by retaining physical control of it. The
practitioner must not lend the token,
whether it is a PDA, cell phone, smart
card, or other device, to anyone. If the
practitioner has reason to believe that
the password or other method used to
authenticate to the token has been
compromised, the practitioner must
notify the service provider as soon as
possible, but no later than 12 hours after
discovery, and change the
authentication. The practitioner must
report to the service provider the loss or
theft of the hard token within 12 hours
of identifying the loss or theft even if
the practitioner does not believe that
someone else will be able to
authenticate to the system. If the hard
token is lost or the key can no longer be
accessed for any reason, the service
provider must revoke the authorization
to sign controlled substances
prescriptions. If a practitioner fails to
notify the service provider of the loss or
compromise within 12 hours or if the
practitioner purposefully allows
someone else to use the hard token to
create and sign electronic prescriptions,
DEA will hold the practitioner
responsible for any controlled substance
prescriptions issued under his name.
Regarding the third-party audits of
electronic prescribing service providers’
prescribing systems, the practitioner
must determine initially and at least
annually thereafter that the third-party
audit report of the service provider
indicates that the system and service
provider meet the DEA requirements for
electronic prescribing systems. If the
third-party audit report indicates that
the system or the service provider does
not meet DEA’s requirements, or the
service provider notifies the practitioner
that the system does not meet DEA’s
requirements, the practitioner must
immediately cease to issue electronic
controlled substance prescriptions using
the system.
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B. Prescription Logs and Security
Incidents
The practitioner would be required to
review the log of his controlled
substance prescriptions transmitted by
the service provider and indicate that he
has reviewed the log; the indication can
be as simple as checking a box. DEA
emphasizes that it does not expect
practitioners to crosscheck the log with
medical records. DEA expects
practitioners to review the list to
determine if something seems unusual,
such as prescriptions for a patient the
practitioner has not seen, prescriptions
for substances the practitioner does not
usually prescribe, or more prescriptions
for a particular controlled substance
than a particular patient would
normally require. If the practitioner
finds problems, the practitioner would
be required to notify DEA and the
service provider within 12 hours.
Pharmacy systems would also be
required to conduct a daily analysis of
the pharmacy system audit trail to check
for auditable events. If an auditable
event occurs, the pharmacy must
determine whether it represents a
security incident that compromised, or
could have compromised, the integrity
of the prescription system and report
any such incidents to the system
provider and DEA within one business
day. Both the practitioner log check and
the pharmacy audit trail analysis will
assist registrants, service providers, and
DEA in identifying any diversion that
has occurred.
Finally, DEA is proposing that service
providers must audit their records and
systems at least once a day. Service
providers would be required to notify
DEA of any security incidents that could
compromise the security of controlled
substance prescriptions. These incidents
would include, but not be limited to, the
discovery that prescriptions were being
written by nonregistrants (identity
theft), that access had been granted
without proper identity proofing, that
prescriptions were being or could have
been altered after transmission, or that
outsiders had penetrated the system.
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C. Electronic Records and Record
Retention
Record retention. The CSA (21 U.S.C.
827(b)(3)) requires that records of
dispensing, i.e., prescriptions retained
by pharmacies, shall be kept and made
available ‘‘for at least two years’’ for
inspection and copying by authorized
personnel, including DEA. As DEA has
noted previously, however, many States
require that these records be maintained
for longer periods of time. DEA
reviewed existing State board of
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pharmacy requirements regarding
record retention and found that 21
States require that records be retained
for two years, nine for three years, one
for four years, 17 for five years, one for
six years, and one State required that
records be retained for seven years.
As has been mentioned throughout
this document, electronic prescribing
poses new threats and vulnerabilities for
diversion due to the increased velocity
of these authenticated automated
transactions. Unlike the paper system,
where only one prescription is created
and provided to a patient who brings
that prescription directly to the
dispensing pharmacy, electronic
systems provide the opportunity to
create and transmit many prescriptions
simultaneously. These many
prescriptions can be simultaneously
transmitted to pharmacies over a broad
geographic area, without the need to
physically move a paper prescription
from one location to another. Further, as
DEA has discussed, the introduction of
service providers and other
intermediaries into the system poses
new vulnerabilities for insider attacks
on the electronic prescribing systems.
DEA is concerned that a significant
amount of time may elapse between the
time a controlled substance is diverted
and the time DEA becomes aware of the
potential or suspected diversion. DEA is
also concerned that administrative,
civil, and criminal cases will become
more complex and time-consuming as
more parties become involved in the
movement of the prescription from the
practitioner to the pharmacy.
The statute of limitations for noncapital offenses is five years. That is, the
United States cannot prosecute, try, or
otherwise punish anyone for any noncapital offense unless the person is
indicted, or an information instituted,
within five years after the offense was
committed (18 U.S.C. 3282). Due to the
potential length and complexity of cases
relating to the diversion of electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances,
DEA believes that a longer retention
period is necessary and permissible
within its statutory authority.
Therefore, to address these concerns,
DEA is proposing to require that all
records regarding electronic prescribing
of controlled substances be maintained
for five years from the date the record
was created. This record retention
requirement shall not pre-empt any
longer period of retention which may be
required now or in the future, by any
other federal or State law or regulation,
applicable to practitioners, pharmacists,
or pharmacies. Records affected by this
requirement would include, but are not
necessarily limited to:
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36749
• The document received by the
service provider from an entity
permitted to conduct in-person identity
proofing regarding the conduct of that
in-person identity proofing for the
specific practitioner.
• The electronic controlled substance
prescription as digitally signed by the
service provider or first processor.
• The electronic controlled substance
prescription as digitally signed by the
pharmacy or last intermediary.
• The dispensing annotations added
to or linked to the prescription record.
• The backup copy of the pharmacy
controlled substances prescription
records.
• The internal audit trail records
created by the pharmacy system.
• The monthly log of controlled
substances prescriptions provided to
each practitioner by the practitioner’s
service provider and the record of the
indication by the practitioner that the
log has been reviewed.
• The third-party SysTrust,
WebTrust, or SAS 70 report of the
electronic prescribing or pharmacy
system.
DEA believes that these record
retention requirements will not pose
any new burdens on service providers
and pharmacies. Many service providers
indicate that they retain these records
for longer periods of time, to comply
with State laws and other Federal
agency requirements. Further, as all of
the records in question can be retained
electronically, there will be limited
costs associated with the storage of
these records. DEA seeks comment
regarding the extent to which service
providers and intermediaries store
electronic records of noncontrolled
substance prescriptions.
Electronic Records. DEA is proposing
that pharmacies must maintain records
of electronic prescriptions and any
linked records for five years. Records
must be maintained electronically.
Records regarding controlled substances
that are maintained electronically must
be immediately retrievable from all
other records by prescriber’s name,
patient’s name, drug dispensed, and
date filled. They must be easily readable
or easily rendered in a human readable
format. The databases in which
prescription records are maintained
must be capable of exporting the records
into database or spreadsheet format that
will allow the data to be sorted by
prescriber name, patient name, drug
dispensed, and date filled. Such records
must be made available to the
Administration upon request. Records
must also be capable of being
immediately printed upon request.
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D. Preventing This Rule From Being
Exploited by Rogue Internet Operators
In recent years, there has been a
significant rise in the amount of
prescription controlled substances sold
without a legitimate medical purpose by
Internet-based entities such as so-called
‘‘rogue Internet pharmacies.’’ The
typical ‘‘rogue Internet pharmacy’’ is
actually a criminal conspiracy run by a
Web ‘‘entrepreneur’’ who contracts with
one or more unscrupulous DEAregistered practitioners to write
prescriptions and one or more
unscrupulous DEA-registered
pharmacies to fill the prescriptions.
Drug seekers easily find their way onto
these Web sites through an Internet
search engine (such as by typing the
search terms ‘‘hydrocodone no
prescription’’) or through spam e-mail
advertisements. Once on such sites, the
drug seeker is immediately shown a
price list of controlled substances (with
such prices usually inflated well above
those of a legitimate pharmacy). After
the drug seeker chooses the drug(s) he
wants, the Web site assists the buyer in
obtaining a prescription from an
unscrupulous practitioner employed by
the site, who has no bona fide doctorpatient relationship with the buyer.
Generally, all that is needed for the
buyer to obtain a prescription is to
supply a credit card number, fill out a
questionnaire and, in some cases, fax in
some form of ‘‘documentation’’ that
purports to show a medical condition.
The prescribing practitioner
employed by the typical rogue Web site
never sees the drug buyer in person,
conducts no meaningful review of the
documentation supplied by the buyer,
and makes no attempt to rule out the
possibility that the ‘‘medical records’’
supplied by the buyer are fraudulent.
Instead, the practitioner employed by
these sites generally writes as many
prescriptions as possible, often from a
location far from the patient. For
example, DEA has found evidence that
many practitioners located in the
Caribbean have been employed by rogue
Web sites to write prescriptions for
‘‘patients’’ located throughout the
continental United States. Once the
prescription has been generated, the
same Web operation typically arranges
for the prescription to be transmitted to
the unscrupulous brick-and-mortar
pharmacy, which fills it
unquestioningly, turning a blind eye to
the circumstances under which it was
issued.
Using the foregoing methods, DEA
estimates that the total amount of
controlled substances illegally
distributed via the Internet is well in
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excess of 100 million dosage units per
year. DEA has taken numerous
enforcement actions recently to shut
down pharmacies, practitioners, and
distributors found to have misused their
DEA registrations to facilitate this
Internet-based diversion. Yet, even with
focused enforcement efforts, there will
remain some unscrupulous individuals
who will continue to seek to exploit the
anonymity of the Internet to profit from
the illegal sales of controlled
substances. Moreover, given that a
single rogue Web site can divert
enormous amounts of controlled
substances throughout the United States
in a relatively short period of time,
allowing such sites to operate even for
brief periods can cause substantial harm
to the public health and safety. It is,
therefore, essential that DEA avoid any
regulatory action that could be exploited
by such rogue actors.
Based on the historical practices of
these rogue Web sites and the claimed
legal defenses they have put forth
(asserting, for example, that their
‘‘business model’’ is having
practitioners prescribe controlled
substances without ever seeing the
‘‘patient’’ and without establishing a
legitimate doctor-patient relationship),
DEA is particularly concerned that the
operators of these rogue sites might
attempt to use this proposed rule as a
justification for their illicit activities or
to expand upon such activities. Absent
a clear statement to the contrary in the
regulations, operators of rogue sites
might argue that, if their site generates
prescriptions for controlled substances
that are transmitted using electronic
prescriptions in a manner that complies
with authentication requirements of this
proposed rule, they are automatically
engaging in legal activity. Of course, all
prescriptions for controlled substances
must be issued for a legitimate medical
purpose in the usual course of
professional practice. Mere compliance
with the authentication requirements of
this proposed rule with respect to a
given prescriptions does not—by itself—
establish that the prescription was
issued for a legitimate medical purpose.
To avoid any possible confusion about
this point, the proposed rule contains a
provision that reaffirms this basic
principle.
In addition, to minimize the
likelihood that operators of rogue
Internet sites would attempt to exploit
this proposed rule, DEA wishes to
reiterate some additional basic
principles that the agency has stated in
prior Federal Register documents. First,
it is axiomatic that, in the absence of a
bona fide doctor-patient relationship, a
practitioner cannot satisfy the
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requirement of issuing a prescription for
a legitimate medical purpose in the
usual course of professional practice.28
An arrangement whereby a Web site
solicits drug seekers and refers them to
practitioners who issue prescriptions for
controlled substances without ever
having seen the patient in person, based
solely on such unreliable information as
an online questionnaire, telephone
conversation, or faxed documents that
purport to be a drug buyer’s medical
records, inherently fails to satisfy the
requirement of issuing a prescription for
a legitimate medical purpose in the
usual course of professional practice.29
This is true regardless of whether the
rogue Web site that operates in such a
fashion utilizes paper, oral, faxed, or
electronic prescriptions. Thus, it bears
repeated emphasis that the use of
electronic prescriptions in accordance
with this proposed rule will in no way
relieve the practitioner of the
longstanding obligation to issue a
prescription for a controlled substance
only for a legitimate medical purpose in
the usual course of professional
practice. Likewise, as has always been
the case, a corresponding responsibility
will continue to rest with the
pharmacist who fills the electronic
prescription to ensure not only that the
prescription was issued in accordance
with the provisions for electronic
prescribing contained in this proposed
rule, but further that the prescription
was issued for a legitimate medical
purpose in the usual course of
professional practice.
E. Other Prescription Issues
Transfers
A pharmacy would be allowed to
transfer an original unfilled electronic
prescription to another pharmacy if that
pharmacy is unable to or chooses not to
fill the prescription.
A pharmacy would also be allowed to
transfer an electronic prescription with
remaining refills to another pharmacy
for filling provided the transfer is
communicated between two licensed
pharmacists. The pharmacy transferring
the prescription would have to void the
remaining refills in its records and note
in its records to which pharmacy the
prescription was transferred. The
notations may occur electronically. The
pharmacy receiving the transferred
28 See United Prescription Services, Inc. (72 FR
50397, August 31, 2007); Southwood
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (72 FR 36487, July 3, 2007);
Trinity Health Care Corp., D/B/A/ Oviedo Discount
Pharmacy (72 FR 30849, June 4, 2007); William
Lockridge, M.D., (71 FR 77791, December 27, 2006);
Dispensing and Purchasing Controlled Substances
over the Internet, (66 FR 21181, April 27, 2001).
29 Id.
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prescription would have to note from
whom the prescription was received
and the number of remaining refills.
Applicability of Current Rules
The CSA provides that a pharmacist
may only dispense a controlled
substance in Schedule II pursuant to a
written prescription, except in
emergency circumstances, where a
pharmacy may dispense pursuant to an
oral prescription (21 U.S.C. 829(a)). The
CSA further provides that a pharmacist
may dispense a Schedule III and IV
prescription pursuant to either a written
or an oral prescription (21 U.S.C.
829(b)). The CSA was enacted in 1970,
long before the advent of electronic
prescriptions, and thus the Act makes
no mention of electronic prescriptions.
As a result, electronically created and
transmitted prescriptions are subject to
the same provisions of the CSA and
DEA regulations that apply to paper
prescriptions. The DEA regulations
provide, as set forth in 21 CFR 1306.11
and 1306.21, that a pharmacist may
dispense a controlled substance under a
written prescription signed by the
practitioner. This requirement applies
equally to manually written and
electronically written prescriptions. In
either case, the prescription can be
prepared by an agent of the practitioner,
such as a nurse or office assistant, but
only the practitioner can apply his
signature to that prescription. Of course,
for Schedule III through V controlled
substances, the prescription could still
be transmitted orally or by facsimile
(including a manual signature by the
practitioner) to the pharmacy at the
practitioner’s discretion.
IX. Summary of Proposed Rule
Requirements
As has been discussed throughout this
rulemaking, DEA is proposing electronic
prescribing of controlled substances as
an addition to, not a replacement of,
existing prescribing and dispensing
methods already permitted by the CSA
and DEA regulations. DEA has
discussed its law enforcement concerns
as they relate to electronic prescribing
and dispensing of controlled substances.
36751
Any requirements DEA implements for
electronic prescribing and dispensing of
controlled substances must ensure that
DEA and other law enforcement needs
under the Controlled Substances Act
and implementing regulations can be
met. DEA is convinced that its concerns
can be addressed without creating
insurmountable barriers to electronic
prescribing. In addition, DEA wishes to
adopt an approach that is flexible
enough that future changes in
technologies will not make the system
obsolete or lock registrants into more
expensive systems. As has been
discussed throughout this rulemaking,
many of the requirements DEA is
proposing are already required by other
Federal agencies or third-party
organizations, and are in practice in
electronic prescribing and electronic
pharmacy systems today. The table
below summarizes the requirements
DEA is proposing by this rule, the
rationale for each, and the current
implementation status of each
requirement.
TABLE 6.—SUMMARY OF PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRONIC PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Requirement
Rationale
Current practice
In-person identity proofing § 1311.105 ...............
Ensures only DEA registrants are granted access and protects against identity theft.
Check validity of State license and DEA registration § 1311.105.
Maintain record of identity proofing § 1311.105
Ensures that only eligible practitioners are
granted access.
Provides a record that protects both the practitioner and service provider.
Provides a direct link between the prescriber
and prescription; prevents misuse of passwords without the practitioner’s knowledge.
Protects the practitioner from staff issuing
prescriptions in the practitioner’s name.
Ensures that only authorized registrants may
sign controlled substance prescriptions.
Prescribing practitioners have ready access to
hospitals, State licensing boards, and State/
local law enforcement agencies, any of
which may conduct in-person identity proofing.
At least some service providers already do
this.
Two-factor Level 4 authentication § 1311.110 ...
Limit access to signing function § 1311.125 ......
Automatic lockout after a period of inactivity
§ 1311.110.
Prescription must contain all DEA data elements § 1311.115.
Present the required data elements to the practitioner § 1311.120.
Indicate that each prescription is ready to be
signed § 1311.120.
Authenticate to the system just before signing
§ 1311.125.
Ensures that system cannot be accessed by
other people once the practitioner has authenticated to the system.
Meets the legal requirements for a controlled
substance prescription.
Ensures that the practitioner has the opportunity to identify any miskeying.
Ensures that the practitioner has positively indicated that the prescription is to be transmitted when multiple prescriptions are being
signed at one time.
Ensures that only the practitioner signs the
prescription.
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Transmit as soon as signed § 1311.130 ............
Prevents any alteration after the practitioner
has signed.
Do not transmit if printed; do not print if transmitted § 1311.130.
Prevents other staff from printing extra copies
that can be used to divert.
Indicate that
§ 1311.125.
Provides assurance to pharmacy that the
practitioner authorized the prescription.
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EHRs certified by CCHIT must support 2-factor authentication so majority of existing
systems have this capability. HIPAA security guidance recommends 2-factor authentication.
EHRs certified by CCHIT must do this so majority of existing systems have this capability.
EHRs certified by CCHIT must do this so majority of existing systems have this capability.
All systems should already have this capability.
Most systems present the full prescription information on a single screen.
Some existing systems already do this, requiring practitioners to check off each prescription they want to sign.
Unclear when current systems require authentication. At least one requires entry of separate password to sign.
May be common practice in existing systems
because signing is the equivalent of transmitting.
May be a new function for most systems.
(This requirement does not prevent printing
a copy of a medical record.)
A new field for electronic prescriptions; industry has indicated that this is not a problem.
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TABLE 6.—SUMMARY OF PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRONIC PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES—
Continued
Requirement
Rationale
Current practice
Generate monthly logs for practitioner review
§ 1311.140.
First recipient digitally signs the prescription as
transmitted § 1311.130.
Provides practitioner a chance to review
record and identify problems.
Provides record integrity. Ensures that DEA
and the practitioner can prove what the
practitioner signed.
Do not convert to fax if cannot be delivered
§ 1311.130.
Faxed prescriptions must be manually signed.
Converting an electronic file to a fax during
transmission creates an invalid written prescription.
Protects against changes during transmission
All systems should be able to generate
records.
At least one service provider is already doing
so. Service providers all have digital certificates and the capability to sign records
digitally.
May alter existing practice for some intermediaries. HHS has proposed removing an
exemption from the SCRIPT standard for
faxes.
Industry says this does not happen so requirement should not impose a burden.
Intermediaries and at least some pharmacy
system providers have digital certificates
and the capability to sign records.
No alteration of the content during transmission
except for formatting § 1311.130.
First pharmacy (or last transmitter) digitally Provides record integrity. Ensures that DEA
signs the prescription as received § 1311.160.
and the pharmacy can prove what the pharmacy received. Eliminates the need to examine the intermediaries’ records in most
cases and provides a basis for identifying
alteration at the pharmacy.
Check the validity of the prescriber’s DEA reg- Ensures that the practitioner is still authorized
istration (Pharmacy) § 1311.165.
to issue prescriptions.
Store all of the DEA data in the pharmacy sys- Parallels paper records ....................................
tem § 1311.165.
Have an internal audit trail and analyze for
auditable events (Pharmacy) § 1311.170.
Electronic prescription records stored electronically. (pharmacy) § 1311.180.
Have a backup system for records at another
location. (Pharmacy) § 1311.170.
SysTrust, WebTrust, or SAS 70 audit
§ 1311.150, § 1311.170.
Report
security
incidents
§ 1311.155, § 1311.170.
§ 1311.145,
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X. Section-By-Section Discussion of the
Proposed Rule
In Part 1300, DEA is proposing to add
a new § 1300.03, definitions relating to
electronic orders for controlled
substances and electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances. The
definitions currently in § 1311.02 would
be moved to § 1300.03. Definitions of
the following would be added: Audit,
audit trail, authentication,
authentication protocol, electronic
prescription, hard token, identity
proofing, intermediary, paper
prescription, PDA, service provider,
token, and valid prescription. In
addition, a definition of NIST special
publication 800–63 and SAS 70,
SysTrust, and WebTrust would be
added. Where possible, DEA is
proposing to use definitions taken from
NIST publications (audit, audit trail,
authentication, authentication protocol,
hard token, identity proofing, service
provider, and token). DEA is using
standard definitions developed for
information technology systems to
reduce the possibility that service
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Provides a record of who annotated or altered
a prescription. Needed to identify diversion
at the pharmacy.
All information is created and received electronically.
Protects against loss of records (accidental or
intentional).
Provides assurance of the physical and processing integrity of the system. Protects
against insider and outsider attacks on the
system.
Provides system provider and DEA with immediate notice of potential problems.
providers will be confused by
definitions as they might be if DEA
translated the definitions into ‘‘plain’’
language.
DEA is also proposing to add a
definition of ‘‘intermediary’’ to cover
any system that receives and transmits
an electronic prescription after it is
signed and before it is received by a
pharmacy system. An intermediary
could be the original service provider if
it is the first recipient of the
prescription, SureScripts or any other
system that processes and reformats
prescriptions, and a pharmacy system
provider if it processes a prescription
before routing it to the pharmacy.
Further, definitions of electronic and
paper prescription would be added. The
definition of electronic prescription
would state that an electronic
prescription must meet the
requirements of parts 1306 and 1311.
The definition also clarifies that a
computer-generated prescription that is
printed out or faxed is not an electronic
prescription for DEA purposes. The
definition of paper prescription clarifies
that such prescriptions can be created
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Many pharmacies already check the DEA
database for registration information.
Pharmacy systems already do this. Some
may have problems with extensions to DEA
numbers.
Most systems have this capability.
Pharmacy systems already maintain electronic information for paper prescriptions.
Many pharmacy system providers, particularly
ASPs, have such backup systems.
At least one service provider already has
adopted this audit.
Imposes no system requirements.
on paper or computer-generated to be
printed or faxed; all paper prescriptions
must be manually signed. Finally, the
definition of valid prescription from
§ 1300.02 would be repeated in the new
section.
In Part 1304, § 1304.04 would be
revised to limit records that cannot be
maintained at a central location to paper
order forms for Schedule I and II
controlled substances and paper
prescriptions. In paragraph (b)(1), DEA
would remove the reference to
prescriptions; all prescription
requirements would be moved to
paragraph (h). Paragraph (h), which
details pharmacy recordkeeping, would
be revised to limit the current
requirements to paper prescriptions and
to state that electronic prescriptions
must be retrievable by prescriber’s
name, patient name, drug dispensed,
and date filled. The electronic records
must be in a format that will allow DEA
or other law enforcement agencies to
read the records and manipulate them;
preferably the data would be
downloadable to a spreadsheet or
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database format that allows DEA to sort
the data. The data extracted should only
include the items DEA requires on a
prescription. Records would also be
required to be capable of being printed
upon request.
In Part 1306, prescriptions, § 1306.05
would be amended to state that
electronic prescriptions must be created
and signed using a system that meets
the requirements of part 1311 and to
limit some requirements to paper
prescriptions (e.g., the requirement that
certain paper prescriptions have the
practitioner’s name stamped or handprinted on the prescriptions). The
section would also add ‘‘computer
printer’’ to the list of methods for
creating a paper prescription and clarify
that a computer-generated prescription
that is printed out or faxed must be
manually signed. DEA is aware that in
some cases, an intermediary transferring
an electronic prescription to a pharmacy
may convert a prescription to a
facsimile if the intermediary cannot
complete the transmission
electronically. For controlled substance
prescriptions, this is not an acceptable
solution. The intermediary must notify
the practitioner that the transmission
could not be completed and have the
practitioner create and sign a written
prescription (for Schedule III, IV, or V
controlled substances) before faxing it to
the pharmacy. For most Schedule II
prescriptions, the practitioner would
have to provide a written prescription to
the patient if notified that the
transmission failed. The section would
also be revised to divide paragraph (a)
into shorter units.
Section 1306.08 would be added to
state that practitioners may sign and
transmit controlled substance
prescriptions electronically if the
systems used are in compliance with
part 1311 and all other requirements of
part 1306 are met. Pharmacies would be
allowed to handle electronic
prescriptions if the pharmacy system
complies with part 1311 and the
pharmacy meets all other applicable
requirements of parts 1306 and 1311.
Sections 1306.11, 1306.13, and
1306.15 would be revised to clarify how
the requirements for Schedule II
prescriptions apply to electronic
prescriptions.
Section 1306.21 would be revised to
clarify how the requirements for
Schedule III–V prescriptions apply to
electronic prescriptions.
Section 1306.22 would be revised to
clarify how the requirements for
Schedule III–IV refills apply to
electronic prescriptions and to clarify
that requirements for electronic refill
records for paper, fax, or oral
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prescriptions do not apply to electronic
refill records for electronic
prescriptions. Pharmacy systems used to
process and retain electronic controlled
substance prescriptions would have to
comply with the requirements in part
1311. In addition, DEA is proposing to
break up the text of the existing section
into shorter paragraphs to make it easier
to read.
Section 1306.25 would be revised to
include separate requirements for
transfers of electronic prescriptions.
These revisions are needed because an
electronic prescription could be
transferred without a telephone call
between pharmacists. Consequently, the
transferring pharmacist must provide,
with the electronic transfer, the
information that the recipient
transcribes when accepting an oral
transfer.
Section 1306.28 would be added to
state the basic recordkeeping
requirements for pharmacies for all
controlled substance prescriptions.
These requirements are now in
§ 1304.22 and remain there as well. DEA
is proposing to add them to part 1306
to place all of the requirements in a
single part on prescriptions.
Part 1311 would be amended to add
requirements related to electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances.
Section 1311.02 providing definitions
related to electronic orders for
controlled substances would be revised
to remove the definitions and replace
them with a cross reference to new
§ 1300.03.
Section 1311.08 would be amended to
add an incorporation by reference for
NIST Special Publication 800–63.
A new subpart C would be added for
the rules that govern the systems that
may be used to issue and process
electronic controlled substance
prescriptions and the responsibilities of
practitioners and pharmacies.
In § 1311.100, DEA would state that
only DEA registrants or persons
exempted from registration under part
1301 would be allowed to issue
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances and only if they use a system
and service provider that meet the
requirements of part 1311. An electronic
prescription for controlled substances
issued through a system and service
provider that did not meet the
requirements of part 1311 would not be
considered valid. The section would
reiterate the requirement from § 1306.05
that the practitioner is responsible if the
prescription does not conform in all
essential respects to the CSA and
implementing regulations.
Sections 1311.105 through 1311.150
would establish minimum requirements
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that a service provider and system must
meet before a practitioner would be able
to use the system to create and sign an
electronic controlled substance
prescription. Although the service
providers and their systems must meet
the requirements, the ultimate
responsibility rests on the practitioner
to use only a system and service
provider that comply with DEA’s
requirements.
Section 1311.105 would require that
the service provider receive a document
regarding in-person identity proofing of
the prescribing practitioner by an entity
authorized by DEA to conduct the
identity proofing. The service provider
must check the DEA registration and
State licensure to ensure they are
current and in good standing, and
maintain records of the identity
proofing.
Section 1311.110 would require the
system to use two-factor authentication
that meets the requirements of NIST SP
800–63, level 4 as discussed above. The
practitioner must reauthenticate to the
system if the system is inactive for more
than 2 minutes. The system must
provide separate authentication
protocols for separate DEA registrations
that a practitioner uses to issue
controlled substances prescriptions.
Finally, the authentication protocol
must expire no later than the expiration
date of the DEA registration with which
it is associated. A DEA registration is
valid for three years and can be renewed
prior to its expiration.
Section 1311.115 would require that
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances contain all of the
information required under paragraph
(b) of that section and § 1306.05. It
would also require that a controlled
substance prescription include only the
DEA number and practitioner
information for the prescribing
practitioner. As discussed above, the
SCRIPT standard allows multiple DEA
numbers to be associated with a
prescription; this is not acceptable to
DEA.
Section 1311.120 would set the
requirements for creating an electronic
prescription as discussed above.
Consistent with current regulations
governing paper prescriptions, DEA is
proposing that the electronic prescribing
system may allow the registrant or his
agent to enter data for a controlled
substance prescription, but only the
registrant may sign and authorize the
prescription. This would include the
requirement that, where more than one
controlled substance prescription has
been prepared, the practitioner
positively indicate that he has reviewed
and approved the information for each
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prescription prior to signing and
authorizing electronic transmission of
the prescriptions.
Section 1311.125 would set the
requirements for signing an electronic
prescription as discussed above. This
would include the practitioner’s
declaration that information contained
in the record constitutes the
practitioner’s legal authorization and
signature.
Section 1311.130 would require that
the system transmit the prescription
immediately upon signing. The section
would disallow the printing of an
electronically transmitted prescription
and would also disallow the electronic
transmission of a printed prescription as
discussed above. These requirements
are to prevent an individual electronic
prescription from being transmitted
more than once to a pharmacy (or
pharmacies). The service provider or
first recipient would be required to
digitally sign and archive a copy of the
prescription as received. Finally, the
section would specify that the DEA
required contents of the prescription
could not be altered after signature
without rendering the prescription
invalid. The contents could be
reformatted; reformatting includes
altering the structure of fields or
machine language so that the receiving
pharmacy system can read the
prescription and import the data into
the system.
Section 1311.135 would set the
requirements revoking the
authentication protocol used to sign
controlled substances prescriptions
upon notification that the password or
token has been compromised, lost, or
stolen or when the DEA registration
expires unless the registration has been
renewed and at any time that the
registration is suspended or revoked.
Section 1311.140 would require the
service provider to generate and
transmit to the practitioner a log of all
controlled substance prescriptions
written under the practitioner’s DEA
number in the previous month. The
section would also require that the
service provider make available, at the
practitioner’s request, a record of all
controlled substance prescriptions
transmitted over the previous five years.
Section 1311.145 would require the
service provider to notify DEA of certain
security incidents, as discussed above.
Section 1311.150 would require each
service provider to have at least an
annual third-party SysTrust or
WebTrust audit for security and
processing integrity as well as
compliance with part 1311. Audits must
be conducted prior to accepting any
controlled substances prescriptions for
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transmission and annually thereafter.
The audit report must be made available
to any practitioner using or considering
use of the system. If the audit finds that
the system does not meet the
requirements of the part, the service
provider must not transmit controlled
substance prescriptions and must notify
practitioners that they should not
attempt to send electronic controlled
substance prescriptions until the
problems have been addressed and
another audit indicates that the system
meets the requirements of part 1311.
Section 1311.155 would specify the
practitioner’s responsibilities as
discussed above. The section would
require practitioners to check the thirdparty audit reports and notifications
from the service providers about system
inadequacies and cease to use the
system for controlled substance
prescriptions if the audit report or
service provider indicated problems.
The practitioner would be required to
provide, or cause to be provided,
documents regarding in-person identity
proofing to the service provider. The
practitioner would be required to
maintain sole possession of the hard
token and notify the service provider no
later than 12 hours after the discovery
of its loss or theft or any indication that
the hard token had been compromised.
The practitioner would be required to
check the monthly log and indicate
having done so. The section would
reiterate that the practitioner has the
same responsibility for the validity of an
electronic prescription as the
practitioner does for a paper
prescription.
Section 1311.160 would require the
pharmacy or the last system
transmitting the prescription to the
pharmacy to digitally sign and archive
the prescription record.
Section 1311.165 would require the
pharmacy to check the validity of the
DEA registration prior to dispensing the
prescription. The pharmacy system
must reject a controlled substance
prescription if it is not signed or is
otherwise not valid. The pharmacy
system would have to be able to include
all of the information required under
part 1306 in the electronic record and be
capable of downloading the records in
a readable and sortable format, as well
as printing the records, if requested.
Section 1311.170 would specify the
security requirements for the pharmacy
system including a backup storage
system at another location, maintaining
an internal audit trail, the
implementation of a list of auditable
events, a daily internal audit to identify
if any auditable events have occurred,
reporting any security incidents that
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could affect the integrity of the
prescription records, and the annual
SAS 70 or SysTrust audit. Audits must
be conducted prior to accepting any
controlled substances prescriptions for
processing and annually thereafter. The
audit report must be made available to
any pharmacy using or considering use
of the system. If the audit finds that the
system does not meet the requirements
of the part, the service provider must
not process controlled substance
prescriptions and must notify
pharmacies that they should not attempt
to process electronic controlled
substance prescriptions until the
problems have been addressed and
another audit indicates that the system
meets the requirements of part 1311.
Section 1311.175 would specify the
pharmacy’s responsibility not to
dispense controlled substances in
response to an electronic prescription if
the pharmacy’s system does not meet
the requirements of part 1311. In
addition, the pharmacy must not
dispense a controlled substance if the
DEA registration of the prescriber was
not valid at the time of signing. Finally,
the section would state that nothing in
part 1311 relieves a pharmacy of its
corresponding responsibility to
dispense only in response to a
prescription written for a legitimate
medical purpose by a prescribing
practitioner acting in the usual course of
professional practice.
Section 1311.180 would specify
recordkeeping requirements for records
required by part 1311.
XI. Digitally Signed Prescriptions for
Federal Health Care Agencies
Federal healthcare providers have
indicated that the electronic
prescription option described above is
not consistent with the electronic
prescription system they currently use,
a system that is based on public key
infrastructure and digital signature
technology. They also stated that the
proposed rule described above did not
meet their security needs. Thus, these
Federal health care providers indicated
that their existing system based on
public key infrastructure and digital
signature technology is more secure
than, and incompatible with, the above
system requirements that DEA is
proposing. As a result, if they were
obligated to adhere to the above system
requirements, they would have to
abandon their existing systems in favor
of a less secure system, and would have
to incur substantial cost and devote
significant time to do so. Such a result
would plainly be counterproductive.
For these reasons, DEA is proposing—
for Federal health care systems only—a
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second approach that is consistent with
their current systems. Federal health
care systems will also have the option
of using the above system that will be
allowable for all practitioners in the
private sector. The two systems have
some elements in common—for
example, the pharmacy requirements
are almost identical—but the digital
signature option adds some steps and
removes others as compared with the
electronic prescription system.
Public Key Infrastructure and Digital
Signatures. Digital signatures are
created as part of a public key
infrastructure (PKI). In a PKI system, a
certification authority (CA) verifies the
identity of an applicant and issues a
digital certificate to the applicant. A
Certification Authority operates under a
publicly available Certificate Policy, a
set of rules that covers subjects such as
obligations of the Certification
Authority, obligations of certificate
holders, enrollment and renewal
procedures, operational requirements,
security procedures, and
administration.30 A digital certificate is
a data record that contains, at a
minimum, the identity of the issuing
Certification Authority, identity
information for the certificate holder,
the public key that corresponds to the
certificate holder’s private key, validity
dates, and a serial number. The
certificate is digitally signed by the CA.
The certification authority provides the
subscriber with the means to generate
an asymmetric pair of cryptographic
keys. The subscriber retains control of
the private key; the public key is
available to anyone. What one of the
keys encrypts, only the other key can
decrypt.
When a person digitally signs a
record, the text of the record is run
through an algorithm that produces a
fixed-length digest (known as the hash).
The private key is used to encrypt the
digest. The encrypted digest is the
digital signature. When the record is
archived or sent to someone else, both
the plain text and the digital signature
are sent along with the signer’s digital
certificate, which includes the public
key. If the recipient wants to confirm
that the record has not been altered
during transmission, the recipient can
use the public key to decrypt the digest.
This step confirms who sent the
message (i.e., no one other than the
holder of the private key could have
sent the message and the holder cannot
30 National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Special Publication 800–32
Introduction to Public Key Technology and the
Federal PKI Infrastructure; February 26, 2001.
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-32/
sp800-32.pdf.
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repudiate the message). The recipient’s
system can run the plain text received
through the same hashing algorithm. If
the two digests match, the recipient
knows that the message sent has not
been altered. For an in-depth
explanation of digital signatures, see
NIST FIPS 186–2.
Discussion of Proposed Requirements
for Digitally Signed Prescriptions
Certification Authorities and Digital
Certificates. Because this alternative
applies only to Federal agencies, DEA is
proposing that the Certification
Authority will be one that is operated
under the Federal PKI Bridge Certificate
Policy and is either a Federal
Certification Authority or cross-certified
with a Federal CA. Digital certificates
are already an option for Federal
employees as part of the Personal
Identification Verification (PIV) cards
(usually a smart card). DEA, therefore, is
proposing that a PIV or other Federal
identity card to be used for signing
controlled substance prescriptions
include a digital certificate. Federal
identity proofing and the smart card
with a digital certificate already meet
Assurance Level 4, so no further
requirements are needed. PIV cards
include both the holder’s photograph
and a biometric.
As with the proposed electronically
signed prescription system, the system
provider (the Federal agency) would be
required to set access controls, set lockout times at 2 minutes, require the
practitioner to indicate which
prescriptions he is authorizing when
signing multiple controlled substance
prescriptions at one time, provide
screens showing the prescription
information, and show the warning
screen prior to signing. The system
would be required to have the
practitioner authenticate to the system
just prior to signing. The system
provider would also be required to
check the CA’s certificate revocation list
(CRL) prior to transmission to ensure
that the certificate is still valid. The CRL
may be cached until a new CRL is
issued.
DEA is proposing that any software
system may be used to sign electronic
controlled substances prescriptions
provided that it has been enabled to
process digital signatures and that the
PKI module meets the following
requirements:
1. The encryption module must
comply with FIPS 140–2.
2. The digital signature generation
system must comply with FIPS 186–2.
3. The secure hash algorithm must
comply with FIPS 180–1.
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4. For software implementations,
when the signing module is deactivated,
the system must clear the plain text
password from the system memory to
prevent the unauthorized access to, or
use of, the private key.
5. The system must have a time
system that is within five minutes of the
official National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) time source.
Item four would ensure that the
password cannot be retrieved from the
certificate holder’s computer memory
following its use. Software systems may
not automatically clear items from
memory when the application is shut
down. Therefore, it is necessary to
specify that the system clear the
password from the system’s memory
whenever the signing application is
closed to ensure that someone cannot
recover the password. Item five requires
the system to have a time system within
five minutes of the official National
Institute of Standards and Technology
time source. It is important that all users
of digitally signed electronic
prescriptions be synchronized to a
single, consistent time source.
Once the prescription record is
digitally signed, both the record and the
digital signature must be archived. DEA
is proposing that the system provider
would be able to adopt one of two
options for transmission after signing.
The system provider could require
transmission immediately on digitally
signing or the system provider could
‘‘lock’’ and archive the prescription as
digitally signed and allow other
elements (e.g., pharmacy URL) to be
added later. The ‘‘lock’’ would have to
ensure that any element that was
digitally signed could not be altered
prior to transmission. For example, the
system provider could program its
system so that only the DEA-required
elements would be digitally signed and
only those elements and their digitally
signed version are archived.
Unlike the electronically signed
prescription approach, the system
provider would not be required to apply
its own digital signature to the record
received from the prescribing
practitioner. Because digital certificates
from a Federal CA and digital signatures
provide a level of security and record
integrity that electronically signed
prescriptions do not have, DEA is not
proposing that a monthly log be
generated and checked for digitally
signed prescriptions.
When prescriptions are transmitted to
retail pharmacies, they are frequently
reformatted, making it impossible to
validate a digitally signed prescription.
DEA is not, therefore, proposing that the
digital signature be transmitted with the
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prescription. This provision should
eliminate the concern that
intermediaries had about the difficulty
of transmitting the digital signature. The
pharmacy would be required to digitally
sign the record as received and archive
it, as with electronically signed
prescriptions. Where a prescription is
sent to a Federal pharmacy, however,
the Federal agency may elect to transmit
the digital signature and have the
pharmacy validate the prescription. In
that case, the Federal pharmacy would
not be required to digitally sign the
prescription. The other pharmacy
requirements would be the same as for
electronically signed prescriptions. The
pharmacy would be required to check
the DEA registration and maintain
internal audit trails with daily computer
checks for auditable events.
DEA is also proposing that Federal
agencies using digital signatures would
have to have an annual third-party audit
of their system processing integrity to
ensure that the systems meet DEA’s
requirements. Prescribing practitioners’
use of digital certificates from a Federal
or cross-certified CA would make
insider identity theft much more
difficult, eliminating the need to require
the audit to review system security as is
the case for the electronically signed
prescription systems.
The practitioner would be required to
notify the CA if the hard token was lost,
stolen, or compromised within 12 hours
of discovery of the loss, theft, or
compromise. The CA would be required
to revoke the certificate upon
notification. These requirements are
already met by the Federal systems.
Section-By-Section Discussion of the
Proposed Rule for Digitally Signed
Controlled Substances Prescriptions for
Federal Health Care Agencies
In Part 1311, as proposed to be
amended as discussed above, DEA is
proposing to add a new Subpart D
regarding requirements for electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
for Federal health care agencies.
Section 1311.200 would state that a
practitioner prescribing controlled
substances at a Federal health care
facility in the course of their official
duties may issue a controlled substance
prescription electronically if the
practitioner is registered as an
individual practitioner, or exempt from
the requirement of registration, and is
authorized under the registration or
exemption to dispense the controlled
substance, and the practitioner uses an
electronic prescription system that
meets all of the applicable requirements
of the subpart. DEA would propose to
define ‘‘Federal health care facility’’ as
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a hospital or other institution that is
operated by an agency of the United
States (including the U.S. Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard,
Department of Veterans Affairs, Public
Health Service, or Bureau of Prisons).
An electronic prescription for controlled
substances issued through a system that
did not meet the requirements of part
1311 would not be considered valid.
The section would reiterate the
requirement from § 1306.05 that the
practitioner is responsible if the
prescription does not conform in all
essential respects to the CSA and
implementing regulations.
Section 1311.205 would establish
requirements for issuance and storage of
digital certificates. It would require that
only Federal Certification Authorities or
Certification Authorities cross-certified
with a Certification Authority operated
by the Federal Public Key Infrastructure
Policy Authority may issue digital
certificates to practitioners prescribing
controlled substances at a Federal
health care facility in the course of their
official duties to sign electronic
controlled substance prescriptions. The
digital certificate must be stored on a
hardware token that meets the
requirements of NIST SP 800–63 Level
4.
Section 1311.210 would state the
system requirements for digitally signed
prescriptions. Any system may be used
to digitally sign electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances provided that
the system has been enabled to accept
digitally signed documents and that it
meets the requirements discussed
above. DEA would require the system to
use two-factor authentication that meets
the requirements of NIST SP 800–63,
Level 4 as discussed above. The
practitioner must reauthenticate to the
system if the system is inactive for more
than 2 minutes.
Section 1311.215 would require that a
digitally signed electronic prescription
for a controlled substance created by the
system must include all of the data
elements required under part 1306.
Section 1311.220 would set the
requirements for creating an electronic
prescription. Consistent with current
regulations governing paper
prescriptions, DEA is proposing that the
electronic prescribing system may allow
the registrant or his agent to enter data
for a controlled substance prescription,
but only the registrant may sign and
authorize the prescription. The system
must display information regarding the
prescriptions including: The patient’s
name and address; the name of the drug
being prescribed; the dosage strength
and form, quantity, and directions for
use; and the DEA registration number
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under which the prescription will be
authorized. Finally, the section would
require that, where more than one
controlled substance prescription has
been prepared, the practitioner
positively indicate that he has reviewed
and approved the information for each
prescription prior to signing and
authorizing electronic transmission of
the prescriptions.
Section 1311.225 would set the
requirements for signing an electronic
prescription. The practitioner must
authenticate to the system using twofactor authentication. This would
include the practitioner’s declaration
that information contained in the record
constitutes the practitioner’s legal
authorization and signature. DEA would
require the system to check the
certificate revocation list of the
Certification Authority that issued the
digital certificate of the practitioner who
digitally signed the controlled substance
prescription. If the certificate is not
valid, the system would not be
permitted to transmit the prescription.
DEA would permit the certificate
revocation list to be cached until the
Certification Authority issues a new
certificate revocation list. If the
prescription is being transmitted to a
pharmacy that does not accept digitally
signed prescriptions, DEA would
require the system to include in the data
file transmitted an indication that the
prescription was signed by the issuing
practitioner.
Section 1311.230 would disallow the
printing of an electronically transmitted
prescription and would also disallow
the electronic transmission of a printed
prescription as discussed above. These
requirements are to prevent an
individual electronic prescription from
being transmitted more than once to a
pharmacy (or pharmacies). The system
would be required to retain the archived
digitally signed prescription for five
years from the date of issuance by the
practitioner. Finally, the section would
specify that the DEA required contents
of the prescription could not be altered
after signature without rendering the
prescription invalid. The contents could
be reformatted; reformatting includes
altering the structure of fields or
machine language so that the receiving
pharmacy system can read the
prescription and import the data into
the system.
Section 1311.235 would set the
requirements for revocation of access
authorization. The system would be
required to revoke access to sign
controlled substance prescriptions on
the expiration date of the practitioner’s
DEA registration, if applicable, unless
the Federal agency determines that the
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registration or Federal agency
authorization has been renewed. The
system would be required to check the
DEA CSA database at least once a week
and revoke access to signing controlled
substance prescriptions for any
practitioner using the system whose
registration or Federal agency
authorization has been terminated,
revoked, or suspended.
Section 1311.245 would require the
Federal agency to notify DEA of certain
security incidents, including:
• An individual who is not a DEA
registrant authorized by the Federal
agency to prescribe controlled
substances in the course of their official
duties at the Federal agency has been
granted access to issue controlled
substance prescriptions.
• Access to issue controlled
substance prescriptions has been
granted to a person using another
person’s identity.
• Prescription records have been
created or altered by an employee not
authorized to create or annotate a
controlled substance record.
• There have been one or more
successful attempts to penetrate the
system from the outside.
• The Federal agency has identified
any other incident that may indicate
that the integrity of the system in regard
to controlled substance prescriptions
has been compromised.
Section 1311.250 would require the
Federal agency to have a third-party
audit to verify that the system used to
create and transmit controlled substance
prescriptions meets the requirements of
this subpart prior to accepting any
controlled substances prescriptions for
transmission and annually thereafter. If
the third-party audit finds that the
system does not meet one or more of the
requirements of the part, the system
must not accept for transmission any
controlled substance prescription. The
Federal agency must also notify the
Administration of the adverse audit
report and provide the report to the
Administration.
Section 1311.255 would specify the
practitioner’s responsibilities as
discussed above. The practitioner would
be required to maintain sole possession
of the hard token and notify the
Certification Authority no later than 12
hours after the discovery of its loss or
theft or any indication that the hard
token had been compromised. The
section would reiterate that the
practitioner has the same responsibility
for the validity of an electronic
prescription as the practitioner does for
a paper prescription.
Section 1311.260 would require that if
a pharmacy receives a controlled
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substance prescription from a Federal
agency system that is not transmitted
with its digital signature, either the
pharmacy must digitally sign the
prescription immediately upon receipt,
or the last intermediary transmitting the
record to the pharmacy must digitally
sign the prescription immediately prior
to transmission and transmit to the
pharmacy the prescription and the
digitally signed record. The pharmacy
must archive the record as received and
the digitally signed copy. If a Federal
pharmacy receives a digitally signed
prescription that includes the digital
signature, the pharmacy must validate
the prescription and archive the
digitally signed record. The pharmacy
record must retain an indication that the
prescription was validated upon receipt.
No additional digital signature is
required.
Section 1311.265 would require the
pharmacy to check the validity of the
DEA registration prior to dispensing the
prescription. The pharmacy system
must reject a controlled substance
prescription if it is not signed or is
otherwise not valid. The pharmacy
system would have to be able to include
all of the information required under
part 1306 in the electronic record and be
capable of downloading the records in
a readable and sortable format, as well
as printing the records, if requested.
Section 1311.270 would specify the
security requirements for the pharmacy
system including a backup storage
system at another location, maintaining
an internal audit trail, the
implementation of a list of auditable
events, a daily internal audit to identify
if any auditable events have occurred,
reporting any security incidents that
could affect the integrity of the
prescription records, and the annual
third-party audit to ensure compliance
with the requirements of this part.
Audits must be conducted prior to
accepting any controlled substances
prescriptions for processing and
annually thereafter. If the audit finds
that the system does not meet the
requirements of the part, the system
must not process controlled substance
prescriptions until the problems have
been addressed and another audit
indicates that the system meets the
requirements of part 1311. The Federal
agency must also notify the
Administration of the adverse audit
report and provide the report to the
Administration.
Section 1311.275 would specify the
pharmacy’s responsibility not to
dispense controlled substances in
response to an electronic prescription if
the pharmacy’s system does not meet
the requirements of part 1311. In
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36757
addition, the pharmacy must not
dispense a controlled substance if the
DEA registration of the prescriber was
not valid at the time of signing. Finally,
the section would state that nothing in
part 1311 relieves a pharmacy of its
corresponding responsibility to
dispense only in response to a
prescription written for a legitimate
medical purpose by a prescribing
practitioner acting in the usual course of
professional practice.
Section 1311.280 would specify
recordkeeping requirements for records
required by Subpart D of part 1311.
XII. Incorporation by Reference
The following standard is proposed to
be incorporated by reference:
NIST SP 800–63, Electronic
Authentication Guideline, April 2006.
XIII. Required Analyses
Executive Order 12866
Under Executive Order 12866 (58 FR
51735, October 4, 1993), DEA must
determine whether a regulatory action is
‘‘significant’’ and, therefore, subject to
Office of Management and Budget
review and the requirements of the
Executive Order. The Order defines
‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as one
that is likely to result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the
economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal government or
communities.
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency.
(3) Materially alter the budgetary
impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof.
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the
President’s priorities, or the principles
set forth in the Executive Order.
A copy of the Initial Economic Impact
Analysis of the Electronic Prescriptions
for Controlled Substances Rule can be
obtained by contacting the Liaison and
Policy Section, Office of Diversion
Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, 8701 Morrissette Drive,
Springfield, VA 22152, Telephone (202)
307–7297. The initial analysis is also
available on DEA’s Diversion Control
Program Web site at https://
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov. DEA seeks
comments on the assumptions used in
the economic analysis and is interested
in any data that commenters can
provide on the time required to comply
with the proposed rule.
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It has been determined that this
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is an
economically significant regulatory
action; therefore, DEA has conducted an
analysis of the options. The following
sections summarize the economic
analysis conducted in support of this
proposed rule.
Options Considered
DEA considered four options for the
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances: the rule as proposed with
service providers conducting the
identity proofing (Base Case); the rule as
proposed (Option 1); a modified PKI
option (not limited to Federal agencies)
(Option 2); and an option that allowed
the use of any existing electronic system
with no additional requirements except
callbacks from the pharmacy to the
practitioner to verify the authenticity
and integrity for all controlled substance
prescriptions (Option 3). Table 7 shows
the differing requirements for the rule
elements for each of the options.
TABLE 7.—OPTIONS CONSIDERED
Requirement
Base case
Option 1
Option 2
Identity Proofing ................
Conducted by service provider.
Two-factor, Hard token ......
Authentication protocol ......
System requirements ........
Digitally signed record .......
Pharmacy ..........................
Required ............................
Issued by service provider
Required ............................
System level ......................
Digitally sign record on receipt.
Required ............................
SysTrust/SAS 70 security
and processing.
Conducted by hospital,
state board, law enforcement.
Required ............................
Issued by service provider
Required ............................
System level ......................
Digitally sign record on receipt.
Required ............................
SysTrust/SAS 70 security
and processing.
Conducted by hospital,
state board, law enforcement.
Required ............................
Digital certificate from CA
Required ............................
Practitioner ........................
Validate practitioner digital
signature.
Required ............................
Processing integrity ...........
Internal Audits ...................
Third-party audits ..............
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
Universe of Affected Entities
The entities that are most directly
affected economically by the adoption
of electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances fall into two groups—
practitioners who sign prescriptions and
the firms that provide the computer and
Internet software and services required
for the creation, transmission, and
receipt of electronic prescriptions.
These firms serve either practitioners’
offices or pharmacies. The affected
universe does not include pharmacies
directly, because the rule does not
require any change in their operating
practices; although their computer
systems may need to be updated, the
additional prescription processing steps
(primarily digitally signing the record
on receipt) will be handled by the
system, not the pharmacist. For options
1 and 2, DEA-registered hospitals or
other officials allowed to conduct
identity proofing would also be affected.
The registered practitioners are
primarily physicians, dentists, and midlevel practitioners (physician’s
assistants and nurse practitioners). Most
other practitioner registrants are less
likely to prescribe as opposed to
administer or dispense controlled
substances (e.g., veterinarians).
As discussed above, the service
providers are vendors of the computer
software and Internet services required
by practitioners’ offices for electronic
creation and transmission of
prescriptions and of the services
required by pharmacies for receiving
and processing electronic prescriptions.
Many service providers to practitioners
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are application service providers
(ASPs). Some of the service providers to
pharmacies are ASPs, but most are not.
Table 8 displays data on current
numbers of practitioners and estimated
future growth rates.
TABLE 8.—PRACTITIONER UNIVERSE
Affected Universe—Practitioners
Current
No.
Future annual
growth rate
(percent)
Physicians .........
Dentists .............
Mid-levels ..........
312,759
170,969
89,744
0.1
0.5
2.2
Total ...........
573,472
0.5
The number of physicians is based on
CDC data on the number of physicians
in office-based practices. Current
numbers for dentists and mid-level
practitioners are DEA registrants as of
December 3, 2007, with two
modifications. The number of mid-level
practitioners reported in this count
includes, in addition to physician’s
assistants and nurse practitioners,
workers in other health occupations
who rarely sign prescriptions and who,
therefore, have not been included. In
addition, because many mid-level
practitioners work at hospitals, the total
was reduced by 25 percent because
these practitioners may not write
prescriptions. Estimated growth rates
are based on recent trends. Regarding
physicians, the trend since 2000
indicates a very slight negative growth
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Option 3
N/A.
N/A.
N/A.
N/A.
N/A.
Call practitioner to confirm
each prescription.
N/A.
N/A.
rate. DEA does not believe this
downward trend will continue;
therefore, an annual growth rate for
physicians of 0.1 percent has been
estimated. The rate for the total number
is the weighted average of the separate
rates.
While the current count of systems
certified by SureScripts or CCHIT (or
both) for practitioners is 119, DEA has
adjusted that figure downward to 110
for Year 1 of the analysis. With 119
firms offering these services and
products to practitioners, it seems
certain that some of them are in a
marginal business condition with
respect to this market. Consequently,
DEA projects a steady diminution over
time in the number of firms. It also
seems reasonable to assume that some of
them will withdraw from the market at
the outset. There are three reasons for
this result. First, the market has already
seen firms leave the market as the
demand for the products has not met
expectations. Second, the security
arrangements at some firms may be
insufficient to withstand the required
security audit, and, for a number of
reasons, some of these firms may be
unwilling or unable to remedy this
defect. Third, some firms may not want
to incur the reprogramming costs
necessary to include electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
capability in their service, and it is
highly unlikely that a firm would try to
stay in the market without controlled
substances capability, as that would
place it at a severe competitive
disadvantage. A relevant point here is
that most current firms offer electronic
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health records (EHRs), with electronic
prescription functionality as part of the
EHR; the reprogramming costs may be
much higher for firms that support only
electronic prescriptions—just under
$150,000 compared to a little under
$40,000 for firms with EHR capability.
To gain certification from CCHIT, EHR
products must already include many of
the security functions DEA is specifying
in the proposed rule. Of the 119 vendors
now in the market, 103 are EHRs. Those
that are not EHRs are clearly more likely
to be deterred by cost. DEA assumes that
36759
six of the electronic prescription-only
vendors will withdraw from the market
rather than add electronic controlled
substances prescribing capability, while
three of those that support EHR will also
withdraw. Table 9 presents the service
provider universe.
TABLE 9.—SERVICE PROVIDER UNIVERSE
Affected Universe—Service Providers
Current No.
Projection
Service providers to practitioners ...
119 Adjusted to 110 ......................
Vendors to pharmacies (some are
ASPs, most are not).
20 ...................................................
The number of firms is expected to diminish over time, stabilizing at
20 vendors after ten years.
Provision of computer and Internet services to pharmacies is already
a mature market segment; the number is not expected to change.
Unit Costs
In estimating unit costs of the rule,
the first step is to establish the baseline
with which to determine the costs that
are incremental with respect to the rule.
DEA presumes that no practitioner’s
office will adopt electronic prescribing
simply to write controlled substance
prescriptions; controlled substance
prescriptions constitute about 11
percent of the total number of
prescriptions. The costs to a
practitioner’s office of complying with
the rule, therefore, are only the costs
directly required by the electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
rule and do not include any of the costs
that the office would incur for setting up
electronic prescription capability
without electronic prescribing of
controlled substances.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
Requirements
• In-person identity proofing
(§ 1311.105) imposes costs on
practitioners, the institutions that
conduct the identity proofing, and
service providers (filing the information
submitted and confirming the
application).
• Two-factor authentication
(§ 1311.110) requires that each
practitioner with authority to sign
controlled substance prescriptions has a
unique hard token to gain access to the
system. This imposes costs on some
practitioners who do not already have a
token (e.g., a PDA).
• Monthly review of controlled
substance prescription logs (§ 1311.140)
by practitioners imposes a cost on
practitioners. (Applies only to Base Case
and Option 1)
• System requirements (§§ 1311.110–
1311.145) imposes reprogramming costs
on service providers.
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• Requirements (§ 1311.150) for
annual third-party audits imposes costs
on service providers.
Costs
Identity proofing. Identity proofing
requires a face-to-face meeting between
each practitioner who will use the
system and either the service provider
(Base Case) or a person from a DEAregistered hospital or other official
(Options 1 and 2). For the Base Case,
DEA assumes that the practitioner and
service provider would spend 2 minutes
each at the practice; the service provider
would spend another 8 minutes at its
offices checking the State license and
DEA registration and filing the
information gathered. Because most
physicians have privileges at hospitals,
DEA assumes that for Option 1 and 2
identity proofing would take only 10
minutes for physicians. All other
practitioners are assumes to need an
hour to travel to and from a hospital or
police station plus the 10 minutes for
the proofing. Each practitioner would
also spend another 1 minute verifying
the application when called by the
provider. For each practitioner, the
hospital staff are assumes to spend 10
minutes checking the identity
documents and completing the form.
The service provider will spend another
11 minutes at the service provider’s
office verifying State license and DEA
registration information, entering the
practitioner’s data into the service
provider’s record of identity proofing,
and calling the practitioner to verify.
These costs are the same for Options 1
and 2, although under Option 2 the
cross-signed identity proofing document
would be sent to the Certification
Authority.
Two-factor authentication. Two-factor
authentication requires that access to
the system can be gained only with a
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hard token, uniquely coded for each
practitioner. A number of devices will
serve for this purpose: e.g., PDAs,
Blackberries, thumb drives, multi-factor
one-time-use password tokens. It is
assumes that physicians and dentists
will already have one of these devices
and be familiar with its use. The same
cannot be assumed for mid-level
practitioners. DEA assumes that tokens
will have to be purchased for 75.0
percent of mid-level practitioners and
those mid-level practitioners will
require training in the use of the tokens.
DEA assumes that the tokens will be
thumb drives. Time required for training
is estimated to be ten minutes per midlevel practitioner. Using the hourly
wages (including fringes and overhead)
for physician’s assistants for $77, the
training cost is estimated to be $12.82.
A thumb drive costs $12.00. One-timepassword tokens may be more or less
expensive; some of these can be
installed on cell phones, which any
practitioner would have.
Digital Certificate. Under Option 2,
practitioners would be required to
obtain a digital certificate from a
certification authority cross-certified
with a Federal Certification Authority.
The annual cost of digital certificates
varies from CA to CA depending on the
security characteristics. DEA assumes
an annual cost of $30.
Monthly review of controlled
substance prescription logs. Under the
Base Case and Option 1, once a month,
each practitioner must review a log of
his controlled substance prescriptions
for that month. As discussed above,
DEA is not proposing to require a
comprehensive review. DEA estimates
that a practitioner can review the log for
unusual controlled substance
prescriptions in an average of two
minutes. DEA recognizes that there will
be a considerable range in review time
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based on the number of controlled
substance prescriptions a practitioner
writes. The average cost is estimated to
be $89 per year, using a weighted hourly
wage for all practitioners.
Reprogramming requirements. Under
the Base Case, Option 1, and Option 2,
all service providers, including those
that serve pharmacies, will have to do
some reprogramming to add electronic
controlled substance prescriptionrequired functions to their systems.
Depending on the functionalities of
their existing systems, they will need
more or less reprogramming. Two
requirements in particular will
necessitate some reprogramming for
almost all systems that serve
practitioners. These are the provision
that the first recipient system digitally
sign and archive the controlled
substance prescription on receipt and
that the system will transmit from a
practitioner’s office immediately
following the practitioner’s signature
with the hard token. (At least one
service provider already digitally signs
prescriptions, and more than one
transmit the prescription immediately
upon signature.) The requirement for a
screen indicating that the prescriber
understands that the prescription is
being signed will also be new for
systems. Other requirements will affect
only some providers. Limiting access to
signing to practitioners may require
reprogramming of some systems, though
this functionality is generally part of
systems. The need to show all of the
selected prescription information on a
single screen may require new
programming for a few systems. For
some stand-alone systems, the
requirements for two-factor
authentication at Level 4 will require
reprogramming as will requirements for
reauthentication after a period of
inactivity. As shown in the table of
requirements in Section IX above, most
EHRs already support these functions.
Consequently, the reprogramming
required for EHR systems will be less
than for stand-alone systems.
Systems that serve pharmacies will
also require some reprogramming,
primarily for digitally signing the record
as received. Those pharmacy systems
that operate as ASPs should already
have digital signature capability; others
may need to do additional programming
to add that functionality. Both will need
to add programming to sign the record.
The industry has indicated that the
requirements for internal audit trails
and internal audit analysis are part of
existing systems.
DEA has estimated that EHR systems
and pharmacy ASP systems will require
an additional 500 hours to program and
test the new functions. For stand-alone
electronic prescription systems and
installed pharmacy systems, DEA
estimates that they will spend 2,000
hours to program and test the new
functions. Using the hourly wage rate
for programmers of $73 (loaded), the
initial programming cost will be $36,700
for EHR and pharmacy ASP systems and
$146,500 for stand-alone systems and
installed pharmacy systems.
Auditing requirements. Under the
Base Case, Option 1, and Option 2, all
system providers that serve practitioners
and those that serve pharmacies must
undergo an annual third-party audit.
Under the Base Case and Option 1, the
audit would have to meet the
requirements for a SysTrust, WebTrust,
or SAS 70 audit for security and
processing integrity. The first such audit
for a service provider is generally more
costly than subsequent audits. DEA
estimates the following per-vendor costs
for audits: First-year audits: $125,000;
Subsequent audits: $100,000. Under
Option 2, the audit would need to
address only processing integrity (i.e.,
that the system reliably meets DEA’s
requirements). Because of the limited
scope of this audit, it could be
conducted by a broader range of
auditors; DEA estimates an annual cost
of $25,000.
DEA notes that the costs of a SysTrust
or SAS 70 audit range from $15,000 to
$250,000 depending on the size of the
company. DEA used a conservative
estimate of $125,000 for the initial audit
although in many cases the cost for the
DEA required audit elements would be
less. A full SysTrust or SAS 70 audit
covers five areas; DEA is requiring that
the audit address only two of those,
physical security and processing
integrity.
Callbacks. For Option 3, the only cost
of electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances would be the callback from
the pharmacy to the practitioner to
confirm the prescription. DEA estimates
that this would take 3 minutes of staff
time at the practitioner’s office to pull
the file and refile it, 1 minute of the
practitioner’s time, and 3 minutes of a
pharmacy technician’s time; the total
cost per call would be $6.55.
Table 10 summarizes unit costs.
TABLE 10.—UNIT COSTS
Requirement
Unit time
Wage rate
Unit cost
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
Identity Proofing
Practitioner (Base) ..............................................
Service Provider (Base) .....................................
Service Provider clerk (Base) ............................
Service Provider .................................................
Storage at service provider ................................
Service Provider (1) ...........................................
Practitioner (1 & 2):
MDs .............................................................
Dentists .......................................................
Mid-level practitioners .................................
Practitioner travel time:
Dentists .......................................................
Mid-level practitioners .................................
Hospital .......................................................
Mailing time .................................................
Mailing cost .................................................
2 minutes ...........................................................
2 minutes ...........................................................
8 minutes ...........................................................
10 minutes .........................................................
............................................................................
13 minutes .........................................................
$222.51
83.80
33.89
33.89
........................
33.89
$7.42
2.79
4.52
5.65
0.01
5.35
11 minutes .........................................................
11 minutes .........................................................
11 minutes .........................................................
269.00
214.07
76.94
49.32
39.25
14.11
1 hour .................................................................
1 hour .................................................................
10 minutes .........................................................
2 minutes ...........................................................
............................................................................
214.07
76.94
35.55
30.33
........................
214.07
76.94
5.93
1.01
0.41
Total—MDs (1 & 2) ..............................
Total—Dentists (1 & 2) ........................
Total—Mid level practitioners (1 & 2) ..
............................................................................
............................................................................
............................................................................
........................
........................
........................
62.32
266.31
104.05
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TABLE 10.—UNIT COSTS—Continued
Requirement
Unit time
Wage rate
Unit cost
2-Factor Token
Learning time ......................................................
Token ..................................................................
Digital Certificate ................................................
Log review ..........................................................
10 minutes .........................................................
............................................................................
............................................................................
24 minutes/year .................................................
76.94
........................
........................
222.51
12.82
12
30/year
89.01
36,623
146,490
125,000 (first year)
100,000 (following)
25,000 per year
Programming
500 hours ...........................................................
2,000 hours ........................................................
............................................................................
73
73
........................
Third-Party Audit (2) ...........................................
Option 3:
Callback ..............................................................
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
EHR/Pharmacy ASP ..........................................
Other systems ....................................................
Third-Party Audit (Base, 1) ................................
............................................................................
........................
1 minute practitioner ..........................................
3 minutes med. staff ..........................................
3 minutes pharmacy tech ..................................
222.51
30.60
26.23
Total costs
To estimate total costs, it is first
necessary to establish the distribution of
costs over time. The costs to be
considered in the analysis may be
divided into start-up costs and ongoing
costs. For a practitioner’s office, the
start-up costs are incurred in the year in
which the office implements electronic
prescribing of controlled substances,
and the ongoing costs are incurred in
every year thereafter. For service
providers, all the start-up costs are
incurred in Year 1 of the analysis. DEA
presumes that all service providers will
add controlled substance electronic
prescribing capability to their systems
in the first year, lest they be placed at
a competitive disadvantage. But this
will not be the case for practitioners’
offices. They will implement electronic
prescribing of controlled substances
over time as they implement electronic
prescriptions and EHRs. DEA has
projected complete implementation of
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances over a 15-year period; i.e., at
the end of the 15th year of the analysis,
all practitioners’ offices will have
controlled substance electronic
prescribing capability in their electronic
prescription systems. This is essentially
an estimate of the rate of electronic
prescription implementation. As
practitioners adopt electronic
prescription capabilities, they will
include electronic prescribing of
controlled substances in the package, as
the incremental cost of doing so for an
office is very slight. DEA notes that
although the selection of the
implementation period is somewhat
arbitrary, DEA believes that 15 years is
a reasonable estimate to reflect the
balance between pressure from insurers,
who want practitioners to implement
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EHR systems, and the reluctance of
practitioners to invest in expensive
systems that are time-consuming to
implement and perhaps not yet fully
tested.
Table 11 shows the schedule at which
DEA projects implementation over time.
TABLE 11.—IMPLEMENTATION
SCHEDULE
Percentage of
offices implementing in a
year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Cumulative implementation
percentage
6.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
6.0
6.0
7.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
11.0
6.0
5.0
6.0
10.0
14.0
19.0
24.0
29.0
35.0
41.0
48.0
57.0
67.0
78.0
89.0
95.0
100.0
1 .......
2 .......
3 .......
4 .......
5 .......
6 .......
7 .......
8 .......
9 .......
10 .....
11 .....
12 .....
13 .....
14 .....
15 .....
The rate in Year 1 is somewhat higher
than the rate in the next several years,
because about 6 percent of offices have
already adopted electronic prescription
systems. After dropping in Year 2, the
rate rises gradually to a peak in Years 12
and 13 and then drops as full
implementation approaches. This is
based on the observation that adoption
of electronic prescribing has been slow
to date and that many practitioners are
very reluctant to accept changes in the
basic methods with which they conduct
their practices, especially the direct
introduction of computer-based systems
into their own work.
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6.55
The start-up costs incurred by
practitioners’ offices in each year will be
based on the number of practitioners in
offices implementing controlled
substances electronic prescribing
capabilities in that year. Ongoing costs
for practitioners will be based on the
total number of practitioners in offices
where electronic prescribing of
controlled substances has been
implemented in a given year, i.e., the
cumulative percentage of practitioners
in offices that have adopted electronic
prescribing of controlled substances.
Both start-up costs and ongoing costs
will also reflect the annual growth rates
of the different classes of practitioners—
0.1 percent for physicians, 0.5 percent
for dentists, and 2.2 percent for midlevel practitioners.
Start-up costs for practitioners are the
initial identity proofing and the
purchase of hard tokens, and training in
their use, for some of the mid-level
practitioners. The major ongoing cost
under the Base Case and Option 1 is the
monthly log review. But there is also
some ongoing cost associated with
turnover of personnel in practitioners’
offices. When a practitioner moves to a
new office, there is a high likelihood
that the transfer will also be a move
between system vendors; when that is
the case, there must be a new identity
proofing for that individual. Transfers of
mid-level practitioners may require new
purchases of hard tokens.
Some further assumptions beyond
implementation and growth rates must
be made to estimate total costs for
practitioners’ offices and service
providers. These are as follows:
• For the Base Case, percentage of
initial identity proofing visits by service
provider staff where the travel to the
office is needed only for the identity
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proofing: 15.0 percent. (Percentage of
non-EHR systems). For ongoing identity
proofing visits due to personnel
turnover, there is no incremental travel.
• Percentage of personnel transfers
between offices that are also transfers
between service providers: 90.0 percent.
• Annual turnover rate for physicians
and dentists: 2.5 percent.
• Annual turnover rate for mid-level
practitioners: 5.0 percent.
As noted earlier, the service providers
will incur all their start-up costs, apart
from identity proofing, in Year 1 of the
analysis. Aside from identity proofing,
their ongoing costs will be the annual
audits. The cost per service provider
will remain the same over time, but the
total cost will diminish as the number
of service providers serving
practitioners declines in an ongoing
process of attrition due to overpopulation on the supply side of the
market. Although this reduction may
seem large, DEA notes that in the mid-
1980s, there were about 400 word
processing software systems; only a few
remain.31 The number of service
providers serving pharmacies remains
stable at 20 throughout the analysis
period. Table 12 shows DEA’s
projection of the number of providers
serving practitioners.
TABLE 12.—PROJECTED REDUCTION IN
ELECTRONIC PRESCRIPTION SERVICE
PROVIDERS
Number of
providers
serving
practitioners
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
TABLE 12.—PROJECTED REDUCTION IN
ELECTRONIC PRESCRIPTION SERVICE
PROVIDERS—Continued
Number of
providers
serving
practitioners
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
9 ...................................
10 .................................
11 .................................
12 .................................
13 .................................
14 .................................
15 .................................
25
25
20
20
20
20
20
The results of the unit costs and the
foregoing assumptions about
110
distribution of costs over time and other
95
80 items are summarized in Tables 13 and
70 14, showing the annualized cost, over
60 15 years at a 7 percent and a 3 percent
50 discount rate. Table 15 presents a
40 summary of annualized costs for the
30 four options.
...................................
...................................
...................................
...................................
...................................
...................................
...................................
...................................
TABLE 13.—ANNUALIZED COST PER OPTION AND REQUIREMENTS
[7% Discount rate]
Practitioners
Providers
Total
Base Case 7.0 percent
Identity Proofing ...................................................................................................
Tokens .................................................................................................................
Training ................................................................................................................
Log reviews ..........................................................................................................
Reprogramming ...................................................................................................
Audits ...................................................................................................................
$352,367
90,757
75,147
22,495,039
................................
................................
$459,425
................................
................................
................................
824,224
8,264,492
$811,792
90,757
75,147
22,495,039
824,224
8,264,492
Total ..............................................................................................................
................................
................................
32,561,452
Option 1
Identity Proofing ...................................................................................................
Tokens .................................................................................................................
Training ................................................................................................................
Log reviews ..........................................................................................................
Reprogramming ...................................................................................................
Audits ...................................................................................................................
6,151,445
90,757
75,147
22,495,039
................................
................................
354,910
................................
................................
................................
824,224
8,264,492
6,506,355
90,757
75,147
22,495,039
824,224
8,264,492
Total ..............................................................................................................
................................
................................
38,256,015
Option 2
6,151,445
90,757
75,147
7,582,154
................................
................................
354,910
................................
................................
................................
703,606
3,636,812
6,506,355
90,757
75,147
7,582,154
703,606
3,636,812
Total ..............................................................................................................
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
Identity Proofing ...................................................................................................
Tokens .................................................................................................................
Training ................................................................................................................
Digital Certificates ................................................................................................
Reprogramming ...................................................................................................
Audits ...................................................................................................................
................................
................................
18,594,831
Option 3
Callbacks .............................................................................................................
31 Bergin, T.J., ‘‘The Proliferation and
Consolidation of Word Processing Software: 1985–
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1,023,778,891
256,261,645
1995.’’ IEEE Annals of the History of Computing.
Volume 28, Issue 4, Oct.–Dec. 2006 Page(s):48–63.
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36763
TABLE 14.—ANNUALIZED COST PER OPTION AND REQUIREMENTS
[3% Discount rate]
Practitioners
Providers
Total
Base Case 3.0 percent
Identity Proofing ...................................................................................................
Tokens .................................................................................................................
Training ................................................................................................................
Log reviews ..........................................................................................................
Reprogramming ...................................................................................................
Audits ...................................................................................................................
$357,789
94,227
76,832
24,389,580
................................
................................
$443,823
................................
................................
................................
628,833
7,401,186
$801,612
94,227
76,832
24,389,580
628,833
7,401,186
Total ..............................................................................................................
................................
................................
33,392,270
Option 1
Identity Proofing ...................................................................................................
Tokens .................................................................................................................
Training ................................................................................................................
Log reviews ..........................................................................................................
Reprogramming ...................................................................................................
Audits ...................................................................................................................
6,269,439
94,227
76,832
24,389,580
................................
................................
360,851
................................
................................
................................
628,833
7,401,186
6,630,290
94,227
76,832
24,389,580
628,833
7,401,186
Total ..............................................................................................................
................................
................................
39,220,948
Option 2
Identity Proofing ...................................................................................................
Tokens .................................................................................................................
Training ................................................................................................................
Digital Certificates ................................................................................................
Reprogramming ...................................................................................................
Audits ...................................................................................................................
6,269,439
94,227
76,832
8,220,726
................................
................................
360,851
................................
................................
................................
536,808
3,369,812
6,630,290
94,227
76,832
8,220,726
536,808
3,369,812
Total ..............................................................................................................
................................
................................
18,928,003
Option 3
Callbacks .............................................................................................................
1,123,085,458
281,119,029
1,404,204,487
TABLE 15.—TOTAL ANNUALIZED COSTS
7.0 percent
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
Base Case ...............................................................................................................................................
Option 1 ...................................................................................................................................................
Option 2 ...................................................................................................................................................
Option 3 ...................................................................................................................................................
The two largest cost drivers for the
Base Case are the monthly log review for
practitioners and the annual audits for
the service providers. The cost for
practitioners almost disappears without
the log review; with the 7.0 percent
interest rate, it drops to under $1.0
million. The annual audits account for
approximately $8 million of the cost to
service providers at the 7.0 percent rate.
For Options 1 and 2, identity proofing
is a significant cost; these costs fall
mainly on practitioners who do not
routinely visit hospitals as part of their
practices. For Option 2, digital
certificates are also a significant cost,
but audits are a lower cost. Option 3 is
far more costly than any of the other
options although it entails no upfront
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costs and imposes no costs on the
service providers.
Benefits
The benefits often ascribed to
electronic prescriptions are not directly
attributable to this rule except to the
extent the rule facilitates
implementation of electronic
prescribing. Electronic prescriptions
may provide benefits to patients by
reducing medication errors caused by
illegible or misunderstood
prescriptions. They may also reduce
processing time at the pharmacy,
callbacks to practitioners, and waiting
time for patients. To estimate the part of
these benefits that may accrue to the
proposed rule, DEA estimated the
number of controlled substance
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$32,561,000
38,256,000
18,595,000
1,280,041,000
3.0 percent
$33,392,000
39,221,000
18,928,000
1,404,205,000
prescriptions that may require callbacks
(approximately 27 percent of original
prescriptions). Assuming that electronic
controlled substance prescriptions
phased in over 15 years, as described
above, the annualized time-saving for
eliminating these callbacks would be
$316 million (at 7% discount) or $346
million (at 3% discount). Electronic
prescriptions could also reduce the
patient’s wait time at the pharmacy.
Assuming the average wait time is 15
minutes for the 81 percent of original
prescriptions that are presented on
paper to retail pharmacies (not mail
order or long-term care prescriptions), at
the current United States average hourly
wage ($19.62), the annualized savings
over 15 years would be $589 million (at
7% discount) or $646 million (at 3%
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discount). The estimates for public wait
time are upper bounds. They assume
that the practitioner will transmit the
prescription and that the pharmacist
will open the record and fill it before
the patient arrives at the pharmacy. It is
probably more realistic to assume that
only a fraction of these benefits will be
gained. There may also be some
offsetting costs to the pharmacy. The
industry estimates that about 20 percent
of prescriptions written are never
presented to pharmacies. If these are
sent to pharmacies electronically and
prepared before the patient arrives, the
pharmacy will have spent time for
which it will not be reimbursed if the
patient does not pick up the
prescription. (It may be reasonable to
expect the 20 percent to decline with
electronic prescriptions, although
probably not to zero.) Table 16 presents
the annualized benefits at a 7 percent
and 3 percent discount rate.
TABLE 16.—ANNUALIZED BENEFITS
7.0 percent
3.0 percent
$315,626,000
588,732,000
$346,242,000
645,839,000
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
Callbacks Avoided ...........................................................................................................................................
Public Wait Time Avoided ...............................................................................................................................
The benefits, both of which represent
time savings, clearly exceed by a wide
margin the costs of the Base Case and
Options 1 and 2. The costs of Option 3
at $1.3 to $1.4 billion a year exceed the
benefits, which would not, of course,
include callbacks eliminated.
Other Benefits. DEA has not
attempted to quantify any reduction in
medical errors. Most of the studies on
medication errors have been done in
hospital settings; the studies of
outpatient errors do not usually
disaggregate the types of errors to
distinguish those that could be
prevented by accurate electronic
prescriptions (e.g., misread illegible
prescriptions versus a dispensing error
such as inadvertently selecting the
wrong drug or wrong strength); and
none indicate what percentage of errors
are related to controlled substances. In
addition, although electronic
prescriptions should eliminate
illegibility issues, some of these
mistakes may be replaced by keying
errors. DEA expects that there will be
reduced medication errors linked to
more readable prescriptions, but
decided that it did not have a reasonable
basis for quantifying the benefits.
Another benefit of electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
that is ascribable to the proposed rule,
but not easily quantified and monetized,
would come from reductions in
controlled substance prescription
forgery and alteration. Prescription
forgery, alteration, and misuse (e.g.,
faxing the same prescription to multiple
pharmacies) is a part of the total illegal
market for diversion of legal drugs.
Diversion of legal medication for illegal
consumption usually involves
controlled substances. Diversion and
abuse are significant social problems;
the proposed rule is intended to help
curb some of these illegal activities.
As discussed above, diversion of
prescription drugs through forgery,
doctor shopping, and alteration of
pharmacy records is a growing problem.
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Controlled substances are diverted in a
number of ways, some of which will not
be affected by electronic prescriptions.
For example, diversion occurs when:
• Drugs are stolen from practitioners
and pharmacies.
• Practitioners knowingly write
nonlegitimate prescriptions.
• Practitioners write prescriptions for
people who have lied about symptoms
to obtain the drugs. A commonly used
term for these types of patients is
‘‘doctor shoppers,’’ people who
routinely visit different doctors with the
same ailment to obtain multiple
prescriptions for controlled substances,
usually pain relievers. These
prescriptions are then filled at various
pharmacies and the drugs are abused or
sold on the illicit market.
Although DEA does not expect this
rule to eliminate these problems, it may
act as a deterrent to practitioners who
write nonlegitimate prescriptions and to
doctor shoppers because it will be easier
for States that have prescription
monitoring programs to monitor
prescriptions when they are electronic
and because digitally signed
prescriptions will make it very difficult
for a practitioner to claim that a digitally
signed prescription has been forged or
altered. Some States are already using
prescription monitoring programs to
identify practitioners who prescribe
unusual quantities of controlled
substances and patients filling multiple
prescriptions at different pharmacies.
Electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances will directly affect the
following types of diversion:
• Stealing prescription pads or
printing them, and writing
nonlegitimate prescriptions.
• Altering a legitimate prescription to
obtain a higher dose or more dosage
units (e.g., changing a ‘‘10’’ to a ‘‘40’’).
• Phoning in nonlegitimate
prescriptions late in the day when it is
difficult for a pharmacy to complete a
confirmation call to the practitioner’s
office.
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• Faxing a prescription to multiple
pharmacies.
• Altering a pharmacy record to cover
the diversion of controlled substances.
These are examples of prescription
forgery that contribute significantly to
the overall problem of drug diversion.
DEA expects this rule to reduce
significantly these types of forgeries
because only practitioners with secure
prescription-writing systems will be
able to issue electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances and because any
alteration of the prescription at the
pharmacy will be discernible from the
audit log and a comparison of the
digitally signed records. DEA expects
that over time, as electronic prescribing
becomes the norm, practitioners issuing
paper prescriptions for controlled
substances may find that their
prescriptions are examined more
closely.
DEA is not aware of any
comprehensive data on controlled
substance prescription diversion in
general, and forgeries in particular. DEA
does not track information on
prescription forgeries and alterations
because enforcement is generally
handled by State and local authorities.
The cost of enforcement is, however,
considerable. In 2007, DEA spent
between $2,700 for a small case and
$147,000 for a large diversion case just
for the primary investigators;
adjudication costs and support staff are
additional. It is reasonable to assume
that State and local law enforcement
agencies are spending similar sums per
case. As discussed above, some cases
involve multiple jurisdictions, all of
which bear costs for collecting data and
deposing witnesses. The rule as
proposed could reduce the number of
cases and, therefore, reduce the costs to
governments at all levels. A reduction in
forgeries would also benefit
practitioners who would be less likely
to be at risk of being accused of
diverting controlled substances and of
then having to prove that they were not
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responsible. In contrast, a less secure
electronic prescription system could
greatly increase diversion and the
number of forgeries and diversion cases
and dramatically increase investigation
costs if every provider and intermediary
involved in a transaction had to provide
testimony.
A reduction in forged controlled
substance prescriptions could also
result in a reduction in drug addictionrelated deaths, injuries, and crime. The
2006 NSDUH found that 6.7 million
people in the United States currently
use prescription-type therapeutic drugs
for nonmedical reasons. SAMHSA
reported that in 2003, in six States
(Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Utah, and Vermont) there
were 352 deaths from misuse of
oxycodone and hydrocodone, both
prescription controlled substances.32
The 32 metropolitan areas that are part
of the Drug Abuse Warning Network
reported 3,530 deaths from misuse of
oxycodone and hydrocodone and 1,381
deaths that involved the misuse of
benzodiazepines in 2003.33 In another
report, SAMHSA stated that in 2004
there were 42,491 emergency room
visits involving nonmedical use of
hydrocodone, 36,559 visits for
nonmedical use of oxycodone, and
144,000 visits for nonmedical use of
benzodiazepines (Schedule IV).34 By
2005, the number of emergency visits
for nonmedical use of these drugs rose
to 51,225 for hydrocodone, 42,810 for
oxycodone, and 172,388 for the
benzodiazepines. For all non-medical
use of prescription opiates except
methadone, the number of visits was
about 155,000.35 The costs of the deaths
in the six States is more than $1 billion
(at $3 million per life) and in the
metropolitan areas more than $10
billion. The cost of the emergency room
visits is above $300 million (at $1,000
per visit). A recent study of drug
diversion and insurance fraud estimated
that drug diversion costs health insurers
$72 billion a year because of claims for
fraudulent prescriptions and treating
patients for the effects of drug abuse.36
If the proposed rule prevents even a
small fraction of these costs, the benefits
will far exceed the implementation
costs.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act
of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601–612) (RFA),
Federal agencies must evaluate the
impact of rules on small entities and
consider less burdensome alternatives.
DEA has conducted an initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis and
concluded that although the rule will
affect a substantial number of small
entities, it will not impose a significant
economic impact on any regulated
entities. The only entities regulated by
DEA under this rule would be DEA
registrants—prescribing practitioners
and pharmacies. The service providers,
although indirectly affected by the rule,
are not registrants. Under the proposed
rule, service providers may design and
implement their systems and services in
any way they choose. A DEA registrant,
however, may not use a system that
does not meet the requirements of the
rule to create, transmit, receive, or
process a controlled substance
prescription. Nothing in this rule
compels a DEA registrant to issue or
process controlled substance
prescriptions electronically.
Practitioners may continue to issue
controlled substances prescriptions on
paper and, where permitted, by fax or
telephone. Besides being only indirectly
affected by the rule, the service
providers are expected to recover their
costs from registrants and others who
purchase the software and systems.
Characteristics of Small Entities
As discussed in previous sections, the
small entities directly affected by the
proposed rule are practitioners and to a
limited extent pharmacies. The firms
marketing services and software are not
directly affected by the rule because
they will recover their costs from
practitioners. Nonetheless, DEA will
discuss the impact on these firms. Table
17 shows Small Business
Administration’s standards for these
firms.
TABLE 17.—SBA DEFINITIONS OF SMALL ENTITIES
Affected entity
Industry description
Practitioner and Mid-Level Practitioner ........................
Offices of Physicians ....................................................
Offices of Dentists ........................................................
Software Publishing ......................................................
Pharmacies and Drug Stores .......................................
Supermarkets and Other Grocery Stores ....................
General Merchandise Stores .......................................
Mail Order Houses .......................................................
Service Provider ...........................................................
Pharmacy ......................................................................
NAICS code
62111
621210
511210
44611
44511
45291
454113
Small business definition
(sales in $)
$9,000,000
6,500,000
23,000,000
6,500,000
25,000,000
25,000,000
23,000,000
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
Although some practitioners are part
of large practices that may qualify as
large businesses, so few practitioners
fall into the large category that it is
simpler to assume that they are all small
entities. It is also the case that the
service providers generally charge on a
per practitioner basis rather than a per
practice basis so that the costs may be
considered as applying to individual
practitioners. Mid-level practitioners are
generally employed by a practice so
their costs would be incurred by the
practice, not the individual. They are
not, therefore, small businesses.
The lowest average net income for a
physician in private practice listed in
the Allied-Physician Survey is
$135,000.37 The American Dental
Association states that the average net
32 The New DAWN Report—Opiate-related Drug
Misuse Deaths in Six States, 2003. Issue 19, 2006;
https://dawninfo.samhsa.gov/pubs/shortreports/.
33 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, Office of Applied Studies. Drug
Abuse Warning Network, 2003: Area Profiles of
Drug-Related Mortality. DAWN series D–27, DHHS
Publication No. (SMA) 05–4023, Rockville, MD,
March 2005; https://dawninfo.samhsa.gov/pubs/
mepubs/.
34 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, Office of Applied Studies. The
DAWN Report—Emergency Department Visits
Involving Nonmedical Use of Selected
Pharmaceuticals. Issue 23, 2006; https://
dawninfo.samhsa.gov/pubs/shortreports/.
35 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, Office of Applied Studies. Drug
Abuse Warning Network, 2005: National Estimates
of Drug-Related Emergency Department Visits.
DAWN Series D–29, DHHS Publication No. (SMA)
07–4256, Rockville, MD, March 2007; https://
dawninfo.samhsa.gov/pubs/edpubs/default.asp.
36 Coalition Against Insurance Fraud,
‘‘Prescription for Peril: How Insurance Fraud
Finances Theft and Abuse of Addictive Prescription
Drugs,’’ December 2007.
37 https://www.allied-physicians.com/salarysurveys, accessed 1/16/2008.
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income of a dentist in private practice
is $185,940 for a general practitioner.
The average gross billings for a dentist
in general practice per dentist is
$595,340.38 For pharmacies, the 17,500
independent pharmacies are small
entities; the other pharmacies belong to
about 200 chains that are mostly large
firms. There may be a few chains with
fewer than 3 pharmacies, which could
be small. In 2006, National Association
of Chain Drug Stores data indicate that
the average independent pharmacy had
prescription sales of $2.48 million a
year; average total sales are about $2.675
million.39
As discussed above, DEA estimates
that there are about 130 service
providers (110 for electronic
prescriptions, 20 for pharmacies) that
will be indirectly affected by this rule.
A few of these are large entities or part
of large companies (e.g., General Electric
and McKesson). DEA has no
information on the revenues of most of
these firms. DEA notes that fully
electronic EHRs cost between $20,000
and $50,000 per practitioner, with a
usual monthly maintenance fee of $500
per practitioner. A provider, therefore,
would need fewer than 4,000
practitioners to qualify as a large
business. The providers of stand-alone
electronic prescribing systems charge a
tenth as much and are assumed to be
small entities.
Costs to Small Entities
The costs to DEA registrants are
relatively small. As noted above, the
initial costs to the practitioner would
range from about $62 to $266 for
identity proofing, mostly for the time to
have the identification checked. The
main ongoing costs for the proposed
rule would be the monthly log review
by practitioners (about $89 a year) plus
any incremental cost of the software or
service. The initial and ongoing costs for
the basic rule elements represent less
than 0.2 percent of the annual income
of the lowest paid practitioner.
Determining the incremental cost of
the system requirements per practitioner
is difficult because it depends on the
number of providers, the number of
customers, the number of system
requirements that a service provider
does not already meet, and how costs
are recovered (in the year in which the
money is spent or over time). For
example, an EHR system that had to
reprogram to the full extent would have
incremental system costs of $161,000
($125,000 for the third-party audit and
$37,000 for reprogramming). If the
service provider had 1,000 practitioners
enrolled in the first year, it would also
incur about $5,660 for identity proofing.
If the service provider recovered the
costs ($167,000) from its 1,000
customers, the incremental cost to those
customers would be $167 or about $14
a month. The costs in the out years
would be lower because no further
programming is needed and the audit
cost is lower ($100,000). If the service
provider added 1,000 practitioners a
year over 15 years, the incremental cost
per practitioner would fall as shown in
Table 18. The costs shown are
conservative because the audits may
cost considerably less depending on the
complexity of the system; many EHRs
may need little reprogramming. Either
or both of these factors in combination
could reduce their costs considerably
and, therefore, reduce the incremental
costs to practitioners.
TABLE 18.—INCREMENTAL COST OF EHR SYSTEMS TO PRACTITIONERS
No. Practitioners
Year
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1 .......................................................................................................................
2 .......................................................................................................................
3 .......................................................................................................................
4 .......................................................................................................................
5 .......................................................................................................................
6 .......................................................................................................................
7 .......................................................................................................................
8 .......................................................................................................................
9 .......................................................................................................................
10 .....................................................................................................................
11 .....................................................................................................................
12 .....................................................................................................................
13 .....................................................................................................................
14 .....................................................................................................................
15 .....................................................................................................................
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
11000
12000
13000
14000
15000
Total provider
costs
$167,70
105,648
105,648
105,648
105,648
105,648
105,648
105,648
105,648
105,648
105,648
105,648
105,648
105,648
105,648
Annual cost/
practitioner
$167.27
52.82
35.22
26.41
21.13
17.61
15.09
13.21
11.74
10.56
9.60
8.80
8.13
7.55
7.04
Monthly cost/
practitioner
$13.94
4.40
2.93
2.20
1.76
1.47
1.26
1.10
0.98
0.88
0.80
0.73
0.68
0.63
0.59
In the first year, the total cost to a
physician for DEA’s requirements
would be less than $300; dentists would
have higher initial costs because of
travel time. After that, the cost will
decline over time to about $100 to $150
a year including the incremental costs
charged for the systems. The lowest
paid physician earns about $135,000 a
year. For none of the registrants will the
cost represent a significant economic
impact.
For pharmacies, the only costs will be
the incremental cost that their service
provider charges to cover the costs of
reprogramming and audits. In the first
year, if the service providers recover the
programming costs in a single year, the
average incremental cost to a pharmacy
would be $85. After that, the
incremental charge to recover the cost of
the third-party audit would be $35 per
pharmacy, assuming the cost is evenly
distributed across all pharmacies. The
first year charge represents 0.003
percent of an independent pharmacy’s
annual sales. It also represents a far
lower cost than the pharmacy will pay
SureScripts or another intermediary for
processing the prescriptions. Currently,
SureScripts charges the pharmacy
$0.215 per electronic prescription to
process and reformat prescriptions to
ensure that the pharmacy system will be
able to capture the data electronically.
Based on National Association of Chain
Drug Stores data on the average price of
prescriptions ($68.26) and the average
value of prescription sales, an
independent pharmacy processes about
36,400 prescriptions a year and would
have to pay SureScripts about $7,800.40
38 https://www.ada.org/ada/prod/survey/faq.asp,
accessed 1/16/2008.
39 https://www.nacds.org/
wmspage.cfm?parm1=507, accessed 1/18/2008.
40 https://www.nacds.org/
wmspage.cfm?parm1=507, accessed 1/18/2008.
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Although these costs do not represent
a significant economic impact, as
discussed above, DEA considered
options. The Base Case option would be
less expensive initially, particularly for
dentists and mid-level practitioners,
because much less time would be
needed for identity proofing. Once the
identity proofing has occurred,
however, the costs would be the same
for the Base Case and Option 1. Option
2 would be less expensive for
practitioners because the monthly log
check would not be needed and the
service provider costs would be lower
because less stringent auditing
requirements would be imposed. DEA
has not proposed the Base Case because
of two concerns about identity proofing.
First, DEA is concerned that having a
service provider employee checking the
documents would make it easier for
insider collusion to occur. Putting the
in-person identity proofing in the hands
of a DEA registrant or a public employee
lessens that threat. Second, others
expressed a concern that service
providers would not visit practitioners’
offices often, which could delay
implementation and adoption,
particularly for rural practices. DEA is
not proposing the PKI option except for
Federal health care agencies because of
the concerns expressed by industry with
regard to the use of digital signatures
and the problems they would create for
intermediaries. The third option, which
would impose no costs on service
providers, would be very expensive for
pharmacies and practitioners. If the
average independent pharmacy
processes 36,400 prescriptions, about 11
percent of those are likely to be for
controlled substances. Their annual cost
for conducting callbacks on each of
those would be about $5,200 in 2008;
eliminating callbacks that already occur,
the costs would be about $3,800 in
2008. If the number of controlled
substance prescriptions (359 million
original and newly authorized refills in
2008) were equally distributed among
practitioners (about 573,000 in 2008),
the average practitioner would incur
costs of about $3,300 for callbacks under
Option 3. Eliminating the callbacks that
already occur, the average practitioner
would incur new costs of about $2,200
under Option 3.
DEA has, therefore, determined that
the proposed rule would not impose a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities
directly subject to the rule. Less
expensive options are considered too
burdensome by the service providers
and intermediaries. The option that
would impose no burden on service
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providers would impose substantially
higher costs on practitioners and
pharmacies.
Another issue that DEA considered is
whether the incremental costs might
affect practitioners’ decisions about
purchasing a system that provides
electronic prescribing. As discussed in
previous sections of this preamble, the
market for these systems has shifted
away from stand-alone systems to EHRs.
The cost of an EHR system for the
functionalities that CCHIT requires
ranges from $20,000 to $50,000 per
practitioner with a usual annual
maintenance charge of $6,000 per
practitioner. (There are some less
expensive systems marketed as EHRs
that have only some of the functions;
some appear to provide billing,
scheduling, and simple records, but
none of the more complex functions
such as electronic prescribing, database
links, etc.) Even in the first year, where
the incremental cost of adding DEA’s
requirements would be between $150
and $200, this additional charge is
unlikely to affect the decision to invest
in an EHR, where the first year cost
would be, at the low end $26,000
($20,000 plus the $6,000 maintenance
fee). The incremental costs would add
less than 1 percent of the cost of the
system; in the out-years, the incremental
costs would similarly be a small fraction
of the annual system maintenance cost.
For stand-alone electronic prescription
systems, the initial incremental costs
will be higher because they are expected
to need more programming. After the
initial year, however, their incremental
costs should be similar. These costs will
represent a greater percentage increase
in their monthly charges, which average
$50 per month, but this is unlikely to
affect the initial decision of whether to
adopt electronic prescribing systems
because most of these systems are being
provided free to practitioners by
insurers that want to encourage
electronic prescribing.
DEA considers it unlikely that any
service provider would attempt to
market a product or service that could
not be used for controlled substance
records and, therefore, no service
provider will be disadvantaged by
complying because all service providers
will incur costs and recover them from
customers. The situation may be similar
to certification of EHRs by CCHIT. Some
were concerned that the standards
would create barriers, but most of the
companies certified have been small.
The chairman of CCHIT, Mark Leavitt,
stated that the data on the revenues of
firms that gained certification ‘‘laid to
rest this concern that it was going to
squeeze out small vendors. It actually
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seems to have done the opposite. It’s
created a level playing field.’’ 41
DEA notes that the barriers to
adoption of electronic prescribing cited
in various government studies relate to
the high cost of the systems, the
disruption caused by implementing
these systems, and the relatively early
stage of system development and
interoperability provided by the existing
systems. Despite the benefits of legible
prescriptions, both in terms of patient
safety and fewer callbacks from
pharmacies, practitioners have resisted
adoption of electronic prescriptions.
Insurance companies that have offered
the systems for free have had difficulty
finding practitioners willing to accept
them because while the service is free,
the cost of additional hardware,
training, and staff disruption is a barrier
to adoption. In 2005, Wellpoint offered
physicians $42 million in hardware,
software, and support. ‘‘Of the 25,000
physicians contacted, only 19,000
accepted these free gifts,’’ Wellpoint
then-CEO Leonard Schaeffer said. ‘‘And
of those 19,000, only 2,700 physicians
chose e-prescribing PDAs. The rest
selected a paperwork reduction package.
* * * Free is not cheap enough,’’
Schaeffer concluded.42 The likelihood
that the electronic prescribing systems
will be part of EHR systems probably is
also slowing adoption because practices
do not want to invest in a stand-alone
system that will be redundant later.
A study of physicians’ experiences
with commercial electronic prescription
systems that was funded by HHS and
published in Health Affairs on April 3,
2007, examined the implementation of
electronic prescribing.43 The study
focused on larger medical practices (12
of the 21 practices had more than 50
doctors; none had fewer than 5), which
meant that many of the practices had IT
staff and support. Many of the problems
encountered involved not the basic
function of writing a prescription, but
other functions that are designed to
improve patient safety (e.g., medication
histories, clinical decision support) and
formulary compliance. Connectivity
with pharmacies was also a problem.
41 California HealthCare Foundation, ‘‘Gauging
the Progress of the National Health Information
Technology Initiative: Perspectives from the Field.’’
January 2008.
42 Schaeffer, L. WellPoint Health Networks,
Thousand Oaks, CA. Transforming an IT-Enabled
Health Care System: The Health Plan Role.
Presentation at the Second Annual National Health
Information Summit. Washington DC, October 20,
2004. https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/
0504/0504.pharmacy.html.
43 Grossman, Joy M. et al., ‘‘Physicians’
Experiences Using Commercial E-Prescribing
Systems,’’ Health Affairs, 26, no. 3 (2007), w393–
w404.
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Practice estimates of the number of
prescriptions printed out for the patient
ranged from 10 percent to close to 100
percent. Despite the theoretical level of
pharmacy readiness for electronic
prescriptions, ‘‘most practices using
electronic fax or EDI [electronic data
interchange] reported spending
substantial time educating pharmacies
about e-prescribing.’’ Many practices
noted that ‘‘at least some of the mailorder PBMs [pharmacy benefit
managers] routinely rejected
prescriptions sent via electronic fax or
EDI* * *’’
Implementing a system was reported
to be very complicated. One physician
reported working with the IT
department 4 hours a week for 6 months
to iron out the ‘‘kinks’’ in the electronic
prescribing module before the system
could be tested. Maintenance of the
system continued to demand staff
resources. The study concluded:
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Much of the literature assessing barriers to
electronic prescribing adoption and use has
focused on cost, physician resistance, and
changing practice workflow. Our findings
highlight the role of product limitations,
external implementation challenges, and
physicians’ preferences for how to use
system features and are consistent with
several other assessments of e-prescribing
system functionality and provider pharmacy
connectivity.
Respondents’ implementation hurdles
belie the view that electronic prescribing
products are relatively simple ‘‘plug-andplay’’ applications. It is hard to imagine that
e-prescribing as it exists today can be the
‘‘killer app’’ that will drive further IT
adoption. All of the practices we examined,
regardless of size, IT expertise, geographic
location, or vendor, had invested many
financial and human resources in
implementing and maintaining e-prescribing.
These findings are consistent with the
CDC study cited above, which found
that electronic prescribing was one of
the less used functions in a fully or
partially electronic EMR system.44
Creating an electronic prescription
takes more time than writing a paper
prescription and handing it to a patient.
The electronic prescription system
shifts some responsibility from the
pharmacy to the practitioners. At
present, it is the pharmacy that checks
to see if a particular drug is covered by
the patient’s insurance and that checks
for drug interactions by examining other
medications the patient is taking. With
electronic prescriptions, all of these
checks may occur before the practitioner
signs the prescription. While this
44 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
‘‘Electronic Medical Record Use by Office-Based
Physicians and Their Practices: United States
2006.’’ Advance Data from Vital and Health
Statistics, Number 393, October 26, 2007.
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process may significantly reduce
processing time at the pharmacy and
ensure that more prescribed drugs are
on the insurance companies’
formularies, it may substantially
increase the time a practitioner must
spend to create a prescription. Rather
than spending a few seconds writing a
prescription while talking to the patient,
the practitioner has to move through a
series of drop-down menus to select the
patient, drug, dosage unit, and
directions, then determine whether the
insurance company will cover it and at
what level of co-pay. Finally the
practitioner will have to find the
pharmacy from a drop-down menu.
Electronic prescriptions are likely to
save practices staff time in reduced
callbacks, but the practitioners may
initially see mainly the additional time
that needs to be spent creating the
prescription and the office disruption
that occurs when staff need to be trained
on new systems. (An earlier Rand study
noted that although electronic
prescriptions will eliminate errors
caused by misread or misunderstood
prescriptions, practitioners may not
review the prescription to check that the
right items from successive menus have
been selected. Electronic prescriptions
may introduce new errors through
system design flaws. They may also
reduce the likelihood that the pharmacy
will check the prescription for errors.) 45
DEA recognizes that the rule could
potentially impose a burden on service
providers, but the costs are not so great
that a service provider would not be
able to recover them from customers or
that the incremental price increase
would discourage customers from
purchasing a system. The programming
that may be needed to implement a
conforming system is not so onerous
that a service provider would find it a
significant burden; designing and
programming systems is what these
companies do. The cost of the annual
third-party audit may be burdensome,
but without the audit there is no
assurance that the system is protected
against identity theft and insider
attacks, two of the most likely sources
of diversion. DEA expects that some
service providers may drop out of the
market if they cannot meet the security
standards that an auditor would
demand, but given other government
requirements for security under HIPAA
and the public’s expectations for secure
medical records, DEA believes that
these providers would not be able to
45 Bell, D.S. et al., ‘‘Recommendations for
Comparing Electronic Prescribing Systems: Results
of An Expert Consensus Process,’’ Health Affairs,
May 25, 2004, W4–305–317.
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meet other standards and public
expectations. The market for healthcare
IT is evolving rapidly. As discussed
above, DEA anticipates that most of the
current providers will not be in this
market by the time most practitioners
have adopted EHR systems. Eventually,
for reasons unrelated to DEA, a few
systems will dominate the market; for
these service providers, DEA’s
requirements will not be a burden.
Further information on small business
costs is included in the Initial Economic
Impact Analysis of the Electronic
Prescriptions for Controlled Substances
Rule.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The Department of Justice, Drug
Enforcement Administration, has
submitted the following information
collection request to the Office of
Management and Budget for review and
clearance in accordance with review
procedures of the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995. The proposed information
collection is published to obtain
comments from the public and affected
agencies.
All comments and suggestions, or
questions regarding additional
information, to include obtaining a copy
of the proposed information collection
instrument with instructions, should be
directed to Mark W. Caverly, Chief,
Liaison and Policy Section, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, 8701 Morrissette Drive,
Springfield, VA 22152.
Written comments and suggestions
from the public and affected agencies
concerning the proposed collection of
information are encouraged. Comments
regarding the information collectionrelated aspects of this proposed rule
should address one or more of the
following four points:
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
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e.g., permitting electronic submission of
responses.
Overview of This Information Collection
(1) Type of Information Collection:
New collection.
(2) Title of the Form/Collection:
Recordkeeping for electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances.
(3) Agency form number, if any, and
the applicable component of the
Department of Justice sponsoring the
collection:
Form number: None.
Office of Diversion Control, Drug
Enforcement Administration,
Department of Justice.
(4) Affected public who will be asked
or required to respond, as well as a brief
abstract:
Primary: Business or other for-profit.
Other: None.
Abstract: DEA would require that a
DEA-registered hospital, State board, or
law enforcement agency check a
government-issued photographic
identification. The practitioner would
mail the signed document that the
identification check has occurred to the
service provider, which would be
required to check the validity of a
registrant’s DEA registration and State
license and retain a record of the check.
The service provider would also be
required to contact the practitioner by
phone to verify the submission. DEA
would require practitioners to review,
on a monthly basis, a log of controlled
substance prescriptions they have
written and indicate that they have done
so. The service provider would be
required to retain a record that the log
was reviewed and would be required to
retain a digitally signed copy of the
prescription as transmitted. Pharmacy
systems would be required to digitally
sign and archive the prescription as
received. All service providers would be
required to post a copy of the report of
an annual third-party audit.
(5) An estimate of the total number of
respondents and the amount of time
estimated for an average respondent to
respond:
Over the three years of this
information collection request, DEA
estimates that a maximum of 110
electronic prescription service
providers, 20 pharmacy service
providers, and 81,000 practitioners will
comply with this proposed rule. The
practitioners are estimated to spend 11
minutes for identity proofing, 2 minutes
for mailing, and 24 minutes a year for
log review. The entity conducting the
in-person identity proofing would
spend 10 minutes for identity proofing.
Service providers would spend 13
minutes on identity proofing per
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practitioner. They will also spend 500
hours (for EHR and pharmacy ASP
systems) or 2,000 hours (for stand-alone
electronic prescription and installed
pharmacy systems) in the first year
programming the systems to meet the
requirements. No costs are associated
with digitally signing or retaining
electronic records. These functions are
handled by computers; service
providers already retain prescription
records as part of normal business
practices.
(6) An estimate of the total public
burden (in hours) associated with the
collection: 211,000 hours over three
years, an average of 70,200 hours per
year.
If additional information is required
contact: Lynn Bryant, Department
Clearance Officer, Information
Management and Security Staff, Justice
Management Division, Department of
Justice, Patrick Henry Building, Suite
1600, 601 D Street, NW., Washington,
DC 20530.
Congressional Review Act
It has been determined that this rule
is a major rule as defined by Section 804
of the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(Congressional Review Act). This rule is
voluntary and could result in a net
reduction in costs. This rule will not
result in a major increase in costs or
prices; or significant adverse effects on
competition, employment, investment,
productivity, innovation, or on the
ability of United States-based
companies to compete with foreignbased companies in domestic and
export markets.
Executive Order 12988
This regulation meets the applicable
standards set forth in Sections 3(a) and
3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988 Civil
Justice Reform.
Executive Order 13132
This rulemaking does not preempt or
modify any provision of State law; nor
does it impose enforcement
responsibilities on any State; nor does it
diminish the power of any State to
enforce its own laws. Accordingly, this
rulemaking does not have federalism
implications warranting the application
of Executive Order 13132.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
This rule will not result in the net
expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $120,000,000 or more
(adjusted for inflation) in any one year
and will not significantly or uniquely
affect small governments. Because this
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36769
proposed rule will not affect other
government, no actions were deemed
necessary under the provisions of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995. The economic impact on private
entities is analyzed in the Draft
Economic Impact Analysis of the
Proposed Electronic Prescription Rule.
Cost savings will exceed direct costs.
List of Subjects
21 CFR Part 1300
Chemicals, Drug traffic control.
21 CFR Part 1304
Drug traffic control, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
21 CFR Part 1306
Drug traffic control, Prescription
drugs.
21 CFR Part 1311
Administrative practice and
procedure, Certification authorities,
Controlled substances, Digital
certificates, Drug traffic control,
Electronic signatures, Prescription
drugs, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
For the reasons set out above, 21 CFR
parts 1300, 1304, 1306, and 1311 are
proposed to be amended as follows:
PART 1300—DEFINITIONS
1. The authority citation for part 1300
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 21 U.S.C. 802, 871(b), 951,
958(f).
2. Section 1300.03 is added to read as
follows:
§ 1300.03 Definitions relating to electronic
orders for controlled substances and
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances.
Audit means an independent review
and examination of records and
activities to assess the adequacy of
system controls, to ensure compliance
with established policies and
operational procedures, and to
recommend necessary changes in
controls, policies, or procedures.
Audit Trail means a record showing
who has accessed an information
technology system and what operations
the user performed during a given
period.
Authentication means verifying the
identity of the user as a prerequisite to
allowing access to the information
system.
Authentication protocol means a well
specified message exchange process that
verifies possession of a token to
remotely authenticate a prescriber.
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Biometric authentication means
authentication based on measurement of
the individual’s physical features or
repeatable actions where those features
or actions are both unique to the
individual and measurable.
Cache means to download and store
information on a local server or hard
drive.
Certificate Policy means a named set
of rules that sets forth the applicability
of the specific digital certificate to a
particular community or class of
application with common security
requirements.
Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
means a list of revoked, but unexpired
certificates issued by a Certification
Authority.
Certification Authority (CA) means an
organization that is responsible for
verifying the identity of applicants,
authorizing and issuing a digital
certificate, maintaining a directory of
public keys, and maintaining a
Certificate Revocation List.
CSOS means controlled substance
ordering system.
Digital certificate means a data record
that, at a minimum—
(1) Identifies the certification
authority issuing it;
(2) Names or otherwise identifies the
certificate holder;
(3) Contains a public key that
corresponds to a private key under the
sole control of the certificate holder;
(4) Identifies the operational period;
and
(5) Contains a serial number and is
digitally signed by the Certification
Authority issuing it.
Digital signature means a record
created when a file is algorithmically
transformed into a fixed length digest
that is then encrypted using an
asymmetric cryptographic private key
associated with a digital certificate. The
combination of the encryption and
algorithm transformation ensure that the
signer’s identity and the integrity of the
file can be confirmed.
Digitally sign means to affix a digital
signature to a data file.
Electronic prescription means a
prescription that is generated on an
electronic system and transmitted as an
electronic data file. An electronic
prescription must comply with the
requirements of parts 1306 and 1311 of
this chapter. A prescription generated
on an electronic system that is printed
out or transmitted via facsimile to a
pharmacy is not considered to be an
electronic prescription and must be
manually signed.
Electronic signature means a method
of signing an electronic message that
identifies a particular person as the
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source of the message and indicates the
person’s approval of the information
contained in the message.
FIPS means Federal Information
Processing Standards. These Federal
standards, as incorporated by reference
in § 1311.08 of this chapter, prescribe
specific performance requirements,
practices, formats, communications
protocols, etc., for hardware, software,
data, etc.
FIPS 140–2, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08 of this chapter,
means a Federal standard for security
requirements for cryptographic
modules.
FIPS 180–2, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08 of this chapter,
means a Federal secure hash standard.
FIPS 186–2, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08 of this chapter,
means a Federal standard for
applications used to generate and rely
upon digital signatures.
Hard token means a cryptographic
key stored on a special hardware device
(e.g., a PDA, cell phone, smart card)
rather than on a general purpose
computer.
Identity Proofing means the process
by which a service provider validates
sufficient information to uniquely
identify a person.
Intermediary means any technology
system that receives and transmits an
electronic prescription between the
practitioner and pharmacy.
Key pair means two mathematically
related keys having the properties that
(1) one key can be used to encrypt a
message that can only be decrypted
using the other key and (2) even
knowing one key, it is computationally
infeasible to discover the other key.
NIST means the National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
NIST SP–800–63, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08 of this chapter,
means a Federal standard for electronic
authentication.
Paper prescription means a
prescription created on paper or
computer generated to be printed or
transmitted via facsimile that meets the
requirements of part 1306 of this
chapter including a manual signature.
PDA means a Personal Digital
Assistant, a handheld computer used to
manage contacts, appointments, and
tasks.
Private key means the key of a key
pair that is used to create a digital
signature.
Public key means the key of a key pair
that is used to verify a digital signature.
The public key is made available to
anyone who will receive digitally signed
messages from the holder of the key
pair.
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Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) means
a structure under which a Certification
Authority verifies the identity of
applicants, issues, renews, and revokes
digital certificates, maintains a registry
of public keys, and maintains an up-todate Certificate Revocation List.
SAS 70 Audit means a third-party
audit of a technology provider that
meets the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS)
70 criteria.
Service provider means a trusted
entity that does one or more of the
following:
(1) Issues or registers practitioner
tokens and issues electronic credentials
to practitioners.
(2) Provides the technology system
(software or service) used to create and
send electronic prescriptions.
(3) Provides the technology system
(software or service) used to receive and
process electronic prescriptions at a
pharmacy.
SysTrust means a professional service
performed by a qualified certified public
accountant to evaluate one or more
aspects of electronic systems.
Token means something a person
possesses and controls (typically a key
or password) used to authenticate the
person’s identity.
Valid prescription means a
prescription that is issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner licensed by law
to administer and prescribe the drugs
concerned and acting in the usual
course of the practitioner’s professional
practice.
WebTrust means a professional
service performed by a qualified
certified public accountant to evaluate
one or more aspects of Web sites.
PART 1304—RECORDS AND
REPORTS OF REGISTRANTS
3. The authority citation for part 1304
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 21 U.S.C. 821, 827, 871(b),
958(e), 965, unless otherwise noted.
4. Section 1304.04 is amended by
revising paragraph (b) introductory text,
paragraph (b)(1), and paragraph (h) to
read as follows:
§ 1304.04 Maintenance of records and
inventories.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) All registrants that are authorized
to maintain a central recordkeeping
system under paragraph (a) of this
section shall be subject to the following
conditions:
(1) The records to be maintained at
the central record location shall not
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include executed order forms and
inventories, which shall be maintained
at each registered location.
*
*
*
*
*
(h) Each registered pharmacy shall
maintain the inventories and records of
controlled substances as follows:
(1) Inventories and records of all
controlled substances listed in Schedule
II shall be maintained separately from
all other records of the pharmacy.
(2) Paper prescriptions for Schedule II
controlled substances shall be
maintained at the registered location in
a separate prescription file.
(3) Inventories and records of
Schedules III, IV, and V controlled
substances shall be maintained either
separately from all other records of the
pharmacy or in such form that the
information required is readily
retrievable from ordinary business
records of the pharmacy.
(4) Paper prescriptions for Schedules
III, IV, and V controlled substances shall
be maintained at the registered location
either in a separate prescription file for
Schedules III, IV, and V controlled
substances only or in such form that
they are readily retrievable from the
other prescription records of the
pharmacy. Prescriptions will be deemed
readily retrievable if, at the time they
are initially filed, the face of the
prescription is stamped in red ink in the
lower right corner with the letter ‘‘C’’ no
less than 1 inch high and filed either in
the prescription file for controlled
substances listed in Schedules I and II
or in the usual consecutively numbered
prescription file for noncontrolled
substances. However, if a pharmacy
employs a computer system for
prescriptions that permits identification
by prescription number and retrieval of
original documents by prescriber’s
name, patient’s name, drug dispensed,
and date filled, then the requirement to
mark the hard copy prescription with a
red ‘‘C’’ is waived.
(5) Records of electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances shall be
maintained in a system that meets the
requirements of Part 1311 of this
chapter. The computers on which the
records are maintained may be located
at another location, but the records must
be immediately accessible at the
registered location if requested by the
Administration or other law
enforcement agent. The electronic
system must be capable of printing out
or transferring the records in a format
that is readily understandable to an
Administration or other law
enforcement agent at the registered
location. Electronic copies of
prescription records must be sortable by
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prescriber name, patient name, drug
dispensed, and date filled.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 1306—PRESCRIPTIONS
5. The authority citation for part 1306
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 21 U.S.C. 821, 829, 871(b),
unless otherwise noted.
6. Section 1306.05 is revised to read
as follows:
§ 1306.05 Manner of issuance of
prescriptions.
(a) All prescriptions for controlled
substances must be dated as of, and
signed on, the day when issued and
must bear the full name and address of
the patient, the drug name, strength,
dosage form, quantity prescribed,
directions for use, and the name,
address and registration number of the
practitioner.
(b) A prescription for a Schedule III,
IV, or V narcotic drug approved by FDA
specifically for ‘‘detoxification
treatment’’ or ‘‘maintenance treatment’’
must include the identification number
issued by the Administrator under
§ 1301.28(d) of this chapter or a written
notice stating that the practitioner is
acting under the good faith exception of
§ 1301.28(e).
(c) Where a prescription is for gammahydroxybutyric acid, the practitioner
shall note on the face of the prescription
the medical need of the patient for the
prescription.
(d) A practitioner may sign a paper
prescription in the same manner as he
would sign a check or legal document
(e.g., J.H. Smith or John H. Smith).
Where an oral order is not permitted,
paper prescriptions must be written
with ink or indelible pencil, typewriter,
or printed on a computer printer and
must be manually signed by the
practitioner. A computer-generated
prescription that is printed out or faxed
must be manually signed.
(e) Electronic prescriptions must be
created and signed using a system that
meets the requirements of part 1311 of
this chapter.
(f) A prescription may be prepared by
the secretary or agent for the signature
of a practitioner, but the prescribing
practitioner is responsible in case the
prescription does not conform in all
essential respects to the law and
regulations. A corresponding liability
rests upon the pharmacist, including a
pharmacist employed by a central fill
pharmacy, who fills a prescription not
prepared in the form prescribed by DEA
regulations.
(g) An individual practitioner
exempted from registration under
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§ 1301.22(c) of this chapter must
include on all prescriptions issued by
him/her the registration number of the
hospital or other institution and the
special internal code number assigned
to him/her by the hospital or other
institution as provided in § 1301.22(c) of
this chapter, in lieu of the registration
number of the practitioner required by
this section. Each paper prescription
must have the name of the physician
stamped, typed, or handprinted on it, as
well as the signature of the physician.
(h) An official exempted from
registration under § 1301.23(a) must
include on all prescriptions issued by
him/her his/her branch of service or
agency (e.g., ‘‘U.S. Army’’ or ‘‘Public
Health Service’’) and his/her service
identification number, in lieu of the
registration number of the practitioner
required by this section. The service
identification number for a Public
Health Service employee is his/her
Social Security identification number.
Each paper prescription must have the
name of the officer stamped, typed, or
handprinted on it, as well as the
signature of the officer.
7. Section 1306.08 is added to read as
follows:
§ 1306.08
Electronic prescriptions.
(a) An individual practitioner may
sign and transmit electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
provided the practitioner meets all of
the following requirements:
(1) The practitioner must comply with
all other requirements for issuing
controlled substance prescriptions in
this part;
(2) The practitioner must use a system
or service provider that meets the
requirements of part 1311 of this
chapter; and
(3) The practitioner must comply with
the requirements for practitioners in
part 1311 of this chapter.
(b) A pharmacy may fill an
electronically transmitted prescription
for a controlled substance provided the
pharmacy complies with all other
requirements for filling controlled
substance prescriptions in this part and
with the requirements of part 1311 of
this chapter.
(c) To annotate an electronic
prescription, a pharmacist must include
all of the information required by this
part for the record.
(d) If the content of any of the
information required under § 1306.05
for a controlled substance prescription
is altered during the transmission, the
prescription is deemed to be invalid and
the pharmacy may not dispense the
controlled substance.
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8. In § 1306.11, paragraphs (a), (c),
(d)(1), and (d)(4) are revised to read as
follows:
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§ 1306.11
Requirement of prescription.
(a) A pharmacist may dispense
directly a Schedule II controlled
substance that is a prescription drug as
determined under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act only pursuant
to a written prescription signed by the
practitioner, except as provided in
paragraph (d) of this section. A paper
prescription for a Schedule II controlled
substance may be transmitted by the
practitioner or the practitioner’s agent to
a pharmacy via facsimile equipment,
provided that the original manually
signed prescription is presented to the
pharmacist for review prior to the actual
dispensing of the controlled substance,
except as noted in paragraph (e), (f), or
(g) of this section. The original paper
prescription must be maintained in
accordance with § 1304.04(h) of this
chapter.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) An institutional practitioner may
administer or dispense directly (but not
prescribe) a controlled substance listed
in Schedule II only pursuant to a
written prescription signed by the
prescribing individual practitioner or to
an order for medication made by an
individual practitioner that is dispensed
for immediate administration to the
ultimate user.
(d) * * *
(1) The quantity prescribed and
dispensed is limited to the amount
adequate to treat the patient during the
emergency period (dispensing beyond
the emergency period must be pursuant
to a paper or electronic prescription
signed by the prescribing individual
practitioner); * * *
(4) Within 7 days after authorizing an
emergency oral prescription, the
prescribing individual practitioner must
cause a written prescription for the
emergency quantity prescribed to be
delivered to the dispensing pharmacist.
In addition to conforming to the
requirements of § 1306.05, the
prescription must have written on its
face ‘‘Authorization for Emergency
Dispensing,’’ and the date of the oral
order. The paper prescription may be
delivered to the pharmacist in person or
by mail, but if delivered by mail it must
be postmarked within the 7-day period.
Upon receipt, the dispensing pharmacist
must attach this paper prescription to
the oral emergency prescription that had
earlier been reduced to writing. For
electronic prescriptions, the pharmacist
must annotate the record of the
electronic prescription with the original
authorization and date of the oral order.
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The pharmacist must notify the nearest
office of the Administration if the
prescribing individual practitioner fails
to deliver a written prescription to him/
her; failure of the pharmacist to do so
shall void the authority conferred by
this paragraph to dispense without a
written prescription of a prescribing
individual practitioner.
*
*
*
*
*
9. In § 1306.13, paragraph (a) is
revised to read as follows:
§ 1306.15 Provision of prescription
information between retail pharmacies and
central fill pharmacies for prescriptions of
Schedule II controlled substances.
prescription drug as determined under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, only pursuant to either a paper
prescription signed by a practitioner, a
facsimile of a signed paper prescription
transmitted by the practitioner or the
practitioner’s agent to the pharmacy, an
electronic prescription that meets the
requirements of this part and part 1311
of this chapter, or an oral prescription
made by an individual practitioner and
promptly reduced to writing by the
pharmacist containing all information
required in § 1306.05, except for the
signature of the practitioner.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) An institutional practitioner may
administer or dispense directly (but not
prescribe) a controlled substance listed
in Schedule III, IV, or V only pursuant
to a paper prescription signed by an
individual practitioner, a facsimile of a
paper prescription or order for
medication transmitted by the
practitioner or the practitioner’s agent to
the institutional practitionerpharmacist, an electronic prescription
that meets the requirements of this part
and part 1311 of this chapter, or an oral
prescription made by an individual
practitioner and promptly reduced to
writing by the pharmacist (containing
all information required in § 1306.05
except for the signature of the
individual practitioner), or pursuant to
an order for medication made by an
individual practitioner that is dispensed
for immediate administration to the
ultimate user, subject to § 1306.07.
12. Section 1306.22 is revised to read
as follows:
*
§ 1306.22
§ 1306.13
Partial filling of prescriptions.
(a) The partial filling of a prescription
for a controlled substance listed in
Schedule II is permissible if the
pharmacist is unable to supply the full
quantity called for in a written or
emergency oral prescription and he
makes a notation of the quantity
supplied on the face of the written
prescription, written record of the
emergency oral prescription, or in the
electronic prescription record. The
remaining portion of the prescription
may be filled within 72 hours of the first
partial filling; however, if the remaining
portion is not or cannot be filled within
the 72-hour period, the pharmacist must
notify the prescribing individual
practitioner. No further quantity may be
supplied beyond 72 hours without a
new prescription.
*
*
*
*
*
10. In § 1306.15, paragraph (a)(1) is
revised to read as follows:
*
*
*
*
(a) * * *
(1) Write the word ‘‘CENTRAL FILL’’
on the face of the original paper
prescription and record the name,
address, and DEA registration number of
the central fill pharmacy to which the
prescription has been transmitted, the
name of the retail pharmacy pharmacist
transmitting the prescription, and the
date of transmittal; for electronic
prescriptions the name, address, and
DEA registration number of the central
fill pharmacy to which the prescription
has been transmitted, the name of the
retail pharmacy pharmacist transmitting
the prescription, and the date of
transmittal must be added to the
electronic prescription record.
*
*
*
*
*
11. In § 1306.21, paragraphs (a) and
(c) are revised to read as follows:
§ 1306.21
Requirement of prescriptions.
(a) A pharmacist may dispense
directly a controlled substance listed in
Schedule III, IV, or V that is a
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Refilling of prescriptions.
(a) No prescription for a controlled
substance listed in Schedule III or IV
shall be filled or refilled more than six
months after the date on which such
prescription was issued. No prescription
for a controlled substance listed in
Schedule III or IV authorized to be
refilled may be refilled more than five
times.
(b) Each refilling of a prescription
shall be entered on the back of the
prescription or on another appropriate
document or electronic prescription
record. If entered on another document,
such as a medication record, or
electronic prescription record, the
document or record must be uniformly
maintained and readily retrievable.
(c) The following information must be
retrievable by the prescription number:
(1) The name and dosage form of the
controlled substance.
(2) The date filled or refilled.
(3) The quantity dispensed.
(4) The initials of the dispensing
pharmacist for each refill.
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(5) The total number of refills for that
prescription.
(d) If the pharmacist merely initials
and dates the back of the prescription or
annotates the electronic prescription
record, it shall be deemed that the full
face amount of the prescription has been
dispensed.
(e) The prescribing practitioner may
authorize additional refills of Schedule
III or IV controlled substances on the
original prescription through an oral
refill authorization transmitted to the
pharmacist provided the following
conditions are met:
(1) The total quantity authorized,
including the amount of the original
prescription, does not exceed five refills
nor extend beyond six months from the
date of issue of the original prescription.
(2) The pharmacist obtaining the oral
authorization records on the reverse of
the original paper prescription or
annotates the electronic prescription
record with the date, quantity of refill,
number of additional refills authorized,
and initials the paper prescription or
annotates the electronic prescription
record showing who received the
authorization from the prescribing
practitioner who issued the original
prescription.
(3) The quantity of each additional
refill authorized is equal to or less than
the quantity authorized for the initial
filling of the original prescription.
(4) The prescribing practitioner must
execute a new and separate prescription
for any additional quantities beyond the
five refill, six-month limitation.
(f) As an alternative to the procedures
provided by paragraphs (a) through (e)
of this section, a computer system may
be used for the storage and retrieval of
refill information for original paper
prescription orders for controlled
substances in Schedule III and IV,
subject to the following conditions:
(1) Any such proposed computerized
system must provide online retrieval
(via computer monitor or hard-copy
printout) of original prescription order
information for those prescription
orders that are currently authorized for
refilling. This shall include, but is not
limited to, data such as the original
prescription number, date of issuance of
the original prescription order by the
practitioner, full name and address of
the patient, name, address, and DEA
registration number of the practitioner,
and the name, strength, dosage form,
quantity of the controlled substance
prescribed (and quantity dispensed if
different from the quantity prescribed),
and the total number of refills
authorized by the prescribing
practitioner.
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(2) Any such proposed computerized
system must also provide online
retrieval (via computer monitor or hardcopy printout) of the current refill
history for Schedule III or IV controlled
substance prescription orders (those
authorized for refill during the past six
months.) This refill history shall
include, but is not limited to, the name
of the controlled substance, the date of
refill, the quantity dispensed, the
identification code, or name or initials
of the dispensing pharmacist for each
refill and the total number of refills
dispensed to date for that prescription
order.
(3) Documentation of the fact that the
refill information entered into the
computer each time a pharmacist refills
an original paper, fax, or oral
prescription order for a Schedule III or
IV controlled substance is correct must
be provided by the individual
pharmacist who makes use of such a
system. If such a system provides a
hard-copy printout of each day’s
controlled substance prescription order
refill data, that printout shall be
verified, dated, and signed by the
individual pharmacist who refilled such
a prescription order. The individual
pharmacist must verify that the data
indicated are correct and then sign this
document in the same manner as he
would sign a check or legal document
(e.g., J. H. Smith, or John H. Smith). This
document shall be maintained in a
separate file at that pharmacy for a
period of two years from the dispensing
date. This printout of the day’s
controlled substance prescription order
refill data must be provided to each
pharmacy using such a computerized
system within 72 hours of the date on
which the refill was dispensed. It must
be verified and signed by each
pharmacist who is involved with such
dispensing. In lieu of such a printout,
the pharmacy shall maintain a bound
log book, or separate file, in which each
individual pharmacist involved in such
dispensing shall sign a statement (in the
manner previously described) each day,
attesting to the fact that the refill
information entered into the computer
that day has been reviewed by him and
is correct as shown. Such a book or file
must be maintained at the pharmacy
employing such a system for a period of
two years after the date of dispensing
the appropriately authorized refill.
(4) Any such computerized system
shall have the capability of producing a
printout of any refill data that the user
pharmacy is responsible for maintaining
under the Act and its implementing
regulations. For example, this would
include a refill-by-refill audit trail for
any specified strength and dosage form
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of any controlled substance (by either
brand or generic name or both). Such a
printout must include name of the
prescribing practitioner, name and
address of the patient, quantity
dispensed on each refill, date of
dispensing for each refill, name or
identification code of the dispensing
pharmacist, and the number of the
original prescription order. In any
computerized system employed by a
user pharmacy, the central
recordkeeping location must be capable
of sending the printout to the pharmacy
within 48 hours, and if a DEA Special
Agent or Diversion Investigator requests
a copy of such printout from the user
pharmacy, it must, if requested to do so
by the Agent or Investigator, verify the
printout transmittal capability of its
system by documentation (e.g.,
postmark).
(5) In the event that a pharmacy
which employs such a computerized
system experiences system down-time,
the pharmacy must have an auxiliary
procedure which will be used for
documentation of refills of Schedule III
and IV controlled substance
prescription orders. This auxiliary
procedure must ensure that refills are
authorized by the original prescription
order, that the maximum number of
refills has not been exceeded, and that
all of the appropriate data are retained
for online data entry as soon as the
computer system is available for use
again.
(g) When filing refill information for
original paper, fax, or oral prescription
orders for Schedule III or IV controlled
substances, a pharmacy may use only
one of the two systems described in
paragraphs (a) through (e) or (f) of this
section.
(h) When filing refill information for
electronic prescriptions, a pharmacy
must use a system that meets the
requirements of part 1311 of this
chapter.
13. Section 1306.25 is revised to read
as follows:
§ 1306.25 Transfer between pharmacies of
prescription information for Schedules III,
IV, and V controlled substances for refill
purposes.
(a) The transfer of original paper
prescription information for a Schedule
III, IV, or V controlled substance for the
purpose of refill dispensing is
permissible between pharmacies on a
one-time basis only. However,
pharmacies electronically sharing a realtime, online database may transfer up to
the maximum refills permitted by law
and the prescriber’s authorization.
(b) Electronic prescriptions may be
transferred up to the maximum refills
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permitted by law and the prescriber’s
authorization.
(c) Transfers of paper prescriptions
are subject to the following
requirements:
(1) The transfer must be
communicated directly between two
licensed pharmacists.
(2) The transferring pharmacist must
do the following:
(i) Write the word ‘‘VOID’’ on the face
of the invalidated prescription.
(ii) Record on the reverse of the
invalidated prescription the name,
address, and DEA registration number of
the pharmacy to which it was
transferred and the name of the
pharmacist receiving the prescription
information.
(iii) Record the date of the transfer
and the name of the pharmacist
transferring the information.
(3) The pharmacist receiving the
transferred paper prescription
information must write the word
‘‘transfer’’ on the face of the transferred
prescription and reduce to writing all
information required to be on a
prescription under § 1306.05 and
include:
(i) Date of issuance of original
prescription.
(ii) Original number of refills
authorized on original prescription.
(iii) Date of original dispensing.
(iv) Number of valid refills remaining
and date(s) and locations of previous
refill(s).
(v) Pharmacy’s name, address, DEA
registration number, and prescription
number from which the prescription
information was transferred.
(vi) Name of pharmacist who
transferred the prescription.
(vii) Pharmacy’s name, address, DEA
registration number, and prescription
number from which the prescription
was originally filled.
(d) For electronic prescriptions, the
transferring pharmacist must do the
following:
(1) Add information to the record of
the original prescription that indicates
the following:
(i) That the prescription has been
transferred.
(ii) The name, address, and DEA
registration number of the pharmacy to
which it was transferred.
(iii) The date of the transfer and the
name of the pharmacist transferring the
information.
(2) Provide the receiving pharmacy
with the following information in
addition to the original electronic
prescription data:
(i) The date of the original dispensing.
(ii) The number of refills remaining
and the dates and location of previous
refills.
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(iii) The transferring pharmacy’s
name, address, DEA registration
number, and prescription number.
(iv) The name of pharmacist
transferring the prescription.
(v) The name, address, DEA
registration number, and prescription
number from the pharmacy that
originally filled the prescription, if
different.
(e) The pharmacist receiving a
transferred electronic prescription must
create an electronic record for the
prescription that includes the receiving
pharmacist’s name and all of the
information transferred with the
prescription under paragraph (d)(2) of
this section.
(f) A transferred electronic
prescription may be transferred multiple
times, as long as there are refills
remaining and as long as the dispensing
occurs within six months of the date of
issue of the prescription.
(g) The original and transferred
prescription(s) must be maintained for a
period of two years from the date of last
refill.
(h) Pharmacies electronically
accessing the same prescription record
must satisfy all information
requirements of a manual mode for
prescription transferal.
(i) The procedure allowing the
transfer of prescription information for
refill purposes is permissible only if
allowable under existing State or other
applicable law.
14. Section 1306.28 is added to read
as follows:
§ 1306.28
Recordkeeping.
(a) All prescription records required
by this part must be maintained as
provided in § 1304.04(h) of this chapter.
(b) In addition to any other
information required under this part, a
pharmacy must retain the following
information for each controlled
substance prescription filled:
(1) Prescriber’s name.
(2) Patient’s name and address.
(3) The name and dosage form of the
controlled substance.
(4) The quantity dispensed.
(5) The date filled.
(6) The written or typewritten name
or initials of the dispensing pharmacist.
(7) The date refilled (Schedule III and
IV only).
(8) The total number of refills for the
prescription (Schedule III and IV only).
(9) In addition to the requirements of
this paragraph, practitioners dispensing
gamma-hydroxybutyric acid under a
prescription must also comply with
§ 1304.26 of this chapter.
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PART 1311—REQUIREMENTS FOR
ELECTRONIC ORDERS AND
PRESCRIPTIONS
15. The authority citation for part
1311 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 21 U.S.C. 821, 828, 829, 871(b),
958(e), 965, unless otherwise noted.
16. The heading for part 1311 is
revised to read as set forth above.
17. Section 1311.01 is revised to read
as follows:
§ 1311.01
Scope.
This part sets forth the rules
governing the creation, transmission,
and storage of electronic orders and
prescriptions.
18. Section 1311.02 is revised to read
as follows:
§ 1311.02
Definitions.
Any term contained in this part shall
have the definition set forth in section
102 of the Controlled Substance Act (21
U.S.C. 802) or part 1300 of this chapter.
19. In § 1311.08, paragraph (a) is
amended by adding paragraph (a)(4) to
read as follows:
§ 1311.08
Incorporation by reference.
(a) * * *
(4) NIST SP 800–63, Electronic
Authentication Guideline, April 2006.
*
*
*
*
*
20. Subpart C, consisting of
§§ 1311.100 through 1311.180, is added
to read as follows:
Subpart C—Electronic Prescriptions
Sec.
1311.100 Eligibility to issue electronic
prescriptions.
1311.105 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Identity proofing.
1311.110 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Authentication.
1311.115 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Prescription contents.
1311.120 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Creating a controlled
substance prescription.
1311.125 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Signing the prescription.
1311.130 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Transmission of electronic
prescriptions.
1311.135 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Revocation of access
authorization.
1311.140 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Providing log of
prescriptions to practitioner.
1311.145 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Security incidents.
1311.150 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Third-party audits of
service provider systems.
1311.155 Practitioner responsibilities.
1311.160 Pharmacy system requirements:
Archiving the initial record.
1311.165 Pharmacy system requirements:
Prescription processing.
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1311.170 Pharmacy system requirements:
Security.
1311.175 Pharmacy responsibilities.
1311.180 Recordkeeping.
§ 1311.100 Eligibility to issue electronic
prescriptions.
(a) A practitioner may issue a
controlled substance prescription
electronically if both of the following
conditions are met:
(1) The practitioner is registered as an
individual practitioner or exempt from
registration under part 1301 of this
chapter and is authorized under the
registration or exemption to dispense
the controlled substance.
(2) The practitioner uses an electronic
prescription system that meets all of the
applicable requirements of this subpart.
(b) An electronic prescription created
and transmitted using an electronic
prescription system that does not meet
the requirements of this subpart is not
a valid prescription.
(c) The practitioner issuing an
electronic controlled substance
prescription is responsible if a
prescription does not conform in all
essential respects to the law and
regulations.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
§ 1311.105 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Identity proofing.
(a) Before permitting access to the
electronic prescription system for
signing controlled substance
prescriptions, the service provider must
receive a document prepared by an
entity permitted to conduct in-person
identity proofing listed in paragraph (b)
of this section. If a practitioner wishes
to electronically prescribe controlled
substances in more than one State, the
service provider must receive a
document prepared by an entity
permitted to conduct in-person identity
proofing that indicates each of the State
licenses and DEA Certificates of
Registration. Such document shall be
prepared either on the identity proofing
entity’s letterhead or other official form
of correspondence, or the service
provider may design a form for use by
the identity proofing entity. Regardless
of the format of the document, the
document must contain all of the
following information:
(1) The name and DEA registration
number, where applicable, of the entity
which conducted the in-person identity
proofing of the practitioner;
(2) The name of the person within the
entity who conducted the in-person
identity proofing of the practitioner;
(3) The name and address of the
principal place of business of the
practitioner whose identity is being
verified;
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(4)(i) For each State in which the
practitioner wishes to prescribe
controlled substances electronically, the
name of the State licensing authority
and State license number of the
practitioner whose identity is being
verified, or
(ii) If the individual practitioner is an
employee of a health care facility that is
operated by the Department of Veterans
Affairs, confirm that the individual
practitioner has been duly appointed to
practice at that facility by the Secretary
of the Department of Veterans Affairs
pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 7401–7408, or
(iii) If the individual practitioner is
working at a health care facility
operated by the Department of Veterans
Affairs on a contractual basis pursuant
to 38 U.S.C. 8153 and, in the
performance of his duties, prescribes
controlled substances, confirm that the
individual practitioner meets the
criteria for eligibility for appointment
under 38 U.S.C. 7401–7408 and is
prescribing controlled substances under
the registration of such facility;
(5) Except as provided in paragraph
(a)(6) of this section, for each State in
which the practitioner wishes to
prescribe controlled substances
electronically, the DEA registration
number and date of expiration of DEA
registration of the practitioner whose
identity is being verified;
(6) For individual practitioners who
prescribe controlled substances using
the DEA registration of the institutional
practitioner, a statement by the
institutional practitioner acknowledging
the authority of the individual
practitioner to prescribe controlled
substances using the institution’s DEA
registration, and the specific internal
code number assigned to the individual
practitioner;
(7) The type of government-issued
photographic identification checked
(e.g., the practitioner’s driver’s license,
passport) and a statement that the
photograph on the identification
matched the person presenting the
photographic identification;
(8) The date on which the
practitioner’s in-person identity
proofing was conducted;
(9) The signature of the person within
the entity who conducted the in-person
identity proofing;
(10) The signature of the practitioner
who is the subject of the in-person
identity proofing.
(b) The following entities are
permitted to conduct in-person identity
proofing as described in paragraph (a) of
this section:
(1) The entity within a DEA-registered
hospital that has previously granted that
practitioner privileges at the hospital
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(e.g., a hospital credentialing office).
The practitioner’s privileges must be
active and in good standing;
(2) The State professional or licensing
board or State controlled substances
authority that currently authorizes the
practitioner to prescribe controlled
substances;
(3) A State or local law enforcement
agency.
(c) For each practitioner seeking to
issue electronic controlled substances
prescriptions, the service provider shall
do the following:
(1) Check with each State to
determine that the practitioner’s State
license to practice medicine is current
and in good standing. If the individual
practitioner is an employee of a health
care facility that is operated by the
Department of Veterans Affairs, the
service provider shall confirm that the
individual practitioner has been duly
appointed to practice at that facility by
the Secretary of the Department of
Veterans Affairs pursuant to 38 U.S.C.
7401–7408. If the individual
practitioner is working at a health care
facility operated by the Department of
Veterans Affairs on a contractual basis
pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 8153 and, in the
performance of his duties, prescribes
controlled substances, the service
provider shall confirm that the
individual practitioner meets the
criteria for eligibility for appointment
under 38 U.S.C. 7401–7408 and is
prescribing controlled substances under
the registration of such facility.
(2) In those States in which a separate
controlled substance registration is
required to prescribe controlled
substances, check with the appropriate
State authority to determine that the
practitioner’s State license is current
and in good standing.
(3) Except for individual practitioners
referred to in paragraph (a)(6) of this
section, check the DEA CSA database to
determine that the DEA registration for
each State is current and in good
standing;
(4) Ensure that the service provider
has an accurate list of the schedules the
practitioner is authorized to prescribe;
(5) Contact the prescribing
practitioner at the practitioner’s
registered location by telephone to
confirm the practitioner’s intent to
apply to prescribe controlled substances
using the service provider’s system. The
service provider must obtain the
telephone number from a public source
other than the application received from
the practitioner. Alternatively, the
service provider may confirm the
practitioner’s intent in person at the
practitioner’s registered location.
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(d) The service provider must retain
the document referred to in paragraph
(a) of this section prepared by the entity
that conducted the in-person identity
proofing for each practitioner
prescribing controlled substances
electronically using the service
provider’s system in the manner
specified in § 1311.180 of this part.
§ 1311.110 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Authentication.
(a) The system must require that
practitioners eligible to issue controlled
substance prescriptions use two-factor
authentication that meets the
requirements of NIST SP 800–63 Level
4 authentication to access the system to
sign and transmit controlled substances
prescriptions.
(b) The hard token needed to meet
NIST SP 800–63 Level 4 authentication
must require the entry of a password or
biometric to activate the authentication
key and must not be able to export the
authentication key. The hard token may
be a PDA or other handheld device,
smart card, thumb drive, etc. The token
must be FIPS 140–2 validated as
follows:
(1) Overall validation at Level 2 or
higher.
(2) Physical security at Level 3 or
higher.
(c) The system must require
reauthentication if the practitioner does
not use the system for more than 2
minutes.
(d) The system must provide a
separate authentication protocol for
separate DEA registrations. At a
minimum, a practitioner must have a
separate authentication protocol for
each State in which the practitioner
holds a DEA registration to dispense
controlled substances. The practitioner
may store multiple authentication
protocols on a single hard token.
(e) The system access authentication
protocol must expire no later than the
expiration date of the practitioner’s DEA
registration with which it is associated.
under a hospital or clinic registration
number, the prescription must include
the registration number and registrantassigned extension identifier. For
military or Public Health Service
practitioners exempt from registration,
the prescription must include the
practitioner’s service identification
number or Social Security number as
required in § 1306.05(h) of this chapter.
(3) The full name and address of the
patient for whom the prescription is
written.
(4) The drug name, strength, dosage
form, quantity prescribed, and
directions for use.
(5) The time and date that the
prescription was signed.
(c) An electronic prescription for a
controlled substance must have the
practitioner name, address, and DEA
registration number for only the
practitioner issuing the prescription.
Multiple DEA registration numbers may
not be associated with a prescription.
§ 1311.120 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Creating a controlled
substance prescription.
(a) The system may allow the
registrant or his agent to enter data for
a controlled substance prescription.
(b) After the practitioner or his agent
has entered the prescription information
into the system, the system must display
the following information related to the
controlled substance prescription:
(1) The patient’s name and address.
(2) The name of the drug being
prescribed;
(3) The dosage strength and form,
quantity, and directions for use.
(4) The DEA registration number
under which the prescription will be
authorized.
(c) Where more than one controlled
substance prescription has been
prepared, the practitioner must
positively indicate those prescriptions
that are to be signed. Any prescription
not indicated to be signed shall not be
transmitted.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
§ 1311.115 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Prescription contents.
§ 1311.125 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Signing the prescription.
(a) An electronic prescription for a
controlled substance created by the
system must include all of the data
elements required under paragraph (b)
of this section and part 1306 of this
chapter.
(b) An electronic prescription for a
controlled substance must include all of
the following information:
(1) The full name and address of the
issuing practitioner.
(2) The DEA registration number of
the issuing practitioner. For
practitioners issuing prescriptions
(a) The practitioner must authenticate
himself to the system using two-factor
authentication immediately before
signing the prescription. The system
may allow a practitioner to sign
multiple prescriptions at the same time.
(b) After a practitioner has
authenticated to the system but prior to
signing the controlled substance
prescription, the system must display
for the practitioner’s review the
information required by § 1311.120(b)
for all prescriptions that are to be
transmitted in connection with that
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signature. While such information is
displayed, the practitioner must be
presented with the following statement
(or its substantial equivalent): ‘‘I, the
prescribing practitioner whose name
and DEA registration number appear on
the controlled substance prescription(s)
being transmitted, have reviewed all of
the prescription information listed
above and have confirmed that the
information for each prescription is
accurate. I further declare that by
transmitting the prescription(s)
information, I am indicating my intent
to sign and legally authorize the
prescription(s).’’ The practitioner must
positively indicate agreement with this
statement. If the practitioner does not
indicate agreement to this statement, the
controlled substances prescriptions
shall not be transmitted.
(c) The service provider must ensure
that its prescription-writing system
permits practitioners to sign controlled
substance prescriptions only if they
have the appropriate State authorization
and DEA registration to prescribe the
schedule of controlled substances being
prescribed.
(d) The system must require that the
DEA registrant whose DEA number is
listed on the prescription sign the
prescription. The system must not allow
any other person to sign the
prescription.
(e) The signing function may take
different names depending on the
system and the terms used. Regardless
of the system labels, signing is the
practitioner’s attestation that the
prescription is accurate and being
issued by the practitioner for a
legitimate medical purpose in the usual
course of professional practice.
(f) The system must include in the
data file transmitted an indication that
the prescription was signed by the
issuing practitioner.
§ 1311.130 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Transmission of electronic
prescriptions.
(a) The electronic prescription system
must transmit the electronic
prescription immediately upon
signature by the practitioner.
(b) The electronic prescription system
must not allow the printing of an
electronic prescription that has been
transmitted.
(c) The electronic prescription system
must not allow the transmission of an
electronic prescription if the
prescription has been printed.
(d) The service provider must ensure
that the service provider or the first
processor of the signed prescription
digitally signs a copy of the prescription
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as received and archives the digitally
signed prescription.
(e) The system must retain the
archived digitally signed prescription
for five years from the date of issuance
by the practitioner.
(f) The contents of the prescription
listed in § 1311.115(b) must not be
altered during transmission. Any change
to the content during transmission will
render the prescription invalid. The
data may be reformatted.
(g) An electronic prescription must be
transmitted from the practitioner to the
pharmacy in its electronic form. At no
time may an electronic prescription be
converted to another form for
transmission.
§ 1311.135 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Revocation of access
authorization.
(a) The service provider must revoke
the authentication protocol used to sign
controlled substance prescriptions
immediately upon receiving notification
from the practitioner that a password or
token has been compromised, lost, or
stolen.
(b) The service provider must revoke
the authentication protocol used to sign
controlled substance prescriptions on
the expiration date of the practitioner’s
DEA registration unless the service
provider determines that the registration
has been renewed.
(c) The service provider must check
the DEA CSA database at least once a
week and revoke the authentication
protocol used to sign controlled
substance prescriptions for each
practitioner using the system whose
registration has been terminated,
revoked, or suspended.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
§ 1311.140 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Providing log of
prescriptions to practitioner.
(a) The electronic prescription system
must, on a monthly basis, automatically
provide the practitioner with an
electronic log (which is readily viewable
by the practitioner using the system) of
all electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances that were issued
by the practitioner during the previous
month using that system.
(b) The electronic prescription system
must provide a means for the
practitioner to indicate that he has
received and reviewed the log.
(c) The electronic prescription system
must retain the log provided to the
practitioner and a record of the
practitioner’s indication of the log
review for five years.
(d) The electronic prescription system
must make available, on the request of
the practitioner, a log of all controlled
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substance prescriptions that the
practitioner has transmitted for the
previous five years.
§ 1311.145 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Security incidents.
(a) The service provider must audit its
records and system at least once a day
in a manner sufficient to meet the
requirements of paragraph (b) of this
section.
(b) The service provider must notify
the Administration within one business
day of any security incidents that
indicate that any of the following may
have occurred:
(1) An individual who is not a DEA
registrant has been granted access to
issue controlled substance
prescriptions.
(2) An individual has been granted
access to issue controlled substance
prescriptions without identity proofing
that meets the requirements of
§ 1311.105 of this part.
(3) Access to issue controlled
substance prescriptions has been
granted to a person using another
person’s identity.
(4) Prescription records have been
created or altered by a service provider
employee.
(5) There have been one or more
successful attempts to penetrate the
service provider’s system from the
outside.
(6) The service provider has identified
any other incident that may indicate
that the integrity of the system in regard
to controlled substance prescriptions
has been compromised.
§ 1311.150 Electronic prescription system
requirements: Third-party audits of service
provider systems.
(a) The service provider must have a
qualified third party conduct an audit
that meets the requirements of a
WebTrust or SysTrust audit for system
security and processing integrity prior
to accepting any controlled substances
prescriptions for transmission and
annually thereafter.
(b) The audit must determine whether
the electronic prescription system and
the service provider meet the
requirements of this part.
(c) The service provider must make
the audit report available to any
practitioner who uses the system or is
considering use of the system. The
service provider must retain each
annual audit report for the last five
years.
(d) If the third-party audit finds that
the system does not meet one or more
of the requirements of this part or does
not provide adequate security against
insider and outsider threats, the service
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provider must not accept for
transmission any controlled substance
prescription. The service provider must
notify practitioners that they should not
use the system to generate and transmit
controlled substance prescriptions. The
service provider must also notify the
Administration of the adverse audit
report and provide the report to the
Administration.
(e) For service providers that install
the prescription-writing system on a
practitioner’s computers and that are
not involved in the subsequent
transmission of the prescription, the
service provider must notify its DEA
registrant customers of the results of any
third-party audit that finds that the
system does not meet one or more of the
requirements of this part. The service
provider must also notify the
Administration of the adverse audit
report and provide the report to the
Administration.
§ 1311.155
Practitioner responsibilities.
(a) The practitioner shall provide, or
cause to be provided, to the service
provider a document from an entity
permitted to conduct in-person identity
proofing that meets the requirements of
§ 1311.105 of this part.
(b) The practitioner must retain sole
possession of the hard token and must
not share the password with any other
person. The practitioner must not allow
any other person to use the token or
enter the password or other
identification means to sign
prescriptions for controlled substances.
Failure by the practitioner to secure the
hard token or password may provide a
basis for revocation or suspension of
registration pursuant to section 304(a)(4)
of the Act (21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4)).
(c) The practitioner must notify the
service provider within 12 hours of
discovery that the hard token has been
lost, stolen, or compromised. A
practitioner who fails to notify the
service provider of the loss, theft, or
compromise of the hard token will be
held responsible for any controlled
substance prescriptions written using
the hard token.
(d) The practitioner must review the
monthly log to determine whether the
prescriptions issued under his DEA
registration number were, in fact, issued
by him and whether any prescriptions
appear to be unusual based on the
practitioner’s known prescribing
pattern. The practitioner must indicate
on the log that he has reviewed it.
Practitioners are not required to check
the log against patient records.
(e) The practitioner must notify both
the service provider and the
Administration within 12 hours of
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discovery that one or more prescriptions
that were issued under his DEA
registration were prescriptions he had
not signed or were not consistent with
the prescription he signed.
(f) The practitioner must determine
initially and at least annually thereafter
that the third-party audit report of the
service provider indicates that the
system and service provider meet the
requirements of this part. If the thirdparty audit report indicates that the
system or the service provider does not
meet the requirements of this part, or
the service provider notifies the
practitioner that the system does not
meet the requirements of this part, the
practitioner must immediately cease to
issue electronic controlled substance
prescriptions using the system.
(g) The practitioner has the same
responsibilities when issuing
prescriptions for controlled substances
via electronic means as when issuing a
paper or oral prescription. Nothing in
this part relieves a practitioner of his
responsibility to dispense controlled
substances only for a legitimate medical
purpose while acting in the usual course
of his professional practice. If an agent
enters information at the practitioner’s
direction prior to the practitioner
reviewing and approving the
information and signing and authorizing
the transmission of that information, the
practitioner is responsible in case the
prescription does not conform in all
essential respects to the law and
regulations.
§ 1311.160 Pharmacy system
requirements: Archiving the initial record.
(a) A copy of each electronic
controlled substance prescription record
that a pharmacy receives must be
digitally signed by one of the following:
(1) The last intermediary transmitting
the record to the pharmacy immediately
prior to transmission to the pharmacy.
(2) The first pharmacy system that
receives the electronic prescription
immediately on receipt.
(b) If the last intermediary digitally
signs the record, it must forward the
digitally signed copy to the pharmacy.
(c) The pharmacy system must
archive and retain the digitally signed
prescription as received for five years
from the date of receipt.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
§ 1311.165 Pharmacy system
requirements: Prescription processing.
(a) The pharmacy system must verify
that the practitioner’s DEA registration
was valid at the time the prescription
was signed. The pharmacy system may
do this by checking the DEA CSA
database or by having the prescribing
practitioner’s service provider or one of
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the intermediaries check the DEA CSA
database during transmission and
indicate on the record that the check has
occurred and the registration is valid.
The CSA database may be cached for
one week from the date of issuance.
(b) The pharmacy system must verify
that the practitioner signed the
prescription by checking the data field
that indicates the prescription was
signed.
(c) The pharmacy system must reject
any of the following controlled
substance prescriptions:
(1) A prescription that was not signed.
(2) A prescription that was signed by
a practitioner without a valid DEA
registration.
(3) A prescription that does not
include all of the information required
under § 1306.05 of this chapter.
(d) The pharmacy system must be
capable of reading and retaining the full
DEA registration number, including any
extensions, or other identification
numbers used under § 1306.05(c) of this
chapter. The full number including
extensions must be retained in the
prescription record.
(e) The pharmacy system must
provide for the following information to
be added or linked to each controlled
substance prescription record for each
dispensing, as required in §§ 1304.22(c)
and 1306.22 of this chapter:
(1) The number of units or volume of
the controlled substance dispensed.
(2) The date of the dispensing.
(3) The full name of the person who
dispensed the prescription.
(4) The number of refills allowed.
(f) The pharmacy system must be
capable of retrieving information on
controlled substance prescriptions by
the following data:
(1) Prescriber name.
(2) Patient name.
(3) Drug dispensed.
(4) Date dispensed.
(g) The pharmacy prescription system
must be capable of downloading an
electronic copy of controlled substance
prescription records into a database or
spreadsheet format that is readily
readable and can be easily sorted by the
data elements listed in paragraph (f) of
this section. Such database or
spreadsheet must be able to be printed
or provided electronically without the
need for additional specialized software.
§ 1311.170 Pharmacy system
requirements: Security.
(a) The pharmacy system must create
and maintain a backup copy of all
controlled substance prescriptions at an
alternate storage site that is
geographically separated from the
primary storage site so as not to be
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susceptible to the same hazards. A copy
of each digitally signed controlled
substance prescription and all linked
dispensing records must be transferred
to the backup storage site at least once
every 24 hours. Backup copies must be
maintained for five years from the date
of the record creation.
(b) The pharmacy system must create
and maintain an internal audit trail that
indicates each time a controlled
substance prescription file is opened,
annotated, altered, or deleted and the
identity of the person taking the action.
The audit trail records must be
maintained for five years.
(c) The pharmacy or the service
provider must establish and implement
a list of auditable events. The auditable
events must, at a minimum, include
attempted or successful unauthorized
access, use, disclosure, modification, or
destruction of information or
interference with system operations in
the prescription system.
(d) The system must analyze the audit
logs at least once every 24 hours and
generate an incident report that
identifies each auditable event.
(e) The pharmacy must determine
whether any identified auditable event
represents a security incident that
compromised or could have
compromised the integrity of the
prescription records. Any such
incidents must be reported to the
service provider and the Administration
within one business day.
(f) The pharmacy system must have a
qualified third party conduct an audit
that meets the requirements of a
SysTrust or SAS 70 audit for system
security and processing integrity prior
to accepting any controlled substances
prescriptions for processing and
annually thereafter.
(g) The third-party audit must
determine whether the system for
processing controlled substance
prescriptions and the service provider
meet the requirements of this part. The
service provider must make the audit
report available to any pharmacy who
uses the system. The service provider
must retain each annual audit report for
the last five years.
(h) If the third-party audit finds that
the system does not meet one or more
of the requirements of this part or does
not provide adequate security against
insider and outsider threats, the system
must not accept or process any
electronic controlled substance
prescription. The service provider must
notify pharmacies that they should not
use the system to accept and process
controlled substance prescriptions. The
service provider must also notify the
Administration of the adverse audit
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report and provide the report to the
Administration.
(i) For service providers that install
the prescription-processing system on a
pharmacy’s computers and that are not
involved in the subsequent acceptance
and processing of the prescription, the
service provider must notify its DEA
registrant customers of the results of any
third-party audit that finds that the
system does not meet one or more of the
requirements of this part. The service
provider must also notify the
Administration of the adverse audit
report and provide the report to the
Administration.
§ 1311.175
Pharmacy responsibilities.
(a) A pharmacy must not dispense
controlled substances in response to
electronic controlled substance
prescriptions if its pharmacy system or
service provider does not meet the
requirements of this part.
(b) A pharmacy must not process
electronic controlled substance
prescriptions if the DEA registration of
the prescriber was not valid at the time
the prescription was signed or if the
system rejected the prescription for any
other reason.
(c) When a pharmacist fills a
prescription in a manner that would
require, under part 1306 of this chapter,
the pharmacist to make a notation on
the prescription if the prescription were
a paper prescription, the pharmacist
must make such notation electronically
when filling an electronic prescription.
(d) Nothing in this part relieves a
pharmacy of its responsibility to
dispense controlled substances only
pursuant to a prescription issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by a
practitioner acting in the usual course of
professional practice.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
§ 1311.180
Recordkeeping.
(a) A practitioner, pharmacy, or
service provider must maintain records
required by this part for electronic
prescriptions for five years from their
creation. Records may be maintained
electronically. Records regarding
controlled substances prescriptions that
are maintained electronically must be
readily retrievable from all other
records.
(b) This record retention requirement
shall not pre-empt any longer period of
retention which may be required now or
in the future, by any other Federal or
State law or regulation, applicable to
practitioners, pharmacists, or
pharmacies.
(c) Electronic records must be easily
readable or easily rendered into a format
that a person can read. They must be
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made available to the Administration
upon request.
21. Subpart D, consisting of
§§ 1311.200 through 1311.280, is added
to read as follows:
Subpart D—Electronic Prescriptions
for Federal Agencies
Sec.
1311.200 Eligibility to digitally sign
electronic prescriptions.
1311.205 Issuance and storage of digital
certificates.
1311.210 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Prescriptionwriting system requirements.
1311.215 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Prescription
contents.
1311.220 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Creating a
controlled substance prescription.
1311.225 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Signing the
prescription.
1311.230 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Transmission of
electronic prescriptions.
1311.235 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Revocation of
access authorization.
1311.245 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Security incidents.
1311.250 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Third-party audits
of systems.
1311.255 Practitioner responsibilities.
1311.260 Pharmacy system requirements:
Archiving the initial record.
1311.265 Pharmacy system requirements:
Prescription processing.
1311.270 Pharmacy system requirements:
Security.
1311.275 Pharmacy responsibilities.
1311.280 Recordkeeping.
§ 1311.200 Eligibility to digitally sign
electronic prescriptions.
(a) As an optional alternative to
issuing electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances under the
conditions set forth in Subpart C of this
part, a practitioner prescribing
controlled substances at a Federal
health care facility in the course of their
official duties may issue a controlled
substance prescription electronically
under the conditions set forth in this
subpart if both of the following
conditions are met:
(1) The practitioner is registered as an
individual practitioner or exempt from
registration under part 1301 of this
chapter and is authorized under the
registration or exemption to dispense
the controlled substance.
(2) The practitioner uses an electronic
prescription system that meets all of the
applicable requirements of this subpart.
(b) For purposes of this section, the
term ‘‘Federal health care facility’’
means a hospital or other institution
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36779
that is operated by an agency of the
United States (including the U.S. Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast
Guard, Department of Veterans Affairs,
Public Health Service, or Bureau of
Prisons).
(c) An electronic prescription created
and transmitted using an electronic
prescription system that does not meet
the requirements of this subpart is not
a valid prescription.
(d) The practitioner issuing an
electronic controlled substance
prescription is responsible if a
prescription does not conform in all
essential respects to the law and
regulations.
§ 1311.205 Issuance and storage of digital
certificates.
(a) Only Federal Certification
Authorities or Certification Authorities
cross-certified with a Certification
Authority operated by the Federal
Public Key Infrastructure Policy
Authority may issue digital certificates
to practitioners prescribing controlled
substances at a Federal health care
facility in the course of their official
duties to sign electronic controlled
substance prescriptions.
(b) The digital certificate must be
stored on a hardware token that meets
the requirements of NIST SP 800–63
Level 4.
§ 1311.210 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Prescription-writing
system requirements.
(a) Any system may be used to
digitally sign electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances provided that
the system has been enabled to accept
digitally signed documents and that it
meets the following requirements:
(1) The cryptographic module must be
FIPS 140–2 level 1 validated.
(2) The digital signature system and
hash function must comply with FIPS
186–2 and FIPS 180–1.
(3) The private key must be stored
encrypted on a FIPS 140–2 level 1
validated cryptographic module using a
FIPS-approved encryption algorithm.
(4) For software implementations,
when the signing module is deactivated,
the system must clear the plain text
password from the system memory to
prevent the unauthorized access to, or
use of, the private key.
(5) The system must have a time
system that is within five minutes of the
official National Institute of Standards
and Technology time source.
(b) The system must require that
practitioners eligible to issue controlled
substance prescriptions use two-factor
authentication that meets the
requirements of NIST SP 800–63 Level
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4 authentication to access the system to
sign and transmit controlled substances
prescriptions.
(c) The hard token needed to meet
NIST SP 800–63 Level 4 authentication
must require the entry of a password or
biometric to activate the authentication
key and must not be able to export the
authentication key. The token must be
FIPS 140–2 validated as follows:
(1) Overall validation at Level 2 or
higher.
(2) Physical security at Level 3 or
higher.
(d) The system must require
reauthentication if the practitioner does
not use the system for more than 2
minutes.
§ 1311.215 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Prescription
contents.
A digitally signed electronic
prescription for a controlled substance
created by the system must include all
of the data elements required under part
1306 of this chapter.
§ 1311.220 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Creating a controlled
substance prescription.
(a) The system may allow the
registrant or his agent to enter data for
a controlled substance prescription.
(b) After the practitioner or his agent
has entered the prescription information
into the system, the system must display
the following information related to the
controlled substance prescription:
(1) The patient’s name and address;
(2) The name of the drug being
prescribed;
(3) The dosage strength and form,
quantity, and directions for use;
(4) The DEA registration number
under which the prescription will be
authorized.
(c) Where more than one controlled
substance prescription has been
prepared, the practitioner must
positively indicate those prescriptions
that are to be signed. Any prescription
not indicated to be signed shall not be
transmitted.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
§ 1311.225 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Signing the
prescription.
(a) The practitioner must authenticate
himself to the system using two-factor
authentication immediately before
signing the prescription. The system
may allow a practitioner to sign
multiple prescriptions at the same time.
(b) After a practitioner has
authenticated to the system but prior to
signing the controlled substance
prescription, the system must display
for the practitioner’s review the
information required by § 1311.220(b)
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for all prescriptions that are to be
transmitted in connection with that
signature. While such information is
displayed, the practitioner must be
presented with the following statement
(or its substantial equivalent): ‘‘I, the
prescribing practitioner whose name
and DEA registration number appear on
the controlled substance prescription(s)
being transmitted, have reviewed all of
the prescription information listed
above and have confirmed that the
information for each prescription is
accurate. I further declare that by
transmitting the prescription(s)
information, I am indicating my intent
to sign and legally authorize the
prescription(s).’’ The practitioner must
positively indicate agreement with this
statement. If the practitioner does not
indicate agreement to this statement, the
controlled substances prescriptions
shall not be transmitted.
(c) The Federal agency must ensure
that its prescription-writing system
permits practitioners to digitally sign
controlled substance prescriptions only
if they have the appropriate
authorization to prescribe the schedule
of controlled substances being
prescribed.
(d) The system must require that the
DEA registrant whose DEA number is
listed on the prescription digitally sign
the prescription. The system must not
allow any other person to sign the
prescription.
(e) The system must check the
certificate revocation list of the
Certification Authority that issued the
digital certificate of the practitioner who
digitally signed the controlled substance
prescription. If the certificate is not
valid, the system must not transmit the
prescription. The certificate revocation
list may be cached until the
Certification Authority issues a new
certificate revocation list.
(f) If the prescription is being
transmitted to a pharmacy that does not
accept digitally signed prescriptions, the
system must include in the data file
transmitted an indication that the
prescription was signed by the issuing
practitioner.
§ 1311.230 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Transmission of
electronic prescriptions.
(a) The electronic prescription system
must not allow the printing of an
electronic prescription that has been
transmitted.
(b) The electronic prescription system
must not allow the transmission of an
electronic prescription if the
prescription has been printed.
(c) The system must retain the
archived digitally signed prescription
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Sfmt 4702
for five years from the date of issuance
by the practitioner.
(d) The data elements required under
part 1306 of this chapter must not be
altered during transmission. Any change
to the content during transmission will
render the prescription invalid. The
data may be reformatted.
(e) An electronic prescription must be
transmitted from the practitioner to the
pharmacy in its electronic form. At no
time may an electronic prescription be
converted to another form for
transmission.
§ 1311.235 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Revocation of access
authorization.
(a) The system must revoke access to
sign controlled substance prescriptions
on the expiration date of the
practitioner’s DEA registration, if
applicable, unless the Federal agency
determines that the registration or
Federal agency authorization has been
renewed.
(b) The system must check the DEA
CSA database at least once a week and
revoke access to signing controlled
substance prescriptions for any
practitioner using the system whose
registration or Federal agency
authorization has been terminated,
revoked, or suspended.
§ 1311.245 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Security incidents.
(a) The Federal agency must audit its
controlled substance prescription
electronic records and system at least
once a day in a manner sufficient to
meet the requirements of paragraph (b)
of this section.
(b) The Federal agency must notify
the Administration within one business
day of any security incidents that
indicate that any of the following may
have occurred:
(1) An individual who is not a DEA
registrant authorized by the Federal
agency to prescribe controlled
substances in the course of their official
duties at the Federal agency has been
granted access to issue controlled
substance prescriptions.
(2) Access to issue controlled
substance prescriptions has been
granted to a person using another
person’s identity.
(3) Prescription records have been
created or altered by an employee not
authorized to create or annotate a
controlled substance record.
(4) There have been one or more
successful attempts to penetrate the
system from the outside.
(5) The Federal agency has identified
any other incident that may indicate
that the integrity of the system in regard
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to controlled substance prescriptions
has been compromised.
essential respects to the law and
regulations.
§ 1311.250 Digitally signed prescription
system requirements: Third-party audits of
systems.
§ 1311.260 Pharmacy system
requirements: Archiving the initial record.
(a) The Federal agency must have a
third-party audit to verify that the
system used to create and transmit
controlled substance prescriptions
meets the requirements of this subpart
prior to accepting any controlled
substances prescriptions for
transmission and annually thereafter.
(b) The Federal agency must retain
each annual audit report for the last five
years.
(c) If the third-party audit finds that
the system does not meet one or more
of the requirements of this part, the
system must not accept for transmission
any controlled substance prescription.
The Federal agency must also notify the
Administration of the adverse audit
report and provide the report to the
Administration.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
§ 1311.255
Practitioner responsibilities.
(a) The practitioner must retain sole
possession of the hard token and must
not share the password with any other
person. The practitioner must not allow
any other person to use the token or
enter the password or other
identification means to sign
prescriptions for controlled substances.
Failure by the practitioner to secure the
hard token or password may provide a
basis for revocation or suspension of
registration pursuant to section 304(a)(4)
of the Act (21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4)).
(b) The practitioner must notify the
Certification Authority within 12 hours
of discovery that the hard token has
been lost, stolen, or compromised. A
practitioner who fails to notify the
Certification Authority of the loss, theft,
or compromise of the hard token will be
held responsible for any controlled
substance prescriptions written using
the hard token.
(c) The practitioner has the same
responsibilities when issuing
prescriptions for controlled substances
via electronic means as when issuing a
paper or oral prescription. Nothing in
this part relieves a practitioner of his
responsibility to dispense controlled
substances only for a legitimate medical
purpose while acting in the usual course
of his professional practice. If an agent
enters information at the practitioner’s
direction prior to the practitioner
reviewing and approving the
information and signing and authorizing
the transmission of that information, the
practitioner is responsible in case the
prescription does not conform in all
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(a) If a pharmacy receives a controlled
substance prescription from a Federal
agency system that is not transmitted
with its digital signature, either the
pharmacy must digitally sign the
prescription immediately upon receipt,
or the last intermediary transmitting the
record to the pharmacy must digitally
sign the prescription immediately prior
to transmission and transmit to the
pharmacy the prescription and the
digitally signed record. The pharmacy
must archive the record as received and
the digitally signed copy.
(b) If a Federal pharmacy receives a
digitally signed prescription that
includes the digital signature, the
pharmacy must validate the prescription
and archive the digitally signed record.
The pharmacy record must retain an
indication that the prescription was
validated upon receipt. No additional
digital signature is required.
(c) The pharmacy system must retain
the digitally signed prescription as
received for five years from the date of
receipt.
§ 1311.265 Pharmacy system
requirements: Prescription processing.
(a) The pharmacy system must verify
that the practitioner’s DEA registration
was valid at the time the prescription
was signed. The pharmacy system may
do this by checking the DEA CSA
database or by having the prescribing
practitioner’s system or one of the
intermediaries check the DEA CSA
database during transmission and
indicate on the record that the check has
occurred and the registration is valid.
The CSA database may be cached for
one week from the date of issuance.
(b) If the digital signature is not part
of the record, the pharmacy system must
verify that the practitioner signed the
prescription by checking the data field
that indicates the prescription was
signed.
(c) The pharmacy system must reject
any of the following controlled
substance prescriptions:
(1) A prescription that was signed by
a practitioner without a valid DEA
registration.
(2) A prescription that does not
include all of the information required
under § 1306.05 of this chapter.
(3) If the digital signature is received,
a prescription that is not validated.
(d) The pharmacy system must be
capable of reading and retaining the full
DEA registration number, including any
extensions, or other identification
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36781
numbers used under § 1306.05(c) of this
chapter. The full number including
extensions must be retained in the
prescription record.
(e) The pharmacy system must
provide for the following information to
be added or linked to each controlled
substance prescription record for each
dispensing, as required in §§ 1304.22(c)
and 1306.22 of this chapter:
(1) The number of units or volume of
the controlled substance dispensed.
(2) The date of the dispensing.
(3) The full name of the person who
dispensed the prescription.
(4) The number of refills allowed.
(f) The pharmacy system must be
capable of retrieving information on
controlled substance prescriptions by
the following data:
(1) Prescriber name.
(2) Patient name.
(3) Drug dispensed.
(4) Date dispensed.
(g) The pharmacy prescription system
must be capable of downloading an
electronic copy of controlled substance
prescription records into a database or
spreadsheet format that is readily
readable and can be easily sorted by the
data elements listed in paragraph (f) of
this section. Such database or
spreadsheet must be able to be printed
or provided electronically without the
need for additional specialized software.
§ 1311.270 Pharmacy system
requirements: Security.
(a) The pharmacy system must create
and maintain a backup copy of all
controlled substance prescriptions at an
alternate storage site that is
geographically separated from the
primary storage site so as not to be
susceptible to the same hazards. A copy
of each digitally signed controlled
substance prescription and all linked
dispensing records must be transferred
to the backup storage site at least once
every 24 hours. Backup copies must be
maintained for five years from the date
of the record creation.
(b) The pharmacy system must create
and maintain an internal audit trail that
indicates each time a controlled
substance prescription file is opened,
annotated, altered, or deleted and the
identity of the person taking the action.
The audit trail records must be
maintained for five years.
(c) The pharmacy must establish and
implement a list of auditable events.
The auditable events must, at a
minimum, include attempted or
successful unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, modification, or destruction
of information or interference with
system operations in the prescription
system.
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jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS3
(d) The system must analyze the audit
logs at least once every 24 hours and
generate an incident report that
identifies each auditable event.
(e) The pharmacy must determine
whether any identified auditable event
represents a security incident that
compromised or could have
compromised the integrity of the
prescription records. Any such
incidents must be reported to the
Federal agency and the Administration
within one business day.
(f) The Federal agency must have a
qualified third party conduct an audit
for processing integrity prior to
accepting any controlled substances
prescriptions for processing and
annually thereafter.
(g) The third-party audit must
determine whether the system for
processing controlled substance
prescriptions meets the requirements of
this part. The Federal agency must
retain each annual audit report for the
last five years.
(h) If the third-party audit finds that
the system does not meet one or more
of the requirements of this part, the
system must not accept or process any
electronic controlled substance
prescription. The Federal agency must
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also notify the Administration of the
adverse audit report and provide the
report to the Administration.
§ 1311.275
Pharmacy responsibilities.
(a) A pharmacy must not dispense
controlled substances in response to
electronic controlled substance
prescriptions if its pharmacy system
does not meet the requirements of this
part.
(b) A pharmacy must not process
electronic controlled substance
prescriptions if the DEA registration or
agency authorization of the prescriber
was not valid at the time the
prescription was signed or if the system
rejected the prescription for any other
reason.
(c) When a pharmacist fills a
prescription in a manner that would
require, under part 1306 of this chapter,
the pharmacist to make a notation on
the prescription if the prescription were
a paper prescription, the pharmacist
must make such notation electronically
when filling an electronic prescription.
(d) Nothing in this part relieves a
pharmacy of its responsibility to
dispense controlled substances only
pursuant to a prescription issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by a
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practitioner acting in the usual course of
professional practice.
§ 1311.280
Recordkeeping.
(a) A Federal agency or pharmacy
must maintain records required by this
part for electronic prescriptions for five
years from their creation. Records may
be maintained electronically. Records
regarding controlled substances
prescriptions that are maintained
electronically must be readily
retrievable from all other records.
(b) This record retention requirement
shall not preempt any longer period of
retention which may be required now or
in the future, by any other federal or
State law or regulation, applicable to
practitioners, pharmacists, or
pharmacies.
(c) Electronic records must be easily
readable or easily rendered into a format
that a person can read. They must be
made available to the Administration
upon request.
Dated: June 6, 2008.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8–14405 Filed 6–26–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 125 (Friday, June 27, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 36722-36782]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-14405]
[[Page 36721]]
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Part IV
Department of Justice
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Drug Enforcement Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
21 CFR Parts 1300, 1304, et al.
Electronic Prescriptions for Controlled Substances; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 125 / Friday, June 27, 2008 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 36722]]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
21 CFR Parts 1300, 1304, 1306, and 1311
[Docket No. DEA-218P]
RIN 1117-AA61
Electronic Prescriptions for Controlled Substances
AGENCY: Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Justice.
ACTION: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: DEA is proposing to revise its regulations to provide
practitioners with the option of writing prescriptions for controlled
substances electronically. These regulations would also permit
pharmacies to receive, dispense, and archive these electronic
prescriptions. These proposed regulations would be an addition to, not
a replacement of, the existing rules. These regulations provide
pharmacies, hospitals, and practitioners with the ability to use modern
technology for controlled substance prescriptions while maintaining the
closed system of controls on controlled substances dispensing;
additionally, the proposed regulations would reduce paperwork for DEA
registrants who dispense or prescribe controlled substances and have
the potential to reduce prescription forgery. The proposed regulations
would also have the potential to reduce the number of prescription
errors caused by illegible handwriting and misunderstood oral
prescriptions. Moreover, they would help both pharmacies and hospitals
to integrate prescription records into other medical records more
directly, which would increase efficiency, and would reduce the amount
of time patients spend waiting to have their prescriptions filled.
DATES: Written comments must be postmarked, and electronic comments
must be sent, on or before September 25, 2008.
ADDRESSES: To ensure proper handling of comments, please reference
``Docket No. DEA-218'' on all written and electronic correspondence.
Written comments sent via regular or express mail should be sent to
Drug Enforcement Administration, Attention: DEA Federal Register
Representative/ODL, 8701 Morrissette Drive, Springfield, VA 22152.
Comments may be directly sent to DEA electronically by sending an
electronic message to dea.diversion.policy@usdoj.gov. Comments may also
be sent electronically through https://www.regulations.gov using the
electronic comment form provided on that site. An electronic copy of
this document is also available at the https://www.regulations.gov Web
site. DEA will accept electronic comments containing MS word,
WordPerfect, Adobe PDF, or Excel files only. DEA will not accept any
file formats other than those specifically listed here.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark W. Caverly, Chief, Liaison and
Policy Section, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, 8701 Morrissette Drive, Springfield, VA 22152,
Telephone (202) 307-7297.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Posting of Public Comments: Please note that all comments received
are considered part of the public record and made available for public
inspection online at https://www.regulations.gov and in the Drug
Enforcement Administration's public docket. Such information includes
personal identifying information (such as your name, address, etc.)
voluntarily submitted by the commenter.
If you want to submit personal identifying information (such as
your name, address, etc.) as part of your comment, but do not want it
to be posted online or made available in the public docket, you must
include the phrase ``PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION'' in the first
paragraph of your comment. You must also place all the personal
identifying information you do not want posted online or made available
in the public docket in the first paragraph of your comment and
identify what information you want redacted.
If you want to submit confidential business information as part of
your comment, but do not want it to be posted online or made available
in the public docket, you must include the phrase ``CONFIDENTIAL
BUSINESS INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph of your comment. You must
also prominently identify confidential business information to be
redacted within the comment. If a comment has so much confidential
business information that it cannot be effectively redacted, all or
part of that comment may not be posted online or made available in the
public docket.
Personal identifying information and confidential business
information identified and located as set forth above will be redacted
and the comment, in redacted form, will be posted online and placed in
the Drug Enforcement Administration's public docket file. Please note
that the Freedom of Information Act applies to all comments received.
If you wish to inspect the agency's public docket file in person by
appointment, please see the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT paragraph.
I. Background
Legal Authority
DEA implements the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, often referred to as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)
and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 801-
971), as amended. DEA publishes the implementing regulations for these
statutes in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts
1300 to 1399. These regulations are designed to ensure an adequate
supply of controlled substances for legitimate medical, scientific,
research, and industrial purposes, and to deter the diversion of
controlled substances to illegal purposes. The CSA mandates that DEA
establish a closed system of control for manufacturing, distributing,
and dispensing controlled substances. Any person who manufactures,
distributes, dispenses, imports, exports, or conducts research or
chemical analysis with controlled substances must register with DEA
(unless exempt) and comply with the applicable requirements for the
activity.
Controlled Substances
Controlled substances are drugs that have a potential for abuse and
psychological and physical dependence; these include opiates,
stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, anabolic steroids, and drugs
that are immediate precursors of these classes of substances. DEA lists
controlled substances in 21 CFR part 1308. The substances are divided
into five schedules: Schedule I substances have a high potential for
abuse and have no accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States. These substances may only be used for research, chemical
analysis, or manufacture of other drugs. Schedule II-V substances have
accepted medical uses and also have potential for abuse and
psychological and physical dependence. Virtually all Schedule II-V
controlled substances are available only under a prescription written
by a practitioner licensed by the State and registered with DEA to
dispense the substances. Overall, controlled substances constitute
between 10 percent and 11 percent of all prescriptions written in the
United States.
[[Page 36723]]
History
The CSA and DEA's regulations were originally adopted at a time
when most transactions and particularly prescriptions were done on
paper. The CSA mandates that some records must be created and kept on
forms that DEA provides and that many controlled substance
prescriptions must be manually signed. In 1999, in response to requests
from the regulated community, DEA began to examine how to revise its
regulations to allow the use of electronic systems within the limits
imposed by the statute and mindful that the records had to be usable in
legal actions. On April 1, 2005, after extensive consultation with the
regulated community, DEA published a final rule that allowed the
electronic creation, signature, transmission, and retention of records
of orders for Schedule I and II controlled substances, orders that
prior to that time had to be created on preprinted forms that DEA
issued (70 FR 16901, April 1, 2005).
At the same time, DEA began to examine how to revise its rules to
allow electronic prescriptions for controlled substances. In addition
to complying with the mandates of the CSA, regulations on electronic
prescriptions must be consistent with other statutory mandates and
Federal regulations. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act of 2000, commonly known as E-Sign, was signed into law on
June 30, 2000 (Pub. L. 106-229). It establishes the basic rules for
using electronic signatures and records in commerce. E-Sign was enacted
to encourage electronic commerce by giving legal effect to electronic
signatures and records and to protect consumers. E-Sign provides that,
with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, a signature may not be denied legal effect solely because it
is in electronic form (15 U.S.C. 7001(a)). However, E-Sign further
provides that, where a statute or regulation requires retention of a
record, and an electronic record is used to meet such requirement,
Federal, State, and local agencies may set performance standards to
ensure accuracy, record integrity, and accessibility of records (15
U.S.C. 7004(b)(3)(A)). Such performance standards may be specified in a
manner that requires the implementation of a specific technology if
such requirement serves an important governmental objective and is
substantially related to that objective interest (Id.).
In 2003, Congress enacted the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) (Pub. L. 108-173). Section
1860D-4(e) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395w-104(e)) contains the
requirement that the electronic transmission of prescriptions and
prescription-related information for covered Part D drugs prescribed
for Part D eligible individuals comply with final uniform standards
adopted by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS). One of the considerations in support of this move to electronic
prescriptions was the view that using electronic prescriptions in lieu
of written or oral prescriptions could reduce medical errors that occur
because handwriting is illegible or phoned in prescriptions are
misunderstood as a result of similar sounding medication names. Another
consideration is that, if prescription records are linked to other
medical records, practitioners can be alerted at the time of
prescribing to possible interactions with other drugs the patient is
taking or allergies a patient might have. Electronic prescribing
systems also can link to insurance formulary lists to inform the
practitioner prior to prescribing whether a drug is covered by a
patient's insurance.
HHS adopted a rule on the transmission standard for electronic
prescriptions in November 2005 (70 FR 67593, November 7, 2005) and
revised it on June 23, 2006 (71 FR 36023). The standard focuses on the
format for the transmitted information, not with the process of
creating the prescription or maintaining the record at the pharmacy.
HHS adopted the National Council of Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP)
SCRIPT Standard, Implementation Guide, Version 8.1. The standard
specifies fields (name, date, address, etc.) and field lengths for
certain transactions including issuing new prescriptions and refills.
The rule applies to prescriptions issued to patients under Part D (the
prescription drug program for Medicare patients). The rule does not
require practitioners or pharmacies to use electronic prescriptions,
but rather requires that companies that sponsor Part D coverage
establish and maintain an electronic prescription program that meets
the standard. The purpose of the standard is to ensure that electronic
prescriptions are created and transmitted in a format that can be read
by the receiving pharmacy (i.e., that the systems creating,
transmitting, and receiving the prescriptions are interoperable).
The rule DEA is hereby proposing has been written to be consistent
with the foregoing HHS standard. However, it bears emphasis that the
context in which the HHS standard was issued was not specific to
controlled substances and therefore not designed to provide safeguards
against the diversion of controlled substances. The responsibility for
establishing regulatory safeguards against diversion of controlled
substances falls upon DEA as the agency charged with administering and
enforcing the CSA. Accordingly, while the rule being proposed here by
DEA is designed to work in tandem with the HHS standard, its scope is
necessarily distinct from the HHS standard.
Prescription records and transmission are also subject to the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which
establishes protection for health information. Any party to the
creation, transmission, and storage of prescriptions must meet
standards to ensure that the information is protected and not revealed
to persons who are not authorized to see it. Health Plans, Health Care
Clearinghouses, and covered Health Care Providers that are involved in
the transmission of prescriptions must comply with HIPAA standards,
which are codified at 45 CFR parts 160, 162, and 164. Because of the
wide variety of healthcare providers subject to HIPAA, the requirements
are general to allow the providers to adopt protections that are
appropriate for their situations. For example, the security steps
needed at a one-practitioner office will be very different from those
needed at a large hospital system or chain pharmacy system. The DEA
rule being issued here is consistent with HIPAA security guidance
issued by HHS, as explained later in this document.
Because both DEA and HHS are involved in addressing electronic
prescriptions, they held a joint public meeting on July 11 and 12,
2006, to gather information from the regulated community (practitioners
and pharmacies) as well as from the prescription and pharmacy service
providers, technical experts, and Federal, State, and local law
enforcement. The meeting record is available at https://
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/ecomm/e_rx/mtgs/july2006/.
Based on the meeting and on the requirements of the CSA and the
other applicable provisions of law outlined above, DEA has developed
this proposed rule. As the proposed rule illustrates, DEA supports the
adoption of electronic prescriptions for controlled substances in a
manner that will minimize the risk of diversion. In the absence of
appropriate controls, allowing electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances could exacerbate the already increasing problem of
prescription controlled substance abuse
[[Page 36724]]
in the United States, as discussed further below. It is also essential
that the rules governing the electronic prescribing of controlled
substances do not undermine the ability of DEA, State, and local law
enforcement to identify and prosecute those who engage in diversion.
The remainder of this preamble for the rule is organized as
follows:
Section II discusses the framework of pertinent provisions of the
CSA and DEA regulations to provide a context for this proposed rule.
Section III describes the current requirements for controlled
substance prescriptions.
Section IV discusses the existing electronic prescription and
pharmacy systems.
Section V discusses potential vulnerabilities that need to be
addressed to prevent electronic prescribing from contributing to the
diversion of controlled substances.
Section VI discusses alternatives considered.
Section VII discusses the risk assessment DEA conducted regarding
electronic prescriptions for controlled substances.
Section VIII describes the proposed rule and the rationale for the
requirements DEA is proposing to impose on prescription and pharmacy
systems that create, process, and archive controlled substance
prescriptions.
Section IX provides a summary of the proposed rule requirements and
their current implementation status.
Section X is a section-by-section analysis of the proposed rule.
Section XI describes a system for the electronic prescribing of
controlled substances that DEA is proposing specifically for use by
Federal health care agencies (including the United States Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, Department of Veterans Affairs,
Public Health Service, and Bureau of Prisons). These agencies would be
permitted to use either system for controlled substances prescribing
and dispensing.
Section XII discusses the incorporation by reference of one
standard published by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
Section XIII presents the required analyses on the economic and
other impacts of the proposed rule.
II. Framework of the Pertinent Provisions of the CSA and DEA
Regulations
In enacting the CSA, Congress sought to control the diversion of
pharmaceutical controlled substances into illicit markets by
establishing a ``closed system'' of drug distribution governing the
legitimate handlers of controlled substances. H. Rep. No. 91-1444,
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4571-72. Under this closed system,
all legitimate manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of
controlled substances must register with DEA and maintain strict
accounting for all controlled substance transactions (Id.).
The CSA defines ``dispense'' to include, among other things, the
issuance of a prescription by a practitioner as well as the delivery of
a controlled substance to a patient by a pharmacy pursuant to a
prescription (21 U.S.C. 802(10)). Thus, both practitioners who
prescribe controlled substances and pharmacies that fill such
prescriptions must obtain a DEA registration (21 U.S.C. 822(a)(2)). The
CSA definition of practitioner (21 U.S.C. 802(21)) includes, among
others, physicians, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacies, and, where
authorized by an appropriate State authority, physician assistants and
advance practice nurses.
It is important to reiterate here that DEA registers pharmacies, as
opposed to pharmacists. As a rule, pharmacists themselves do not have
the authority to independently prescribe controlled substances. Rather,
pharmacists rely on the prescription, as written by the individual
practitioner, for authority to conduct the dispensing.
Under longstanding Federal law, for a prescription for a controlled
substance to be valid, it must be issued for a legitimate medical
purpose by a practitioner acting in the usual course of professional
practice (United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975); 21 CFR
1306.04(a)). As the DEA regulations state: ``The responsibility for the
proper prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances is upon the
prescribing practitioner, but a corresponding responsibility rests with
the pharmacist who fills the prescription.'' (21 CFR 1306.04(a)).
The CSA provides that a controlled substance in Schedule II may
only be dispensed by a pharmacy pursuant to a ``written prescription,''
except in emergency situations (21 U.S.C. 829(a)). In contrast, for
controlled substances in Schedules III and IV, the CSA provides that a
pharmacy may dispense pursuant to a ``written or oral prescription.''
(21 U.S.C. 829(b)). Where an oral prescription is permitted by the CSA,
the DEA regulations further provide that a practitioner may transmit to
the pharmacy a facsimile of a written prescription in lieu of an oral
prescription (21 CFR 1306.21(a)).
Enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act
The Controlled Substances Act is unique among criminal laws in that
it stipulates acts pertaining to controlled substances that are
permissible. That is, if the CSA does not explicitly permit an action
pertaining to a controlled substance, then by its lack of explicit
permissibility the act is prohibited. Violations of the Act can be
civil or criminal in nature, which may result in administrative, civil,
or criminal proceedings. Remedies under the Act can range from
modification or revocation of DEA registration, to civil monetary
penalties or imprisonment, depending on the nature, scope, and extent
of the violation.
Specifically, it is unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance or to possess a controlled substance with the intent of
manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing that controlled substance,
except as authorized by the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1)).
Further, it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
to possess a controlled substance unless such substance was obtained
directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order, issued for a
legitimate medical purpose, from a practitioner, while acting in the
course of the practitioner's professional practice, or except as
otherwise authorized by the CSA (21 U.S.C. 844(a)). It is unlawful for
any person to knowingly or intentionally acquire or obtain possession
of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery,
deception, or subterfuge (21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3)).
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use a
DEA registration number that is fictitious, revoked, suspended,
expired, or issued to another person in the course of dispensing a
controlled substance, or for the purpose of acquiring or obtaining a
controlled substance (21 U.S.C. 843(a)(2)).
Beyond these possession and dispensing requirements, it is unlawful
for any person to refuse or negligently fail to make, keep, or furnish
any record (including any record of dispensing) that is required by the
CSA (21 U.S.C. 842(a)(5)). It is also unlawful to furnish any false or
fraudulent material information in, or omit any information from, any
record required to be made or kept (21 U.S.C. 843(a)(4)(A)).
Within the CSA's system of controls, it is the individual
practitioner (e.g., physician, dentist, veterinarian, nurse
[[Page 36725]]
practitioner) who issues the prescription authorizing the dispensing of
the controlled substance. This prescription must be issued for a
legitimate medical purpose and must be issued in the usual course of
professional practice. The individual practitioner is responsible for
ensuring that the prescription conforms to all legal requirements. The
pharmacist, acting under the authority of the DEA-registered pharmacy,
has a corresponding responsibility to ensure that the prescription is
valid and meets all legal requirements. The DEA-registered pharmacy
does not order the dispensing. Rather, the pharmacy, and the dispensing
pharmacist, merely rely on the prescription as written by the DEA-
registered individual practitioner to conduct the dispensing.
Thus, a prescription is much more than the mere method of
transmitting dispensing information from a practitioner to a pharmacy.
The prescription serves both as a record of the practitioner's
determination of the legitimate medical need for the drug to be
dispensed, and as a record of the dispensing, providing the pharmacy
with the legal justification and authority to dispense the medication
prescribed by the practitioner. The prescription also provides a record
of the actual dispensing of the controlled substance to the ultimate
user (the patient) and, therefore, is critical to documenting that
controlled substances held by a pharmacy have been dispensed legally.
The maintenance by pharmacies of complete and accurate prescription
records is an essential part of the overall CSA regulatory scheme
established by Congress, wherein all those within the legitimate
distribution chain must strictly account for all controlled substances
on hand, as well as those received, sold, delivered, or otherwise
disposed of (21 U.S.C. 827). The CSA recordkeeping requirements for
prescriptions are somewhat unusual in that the practitioner is not
required to maintain a record of prescriptions written; instead, the
record is held only by the pharmacy.
Abuse of Controlled Substances
The level of control mandated by Congress for controlled substances
far exceeds that for other prescription drugs commensurate with the
facts that controlled substances can cause physical and psychological
dependence and have historically been abused. Several studies of drug
abuse patterns indicate that nonmedical use of prescription controlled
substances (those in Schedules II through V) is an increasing problem
even as the use of certain Schedule I substances appears to have
declined somewhat in recent years.
The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) (formerly the
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse) is an annual survey of the
civilian, non-institutionalized, population of the United States aged
12 or older. The survey is conducted by the Office of Applied Studies,
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, of the
Department of Health and Human Services. Findings from the 2006 NSDUH
were released in September 2007 and are the latest year for which
information is currently available.
The 2006 NSDUH \1\ estimated that 20.4 million Americans were
classified with substance dependence or abuse (8.3 percent of the total
population aged 12 or older). Further, the 2006 NSDUH estimated that
6.7 million persons were current users, i.e., past 30 days, of
psychotherapeutic drugs--pain relievers, anti-anxiety medications,
stimulants, and sedatives--taken nonmedically. This represents 2.8
percent of the population aged 12 or older. Specifically, the NSDUH
estimated that 5.2 million persons used pain relievers, 1.8 million
used tranquilizers, 1.2 million used stimulants, and 0.4 million used
sedatives. Except for tranquilizers, these estimates are increases from
the corresponding estimates for 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.
(2007). Results From the 2006 National Survey on Drug Use and
Health: National Findings (Office of Applied Studies, NSDUH Series
H-32, DHHS Publication No. SMA 07-4293). Rockville, MD. https://
www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the NSDUH, more than 20 percent of persons age 12 or
older have used psychotherapeutic drugs nonmedically in their lifetime.
Overall, 33 million Americans are estimated to have used prescription
pain killers for nonmedical reasons in their lifetime. Specific pain
relievers with statistically significant increases in lifetime use for
18 to 25 year olds between 2003 and 2006 were the Schedule III
controlled substances Vicodin[supreg], Lortab[supreg], or
Lorcet[supreg] (from 15.0 percent to 18 percent); Schedule III
controlled substances containing hydrocodone (from 16.3 percent to 19.2
percent); the Schedule II controlled substance OxyContin[supreg] (from
3.6 percent to 5.1 percent); and the Schedule II controlled substances
containing oxycodone (from 8.9 percent to 10.8 percent).
Results of a separate study of seventh through twelfth grade
students were released April 21, 2005, by the Partnership for a Drug-
Free America. The Partnership Attitude Tracking Study \2\ tracks
consumers' exposure to and attitudes about drugs. The study focuses on
perceived risk and social attitudes. For the first time in its
seventeen-year history, the study found that teenagers are more likely
to have abused a prescription pain medication to get high than they are
to have experimented with a variety of illicit drugs including Ecstasy,
cocaine, crack and LSD. In 2004, the study reported that nearly one in
five teenagers, 18 percent, or 4.3 million teenagers nationally,
indicated they have used the Schedule III controlled substance
Vicodin[supreg] without a prescription. Approximately ten percent of
teens, or 2.3 million teens nationally, reported using the Schedule II
controlled substance OxyContin[supreg] without a prescription. Further,
the study reported that ten percent, or 2.3 million teenagers
nationally, reported having used prescription stimulants,
Ritalin[supreg] and/or Adderall[supreg], without a prescription. The
2005 survey indicated that 50 percent of the teenagers surveyed
indicated that prescription drugs are widely available; a third
indicated that they were easy to purchase over the Internet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Partnership for a Drug-Free America; Partnership Attitude
Tracking study, 2005; https://www.drugfree.org/Portal/DrugIssue/
Research/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2006 National Institute of Drug Abuse survey of drug use by
teens in the eighth, tenth, and twelfth grades, Monitoring the Future:
National Results on Adolescent Drug Use \3\, found that past-year
nonmedical use of Vicodin[supreg] (Schedule III) remained high among
all three grades, with nearly one in ten high school seniors using it
in the past year. Despite a drop from 2005 to 2006 in past-year abuse
of OxyContin[supreg] among twelfth graders (from 5.5 percent to 4.3
percent), there has been no such decline among the eighth and tenth
grade students, and the rate of use among the youngest students has
increased significantly since it was included in the survey in 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Johnston, L. D., O'Malley, P. M., Bachman, J. G., and
Schulenberg, J. E. (2007). Monitoring the Future national results on
adolescent drug use: Overview of key findings, 2006. (NIH
Publication No. 07-6202). Bethesda, MD: National Institute on Drug
Abuse; https://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The consequences of prescription drug abuse are seen in the data
collected by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration on emergency room visits. In the latest data, Drug Abuse
Warning Network (DAWN), 2005: National Estimates of Drug-Related
Emergency Department Visits,\4\ SAMHSA estimates that about
[[Page 36726]]
599,000 emergency department visits involved nonmedical use of
prescription or over-the-counter drugs or dietary supplements, a 21
percent increase over 2004. Of the 599,000 visits, 172,000 involved
benzodiazepines (Schedule IV) and 196,000 involved opiates (Schedule II
and III). Overall, controlled substances represented 66 percent of the
estimated emergency department visits. Between 2004 and 2005, the
number of visits involving opiates increased 24 percent and the number
involving benzodiazepines increased 19 percent. About a third (200,000)
of all visits involving nonmedical use of pharmaceuticals resulted in
admission to the hospital; about 66,000 of those individuals were
admitted to critical care units; 1,365 of the visits ended with the
death of the patient. More than half of the visits involved patients 35
and older.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,
Office of Applied Studies. Drug Abuse Warning Network, 2005:
National Estimates of Drug-Related Emergency Department Visits. DAWN
Series D-29, DHHS Publication No. (SMA) 07-4256, Rockville, MD,
2007; https://dawninfo.samhsa.gov/pubs/edpubs/default.asp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Means by Which Controlled Substances Are Diverted
Understanding the means by which controlled substances are diverted
is critical to determining appropriate regulatory controls. Diversion
of prescription controlled substances can occur in a number of ways,
including, but not limited to, the following:
Prescription pads are stolen from practitioners' offices
by patients, staff, or others and illegitimate prescriptions are
written.
Legitimate prescriptions are altered to obtain additional
amounts of legitimately prescribed controlled substances.
Drug-seeking patients may falsify symptoms and/or obtain
multiple prescriptions from different practitioners for their own use
or for resale. In some cases, organized groups visit practitioners with
fake symptoms to obtain prescriptions, which are filled and resold.
Some patients resell their legitimately obtained drugs to earn extra
money.
Prescription pads containing legitimate practitioner
information (e.g., name, address, DEA registration number) are printed
with a different call back number that is answered by an accomplice to
verify the prescription.
Computers and scanning or copying equipment are used to
create prescriptions for nonexistent practitioners or to copy
legitimate practitioners' prescriptions.
Pharmacies and other locations where controlled substances
are stored are robbed or burglarized.
Diversion from within the practitioner's practice or pharmacy may
also occur, such as in the following situations:
Prescriptions are written for other than a legitimate
medical purpose. Some practitioners knowingly write prescriptions for
nonmedical purposes. Criminal organizations commonly referred to as
``rogue Internet pharmacies'' often employ practitioners to issue
prescriptions based on online questionnaires from patients with whom
the practitioner has no legitimate medical relationship.
Controlled substances are stolen from a pharmacy by
pharmacy personnel. Legitimately dispensed prescriptions may be altered
to make the thefts less detectable.
Legitimate prescriptions may be stolen from legitimate
patients. The stolen legitimate prescriptions may be filled by persons
addicted to or abusing controlled substances.
Given these common methods of diversion, as well as the alarmingly
increasing extent of prescription controlled substance abuse in the
United States, many of those at the DEA/HHS public meeting in 2006,
particularly representatives of Federal and state law enforcement and
regulatory agencies, emphasized that any system allowing the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances must have sufficient safeguards to
prevent contributing further to the diversion problem in this country.
Indeed, this is true regardless of the means used to divert controlled
substances in the paper-based system, because electronic prescribing of
controlled substances could, if not properly implemented, present
another means of diversion in addition to those listed above. However,
with proper controls, the risk of diversion can actually be reduced
through the use of electronic prescriptions. Among the essential
elements of such a system are ensuring that only DEA registrants
electronically sign and authorize controlled substance prescriptions
and that the prescription record cannot be altered without the
alteration being detectable. A system that fails to provide
verification of the signer's identity and authority to issue controlled
substance prescriptions, and/or fails to ensure that alteration of the
record is detectable, would create new routes of diversion that could
be even harder to prevent and detect.
III. Current Requirements for Prescriptions for Controlled Substances
As noted above, the CSA requires that, except in limited emergency
circumstances, a pharmacist may only dispense a Schedule II controlled
substance pursuant to a written prescription from a practitioner (21
U.S.C. 829(a)). For Schedule III and IV controlled substances, a
pharmacist may dispense the controlled substance pursuant to a written
or oral prescription from a practitioner (21 U.S.C. 829(b)). Every
written prescription must be signed by the practitioner in the same way
the practitioner would sign a check or other legal document, e.g.,
``John H. Smith'' or ``J.H. Smith'' (21 CFR 1306.05). A prescription
for a controlled substance may be issued only by an individual
practitioner who is authorized to prescribe by the State in which he is
licensed to practice and is registered, or exempted from registration,
with DEA (21 U.S.C. 822, 823). To be valid, a prescription must be
written for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner
acting in the usual course of professional practice; a corresponding
responsibility rests with the pharmacist who fills the prescription (21
CFR 1306.04). An order purporting to be a prescription issued not in
the usual course of professional treatment is not a prescription within
the meaning and intent of the Controlled Substances Act, and the person
knowingly filling such a purported prescription, as well as the person
issuing it, is subject to the penalties provided for violations of the
provisions of law relating to controlled substances.
Longstanding DEA regulations specify that each controlled substance
prescription contain certain information including the practitioner's
manual signature (21 CFR 1306.05). The manual signature affixed to the
controlled substance prescription by the practitioner serves as formal
attestation by the practitioner that the prescription has been written
for a legitimate medical purpose and affirms the practitioner's
authority to prescribe the controlled substance in question. The
prescribing practitioner is responsible in case the prescription does
not conform in all essential respects to the law and regulations.
Further, a corresponding liability rests upon the pharmacist who fills
a prescription not prepared in the form prescribed by DEA regulations
(21 CFR 1306.05).
A prescription may be filled only by a pharmacist acting in the
usual course of professional practice who is
[[Page 36727]]
employed in a registered pharmacy (21 CFR 1306.06). Except under
limited circumstances, a pharmacist may dispense a Schedule II
controlled substance only upon receipt of the original written
prescription manually signed by the practitioner (21 U.S.C. 829, 21 CFR
1306.11). A pharmacist may dispense a Schedule III or IV controlled
substance only pursuant to a written and manually signed prescription
from an individual practitioner, which is presented directly or
transmitted via facsimile to the pharmacist, or an oral prescription,
which the pharmacist promptly reduces to writing containing all of the
information required to be in a prescription, except the signature of
the practitioner (21 U.S.C. 829, 21 CFR 1306.21).
Every prescription must be initialed and dated by the pharmacist
filling the prescription (21 CFR 1304.22(c)). Under many circumstances,
pharmacists are required to note certain specific information regarding
dispensing on the prescription or recorded in a separate document
referencing the prescription before the prescription is placed in the
pharmacy's prescription records.
DEA requires the registered pharmacy to maintain records of each
dispensing for two years from the date of dispensing of the controlled
substance (21 U.S.C. 827(b), 21 CFR 1304.04). However, many States
require that these records be maintained for longer periods of time.
These records must be made available for inspection and copying by
authorized employees of DEA (21 U.S.C. 827(b)). This system of records
is unique in that the prescribing practitioner creates the
prescription, but the dispensing pharmacy retains the record.
The signature requirement for written prescriptions for controlled
substances provides DEA with reliable evidence needed to enforce the
CSA in administrative, civil, and criminal legal proceedings. In
criminal proceedings for violations of the CSA, the Government must
prove the violation beyond a reasonable doubt. As the agency
responsible for monitoring compliance with the regulatory requirements
of the CSA, it is essential that DEA have the ability to determine
whether a given prescription for a controlled substance was, in fact,
signed by the practitioner whose name appears on the prescription. It
is likewise essential that DEA have the ability to determine that a
prescription that has been filled by a pharmacy was not altered after
it was prepared by the practitioner. Further, because DEA relies on the
records of these prescriptions in the conduct of investigations, DEA
must also know that the prescription has not been altered after receipt
by the pharmacy.
The elements of the prescription that identify the practitioner
(the practitioner's name, address, DEA registration number, and
signature) also serve to enable the pharmacy to authenticate the
prescription. If a pharmacy is unfamiliar with the practitioner, it can
use the registration number to verify the identity of the practitioner
through publicly available records. Those same records would indicate
to the pharmacy whether the practitioner has the authority to prescribe
the schedule of the controlled substance in question.
Requiring that the original documents be maintained in paper form
serves to support both the accuracy and integrity of each record and,
thus, the accuracy and integrity of the system of records as a whole.
The availability of the original written and manually signed
prescription provides a level of document integrity and provides
physical evidence if the record has been altered: alterations of a
hard-copy record are usually apparent upon close examination. A
forensic examination of a prescription can prove that a practitioner
signed it or, equally important, that the practitioner did not sign it.
The maintenance of the paper record at a pharmacy also ensures that
State and local law enforcement agencies have access to records they
need for investigations. In addition, there will be a limited number of
pharmacy employees who will have annotated the record and can testify
that the prescription is, in fact, the prescription they received and
dispensed.
IV. Existing Electronic Prescription Systems
At present, there are more than 110 service providers that offer
systems to generate electronic prescriptions and approximately 20 that
handle the receipt of prescriptions at pharmacies.\5\ The electronic
capabilities of practitioners' offices and pharmacies and the systems
used are considerably different. Both types of systems, however, can be
classified in the same ways. Systems may be stand-alone software that
only handle prescriptions or integrated into larger management systems.
In general, pharmacy systems are part of larger pharmacy management
systems. Most electronic prescription systems are now integrated into
larger electronic health records (EHR) systems; existing stand-alone
systems may be integrated into EHR systems in the future.6 7
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\5\ Estimates are based on the number of systems certified by
SureScripts plus the number of electronic medical record systems
certified by the Certification Commission for Health Information
Technology.
\6\ National Alliance on Health Information Technology, ``Report
to the office of the National Coordinator on Health Information
Technology on Defining Key Health Information Technology Terms'',
April 28, 2008. https://www.nahit.org/cms/images/docs/
hittermsfinalreport_051508.pdf.
\7\ The National Alliance for Health Information Technology has
defined the terms ``electronic Medical record (EMR),'' ``electronic
health record (EHR),'' and ``personal health record (PHR).'' Both
EMRs and EHRs are defined to be maintained by practitioners, whereas
a PHR is defined to be maintained by the individual patient. The
main distinction between an EMR and an EHR is the EHR's ability to
exchange information interoperably. DEA's use of the term EHR in
this rule relates to those records maintained by practitioners, as
opposed to a PHR maintained by an individual patient, regardless of
how those records are maintained.
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Systems may also be installed on a practice or pharmacy computers
or may be operated by application service providers (ASPs). In the ASP
model, the program is retained on the ASP servers and the user accesses
the system using leased lines or over the Internet. The ASP retains the
records generated. Many pharmacy systems are installed at the pharmacy,
but larger chains often operate like an ASP, holding the records on a
central server that any pharmacy in the chain may access. Many
practitioner stand-alone electronic prescription systems are ASPs.
Because practitioners want to be able to access the system when they
are out of the office, access is usually over the Internet.
Practitioners log on to the system using the same kinds of
identification mechanisms as other online business sites (passwords,
user IDs).
Pharmacy Systems. Almost all pharmacies have computerized
prescription records, which are integrated into overall pharmacy
management systems that process insurance claims and billings. When a
pharmacy receives a prescription on paper or by phone, the pharmacist
or technician keys the information on the prescription into the system;
if the patient has had other prescriptions filled at that pharmacy, the
patient's personal identifying information is already in the system and
does not have to be rekeyed.
Many pharmacy systems have been reprogrammed to be able to capture
the data from electronic prescriptions directly. Although many
pharmacies have the ability to accept electronic prescriptions, few
such prescriptions are sent currently. Many of the ``electronic
prescriptions'' generated are in fact transmitted to the pharmacy as
faxes or simply printed out and given to
[[Page 36728]]
the patient. Renewals are more likely to be handled electronically than
original prescriptions. Nonetheless, the capability to accept
electronic prescriptions is widespread in the pharmacy sector.
Practitioner Electronic Prescription Systems. Electronic
prescription systems for practitioners have existed for a number of
years, but are still not widely used. A Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) study of electronic medical record (EMR) system use in
2006 found that about 12 percent of physicians have the ability to send
prescriptions electronically using their EMR system.\8\ The number of
those systems that are used or that generate true electronic
prescriptions is unclear. A Rand Health study of 58 electronic
prescribing systems found that only 58 percent allowed electronic
transmission of the prescriptions (as a data file), while almost all
produced printed prescriptions and most could generate faxes.\9\ The
CDC study indicated that the electronic prescribing function is one of
the less used functions of EMRs.
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\8\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ``Electronic
Medical Record Use by Office-Based Physicians and Their Practices:
United States 2006.'' Advance Data from Vital and Health Statistics,
Number 393, October 26, 2007.
\9\ Wang, C. Jason et al., ``Functional Characteristics of
Commercial Ambulatory Electronic Prescribing Systems: A Field
Study,'' Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association,
2005; 12:346-356.
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As noted above, many electronic prescription systems are Web-based
ASPs. The ASP maintains the records, which reduces the initial cost to
the practice by limiting the investment in hardware and connections.
The ASP enrolls a practice, issues keys or sets up other authentication
mechanisms, which allow the practitioner to log onto the system from
any location. Most ASP systems and some installed systems can be
accessed using PDAs and other handheld devices. Because many office
staff may need to access the systems, many service providers also set
different levels of authority so that only practitioners may sign
prescriptions; the ability to support varying access levels is a
requirement for EHR certification for systems certified by the
Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology (CCHIT).
Over the long term, it is generally assumed that stand-alone electronic
prescription systems will be integrated into or replaced by electronic
health record (EHR) systems. In this way, data on prescriptions will be
automatically added to a patient's records. This shift to EHRs is
occurring rapidly. Of the 119 systems certified by SureScripts or CCHIT
at the end of 2007, 103 were EHRs. DEA welcomes comments on the
protections currently implemented in the systems referenced above to
protect against noncontrolled substance prescription forgery, fraud,
and other related crimes, and what risk-mitigating controls are in
place.
DEA also seeks comment as to whether up-to-date information or
statistics are available regarding physicians' ability to send
noncontrolled substance prescriptions electronically using their EHR
systems and usage of such system functionality. When providing comments
regarding this or any other request in this NPRM, commenters should
clearly cite the source of the information, the origin of the data, the
methodology or analytical techniques used to derive the information,
and the limitations of the information, so that DEA may determine the
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of any data or information
provided.
Intermediaries. With so many electronic prescription systems and
pharmacy systems, the issue of interoperability is critical. Electronic
prescriptions will be of limited value to pharmacies if their systems
cannot read the prescription and translate the data directly into their
databases. To deal with this issue, the National Council for
Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP) has established a standard format
for prescriptions, NCPDP SCRIPT standard in XML (current version is 10,
but version 8.1 is the standard that Medicare specifies). Despite the
standard, interoperability problems are likely to continue as both
practitioner and pharmacy systems may be using different platforms and
different versions of SCRIPT. At present, the interoperability problem
is solved by using intermediaries that reformat the prescription so
that the receiving pharmacy will be able to process it electronically.
Electronic prescriptions are transmitted through not one, but a
series of intermediaries. The first recipient, once the prescription is
signed, may be the ASP or an aggregator that the electronic
prescription system uses. This recipient assigns a trace number to the
electronic prescription that becomes part of the prescription record.
The ASP or aggregator generally will transmit it to SureScripts or a
similar intermediary. SureScripts is a service established by the
pharmacy industry to reformat the prescriptions so the receiving
pharmacy's system can process them without rekeying the information.
SureScripts certifies both pharmacy and practitioner service providers,
to ensure that the data it receives will be translatable into other
formats. SureScripts may transmit the reformatted electronic
prescription directly to a pharmacy, the central server of a chain
pharmacy, or the ASP pharmacy management system, which then routes the
prescription to the pharmacy for ultimate dispensing. DEA welcomes
comments on the protections currently implemented by intermediaries to
protect against noncontrolled substance prescription forgery, fraud,
and other related crimes, and what risk-mitigating controls are in
place. DEA also welcomes comments regarding the current standards and
practices used by network intermediaries to route noncontrolled
substance electronic prescriptions and whether such networks allow or
provide the capability to ``open'' an electronic prescription that is
en route.
Hospitals. A final complexity to the electronic prescription
network arises from practitioners who serve on the staff of hospitals.
Two technical issues exist with any electronic prescriptions these
practitioners may write. First, hospital electronic record systems are
written in computer languages other than SCRIPT, often HL7. If a staff
practitioner writes an electronic prescription for a patient to fill at
a pharmacy outside of the hospital, the intermediaries or pharmacies
have to be able to translate the electronic prescriptions from HL7 to
their own computer system language. Second, staff practitioners are not
required to register with DEA. They are allowed to issue prescriptions
under the hospital DEA registration number with a hospital-assigned
extension that identifies the specific person issuing the prescription.
DEA does not dictate the format of the extension. In at least some
cases, pharmacy computer systems have not been able to handle the
extensions.
V. Potential Vulnerabilities That Need To Be Addressed To Prevent
Electronic Prescribing From Contributing to the Diversion of Controlled
Substances
Many parties in the healthcare industry are encouraging the
adoption of electronic prescriptions because such prescriptions have
the potential to improve patient safety by eliminating medical errors
that arise from misread or misunderstood prescriptions and eliminating
adverse events that result from drug interactions. They can also
control costs by ensuring that more drugs prescribed are covered by
formularies or are generic versions.
Although DEA also supports electronic prescribing, the
Administration faces some challenges as it moves into an electronic
world. A recent study conducted for HHS by the
[[Page 36729]]
American Health Information Management Association \10\ noted that ``e-
prescribing presents a new vulnerability because of the increased
velocity of authenticated automated transactions.'' Unless an
electronic prescription system is properly designed, DEA's ability to
prevent diversion and take legal action against those who violate the
CSA could be seriously undermined.
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\10\ American Health Information Management Association,
``Report on the Use of Health Information Technology to Enhance and
Expand Health Care Anti-Fraud Activities,'' [September 2005] p. 45.
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As discussed above, with the paper-based system, the paper records
provide DEA and other law enforcement agencies with documents that can
be used in legal actions to prove that a practitioner has issued
prescriptions for other than legitimate medical purposes, that others
have forged prescriptions, or that pharmacy records or inventories are
inconsistent with prescriptions received. The necessity for presenting
prescriptions to pharmacies and picking up the drugs also limits the
scope of diversion when it occurs. In contrast, electronic
prescriptions can be easy to create, transmit, and alter, often without
leaving a trail that links the person forging or altering a
prescription to the record. Not only practice and pharmacy staff, but
also staff at any of the systems involved in creating, transmitting,
and processing prescriptions could generate or alter prescriptions.
With the Internet and mail order pharmacies, those bent on diversion
gain the ability to send prescriptions to a large number of pharmacies
with a few keystrokes.
DEA's concerns with the existing electronic prescription system are
the following:
Service providers do not always determine whether the
people enrolling are legally permitted to issue prescriptions, let
alone controlled substance prescriptions. Some service providers appear
to enroll practices over the Internet; some require submission of
copies of the person's DEA registration and State license. Such
procedures provide no assurance that authority to issue controlled
substance electronic prescriptions will not be granted to people who
are not DEA registrants. The DEA registrant list, including DEA
registration numbers, is publicly available. The DEA number also
appears on each controlled substance prescription and in many cases is
preprinted on prescription pads so that any patient receiving a
prescription for any drug, regardless of whether it is a controlled
substance, will have access to the number. State license information is
readily accessible from online State databases. Office staff may have
access to the originals to copy. Copies of registration and license
certificates would be easy to generate and submit. Present service
provider procedures do not protect a practitioner from someone inside
or outside the practitioner's practice setting up an account and
creating fraudulent prescriptions in the practitioner's name. Moreover,
current system designs could also allow a practitioner to repudiate
prescriptions written for the purpose of diversion.
Some systems may not limit who within a medical practice
can ``sign'' prescriptions. Many staff at practices may have legitimate
needs to access the system; only some have a legal right to sign
prescriptions. Unless systems limit the ``signing'' function to
practitioners with a legal right to issue prescriptions and provide
unique identifiers that make it possible to determine who signed the
prescription, taking enforcement action against practitioners who issue
illegal prescriptions will be impossible because DEA will not be able
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt who signed the prescription. This
problem is exacerbated because ``signing'' in an electronic
prescription system is a function that is usually nothing more than a
keystroke that indicates that the prescription is complete; there is no
``signature'' applied to the prescription. In some cases, there may not
be a ``signing'' function, but simply a command to transmit. (The
SCRIPT standard does not currently provide a field for an electronic
signature or an indication that the prescription has been signed.)
Access to systems is usually by means of easily shared or
stolen information (passwords, user IDs). As William Winsley, Executive
Director of the Ohio Board of Pharmacy testified at the DEA/HHS July
2006 public meeting, ``Passwords are useless as a means of computer
security in a healthcare setting.'' Too many people are in the vicinity
of computers in practice offices to be certain that a password has not
been compromised. If passwords or PINs are the only means of
authentication for an electronic prescription system, law enforcement
agencies will not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt who signed
an electronic prescription. Practitioners will be able to repudiate
prescriptions by saying that someone must have used their passwords.
Once created and signed, electronic prescriptions pass
through several intermediaries, all of which may open the record.
Although this process is usually handled without individuals accessing
the record, there is no guarantee that they could not do so. Most
identity theft occurs not from people hacking into systems, but rather
from insiders who know how to manipulate the system. Paul Donfried of
SAFE BioPharma \11\ and Strategic Identity Group noted at the July
2006, DEA/HHS public meeting: ``It generally is not the cryptography or
the firewalls or the audit logs or the data centers that people attack.
It is whatever the weak link in the chain is, which normally is the
human beings who are responsible for keeping the stuff running and
operating correctly.''
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\11\ SAFE BioPharma is an organization ``that created and
manages the SAFE digital identity and signature standard for the
pharmaceutical and healthcare industries.''
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The processing of the prescriptions by multiple parties
could mean that law enforcement would have to prove that none of the
parties altered the document. This requirement could substantially
increase the cost of bringing cases against registrants who are
diverting controlled substances as well as burden the service providers
and intermediaries, which would have to produce audit trail records and
experts to testify.
The records of the prescriptions are often held by the
service providers and intermediaries, not the pharmacies. With paper
records, DEA and other law enforcement agencies have the right to
inspect and remove records from pharmacies. With electronic records
held by service providers and others, DEA and other agencies would have
to subpoena records from the third parties--nonregistrants over whom
law enforcement may have limited jurisdiction. Although this is a
lesser problem for DEA, it could pose a substantial barrier to State
and local law enforcement, which would be in the position of having to
find other agencies willing to serve subpoenas on service providers who
were located in other States.
Records of electronic prescriptions at pharmacies and at
intermediaries may be stored as strings of data, not as easily read
text. These records must be able to be downloaded into a format that is
easily read and manipulated by law enforcement.
DEA is convinced that its concerns can be addressed without
creating insurmountable barriers to electronic prescribing. DEA's
requirements in developing this proposed rule are the following:
The approach must meet DEA's statutory mandates. Only DEA
registrants may be granted the authority
[[Page 36730]]
to sign controlled substance electronic prescriptions.
The method used to authenticate a practitioner to the
electronic prescribing system must ensure to the greatest extent
possible that the practitioner cannot repudiate the prescription.
Authentication methods that can be compromised without the practitioner
being aware of the compromise are not acceptable.
Electronic prescriptions must include all information
required for paper controlled substance prescriptions.
The prescription records must be reliable enough to be
used in legal actions without having to substantially expand the number
of witnesses that need to be called to verify records.
The pharmacy system must allow annotation of the records
as required for paper prescriptions and must indicate who made each
annotation.
The security systems used by any of the service providers
must, to the greatest extent possible, prevent the possibility of
insider creation or alteration of controlled substance prescriptions.
In addition, DEA wishes to adopt an approach that is flexible
enough that future changes in technologies will not make the system
obsolete or lock registrants into more expensive systems. DEA notes
that its requirements do not relate to most of the functions of
electronic prescribing systems. Other than requiring that the
electronic prescription contain the basic information that any
controlled substance prescription must contain (and that most
prescriptions contain), DEA is not concerned about the format or
transmission standards, or any of the added functions (formulary
checks, clinical support, medication histories) available in electronic
prescribing systems.
Further, as DEA notes throughout this document, the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances is in addition to, not a
replacement of, existing requirements for written and oral
prescriptions for controlled substances. This propo