In the Matter of Florida Power and Light Company, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant; Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately), 36131-36134 [E8-14317]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 123 / Wednesday, June 25, 2008 / Notices
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket Nos.: 50–335, 50–389; License
Nos.: DPR–67, NPF–16; EA–07–321]
In the Matter of Florida Power and
Light Company, St. Lucie Nuclear
Plant; Confirmatory Order (Effective
Immediately)
I
Florida Power and Light Company
(FPL or Licensee) is the holder of
Operating License Nos. DPR–67 and
NPF–16, issued by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC or
Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part
50 on March 1, 1976, and April 6, 1983,
respectively. The license authorizes the
operation of St. Lucie Nuclear Plant,
Units 1 and 2, (St. Lucie or facility) in
accordance with conditions specified
therein. The facility is located on the
Licensee’s site in Jensen Beach, Florida.
This Confirmatory Order is the result
of an agreement reached during an
alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
mediation session conducted on May
16, 2008.
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II
On September 1, 2006, the NRC Office
of Investigations (OI) began an
investigation (OI Case No. 2–2006–034)
at St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. Based on the
evidence developed during the
investigation, the NRC staff concluded
that a supervisor at St. Lucie willfully
failed to take action to identify two
contract workers as untrustworthy,
subsequent to their actions to falsify a
work order related to valve maintenance
activities they performed. The results of
the investigation were sent to FPL in a
letter dated April 2, 2008.
The NRC’s letter of April 2, 2008,
documented the forgoing incident
which occurred on or about March 10,
2005. Two contractors documented a
work order to indicate that they had
used the torque wrench required by the
work order when, in fact, they had used
a different torque wrench, in an
apparent effort to conceal their overtorquing of a valve. The April 2nd letter
also documented the subsequent
investigation of this incident by FPL
and the corrective actions taken by
FPL’s St. Lucie management. Although
FPL’s immediate actions to ensure all
maintenance and operational issues
associated with the valve in question
were prompt and comprehensive, the
NRC’s letter of April 2, 2008,
documented two apparent violations
associated with FPL’s initial review and
investigation into the matter.
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III
On May 16, 2008, the NRC and FPL
met in an ADR session mediated by a
professional mediator, arranged through
Cornell University’s Institute on
Conflict Resolution. ADR is a process in
which a neutral mediator with no
decisionmaking authority assists the
parties in reaching an agreement or
resolving any differences regarding their
dispute. This confirmatory order is
issued pursuant to the agreement
reached during the ADR process. The
elements of the agreement consist of the
following:
1. The NRC and FPL agreed that a
violation occurred involving FPL’s
failure to adhere to FPL Nuclear
Division Policy, NP–415, Revision 3,
and ADM–15.02. These procedures
require, in part, that in all instances
where the trustworthiness and
reliability of a person who is currently
granted unescorted access (UA) is called
into question by credible objective
evidence, the responsible supervisor or
manager of that individual shall
promptly contact the appropriate site
security manager at the nuclear plant
site. In this case, the falsification of the
work order called into question the
trustworthiness and reliability of the
two contract workers. However, FPL did
not ensure that the site security manager
was contacted or otherwise initiate
action such that the trustworthiness and
reliability of the two contract workers
could be assessed at that time. The
actions of the two contract workers
should have been considered in
evaluating the two contract workers’
suitability for continued unescorted
access and possible entry into the
Personnel Access Data System (PADS).
As a result, FPL did not meet the Access
Authorization program objective in 10
CFR 73.56(b)(1), which is to provide
high assurance that individuals granted
UA are trustworthy and reliable, and do
not constitute an unreasonable risk to
the health and safety of the public
including a potential to commit
radiological sabotage. Subsequently, the
two contract workers’ trustworthiness
was evaluated and they were entered
into PADS. Prior to being entered into
PADS, however, the contract workers
were granted access to a number of
nuclear sites, including St. Lucie.
2. The NRC and FPL agreed that CR
2005–7449 did not fully document the
circumstances of the matter to permit
FPL to conduct a thorough review such
that corrective actions and a
trustworthiness and reliability
assessment would be performed.
3. The NRC and FPL agreed that the
violation described above did not result
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36131
in any adverse consequences. However,
the failure to conduct a trustworthiness
and reliability assessment is of concern
to the NRC because the potential
consequences, under different
circumstances, could be significant.
4. FPL reiterated its commitment to
the conduct of trustworthiness and
reliability assessments as required. FPL
agreed that the violation discussed
above occurred as stated, and in
response, agreed to implement or has
completed the following corrective
actions and enhancements:
a. FPL will issue a fleet-wide training
brief to managers and supervisors
reinforcing the requirements of NP–415,
the corporate policy governing Denial of
Unescorted Access to FPL’s Nuclear
Facilities, and the site implementing
procedures on access control.
b. FPL will revise the site
administrative procedures on access
control as necessary to ensure that they
require that contractor representatives
and supervisors immediately notify FPL
management of any incident or behavior
that may call into question the
trustworthiness or reliability of an
individual.
c. Site-specific Control and
Acceptance of Contracted Services
procedures will be revised as necessary
to ensure that the NP–415 requirements
are reviewed by the Site Technical
Representative (STRs) as part of the
termination request process. FPL will
also conduct a review of existing
procedures related to contractor
oversight and administration to ensure
that the processes therein properly
reflect the access control responsibilities
of FPL.
d. All STRs will receive a training
bulletin that reinforces management
expectations regarding FPL ownership
of access control as part of the
procedure revision. The initial and
continuing training lesson plan will be
revised to ensure that STRs, supervisors
and managers understand management
expectations regarding FPL ownership
of access control.
e. FPL will review fleet-wide the site
administrative procedures for access
control to ensure they require an
express declaration of favorable or
unfavorable termination, and to ensure
that contractors are not allowed to
manage their own access terminations
without FPL management or STR
approval.
f. Plant management will reinforce
management expectations via a fleetwide training brief to all managers and
supervisors, including the Management
Review Committee (MRC) and the Initial
Screening Team (IST), reinforcing the
requirements of NP–415 and the site
E:\FR\FM\25JNN1.SGM
25JNN1
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES
36132
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 123 / Wednesday, June 25, 2008 / Notices
access control procedures. A LessonsLearned Bulletin will be deployed for
all Corrective Action Program
Coordinators (CAPCOs) to ensure that
identified CRs contain sufficient detail
for the MRCs to make informed
decisions regarding level, investigation
type, and immediate action
recommendations.
g. A representative from the Security
Department will be added as a primary
member of the MRC at each site.
h. Management will conduct a
briefing to MRC members with a focus
on the lessons learned from the NNI
event and need for conservative action
for any issues that question the
trustworthiness or reliability of any
individual. FPL will institutionalize an
MRC Job Familiarization Guide
requiring new MRC and IST members to
receive an orientation from management
on the importance of recognizing
potential security concerns while
reviewing CRs.
i. To address situations where the CR
evaluator is not the person primarily
responsible for the event/issue, plant
procedures will be revised to require the
system/process owner to review the
evaluator’s analysis and approve of the
evaluation.
j. Supervisor initial and continuing
Fitness-For-Duty and Continued
Behavioral Observation Program
training will reinforce FPL’s expectation
of each Supervisor’s obligations to
notify the Security Department of any
potential trustworthiness and reliability
issues.
k. At St. Lucie, FPL validated that
each fleet nuclear policy was
appropriately implemented in a site
implementing procedure. FPL will
conduct an extent of condition review to
validate the implementation of nuclear
policies throughout the fleet.
l. FPL agrees to complete all
corrective actions and enhancements
identified in this paragraph 4 (items a.
through k.) within six months of the
date of issuance of the Confirmatory
Order.
5. The NRC and FPL agree that the
above elements will be incorporated
into a Confirmatory Order.
6. In consideration of the
commitments delineated in Item 4
above, the NRC agrees to exercise
enforcement discretion to forego
issuance of a Notice of Violation against
FPL for all matters discussed in the
NRC’s letter to FPL of April 2, 2008
(EA–07–321).
7. This agreement is binding upon
successors and assigns of the St. Lucie
Nuclear Plant and FPL.
On June 10, 2008, the Licensee
consented to issuance of this Order with
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the commitments, as described in
Section V below. The Licensee further
agreed that this Order is to be effective
upon issuance and that it has waived its
right to a hearing.
IV
Since the licensee has agreed to take
additional actions to address NRC
concerns, as set forth in Section III
above, the NRC has concluded that its
concerns can be resolved through
issuance of this Order.
I find that the Licensee’s
commitments as set forth in Section V
are acceptable and necessary and
conclude that with these commitments
the public health and safety are
reasonably assured. In view of the
foregoing, I have determined that public
health and safety require that the
Licensee’s commitments be confirmed
by this Order. Based on the above and
the Licensee’s consent, this Order is
immediately effective upon issuance.
V
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections
104b, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 186 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, and the Commission’s
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR
Part 50, it is hereby ordered, effective
immediately, that License Nos. DPR–67
and NPF–16 are modified as follows:
a. FPL will issue a fleet-wide training
brief to managers and supervisors
reinforcing the requirements of NP–415,
the corporate policy governing Denial of
Unescorted Access to FPL’s Nuclear
Facilities, and the site implementing
procedures on access control.
b. FPL will revise the site
administrative procedures on access
control as necessary to ensure that they
require that contractor representatives
and supervisors immediately notify FPL
management of any incident or behavior
that may call into question the
trustworthiness or reliability of an
individual.
c. Site-specific Control and
Acceptance of Contracted Services
procedures will be revised as necessary
to ensure that the NP–415 requirements
are reviewed by the Site Technical
Representative (STRs) as part of the
termination request process. FPL will
also conduct a review of existing
procedures related to contractor
oversight and administration to ensure
that the processes therein properly
reflect the access control responsibilities
of FPL.
d. All STRs will receive a training
bulletin that reinforces management
expectations regarding FPL ownership
of access control as part of the
procedure revision. The initial and
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Frm 00098
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
continuing training lesson plan will be
revised to ensure that STRs, supervisors
and managers understand management
expectations regarding FPL ownership
of access control.
e. FPL will review fleet-wide the site
administrative procedures for access
control to ensure they require an
express declaration of favorable or
unfavorable termination, and to ensure
that contractors are not allowed to
manage their own access terminations
without FPL management or STR
approval.
f. Plant management will reinforce
management expectations via a fleetwide training brief to all managers and
supervisors, including the Management
Review Committee (MRC) and the Initial
Screening Team (IST), reinforcing the
requirements of NP–415 and the site
access control procedures. A LessonsLearned Bulletin will be deployed for
all Corrective Action Program
Coordinators (CAPCOs) to ensure that
identified CRs contain sufficient detail
for the MRCs to make informed
decisions regarding level, investigation
type, and immediate action
recommendations.
g. A representative from the Security
Department will be added as a primary
member of the MRC at each site.
h. Management will conduct a
briefing to MRC members with a focus
on the lessons learned from the NNI
event and need for conservative action
for any issues that question the
trustworthiness or reliability of any
individual. FPL will institutionalize an
MRC Job Familiarization Guide
requiring new MRC and IST members to
receive an orientation from management
on the importance of recognizing
potential security concerns while
reviewing CRs.
i. To address situations where the CR
evaluator is not the person primarily
responsible for the event/issue, plant
procedures will be revised to require the
system/process owner to review the
evaluator’s analysis and approve of the
evaluation.
j. Supervisor initial and continuing
Fitness-For-Duty and Continued
Behavioral Observation Program
training will reinforce FPL’s expectation
of each Supervisor’s obligations to
notify the Security Department of any
potential trustworthiness and reliability
issues.
k. At St. Lucie, FPL validated that
each fleet nuclear policy was
appropriately implemented in a site
implementing procedure. FPL will
conduct an extent of condition review to
validate the implementation of nuclear
policies throughout the fleet.
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 123 / Wednesday, June 25, 2008 / Notices
l. FPL agrees to complete all
corrective actions and enhancements
identified in this paragraph (Section V,
items a. through k.) within six months
of the date of issuance of the
Confirmatory Order.
The Regional Administrator, NRC
Region II, may relax or rescind, in
writing, any of the above conditions
upon a showing by FPL of good cause.
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VI
Any person adversely affected by this
Confirmatory Order, other than the
Licensee, may request a hearing within
20 days of its issuance. Where good
cause is shown, consideration will be
given to extending the time to request a
hearing. A request for extension of time
must be directed to the Director, Office
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, and include a statement of good
cause for the extension.
If a person other than FPL requests a
hearing, that person shall set forth with
particularity the manner in which his
interest is adversely affected by this
Order and shall address the criteria set
forth in 10 CFR 2.309 (d) and (f).
If a hearing is requested by a person
whose interest is adversely affected, the
Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of any
hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to
be considered at such hearing shall be
whether this Confirmatory Order should
be sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), any
person adversely affected by this Order
may, within 20 days of the issuance of
this order, in addition to requesting a
hearing, move the presiding officer to
set aside the immediate effectiveness of
the Order on the ground that the Order,
including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate
evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations or error. The
motion must state with particularity the
reasons why the Order is not based on
adequate evidence and must be
accompanied by affidavits or other
evidence relied on.
A request for a hearing or to set aside
the immediate effectiveness of this
Order must be filed in accordance with
the NRC E-Filing rule, which became
effective on October 15, 2007. The NRC
E-filing Final Rule was issued on
August 28, 2007 (72 FR 49,139) and was
codified in pertinent part at 10 CFR Part
2, Subpart B. The E-Filing process
requires participants to submit and
serve documents over the Internet or, in
some cases, to mail copies on electronic
optical storage media. Participants may
not submit paper copies of their filings
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20:04 Jun 24, 2008
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unless they seek a waiver in accordance
with the procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural
requirements associated with E-Filing,
at least five (5) days prior to the filing
deadline the requestor must contact the
Office of the Secretary by e-mail at
HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV, or by
calling (301) 415–1677, to request (1) a
digital ID certificate, which allows the
participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign
documents and access the E-Submittal
server for any NRC proceeding in which
it is participating; and/or (2) creation of
an electronic docket for the proceeding
(even in instances when the requestor
(or its counsel or representative) already
holds an NRC-issued digital ID
certificate). Each requestor will need to
download the Workplace Forms
ViewerTM_ to access the Electronic
Information Exchange (EIE), a
component of the E-Filing system. The
Workplace Forms ViewerTM is free and
is available at https://www.nrc.gov/sitehelp/e-submittals/install-viewer.html.
Information about applying for a digital
ID certificate also is available on NRC’s
public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals/applycertificates.html.
Once a requestor has obtained a
digital ID certificate, had a docket
created, and downloaded the EIE
viewer, it can then submit a request for
a hearing through EIE. Submissions
should be in Portable Document Format
(PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance
available on the NRC public Web site at
https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. A filing is considered
complete at the time the filer submits its
document through EIE. To be timely,
electronic filings must be submitted to
the EIE system no later than 11:59 p.m.
Eastern Time on the due date. Upon
receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing
system time-stamps the document and
sends the submitter an e-mail notice
confirming receipt of the document. The
EIE system also distributes an e-mail
notice that provides access to the
document to the NRC Office of the
General Counsel and any others who
have advised the Office of the Secretary
that they wish to participate in the
proceeding, so that the filer need not
serve the document on those
participants separately. Therefore, any
others who wish to participate in the
proceeding (or their counsel or
representative) must apply for and
receive a digital ID certificate before a
hearing request is filed so that they may
obtain access to the document via the EFiling system.
A person filing electronically may
seek assistance through the ‘‘Contact
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36133
Us’’ link located on the NRC Web site
at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html or by calling the NRC
technical help line, which is available
between 8:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m.,
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday.
The help line number is (800) 397–4209
or locally, (301) 415–4737.
Participants who believe that they
have good cause for not submitting
documents electronically must file a
motion, in accordance with 10 CFR
2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
requesting authorization to continue to
submit documents in paper format.
Such filings must be submitted by (1)
first class mail addressed to the Office
of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or
(2) courier, express mail, or expedited
delivery service to the Office of the
Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff.
Participants filing a document in this
manner are responsible for serving the
document on all other participants.
Filing is considered complete by firstclass mail as of the time of deposit in
the mail, or by courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service upon
depositing the document with the
provider of the service.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory
proceedings will appear in NRC’s
electronic hearing docket which is
available to the public at https://
ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp,
unless excluded pursuant to an order of
the Commission, an Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board, or a Presiding Officer.
Participants are requested not to include
personal privacy information, such as
social security numbers, home
addresses, or home phone numbers in
their filings. With respect to copyrighted
works, except for limited excerpts that
serve the purpose of the adjudicatory
filings and would constitute a Fair Use
application, Participants are requested
not to include copyrighted materials in
their works.
VII
In the absence of any request for
hearing, or written approval of an
extension of time in which to request a
hearing, the provisions specified in
Section V above shall be final 20 days
from the date of this Order without
further order or proceedings. If an
extension of time for requesting a
hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section V shall
be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received. A
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36134
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 123 / Wednesday, June 25, 2008 / Notices
request for hearing shall not stay the
immediate effectiveness of this order.
Dated this 13th day of June 2008.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Luis A. Reyes,
Regional Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8–14317 Filed 6–24–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–305]
Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.;
Kewaunee Power Station;
Environmental Assessment and
Finding of No Significant Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is considering
issuance of an amendment pursuant to
Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Section
50.90, for Facility Operating License No.
DPR–43, issued to Dominion Energy
Kewaunee, Inc. (the licensee), for
operation of the Kewaunee Power
Station (KPS), located in Kewaunee
County, Wisconsin. Therefore, as
required by 10 CFR 51.21, the NRC is
issuing this environmental assessment
and finding of no significant impact.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed action would revise the
facility operating license by removing
condition 2.C(5), ‘‘Fuel Burnup,’’ which
had limited the peak rod average
burnup to 60 gigawatt-days per metric
ton urnanium (GWD/MTU) until
completion of an NRC environmental
assessment supporting an increased
limit. The proposed action would allow
an increase of the maximum rod average
burnup to as high as 62 GWD/MTU. The
licensee has procedures in place to
ensure that maximum rod burnup will
not exceed 62 GWD/MTU.
The proposed action is in accordance
with the licensee’s application dated
July 2, 2007.
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES
The Need for the Proposed Action
The proposed action to delete the
license condition for fuel burnup would
allow a higher maximum rod average
burnup of 62 GWD/MTU, which would
allow for more effective fuel
management. If the amendment is not
approved, the licensee will not be
provided the opportunity to increase
maximum rod average burnup to as high
as 62 GWD/MTU and allow fuel
management flexibility.
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20:04 Jun 24, 2008
Jkt 214001
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed
Action
In this environmental assessment
regarding the impacts of the use of
extended burnup fuel beyond 60 GWD/
MTU, the Commission is relying on the
results of the updated study conducted
for NRC by the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory (PNNL), entitled
‘‘Environmental Effects of Extending
Fuel Burnup Above 60 GWD/MTU’’
(NUREG/CR–6703, PNNL–13257,
January 2001). Environmental impacts
of high burnup fuel up to 75 GWD/MTU
were evaluated in the study, but some
aspects of the review were limited to
evaluating the impacts of the extended
burnup up to 62 GWD/MTU because of
the need for additional data on the effect
of extended burnup on gap release
fractions. All the aspects of the fuelcycle were considered during the study,
from mining, milling, conversion,
enrichment and fabrication through
normal reactor operation,
transportation, waste management, and
storage of spent fuel.
The amendment would allow KPS to
extend lead rod average burnup to 62
GWD/MTU. The NRC staff has
completed its evaluation of the
proposed action and concludes that
such changes would not adversely affect
plant safety, and would have no adverse
affect on the probability of any accident.
For the accidents that involve damage or
melting of the fuel in the reactor core,
fuel rod integrity has been shown to be
unaffected by extended burnup under
consideration; therefore, the probability
of an accident will not be affected. For
the accidents in which core remains
intact, the increased burnup may
slightly change the mix of fission
products that could be released in the
event of a serious accident, but because
the radionuclides contributing most to
the dose are short-lived, increased
burnup would not have an effect on the
consequences of a serious accident
beyond the previously evaluated
accident scenarios. Increases in
projected consequences of postulated
accidents associated with fuel burnup
up to 62 GWD/MTU are not considered
significant, and remain well below
regulatory limits.
Regulatory limits on radiological
effluent releases are independent of
burnup. The requirements of 10 CFR
50.36a and Appendix I to 10 CFR Part
50 ensure that any release of gaseous,
liquid or solid radiological effluents to
unrestricted areas is kept ‘‘As Low As is
Reasonably Achievable.’’ Therefore,
NRC staff concludes that during routine
operations, there will be no significant
increase in the amount of gaseous
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
radiological effluents released into the
environment as a result of the proposed
action, nor will there be a significant
increase in the amount of liquid
radiological effluents or solid
radiological effluents released into the
environment.
The proposed action will not change
normal plant operating conditions. No
changes are expected in the fuel
handling, operational or storing
processes. There will be no significant
changes in radiation levels during these
evolutions. No significant increase in
the allowable individual or cumulative
occupational radiation exposure is
expected to occur.
The use of extended irradiation will
not change the potential environmental
impacts of incident-free transportation
of spent nuclear fuel or the accident
risks associated with spent fuel
transportation if the fuel is cooled for 5
years after being discharged from the
reactor. The PNNL report for the NRC
(NUREG/CR–6703, January 2001),
concluded that doses associated with
incident-free transportation of spent fuel
with burnup to 75 GWD/MTU are
bounded by the doses given in 10 CFR
51.52, Table S–4 for all regions of the
country, based on the dose rates from
the shipping casks being maintained
within regulatory limits. Increased fuel
burnup will decrease the annual
discharge of fuel to the spent fuel pool,
which will postpone the need to remove
spent fuel from the pool.
NUREG/CR–6703 determined that no
increase in environmental effects of
spent fuel transportation accidents are
expected as a result of increasing fuel
burnup to 75 GWD/MTU.
The proposed action does not affect
non-radiological plant effluents, and no
changes to the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System permit
are needed. No effects on the aquatic or
terrestrial habitat in the vicinity of the
plant, or on endangered and/or
threatened species and their habitats are
expected. The proposed action does not
involve any historical or archaeological
sites.
The proposed action will not change
the method of generating electricity or
the method of handling any influents
from the environment or nonradiological effluents to the
environment. Therefore, no changes or
different types of non-radiological
environmental impacts are expected as
a result of this amendment.
Accordingly, the NRC concludes that
there are no significant environmental
impacts associated with the proposed
action. For more detailed information
regarding the environmental impacts of
extended fuel burnup, please refer to the
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 123 (Wednesday, June 25, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 36131-36134]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-14317]
[[Page 36131]]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos.: 50-335, 50-389; License Nos.: DPR-67, NPF-16; EA-07-321]
In the Matter of Florida Power and Light Company, St. Lucie
Nuclear Plant; Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately)
I
Florida Power and Light Company (FPL or Licensee) is the holder of
Operating License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16, issued by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 on
March 1, 1976, and April 6, 1983, respectively. The license authorizes
the operation of St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, (St. Lucie or
facility) in accordance with conditions specified therein. The facility
is located on the Licensee's site in Jensen Beach, Florida.
This Confirmatory Order is the result of an agreement reached
during an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session
conducted on May 16, 2008.
II
On September 1, 2006, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) began
an investigation (OI Case No. 2-2006-034) at St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.
Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, the NRC staff
concluded that a supervisor at St. Lucie willfully failed to take
action to identify two contract workers as untrustworthy, subsequent to
their actions to falsify a work order related to valve maintenance
activities they performed. The results of the investigation were sent
to FPL in a letter dated April 2, 2008.
The NRC's letter of April 2, 2008, documented the forgoing incident
which occurred on or about March 10, 2005. Two contractors documented a
work order to indicate that they had used the torque wrench required by
the work order when, in fact, they had used a different torque wrench,
in an apparent effort to conceal their over-torquing of a valve. The
April 2nd letter also documented the subsequent investigation of this
incident by FPL and the corrective actions taken by FPL's St. Lucie
management. Although FPL's immediate actions to ensure all maintenance
and operational issues associated with the valve in question were
prompt and comprehensive, the NRC's letter of April 2, 2008, documented
two apparent violations associated with FPL's initial review and
investigation into the matter.
III
On May 16, 2008, the NRC and FPL met in an ADR session mediated by
a professional mediator, arranged through Cornell University's
Institute on Conflict Resolution. ADR is a process in which a neutral
mediator with no decisionmaking authority assists the parties in
reaching an agreement or resolving any differences regarding their
dispute. This confirmatory order is issued pursuant to the agreement
reached during the ADR process. The elements of the agreement consist
of the following:
1. The NRC and FPL agreed that a violation occurred involving FPL's
failure to adhere to FPL Nuclear Division Policy, NP-415, Revision 3,
and ADM-15.02. These procedures require, in part, that in all instances
where the trustworthiness and reliability of a person who is currently
granted unescorted access (UA) is called into question by credible
objective evidence, the responsible supervisor or manager of that
individual shall promptly contact the appropriate site security manager
at the nuclear plant site. In this case, the falsification of the work
order called into question the trustworthiness and reliability of the
two contract workers. However, FPL did not ensure that the site
security manager was contacted or otherwise initiate action such that
the trustworthiness and reliability of the two contract workers could
be assessed at that time. The actions of the two contract workers
should have been considered in evaluating the two contract workers'
suitability for continued unescorted access and possible entry into the
Personnel Access Data System (PADS). As a result, FPL did not meet the
Access Authorization program objective in 10 CFR 73.56(b)(1), which is
to provide high assurance that individuals granted UA are trustworthy
and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health
and safety of the public including a potential to commit radiological
sabotage. Subsequently, the two contract workers' trustworthiness was
evaluated and they were entered into PADS. Prior to being entered into
PADS, however, the contract workers were granted access to a number of
nuclear sites, including St. Lucie.
2. The NRC and FPL agreed that CR 2005-7449 did not fully document
the circumstances of the matter to permit FPL to conduct a thorough
review such that corrective actions and a trustworthiness and
reliability assessment would be performed.
3. The NRC and FPL agreed that the violation described above did
not result in any adverse consequences. However, the failure to conduct
a trustworthiness and reliability assessment is of concern to the NRC
because the potential consequences, under different circumstances,
could be significant.
4. FPL reiterated its commitment to the conduct of trustworthiness
and reliability assessments as required. FPL agreed that the violation
discussed above occurred as stated, and in response, agreed to
implement or has completed the following corrective actions and
enhancements:
a. FPL will issue a fleet-wide training brief to managers and
supervisors reinforcing the requirements of NP-415, the corporate
policy governing Denial of Unescorted Access to FPL's Nuclear
Facilities, and the site implementing procedures on access control.
b. FPL will revise the site administrative procedures on access
control as necessary to ensure that they require that contractor
representatives and supervisors immediately notify FPL management of
any incident or behavior that may call into question the
trustworthiness or reliability of an individual.
c. Site-specific Control and Acceptance of Contracted Services
procedures will be revised as necessary to ensure that the NP-415
requirements are reviewed by the Site Technical Representative (STRs)
as part of the termination request process. FPL will also conduct a
review of existing procedures related to contractor oversight and
administration to ensure that the processes therein properly reflect
the access control responsibilities of FPL.
d. All STRs will receive a training bulletin that reinforces
management expectations regarding FPL ownership of access control as
part of the procedure revision. The initial and continuing training
lesson plan will be revised to ensure that STRs, supervisors and
managers understand management expectations regarding FPL ownership of
access control.
e. FPL will review fleet-wide the site administrative procedures
for access control to ensure they require an express declaration of
favorable or unfavorable termination, and to ensure that contractors
are not allowed to manage their own access terminations without FPL
management or STR approval.
f. Plant management will reinforce management expectations via a
fleet-wide training brief to all managers and supervisors, including
the Management Review Committee (MRC) and the Initial Screening Team
(IST), reinforcing the requirements of NP-415 and the site
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access control procedures. A Lessons-Learned Bulletin will be deployed
for all Corrective Action Program Coordinators (CAPCOs) to ensure that
identified CRs contain sufficient detail for the MRCs to make informed
decisions regarding level, investigation type, and immediate action
recommendations.
g. A representative from the Security Department will be added as a
primary member of the MRC at each site.
h. Management will conduct a briefing to MRC members with a focus
on the lessons learned from the NNI event and need for conservative
action for any issues that question the trustworthiness or reliability
of any individual. FPL will institutionalize an MRC Job Familiarization
Guide requiring new MRC and IST members to receive an orientation from
management on the importance of recognizing potential security concerns
while reviewing CRs.
i. To address situations where the CR evaluator is not the person
primarily responsible for the event/issue, plant procedures will be
revised to require the system/process owner to review the evaluator's
analysis and approve of the evaluation.
j. Supervisor initial and continuing Fitness-For-Duty and Continued
Behavioral Observation Program training will reinforce FPL's
expectation of each Supervisor's obligations to notify the Security
Department of any potential trustworthiness and reliability issues.
k. At St. Lucie, FPL validated that each fleet nuclear policy was
appropriately implemented in a site implementing procedure. FPL will
conduct an extent of condition review to validate the implementation of
nuclear policies throughout the fleet.
l. FPL agrees to complete all corrective actions and enhancements
identified in this paragraph 4 (items a. through k.) within six months
of the date of issuance of the Confirmatory Order.
5. The NRC and FPL agree that the above elements will be
incorporated into a Confirmatory Order.
6. In consideration of the commitments delineated in Item 4 above,
the NRC agrees to exercise enforcement discretion to forego issuance of
a Notice of Violation against FPL for all matters discussed in the
NRC's letter to FPL of April 2, 2008 (EA-07-321).
7. This agreement is binding upon successors and assigns of the St.
Lucie Nuclear Plant and FPL.
On June 10, 2008, the Licensee consented to issuance of this Order
with the commitments, as described in Section V below. The Licensee
further agreed that this Order is to be effective upon issuance and
that it has waived its right to a hearing.
IV
Since the licensee has agreed to take additional actions to address
NRC concerns, as set forth in Section III above, the NRC has concluded
that its concerns can be resolved through issuance of this Order.
I find that the Licensee's commitments as set forth in Section V
are acceptable and necessary and conclude that with these commitments
the public health and safety are reasonably assured. In view of the
foregoing, I have determined that public health and safety require that
the Licensee's commitments be confirmed by this Order. Based on the
above and the Licensee's consent, this Order is immediately effective
upon issuance.
V
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 104b, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and
186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR Part 50, it is hereby ordered,
effective immediately, that License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16 are modified
as follows:
a. FPL will issue a fleet-wide training brief to managers and
supervisors reinforcing the requirements of NP-415, the corporate
policy governing Denial of Unescorted Access to FPL's Nuclear
Facilities, and the site implementing procedures on access control.
b. FPL will revise the site administrative procedures on access
control as necessary to ensure that they require that contractor
representatives and supervisors immediately notify FPL management of
any incident or behavior that may call into question the
trustworthiness or reliability of an individual.
c. Site-specific Control and Acceptance of Contracted Services
procedures will be revised as necessary to ensure that the NP-415
requirements are reviewed by the Site Technical Representative (STRs)
as part of the termination request process. FPL will also conduct a
review of existing procedures related to contractor oversight and
administration to ensure that the processes therein properly reflect
the access control responsibilities of FPL.
d. All STRs will receive a training bulletin that reinforces
management expectations regarding FPL ownership of access control as
part of the procedure revision. The initial and continuing training
lesson plan will be revised to ensure that STRs, supervisors and
managers understand management expectations regarding FPL ownership of
access control.
e. FPL will review fleet-wide the site administrative procedures
for access control to ensure they require an express declaration of
favorable or unfavorable termination, and to ensure that contractors
are not allowed to manage their own access terminations without FPL
management or STR approval.
f. Plant management will reinforce management expectations via a
fleet-wide training brief to all managers and supervisors, including
the Management Review Committee (MRC) and the Initial Screening Team
(IST), reinforcing the requirements of NP-415 and the site access
control procedures. A Lessons-Learned Bulletin will be deployed for all
Corrective Action Program Coordinators (CAPCOs) to ensure that
identified CRs contain sufficient detail for the MRCs to make informed
decisions regarding level, investigation type, and immediate action
recommendations.
g. A representative from the Security Department will be added as a
primary member of the MRC at each site.
h. Management will conduct a briefing to MRC members with a focus
on the lessons learned from the NNI event and need for conservative
action for any issues that question the trustworthiness or reliability
of any individual. FPL will institutionalize an MRC Job Familiarization
Guide requiring new MRC and IST members to receive an orientation from
management on the importance of recognizing potential security concerns
while reviewing CRs.
i. To address situations where the CR evaluator is not the person
primarily responsible for the event/issue, plant procedures will be
revised to require the system/process owner to review the evaluator's
analysis and approve of the evaluation.
j. Supervisor initial and continuing Fitness-For-Duty and Continued
Behavioral Observation Program training will reinforce FPL's
expectation of each Supervisor's obligations to notify the Security
Department of any potential trustworthiness and reliability issues.
k. At St. Lucie, FPL validated that each fleet nuclear policy was
appropriately implemented in a site implementing procedure. FPL will
conduct an extent of condition review to validate the implementation of
nuclear policies throughout the fleet.
[[Page 36133]]
l. FPL agrees to complete all corrective actions and enhancements
identified in this paragraph (Section V, items a. through k.) within
six months of the date of issuance of the Confirmatory Order.
The Regional Administrator, NRC Region II, may relax or rescind, in
writing, any of the above conditions upon a showing by FPL of good
cause.
VI
Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other
than the Licensee, may request a hearing within 20 days of its
issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to
extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of
time must be directed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and include a
statement of good cause for the extension.
If a person other than FPL requests a hearing, that person shall
set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is
adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set
forth in 10 CFR 2.309 (d) and (f).
If a hearing is requested by a person whose interest is adversely
affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and
place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered
at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory Order should be
sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), any person adversely affected by
this Order may, within 20 days of the issuance of this order, in
addition to requesting a hearing, move the presiding officer to set
aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the
Order, including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on
adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations or
error. The motion must state with particularity the reasons why the
Order is not based on adequate evidence and must be accompanied by
affidavits or other evidence relied on.
A request for a hearing or to set aside the immediate effectiveness
of this Order must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule,
which became effective on October 15, 2007. The NRC E-filing Final Rule
was issued on August 28, 2007 (72 FR 49,139) and was codified in
pertinent part at 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart B. The E-Filing process
requires participants to submit and serve documents over the Internet
or, in some cases, to mail copies on electronic optical storage media.
Participants may not submit paper copies of their filings unless they
seek a waiver in accordance with the procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements associated with E-
Filing, at least five (5) days prior to the filing deadline the
requestor must contact the Office of the Secretary by e-mail at
HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV, or by calling (301) 415-1677, to request (1) a
digital ID certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal
server for any NRC proceeding in which it is participating; and/or (2)
creation of an electronic docket for the proceeding (even in instances
when the requestor (or its counsel or representative) already holds an
NRC-issued digital ID certificate). Each requestor will need to
download the Workplace Forms Viewer\TM\-- to access the Electronic
Information Exchange (EIE), a component of the E-Filing system. The
Workplace Forms Viewer\TM\ is free and is available at https://
www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/install-viewer.html. Information
about applying for a digital ID certificate also is available on NRC's
public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-
certificates.html.
Once a requestor has obtained a digital ID certificate, had a
docket created, and downloaded the EIE viewer, it can then submit a
request for a hearing through EIE. Submissions should be in Portable
Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance available on the
NRC public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
A filing is considered complete at the time the filer submits its
document through EIE. To be timely, electronic filings must be
submitted to the EIE system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on
the due date. Upon receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-
stamps the document and sends the submitter an e-mail notice confirming
receipt of the document. The EIE system also distributes an e-mail
notice that provides access to the document to the NRC Office of the
General Counsel and any others who have advised the Office of the
Secretary that they wish to participate in the proceeding, so that the
filer need not serve the document on those participants separately.
Therefore, any others who wish to participate in the proceeding (or
their counsel or representative) must apply for and receive a digital
ID certificate before a hearing request is filed so that they may
obtain access to the document via the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically may seek assistance through the
``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals.html or by calling the NRC technical help line,
which is available between 8:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Eastern Time,
Monday through Friday. The help line number is (800) 397-4209 or
locally, (301) 415-4737.
Participants who believe that they have good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file a motion, in accordance
with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing requesting
authorization to continue to submit documents in paper format. Such
filings must be submitted by (1) first class mail addressed to the
Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or expedited
delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852,
Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants filing a
document in this manner are responsible for serving the document on all
other participants. Filing is considered complete by first-class mail
as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service upon depositing the document with the
provider of the service.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at
https://ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp, unless excluded pursuant
to an order of the Commission, an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, or
a Presiding Officer. Participants are requested not to include personal
privacy information, such as social security numbers, home addresses,
or home phone numbers in their filings. With respect to copyrighted
works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the
adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use application,
Participants are requested not to include copyrighted materials in
their works.
VII
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section V above shall be final 20 days from the date of
this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of
time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions
specified in Section V shall be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received. A
[[Page 36134]]
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this
order.
Dated this 13th day of June 2008.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Luis A. Reyes,
Regional Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8-14317 Filed 6-24-08; 8:45 am]
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