Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, Referral for Panel Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 34654-34663 [E8-13435]

Agencies

• Executive Office for Immigration Review
• Department of Justice

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 118 (Wednesday, June 18, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 34654-34663]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-13435]


========================================================================
Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

========================================================================


Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 118 / Wednesday, June 18, 2008 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 34654]]



DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Executive Office for Immigration Review

8 CFR Part 1003

[EOIR Docket No. 159P; AG Order No. 2976-2008]
RIN 1125-AA58


Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, 
Referral for Panel Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents

AGENCY: Executive Office for Immigration Review, Justice.

ACTION: Proposed rule with request for comments.

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SUMMARY: This proposed rule would amend the Department of Justice 
(Department) regulations regarding the administrative review procedures 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) in three ways. First, this 
rule provides greater flexibility for the Board to decide, in the 
exercise of its discretion, whether to issue an affirmance without 
opinion (AWO) or any other type of decision. This rule clarifies that 
the criteria the Board uses in deciding to invoke its AWO authority are 
solely for its own internal guidance, and that the Board's decision 
depends on the Board's judgment regarding its resources and is not 
reviewable. The revision related to AWO is needed to address divergent 
precedent in the United States Courts of Appeals regarding the 
reviewability of the Board's decision to issue an AWO. Finally, this 
revision clarifies that when the Board issues an AWO or a short 
decision adopting some or all of the immigration judge's decision, the 
decision is generally based on issues and claims of errors raised on 
appeal and is not to be construed as waiving a party's obligation to 
raise issues and exhaust claims of error before the Board. Second, this 
rule expands the authority to refer cases for three-member panel review 
for a small class of particularly complex cases involving complex or 
unusual issues of law or fact. Third, this rule amends the regulations 
relating to precedent decisions of the Board by authorizing publication 
of decisions either by a majority of the panel members or by a majority 
of permanent Board members and clarifying the relevant considerations 
for designation of precedents. These revisions implement, in part, the 
Memorandum for Immigration Judges and Members of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals issued by the Attorney General on August 9, 2006.

DATES: Comment date: Comments may be submitted not later than August 
18, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by EOIR Docket No. 159P, 
by one of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Mail: John Blum, Acting General Counsel, Executive Office 
for Immigration Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2600, Falls Church, 
Virginia 22041. To ensure proper handling, please reference EOIR Docket 
No. 159P on your correspondence. This mailing address may also be used 
for paper, disk, or CD-ROM submissions.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: John Blum, Acting General Counsel, 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 
2600, Falls Church, Virginia 22041; telephone (703) 305-0470 (not a 
toll-free call).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Blum, Acting General Counsel, 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 
2600, Falls Church, Virginia 22041; telephone (703) 305-0470 (not a 
toll-free call).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Public Participation

    Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by 
submitting written data, views, or arguments on all aspects of this 
rule. Comments that will provide the most assistance to the Department 
of Justice will reference a specific portion of the rule, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include data, information, or 
authority supporting the recommended change.
    All submissions received must include the agency name and EOIR 
Docket No. 159P.
    Posting of Public Comments: Please note that all comments received 
are considered part of the public record and made available for public 
inspection online at www.regulations.gov. Such information includes 
personal identifying information (such as your name, address, etc.) 
voluntarily submitted by the commenter.
    If you want to submit personal identifying information (such as 
your name, address, etc.) as part of your comment, but do not want it 
to be posted online, you must include the phrase ``PERSONAL IDENTIFYING 
INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph of your comment. You must also 
locate all the personal identifying information you do not want posted 
online in the first paragraph of your comment and identify what 
information you want redacted.
    If you want to submit confidential business information as part of 
your comment but do not want it to be posted online, you must include 
the phrase ``CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph 
of your comment. You must also prominently identify confidential 
business information to be redacted within the comment. If a comment 
has so much confidential business information that it cannot be 
effectively redacted, all or part of that comment may not be posted on 
https://www.regulations.gov.
    Personal identifying information identified and located as set 
forth above will be placed in the agency's public docket file, but not 
posted online. Confidential business information identified and located 
as set forth above will not be placed in the public docket file. If you 
wish to inspect the agency's public docket file in person by 
appointment, please see the ``For Further Information Contact'' 
paragraph.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov. Submitted comments 
may also be inspected at the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2600, Falls Church, Virginia 22041. To make 
an appointment, please contact the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review at (703) 305-0470 (not a toll free call).

[[Page 34655]]

II. The Attorney General's Review

    On January 9, 2006, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales directed a 
comprehensive review of the Immigration Courts and the Board. This 
review was undertaken in response to concerns about the quality of 
decisions being issued by the immigration judges and the Board and 
about reports of intemperate behavior by some immigration judges.
    At that time, the Deputy Attorney General and the Associate 
Attorney General assembled a review team, which over the course of 
several months conducted hundreds of interviews, administered an online 
survey, and analyzed thousands of documents to assess the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) adjudicative process. With regard 
to the Board's appellate process, the review team received much 
commentary about the streamlining and Board reform regulations, 
specifically the Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management Rule, 67 
FR 54878 (August 26, 2002) (``Board reform rule''). This rule provided 
for improved case management procedures and expanded the number of 
cases that could be referred to a single Board member for review. This 
new case management system was intended to reduce delays in the 
appellate review process, reduce the backlog of pending cases, and 
allow Board members to focus more attention on cases presenting novel 
or significant issues.
    Critics of the procedural reforms rule speculated that the revised 
procedures allowed Board members insufficient time to review cases 
thoroughly and made it more difficult for the Board to publish adequate 
numbers of precedential decisions. Supporters observed that the reforms 
brought much-needed efficiency to the appellate process, which allowed 
the Board to eliminate a large backlog of cases and to adjudicate cases 
in a timely manner.
    On August 9, 2006, Attorney General Gonzales announced that the 
review was complete, and he directed that a series of measures be taken 
to improve adjudications by the immigration judges and the Board. EOIR 
is implementing most of those initiatives through administrative and 
management actions, although several of the initiatives require changes 
to the existing regulations. This rule is one of several new regulatory 
actions resulting from this senior level review, and implements three 
initiatives relating to the Board.
    The Department considered the Board's current and predicted 
caseload, its resources, and the need to adjudicate cases thoroughly 
and in a timely manner and concluded that the basic principles set 
forth in the Board reform rule were still necessary to prevent future 
backlogs and delays in adjudication. Accordingly, the Department is not 
reopening or seeking public comment on the existing final regulations 
that were adopted in 2002.
    However, the Department has concluded that three specific 
adjustments to the Board reform rule are appropriate, and it is with 
respect to these three changes that we seek public comments. The 
proposed rule, accordingly, would revise the regulations governing the 
Board to (1) encourage the increased use of one-member written opinions 
to address poor or intemperate immigration judge decisions, instead of 
issuing affirmances without opinion, (2) allow for the use of three-
member written opinions to provide greater legal analysis in a small 
class of particularly complex cases, and (3) authorize three-member 
panels, by majority vote, to designate their decisions as precedent 
decisions. The Department has already published a separate rule 
increasing the number of Board members in order to carry out the 
Board's expanded responsibilities. 71 FR 70855 (Dec. 7, 2006).

III. Affirmance Without Opinion

A. Mandatory and Discretionary Affirmances Without Opinion

    Historically, with a few exceptions not mentioned here, the Board 
adjudicated all of its cases in panels of three Board members. Those 
three-member panels generally issued full written decisions explaining 
the order in each case. However, as the Board's caseload began to grow 
dramatically over the years, changes were necessary to help the Board 
manage its docket.
    In 1999, a regulatory amendment authorized the Board to affirm the 
decision of an immigration judge without issuing a separate written 
opinion. See Board of Immigration Appeals; Streamlining, 64 FR 56135 
(Oct. 18, 1999). This kind of order is called an affirmance without 
opinion (AWO), and the decision contains only two sentences prescribed 
by regulation, without any additional language or explanation about the 
reasons for the affirmance. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(4)(ii). The Board 
implemented the AWO process successfully, although the process was 
initially utilized only in certain categories of cases pending before 
the Board, and all other cases were still referred to a three-member 
panel for decision. Despite the use of this new procedural device, 
however, the Board's backlog of pending cases continued to grow and the 
average period of time that cases remained pending on appeal to the 
Board lengthened considerably.
    More than five years ago, Attorney General John Ashcroft published 
the Board reform rule. See 67 FR 54878 (Aug. 26, 2002). That rule 
retained the basic AWO process as introduced in 1999, but expanded the 
use of affirmances without opinion by providing for the Board to issue 
an AWO in any case when certain regulatory criteria are met. Compare 8 
CFR 3.1(a)(7)(ii) (2000) (providing that a single Board member ``may'' 
affirm without opinion) with 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(4)(i) (2006) (providing 
that, in certain circumstances, a single Board member ``shall'' affirm 
without opinion).\1\ Under the current regulations, a single Board 
member will affirm an immigration judge's decision without opinion when 
he or she is satisfied that the immigration judge's decision reached 
the correct result, that any errors were harmless or nonmaterial, and 
that the issues on appeal are either (1) squarely controlled by 
precedent and do not require an application of precedent to a novel 
factual scenario, or (2) are not so substantial as to warrant the 
issuance of a written opinion in the case. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(4)(i). 
When a single Board member is satisfied that the regulatory criteria 
are met and issues an AWO, the order will state that ``[t]he Board 
affirms, without opinion, the result of the decision below. The 
decision below is, therefore, the final agency determination.'' 8 CFR 
1003.1(e)(4)(ii).
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    \1\ In 2003, the Attorney General redesignated the previous 
regulations in 8 CFR part 3, relating to EOIR, as 8 CFR part 1003 in 
connection with the abolition of the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service and the transfer of its responsibilities to 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Under the Homeland 
Security Act, EOIR (including the Board and the immigration judges) 
remains under the authority of the Attorney General. See 6 U.S.C. 
521; 8 U.S.C. 1103(g).
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    When the Board member determines that an AWO is not warranted in a 
case, the current regulation provides that most such cases will be 
resolved by an opinion issued by a single Board member rather than 
referred to a panel of three Board members. A single Board member may 
issue a decision that affirms, modifies, or remands an immigration 
judge's decision, and may provide any explanation or address any issue 
he or she deems appropriate. The majority of single member decisions, 
in fact, are not AWOs, but are fuller orders addressing the issues 
raised on appeal. In fact, in fiscal year 2007, only 10% of

[[Page 34656]]

the Board's decisions were issued as AWOs.
    In addition to restructuring the decisional process, the Board 
reform rule set specific time limits for the disposition of appeals 
after the record on appeal is completed and the case is ready for 
adjudication. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8). With rare exceptions, a Board 
member must adjudicate a case within 90 days of completion of the 
record. If the case is referred to a three-member panel, the case must 
be adjudicated within 180 days of referral.
    With the Board reform rule, the Department provided the Board with 
powerful tools to address a burgeoning number of appeals and a growing 
backlog of cases. When he announced the Board's restructuring in 
February 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft cited the size of the Board's 
backlog and the substantial delays in reaching final decisions as the 
basis for the reform. At that time, 56,000 cases were pending before 
the Board. More than 10,000 of those cases had been pending for more 
than three years and another 34,000 had been pending for more than one 
year. Presently, approximately 27,000 cases are pending at the Board--
more than a 50% decrease--even though the number of cases being filed 
with the Board has remained very high, with 40,000 new cases received 
during FY2006. Except for cases on regulatory hold, see 8 CFR 
1003.1(e)(8)(ii), virtually none of the 27,000 current cases has been 
pending for more than three years. The vast majority of the pending 
cases were filed in FY2007 or 2008; only 10 percent were filed in 
FY2006. In short, the Board has essentially eliminated the backlog of 
pending appeals and reduced the time for processing appeals and motions 
in compliance with the regulatory time frames governing the completion 
of cases.\2\
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    \2\ The regulatory time frames relate to the period beginning 
when the record is complete and the case is ready for adjudication. 
At present, the principal cause of delay in the Board's 
adjudications relates to the time required for preparation of 
transcripts of the immigration judge proceedings and other steps 
needed to complete the record. EOIR is already working to reduce 
those delays in response to another Attorney General directive.
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    Although individuals have challenged the Board reform rule on due 
process and administrative law grounds, the federal courts have 
consistently affirmed the Attorney General's authority to adopt the 
rule. See Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2004); 
Zhang v. United States Dep't of Justice, 362 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2004); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 
F.3d 228, 238-45 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 
724-32 (6th Cir. 2003); Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845 (9th 
Cir. 2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2003); Mendoza 
v.  U.S. Att'y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2003); Soadjede v. 
Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2003); Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365 
(1st Cir. 2003); Capital Area Immigrants' Rights Coalition v. U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, 264 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2003).
    The success of the reform regulation rests on both the ability of 
the Board to adjudicate the majority of cases by single-member review 
and the ability of the Board to affirm the decision of an immigration 
judge without issuing a full opinion. See Guyadin v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 
465, 469 (2d Cir. 2006) (highlighting the importance of the 
streamlining regulations to address a ``crushing backlog''). The number 
of decisions issued by a single Board member has remained relatively 
constant since the effective date of the reform regulation. In 
contrast, the rate of AWOs has been decreasing. In fiscal year 2003, 
approximately 36% of the Board's decisions were AWOs. That number 
declined to approximately 32% in fiscal year 2004, 20% in fiscal year 
2005, and 15% in fiscal year 2006. The AWO rate for fiscal year 2007 is 
only 10%.
    Despite the success of the Board's reform rule in addressing delays 
in decision times and in managing a very heavy caseload, some courts of 
appeals have levied pointed criticism in some cases where the 
immigration judge's conduct was intemperate or abusive, raising the 
concern that such conduct was not adequately addressed by the Board's 
decisions, particularly in cases where the Board issued an AWO. See, 
e.g., Fiadjoe v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 411 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2005); Cham v. 
U.S. Att'y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 693-94 (3d Cir. 2006); Huang v. 
Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2006). Some courts of appeals have also 
criticized the quality of the immigration judge and Board decisions. 
See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005), and cases 
cited therein. The criticism has been limited to a relatively small 
number of cases and a minority of circuit courts. Moreover, the overall 
rate at which the federal courts have overturned Board decisions on 
judicial review has remained fairly constant, averaging only 10 to 12 
percent. It should also be borne in mind that only the aliens are able 
to petition for review in the circuit courts. DHS may not appeal 
adverse Board decisions to the courts of appeals; thus, the courts 
never see the thousands of cases in which the aliens are granted relief 
or protection from removal. Nevertheless, the Attorney General has 
concluded that some adjustments to the Board's streamlining practices 
are now appropriate to improve the quality of the Board's review of 
complex or problematic cases while retaining the fundamentals of 
streamlining.
    Attorney General Gonzales directed the Board to increase the use of 
single-member written opinions to address immigration judge decisions 
that are poor in quality and cases in which the immigration judge's 
conduct during the hearing was intemperate or abusive. This rule meets 
that objective by providing the Board with greater flexibility to issue 
decisions that respond to the concerns expressed by the federal circuit 
courts.
    Under this rule, single Board members will have discretion to 
decide whether to issue an AWO or to issue a written opinion with an 
explanation of the reasons for the decision. The existing regulations 
already provide that a single Board member is not required to issue an 
AWO when there is a substantial factual or legal issue in the case 
warranting the issuance of a written opinion, but this rule recognizes 
that Board members may choose to issue either an AWO or a written 
opinion, as a matter of discretion, in cases where the regulatory 
criteria in 8 CFR 1003.1(a)(4)(i) are met.
    In determining whether to exercise its discretion to issue an AWO 
or a single-member opinion, the Board may consider available resources 
to balance the need to complete cases efficiently while evaluating 
whether there is a need to provide further guidance to the immigration 
judge, the parties, and the federal courts through a written decision 
addressing the issues in a case. The Board is best positioned to assess 
its resources and the importance of various competing demands, because 
the Board sees the full expanse of issues presented in the more than 
40,000 cases filed each year from decisions of the immigration judges 
and of DHS service centers or other adjudicating officers in those 
cases subject to review by the Board. The Board is thus able to see 
recurring problems or issues arising in the decisions under review.
    The Board may consider exercising its discretion to issue a written 
order in those cases in which the immigration judge's decision would 
otherwise meet the criteria for AWO, but the immigration judge 
exhibited inappropriate conduct at the hearing or made intemperate 
comments in the oral decision. Likewise, the Board may consider issuing 
single-member opinions in those cases in which the

[[Page 34657]]

infirmities in the decision under review are not prejudicial, but are 
of such a nature and extent that the Board may find it appropriate to 
address the basis for the decision. Examples include where the 
immigration judge reaches the correct result but does not provide a 
complete analysis, the immigration judge's analysis includes some 
immaterial or technical error, or the immigration judge fails to 
include citations to applicable precedent or regulations. While the 
result may be correct and the errors harmless, the Board member may 
consider that, in these kinds of cases, further explanation is 
warranted.

B. Reviewability

    With the greater level of flexibility afforded by this rule, the 
Board is better situated to address the concern expressed by some 
courts that AWOs allow room for confusion in the record about the basis 
for the Board's decision, and thus, the jurisdiction of the federal 
circuit courts. See generally Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 
2004). The Department acknowledges the high volume of cases now pending 
before the courts of appeals and sees this rule as a means of 
addressing some of the courts' concerns and of promoting greater 
uniformity in the way the courts review administrative decisions.
    Existing regulations establish that when the Board issues an AWO, 
the decision of the immigration judge becomes the ``final agency 
determination.'' 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(4)(ii). Although the immigration 
judge's decision becomes the ``final agency determination,'' the Board 
remains the final agency decision maker exercising the authority 
delegated by the Attorney General. It is the Board's AWO that triggers 
the time period for seeking review in a circuit court. When an alien 
petitions for review following the Board's issuance of an AWO, the 
courts review the merits of the immigration judge's decision.
    Some circuits, however, have concluded that, in addition to 
reviewing the merits of the underlying immigration judge's decision, 
the court may also review the Board's decision to issue an AWO, as 
opposed to another type of order. Other circuits have reached the 
opposite conclusion. This inconsistency threatens the goal of the 
Board's procedural reforms: securing finality in immigration cases as 
efficiently as possible.
    The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have concluded that the Board's 
decision to issue an AWO is not reviewable. See Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 
F.3d 975, 981-88 (8th Cir. 2004); Tsegay v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 
1355-58 (10th Cir. 2004). In particular, the Tenth Circuit found it 
lacked jurisdiction to review the Board's procedural decision to issue 
an AWO, as opposed to a single-member decision with an opinion or a 
three-member decision. The court noted that when the Board affirms an 
immigration judge's decision without opinion, the immigration judge's 
decision becomes the final agency decision. The Tenth Circuit concluded 
that because the Immigration and Nationality Act vests jurisdiction in 
the courts of appeals to review a ``final order of removal,'' the court 
was without jurisdiction to review the Board's AWO decision because an 
AWO is not in the nature of a final agency decision. Id. at 1353. The 
Tenth Circuit also concluded that because the decision to issue an AWO 
is committed to the Board's discretion, the Administrative Procedure 
Act did not confer jurisdiction on the circuit courts to review the 
Board's decision to issue an AWO. Id. at 1355.
    The Fourth Circuit has reached a conclusion similar in effect to 
the decisions of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. The Fourth Circuit held 
that even if the Board's decision to issue an AWO is erroneous, the 
court simply reviews the merits of the underlying decision of the 
immigration judge. See Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 
281 (4th Cir. 2004) (analyzing the similar AWO provision previously 
found at 8 CFR 3.1(a)(7)). In sum, the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits do not review the Board's decision to issue an AWO, but simply 
review the merits of the underlying decision, as prescribed by the 
language in the Board's AWO order.
    In contrast, the Third Circuit has concluded that the Board's 
decision to issue an AWO is reviewable, separate and apart from the 
question of whether the underlying merits decision is supported. See 
Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 290-95 (3d Cir. 2004). The First 
Circuit also regards as reviewable the Board's determination of whether 
the AWO criteria exist in a particular case. See Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 
F.3d 201 (1st Cir. 2003). A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reached 
the same conclusion in Chen v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 
2004). The court in Chen concluded that, unless the underlying issue in 
a case rests on a discretionary determination, it has jurisdiction to 
review whether the use of an AWO was appropriate. Such review causes 
the court to examine the propriety of the Board's decision to apply its 
AWO authority and summarily affirm the immigration judge's decision. 
This approach results in a superfluous and unnecessary layer of review 
about an issue--the Board's decision to affirm without opinion rather 
than affirm with an opinion--that does not resolve the dispositive 
issue, namely whether the underlying decision of the immigration judge 
withstands review.
    The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have not squarely decided the 
reviewability issue. However, both circuits have suggested that, 
although the Board's decision to issue an AWO may be separately 
reviewable, the review of the decision to AWO often will merge with the 
review of the underlying decision of the immigration judge. See Denko 
v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 731-32 (6th Cir. 2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 
F.3d 962, 966-67 & n.4 (7th Cir. 2003). Where those decisions 
essentially merge, the Seventh Circuit has stated that ``it makes no 
practical difference whether the BIA properly or improperly streamlined 
review.'' Georgis v. Aschcroft, supra at 967; see also Hamdan v. 
Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 2005).
    The inconsistency in the circuit courts has prompted the Department 
to propose a revision to the regulatory language. The rule clarifies 
that the decision to issue an AWO is discretionary and is based on an 
internal agency directive created for the purpose of efficient case 
management that does not create any substantive or procedural rights. 
The Board reform rule was successful in creating procedures that 
increased efficiency and promoted finality in immigration cases without 
sacrificing fairness. The additional layer of review in some circuits 
is not consistent with the reform rule's goal of promoting efficiency 
and finality in the immigration system. The efficient and fair 
adjudication of immigration appeals remains a priority of the 
Department. This revision to the AWO regulation in no way reflects a 
diminished commitment to timely and fair adjudications at the 
administrative level. In light of the strict regulatory time frames 
governing the adjudication of appeals and the Board's decreasing use of 
AWOs, the Department expects that the Board will continue to manage its 
docket efficiently following this revision to the AWO procedure.

C. Scope of Board's Dispositions on Appeal

    Finally, this rule clarifies that, when the Board chooses to issue 
an AWO or a short order adopting all or part of the immigration judge's 
decision, that decision is based not only on the nature of the case and 
whether it fits the criteria for AWO, but also on the nature of the 
issues and claims of error

[[Page 34658]]

properly raised on appeal. The Board's decision to issue an AWO or 
short order affirming the immigration judge's decision should not be 
construed as waiving a party's obligation to exhaust issues and claims 
before the Board. While it is true that the Board has the discretion to 
consider issues not raised on appeal, this does not excuse a party from 
filing a Notice of Appeal and supporting brief that are sufficiently 
precise in identifying any claims, errors, and other issues in the 
immigration judge's decision with which the party disagrees. Further, 
it is not enough for a party to raise an issue on appeal in passing. 
Rather, the party must spell out, in a meaningful way, its arguments 
and claims of error in the Notice of Appeal or supporting brief. In 
addition, the regulation clarifies that the Board need not specifically 
address every issue raised on appeal, but is presumed to have 
considered all properly raised issues on appeal in reaching its 
decision, even if that decision is an AWO or short order that does not 
specifically discuss every issue the parties may have raised on appeal. 
See, e.g., Toussaint v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 409 (3d Cir. 2006), 
citing Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003); Mansour v. INS, 
230 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 2000).
    For purposes of complying with the mandate to exhaust 
administrative remedies as of right under section 242(d)(1) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1), claims of error raised in the Notice of Appeal or 
the brief shall be deemed the matters presented to the Board for review 
and thereby exhausted. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an 
indispensable component of administrative decision making and judicial 
review of an agency's decisions. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 
(1992) (superseded by statute). Litigants fail to exhaust their claims 
at their own peril, in that they waive matters that might have been 
corrected by the agency. Courts that ignore this rule usurp the 
agency's role and function by setting aside an agency decision on 
grounds that were not raised to and disposed of by the agency. See 
Unemployment Compensation Comm'n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 
(1946).
    In the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress has dictated that 
the Attorney General shall, in the first instance, resolve a 
controversy before judicial intervention, see 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1), and 
the Attorney General by regulation has delegated that function to the 
Board. The federal courts have consistently held that they do not sit 
as administrative agencies. Failure to raise an issue on appeal to the 
Board constitutes failure to exhaust administrative remedies or 
preserve the issue for appeal, and deprives the courts of appeal of 
jurisdiction to consider the issue. See Rivera-Zurita v. INS, 946 F.2d 
118 (10th Cir. 1991); Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1992); 
Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1990); Martinez-Zelaya v. INS, 
841 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1988); Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th 
Cir. 1987); Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976). The 
courts have concluded that when the agency resolves the matter first, 
the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently developed to aid 
the court in reviewing a person's claim and the agency's findings and 
conclusions regarding such claim. See Madigan, 503 U.S. at 145-46.
    Recently, two courts of appeal have concluded otherwise when the 
Board's decision has been an AWO or a short order affirming the 
immigration judge's decision. In Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th 
Cir. 2005), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that when 
the Board adopts or affirms the decision of an immigration judge 
without further opinion, and the Board does not explicitly state in its 
decision that it is declining to consider any arguments not raised on 
appeal, then the Board's adoption of the immigration judge's decision, 
which discusses all issues litigated below, is enough to satisfy the 
exhaustion requirement. Likewise, in Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530 
(7th Cir. 2005), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 
when the Board summarily affirms the immigration judge's decision 
below, the Board waives failure to exhaust, especially where the Board 
fails to specify that it was confining its review to the questions 
raised on appeal and deemed all others waived.
    Under the rule of law created by Abebe and Pasha, aliens can 
circumvent the appellate process set up by the Attorney General, which 
is designed specifically to review and correct any errors raised on 
appeal. Without a Notice of Appeal or brief that points out specific 
errors the parties believe the immigration judge made, the Board might 
choose to issue an AWO or short order affirming the immigration judge. 
The alien can then go to the courts of appeals and raise and fully 
brief arguments never made to the Board.
    This rule reaffirms the historical practice of the Board with 
respect to exhaustion requirements. The Board has repeatedly stated 
that it need not address issues that are not raised. See, e.g., Matter 
of Cervantes-Gonzales, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 561 n.1 (BIA 1999) (noting that 
``[a]s the respondent does not raise this issue on appeal, we decline 
to address it''); Matter of Gutierrez, 19 I&N Dec. 562, 565 n.3 (BIA 
1988) (stating that ``[a]s the Service does not directly raise this 
issue on appeal, we shall not address it'').
    When the Board invokes its AWO authority or issues a short decision 
adopting the immigration judge's decision, there is no cause to depart 
from the foregoing exhaustion principles. Adopting the immigration 
judge's decision or designating the immigration judge's decision as the 
final agency determination under the AWO regulation is the final act of 
the Board that triggers the alien's opportunity to seek judicial 
review, but it occurs only after the alien has set the issues to be 
determined by the Board. It is those issues that the Board takes into 
account in determining what type of decision to issue.
    This rule would make clear, however, that the Board may address an 
issue that was not raised on appeal sua sponte when the Board in its 
discretion concludes that the issue warrants attention. See generally 8 
CFR 1003.1(c) (authorizing the Board to certify a case to itself). See 
also Ghassan v. INS, 972 F.2d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the 
Board may consider an issue that has not been appealed by either 
party). The Board will continue to review the record and address any 
errors that it finds, in its discretion, could result in a miscarriage 
of justice.

IV. Three-Member Panel Decisions

    Under the current regulations, a single Board member ``may only'' 
refer a case to a three-member panel if the case fits one or more of 
the enumerated criteria set out in 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(6)(i)-(vi). These 
circumstances are circumscribed and include the following: (1) The need 
to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of different immigration 
judges, (2) the need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of 
laws, regulations, or procedures, (3) the need to review a decision by 
an immigration judge or DHS that is not in conformity with the law, (4) 
the need to resolve a case or controversy of major national import, (5) 
the need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination by an 
immigration judge, or (6) the need to reverse the decision of an 
immigration judge or DHS. Id. The streamlining provisions anticipated 
that a single Board member would decide a substantial majority of the 
cases either through an AWO or through a short order.
    While the streamlining provisions allowed the Board to resolve its 
backlog,

[[Page 34659]]

the Attorney General has determined that the Board is in a better 
position to devote more resources to improving its review of complex or 
problematic cases. This regulation expands the criteria for three-
member decisions by allowing a Board member, in the exercise of 
discretion, to refer a case to a three-member panel when the case 
presents a complex, novel, or unusual legal or factual issue. The 
Attorney General anticipates that three-member review of complex or 
problematic cases may enhance the review and analysis of the issues 
presented, and may provide more authoritative guidance.
    This provision will also permit the panels to publish more cases as 
precedent decisions because the Board members will have greater 
discretion to refer cases to a three-member panel, and will therefore 
have more cases to consider for publication. Under the Board's current 
practice, opinions issued by a single Board member are not considered 
for publication as a precedent decision. Cases involving unusual or 
complex legal or factual issues are often the type of case that the 
Board would consider for publication of a precedent decision.
    In exercising its discretion to refer a case to a three-member 
panel under this provision, the Board may consider available resources 
and the best use of those resources while fulfilling its many 
responsibilities such as providing a full and fair review in each 
individual case, offering guidance to immigration judges and the 
federal courts of appeals when they are faced with recurring issues, 
promoting national uniformity in the interpretation of the immigration 
laws, and the need for issuing published precedential decisions. The 
Board will be able to determine the need for enhanced review and 
analysis, and the need to issue guidance, in evaluating which cases to 
refer for three-member review.

V. Publication of Precedent Decisions

A. The Importance of Precedent Decisions

    Another criticism that emerged during the Attorney General's review 
was that the promulgation of the Board reform rule made it more 
difficult for the Board to publish adequate numbers of precedential 
decisions. In fact, one of Attorney General Ashcroft's goals in 
adopting the Board reform rule in 2002 was to promote the cohesiveness 
and collegiality of the Board's decision-making process and to 
facilitate the publication of more precedent decisions with greater 
uniformity. See 67 FR at 54894.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ The Attorney General discussed at some length the importance 
of the Board's role in providing precedential guidance regarding the 
interpretation of the immigration laws. See 67 FR at 54880 (``This 
precedent setting function recognizes that novel issues arise each 
and every time that the Act, or the regulations, change; complex 
issues arise because of the interrelationship of multiple provisions 
of law; and repetitive issues arise before different immigration 
judges because of the national nature of the immigration process. 
All of the participants in the immigration adjudication process 
deserve concise and useful guidance on how these novel, complex, and 
repetitive issues are best resolved * * *. Both the three-member 
panel and the en banc Board should be used to develop concise 
interpretive guidance on the meaning of the Act and regulations. 
Thus, the Department expects the Board to be able to provide more 
precedential guidance to the immigration judges, the Service, 
attorneys and accredited representatives, and respondents.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Initially, after publication of the Board reform rule, the Board 
reduced the number of precedent decisions published. Instead, the Board 
concentrated its efforts and resources on implementing the many changes 
mandated by the rule, the most pressing of which was to address the 
backlog of cases and to create case management practices that would 
allow the Board to complete appeals in a timely fashion. As noted 
earlier, the Board has been successful in these endeavors, while 
adjusting to a smaller number of Board members. Now that the backlog 
has been brought under control and case management practices are firmly 
in place, the Board has been able to turn its attention to increasing 
the number of published decisions. In fiscal year 2006 the Board 
published more precedents (25) than in any other year since fiscal year 
2000, and surpassed that number in fiscal year 2007, publishing 40 
decisions.
    At a time when the Board has been issuing some 44,000 decisions 
annually, the Attorney General has concluded that publishing a greater 
number of precedent decisions is required to resolve more of the 
important and recurring legal issues, factual settings, procedural 
questions, and matters of discretion facing the Board and the 
immigration judges. Given that there are approximately 220 immigration 
judges around the country who are adjudicating 350,000 cases annually, 
there is an important need not only to provide clear guidance but also 
to promote a degree of national uniformity and consistency in the 
disposition of these cases. Without published precedent decisions, 
immigration judges may continue to interpret the law in inconsistent 
ways, requiring duplicative litigation and appeals by the parties, 
which in turn raises the specter of possible inconsistencies in the 
Board's dispositions. At the least, in the absence of published 
precedent decisions addressing the interpretation of a particular 
statutory or regulatory provision, there is no clear assurance to the 
parties and the federal courts that the Board and the immigration 
judges are resolving issues consistently through unpublished decisions 
in a series of different cases.
    The number of Board decisions published as precedents also has 
important implications for judicial review. The courts of appeals have 
been issuing hundreds of precedent decisions each year in reviewing 
cases decided by the Board, and a substantial number of the court 
decisions are interpreting the immigration laws and regulations. As a 
result, the courts of appeals, in many cases, have found themselves 
faced with the need to resolve key interpretive or procedural issues 
without the benefit of any precedential guidance from the Board on 
those issues.
    In some cases, the courts of appeals have proceeded to announce 
their own interpretations, which then may become binding with respect 
to other immigration cases arising within that circuit.\4\ This effect 
has been particularly evident in the Ninth Circuit, which hears 
slightly less than half of all of the immigration cases being appealed 
from the Board each year; thus, a precedent decision from the Ninth 
Circuit affects a very large number of other pending immigration cases. 
In any of the circuits, though, the result all too often is that the 
interpretation of the immigration laws has become fragmented, with the 
interpretation of legal or procedural issues often varying 
substantially depending solely on the circuit in which each case 
arises. Such results frustrate the goal of national uniformity and 
consistency in the immigration process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ See, e.g., Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 971-76 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (en banc) (noting that the Board had not issued a 
precedent decision interpreting the asylum regulation dealing with 
firm resettlement, 8 CFR 208.15, since it had been adopted 16 years 
earlier; court of appeals then surveyed judicial interpretations 
from various court of appeals decisions and announced its own 
interpretation of the regulatory language).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In other cases, particularly in recent years, some courts of 
appeals instead have remanded pending cases back to the Board, allowing 
the Board to issue a precedent decision on the issues raised in the 
case, rather than having the court of appeals announce its own legal 
interpretation as a matter of first impression. These remand orders 
provide an opportunity for the Board to

[[Page 34660]]

resolve the legal issues in each such case before the court adopts its 
own interpretations.
    In Yuanliang Liu v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 455 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 
2006), the Second Circuit remanded a case to the Board with 
instructions to develop precedential standards and procedures for the 
immigration judges to follow in deciding whether an alien has knowingly 
filed a frivolous asylum application. Section 208(d)(6) of the INA 
provides that, if the Attorney General determines that an alien has 
knowingly made a frivolous asylum application after receiving notice of 
the statutory penalties for doing so, the alien shall be permanently 
ineligible for any benefits under the INA. Despite the significance of 
such a powerful sanction, the court of appeals found that the existing 
regulatory provision in 8 CFR 1208.20 leaves important substantive and 
procedural questions unresolved, and noted that the Board has not 
issued a precedent decision relating to section 208(d)(6) since it took 
effect over nine years ago. However, rather than undertaking to 
establish its own legal standards as a matter of first impression, the 
court remanded the case to the Board to provide precedential guidance 
on the issues arising under this provision. The Second Circuit's 
explanation of its reasons for doing so are relevant in a broader 
sense, as they set forth in a concise fashion many of the reasons why 
the Board itself may be considering the publication of precedent 
decisions, including the need for national uniformity, the absence of 
prior precedents, the existence of a statutory ambiguity, the volume of 
cases raising the same or similar issues, the importance of the issues, 
and the need for clearer standards to avoid ad hoc decision making. 
Liu, 455 F.3d at 116-17. In response to the remand, the Board recently 
issued a precedent decision addressing the interpretive issues with 
respect to frivolous asylum applications, Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 
151 (BIA 2007).\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ In addition, in response to a remand order from the Second 
Circuit, the Board issued a comprehensive decision in Matter of 
Wang, 23 I&N Dec. 924 (BIA 2006), which addressed and resolved a 
number of different interpretive issues relating to the Chinese 
Student Protection Act and the relevance of Congress's subsequent 
enactment of a new process for adjustment of status under section 
245(i) of the INA. As another example, in response to the Second 
Circuit's directive in Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 
F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2005), the Board issued a precedent decision 
providing an interpretation of the asylum laws relating to coercive 
population control practices. Matter of S-L-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 
2006), rev'd, Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 
(2d Cir. 2007) (en banc). In another case, in response to a remand 
order from the court of appeals in Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 
163 (2d Cir. 2006), the Board issued a precedent decision concluding 
that the category of ``affluent Guatemalans'' does not qualify as a 
``particular social group'' for purposes of claims of persecution 
under the asylum laws. Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69 
(BIA 2007), aff'd sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d 
Cir. 2007). See also Velazquez-Herrera v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 781, 
783 (9th Cir. 2006) (``We decline to reach the question whether 
either of these two definitions (or any other definition) is a 
permissible construction of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) . * * * Given 
that the Board has twice touched upon the issue of child abuse 
without authoritatively defining the term, and that the Board's two 
definitions are not consistent with each other, we think it prudent 
to allow the BIA in the first instance to settle upon a definition 
of child abuse in a precedential opinion.''); Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 
457 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding to the Board to define 
standards with respect to economic persecution); Matter of T-Z-, 24 
I&N Dec. 163 (BIA 2007) (establishing standards for determining 
whether nonphysical harm, including economic sanctions, rises to the 
level of persecution).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three other recent developments also emphasize the importance of 
precedential guidance from the Board. First, in Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 
U.S. 183 (2006), the Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Ninth 
Circuit that had interpreted the asylum laws to mean that a person's 
membership in a nuclear family constitutes a ``particular social 
group'' for purposes of evaluating claims of persecution. The Supreme 
Court reversed, noting that such determinations should be made in the 
first instance by the Board rather than the federal courts. With 
respect to such issues arising under the immigration laws, Thomas 
emphasizes the importance of the Board's role to provide interpretive 
guidance. Cf. Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(``Our mandate serves the convenience of the BIA as well as this Court, 
and promotes the purposes of the INA. Thomas requires that we (in 
effect) certify this question. There is a press of cases raising 
similar questions in this Court, in the BIA, and before immigration 
judges; and the common project of deciding asylum cases promptly will 
be advanced by prompt guidance.''); Jian Hui Shao v. BIA, 465 F.3d 497, 
502 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting the foreign policy considerations relating 
to Chinese coercive population control asylum cases and the large 
number of affected aliens and stating: ``We believe, in light of these 
concerns, that it would be unsound for each of the several Courts of 
Appeals to elaborate a potentially non-uniform body of law; only a 
precedential decision by the BIA--or the Supreme Court of the United 
States--can ensure the uniformity that seems to us especially desirable 
in cases such as these.''); Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 196 (BIA 
2007) (responding to Shao v. BIA, supra).
    Second, the Ninth Circuit has recently concluded that 
interpretations of the provisions of the INA announced in unpublished 
decisions of the Board are not entitled to judicial deference under the 
standards of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 
1006, 1012-14 (9th Cir. 2006). The court of appeals determined that, in 
light of the Supreme Court's more recent decision in United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001), only published precedent 
decisions of the Board are entitled to Chevron deference. More 
recently, the Second Circuit also concluded that it will follow a 
similar approach with respect to unpublished BIA decisions. Rotimi v. 
Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2007). Given the disproportionate share 
of immigration cases arising in the Ninth Circuit and the Second 
Circuit, we recognize the importance of the issuance of precedent 
decisions in order to promote national uniformity and obtain Chevron 
deference for the Board's interpretive decisions.
    Third, the Supreme Court has made clear that an administrative 
agency is free to adopt a new interpretation of an ambiguous statutory 
provision, even though a federal court may have already issued a 
decision adopting a different interpretation of that same statute. See 
National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 
967 (2005). ``A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps 
an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if 
the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the 
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency 
discretion.'' Id. at 982. Brand X Internet makes clear that--unless the 
court finds the statutory provision unambiguous under Chevron step 
one--the administrative agency is free to adopt a contrary 
interpretation, as long as it does so with proper foundation and 
explanation, and the courts are thereafter required to defer to the 
agency's new interpretation if it is sustainable under Chevron step 
two.\6\

[[Page 34661]]

The Supreme Court also noted that leaving the agency free to 
reinterpret statutory provisions, notwithstanding prior judicial 
precedents to the contrary, reflects the proper interpretive authority 
vested by Congress in the agency with respect to ambiguous statutory 
provisions. See id. at 983-84 (``In all other respects, the court's 
prior ruling remains binding law (for example, as to agency 
interpretations to which Chevron is inapplicable). The [court's] 
precedent has not been `reversed' by the agency, any more than a 
federal court's interpretation of a State's law can be said to have 
been `reversed' by a state court that adopts a conflicting (yet 
authoritative) interpretation of state law.'') Cf. Jian Hui Shao, 465 
F.3d at 502 (``Accordingly, any effort expended by us interpreting the 
statute would be for nought should the BIA subsequently reach a 
different, yet reasonable, interpretation of this ambiguous 
provision.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ As the Supreme Court explained, 545 U.S. at 982-83 
(citations omitted):
    Chevron established a ``presumption that Congress, when it left 
ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, 
understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, 
by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to 
possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.'' Yet 
allowing a judicial precedent to foreclose an agency from 
interpreting an ambiguous statute, as the Court of Appeals assumed 
it could, would allow a court's interpretation to override an 
agency's. Chevron's premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, 
to fill statutory gaps. The better rule is to hold judicial 
interpretations contained in precedents to the same demanding 
Chevron step one standard that applies if the court is reviewing the 
agency's construction on a blank slate: Only a judicial precedent 
holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's 
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to 
fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction. A contrary rule 
would produce anomalous results. It would mean that whether an 
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to 
Chevron deference would turn on the order in which the 
interpretations issue: If the court's construction came first, its 
construction would prevail, whereas if the agency's came first, the 
agency's construction would command Chevron deference. Yet whether 
Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to interpret a 
statute does not depend on the order in which the judicial and 
administrative constructions occur. The Court of Appeals' rule, 
moreover, would ``lead to the ossification of large portions of our 
statutory law,'' by precluding agencies from revising unwise 
judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes. Neither Chevron nor 
the doctrine of stare decisis requires these haphazard results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Supreme Court's decision in Brand X Internet offers an 
important opportunity for the Attorney General and the Board to be able 
to reclaim Chevron deference with respect to the interpretation of 
ambiguous statutory provisions in the immigration laws, notwithstanding 
contrary judicial interpretations, as long as the agency interpretation 
is within the scope of Chevron step two deference. Implementation of 
the interpretive authority recognized under Brand X Internet is 
undertaken through formal agency processes--i.e., by rulemaking or by a 
precedent decision by the Board or the Attorney General.
    As a recent example, in Matter of Torres-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. 866 
(BIA 2006), the Board issued a precedent decision interpreting the 
provisions of section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) and 8 CFR 212.2, as they relate to an alien 
seeking to establish admissibility in conjunction with an application 
for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the INA. The Board's 
precedent decision explained at length why the Board disagreed with a 
prior decision of the Ninth Circuit that interpreted these same 
provisions to reach an opposite result. See Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 
379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004), recon. denied, 403 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 
2005); Torres-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. at 873-76. The Ninth Circuit has 
recognized that its prior decision in Perez-Gonzalez is no longer good 
law, because the court is required, under Brand X Internet, to defer to 
the Board's decision in Torres-Garcia that adopted a different, 
reasonable interpretation of the provisions at issue. See Gonzales v. 
DHS, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007) (``under Chevron and Brand X we are 
required to defer to In re Torres-Garcia's interpretation of the 
statutory scheme, regardless of whether the agency once adhered to a 
different interpretation. * * * [W]e hold today that we are bound by 
the BIA's interpretation of the applicable statutes in In re Torres-
Garcia, even though that interpretation differs from our prior 
interpretation in Perez-Gonzalez.'').

B. Changes to the Current Regulations

    Under the current regulations, the Board's decisions are published 
as precedents upon a majority vote of the permanent Board members. 
While that process ensures that precedent decisions are fully 
considered by the members of the Board, it also means that the Board's 
panels are not able to designate their decisions as precedential unless 
a majority of the Board members agree.
    At a time when the Board had only 5 members (which was the case 
until 1995), it made sense to require that a majority of Board members 
would be needed to designate any decision as a precedent. At that time, 
the three members of each panel constituted a majority of the Board 
members, and thus the members of a panel would have been able, on their 
own authority, to publish unanimous decisions of that panel as 
precedents. In fact, when the Board had only 5 members, the Board often 
published as many as 50 or 60 precedent decisions annually, at a time 
when the Board had a much smaller caseload and there were far fewer 
immigration judges whose decisions were being reviewed.
    To facilitate the publication of precedent decisions, the Attorney 
General has decided to revise the Board's processes to allow three-
member panels to publish precedent opinions if a majority of the 
permanent Board members of a panel votes to publish a decision. This 
rule also proposes to codify the Attorney General's authority to direct 
the Board to publish a decision as a precedent.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Though the authority has not previously been codified in the 
regulations, the Attorney General in the past has directed the Board 
to publish a previously issued unpublished decision as a precedent 
to govern all similar cases. See Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N 
Dec. 819 (BIA 1990; A.G. 1994). This rule provides specific 
authority for the Attorney General to direct that previously issued 
Board decisions be published to serve as precedents. The rule also 
provides that the Attorney General may redelegate that authority to 
other Department officials, which may include the Deputy Attorney 
General or the Associate Attorney General.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department acknowledges that most of the more than 40,000 
decisions issued by the Board each year do not articulate a new rule of 
law or procedure, and indeed even a substantial number of the cases 
that are referred to a three-member panel under the specific standards 
of 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(6) may not merit publication as a precedent. 
However, in cases where a majority of the Board members issuing a panel 
decision conclude that a case involves one or more issues that the 
Board has not previously resolved in a precedent decision,\8\ and that 
publishing a precedent would be appropriate, in the exercise of 
discretion, this rule facilitates the publication of Board decisions in 
order to provide authoritative guidance to the aliens and their 
representatives, the immigration judges, the administrative agencies, 
and the federal courts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Note that a precedent decision need not address every issue 
in a case. Just as the courts of appeals do at times, the Board may 
choose to publish a precedent decision dealing with one or two key 
issues in the case, and then resolve the remaining issues in an 
unpublished decision if those issues do not merit discussion in a 
precedent decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This rule encourages publication of opinions which meet certain 
criteria, such as whether: (1) The case involves a substantial issue of 
first impression; (2) the case involves a legal, factual, or procedural 
issue that can be expected to arise frequently in immigration cases; 
(3) the case announces, modifies, or clarifies a rule of law; (4) the 
case resolves a conflict in decisions by immigration judges or the 
federal courts; (5) there is a need to achieve or maintain national 
uniformity of interpretation under the immigration laws and regulations 
with respect to the issues presented in the case, or to restore such 
uniformity of interpretation

[[Page 34662]]

pursuant to interpretive authority recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Brand X Internet; or (6) the case warrants publication in light of 
other factors that give it general public interest.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Although the Board ordinarily does not entertain 
interlocutory appeals, the Board on very rare occasions does rule on 
the merits of interlocutory appeals where it is deemed necessary to 
address important jurisdictional questions regarding the 
administration of the immigration laws, or to correct recurring 
problems in the handling of cases by the immigration judges. See, 
e.g., Matter of Guevara, 20 I&N Dec. 238 (BIA 1990, 1991); Matter of 
Dobere, 20 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 1990). These standards for 
interlocutory appeals are appropriately narrow, in order to avoid 
piecemeal review of the myriad of quest