Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Jetstream) Model 4101 Airplanes, 32488-32490 [E8-12828]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 111 (Monday, June 9, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 32488-32490]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-12828]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0622; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-064-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited 
(Jetstream) Model 4101 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory 
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation 
authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe 
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 
condition as:

    Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations 
required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and 
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation 
Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified * * * features in the 
Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. * * *
    Internal fuel tank wiring chafing damage, if not corrected, 
could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent fuel tank 
explosion.
* * * * *
The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the 
unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by July 9, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory 
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street 
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is 
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket 
shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 
227-1175; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No.

[[Page 32489]]

FAA-2008-0622; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-064-AD'' at the beginning 
of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall 
regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this 
proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date 
and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We 
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical 
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA 
Airworthiness Directive 2008-0041, dated February 27, 2008 (referred to 
after this as ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for the 
specified products. The MCAI states:

    Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations 
required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and 
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities) policy, BAE Systems 
identified two features in the Jetstream 4100 where the need for 
design changes was apparent. One of these is addressed by Service 
Bulletin (SB) J41-28-014 which introduces changes to the wiring 
harness installations to the left (LH) and right (RH) fuel boost 
pumps, identified by modification number JM41672. In addition, to 
detect excessive cable lengths and evidence of chafing damage, SB 
J41-28-014 provides instructions to inspect and correct, as 
necessary, the internal fuel tank wiring routed to the LH and RH 
high level sensors.
    Internal fuel tank wiring chafing damage, if not corrected, 
could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent fuel tank 
explosion.
    For the reason stated above, this EASA Airworthiness Directive 
(AD) requires the replacement of the (LH and RH) fuel boost pump 
metallic conduit assemblies with loom assemblies and the inspection 
of internal fuel tank high level sensor wiring, including corrective 
actions, as necessary.

Corrective actions include replacing any damaged internal fuel tank 
high level sensor wiring and removing excess wiring. You may obtain 
further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.
    The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel 
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the 
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes 
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for 
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a 
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, 
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' 
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards 
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule 
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' 
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
    Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., 
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders 
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition 
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design 
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for 
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to 
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance 
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety 
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to 
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary 
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
    In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four 
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel 
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of 
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable 
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address 
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in 
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure 
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included 
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for 
further action.
    The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that 
is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European 
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation 
regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed 
to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory 
standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that 
all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport 
category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against 
explosion risks.
    We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are 
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel 
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result 
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

    BAE Systems (Operations) Limited has issued Service Bulletin J41-
28-014, Revision 1, dated December 21, 2007. The actions described in 
this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition 
identified in the MCAI.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to 
our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have 
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service 
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we 
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition 
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same 
type design.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are 
highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.

Costs of Compliance

    Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD 
would affect 7 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it 
would take 47 work-hours per product to comply with the basic 
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per 
work-hour. Required parts would cost about $7,000 per product. Where 
the service information lists required parts costs that are covered 
under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these 
costs. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, 
some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these 
figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to 
be $75,320, or $10,760 per product.

[[Page 32490]]

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed 
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Formerly British Aerospace 
Regional Aircraft): Docket No. FAA-2008-0622; Directorate Identifier 
2008-NM-064-AD.

Comments Due Date

    (a) We must receive comments by July 9, 2008.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited 
Model Jetstream 4101 airplanes, certificated in any category, all 
serial numbers.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:

    Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations 
required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and 
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation 
Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two features in the 
Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. One 
of these is addressed by Service Bulletin (SB) J41-28-014 which 
introduces changes to the wiring harness installations to the left 
(LH) and right (RH) fuel boost pumps, identified by modification 
number JM41672. In addition, to detect excessive cable lengths and 
evidence of chafing damage, SB J41-28-014 provides instructions to 
inspect and correct, as necessary, the internal fuel tank wiring 
routed to the LH and RH high level sensors.
    Internal fuel tank wiring chafing damage, if not corrected, 
could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent fuel tank 
explosion.
    For the reason stated above, this EASA Airworthiness Directive 
(AD) requires the replacement of the (LH and RH) fuel boost pump 
metallic conduit assemblies with loom assemblies and the inspection 
of internal fuel tank high level sensor wiring, including corrective 
actions, as necessary.

Corrective actions include replacing any damaged internal fuel tank 
high level sensor wiring and removing excess wiring.

Actions and Compliance

    (f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, unless 
already done, do the following actions.
    (1) Modify the LH and RH wing fuel boost pump wiring in 
accordance with paragraphs 2.B. and 2.C. of the Accomplishment 
Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin 
J41-28-014, Revision 1, dated December 21, 2007.
    (2) Inspect the LH and RH wing fuel high level sensor wiring in 
accordance with paragraph 2.D. of the Accomplishment Instructions of 
BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin J41-28-014, 
Revision 1, dated December 21, 2007.
    (3) When excess wiring and/or damaged wiring is found during the 
inspection required by paragraph (f)(2) of this AD, before next 
flight, accomplish the corrective actions as specified in paragraph 
2.D. of the Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) 
Limited Service Bulletin J41-28-014, Revision 1, dated December 21, 
2007.

FAA AD Differences

    Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information 
as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using 
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Todd 
Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1175; fax (425) 227-1149. 
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC 
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA 
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 
FSDO.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in 
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information 
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.

Related Information

    (h) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness Directive 2008-0041, dated 
February 27, 2008, and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service 
Bulletin J41-28-014, Revision 1, dated December 21, 2007, for 
related information.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 30, 2008.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. E8-12828 Filed 6-6-08; 8:45 am]
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