Paul H. Volkman; Denial of Application, 30630-30644 [E8-11851]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 103 / Wednesday, May 28, 2008 / Notices
By order of the Commission.
Marilyn R. Abbott,
Secretary to the Commission.
[FR Doc. E8–11843 Filed 5–27–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020–02–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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Notice of Lodging of Two Amendments
to Consent Decree Under the
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (‘‘CERCLA’’)
Consistent with Section 122(d) of the
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, as amended (‘‘CERCLA’’),
42 U.S.C. 9622(d), and 28 CFR 50.7,
notice is hereby given that on May 20,
2008, the United States lodged two
amendments to the Consent Decree
approved by the Court on February 23,
2001 in United States of America v.
Abex Aerospace Division, et al, Civil
No. 00-cv-012471 TJH(JWJx) (USDC C.D.
Cal.). The original Consent Decree
resolved the liability of certain
defendants for the ‘‘Phase 1a Area’’ of
the Site under Sections 106 and 107 of
the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (‘‘CERCLA’’), 42 U.S.C. 9606
and 9607, as amended, and Section
7003 of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6973, as alleged
in the Complaint filed in this matter.
The First Amendment primarily
amends the Statement of Work under
the original Consent Decree to add
certain response activities necessary to
address indoor air contamination
observed at an indoor roller skating rink
located adjacent to the Omega Chemical
Corporation Superfund Site, listed on
the National Priorities List on January
19, 1999, 64 FR 2950 (‘‘Site’’). The
Second Amendment adds additional
Settling Work Defendants, and Settling
Cash Defendants to those covered by the
original Consent Decree, as amended.
The Second Amendment also
incorporates additional volume and
related payments of certain original
Settling Cash Defendants, and corrects
certain omissions and typographical
errors in the caption. The Department of
Justice will receive for a period of thirty
(30) days from the date of this
publication comments relating to the
Consent Decree Amendments.
Comments should be addressed to the
Assistant Attorney General,
Environment and Natural Resources
Division, and either e-mailed to
pubcomment-ees.enrd@usdoj.gov or
mailed to P.O. Box 7611, U.S.
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Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20044–06529.
The Consent Decree Amendments
may be examined at U.S. EPA Region 9,
75 Hawthorne Street, San Francisco, CA
94105 (contact Stephen Berninger, Esq.
(415) 972–3909). During the public
comment period, the Consent Decree
Amendments may also be examined on
the following Department of Justice Web
site, https://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/
Consent_Decrees.html. A copy of the
Consent Decree may also be obtained by
mail from the Consent Decree Library,
U.S. Department of Justice, P.O. Box
7611, Washington, DC 20044–7611 or by
faxing or e-mailing a request to Tonia
Fleetwood (tonia.fleetwood@usdoj.gov),
fax no. (202) 514–0097, phone
confirmation number (202) 514–1547. In
requesting a copy from the Consent
Decree Library, please refer to United
States of America v. Abex Aerospace
Division, et al, Civil No. 00-cv-012471
TJH(JWJx) (USDC C.D. Cal.) (DOJ Ref.
No. 90–11–3–06529), and enclose a
check in the amount of $57.25 (25 cents
per page reproduction cost) payable to
the U.S. Treasury or, if by e-mail or fax,
forward a check in that amount to the
Consent Decree Library at the stated
address.
Henry S. Friedman,
Assistant Section Chief, Environmental
Enforcement Section, Environment and
Natural Resources Division.
[FR Doc. E8–11846 Filed 5–27–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–15–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[No. 06–45]
Paul H. Volkman; Denial of Application
On February 10, 2006, I, the Deputy
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause and Immediate Suspension
of Registration to Paul H. Volkman,
M.D. (Respondent), of Chillicothe, Ohio.
The Order immediately suspended
Respondent’s DEA Certificate of
Registration, AV6952837, as a
practitioner, on the grounds that his
continued registration during the
pendency of the proceeding ‘‘would
constitute an imminent danger to public
health and safety because of the
substantial likelihood that [he] will
continue to divert controlled substances
to persons who will abuse these
products.’’ Id. at 12.
More specifically, the Show Cause
Order alleged that in twelve instances,
Respondent had prescribed multiple
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controlled substances to persons who,
within days, died of overdoses of the
drugs. Id. at 9–11. The Show Cause
Order further alleged that Respondent
had issued prescriptions to these
persons for multiple controlled
substances including opiates in
schedule II (oxycodone) and/or
schedule III (hydrocodone); schedule IV
benzodiazepines such as diazepam and
valium; and carisoprodol, a noncontrolled drug which is nonetheless
highly abused. Id.; see also id. at 3.
Relatedly, the Order alleged that in July
2005, the assistant coroner for the
county in which Respondent was
practicing, had notified DEA ‘‘that his
staff [had] observed an increase in
emergency room overdoses and believed
that several recent drug-related deaths
involving young [and] otherwise healthy
individuals could be attributed to the
consumption of large amounts of
oxycodone, hydrocodone and
alprazolam,’’ which Respondent had
dispensed. Id. at 8.
The Show Cause Order also alleged
that DEA had received information from
various distributors that Respondent
was ordering excessive quantities of
controlled substances. Id. Relatedly, the
Show Cause Order alleged that during
2004, Respondent was the largest
practitioner-purchaser of oxycodone in
the country having purchased 438,000
dosage units, when the average amount
of this drug purchased by other
physicians ‘‘was only 4,792 dosage
units.’’ Id. at 2.
The Show Cause Order further alleged
that DEA investigators interviewed
several of Respondent’s patients who
informed them that Respondent had
prescribed controlled substances
without performing physical
examinations, that the clinic charged
between $160 and $200 for an office
visit, and that the clinic required that
the patients pay cash and would not
accept third-party payments from
insurers, Medicare, Medicaid or
worker’s compensation. Id. at 4.
The Show Cause Order also alleged
that on various dates, confidential
sources had visited the clinic, and that
Respondent had issued these persons
prescriptions for controlled substances
without performing physical
examinations and other medical tests.
Id. at 5. The Show Cause Order
specifically alleged that on two
occasions, the confidential sources had
told the clinic’s employees that their
pain levels were ‘‘one or two’’ and
‘‘zero’’ on a scale of one-to-ten (with the
latter being the most severe); that upon
Respondent’s asking them how they felt,
the sources had told him ‘‘fair’’ and
‘‘pretty good’’; and that Respondent,
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without performing a physical exam on
either person, immediately issued to
each of them, prescriptions for 180
tablets of hydrocodone/acetaminophen
10/650 mg., 90 tablets of diazepam 10
mg., and 60 tablets of carisoprodol. Id.
at 5–6. Both sources then allegedly
filled the prescriptions at Respondent’s
clinic for an additional charge. Id. at 6.
The Show Cause Order further alleged
that in May 2005, DEA investigators
received information from another
confidential source who acknowledged
his/her involvement in diverting
controlled substances. Id. The source
allegedly identified Respondent as a
physician who would write
prescriptions for Oxycontin and other
controlled substances without
performing a physical examination; the
source allegedly stated that he and a
friend had obtained from Respondent
prescriptions for drugs which they then
sold on the street. Id.
Next, the Show Cause Order alleged
that in July 2005, DEA investigators
conducted an accountability audit of the
controlled substances which were
ordered under Respondent’s registration
by the clinic where he worked. Id. at 7.
The investigators allegedly found that
Respondent did not maintain
dispensing records in violation of
Federal regulations. Id. Moreover,
Respondent allegedly ‘‘could not
account for more than 850,000 dosage
units of controlled substances that were
ordered and dispensed under [his] DEA
registration.’’ Id. The Order specifically
alleged that Respondent was short
nearly 89,000 dosage units of
alprazolam 2 mg., nearly 48,000 dosage
units of diazepam 10 mg., 77,000 dosage
units of hydrocodone/apap 1 (10/500
mg.), and more than 126,000 dosage
units of hydrocodone/apap 10/650. Id.
With respect to drugs containing
oxycodone, the Order alleged, inter alia,
that Respondent was short more than
49,000 dosage units of oxycodone 5 mg.,
48,506 dosage units of oxycodone/apap
(5/325 mg.), 165,500 dosage units of
Roxicodone 15 mg., and 130,000 dosage
units of Roxicodone 30 mg. Id. at 7–8.
Respondent requested a hearing on
the allegations, and the matter was
assigned to Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) Gail Randall. Following various
extensions which both parties sought, as
well as pre-hearing procedures,2 a
hearing was held in Columbus, Ohio on
December 5–8, 2006, and January 9–10,
1 Apap
is the abbreviation for acetaminophen.
Respondent requested an expedited
hearing, on March 17, 2006, his first counsel
withdrew. ALJ at 2. While on May 2, 2006, a new
counsel entered an appearance on Respondent’s
behalf, on October 10, 2006, a third counsel entered
a notice of appearance. Id.
2 While
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2007. At the hearing, both parties
submitted documentary evidence and
presented the testimony of witnesses.
Following the hearing, the
Government submitted a brief
containing its proposed findings,
conclusions of law, and
recommendations. Respondent chose
not to submit a post-hearing brief and
instead filed a petition for review with
the Sixth Circuit.
On June 20, 2007, the ALJ issued her
recommended decision (hereinafter
cited as ALJ). In her decision, the ALJ
found that ‘‘[t]he record contains
abundant evidence to demonstrate that
the Respondent did not issue
prescriptions ’in the usual course of his
professional practice,’’’ and that he
‘‘failed to limit his prescribing of
controlled substances to cases where
such medication would be provided for
a legitimate medical purpose.’’ ALJ at
39–40 (citation omitted). More
specifically, the ALJ concluded that
‘‘without adequate physical
examinations and development of
medical histories, the Respondent failed
to adequately diagnose the patients,’’
and yet ‘‘prescribed controlled
substances even when interacting with
a patient for the first time.’’ Id. at 40.
The ALJ further noted that
‘‘Respondent prescribed the same
combinations of controlled substances
to a majority of his patients, again
without adequate examinations or
ongoing diagnoses,’’ and that ‘‘[t]his
combination of drugs was common in
the drug-abuse community’’ and was
known as ‘‘a cocktail or the trifecta.’’ Id.
(int. quotation and citations omitted).
Finally, the ALJ noted that ‘‘Respondent
treated at least sixteen patients between
June of 2003 and February of 2006 who
died of drug-related causes,’’ and that
‘‘Respondent’s lack of adequate
monitoring of these patients directly
contributed to [their] deaths.’’ Id. at 41.
The ALJ further noted that
Respondent was dispensing controlled
substances ‘‘obtained through the use of
[his] DEA registration,’’ id., and yet
failed to maintain the required
inventory and dispensing records and
‘‘to adequately supervise the individuals
to whom he had delegated such
dispensing responsibilities.’’ Id. at 43.
Moreover, Respondent ‘‘was unable to
account for over one million tablets of
controlled substances.’’ Id. at 42.
Finally, the ALJ noted that Respondent
had failed to accept responsibility for
his conduct. Id. at 44.
The ALJ thus concluded that the
Government had established a prima
facie case that Respondent’s continued
registration would be inconsistent with
the public interest. Id. at 45. Because
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Respondent had failed to ‘‘justify his
past conduct’’ and ‘‘to provide adequate
assurances that his future handling of
controlled substances would meet the
standards required of a DEA registrant,’’
the ALJ recommended that I revoke his
registration and deny his pending
applications to renew and modify his
registration. Id.
Respondent filed exceptions to the
ALJ’s decision raising numerous issues,
and the Government filed a response.
More specifically, Respondent contends
that the Government failed to provide
adequate notice and thus violated his
rights under the Due Process Clause
because it expanded its presentation
beyond the allegations of the Show
Cause Order, Exceptions at 4–10; that
the proceeding violated his First
Amendment rights because the ALJ
failed to exclude an e-mail which the
Government introduced into evidence
in which Respondent portrayed the
Agency, the ALJ, and the prosecuting
attorney in a ‘‘not flattering’’ manner, id.
at 10–11; that the Agency was
unlawfully regulating the practice of
medicine, id. at 11–12; that the ALJ
failed to consider his evidence; and that
records which he subpoenaed were not
turned over to him.3
Having considered the record as a
whole, I reject each of Respondent’s
exceptions. While I do not adopt all of
the ALJ’s factual findings, I adopt the
ALJ’s conclusions of law that
Respondent repeatedly dispensed
controlled substances outside of the
usual course of professional practice
and without a legitimate medical
purpose. I also adopt her conclusions
with respect to Respondent’s failure to
maintain proper records and properly
supervise clinic employees, as well as
his inability to account for large
quantities of controlled substances.
Finally, I adopt the ALJ’s conclusion
that the Government has established its
prima facie case that Respondent’s
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest and that Respondent has
not demonstrated that he can be
entrusted with a registration.
As explained below, Respondent did
not file a timely renewal application in
accordance with agency rules, and
therefore, there is no existing
registration to revoke or modify.
Respondent did, however, apply for a
registration; that application will be
denied. I make the following findings.
3 To the extent that Respondent’s exceptions are
based on the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence or
alleged failure to consider certain evidence, the
ALJ’s decision is only a recommendation. See 21
CFR 1316.65(a). As ultimate factfinder, I have
carefully considered the entire record including the
ALJ’s report and Respondent’s exceptions.
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Findings
Respondent formerly held DEA
Certificate of Registration, AV6952837,
which authorized him to dispense
controlled substances in schedules II
through V, and which expired on May
31, 2006. GX 1. Between April 16, 2003,
and November 18, 2003, Respondent’s
registered location was Tri-State Health
Care (hereinafter, Tri-State), 1200 Gay
Street, Portsmouth, Ohio. GX 2.
Between November 19, 2003, and
September 11, 2005, Respondent’s
registered location was 1219 Findlay St.,
Portsmouth, id., which apparently was
Tri-State’s new location. GX 11, at 2
(inspection report of Ohio State Board of
Pharmacy). Subsequently, Respondent
left Tri-State, and on September 12,
2005, Respondent changed his
registered location to 1310 Center St.,
Portsmouth. GX 2. On May 12, 2006, at
which time his registration was
suspended and which was less than
forty-five days before the expiration of
his registration, Respondent applied for
a renewal of his registration and
requested an address change to his
home in Chicago, Illinois. Id., see also
RX P at 1.
Respondent holds both an M.D. and
Ph.D. from the University of Chicago
and has practiced as an emergency room
physician, as well as in family practice
and pediatrics. Id. at 3. Respondent
testified that in the course of his
practice, he had two medical
malpractice cases which his insurers
settled without his consent and his
admitting liability, and ‘‘two cases [that]
resulted in judgments against’’ him. Tr.
1400. According to Respondent, by
2003, the awards and settlements
totaled ‘‘over a million-and-a-half
dollars,’’ and as a result, he was ‘‘unable
to obtain malpractice insurance.’’ Id. As
a consequence, Respondent ‘‘could no
longer work in emergency medicine,
and * * * couldn’t work for another
clinic * * * because virtually every
clinic that required hospital coverage of
nighttime patients requires the doctor to
have insurance.’’ Id.
Respondent therefore needed to find a
job which did not require malpractice
insurance. Id. Searching on the internet,
Respondent found a job posting for TriState Health Care in Portsmouth, Ohio.
Id. at 1400–01. During discussions with
Tri-State’s owner, Ms. Denise Huffman,
Respondent was told that he did not
need malpractice insurance to work for
her clinic. Id. at 1401. Respondent
accepted the position, and in June 2003,
he obtained board certification in pain
management. Id. at 1402.
In April 2003, Respondent began
working at Ms. Huffman’s clinic under
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an ‘‘informal handshake’’ agreement
which paid him $5000 a week to start;
his pay was later raised to $5500. Id. at
1404. Ms. Huffman was not a licensed
physician and was ‘‘not any type of a
health care professional’’ even though
she was running ‘‘a pain clinic.’’ Id.
Respondent ‘‘did not think’’ to ask to
see Ms. Huffman’s licenses or verify her
credentials. Id. at 1404. Respondent
further maintained that he ‘‘didn’t know
that I should have done’’ that, and that
he did not find out that he should have
made these inquiries until being advised
of this (‘‘two years later’’) by one of his
attorneys. Id. In light of Respondent’s
thirty years of experience in the medical
profession and his educational
background, I find implausible
Respondent’s testimony regarding his
failure to verify whether Ms. Huffman
was properly licensed.
Ms. Huffman’s daughter Alice was
Tri-State’s office manager. ALJ at 3–4
(stipulated findings). According to the
report of Agent Kevin Kinneer of the
Ohio State Board of Pharmacy, Alice
Huffman was a ‘‘former employee and
patient of Dr. [David] Proctor,’’ GX 12,
at 4, a convicted drug dealer. Tr. 1014–
15. Mr. Chad Ball, who was Alice
Huffman’s boyfriend (and subsequently
became her husband), worked as a
security guard at the clinic. Tr. 521, 530.
Other employees included Chris Helton
(who also worked as security guard) and
Denise Huffman’s nieces, Ms. Tara
Bentley and Ms. Elizabeth Madden. Id.
at 530. Respondent was the only
licensed physician and DEA registrant
at the clinic. Id. at 530–31.4
During an interview with a DEA
diversion investigator (DI), Ms. Denise
Huffman stated that Tri-State ‘‘was a full
cash business’’ and did no ‘‘third-party
billing.’’ Id. at 543. The DI further
testified that Ms. Huffman stated that ‘‘it
would not be cost effective to have
somebody file a medical insurance
claim.’’ Id. at 544.5 Tri-State charged
$200 for an office visit. Id. at 854–56.
4 To clarify, the clinic did not hold a DEA
registration.
5 The record does, however, contain a document
entitled ‘‘UTILIZATION REVIEW—NOTICE OF
DENIAL’’ issued by Liberty Mutual Managed Care,
Inc., which is addressed to Respondent at TriState’s Findlay St. address. GX 65. This document
stated that Liberty Mutual had performed a
utilization review for the Kentucky Worker’s
Compensation program of a ‘‘proposed treatment/
service request’’ for a patient named ‘‘Paul
Huffman,’’ and determined that it did not meet
‘‘nationally accepted practice protocols.’’ Id. More
specifically, the document noted that ‘‘[t]he request
for oxycodone 425 pills per month (fourteen/day)
and Valium 125 pills per month (four/day) is not
medically necessary or appropriate. The current
narcotic situation is not beneficial in that the
claimant is taking narcotics around the clock.’’ Id.
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Beginning in the summer of 2003,
numerous pharmacies refused to fill
Respondent’s prescriptions. Tr. 1428–
29. Accordingly, Respondent and
Denise Huffman decided that they
‘‘should institute a dispensary on-site’’
so that they could provide pain
medicines for their patients. Id.
Respondent agreed that his registration
could be used to order controlled
substances, id. at 1550, and Tri-State
proceeded to order large quantities of
both oxycodone, a schedule II
controlled substance, and combination
hydrocodone/apap, a schedule III
controlled substance. GX 10. For
example, between August 18, 2003, and
December 30, 2003, Tri-State ordered
nearly 136,000 dosage units of
oxycodone under Respondent’s DEA
registration. Id. at 140. During 2004, TriState ordered more than 457,000 dosage
units of oxycodone under his
registration. Id. at 143. Finally, between
January 1, 2005, and September 2, 2005
(shortly before he left Tri-State), the
clinic ordered more than 414,000 dosage
units of oxycodone under his
registration. Id. at 145. Respondent was
the largest practitioner-purchaser of
oxycodone in the nation during both
2004 and the first nine months of 2005.
Id. at 5 & 28.
Moreover, Respondent’s purchases of
oxycodone dwarfed that of other Ohiobased practitioners. For example, during
the last six months of 2003, Respondent
purchased more than twenty-eight times
the amount of oxycodone purchased by
the second largest Ohio-based
practitioner (4,800 dosage units); by
contrast, the fourth through thirteenth
largest purchasers bought only between
300 to 100 dosage units. Id. at 51.
In 2004, Respondent purchased nearly
110 times the amount of oxycodone
purchased by the second largest Ohiobased practitioner (4,160 dosage units);
by contrast, the third through tenth
largest practitioners purchased between
3,228 and 400 dosage units. Id. at 29.
Finally, in a little more than the first
eight months of 2005, Respondent
purchased approximately thirty-eight
times the amount of oxycodone
purchased by the second largest Ohiobased practitioner-purchaser; by
contrast, the sixth through tenth largest
practitioner-purchasers bought between
600 and 240 dosage units. Id. at 7.
With respect to hydrocodone,
between July 24, 2003, and the end of
that year, Respondent purchased
222,600 dosage units. Id. at 148. In
2004, Respondent purchased 263,500
dosage units, and in a little more than
the first eight months of 2005, he
purchased 168,500 dosage units of the
drug. Id. at 150–52. Between 2003 and
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2005, Respondent ranked between the
eleventh to twenty-third largest
purchaser nationwide of combination
hydrocodone drugs, and was the largest
Ohio-based practitioner-purchaser of
combination hydrocodone drugs by a
wide margin.6 Id. at 72–73, 95–96, 118–
20.
A DEA DI subsequently obtained a
report of the prescriptions written by
Respondent that were filled by
Kentucky pharmacies during 2004 from
the State of Kentucky’s KASPER
system.7 Upon review of the data, the DI
found that Respondent had prescribed
three or more drugs per visit to 419 of
his patients and that Respondent had
issued three or more prescriptions per
visit 1974 times. GX 71. The DI further
found that 54 percent of Respondent’s
prescribing involved ‘‘three or more
prescriptions per visit,’’ and that in
1065 separate instances, Respondent
had prescribed four drugs including
oxycodone, hydrocodone, a
benzodiazepine, and carisoprodol. Id. at
2. The DI also found that during 2004,
Kentucky pharmacies dispensed
647,440 dosage units of oxycodone and
537,691 dosage units of hydrocodone
pursuant to Respondent’s prescriptions.
Id.
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The Investigations of Respondent
As found above, in April 2003,
Respondent commenced his
employment at Tri-State. On April 17,
2003, one day after Respondent
obtained his DEA registration at TriState’s 1200 Gay Street location, Agent
Kevin Kinneer of the Ohio State Board
of Pharmacy received two reports from
Portsmouth pharmacists regarding
Respondent’s prescribing practices. GX
12, at 1–2.
The first pharmacist reported that
Respondent was ‘‘writing large
quantities of narcotics and
benzodiazepines,’’ and that his patients
were presenting ‘‘prescriptions for 180
6 In the first nine months of 2005, Respondent
purchased 11 times the amount of hydrocodone
purchased by the second largest Ohio-based
practitioner; in 2004, he purchased 11.7 times the
amount purchased by the second largest Ohio-based
practitioner; in the last six months of 2003, he
purchased approximately 16.5 times the amount
purchased by the second largest Ohio-based
practitioner. Id. at 73–74, 96–97, 120–21.
7 KASPER is the ‘‘Kentucky All Scheduled
Prescriptions Electronic Reporting’’ program. GX
71. Under KASPER, pharmacies are required to
periodically report to the State all scheduled-drug
prescriptions that they dispense. Physicians are also
able to access the database to determine whether
their patients are obtaining controlled substances
from other practitioners. GX 26, Tr. 1030.
These figures do not, however, include
prescriptions issued by Respondent which were
filled at pharmacies in Ohio and other States; nor
do they include the prescriptions dispensed at TriState.
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to 300 tablets of Lorcet 10/650 mgs.,’’
id., a schedule III controlled substance
containing hydrocodone and
acetaminophen. ALJ at 5. The
pharmacist further reported that some
patients had ‘‘two types of narcotic
prescriptions,’’ that the prescriptions
were for a quantity beyond the
‘‘manufacturer’s suggested [daily]
supply of Tylenol [acetaminophen]
intake,’’ and that ‘‘[t]hese patients also
had prescriptions [for] Xanax 2 mg. and
a Soma [carisoprodol] prescription.’’ Id.
The pharmacist further reported that
‘‘many of the patients are prior problem
patients’’ of a physician (Dr. Proctor),8
who had been convicted of drug
trafficking and is currently incarcerated.
Id. at 1–2; Tr. 1015. According to the
pharmacist, these persons ‘‘had prior
drug abuse problems’’ including arrests
on drug charges. GX 12, at 1–2. The
pharmacist also told Agent Kinneer that
‘‘he would not fill any of’’ Respondent’s
prescriptions. Id. at 2.
The second pharmacist told Agent
Kinneer that he had ‘‘refused to fill
prescriptions for high quantities of
narcotics and Xanax 2mgs and Soma
[that were] prescribed by’’ Respondent.
Id. The pharmacist further notified
Agent Kinneer that Respondent was
prescribing ‘‘duplicate therapy of
narcotics’’ and large amounts of
acetaminophen. Id.
Approximately two months later,
another Portsmouth-area pharmacist
informed Agent Kinneer of ‘‘trouble
with [Respondent’s] patients.’’ Id. More
specifically, the pharmacist reported
that on or about June 11, 2003, five
persons came in a van to his pharmacy
and that one of them ‘‘smelled of beer
and dope.’’ Id. These persons all
presented ‘‘the same type of
prescriptions’’ and the pharmacist
refused to fill them. Id.; Tr. 255–56.
One week later on June 18, 2003,
Respondent telephoned Agent Kinneer
and complained that local pharmacists
were refusing to fill his prescriptions.
Tr. 256. Respondent demanded that the
Board order the pharmacists to fill his
prescriptions. Id.; GX 12, at 3. Agent
Kinneer told Respondent that he was
not going to do so because the
pharmacists had the right to exercise
their own professional judgment in
practicing pharmacy. GX 12, at 3; Tr.
256.
8 The pharmacist also stated that these
individuals were patients of another problem
physician, Dr. Williams. GX 12, at 2. The testimony
indicates that another area physician, Dr. Fortune
Williams, was convicted of drug trafficking, but his
conviction was overturned on appeal. Tr. 1016. It
is unclear whether the pharmacist’s reference to Dr.
Williams was to this individual.
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Throughout the summer of 2003,
Agent Kinneer received further
complaints from pharmacists about
Respondent’s prescribing practices. GX
12, at 3. These included that many of
the patients were from Kentucky, West
Virginia and Tennessee; that
Respondent was writing prescriptions
for multiple narcotics, Xanax 2 mg. and
carisoprodol ‘‘for the same patient [in]
high quantities’’; that the prescriptions
were for drugs with ‘‘a high abuse
potential’’; that ‘‘[f]amily members
within the same address [were]
receiving the same type of controlled
substance’’; that ‘‘many of the patients’’
were known ‘‘to be drug abusers’’; and
that some of the patients had ‘‘large
amounts of cash on their person.’’ Id.
Agent Kinneer also received information
that Respondent had called pharmacists
and demanded that they fill his
prescriptions. Id. Moreover, between
July and September 2003, pharmacists
in Columbus and Cincinnati notified
Agent Kinneer that persons were
presenting prescriptions issued by
Respondent. Id. at 5.
On July 22, 2003, Agent Kinneer (and
another state agent) visited Tri-State to
conduct an inspection pursuant to
Respondent’s obtaining of a clinic
license, which under Ohio law, was
required ‘‘to obtain controlled
substances to dispense out of [the]
clinic.’’ Tr. 244; see also GX 12, at 3.
During the inspection, Alice Huffman
told the agents that a bodyguard
patrolled the parking area and
monitored the waiting room.9 GX 12, at
3–4. The agents observed the security
arrangements, explained recordkeeping
requirements, provided Respondent and
Ms. Huffman with copies of the
applicable federal and state laws and
regulations, and gave Respondent the
license. Id. at 4.
On December 30, 2003, Agent Kinneer
and another agent went to Tri-State’s
new address at 1219 Findlay St. to
conduct an inspection for a new license.
Id. at 5. Agent Kinneer found numerous
violations including incomplete
dispensing logs for several controlled
substances. GX 11, at 2. More
specifically, the dispensing log for
hydrocodone/apap 10/650 had not been
completed since August 15, 2003. Id.
Respondent had, however, ordered
thousands of dosage units of this drug
after August 15th. See GX 10, at 147–48.
As for the other controlled substances
the clinic was dispensing, Agent
Kinneer found that the last entries for
9 It is unclear whether there were multiple
bodyguards on the premises. During an inspection
conducted on December 30, 2003, Agent Kinneer
noted that there were two bodyguards at the clinic.
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both Xanax 1 mg., and diazepam 10 mg.,
had been made on August 15, 2003.10
GX 11, at 2. He also found that while the
log for hydrocodone/apap 10/325 mg.
had been started on August 11, 2003,
the last entry was dated the following
day. Id.
Agent Kinneer further found that
numerous DEA 222 forms, which are
required to order schedule II controlled
substances, were not properly
completed. Id. He observed that Alice
Huffman, who was not a registered
pharmacist, was dispensing drugs
without obtaining Respondent’s final
approval. Id. at 3–5. He also found ‘‘four
vials of unmarked pills with unknown
medications [in] the dispensing area.’’
Id. at 6.
In his report, Agency Kinneer further
stated that he ‘‘found this clinic not to
be your normal Doctor’s Office.’’ Id. In
support of his conclusion, Agent
Kinneer noted that there was a Glock
handgun in the dispensing area, that
there were two night sticks and a fourfoot long club with leather straps, and
that these were ‘‘things that [he]
normally would not see in a physician’s
office or a dispensing area.’’ Tr. 259–60;
GX 12, at 7. Agent Kinneer also noted
that Respondent was treating both
Denise and Alice Huffman, that he had
prescribed narcotics for them, and that
both appeared to be ‘‘over medicated.’’
GX 12, at 6. In his testimony, Agent
Kinneer also related that he had
received reports that ‘‘there would be 20
to 30 cars lined up outside of
[Respondent’s] practice,’’ and that
people would be lined up waiting to
enter the clinic. Tr. 260–61; see also Tr.
455–56 (testimony of Detective John
Koch, Scioto County Sheriff’s Office that
he observed a ‘‘large group of people
outside the office,’’ and that he had
‘‘never seen that outside of a doctor’s
office, where groups of people would
hang out’’).
Agent Kinneer thus concluded that
Respondent was running a ‘‘prescription
mill.’’ Id. at 260. Nonetheless, on
February 4, 2004, following receipt of a
letter from Respondent which stated
that Tri-State was ‘‘now currently in
compliance with all issues’’ found at the
inspection and that ‘‘[a]ll log books are
current and up to date and are being
kept current,’’ GX 11,11 Agent Kinneer
delivered a new license to Tri-State and
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10 Both
logs were started on July 30, 2003. GX 11,
at 2.
11 While the letter is dated January 19, 2003, it
references the December 30, 2003 inspection report.
See GX 11. I thus find that the letter was actually
sent on January 19, 2004. As discussed below,
during a search warrant which was executed on
June 7, 2005, Tri-State did not have any logbooks
for 2004. See Tr. 612.
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obtained Respondent’s dispensing
records. GX 12, at 6. The same day,
Agent Kinneer contacted three
distributors (Cardinal, McKesson, and
Moore Medical) to obtain copies of
Respondent’s purchases from them. GX
12, at 6–7.
The purchase records showed, inter
alia, that between October 13, 2003, and
January 12, 2004, Respondent had
purchased 277,500 tablets of
Roxicodone 30 mg., a schedule II
controlled substance. GX 12, at 7.
Moreover, between August 18, 2003,
and January 6, 2004, Respondent
purchased 65,700 tablets of oxycodone
hcl 5 mg., and 59,000 tables of
oxycodone/apap (5/325 mg.). Id.
The records also showed that between
July 24, 2003, and October 21, 2003,
Respondent purchased more than
57,000 dosage units of combination
hydrocodone/apap drugs in 10/325 mg.,
10/500 mg., and 10/650 mg.
strengths.12 Id. Furthermore, between
various dates, he had purchased more
than 32,600 dosage units of
benzodiazepines including alprazolam
in 1 mg. and .5 mg. strengths, and both
diazepam and lorazepam in 10 mg.
strength.13 Id. at 7.
In late June 2003, a Diversion
Investigator (DI) with DEA’s Columbus,
Ohio office received a phone call from
a pharmacist in Kenova, Ohio. Tr. 472,
508, GX 6. The pharmacist inquired as
to whether Respondent had an active
DEA registration; he also told the DI that
he was ‘‘receiving numerous
prescriptions for OxyContin and
Percocet,’’ as well as Lorcet, Xanax and
Soma (carisoprodol), which Respondent
had written. Tr. 472–73, 508. The
pharmacist also stated that between
June 1, 2003, and July 15, 2003,
Respondent’s ‘‘prescriptions had
tripled’’ and that the prescriptions were
for ‘‘very large’’ quantities. Id. at 473.
The pharmacist further told the DI that
the persons who were presenting
prescriptions from Respondent ‘‘were
lining up outside’’ of his pharmacy to
get them filled. Id. at 507–08.
The DI further testified that she had
received phone calls from numerous
12 Respondent was also purchasing large
quantities of combination hydrocodone/apap drugs
from PD–RX Pharmaceuticals, Inc., during this
period See GX 10, at 147–48.
13 According to the testimony of a detective with
the narcotics unit of the Scioto County Sheriff’s
Office, the illegal trafficking of prescriptions drugs
is ‘‘[t]he number one [drug] problem’’ in the
County. Tr. 444. The Detective further testified that
oxycodone, which is the ‘‘most abused’’ drugs sells
‘‘for between 30 and 40 dollars per pill’’ of thirty
milligram strength, that Xanax sells for ‘‘between $5
and $12’’ per pill depending upon its strength, and
that combination hydrocodone drugs sell for
‘‘between $7 to $15’’ per pill. Id. at 450.
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other pharmacies regarding
Respondent’s prescribing practices
including pharmacies that were located
in Northern Kentucky and Columbus,
Ohio. Id. 476. The pharmacists reported
that Respondent was prescribing ‘‘very
high quantities’’ of OxyContin, Percocet,
Lortab, Xanax, and Somas, and that the
patients were paying cash for their
drugs.14
The DI also received a phone call
from a DI in Forth Worth, Texas,
regarding a report from McKesson, a
distributor, that Respondent had
ordered large quantities of combination
hydrocodone/apap. Tr. 482. More
specifically, McKesson had reported
that on August 7, 2003, Respondent
ordered thirty 100-count bottles of
combination hydrocodone/apap, and on
August 15, 2003, he ordered forty 100count bottles of the drug. Id. Moreover,
on August 22, 2003, Respondent
ordered twenty 100-count bottles of
combination hydrocodone/apap, as well
as twenty 100-count bottles of
alprazolam. Id.; see also GX 15, at 3–5.
Thereafter, the DI obtained copies of
invoices documenting Respondent’s
purchases of controlled substances from
McKesson and other distributors. GX
14–16.
In November 2003, the Columbusbased DI was contacted by another
Portsmouth-based physician who
informed her that ‘‘there were numerous
patients that were coming from
[Respondent’s] office’’ who were
seeking detoxification treatment. Tr.
483. The physician related that
Respondent had put the patients on
excessive amounts of opiates such as
OxyContin, Percocet, and hydrocodone.
Id. The physician also told the DI that
Respondent was telling the patients to
go to particular pharmacies to get their
prescriptions filled.15 Id. at 484.
14 The DI also received information from an FBI
task force officer. Tr. 475. The officer told the DI
that an informant had obtained a prescription from
Respondent without the latter having performed an
evaluation on him, and that Denise Huffman had
filled the prescription for ‘‘approximately $200.’’ Id.
The DI did not, however, testify as to what drug was
involved. See id.
15 The DI also testified that she had been
informed that one of Respondent’s ‘‘patients’’ had
contacted DEA regarding her visit with Respondent.
Id. The patient related that she had taken a friend
with her to the clinic and had been ‘‘scolded’’ for
doing so by Denise Huffman, the clinic owner,
because ‘‘she didn’t like anybody coming with
patients,’’ id. at 486, and ‘‘law enforcement was
watching the building.’’ Id. at 488. The patient
further stated that Respondent had prescribed Soma
and an analgesic even though he ‘‘only saw her for
a couple of minutes’’ and had little interest in
reviewing her x-ray. Id. at 485. Because of what was
going on at the clinic, the patient decided to see
another physician. Id. at 486. Respondent’s office
repeatedly refused to send her records to her new
physician and the patient had to retain an attorney
to obtain them. Id. at 486–87.
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Thereafter, DEA investigators
obtained records from various
pharmacies pertaining to Respondent’s
prescriptions. Id. 489; see also GX 18–
20, 22–25. A DI also obtained from the
State of Kentucky the previously
mentioned KASPER report. See GX 26.
Moreover, in April-May 2005, the
Agency also obtained records pertaining
to Respondent’s purchases from four
distributors (PD–RX Pharmaceuticals,
Cardinal, McKesson, and Moore
Medical). See GX 29.
On June 7, 2005, DEA investigators
executed a search warrant at the TriState facility and seized the controlled
substances that were on the premises,
patient records, invoices, DEA Form
222s, and financial records.16 Tr. 541,
696–97. One of the DIs interviewed
Denise Huffman, Tri-State’s owner.
Denise Huffman told the DI that based
on what Respondent ‘‘told her to order,’’
she would order the controlled
substances from the distributors. Id. at
543. Ms. Huffman also stated that the
clinic did not do third-party billing and
was a ‘‘full cash business.’’ Id. Ms.
Huffman further related that her
daughter Alice and Respondent ‘‘were
in complete control of the dispensing
center.’’ Id. at 545.
The DI also interviewed Alice
Huffman, who confirmed that Tri-State
‘‘was a cash only business’’ with ‘‘no
third-party billing.’’ Id. at 544. Alice
Huffman admitted that she filled ‘‘all
the prescriptions and was supposed to
keep the records,’’ including the
dispensing records, but did not. Id.
Alice Huffman further stated that ‘‘she
wasn’t sure’’ if there were any
inventories and ‘‘didn’t know if they’’
would be accurate if there were any. Id.
at 545. When asked by the DI whether
she was aware of whether any of TriState’s patients had overdosed, Huffman
gave the names of two persons ‘‘that she
believed had overdosed on prescriptions
that were written from the clinic.’’17 Id.
The same day, DEA investigators
attempted to interview Respondent at
his residence, but he declined. Id. at
691. Later that day, Respondent arrived
at the clinic and he eventually agreed to
an interview. Id. at 692. Regarding the
interview, the DI testified that
Respondent ‘‘declined to talk’’ when
asked about the deaths of Tri-State’s
patients. Id. at 694. Respondent further
maintained that he was an independent
contractor and serving as a ‘‘loc[um]
16 ‘‘To accommodate’’ Respondent, the
investigators made copies of the medical records
and provided them to the clinic before ‘‘the summer
ended.’’ Tr. 697.
17 The circumstances surrounding the overdose of
one of these persons ( K.R.) is discussed below.
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ten[ens]’’ practitioner 18 who had found
his position on the internet. Id. at 695.
Respondent could not, however, ‘‘recall
what company * * * he was a loc[um]
ten[ens] for,’’ id., and, of course, had
been working at Tri-State for more than
two years at that point.
Moving on to other subjects,
Respondent stated that the clinic did
not have a physical therapist on its staff
and he was not sure whether the clinic
even had a nurse. Id. at 695. Respondent
also told the DI that he ‘‘rarely
recommend[ed] people to other
physicians’’ and that ‘‘for the most
part,’’ he did not associate with other
area physicians. Id. at 695–96.
On the same day that the warrant was
executed, DEA investigators attempted
to conduct an accountability audit. Id. at
546. The investigators inventoried all of
the controlled substances that were
being seized. Id. at 613–14. Consistent
with Alice Huffman’s testimony, the DIs
did not find either any initial or
biannual inventories as required by
Federal regulations. Id. at 615. Nor were
there any dispensing logs for the year
2004. Id. at 612.
Using records subsequently obtained
from various distributors, the DI was
able to determine the amounts of the
various controlled substances
Respondent purchased during the audit
period and concluded that there were
substantial shortages of the drugs. Id. at
615. These records also showed that
Respondent had ordered large quantities
of alprazolam (2 mg.) and diazepam (10
mg.), hydromorphone (4 mg.), and both
oxycodone and combination
hydrocodone in various strengths. GX
30.
I find it unnecessary to make findings
regarding the actual amounts of the
shortages.19 Instead, I find that
Respondent authorized the ordering of
large quantities of numerous controlled
18 As commonly understood, the term ‘‘locum
tenens’’ means ‘‘one filling an office for a time or
temporarily taking the place of another.’’ Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 684 (10th ed. 1998).
19 Because Tri-State had no inventories, the DI
used the starting figure of ‘‘0’’ for each drug. Under
the heading for the closing inventory, the audit
chart stated ‘‘as of 12–31–04.’’ GX 30. The DI
testified, however, that the actual inventory was
taken on June 7, 2005. Tr. 613. The record does not
establish how the DI arrived at the inventory figures
for December 31, 2004.
There was also testimony that during the search,
Denise Huffman stated that the dispensing logs
‘‘were probably at her house.’’ Tr. 669. Eventually,
Ms. Huffman produced logbooks for 2005; Ms.
Huffman admitted, however, that there were no
records for 2004. Id. at 670. The DI further testified
that the logbooks were provided only after the
Government provided copies of the patient files
subsequent to the search. Id. at 674–75. The
logbooks ‘‘were brand new,’’ and appeared to have
been newly created based on the copies of the
medical records. Id.
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substances, and that the disposition of
these drugs cannot be adequately
accounted for because Respondent
failed to maintain accurate records.
On September 9, 2005, Respondent’s
relationship with Tri-State ended. Id. at
1433–34. Respondent initially saw
patients at his apartment in Portsmouth.
Id. at 1434–35. Regarding his activities
at this location, a DEA Investigator
testified that he had interviewed the
friend (DC) of one of Respondent’s
deceased patients (M.R.). Tr. 761. DC
told the investigator that he and M.R.
‘‘knew that [Respondent] was writing
prescriptions without any type of
medical examination.’’ Id. Accordingly,
they decided to see Respondent (at his
Center St., Portsmouth) address to
obtain drugs that they could sell on the
street. Id.
DC related that upon his arrival at
Respondent’s office, he encountered a
former girlfriend who was now working
for Respondent. Id. at 762. After filling
out various forms, the ex-girlfriend
asked DC what he was taking. Id. DC
asked her: ‘‘what is he writing?’’ Id. She
then wrote out ‘‘prescriptions for
oxycodone, a hydrocodone product, and
Xanax.’’ Id.
DC further related that Respondent
did not physically examine him.
Respondent signed the prescriptions
and engaged in small talk with DC
before Respondent left the exam room.
Id. at 763–64.
On October 4, 2005, the Portsmouth
Police Department executed a warrant at
Respondent’s apartment and seized
various items including patient
files.20 Id. at 1436–37. The Chief of
Police also issued a condemnation
notice, which in Respondent’s words,
ordered him ‘‘to immediately vacate the
premises.’’ Id. at 1437.
Approximately a week later,
Respondent relocated to Chillicothe,
Ohio. Id. at 1437–38. On February 6,
2006, DEA investigators obtained a
warrant to search Respondent’s
Chillicothe office. GX 78. On February
10, 2006, the warrant was executed and
additional patient files were seized. GX
73.
A DI subsequently reviewed the 1258
patient files that were seized during
both the June 2005 search of Tri-State
and the February 2006 search of
Respondent’s Chillicothe office. Id.
Most significantly, the DI determined
20 Respondent testified that the seizure occurred
because the police ‘‘were bigger than I was, and
they decided that they were going to come in and
do that.’’ Tr. 1436. He also maintained that the
‘‘search warrant * * * contained a lot of frankly
irrelevant materials.’’ Id. Respondent did not,
however, produce any evidence that a court had
quashed the warrant.
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that 900 of the patient files lacked
documentation that Respondent had
performed a physical examination on
the patient. Id.
During the course of the investigation,
DEA investigators received information
from various sources including family
members, friends, emergency room
physicians, and various coroners
indicating that sixteen persons had died
of drug overdoses shortly after seeing
Respondent. Tr. 617–20; see also GXs
32–60. For example, the widow of J.R.
testified that her husband had obtained
prescriptions from Respondent for
Oxycontin, oxycodone, hydrocodone,
valium, and Soma, and was receiving as
many as 622 pills per month. Tr. 40, 42–
43. At one point J.R. attempted to
commit suicide and was hospitalized;
J.R., however, was released. Id. at 81–82.
On November 18, 2003, J.R. visited
Respondent. Id. at 53; GX 61.
On the morning of November 20,
2003, J.R. was found dead in the
bathroom. Tr. 52. According to the
Deputy Coroner’s report, there were four
pill bottles on the bathroom sink: two
bottles were labeled as containing
oxycodone (Rx’d on 10/3/03 and 10/20/
03) although both were found empty;
one contained 12 tablets of diazepam
out of the original 90 count which was
prescribed on 11/18/03; and one bottle
contained three methadone tablets. See
GX 60, at 4. Respondent was listed as
the prescriber on the two oxycodone
and the diazepam bottles. Id. No
prescriber was listed on the bottle
which contained methadone. Id.
The coroner found that the immediate
cause of J.R.’s death was an ‘‘overdose’’
due to multiple drug intoxication. GX
60, at 1. See also GX 59. According to
J.R.’s widow, her husband was addicted
to drugs. Tr. 33, 45. She also testified
that her husband was selling some of his
drugs to pay for his visits with
Respondent. Id. at 64. According to her
testimony, her husband had told her
that Respondent ‘‘was trying to give him
[S]omas also and to take them, and that
[Respondent] said if he didn’t take them
to sell them.’’ Id. at 42.
J.R.’s step-daughter corroborated this
testimony. More specifically, she
testified that her step-father had ‘‘said
that I could get more if I wanted.
[Respondent] offered me [S]omas, and I
told him that I was allergic to them, and
he [Respondent] said sell them, trade
them, whatever you need to do.’’ 21 Id. at
104.
21 While Soma (carisoprodol) is a prescription
drug, it is not a controlled substance. It is, however,
a highly abused drug which metabolizes into
meprobamate, a schedule IV depressant. See 21 CFR
1308.14(c); ALJ Ex. 11, at 4; Tr. 934 (testimony of
Dr. Wheeler). Respondent’s statements to J.R. to sell
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During the June 2005 search of TriState, DEA investigators ‘‘could not find
[J.R.’s] medical chart.’’ Id. at 706; see
also id. at 709. The investigators did,
however, find a ‘‘sign-in sheet’’ which
indicated that J.R. had visited
Respondent on November 18, 2003, two
days before his death. Id.; see also GX
61.
DEA did, however, obtain the medical
charts of six ‘‘patients’’ who died while
under Respondent’s care and provided
these to L. Douglas Kennedy, M.D., for
his review. GX 74. Dr. Kennedy holds
medical licenses in Kentucky, Ohio, and
Florida, and board certifications in
anesthesiology and pain medicine. GX
63, at 9. He has been a fellow in pain
medicine at the Cleveland Clinic
Foundation, served as an assistant
professor of anesthesiology and director
of the chronic pain management
program at the University of Kentucky
Medical Center, and has approximately
fifteen years experience as the medical
director of a pain management practice.
GX 63, at 1–2. Dr. Kennedy has also
lectured on pain management at
numerous symposia and conferences.
Id. at 3–7. Dr. Kennedy was qualified as
an expert witness in the standard of care
in pain management and the prescribing
of controlled substances for the
treatment of chronic pain. Tr. at 1021–
22.
Dr. Kennedy specifically reviewed
records including Respondent’s patient
files for six individuals (M.C., S.H., S.J.,
C.J., D.P, and K.R.). GX 74, at 1–5; see
also Tr. 1084–89. He also ‘‘reviewed
past or concurrent medical records
present on [Respondent’s] ‘patient’
charts from other physicians [and]/or
medical facilities,’’ police reports, as
well as death certificates, autopsy,
coroner’s, and post-mortem toxicology
reports. GX 74, at 1. In his report, Dr.
Kennedy further stated that he had
reviewed, and was ‘‘generally familiar
with, regulations including Ohio
Administrative Code, Chapter 4731–21
on Intractable Pain,’’ the Federation of
State Medical Board’s Model Policy for
the Use of Controlled Substances for the
Treatment of Pain, and ‘‘other
applicable standards and guidelines
with respect to pain management and
the prescription of controlled
substances for same.’’ Id. at 2.22
or trade the drug are nonetheless relevant to show
his knowledge and intent.
22 While much of the cross-examination of Dr.
Kennedy focused on his reliance on the Kentucky
guidelines, in both his report and testimony, Dr.
Kennedy made clear that he had also reviewed the
Ohio Administrative Code. See Tr. 1198–1203.
When Dr. Kennedy offered to explain why
Respondent also violated the Ohio regulations,
Respondent’s counsel declined to pursue this line
of questioning. Id. at 1202–03.
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Dr. Kennedy specifically noted that
the drugs Respondent prescribed ‘‘were
present in the Toxicology Testing postmortem and were the primary (in some
cases the only) cause of death.’’ 23 Id. at
23 With respect to patient M.C., the record
establishes that she saw Respondent on January 8,
2004, and died on January 10, 2004, at the age of
32. GX 84, at 6–7; GX 44. During the January 8 visit,
Respondent issued her three prescriptions: one for
300 tablets of Norco (hydrocodone/apap 10/325);
one for 60 tablets of oxycodone 30 mg.; and one for
120 tablets of Xanax 2 mg. GX 84, at 6–7. The
coroner concluded that M.C. died from
‘‘intoxication’’ caused ‘‘by the combined effects of
oxycodone and hydrocodone.’’ GX 42 & 44.
With respect to patient S.H., the record
establishes that he saw Respondent on April 19,
2005, and died the next morning at the age of 33.
GX 84, at 12–14; GX 38, at 3. During the April 19
visit, Respondent issued him prescriptions for 360
tablets of oxycodone (15 mg.) with an instruction
to take 12 per day; 120 tablets of Valium (10 mg.);
30 tablets of Xanax (2 mg.), and another drug
Carafate, which is not controlled. GX 84, at 12–13.
Respondent also issued an RX for an MRI during
this visit. The coroner concluded that S.H.
overdosed and died of the ‘‘acute combined effects
of oxycodone, diazepam, and alprazolam.’’ GX 38,
at 1.
With respect to S.J., the record establishes that
she saw Respondent on both September 16 and
September 29, 2005. On September 16, Respondent
prescribed to her 270 tablets of oxycodone 30 mg.;
270 tablets of Percocet 5/325 (oxycodone/apap); 60
tables of Xanax (2 mg.), and 120 tablets of Soma
(350) even though her pain was indicated as being
‘‘2/10.’’ GX 84, at 21–24. On September 26, 2005,
Respondent prescribed to S.J. an additional 135
tablets of both Percocet 5/325 and oxycodone 30.
Id. at 25–26. The form documenting the 9/26/05
visit does not contain any indication of a medical
complaint and the entry for ‘‘Pain: Location,
Description, Duration’’ is blank. Id. at 26. S.J. died
September 30, 2005; the coroner concluded that the
cause of death was ‘‘[m]ultiple drug intoxication,
with acute bronchopneumonia contributing.’’ GX
55, at 2. The coroner further noted that S.J., who
was 30 years old, had ingested oxycodone,
alprazolam, cocaine and diphenhydramine. Id. at 2–
3.
With respect to K.R., the record establishes that
on March 8, 2004, Respondent gave her two
separate prescriptions for 90 tablets of oxycodone
30 mg., a prescription for 180 tablets of Lorcet 10/
650 (hydrocodone/apap), and a prescription for 120
Xanax (2 mg.). GX 84, at 10. The progress note for
the visit suggests that Respondent also gave her a
prescription for Soma 350. Id. at 11. K.R, who was
39 years old, died the following day of a drug
overdose. GX 51, at 2. The toxicology report
indicates that oxycodone, benzodiazepines, and
carisoprodol /meprobamate were present. Id. at 3.
Dr. Kennedy specifically noted that Respondent
had ‘‘essentially doubled’’ K.R.’s medication ‘‘the
day before she died,’’ and that he saw ‘‘no
indication for her being on the medicines in the
first place, let alone [Respondent’s] doubling them.’’
Tr. 1090.
With respect to C.J., the record establishes that on
October 16, 2003, Respondent gave him
prescriptions for 120 tablets of oxycodone 30 mg.,
180 tablets of Percocet 10/650 (oxycodone/apap);
180 Xanax 2 mg., and 90 Soma 350 mg. GX 84, at
3–5. The progress note indicated that C.J.’s pain
level was 5–6/10, and his spasms were 0/10. Id. at
5. C.J. died five days later; the coroner determined
that the cause of his death was ‘‘acute opioid
(oxycodone) toxicity.’’
With respect to D.P., the record establishes that
on August 11, 2004, Respondent issued to him
prescriptions for 300 tablets of oxycodone 30 mg.,
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4. He further found that Respondent
‘‘practiced ‘polypharmacy[,]’ prescribing
multiple controlled substances at the
same time.’’ Id. at 5. Relatedly, Dr.
Kennedy observed that Respondent
‘‘averaged 3.8 controlled substance
prescriptions for each ‘patient’ visit,’’
and that ‘‘[t]his increased the likelihood
of sedation, respiratory depression and
death.’’ Id. He also noted that ‘‘[d]eath
occurred on average * * * [three] days
after the last visit with [Respondent]
[with] some [occurring] the next day.’’
Id.
Dr. Kennedy further described
Respondent’s practices as ‘‘prescrib[ing]
drug ‘cocktails’ * * * often including
an opioid[] (often 2–3 types), a
benzodiazepine, and Soma.’’ Id. at 3.
According to Dr. Kennedy,
Respondent’s prescribing practices
‘‘greatly increased the chance for drug
abuse, diversion, [and]/or addiction.’’
Id.
Moreover, based upon his review of
the ‘‘patient charts’’ (which is more
fully set forth in GX 82), Dr. Kennedy
found that Respondent ‘‘did not
establish a doctor-patient relationship
on initial visits, and did not establish or
maintain such a relationship on
followup visits.’’ GX 74, at 3. Relatedly,
Dr. Kennedy noted that ‘‘[t]here was
inadequate or no history [and] physical
examination,’’ that ‘‘[t]here was seldom
any diagnostic testing or past medical
record present,’’ and that ‘‘[w]here there
was, [Respondent] did not rely upon it
for medical decision making.’’ Id. at 4.
Dr. Kennedy also observed ‘‘[t]here
existed no plan to diagnose or treat the
person’s problem(s),’’ and that ‘‘[t]he
‘plan of care’ was essentially the same
for every person: drugs (predominately
controlled substances), for which no
medical necessity was established.’’ Id.
Moreover, once Respondent began his
‘‘ ‘plan of care’ * * * [he] continued [it]
with no reassessment as to effect,
success, or ill effects.’’ Id. Relatedly, Dr.
360 tablets of hydrocodone/apap (10/325), 120
tablets of alprazolam 2 mg., and 180 tablets of
carisoprodol 350 mg. GX 26, at 385. D.P. filled the
first two prescriptions the same day, and filled the
latter two the next day. Id. According to the chart,
D.P. reported that his pain level was ‘‘O–1/10,’’ and
his spasms were ‘‘0/10.’’ GX 84, at 17. There is a
notation ‘‘See Cleve. Clinic Report,’’ but the note
does not say what the referral was for. Id. There is
also a notation that Rx Express Pharmacy had been
called and D.P. had not filled either the Soma or
Xanax prescriptions, Id.; he did, however, fill them
the next day. Id.
While the record does not contain D.P.’s death
certificate, the testimony establishes that he died on
August 12, 2004. Tr. 736. Moreover, the toxicology
report confirmed the presence of oxycodone in
D.P.’s blood. GX 34, at 2. According to the
spreadsheet compiled by Dr. Kennedy, there is a
handwritten note on a preliminary toxicology sheet
which states that D.P.’s death was caused by ‘‘acute
oxycodone toxicity.’’ GX 82.
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Kennedy found that Respondent ‘‘did
not regularly and consistently address
pain complaints with other methods, for
example, nonprescription drugs, noncontrolled substance prescription drugs,
physical therapy or behavioral medicine
consultation, before resorting to
controlled substance prescriptions.’’ Id.
at 3.
Dr. Kennedy also concluded that
Respondent ‘‘ignored and failed to
obtain necessary testing and
consultations (with Behavioral
Medicine, Psychiatry, or Addiction
Medicine) that would have identified
and then allowed treatment for abuse
and addiction as well as identifying
those persons who may have been
diverting the drugs.’’ Id. at 5. More
specifically, Dr. Kennedy found that
Respondent ‘‘rarely tested, checked for,
or heeded signs of addiction (he rarely
performed in office urinary drug
screens). When he did perform in office
urinary drug screens, the tests were
inadequate.’’ 24 Id. at 3. As Dr. Kennedy
24 According to Dr. Kennedy’s spreadsheet,
Respondent did not perform a single urinary drug
screen on M.C., even though she made five visits
to him over a four month period. GX 82. Notably,
M.C.’s toxicology report was positive for
cannabinoids. Id. Dr. Kennedy thus concluded that
M.C.’s use of marijuana ‘‘most likely would have
been picked up by [Respondent] if he had checked,
triggering an addiction medicine [and]/or law
enforcement evaluation.’’ Id. According to Dr.
Wayne Wheeler, who also testified as an expert
witness for the Government, M.C.’s emergency
room records indicate that on August 5, 2003, she
had been in a car accident; a drug test done at the
hospital indicated that she was positive for
marijuana and ‘‘the police report indicated she had
taken Soma and Percocet and lost control of her
vehicle.’’ Tr. 946.
Dr. Kennedy noted that S.J. ‘‘had been dismissed
in 2003 for falsifying symptoms and cancer
records.’’ GX 82. Respondent did not, however,
perform a drug screen on S.J. Id. Dr. Wheeler noted
that S.J. had made ‘‘multiple visits to the emergency
room’’ for conditions (falls, headaches, dental pain)
that are the ‘‘hallmarks of * * * pill-seeking
behavior’’ because it is ‘‘very hard to find objective
evidence’’ that the patient is not telling the truth.
Tr. 948.
Dr. Kennedy also noted that Respondent did not
perform a single drug screen on D.P., even though
he had visited Respondent seventeen times over the
course of sixteen months and had received a total
of 74 controlled-substance prescriptions from him.
GX 82.
Respondent performed only a single drug screen
on S.H., even though he was a patient for more than
two years and saw Respondent thirteen times. Id.
He also noted that S.H. had previously been treated
at Tri-State (albeit at a different location) and that
records of an earlier visit indicated an abnormal
drug screen in that S.H. indicated that he was
currently taken Lortab 10/500 and the screen was
negative. Id. Moreover, S.H. had previously been
hospitalized for mental illness; these records
indicated that S.H. had stated that ‘‘he has smoked
pot [and], taken Cocaine.’’ Id. Moreover, S.H. had
a Xanax bottle which had been filled ten days
earlier but was then empty. S.H. had also stated that
he was out of medications and that prior to his
admission, he was taking Xanax, Oxycontin, and
oxycodone. Id. The note also stated that S.H. had
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explained, if a test does not pick up a
drug that a physician has prescribed, it
raises the possibility that the ‘‘person
could have been selling those drugs.’’
Tr. 1091. Dr. Kennedy further noted that
Respondent ‘‘prescribed and continued
to prescribe controlled substances to
persons who exhibited behavior
consistent with possible drug abuse,
addiction [and]/or diversion.’’ Id. at 3.
Dr. Kennedy thus concluded that
Respondent ‘‘did not establish’’ a bonafide doctor patient relationship or ‘‘any
relationship adequate for prescribing
controlled substances on the [patient’s]
initial visit’’ or ‘‘on subsequent visits.’’
Id. at 4. Most significantly, he
concluded that Respondent ‘‘knowingly
and intentionally distribute[d]
prescriptions for oxycodone and other
controlled substances not for a
legitimate medical purpose and beyond
the bounds of medical practice.’’ Id.
Finally, Dr. Kennedy concluded that
Respondent’s ‘‘distribution of multiple
and regular controlled substances
resulted in the death’’ of ‘‘all [six]’’
patients whose records he examined,
and that ‘‘each one of these [six] deaths
was preventable.’’ Id. at 4–5.25
a history of ‘‘significant alcohol abuse’’ and
‘‘[s]uicidal ideation with family member stating that
the patient does have the potential for selfdestructive behavior.’’ Id. Moreover, the patient had
tested positive for benzodiazepines and cocaine but
negative for opiates. Id. As Dr. Kennedy noted in
the spreadsheet, ‘‘[t]here are numerous ‘red flags’
for significant mental illness * * * with medication
non-compliance, drug abuse & addiction
(polysubstance abuse), and general non-compliance
with treatment recommendations.’’ Id.
Respondent performed a single drug screen on
C.J., who was his patient for more than six months
and saw him seven times. Id. During the screen,
only cocaine and THC were checked for. Id.
Finally, with respect to K.R., who was a patient
for nearly eleven months and made 14 office visits
during this period, Dr. Kennedy noted in his
spreadsheet that Respondent had obtained two inoffice drug screens. GX 82. On cross-examination,
it appeared that both screens were ordered by a
different physician, who was practicing in TriState’s South Shore, KY office, and not Respondent.
Id.; see also Tr. 1182–83, 1186. The first of these
occurred on December 1, 2003, nearly eight months
after K.R.’s first visit; the second drug screen was
obtained on January 23, 2004. GX 82. Dr. Kennedy
noted that the first screen did not test for
oxycodone and that the second test did not check
for specific opiates or benzodiazepines. Id. Dr.
Wheeler noted that while Respondent had referred
K.R. to a yoga class, she went only one time and
decided not to go back. Tr. 949. According to Dr.
Wheeler, allowing the patient to quit after one class
does not give that treatment ‘‘modality a reasonable
chance to produce any positive results.’’ Id.
25 The Government also called to testify Dr.
Wayne Wheeler, who is licensed in Ohio and other
states, and holds board certifications in both
emergency and occupational medicine, as well as
quality assurance and utilization review. Tr. 907–
08. Dr. Wheeler also has extensive experience in
emergency medicine and has served as a deputy
coroner of Scioto County, Ohio, since 1990. GX 69,
at 2. Dr. Wheeler is a member of the Ohio Medical
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On cross-examination, Dr. Kennedy
acknowledged that K.R’s medical
records indicated that Respondent had
performed a physical exam on her on
April 17, 2003, which was the date of
K.R.’s first visit to him.26 Tr. 1174–78.
However, during his lengthy crossexamination of Dr. Kennedy,
Respondent’s counsel did not establish
that Respondent had ever performed a
followup physical examination or that
he properly monitored K.R.
Moreover, Dr. Kennedy noted that
during K.R.’s first visit with
Respondent, the latter proceeded to
prescribe what Dr. Kennedy termed the
‘‘cocktail’’ or ‘‘trifecta’’ of Soma, Xanax,
and Lorcet 10, which is ‘‘one of the
highest doses of hydrocodone.’’ Id. at
1178.27 While Respondent testified as to
Malpractice Commission, a board member of the
Ohio Patient Safety Institute, and Chairman of the
Ethics Committee at the Southern Ohio Medical
Center of Portsmouth. Id. Dr. Wheeler was accepted
as an expert in occupational medicine. Tr. 915.
Dr. Wheeler testified that prescription drug abuse
is ‘‘a particular problem in Scioto County.’’ Id. at
917. Dr. Wheeler explained that in treating a
chronic pain patient, a physician must determine
the patient’s complaint, the history of the problem
including ‘‘what therapies have been tried’’ and
‘‘who has been taking care of the problem,’’ and
how the condition has ‘‘developed.’’ Id. at 922. Dr.
Wheeler also testified that the treating physician
‘‘need[s] to get a past medical history, which
included other injuries, other illnesses,’’ including
‘‘psychiatric histories’’ and ‘‘social backgrounds.’’
Id. Next, the physician should do ‘‘a top-to-bottom
physical exam.’’ Id. Finally, if other practitioners
have been ‘‘caring for [the] patient, it become * * *
fairly important that you get their records and find
out what they have done and what their
impressions have been.’’ Id. at 923. Dr. Wheeler
explained that patients sometimes ‘‘don’t really
understand what has been told them about their
condition or they cover up material or just
intentionally leave it out.’’ Id.
Dr. Wheeler further testified that in evaluating a
patient, it is ‘‘essential’’ to determine if there is ‘‘a
history of overdosing on drugs’’ or of psychiatric
problems. Id. at 927. He also explained that he
would have his patients sign releases so that he
could obtain the patients’ records from the other
physicians who had previously treated them, as
well as emergency room and hospital records. Id.
at 928. According to Dr. Wheeler, obtaining
emergency room records is ‘‘not a terribly laborious
or complicated process.’’ Id. at 951. On crossexamination, Dr. Wheeler further explained that
while it was not his experience that a hospital
would fail to provide the records to a physician, a
patient is entitled to her medical record. Id. at 988.
While Dr. Wheeler acknowledged that ‘‘pain is
very subjective,’’ he added that some patients
exaggerate their pain level. Id. Moreover, he would
not prescribe a narcotic unless he ‘‘truly believed’’
the patient was ‘‘experiencing pain somewhere in
the 5 to 6 level.’’ Id. Dr. Wheeler particularly noted
that drug abusers ‘‘have long track records of painmedicine seeking behavior’’ with multiple visits to
emergency rooms. Id. at 929.
26 Dr. Kennedy noted that Respondent’s diagnosis
of ‘‘left sciatica’’ was ‘‘odd, because the left straight
leg raise had a greater range of motion than did the
right.’’ Id. at 1177.
27 Respondent’s counsel also cross-examined Dr.
Kennedy about two referrals that K.R. was given,
one for a neurosurgeon, the other for a neurologist.
Tr. at 1183–84; 1186–87. Neither document was
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the general rationale for his prescribing
practices,28 id. at 1416–18, he did not
testify regarding his prescribing to the
six deceased patients and presented no
expert testimony refuting Dr. Kennedy’s
opinion that there was no legitimate
medical purpose for prescribing these
drugs in combination. GX 64, at 2; GX
74, at 5 (noting that prescribing this
combination of drugs ‘‘increased the
likelihood of sedation, respiratory
depression and death’’); Tr. 1047 (noting
that the ‘‘cocktail * * * is very popular
amongst those individuals who go to
doctors’ offices to take drugs to abuse
them, [and] not [use them] for legitimate
medical purposes’’); see also id. at
1036–37; 1189. Moreover, Respondent
did nothing to impeach Dr. Kennedy’s
findings with respect to the remaining
five deceased patients (M.C., S.H., S.J.,
C.J. and D.P.).
In his defense, Respondent testified
that when he ‘‘started seeing these
patients, they were all new to me, and
so I had to evaluate all of them pretty
much from scratch.’’ Id. at 1407.
Respondent maintained that he ‘‘did a
physical exam on all of them, and
evaluated their complaints, evaluated
the medical records that were in the
charts, as far as prior treatments, prior
x-rays, prior MRIs, prior lab tests, prior
consultations with other
physicians.’’ 29 Id. Relatedly, he asserted
that ‘‘[v]irtually all the patients that I
found had previous consultations with
neurosurgeons or neurologists,’’ and
admitted into the record, and the testimony
suggests that both referrals were issued by a doctor
who was working at a Tri-State Clinic in South
Shore, Kentucky, and not Respondent. Id.
Moreover, Respondent’s counsel did not establish
that K.R. ever went to either specialist, and
Respondent did not testify that he had reviewed a
report from either specialist.
28 In his testimony, Respondent described at
length the role of opiates in the treatment of pain;
he testified that he used both oxycodone and
hydrocodone because ‘‘it was perfectly appropriate,
as well as usually necessary, to treat chronic severe
intractable pain with two opiates, usually a stronger
or long acting one [oxycodone], as well as a shorter
acting one,’’ hydrocodone, which he used ‘‘for [his]
breakthrough medicine.’’ 1418. As support for his
testimony, Respondent cited various guidelines,
Ohio’s regulations, and a document of frequently
asked questions published by this Agency and two
other entities. Tr. 1412–15. He also justified his
prescribing of carisoprodol on the grounds that ‘‘I
learned that almost [all] of my patients complained
of severe muscle spasms * * * usually radiating
down one or both legs.’’ Id. at 1415. Finally, he
justified his prescribing of either Valium
(diazepam) or Xanax (alprazolam) on the ground
that ‘‘virtually all of these patients needed medicine
to help them sleep.’’ 1417–18. He also justified his
prescribing of benzodiazepines as medically
necessary to relieve muscle spasms. Id.
29 Respondent maintained that he ‘‘would
always’’ do a physical exam during his first visit
with a patient. Id. at 1469. He further testified that
he would not necessarily do a new physical exam
at a subsequent visit because in ‘‘many instances,’’
there was ‘‘no new factor to evaluate.’’ Id.
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‘‘[m]ost of them had surgery one or more
times,’’ and ‘‘extensive injections given
by neurosurgeons, which they reported
to me had done very little to treat their
pain.’’ Id. at 1409.
Respondent further testified that
‘‘[m]ost of’’ his patients ‘‘had run the
gamut of treatment from specialists, and
were still in severe chronic pain,’’ and
‘‘fit the diagnosis and the category of
chronic intractable pain patients’’ who
‘‘would need medicine on a continuing
basis for the rest of their lives [as] there
was no other treatment available to
them which would in any way alleviate
their pain.’’ Id. He also maintained that
‘‘I at all times attempted to verify that
all the patients were in fact genuine
patients who had a legitimate need and
requirement for pain medication.’’ Id. at
1407. He also testified that if he did see
a patient who would be helped by
surgery, he would refer them to the
Cleveland Clinic. Id. at 1410.30
Respondent further testified that
‘‘each and every one of’’ his patients
‘‘signed narcotic contracts’’ which set
forth that his patients were ‘‘to take
their medicine’’ as he prescribed it and
how the patients were to secure the
drugs. Id. 1420. Relatedly, Respondent
testified that he directed that the TriState staff call in his patients for random
pill counts and that his patients were
subject to ‘‘random drug screens.’’ Id. at
1421. He further asserted that he sent
his patient to two hospitals ‘‘for more
extensive blood and urine tests,’’ id. at
1424, and that he dismissed those
patients who were non-compliant and
referred them to addiction treatment
programs. Id. at 1444.
Respondent further testified that ‘‘at
all times,’’ he documented his
diagnosis, id. at 1471, and that he
‘‘always wrote my justification and my
thinking as to why I put patients on
certain medicines, and I believe that
would be apparent in any reading of my
charts.’’ Id. at 1472. Moreover, he
maintained that he would document the
patients’ ‘‘response to the medication,’’
and any ‘‘adverse [drug] effect’’ and
changes in medication. Id. at 1473. He
also contended that ‘‘[a]t all times [he]
would look for signs of diversion’’ such
as abnormal drug tests and physical
signs of ‘‘intravenous drug abuse or
perhaps intranasal drug abuse.’’ Id. at
1474.
Regarding the six deceased patients
whose files Dr. Kennedy reviewed,
Respondent’s testimony was limited to
30 He also testified that he arranged for a yoga
instructor to come to Portsmouth, and that the
instructor did so ‘‘two days a week’’ for about ‘‘the
better part of a year,’’ when Ms. ‘‘Huffman decided
that she did not want to subsidize the * * *
instructor any longer.’’ Tr. 1411–12.
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a discussion of their autopsies and
toxicology results, with in some
instances, Respondent disputing the
findings that the patients had taken
drugs in amounts that could be
definitively shown to be the cause of
their deaths. See 1475–86.; id. at 1481
(testifying that ‘‘post mortem values of
opiates are irrelevant to any
determination of cause of death,’’
because the values only show ‘‘the
patient having ingested those
compounds, but could not speak to
whether they were involved in the cause
of death.’’); id. at 1482–83 (testifying
regarding toxic levels of meprobamate).
However, with respect to several
patients, the coroners found that these
individuals had ingested not only
opiates, but opiates in combination with
benzodiazepines (S.H.), opiates in
combination with a benzodiazepine and
illicit drugs (S.J.), or opiates in
combination with benzodiazepines and
carisoprodol (K.R.). Moreover, even
with respect to those patients who were
found to have ingested only opiates, I
reject Respondent’s testimony either
because there were other findings
consistent with the Coroner’s finding
(M.C., GX 42; noting presence of
extreme pulmonary edema, which
according to Dr. Wheeler, ‘‘typically
occurs when someone has overdosed on
a narcotic drug [or] narcotic drugs,’’ Tr.
945), or because I presume that the
officials performing the autopsies are
competent and reviewed other
information (including the clinical
history, EMS run sheet, and emergency
room report) that is relevant in
determining the cause of death. Tr.
1196–97.
The ALJ did not make a credibility
finding pertaining to this portion of
Respondent’s testimony. She did,
however, find that she ‘‘doubt[ed]
Respondent’s credibility’’ with respect
to his testimony regarding his treatment
practices such as whether he took
medical histories and performed
physical exams, had his patients sign
narcotic contracts, called patients in for
pill counts, and performed drug screens.
ALJ at 34–35. As the ALJ explained,
‘‘[n]either Dr. Wheeler nor Dr. Kennedy
testified about finding such safeguards
in the patient charts they reviewed for
this proceeding.’’ Id. at 35.
I adopt the ALJ’s credibility finding.
While I acknowledge that there is
evidence that Respondent performed a
physical exam during K.R’s initial visit,
he did not introduce any evidence to
corroborate that he performed a physical
exam on any of the five other patients
whose records were reviewed by Dr.
Kennedy. Notably, Respondent was
provided with the patients files for these
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six patients and testified that he always
documented his findings. Tr. 1471.
Moreover, there was other evidence
suggesting that Respondent frequently
failed to perform physical exams
including testimony regarding an
interview with DC, Tr. 762–64, and a
DI’s analysis that in 900 of the 1258
patient files she reviewed, there was no
documentation that Respondent had
performed a physical exam. GX 73.
Furthermore, Dr. Kennedy’s review of
the six patient files establishes that
Respondent rarely performed drug
screens on those patients. See n.22. For
example, Respondent did not perform a
single drug screen on D.P., even though
he issued 74 controlled-substances
prescriptions to him during some
seventeen visits over a sixteen-month
period. GX 82. He performed but a
single drug screen on S.H., even though
he saw S.H. thirteen times over a period
of two years. Id. This evidence, which
is unrebutted by any documentary
evidence, gives ample reason to reject
Respondent’s testimony.31
Moreover, none of Respondent’s other
evidence (including the various exhibits
he submitted on pain management and
the testimony of his witnesses) rebuts
Dr. Kennedy’s ultimate findings that
Respondent did not establish and
maintain valid doctor-patient
relationships with the six deceased
patients and that his prescribing lacked
a legitimate medical purpose and was
outside of the usual course of
professional practice. Only one of
Respondent’s three witnesses (I.A.)
testified that she knew one of the
deceased patients (D.P.), and she did not
even know that D.P. had died of a drug
overdose. Tr. 1286–87. Ms. I.A., who
worked at Tri-State, and apparently did
so only ‘‘a few hours now and then,’’ id.
at 1284, testified that she ‘‘opened the
31 In his exceptions, Respondent notes that he
attempted to subpoena records from a hospital that
would have showed that he ‘‘routinely and
consistently ordered urine drug screens on his
patients.’’ Exceptions at 13. Respondent states: ‘‘[o]f
course, such records were simply ‘not available,’ ’’
implying that there is a conspiracy to deny him
access to records that would vindicate him.
According to Respondent: ‘‘[t]he non-production of
the forgoing documents, records, and evidence fits
synergistically with the course of conduct of the
hearing before the ALJ and stands as a poignant
indictment of the legality of the process utilized by
the agency.’’ Id. at 14.
The letter from King’s Daughters Medical Center
merely stated that the hospital was ‘‘unable to
retrieve the information * * * from our system
without patient specific information.’’ RX T. My
review of the subpoena indicates that it sought
‘‘records of all urine drug screens ordered by
[Respondent] from April 2003, through February
2006.’’ RX O, at 5. Respondent offered no evidence
that the records could, in fact, be retrieved based
solely on his name, and there is no evidence that
he subsequently provided patient names to the
hospital.
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doors,’’ ‘‘basically answered the
phones,’’ ‘‘pulled charts, and once in a
while . . . would write a few patients up
if somebody was gone’’ based on what
the patient told her. Id. at 1287–88. Ms.
I.A. had no personal knowledge of
Respondent’s treatment of any of the six
patients whose files were reviewed by
Dr. Kennedy.32
S.S. (who was I.A.’s sister) also
testified. S.S. did not work at Tri-State
and started working for Respondent
only after his falling out with the
Huffmans; her employment was thus
limited to the time he worked out of his
Portsmouth apartment and in
Chillicothe. Id. at 1328–29. S.S. testified
that she ‘‘would set up the charts’’ and
obtain information from both the
patients and the hospitals to corroborate
their stories. Id. at 1331. S.S. further
testified that Respondent ‘‘usually
required his patients to have at least a
year of therapy.’’ Id. at 1332. S.S. further
maintained that ‘‘we obtained histories.
We did physicals. We did the drug
exams’’ and monitored the patients’
‘‘drug levels.’’ Id. S.S. did not, however,
have any knowledge regarding
Respondent’s treatment of patients
(other than her sister) at Tri-State and
offered no testimony regarding his
treatment of the six deceased patients.
Respondent’s remaining witness
(E.S.M.) likewise worked for him for
only two months at his Chillicothe
office. Id. at 1363. While E.S.M. testified
that Respondent made ‘‘a lot of
referrals,’’ and that ‘‘[h]e was very strict
with’’ monitoring patient compliance,
id. at 1368, she did not work under him
during the period in which he treated
the six patients whose files were
reviewed by Dr. Kennedy. Furthermore,
at the time she was employed by him,
Respondent clearly had reason to know
that he was the subject of criminal
investigations because various law
enforcement authorities had twice
searched his offices. Under these
circumstances, even if true, evidence
that Respondent was making referrals,
was closely monitoring his patients and
attempting to corroborate their stories,
32 While Ms. I.A. testified that Respondent had
sent her to several specialists, Tr. 1268, this
testimony is not probative of Respondent’s
treatment of the six deceased patients whose files
were reviewed by Dr. Kennedy. It should also be
noted that I.A. was related to Denise Huffman, id.
at 1288–89, and had testified before a grand jury on
matters related to her employment at Tri-State. Id.
Ms. I.A. also testified that Respondent ordered that
blood be drawn on any patient he prescribed to, id.
at 1318, yet there was no evidence of blood tests
being performed on any of the six patients with the
possible exception of a test done on S.H. at King’s
Daughters Hospital on March 2, 2005 (although it
is unclear whether the test was a urine screen or
blood test). GX 82. Based on the weight of the
evidence, I reject this testimony.
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and performing physical exams, is not
probative of Respondent’s practices
while he was employed at Tri-State.
Finally, as for his exhibits, most of
them are only marginally relevant to the
issues in this case. While one of
Respondent’s Exhibits (an FAQ
supported by DEA, the Last Acts
Partnership, and the Univ. of
Wisconsin) indicates that it may be
appropriate ‘‘on a case by case basis’’ to
prescribe more than one opiate
including a short-acting one to address
‘‘breakthrough pain,’’ RX I, at 25;
nothing in this document refutes the
testimony of the Government’s experts
regarding the medical propriety of
Respondent’s prescribing of the trifecta
and quadfecta cocktails.
Moreover, this document notes the
importance of ‘‘tak[ing] a detailed
history and perform[ing] an appropriate
physical examination,’’ ‘‘[s]creen[ing]
for addictive behaviors of other family
members,’’ and ‘‘[i]dentify[ing]
concurrent psychiatric illness.’’ Id. at
31. The document further notes that the
physician should ‘‘[c]onsider multiple
approaches to the treatment of chronic
pain’’ including ‘‘[n]onpharmacological
and nonopioid analgesic approaches.’’
Id. The document also explains that the
physician should ‘‘[r]ecognize that
opioid therapy is as much a ‘therapeutic
trial’ as any other treatment[,]’’ and that
‘‘[i]f the benefits are not clear, or the
risks of adverse effects are not easily
managed, the therapy can be modified
or stopped.’’ Id.
Relatedly, the document suggests that
the physician ‘‘[s]tructure the treatment
in a manner that maintains the safety of
the patient, and increases both the
patient’s ability to maintain control and
the clinician’s ability to identify
medication misuse.’’ Id. at 37. Among
the measures which the document
recommends that a physician employ
are: ‘‘the prescribing of small
quantities,’’ ‘‘the use of a single drug
(typically a long-acting opioid’’), ‘‘pill
counts,’’ and ‘‘regular screening of urine
toxicology (to provide evidence of
therapeutic adherence and non-use of
other drugs).’’ Id. As found above, the
credible evidence establishes that
Respondent rarely followed these
recommendations.
Most significantly, as found above,
there is abundant evidence that
Respondent did not regularly perform
physical exams, rarely conducted drug
screenings, rarely used methods other
than prescribing controlled substances
to treat the six deceased patients, and
continued to prescribe controlled
substances to persons whose behavior
was consistent with either diversion or
self-abuse. Moreover, as found above,
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Respondent’s testimony that he
complied with these standards is not
credible. Contrary to Respondent’s
contention, this document does not
support Respondent.
Discussion
Respondent’s Exceptions
Two of Respondent’s remaining
exceptions raise constitutional claims
which are not intertwined with the
merits. Accordingly, they will be
discussed before addressing the
application of the public interest
standard.33
The first of these is Respondent’s
contention that the Government was
allowed to introduce over his objection
an e-mail in which ‘‘Respondent
expresse[d] some opinions about the
DEA, the ALJ, and the prosecuting DEA
attorney,’’ which ‘‘are not flattering.’’
Exceptions at 10. Respondent notes that
he ‘‘objected based upon relevance,
prejudice, and intentional inflammation
of the factfinder,’’ that the evidence was
not relevant ‘‘to the factual issues in
dispute,’’ and the admission of the
evidence punished him ‘‘for merely
expressing his Constitutionally
protected opinions.’’ Id.
Respondent is correct that the e-mail
was not relevant to any issue in the
case. The e-mail does not contain any
evidence that is probative of either the
allegations that he failed to maintain
proper records and could not account
for large quantities of controlled
substances, or the allegations that his
prescribing of controlled substances to
various patients violated Federal law.
GX 83. The Government’s contention at
the hearing that the e-mail was relevant
because Respondent made ‘‘disparaging
remarks’’ about the proceeding, DEA
counsel and the ALJ, and that this
‘‘raise[s] questions about judgment, and
[is] therefore relevant to the public
interest consideration,’’ Tr. 1506, finds
no support in the decisions of this
Agency.
While a registrant’s judgment may be
relevant in determining the public
interest, what makes it relevant is the
nexus between the registrant’s judgment
and the performance of his obligations
under the CSA and DEA regulations. As
one example, entrusting one’s
registration to someone without doing a
background check and failing to
adequately supervise that person
reflects poor judgment that is relevant in
the public interest determination. See,
e.g., Rose Mary Jacinta Lewis, 72 FR
4035, 4040 (2007). In contrast to his
33 Respondent’s exception that DEA is engaged in
the unlawful regulation of the practice of medicine
will be discussed in the public interest analysis.
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conduct, the opinions expressed by
Respondent in his e-mail do not
establish whether he committed any
violations in the past or whether he is
likely to do so in the future. The e-mail
should not have been admitted into
evidence and Respondent should not
have been questioned about it.
That being said, the Administrative
Procedure Act recognizes a rule of
prejudicial error. See 5 U.S.C. 706. The
ALJ did not rely on the e-mail in her
recommended decision. Most
significantly, having concluded that it is
irrelevant, as ultimate factfinder, I have
not considered it. Respondent’s
exception is therefore rejected.
Respondent’s second constitutionally
based exception is that the Agency
violated his right to Due Process
because it failed to provide him with
‘‘fair notice’’ of its ‘‘theory of the case’’
because the Government was repeatedly
allowed to introduce ‘‘evidence which
grossly exceeded the scope of the
February 2006 show cause order.’’
Exceptions at 5 (citation omitted). While
acknowledging that each of the
unnamed patients listed in the Show
Cause Order (most of whom were
alleged to have died shortly after
obtaining prescriptions from
Respondent, see Show Cause Order at
9–11), were identified by the
Government in its March 2006 prehearing statement, Respondent contends
that the Government was allowed to
introduce evidence ‘‘about more than
twenty-five specific patients,’’ and that
this ‘‘effectively expanded’’ the scope of
the hearing ‘‘without proper notice or
any realistic chance to defend.’’
Exceptions at 6. Respondent also notes
that the Government was allowed to ask
him ‘‘about many more patients by
reading names from a spreadsheet.’’ Id.
Respondent did not, however,
identify who the twenty-five patients
were by citation of either the transcript
or exhibits. See 21 CFR 1316.66(a)
(‘‘[t]he party shall include a statement of
supporting reasons for such exceptions
together with evidence of record
(including specific and complete
citations of the pages of the transcript
and exhibits)’’). Respondent has
therefore failed to properly preserve this
exception.34
Respondent also argues that he was
denied a meaningful opportunity to
34 It appears that the twenty-five patients
included those patients who were listed on the
KASPER report as having obtained controlled
substances from Respondent (see GX 26, Exceptions
at 8 n.6); the Government merely asked Respondent
whether he recalled each of these patients. Tr.
1521–29. Respondent has made no showing that the
Government failed to timely provide this document
to him. In any event, I do not rely on this portion
of his testimony.
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respond to the Government’s case
because it used ‘‘patient charts to
prepare its own expert witnesses,’’ but
denied him ‘‘timely access to these
charts.’’ Exceptions at 7. Respondent
contends that ‘‘it was essential to a
meaningful hearing that [he] receive
copies of the very same charts the
[G]overnment used in order to procure
expert opinion testimony from their
own witnesses.’’ Id. Respondent further
argues that he ‘‘asked for the charts,’’
but the Government would not provide
them because it had decided not to enter
them into the record. Id.
Respondent acknowledges, however,
that the Government provided him with
nine patient charts, including five of the
charts which were reviewed by Dr.
Kennedy. Exceptions at 8 n.6. Moreover,
the record establishes that Respondent
received all six of the patient files
which Dr. Kennedy reviewed in creating
his report on Respondent’s prescribing
to the six deceased patients. Tr. 1126–
27. While Respondent contends that he
did not have enough time to review the
charts and consult an expert witness
because the Government turned over the
charts only four days before the hearing
convened, Exceptions at 8 n.6,
Respondent ignores that the hearing was
adjourned for approximately one month
and that the ALJ allowed him to defer
his cross-examination of Dr. Kennedy
until the hearing reconvened. Tr. 1094–
95.
Respondent thus had a meaningful
opportunity to prepare for his crossexamination of Dr. Kennedy, as well as
to retain an expert witness to review the
patient files which Dr. Kennedy
reviewed. Accordingly, there is no merit
to his contention that the proceeding
violated his rights under the Due
Process Clause.35
35 While it is true that DEA’s regulations and the
Administrative Procedure Act require that an Order
to Show Cause contain ‘‘a summary of the matters
of fact and law asserted,’’ 21 CFR 1301.37(c), an
agency is not required ‘‘to give every [Respondent]
a complete bill of particulars as to every allegation
that [he] will confront.’’ Boston Carrier, Inc., v. ICC,
746 F.2d 1555, 1560 (DC Cir. 1984). As the ALJ
explained at the hearing, the Show Cause Order
only sets forth the parameters of the proceedings.
See Medicine Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 FR 364, 368
(2008). The actual conduct of the proceeding is
controlled by the pre-hearing statements.
Respondent also raises an exception based on the
ALJ’s denial of his request for a subpoena requiring
Dr. Kennedy to produce ‘‘[c]opies of all opinion
reports evaluating medical care by physicians
written for the DEA from December 2001 through
December 2006.’’ RX O, at 1. The ALJ denied
Respondent’s ‘‘request absent any further
justification.’’ Id. at 2. Respondent did not,
however, provide any further justification.
Accordingly, this exception is without merit. See 5
U.S.C. 555(d); 21 U.S.C. 875 & 876.
At Respondent’s request, the ALJ issued a
subpoena which directed DEA to provide patient
release forms it had obtained from Dr. Joseph
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The Public Interest Analysis
Respondent’s Registration Status
At the outset, the scope of this
proceeding must be determined. As
found above, Respondent’s registration
expired on May 31, 2006, and he did not
submit a renewal application (and his
request for a modification) until May 12,
2006. While one of the Government’s
exhibits states that because Respondent
filed a renewal application, his
registration has ‘‘remained in effect on
a day-to-day basis pending the
resolution of administrative
proceedings,’’ the document cited no
authority for this statement which is
contrary to Agency regulations. GX 2.
Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, ‘‘[w]hen [a] licensee has made
timely and sufficient application for a
renewal or a new license in accordance
with agency rules, a license with
reference to an activity of a continuing
nature does not expire until the
application has been finally determined
by the agency.’’ 5 U.S.C. 558(c). When,
however, a Show Cause Order has been
issued to a registrant, DEA’s regulation
provides that:
[i]n the event that an applicant for
reregistration (who is doing business under a
registration previously granted and not
revoked or suspended) has applied for
reregistration at least 45 days before the date
on which the existing registration is due to
expire, and the Administrator has issued no
order on the application on the date on
which the existing registration is due to
expire, the existing registration shall
automatically be extended and continue in
effect until the date on which the
Administrator so issues his/her order. The
Administrator may extend any other existing
registration under the circumstances
contemplated in this section even though the
registrant failed to apply for reregistration at
least 45 days before expiration of the existing
registration, if the Administrator finds that
such extension is not inconsistent with
public health and safety.
21 CFR 1301.36(i) (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding that he had
previously been served with a Show
Cause Order, Respondent did not file
his renewal application until nineteen
days before his registration expired.
Accordingly, Respondent did not make
a timely renewal application in
accordance with agency rules; his
registration has not remained in effect
pending the resolution of this
proceeding. See 5 U.S.C. 558(c).
Moreover, in light of the allegations of
the Show Cause Order (and the facts
found above), the extension of his
Delzotto. Id. at 1–3. Upon receipt of the subpoena,
DEA searched its case files and found no such
documents. Id. at 10. Respondent has made no
showing that this was not the case.
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30641
registration pending this Final Order
would be manifestly ‘‘inconsistent with
public health and safety.’’ 21 CFR
1301.36(i). I therefore conclude that
Respondent’s registration has expired.36
Respondent did, however, submit a
renewal application and a request for
modification, which under Agency
regulation, is ‘‘handled in the same
manner as an application for
registration.’’ 21 CFR 1301.51.
Accordingly, Respondent does have an
application pending before the Agency.
The Public Interest Factors
Section 303(f) of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) provides that an
application for a practitioner’s
registration may be denied upon a
determination ‘‘that the issuance of such
registration would be inconsistent with
the public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(f). In
making the public interest
determination, the CSA requires the
consideration of the following factors:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate
State licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant’s experience in
dispensing * * * controlled substances.
(3) The applicant’s conviction record under
Federal or State laws relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to controlled
substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten
the public health and safety.
Id.
‘‘These factors are considered in the
disjunctive.’’ Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 68
FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I ‘‘may rely on
any one or a combination of factors, and
may give each factor the weight [I]
deem[] appropriate in determining
whether * * * an application for
registration [should be] denied.’’ Id.
Moreover, I am ‘‘not required to make
findings as to all of the factors.’’ Hoxie
v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir.
2005); see also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d
165, 173–74 (DC Cir. 2005).
Having considered all of the factors, I
conclude that factors two, four, and five
amply demonstrate that issuing a
registration to Respondent ‘‘would be
inconsistent with the public interest.’’
21 U.S.C. 823(f). In this matter, there is
abundant evidence that Respondent
repeatedly violated Federal law by
prescribing controlled substances
without a legitimate medical purpose
and outside of the course of professional
practice. Moreover, the evidence also
establishes that Respondent authorized
Tri-State personnel to use his
registration to order huge quantities of
36 No
footnote.
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controlled substances and that he failed
to ensure the accountability of these
drugs by maintaining lawfully required
records. Accordingly, Respondent’s
application will be denied.
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Factors Two and Four—Respondent’s
Experience in Dispensing Controlled
Substances and Record of Compliance
With Applicable Laws
Respondent’s Prescribing Practices
One of the principal issues in this
case is whether the prescriptions
Respondent issued complied with
Federal law. While Respondent
maintains that his prescribing practices
were compliant with the State of Ohio’s
regulations of the practice of medicine,
the evidence conclusively establishes
that Respondent used his prescribing
authority to act as a drug pusher.
Under a longstanding DEA regulation,
a prescription for a controlled substance
is not ‘‘effective’’ unless it is ‘‘issued for
a legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of his professional
practice.’’ 21 CFR 1306.04(a). This
regulation further provides that ‘‘an
order purporting to be a prescription
issued not in the usual course of
professional treatment * * * is not a
prescription within the meaning and
intent of [21 U.S.C. 829] and * * * the
person issuing it, shall be subject to the
penalties provided for violations of the
provisions of law related to controlled
substances.’’ Id.
In Gonzalez v. Oregon, the Supreme
Court explained that ‘‘the prescription
requirement * * * ensures patients use
controlled substances under the
supervision of a doctor so as to prevent
addiction and recreational abuse. As a
corollary, [it] also bars doctors from
peddling to patients who crave the
drugs for those prohibited uses.’’ 546
U.S. 243, 274 (2006) (citing United
States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 135 & 143
(1975)).
It is fundamental that a practitioner
must establish and maintain a bona-fide
doctor-patient relationship in order to
be acting ‘‘in the usual course of * * *
professional practice’’ and to issue a
prescription for a ‘‘legitimate medical
purpose.’’ See Moore, 423 U.S. at 142–
43 (noting that the evidence established
that physician ‘‘exceeded the bounds of
‘professional practice,’ ’’ when ‘‘he gave
inadequate physical examinations or
none at all,’’ ‘‘ignored the results of the
tests he did make,’’ and ‘‘took no
precautions against * * * misuse and
diversion’’). Moreover, as I have
explained, ‘‘the CSA looks to state law
in determining whether a physician has
established [and is maintaining] a valid
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Jkt 214001
doctor-patient relationship.’’ United
Prescription Services, Inc., 72 FR 50397,
50407 (2007) (citing DEA, Dispensing
and Purchasing Controlled Substances
over the Internet, 66 FR 21181, 21182–
83 (2001)). See also Kamir GarcesMejias, 72 FR 54931, 54935 (2007)
(citing numerous state practice
standards violated by physician).
Respondent argues that under
Gonzales, DEA ‘‘cannot lawfully
determine and enforce a national
medical standard of care.’’ Exceptions at
11. Respondent further contends that
because ‘‘Gonzales directs that the states
retain the power to set parameters on
the practice of medicine, [and he]
produced evidence that his prescribing
practices conformed with Ohio law,’’
DEA cannot act against his federal
registration. Id. Relatedly, Respondent
argues that whether he ‘‘did or did not
conform his conduct to the mandates of
Ohio law is a question for the State
Medical Board of Ohio—not DEA.’’ Id.
at 12. Respondent’s argument that he
was in compliance with the Ohio
regulations is not factually correct; his
contention that the Agency is exceeding
its authority and usurping the State’s
role in regulating the practice of
medicine is also mistaken.
As found above, Respondent’s
testimony that he complied with Ohio
law was not credible. Under Ohio law,
‘‘when utilizing any prescription drug
for the treatment of intractable pain on
a protracted basis or when managing
intractable pain with prescription drugs
in amounts that may not be appropriate
when treating other medical conditions,
a practitioner shall’’ perform:
[a]n initial evaluation of the patient * * *
and documented in the patient’s record that
includes a relevant history, including
complete medical, pain, alcohol and
substance abuse histories; an assessment of
the impact of pain on the patient’s physical
and psychological functions; a review of
previous diagnostic studies and previously
utilized therapies; an assessment of
coexisting illnesses, diseases or conditions;
and an appropriate physical examination.
Ohio Admin. Code R. 4731–21–02(A)
(emphasis added).
There is ample evidence that
Respondent failed to obtain adequate
histories and perform adequate physical
exams including the testimony of Dr.
Kennedy and the DI’s review of
Respondent’s patient files which found
that there was no documentation of a
physical exam in 900 of the files as
required by Ohio law. This conclusion
is also supported by the testimony
regarding the interview of DC, who
obtained three controlled-substance
prescriptions from Respondent without
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the latter having performed a physical
exam.
Moreover, the Ohio regulations
require that ‘‘[t]he practitioner’s
diagnosis of intractable pain shall be
made after having the patient evaluated
by one or more other practitioners who
specialize in the treatment of the
anatomic area, system, or organ of the
body perceived as the source of the
pain.’’ Ohio Admin. Code R. 4731–21–
02(A)(4)(a). Furthermore, ‘‘[t]he
practitioner shall maintain a copy of any
report made by any practitioner to
whom referral for evaluation was made
under this’’ provision.37 Id. With respect
to the six deceased patients, there is no
credible evidence that Respondent had
them evaluated by specialists 38 or relied
on reports that a specialist had prepared
‘‘within a reasonable period of time’’
before diagnosing them as having
intractable pain. Id. R. 4731–21–
02(4)(b).
Respondent argues that while Dr.
Kennedy ‘‘claim[ed] to be aware of the
Ohio guidelines,’’ he was ‘‘painfully
unfamiliar with the controlling state
standards.’’ Exceptions at 12 (citing Tr.
1202–03). While it is true that much of
Dr. Kennedy’s testimony focused on the
Kentucky guidelines, he also testified
that ‘‘there is no significant variation
between the’’ Ohio standards and the
Kentucky guidelines. Tr. 1203.
Moreover, when Dr. Kennedy offered to
display the Ohio provisions to the court
and explain how Respondent ‘‘violated
the Ohio Code,’’ Respondent’s counsel
declined to pursue this line of
questioning. See Id. Furthermore, in his
report, Dr. Kennedy made clear that he
had reviewed and was generally familiar
with the Ohio standards for treating
intractable pain (as well as other
professional standards such as those
issued by the Federation of State
Medical Boards). GX 74, at 2; see also
Tr. 1075 (expressing opinion that
Respondent knew better because of ‘‘the
guidelines that were published by the
37 The practitioner is not ‘‘required to obtain such
an evaluation, if the practitioner obtains a copy of
medical records or a detailed written summary
thereof showing that the patient has been evaluated
and treated within a reasonable period of time by
a specialist.’’ Ohio Admin. Code R. 4731–21–
02(A)(4)(b). The practitioner must, however ‘‘obtain
and review all available medical records or detailed
written summaries thereof of prior treatment of the
intractable pain or the condition underlying the
intractable pain.’’ Id. Moreover, under this
regulation, the practitioner is required to ‘‘maintain
a copy of any record or report * * * on which [he]
relied.’’ Id.
38 While there is evidence in a progress note
dated 8/11/04 that D.P. had been referred to the
Cleveland Clinic, the note does not indicate what
the referral was for and when it occurred. At the
time, D.P. had been seeing Respondent since April
2003.
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State Medical Board of Ohio [and] the
Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure
that were well circulated’’).
Respondent further argues that I
should reject Dr. Kennedy’s testimony
because ‘‘it was clear that he had not
studied the chart * * * and was unable
to harmonize his criticism of
[Respondent’s] care with the actual
patient record then in front of him.’’
Exceptions at 11. Respondent then
argues that Dr. Kennedy ‘‘admittedly
worked from summaries, print-outs, and
other documents created by the
government or himself, based on
pharmacy records—without any
meaningful review and reliance on the
patient record itself.’’ Id.
Respondent does not, however,
support these contentions with any
citations to the record. See 21 CFR
1316.66. Moreover, in both his report
and testimony, Dr. Kennedy made clear
that for each of the patients, he had
‘‘reviewed records obtained from
[Respondent’s] office’’ including his
‘‘clinical records.’’ See also GX 74, at 1–
2; see also Tr. 1068. While it is true that
Respondent showed that he had
performed a physical exam on K.R. at
apparently her first visit (which also
coincided with when he started working
for Tri-State), he made no such showing
with respect to the other five patients.
Moreover, even with respect to K.R.,
Respondent did not establish that he
complied with the Ohio standards and
maintained a valid doctor-patient
relationship with her.
Indeed, Respondent offered no
testimony specific to his treatment of
the six deceased patients and did not
submit their patient files into the record.
Accordingly, I adopt Dr. Kennedy’s
opinion that Respondent ‘‘distributed
prescriptions for oxycodone and other
controlled substances not for a
legitimate medical purpose and beyond
the usual course of professional
practice.’’ GX 74, at 3.
Respondent further argues that the
Agency is acting ‘‘in direct
contravention to Gonzales’’ because it
‘‘sought to pass judgment upon the
medical care [he] rendered.’’ Exceptions
at 11. Relatedly, Respondent contends
that whether he complied with Ohio
law ‘‘is a question for the State Medical
Board of Ohio [and] not DEA.’’ Id. at 12.
It is true that in enacting the CSA,
Congress did not adopt a federal
standard for determining whether a
valid doctor-patient relationship exists.
Rather, on this issue, the CSA
recognizes the traditional role of the
States in regulating the practice of
medicine. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at
270. The CSA therefore looks to state
law in determining whether there is a
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valid doctor-patient relationship. United
Prescription Services, 72 FR at 50407;
Dispensing and Purchasing ControlledSubstances over the Internet, 66 FR at
21182–83.
Determining whether Respondent
established and maintained a valid
doctor-patient relationship with the six
deceased patients under Ohio law is
thus a necessary and permissible
incident of determining whether
Respondent complied with the
prescription requirement of Federal law.
Cf. 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(4) (directing
consideration of applicant’s
‘‘[c]ompliance with applicable State
* * * or local laws relating to
controlled substances’’). Whether
Respondent complied with Ohio law in
prescribing controlled substances is
thus not only a question for the Ohio
Medical Board, but also a question for
the Attorney General, who has been
entrusted with the authority under
Federal law to determine whether the
granting of a registration to dispense
controlled substances is consistent with
the public interest. See Id. section
823(f); Id. § 824(a) (granting Attorney
General authority to revoke a
registration where a registrant has
committed acts inconsistent with the
public interest). DEA’s reliance on
Ohio’s medical practice standards thus
does not exceed this Agency’s authority
as set forth in Gonzales.39
Accordingly, Respondent’s arguments
are without merit. Because the evidence
establishes that Respondent lacked a
‘‘legitimate medical purpose’’ and acted
outside of ‘‘the usual course of his
professional practice’’ in distributing
numerous controlled-substance
prescriptions to the six deceased
patients (and others), he violated
Federal law. This conclusion provides
reason alone to conclude that granting
his application ‘‘would be inconsistent
with the public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C.
823(f).
39 By contrast, Gonzales did not involve reliance
on a State’s medical practice standards but the
issuance of an interpretive rule, unsupported by a
grant of Congressional authority, which would have
barred conducted permitted by state law. See 546
U.S. at 274–75. Moreover, as Gonzales recognized,
prior to 1984, ‘‘the Attorney General was required
to register any physician who was authorized by his
State [and] could only deregister a physician who
falsified his application, was convicted of a felony
relating to controlled substances, or had his state
license or registration revoked.’’ Id. at 261. In 1984,
however, the CSA was amended to grant ‘‘the
Attorney General the authority to deny a
registration to an applicant ‘if he determines that
the issuance of such registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest.’’ ’Id. (quoting
21 U.S.C. 823(f)). Respondent’s prescribing
practices are therefore properly considered in this
proceeding.
PO 00000
Frm 00044
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
30643
The Record Keeping Violations
The record also contains extensive
evidence that Respondent violated
Federal law by failing to keep proper
records for the controlled substances
that were ordered and dispensed under
his registration at Tri-State. Respondent
agreed that his registration could be
used to order and dispense controlled
substances for Tri-State’s customers. Tr.
1550. As the record establishes,
Respondent agreed to this because
numerous pharmacists were questioning
his prescriptions and refusing to fill
them. Tr. 1428–29. Moreover,
Respondent told Denise Huffman what
drugs to order. Id. at 543.
Respondent rapidly became the
largest practitioner-purchaser in the
nation of oxycodone, a schedule II
controlled substance which is highly
sought after by drug-abusers, and which
commands top dollar in the illicit
market. As found above, his purchases
dwarfed that of other Ohio-based
practitioners who purchased the drug.
Moreover, Respondent also became—by
a wide margin—the largest Ohio-based
practitioner-purchaser of combination
hydrocodone/apap drugs.40
Respondent proceeded to order
hundreds of thousands of dosage units
of these drugs (136,000 dosage units of
oxycodone between 8/18/03 and 12/30/
03; 222,600 dosage units of
hydrocodone between 7/24/03 and 12/
30/03) 41 which he distributed, and was
required to maintain purchasing,
inventory and dispensing records. See
21 U.S.C. 827(a); 21 CFR 1304.03(b)
(requiring dispenser to keep records);
see also 21 CFR 1304.11 (requiring
initial and biennial inventories), id.
1304.22(c) (requiring maintenance of
receiving and dispensing records).
When, however, on December 30, 2003,
Agent Kinneer of the Ohio State Board
of Pharmacy inspected Tri-State, he
found that the clinic had not made any
entries in several controlled-substance
dispensing logs in more than four
months. See GX 11, at 2; GX 12, at 5.
Respondent was thus already repeatedly
violating Federal law.
40 The record further establishes that Respondent
also ordered large quantities of hydromorphone,
another schedule II controlled substance, 21 CFR
1308.12(b)(1), and several benzodiazepines, which
are schedule IV controlled substances. Id.
1308.14(c). During the 2005 search, there were also
no records documenting the handling of these
drugs.
41 As found above, in 2004, Respondent ordered
457,000 dosage units of oxycodone and 263,500
dosage units of hydrocodone/apap. Moreover,
during the little more than eight months of 2005
when he worked at Tri-State, Respondent ordered
414,000 dosage units of oxycodone and 168,500
dosage units of hydrocodone.
E:\FR\FM\28MYN1.SGM
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30644
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 103 / Wednesday, May 28, 2008 / Notices
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES
Thereafter, in January 2004,
Respondent represented to the Ohio
Board that ‘‘[a]ll log books are current
and up to date and are being kept
current.’’ GX 11. He also stated that
‘‘[a]ll controlled medication being
dispensed * * * is being logged as it is
filled.’’ GX 11.
Notwithstanding Respondent’s
representations to the state board, on
June 7, 2005, DEA investigators could
not find any dispensing logs for the year
2004, and Denise Huffman admitted that
there were no such logs. Tr. 670. Under
Federal regulations, however,
Respondent was required to maintain
these records for a period of two years.
See 21 U.S.C. 827(b). Moreover, given
the circumstances in which the 2005
logs were not at the clinic but were later
provided to the Government only after
copies of the patient files were given to
the clinic (following the search), and
that the logs appeared to be brand new,
it is most unlikely that these were
accurate records. In any event, the
various dispensing logs were required to
be maintained at the clinic. See 21 CFR
1304.04(1). Respondent thus repeatedly
violated Federal law by failing to
maintain the required records and did
so over a sustained period of time. It is
no defense that Respondent delegated
this responsibility to Ms. Huffman.42 Tr.
1511.
Aggravating these violations is the
fact that he ordered extraordinary
quantities of various highly abused
controlled substances and that there is
no way—given the wholly deficient
recordkeeping—to determine where
these drugs have gone. Recordkeeping is
one of the CSA’s central features; a
registrant’s accurate and diligent
adherence to this obligation is
absolutely essential to protect against
the diversion of controlled substances.
Given the extraordinary quantities of
controlled substances which
Respondent ordered and his complete
lack of accountability for them, it is
likely that most of these drugs were
diverted. Respondent’s failure to
maintain accurate records (assuming
that they were ever accurately
maintained beyond August 2003,43 see
GX 11, at 2), provides a further reason—
which is sufficient by itself—to
conclude that granting him a
42 As I have previously explained, when a
registrant authorizes another person to perform acts
under his registration, he is responsible for that
individual’s misuse of the registration and failure
to perform required acts. See Rose Mary Jacinta
Lewis, 72 FR 4035, 4040 (2007); see also Summer
Grove Pharmacy, 54 FR 28522, 28523 (1989).
43 While Agent Kinneer stated in his report that
during his February 2004 visit, Respondent and
Alice Huffman gave him dispensing logs, no such
logs were found during the June 2005 search.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:31 May 27, 2008
Jkt 214001
registration would ‘‘be inconsistent with
the public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(f).
At the hearing, Respondent testified
that ‘‘as far as I was concerned, as far
as my knowledge of Ohio law, Federal
law, standards of care of pain
management, and anything else I could
find, I had done nothing wrong, and was
following absolutely prescribed
procedures that I should in every
respect.’’ Tr. 1439. I beg to differ. As the
record shows, Respondent is an
egregious violator of the CSA’s
requirements with respect to both his
prescribing practices and compliance
with the Act’s recordkeeping
requirements.44 And even assuming—
given the remedial purpose of
proceedings under section 303—that
there could be circumstances in which
an egregious violator of the Act might
convincingly establish that he has
reformed, Respondent has offered no
credible evidence to demonstrate that he
can be entrusted with a new
registration. Accordingly, I conclude
that granting Respondent’s application
for a new registration would be
‘‘inconsistent with the public
interest.’’ 45 21 U.S.C. 823(f).
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(f), as well as 28 CFR
0.100(b) & 0.104, I order that the
application of Paul H. Volkman, M.D.,
for a DEA Certificate of Registration as
a practitioner be, and it hereby is,
denied. This order is effective June 27,
2008.
Dated: May 16, 2008.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8–11851 Filed 5–27–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD
Agency Information Collection
Activities; Proposed Collection
AGENCY:
Merit Systems Protection
Board.
ACTION:
Notice.
SUMMARY: In compliance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), the
44 There is also evidence in the record that
Respondent told a patient (J.R.) to sell a drug
(Soma) if he did not take it. Tr. 42 & 104. While
Soma is not controlled under Federal law, the
evidence is nonetheless probative of Respondent’s
intent.
45 In light of the extensive evidence of
Respondent’s misconduct, I conclude that it is
unnecessary to make findings regarding the
remaining factors.
PO 00000
Frm 00045
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) announces that it is planning to
submit a request for a three-year
extension of an Information Collection
Request (ICR) to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). Before
submitting this ICR to OMB for review
and approval, MSPB is soliciting
comments on specific aspects of its
information collection activities as
described below.
DATES: Written comments must be
received on or before June 27, 2008.
ADDRESSES: Submit written comments
on the collection of information to Dr.
Dee Ann Batten, Merit Systems
Protection Board, 1615 M Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20419.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Requests for additional information
should be directed to Dr. Dee Ann
Batten at (202) 653–6772, ext. 1411.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under the
PRA (44 U.S.C. 3501–3520), Federal
agencies must obtain approval from
OMB for each collection of information
they conduct or sponsor. The MSPB
intends to ask for a three-year renewal
of its Generic Clearance Request for
Voluntary Customer Surveys, OMB
Control No. 3124–0012. Executive Order
12862, ‘‘Setting Customer Service
Standards,’’ mandates that agencies
identify their customers and survey
them to determine the kind and quality
of services they want and their level of
satisfaction with existing services.
In this regard, we are soliciting
comments on the public reporting
burden. The reporting burden for the
collection of information on this request
is estimated to vary from 5 minutes to
30 minutes, with an average of 15
minutes, including time for reviewing
instructions, searching existing data
sources, gathering and maintaining the
data needed, and completing and
reviewing the collection of information.
In the estimated annual reporting
burden listed below, the reason that the
annual number of respondents differs
from the number of total annual
responses is that the latter figure
assumes a 60% response rate. Our
experience has been that fewer than
60% of those invited to participate in
our voluntary customer surveys avail
themselves of that opportunity.
In addition, the MSPB invites
comments on (1) Whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of MSPB’s
functions, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(2) the accuracy of MSPB’s estimate of
burden of the proposed collection of
information, including the validity of
the methodology and assumptions used;
E:\FR\FM\28MYN1.SGM
28MYN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 103 (Wednesday, May 28, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30630-30644]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-11851]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[No. 06-45]
Paul H. Volkman; Denial of Application
On February 10, 2006, I, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate
Suspension of Registration to Paul H. Volkman, M.D. (Respondent), of
Chillicothe, Ohio. The Order immediately suspended Respondent's DEA
Certificate of Registration, AV6952837, as a practitioner, on the
grounds that his continued registration during the pendency of the
proceeding ``would constitute an imminent danger to public health and
safety because of the substantial likelihood that [he] will continue to
divert controlled substances to persons who will abuse these
products.'' Id. at 12.
More specifically, the Show Cause Order alleged that in twelve
instances, Respondent had prescribed multiple controlled substances to
persons who, within days, died of overdoses of the drugs. Id. at 9-11.
The Show Cause Order further alleged that Respondent had issued
prescriptions to these persons for multiple controlled substances
including opiates in schedule II (oxycodone) and/or schedule III
(hydrocodone); schedule IV benzodiazepines such as diazepam and valium;
and carisoprodol, a non-controlled drug which is nonetheless highly
abused. Id.; see also id. at 3. Relatedly, the Order alleged that in
July 2005, the assistant coroner for the county in which Respondent was
practicing, had notified DEA ``that his staff [had] observed an
increase in emergency room overdoses and believed that several recent
drug-related deaths involving young [and] otherwise healthy individuals
could be attributed to the consumption of large amounts of oxycodone,
hydrocodone and alprazolam,'' which Respondent had dispensed. Id. at 8.
The Show Cause Order also alleged that DEA had received information
from various distributors that Respondent was ordering excessive
quantities of controlled substances. Id. Relatedly, the Show Cause
Order alleged that during 2004, Respondent was the largest
practitioner-purchaser of oxycodone in the country having purchased
438,000 dosage units, when the average amount of this drug purchased by
other physicians ``was only 4,792 dosage units.'' Id. at 2.
The Show Cause Order further alleged that DEA investigators
interviewed several of Respondent's patients who informed them that
Respondent had prescribed controlled substances without performing
physical examinations, that the clinic charged between $160 and $200
for an office visit, and that the clinic required that the patients pay
cash and would not accept third-party payments from insurers, Medicare,
Medicaid or worker's compensation. Id. at 4.
The Show Cause Order also alleged that on various dates,
confidential sources had visited the clinic, and that Respondent had
issued these persons prescriptions for controlled substances without
performing physical examinations and other medical tests. Id. at 5. The
Show Cause Order specifically alleged that on two occasions, the
confidential sources had told the clinic's employees that their pain
levels were ``one or two'' and ``zero'' on a scale of one-to-ten (with
the latter being the most severe); that upon Respondent's asking them
how they felt, the sources had told him ``fair'' and ``pretty good'';
and that Respondent,
[[Page 30631]]
without performing a physical exam on either person, immediately issued
to each of them, prescriptions for 180 tablets of hydrocodone/
acetaminophen 10/650 mg., 90 tablets of diazepam 10 mg., and 60 tablets
of carisoprodol. Id. at 5-6. Both sources then allegedly filled the
prescriptions at Respondent's clinic for an additional charge. Id. at
6.
The Show Cause Order further alleged that in May 2005, DEA
investigators received information from another confidential source who
acknowledged his/her involvement in diverting controlled substances.
Id. The source allegedly identified Respondent as a physician who would
write prescriptions for Oxycontin and other controlled substances
without performing a physical examination; the source allegedly stated
that he and a friend had obtained from Respondent prescriptions for
drugs which they then sold on the street. Id.
Next, the Show Cause Order alleged that in July 2005, DEA
investigators conducted an accountability audit of the controlled
substances which were ordered under Respondent's registration by the
clinic where he worked. Id. at 7. The investigators allegedly found
that Respondent did not maintain dispensing records in violation of
Federal regulations. Id. Moreover, Respondent allegedly ``could not
account for more than 850,000 dosage units of controlled substances
that were ordered and dispensed under [his] DEA registration.'' Id. The
Order specifically alleged that Respondent was short nearly 89,000
dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg., nearly 48,000 dosage units of
diazepam 10 mg., 77,000 dosage units of hydrocodone/apap \1\ (10/500
mg.), and more than 126,000 dosage units of hydrocodone/apap 10/650.
Id. With respect to drugs containing oxycodone, the Order alleged,
inter alia, that Respondent was short more than 49,000 dosage units of
oxycodone 5 mg., 48,506 dosage units of oxycodone/apap (5/325 mg.),
165,500 dosage units of Roxicodone 15 mg., and 130,000 dosage units of
Roxicodone 30 mg. Id. at 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Apap is the abbreviation for acetaminophen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent requested a hearing on the allegations, and the matter
was assigned to Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gail Randall. Following
various extensions which both parties sought, as well as pre-hearing
procedures,\2\ a hearing was held in Columbus, Ohio on December 5-8,
2006, and January 9-10, 2007. At the hearing, both parties submitted
documentary evidence and presented the testimony of witnesses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ While Respondent requested an expedited hearing, on March
17, 2006, his first counsel withdrew. ALJ at 2. While on May 2,
2006, a new counsel entered an appearance on Respondent's behalf, on
October 10, 2006, a third counsel entered a notice of appearance.
Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the hearing, the Government submitted a brief containing
its proposed findings, conclusions of law, and recommendations.
Respondent chose not to submit a post-hearing brief and instead filed a
petition for review with the Sixth Circuit.
On June 20, 2007, the ALJ issued her recommended decision
(hereinafter cited as ALJ). In her decision, the ALJ found that ``[t]he
record contains abundant evidence to demonstrate that the Respondent
did not issue prescriptions 'in the usual course of his professional
practice,''' and that he ``failed to limit his prescribing of
controlled substances to cases where such medication would be provided
for a legitimate medical purpose.'' ALJ at 39-40 (citation omitted).
More specifically, the ALJ concluded that ``without adequate physical
examinations and development of medical histories, the Respondent
failed to adequately diagnose the patients,'' and yet ``prescribed
controlled substances even when interacting with a patient for the
first time.'' Id. at 40.
The ALJ further noted that ``Respondent prescribed the same
combinations of controlled substances to a majority of his patients,
again without adequate examinations or ongoing diagnoses,'' and that
``[t]his combination of drugs was common in the drug-abuse community''
and was known as ``a cocktail or the trifecta.'' Id. (int. quotation
and citations omitted). Finally, the ALJ noted that ``Respondent
treated at least sixteen patients between June of 2003 and February of
2006 who died of drug-related causes,'' and that ``Respondent's lack of
adequate monitoring of these patients directly contributed to [their]
deaths.'' Id. at 41.
The ALJ further noted that Respondent was dispensing controlled
substances ``obtained through the use of [his] DEA registration,'' id.,
and yet failed to maintain the required inventory and dispensing
records and ``to adequately supervise the individuals to whom he had
delegated such dispensing responsibilities.'' Id. at 43. Moreover,
Respondent ``was unable to account for over one million tablets of
controlled substances.'' Id. at 42. Finally, the ALJ noted that
Respondent had failed to accept responsibility for his conduct. Id. at
44.
The ALJ thus concluded that the Government had established a prima
facie case that Respondent's continued registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest. Id. at 45. Because Respondent
had failed to ``justify his past conduct'' and ``to provide adequate
assurances that his future handling of controlled substances would meet
the standards required of a DEA registrant,'' the ALJ recommended that
I revoke his registration and deny his pending applications to renew
and modify his registration. Id.
Respondent filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision raising numerous
issues, and the Government filed a response. More specifically,
Respondent contends that the Government failed to provide adequate
notice and thus violated his rights under the Due Process Clause
because it expanded its presentation beyond the allegations of the Show
Cause Order, Exceptions at 4-10; that the proceeding violated his First
Amendment rights because the ALJ failed to exclude an e-mail which the
Government introduced into evidence in which Respondent portrayed the
Agency, the ALJ, and the prosecuting attorney in a ``not flattering''
manner, id. at 10-11; that the Agency was unlawfully regulating the
practice of medicine, id. at 11-12; that the ALJ failed to consider his
evidence; and that records which he subpoenaed were not turned over to
him.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ To the extent that Respondent's exceptions are based on the
ALJ's weighing of the evidence or alleged failure to consider
certain evidence, the ALJ's decision is only a recommendation. See
21 CFR 1316.65(a). As ultimate factfinder, I have carefully
considered the entire record including the ALJ's report and
Respondent's exceptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Having considered the record as a whole, I reject each of
Respondent's exceptions. While I do not adopt all of the ALJ's factual
findings, I adopt the ALJ's conclusions of law that Respondent
repeatedly dispensed controlled substances outside of the usual course
of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose. I
also adopt her conclusions with respect to Respondent's failure to
maintain proper records and properly supervise clinic employees, as
well as his inability to account for large quantities of controlled
substances. Finally, I adopt the ALJ's conclusion that the Government
has established its prima facie case that Respondent's registration is
inconsistent with the public interest and that Respondent has not
demonstrated that he can be entrusted with a registration.
As explained below, Respondent did not file a timely renewal
application in accordance with agency rules, and therefore, there is no
existing registration to revoke or modify. Respondent did, however,
apply for a registration; that application will be denied. I make the
following findings.
[[Page 30632]]
Findings
Respondent formerly held DEA Certificate of Registration,
AV6952837, which authorized him to dispense controlled substances in
schedules II through V, and which expired on May 31, 2006. GX 1.
Between April 16, 2003, and November 18, 2003, Respondent's registered
location was Tri-State Health Care (hereinafter, Tri-State), 1200 Gay
Street, Portsmouth, Ohio. GX 2. Between November 19, 2003, and
September 11, 2005, Respondent's registered location was 1219 Findlay
St., Portsmouth, id., which apparently was Tri-State's new location. GX
11, at 2 (inspection report of Ohio State Board of Pharmacy).
Subsequently, Respondent left Tri-State, and on September 12, 2005,
Respondent changed his registered location to 1310 Center St.,
Portsmouth. GX 2. On May 12, 2006, at which time his registration was
suspended and which was less than forty-five days before the expiration
of his registration, Respondent applied for a renewal of his
registration and requested an address change to his home in Chicago,
Illinois. Id., see also RX P at 1.
Respondent holds both an M.D. and Ph.D. from the University of
Chicago and has practiced as an emergency room physician, as well as in
family practice and pediatrics. Id. at 3. Respondent testified that in
the course of his practice, he had two medical malpractice cases which
his insurers settled without his consent and his admitting liability,
and ``two cases [that] resulted in judgments against'' him. Tr. 1400.
According to Respondent, by 2003, the awards and settlements totaled
``over a million-and-a-half dollars,'' and as a result, he was ``unable
to obtain malpractice insurance.'' Id. As a consequence, Respondent
``could no longer work in emergency medicine, and * * * couldn't work
for another clinic * * * because virtually every clinic that required
hospital coverage of nighttime patients requires the doctor to have
insurance.'' Id.
Respondent therefore needed to find a job which did not require
malpractice insurance. Id. Searching on the internet, Respondent found
a job posting for Tri-State Health Care in Portsmouth, Ohio. Id. at
1400-01. During discussions with Tri-State's owner, Ms. Denise Huffman,
Respondent was told that he did not need malpractice insurance to work
for her clinic. Id. at 1401. Respondent accepted the position, and in
June 2003, he obtained board certification in pain management. Id. at
1402.
In April 2003, Respondent began working at Ms. Huffman's clinic
under an ``informal handshake'' agreement which paid him $5000 a week
to start; his pay was later raised to $5500. Id. at 1404. Ms. Huffman
was not a licensed physician and was ``not any type of a health care
professional'' even though she was running ``a pain clinic.'' Id.
Respondent ``did not think'' to ask to see Ms. Huffman's licenses or
verify her credentials. Id. at 1404. Respondent further maintained that
he ``didn't know that I should have done'' that, and that he did not
find out that he should have made these inquiries until being advised
of this (``two years later'') by one of his attorneys. Id. In light of
Respondent's thirty years of experience in the medical profession and
his educational background, I find implausible Respondent's testimony
regarding his failure to verify whether Ms. Huffman was properly
licensed.
Ms. Huffman's daughter Alice was Tri-State's office manager. ALJ at
3-4 (stipulated findings). According to the report of Agent Kevin
Kinneer of the Ohio State Board of Pharmacy, Alice Huffman was a
``former employee and patient of Dr. [David] Proctor,'' GX 12, at 4, a
convicted drug dealer. Tr. 1014-15. Mr. Chad Ball, who was Alice
Huffman's boyfriend (and subsequently became her husband), worked as a
security guard at the clinic. Tr. 521, 530. Other employees included
Chris Helton (who also worked as security guard) and Denise Huffman's
nieces, Ms. Tara Bentley and Ms. Elizabeth Madden. Id. at 530.
Respondent was the only licensed physician and DEA registrant at the
clinic. Id. at 530-31.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ To clarify, the clinic did not hold a DEA registration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During an interview with a DEA diversion investigator (DI), Ms.
Denise Huffman stated that Tri-State ``was a full cash business'' and
did no ``third-party billing.'' Id. at 543. The DI further testified
that Ms. Huffman stated that ``it would not be cost effective to have
somebody file a medical insurance claim.'' Id. at 544.\5\ Tri-State
charged $200 for an office visit. Id. at 854-56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The record does, however, contain a document entitled
``UTILIZATION REVIEW--NOTICE OF DENIAL'' issued by Liberty Mutual
Managed Care, Inc., which is addressed to Respondent at Tri-State's
Findlay St. address. GX 65. This document stated that Liberty Mutual
had performed a utilization review for the Kentucky Worker's
Compensation program of a ``proposed treatment/service request'' for
a patient named ``Paul Huffman,'' and determined that it did not
meet ``nationally accepted practice protocols.'' Id. More
specifically, the document noted that ``[t]he request for oxycodone
425 pills per month (fourteen/day) and Valium 125 pills per month
(four/day) is not medically necessary or appropriate. The current
narcotic situation is not beneficial in that the claimant is taking
narcotics around the clock.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beginning in the summer of 2003, numerous pharmacies refused to
fill Respondent's prescriptions. Tr. 1428-29. Accordingly, Respondent
and Denise Huffman decided that they ``should institute a dispensary
on-site'' so that they could provide pain medicines for their patients.
Id. Respondent agreed that his registration could be used to order
controlled substances, id. at 1550, and Tri-State proceeded to order
large quantities of both oxycodone, a schedule II controlled substance,
and combination hydrocodone/apap, a schedule III controlled substance.
GX 10. For example, between August 18, 2003, and December 30, 2003,
Tri-State ordered nearly 136,000 dosage units of oxycodone under
Respondent's DEA registration. Id. at 140. During 2004, Tri-State
ordered more than 457,000 dosage units of oxycodone under his
registration. Id. at 143. Finally, between January 1, 2005, and
September 2, 2005 (shortly before he left Tri-State), the clinic
ordered more than 414,000 dosage units of oxycodone under his
registration. Id. at 145. Respondent was the largest practitioner-
purchaser of oxycodone in the nation during both 2004 and the first
nine months of 2005. Id. at 5 & 28.
Moreover, Respondent's purchases of oxycodone dwarfed that of other
Ohio-based practitioners. For example, during the last six months of
2003, Respondent purchased more than twenty-eight times the amount of
oxycodone purchased by the second largest Ohio-based practitioner
(4,800 dosage units); by contrast, the fourth through thirteenth
largest purchasers bought only between 300 to 100 dosage units. Id. at
51.
In 2004, Respondent purchased nearly 110 times the amount of
oxycodone purchased by the second largest Ohio-based practitioner
(4,160 dosage units); by contrast, the third through tenth largest
practitioners purchased between 3,228 and 400 dosage units. Id. at 29.
Finally, in a little more than the first eight months of 2005,
Respondent purchased approximately thirty-eight times the amount of
oxycodone purchased by the second largest Ohio-based practitioner-
purchaser; by contrast, the sixth through tenth largest practitioner-
purchasers bought between 600 and 240 dosage units. Id. at 7.
With respect to hydrocodone, between July 24, 2003, and the end of
that year, Respondent purchased 222,600 dosage units. Id. at 148. In
2004, Respondent purchased 263,500 dosage units, and in a little more
than the first eight months of 2005, he purchased 168,500 dosage units
of the drug. Id. at 150-52. Between 2003 and
[[Page 30633]]
2005, Respondent ranked between the eleventh to twenty-third largest
purchaser nationwide of combination hydrocodone drugs, and was the
largest Ohio-based practitioner-purchaser of combination hydrocodone
drugs by a wide margin.\6\ Id. at 72-73, 95-96, 118-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ In the first nine months of 2005, Respondent purchased 11
times the amount of hydrocodone purchased by the second largest
Ohio-based practitioner; in 2004, he purchased 11.7 times the amount
purchased by the second largest Ohio-based practitioner; in the last
six months of 2003, he purchased approximately 16.5 times the amount
purchased by the second largest Ohio-based practitioner. Id. at 73-
74, 96-97, 120-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A DEA DI subsequently obtained a report of the prescriptions
written by Respondent that were filled by Kentucky pharmacies during
2004 from the State of Kentucky's KASPER system.\7\ Upon review of the
data, the DI found that Respondent had prescribed three or more drugs
per visit to 419 of his patients and that Respondent had issued three
or more prescriptions per visit 1974 times. GX 71. The DI further found
that 54 percent of Respondent's prescribing involved ``three or more
prescriptions per visit,'' and that in 1065 separate instances,
Respondent had prescribed four drugs including oxycodone, hydrocodone,
a benzodiazepine, and carisoprodol. Id. at 2. The DI also found that
during 2004, Kentucky pharmacies dispensed 647,440 dosage units of
oxycodone and 537,691 dosage units of hydrocodone pursuant to
Respondent's prescriptions. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ KASPER is the ``Kentucky All Scheduled Prescriptions
Electronic Reporting'' program. GX 71. Under KASPER, pharmacies are
required to periodically report to the State all scheduled-drug
prescriptions that they dispense. Physicians are also able to access
the database to determine whether their patients are obtaining
controlled substances from other practitioners. GX 26, Tr. 1030.
These figures do not, however, include prescriptions issued by
Respondent which were filled at pharmacies in Ohio and other States;
nor do they include the prescriptions dispensed at Tri-State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Investigations of Respondent
As found above, in April 2003, Respondent commenced his employment
at Tri-State. On April 17, 2003, one day after Respondent obtained his
DEA registration at Tri-State's 1200 Gay Street location, Agent Kevin
Kinneer of the Ohio State Board of Pharmacy received two reports from
Portsmouth pharmacists regarding Respondent's prescribing practices. GX
12, at 1-2.
The first pharmacist reported that Respondent was ``writing large
quantities of narcotics and benzodiazepines,'' and that his patients
were presenting ``prescriptions for 180 to 300 tablets of Lorcet 10/650
mgs.,'' id., a schedule III controlled substance containing hydrocodone
and acetaminophen. ALJ at 5. The pharmacist further reported that some
patients had ``two types of narcotic prescriptions,'' that the
prescriptions were for a quantity beyond the ``manufacturer's suggested
[daily] supply of Tylenol [acetaminophen] intake,'' and that ``[t]hese
patients also had prescriptions [for] Xanax 2 mg. and a Soma
[carisoprodol] prescription.'' Id. The pharmacist further reported that
``many of the patients are prior problem patients'' of a physician (Dr.
Proctor),\8\ who had been convicted of drug trafficking and is
currently incarcerated. Id. at 1-2; Tr. 1015. According to the
pharmacist, these persons ``had prior drug abuse problems'' including
arrests on drug charges. GX 12, at 1-2. The pharmacist also told Agent
Kinneer that ``he would not fill any of'' Respondent's prescriptions.
Id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The pharmacist also stated that these individuals were
patients of another problem physician, Dr. Williams. GX 12, at 2.
The testimony indicates that another area physician, Dr. Fortune
Williams, was convicted of drug trafficking, but his conviction was
overturned on appeal. Tr. 1016. It is unclear whether the
pharmacist's reference to Dr. Williams was to this individual.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second pharmacist told Agent Kinneer that he had ``refused to
fill prescriptions for high quantities of narcotics and Xanax 2mgs and
Soma [that were] prescribed by'' Respondent. Id. The pharmacist further
notified Agent Kinneer that Respondent was prescribing ``duplicate
therapy of narcotics'' and large amounts of acetaminophen. Id.
Approximately two months later, another Portsmouth-area pharmacist
informed Agent Kinneer of ``trouble with [Respondent's] patients.'' Id.
More specifically, the pharmacist reported that on or about June 11,
2003, five persons came in a van to his pharmacy and that one of them
``smelled of beer and dope.'' Id. These persons all presented ``the
same type of prescriptions'' and the pharmacist refused to fill them.
Id.; Tr. 255-56.
One week later on June 18, 2003, Respondent telephoned Agent
Kinneer and complained that local pharmacists were refusing to fill his
prescriptions. Tr. 256. Respondent demanded that the Board order the
pharmacists to fill his prescriptions. Id.; GX 12, at 3. Agent Kinneer
told Respondent that he was not going to do so because the pharmacists
had the right to exercise their own professional judgment in practicing
pharmacy. GX 12, at 3; Tr. 256.
Throughout the summer of 2003, Agent Kinneer received further
complaints from pharmacists about Respondent's prescribing practices.
GX 12, at 3. These included that many of the patients were from
Kentucky, West Virginia and Tennessee; that Respondent was writing
prescriptions for multiple narcotics, Xanax 2 mg. and carisoprodol
``for the same patient [in] high quantities''; that the prescriptions
were for drugs with ``a high abuse potential''; that ``[f]amily members
within the same address [were] receiving the same type of controlled
substance''; that ``many of the patients'' were known ``to be drug
abusers''; and that some of the patients had ``large amounts of cash on
their person.'' Id. Agent Kinneer also received information that
Respondent had called pharmacists and demanded that they fill his
prescriptions. Id. Moreover, between July and September 2003,
pharmacists in Columbus and Cincinnati notified Agent Kinneer that
persons were presenting prescriptions issued by Respondent. Id. at 5.
On July 22, 2003, Agent Kinneer (and another state agent) visited
Tri-State to conduct an inspection pursuant to Respondent's obtaining
of a clinic license, which under Ohio law, was required ``to obtain
controlled substances to dispense out of [the] clinic.'' Tr. 244; see
also GX 12, at 3. During the inspection, Alice Huffman told the agents
that a bodyguard patrolled the parking area and monitored the waiting
room.\9\ GX 12, at 3-4. The agents observed the security arrangements,
explained recordkeeping requirements, provided Respondent and Ms.
Huffman with copies of the applicable federal and state laws and
regulations, and gave Respondent the license. Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ It is unclear whether there were multiple bodyguards on the
premises. During an inspection conducted on December 30, 2003, Agent
Kinneer noted that there were two bodyguards at the clinic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 30, 2003, Agent Kinneer and another agent went to Tri-
State's new address at 1219 Findlay St. to conduct an inspection for a
new license. Id. at 5. Agent Kinneer found numerous violations
including incomplete dispensing logs for several controlled substances.
GX 11, at 2. More specifically, the dispensing log for hydrocodone/apap
10/650 had not been completed since August 15, 2003. Id. Respondent
had, however, ordered thousands of dosage units of this drug after
August 15th. See GX 10, at 147-48. As for the other controlled
substances the clinic was dispensing, Agent Kinneer found that the last
entries for
[[Page 30634]]
both Xanax 1 mg., and diazepam 10 mg., had been made on August 15,
2003.\10\ GX 11, at 2. He also found that while the log for
hydrocodone/apap 10/325 mg. had been started on August 11, 2003, the
last entry was dated the following day. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Both logs were started on July 30, 2003. GX 11, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agent Kinneer further found that numerous DEA 222 forms, which are
required to order schedule II controlled substances, were not properly
completed. Id. He observed that Alice Huffman, who was not a registered
pharmacist, was dispensing drugs without obtaining Respondent's final
approval. Id. at 3-5. He also found ``four vials of unmarked pills with
unknown medications [in] the dispensing area.'' Id. at 6.
In his report, Agency Kinneer further stated that he ``found this
clinic not to be your normal Doctor's Office.'' Id. In support of his
conclusion, Agent Kinneer noted that there was a Glock handgun in the
dispensing area, that there were two night sticks and a four-foot long
club with leather straps, and that these were ``things that [he]
normally would not see in a physician's office or a dispensing area.''
Tr. 259-60; GX 12, at 7. Agent Kinneer also noted that Respondent was
treating both Denise and Alice Huffman, that he had prescribed
narcotics for them, and that both appeared to be ``over medicated.'' GX
12, at 6. In his testimony, Agent Kinneer also related that he had
received reports that ``there would be 20 to 30 cars lined up outside
of [Respondent's] practice,'' and that people would be lined up waiting
to enter the clinic. Tr. 260-61; see also Tr. 455-56 (testimony of
Detective John Koch, Scioto County Sheriff's Office that he observed a
``large group of people outside the office,'' and that he had ``never
seen that outside of a doctor's office, where groups of people would
hang out'').
Agent Kinneer thus concluded that Respondent was running a
``prescription mill.'' Id. at 260. Nonetheless, on February 4, 2004,
following receipt of a letter from Respondent which stated that Tri-
State was ``now currently in compliance with all issues'' found at the
inspection and that ``[a]ll log books are current and up to date and
are being kept current,'' GX 11,\11\ Agent Kinneer delivered a new
license to Tri-State and obtained Respondent's dispensing records. GX
12, at 6. The same day, Agent Kinneer contacted three distributors
(Cardinal, McKesson, and Moore Medical) to obtain copies of
Respondent's purchases from them. GX 12, at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ While the letter is dated January 19, 2003, it references
the December 30, 2003 inspection report. See GX 11. I thus find that
the letter was actually sent on January 19, 2004. As discussed
below, during a search warrant which was executed on June 7, 2005,
Tri-State did not have any logbooks for 2004. See Tr. 612.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The purchase records showed, inter alia, that between October 13,
2003, and January 12, 2004, Respondent had purchased 277,500 tablets of
Roxicodone 30 mg., a schedule II controlled substance. GX 12, at 7.
Moreover, between August 18, 2003, and January 6, 2004, Respondent
purchased 65,700 tablets of oxycodone hcl 5 mg., and 59,000 tables of
oxycodone/apap (5/325 mg.). Id.
The records also showed that between July 24, 2003, and October 21,
2003, Respondent purchased more than 57,000 dosage units of combination
hydrocodone/apap drugs in 10/325 mg., 10/500 mg., and 10/650 mg.
strengths.\12\ Id. Furthermore, between various dates, he had purchased
more than 32,600 dosage units of benzodiazepines including alprazolam
in 1 mg. and .5 mg. strengths, and both diazepam and lorazepam in 10
mg. strength.\13\ Id. at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Respondent was also purchasing large quantities of
combination hydrocodone/apap drugs from PD-RX Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
during this period See GX 10, at 147-48.
\13\ According to the testimony of a detective with the
narcotics unit of the Scioto County Sheriff's Office, the illegal
trafficking of prescriptions drugs is ``[t]he number one [drug]
problem'' in the County. Tr. 444. The Detective further testified
that oxycodone, which is the ``most abused'' drugs sells ``for
between 30 and 40 dollars per pill'' of thirty milligram strength,
that Xanax sells for ``between $5 and $12'' per pill depending upon
its strength, and that combination hydrocodone drugs sell for
``between $7 to $15'' per pill. Id. at 450.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In late June 2003, a Diversion Investigator (DI) with DEA's
Columbus, Ohio office received a phone call from a pharmacist in
Kenova, Ohio. Tr. 472, 508, GX 6. The pharmacist inquired as to whether
Respondent had an active DEA registration; he also told the DI that he
was ``receiving numerous prescriptions for OxyContin and Percocet,'' as
well as Lorcet, Xanax and Soma (carisoprodol), which Respondent had
written. Tr. 472-73, 508. The pharmacist also stated that between June
1, 2003, and July 15, 2003, Respondent's ``prescriptions had tripled''
and that the prescriptions were for ``very large'' quantities. Id. at
473. The pharmacist further told the DI that the persons who were
presenting prescriptions from Respondent ``were lining up outside'' of
his pharmacy to get them filled. Id. at 507-08.
The DI further testified that she had received phone calls from
numerous other pharmacies regarding Respondent's prescribing practices
including pharmacies that were located in Northern Kentucky and
Columbus, Ohio. Id. 476. The pharmacists reported that Respondent was
prescribing ``very high quantities'' of OxyContin, Percocet, Lortab,
Xanax, and Somas, and that the patients were paying cash for their
drugs.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ The DI also received information from an FBI task force
officer. Tr. 475. The officer told the DI that an informant had
obtained a prescription from Respondent without the latter having
performed an evaluation on him, and that Denise Huffman had filled
the prescription for ``approximately $200.'' Id. The DI did not,
however, testify as to what drug was involved. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DI also received a phone call from a DI in Forth Worth, Texas,
regarding a report from McKesson, a distributor, that Respondent had
ordered large quantities of combination hydrocodone/apap. Tr. 482. More
specifically, McKesson had reported that on August 7, 2003, Respondent
ordered thirty 100-count bottles of combination hydrocodone/apap, and
on August 15, 2003, he ordered forty 100-count bottles of the drug. Id.
Moreover, on August 22, 2003, Respondent ordered twenty 100-count
bottles of combination hydrocodone/apap, as well as twenty 100-count
bottles of alprazolam. Id.; see also GX 15, at 3-5. Thereafter, the DI
obtained copies of invoices documenting Respondent's purchases of
controlled substances from McKesson and other distributors. GX 14-16.
In November 2003, the Columbus-based DI was contacted by another
Portsmouth-based physician who informed her that ``there were numerous
patients that were coming from [Respondent's] office'' who were seeking
detoxification treatment. Tr. 483. The physician related that
Respondent had put the patients on excessive amounts of opiates such as
OxyContin, Percocet, and hydrocodone. Id. The physician also told the
DI that Respondent was telling the patients to go to particular
pharmacies to get their prescriptions filled.\15\ Id. at 484.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ The DI also testified that she had been informed that one
of Respondent's ``patients'' had contacted DEA regarding her visit
with Respondent. Id. The patient related that she had taken a friend
with her to the clinic and had been ``scolded'' for doing so by
Denise Huffman, the clinic owner, because ``she didn't like anybody
coming with patients,'' id. at 486, and ``law enforcement was
watching the building.'' Id. at 488. The patient further stated that
Respondent had prescribed Soma and an analgesic even though he
``only saw her for a couple of minutes'' and had little interest in
reviewing her x-ray. Id. at 485. Because of what was going on at the
clinic, the patient decided to see another physician. Id. at 486.
Respondent's office repeatedly refused to send her records to her
new physician and the patient had to retain an attorney to obtain
them. Id. at 486-87.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 30635]]
Thereafter, DEA investigators obtained records from various
pharmacies pertaining to Respondent's prescriptions. Id. 489; see also
GX 18-20, 22-25. A DI also obtained from the State of Kentucky the
previously mentioned KASPER report. See GX 26. Moreover, in April-May
2005, the Agency also obtained records pertaining to Respondent's
purchases from four distributors (PD-RX Pharmaceuticals, Cardinal,
McKesson, and Moore Medical). See GX 29.
On June 7, 2005, DEA investigators executed a search warrant at the
Tri-State facility and seized the controlled substances that were on
the premises, patient records, invoices, DEA Form 222s, and financial
records.\16\ Tr. 541, 696-97. One of the DIs interviewed Denise
Huffman, Tri-State's owner. Denise Huffman told the DI that based on
what Respondent ``told her to order,'' she would order the controlled
substances from the distributors. Id. at 543. Ms. Huffman also stated
that the clinic did not do third-party billing and was a ``full cash
business.'' Id. Ms. Huffman further related that her daughter Alice and
Respondent ``were in complete control of the dispensing center.'' Id.
at 545.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ ``To accommodate'' Respondent, the investigators made
copies of the medical records and provided them to the clinic before
``the summer ended.'' Tr. 697.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DI also interviewed Alice Huffman, who confirmed that Tri-State
``was a cash only business'' with ``no third-party billing.'' Id. at
544. Alice Huffman admitted that she filled ``all the prescriptions and
was supposed to keep the records,'' including the dispensing records,
but did not. Id. Alice Huffman further stated that ``she wasn't sure''
if there were any inventories and ``didn't know if they'' would be
accurate if there were any. Id. at 545. When asked by the DI whether
she was aware of whether any of Tri-State's patients had overdosed,
Huffman gave the names of two persons ``that she believed had overdosed
on prescriptions that were written from the clinic.''\17\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The circumstances surrounding the overdose of one of these
persons ( K.R.) is discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same day, DEA investigators attempted to interview Respondent
at his residence, but he declined. Id. at 691. Later that day,
Respondent arrived at the clinic and he eventually agreed to an
interview. Id. at 692. Regarding the interview, the DI testified that
Respondent ``declined to talk'' when asked about the deaths of Tri-
State's patients. Id. at 694. Respondent further maintained that he was
an independent contractor and serving as a ``loc[um] ten[ens]''
practitioner \18\ who had found his position on the internet. Id. at
695. Respondent could not, however, ``recall what company * * * he was
a loc[um] ten[ens] for,'' id., and, of course, had been working at Tri-
State for more than two years at that point.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ As commonly understood, the term ``locum tenens'' means
``one filling an office for a time or temporarily taking the place
of another.'' Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 684 (10th ed. 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moving on to other subjects, Respondent stated that the clinic did
not have a physical therapist on its staff and he was not sure whether
the clinic even had a nurse. Id. at 695. Respondent also told the DI
that he ``rarely recommend[ed] people to other physicians'' and that
``for the most part,'' he did not associate with other area physicians.
Id. at 695-96.
On the same day that the warrant was executed, DEA investigators
attempted to conduct an accountability audit. Id. at 546. The
investigators inventoried all of the controlled substances that were
being seized. Id. at 613-14. Consistent with Alice Huffman's testimony,
the DIs did not find either any initial or biannual inventories as
required by Federal regulations. Id. at 615. Nor were there any
dispensing logs for the year 2004. Id. at 612.
Using records subsequently obtained from various distributors, the
DI was able to determine the amounts of the various controlled
substances Respondent purchased during the audit period and concluded
that there were substantial shortages of the drugs. Id. at 615. These
records also showed that Respondent had ordered large quantities of
alprazolam (2 mg.) and diazepam (10 mg.), hydromorphone (4 mg.), and
both oxycodone and combination hydrocodone in various strengths. GX 30.
I find it unnecessary to make findings regarding the actual amounts
of the shortages.\19\ Instead, I find that Respondent authorized the
ordering of large quantities of numerous controlled substances, and
that the disposition of these drugs cannot be adequately accounted for
because Respondent failed to maintain accurate records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Because Tri-State had no inventories, the DI used the
starting figure of ``0'' for each drug. Under the heading for the
closing inventory, the audit chart stated ``as of 12-31-04.'' GX 30.
The DI testified, however, that the actual inventory was taken on
June 7, 2005. Tr. 613. The record does not establish how the DI
arrived at the inventory figures for December 31, 2004.
There was also testimony that during the search, Denise Huffman
stated that the dispensing logs ``were probably at her house.'' Tr.
669. Eventually, Ms. Huffman produced logbooks for 2005; Ms. Huffman
admitted, however, that there were no records for 2004. Id. at 670.
The DI further testified that the logbooks were provided only after
the Government provided copies of the patient files subsequent to
the search. Id. at 674-75. The logbooks ``were brand new,'' and
appeared to have been newly created based on the copies of the
medical records. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 9, 2005, Respondent's relationship with Tri-State
ended. Id. at 1433-34. Respondent initially saw patients at his
apartment in Portsmouth. Id. at 1434-35. Regarding his activities at
this location, a DEA Investigator testified that he had interviewed the
friend (DC) of one of Respondent's deceased patients (M.R.). Tr. 761.
DC told the investigator that he and M.R. ``knew that [Respondent] was
writing prescriptions without any type of medical examination.'' Id.
Accordingly, they decided to see Respondent (at his Center St.,
Portsmouth) address to obtain drugs that they could sell on the street.
Id.
DC related that upon his arrival at Respondent's office, he
encountered a former girlfriend who was now working for Respondent. Id.
at 762. After filling out various forms, the ex-girlfriend asked DC
what he was taking. Id. DC asked her: ``what is he writing?'' Id. She
then wrote out ``prescriptions for oxycodone, a hydrocodone product,
and Xanax.'' Id.
DC further related that Respondent did not physically examine him.
Respondent signed the prescriptions and engaged in small talk with DC
before Respondent left the exam room. Id. at 763-64.
On October 4, 2005, the Portsmouth Police Department executed a
warrant at Respondent's apartment and seized various items including
patient files.\20\ Id. at 1436-37. The Chief of Police also issued a
condemnation notice, which in Respondent's words, ordered him ``to
immediately vacate the premises.'' Id. at 1437.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Respondent testified that the seizure occurred because the
police ``were bigger than I was, and they decided that they were
going to come in and do that.'' Tr. 1436. He also maintained that
the ``search warrant * * * contained a lot of frankly irrelevant
materials.'' Id. Respondent did not, however, produce any evidence
that a court had quashed the warrant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approximately a week later, Respondent relocated to Chillicothe,
Ohio. Id. at 1437-38. On February 6, 2006, DEA investigators obtained a
warrant to search Respondent's Chillicothe office. GX 78. On February
10, 2006, the warrant was executed and additional patient files were
seized. GX 73.
A DI subsequently reviewed the 1258 patient files that were seized
during both the June 2005 search of Tri-State and the February 2006
search of Respondent's Chillicothe office. Id. Most significantly, the
DI determined
[[Page 30636]]
that 900 of the patient files lacked documentation that Respondent had
performed a physical examination on the patient. Id.
During the course of the investigation, DEA investigators received
information from various sources including family members, friends,
emergency room physicians, and various coroners indicating that sixteen
persons had died of drug overdoses shortly after seeing Respondent. Tr.
617-20; see also GXs 32-60. For example, the widow of J.R. testified
that her husband had obtained prescriptions from Respondent for
Oxycontin, oxycodone, hydrocodone, valium, and Soma, and was receiving
as many as 622 pills per month. Tr. 40, 42-43. At one point J.R.
attempted to commit suicide and was hospitalized; J.R., however, was
released. Id. at 81-82. On November 18, 2003, J.R. visited Respondent.
Id. at 53; GX 61.
On the morning of November 20, 2003, J.R. was found dead in the
bathroom. Tr. 52. According to the Deputy Coroner's report, there were
four pill bottles on the bathroom sink: two bottles were labeled as
containing oxycodone (Rx'd on 10/3/03 and 10/20/03) although both were
found empty; one contained 12 tablets of diazepam out of the original
90 count which was prescribed on 11/18/03; and one bottle contained
three methadone tablets. See GX 60, at 4. Respondent was listed as the
prescriber on the two oxycodone and the diazepam bottles. Id. No
prescriber was listed on the bottle which contained methadone. Id.
The coroner found that the immediate cause of J.R.'s death was an
``overdose'' due to multiple drug intoxication. GX 60, at 1. See also
GX 59. According to J.R.'s widow, her husband was addicted to drugs.
Tr. 33, 45. She also testified that her husband was selling some of his
drugs to pay for his visits with Respondent. Id. at 64. According to
her testimony, her husband had told her that Respondent ``was trying to
give him [S]omas also and to take them, and that [Respondent] said if
he didn't take them to sell them.'' Id. at 42.
J.R.'s step-daughter corroborated this testimony. More
specifically, she testified that her step-father had ``said that I
could get more if I wanted. [Respondent] offered me [S]omas, and I told
him that I was allergic to them, and he [Respondent] said sell them,
trade them, whatever you need to do.'' \21\ Id. at 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ While Soma (carisoprodol) is a prescription drug, it is not
a controlled substance. It is, however, a highly abused drug which
metabolizes into meprobamate, a schedule IV depressant. See 21 CFR
1308.14(c); ALJ Ex. 11, at 4; Tr. 934 (testimony of Dr. Wheeler).
Respondent's statements to J.R. to sell or trade the drug are
nonetheless relevant to show his knowledge and intent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the June 2005 search of Tri-State, DEA investigators ``could
not find [J.R.'s] medical chart.'' Id. at 706; see also id. at 709. The
investigators did, however, find a ``sign-in sheet'' which indicated
that J.R. had visited Respondent on November 18, 2003, two days before
his death. Id.; see also GX 61.
DEA did, however, obtain the medical charts of six ``patients'' who
died while under Respondent's care and provided these to L. Douglas
Kennedy, M.D., for his review. GX 74. Dr. Kennedy holds medical
licenses in Kentucky, Ohio, and Florida, and board certifications in
anesthesiology and pain medicine. GX 63, at 9. He has been a fellow in
pain medicine at the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, served as an
assistant professor of anesthesiology and director of the chronic pain
management program at the University of Kentucky Medical Center, and
has approximately fifteen years experience as the medical director of a
pain management practice. GX 63, at 1-2. Dr. Kennedy has also lectured
on pain management at numerous symposia and conferences. Id. at 3-7.
Dr. Kennedy was qualified as an expert witness in the standard of care
in pain management and the prescribing of controlled substances for the
treatment of chronic pain. Tr. at 1021-22.
Dr. Kennedy specifically reviewed records including Respondent's
patient files for six individuals (M.C., S.H., S.J., C.J., D.P, and
K.R.). GX 74, at 1-5; see also Tr. 1084-89. He also ``reviewed past or
concurrent medical records present on [Respondent's] `patient' charts
from other physicians [and]/or medical facilities,'' police reports, as
well as death certificates, autopsy, coroner's, and post-mortem
toxicology reports. GX 74, at 1. In his report, Dr. Kennedy further
stated that he had reviewed, and was ``generally familiar with,
regulations including Ohio Administrative Code, Chapter 4731-21 on
Intractable Pain,'' the Federation of State Medical Board's Model
Policy for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain,
and ``other applicable standards and guidelines with respect to pain
management and the prescription of controlled substances for same.''
Id. at 2.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ While much of the cross-examination of Dr. Kennedy focused
on his reliance on the Kentucky guidelines, in both his report and
testimony, Dr. Kennedy made clear that he had also reviewed the Ohio
Administrative Code. See Tr. 1198-1203. When Dr. Kennedy offered to
explain why Respondent also violated the Ohio regulations,
Respondent's counsel declined to pursue this line of questioning.
Id. at 1202-03.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Kennedy specifically noted that the drugs Respondent prescribed
``were present in the Toxicology Testing post-mortem and were the
primary (in some cases the only) cause of death.'' \23\ Id. at
[[Page 30637]]
4. He further found that Respondent ``practiced `polypharmacy[,]'
prescribing multiple controlled substances at the same time.'' Id. at
5. Relatedly, Dr. Kennedy observed that Respondent ``averaged 3.8
controlled substance prescriptions for each `patient' visit,'' and that
``[t]his increased the likelihood of sedation, respiratory depression
and death.'' Id. He also noted that ``[d]eath occurred on average * * *
[three] days after the last visit with [Respondent] [with] some
[occurring] the next day.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ With respect to patient M.C., the record establishes that
she saw Respondent on January 8, 2004, and died on January 10, 2004,
at the age of 32. GX 84, at 6-7; GX 44. During the January 8 visit,
Respondent issued her three prescriptions: one for 300 tablets of
Norco (hydrocodone/apap 10/325); one for 60 tablets of oxycodone 30
mg.; and one for 120 tablets of Xanax 2 mg. GX 84, at 6-7. The
coroner concluded that M.C. died from ``intoxication'' caused ``by
the combined effects of oxycodone and hydrocodone.'' GX 42 & 44.
With respect to patient S.H., the record establishes that he saw
Respondent on April 19, 2005, and died the next morning at the age
of 33. GX 84, at 12-14; GX 38, at 3. During the April 19 visit,
Respondent issued him prescriptions for 360 tablets of oxycodone (15
mg.) with an instruction to take 12 per day; 120 tablets of Valium
(10 mg.); 30 tablets of Xanax (2 mg.), and another drug Carafate,
which is not controlled. GX 84, at 12-13. Respondent also issued an
RX for an MRI during this visit. The coroner concluded that S.H.
overdosed and died of the ``acute combined effects of oxycodone,
diazepam, and alprazolam.'' GX 38, at 1.
With respect to S.J., the record establishes that she saw
Respondent on both September 16 and September 29, 2005. On September
16, Respondent prescribed to her 270 tablets of oxycodone 30 mg.;
270 tablets of Percocet 5/325 (oxycodone/apap); 60 tables of Xanax
(2 mg.), and 120 tablets of Soma (350) even though her pain was
indicated as being ``2/10.'' GX 84, at 21-24. On September 26, 2005,
Respondent prescribed to S.J. an additional 135 tablets of both
Percocet 5/325 and oxycodone 30. Id. at 25-26. The form documenting
the 9/26/05 visit does not contain any indication of a medical
complaint and the entry for ``Pain: Location, Description,
Duration'' is blank. Id. at 26. S.J. died September 30, 2005; the
coroner concluded that the cause of death was ``[m]ultiple drug
intoxication, with acute bronchopneumonia contributing.'' GX 55, at
2. The coroner further noted that S.J., who was 30 years old, had
ingested oxycodone, alprazolam, cocaine and diphenhydramine. Id. at
2-3.
With respect to K.R., the record establishes that on March 8,
2004, Respondent gave her two separate prescriptions for 90 tablets
of oxycodone 30 mg., a prescription for 180 tablets of Lorcet 10/650
(hydrocodone/apap), and a prescription for 120 Xanax (2 mg.). GX 84,
at 10. The progress note for the visit suggests that Respondent also
gave her a prescription for Soma 350. Id. at 11. K.R, who was 39
years old, died the following day of a drug overdose. GX 51, at 2.
The toxicology report indicates that oxycodone, benzodiazepines, and
carisoprodol /meprobamate were present. Id. at 3.
Dr. Kennedy specifically noted that Respondent had ``essentially
doubled'' K.R.'s medication ``the day before she died,'' and that he
saw ``no indication for her being on the medicines in the first
place, let alone [Respondent's] doubling them.'' Tr. 1090.
With respect to C.J., the record establishes that on October 16,
2003, Respondent gave him prescriptions for 120 tablets of oxycodone
30 mg., 180 tablets of Percocet 10/650 (oxycodone/apap); 180 Xanax 2
mg., and 90 Soma 350 mg. GX 84, at 3-5. The progress note indicated
that C.J.'s pain level was 5-6/10, and his spasms were 0/10. Id. at
5. C.J. died five days later; the coroner determined that the cause
of his death was ``acute opioid (oxycodone) toxicity.''
With respect to D.P., the record establishes that on August 11,
2004, Respondent issued to him prescriptions for 300 tablets of
oxycodone 30 mg., 360 tablets of hydrocodone/apap (10/325), 120
tablets of alprazolam 2 mg., and 180 tablets of carisoprodol 350 mg.
GX 26, at 385. D.P. filled the first two prescriptions the same day,
and filled the latter two the next day. Id. According to the chart,
D.P. reported that his pain level was ``O-1/10,'' and his spasms
were ``0/10.'' GX 84, at 17. There is a notation ``See Cleve. Clinic
Report,'' but the note does not say what the referral was for. Id.
There is also a notation that Rx Express Pharmacy had been called
and D.P. had not filled either the Soma or Xanax prescriptions, Id.;
he did, however, fill them the next day. Id.
While the record does not contain D.P.'s death certificate, the
testimony establishes that he died on August 12, 2004. Tr. 736.
Moreover, the toxicology report confirmed the presence of oxycodone
in D.P.'s blood. GX 34, at 2. According to the spreadsheet compiled
by Dr. Kennedy, there is a handwritten note on a preliminary
toxicology sheet which states that D.P.'s death was caused by
``acute oxycodone toxicity.'' GX 82.
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Dr. Kennedy further described Respondent's practices as
``prescrib[ing] drug `cocktails' * * * often including an opioid[]
(often 2-3 types), a benzodiazepine, and Soma.'' Id. at 3. According to
Dr. Kennedy, Respondent's prescribing practices ``greatly increased the
chance for drug abuse, diversion, [and]/or addiction.'' Id.
Moreover, based upon his review of the ``patient charts'' (which is
more fully set forth in GX 82), Dr. Kennedy found that Respondent ``did
not establish a doctor-patient relationship on initial visits, and did
not establish or maintain such a relationship on followup visits.'' GX
74, at 3. Relatedly, Dr. Kennedy noted that ``[t]here was inadequate or
no history [and] physical examination,'' that ``[t]here was seldom any
diagnostic testing or past medical record present,'' and that ``[w]here
there was, [Respondent] did not rely upon it for medical decision
making.'' Id. at 4.
Dr. Kennedy also observed ``[t]here existed no plan to diagnose or
treat the person's problem(s),'' and that ``[t]he `plan of care' was
essentially the same for every person: drugs (predominately controlled
substances), for which no medical necessity was established.'' Id.
Moreover, once Respondent began his `` `plan of care' * * * [he]
continued [it] with no reassessment as to effect, success, or ill
effects.'' Id. Relatedly, Dr. Kennedy found that Respondent ``did not
regularly and consistently address pain complaints with other methods,
for example, nonprescription drugs, non-controlled substance
prescription drugs, physical therapy or behavioral medicine
consultation, before resorting to controlled substance prescriptions.''
Id. at 3.
Dr. Kennedy also concluded that Respondent ``ignored and failed to
obtain necessary testing and consultations (with Behavioral Medicine,
Psychiatry, or Addiction Medicine) that would have identified and then
allowed treatment for abuse and addiction as well as identifying those
persons who may have been diverting the drugs.'' Id. at 5. More
specifically, Dr. Kennedy found that Respondent ``rarely tested,
checked for, or heeded signs of addiction (he rarely performed in
office urinary drug screens). When he did perform in office urinary
drug screens, the tests were inadequate.'' \24\ Id. at 3. As Dr.
Kennedy explained, if a test does not pick up a drug that a physician
has prescribed, it raises the possibility that the ``person could have
been selling those drugs.'' Tr. 1091. Dr. Kennedy further noted that
Respondent ``prescribed and continued to prescribe controlled
substances to persons who exhibited behavior consistent with possible
drug abuse, addiction [and]/or diversion.'' Id. at 3.
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\24\ According to Dr. Kennedy's spreadsheet, Respondent did not
perform a single urinary drug screen on M.C., even though she made
five visits to him over a four month period. GX 82. Notably, M.C.'s
toxicology report was positive for cannabinoids. Id. Dr. Kennedy
thus concluded that M.C.'s use of marijuana ``most likely would have
been picked up by [Respondent] if he had checked, triggering an
addiction medicine [and]/or law enforcement evaluation.'' Id.
According to Dr. Wayne Wheeler, who also testified as an expert
witness for the Government, M.C.'s emergency room records indicate
that on August 5, 2003, she had been in a car accident; a drug test
done at the hospital indicated that she was positive for marijuana
and ``the police report indicated she had taken Soma and Percocet
and lost control of her vehicle.'' Tr. 946.
Dr. Kennedy noted that S.J. ``had been dismissed in 2003 for
falsifying symptoms and cancer records.'' GX 82. Respondent did not,
however, perform a drug screen on S.J. Id. Dr. Wheeler noted that
S.J. had made ``multiple visits to the emergency room'' for
conditions (falls, headaches, dental pain) that are the ``hallmarks
of * * * pill-seeking behavior'' because it is ``very hard to find
objective evidence'' that the patient is not telling the truth. Tr.
948.
Dr. Kennedy also noted that Respondent did not perform a single
drug screen on D.P., even though he had visited Respondent seventeen
times over the course of sixteen months and had received a total of
74 controlled-substance prescriptions from him. GX 82.
Respondent performed only a single drug screen on S.H., even
though he was a patient for more than two years and saw Respondent
thirteen times. Id. He also noted that S.H. had previously been
treated at Tri-State (albeit at a different location) and that
records of an earlier visit indicated an abnormal drug screen in
that S.H. indicated that he was currently taken Lortab 10/500 and
the screen was negative. Id. Moreover, S.H. had previously been
hospitalized for mental illness; these records indicated that S.H.
had stated that ``he has smoked pot [and], taken Cocaine.'' Id.
Moreover, S.H. had a Xanax bottle which had been filled ten days
earlier but was then empty. S.H. had also stated that he was out of
medications and that prior to his admission, he was taking Xanax,
Oxycontin, and oxycodone. Id. The note also stated that S.H. had a
history of ``significant alcohol abuse'' and ``[s]uicidal ideation
with family member stating that the patient does have the potential
for self-destructive behavior.'' Id. Moreover, the patient had
tested positive for benzodiazepines and cocaine but negative for
opiates. Id. As Dr. Kennedy noted in the spreadsheet, ``[t]here are
numerous `red flags' for significant mental illness * * * with
medication non-compliance, drug abuse & addiction (polysubstance
abuse), and general non-compliance with treatment recommendations.''
Id.
Respondent performed a single drug screen on C.J., who was his
patient for more than six months and saw him seven times. Id. During
the screen, only cocaine and THC were checked for. Id.
Finally, with respect to K.R., who was a patient for nearly
eleven months and made 14 office visits during this period, Dr.
Kennedy noted in his spreadsheet that Respondent had obtained two
in-office drug screens. GX 82. On cross-examination, it appeared
that both screens were ordered by a different physician, who was
practicing in Tri-State's South Shore, KY office, and not
Respondent. Id.; see also Tr. 1182-83, 1186. The first of these
occurred on December 1, 2003, nearly eight months after K.R.'s first
visit; the second drug screen was obtained on January 23, 2004. GX
82. Dr. Kennedy noted that the first screen did not test for
oxycodone and that the second test did not check for specific
opiates or benzodiazepines. Id. Dr. Wheeler noted that while
Respondent had referred K.R. to a yoga class, she went only one time
and decided not to go back. Tr. 949. According to Dr. Wheeler,
allowing the patient to quit after one class does not give that
treatment ``modality a reasonable chance to produce any positive
results.'' Id.
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Dr. Kennedy thus concluded that Respondent ``did not establish'' a
bona-fide doctor patient relationship or ``any relationship adequate
for prescribing controlled substances on the [patient's] initial
visit'' or ``on subsequent visits.'' Id. at 4. Most signif