Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 28904-28964 [E8-10247]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 97 / Monday, May 19, 2008 / Proposed Rules
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 227
[Regulation AA; Docket No. R–1314]
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Thrift Supervision
12 CFR Part 535
[Docket ID. OTS–2008–0004]
RIN 1550–AC17
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION
ADMINISTRATION
12 CFR Part 706
RIN 3133–AD47
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (Board); Office
of Thrift Supervision, Treasury (OTS);
and National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA).
ACTION: Proposed rule; request for
public comment.
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AGENCIES:
SUMMARY: The Board, OTS, and NCUA
(collectively, the Agencies) are
proposing to exercise their authority
under section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to prohibit unfair or
deceptive acts or practices. The
proposed rule would prohibit
institutions from engaging in certain
acts or practices in connection with
consumer credit cards accounts and
overdraft services for deposit accounts.
This proposal evolved from the Board’s
June 2007 Notice of Proposed Rule
under the Truth in Lending Act and
OTS’s August 2007 Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking under the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The proposed
rule relates to other Board proposals
under the Truth in Lending Act and the
Truth in Savings Act, which are
published elsewhere in today’s Federal
Register.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before August 4, 2008.
ADDRESSES: Because paper mail in the
Washington DC area and at the Agencies
is subject to delay, we encourage
commenters to submit comments by email, if possible. We also encourage
commenters to use the title ‘‘Unfair or
Deceptive Acts or Practices’’ to facilitate
our organization and distribution of the
comments. Comments submitted to one
or more of the Agencies will be made
available to all of the Agencies.
Interested parties are invited to submit
comments as follows:
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Board: You may submit comments,
identified by Docket No. R–1314, by any
of the following methods:
• Agency Web site: https://
www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• E-mail:
regs.comments@federalreserve.gov.
Include the docket number in the
subject line of the message.
• Facsimile: (202) 452–3819 or (202)
452–3102.
• Mail: Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary,
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20551.
All public comments are available
from the Board’s Web site at https://
www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/
foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as submitted,
unless modified for technical reasons.
Accordingly, your comments will not be
edited to remove any identifying or
contact information. Public comments
may also be viewed electronically or in
paper form in Room MP–500 of the
Board’s Martin Building (20th and C
Streets, NW) between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.
on weekdays.
OTS: You may submit comments,
identified by OTS–2008–0004, by any of
the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal‘‘Regulations.gov’’: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov, under the ‘‘more
Search Options’’ tab click next to the
‘‘Advanced Docket Search’’ option
where indicated, select ‘‘Office of Thrift
Supervision’’ from the agency dropdown menu, then click ‘‘Submit.’’ In the
‘‘Docket ID’’ column, select ‘‘OTS–
2008–0004’’ to submit or view public
comments and to view supporting and
related materials for this proposed
rulemaking. The ‘‘How to Use This Site’’
link on the Regulations.gov home page
provides information on using
Regulations.gov, including instructions
for submitting or viewing public
comments, viewing other supporting
and related materials, and viewing the
docket after the close of the comment
period.
• Mail: Regulation Comments, Chief
Counsel’s Office, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 1700 G Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20552, Attention: OTS–
2008–0004.
• Facsimile: (202) 906–6518.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: Guard’s
Desk, East Lobby Entrance, 1700 G
Street, NW., from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on
business days, Attention: Regulation
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Comments, Chief Counsel’s Office,
Attention: OTS–2008–0004.
• Instructions: All submissions
received must include the agency name
and docket number for this rulemaking.
All comments received will be entered
into the docket and posted on
Regulations.gov without change,
including any personal information
provided. Comments, including
attachments and other supporting
materials received are part of the public
record and subject to public disclosure.
Do not enclose any information in your
comment or supporting materials that
you consider confidential or
inappropriate for public disclosure.
• Viewing Comments Electronically:
Go to https://www.regulations.gov, select
‘‘Office of Thrift Supervision’’ from the
agency drop-down menu, then click
‘‘Submit.’’ Select Docket ID ‘‘OTS–
2008–0004’’ to view public comments
for this notice of proposed rulemaking.
• Viewing Comments On-Site: You
may inspect comments at the Public
Reading Room, 1700 G Street, NW., by
appointment. To make an appointment
for access, call (202) 906–5922, send an
e-mail to public.info@ots.treas.gov, or
send a facsimile transmission to (202)
906–6518. (Prior notice identifying the
materials you will be requesting will
assist us in serving you.) We schedule
appointments on business days between
10 a.m. and 4 p.m. In most cases,
appointments will be available the next
business day following the date we
receive a request.
NCUA: You may submit comments,
identified by number RIN 3133–AD47,
by any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• NCUA Web site: https://
www.ncua.gov/news/proposed_regs/
proposed_regs.html. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• E-mail: Address to
regcomments@ncua.gov. Include ‘‘[Your
name] Comments on Proposed Rule Part
706’’ in the e-mail subject line.
• Facsimile: (703) 518–6319. Use the
subject line described above for e-mail.
• Mail: Address to Mary Rupp,
Secretary of the Board, National Credit
Union Administration, 1775 Duke
Street, Alexandria, VA 22314–3428.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: Same as
mail address.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Board: Benjamin K. Olson, Attorney,
or Ky Tran-Trong, Counsel, Division of
Consumer and Community Affairs, at
(202) 452–2412 or (202) 452–3667,
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 20th and C Streets,
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NW., Washington, DC 20551. For users
of Telecommunications Device for the
Deaf (TDD) only, contact (202) 263–
4869.
OTS: April Breslaw, Director,
Consumer Regulations, (202) 906–6989;
Suzanne McQueen, Consumer
Regulations Analyst, Compliance and
Consumer Protection Division, (202)
906–6459; Glenn Gimble, Senior Project
Manager, Compliance and Consumer
Protection Division, (202) 906–7158; or
Richard Bennett, Senior Compliance
Counsel, Regulations and Legislation
Division, (202) 906–7409, at Office of
Thrift Supervision, 1700 G Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20552.
NCUA: Matthew J. Biliouris, Program
Officer, Office of Examination and
Insurance, (703) 518–6360; or Moisette
I. Green or Ross P. Kendall, Staff
Attorneys, Office of General Counsel,
(703) 518–6540, National Credit Union
Administration, 1775 Duke Street,
Alexandria, VA 22314–3428.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Federal Reserve Board (Board), the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and
the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA) (collectively,
the Agencies) are proposing several new
provisions intended to protect
consumers against unfair or deceptive
acts or practices with respect to
consumer credit card accounts and
overdraft services for deposit accounts.
These proposals are promulgated
pursuant to section 18(f)(1) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act), which makes the Agencies
responsible for prescribing regulations
that prevent unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce
within the meaning of section 5(a) of the
FTC Act. See 15 U.S.C. 57a(f)(1), 45(a).
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I. Background
A. The Board’s June 2007 Regulation Z
Proposal on Open-End (Non-Home
Secured) Credit
On June 14, 2007, the Board requested
public comment on proposed
amendments to the open-end credit (not
home-secured) provisions of Regulation
Z, which implements the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA), as well as proposed
amendments to the corresponding staff
commentary to Regulation Z. 72 FR
32948 (June 2007 Proposal). The
purpose of TILA is to promote the
informed use of consumer credit by
providing disclosures about its costs
and terms. See 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.
TILA’s disclosures differ depending on
whether the consumer credit is an openend (revolving) plan or a closed-end
(installment) loan. The goal of the
proposed amendments was to improve
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the effectiveness of the disclosures that
creditors provide to consumers at
application and throughout the life of an
open-end (not home-secured) account.
As part of this effort, the Board
retained a research and consulting firm
(Macro International) to assist the Board
in conducting extensive consumer
testing in order to develop improved
disclosures that consumers would be
more likely to pay attention to,
understand, and use in their decisions,
while at the same time not creating
undue burdens for creditors. While the
testing assisted the Board in developing
improved disclosures, the testing also
identified the limitations of disclosure,
in certain circumstances, as a means of
enabling consumers to make decisions
effectively. See 72 FR at 32948–52.
In response to the June 2007 Proposal,
the Board received more than 2,500
comments, including approximately
2,100 comments from individual
consumers. Comments from consumers,
consumer groups, a member of
Congress, other government agencies,
and some creditors were generally
supportive of the proposed revisions to
Regulation Z. A number of comments,
however, urged the Board to take
additional action with respect to a
number of credit card practices,
including late fees and other penalties
resulting from perceived reductions in
the amount of time consumers are given
to make timely payments, allocation of
payments to balances with the lowest
annual percentage rate, application of
increased annual percentage rates to
pre-existing balances, and the so-called
two-cycle method of computing interest.
B. The OTS’s August 2007 FTC Act
Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
On August 6, 2007, OTS issued an
ANPR requesting comment on its rules
under section 5 of the FTC Act. See 72
FR 43570 (OTS ANPR). The purpose of
OTS’s ANPR was to determine whether
OTS should expand on its current
prohibitions against unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in its Credit
Practices Rule (12 CFR part 535).
OTS’s ANPR discussed a very broad
array of issues including:
• The legal background on OTS’s
authority under the FTC Act and the
Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA);
• OTS’s existing Credit Practices
Rule;
• Possible principles OTS could use
to define unfair and deceptive acts or
practices, including looking to
standards the FTC and states follow;
• Practices that OTS, individually or
on an interagency basis, has addressed
through guidance;
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• Practices that other federal agencies
have addressed through rulemaking;
• Practices that states have addressed
statutorily;
• Acts or practices OTS might target
involving products such as credit cards,
residential mortgages, gift cards, and
deposit accounts; and
• OTS’s existing Advertising Rule (12
CFR 563.27).
OTS recognized in its ANPR that the
financial services industry and
consumers have benefited from
consistency in rules and guidance as the
federal banking agencies and the NCUA
have adopted uniform or very similar
rules in many areas. 72 FR at 43571.
OTS emphasized in its ANPR that it
would be mindful of the goal of
consistent interagency standards as it
considered issues relating to unfair and
deceptive acts or practices. Id.
OTS received 29 comment letters on
its ANPR, including thirteen from
financial institutions and their trade
associations, three from consumer
advocacy organizations, two from
members of Congress, one from the FTC,
and ten from others. Generally speaking,
the commenters agreed on only one
point . . . that OTS should adopt the
same principles-based standards for
unfairness and deception used by the
FTC, the other federal banking agencies,
and the NCUA.
Financial industry commenters
opposed OTS taking any further action
beyond issuing guidance along those
lines. They argued that OTS must not
create an unlevel playing field for OTSregulated institutions and that
uniformity among the federal banking
agencies and the NCUA is essential.
They questioned the need for any new
OTS rules. They challenged the list of
practices OTS had indicated it could
consider targeting, arguing that the
practices listed were neither unfair nor
deceptive under the FTC standards.
They explained the reasons they use the
particular practices listed and how some
benefit consumers. Some commenters
urged OTS to await the Board’s
rulemaking under the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) on
unfair or deceptive acts or practices and
then follow the Board’s lead.1 They also
opposed using state laws as a model or
converting guidance to rules. Further,
they opposed OTS expanding its
advertising rules.
In contrast, the consumer commenters
urged OTS to move ahead with a rule
that would combine the FTC’s
principles-based standards with
prohibitions on specific practices. They
1 The Board issued its HOEPA proposed in
January 2008. See 73 FR 1672 (Jan. 9, 2008).
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urged OTS to ban numerous practices,
including but not limited to those the
ANPR indicated OTS might target. One
emphasized that whatever OTS does
must not preempt state laws on unfair
and deceptive acts or practices.
A joint comment from House
Financial Services Committee Chairman
Barney Frank and Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit Chairman Carolyn Maloney urged
OTS to proceed promptly to adopt
comprehensive regulations on unfair
and deceptive acts or practices. A
comment from Senator Carl Levin urged
OTS to move ahead with rulemaking; he
focused his comment on unfair or
deceptive credit card practices.
A comment from the FTC summarized
the FTC’s interest and experience with
respect to financial services, described
how the FTC has used its unfairness and
deception authority in rulemaking and
law enforcement actions, and
recommended that OTS consider the
FTC’s experience in determining
whether to impose rules prohibiting or
restricting particular acts and practices.
OTS received comments on several
practices relevant to the specific credit
card practices addressed in today’s
proposal:
• OTS received comments on the
practice of ‘‘universal default’’ or
‘‘adverse action pricing,’’ which the
OTS ANPR described as imposing an
interest rate increase that is triggered by
adverse information unrelated to the
credit card account. The OTS ANPR
contrasted this practice to longestablished risk based pricing.
Consumer groups supported prohibiting
these practices as abusive and unfair to
consumers. They cited inaccuracies in
the credit reporting system and
disparate racial impact as reasons to
prohibit using credit reports or credit
scores to impose penalty rates. On the
other hand, several industry
commenters defended these practices.
They commented that credit cards
should be priced to reflect their current
risk. They argued that otherwise, credit
card issuers would build a risk premium
into all rates to the detriment of other
customers.
• OTS received comments on the
practice of applying payments first to
balances subject to a lower rate of
interest before applying payments to
balances subject to higher rates of
interest, as well as the practice of
applying payments first to fees,
penalties, or other charges before
applying them to principal and interest.
Consumer groups supported prohibiting
these practices as abusive and unfair to
consumers. On the other hand, several
industry commenters defended these
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practices. They commented that if these
practices were prohibited fewer
products would be available to
consumers such as zero or low-cost
balance transfers. Some commented that
applying payments in this manner was
fundamental and would impose
significant implementation costs to
change.
• OTS received comments on the
practice of imposing an over-the-creditlimit fee that is triggered by the
imposition of a penalty fee (such as a
late fee) and the practice of charging
penalty fees in consecutive months
based on previous late or over-thecredit-limit transactions, not on new
actions. Consumer groups supported
prohibiting these practices and
prohibiting any over-the-credit-limit fee
where the creditor approved the
transaction or padded the credit limit,
as abusive and unfair to consumers. On
the other hand, several industry
commenters defended these practices.
They commented that the practices
deter future defaults and are a way to
charge a little more to a customer who
has demonstrated higher risk without
permanently raising the customer’s
borrowing costs. They argued that
otherwise, these costs would be passed
on to borrowers who do not go over
their credit limit or pay late.
Consumer groups also commented on
additional credit card practices of
concern that are relevant to the practices
addressed in today’s proposal. They
urged that payment cut-off times be
prohibited and that payments be treated
as timely if they are postmarked as of
the due date. They also urged that
subprime credit cards be prohibited if
less than $300 of available credit is left
after initial fees are subtracted or initial
fees total more than 10% of the overall
credit line.
C. Related Action by the Agencies
In addition to receiving information
via comments, the Agencies have
conducted outreach regarding credit
card practices, including meetings and
discussions with consumer group
representatives, industry
representatives, other federal and state
banking agencies, and the FTC. On
April 8, 2008, the Board hosted a forum
on credit cards in which card issuers
and payment network operators,
consumer advocates, counseling
agencies, and other regulatory agencies
met to discuss relevant industry trends
and identify areas that may warrant
action or further study. Among the
topics discussed were the Board’s
previously announced plan to issue a
proposal under the FTC Act and the
Board’s June 2007 Proposal. In addition,
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the Agencies have reviewed consumer
complaints received by each of the
federal banking agencies and several
studies of the credit card industry.2 The
Agencies’ understanding of credit card
practices and consumer behavior has
also been informed by the results of
consumer testing conducted on behalf of
the Board in connection with its June
2007 Proposal under Regulation Z.
Based on this and other information
discussed below, the Agencies have
developed proposed rules under the
FTC Act prohibiting specific unfair acts
or practices regarding consumer credit
card accounts.
Finally, the Agencies have also
gathered information from a number of
recent Congressional hearings on
consumer protection issues regarding
credit cards.3 In these hearings,
members of Congress heard testimony
from individual consumers,
2 See, e.g., Am. Bankers Assoc., Likely Impact of
Proposed Credit Card Legislation: Survey Results of
Credit Card Issuers (Spring 2008); Darryl E. Getter,
Cong. Research Srvc., The Credit Card Market:
Recent Trends, Funding Cost Issues, and Repricing
Practices (Feb. 2008); Tim Westrich & Christian E.
Weller, Ctr. for Am. Progress, House of Cards:
Consumers Turn to Credit Cards Amid the Mortgage
Crisis, Delaying Inevitable Defaults (Feb. 2008)
(available at https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2008/02/pdf/house_of_cards.pdf); Jose A.
Garcia, Demos, Borrowing to Make Ends Meet: The
Rapid Growth of Credit Card Debt in America (Nov.
2007) (available at https://www.demos.org/pubs/
borrowing.pdf ); Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., FeeHarvesters: Low-Credit, High-Cost Cards Bleed
Consumers (Nov. 2007) (available at https://
www.consumerlaw.org/issues/credit_cards/content/
FEE-HarvesterFinal.pdf); Jonathan M. Orszag &
Susan H. Manning, Am. Bankers Assoc., An
Economic Assessment of Regulating Credit Card
Fees and Interest Rates (Oct. 2007) (available at
https://www.aba.com/aba/documents/press/
regulating_creditcard_fees_interest_rates92507.pdf);
Cindy Zeldin & Mark Rukavia, Demos, Borrowing to
Stay Healthy: How Credit Card Debt Is Related to
Medical Expenses (Jan. 2007) (available at https://
www.demos.org/pubs/healthy_web.pdf); U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office, Credit Cards: Increased
Complexity in Rates and Fees Heightens Need for
More Effective Disclosures to Consumers (Sept.
2006) (‘‘GAO Credit Card Report’’) (available at
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pdf ); Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report
to Congress on Practices of the Consumer Credit
Industry in Soliciting and Extending Credit and
their Effects on Consumer Debt and Insolvency
(June 2006) (available at https://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/
bankruptcy/bankruptcybillstudy200606.pdf );
Demos & Ctr. for Responsible Lending, The Plastic
Safety Net: The Reality Behind Debt in America
(Oct. 2005) (available at https://www.demos.org/
pubs/PSN_low.pdf).
3 See, e.g., The Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights:
Providing New Protections for Consumers: Hearing
before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Instits. & Consumer
Credit, 110th Cong. (2007); Credit Card Practices:
Unfair Interest Rate Increases: Hearing before the S.
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 110th
Cong. (2007); Credit Card Practices: Current
Consumer and Regulatory Issues: Hearing before H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2007); Credit
Card Practices: Fees, Interest Rates, and Grace
Periods: Hearing before the S. Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations, 110th Cong. (2007).
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representatives of consumer groups,
representatives of financial and credit
card industry groups, and others.
Consumer and community group
representatives generally testified that
certain credit card practices (including
those discussed above) unfairly increase
the cost of credit after the consumer has
committed to a particular transaction.
These witnesses further testified that
these practices should be prohibited
because they lead consumers to
underestimate the costs of using credit
cards and that disclosure of these
practices under Regulation Z is
ineffective. Financial services and credit
card industry representatives agreed
that consumers need better disclosures
of credit card terms but testified that
substantive restrictions on specific
terms would lead to higher interest rates
for all borrowers as well as reduced
access to credit for some. Members of
Congress have proposed several bills
addressing consumer protection issues
regarding credit cards.4
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D. Agency Actions on Overdraft Services
Overdraft services are sometimes
offered to transaction account customers
as an alternative to traditional ways of
covering overdrafts (e.g., overdraft lines
of credit or linked accounts). Coverage
is generally ‘‘automatically’’ provided to
consumers that meet a depository
institution’s criteria, and the service
may extend to check as well as other
transactions, such as automated teller
machine (ATM) withdrawals, debit card
transactions and automated
clearinghouse (ACH) transactions. Most
institutions state that payment of an
overdraft is at their discretion. If an
overdraft is paid, the consumer will be
charged a flat fee for each item. A daily
fee also may apply for each day the
account remains overdrawn.
In response to the increased
availability and customer use of these
overdraft protection services, the FDIC,
Board, OCC, OTS, and NCUA published
guidance on overdraft protection
programs in February 2005.5 The Joint
Guidance addresses three primary
areas—safety and soundness
4 See, e.g., The Credit Card Reform Act of 2008,
S. 2753, 110th Cong. (Mar. 12, 2008); The Credit
Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5244,
110th Cong. (Feb. 7, 2008); The Stop Unfair
Practices in Credit Cards Act of 2007, H.R. 5280,
110th Cong. (Feb. 7, 2008); The Stop Unfair
Practices in Credit Cards Act of 2007, S. 1395, 110th
Cong. (May 15, 2007); The Universal Default
Prohibition Act of 2007, H.R. 2146, 110th Cong.
(May 3, 2007); The Credit Card Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2007, H.R.
1461, 110th Cong. (Mar. 9, 2007).
5 See Interagency Guidance on Overdraft
Protection Programs (Joint Guidance), 70 FR 9127
(Feb. 24, 2005) and OTS Guidance on Overdraft
Protection Programs, 70 FR 8428 (Feb. 18, 2005).
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considerations, legal risks, and best
practices—while the OTS guidance
focuses on safety and soundness
considerations and best practices. The
best practices focus on the marketing
and communications that accompany
the offering of overdraft services, as well
as the disclosure and operation of
program features, including the
provision of a consumer election or optout of the overdraft service. The
Agencies have also published a
consumer brochure on overdraft
services.6
In May 2005, the Board separately
issued revisions to Regulation DD and
the staff commentary pursuant to its
authority under the Truth in Savings
Act (TISA) to address concerns about
the uniformity and adequacy of
institutions’ disclosure of overdraft fees
generally, and to address concerns about
advertised overdraft services in
particular.7 The goal of the final rule
was to improve the uniformity and
adequacy of disclosures provided to
consumers about overdraft and
returned-item fees to assist consumers
in better understanding the costs
associated with the payment of
overdrafts. In addition, the final rule
addressed some of the Board’s concerns
about institutions’ marketing practices
with respect to overdraft services.
In addition to regulatory actions, there
has also been significant Congressional
interest in overdraft services, with
legislation introduced seeking to curb
some of the perceived abusive practices
associated with these services. In June
2007, a hearing was held to discuss the
proposed legislation with testimony
from consumer advocates and industry
representatives.8
II. Statutory Authority Under the
Federal Trade Commission Act To
Address Unfair or Deceptive Acts or
Practices
A. Rulemaking and Enforcement
Authority Under the FTC Act
Section 18(f)(1) of the FTC Act
provides that the Board (with respect to
banks), OTS (with respect to savings
associations), and the NCUA (with
respect to federal credit unions) are
6 The brochure, entitled ‘‘Protecting Yourself from
Overdraft and Bounced-Check Fees,’’ can be found
at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bounce/
default.htm.
7 70 FR 29582 (May 24, 2005). A substantively
similar rule applying to credit unions was issued
separately by the NCUA. 71 FR 24568 (Apr. 26,
2006). The NCUA issued an interim final rule in
2005. 70 FR 72895 (Dec. 8, 2005).
8 H.R. 946, ‘‘The Consumer Overdraft Protection
Fair Practices Act.’’ See also Overdraft Protection:
Fair Practices for Consumers: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit, 110th Cong. (2007).
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responsible for prescribing ‘‘regulations
defining with specificity * * * unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, and
containing requirements prescribed for
the purpose of preventing such acts or
practices.’’ 15 U.S.C. 57a(f)(1).9
The FTC Act allocates responsibility
for enforcing compliance with
regulations prescribed under section 18
with respect to banks, savings
associations, and federal credit unions
among the Board, OTS, and NCUA, as
well as the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
See 15 U.S.C. 57a(f)(2)–(4). The FTC Act
grants the FTC rulemaking and
enforcement authority with respect to
other persons and entities, subject to
certain exceptions and limitations. See
15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. 57a(a). The
FTC Act, however, sets forth specific
rulemaking procedures for the FTC that
do not apply to the Agencies. See 15
U.S.C. 57a(b)–(e), (g)–(j); 15 U.S.C. 57a–
3.
B. Standards for Unfairness Under the
FTC Act
Congress has codified standards
developed by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) for the FTC to use in
determining whether acts or practices
are unfair under section 5(a) of the FTC
Act.10 Specifically, the FTC Act
provides that the FTC has no authority
to declare an act or practice is unfair
unless: (1) It causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers; (2) the
injury is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves; and (3) the
injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or
to competition. In addition, the FTC
may consider established public policy,
but public policy may not serve as the
primary basis for its determination that
an act or practice is unfair. See 15
U.S.C. 45(n).
9 The FTC Act refers to OTS’s predecessor agency,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), rather
than to OTS. However, in section 3(e) of HOLA,
Congress transferred this rulemaking power of the
FHLBB, among others, to the Director of OTS. 12
U.S.C. 1462a(e). The FTC Act refers to ‘‘savings and
loan institutions’’ in some provisions and ‘‘savings
associations’’ in other provisions. Although
‘‘savings associations’’ is the term currently used in
the HOLA, see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1462(4), the terms
‘‘savings and loan institutions’’ and ‘‘savings
associations’’ can be and are used interchangeably.
OTS has determined that the outdated language
does not affect OTS’s rulemaking authority under
the FTC Act.
10 See 15 U.S.C. 45(n); FTC Policy Statement on
Unfairness, Letter from the FTC to the Hon.
Wendell H. Ford and the Hon. John C. Danforth, S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp. (Dec. 17,
1980) (FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness)
(available at https://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/adunfair.htm).
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In proposing rules under section
18(f)(1) of the FTC Act, the Agencies
have applied the statutory elements
consistent with the standards
articulated by the FTC. The Board,
FDIC, and OCC have issued guidance
generally adopting these standards for
purposes of enforcing the FTC Act’s
prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts
or practices.11 Although the OTS has
not taken similar action in generally
applicable guidance,12 the commenters
on OTS’s ANPR who addressed this
issue overwhelmingly urged OTS to be
consistent with the FTC’s standards for
unfairness.
According to the FTC, an unfair act or
practice will almost always represent a
market failure or imperfection that
prevents the forces of supply and
demand from maximizing benefits and
minimizing costs.13 Not all market
failures or imperfections constitute
unfair acts or practices, however.
Instead, the central focus of the FTC’s
unfairness analysis is whether the act or
practice causes substantial consumer
injury.14
First, the FTC has stated that a
substantial consumer injury generally
consists of monetary, economic, or other
tangible harm.15 Trivial or speculative
harms do not constitute substantial
consumer injury.16 Consumer injury
may be substantial, however, if it
imposes a small harm on a large number
of consumers or if it raises a significant
risk of concrete harm.17
Second, the FTC has stated that an
injury is not reasonably avoidable when
consumers are prevented from
effectively making their own decisions
about whether to incur that injury.18
The marketplace is normally expected
11 See Board and FDIC, Unfair or Deceptive Acts
or Practices by State-Chartered Banks (Mar. 11,
2004) (available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/press/bcreg/2004/20040311/
attachment.pdf ); OCC Advisory Letter 2002–3,
Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices
(Mar. 22, 2002) (available at https://
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2002–3.doc).
12 See OTS ANPR, 72 FR at 43573.
13 Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory
Analysis for Federal Trade Commission Credit
Practices Rule (Statement for FTC Credit Practices
Rule), 49 FR 7740, 7744 (Mar. 1, 1984).
14 Id. at 7743.
15 See id.; FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness at
3.
16 See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rule, 49
FR at 7743 (‘‘[E]xcept in aggravated cases where
tangible injury can be clearly demonstrated,
subjective types of harm—embarrassment,
emotional distress, etc.—will not be enough to
warrant a finding of unfairness.’’); FTC Unfairness
Policy Statement at 3 (‘‘Emotional impact and other
more subjective types of harm * * * will not
ordinarily make a practice unfair.’’).
17 See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rules,
49 FR at 7743; FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness
at 3 & n.12.
18 See FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness at 3.
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to be self-correcting because consumers
are relied upon to survey the available
alternatives, choose those that are most
desirable, and avoid those that are
inadequate or unsatisfactory.19
Accordingly, the test is not whether the
consumer could have made a wiser
decision but whether an act or practice
unreasonably creates or takes advantage
of an obstacle to the consumer’s ability
to make that decision freely.20
Third, the FTC has stated that the act
or practice causing the injury must not
also produce benefits to consumers or
competition that outweigh the injury.21
Generally, it is important to consider
both the costs of imposing a remedy and
any benefits that consumers enjoy as a
result of the practice.22 The FTC has
stated that both consumers and
competition benefit from prohibitions
on unfair or deceptive acts or practices
because prices may better reflect actual
transaction costs and merchants who do
not rely on unfair or deceptive acts or
practices are no longer required to
compete with those who do.23
C. Standards for Deception Under the
FTC Act
The FTC has also adopted standards
for determining whether an act or
19 See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rule, 49
FR at 7744 (‘‘Normally, we can rely on consumer
choice to govern the market.’’); FTC Policy
Statement on Unfairness at 3.
20 See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rule, 49
FR at 7744 (‘‘In considering whether an act or
practice is unfair, we look to whether free market
decisions are unjustifiably hindered.’’); FTC Policy
Statement on Unfairness at 3 & n.19 (‘‘In some
senses any injury can be avoided—for example, by
hiring independent experts to test all products in
advance, or by private legal actions for damages—
but these courses may be too expensive to be
practicable for individual consumers to pursue.’’).
21 See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rule, 49
FR at 7744; FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness at
3; see also S. Rep. 103–130, at 13 (1994), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1776, 1788 (‘‘In determining
whether a substantial consumer injury is
outweighed by the countervailing benefits of a
practice, the Committee does not intend that the
FTC quantify the detrimental and beneficial effects
of the practice in every case. In many instances,
such a numerical benefit-cost analysis would be
unnecessary; in other cases, it may be impossible.
This section would require, however, that the FTC
carefully evaluate the benefits and costs of each
exercise of its unfairness authority, gathering and
considering reasonably available evidence.’’).
22 See FTC Public Comment on OTS–2007–0015,
at 6 (Dec. 12, 2007) (available at
https://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/9/963034.pdf ).
23 See FTC Public Comment on OTS–2007–0015,
at 8 (citing Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and
Defenses, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 FR
53506, 53523 (Nov. 18, 1975) (codified at 16 CFR
433)); see also FTC Policy Statement on Deception,
Letter from the FTC to the Hon. John H. Dingell, H.
Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983) (FTC
Policy Statement on Deception) (available at https://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm)
(‘‘Deceptive practices injure both competitors and
consumers because consumers who preferred the
competitor’s product are wrongly diverted.’’).
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practice is deceptive under the FTC
Act.24 Under the FTC’s standards, an act
or practice is deceptive where: (1) There
is a representation or omission of
information that is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the
circumstances; and (2) that information
is material to consumers.25 Although
these standards have not been codified,
they have been applied by numerous
courts.26 Accordingly, in proposing
rules under section 18(f)(1) of the FTC
Act, the Agencies have applied the
standards articulated by the FTC for
determining whether an act or practice
is deceptive.27
A representation or omission is
deceptive if the overall net impression
created is likely to mislead consumers.28
The FTC conducts its own analysis to
determine whether a representation or
omission is likely to mislead consumers
acting reasonably under the
circumstances.29 When evaluating the
reasonableness of an interpretation, the
FTC considers the sophistication and
understanding of consumers in the
group to whom the act or practice is
targeted.30 If a representation is
susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, and if one such
interpretation is misleading, then the
representation is deceptive even if
other, non-deceptive interpretations are
possible.31
A representation or omission is
material if it is likely to affect the
consumer’s conduct or decision
regarding a product or service.32 Certain
types of claims are presumed to be
material, including express claims and
24 FTC
Policy Statement on Deception.
at 1–2. The FTC views deception as a subset
of unfairness but does not apply the full unfairness
analysis because deception is very unlikely to
benefit consumers or competition and consumers
cannot reasonably avoid being harmed by
deception. Id.
26 See, e.g., FTC v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1277
(11th Cir. 2003); FTC v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 950 (9th
Cir. 2001); FTC v. QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908,
957 (N.D. Ill. 2006); FTC v. Think Achievement, 144
F. Supp. 2d 993, 1009 (N.D. Ind. 2000); FTC v.
Minuteman Press, 53 F. Supp. 2d 248, 258 (E.D.N.Y.
1998).
27 As noted above, the Board, FDIC, and OCC
have issued guidance generally adopting these
standards for purposes of enforcing the FTC Act’s
prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
As with the unfairness standard, comments on
OTS’s ANPR addressing this issue overwhelmingly
urged the OTS to adopt the same deception
standard as the FTC.
28 See, e.g., FTC v. Cyberspace.com, 453 F.3d
1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006); Gill, 265 F.3d at 956;
Removatron Int’l Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d 1489, 1497
(1st Cir. 1989).
29 See FTC v. Kraft, Inc., 970 F.2d 311, 319 (7th
Cir. 1992); QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d at 958.
30 FTC Policy Statement on Deception at 3.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 2, 6–7.
25 Id.
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claims regarding the cost of a product or
service.33
D. Choice of Remedy
The Agencies have wide latitude to
determine what remedy is necessary to
prevent an unfair or deceptive act or
practice so long as that remedy has a
reasonable relation to the act or
practice.34 Thus, the Agencies are not
required to adopt the most restrictive
means of preventing the act or practice,
nor are they required to adopt the least
restrictive means.
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III. Summary of Proposed Revisions
In order to best ensure that all entities
that offer the products addressed in the
proposed rule are treated in a like
manner, the Board, OTS, and NCUA
have joined together to issue today’s
proposal. This interagency approach is
consistent with section 303 of the Riegle
Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994.
See 12 U.S.C. 4803. Section 303(a)(3), 12
U.S.C. 4803(a)(3), directs the federal
banking agencies to work jointly to
make uniform all regulations and
guidelines implementing common
statutory or supervisory policies. In
today’s proposal, two federal banking
agencies—the Board and OTS—are
primarily implementing the same
statutory provision, section 18(f) of the
FTC Act, as is the NCUA. Accordingly,
the Agencies have endeavored to
propose rules that are as uniform as
possible. The Agencies also consulted
with the two other federal banking
agencies, OCC and FDIC, as well as with
the FTC.
The effort to achieve an even playing
field is also furthered by the Agencies’
focus on unfair and deceptive acts or
practices involving credit cards and
overdraft services, which are generally
provided only by depository institutions
such as banks, savings associations, and
credit unions. The Agencies recognize
that state-chartered credit unions and
any entities providing consumer credit
card accounts independent of a
depository institution fall within the
FTC’s jurisdiction and therefore would
not be subject to these rules. The
Agencies believe, however, that FTCregulated entities represent a small
percentage of the market for consumer
credit card accounts and overdraft
services. For OTS, addressing certain
33 See FTC Public Comment on OTS–2007–0015,
at 21; FTC Policy Statement on Deception at 6; see
also FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095–
96 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Peacock Buick, 86 F.T.C.
1532, 1562 (1975), aff’d 553 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1977).
34 See Am. Fin. Servs. Assoc. v. FTC, 767 F.2d
957, 988–89 (DC Cir. 1985) (citing Jacob Siegel Co.
v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612–13 (1946)).
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deceptive credit card practices in
today’s proposal, rather than through an
interpretation or expansion of its
Advertising Rule, also fosters
consistency because the other Agencies
do not have comparable advertising
regulations.
Credit Practices Rule
The Agencies are proposing to make
non-substantive, organizational changes
to the Credit Practices Rule.
Specifically, in order to avoid
repetition, the Agencies would move the
statement of authority, purpose, and
scope out of the Credit Practices Rule
and revise it to apply not only to the
Credit Practices Rule but also to the
proposed rules regarding consumer
credit card accounts and overdraft
services. OTS and NCUA have made
additional, non-substantive changes to
the organization of their versions of the
Credit Practices Rule.
Consumer Credit Card Accounts
The Agencies are proposing seven
provisions under the FTC Act regarding
consumer credit card accounts. These
provisions are intended to ensure that
consumers have the ability to make
informed decisions about the use of
credit card accounts without being
subjected to unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.
First, institutions would be prohibited
from treating a payment as late for any
purpose unless consumers have been
provided a reasonable amount of time to
make that payment. The proposed rule
would create a safe harbor for
institutions that adopt reasonable
procedures designed to ensure that
periodic statements (which provide
payment information) are mailed or
delivered at least 21 days before the
payment due date. Elsewhere in today’s
Federal Register, the Board has made
two additional proposals under
Regulation Z that would further ensure
that consumers receive a reasonable
amount of time to make payment.
Specifically, the Board is proposing to
revise 12 CFR 226.10(b) to prohibit
creditors from setting a cut-off time for
mailed payments that is earlier than 5
p.m. at the location specified by the
creditor for receipt of such payments.
The Board is also proposing to add 12
CFR 226.10(d), which would require
that, if the due date for payment is a day
on which the U.S. Postal Service does
not deliver mail or the creditor does not
accept payment by mail, the creditor
may not treat a payment received by
mail the next business day as late for
any purpose.
Second, when different annual
percentage rates apply to different
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balances, institutions would be required
to allocate amounts paid in excess of the
minimum payment using one of three
specified methods or a method that is
no less beneficial to consumers. The
specified methods are applying the
entire amount first to the balance with
the highest annual percentage rate,
splitting the amount equally among the
balances, or splitting the amount pro
rata among the balances. Furthermore,
when an account has a discounted
promotional rate balance or a balance on
which interest is deferred, institutions
would be required to give consumers
the full benefit of that discounted rate
or deferred interest plan by allocating
amounts in excess of the minimum
payment first to balances on which the
rate is not discounted or interest is not
deferred (except, in the case of a
deferred interest plan, for the last two
billing cycles during which interest is
deferred). Institutions would also be
prohibited from denying consumers a
grace period on purchases (if one is
offered) solely because they have not
paid off a balance at a promotional rate
or a balance on which interest is
deferred.
Third, institutions would be
prohibited from increasing the annual
percentage rate on an outstanding
balance. This prohibition would not
apply, however, where a variable rate
increases due to the operation of an
index, where a promotional rate has
expired or is lost (provided the rate is
not increased to a penalty rate), or
where the minimum payment has not
been received within 30 days after the
due date.
Fourth, institutions would be
prohibited from assessing a fee if a
consumer exceeds the credit limit on an
account solely due to a hold placed on
the available credit. If, however, the
actual amount of the transaction would
have exceeded the credit limit, then a
fee may be assessed.
Fifth, institutions would be
prohibited from imposing finance
charges on balances based on balances
for days in billing cycles that precede
the most recent billing cycle. The
proposed rule would prohibit
institutions from reaching back to
earlier billing cycles when calculating
the amount of interest charged in the
current cycle, a practice that is
sometimes referred to as two-or doublecycle billing.
Sixth, institutions would be
prohibited from financing security
deposits or fees for the issuance or
availability of credit (such as accountopening fees or membership fees) if
those deposits or fees utilize the
majority of the available credit on the
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account. The proposal would also
require security deposits and fees
exceeding 25 percent of the credit limit
to be spread over the first year, rather
than charged as a lump sum during the
first billing cycle. In addition, elsewhere
in today’s Federal Register, the Board is
proposing to revise Regulation Z to
provide that a creditor that collects or
obtains a consumer’s agreement to pay
a fee before providing account-opening
disclosures must permit that consumer
to reject the plan after receiving the
disclosures and, if the consumer does
so, must refund any fee collected or take
any other action necessary to ensure the
consumer is not obligated to pay the fee.
Seventh, institutions making firm
offers of credit advertising multiple
annual percentage rates or credit limits
would be required to disclose in the
solicitation the factors that determine
whether a consumer will qualify for the
lowest annual percentage rate and
highest credit limit advertised.
Overdraft Services
The Agencies are proposing two
provisions prohibiting unfair acts or
practices related to overdraft services in
connection with consumer deposit
accounts. The proposed provisions are
intended to ensure that consumers
understand overdraft services and have
the choice to avoid the associated costs
where such services do not meet their
needs.
The first would provide that it is an
unfair act or practice for an institution
to assess a fee or charge on a consumer’s
account for paying an overdraft unless
the institution provides the consumer
with the right to opt out of the
institution’s payment of overdrafts and
a reasonable opportunity to exercise the
opt out, and the consumer does not opt
out. The proposed opt-out right would
apply to all transactions that overdraw
an account regardless of whether the
transaction is, for example, a check, an
ACH transaction, an ATM withdrawal, a
recurring payment, or a debit card
purchase at a point of sale.
The second proposal would prohibit
certain acts or practices associated with
assessing overdraft fees in connection
with debit holds. Specifically, the
proposal would prohibit an institution
from assessing an overdraft fee if the
overdraft is caused solely by a hold
placed on funds that exceeds the actual
purchase amount of the transaction,
unless this purchase amount would
have caused the overdraft.
Elsewhere in today’s Federal Register,
the Board is also proposing to address
potentially misleading balance
disclosures by generally requiring
depository institutions to provide only
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balances that reflect the consumer’s own
funds (without funds added by the
institution to cover overdrafts) in
response to consumer inquiries received
through an automated system such as a
telephone response system, ATM, or an
institution’s Web site.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the
Credit Practices Subpart
On March 1, 1984, the FTC adopted
its Credit Practices Rule pursuant to its
authority under the FTC Act to
promulgate rules that define and
prevent unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.35
The FTC Act provides that, whenever
the FTC promulgates a rule prohibiting
specific unfair or deceptive practices,
the Board, OTS (as the successor to the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board), and
NCUA must adopt substantially similar
regulations imposing substantially
similar requirements with respect to
banks, savings and loan institutions,
and federal credit unions within 60 days
of the effective date of the FTC’s rule
unless the agency finds that such acts or
practices by banks, savings associations,
or federal credit unions are not unfair or
deceptive or the Board finds that the
adoption of similar regulations for
banks, savings associations, or federal
credit unions would seriously conflict
with essential monetary and paymentsystems policies of the Board. The
Agencies have adopted rules
substantially similar to the FTC’s Credit
Practices Rule.36
As part of this rulemaking, the
Agencies are proposing to reorganize
aspects of their respective Credit
Practices Rules. Although the Agencies
have approached these revisions
differently in some respects, the
Agencies do not intend to create any
substantive difference among their
respective rules.
Proposal
Subpart A—General Provisions
Subpart A contains general provisions
that apply to the entire part. As
discussed below, there are some
differences among the Agencies’
proposals.
ll.1 Authority, Purpose, and Scope 37
The provisions in proposed § ll.1
are largely drawn from the current
35 See 42 FR 7740 (Mar. 1, 1984) (codified at 16
CFR part 444); see also 15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B),
45(a)(1).
36 See 12 CFR part 227, subpart B (Board); 12 CFR
535 (OTS); 12 CFR 706 (NCUA).
37 The Board, OTS, and NCUA would place the
proposed rules in, respectively, parts 227, 535, and
706 of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
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authority, purpose, and scope
provisions in the Agencies’ respective
Credit Practices Rules.
ll.1(a) Authority
Proposed § ll.1(a) provides that the
Agencies have issued this part under
section 18(f) of the FTC Act. In OTS’s
proposed rule, this provision further
provides that OTS is also exercising its
authority under various provisions of
HOLA, although the FTC Act is the
primary authority for OTS’s rule.
ll.1(b) Purpose
Proposed § ll.1(b) provides that the
purpose of the part is to prohibit unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in
violation of section 5(a)(1) of the FTC
Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). It further
provides that the part contains
provisions that define and set forth
requirements prescribed for the purpose
of preventing specific unfair or
deceptive acts or practices. The
Agencies note that these provisions
define and prohibit specific unfair or
deceptive acts or practices within a
single provision, rather than setting
forth the definitions and remedies
separately. Finally, it clarifies that the
prohibitions in subparts B, C, and D do
not limit the Agencies’ authority to
enforce the FTC Act with respect to
other unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.
ll.1(c) Scope
Proposed § ll.1(c) describes the
scope of each agency’s rules. The
Agencies have each tailored this
paragraph to describe those entities to
which their part applies. The Board’s
provision states that its rules would
apply to banks and their subsidiaries,
except savings associations as defined
in 12 U.S.C. 1813(b). The Board’s
provision further explains that
enforcement of its rules is allocated
among the Board, OCC, and FDIC,
depending on the type of institution.
This provision has been updated to
reflect intervening changes in law. The
Board’s Staff Guidelines to the Credit
Practices Rule would be revised to
remove questions 11(c)–1 and 11(c)–2
and the substance of the Board’s
answers would be updated and
published as commentary under
proposed § 227.1(c). See proposed Board
comments 227.1(c)–1 and –2. The
remaining questions and answers in the
For each of reference, the discussion in this
Supplementary Information uses the shared
numerical suffix of each agency’s rule. For example,
proposed § ll.1 would be codified at 12 CFR
227.1 by the Board, 12 CFR 535.1 by OTS, and 12
CFR 706.1 by NCUA.
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Board’s Staff Guidelines would remain
in place.
OTS’s provision would state that its
rules apply to savings associations and
subsidiaries owned in whole or in part
by a savings association. OTS also
enforces compliance with respect to
these institutions. The entire OTS part
would have the same scope. OTS notes
that this scope is somewhat different
from the scope of its existing Credit
Practices Rule. OTS’s Credit Practices
Rule currently applies to savings
associations and service corporations
that are wholly owned by one or more
savings associations, which engage in
the business of providing credit to
consumers. Since the proposed rules
would cover more practices than
consumer credit, the reference to
engaging in the business of providing
credit to consumers would be deleted.
The reference to wholly owned service
corporations would be updated to refer
instead to subsidiaries, to reflect the
current terminology used in OTS’s
Subordinate Organizations Rule.38
The NCUA’s provision would state
that its rules apply to federal credit
unions.
227.1(d) Definitions
Proposed § ll.1(d) of the Board’s
rule would clarify that, unless otherwise
noted, the terms used in the Board’s
proposed § ll.1(c) that are not defined
in the FTC Act or in section 3(s) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. 1813(s)) have the meaning given
to them in section 1(b) of the
International Banking Act of 1978 (12
U.S.C. 3101). OTS and NCUA do not
have a need for a comparable subsection
so none is included in their proposed
rules.
227.2 Consumer-Complaint Procedure
In order to accommodate the revisions
discussed above, the Board would
consolidate the consumer complaint
provisions currently located in 12 CFR
227.1 and 227.2 in proposed § 227.2.
OTS and NCUA do not currently have
and do not propose to add comparable
provisions.
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Subpart B—Credit Practices
Each agency would place the
substantive provisions of their current
Credit Practices Rule in Subpart B. In
order to retain the current numbering in
its Credit Practices Rule, the Board
would reserve 12 CFR 227.11, which
currently contains the Board’s statement
38 12 CFR part 559. OTS has substantially revised
this rule since promulgating its Credit Practices
Rule. See, e.g., Subsidiaries and Equity Investments:
Final Rule, 61 FR 66561 (Dec. 18, 1996).
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of authority, purpose, and scope. The
other provisions of the Board’s Credit
Practices Rule (§§ 227.12 through
227.16) would not be revised.
OTS is proposing the following
notable changes to its version of Subpart
B:
Section 535.15 State Exemptions
(Existing Section 535.5)
Section 535.11
Section 535.1)
Request for Comment
Definitions (Existing
OTS would delete the definitions of
‘‘Act,’’ ‘‘creditor,’’ and ‘‘savings
association’’ as unnecessary. For the
convenience of the user, OTS would
incorporate the definition of ‘‘consumer
credit’’ into this section, instead of
using a cross-reference to a definition
contained in a different part of OTS’s
rules. OTS would move the definition of
‘‘cosigner’’ to the section on unfair or
deceptive cosigner practices. OTS
would merge the definition of ‘‘debt’’
into the definition of ‘‘collecting a debt’’
contained in the section on late charges.
OTS would move the definition of
‘‘household goods’’ to the section on
unfair credit contract provisions.
Section 535.12 Unfair Credit Contract
Provisions (Existing Section 535.2)
OTS would revise the title of this
section to reflect its focus on credit
contract provisions. OTS would delete
the obsolete reference to extensions of
credit after January 1, 1986.
Section 535.13 Unfair or Deceptive
Cosigner Practices (Existing Section
535.3)
OTS would delete the obsolete
reference to extensions of credit after
January 1, 1986. OTS would substitute
the term ‘‘substantially similar’’ for the
term ‘‘substantially equivalent’’ in
referencing a document that equates to
the cosigner notice for consistency with
the Board’s rule and to avoid confusion
with the term of art ‘‘substantial
equivalency’’ used in the section on
state exemptions. OTS would also
clarify that the date that may be stated
on the cosigner notice is the date of the
transaction. NCUA would make similar
amendments to its rule in § 706.13
(existing § 706.3).
Section 535.14 Unfair Late Charges
(Existing Section 535.4)
OTS would revise the title of this
section to reflect its focus on unfair late
charges. OTS would delete the obsolete
reference to extensions of credit after
January 1, 1986. Similarly, NCUA
would propose revisions to § 706.14
(existing § 706.4).
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OTS would revise the subsection on
delegated authority to update the
current title of the OTS official with
delegated authority to make
determinations under this section.
The FTC’s Credit Practices Rule
included a provision allowing states to
seek exemptions from the rule if state
law affords a greater or substantially
similar level of protection. See 16 CFR
444.5. The Agencies adopted similar
provisions in their respective Credit
Practices Rules. See 12 CFR 227.16; 12
CFR 535.5; 12 CFR 706.5. In the absence
of any legal requirement, however, the
Agencies do not propose to extend this
provision to the proposed rules for
consumer credit card accounts and
overdraft services.39 The Agencies note
that only three states have been granted
exemptions under the Credit Practices
Rule.40 Because the exemption is
available when state law is
‘‘substantially equivalent’’ to the federal
rule, an exemption may provide little
relief from regulatory burden while
undermining the uniform application of
federal standards. Accordingly, the
Agencies request comment on whether
states should be permitted to seek
exemption from the proposed rules on
consumer credit card accounts and
overdraft services if state law affords
greater or substantially similar level of
protection.
In addition, OTS also requests
comment on whether the state
exemption provision in its Credit
Practices Rule should be retained.
V. Section-by-Section Analysis of the
Consumer Credit Card Practices
Subpart
Pursuant to their authority under 15
U.S.C. 57a(f)(1), the Agencies are
proposing to adopt rules prohibiting
specific unfair acts or practices with
respect to consumer credit card
accounts. The Agencies would locate
these rules in a new Subpart C to their
39 The provision of the FTC Act addressing
exemptions applies only to the FTC. See 12 U.S.C.
57a(g).
40 The Board and the FTC have granted
exemptions to Wisconsin, New York, and
California. 51 FR 24304 (July 3, 1986) (FTC
exemption for Wisconsin); 51 FR 28238 (Aug. 7,
1986) (FTC exemption for New York); 51 FR 41763
(Nov. 19, 1986) (Board exemption for Wisconsin);
52 FR 2398 (Jan. 22, 1987) (Board exemption for
New York); 53 FR 19893 (June 1, 1988) (FTC
exemption for California); 53 FR 29233 (Aug. 3,
1988) (Board exemption for California). OTS has
granted an exemption to Wisconsin. 51 FR 45879
(Dec. 23, 1986). The NCUA has not granted any
exemptions.
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respective regulations under the FTC
Act. These proposals should not be
construed as a definitive conclusion by
the Agencies that a particular act or
practice is unfair or deceptive.
Section ll.21—Definitions
Proposed § ll.21 would define
certain terms used in new Subpart C.
ll.21(a) Annual Percentage Rate
Proposed § ll.21(a) defines ‘‘annual
percentage rate’’ as the product of
multiplying each periodic rate for a
balance or transaction on a consumer
credit card account by the number of
periods in a year. This definition
corresponds to the definition of ‘‘annual
percentage rate’’ in 12 CFR 226.14(b). As
discussed in the Board’s official staff
commentary to § 226.14(b), this
computation does not reflect any
particular finance charge or periodic
balance. See comment 14(b)–1. This
definition also incorporates the
definition of ‘‘periodic rate’’ from
Regulation Z. See 12 CFR 226.2.
ll.21(b) Consumer
Proposed § ll.21(b) defines
‘‘consumer’’ as a natural person to
whom credit is extended under a
consumer credit card account or a
natural person who is a co-obligor or
guarantor of a consumer credit card
account.
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ll.21(c) Consumer Credit Card
Account
Proposed § ll.21(c) defines
‘‘consumer credit card account’’ as an
account provided to a consumer
primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes under an open-end
credit plan that is accessed by a credit
or charge card. This definition
incorporates the definitions of ‘‘openend credit,’’ ‘‘credit card,’’ and ‘‘charge
card’’ from Regulation Z. See 12 CFR
226.2. Under this definition, a number
of accounts would be excluded
consistent with exceptions to disclosure
requirements for credit and charge card
applications and solicitations. See
proposed 12 CFR 226.5a(a)(5), 72 FR at
33045–46. For example, home-equity
plans accessible by a credit card and
lines of credit accessible by a debit card
are not covered by proposed
§ ll.21(c).
ll.21(d) Promotional Rate
Proposed § ll.21(d) is similar to the
definition of ‘‘promotional rate’’
proposed by the Board in 12 CFR
226.16(e)(2) elsewhere in today’s
Federal Register. The first type of
‘‘promotional rate’’ covered by this
definition is any annual percentage rate
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applicable to one or more balances or
transactions on a consumer credit card
account for a specified period of time
that is lower than the annual percentage
rate that will be in effect at the end of
that period. Proposed comment
21(d)(1)–1 clarifies that, for purposes of
determining whether a rate is a
‘‘promotional rate’’ when the rate that
will apply at the end of the specified
period is a variable rate, the rate offered
by the institution is compared to the
variable rate that would have been
disclosed at the time of the offer if the
promotional rate had not been offered
by the institution, subject to applicable
accuracy requirements. See, e.g., 12 CFR
226.5a(b)(1)(iii); proposed 12 CFR
226.5a(c)(2)(ii), 72 FR at 33047.
The second type of ‘‘promotional
rate’’ encompassed by the definition is
any annual percentage rate applicable to
one or more transactions on a consumer
credit card account that is lower than
the annual percentage rate that applies
to other transactions of the same type.
This definition is meant to capture ‘‘life
of balance’’ offers where a special rate
is offered on a particular balance for as
long as that balance exists. Proposed
comment 21(d)(2)–1 provides an
example of a rate that meets this
definition.
Section ll.22—Unfair Acts or
Practices Regarding Time To Make
Payment
The Agencies are proposing to
prohibit institutions from treating
payments on a consumer credit card
account as late for any purpose unless
the institution has provided a
reasonable amount of time for
consumers to make payment. Currently,
section 163(a) of TILA requires creditors
to send periodic statements at least 14
days before expiration of any period
during which consumers can avoid
finance charges on purchases by paying
the balance in full (i.e., the ‘‘grace
period’’). 15 U.S.C. 1666b(a). Federal
law does not, however, mandate a grace
period, and grace periods generally do
not apply when consumers carry a
balance from month to month.
Regulation Z requires that creditors mail
or deliver periodic statements 14 days
before the date by which payment is due
for purposes of avoiding additional
finance charges or other charges, such as
late fees. See 12 CFR 226.5(b)(2)(ii);
comment 5(b)(2)(ii)–1.
In its June 2007 Proposal, the Board
noted anecdotal evidence of consumers
receiving statements relatively close to
the payment due date, with little time
remaining to mail their payments in
order to avoid having those payments
treated as late. The Board observed that
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it may take several days for a consumer
to receive a statement after the close of
a billing cycle. The Board also observed
that consumers who pay by mail may
need to mail their payments several
days before the due date to ensure that
the payment is received on or before
that date. Accordingly, the Board
requested comment on whether it
should recommend to Congress that the
14-day requirement in section 163(a) of
TILA be increased. See 72 FR at 32973.
The Board received comments from
individual consumers, consumer
groups, and a member of Congress
indicating that consumers were not
being provided with a reasonable
amount of time to pay their credit card
bills. Comments indicated that, because
of the time required for periodic
statements to reach consumers by mail
and for consumers’ payments to reach
creditors by mail, consumers had little
time in between to review their
statements for accuracy before making
payment. This situation can be
exacerbated if the consumer is traveling
or otherwise unable to give the
statement immediate attention when it
is delivered or if the consumer needs to
compare the statement to receipts or
other records. In addition, some
comments indicated that consumers are
unable to accurately predict when their
payment will be received by a creditor
due to uncertainties in how quickly
mail is delivered. Some comments
argued that, because of these
difficulties, consumers’ payments were
received after the due date, leading to
finance charges as a result of loss of the
grace period, late fees, rate increases,
and other adverse consequences.
Comments from industry, however,
generally stated that consumers
currently receive ample time to make
payments, particularly in light of the
increasing number of consumers who
receive periodic statements
electronically and make payments
electronically or by telephone. These
comments also stated that providing
additional time for consumers to make
payments would be operationally
difficult and would reduce interest
revenue, which would have to be
recovered by raising the cost of credit
elsewhere.
The Agencies understand that,
although increasing numbers of
consumers are receiving periodic
statements and making payments
electronically, a significant number still
utilize mail. In addition, the Agencies
recognize that, while first class mail is
often delivered within three business
days, in some cases it can take
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significantly longer.41 Indeed, some
large credit card issuers recommend that
consumers allow up to seven days for
their payments to be received by the
issuer via mail. Accordingly, in some
cases, a statement sent 14 days before
the payment due date may not provide
consumers with a reasonable amount of
time to pay in order to avoid interest
charges, late fees, or other adverse
consequences.
The Agencies recognize that, in
enacting § 163(a) of TILA, Congress set
the minimum amount of time between
sending the periodic statement and
expiration of any grace period offered by
the creditor at 14 days. At the time of
its June 2007 Proposal, the Board
believed that consumers might benefit
from receiving additional time to make
payment. The Board understands that
most creditors currently offer grace
periods and that they use a single due
date, which is both the expiration of the
grace period and the date after which a
payment will be considered late for
other purposes (such as the assessment
of late fees). For that reason, the Board
sought comment on whether it should
request that Congress increase the 14day minimum mailing requirement with
respect to grace periods. Based on the
comments and other information
discussed herein, however, the Agencies
are concerned that a separate rule may
be needed that specifically addresses
harms other than loss of the grace
period when institutions do not provide
a reasonable amount of time for
consumers to make payment. This harm
includes late fees and rate increases as
a penalty for late payment. The
Agencies’ proposal does not affect the
requirements of TILA § 163(a).
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with PROPOSALS3
Legal Analysis
Treating a payment on a consumer
credit card account as late for any
purpose (other than expiration of a grace
period) unless the consumer has been
provided a reasonable amount of time to
make that payment appears to be an
unfair act or practice under 15 U.S.C.
45(n) and the standards articulated by
the FTC.
Substantial consumer injury. An
institution’s failure to provide
consumers a reasonable amount of time
to make payment appears to cause
substantial monetary and other injury.
When a payment is received after the
due date, institutions may impose late
fees, increase the annual percentage rate
on the account as a penalty, or report
41 See, e.g., Testimony of Jody Berenblatt, Senior
Vice President—Postal Strategy, Bank of America,
before the S. Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt., Gov’t
Info., Fed. Srvs., and Int’l Security (Aug. 2, 2007).
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the consumer as delinquent to a credit
reporting agency.
Injury is not reasonably avoidable. It
appears that consumers cannot
reasonably avoid this injury unless they
have been provided a reasonable
amount of time to pay. Although what
constitutes a reasonable amount of time
may vary based on the circumstances, it
may be unreasonable to expect
consumers to make payment if they are
not given a reasonable amount of time
to do so after receiving a periodic
statement. TILA and Regulation Z
provide consumers with the right to
dispute transactions or other items that
appear on their periodic statements. In
order to exercise certain of these rights,
consumers must have a reasonable
opportunity to review their statements.
See 15 U.S.C. 1666i; 12 CFR 226.12(c).
Furthermore, in some cases, travel or
other circumstances may prevent the
consumer from reviewing the statement
immediately upon receipt. Finally, as
discussed above, consumers cannot
control when a mailed payment will be
received by the institution. Thus, a
payment mailed well in advance of the
due date may nevertheless arrive after
that date.
Injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits. The injury does
not appear to be outweighed by any
countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition. The Agencies are not
aware of any direct benefit to consumers
from receiving too little time to make
their payments. Although a longer time
to make payment could result in
additional finance charges for
consumers who do not receive a grace
period, the consumer would have the
choice whether to wait until the due
date to make payment. The Agencies are
also aware that, as a result of the
proposed rule, some institutions may be
required to incur costs to alter their
systems and will, directly or indirectly,
pass those costs on to consumers. It
does not appear, however, that these
costs would outweigh the benefits to
consumers of receiving a reasonable
amount of time to make payment.
Proposal
Proposed § ll.22(a) prohibits
institutions from treating a payment as
late for any purpose unless the
consumer has been provided a
reasonable amount of time to make that
payment. Proposed comment 22(a)–1
clarifies that treating a payment as late
for any purpose includes increasing the
annual percentage rate as a penalty,
reporting the consumer as delinquent to
a credit reporting agency, or assessing a
late fee or any other fee based on the
consumer’s failure to make a payment
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28913
within the amount of time provided
under this section. Although the
proposed rule does not mandate a
specific amount of time, the
commentary to the proposal states that
reasonableness would be evaluated from
the perspective of the consumer, not the
institution. See proposed comment
22(a)–2.
Proposed § ll.22(b) provides a safe
harbor for institutions that have adopted
reasonable procedures designed to
ensure that periodic statements
specifying the payment due date are
mailed or delivered to consumers at
least 21 days before the payment due
date. Compliance with this safe harbor
would allow seven days for the periodic
statement to reach the consumer by
mail, seven days for the consumer to
review the statement and make
payment, and seven days for that
payment to reach the institution by
mail. As noted above, some institutions
already recommend that consumers
allow seven days for receipt of mailed
payments. The Agencies believe 21 days
to be reasonable because it allows
sufficient time for even delayed mail to
be delivered while also allowing most
consumers at least a week to review
their bill and make payment.
In order to minimize burden and
facilitate compliance, proposed
comment 22(b)–1 clarifies that an
institution with reasonable procedures
in place designed to ensure that
statements are mailed or delivered
within a certain number of days from
the closing date of the billing cycle may
utilize the safe harbor by adding that
number to the 21-day safe harbor for
purposes of determining the payment
due date on the periodic statement. For
example, if an institution had
reasonable procedures in place designed
to the ensure that statements are mailed
or delivered within three days of the
closing date of the billing cycle, the
institution could comply with the safe
harbor by stating a payment due date on
its periodic statements that is 24 days
from the close of the billing cycle (i.e.,
21 days plus three days). Similarly, if an
institution’s procedures reasonably
ensured that payments would be sent
within five days of the close of the
billing cycle, the institution could
comply with the safe harbor by setting
the due date 26 days from the close of
the billing cycle. Proposed comment
22(b)–2 further clarifies that the
payment due date is the date by which
the institution requires the consumer to
make payment in order to avoid being
treated as late for any purpose (except
with respect to expiration of a grace
period).
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Finally, in order to avoid any
potential conflict with section 163(a) of
TILA, proposed § ll.22(c) provides
that proposed § ll.22(a) does not
apply to any time period provided by
the institution within which the
consumer may repay the new balance or
any portion of the new balance without
incurring finance charges (i.e., a grace
period).
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Request for Comment
The Agencies request comment on:
• The percentages of consumers who
receive periodic statements by mail and
electronically.
• The percentages of consumers who
make payment by mail, electronically,
by telephone, and through other
methods.
• The number of days after the
closing date of the billing cycle that
institutions typically mail or deliver
periodic statements.
• Whether the proposed 21-day safe
harbor period between mailing or
delivery of the periodic statement and
the due date would give consumers
sufficient time to review their
statements and make payment and is
otherwise a reasonable amount of time
to make payment.
• The cost to institutions of altering
their systems to comply with the
proposed rule and to mail or deliver
periodic statements 21 days in advance
of the payment due date.
• Whether the Agencies should adopt
a rule that prohibits institutions from
treating a payment as late if received
within a certain number of days after
the due date and, if so, the number of
days that would be appropriate.
• Whether the Agencies should adopt
a rule that requires institutions, upon
the request of a consumer, to reverse a
decision to treat a payment mailed
before the due date as late and, if so,
what evidence the institution could
require the consumer to provide (e.g., a
receipt from the U.S. Postal Service or
other common carrier) and what time
frame would be appropriate (e.g.,
payment mailed at least five days before
the due date, payment received no more
than two business days late).
• The impact of the proposed rule on
the availability of credit.
Section l.23—Unfair Acts or Practices
Regarding Allocation of Payments
The Agencies are proposing to
prohibit certain unfair acts or practices
regarding the allocation of payments on
consumer credit card accounts with
multiple balances at different interest
rates. In its June 2007 Proposal, the
Board discussed the practice among
some creditors of allocating payments
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first to balances that are subject to the
lowest interest rate. 72 FR at 32982–83.
Because many creditors offer different
rates for purchases, cash advances, and
balance transfers, this practice can
result in consumers who do not pay the
balance in full each month incurring
higher finance charges than they would
under a different allocation method. The
Board was particularly concerned that,
when the consumer has responded to a
promotional rate offer, the allocation of
payments to balances with the lowest
interest rate often prevents the
consumer from receiving the full benefit
of the promotional rate if the consumer
uses the card for other transactions.
For example, assume that a consumer
responds to an offer of 5% on
transferred balances for six months by
opening an account and transferring
$3,000. Then, during the same billing
cycle, the consumer uses the account for
a $300 cash advance (to which an
interest rate of 20% applies) and a $500
purchase (to which an interest rate of
15% applies). If the consumer makes an
$800 payment, most creditors would
apply the entire payment to the
promotional rate balance and the
consumer would incur interest on the
more costly cash advance and purchase
balances. Under these circumstances,
the consumer is effectively denied the
benefit of the 5% promotional rate for
six months if the card is used for
transactions because the consumer must
pay off the entire transferred balance in
order to avoid paying a higher rate on
the transactions. Indeed, the only way
for the consumer to receive the benefit
of the 5% promotional rate is to not use
the card for purchases, which would
effectively require the consumer to use
an open-end credit account as a closedend installment loan.
Deferred interest plans raise the same
basic concerns. Many creditors offer
deferred interest plans where consumers
may avoid paying interest on purchases
if the balance is paid in full by the end
of the deferred interest period. If the
balance is not paid in full when the
deferred interest period ends, these
deferred interest plans often require the
consumer to pay interest that has
accrued during the deferred interest
period. A consumer whose payments
are applied to a balance on which
interest is deferred instead of a balance
on which interest is not deferred incurs
additional finance charges and therefore
does not receive the benefit of the
deferred interest plan.
In addition, creditors typically offer a
grace period for purchases if a consumer
pays in full each month but do not
typically offer a grace period on balance
transfers or cash advances. Because
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payments will be allocated to the
transferred balance first, a consumer
cannot take advantage of both a
promotional rate on balance transfers or
cash advances and a grace period on
purchases. Under these circumstances,
the only way for a consumer to avoid
paying interest on purchases is to pay
off the entire balance, including the
transferred balance or cash advance
balance subject to the promotional rate.
In preparing its June 2007 Proposal,
the Board sought to address issues
regarding payment allocation by
developing disclosures explaining
payment allocation methods on
accounts with multiple balances at
different annual percentage rates so that
consumers could make informed
decisions about card usage, particularly
in regard to promotional rates. For
example, if consumers knew that they
would not receive the full benefit of a
promotional rate on a particular credit
card account if they used that account
for purchases during the promotional
period, they might use a different
account for purchases and pay that
account in full every month to take
advantage of the grace period. The
Board conducted extensive consumer
testing in an effort to develop
disclosures that would enable
consumers to understand typical
payment allocation practices and make
informed decisions regarding the use of
credit cards. In this testing, many
participants did not understand that
they could not take advantage of the
grace period on purchases and the
discounted rate on balance transfers at
the same time. Model forms were tested
that included a disclosure notice
attempting to explain this to consumers.
Nonetheless, testing showed that a
significant percentage of participants
still did not fully understand how
payment allocation can affect their
interest charges, even after reading the
disclosures tested. In the supplementary
information accompanying the June
2007 Proposal, the Board indicated its
plans to conduct further testing of the
disclosure to determine whether the
disclosure could be improved to more
effectively communicate to consumers
how payment allocation can affect their
interest charges. 72 FR at 33047, 33050.
In the June 2007 Proposal, the Board
did, however, propose to add
§ 226.5a(b)(15) to require a creditor to
explain payment allocation to
consumers. Specifically, the Board
proposed that creditors explain how
payment allocation would affect
consumers, if an initial discounted rate
was offered on balance transfers or cash
advances but not purchases. The Board
proposed that creditors must disclose to
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consumers that (1) the initial discounted
rate applies only to balance transfers or
cash advances, as applicable, and not to
purchases; (2) that payments will be
allocated to the balance transfer or cash
advance balance, as applicable, before
being allocated to any purchase balance
during the time the discounted initial
rate is in effect; and (3) that the
consumer will incur interest on the
purchase balance until the entire
balance is paid, including the
transferred balance or cash advance
balance, as applicable. 72 FR at 32948,
33047.
In response to the June 2007 Proposal,
several commenters recommended the
Board test a simplified payment
allocation disclosure that covers
situations other than low rate balance
transfers offered with cards. One credit
card issuer, however, stated that,
because creditors almost uniformly
apply payments to the balance with the
lowest annual percentage rate,
consumers could not shop for a better
payment allocation method even if an
effective disclosure could be developed.
Furthermore, comments from
consumers and consumer groups urged
the Board to go further and prohibit
payment allocation methods that
applied payments to the lowest rate
balance before other balances.
In consumer testing conducted for the
Board in March 2008, the Board tested
a revised payment allocation
disclosure.42 Some participants
understood from earlier experience that
creditors typically will apply payments
to lower rate balances first and that this
method causes them to incur higher
interest charges. For those participants,
however, that did not know about
payment allocation methods from
earlier experience, the disclosure tested
was still not effective in communicating
payment allocation methods.
Accordingly, the Agencies propose to
address the foregoing concerns
regarding payment allocation by
prohibiting specific unfair acts or
practices under the FTC Act. To the
extent the Agencies’ proposals are
ultimately adopted, the Board would
withdraw its proposal under Regulation
Z to require a creditor to explain
payment allocation to consumers.
Legal Analysis
Proposed § ll.23 would prohibit
three unfair acts or practices. First,
42 This disclosure stated: ‘‘Payments may be
applied to balances with lower APRs first. If you
have balances at higher APRs, you may pay more
in interest because these balances cannot be paid
off until all lower-APR balances are paid in full
(including balance transfers you make at the
introductory rate).’’
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when different annual percentage rates
apply to different balances on a
consumer credit card account, the
Agencies would prohibit allocation
among the balances of any amount paid
by the consumer in excess of the
required minimum periodic payment in
a manner that is less beneficial to
consumers than one of three listed
methods. Second, when a consumer
credit card account has one or more
promotional rate balances or balances
on which interest is deferred, the
Agencies would prohibit allocation of
amounts paid by the consumer in excess
of the minimum payment to such
balances before other balances. Third,
the Agencies would prohibit institutions
from requiring consumers to repay any
portion of a promotional rate balance or
deferred interest balance in order to
receive any grace period offered for
purchases. As discussed below, these
acts or practices appear to meet the
definition of unfairness under 15 U.S.C.
45(n) and the standards articulated by
the FTC.
Substantial consumer injury. Each of
the three practices described above
appear to cause substantial monetary
injury to consumers in the form of
higher interest charges than would be
incurred if institutions did not engage in
these practices. Specifically, as
discussed above, consumers who do not
pay the balance in full and whose
payments in excess of the minimum
payment are first applied to the balance
with the lowest annual percentage rate
incur higher interest charges than they
would under other payment allocation
methods, such as division of the amount
among the balances or application of the
amount to the balance with the highest
rate first. Similarly, consumers who do
not receive a grace period offered on a
purchase balance solely because they
also have a promotional rate balance or
deferred interest balance incur higher
interest charges than they would if they
received the grace period.
Injury is not reasonably avoidable.
Several factors appear to prevent
consumers from reasonably avoiding
these additional interest charges. First,
consumers generally have no control
over the institution’s allocation of
payments or provision of grace periods.
Second, the Board’s consumer testing
indicates that disclosures may not
enable consumers to understand
sufficiently the effects of payment
allocation or the loss of the grace period.
Even if disclosures were effective, it
appears that consumers still could not
avoid the injury by selecting a credit
card account with more favorable terms
because institutions almost uniformly
apply payments to the balance with the
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28915
lowest rate and do not provide a grace
period when a consumer has a
promotional rate balance or deferred
interest balance.43 Third, although a
consumer could avoid the injury by
paying the balance in full each month,
this may not be a reasonable expectation
as many consumers are unable to do so.
Similarly, it may be unreasonable to
expect a consumer to avoid the injury
by, for example, taking a cash advance
or transferring a balance in response to
a promotional rate offer and then using
a different account for purchases
because this would effectively require
the consumer to use an open-end credit
account as a closed-end installment
loan.
Injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits. The prohibited
practices do not appear to create
benefits for consumers and competition
that outweigh the injury. The Agencies
understand that, if implemented, the
proposal may reduce the revenue that
institutions receive from interest
charges, which may in turn lead
institutions to increase rates generally or
to offer higher promotional rates or
fewer deferred interest plans. As a
result, consumers who, for example, do
not use an account for purchases after
transferring a balance would lose the
benefit of the lower promotional rate.
This effect should be muted, however,
because the Agencies’ proposal
prohibits only the practices that are
most harmful to consumers and leaves
institutions with considerable flexibility
in the allocation of payments,
particularly with regard to the minimum
payment. Furthermore, the Agencies
believe that the proposal would enhance
transparency and enable consumers to
better assess the costs associated with
using their credit card accounts at the
time they engage in transactions. To the
extent that upfront costs have been
artificially reduced because many
consumers cannot reasonably avoid
paying higher interest charges later, the
reduction does not represent a true
benefit to consumers as a whole.
Finally, it appears that the Agencies’
proposal should enhance rather than
harm competition because institutions
offering rates that reflect the
institution’s costs (including the cost to
the institution of borrowing funds and
43 See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rule, 48
FR at 7746 (‘‘If 80 percent of creditors include a
certain clause in their contracts, for example, even
the consumer who examines contract[s] from three
different sellers has a less than even chance of
finding a contract without the clause. In such
circumstances relatively few consumers are likely
to find the effort worthwhile, particularly given the
difficulties of searching for contract terms * * *’’
(footnotes omitted)).
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operational expenses) would no longer
be forced to compete with institutions
that offer artificially reduced rates.
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with PROPOSALS3
Proposal
Proposed § ll.23(a) would establish
a general rule governing payment
allocation on accounts that do not have
a promotional rate balance or a balance
on which interest is deferred. Proposed
§ ll.23(b) would establish special
rules for accounts that do have a
promotional rate balance or a deferred
interest balance.
Proposed § ll.23 does not limit or
otherwise address the institution’s
ability to determine the amount of the
minimum payment or how that payment
is allocated. See proposed comment 23–
1. Furthermore, an institution may
adjust amounts to the nearest dollar
when allocating. See proposed comment
23–2.
ll.23(a) General Rule for Accounts
Within Different Annual Percentage
Rates on Different Balances
Proposed § ll.23(a) would require
the institution to allocate any amount
paid by the consumer in excess of the
required minimum periodic payment
among the balances in a manner that is
no less beneficial to consumers than one
of three listed methods. Although the
proposed rule does not prohibit
institutions from using allocation
methods other than those listed, the
method used must be no less beneficial
to consumers than one of the listed
methods. A method is no less beneficial
to consumers if the method results in
the assessment of the same or a lesser
amount of interest charges than would
be assessed under the listed method. For
example, an institution may not
reasonably allocate the entire amount
paid by the consumer in excess of the
required minimum periodic payment to
the balance with the lowest annual
percentage rate because this method
would result in higher interest charges
than any of the methods listed in
proposed § ll.23(a). See proposed
comment 23(a)–1. An example of an
allocation method that is no less
beneficial to consumers than a listed
method is provided in proposed
comment 23(a)–2.
Proposed § ll.23(a) lists three
permissible payment allocation
methods. First, proposed § ll.23(a)
would allow an institution to apply the
entire amount paid in excess of the
minimum payment first to the balance
with the highest annual percentage rate
and any remaining amount to the
balance with the next highest annual
percentage rate and so forth. Although
this method could result in none of the
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amount being applied to some balances,
the Agencies believe that institutions
should be able to use this approach
because it will generally minimize
interest charges. An example of this
allocation method is provided in
proposed comment 23(a)(1)–1.
Second, proposed § ll.23(a) would
allow an institution to allocate equal
portions of the amount paid in excess of
the minimum payment to each balance.
Third, the proposal would allow an
institution to allocate the amount among
the balances in the same proportion as
each balance bears to the total balance
(i.e., pro rata). Examples of these
allocation methods are provided in
proposed comments 23(a)(2)–1 and
23(a)(3)–1.
ll.23(b) Special Rules for Accounts
With Promotional Rate Balances or
Deferred Interest Balances
The Agencies believe that separate
requirements may be warranted for
accounts with promotional rate balances
or balances on which interest is deferred
because, in many cases, the consumer
will have engaged in transactions based
on representations made by the
institution regarding a promotional rate
or a deferred interest plan. Proposed
§ ll.23(b) seeks to ensure that
consumers receive the benefit of
promotional rates and deferred interest
plans.
ll.23(b)(1)(i) Rule Regarding Payment
Allocation
Proposed § ll.23(b)(1)(i) would
ensure that consumers receive the
benefit of a promotional rate or deferred
interest plan by requiring that amounts
paid in excess of the minimum payment
would be allocated to the promotional
rate balance or the deferred interest
balance only if other balances have been
fully paid. Specifically, the proposal
would require that amounts paid by the
consumer in excess of the minimum
payment be allocated first among
balances that are not promotional rate
balances or deferred interest balances,
consistent with proposed § ll.23(a). If
there is any remaining amount,
proposed § ll.23(b)(1)(i) would
require the institution to allocate the
remaining amount to each promotional
rate balance or deferred interest balance,
consistent with proposed § ll.23(a).
Proposed comment 23(b)(1)(i)–1 would
provide illustrative examples of how
payments must be allocated under
proposed § ll.23(b)(1)(i).
ll.23(b)(1)(ii) Exception for Balances
on Which Interest Is Deferred
Proposed § ll.23(b)(1)(ii) would
create an exception to the payment
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allocation rule in proposed
§ ll.23(b)(1)(i) during the last two
billing cycles of a deferred interest plan.
The Agencies understand that currently
some institutions begin to apply
consumers’ payments to the deferred
interest balance during the last two
billing cycles of a deferred interest plan
because doing so will reduce or
eliminate that balance and thereby
reduce or eliminate the deferred interest
that may be charged when the deferred
interest plan expires. Because this
practice appears to be beneficial to
consumers, the Agencies propose to
permit institutions to utilize this
practice, at their option. Proposed
comment 23(b)(1)(ii)–1 provides
illustrative examples of how payments
may be allocated under this exception.
As noted below, the Agencies request
comment on whether this exception is
appropriate and, if so, whether it should
apply during the last two billing cycles
of the deferred interest plan or a
different period of time.
ll.23(b)(2) Rule Regarding Grace
Period
Proposed § ll.23(b)(2) would
prohibit institutions from requiring
consumers who are otherwise eligible
for a grace period to repay any portion
of a promotional rate balance or
deferred interest balance in order to
receive the benefit of any grace period
on other balances. Under the provision,
a consumer would not be denied the
benefits of a grace period solely because
the consumer carries a balance covered
by a promotional rate or deferred
interest plan. Proposed comment
23(b)(2)–1 provides an example of when
this prohibition would apply.
Request for Comment
The Agencies request comment on:
• Whether other methods of
allocation should be listed in proposed
§ ll.23(a).
• Whether proposed § ll.23(a)
should permit institutions to apply
amounts in excess of the minimum
payment first to balances on which the
institution is prohibited from increasing
the rate (pursuant to proposed
§ ll.24).
• Whether the requirement in
proposed § ll.23(b)(1)(i) that amounts
in excess of the minimum payment be
applied to other balances before
deferred interest balances may prevent
consumers from paying the deferred
interest balance in full by the end of the
deferred interest period.
• The need for the exception
regarding deferred interest balances in
proposed § ll.23(b)(1)(ii).
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• Whether the exception regarding
deferred interest balances in proposed
§ ll.23(b)(1)(ii) should apply during
the last two billing cycles of the
deferred interest plan or during a
different time period.
• Whether consumers should be
permitted to instruct the institution
regarding allocation of amounts in
excess of the required minimum
periodic payment.
• The cost to institutions of the
proposed rule and the impact on the
availability of credit.
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with PROPOSALS3
Section ll.24—Unfair Acts and
Practices Regarding Application of
Increased Rates to Outstanding
Balances
The Agencies are proposing to
prohibit the application of increased
rates to pre-existing balances, except in
certain limited circumstances.
Currently, § 226.9(c) of Regulation Z
requires 15 days advance notice of
certain changes to the terms of an openend plan as well as increases in the
minimum payment. However, advance
notice is not required if an interest rate
or other finance charge increases due to
a consumer’s default or delinquency.
See 12 CFR 226.9(c)(1); comment
9(c)(1)–3. Furthermore, no change-interms notice is required if the creditor
set forth the specific change in the
account-opening disclosures. See 12
CFR 226.9(c), comment 9(c)–1.
In its June 2007 Proposal, the Board
expressed concern that the imposition
of penalty pricing can come as a costly
surprise to consumers who are not
aware of, or do not understand, what
behavior is considered a ‘‘default’’
under their agreement. See 72 FR at
33009–13. The Board noted that penalty
rates can be more than twice as much
as the consumer’s normal rate on
purchases and may apply to all of the
balances on the consumer’s account for
several months or longer.44
Consumer testing conducted for the
Board indicated that some consumers
do not understand what factors can
trigger penalty pricing, such as the fact
that one late payment may constitute a
‘‘default.’’ In addition, some
participants did not appear to
understand that penalty rates can apply
to all of their balances, including
existing balances. Some participants
also did not appear to understand how
44 See also GAO Credit Card Report at 24 (noting
that, for the 28 credit cards it reviewed, ‘‘[t]he
default rates were generally much higher than rates
that otherwise applied to purchases, cash advances,
or balance transfers. For example, the average
default rate across the 28 cards was 27.3 percent in
2005—up from the average of 23.8 in 2003—with
as many as 7 cards charging rates over 30 percent’’).
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long a penalty rate could remain in
effect. The Board observed that accountopening disclosures may be provided to
the consumer too far in advance for the
consumer to recall the circumstances
that may cause his or her rates to
increase. In addition, the consumer may
not have retained a copy of the accountopening disclosures and may not be able
to effectively link the information
disclosed at account opening to the
current repricing of his or her account.
The Board’s June 2007 Proposal
included revisions to Regulation Z and
its commentary designed to improve
consumers’ awareness about changes in
their account terms and increased rates,
including rate increases imposed as a
penalty for delinquency or other acts or
omissions constituting default under the
account agreement. These revisions
were also intended to enhance
consumers’ ability to shop for
alternative financing before such
changes in terms or increased rates
become effective. Specifically, the Board
proposed to give consumers 45 days
advance notice of a change in terms or
an increased rate imposed as a penalty
and to make the disclosures about
changes in terms and increased rates
more effective. See proposed 12 CFR
226.9(c), (g), 72 FR at 33056–58.45 The
Board also proposed to require that
periodic statements for credit card
accounts disclose the annual percentage
rate or rates that may be imposed as a
result of late payment. See proposed 12
CFR 226.7(b)(11)(i)(C), 72 FR at 33053.
When developing the June 2007
Proposal, the Board considered, but did
not propose, a prohibition on so-called
‘‘universal default clauses’’ or similar
practices under which a creditor raises
a consumer’s interest rate to the penalty
rate if, for example, the consumer makes
a late payment on an account with a
different creditor. The Board also
considered but did not propose a
requirement similar to that in some state
laws providing consumers with the right
to reject a change in terms.
In response to its June 2007 Proposal,
the Board received comments from
individual consumers, consumer
groups, another federal banking agency,
and a member of Congress stating that
notice alone was not sufficient to
protect consumers from the harm
caused by rate increases. These
comments argued that many consumers
would not read or understand the
proposed disclosures and, even if they
did, many would be unable to transfer
the balance to a new credit card account
45 The Board has proposed additional revisions to
these provisions elsewhere in today’s Federal
Register.
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28917
with comparable terms before the
increased rate went into effect. Some of
these comments argued that creditors
should be prohibited from increasing
the rate on an existing balance in all
instances. Others argued that consumers
should be given the right to reject
application of an increased rate to an
existing balance by closing the account,
but only if the increase was not
triggered by a late payment or other
violation of the terms of that account.
This approach was also endorsed by
some creditors. On the other hand,
comments from the majority of creditors
stated that the 45-day notice
requirement would delay creditors from
increasing rates to reflect a consumer’s
increased risk of default, requiring
creditors to account for that risk by, for
example, charging higher annual
percentage rates at the outset of the
account relationship. These comments
also noted that, because creditors use
rate increases to pass on the costs of
funds the creditors themselves pay,
delays in the imposition of increased
rates could result in higher costs of
credit or less available credit.
The Agencies are concerned that
disclosure alone may be insufficient to
protect consumers from the harm
caused by the application of increased
rates to pre-existing balances.
Accordingly, the Agencies are proposing
to prohibit this practice except in
certain limited circumstances.
Legal Analysis
The Agencies propose to prohibit
institutions from increasing the annual
percentage rate applicable to the
outstanding balance before the effective
date of the rate increase, except in
certain circumstances. As discussed
below, this practice appears to meet the
test for unfairness under 15 U.S.C. 45(n)
and the standards articulated by the
FTC.
Substantial consumer injury.
Application of an increased annual
percentage rate to an outstanding
balance appears to cause substantial
monetary injury by increasing the
interest charges assessed to a
consumer’s credit card account.
Injury is not reasonably avoidable.
Although the injury resulting from
increases in the annual percentage rate
may be avoidable by some consumers
under certain circumstances, this injury
does not appear to be reasonably
avoidable by consumers as a general
matter. As discussed above, the Board’s
consumer testing indicates that many
consumers are not aware of the
circumstances under which their rates
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may increase.46 Thus, when deciding
whether to use a credit card for a
particular transaction or whether to pay
off a credit card balance versus some
other obligation, the consumer is likely
to consider only the annual percentage
rate in effect at that time. Although the
disclosures proposed by the Board
under Regulation Z should, if
implemented, improve consumers’
understanding, disclosures alone may
not be sufficient to enable consumers to
avoid injury. Consumers may ignore the
disclosures because they overestimate
their ability to avoid the penalty
triggers.47 Furthermore, although the
Board’s proposed 45 days advance
notice of a rate increase would enable
some consumers to transfer the balance
to another account with a comparable
annual percentage rate and terms,
consumers who are not able to do so
cannot avoid the resulting injury. For
these reasons, disclosures alone may not
enable consumers to avoid the injury
caused by an increase in rate on an
existing balance.
Consumers also lack control over
many of the circumstances under which
an institution increases an annual
percentage rate. First, an institution may
increase a rate for reasons that are
completely unrelated to any individual
consumer. For instance, an institution
may increase rates to increase revenues
or in response to changes in the cost to
the institution of borrowing funds.
Consumers lack any control over these
increases and therefore cannot
reasonably avoid the resulting injury.
Furthermore, consumers cannot be
reasonably expected to predict when
such repricing will occur because many
46 See also GAO Credit Card Report at 6 (‘‘[O]ur
interviews with 112 cardholders indicated that
many failed to understand key terms or conditions
that could affect their costs, including when they
would be charged for late payments or what actions
could cause issuers to raise rates.’’).
47 See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rule, 49
FR at 7744 (‘‘Because remedies are relevant only in
the event of default, and default is relatively
infrequent, consumers reasonably concentrate their
search on such factors as interest rates and payment
terms.’’). This behavior is commonly referred to as
‘‘hyperbolic discounting.’’ See, e.g., Angela Littwin,
Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and
Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 80 Tex.
L. Rev. 451, 467–478 (2008) (discussing consumers’
tendency to underestimate their future credit card
usage when they apply for a card and thereby
failing to adequately anticipate the costs of the
product); Shane Frederick, et al., Time Discounting
and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. Econ.
Literature 351, 366–67 (2002) (reviewing the
literature on hyperbolic discounting); Ted
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or
Later, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 103, 103, 111 (1999)
(explaining people’s preference for delaying
unpleasant activities and accepting immediate
rewards despite their knowledge that the delay may
lessen potential future rewards or increase potential
adverse consequences).
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institutions reserve the right to change
the terms of the consumer’s account at
any time for any reason.
Second, an institution may increase
an annual percentage rate based on
consumer behavior that is unrelated to
the consumer’s performance on the
credit card account with that institution.
For example, an institution may
increase a rate due to a drop in a
consumer’s credit score or a default on
an account with a different creditor
even though the consumer has paid the
credit card account with the institution
according to the terms of the cardholder
agreement.48 As noted above, this type
of increase is sometimes referred to as
‘‘universal default.’’ The consumer may
or may not have been aware of or able
to control the factor that caused the
drop in the consumer’s credit score, and
the consumer cannot control what
factors are considered or how those
factors are weighted in creating the
credit score. For example, a consumer
may be unaware that using a certain
amount of the available credit on openend credit accounts can lead to a
reduction in credit score. Furthermore,
as discussed below, a default may not be
reasonably avoidable in some instances.
Nor can the consumer control how the
institution uses credit scores or other
information to set interest rates.
Third, an institution may increase an
annual percentage rate based on
consumer behavior that is related to the
consumer’s credit card account with the
institution but does not violate the
account terms. For example, an
institution may increase the annual
percentage rates of consumers who are
close to (but not over) the credit limit on
the account or who make the minimum
payment set by the institution for
several consecutive months.49 Although
this type of activity may be within the
consumer’s control, the consumer may
not be able to reasonably avoid the
resulting injury because the consumer is
not aware that this behavior may be
used by the institution’s internal risk
models as a basis for increasing the rate
on the account. Indeed, the institution’s
provision of a specific credit limit or
minimum payment, for example, may be
reasonably interpreted by the consumer
48 See, e.g., Statement of Janet Hard before S.
Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations, Hearing on
Credit Card Practices: Unfair Interest Rate Increases
(Dec. 4, 2007) (available at https://www.senate.gov/
∼govt-aff/index.cfm?Fuseaction=
Hearings.Detail&HearingID=509).
49 See, e.g., Statement of Bruce Hammonds,
President, Bank of America Card Services before S.
Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations, Hearing on
Credit Card Practices: Unfair Interest Rate Increases
at 5 (Dec. 4, 2007) (available at https://
hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/STMTHammonds
BOA.pdf).
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as an implicit representation that the
consumer will not be penalized if the
credit limit is not exceeded or the
minimum payment is made.
Fourth, an institution may increase an
annual percentage rate based on
consumer behavior that violates the
account terms. What violates the
account terms can vary from institution
to institution and from account to
account. The Agencies understand that
the most common violations of the
account terms that result in an increase
in rate are exceeding the credit limit, a
payment that is returned for insufficient
funds, and a late payment.50 In some
cases, it appears that individual
consumers may have been able to avoid
these events by taking reasonable
precautions. In other cases, however, it
appears that the event may not be
reasonably avoidable.
For example, consumers who
carefully track their transactions may
still exceed the credit limit because of
charges of which they were not aware
(such as the institution’s imposition of
interest or fees) or because of the
institution’s delay in replenishing the
credit limit following payment.
Similarly, although consumers can
reduce the risk of making a payment
that will be returned for insufficient
funds by carefully tracking the credits
and debits on their deposit account,
consumers still lack sufficient
information about key aspects on their
accounts, including how holds will
affect the availability of funds and when
funds from a deposit or a credit will be
made available by the depository
institution.51 Finally, although the
Agencies’ proposed §ll.22 would, if
implemented, ensure that consumers’
payments will not be treated as late for
any reason (including for purposes of
triggering an increase in rate) unless
they receive a reasonable amount of
time to make payment, there may be
other reasons why consumers pay late
or miss a payment.52
50 See
GAO Credit Card Report at 25.
discussion of overdrafts and debit holds in
relation to proposed §ll.32 below.
52 See, e.g., Statement for FTC Credit Practices
Rule, 49 FR at 7747–48 (finding that ‘‘the majority
[of defaults] are not reasonably avoidable by
consumers’’ because of factors such as loss of
income or illness); Testimony of Gregory Baer,
Deputy General Counsel, Bank of America before
the H. Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Fin. Instit. &
Consumer Credit at 4 (Mar. 13, 2008) (‘‘If a
customer falls behind on an account, our
experience tells us it is likely due to circumstances
outside his or her control.’’); Sumit Agarwal &
Chunlin Liu, Determinants of Credit Card
Delinquency and Bankruptcy: Macroeconomic
Factors, 27 J. of Econ. & Finance 75, 83 (2003)
(finding ‘‘conclusive evidence that unemployment
is critical in determining delinquency’’); Fitch: U.S.
Credit Card & Auto ABS Would Withstand Sizeable
51 See
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Accordingly, although the injury
resulting from the application of
increased annual percentage rates to
existing balances may be avoidable in
some individual cases, it appears that,
as a general matter, this injury is not
reasonably avoidable. It does not
appear, however, that this reasoning
extends to the application of increased
rates to new transactions. The Board’s
proposal under Regulation Z would, if
implemented, require creditors to
provide notice 45 days in advance of an
increase in the annual percentage rate.
See proposed 12 CFR 226.9(c), (g), 72 FR
at 33056–58.53 In addition, as discussed
below, proposed ll.24 would not
permit the institution to increase the
rate on purchases made up to 14 days
after provision of the 45-day notice.
These proposals would enable
consumers to reasonably avoid any
injury caused by application of an
increased rate to new transactions by
providing consumers sufficient time to
receive and review the 45-day notice
and to decide whether to continue using
the card. Finally, as also discussed
below, it does not appear that, when a
consumer has violated the account
terms, application of an increased rate
to an existing balance is an unfair
practice in all circumstances.
Injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits. It appears that
the proposal will result in a net benefit
to consumers because some consumers
are likely to benefit substantially while
the adverse effects on others are likely
to be small. The Agencies are aware that
some institutions may offer lower
annual percentage rates to consumers at
the outset of an account relationship
knowing that the rate can be
subsequently adjusted to compensate for
an increase in the cost of funds or in the
risk of default. The Agencies are also
aware that, if institutions are prohibited
from increasing rates on existing
balances, they may charge higher rates
or set lower credit limits initially or
curtail credit availability to higher risk
consumers. As discussed below,
however, the Agencies have crafted the
proposal to protect consumers from the
substantial injury caused by rate
increases on existing balances while, to
the extent possible, minimizing the
Unemployment Stress, Reuters (Mar. 24, 2008)
(‘‘According to analysis performed by Fitch,
increases in the unemployment rate are expected to
cause auto loan and credit card loss rates to
increase proportionally with subprime assets
experiencing the highest proportional rate.’’)
(available at https://www.reuters.com/article/
pressRelease/idUS94254+24-Mar2008+BW20080324).
53 The Board has proposed additional revisions to
these provisions elsewhere in today’s Federal
Register.
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impact on institutions’ ability to adjust
to market conditions and price for risk.
As an initial matter, because the
prohibition on applying an increased
annual percentage rate to an existing
balance does not extend to variable
rates, an institution can guard against
increases in the cost of funds by
utilizing a variable rate that reflects
market conditions. Furthermore, the
Agencies do not propose to prohibit
institutions from increasing the annual
percentage rate on an existing balance if
a consumer becomes 30 days
delinquent. Although the delinquency
may not have been reasonably avoidable
in certain individual cases, the
consumer will have received notice of
the delinquency (in the periodic
statement and likely in other notices as
well) and had an opportunity to cure
before becoming 30 days delinquent. A
consumer is unlikely, for example, to
become 30 days delinquent due to a
single returned item or the loss of a
payment in the mail. Thus, even when
the delinquency was not reasonably
avoidable, it appears that the harm in
such cases is outweighed by the benefit
to consumers as a whole (in the form of
lower annual percentage rates and
broader access to credit) from allowing
institutions to reprice for risk once a
consumer has become significantly
delinquent.54
Accordingly, although the proposal
could ultimately result in higher upfront
costs and less available credit for some
consumers, it appears that consumers
and competition may benefit as a whole.
Consumers will not only be protected
against unexpected increases in the cost
of transactions that have already been
completed but will also be able to more
accurately assess the cost of using their
credit card accounts at the time they
engage in new transactions.
Furthermore, as discussed in regard to
payment allocation, upfront annual
percentage rates that are artificially
reduced based on the expectation of
future increases do not represent a true
benefit to consumers as a whole.
Similarly, competition may be enhanced
because institutions that offer annual
percentage rates that realistically reflect
risk and market conditions will no
54 The Agencies also note that, although some
consumers may not have been able to avoid fees for
violating the account terms (for example, late
payment fees or fees for exceeding the credit limit),
this injury does not appear to outweigh the
countervailing benefit to consumers or competition.
The application of an increased rate to an existing
balance increases consumers’ costs until the
balance is paid in full or is transferred to an account
with more favorable terms. The assessment of a fee,
however, is generally an isolated cost that will not
be repeated unless the account terms are violated
again.
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28919
longer be forced to compete with
institutions offering artificially reduced
rates.
The Agencies considered the
suggestion raised in some comments
that consumers be permitted to reject (or
opt out of) the application of an
increased rate to an existing balance by
closing the account. As formulated in
some of those comments, this proposal
would not have addressed the injury to
consumers whose rates were increased
due to an unavoidable violation of the
account terms. Even if consumers were
given a right to reject application of an
increased rate to an existing balance in
all circumstances and were provided
timely notice of that right (for example,
in the Board’s proposed 45-day notice
under Regulation Z), it appears that the
benefits to consumers of such a right do
not outweigh the injury caused by
application of an increased rate to an
existing balance.
In most cases, it would not be
economically rational for a consumer to
choose to pay more for credit that has
already been extended, particularly
when the increased rate is significantly
higher than the prior rate. Accordingly,
assuming consumers understand their
right to reject a rate increase, most
would rationally exercise that right.55
As a result, the costs associated with
prohibiting application of an increased
rate to an existing balance and
providing consumers with the right to
reject such application should be
similar. However, providing consumers
with notice and a means to exercise an
opt-out right (e.g., a toll-free telephone
number) would create additional costs
and burdens for institutions and
consumers. Furthermore, a right to
reject application of an increased rate to
an existing balance would provide fewer
benefits to consumers as a whole than
the proposed rule because, no matter
how well the right is disclosed, a
substantial number of consumers might
inadvertently forfeit that right by failing
to read, understand, or act on the notice.
In a 2006 report, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) noted that,
although state laws applying to four of
the six largest credit card issuers require
an opt-out, representatives of those
issuers stated that few consumers
exercise that right.56 Thus, a right to
reject application of an increased rate to
an existing balance could create similar
55 A consumer who cannot obtain a lower rate
elsewhere may not reject application of an
increased rate to an existing balance. This choice,
however, may not enable the consumer to
reasonably avoid injury.
56 GAO Credit Card Report at 26–27.
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or greater costs while producing fewer
benefits than the proposed rule.
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Proposal
ll.24(a) General Rule
Proposed § ll.24(a)(1) prohibits
institutions from increasing the annual
percentage rate applicable to any
outstanding balance on a consumer
credit card account, except in the
circumstances set forth in proposed
§ ll.24(b). Proposed § ll.24(a)(2)
defines ‘‘outstanding balance’’ as
meaning the amount owed on a
consumer credit card account at the end
of the fourteenth day after the
institution provides a notice required by
proposed 12 CFR 226.9(c) or (g) as set
forth in the Board’s June 2007 Proposal.
As discussed above, the Board’s June
2007 Proposal would require a creditor
to provide consumers with a written
notice of a rate increase at least 45 days
before the effective date of that increase.
See proposed 12 CFR 226.9(c) and (g),
72 FR at 33056, 33058. The definition of
‘‘outstanding balance’’ in proposed
§ ll.24(a)(2) is intended to prevent the
Board’s 45-day notice requirement from
creating an extended period following
receipt of that notice during which new
transactions can be made at the prior
rate. Although institutions could
address this concern by denying
additional extensions of credit after
sending the 45-day notice, that outcome
may not be beneficial to consumers who
have received the notice and wish to use
the account for new transactions.
Accordingly, under proposed
§ ll.24(a), the balance to which an
institution could not apply an increased
rate is the balance 14 days after the
institution has provided the 45-day
notice. Consistent with the safe harbor
in proposed § ll.23(b), 14 days would
allow seven days for the notice to reach
the consumer and seven days for the
consumer to review that notice.
Proposed comment 24(a)–1 provides
the following example of the application
of proposed § ll.24(a): Assume that
on December 30 a consumer credit card
account has a balance of $1,000 at an
annual percentage rate of 15%. On
December 31, the institution mails or
delivers a notice required by proposed
12 CFR 226.9(c) informing the consumer
that the annual percentage rate will
increase to 20% on February 15. The
consumer uses the account to make
$2,000 in purchases on January 10 and
$1,000 in purchases on January 20.
Assuming no other transactions, the
outstanding balance for purposes of
proposed § ll.24 is the $3,000 balance
as of the end of the day on January 14.
Therefore, under proposed § ll.24(a),
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the institution cannot increase the
annual percentage rate applicable to that
balance. The institution can apply the
20% rate to the $1,000 in purchases
made on January 20 but, consistent with
proposed 12 CFR 226.9(c), it cannot do
so until February 15.
Proposed comment 24(a)–2 clarifies
that, consistent with the approach in
proposed § ll.22(b), an institution is
not required to determine the specific
date on which a notice required by
proposed 12 CFR 226.9(c) or (g) was
provided. For purposes of proposed
§ ll.24(a)(2), if the institution has
adopted reasonable procedures designed
to ensure that notices required by
proposed 12 CFR 226.9(c) or (g) are
provided to consumers no later than, for
example, three days after the event
giving rise to the notice, the outstanding
balance is the balance at the end of the
seventeenth day after such event.
ll.24(b) Exceptions
Proposed § ll.24(b) provides that an
institution may apply an increased
annual percentage rate to an outstanding
balance in three circumstances. First,
when the rate is increased due to the
operation of an index that is not under
the institution’s control and is available
to the general public, the increased rate
may be applied to the outstanding
balance. This exception is similar to that
in 12 CFR 226.5b(f)(1) and would apply
to variable rates. Proposed comment
24(b)(1)–1 clarifies that an institution
may not increase the rate on an
outstanding balance based on its own
prime rate but may use a published
prime rate, such as that in the Wall
Street Journal, even if the institution’s
prime rate is one of several rates used
to establish the published rate. This
comment would also clarify that an
institution may not increase the rate on
an outstanding balance by changing the
method used to determine the indexed
rate. Proposed comment 24(b)(1)–2
clarifies when a rate is considered
‘‘publicly available.’’
Second, when a promotional rate
expires or is lost for a reason specified
in the account agreement (e.g., late
payment), an increased rate may be
applied to the outstanding balance,
provided that the institution increases
the rate to the standard rate rather than
the penalty rate. For example, as set
forth in proposed comment 24(b)(2)–1,
assume that a consumer credit card
account has a balance of $1,000 at a 5%
promotional rate and that the institution
also charges an annual percentage rate
of 15% for purchases and a penalty rate
of 25%. If the consumer does not make
payment by the due date and the
account agreement specifies that event
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as a trigger for applying the penalty rate,
the institution may increase the annual
percentage rate on the $1,000 from the
5% promotional rate to the 15% annual
percentage rate for purchases. The
institution may not, however, increase
the rate on the $1,000 from the 5%
promotional rate to the 25% penalty
rate, except as otherwise permitted
under proposed § ll.24(b)(3).
Third, an institution may apply an
increased rate to the outstanding
balance if the consumer’s minimum
payment has not been received within
30 days after the due date. An example
is provided in proposed comment
24(b)(3)–1. As discussed above, a
consumer will generally have notice and
an opportunity to cure the delinquency
before becoming 30 days past due.
ll.24(c) Treatment of Outstanding
Balances Following a Rate Increase
Proposed § ll.24(c) prohibits
institutions that have increased the
annual percentage rate applicable to a
category of transactions on a consumer
credit card account with an outstanding
balance in that category from requiring
payment of that outstanding balance
using a method that is less beneficial to
the consumer than one of two listed
methods and from assessing fees or
charges solely on an outstanding
balance. Proposed comment 24(c)–1
clarifies that proposed § ll.24(c) does
not apply if the account does not have
an outstanding balance or if the rate on
an outstanding balance is increased
pursuant to proposed § ll.24(b).
Proposed comment 24(c)–2 clarifies that
proposed § ll.24(c) does not apply to
balances in categories of transactions
other than the category for which an
institution has increased the annual
percentage rate. For example, if an
institution increases the annual
percentage rate that applies to purchases
but not the rate that applies to cash
advances, proposed § ll.24(c) applies
to an outstanding balance consisting of
purchases but not an outstanding
balance consisting of cash advances.
Proposed § ll.24(c)(1) would
address the amount of time provided to
the consumer in which to pay off the
outstanding balance. While there may
be circumstances in which institutions
would accelerate repayment of the
outstanding balance to manage risk,
proposed § ll.24(a) would provide
little effective protection if consumers
did not receive a reasonable amount of
time to pay off the outstanding balance.
Accordingly, proposed § ll.24(c)(1)
would require institutions to provide
consumers with a method of paying the
outstanding balance that is no less
beneficial to the consumer than the
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methods listed in proposed
§ ll.24(c)(1)(i) and (ii). See proposed
comment 24(c)(1)–1. Proposed
§ ll.24(c)(1)(i) would also allow an
institution to amortize the outstanding
balance over a period of no less than
five years, starting from the date on
which the increased rate went into
effect.57 Proposed § ll.24(c)(1)(ii)
would allow the percentage of the
outstanding balance that was included
in the required minimum periodic
payment before the rate increase to be
doubled. Proposed comment
24(c)(1)(ii)–1 clarifies that this provision
does not limit or otherwise address an
institution’s ability to determine the
amount of the minimum payment on
other balances. Proposed comment
24(c)(1)(ii)–2 provides an example of
how an institution could adjust the
minimum payment on the outstanding
balance.
The protections of proposed
§ ll.24(a) could also be undercut if
institutions were permitted to assess
fees or other charges as a substitute for
an increase in the annual percentage
rate. Accordingly, proposed
§ ll.24(c)(2) would prohibit
institutions from assessing any fee or
charge based solely on the outstanding
balance. As explained in proposed
comment 24(c)(2)–1, this proposal
would prohibit, for example, an
institution from assessing a monthly
maintenance fee on the outstanding
balance. The proposal would not,
however, prohibit an institution from
assessing fees such as late payment fees
or fees for exceeding the credit limit that
are based in part on the outstanding
balance.
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with PROPOSALS3
Request for Comment
The Agencies request comment on:
• The extent to which institutions
raise rates on pre-existing card balances.
• The extent to which credit cards are
offered pursuant to agreements that do
not permit institutions to raise rates on
pre-existing card balances.
• The extent to which credit cards are
offered pursuant to agreements that
permit consumers to reject application
of increased rates to pre-existing
balances and the extent to which
consumers take advantage of this
opportunity.
57 This amortization period is consistent with
guidance issued by the Board, OCC, FDIC, and OTS,
under the auspices of the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, noting that credit
card workout programs should generally strive to
have borrowers repay debt within 60 months. See,
e.g., Board Supervisory Letter SR 03–1 on Account
Management and Loss Allowance Methodology for
Credit Card Lending (Jan. 8, 2003) (available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/
2003/sr0301.htm).
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• What consumer behavior with
respect to an account institutions
consider when determining whether to
increase the rate on existing balances
(other than late payment, returned
payment for insufficient funds, or
exceeding the credit limit).
• The reasons institutions currently
increase rates on existing balances and,
for each reason, what percentage it
represents of all rate increases.
• What effect the restrictions in
proposed § ll.24(a) would have on
outstanding securitizations and
institutions’ ability to securitize credit
card assets in the future.
• Whether the restrictions in
proposed § ll.24(a) would limit an
institution’s ability to effectively
manage risk if the default rate on credit
cards is greater than anticipated in light
of the exceptions in proposed
§ ll.24(b).
• Whether the 14-day period in
proposed § ll.24(a)(2) is an
appropriate amount of time to enable
consumers to receive and review notice
of a rate increase.
• Whether other means of protecting
consumers from application of
increased rates to existing balances (e.g.,
an opt-out) are more appropriate.
• Whether the exceptions in proposed
§ ll.24(b) are appropriate or necessary
and whether other exceptions would be
appropriate. In particular, the Agencies
seek comment on whether: (1)
Additional exceptions are needed to
address safety and soundness concerns;
(2) additional exceptions are needed for
a consumer’s failure to pay the account
as agreed under the account terms, such
as conduct that results in imposition of
a penalty rate (including late payment,
returned payment for insufficient funds,
or exceeding the credit limit); and (3) 30
days is the appropriate measure of a
serious delinquency.
• Whether additional or different
approaches to the repayment of
outstanding balances should be
considered.
• Whether restrictions similar to
those in proposed § ll.24(c) should
apply when, rather than increasing the
rate on future transactions, an
institution declines to extend additional
credit to the consumer. For example, the
Agencies seek comment on whether, if
an institution responds to an increased
risk of default by declining to extend
additional credit to a consumer, the
consumer should receive the protections
in proposed § ll.24(c) with respect to
any balance on the account.
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28921
§ ll.25—Unfair Acts or Practices
Regarding Fees for Exceeding the Credit
Limit Caused by Credit Holds
Although the Board’s June 2007
Proposal did not directly address overthe-credit-limit (OCL) fees, the Board
received comments from consumers,
consumer groups, and members of
Congress expressing concern about the
penalties imposed by creditors for
exceeding the credit limit. Specifically,
commenters were concerned that
consumers may unknowingly exceed
their credit limit and incur significant
rate increases and fees as a result. The
Agencies’ proposal to prohibit the
application of increased rates to existing
balances addresses consumer harm
resulting from rate increases imposed as
a penalty for exceeding the credit limit.
The Agencies also have concerns,
however, about the imposition of OCL
fees in connection with credit holds.
This proposal is consistent with a
parallel proposal in Subpart D with
respect to overdraft fees assessed in
connection with debit holds.
As further discussed below in Subpart
D, some merchants place a temporary
‘‘hold’’ on an account when a consumer
uses a credit or debit card for a
transaction in which the actual
purchase amount is not known at the
time the transaction is authorized. For
example, when a consumer uses a credit
card to obtain a hotel room, the hotel
often will not know the total amount of
the transaction at the time because that
amount may depend on, for example,
the number of days the consumer stays
at the hotel or the charges for incidental
services the hotel may provide to the
consumer during the stay (e.g., room
service). Therefore, to cover against its
risk of loss, the hotel may place a hold
on the available credit on the
consumer’s account in an amount
sufficient to cover the expected length
of the stay plus an additional amount
for potential purchases of incidentals. In
these circumstances, the institution may
authorize the hold but does not know
the amount of the transaction until the
hotel submits the actual purchase
amount for settlement.
Typically, the hold is kept in place
until the transaction amount is
presented to the institution for payment
and settled, which may take place a few
days after the transaction occurred.
During this time between authorization
and settlement, the hold remains in
place on the consumer’s account. The
Agencies are concerned that consumers
unfamiliar with credit hold practices
may inadvertently exceed the credit
limit and incur an OCL fee because they
assumed that only the actual purchase
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amount of the transaction was
unavailable for additional transactions.
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Legal Analysis
Assessing an OCL fee when the credit
limit is exceeded as a result of a credit
hold appears to be an unfair act or
practice under 15 U.S.C. 45(n) and the
standards articulated by the FTC. First,
an OCL fee constitutes substantial
monetary injury. Second, this injury
does not appear to be reasonably
avoidable because consumers are
generally unaware that a hold has been
placed on their account. The Agencies
do not believe that enhanced
disclosures would enable consumers to
avoid the injury because, even if
consumers were to receive notice of the
amount of the hold at point of sale, they
could not know the length of time the
hold will remain in place. Third, there
do not appear to be countervailing
benefits to consumers or competition.
The proposal does not prohibit the use
of holds, only the assessment of an OCL
fee caused by a hold. The Agencies note
that there is little risk to the institution
from an authorized transaction until the
transaction is presented for settlement
by the merchant. At that point, the risk
of loss is not for the amount of the hold,
but rather for the actual purchase
amount of the transaction. The Agencies
do not, however, propose to prohibit
institutions from assessing an OCL fee if
there is insufficient available credit to
cover the actual purchase amount.
Proposal
Proposed § ll.25 would prohibit
institutions from assessing an OCL fee if
the credit limit was exceeded due to a
hold unless the actual amount of the
transaction for which the hold was
placed would have resulted in the
consumer exceeding the credit limit.
Proposed comments 25–2 and 25–3
provide examples of two situations in
which this prohibition would apply.
The first is where the amount of the
hold for an authorized transaction
exceeds the credit limit. Assume that a
consumer has a credit limit of $2,000
and a balance of $1,500 on a consumer
credit card account. The consumer uses
the credit card to reserve a hotel room
for five days. When the consumer
checks in, the hotel obtains
authorization from the institution for a
$750 ‘‘hold’’ on the account to ensure
there is adequate available credit to
cover the total cost of the anticipated
stay. The consumer checks out of the
hotel after three days, and the total cost
of the stay is $450, which is charged to
the consumer’s credit card account.
Assuming that there is no other activity
on the account, § ll.25 prohibits the
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institution from assessing an OCL fee
with respect to the $750 hold. If,
however, the total cost of the stay had
been more than $500, § ll.25 would
not prohibit the institution from
assessing an OCL fee.
Another situation in which an
institution would be prohibited from
assessing an OCL fee is when the hold
for a transaction causes a subsequent
transaction to exceed the credit limit.
Assume that a consumer has a credit
limit of $2,000 and a balance of $1,400
on a consumer credit card account. The
consumer uses the credit card to reserve
a hotel room for five days. When the
consumer checks in, the hotel obtains
authorization from the institution for a
$750 hold on the account to ensure
there is adequate available credit to
cover the total cost of the anticipated
stay. While the hold remains in place,
the consumer uses the credit card to
make a $150 purchase. The consumer
checks out of the hotel after three days,
and the total cost of the stay is $450,
which is charged to the consumer’s
credit card account. Assuming that there
is no other activity on the account,
§ ll.25 would prohibit the institution
from assessing an OCL fee with respect
to either the $750 hold or the $150
purchase. If, however, the total cost of
the stay had been more than $450,
§ ll.25 would not prohibit the
institution from assessing an OCL fee.
Proposed comments 25–4 and 25–5
provide additional examples of the
operation of this rule.
Request for Comment
The Agencies are concerned about
other potentially unfair practices
regarding the assessment of fees for
exceeding the credit limit. In order to
gather information for purposes of
determining whether additional
prohibitions are warranted, the
Agencies solicit comment on:
• The extent to which institutions
assess more than one fee per billing
cycle for exceeding the credit limit and,
if so, what factors determine whether a
fee is assessed (e.g., one fee for each
transaction while the account is over the
credit limit).
• The extent to which institutions tier
or otherwise vary the fee for exceeding
the credit limit based on the number or
dollar amount of transactions while the
account is over the credit limit.
• The extent to which institutions
assess fees for exceeding the credit limit
when the transaction that exceeded the
credit limit occurred in an earlier billing
cycle and the consumer has not engaged
in subsequent transactions.
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Sectionll.26—Unfair Balance
Computation Method
The Agencies propose to prohibit
institutions, as an unfair act or practice,
from imposing finance charges on
consumer credit card accounts based on
balances for days in billing cycles that
precede the most recent billing cycle.
Currently, TILA requires creditors to
explain as part of the account-opening
disclosures the method used to
determine the balance to which rates are
applied. 15 U.S.C. 1637(a)(2). In its June
2007 Proposal, the Board proposed that
the balance computation method be
disclosed outside the account-opening
table because explaining lengthy and
complex methods may not benefit
consumers. 72 FR at 32991–92. That
proposal was based on the Board’s
consumer testing, which indicated that
consumers did not understand
explanations of balance computation
methods. Nevertheless, the Board
observed that, because some balance
computation methods are more
favorable to consumers than others, it
was appropriate to highlight the method
used, if not the technical computation
details.
In response to its proposal, the Board
received comments from consumers,
consumer groups, and members of
Congress urging the Board to prohibit
the balance computation method
sometimes referred to as ‘‘two-cycle’’ or
‘‘double-cycle.’’ This method has
several permutations but, generally
speaking, an institution using the twocycle method assesses interest not only
on the balance for the current billing
cycle but also on the balance for the
preceding billing cycle. This method
generally does not result in additional
finance charges for a consumer who
consistently carries a balance from
month to month because interest is
always accruing on the balance. Nor
does the two-cycle method affect
consumers who pay their balance in full
within the grace period every month
because interest is not imposed on their
balances. The two-cycle method does,
however, result in greater interest
charges for consumers who pay their
balance in full one month but not the
next month.
The following example illustrates
how the two-cycle method results in
higher costs for these consumers than
other balance computation methods. A
consumer has a zero balance on a credit
card account on January 1, which is the
start of the billing cycle. The consumer
uses the credit card for a $500 purchase
on January 15. The consumer makes no
other purchases and the billing cycle
closes on January 31. The consumer
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Legal Analysis
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pays $400 on the due date (February
25), leaving a $100 balance. Under the
average daily balance computation
method that is used by most credit card
issuers, because the consumer did not
pay the balance in full on February 25,
the periodic statement showing
February activity would reflect interest
charged on the $500 purchase from the
start of the billing cycle (February 1)
through February 24 and interest on the
remaining $100 from February 25
through the end of the billing cycle
(February 28). Under the two-cycle
method, however, interest would also be
charged on the $500 purchase from the
date of purchase (January 15) to the end
of the January billing cycle (January 31).
ll.26(b) Exceptions
Proposed § ll.26(b) would create
two exceptions to the general
prohibition in proposed § ll.26(a).
First, institutions would not be
prohibited from charging consumers for
deferred interest even though that
interest may have accrued over multiple
billing cycles. Thus, if a consumer did
not pay a balance or transaction in full
by the specified date under a deferred
interest plan, the institution would be
permitted to charge the consumer for
interest accrued during the period the
plan was in effect.
Second, institutions would not be
prohibited from adjusting finance
charges following resolution of a billing
error dispute. For example, if after
complying with the requirements of 12
CFR 226.13 an institution determines
that a consumer owes all or part of a
disputed amount, the institution would
be permitted to adjust the finance
charge accordingly, even if that requires
computing finance charges based on
balances in billing cycles preceding the
most recent billing cycle.
Imposing finance charges on
consumer credit card accounts based on
balances for days in billing cycles that
precede the most recent billing cycle
appears to be an unfair act or practice
under 15 U.S.C. 45(n) and the standards
articulated by the FTC.
First, as described above, computing
finance charges based on balances
preceding the most recent billing cycle
appears to cause substantial consumer
injury because consumers incur higher
interest charges than they would under
a balance computation method that
focuses only on the most recent billing
cycle. Second, it does not appear that
consumers can reasonably avoid this
injury because, once they use the card,
they have no control over the methods
used to calculate the finance charges on
their accounts. Furthermore, as noted
above, the Board’s consumer testing
indicates that disclosures are not
successful in helping consumers
understand balance computation
methods. Accordingly, a disclosure will
not enable the consumer to avoid that
method when comparing credit card
accounts or to avoid its effects when
using a credit card.
Third, there do not appear to be any
significant benefits to consumers or
competition from computing finance
charges based on balances preceding the
most recent billing cycle. The Agencies
understand that many institutions no
longer use the two-cycle computation
method. Although prohibition of the
two-cycle computation method may
reduce revenue for the institutions that
currently use it and those institutions
may replace that revenue by charging
consumers higher annual percentage
rates or fees, it appears that this result
would nevertheless benefit consumers
because it will result in more
transparent pricing.
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ll.26(a) General Rule
Proposed § ll.26(a) would prohibit
institutions from imposing finance
charges on balances on consumer credit
card accounts based on balances for
days in billing cycles preceding the
most recent billing cycle. Proposed
comment 26(a)–1 cites the two-cycle
average daily balance computation
method as an example of balance
computation methods that would be
prohibited by the proposed rule and
tracks commentary under Regulation Z.
See 12 CFR 226.5a cmt. 5a(g)–2.
Proposed comment 26(a)–2 provides an
example of the application of the twocycle method.
Sectionll.27—Unfair Acts or
Practices Regarding Security Deposits
and Fees for the Issuance or Availability
of Credit
The Agencies propose to prohibit
institutions from charging to a consumer
credit card account security deposits
and fees for the issuance or availability
of credit during the twelve months after
the account is opened that, in the
aggregate, constitute the majority of the
credit limit for that account. In addition,
the proposal would prohibit institutions
from charging to the account during the
first billing cycle security deposits and
fees for the issuance or availability of
credit that total more than 25 percent of
the credit limit. Finally, if security
deposits and fees for the issuance or
availability of credit total more than 25
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percent but less than the majority of the
credit limit during the first year, the
institution would be required to spread
that amount equally over the eleven
billing cycles following the first billing
cycle.
As the Board noted in its June 2007
Proposal, subprime credit cards often
have substantial fees related to the
issuance or availability of credit. See 72
FR at 32980, 32983. For example, these
cards may impose an annual fee and a
monthly maintenance fee for the card.
In other cases, a security deposit may be
charged to the account. These cards may
also impose multiple one-time fees
when the consumer opens the card
account, such as an application fee and
a program fee. Those amounts are often
billed to the consumer as part of the first
statement and substantially reduce the
amount of credit that the consumer has
available to make purchases or other
transactions on the account. For
example, after security deposits or fees
have been billed to accounts with a
minimum credit line of $250, the
consumer may have less than $100 of
available credit with which to make
purchases or other transactions unless
the consumer pays the deposits or fees.
In addition, consumers will pay interest
on security deposits and fees until they
are paid in full.
The federal banking agencies have
received many complaints from
consumers with respect to cards of this
type. Consumers often say that they
were not aware of how little available
credit they would have after the
assessment of security deposits and fees.
In an effort to address these concerns,
the Board’s June 2007 Proposal included
several proposed amendments to
Regulation Z’s solicitation and
application disclosures for credit and
charge cards.
Specifically, the Board proposed to
require creditors to disclose both the
annualized and the periodic amount of
the fee and how often the periodic fee
will be imposed. See proposed 12 CFR
226.5a(b)(2), 72 FR at 33046; see also 72
FR at 32980. The Board also proposed
to require creditors to disclose the
impact of security deposits and fees for
the issuance or availability of credit on
consumers’ initial available credit. See
proposed 12 CFR 226.5a(b)(16), 72 FR at
33047. Specifically, the Board proposed
that, if the total amount of any security
deposit or required fees for the issuance
or availability of credit that will be
charged against the card at account
opening equals 25 percent or more of
the minimum credit limit offered for the
card, the creditor must disclose an
example of the amount of available
credit a consumer would have
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remaining, assuming that the consumer
receives the minimum credit limit
offered on the account. For example, if
the minimum credit limit on an account
is $250 and security deposits and
covered fees total $150, the creditor
would be required to disclose that the
consumer may receive only $100 in
available credit.
Elsewhere in today’s Federal Register,
the Board is proposing to clarify the
circumstances in which a consumer
who has received account-opening
disclosures, but has not yet used the
account or paid a fee, may reject the
plan and not be obligated to pay upfront
fees. Under proposed 12 CFR
226.5(b)(1)(iv), the right to reject an
open-end (not home-secured) plan
would apply when any fee (other than
an application fee that is charged to all
applicants whether or not they receive
the credit) is charged or agreed to be
paid before the consumer receives the
account-opening disclosures. Similarly,
under proposed 12 CFR 226.6(b)(4)(vii),
creditors that require substantial fees at
account opening and leave consumers
with a limited amount of available
credit would be required to provide a
notice of the consumer’s right to reject
the plan and not pay fees (other than an
application fee, as discussed above)
unless the consumer uses the account or
pays the fees after receiving a billing
statement. As discussed below,
however, the Agencies are proposing
additional, substantive protections.
Legal Analysis
Charging to a consumer credit card
account security deposits and fees for
the issuance or availability of the credit
during the first year that total a majority
of the credit limit appears to be an
unfair act or practice under 15 U.S.C.
45(n) and the standards articulated by
the FTC. Similarly, charging to the
account in the first billing cycle security
deposits and fees for the issuance or
availability of credit that total more than
25 percent of the credit limit also
appears to be an unfair act or practice
under 15 U.S.C. 45(n) and the standards
articulated by the FTC.
Substantial consumer injury.
Consumers incur substantial monetary
injury when security deposits and fees
for the issuance or availability of credit
are charged to a consumer credit card
account, both in the form of the charges
themselves and in the form of interest
on those charges. Even in cases where
the institution provides a grace period,
many consumers may not be able to pay
the charges in full during that grace
period. The potential injury from
interest charges increases when security
deposits and fees for the issuance or
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availability of credit are charged to the
account in the first billing cycle rather
than over a longer period of time. In
addition, when security deposits and
fees for the issuance or availability of
credit are charged to the consumer’s
account, they diminish the value of that
account by reducing the credit available
to the consumer for purchases or other
transactions.58
Injury is not reasonably avoidable. It
does not appear that consumers are able
to avoid the injury caused by the
financing of security deposits and fees
for the issuance or availability of credit.
As an initial matter, disclosures may not
be effective in allowing consumers to
avoid these charges, particularly where
deceptive sales practices mislead
consumers about the amount of credit
available.59 For example, in one recent
case, the court found that credit card
marketing materials sent to consumers
who were otherwise unable to qualify
for credit ‘‘did not represent an accurate
estimation of a consumer’s credit limit’’
and that, ‘‘at all times, it appeared that
the confusion was purposely fostered by
[the defendant’s] telemarketers.’’ 60 In
these circumstances, consumers may
lack the information necessary to avoid
harm.
Furthermore, because cards with high
security deposits and fees are typically
targeted at subprime consumers whose
credit histories or other characteristics
may prevent them from obtaining a
credit card elsewhere, those consumers
may not be able to avoid financing the
fees associated with these cards because
they lack the funds to pay the charges
up front.61 Furthermore, because the
58 See OCC Advisory Letter 2004–4, at 3 (Apr. 28,
2004) (stating that a finding of unfairness with
respect to subprime cards with financed security
deposits could be based on the fact that ‘‘because
charges to the card by the issuer utilize all or
substantially all of the nominal credit line assigned
by the issuer, they eliminate the card utility and
credit availability applied and paid for by the
cardholder’’) (available at https://www.occ.treas.gov/
ftp/advisory/2004-4.txt).
59 See, e.g., OCC Advisory Letter 2004–4, at 2–3
(finding that ‘‘solicitations and other marketing
materials used for [subprime] credit card programs
have not adequately informed consumers of the
costs and other terms, risks, and limitations of the
product being offered’’ and that, ‘‘[i]n a number of
cases, disclosures problems associated with secured
credit cards and related products have constituted
deceptive practices under the applicable standards
of the FTC Act’’ (emphasis in original)); In re First
Nat’l Bank in Brookings, No. 2003–1 (Dept. of the
Treasury, OCC) (Jan. 17, 2003) (available at
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea2003-1.pdf); In re First
Nat’l Bank of Marin, No. 2001–97 (Dept. of the
Treasury, OCC Dec. 3, 2001) (available at
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea2001-97.pdf).
60 People v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 805 N.Y.S.2d
175, 178 (App. Div. 2005).
61 See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rule, 48
FR at 7746 (‘‘If 80 percent of creditors include a
certain clause in their contracts, for example, even
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Board’s proposals under Regulation Z
focus on amounts charged when the
account is opened, those disclosures
could be evaded by subsequent charges,
leaving consumers with less available
credit than they anticipated. Thus,
consumers may not reasonably be able
to avoid the injury caused by the
financing of security deposits and fees
for the issuance or availability of credit.
Injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits. The Agencies
understand that, in some cases,
consumer credit card accounts with
financed security deposits and fees can
provide benefits to consumers who are
unable to obtain a credit card without
such charges and who lack the available
funds to pay the security deposit and
fees at or before account opening. Once,
however, security deposits and fees for
the issuance or availability of credit
consume a majority of the credit limit,
it appears that the benefit to consumers
from access to available credit is
outweighed by the high cost of paying
for that credit. The Agencies have
sought to narrowly tailor the proposal
by allowing institutions to charge to the
account security deposits and fees that
total less than a majority of the credit
limit during the first year and by
allowing institutions to charge amounts
totaling no more than 25 percent of the
credit limit during the first billing cycle.
Security deposits and fees paid from
separate funds would not be affected by
the proposal.
Finally, although public policy does
not serve a primary basis for the
Agencies’ determination, the established
public policy in favor of the safety and
soundness of financial institutions
appears to support the proposed
limitations on the financing of security
deposits and fees for the issuance or
availability of credit because that
practice appears to create a greater risk
of default.62
the consumer who examines contract[s] from three
different sellers has a less than even chance of
finding a contract without the clause. In such
circumstances relatively few consumers are likely
to find the effort worthwhile, particularly given the
difficulties of searching for contract terms. * * *’’
(footnotes omitted)).
62 See OCC Advisory Letter 2004–4, at 4
(‘‘[P]roducts carrying fee structures that are
significantly higher than the norm pose a greater
risk of default. * * * This is particularly true when
the security deposit and fees deplete the credit line
so as to provide little or no card utility or credit
availability upon issuance. In such circumstances,
when the consumer has no separate funds at stake,
and little or no consideration has been provided in
exchange for the fees and other amounts charged to
the consumer, the product may provide a
disincentive for responsible credit behavior and
adversely affect the consumer’s credit standing.’’).
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ll.27(a) Annual Rule
Proposed § ll.27(a) prohibits
institutions from financing security
deposits and fees for the issuance or
availability of credit during the twelve
months following account opening if, in
the aggregate, those fees constitute a
majority of the initial credit limit.
Proposed § ll.27(a) would not,
however, apply to security deposits and
fees for the issuance or availability of
credit that are not charged to the
account. For example, an institution
would not be prohibited from providing
a credit card account that requires a
consumer to pay a security deposit
equal to the amount of credit extended
if that deposit is not charged to the
account. Proposed comment 27–1
clarifies that the ‘‘initial credit limit’’ for
purposes of this section is the limit in
effect when the account is opened.
Proposed comment 27(a)–1 clarifies that
the total amount of security deposits
and fees for the issuance or availability
of credit constitutes a majority of the
initial credit limit if that total is greater
than half of the limit. For example,
assume that a consumer credit card
account has an initial credit limit of
$500. Under proposed § ll.27(a), an
institution may charge to the account
security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit totaling
no more than $250 during the twelve
months after the date on which the
account is opened (consistent with
proposed § ll.27(b)).
ll.27(b) Monthly Rule
Proposed § .27(b) prohibits
institutions from charging to the
account during the first billing cycle
security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit that, in
the aggregate, constitute more than 25
percent of the initial credit limit. Any
additional security deposits and fees
must be spread equally among the
eleven billing cycles following the first
billing cycle. Proposed comment
27(b)–1 clarifies that, when dividing
amounts pursuant to proposed
§ ll.27(b)(2), the institution may
adjust amounts by one dollar or less. For
example, if an institution is dividing
$125 over eleven billing cycles, it may
charge $12 for four months and $11 for
seven months. Proposed comment
27(b)–2 provides the following example
of the application of proposed
§ ll.27(b): Assume that a consumer
credit card account opened on January
1 has an initial credit limit of $500 and
that an institution charges to the
account security deposits and fees for
the issuance or availability of credit that
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total $250 during the twelve months
after the date on which the account is
opened. Assume also that the billing
cycles for this account begin on the first
day of the month and end on the last
day of the month. Under proposed
§ ll.27(b), the institution may charge
to the account no more than $250 in
security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit. If it
charges $250, the institution may charge
as much as $125 during the first billing
cycle. If it charges $125 during the first
billing cycle, it may then charge $12 in
any four billing cycles and $11 in any
seven billing cycles during the year.
ll.27(c) Fees for the Issuance or
Availability of Credit
Proposed § ll.27(c) defines ‘‘fees for
the issuance or availability of credit’’ as
including any annual or other periodic
fee, any fee based on account activity or
inactivity, and any non-periodic fee that
relates to opening an account. This
definition is based on the definition of
‘‘fees for the issuance or availability of
credit’’ in proposed 12 CFR 226.5a(b)(2).
See 72 FR at 33046. This definition does
not include fees such as late fees, fees
for exceeding the credit limit, or fees for
replacing a card. Proposed comments
27(c)–1, 2, and 3 are based on similar
commentary to proposed 12 CFR
226.5a(b)(2) and clarify the meaning of
‘‘fees for the issuance or availability of
credit.’’ See 72 FR at 33108.
Request for Comment
The Agencies seek comment on:
• The dollar amount of security
deposits and fees for the issuance or
availability of credit typically charged to
the account in the first billing cycle.
• The percentage of the initial credit
line that is typically made unavailable
due to security deposits and fees
charged to the account during the first
billing cycle.
• The degree to which consumers
(including consumers with limited or
damaged credit histories) can secure
credit cards without high fees for the
issuance or availability of credit.
• Whether the proposal would
inappropriately curtail consumers’
access to credit.
• Whether the final rule should
impose additional, specific restrictions
on charges on credit card accounts that
a creditor can impose without the
consumer’s advance authorization.
• Whether the twelve-month time
period in the proposal is the appropriate
time period to consider in determining
how much of the credit limit is
consumed by security deposits and fees.
• Whether disclosure of security
deposits and fees enables consumers to
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understand the impact of those charges
on the availability of credit.
• Whether alternatives to proposed
§ ll.27(b) are appropriate.
Section ll.28—Deceptive Acts or
Practices Regarding Firm Offers of
Credit
Proposed § ll.28 applies when
institutions make firm offers of credit
for consumer credit card accounts that
contain a range of or multiple annual
percentage rates or credit limits. When
the rate or credit limit that a consumer
responding to such an offer will receive
depends on specific criteria bearing on
creditworthiness, § ll.28 requires that
the institution disclose the types of
eligibility criteria in the solicitation.
The disclosure must be provided in a
manner that is reasonably
understandable to consumers and
designed to call attention to the nature
and significance of the eligibility criteria
for the lowest annual percentage rate or
highest credit limit stated in the
solicitation. Under the proposal, an
institution may use the following
disclosure to meet these requirements, if
it is presented in a manner that calls
attention to the nature and significance
of the eligibility information, as
applicable: ‘‘If you are approved for
credit, your annual percentage rate and/
or credit limit will depend on your
credit history, income, and debts.’’
Legal Analysis
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
limits the purposes for which consumer
reports can be obtained. It permits
consumer reporting agencies to furnish
consumer reports only for one of the
‘‘permissible purposes’’ enumerated in
the statute.63 One of the permissible
purposes set forth in the FCRA relates
to prescreened firm offers of credit or
insurance.64 In a typical use of
prescreening for firm offers of credit, a
creditor submits a request to a consumer
reporting agency for the contact
information of consumers meeting
certain pre-established criteria that will
be reflected in the consumer reporting
agency’s records, such as credit scores
in a certain range. The creditor then
sends offers of credit targeted to those
consumers, which state certain terms
under which credit may be provided.
For example, a firm offer of credit may
contain statements regarding the annual
percentage rate or credit limit that may
be provided.
63 See 15 U.S.C. 1681b. Similarly, persons
obtaining consumer reports may do so only with a
permissible purpose. See 15 U.S.C. 1681b(f).
64 See 15 U.S.C. 1681a(l) (defining ‘‘firm offer of
credit or insurance’’).
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The FCRA requires that a firm offer of
credit state, among other things, that (1)
information contained in the
consumer’s credit report was used in
connection with the transaction; (2) the
consumer received the firm offer
because the consumer satisfied the
criteria for creditworthiness under
which the consumer was selected for
the offer; and (3) if applicable, the credit
may not be extended if, after the
consumer responds to the offer, the
consumer does not meet the criteria
used to select the consumer for the offer
or any other applicable criteria bearing
on creditworthiness or does not furnish
any required collateral.65 The creditor
may apply certain additional criteria to
evaluate applications from consumers
that respond to the offer, such as the
consumer’s income or debt-to-income
ratio.66 As discussed below, the
Agencies are concerned that consumers
receiving firm offers of credit may not
understand that they are not necessarily
eligible for the lowest annual percentage
rate and the highest credit limit stated
in the offer.
It appears to be a deceptive act or
practice under the standards articulated
by the FTC to make a firm offer of credit
for a consumer credit card account
without disclosing that consumers may
not receive the lowest annual
percentage rate and highest credit limit
offered.
Likely to mislead consumers acting
reasonably under the circumstances. As
discussed above, the FCRA requires that
firm offers of credit state that the
consumer was selected for the offer
based on certain criteria for
creditworthiness.67 Indeed, firm offers
of credit often state that consumers have
been ‘‘pre-selected’’ for credit or make
similar statements. Thus, in the absence
of an affirmative statement to the
contrary, consumers may reasonably
believe that they can receive the lowest
annual percentage rate and highest
credit limit stated in the offer even
though that is not the case.68 For
65 See 15 U.S.C. 1681m(d)(1); see also 16 CFR
642.1–642.4 (Prescreen Opt-Out Notice Rule).
66 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 1681a(l).
67 See 15 U.S.C. 1681m(d)(1)(B).
68 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception at 3
(‘‘To be considered reasonable, the interpretation or
reaction does not have to be the only one. When
a seller’s representation conveys more than one
meaning to reasonable consumers, one of which is
false, the seller is liable for the misleading
interpretation.’’ (footnotes omitted)). In consumer
testing conducted in relation to the Board’s June
2007 Proposal, almost all participants understood
that the credit limit for which they would qualify
depended on their creditworthiness, such as credit
history. See 72 FR at 32984. This testing did not,
however, specifically focus on firm offers of credit,
which, as discussed above, contain statements that
the consumer has been selected for the offer.
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example, assume that an institution
obtains from a consumer reporting
agency a list of consumers with credit
scores of 650 or higher for purposes of
sending those consumers a solicitation
for a firm offer of credit. The solicitation
sent by the institution states that the
consumer has been ‘‘pre-selected’’ for
credit and advertises ‘‘rates from 8.99%
to 19.99%’’ and ‘‘credit limits from
$1,000 to $10,000.’’ But under the
criteria established by the institution
before the selection of the consumers for
the offer, the institution will only
provide an interest rate of 8.99% and a
credit limit of $10,000 to those
consumers responding to the
solicitation who are verified to have a
credit score of 650 or higher, who have
a debt-to-income ratio below a certain
amount, and who meet other specific
criteria bearing on creditworthiness.
Because the consumers receiving the
offer are not informed of these
requirements, consumers who do not
meet one or more of the requirements
could reasonably interpret the offer as
stating that they may receive an interest
rate of 8.99% or a credit limit of $10,000
when, in fact, they will not.69
As noted above, the FCRA requires
that firm offers of credit state, where
applicable, that credit may not be
extended if the consumer no longer
meets the criteria used to select the
consumer for the offer or does not meet
any other applicable criteria bearing on
creditworthiness.70 This statement,
however, only informs the consumer
that there may be circumstances in
which the consumer will not be eligible
to receive any credit. This statement
does not enable consumers to evaluate
whether they will be eligible for the
lowest annual percentage rate and
highest credit limit if they respond to
the firm offer.
Materiality. Statements in firm offers
of credit that the consumer has been
selected for the offer based on certain
criteria for creditworthiness or that the
consumer has been ‘‘pre-selected’’ for
credit are material because they are
likely to affect a consumer’s decision
about whether to respond to the offer of
credit.71 Furthermore, statements in
firm offers of credit regarding credit
69 See FTC v. U.S. Sales Corp., 785 F. Supp. 737,
751 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (concluding that express
representations that consumers would not be turned
down for a secured credit card were misleading
because applicants could be denied a card if they
had a poor credit history).
70 See 15 U.S.C. 1681m(d)(1)(C).
71 FTC Policy Statement on Deception at 6–7 (‘‘A
‘material’ misrepresentation or practice is one
which is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or
conduct regarding a product. In other words, it is
information that is important to consumers.’’
(footnotes omitted)).
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terms are presumptively material
because they relate to the cost of a
product or service.72
Proposal
ll.28(a) Disclosure of Criteria Bearing
on Creditworthiness
Proposed § ll.28(a) provides that, if
an institution offers a range or multiple
annual percentage rates or credit limits
when making a solicitation for a firm
offer of credit for a consumer credit card
account, and the annual percentage rate
or credit limit that consumers approved
for credit will receive depends on
specific criteria bearing on
creditworthiness, the institution must
disclose the types of criteria in the
solicitation. The disclosure must be
provided in a manner that is reasonably
understandable to consumers and
designed to call attention to the nature
and significance of the information
regarding the eligibility criteria for the
lowest annual percentage rate or highest
credit limit offered.
Under the proposal, an institution
may use the following disclosure to
meet these requirements, if it is
presented in a manner that calls
attention to the nature and significance
of the eligibility information: ‘‘If you are
approved for credit, your annual
percentage rate and credit limit will
depend on your credit history, income,
and debts.’’ Proposed comment
.28(a)(1)–1 explains that whether a
disclosure has been provided in a
manner that is designed to call attention
to the nature and significance of
required information depends on where
the disclosure is placed in the
solicitation and how it is presented,
including whether the disclosure uses a
typeface and type size that are easy to
read and uses boldface or italics. Placing
the disclosure in a footnote would not
satisfy this requirement. Proposed
comment .28(a)–2 clarifies that, to the
extent that disclosures required by
proposed § ll.28(a) are provided
electronically, the institution must
comply with the requirements in 12
CFR 226.5a(a)(2)–8 and –9.
Proposed comment .28(a)–3 clarifies
that a firm offer of credit solicitation
that states an annual percentage rate or
credit limit for a credit card feature and
a different annual percentage rate or
credit limit for a different credit card
feature does not offer multiple annual
percentage rates or credit limits. For
example, if a firm offer of credit
solicitation offers a 15% annual
percentage rate for purchases and a 20%
annual percentage rate for cash
72 See
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advances, the solicitation does not offer
multiple annual percentage rates for
purposes of proposed § ll.28(a).
Proposed comment .28(a)–4 provides an
example of the operation of proposed
§ ll.28(a).
Proposed comment .28(a)–5 clarifies
that, when making a disclosure under
proposed § ll.28, an institution may
only disclose the criteria it uses in
evaluating whether consumers who are
approved for credit will receive the
lowest annual percentage rate or the
highest credit limit. For example, if an
institution does not consider the
consumer’s debts when determining
whether the consumer should receive
the lowest annual percentage rate or
highest credit limit, the disclosure must
not refer to ‘‘debts.’’
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.28(b) Firm Offer of Credit Defined
Proposed § ll.28(c) provides that,
for purposes of this section, ‘‘firm offer
of credit’’ has the same meaning as that
term has under the definition of ‘‘firm
offer of credit or insurance’’ in section
603(l) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(15 U.S.C. 1681a(l)).
Request for Comment
The Agencies are concerned that the
disclosure in proposed § ll.28(a) may
not be effective unless it is provided in
close proximity to the annual
percentage rate and/or credit limit in the
firm offer of credit. However, the
Agencies also recognize that the annual
percentage rate and/or credit limit may
be stated multiple times in the offer.
Accordingly, the Agencies request
comment on whether proposed
§ ll.28 should contain a proximity
requirement. If a proximity requirement
were to be adopted, the Agencies
request comment on whether the
disclosure should be proximate to the
first statement of the annual percentage
rate or credit limit or the most
prominent statement of the annual
percentage rate or credit limit.
The Agencies also request comment
on:
• Whether consumers who receive
firm offers of credit offering a range of
or multiple annual percentage rates or
credit limits understand that there may
be no possibility that they will be
eligible for the lowest annual percentage
rate and the highest credit limit stated
in the offer.
• Whether the proposed disclosure
would be effective in informing
consumers that they may not receive the
best terms advertised.
Other Credit Card Practices
The Agencies are also concerned
about the potentially deceptive use of
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the term ‘‘interest free’’ in connection
with deferred interest plans for credit
cards. While consumers may benefit
from making payments over a period of
time, the Agencies are concerned that
some consumers may not be adequately
informed that accrued interest charges
will be added to the principal owed if
they fail to make payment in full by the
end of the deferred interest term or
otherwise default on the agreement.
Because the Board is addressing this
concern in a separate proposal under
Regulation Z in today’s Federal
Register, the Agencies are not proposing
to address the issue in this rulemaking.
Under the Board’s Regulation Z
proposal, creditors that describe
deferred interest plans by using ‘‘no
interest’’ or similar terms in regard to
interest during the deferred interest
period would be required to disclose in
close proximity to the first listing of
such terms: (1) A statement that interest
will be charged from the date of
purchase if the balance is not paid in
full by the end of the deferred interest
period; and (2) if applicable, a statement
that making only the minimum payment
will not pay off the balance or
transaction in time to avoid interest
charges.
VI. Section-By-Section Analysis of
Overdraft Services Subpart
Introduction
Historically, if a consumer engaged in
a transaction that overdrew his or her
account, depository institutions used
their discretion on an ad hoc basis to
pay the overdraft, usually imposing a
fee. The Board recognized this
longstanding practice when it initially
adopted Regulation Z in 1969 to
implement TILA. The regulation
provided that these transactions are
generally not covered under Regulation
Z where there is no written agreement
between the consumer and institution to
pay an overdraft and impose a fee. See
12 CFR § 226.4(c)(3). The treatment of
overdrafts in Regulation Z was designed
to facilitate depository institutions’
ability to accommodate consumers’
transactions on an ad hoc basis.
Over the years, most institutions have
largely automated the overdraft payment
process, including setting specific
criteria for determining whether to
honor overdrafts and limits on the
amount of the coverage provided. From
the industry’s perspective, the benefits
of overdraft, or bounced check, services
include a reduction in the costs of
manually reviewing individual items, as
well as the consistent treatment for all
customers with respect to overdraft
payment decisions. Moreover, industry
representatives assert that overdraft
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28927
services are valued by consumers,
particularly for check transactions, as
they allow consumers to avoid
additional fees that would be charged by
the merchant if the item was returned
unpaid, and other adverse
consequences, such as the furnishing of
negative information to a consumer
reporting agency.73
In contrast, consumer advocates
believe overdraft transactions are a highcost form of lending that traps low- and
moderate-income consumers
(particularly students and the elderly)
into paying high fees. They also note
that consumers are enrolled in overdraft
services automatically, often with no
chance to opt out. In addition, consumer
advocates believe that by honoring
check and other types of overdrafts,
institutions encourage consumers to rely
on this service and thereby consumers
incur greater costs. Consumer advocates
also express concerns about debit card
overdrafts where the dollar amount of
the fee may far exceed the dollar
amount of the overdraft, and multiple
fees may be assessed in a single day for
a series of small-dollar transactions.74
According to a recent report from the
GAO, the average cost of overdraft and
insufficient funds fees has increased
roughly 11 percent between 2000 and
2007 to just over $26 per item.75 The
GAO also reported that large institutions
charged between $4 and $5 more for
overdraft and insufficient fund fees
compared to smaller institutions. In
addition, the GAO Bank Fees Report
noted that a small number of
institutions (primarily large banks)
apply tiered fees to overdrafts, charging
higher fees as the number of overdrafts
in the account increases.76
73 See, e.g., Overdraft Protection: Fair Practices
for Consumers: Hearing before the House
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit, House Comm. on Financial Services, 110th
Cong. (2007) (Overdraft Protection Hearing)
(available at https://www.house.gov/apps/list/
hearing/financialsvcs_dem/hr0705072.shtml).
74 See, e.g., Overdraft Protection Hearing at n.42;
Jacqueline Duby, Eric Halperin & Lisa James, High
Cost and Hidden From View: The $10 Billion
Overdraft Loan Market, Ctr. for Responsible
Lending (May 26, 2005) (noting that the bulk of
overdraft fees are incurred by repeat users)
(available at www.responsiblelending.org).
75 See Bank Fees: Federal Banking Regulators
Could Better Insure That Consumers Have Required
Disclosure Documents Prior to Opening Checking or
Savings Accounts, GAO Report 08–281 (January
2008) (GAO Bank Fees Report); see also Bankrate
2007 Checking Account Study, posted Sep. 26, 2007
(reporting an average overdraft fee of over $28 per
item) (available at: www.bankrate.com/brm/news/
chk/chkstudy/20070924_bounced_check_fee_a1.
asp?caret=2e).
76 According to the GAO, of the financial
institutions that applied up to three tiers of fees in
2006, the average overdraft fees were $26.74, $32.53
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Overdraft services vary among
institutions but typically share certain
characteristics. Coverage is ‘‘automatic’’
for consumers who meet the
institution’s criteria (e.g., the account
has been open a certain number of days,
the account is in ‘‘good standing,’’
deposits are made regularly). While
institutions generally do not underwrite
on an individual account basis in
determining whether to enroll the
consumer in the service initially, most
institutions will review individual
accounts periodically to determine
whether the consumer continues to
qualify for the service, and the amounts
that may be covered.
Most overdraft program disclosures
state that payment of an overdraft is
discretionary on the part of the
institution, and disclaim any legal
obligation of the institution to pay any
overdraft. Typically, the service is
extended to also cover non-check
transactions, including withdrawals at
ATMs, automated clearinghouse (ACH)
transactions, debit card transactions at
point-of-sale, pre-authorized automatic
debits from a consumer’s account,
telephone-initiated funds transfers, and
on-line banking transactions. A flat fee
is charged each time an overdraft is paid
and, commonly, institutions charge the
same amount for paying the overdraft as
they would if they returned the item
unpaid. A daily fee also may apply for
each day the account remains
overdrawn.
Where institutions vary most in their
provision of overdraft services is the
extent to which institutions inform
consumers about the existence of the
service or otherwise promote the use of
the service. For those institutions that
choose to promote the existence and
availability of the service, they may also
disclose to consumers, typically in a
brochure or welcome letter, the
aggregate dollar limit of overdrafts that
may be paid under the service.
Notwithstanding the Agencies’
issuance in February 2005 of guidance
on overdraft protection programs, the
Board’s May 2005 final rule under
Regulation DD, and NCUA’s 2006 final
rule under part 707,77 the Agencies
remain concerned about certain aspects
of the marketing, disclosure, and
implementation of some overdraft
services. For example, many consumers
may be automatically enrolled in their
institution’s overdraft service, without
and $34.74, respectively. See GAO Bank Fees
Report at 14.
77 See Background section of the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION for discussion of February 2005 Joint
Guidance and OTS Guidance, the 2005 final
amendments under Regulation DD, and the 2006
final amendments to part 707.
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being given an adequate opportunity to
opt out of the service and avoid the
costs associated with the service. While
the February 2005 overdraft guidance
recommended that consumers be given
an opportunity to opt out, this practice
may not be uniform across institutions
and the opt-out right may not be
adequately disclosed to consumers. In
addition, the Agencies remain
concerned about the adequacy of
disclosures provided to consumers
regarding the costs of overdraft services.
Thus, pursuant to their authority
under 15 U.S.C. 57a(f)(1), the Agencies
are proposing to adopt rules prohibiting
specific unfair acts or practices with
respect to overdraft services. The
Agencies would locate these rules in a
new Subpart D to their respective
regulations under the FTC Act. These
proposals should not be construed as a
definitive conclusion by the Agencies
that a particular act or practice is unfair.
The Board is also publishing a separate
proposal addressing overdraft services
in today’s Federal Register using its
authority under TISA and Regulation
DD.
Section ll.31—Definitions
Proposed § ll.31 sets forth certain
key definitions to clarify the scope and
intent of the provisions addressing
unfair acts or practices involving
overdraft services.
Account
The Agencies would limit the scope
of the overdraft services provisions to
‘‘accounts’’ as defined in TISA,
Regulation DD, and part 707. Thus, the
proposal uses a definition of ‘‘account’’
that is limited to ‘‘a deposit account at
a depository institution that is held by
or offered to a consumer.’’ See proposed
§ ll.31(a); 12 CFR 230.2(a) and
707.2(a). Although the Agencies are
aware that overdraft services are
sometimes provided for prepaid cards,
such card products are beyond the
scope of this rulemaking.
Consumer
The term ‘‘consumer’’ refers to a
person who holds an account primarily
for personal, family, or household
purposes.78 Thus, the proposal would
not cover overdraft services that are
provided for business accounts,
including sole proprietorships. See
proposed § ll.31(b).
Overdraft Service
Proposed § ll.31(c) defines
‘‘overdraft service’’ to mean a service
78 For purposes of this rulemaking, as it relates to
federal credit unions, the term ‘‘consumer’’ refers to
natural person members.
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under which an institution charges a fee
for paying a transaction (including a
check, point-of-sale debit card
transaction, ATM withdrawal and other
electronic transaction, such as a
preauthorized electronic fund transfer
or an ACH debit) that overdraws an
account. The term covers circumstances
when an institution pays an overdraft
pursuant to a promoted program or
service or under an undisclosed policy
or practice and charges a fee for that
service. The term does not, however,
include services in which an institution
pays an overdraft pursuant to a line of
credit subject to the Board’s Regulation
Z, including transfers from a credit card
account, a home equity line of credit or
an overdraft line of credit. The term also
excludes any overdrafts paid through a
service that transfers funds from another
account of the consumer held at the
institution.
Section ll.32—Unfair Acts or
Practices Regarding Overdraft Services
ll.32(a) Consumer Right To Opt Out
In the February 2005 overdraft
guidance, the FDIC, Board, OCC, OTS,
and NCUA recommended as a best
practice that institutions should obtain
a consumer’s affirmative consent to
receive overdraft protection.
Alternatively, where the consumer is
automatically enrolled in overdraft
protection, these agencies stated that
institutions should provide consumers
the opportunity to ‘‘opt out’’ of the
overdraft program and provide a clear
consumer disclosure of this option. 70
FR at 9132; 70 FR at 8431.
While many institutions voluntarily
provide consumers the right to opt out
of overdraft services,79 this may not be
a uniform practice across all
institutions. Moreover, institutions vary
significantly in the manner in which
they provide notice of the opt-out,
leading to the Agencies’ concern that
the opt-out may not be adequately
disclosed to consumers. For instance,
some institutions may disclose the optout in a clause in their deposit
agreement, which many consumers are
unlikely to read, or the clause may not
be written in clearly understandable
language. Others may disclose a
consumer’s right to opt out in a
welcome letter or brochure that
highlights the potential benefits of the
overdraft service, while minimizing or
obscuring either the fees associated with
the service or that there may be less
costly alternatives to the service.
In addition, opt-out notices may not
be provided to consumers at a time
79 See, e.g., American Bankers Association,
‘‘Overdraft Protection: A Guide for Bankers’’ at 18.
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when the consumer is most likely to act.
For example, institutions may provide
notice of a consumer’s right to opt out
solely at account opening or when the
service is initially added to the
consumer’s account. Subsequently,
however, after experiencing an overdraft
and incurring the associated fees, the
consumer will typically not receive
additional notice of the opt-out right,
even though it may be the time at which
the consumer is most likely to focus on
the merits and cost of the service.
In light of these concerns, the
Agencies are proposing to create a new
substantive right for consumers to opt
out of an institution’s overdraft service
to ensure that they have a meaningful
opportunity to decline the service.
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with PROPOSALS3
Legal Analysis
Assessing overdraft fees before the
consumer has been provided with
notice and a reasonable opportunity to
opt out of the institution’s overdraft
service appears to be an unfair act or
practice under 15 U.S.C. 45(n) and the
standards articulated by the FTC.
Substantial consumer injury.
Consumers incur substantial monetary
injury due to the fees assessed in
connection with the payment of
overdrafts. These fees may include per
item fees as well as additional fees that
may be imposed for each day the
account remains overdrawn. As noted
above, the GAO Bank Fees Report
indicates that the cost to consumers
resulting from overdraft loans has grown
over the past few years to just over $26
per item.80 While the payment of
overdrafts may allow consumers to
avoid merchant fees for a returned
check or ACH transaction, there are no
similar consumer benefits for ACH
withdrawals and point-of-sale debit card
transactions. Moreover, consumers
80 See GAO Bank Fees Report at 13–14; see also
Marc Fusaro, Hidden Consumer Loans: An Analysis
of Implicit Interest Rates on Bounced Checks, J. of
Fam. & Econ. Issues (forthcoming June 2008)
(Hidden Consumer Loans) (citing a Moebs $ervices
estimate that 60% of service charge income comes
from insufficient funds fees) (available at: https://
personal.ecu.edu/fusarom/
fusarobpinterestrates.pdf); Eric Halperin and Peter
Smith, Out of Balance: Consumers Pay $17.5 Billion
Per Year in Fees for Abusive Overdraft Loans,
Center for Responsible Lending (July 11, 2007)
(available at: https://www.responsiblelending.org/
pdfs/out-of-balance-report-7-10-final.pdf)
(estimating that consumers paid over $17 billion in
fees for overdraft loans in 2006); Howard Mason,
The Criminal Risk of Actively-Marketed Bounce
Protection Programs, Bernstein Research Call (Feb.
18, 2005) (suggesting that bounce protection
programs account for 2/3 or more of industry NSF
fees of an estimated $12–14 billion); Howard
Mason, Impact of Regulatory Best Practices on
Bounce Protection Services and NSF Fees,
Bernstein Research Call (Feb. 17, 2005) (estimating
that overdraft and NSF fees make up approximately
half of service charge income).
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Jkt 214001
relying on overdraft services may be
more likely to overdraw their accounts,
thereby incurring more overdraft fees in
the long run.
Injury is not reasonably avoidable. It
appears that consumers cannot
reasonably avoid this injury if they are
automatically enrolled in an
institution’s overdraft service without
having an opportunity to opt out.
Although consumers can reduce the risk
of overdrawing their accounts by
carefully tracking their credits and
debits, consumers often lack sufficient
information about key aspects of their
account. For example, a consumer
cannot know with any degree of
certainty when funds from a deposit or
a credit for a returned purchase will be
made available.
Injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits. The benefits to
consumers and competition from not
providing an opt-out do not appear to
outweigh the injury. This is particularly
the case for ATM withdrawals and POS
debit card transactions where, but for
the overdraft service, the transaction
would typically be denied and the
consumer would be given the
opportunity to provide other forms of
payment without incurring any fees.81
Moreover, for many POS debit card
transactions, the amount of the fee
assessed may substantially exceed the
amount of the overdraft loan.82 This
injury to consumers is further
aggravated when multiple fees are
charged in a single day due to multiple
small-dollar overdrafts. Even in the case
of check and ACH transactions, where
payment of the check or ACH overdraft
may allow the consumer to avoid a
second fee assessed by the merchant for
a returned item as well as possible
negative reporting consequences,
consumers may prefer instead not to
have the overdraft paid to avoid
additional daily fees. Furthermore,
consumers who have overdraft services
may be more likely to rely on the
existence of the service and overdraw
81 According to one consumer group survey, most
respondents preferred that their debit card be
declined for insufficient funds at the checkout
rather than having the overdraft paid and being
assessed a fee. Eric Halperin, Lisa James and Peter
Smith, Debit Card Danger, Center for Responsible
Lending at 9 (Jan. 25, 2007) (available at: https://
responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Debit-Card-Dangerreport.pdf).
82 See Eric Halperin, Testimony on Overdraft
Protection: Fair Practices for Consumers Before the
House Comm. on Financial Services, Subcomm. on
Fin. Instits. & Consumer Credit at 6 (July 11, 2007)
(stating that consumers pay $1.94 in fees for every
one dollar borrowed to cover a debit card POS
overdraft) (available at: https://www.house.gov/apps/
list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/hr0705072.shtml).
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28929
their accounts and thereby incur
substantial fees.83
Thus, while many consumers may
derive some benefit from having
overdraft transactions paid, the
proposed rule would allow each
consumer to decide whether this benefit
sufficiently compensates for the cost of
the overdraft fees that will be assessed
against his or her account.
Proposal
ll.32(a)(1) General Rule
Under § ll.32(a)(1), institutions
would be prohibited from assessing any
fees on a consumer’s account in
connection with an overdraft service
unless the consumer is given notice and
a reasonable opportunity to opt out of
the service, and the consumer does not
opt out. The consumer’s right to opt out
of an institution’s overdraft service
would apply to all methods of payment,
including check, ACH and other
electronic methods of payment, such as
ATM withdrawals and POS debit card
transactions. Institutions would also be
required to provide consumers with the
option of opting out only of overdrafts
at ATMs and for POS debit card
transactions under proposed
§ ll.32(a)(2), discussed below.
The proposal would require notice of
the opt-out to be provided both before
the institution’s assessment of any fee or
charge for paying an overdraft to allow
consumers to avoid overdraft fees
altogether, and subsequently at least
once during or for each periodic
statement cycle in which any overdraft
fee or charge is assessed to the
consumer’s account. The subsequent
notice requirement is intended to ensure
that consumers are given notice of their
right to opt out at a time that may be
most relevant to them, that is, after they
have been assessed fees or other charges
for the service. The institution would
have flexibility with respect to the
means by which it provides notice of
83 Some economic research suggests that when a
bank pays overdrafts through an overdraft program,
consumers overdraw their accounts more often. See
Fusaro, Hidden Consumer Loans at 6. This finding
is consistent with assertions by some third-party
vendors of overdraft protection services that
implementation of overdraft protection can result in
a substantial increase in fee income from overdraft
and insufficient funds fees. See, e.g., https://
www.banccommercegroup.com/aarp.html
(‘‘guaranteeing’’ that use of overdraft protection can
increase revenue from insufficient funds income by
at least 50%) (visited Mar. 21, 2008); https://
www.cetoandassociates.com/
index.php?option=com_content&
task=view&id=147&Itemid=102 (representing that
overdraft protection can increase insufficient funds
revenue by 200%) (visited Mar. 21, 2008); https://
www.jmfa.com/pageContent.aspx?id=126 (reporting
an increase of 50–300% in insufficient funds
revenue for clients) (visited Mar. 21, 2008).
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the consumer’s opt-out right following
the payment of the overdraft.
For example, the consumer may be
given notice on a periodic statement
that reflects the imposition of fees
associated with payment of an overdraft.
Alternatively, the opt-out right may be
disclosed on a notice that the institution
may send promptly after the payment of
an overdraft to alert the consumer of the
overdraft, as is the practice of many
institutions. (Under the latter option,
institutions need only provide the optout notice once during a statement
period, even if multiple fees are charged
in a single period.) The requirement to
provide subsequent notice of the opt-out
would terminate if the consumer has
exercised this right. See proposed
§ ll.32(a)(1). Of course, if the
consumer opts out after having incurred
an overdraft fee, the opt-out would
apply only to subsequent transactions
and the consumer would remain
responsible for the fee.
The Agencies are nevertheless aware
that an opt-out will not provide a
meaningful consumer protection if the
notice of the opt-out right is not
presented in a clear and conspicuous
manner to a consumer, or if the notice
does not contain sufficient information
for the consumer to make an informed
choice. Thus, in a separate proposal
under TISA and Regulation DD in
today’s Federal Register, the Board is
proposing additional amendments
regarding the form, content and timing
requirements for the opt-out notice. See
proposed comment 32(a)(1)–1.84 As part
of the rulemaking process, the Board
intends to conduct consumer testing on
the proposed opt-out form to ensure that
the notice is presented effectively to
consumers in a format they can easily
understand and use. The Agencies
anticipate issuing any final rules
simultaneously after reviewing
comments received on both proposals.
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with PROPOSALS3
ll.32(a)(2) Partial Opt-Out
Some consumers may want their
institution to pay overdrafts by check
and ACH, but do not want overdrafts
paid in other circumstances, such as for
ATM withdrawals and debit card
transactions at a point-of-sale.85 Thus,
the proposed rule requires institutions
to provide consumers with the option of
84 While NCUA is not proposing amendments to
its 12 CFR part 707 in today’s Federal Register,
TISA requires NCUA to promulgate regulations
substantially similar to Regulation DD. Accordingly,
NCUA will issue amendments to part 707 following
the Board’s adoption of final rules under Regulation
DD.
85 See Haperin, et al., Debit Card Danger at 3
(concluding that debit card POS overdraft loans are
more costly than overdraft loans from other sources,
such as overdrafts by check).
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opting out only of the payment of
overdrafts at ATMs and for debit card
transactions at the point-of-sale. See
§ ll.32(a)(2). As previously stated, the
Agencies note that a consumer that opts
out of an overdraft protection service
typically also incurs a cost when the
check is returned and an insufficient
funds fee is charged by the institution
(and possibly also by the merchant).
Accordingly, the partial opt-out
requirement in § ll.32(a)(2) is
intended to allow consumers the ability
to determine for themselves whether
they prefer that their institution deny
the payment of all overdrafts, or to have
overdrafts paid for check and ACH
transactions in order to avoid potential
merchant fees for returned items or
other adverse consequences. While the
Agencies understand that some
processors do not currently have
systems capable of paying overdrafts for
some, but not all, payment channels, it
appears that the benefits of providing
consumers a choice regarding the
transaction types for which they want to
have overdrafts paid outweighs the
potential programming costs associated
with this requirement.
As further discussed below, in light of
the potential benefits to consumers if
overdrafts for check and ACH
transactions are paid, the Agencies seek
comment on whether the consumer’s
right to opt out should be limited to
overdrafts caused by ATM withdrawals
and debit card transactions at a pointof-sale. Under this alternative approach,
institutions would be permitted, but not
required, to provide consumers the
option of opting out of the payment of
overdrafts for check and ACH
transactions.
ll.32(a)(3) Exceptions
In some cases, an institution may not
be able to avoid paying a transaction
that overdraws an account. Under the
proposal, if the institution does pay an
overdraft, the consumer’s decision to
opt out of the institution’s overdraft
service would not prohibit institutions
from paying overdrafts in all cases.
Rather, if the institution does pay an
overdraft, the consumer’s decision to
opt out would generally prohibit the
institution from assessing a fee for the
service. The Agencies recognize,
however, that, in certain narrow
circumstances, it may be appropriate to
allow institutions to assess a fee or
charge for paying an overdraft even
where the consumer has elected to opt
out.
Section ll.32(a)(3)(i) would permit
an institution to charge an overdraft fee
for a debit card transaction if the
purchase amount presented at
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settlement by a merchant exceeds the
amount that was originally requested for
pre-authorization.86 This exception is
intended to cover circumstances in
which the settlement amount exceeds
the authorization amount because the
precise transaction amount is not
known to the consumer at the time of
the transaction. (This situation is
distinct from the circumstances
discussed below with respect to the
proposed prohibition of assessing an
overdraft fee in connection with debit
holds in which the authorization
amount exceeds the actual purchase
amount presented at settlement.)
For example, for some fuel purchases,
the consumer may swipe his or her
debit card and the merchant may seek
a $1 pre-authorization that is primarily
intended to verify whether the
consumer’s account is valid. After the
consumer has completed the fuel
purchase, the merchant will submit the
actual amount of the purchase for
settlement, which may cause the
consumer to incur an overdraft.
Similarly, for restaurant meals, the
settlement amount may not match the
amount submitted for pre-authorization
if the consumer elects to add a tip to the
amount of the bill. Proposed comments
32(a)(3)(i)–1 and –2 illustrate this
exception for fuel purchases and
restaurant transactions.
The second exception is intended to
address circumstances in which a
merchant or other payee presents a debit
card transaction for payment by paperbased means, rather than electronically
using a card terminal, and in which the
payee does not obtain authorization
from the card issuer at the time of the
transaction. For example, the merchant
may use a card imprinter to take an
imprint of the consumer’s card and later
submit the sales slip with the imprint to
its acquirer for payment. In this
circumstance, the card issuer does not
learn about the transaction, and thus
cannot verify whether the consumer has
sufficient funds, until it receives the
sales slip presenting the transaction for
payment. Section ll.32(a)(3)(ii) would
permit an institution to assess an
overdraft fee or charge if the transaction
causes the consumer to overdraw his or
her account, despite the consumer’s
election to opt out. Proposed comment
32(a)(3)(ii)–1 illustrates this exception.
The Agencies considered, but are not
proposing, an exception that would
86 Pre-authorization describes the dollar amount
of funds that are held on a consumer’s account (or
against a credit line) when a card is swiped to
initiate a transaction. This typically occurs in
connection with debit and credit card transactions
in which the actual dollar amount of the transaction
is not known until the end of the transaction.
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allow an institution to impose an
overdraft fee despite a consumer’s optout election as long as the institution
did not ‘‘knowingly’’ authorize a
transaction that resulted in an overdraft.
The Agencies are concerned, however,
that given the difficulty in determining
a consumer’s ‘‘real-time’’ account
balance at any given time, such an
exception would undercut the
protections provided by a consumer’s
election to opt out. At the same time,
the Agencies recognize that a rule that
generally prohibits institutions from
imposing an overdraft fee if the
consumer has opted out could adversely
impact small institutions that use a
daily batch balance method for
authorizing transactions. Because such
institutions do not update the balance
during the day to reflect other
authorizations or settlements for
transactions that occurred before the
authorization request, their
authorization decisions would be based
upon the same dollar amount
throughout the day. Accordingly, it
would be infeasible for these
institutions to determine at any given
point in time whether the consumer in
fact has a sufficient balance to cover the
requested transaction. Similarly,
institutions that use a stand-in processor
because, for example, the ATM network
is temporarily off-line, would also be
unable to determine at the time of the
transaction whether the consumer’s
balance is sufficient to cover a requested
transaction. In both of these cases, a
transaction could result in an overdraft
but the institution would not be able to
assess a fee for that service. Thus, as
discussed below in the request for
comment, the Agencies seek comment
on whether exceptions are necessary to
address these circumstances, and if so,
how such exceptions may be narrowly
tailored so as not to undermine
protections afforded by a consumer’s
election to opt out. Comment is also
requested on whether there are
additional circumstances in which an
exception may be appropriate to allow
an institution to impose a fee in
connection with paying an overdraft,
notwithstanding a consumer’s election
to opt out.
ll.32(a)(4)–(6)
Section ll.32(a)(4) provides that
institutions must comply with a
consumer’s opt-out request as soon as
reasonably practicable after the
institution receives it. Proposed
§ ll.32(a)(5) provides that a consumer
may opt out of an institution’s overdraft
service at any time since consumers
may decide later in the account
relationship not to have overdrafts paid.
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Once exercised, the consumer’s opt-out
remains in effect unless subsequently
revoked by the consumer in writing or,
if the consumer agrees, electronically.
See § ll.32(a)(6).
Request for Comment
The Agencies request comment on:
• Whether the scope of the
consumer’s opt-out right under
§ ll.32(a)(1) should be limited to
ATM transactions and debit card
transactions at the point-of-sale. Under
this alternative approach, institutions
would be permitted, but not required, to
provide consumers the option of opting
out of the payment of overdrafts for
check and ACH transactions.
• The potential costs and consumer
benefits for implementing a partial optout that applies only to ATM
transactions and debit card transactions
at the point-of-sale.
• Whether there are other
circumstances in which an exception
may be appropriate to allow an
institution to impose a fee or charge for
paying an overdraft even if the
consumer has opted out of the
institution’s overdraft service, and if so
how to narrowly craft such an exception
so as not to undermine protections
provided by a consumer’s opt-out
election.
Debit Holds
ll.32(b) Debit Holds
Debit holds occur when a consumer
uses a debit card for a transaction in
which the actual purchase amount is
not known at the time the transaction is
authorized, causing the merchant (and
in some cases the card-issuing bank) to
place a hold on the consumer’s account
for an amount that may be in excess of
the actual purchase amount in order to
protect against potential risk of loss. For
example, this may occur at a pay-at-the
pump fuel dispenser, restaurant, or
hotel. For example, for fuel purchases,
card network rules may allow the
merchant to place a pre-authorization
hold of up to $75 on the consumer’s
account in certain types of debit card
transactions.87 Similarly, a hotel may
place a hold on the consumer’s account
in an amount sufficient to cover the
length of the stay, plus an additional
amount for incidentals, such as
anticipated room service charges.
While the merchant generally
determines the hold amount based on
limits imposed by the card network, it
is the card-issuing financial institution
that determines how long the hold
87 Other merchants may instead only place a preauthorization hold of $1 in order to verify that the
consumer’s account is valid.
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remains in place, also subject to any
limits imposed by the card network
rules. Typically, the hold is kept in
place until the transaction amount is
presented to the financial institution for
payment and settled. While PIN-based
debit card transactions typically settle
on the same day the card is used by the
consumer (assuming the transaction
takes place before the processing cut-off
time that day), settlement for signaturebased transactions may take up to three
days following authorization. During the
time between authorization and
settlement, the hold remains in place on
the consumer’s account. In some cases,
where the merchant does not use the
same transaction number for both the
authorization and the settlement, both
the authorization amount and the
settlement amount are held on the
consumer’s account until the institution
is able to reconcile the transactions.
The Agencies are concerned that
consumers unfamiliar with debit hold
practices may inadvertently incur
considerable overdraft fees on the
assumption that the available funds in
their account will only be reduced by
the actual purchase amount of the
transaction. For example, a consumer
who purchases $20 worth of gas, but has
a debit hold of $75 placed on the funds
in the consumer’s account, may not
realize that $55 has been made
unavailable to the consumer to use until
the merchant presents the transaction
for payment. During that time, the
consumer engaging in a subsequent
transaction in the belief that they have
only ‘‘spent’’ $20, may inadvertently
spend more than the available amount
in the consumer’s account, incurring
overdraft fees in the process.
Legal Analysis
Assessing an overdraft fee when the
overdraft would not have occurred but
for a hold placed on funds in the
consumer’s account that is in excess of
the actual purchase or transaction
amount appears to be an unfair act or
practice under 15 U.S.C. 45(n) and the
standards articulated by the FTC.
Substantial consumer injury. There is
substantial injury to consumers from
incurring overdraft fees resulting from
debit hold amounts that exceed the
amount of the transaction. The effect
can be compounded if the consumer
conducts more than one transaction
overdrawing his or her account, as a fee
is generally charged each time the
consumer overdraws the account.
Injury is not reasonably avoidable. It
appears that consumers cannot
reasonably avoid this injury as they are
generally unaware of the practice of
debit holds. Even if the consumer were
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to receive notice at point of sale that a
hold, including the amount, will be
placed on the consumer’s funds, the
consumer cannot know the length of
time the hold will remain in place. As
discussed above, the length of a hold
will vary depending on how fast the
transaction is processed and the
procedures of the consumer’s accountholding institution. A consumer cannot
reasonably be expected to verify
whether a hold remains in place before
each and every subsequent transaction.
Injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits. The benefits to
consumers and competition from
allowing fees for an overdraft to be
charged when the overdraft was caused
by a debit hold amount that exceeds the
transaction amount do not appear to
outweigh the injury. The Agencies
understand that financial institutions
charge overdraft fees in part to account
for the potential risk the institution may
assume if the consumer does not have
sufficient funds for a requested
transaction. Under card network rules
generally, institutions guarantee
merchants payment for debit card
transactions that were properly
authorized by the consumer.
Accordingly, without the ability to
assess overdraft fees to protect against
potential losses due to non-payment,
account-holding institutions may be
reluctant to issue debit cards to
consumers.
The Agencies note, however, that the
card issuing financial institution is not
required to send payment for an
authorized transaction until the
transaction is presented for settlement
by the merchant and is posted to the
consumer’s account. At this time, any
potential loss for the financial
institution is not for the amount of the
debit hold, but rather for the actual
purchase amount for the transaction.
The proposed provision would not
prohibit institutions from assessing an
overdraft fee if the consumer’s account
has insufficient funds to cover the
actual purchase amount when the
transaction is presented for settlement
(and the consumer has not opted out).
Thus, because the provision would
allow account-holding institutions to
cover their risk of loss in the event
consumers overdraw their accounts for
the purchase amount of the transaction,
it appears that the availability of debit
cards for consumers will not be
adversely impacted even if this proposal
is adopted. The proposed provision,
however, would allow consumers to
avoid the injury of unwarranted
overdraft fees caused by debit holds that
exceed the purchase amount of the
requested transaction.
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Proposal
As discussed above, proposed
§ ll.32(b) would provide that an
institution must not assess a fee or
charge on the consumer’s account in
connection with an overdraft service if
an overdraft would not have occurred
but for a hold placed on funds in the
consumer’s account that exceeds the
actual purchase or transaction amount.
The Agencies believe that a substantive
ban on assessing fees to address
problems with debit holds is
appropriate rather than disclosure of the
existence of the hold in light of
concerns that such disclosures may be
ineffective for the reasons discussed
above.
Comment 32(b)–1 as proposed
clarifies that the prohibition against
assessing an overdraft fee in connection
with a debit hold applies only if the
overdraft is caused solely by the
existence of the hold. Thus, if there are
other reasons or causes for the
consumer’s overdraft, the institution
may assess an overdraft fee or charge.
These reasons may include other
transactions that may have been
authorized but not yet presented for
settlement, a deposited check in the
consumer’s account that is returned, or
if the actual purchase or transaction
amount for the transaction for which the
hold was placed would have caused the
consumer to overdraw his or her
account.
Application of the rule is illustrated
by four separate examples set forth in
proposed commentary provisions. See
comments 32(b)–2 through –5. The first
example describes the circumstance
where the amount of the hold for an
authorized transaction exceeds the
consumer’s balance. For example,
assume that a consumer with $50 in his
deposited account purchases $20 worth
of fuel. In authorizing the consumer to
begin dispensing fuel after the consumer
has swiped his or her debit card at the
pump, the gas station imposes a hold for
$75 on the consumer’s account. The
proposal would prohibit the consumer’s
financial institution from assessing an
overdraft fee or charge because the
purchase amount for the fuel would not
have caused the consumer to overdraw
his or her account. See proposed
comment 32(b)–2. However, had the
consumer purchased $60 of fuel, the
institution would be permitted to assess
an overdraft fee or charge (assuming the
consumer had not opted out of the
overdraft service) because the
transaction exceeds the consumer’s
account balance.
The second example illustrates the
prohibition when the hold is made in
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connection with another transaction
that has been authorized by the
institution but not yet been presented
for settlement. To illustrate, assume the
same consumer as in the prior example
has $100 in his deposit account, and
uses his or her debit card to purchase
fuel. The gas station puts a hold for $75
on the consumer’s account. The
consumer purchases $20 worth of fuel.
Later that day, and assuming no other
transactions, the consumer withdraws
$75 at an ATM. Under this example, the
consumer’s account-holding institution
would be prohibited from assessing an
overdraft fee or charge in connection
with the $75 withdrawal because the
overdraft would not have occurred but
for the $75 hold. See proposed comment
32(b)–3.
The third example illustrates the
prohibition when both the authorization
amount and the settlement amount are
held against the consumer’s account,
because the merchant did not use the
same transaction code for both
authorization and settlement, causing
the institution to later reconcile the
transaction. To illustrate, assume a
consumer has $100 in his deposit
account, and uses his debit card to
purchase $50 worth of fuel. At the time
the consumer swipes his debit card at
the fuel pump, a hold of $75 is placed
on the consumer’s account. Because the
merchant does not use the same
transaction code for both the preauthorization and for settlement, the
consumer’s account is temporarily
overdrawn. Because the overdraft would
not have occurred but for the existence
of the $75 hold, the institution may not
assess a fee or charge for paying an
overdraft. See proposed comment 32(b)–
4.
The fourth example illustrates a
circumstance in which an institution
may charge an overdraft fee despite the
existence of a hold on funds in the
consumer’s account because there are
other reasons for the overdraft. Using
the same facts as in the example in
proposed comment 32(b)–3, the
consumer makes a $35 purchase of fuel,
instead of $20. Under the third example,
the institution could permissibly charge
an overdraft fee or charge for the
subsequent $75 ATM withdrawal
because the consumer would have
incurred the overdraft even if the hold
had been for the actual amount of the
fuel purchase. See proposed comment
32(b)–5.
Request for Comment
The Agencies seek comment on the
operational issues and costs of
implementing the proposed prohibition
on the imposition of overdraft fees if the
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VIII. Regulatory Analysis
overdraft occurs solely because of the
existence of a hold.
Other Overdraft Practices
Balance Disclosures
The Agencies are also concerned
about balance disclosures that may be
deceptive to consumers if they represent
that the consumer has more funds in his
or her account due to the inclusion of
additional funds the institution may
provide to cover an overdraft. The Board
is addressing this issue in a Regulation
DD proposal published
contemporaneously with today’s
proposed rule.
Transaction Clearing Practices
The Agencies are also concerned
about the impact of transaction clearing
practices on the amount of overdraft
fees that may be incurred by the
consumer. The February 2005 overdraft
guidance lists as a best practice
explaining the impact of transaction
clearing policies to consumers,
including that transactions may not be
processed in the order in which they
occurred and that the order in which
transactions are received by the
institution and processed can affect the
total amount of overdraft fees incurred
by the consumer.88 In its Guidance on
Overdraft Protection Programs, the OTS
also recommended as best practices: (1)
clearly disclosing rules for processing
and clearing transactions; and (2) having
transaction clearing rules that are not
administered unfairly or manipulated to
inflate fees.89
While today’s proposal does not
address transaction clearing practices,
the Agencies solicit comment on the
impact of requiring institutions to pay
smaller dollar items before larger dollar
items when received on the same day
for purposes of assessing overdraft fees
on a consumer’s account. Under such an
approach, institutions could use an
alternative clearing order, provided that
it discloses this option to the consumer
and the consumer affirmatively opts in.
The Agencies solicit comment on how
such a rule would impact an
institution’s ability to process
transactions on a real-time basis.
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VII. Effective Date
The Agencies solicit comment on
when any final rules should be effective
and whether a one-year time period is
appropriate or whether the period
should be longer or shorter.
88 70
89 70
FR at 8431; 70 FR at 9132.
FR at 8431.
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A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Board: The Regulatory Flexibility Act
(5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) (RFA) generally
requires an agency to perform an
assessment of the impact a rule is
expected to have on small entities.
However, under section 605(b) of the
RFA, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the regulatory
flexibility analysis otherwise required
under section 604 of the RFA is not
required if an agency certifies, along
with a statement providing the factual
basis for such certification, that the rule
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. Based on its analysis and for
the reasons stated below, the Board
believes that this proposed rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities. A
final regulatory flexibility analysis will
be conducted after consideration of
comments received during the public
comment period.
1. Statement of the need for, and
objectives of, the proposed rule. The
Federal Trade Commission Act (15
U.S.C. 41 et seq.) (FTC Act) prohibits
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce. 15 U.S.C.
45(a)(1). The FTC Act provides that the
Board (with respect to banks), OTS
(with respect to savings associations),
and the NCUA (with respect to federal
credit unions) are responsible for
prescribing regulations prohibiting such
acts or practices. 15 U.S.C. 57a(f)(1). The
Board, OTS, and NCUA are jointly
proposing regulations under the FTC
Act to protect consumers from specific
unfair or deceptive acts or practices
regarding consumer credit card accounts
and overdraft services. The Board’s
proposed rule will revise Regulation
AA.
Proposals Regarding Consumer Credit
Card Accounts
The proposed requirements would
provide several substantive protections
for consumers against unfair or
deceptive acts or practices with respect
to consumer credit card accounts. First,
proposed § 227.22 ensures that
consumers’ credit card payments are not
treated as late unless they have been
provided a reasonable amount of time to
make payment. Second, proposed
§ 227.23 would ensure that, when
different annual percentage rates apply
to different balances on a credit card
account, consumers’ payments in excess
of the required minimum payment are
allocated among the balances, rather
than exclusively to the balance with the
lowest annual percentage rate. Third,
under proposed § 227.24, an increase in
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28933
the annual percentage rate could not be
applied to the outstanding balance on a
credit card account, except in certain
circumstances. Fourth, proposed
§ 227.25 would protect consumers from
being assessed a fee if the credit limit is
exceeded solely due to a hold placed on
the available credit. Fifth, proposed
§ 227.26 would prohibit institutions
from reaching back to days in earlier
billing cycles when calculating the
amount of interest charged in the
current cycle. Sixth, proposed § 227.27
would ensure that security deposits and
fees for the issuance or availability of
credit (such as account-opening fees or
membership fees) do not consume the
majority of the available credit on a
credit card account during the twelve
months after the account is opened. In
addition, when such amounts exceed 25
percent of the credit limit, they must be
spread equally among the eleven billing
cycles following the first billing cycle.
Seventh and last, proposed § 227.28
would require institutions to disclose in
a firm offer of credit the criteria that will
determine whether consumers receive
the lowest annual percentage rate and
highest credit limit.
Proposals Regarding Overdraft Services
The proposed rule would also provide
substantive protections against unfair or
deceptive acts or practices with respect
to overdraft services. Proposed § 227.32
is intended to ensure that consumers
understand overdraft services and have
the choice to avoid the associated costs
where such services do not meet their
needs. First, consumers could not be
assessed a fee or charge for paying an
overdraft unless the consumer is
provided with the right to opt out of the
payment of overdrafts and a reasonable
opportunity to exercise that right but
does not do so. Second, the proposal
would protect consumers from being
assessed an overdraft fee if the overdraft
is caused solely by a hold on funds.
2. Small entities affected by the
proposed rule. The Board’s proposed
rule would apply to banks and their
subsidiaries, except savings associations
as defined in 12 U.S.C. 1813(b). Based
on 2007 call report data, there are
approximately 2,159 banks with assets
of $165 million or less that would be
required to comply with the Board’s
proposed rule.
3. Recordkeeping, reporting, and
compliance requirements. The proposed
rule does not impose any new
recordkeeping or reporting
requirements. The proposed rule would,
however, impose new compliance
requirements.
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Proposals Regarding Consumer Credit
Card Accounts
Proposed § 227.22 may require some
banks to extend the period of time
provided to consumers to make
payments on consumer credit card
accounts. The Board notes, however,
that some credit card issuers already
send periodic statements 21 days in
advance of the payment due date, which
constitutes a reasonable amount of time
under the proposed rule. Thus, small
entities following this practice would
not be required to alter their systems or
procedures.
Proposed § 227.23 would require
small entities that provide consumer
credit card accounts with multiple
balances at different rates to redesign
their systems to allocate payments in
excess of the minimum payment among
the balances, consistent with the
proposed rule. Compliance with this
proposal may also reduce interest
revenue for small entities that currently
allocate payments first to balances with
the lowest annual percentage rate.
Similarly, compliance with proposed
§ 227.24 will also reduce interest
revenue because such entities would be
prohibited from increasing the annual
percentage rate on an outstanding
balance, except in certain
circumstances. However, small entities
are likely to adjust other terms (such as
increasing the annual percentage rates
offered to consumers when the account
is opened) to compensate for the loss of
revenue. In addition, although proposed
§ 227.24 will limit the ability of small
entities to impose higher rates on preexisting balances, it would permit small
entities to increase the rates applicable
to new transactions. Furthermore, the
use of variable rates that reflect market
conditions could mitigate this effect
because proposed § 227.24 does not
apply to variable rates. Finally,
proposed § 227.24 would also permit
small entities to apply an increased rate
to an outstanding balance when a
promotional rate is lost or expires or
when the consumer’s payment has not
been received within 30 days after the
due date.
Proposed § 227.25 would require
small entities that provide credit cards
to redesign their systems to prevent the
assessment of fees for exceeding the
credit limit that are caused by holds on
the available credit. Similarly, proposed
§ 227.26 could require some small
entities that provide credit cards to
change the way finance charges are
calculated, although the Board
understands that few institutions still
use the prohibited method.
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Proposed § 227.27 would require
small entities that provide credit cards
to modify their systems in order to track
security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit that are
charged to the account during the first
year. This proposal could also reduce
revenue derived from security deposits
and fees. These costs, however, would
likely be borne by the few entities
offering cards with security deposits
and fees that consume a majority of the
credit limit.
Proposed § 227.28 would require
small entities to disclose that, if the
consumer is approved for credit, the
annual percentage rate and the credit
limit the consumer will receive will
depend on specific criteria bearing on
creditworthiness. Because similar
disclosures are required by the FCRA,
this proposal should not result in
substantial compliance costs.
Proposals Regarding Overdraft Services
Proposed § 227.32 would convert
current Board guidance regarding
provision of a notice and opportunity to
opt out of overdraft services into a rule.
Thus, this proposal should not have a
significant impact on small entities if
those entities are currently providing
opt-out notices. Proposed § 227.32
would also require small entities to
redesign their systems to prevent the
assessment of overdraft fees that are
caused by holds on the available credit.
4. Other federal rules. The Board has
not identified any federal rules that
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the
proposed revisions to Regulation AA.
5. Significant alternatives to the
proposed revisions. One approach to
minimizing the burden on small entities
would be to provide a specific
exemption for small institutions.
However, the FTC Act’s prohibition
against unfair or deceptive acts or
practices makes no provision for
exempting small institutions and the
Board has no specific authority under
the FTC Act to grant an exception that
would remove small institutions.
Further, in considering rulemaking
under the Act, the Board believes an act
or practice that is unfair or deceptive
remains so despite the size of the
institution engaging in such act or
practice and, thus, should not be
exempt from this rule.
In addition, the Board believes the
proposed rule, where appropriate,
provides for sufficient flexibility and
choice for institutions, including small
entities. As such, any institution,
regardless of size, may tailor its
operations to its individual needs and,
thus, mitigate any incremental burden
that may be created by the proposed
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rule. For instance, § 227.23, which
addresses payment allocation, provides
an institution a choice of payment
allocation methods.
The Board solicits comment on any
significant alternatives that would
minimize the impact of the proposed
rule on small entities.
OTS: The Regulatory Flexibility Act
(5 U.S.C. 601–612) (RFA) requires an
agency to either provide an Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis with a
proposed rule or certify that the
proposed rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. For purposes
of the RFA and OTS-regulated entities,
a ‘‘small entity’’ is a savings association
with assets of $165 million or less
(small savings association). Based on its
analysis and for the reason stated below,
OTS certifies that this proposed rule
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
1. Reasons for Proposed Rule
This proposed rule is promulgated
pursuant to section 18(f)(1) of the FTC
Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(f)(1)), which makes
OTS responsible for prescribing
regulations that prevent savings
associations from engaging in unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce within the meaning
of section 5(a) of the FTC Act (15 U.S.C.
45(a)). OTS, the Board, and the NCUA
are jointly proposing this rule to protect
consumers against unfair or deceptive
acts or practices with respect to
consumer credit card accounts and
overdraft services for deposit accounts.
The Agencies have identified a number
of business practices that present a
significant risk of harm to consumers of
these products and services. As
discussed in the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION, the Agencies have
acquired information about these
practices from several sources,
including consumer complaints,
supervisory observations, and
comments received on OTS’s ANPR
issued August 6, 2007 and the Board’s
Reg. Z open-end proposal issued June
14, 2007.
2. Statement of Objectives and Legal
Basis
The SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
above contains this information. The
legal basis for OTS’s portion of the
proposed rule is section 57(a) of the FTC
Act and HOLA.
3. Description and Estimate of Small
Entities to Which the Rule Applies
OTS’s portion of the proposed rule
would apply to savings associations and
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their subsidiaries. There are 407 thrifts
with $165 million in assets or less.
There are 26 thrifts with $165 million in
assets or less that offer credit cards.
Many of the thrifts with $165 million in
assets or less offer overdraft services.
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4. Projected Recordkeeping, Reporting,
and Other Compliance Requirements
The proposed rule would not have a
significant impact on a substantial
number of small entities. It imposes no
new recordkeeping requirements or new
requirements to report information to
the Agencies.
Some of the proposed requirements
are not new. Section 535.13, which
involves providing disclosures to
consumers so that consumers will know
their rights and responsibilities as
cosigners on consumer loans, is merely
a recodification of a long-standing
requirement currently codified in
section 535.3. Section 535.32, which
would require institutions to provide a
notice and opportunity to consumers to
opt out of overdraft services on deposit
accounts, would turn current OTS
guidance into a rule. Thus, these
provisions of the proposed rule would
not have a significant impact on small
entities.
The proposal in section 535.28 is
new, and would require savings
associations that make a solicitation for
a firm offer of credit for a consumer
credit card account to include certain
consumer disclosures in the
solicitations. Since savings associations
will have developed this information in
preparing the firm offer, the burden
would be limited to placing an
appropriate disclosure in the
solicitation and, therefore, would not
have a significant impact on small
entities.
The professional skills necessary for
preparation of the consumer disclosures
under sections 535.13 and 535.28 are
the same skills needed to prepare
disclosures under many other consumer
protection laws and regulations, such as
the Truth in Lending Act/Reg. Z (12
CFR part 226) and the Truth in Savings
Act/Reg. DD (12 CFR part 230). The
professional skills necessary for
preparation of the notice and opt-out
notice under section 535.32 are the
same skills needed to prepare opt-out
notices under a variety of consumer
protection laws and regulations, such as
the Privacy Rule (12 CFR part 573)
issued under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act
Rule (12 CFR part 571) . These
professional skills could include
attorneys and compliance specialists, as
well as computer programmers.
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In addition to disclosures and opt-out
notices, the proposed rule would
impose some additional compliance
requirements. Under section 535.22, a
savings association may need to extend
the period of time it gives consumers to
make credit card account payments.
Under section 535.23, a savings
association may need to change the way
it allocates credit card account
payments among multiple account
balances. Under section 535.24, a
savings association may need to change
the circumstances in which it can raise
interest rates on outstanding credit card
account balances. Under section 535.25,
a savings association may need to
change the circumstances in which it
imposes over limit fees. Under section
535.26, a savings association may need
to change the way it computes finance
charges on outstanding credit card
account balances. Under section 535.27,
a savings association may need to
change the way it collects security
deposits and fees for a credit card’s
issuance or availability of credit. Each of
these provisions could require some
adjustments to a savings association’s
operations and require some additional
training of staff as well as computer
programming.
Many savings associations already
employ the professionals that would be
needed to meet the requirements that
would be imposed by the rule as
proposed rule, since they need these
professionals to meet other existing
consumer protection requirements. The
others have pre-existing arrangements
with third party service providers to
perform the functions that would be
affected by this rulemaking.
In addition, as discussed in the
Executive Order 12866 analysis, most of
the practices which the proposed
provisions would impact are not
common among savings associations.
Accordingly, the proposed provisions
would not have a significant impact on
small entities.
While OTS believes the proposed rule
does not have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities,
OTS, nevertheless, requests comment
and data on the size and incremental
burden on small savings associations
that would be created by the proposed
rule.
5. Identification of Duplicative,
Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal
Rules
OTS has not identified any federal
statutes or regulations that would
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the
proposed rule. As discussed in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, the laws of
only three states have been found by
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28935
any of the Agencies to provide
substantially equivalent rights as the
existing Credit Practices rule. OTS seeks
comment regarding any statutes or
regulations, including state or local
statutes or regulations, which would
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the
proposed rule.
6. Discussion of Significant Alternatives
One approach to minimizing the
burden on small entities would be to
provide a specific exemption for small
institutions. However, the FTC Act’s
prohibition against unfair or deceptive
acts or practices makes no provision for
exempting small institutions and OTS
has no specific authority under the FTC
Act to grant an exception that would
remove small institutions. Further, in
contemplating rulemaking under the
Act, OTS believes an act or practice that
is unfair or deceptive remains so despite
the size of the institution engaging in
such act or practice and, thus, should
not be exempt from this rule.
In addition, OTS believes the
proposed rule, where appropriate,
provides for sufficient flexibility and
choice for institutions, including small
entities. As such, any savings
association, regardless of size, may
tailor its operations to its individual
needs and, thus, mitigate any
incremental burden that may be created
by the proposed rule. For instance,
Section 535.23, unfair payment
allocations, provides an institution a
choice of payment allocation methods.
OTS welcomes comments on any
significant alternatives that would
minimize the impact of the proposed
rule on small entities.
NCUA: Under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.,
NCUA must publish an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis with its
proposed rule, unless NCUA certifies
the rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. For NCUA,
these are federal credit unions with less
than $10 million in assets. NCUA
certifies this proposed rule would not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
1. Reasons for Proposed Rule
NCUA is exercising authority under
section 18(f)(1) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 57a(f)(1),
and proposing to prohibit certain unfair
or deceptive acts or practices (UDAPs)
that violate section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a).
The proposed rule reorganizes and
renames NCUA’s longstanding Credit
Practices Rule, 12 CFR part 706, and
addresses UDAPs involving credit cards
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and overdraft protection services.
NCUA, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the Office
of Thrift Supervision are jointly
proposing this rule to protect consumers
against unfair or deceptive acts or
practices with respect to consumer
credit card accounts and overdraft
services for deposit accounts.
2. Statement of Objectives and Legal
Basis
The SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
above contains this information. The
legal basis for the proposed rule is
sections 45(a) and 57(a) of the FTC Act.
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3. Description and Estimate of Small
Entities to Which the Rule Applies
NCUA’s portion of the proposed rule
would apply to all federal credit unions.
As of December 31, 2007, there are
5,036 federal credit unions, of which
2,374 have total assets less than $10
million. NCUA estimates 2,363 small
credit unions offer loans to their
members. NCUA does not believe the
disclosure requirements for co-signors
will significantly affect small credit
unions because all credit unions have
complied with this requirement since
1987, when the credit practices rule was
initially promulgated. This proposed
rule does not change the co-signor
disclosure requirements, but renumbers
the applicable sections of the rule.
The proposed rule contains new
requirements regarding credit card
accounts and overdraft protection
services. Approximately 2,461 federal
credit unions issue credit cards and
have an aggregate portfolio of $18.92
billion. Of these, 425 small federal
credit unions issue credit cards and
have an aggregate credit card portfolio
of approximately $124.73 million.
Approximately 2,094 federal credit
unions offer overdraft protection
service, and 353 of these are small
federal credit unions.
4. Projected Recordkeeping, Reporting,
and Other Compliance Requirements
The proposed rule does not impose
any new recordkeeping or reporting
requirements. The proposed rule would,
however, impose new compliance
requirements.
Some of the proposed requirements
are not new. Section 706.13, which
involves providing disclosures to
cosigners on consumer loans, is a
recodification of a long-standing
requirement currently in § 706.3.
Section 703.32, which would require
institutions to provide a notice and
opportunity to consumers to opt out of
overdraft services on deposit accounts,
would turn current interagency
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guidance into a rule. Thus, these
provisions of the proposed rule would
not have a significant impact on small
entities.
The proposal in § 706.28 is new, and
would require federal credit unions that
make a solicitation for a firm offer of
credit for a consumer credit card
account to include certain consumer
disclosures in the solicitations. Since
federal credit unions will have
developed this information in preparing
the firm offer, the burden would be
limited to placing an appropriate
disclosure in the solicitation and,
therefore, would not have a significant
impact on small entities.
The professional skills necessary for
preparation of the consumer disclosures
under §§ 706.13 and 706.28 are the same
skills needed to prepare disclosures
under many other consumer protection
laws and regulations, such as the Truth
in Lending Act, Regulation Z (12 CFR
part 226), and the Truth in Savings Act
and part 707 (12 CFR part 707). The
professional skills necessary for
preparation of the notice and opt-out
notice under § 706.32 are the same skills
needed to prepare opt-out notices under
a variety of consumer protection laws
and regulations, such as the Privacy
Rule (12 CFR part 716) issued under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act Rule (12 CFR part
717). These professional skills could
include attorneys and compliance
specialists, as well as computer
programmers.
In addition to disclosures and opt-out
notices, the proposed rule would
impose some additional compliance
requirements. Under § 706.22, a federal
credit union may need to extend the
period of time it gives consumers to
make credit card account payments.
Under § 706.23, a federal credit union
may need to change the way it allocates
credit card account payments among
multiple account balances. Under
§ 706.24, a federal credit union may
need to change the circumstances in
which it can raise interest rates on
outstanding credit card account
balances. Under § 706.25, a federal
credit union may need to change the
circumstances in which it imposes over
limit fees. Under § 706.26, a federal
credit union may need to change the
way it computes finance charges on
outstanding credit card account
balances. Under § 706.27, a federal
credit union may need to change the
way it collects security deposits and
fees for a credit card’s issuance or
availability of credit. Each of these
provisions could require some
adjustments to a federal credit union’s
operations and require additional
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computer programming and training of
staff.
Many federal credit unions already
employ the professionals that would be
needed to meet the requirements that
would be imposed by the rule as
proposed rule, since they need these
professionals to meet other existing
consumer protection requirements. The
others have pre-existing arrangements
with third-party service providers to
perform the functions that would be
affected by this rulemaking.
Additionally, most of the practices
that the proposed provisions would
impact are not common among federal
credit unions. Accordingly, the
proposed provisions would not have a
significant impact on small entities.
While NCUA believes the proposed
rule does not have a significant impact
on a substantial number of small
entities, it requests comments on the
size and incremental burden on small
federal credit unions that would be
created by the proposed rule.
5. Identification of Duplicative,
Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal
Rules
NCUA has not identified any federal
statutes or regulations that would
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the
proposed rule. NCUA seeks comment
regarding any statutes or regulations,
including state or local statutes or
regulations, which would duplicate,
overlap, or conflict with the proposed
rule.
6. Discussion of Significant Alternatives
NCUA has not identified any
significant alternatives to the
prohibitions and requirements in the
proposed rule. The Agencies explored
requiring financial institutions provide
disclosures regarding the credit card
and overdraft practices to consumers.
NCUA does not believe federal credit
unions can provide clear or concise
disclosures that members could easily
understand and use to make an
informed decision regarding their credit
and saving needs.
Another approach to minimizing the
burden on small entities would be to
provide a specific exemption to small
federal credit unions. However, the
Federal Trade Commission Act’s
prohibition against unfair or deceptive
acts or practices makes no provision for
exempting small federal credit unions,
and NCUA does not have authority to
grant an exception. Further, NCUA
believes an act or practices that is unfair
or deceptive under the Federal Trade
Commission Act remains unfair or
deceptive despite the size of a federal
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credit union and should not be exempt
from the proposed rule.
NCUA believes the proposed rule
provides sufficient flexibility where
appropriate for all federal credit unions.
NCUA welcomes comments on any
significant alternatives that would
minimize the impact of the proposed
rule on small entities.
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B. Paperwork Reduction Act
Board: In accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3506; 5 CFR part 1320
Appendix A.1), the Board reviewed the
rule under the authority delegated to the
Board by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). The collections of
information that are required by this
proposed rule are found in 12 CFR
227.14 and 227.28.
This information collection is
required to provide benefits for
consumers and is mandatory (15 U.S.C.
4301 et seq.). The respondents/
recordkeepers are for-profit financial
institutions, including small businesses.
Regulation AA establishes consumer
complaint procedures and defines
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
extending credit to consumers. As
discussed above, the Federal Reserve is
seeking comment on a proposed rule
that would prohibit institutions from
engaging in certain acts or practices in
connection with consumer credit card
accounts and overdraft services for
deposit accounts. This proposal evolved
from the Board’s June 2007 Proposal
and OTS’s August 2007 ANPR. The
proposed rule is coordinated with the
Board’s proposals under the Truth in
Lending Act and the Truth in Savings
Act published in separate notices in
today’s Federal Register.
Consumer Credit Card Accounts
Under proposed § 227.28 (titled
‘‘Deceptive acts or practices regarding
firm offers of credit’’), banks would be
prohibited from certain marketing
practices in relation to prescreened firm
offers for consumer credit card accounts
unless a disclaimer sufficiently explains
the limitations of the offers. The Board
anticipates that banks would, with no
additional burden, incorporate the
proposed disclosure requirement under
proposed § 227.28 with an existing
disclosure requirement in Regulation Z
regarding credit and charge card
applications and solicitations. See 12
CFR 226.5a. Thus, in order to avoid
double-counting, the Board will account
for the burden associated with proposed
Regulation AA § 227.28 under
Regulation Z (OMB No. 7100–0199)
§ 226.5a. Under Regulation AA
§ 227.14(b) (titled ‘‘Unfair and deceptive
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practices involving cosigners’’), a clear
and conspicuous disclosure statement
shall be given in writing to the cosigner
prior to being obligated. The disclosure
statement must be substantively similar
to the example provided in § 227.14(b).
The Board will also account for the
burden associated with Regulation AA
§ 227.14(b) under Regulation Z. The title
of the Regulation Z information
collection will be updated to account for
these sections of Regulation AA.
Overdraft Services
The proposed rule would also provide
substantive protections against unfair
and deceptive acts or practices with
respect to overdraft services. Proposed
§ 227.32 is intended to ensure that
consumers understand overdraft
services and have the choice to avoid
the associated costs where such services
do not meet their needs. Under this
proposal, consumers could not be
assessed a fee or charge for paying an
overdraft unless the consumer is
provided with the right to opt out of the
payment of overdrafts and a reasonable
opportunity to exercise that right but
does not do so.
The burden associated with
Regulation AA § 227.28 will be
accounted for under Regulation DD
(OMB No. 7100–0271) §§ 230.10 (optout disclosures for overdraft services),
230.11(a) (disclosure of total fees on
periodic statements), and 230.11(c)
(disclosure of account balances). The
title of the Regulation DD information
collection will be updated to account for
this section of Regulation AA.
Comments are invited on: (a) Whether
the proposed collection of information
is necessary for the proper performance
of the Board’s functions, including
whether the information has practical
utility; (b) the accuracy of the Board’s
estimate of the burden of the proposed
information collection, including the
cost of compliance; (c) ways to enhance
the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected; and (d)
ways to minimize the burden of
information collection on respondents,
including through the use of automated
collection techniques or other forms of
information technology. Comments on
the collection of information should be
sent to Michelle Shore, Federal Reserve
Board Clearance Officer, Division of
Research and Statistics, Mail Stop 151–
A, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Washington, DC 20551,
with copies of such comments sent to
the Office of Management and Budget,
Paperwork Reduction Project
(Regulation AA), Washington, DC
20503.
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28937
OTS and NCUA: In accordance with
section 3512 of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501–
3521 (‘‘PRA’’), the Agencies may not
conduct or sponsor, and the respondent
is not required to respond to, an
information collection unless it displays
a currently valid Office of Management
and Budget (‘‘OMB’’) control number.
The information collection requirements
contained in this joint notice of
proposed rulemaking have been
submitted by the OTS and NCUA to
OMB for review and approval under
section 3507 of the PRA and section
1320.11 of OMB’s implementing
regulations (5 CFR part 1320). The
review and authorization information
for the Board is provided later in this
section along with the Board’s burden
estimates. The proposed rule contains
requirements subject to the PRA. The
requirements are found in 12 CFR
ll.13, and ll.32. Comments are
invited on:
(a) Whether the collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the Agencies’ functions,
including whether the information has
practical utility;
(b) The accuracy of the estimates of
the burden of the information
collection, including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
(c) Ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected;
(d) Ways to minimize the burden of
the information collection on
respondents, including through the use
of automated collection techniques or
other forms of information technology;
and
(e) Estimates of capital or start up
costs and costs of operation,
maintenance, and purchase of services
to provide information.
All comments will become a matter of
public record.
Comments should be addressed to:
OTS: Information Collection
Comments, Chief Counsel’s Office,
Office of Thrift Supervision, 1700 G
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552;
send a facsimile transmission to (202)
906–6518; or send an e-mail to
infocollection.comments@ots.treas.gov.
OTS will post comments and the related
index on the OTS Internet site at https://
www.ots.treas.gov. In addition,
interested persons may inspect the
comments at the Public Reading Room,
1700 G Street, NW., by appointment. To
make an appointment, call (202) 906–
5922, send an e-mail to
public.info@ots.treas.gov, or send a
facsimile transmission to (202) 906–
7755.
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NCUA: Jeryl Fish, Paperwork
Clearance Officer, National Credit
Union Administration, 1775 Duke
Street, Alexandria, VA 22314–3428;
send a facsimile to (703) 518–6319; or
send an e-mail to
regcomments@ncua.gov. Please submit
information collection comments by one
method. NCUA will post comments on
its Web site at https://www.ncua.gov/
RegulationsOpinionsLaws/
proposedregs/proposedregs.html. Also,
interested persons may inspect the
comments at NCUA, 1775 Duke Street,
Alexandria, Virginia 22314, by
appointment. To make an appointment,
call (703) 518–6540, send an e-mail to
OGCmail@ncua.gov, or send a facsimile
transmission to (703) 518–6667.
OTS: Savings associations and their
subsidiaries.
NCUA: Federally-chartered credit
unions.
Abstract: Under section 18(f) of the
FTC Act, the Agencies are responsible
for prescribing rules to prevent unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, including acts or
practices that are unfair or deceptive to
consumers. Under this proposed
rulemaking, the Agencies would
incorporate their existing Credit
Practices Rules, which govern unfair or
deceptive acts or practices involving
consumer credit, into new, more
comprehensive rules that would also
address unfair or deceptive acts or
practices involving credit cards and
overdraft protection services.
Estimated Burden: The burden
associated with this collection of
information may be summarized as
follows.
OTS:
Estimated number of respondents:
826.
Estimated time developing opt outs:
10 hours.
Estimated time developing disclaimer:
10 hours.
Estimated time for training: 4 hours.
Total estimated time per respondent:
24 hours.
Total estimated annual burden:
19,824 hours.
NCUA:
Estimated number of respondents:
5,036.
Estimated time developing opt outs:
10 hours.
Estimated time developing disclaimer:
10 hours.
Estimated time for training: 4 hours.
Total estimated time per respondent:
24 hours.
Total estimated annual burden:
120,864 hours.
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C. OTS Executive Order 12866
Determination
OTS has determined that its portion
of the proposed rulemaking is not a
significant regulatory action under
Executive Order 12866. However, OTS
solicits comment on the economic
impact of the rule as proposed.
Summary
The proposed rulemaking is not a
significant regulatory action under
Executive Order 12866 for a number of
reasons. First, the OTS proposal applies
only to savings associations and their
subsidiaries. As explained in more
detail below, these OTS-supervised
institutions account for only a small
portion of the affected market. Second,
these OTS-supervised institutions
already refrain from engaging in many
of the proposed prohibited practices.
Issuing a rule to prevent institutions
from taking up these practices will help
ensure that market conduct standards
remain high, but it will not cause
significant economic impact.
The prohibitions that relate to annual
percentage rate (APR) increases on
outstanding balances and payment
allocation practices will, to some extent,
limit fees and interest income currently
generated by these practices. However,
to the extent income to savings
associations is affected, the
corresponding offset provided by the
limitations is an equally sized consumer
benefit of lower fees and interest
payments. As a result, most economic
effects of the proposed rulemaking
would result in small transfers from
institutions to consumers, with an
overall limited net effect.
Moreover, if such fee and interest
income is economically justified in a
competitive environment for the
allocation of credit, then a likely longerterm outcome would be that institutions
would reflect such economic factors in
the initial terms of a credit card
contract. If that occurs, then consumers
will have clearer initial information
about potential costs with which to
compare credit card offerings than they
do currently. Consequently, any shorter
term disruptions to institutions caused
by the proposed rulemaking will likely
be addressed in the longer term by
changes in disclosed credit card account
APRs and fees, thus making consumer
costs and benefits more easily
considered and compared.
In-Depth Analysis
1. Limited Economic Effect: Limited
Scope of the Proposal
OTS’s portion of the proposed
rulemaking would apply only to OTS-
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supervised savings associations and
their subsidiaries. OTS is the primary
federal regulator for 826 federally- and
state-chartered savings associations. The
proposed rulemaking primarily
addresses certain credit card practices.
Of the 826 savings associations, only
124 report any credit card assets.
Among those 124 savings associations,
only 19 have more than 1% of their total
assets in credit card receivables.
Moreover, credit card assets comprise
only 3% of all assets held by savings
associations. In sum, OTS-supervised
institutions potentially engaged in the
practices prohibited by the proposed
rulemaking are not representative of the
overall industry that OTS supervises.
Most provisions of the proposed
rulemaking would have little economic
effect on the vast majority of the
institutions under OTS jurisdiction.
The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the National Credit
Union Administration are
simultaneously proposing a similar set
of rules governing credit card practices
for other types of federally insured
financial institutions. As a consequence,
the rulemaking should have little or no
intra-industry competitive effects.
2. Limited Economic Effect: Most
Affected Practices Are Not Common
Most of the practices covered by this
rulemaking have been included as a
prophylactic measure to ensure that
institutions do not begin to use or
expand the use of activities deemed
unfair or deceptive. Since most OTSsupervised institutions do not currently
engage in these practices, the costs of
complying with the provisions of the
proposed rule are likely to be minimal.
§ 535.22 Unfair time to make
payments. This section would prohibit
treating a payment on a consumer credit
card account as late for any purpose
unless consumers have been provided a
reasonable amount of time to make
payment. The proposed rule would
create a safe harbor for institutions that
adopt reasonable procedures designed
to ensure that periodic statements
specifying the payment due date are
mailed or delivered to consumers at
least 21 days before the payment due
date. Based on our supervisory
observations and experience, OTSsupervised institutions, in general, mail
or deliver periodic statements to their
customers at least 21 days before the
due date. Therefore, a rule that requires
institutions to provide a reasonable
amount of time to make payment, such
as by mailing or delivering periodic
statements to customers at least 21 days
in advance of the payment due date,
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would have insignificant or no
economic impact.
§ 535.25 Unfair fees for exceeding
the credit limit due to credit holds. This
section would prohibit assessing a fee
for exceeding the credit limit on a
consumer credit card account if the
credit limit would not have been
exceeded but for a hold on any portion
of the available credit on the account
that is in excess of the actual purchase
or transaction amount. Based on our
supervisory observations and
experience, OTS-supervised institutions
do not, in general, charge overlimit fees
in this manner. Therefore, prohibiting
this practice would have insignificant or
no economic impact.
§ 535.26 Unfair balance
computation method. This section
would prohibit imposing finance
charges on outstanding balances on a
consumer credit card account based on
balances in billing cycles preceding the
most recent billing cycle, subject to
certain exceptions.
Very few institutions compute
balances using any method other than a
single-cycle method. This conclusion
was reached by the GAO as part of its
recent credit card study.90 According to
the GAO, of the six largest card issuers,
only two used the double-cycle billing
method between 2003 and 2005.91
GAO’s finding conforms to OTS’s own
supervisory observations with respect to
the prevalence of use of balance
computation methods other than singlecycle methods by institutions OTS
supervises. Use of a balance
computation method other than a
single-cycle method is the exception,
rather than the norm, for OTSsupervised institutions.
Moreover, the economic impact of
this practice arises only in instances
where a card holder converts from a
convenience user, i.e., one who pays off
his/her card balance in full at the end
of the billing cycle, to a revolver, i.e.,
one who carries a balance beyond the
end of the billing cycle. Accounts that
routinely stay in a ‘‘convenience’’ or
nonrevolving status would not be
impacted by this prohibition. The same
would be true of accounts that routinely
stay in a revolving status. Only when an
account would convert from a
nonrevolving status to a revolving status
would the prohibition have an impact.
90 See
GAO Credit Card Report.
Credit Card Report at 28 (‘‘In our review
of 28 popular cards from the six largest issuers, we
found that two of the six issuers used the doublecycle billing method on one or more popular cards
between 2003 and 2005. The other four issuers
indicated they would only go back one cycle to
impose finance charges.’’).
§ 535.27 Unfair charging to the
account of security deposits and fees for
the issuance or availability of credit.
During the period beginning with the
date on which a consumer credit card
account is opened and ending 12
months from that date, this section
would prohibit institutions from
charging the account security deposits
or fees for the issuance or availability of
credit if the total amount of such
security deposits and fees constituted a
majority of the initial credit limit for the
account. During this same period, this
rule would require institutions that
charge security deposits or fees against
the account for the issuance or
availability of credit constituting more
than 25 percent of the initial credit limit
for the account, to apply these charges
in the following manner: during the first
billing cycle, an institution could charge
no more than 25% of the initial credit
limit offered for the account; in each of
11 months following the first billing
cycle, an institution could charge no
more than one eleventh of the total
security deposit or fees for the issuance
of availability of credit in excess of 25
percent of the initial credit limit for the
account.
Credit cards to which security
deposits and high account opening
related fees are charged against the
credit line are found predominately in
the subprime credit card market.
Subprime credit cards represent just 5%
of all credit cards issued.92 Cards of this
type are rare among OTS-supervised
institutions. Therefore, a rule
prohibiting this practice would have
insignificant economic impact.
§ 535.28 Deceptive firm offers of
credit. This section would prohibit the
practice of offering a range of or
multiple annual percentage rates or
credit limits in a solicitation for a firm
offer of credit for a consumer credit card
unless it is disclosed to the consumer
that, if approved, the consumer’s annual
percentage rate and the credit limit will
depend on specific criteria bearing on
creditworthiness.
While the rule would affect how
institutions advertise credit, it would
not limit the terms of credit offered nor
impact any underwriting strategy. Once
the rule became effective, institutions
would likely adjust their marketing so
as not to be misleading under the rule.
Operational costs to do so should be
minimal and the economic impact,
overall, insignificant.
91 GAO
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92 Outstanding credit card balances as of February
2008 as reported by Fitch Ratings, Know Your Risk;
Asset Backed Securities Prime Credit Card Index
and Subprime Credit Card Index available at https://
www.fitchresearch.com/creditdesk/sectors/
surveilance/asset_backed/credit_card.
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§ 535.32 Unfair overdraft service
practices. This section contains two
main requirements. First, with certain
exceptions, it would prohibit assessing
a fee or charge on a consumer’s account
in connection with an overdraft service,
unless an institution provides the
consumer with notice and reasonable
opportunity to opt out of the payment
of all overdrafts and the consumer has
not opted out. The consumer would also
have to be provided the more limited
option of opting out only for the
payment of overdrafts for ATM and
point-of-sale transactions initiated by a
debit card.
OTS Guidance on Overdraft
Protection Programs suggests that, as a
best practice, institutions that have
overdraft protection programs should
provide an election or opt-out of the
service and obtain affirmative consent
from consumers to receive overdraft
protection.93 Therefore, some OTSsupervised institutions may already be
carrying out the requirements proposed
in this rule. For those institutions, the
effect of the opt-out provisions of this
notice would be minimal. For the
institutions that do not currently offer
an opt-out, the rule would trigger some
operational costs, but those costs are not
likely to materially reduce the revenue
generated by overdraft fees. This is
because institutions often charge the
same fee to pay an overdraft as they do
to return it.
Second, this section would prohibit
assessing a fee or charge on a
consumer’s account in connection with
an overdraft service if the overdraft
would not have occurred but for a hold
placed on funds in the consumer’s
account that is in excess of the actual
purchase or transaction amount. Based
on our supervisory observations and
experience, OTS-supervised institutions
do not, in general, charge overdraft fees
in this manner. Therefore, prohibiting
this practice would have insignificant or
no economic impact.
3. Limited Economic Effect: Small
Transfers From Institutions to
Consumers
The proposed rulemaking contains
two other sections. One affects the way
in which payments received by the
institution are allocated among the
customer’s outstanding balances. The
other specifies the conditions under
which the institution could raise the
APRs on outstanding balances.
§ 535.23 Unfair payment allocations.
A consumer may have multiple balances
on a consumer credit card account.
Currently, most institutions allocate any
93 See
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payment received from a consumer by
first covering any fees and finance
charges, then allocating any remaining
amounts from the lowest APR balance to
the highest. This section of the proposed
rulemaking would require allocation in
a manner that is no less beneficial to the
consumer than one of the following
methods: (1) Applying the entire
amount first to the balance with the
highest annual percentage rate, (2)
splitting the amount equally among
balances, or (3) allocating pro rata
among the balances. Any allocation
method that would be less beneficial to
the consumer than these three methods
would be impermissible. For instance,
applying the entire amount first to the
balance with the lowest annual
percentage rate is an example of an
allocation method that would be less
beneficial to the consumer. The rule
leaves open the door to the possibility
of other reasonable payment allocation
methods.
The costs of the proposed rule are
mitigated to some extent by providing
institutions with operational flexibility
as to which of the allocation methods
they choose. To the extent there are
economic costs imposed by the payment
allocation restrictions included in the
proposal, institutions are likely to adjust
initial credit card terms to reflect those
costs. If this occurs, consumers will
likely have a clearer initial disclosure of
potential costs with which to compare
credit card offerings than they do now.
Their actual cost of credit will not be
increased by low-to-high balance
payment allocation strategies
implemented by institutions after
charges have been incurred.
§ 535.24 Unfair annual percentage
rate increases on outstanding balances.
This section would generally prohibit
institutions from increasing the annual
percentage rate on an outstanding
balance. This prohibition would not
apply, however, where a variable rate
increases due to the operation of an
index that is not under the institution’s
control and is available to the general
public, where a promotional rate has
expired or is lost (provided the APR is
not increased to a rate greater than the
APR that would have applied after
expiration of the promotional rate), or
where the minimum payment has not
been received within 30 days after the
due date.
The proposed rulemaking would not
permit the institution to increase the
APR on the outstanding balances simply
because the consumer pays late or
defaults on other debt obligations. This
practice is sometimes referred to as
‘‘universal default.’’ However, the
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section would permit APR increases on
new purchases or transactions.
Based on our supervisory
observations and experience, most
larger OTS-supervised institutions do
not practice universal default. However,
some institutions do raise APR on
outstanding balances based on external
factors such as a decline in a consumer’s
credit score. Institutions that make use
of this approach would likely adjust to
the rule in the longer term by adjusting
their initial interest rate pricing
schedule.
A potential small negative effect
might be that the prohibition on APR
increases on outstanding balances
would result in higher initial average
APRs across all consumers, if the
increases on outstanding balances acted
as an effective screen for initially
weaker credits. However, the fact that
most institutions do not use a universal
default trigger to increase APRs suggests
that this effect may be limited.
D. OTS Executive Order 13132
Determination
OTS has determined that its portion
of the proposed rulemaking does not
have any federalism implications for
purposes of Executive Order 13132.
E. NCUA Executive Order 13132
Determination
Executive Order 13132 encourages
independent regulatory agencies to
consider the impact of their actions on
State and local interests. In adherence to
fundamental federalism principles, the
NCUA, an independent regulatory
agency as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5)
voluntarily complies with the Executive
Order. The proposed rule apply only to
federally chartered credit unions and
would not have substantial direct effects
on the States, on the connection
between the national government and
the States, or on the distribution of
power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government. The
NCUA has determined that the
proposed rule does not constitute a
policy that has federalism implications
for purposes of the Executive Order.
F. OTS Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995 Determinations
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Public
Law 104–4 (Unfunded Mandates Act)
requires that an agency prepare a
budgetary impact statement before
promulgating a rule that includes a
Federal mandate that may result in
expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more
in any one year. If a budgetary impact
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statement is required, section 205 of the
Unfunded Mandates Act also requires
an agency to identify and consider a
reasonable number of regulatory
alternatives before promulgating a rule.
OTS has determined that this proposed
rule will not result in expenditures by
State, local, and tribal governments, or
by the private sector, of $100 million or
more. Accordingly, OTS has not
prepared a budgetary impact statement
or specifically addressed the regulatory
alternatives considered.
G. NCUA: The Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act, 1999—
Assessment of Federal Regulations and
Policies on Families
The NCUA has determined that this
proposed rule would not affect family
well-being within the meaning of
section 654 of the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act, 1999,
Pub. L. 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
IX. Solicitation of Comments on Use of
Plain Language
Section 722 of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act requires the Board and OTS
to use plain language in all proposed
and final rules published after January
1, 2000. Additionally, NCUA’s goal is to
promulgate clear and understandable
regulations that impose minimal
regulatory burdens. Therefore, the
Agencies specifically invite your
comments on how to make this proposal
easier to understand. For example:
• Have we organized the material to
suit your needs? If not, how could this
material be better organized?
• Are the requirements in the
proposed regulations clearly stated? If
not, how could the regulations be more
clearly stated?
• Do the proposed regulations contain
language or jargon that is not clear? If
so, which language requires
clarification?
• Would a different format (grouping
and order of sections, use of headings,
paragraphing) make the regulations
easier to understand? If so, what
changes to the format would make them
easier to understand?
• What else could we do to make the
regulations easier to understand?
List of Subjects
12 CFR Part 227
Banks, Banking, Credit,
Intergovernmental relations, Trade
practices.
12 CFR Part 535
Consumer credit, Consumer
protection, Credit, Credit cards,
Deception, Intergovernmental relations,
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Savings associations, Trade practices,
Overdrafts, Unfairness.
12 CFR Part 706
Credit, Credit unions, Deception,
Intergovernmental relations, Overdrafts,
Trade practices, Unfairness.
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System
12 CFR Chapter II
Text of Proposed Revisions
Certain conventions have been used
to highlight the proposed revisions.
New language is shown inside arrows
while language that would be deleted is
set off with brackets.
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons discussed in the joint
preamble, the Board proposes to amend
12 CFR part 227 as set forth below:
PART 227—UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE
ACTS OR PRACTICES (REGULATION
AA)
1. The authority citation for part 227
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 57a(f).
Subpart A—General Provisions
2. The heading for subpart A is
revised to read as set forth above.
§ 227.1
[Removed]
§ 227.11
[Redesignated as § 227.1]
3. Section 227.1 is removed and
§ 227.11 is redesignated as § 227.1 and
revised to read as follows:
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§ 227.1
Authority, Purpose, and Scope.
(a) Authority. This [subpart] flpartfi
is issued by the Board under section
18(f) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 [USC] flU.S.C.fi 57a(f)
(§ 202(a) of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty—Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act, Pub. L. 93–637).
(b) Purpose. flThe purpose of this
part is to prohibit unfairfi [Unfair] or
deceptive acts or practices flin
violation offi [in or affecting commerce
are unlawful under] section 5(a)(1) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
[USC] flU.S.C.fi 45(a)(1). [This subpart
defines] flSubparts B, C, and D define
and contain requirements prescribed for
the purpose of preventing specificfi
unfair or deceptive acts or practices of
banks [in connection with extensions of
credit to consumers]. flThe
prohibitions in subparts B, C, and D do
not limit the Board’s authority to
enforce the FTC Act with respect to any
other unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.fi
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(c) Scope. [This subpart applies]
flSubparts B, C, and D applyfi to all
banks and their subsidiaries, except
[Federal savings banks] flsavings
associations as defined in 12 U.S.C.
1813(b).fi Compliance is to be enforced
by:
(1) The Comptroller of the Currency,
in the case of national banks[, banks
operating under the code of laws for the
District of Columbia,] and federal
branches and federal agencies of foreign
banks;
(2) The Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, in the case of
banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System (other than banks
referred to in paragraph (c)(1) of this
section), branches and agencies of
foreign banks (other than federal
branches, federal agencies, and insured
state branches of foreign banks),
commercial lending companies owned
or controlled by foreign banks, and
organizations operating under section
25 or 25A of the Federal Reserve Act;
and
(3) The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, in the case of banks
insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (other than banks
referred to in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2)
of this section), and insured state
branches of foreign banks.
(d) flUnless otherwise noted,fi
[T]fltfihe terms used in paragraph (c)
of this section that are not defined in the
Federal Trade Commission Act or in
section 3(s) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (12 [USC] flU.S.C.fi
1813(s)) shall have the meaning given to
them in section 1(b) of the International
Banking Act of 1978 (12 [USC]
flU.S.C.fi 3101).
4. Section 227.2 is amended by
redesignating paragraphs (a) through (c)
as paragraphs (b) through (d),
respectively, and republishing them,
and adding a new paragraph (a) to read
as follows:
§ 227.2
Consumer-Complaint Procedure.
fl(a) Definitions. For purposes of this
section, unless the context indicates
otherwise, the following definitions
apply:
(1) ‘‘Board’’ means the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
(2) ‘‘Consumer complaint’’ means an
allegation by or on behalf of an
individual, group of individuals, or
other entity that a particular act or
practice of a State member bank is
unfair or deceptive, or in violation of a
regulation issued by the Board pursuant
to a Federal statute, or in violation of
any other act or regulation under which
the bank must operate.
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(3) ‘‘State member bank’’ means a
bank that is chartered by a State and is
a member of the Federal Reserve
System.
(4) Unless the context indicates
otherwise, ‘‘bank’’ shall be construed to
mean a ‘‘State member bank,’’ and
‘‘complaint’’ to mean a ‘‘consumer
complaint.’’fi
(b) Submission of complaints. (1) Any
consumer having a complaint regarding
a State member bank is invited to
submit it to the Federal Reserve System.
The complaint should be submitted in
writing, if possible, and should include
the following information:
(i) A description of the act or practice
that is thought to be unfair or deceptive,
or in violation of existing law or
regulation, including all relevant facts;
(ii) The name and address of the bank
that is the subject of the complaint; and
(iii) The name and address of the
complainant.
(2) Consumer complaints should be
made to—Federal Reserve Consumer
Help Center, P.O. Box 1200,
Minneapolis, MN 55480, Toll-free
number: (888) 851–1920, Fax number:
(877) 888–2520, TDD number: (877)
766–8533.
(c) Response to complaints. Within 15
business days of receipt of a written
complaint by the Board or a Federal
Reserve Bank, a substantive response or
an acknowledgment setting a reasonable
time for a substantive response will be
sent to the individual making the
complaint.
(d) Referrals to other agencies.
Complaints received by the Board or a
Federal Reserve Bank regarding an act
or practice of an institution other than
a State member bank will be forwarded
to the Federal agency having
jurisdiction over that institution.
§ 227.11
[Reserved]
5. In Subpart B, § 227.11 is added and
reserved.
6. A new Subpart C is added to part
227 to read as follows:
Subpart C—Consumer Credit Card Account
Practices Rule
Sec.
227.21 Definitions.
227.22 Unfair acts or practices regarding
time to make payment.
227.23 Unfair acts or practices regarding
allocation of payments.
227.24 Unfair acts or practices regarding
application of increased annual
percentage rates to outstanding balances.
227.25 Unfair acts or practices regarding
fees for exceeding the credit limit caused
by credit holds.
227.26 Unfair balance computation method.
227.27 Unfair acts or practices regarding
security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit.
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227.28 Deceptive acts or practices regarding
firm offers of credit.
Subpart C—Consumer Credit Card
Account Practices Rule
§ 227.21
Definitions.
For purposes of this subpart, the
following definitions apply:
(a) ‘‘Annual percentage rate’’ means
the product of multiplying each
periodic rate for a balance or transaction
on a consumer credit card account by
the number of periods in a year. The
term ‘‘periodic rate’’ has the same
meaning as in 12 CFR 226.2.
(b) ‘‘Consumer’’ means a natural
person to whom credit is extended
under a consumer credit card account or
a natural person who is a co-obligor or
guarantor of a consumer credit card
account.
(c) ‘‘Consumer credit card account’’
means an account provided to a
consumer primarily for personal, family,
or household purposes under an openend credit plan that is accessed by a
credit card or charge card. The terms
‘‘open-end credit,’’ ‘‘credit card,’’ and
‘‘charge card’’ have the same meanings
as in 12 CFR 226.2. The following are
not consumer credit card accounts for
purposes of this subpart:
(1) Home equity plans subject to the
requirements of 12 CFR 226.5b that are
accessible by a credit or charge card;
(2) Overdraft lines of credit tied to
asset accounts accessed by checkguarantee cards or by debit cards;
(3) Lines of credit accessed by checkguarantee cards or by debit cards that
can be used only at automated teller
machines; and
(4) Lines of credit accessed solely by
account numbers.
(d) ‘‘Promotional rate’’ means:
(1) Any annual percentage rate
applicable to one or more balances or
transactions on a consumer credit card
account for a specified period of time
that is lower than the annual percentage
rate that will be in effect at the end of
that period; or
(2) Any annual percentage rate
applicable to one or more transactions
on a consumer credit card account that
is lower than the annual percentage rate
that applies to other transactions of the
same type.
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§ 227.22 Unfair acts or practices regarding
time to make payment.
(a) General rule. Except as provided in
paragraph (c) of this section, a bank
must not treat a payment on a consumer
credit card account as late for any
purpose unless the consumer has been
provided a reasonable amount of time to
make the payment.
(b) Safe harbor. A bank satisfies the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this
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section if it has adopted reasonable
procedures designed to ensure that
periodic statements specifying the
payment due date are mailed or
delivered to consumers at least 21 days
before the payment due date.
(c) Exception for grace periods.
Paragraph (a) of this section does not
apply to any time period provided by
the bank within which the consumer
may repay any portion of the credit
extended without incurring an
additional finance charge.
§ 227.23 Unfair acts or practices regarding
allocation of payments.
(a) General rule for accounts with
different annual percentage rates on
different balances. Except as provided
in paragraph (b) of this section, when
different annual percentage rates apply
to different balances on a consumer
credit card account, the bank must
allocate any amount paid by the
consumer in excess of the required
minimum periodic payment among the
balances in a manner that is no less
beneficial to the consumer than one of
the following methods:
(1) The amount is allocated first to the
balance with the highest annual
percentage rate and any remaining
portion to the other balances in
descending order based on the
applicable annual percentage rate;
(2) Equal portions of the amount are
allocated to each balance; or
(3) The amount is allocated among the
balances in the same proportion as each
balance bears to the total balance.
(b) Special rules for accounts with
promotional rate balances or deferred
interest balances. (1) Rule regarding
payment allocation. (i) In general. When
a consumer credit card account has one
or more balances at a promotional rate
or balances on which interest is
deferred, the bank must allocate any
amount paid by the consumer in excess
of the required minimum periodic
payment among the other balances on
the account consistent with paragraph
(a) of this section. If any amount
remains after such allocation, the bank
must allocate that amount among the
promotional rate balances or the
deferred interest balances consistent
with paragraph (a) of this section.
(ii) Exception for deferred interest
balances. Notwithstanding paragraph
(b)(1)(i) of this section, the bank may
allocate the entire amount paid by the
consumer in excess of the required
minimum periodic payment to a balance
on which interest is deferred during the
two billing cycles immediately
preceding expiration of the period
during which interest is deferred.
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(2) Rule regarding grace periods. A
bank must not require a consumer to
repay any portion of a promotional rate
balance or deferred interest balance on
a consumer credit card account in order
to receive any time period offered by the
bank in which to repay other credit
extended without incurring finance
charges, provided that the consumer is
otherwise eligible for such a time
period.
§ 227.24 Unfair acts or practices regarding
application of increased annual percentage
rates to outstanding balances.
(a) Prohibition on increasing annual
percentage rates on outstanding
balances. (1) General rule. Except as
provided in paragraph (b) of this
section, a bank must not increase the
annual percentage rate applicable to any
outstanding balance on a consumer
credit card account.
(2) Outstanding balance. For purposes
of this section, ‘‘outstanding balance’’
means the amount owed on a consumer
credit card account at the end of the
fourteenth day after the bank provides a
notice required by 12 CFR 226.9(c) or
(g).
(b) Exceptions. Paragraph (a) of this
section does not apply where the annual
percentage rate is increased due to:
(1) The operation of an index that is
not under the bank’s control and is
available to the general public;
(2) The expiration or loss of a
promotional rate, provided that, if a
promotional rate is lost, the bank does
not increase the annual percentage rate
to a rate that is greater than the annual
percentage rate that would have applied
after expiration of the promotional rate;
or
(3) The bank not receiving the
consumer’s required minimum periodic
payment within 30 days after the due
date for that payment.
(c) Treatment of outstanding balances
following rate increase. (1) Payment of
outstanding balances. When a bank
increases the annual percentage rate
applicable to a category of transactions
on a consumer credit card account and
the bank is prohibited by this section
from applying the increased rate to
outstanding balances in that category,
the bank must provide the consumer
with a method of paying that
outstanding balance that is no less
beneficial to the consumer than one of
the following methods:
(i) An amortization period for the
outstanding balance of no less than five
years, starting from the date on which
the increased annual percentage rate
went into effect; or
(ii) A required minimum periodic
payment on the outstanding balance
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A bank must not assess a fee or charge
for exceeding the credit limit on a
consumer credit card account if the
credit limit would not have been
exceeded but for a hold placed on any
portion of the available credit on the
account that is in excess of the actual
purchase or transaction amount.
(1) During the first billing cycle after
the account is opened, the bank must
not charge to the account security
deposits and fees for the issuance or
availability of credit that total more than
25 percent of the initial credit limit for
the account; and
(2) In each of the eleven billing cycles
following the first billing cycle, the bank
must not charge to the account more
than one eleventh of the total amount of
any security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit in
excess of 25 percent of the initial credit
limit for the account.
(c) Fees for the issuance or availability
of credit. For purposes of paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section, fees for the
issuance or availability of credit
include:
(1) Any annual or other periodic fee
that may be imposed for the issuance or
availability of a consumer credit card
account, including any fee based on
account activity or inactivity; and
(2) Any non-periodic fee that relates
to opening an account.
§ 227.26 Unfair balance computation
method.
§ 227.28 Deceptive acts or practices
regarding firm offers of credit.
(a) General rule. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this section, a bank
must not impose finance charges on
balances on a consumer credit card
account based on balances for days in
billing cycles that precede the most
recent billing cycle.
(b) Exceptions. Paragraph (a) of this
section does not apply to:
(1) The assessment of deferred
interest; or
(2) Adjustments to finance charges
following the resolution of a billing
error dispute under 12 CFR 226.12(b) or
12 CFR 226.13.
(a) Disclosure of criteria bearing on
creditworthiness. If a bank offers a range
or multiple annual percentage rates or
credit limits when making a solicitation
for a firm offer of credit for a consumer
credit card account, and the annual
percentage rate or credit limit that
consumers approved for credit will
receive depends on specific criteria
bearing on creditworthiness, the bank
must disclose the types of criteria in the
solicitation. The disclosure must be
provided in a manner that is reasonably
understandable to consumers and
designed to call attention to the nature
and significance of the information
regarding the eligibility criteria for the
lowest annual percentage rate or highest
credit limit stated in the solicitation. If
presented in a manner that calls
attention to the nature and significance
of the information, the following
disclosure may be used to satisfy the
requirements of this section (as
applicable): ‘‘If you are approved for
credit, your annual percentage rate and/
or credit limit will depend on your
credit history, income, and debts.’’
(b) Firm offer of credit defined. For
purposes of this section, ‘‘firm offer of
credit’’ has the same meaning as that
term has under the definition of ‘‘firm
offer of credit or insurance’’ in section
603(l) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(15 U.S.C. 1681a(l)).
7. A new Subpart D is added to part
227 to read as follows:
that includes a percentage of that
balance that is no more than twice the
percentage included before the date on
which the increased annual percentage
rate went into effect.
(2) Fees and charges on outstanding
balance. When a bank increases the
annual percentage rate applicable to a
category of transactions on a consumer
credit card account and the bank is
prohibited by this section from applying
the increased rate to outstanding
balances in that category, the bank must
not assess any fee or charge based solely
on the outstanding balance.
§ 227.25 Unfair acts or practices regarding
fees for exceeding the credit limit caused
by credit holds.
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§ 227.27 Unfair acts or practices regarding
security deposits and fees for the issuance
or availability of credit.
(a) Annual rule. During the period
beginning with the date on which a
consumer credit card account is opened
and ending twelve months from that
date, a bank must not charge to the
account security deposits or fees for the
issuance or availability of credit if the
total amount of such security deposits
and fees constitutes a majority of the
initial credit limit for the account.
(b) Monthly rule. If the total amount
of security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit charged
to a consumer credit card account
during the period beginning with the
date on which a consumer credit card
account is opened and ending twelve
months from that date constitutes more
than 25 percent of the initial credit limit
for the account:
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Subpart D—Overdraft Services Rule
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227.31 Definitions.
227.32 Unfair acts or practices regarding
overdraft services.
Subpart D—Overdraft Services Rule
§ 227.31
Definitions.
For purposes of this subpart, the
following definitions apply:
(a) ‘‘Account’’ means a deposit
account at a bank that is held by or
offered to a consumer, and has the same
meaning as in § 230.2(a) of the Board’s
Regulation DD, Truth in Savings (12
CFR part 230).
(b) ‘‘Consumer’’ means a person who
holds an account primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes.
(c) ‘‘Overdraft service’’ means a
service under which a bank charges a
fee for paying a transaction (including a
check or other item) that overdraws an
account. The term ‘‘overdraft service’’
does not include any payment of
overdrafts pursuant to—
(1) A line of credit subject to the
Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Z
(12 CFR part 226), including transfers
from a credit card account, home equity
line of credit or overdraft line of credit;
or
(2) A service that transfers funds from
another account of the consumer.
§ 227.32 Unfair acts or practices regarding
overdraft services.
(a) Opt-out requirement. (1) General
rule. A bank must not assess a fee or
charge on a consumer’s account in
connection with an overdraft service,
unless the bank provides the consumer
with the right to opt out of the bank’s
payment of overdrafts and a reasonable
opportunity to exercise that opt-out and
the consumer has not opted out. The
consumer must be given notice and an
opportunity to opt out before the bank’s
assessment of any fee or charge for an
overdraft, and subsequently at least
once during or for any periodic
statement cycle in which any fee or
charge for paying an overdraft is
assessed. The notice requirements in
paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) do not apply
if the consumer has opted out, unless
the consumer subsequently revokes the
opt-out.
(2) Partial opt-out. A bank must
provide a consumer the option of opting
out only for the payment of overdrafts
at automated teller machines and for
point-of-sale transactions initiated by a
debit card, in addition to the choice of
opting out of the payment of overdrafts
for all transactions.
(3) Exceptions. Notwithstanding a
consumer’s election to opt out under
paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section,
a bank may assess a fee or charge on a
consumer’s account for paying a debit
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card transaction that overdraws an
account if:
(i) There were sufficient funds in the
consumer’s account at the time the
authorization request was received, but
the actual purchase amount for that
transaction exceeds the amount that had
been authorized; or
(ii) The transaction is presented for
payment by paper-based means, rather
than electronically through a card
terminal, and the bank has not
previously authorized the transaction.
(4) Time to comply with opt-out. A
bank must comply with a consumer’s
opt-out request as soon as reasonably
practicable after the bank receives it.
(5) Continuing right to opt-out. A
consumer may opt out of the bank’s
future payment of overdrafts at any
time.
(6) Duration of opt-out. A consumer’s
opt-out is effective unless subsequently
revoked by the consumer.
(b) Debit holds. A bank must not
assess a fee or charge on a consumer’s
account for an overdraft service if the
consumer’s overdraft would not have
occurred but for a hold placed on funds
in the consumer’s account that is in
excess of the actual purchase or
transaction amount.
8. A new Supplement I is added to
part 227 as follows:
Supplement I to Part 227—Official Staff
Commentary
Subpart A—General Provisions for
Consumer Protection Rules
Section 227.1—Authority, Purpose, and
Scope
1(c) Scope
1. Penalties for noncompliance.
Administrative enforcement of the rule for
banks may involve actions under section 8 of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
1818), including cease-and-desist orders
requiring that actions be taken to remedy
violations and civil money penalties.
2. Industrial loan companies. Industrial
loan companies that are insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are
covered by the Board’s rule.
Subpart C—Consumer Credit Card Account
Practices Rule
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Section 227.21—Definitions
(d) Promotional Rate
Paragraph (d)(1)
1. Rate in effect at the end of the
promotional period. If the annual percentage
rate that will be in effect at the end of the
specified period of time is a variable rate, the
rate in effect at the end of that period for
purposes of § 227.21(d)(1) is the rate that
would otherwise apply if the promotional
rate was not offered, consistent with any
applicable accuracy requirements under 12
CFR part 226.
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Paragraph (d)(2)
1. Example. A bank generally offers a 15%
annual percentage rate for purchases on a
consumer credit card account. For purchases
made during a particular month, however,
the creditor offers a rate of 5% that will apply
until the consumer pays those purchases in
full. Under § 227.21(d)(2), the 5% rate is a
‘‘promotional rate’’ because it is lower than
the 15% rate that applies to other purchases.
Section 227.22—Unfair Acts or Practices
Regarding Time To Make Payment
(a) General Rule
1. Treating a payment as late for any
purpose. Treating a payment as late for any
purpose includes increasing the annual
percentage rate as a penalty, reporting the
consumer as delinquent to a credit reporting
agency, or assessing a late fee or any other
fee based on the consumer’s failure to make
a payment within the amount of time
provided to make that payment under this
section.
2. Reasonable amount of time to make
payment. Whether an amount of time is
reasonable for purposes of making a payment
is determined from the perspective of the
consumer, not the bank. Under § 227.22(b), a
bank provides a reasonable amount of time
to make a payment if it has adopted
reasonable procedures designed to ensure
that periodic statements specifying the
payment due date are mailed or delivered to
consumers at least 21 days before the
payment due date.
(b) Safe Harbor
1. Reasonable procedures. A bank is not
required to determine the specific date on
which periodic statements are mailed or
delivered to each individual consumer. A
bank provides a reasonable amount of time
to make a payment if it has adopted
reasonable procedures designed to ensure
that periodic statements are mailed or
delivered to consumers no later than, for
example, three days after the closing date of
the billing cycle and the payment due date
on the periodic statement is no less than 24
days after the closing date of the billing
cycle.
2. Payment due date. For purposes of
§ 227.22(b), ‘‘payment due date’’ means the
date by which the bank requires the
consumer to make payment to avoid being
treated as late for any purpose, except as
provided in § 227.22(c).
Section 227.23—Unfair Acts or Practices
Regarding Allocation of Payments
1. Minimum periodic payment. This
section addresses the allocation of amounts
paid by the consumer in excess of the
minimum periodic payment required by the
bank. This section does not limit or
otherwise address the bank’s ability to
determine the amount of the minimum
periodic payment or how that payment is
allocated.
2. Adjustments of one dollar or less
permitted. When allocating payments, the
bank may adjust amounts by one dollar or
less. For example, if a bank is allocating $100
equally among three balances, the bank may
apply $34 to one balance and $33 to the
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others. Similarly, if a bank is splitting
$100.50 between two balances, the bank may
apply $50 to one balance and $50.50 to
another.
(a) General Rule for Accounts With Different
Annual Percentage Rates on Different
Balances
1. No less beneficial to the consumer. A
bank may allocate payments using a method
that is different from the methods listed in
§ 227.23(a) so long as the method used is no
less beneficial to the consumer than one of
the listed methods. A method is no less
beneficial to the consumer than a listed
method if it results in the assessment of the
same or a lesser amount of interest charges
than would be assessed under any of the
listed methods. For example, a bank may not
allocate the entire amount paid by the
consumer in excess of the required minimum
periodic payment to the balance with the
lowest annual percentage rate because this
method would result in a higher assessment
of interest charges than any of the methods
listed in § 227.23(a).
2. Example of payment allocation method
that is no less beneficial to consumers than
a method listed in § 227.23(a). Assume that
a consumer’s account has a cash advance
balance of $500 at an annual percentage rate
of 20% and a purchase balance of $1,500 at
an annual percentage rate of 15% and that
the consumer pays $555 in excess of the
required minimum periodic payment. A bank
could allocate one-third of this amount
($185) to the cash advance balance and twothirds ($370) to the purchase balance even
though this is not a method listed in
§ 227.23(a) because the bank is applying
more of the amount to the balance with the
highest annual percentage rate (with the
result that the consumer will be assessed less
in interest charges) than would be the case
under the pro rata allocation method in
§ 227.23(a)(3). See comment 23(a)(3)–1.
Paragraph (a)(1)
1. Examples of allocating first to the
balance with the highest annual percentage
rate.
(A) Assume that a consumer’s account has
a cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 20% and a purchase
balance of $1,500 at an annual percentage
rate of 15% and that the consumer pays $800
in excess of the required minimum periodic
payment. None of the minimum periodic
payment is allocated to the cash advance
balance. A bank using this method would
allocate $500 to pay off the cash advance
balance and then allocate the remaining $300
to the purchase balance.
(B) Assume that a consumer’s account has
a cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 20% and a purchase
balance of $1,500 at an annual percentage
rate of 15% and that the consumer pays $400
in excess of the required minimum periodic
payment. A bank using this method would
allocate the entire $400 to the cash advance
balance.
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Paragraph (a)(2)
1. Example of equal portion method.
Assume that a consumer’s account has a cash
advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 20% and a purchase
balance of $1,500 at an annual percentage
rate of 15% and that the consumer pays $555
in excess of the required minimum periodic
payment. A bank using this method would
allocate $278 to the cash advance balance
and $277 to the purchase balance (or vice
versa).
Paragraph (a)(3)
1. Example of pro rata method. Assume
that a consumer’s account has a cash advance
balance of $500 at an annual percentage rate
of 20% and a purchase balance of $1,500 at
an annual percentage rate of 15% and that
the consumer pays $555 in excess of the
required minimum periodic payment. A bank
using this method would allocate 25% of the
amount ($139) to the cash advance balance
and 75% of the amount ($416) to the
purchase balance.
(b) Special Rules for Accounts With
Promotional Rate Balances or Deferred
Interest Balances
Paragraph (b)(1)(i)
1. Examples of special rule regarding
payment allocation for accounts with
promotional rate balances or deferred
interest balances.
(A) A consumer credit card account has a
cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 20%, a purchase balance
of $1,500 at an annual percentage rate of
15%, and a transferred balance of $3,000 at
a promotional rate of 5%. The consumer pays
$800 in excess of the required minimum
periodic payment. The bank must allocate
the $800 between the cash advance and
purchase balances (consistent with
§ 227.23(a)) and apply nothing to the
transferred balance.
(B) A consumer credit card account has a
cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 20%, a balance of $1,500
on which interest is deferred, and a
transferred balance of $3,000 at a
promotional rate of 5%. The consumer pays
$800 in excess of the required minimum
periodic payment. None of the minimum
periodic payment is allocated to the cash
advance balance. The bank must allocate
$500 to pay off the cash advance balance
before allocating the remaining $300 between
the deferred interest balance and the
transferred balance (consistent with
§ 227.23(a)).
Paragraph (b)(1)(ii)
1. Examples of exception for deferred
interest balances. Assume that on January 1
a consumer uses a credit card to make a
$1,000 purchase on which interest is deferred
until June 30. If this amount is not paid in
full by June 30, all interest accrued during
the six-month period will be charged to the
account. The billing cycle for this credit card
begins on the first day of the month and ends
on the last day of the month. Each month
from January through June the consumer uses
the credit card to make $200 in purchases on
which interest is not deferred.
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(A) The consumer pays $300 in excess of
the minimum periodic payment each month
from January through June. None of the
minimum periodic payment is applied to the
deferred interest balance or the purchase
balance. For the January, February, March,
and April billing cycles, the bank must
allocate $200 to the purchase balance and
$100 to the deferred interest balance. For the
May and June billing cycles, however, the
bank has the option of allocating the entire
$300 to the deferred interest balance, which
will result in that balance being paid in full
before the deferred interest period expires on
June 30. In this example, the interest that
accrued between January 1 and June 30 will
not be assessed to the consumer’s account.
(B) The consumer pays $200 in excess of
the minimum periodic payment each month
from January through June. None of the
minimum periodic payment is applied to the
deferred interest balance or the purchase
balance. For the January, February, March,
and April billing cycles, the bank must
allocate the entire $200 to the purchase
balance. For the May and June billing cycles,
however, the bank has the option to allocate
the entire $200 to the deferred interest
balance, which will result in that balance
being reduced to $600 before the deferred
interest period expires on June 30. In this
example, the interest that accrued between
January 1 and June 30 will be assessed to the
consumer’s account.
Paragraph (b)(2)
1. Example of special rule regarding grace
periods for accounts with promotional rate
balances or deferred interest balances. A
bank offers a promotional rate on balance
transfers and a higher rate on purchases. The
bank also offers a grace period under which
consumers who pay their balances in full by
the due date are not charged interest on
purchases. A consumer who has paid the
balance for the prior billing cycle in full by
the due date transfers a balance of $2,000 and
makes a purchase of $500. Because the bank
offers a grace period, it must provide a grace
period on the $500 purchase if the consumer
pays that amount in full by the due date,
even though the $2,000 balance at the
promotional rate remains outstanding.
Section 227.24—Unfair Acts or Practices
Regarding Application of Increased Annual
Percentage Rates to Outstanding Balances
(a) Prohibition Against Increasing Annual
Percentage Rates on Outstanding Balances
1. Example. Assume that on December 30
a consumer credit card account has a balance
of $1,000 at an annual percentage rate of
15%. On December 31, the bank mails or
delivers a notice required by 12 CFR 226.9(c)
informing the consumer that the annual
percentage rate will increase to 20% on
February 15. The consumer uses the account
to make $2,000 in purchases on January 10
and $1,000 in purchases on January 20.
Assuming no other transactions, the
outstanding balance for purposes of § 227.24
is the $3,000 balance as of the end of the day
on January 14. Therefore, under § 227.24(a),
the bank cannot increase the annual
percentage rate applicable to that balance.
The bank can apply the 20% rate to the
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$1,000 in purchases made on January 20 but,
consistent with 12 CFR 226.9(c), the bank
cannot do so until February 15.
2. Reasonable procedures. A bank is not
required to determine the specific date on
which a notice required by 12 CFR 226.9(c)
or (g) was provided. For purposes of
§ 227.24(a)(2), if the bank has adopted
reasonable procedures designed to ensure
that notices required by 12 CFR 226.9(c) or
(g) are provided to consumers no later than,
for example, three days after the event giving
rise to the notice, the outstanding balance is
the balance at the end of the seventeenth day
after such event.
(b) Exceptions
Paragraph (b)(1)
1. External index. A bank may increase the
annual percentage rate on an outstanding
balance if the increase is based on an index
outside the bank’s control. A bank may not
increase the rate on an outstanding balance
based on its own prime rate or cost of funds
and may not reserve a contractual right to
change rates on outstanding balances at its
discretion. In addition, a bank may not
increase the rate on an outstanding balance
by changing the method used to determine
that rate. A bank is permitted, however, to
use a published prime rate, such as that in
the Wall Street Journal, even if the bank’s
own prime rate is one of several rates used
to establish the published rate.
2. Publicly available. The index must be
available to the public. A publicly available
index need not be published in a newspaper,
but it must be one the consumer can
independently obtain (by telephone, for
example) and use to verify the rate applied
to the outstanding balance.
Paragraph (b)(2)
1. Example. Assume that a consumer credit
card account has a balance of $1,000 at a 5%
promotional rate and that the bank also
charges an annual percentage rate of 15% for
purchases and a penalty rate of 25%. If the
consumer does not make payment by the due
date and the account agreement specifies that
event as a trigger for applying the penalty
rate, the bank may increase the annual
percentage rate on the $1,000 from the 5%
promotional rate to the 15% annual
percentage rate for purchases. The bank may
not, however, increase the rate on the $1,000
from the 5% promotional rate to the 25%
penalty rate, except as otherwise permitted
under § 227.24(b)(3).
Paragraph (b)(3)
1. Example. Assume that the annual
percentage rate applicable to purchases on a
consumer credit card account is increased
from 15% to 20% and that the account has
an outstanding balance of $1,000 at the 15%
rate. The payment due date on the account
is the twenty-fifth of the month. If the bank
has not received the required minimum
periodic payment due on March 15 on or
before April 14, the bank may increase the
rate applicable to the $1,000 balance once the
bank has complied with the notice
requirements in 12 CFR 226.9(g).
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(c) Treatment of Outstanding Balances
Following Rate Increase
1. Scope. This provision does not apply if
the consumer credit card account does not
have an outstanding balance. This provision
also does not apply if a rate is increased
pursuant to any of the exceptions in
§ 227.24(b).
2. Category of transactions. This provision
does not apply to balances in categories of
transactions other than the category for
which the bank has increased the annual
percentage rate. For example, if a bank
increases the annual percentage rate that
applies to purchases but not the rate that
applies to cash advances, § 227.24(c)(1) and
(2) apply to an outstanding balance
consisting of purchases but not an
outstanding balance consisting of cash
advances.
Paragraph (c)(1)
1. No less beneficial to the consumer. A
bank may provide a method of paying the
outstanding balance that is different from the
methods listed in § 227.24(c)(1) so long as the
method used is no less beneficial to the
consumer than one of the listed methods. A
method is no less beneficial to the consumer
if the method amortizes the outstanding
balance in five years or longer or if the
method results in a required minimum
periodic payment on the outstanding balance
that is equal to or less than a minimum
payment calculated consistent with
§ 227.24(c)(1)(ii). For example, a bank could
more than double the percentage of amounts
owed included in the minimum payment so
long as the minimum payment does not
result in amortization of the outstanding
balance in less than five years. Alternatively,
a bank could require a consumer to make a
minimum payment on the outstanding
balance that amortizes that balance in less
than five years so long as the payment does
not include a percentage of the outstanding
balance that is more than twice the
percentage included in the minimum
payment before the effective date of the
increased rate.
Paragraph (c)(1)(ii)
1. Required minimum periodic payment on
other balances. This paragraph addresses the
required minimum periodic payment on the
outstanding balance. This paragraph does not
limit or otherwise address the bank’s ability
to determine the amount of the minimum
periodic payment for other balances.
2. Example. Assume that the method used
by a bank to calculate the required minimum
periodic payment for a consumer credit card
account requires the consumer to pay either
the total of fees and interest charges plus 1%
of the total amount owed or $20, whichever
is greater. Assume also that the bank
increases the annual percentage rate
applicable to purchases on a consumer credit
card account from 15% to 20% and that the
account has an outstanding balance of $1,000
at the 15% rate. Section 227.24(c)(1)(ii)
would permit the bank to calculate the
required minimum periodic payment on the
outstanding balance by adding fees and
interest charges to 2% of the outstanding
balance.
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Paragraph (c)(2)
1. Fee or charge based solely on the
outstanding balance. A bank is prohibited
from assessing a fee or charge based solely on
an outstanding balance. For example, a bank
is prohibited from assessing a maintenance or
similar fee based on an outstanding balance.
A bank is not, however, prohibited from
assessing fees such as late payment fees or
fees for exceeding the credit limit even if
such fees are based in part on an outstanding
balance.
Section 227.25—Unfair Acts or Practices
Regarding Fees for Exceeding the Credit Limit
Caused by Credit Holds
1. General. Under § 227.25, a bank may not
assess a fee for exceeding the credit limit if
the credit limit would not have been
exceeded but for a hold placed on the
available credit for a consumer credit card
account for a transaction that has been
authorized but has not yet been presented for
settlement, if the amount of the hold is in
excess of the actual purchase or transaction
amount when the transaction is settled.
Section 227.25 does not limit a bank from
charging a fee for exceeding the credit limit
in connection with a particular transaction if
the consumer would have exceeded the
credit limit due to other reasons, such as
other transactions that may have been
authorized but not yet presented for
settlement, a payment that is returned, or if
the purchase or transaction amount for the
transaction for which the hold was placed
would have also caused the consumer to
exceed the credit limit.
2. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for same transaction.
Assume that a consumer credit card account
has a credit limit of $2,000 and a balance of
$1,500. The consumer uses the credit card to
check into a hotel for an anticipated stay of
five days. When the consumer checks in, the
hotel obtains authorization from the bank for
a $750 hold on the account to ensure there
is adequate available credit to cover the cost
of the anticipated stay. The consumer checks
out of the hotel after three days, and the total
cost of the stay is $450, which is charged to
the consumer’s credit card account.
Assuming that there is no other activity on
the account, the bank is prohibited from
assessing a fee for exceeding the credit limit
with respect to the $750 hold. If, however,
the total cost of the stay charged to the
account had been more than $500, the bank
would not be prohibited from assessing a fee
for exceeding the credit limit.
3. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for another transaction.
Assume that a consumer credit card account
has a credit limit of $2,000 and a balance of
$1,400. The consumer uses the credit card to
check into a hotel for an anticipated stay of
five days. When the consumer checks in, the
hotel obtains authorization from the bank for
a $750 hold on the account to ensure there
is adequate available credit to cover the cost
of the anticipated stay. While the hold
remains in place, the consumer uses the
credit card to make a $150 purchase. The
consumer checks out of the hotel after three
days, and the total cost of the stay is $450,
which is charged to the consumer’s credit
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card account. Assuming that there is no other
activity on the account, the bank is
prohibited from assessing a fee for exceeding
the credit limit with respect to either the
$750 hold or the $150 purchase. If, however,
the total cost of the stay charged to the
account had been more than $450, the bank
would not be prohibited from assessing a fee
for exceeding the credit limit.
4. Example of prohibition when
authorization and settlement amounts are
held for the same transaction. Assume that
a consumer credit card account has a credit
limit of $2,000 and a balance of $1,400. The
consumer uses the credit card to check into
a hotel for an anticipated stay of five days.
When the consumer checks in, the hotel
obtains authorization from the bank for a
$750 hold on the account to ensure there is
adequate available credit to cover the cost of
the anticipated stay. The consumer checks
out of the hotel after three days, and the total
cost of the stay is $450, which is charged to
the consumer’s credit card account. When
the hotel presents the $450 transaction for
settlement, it uses a different transaction
code to identify the transaction than it had
used for the pre-authorization, causing both
the $750 hold and the $450 purchase amount
to be temporarily posted to the consumer’s
account at the same time, and the consumer’s
balance to exceed the credit limit. Under
these circumstances, and assuming no other
transactions, the bank is prohibited from
assessing a fee for exceeding the credit limit
because the credit limit was exceeded solely
due to the $750 hold.
5. Example of permissible fee for exceeding
the credit limit in connection with a hold.
Assume that a consumer has a credit limit of
$2,000 and a balance of $1,400 on a
consumer credit card account. The consumer
uses the credit card to check into a hotel for
an anticipated stay of five days. When the
consumer checks in, the hotel obtains
authorization from the bank for a $750 hold
on the account to ensure there is adequate
available credit to cover the cost of the
anticipated stay. While the hold remains in
place, the consumer uses the credit card to
make a $650 purchase. The consumer checks
out of the hotel after three days, and the total
cost of the stay is $450, which is charged to
the consumer’s credit card account.
Notwithstanding the existence of the hold
and assuming that there is no other activity
on the account, the bank may charge the
consumer a fee for exceeding the credit limit
with respect to the $650 purchase because
the consumer would have exceeded the
credit limit even if the hold had been for the
actual amount of the hotel transaction.
Section 227.26—Unfair Balance
Computation Method
(a) General Rule
1. Two-cycle method prohibited. A bank is
prohibited from computing the finance
charge using the so-called two-cycle average
daily balance computation method. This
method calculates the finance charge using a
balance that is the sum of the average daily
balances for two billing cycles. The first
balance is for the current billing cycle, and
is calculated by adding the total balance
(including or excluding new purchases and
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deducting payments and credits) for each day
in the billing cycle, and then dividing by the
number of days in the billing cycle. The
second balance is for the preceding billing
cycle.
2. Example. Assume that the billing cycle
on a consumer credit card account starts on
the first day of the month and ends on the
last day of the month. A consumer has a zero
balance on March 1. The consumer uses the
credit card to make a $500 purchase on
March 15. The consumer makes no other
purchases and pays $400 on the due date
(April 25), leaving a $100 balance. The bank
may charge interest on the $500 purchase
from the start of the billing cycle (April 1)
through April 24 and interest on the
remaining $100 from April 25 through the
end of the April billing cycle (April 30). The
bank is prohibited, however, from reaching
back and charging interest on the $500
purchase from the date of purchase (March
15) to the end of the March billing cycle
(March 31).
Section 227.27—Unfair Acts or Practices
Regarding Security Deposits and Fees for the
Issuance or Availability of Credit
1. Initial credit limit for the account. For
purposes of this section, the initial credit
limit is the limit in effect when the account
is opened.
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(a) Annual Rule
1. Majority of the credit limit. The total
amount of security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit constitutes
a majority of the initial credit limit if that
total is greater than half of the limit. For
example, assume that a consumer credit card
account has an initial credit limit of $500.
Under § 227.27(a), a bank may only charge to
the account security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit totaling no
more than $250 during the twelve months
after the date on which the account is opened
(consistent with § 227.27(b)).
(b) Monthly Rule
1. Adjustments of one dollar or less
permitted. When dividing amounts pursuant
to § 227.27(b)(2), the bank may adjust
amounts by one dollar or less. For example,
if a bank is dividing $125 over eleven billing
cycles, the bank may charge $12 for four
months and $11 for the remaining seven
months.
2. Example. Assume that a consumer credit
card account opened on January 1 has an
initial credit limit of $500 and that a bank
charges to the account security deposits and
fees for the issuance or availability of credit
that total $250 during the twelve months
after the date on which the account is
opened. Assume also that the billing cycles
for this account begin on the first day of the
month and end on the last day of the month.
Under § 227.27(b), the bank may charge to
the account no more than $250 in security
deposits and fees for the issuance or
availability of credit. If it charges $250, the
bank may charge as much as $125 during the
first billing cycle. If it charges $125 during
the first billing cycle, it may then charge $12
in any four billing cycles and $11 in any
seven billing cycles during the year.
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(c) Fees for the Issuance or Availability of
Credit
1. Membership fees. Membership fees for
opening an account are fees for the issuance
or availability of credit. A membership fee to
join an organization that provides a credit or
charge card as a privilege of membership is
a fee for the issuance or availability of credit
only if the card is issued automatically upon
membership. If membership results merely in
eligibility to apply for an account, then such
a fee is not a fee for the issuance or
availability of credit.
2. Enhancements. Fees for optional
services in addition to basic membership
privileges in a credit or charge card account
(for example, travel insurance or cardregistration services) are not fees for the
issuance or availability of credit if the basic
account may be opened without paying such
fees.
3. One-time fees. Only non-periodic fees
related to opening an account (such as onetime membership or participation fees) are
fees for the issuance or availability of credit.
Fees for reissuing a lost or stolen card and
statement reproduction fees are examples of
fees that are not fees for the issuance or
availability of credit.
Section 227.28—Deceptive Acts or Practices
Regarding Firm Offers of Credit
(a) Disclosure of Criteria Bearing on
Creditworthiness
1. Designed to call attention. Whether a
disclosure has been provided in a manner
that is designed to call attention to the nature
and significance of required information
depends on where the disclosure is placed in
the solicitation and how it is presented,
including whether the disclosure uses a
typeface and type size that are easy to read
and uses boldface or italics. Placing the
disclosure in a footnote would not satisfy this
requirement.
2. Form of electronic disclosures.
Electronic disclosures must be provided
consistent with 12 CFR 226.5a(a)(2)–8 and
–9.
3. Multiple annual percentage rates or
credit limits. For purposes of this section, a
firm offer of credit solicitation that states an
annual percentage rate or credit limit for a
credit card feature and a different annual
percentage rate or credit limit for a different
credit card feature does not offer multiple
annual percentage rates or credit limits. For
example, if a firm offer of credit solicitation
offers a 15% annual percentage rate for
purchases and a 20% annual percentage rate
for cash advances, the solicitation does not
offer multiple annual percentage rates for
purposes of this section.
4. Example. Assume that a bank requests
from a consumer reporting agency a list of
consumers with credit scores of 650 or higher
so that the bank can send those consumers
a firm offer of credit solicitation. The bank
sends a solicitation to those consumers for a
consumer credit card account advertising
‘‘rates from 8.99% to 19.99%’’ and ‘‘credit
limits from $1,000 to $10,000.’’ Before
selection of the consumers for the offer,
however, the bank determines that it will
provide an interest rate of 8.99% and a credit
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limit of $10,000 only to those consumers
responding to the solicitation who are
verified to have a credit score of 650 or
higher, who have a debt-to-income ratio
below a certain amount, and who meet other
specific criteria bearing on creditworthiness.
Under § 227.28, this solicitation is deceptive
unless the bank discloses, in a manner that
is reasonably understandable to the
consumer and designed to call attention to
the nature and significance of the
information, that, if the consumer is
approved for credit, the annual percentage
rate and credit limit the consumer will
receive will depend on specific criteria
bearing on the consumer’s creditworthiness.
The bank may satisfy this requirement by
using a typeface and type size that are easy
to read and stating in boldface in a manner
that otherwise calls attention to the nature
and significance of the information: ‘‘If you
are approved for credit, your annual
percentage rate and/or credit limit will
depend on your credit history, income, and
debts.’’
5. Applicability of criteria in disclosure.
When making a disclosure under this section,
a bank may only disclose the criteria it uses
in evaluating whether consumers who are
approved for credit will receive the lowest
annual percentage rate or the highest credit
limit. For example, if a bank does not
consider the consumer’s debts when
determining whether the consumer should
receive the lowest annual percentage rate or
highest credit limit, the disclosure must not
refer to ‘‘debts.’’
Subpart D—Overdraft Services Rule
Section 227.32—Unfair Acts or Practices
Regarding Overdraft Services
(a) Opt-Out Requirement
(a)(1) General Rule
1. Form, content and timing of disclosure.
The form, content and timing of the opt-out
notice required to be provided under
paragraph (a) of this section are addressed
under § 230.10 of the Board’s Regulation DD,
Truth in Savings (12 CFR 230).
(a)(3) Exceptions
Paragraph (a)(3)(i)
1. Example of transaction amount
exceeding authorization amount (fuel
purchase). A consumer has $30 in a deposit
account. The consumer uses a debit card to
purchase fuel. Before permitting the
consumer to use the fuel pump, the merchant
verifies the validity of the card by obtaining
authorization from the bank for a $1
transaction. The consumer purchases $50 of
fuel. If the bank pays the transaction, it
would be permitted to assess a fee or charge
for paying the overdraft, even if the consumer
has opted out of the payment of overdrafts.
2. Example of transaction amount
exceeding authorization amount (restaurant).
A consumer has $50 in a deposit account.
The consumer pays for a $45 meal at a
restaurant using a debit card. While the
restaurant may obtain authorization for the
$45 cost of the meal, the consumer may add
$10 for a tip. If the bank pays the $55
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transaction (including the tip amount), it
would be permitted to assess a fee or charge
for paying the overdraft, even if the consumer
has opted out of the payment of overdrafts.
Paragraph (a)(3)(ii)
1. Example of transaction presented by
paper-based means. A consumer has $50 in
a deposit account. The consumer makes a
$60 purchase and presents his or her debit
card for payment. The merchant takes an
imprint of the card. Later that day, the
merchant submits a sales slip with the card
imprint to its processor for payment. If the
consumer’s bank pays the transaction, it
would be permitted to assess a fee or charge
for paying the overdraft, even if the consumer
has opted out of the payment of overdrafts.
(b) Debit Holds
1. General. Under § 227.32(b), a bank may
not assess an overdraft fee if the overdraft
would not have occurred but for a hold
placed on funds in the consumer’s account
for a transaction that has been authorized but
has not yet been presented for settlement, if
the amount of the hold is in excess of the
actual purchase or transaction amount when
the transaction is settled. Section 227.32(b)
does not limit a bank from charging an
overdraft fee in connection with a particular
transaction if the consumer would have
incurred an overdraft due to other reasons,
such as other transactions that may have
been authorized but not yet presented for
settlement, a deposited check that is
returned, or if the purchase or transaction
amount for the transaction for which the hold
was placed would have also caused the
consumer to overdraw his or her account.
2. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for same transaction. A
consumer has $50 in a deposit account. The
consumer makes a fuel purchase using his or
her debit card. Before permitting the
consumer to use the fuel pump, the merchant
obtains authorization from the consumer’s
bank for a $75 ‘‘hold’’ on the account which
exceeds the consumer’s funds. The consumer
purchases $20 of fuel. Under these
circumstances, § 227.32(b) prohibits the bank
from assessing a fee or charge in connection
with the debit hold because the actual
amount of the fuel purchase did not exceed
the funds in the consumer’s account.
However, if the consumer had purchased $60
of fuel, the bank could assess a fee or charge
for an overdraft because the transaction
exceeds the funds in the consumer’s account,
unless the consumer has opted out of the
payment of overdrafts under § 227.32(a).
3. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for another transaction. A
consumer has $100 in a deposit account. The
consumer makes a fuel purchase using his or
her debit card. Before permitting the
consumer to use the fuel pump, the merchant
obtains authorization from the consumer’s
bank for a $75 ‘‘hold’’ on the account. The
consumer purchases $20 of fuel, but the
transaction is not presented for settlement
until the next day. Later on the first day, and
assuming no other transactions, the
consumer withdraws $75 at an ATM. Under
these circumstances, § 227.32(b) prohibits the
bank from assessing a fee or charge for paying
an overdraft with respect to the $75
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withdrawal because the overdraft was caused
solely by the $75 hold.
4. Example of prohibition when
authorization and settlement amounts are
held for the same transaction. A consumer
has $100 in his deposit account, and uses his
debit card to purchase $50 worth of fuel.
Before permitting the consumer to use the
fuel pump, the merchant obtains
authorization from the consumer’s bank for a
$75 ‘‘hold’’ on the account. The consumer
purchases $50 of fuel. When the merchant
presents the $50 transaction for settlement, it
uses a different transaction code to identify
the transaction than it had used for the preauthorization, causing both the $75 hold and
the $50 purchase amount to be temporarily
posted to the consumer’s account at the same
time, and the consumer’s account to be
overdrawn. Under these circumstances, and
assuming no other transactions, § 227.32(b)
prohibits the bank from assessing a fee or
charge for paying an overdraft because the
overdraft was caused solely by the $75 hold.
5. Example of permissible overdraft fees in
connection with a hold. A consumer has
$100 in a deposit account. The consumer
makes a fuel purchase using his or her debit
card. Before permitting the consumer to use
the fuel pump, the merchant obtains
authorization from the consumer’s bank for a
$75 ‘‘hold’’ on the account. The consumer
purchases $35 of fuel, but the transaction is
not presented for settlement until the next
day. Later on the first day, and assuming no
other transactions, the consumer withdraws
$75 at an ATM. Notwithstanding the
existence of the hold, and assuming the
consumer has not opted out of the payment
of overdrafts under § 227.32(a), the
consumer’s bank may charge the consumer
an overdraft fee for the $75 ATM withdrawal,
because the consumer would have incurred
the overdraft even if the hold had been for
the actual amount of the fuel purchase.
9. The Federal Reserve System Board of
Governors’ Staff Guidelines on the Credit
Practices Rule, published August 3, 1988 at
51 FR 29225, is amended as follows:
Staff Guidelines on the Credit Practices Rule
Effective January 1, 1986; as amended
effective [August 1, 1988] flInsert effective
date of new amendmentsfi
Introduction
*
*
*
*
*
3. Scope; enforcement.flAs stated in
subpart A of Regulation AA,fi [The Board’s]
flthisfi rule applies to all banks and their
subsidiariesfl, except savings associations as
defined in 12 U.S.C. 1813(b).fi [institutions
that are members of the Federal Home Loan
Bank System and nonbank subsidiaries of
bank holding companies are covered by the
rules of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
and the FTC, respectively.] The Board has
enforcement responsibility for state-chartered
banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System. The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency has enforcement
responsibility for national banks. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation has
enforcement responsibility for insured statechartered banks that are not members of the
Federal Reserve System.
*
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*
*
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*
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*
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[Section 227.11
Scope
Authority, Purpose, and
Q11(c)–1: Penalties for noncompliance.
What are the penalties for noncompliance
with the rule?
A: Administrative enforcement of the rule
for banks may involve actions under section
8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. 1818), including cease-and-desist
orders requiring that actions be taken to
remedy violations. If the terms of the order
are violated, the federal supervisory agency
may impose penalties of up to $1,000 per day
for every day that the bank is in violation of
the order.
Q11(c)–2: Industrial loan companies. Are
industrial loan companies subject to the
Board’s rule?
A: Industrial loan companies that are
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation are covered by the Board’s rule.]
*
*
*
*
*
Department of the Treasury
Office of Thrift Supervision
12 CFR Chapter V
For the reasons discussed in the joint
preamble, the Office of Thrift
Supervision proposes to amend chapter
V of title 12 of the Code of Federal
Regulations by revising 12 CFR part 535
to read as follows:
PART 535—UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE
ACTS OR PRACTICES
Subpart A—General Provisions
Sec.
535.1
Authority, purpose, and scope.
Subpart B—Consumer Credit Practices
535.11 Definitions.
535.12 Unfair credit contract provisions.
535.13 Unfair or deceptive cosigner
practices.
535.14 Unfair late charges.
535.15 State exemptions.
Subpart C—Consumer Credit Card Account
Practices
535.21 Definitions.
535.22 Unfair time to make payment.
535.23 Unfair payment allocations.
535.24 Unfair annual percentage rate
increases on outstanding balances.
535.25 Unfair fees for exceeding the credit
limit due to credit holds.
535.26 Unfair balance computation method.
535.27 Unfair charging to the account of
security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit.
535.28 Deceptive firm offers of credit.
Subpart D—Overdraft Service Practices
535.31 Definitions.
535.32 Unfair overdraft service practices.
Appendix to Part 535—Official Staff
Commentary
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1462a, 1463, 1464; 15
U.S.C. 57a.
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§ 535.12
Subpart A—General Provisions
§ 535.1
Authority, purpose and scope.
(a) Authority. This part is issued by
OTS under section 18(f) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 57a(f).
(b) Purpose. The purpose of this part
is to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in violation of section 5(a)(1)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). This part defines and
contains requirements prescribed for the
purpose of preventing specific unfair or
deceptive acts or practices of savings
associations. The prohibitions in this
part do not limit OTS’s authority to
enforce the FTC Act with respect to any
other unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.
(c) Scope. This part applies to savings
associations and subsidiaries owned in
whole or in part by a savings
association.
Subpart B—Consumer Credit Practices
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§ 535.11
Definitions.
For purposes of this subpart, the
following definitions apply:
(a) Consumer means a natural person
who seeks or acquires goods, services,
or money for personal, family, or
household purposes, other than for the
purchase of real property, and who
applies for or is extended consumer
credit.
(b) Consumer credit means credit
extended to a natural person for
personal, family, or household
purposes. It includes consumer loans;
educational loans; unsecured loans for
real property alteration, repair or
improvement, or for the equipping of
real property; overdraft loans; and credit
cards. It also includes loans secured by
liens on real estate and chattel liens
secured by mobile homes and leases of
personal property to consumers that
may be considered the functional
equivalent of loans on personal security
but only if the savings association relies
substantially upon other factors, such as
the general credit standing of the
borrower, guaranties, or security other
than the real estate or mobile home, as
the primary security for the loan.
(c) Earnings means compensation
paid or payable to an individual or for
the individual’s account for personal
services rendered or to be rendered by
the individual, whether denominated as
wages, salary, commission, bonus, or
otherwise, including periodic payments
pursuant to a pension, retirement, or
disability program.
(d) Obligation means an agreement
between a consumer and a creditor.
(e) Person means an individual,
corporation, or other business
organization.
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Unfair credit contract provisions.
It is an unfair act or practice for you,
directly or indirectly, to enter into a
consumer credit obligation that
constitutes or contains, or to enforce in
a consumer credit obligation you
purchased, any of the following
provisions:
(a) Confession of judgment. A
cognovit or confession of judgment (for
purposes other than executory process
in the State of Louisiana), warrant of
attorney, or other waiver of the right to
notice and the opportunity to be heard
in the event of suit or process thereon.
(b) Waiver of exemption. An
executory waiver or a limitation of
exemption from attachment, execution,
or other process on real or personal
property held, owned by, or due to the
consumer, unless the waiver applies
solely to property subject to a security
interest executed in connection with the
obligation.
(c) Assignment of wages. An
assignment of wages or other earnings
unless:
(1) The assignment by its terms is
revocable at the will of the debtor;
(2) The assignment is a payroll
deduction plan or preauthorized
payment plan, commencing at the time
of the transaction, in which the
consumer authorizes a series of wage
deductions as a method of making each
payment; or
(3) The assignment applies only to
wages or other earnings already earned
at the time of the assignment.
(d) Security interest in household
goods. A nonpossessory security interest
in household goods other than a
purchase-money security interest. For
purposes of this paragraph, household
goods:
(1) Means clothing, furniture,
appliances, linens, china, crockery,
kitchenware, and personal effects of the
consumer and the consumer’s
dependents.
(2) Does not include:
(i) Works of art;
(ii) Electronic entertainment
equipment (except one television and
one radio);
(iii) Antiques (any item over one
hundred years of age, including such
items that have been repaired or
renovated without changing their
original form or character); or
(iv) Jewelry (other than wedding
rings).
§ 535.13 Unfair or deceptive cosigner
practices.
(a) Prohibited deception. It is a
deceptive act or practice for you,
directly or indirectly in connection with
the extension of credit to consumers, to
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misrepresent the nature or extent of
cosigner liability to any person.
(b) Prohibited unfairness. It is an
unfair act or practice for you, directly or
indirectly in connection with the
extension of credit to consumers, to
obligate a cosigner unless the cosigner is
informed, before becoming obligated, of
the nature of the cosigner’s liability.
(c) Disclosure requirement. (1)
Disclosure statement. A clear and
conspicuous statement must be given in
writing to the cosigner before becoming
obligated. In the case of open-end credit,
the disclosure statement must be given
to the cosigner before the time that the
cosigner becomes obligated for any fees
or transactions on the account. The
disclosure statement must contain the
following statement or one that is
substantially similar:
Notice of Cosigner
You are being asked to guarantee this debt.
Think carefully before you do. If the
borrower doesn’t pay the debt, you will have
to. Be sure you can afford to pay if you have
to, and that you want to accept this
responsibility.
You may have to pay up to the full amount
of the debt if the borrower does not pay. You
may also have to pay late fees or collection
costs, which increase this amount.
The creditor can collect this debt from you
without first trying to collect from the
borrower. The creditor can use the same
collection methods against you that can be
used against the borrower, such as suing you,
garnishing your wages, etc. If this debt is ever
in default, that fact may become a part of
your credit record.
(2) Compliance. Compliance with
paragraph (d)(1) of this section
constitutes compliance with the
consumer disclosure requirement in
paragraph (b) of this section.
(3) Additional content limitations. If
the notice is a separate document,
nothing other than the following items
may appear with the notice:
(i) Your name and address;
(ii) An identification of the debt to be
cosigned (e.g., a loan identification
number);
(iii) The date (of the transaction); and
(iv) The statement, ‘‘This notice is not
the contract that makes you liable for
the debt.’’
(d) Cosigner defined. (1) Cosigner
means a natural person who assumes
liability for the obligation of a consumer
without receiving goods, services, or
money in return for the obligation, or,
in the case of an open-end credit
obligation, without receiving the
contractual right to obtain extensions of
credit under the account.
(2) Cosigner includes any person
whose signature is requested as a
condition to granting credit to a
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consumer, or as a condition for
forbearance on collection of a
consumer’s obligation that is in default.
The term does not include a spouse or
other person whose signature is
required on a credit obligation to perfect
a security interest pursuant to state law.
(3) A person who meets the definition
in this paragraph is a cosigner, whether
or not the person is designated as such
on a credit obligation.
§ 535.14
Unfair late charges.
(a) Prohibition. In connection with
collecting a debt arising out of an
extension of credit to a consumer, it is
an unfair act or practice for you, directly
or indirectly, to levy or collect any
delinquency charge on a payment, when
the only delinquency is attributable to
late fees or delinquency charges
assessed on earlier installments and the
payment is otherwise a full payment for
the applicable period and is paid on its
due date or within an applicable grace
period.
(b) Collecting a debt defined.
Collecting a debt means, for the
purposes of this section, any activity,
other than the use of judicial process,
that is intended to bring about or does
bring about repayment of all or part of
money due (or alleged to be due) from
a consumer.
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§ 535.15
State exemptions.
(a) Applications. An appropriate state
agency may apply to OTS for a
determination that:
(1) There is a state requirement or
prohibition in effect that applies to any
transaction to which a provision of this
subpart applies; and
(2) The state requirement or
prohibition affords a level of protection
to consumers that is substantially
equivalent to, or greater than, the
protection afforded by this subpart.
(b) Determinations. If OTS makes a
determination under paragraph (a) of
this section, then the provision of this
subpart will not be in effect in that state
to the extent specified by OTS in its
determination, for as long as the state
administers and enforces the state
requirement or prohibition effectively,
as determined by OTS.
(c) Delegated authority. The Managing
Director, Compliance and Consumer
Protection in consultation with the
Chief Counsel has delegated authority to
make such determinations as are
required under this subpart.
Subpart C—Consumer Credit Card
Account Practices
§ 535.21
Definitions.
For purposes of this subpart, the
following definitions apply:
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(a) Annual percentage rate means the
product of multiplying each periodic
rate for a balance or transaction on a
consumer credit card account by the
number of periods in a year. The term
periodic rate has the same meaning as
in § 226.2 of this title.
(b) Consumer means a natural person
to whom credit is extended under a
consumer credit card account or a
natural person who is a co-obligor or
guarantor of a consumer credit card
account.
(c) Consumer credit card account
means an account provided to a
consumer primarily for personal, family,
or household purposes under an openend credit plan that is accessed by a
credit card or charge card. The terms
open-end credit, credit card, and charge
card have the same meanings as in
§ 226.2 of this title. The following are
not consumer credit card accounts for
purposes of this subpart:
(1) Home equity plans subject to the
requirements of § 226.5b of this title that
are accessible by a credit or charge card;
(2) Overdraft lines of credit tied to
asset accounts accessed by checkguarantee cards or by debit cards;
(3) Lines of credit accessed by checkguarantee cards or by debit cards that
can be used only at automated teller
machines; and
(4) Lines of credit accessed solely by
account numbers.
(d) Promotional rate means:
(1) Any annual percentage rate
applicable to one or more balances or
transactions on a consumer credit card
account for a specified period of time
that is lower than the annual percentage
rate that will be in effect at the end of
that period; or
(2) Any annual percentage rate
applicable to one or more transactions
on a consumer credit card account that
is lower than the annual percentage rate
that applies to other transactions of the
same type.
§ 535.22
Unfair time to make payment.
(a) General rule. Except as provided in
paragraph (c) of this section, you must
not treat a payment on a consumer
credit card account as late for any
purpose unless you have provided the
consumer a reasonable amount of time
to make the payment.
(b) Safe harbor. You satisfy the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section if you have adopted reasonable
procedures designed to ensure that
periodic statements specifying the
payment due date are mailed or
delivered to consumers at least 21 days
before the payment due date.
(c) Exception for grace periods.
Paragraph (a) of this section does not
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apply to any time period you provide
within which the consumer may repay
any portion of the credit extended
without incurring an additional finance
charge.
§ 535.23
Unfair payment allocations.
(a) General rule for accounts with
different annual percentage rates on
different balances. Except as provided
in paragraph (b) of this section, when
different annual percentage rates apply
to different balances on a consumer
credit card account, you must allocate
any amount paid by the consumer in
excess of the required minimum
periodic payment among the balances in
a manner that is no less beneficial to the
consumer than one of the following
methods:
(1) You allocate the amount first to
the balance with the highest annual
percentage rate and any remaining
portion to the other balances in
descending order based on the
applicable annual percentage rate;
(2) You allocate equal portions of the
amount to each balance; or
(3) You allocate the amount among
the balances in the same proportion as
each balance bears to the total balance.
(b) Special rules for accounts with
promotional rate balances or deferred
interest balances. (1) Rule regarding
payment allocation. (i) In general. When
a consumer credit card account has one
or more balances at a promotional rate
or balances on which interest is
deferred, you must allocate any amount
paid by the consumer in excess of the
required minimum periodic payment
among the other balances on the
account consistent with paragraph (a) of
this section. If any amount remains after
such allocation, you must allocate that
amount among the promotional rate
balances or the deferred interest
balances consistent with paragraph (a)
of this section.
(ii) Exception for deferred interest
balances. Notwithstanding paragraph
(b)(1)(i) of this section, you may allocate
the entire amount paid by the consumer
in excess of the required minimum
periodic payment to a balance on which
interest is deferred during the two
billing cycles immediately preceding
expiration of the period during which
interest is deferred.
(2) Rule regarding grace period. You
must not require a consumer to repay
any portion of a promotional rate
balance or deferred interest balance on
a consumer credit card account in order
to receive any time period you offer in
which to repay other credit extended
without incurring finance charges,
provided that the consumer is otherwise
eligible for such a time period.
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§ 535.24 Unfair annual percentage rate
increases on outstanding balances.
§ 535.25 Unfair fees for exceeding the
credit limit due to credit holds.
(a) Prohibition against increasing
annual percentage rates on outstanding
balances. (1) General rule. Except as
provided in paragraph (b) of this
section, you must not increase the
annual percentage rate applicable to any
outstanding balance on a consumer
credit card account.
(2) Outstanding balance defined. For
purposes of this section, outstanding
balance means the amount owed on a
consumer credit card account at the end
of the fourteenth day after you provide
a notice required by §§ 226.9(c) or
226.9(g) of this title.
(b) Exceptions. Paragraph (a) of this
section does not apply where the annual
percentage rate is increased due to:
(1) The operation of an index that is
not under your control and is available
to the general public;
(2) The expiration or loss of a
promotional rate provided that, if a
promotional rate is lost, you do not
increase the annual percentage rate to a
rate that is greater than the annual
percentage rate that would have applied
after expiration of the promotional rate;
or
(3) You not receiving the consumer’s
required minimum payment within 30
days after the due date for that payment.
(c) Treatment of outstanding balances
following rate increase. (1) Payment of
outstanding balances. When you
increase the annual percentage rate
applicable to a category of transaction
on a consumer credit card account and
this section prohibits you from applying
the increased rate to outstanding
balances in that category, you must
provide the consumer with a method of
paying that outstanding balance that is
no less beneficial to the consumer than
one of the following methods:
(i) An amortization period for the
outstanding balance of no less than five
years, starting from the date on which
the increased annual percentage rate
went into effect; or
(ii) A required minimum periodic
payment on the outstanding balance
that includes a percentage of that
balance that is no more than twice the
percentage included before the date on
which the increased annual percentage
rate went into effect.
(2) Fees and charges on outstanding
balance. When you increase the annual
percentage rate applicable to a category
of transactions on a consumer credit
card account and this section prohibits
you from applying the increased rate to
outstanding balances in that category,
you must not assess any fee or charge
based solely on the outstanding balance.
You must not assess a fee or charge
for exceeding the credit limit on a
consumer credit card account if the
credit limit would not have been
exceeded but for a hold placed on any
portion of the available credit on the
account that is in excess of the actual
purchase or transaction amount.
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§ 535.26 Unfair balance computation
method.
(a) General rule. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this section, you must
not impose finance charges on balances
on a consumer credit card account
based on balances for days in billing
cycles that precede the most recent
billing cycle.
(b) Exceptions. Paragraph (a) of this
section does not apply to:
(1) The assessment of deferred
interest; or
(2) Adjustments to finance charges
following the resolution of a billing
error dispute under §§ 226.12(b) or
226.13 of this title.
§ 535.27 Unfair charging to the account of
security deposits and fees for the issuance
or availability of credit.
(a) Annual rule. During the period
beginning with the date on which a
consumer credit card account is opened
and ending twelve months from that
date, you must not charge to the account
security deposits or fees for the issuance
or availability of credit if the total
amount of such security deposits and
fees constitutes a majority of the initial
credit limit for the account.
(b) Monthly rule. If the total amount
of security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit charged
to a consumer credit card account
during the period beginning with the
date on which a consumer credit card
account is opened and ending twelve
months from that date constitutes more
than 25 percent of the initial credit limit
for the account:
(1) During the first billing cycle after
the account is opened, you must not
charge to the account security deposits
and fees for the issuance or availability
of credit that total more than 25 percent
of the initial credit limit for the account;
and
(2) In each of the eleven billing cycles
following the first billing cycle, you
must not charge to the account more
than one eleventh of the total amount of
any security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit in
excess of 25 percent of the initial credit
limit for the account.
(c) Fees for the issuance or availability
of credit. For purposes of paragraphs (a)
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and (b) of this section, fees for the
issuance or availability of credit
include:
(1) Any annual or other periodic fee
that may be imposed for the issuance or
availability of a consumer credit card
account, including any fee based on
account activity or inactivity; and
(2) Any non-periodic fee that relates
to opening an account.
§ 535.28
Deceptive firm offers of credit.
(a) Disclosure of criteria bearing on
creditworthiness. If you offer a range or
multiple annual percentage rates or
credit limits when you make a
solicitation for a firm offer of credit for
a consumer credit card account, and the
annual percentage rate or credit limit
that consumers approved for credit will
receive depends on specific criteria
bearing on creditworthiness, you must
disclose the types of criteria in the
solicitation. You must provide the
disclosure in a manner that is
reasonably understandable to
consumers and designed to call
attention to the nature and significance
of the eligibility criteria for the lowest
annual percentage rate or highest credit
limit stated in the solicitation. If
presented in a manner that calls
attention to the nature and significance
of the information, the following
disclosure may be used to satisfy the
requirements of this section (as
applicable): ‘‘If you are approved for
credit, your annual percentage rate and/
or credit limit will depend on your
credit history, income, and debts.’’
(b) Firm offer of credit defined. For
purposes of this section, firm offer of
credit has the same meaning as that term
has under the definition of firm offer of
credit or insurance in section 603(l) of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C.
1681a(l)).
Subpart D—Overdraft Service
Practices
§ 535.31
Definitions.
For purposes of this subpart, the
following definitions apply:
(a) Account means a deposit account
at a savings association that is held by
or offered to a consumer. The term
account has the same meaning as in
§ 230.2(a) of this title.
(b) Consumer means a person who
holds an account primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes.
(c) Overdraft service means a service
under which a savings association
charges a fee for paying a transaction
(including a check or other item) that
overdraws an account. The term
overdraft service does not include any
payment of overdrafts pursuant to:
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(1) A line of credit subject to part 226
of this title, including transfers from a
credit card account, home equity line of
credit, or overdraft line of credit; or
(2) A service that transfers funds from
another account of the consumer.
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§ 535.32
Unfair overdraft service practices.
(a) Opt-out requirement. (1) General
rule. You must not assess a fee or charge
on a consumer’s account in connection
with an overdraft service, unless you
provide the consumer with the right to
opt out of your payment of overdrafts
and a reasonable opportunity to exercise
that opt out and the consumer has not
opted out. The consumer must be given
notice and an opportunity to opt out
before you assess any fee or charge for
an overdraft, and subsequently at least
once during or for any periodic
statement cycle in which any fee or
charge for paying an overdraft is
assessed. The notice requirements in
paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this
section do not apply if the consumer has
opted out, unless the consumer
subsequently revokes the opt-out.
(2) Partial opt-out. You must provide
a consumer the option of opting out
only for the payment of overdrafts at
automated teller machines and for
point-of-sale transactions initiated by a
debit card, in addition to the choice of
opting out of the payment of overdrafts
for all transactions.
(3) Exceptions. Notwithstanding a
consumer’s election to opt out under
paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section,
you may assess a fee or charge on a
consumer’s account for paying a debit
card transaction that overdraws an
account if:
(i) There were sufficient funds in the
consumer’s account at the time the
authorization request was received, but
the actual purchase amount for that
transaction exceeds the amount that had
been authorized; or
(ii) The transaction is presented for
payment by paper-based means, rather
than electronically through a card
terminal, and you have not previously
authorized the transaction.
(4) Time to comply with opt-out. You
must comply with a consumer’s opt-out
request as soon as reasonably
practicable after you receive it.
(5) Continuing right to opt-out. A
consumer may opt out of your future
payment of overdrafts at any time.
(6) Duration of opt-out. A consumer’s
opt-out is effective unless the consumer
subsequently revokes it.
(b) Debit holds. You must not assess
a fee or charge on a consumer’s account
for an overdraft service if the
consumer’s overdraft would not have
occurred but for a hold placed on funds
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in the consumer’s account that is in
excess of the actual purchase or
transaction amount.
Appendix to Part 535—Official Staff
Commentary
Subpart A—General Provisions
Section 535.1—Authority, Purpose, and
Scope
1(c) Scope
1. Penalties for noncompliance.
Administrative enforcement of the rule for
savings associations may involve actions
under section 8 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1818), including
cease-and-desist orders requiring that action
be taken to remedy violations and civil
money penalties.
Subpart C—Consumer Credit Card Account
Practices
Section 535.21—Definitions
(d) Promotional Rate
Paragraph (d)(1)
1. Rate in effect at the end of the
promotional period. If the annual percentage
rate that will be in effect at the end of the
specified period of time is a variable rate, the
rate in effect at the end of that period for
purposes of § 535.21(d)(1) is the rate that
would otherwise apply if the promotional
rate were not offered, consistent with any
applicable accuracy requirements under part
226 of this title.
Paragraph (d)(2)
1. Example. A savings association
generally offers a 15% annual percentage rate
for purchases on a consumer credit card
account. For purchases made during a
particular month, however, the creditor offers
a rate of 5% that will apply until the
consumer pays those purchases in full.
Under § 535.21(d)(2), the 5% rate is a
‘‘promotional rate’’ because it is lower than
the 15% rate that applies to other purchases.
Section 535.22—Unfair Time To Make
Payment
(a) General Rule
1. Treating a payment as late for any
purpose. Treating a payment as late for any
purpose includes increasing the annual
percentage rate as a penalty, reporting the
consumer as delinquent to a credit reporting
agency, or assessing a late fee or any other
fee based on the consumer’s failure to make
a payment within the amount of time
provided to make that payment under this
section.
2. Reasonable amount of time to make
payment. Whether an amount of time is
reasonable for purposes of making a payment
is determined from the perspective of the
consumer, not the savings association. Under
§ 535.22(b), a savings association provides a
reasonable amount of time to make a
payment if it has adopted reasonable
procedures designed to ensure that periodic
statements specifying the payment due date
are mailed or delivered to consumers at least
21 days before the payment due date.
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(b) Safe Harbor
1. Reasonable procedures. A savings
association is not required to determine the
specific date on which periodic statements
are mailed or delivered to each individual
consumer. A savings association provides a
reasonable amount of time to make a
payment if it has adopted reasonable
procedures designed to ensure that periodic
statements are mailed or delivered to
consumers no later than, for example, three
days after the closing date of the billing cycle
and the payment due date on the periodic
statement is no less than 24 days after the
closing date of the billing cycle.
2. Payment due date. For purposes of
§ 535.22(b), ‘‘payment due date’’ means the
date by which the savings association
requires the consumer to make payment to
avoid being treated as late for any purpose,
except as provided in § 535.22(c).
Section 535.23—Unfair Payment Allocations
1. Minimum periodic payment. This
section addresses the allocation of amounts
paid by the consumer in excess of the
minimum periodic payment required by the
savings association. This section does not
limit or otherwise address the savings
association’s ability to determine the amount
of the minimum periodic payment or how
that payment is allocated.
2. Adjustments of one dollar or less
permitted. When allocating payments, the
savings association may adjust amounts by
one dollar or less. For example, if a savings
association is allocating $100 equally among
three balances, the savings association may
apply $34 to one balance and $33 to the
others. Similarly, if a savings association is
splitting $100.50 between two balances, the
savings association may apply $50 to one
balance and $50.50 to another.
(a) General Rule for Accounts With Different
Annual Percentage Rates on Different
Balances
1. No less beneficial to the consumer. A
savings association may allocate payments
using a method that is different from the
methods listed in § 535.23(a) so long as the
method used is no less beneficial to the
consumer than one of the listed methods. A
method is no less beneficial to the consumer
than a listed method if it results in the
assessment of the same or a lesser amount of
interest charges than would be assessed
under any of the listed methods. For
example, a savings association may not
allocate the entire amount paid by the
consumer in excess of the required minimum
periodic payment to the balance with the
lowest annual percentage rate because this
method would result in a higher assessment
of interest charges than any of the methods
listed in § 535.23(a).
2. Example of payment allocation method
that is no less beneficial to consumers than
a method listed in § 535.23(a). Assume that
a consumer’s account has a cash advance
balance of $500 at an annual percentage rate
of 20% and a purchase balance of $1,500 at
an annual percentage rate of 15% and that
the consumer pays $555 in excess of the
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required minimum periodic payment. A
savings association could allocate one-third
of this amount ($185) to the cash advance
balance and two-thirds ($370) to the
purchase balance even though this is not a
method listed in § 535.23(a) because the
savings association is applying more of the
amount to the balance with the highest
annual percentage rate (with the result that
the consumer will be assessed less in interest
charges) than would be the case under the
pro rata allocation method in § 535.23(a)(3).
See comment 23(a)(3)–1.
Paragraph (a)(1)
1. Examples of allocating first to the
balance with the highest annual percentage
rate.
(A) Assume that a consumer’s account has
a cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 20% and a purchase
balance of $1,500 at an annual percentage
rate of 15% and that the consumer pays $800
in excess of the required minimum periodic
payment. None of the minimum periodic
payment is allocated to the cash advance
balance. A savings association using this
method would allocate $500 to pay off the
cash advance balance and then allocate the
remaining $300 to the purchase balance.
(B) Assume that a consumer’s account has
a cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 20% and a purchase
balance of $1,500 at an annual percentage
rate of 15% and that the consumer pays $400
in excess of the required minimum periodic
payment. A savings association using this
method would allocate the entire $400 to the
cash advance balance.
Paragraph (a)(2)
1. Example of equal portion method.
Assume that a consumer’s account has a cash
advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 20% and a purchase
balance of $1,500 at an annual percentage
rate of 15% and that the consumer pays $555
in excess of the required minimum periodic
payment. A savings association using this
method would allocate $278 to the cash
advance balance and $277 to the purchase
balance (or vice versa).
Paragraph (a)(3)
1. Example of pro rata method. Assume
that a consumer’s account has a cash advance
balance of $500 at an annual percentage rate
of 20% and a purchase balance of $1,500 at
an annual percentage rate of 15% and that
the consumer pays $555 in excess of the
required minimum periodic payment. A
savings association using this method would
allocate 25% of the amount ($139) to the cash
advance balance and 75% of the amount
($416) to the purchase balance.
(b) Special Rules for Accounts With
Promotional Rate Balances or Deferred
Interest Balances
Paragraph (b)(1)(i)
1. Examples of special rule regarding
payment allocation for accounts with
promotional rate balances or deferred
interest balances.
(A) A consumer credit card account has a
cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 20%, a purchase balance
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of $1,500 at an annual percentage rate of
15%, and a transferred balance of $3,000 at
a promotional rate of 5%. The consumer pays
$800 in excess of the required minimum
periodic payment. The savings association
must allocate the $800 between the cash
advance and purchase balances (consistent
with § 535.23(a)) and apply nothing to the
transferred balance.
(B) A consumer credit card account has a
cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 20%, a balance of $1,500
on which interest is deferred, and a
transferred balance of $3,000 at a
promotional rate of 5%. The consumer pays
$800 in excess of the required minimum
periodic payment. None of the minimum
periodic payment is allocated to the cash
advance balance. The savings association
must allocate $500 to pay off the cash
advance balance before allocating the
remaining $300 between the deferred interest
balance and the transferred balance
(consistent with § 535.23(a)).
Paragraph (b)(1)(ii)
1. Examples of exception for deferred
interest balances. Assume that on January 1,
a consumer uses a credit card to make a
$1,000 purchase on which interest is deferred
until June 30. If this amount is not paid in
full by June 30, all interest accrued during
the six-month period will be charged to the
account. The billing cycle for this credit card
begins on the first day of the month and ends
on the last day of the month. Each month
from January through June the consumer uses
the credit card to make $200 in purchases on
which interest is not deferred.
(A) The consumer pays $300 in excess of
the minimum periodic payment each month
from January through June. None of the
minimum periodic payment is applied to the
deferred interest balance or the purchase
balance. For the January, February, March,
and April billing cycles, the savings
association must allocate $200 to the
purchase balance and $100 to the deferred
interest balance. For the May and June billing
cycles, however, the savings association has
the option of allocating the entire $300 to the
deferred interest balance, which will result in
that balance being paid in full before the
deferred interest period expires on June 30.
In this example, the interest that accrued
between January 1 and June 30 will not be
assessed to the consumer’s account.
(B) The consumer pays $200 in excess of
the minimum periodic payment each month
from January through June. None of the
minimum periodic payment is applied to the
deferred interest balance or the purchase
balance. For the January, February, March,
and April billing cycles, the savings
association must allocate the entire $200 to
the purchase balance. For the May and June
billing cycles, however, the savings
association has the option to allocate the
entire $200 to the deferred interest balance,
which will result in that balance being
reduced to $600 before the deferred interest
period expires on June 30. In this example,
the interest that accrued between January 1
and June 30 will be assessed to the
consumer’s account.
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Paragraph (b)(2)
1. Example of special rule regarding grace
periods for accounts with promotional rate
balances or deferred interest balances. A
savings association offers a promotional rate
on balance transfers and a higher rate on
purchases. The savings association also offers
a grace period under which consumers who
pay their balances in full by the due date are
not charged interest on purchases. A
consumer who has paid the balance for the
prior billing cycle in full by the due date
transfers a balance of $2,000 and makes a
purchase of $500. Because the savings
association offers a grace period, it must
provide a grace period on the $500 purchase
if the consumer pays that amount in full by
the due date, even though the $2,000 balance
at the promotional rate remains outstanding.
Section 535.24—Unfair Annual Percentage
Rate Increases on Outstanding Balances
(a) Prohibition Against Increasing Annual
Percentage Rates on Outstanding Balances
1. Example. Assume that on December 30,
a consumer credit card account has a balance
of $1,000 at an annual percentage rate of
15%. On December 31, the savings
association mails or delivers a notice
required by § 226.9(c) of this title informing
the consumer that the annual percentage rate
will increase to 20% on February 15. The
consumer uses the account to make $2,000 in
purchases on January 10 and $1,000 in
purchases on January 20. Assuming no other
transactions, the outstanding balance for
purposes of § 535.24 is the $3,000 balance as
of the end of the day on January 14.
Therefore, under § 535.24(a), the savings
association cannot increase the annual
percentage rate applicable to that balance.
The savings association can apply the 20%
rate to the $1,000 in purchases made on
January 20 but, consistent with § 226.9(c) of
this title, the savings association cannot do
so until February 15.
2. Reasonable procedures. A savings
association is not required to determine the
specific date on which a notice required by
§§ 226.9(c) or 226.9(g) of this title was
provided. For purposes of § 535.24(a)(2), if
the savings association has adopted
reasonable procedures designed to ensure
that notices required by §§ 226.9(c) or
229.9(g) of this title are provided to
consumers no later than, for example, three
days after the event giving rise to the notice,
the outstanding balance is the balance at the
end of the seventeenth day after such event.
(b) Exceptions
Paragraph (b)(1)
1. External index. A savings association
may increase the annual percentage rate on
an outstanding balance if the increase is
based on an index outside the savings
association’s control. A savings association
may not increase the rate on an outstanding
balance based on its own prime rate or cost
of funds and may not reserve a contractual
right to change rates on outstanding balances
at its discretion. In addition, a savings
association may not increase the rate on an
outstanding balance by changing the method
used to determine that rate. A savings
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association is permitted, however, to use a
published prime rate, such as that in the Wall
Street Journal, even if the savings
association’s own prime rate is one of several
rates used to establish the published rate.
2. Publicly available. The index must be
available to the public. A publicly available
index need not be published in a newspaper,
but it must be one the consumer can
independently obtain (by telephone, for
example) and use to verify the rate applied
to the outstanding balance.
Paragraph (b)(2)
1. Example. Assume that a consumer credit
card account has a balance of $1,000 at a 5%
promotional rate and that the savings
association also charges an annual percentage
rate of 15% for purchases and a penalty rate
of 25%. If the consumer does not make
payment by the due date and the account
agreement specifies that event as a trigger for
applying the penalty rate, the savings
association may increase the annual
percentage rate on the $1,000 from the 5%
promotional rate to the 15% annual
percentage rate for purchases. The savings
association may not, however, increase the
rate on the $1,000 from the 5% promotional
rate to the 25% penalty rate, except as
otherwise permitted under § 535.24(b)(3).
Paragraph (b)(3)
1. Example. Assume that the annual
percentage rate applicable to purchases on a
consumer credit card account is increased
from 15% to 20% and that the account has
an outstanding balance of $1,000 at the 15%
rate. The payment due date on the account
is the twenty-fifth of the month. If the savings
association has not received the required
minimum periodic payment due on March 15
on or before April 14, the savings association
may increase the rate applicable to the $1,000
balance once the savings association has
complied with the notice requirements
§ 226.9(g) of this title.
(c) Treatment of Outstanding Balances
Following Rate Increase
1. Scope. This provision does not apply if
the consumer credit card account does not
have an outstanding balance. This provision
also does not apply if a rate is increased
pursuant to any of the exceptions in
§ 535.24(b).
2. Category of transactions. This provision
does not apply to balances in categories of
transactions other than the category for
which the savings association has increased
the annual percentage rate. For example, if a
savings association increases the annual
percentage rate that applies to purchases but
not the rate that applies to cash advances,
§§ 535.24(c)(1) and 535.(c)(2) apply to an
outstanding balance consisting of purchases
but not an outstanding balance consisting of
cash advances.
Paragraph (c)(1)
1. No less beneficial to the consumer. A
savings association may provide a method of
paying the outstanding balance that is
different from the methods listed in
§ 535.24(c)(1) so long as the method used is
no less beneficial to the consumer than one
of the listed methods. A method is no less
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beneficial to the consumer if the method
amortizes the outstanding balance in five
years or longer or if the method results in a
required minimum periodic payment on the
outstanding balance that is equal to or less
than a minimum payment calculated
consistent with § 535.24(c)(1)(ii). For
example, a savings association could more
than double the percentage of amounts owed
included in the minimum payment so long
as the minimum payment does not result in
amortization of the outstanding balance in
less than five years. Alternatively, a savings
association could require a consumer to make
a minimum payment on the outstanding
balance that amortizes that balance in less
than five years so long as the payment does
not include a percentage of the outstanding
balance that is more than twice the
percentage included in the minimum
payment before the effective date of the
increased rate.
Paragraph (c)(1)(ii)
1. Required minimum periodic payment on
other balances. This paragraph addresses the
required minimum periodic payment on the
outstanding balance. This paragraph does not
limit or otherwise address the savings
association’s ability to determine the amount
of the minimum periodic payment for other
balances.
2. Example. Assume that the method used
by a savings association to calculate the
required minimum periodic payment for a
consumer credit card account requires the
consumer to pay either the total of fees and
interest charges plus 1% of the total amount
owed or $20, whichever is greater. Assume
also that the savings association increases the
annual percentage rate applicable to
purchases on a consumer credit card account
from 15% to 20% and that the account has
an outstanding balance of $1,000 at the 15%
rate. Section 535.24(c)(1)(ii) would permit
the savings association to calculate the
required minimum periodic payment on the
outstanding balance by adding fees and
interest charges to 2% of the outstanding
balance.
Paragraph (c)(2)
1. Fee or charge based solely on the
outstanding balance. You are prohibited from
assessing a fee or charge based solely on an
outstanding balance. For example, a savings
association is prohibited from assessing a
maintenance or similar fee based on an
outstanding balance. A savings association is
not, however, prohibited from assessing fees
such as late payment fees or fees for
exceeding the credit limit even if such fees
are based in part on an outstanding balance.
Section 535.25—Unfair Fees for Exceeding
the Credit Limit Due to Credit Holds
1. General. Under § 535.25, a savings
association may not assess a fee for exceeding
the credit limit if the credit limit would not
have been exceeded but for a hold placed on
the available credit for a consumer credit
card account for a transaction that has been
authorized but has not yet been presented for
settlement, if the amount of the hold is in
excess of the actual purchase or transaction
amount when the transaction is settled.
Section 535.25 does not limit a savings
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association from charging a fee for exceeding
the credit limit in connection with a
particular transaction if the consumer would
have exceeded the credit limit due to other
reasons, such as other transactions that may
have been authorized but not yet presented
for settlement, a payment that is returned, or
if the purchase or transaction amount for the
transaction for which the hold was placed
would have also caused the consumer to
exceed the credit limit.
2. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for same transaction.
Assume that a consumer credit card account
has a credit limit of $2,000 and a balance of
$1,500. The consumer uses the credit card to
check into a hotel for an anticipated stay of
five days. When the consumer checks in, the
hotel obtains authorization from the savings
association for a $750 hold on the account to
ensure there is adequate available credit to
cover the cost of the anticipated stay. The
consumer checks out of the hotel after three
days, and the total cost of the stay is $450,
which is charged to the consumer’s credit
card account. Assuming that there is no other
activity on the account, the savings
association is prohibited from assessing a fee
for exceeding the credit limit with respect to
the $750 hold. If, however, the total cost of
the stay charged to the account had been
more than $500, the savings association
would not be prohibited from assessing a fee
for exceeding the credit limit.
3. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for another transaction.
Assume that a consumer credit card account
has a credit limit of $2,000 and a balance of
$1,400. The consumer uses the credit card to
check into a hotel for an anticipated stay of
five days. When the consumer checks in, the
hotel obtains authorization from the savings
association for a $750 hold on the account to
ensure there is adequate available credit to
cover the cost of the anticipated stay. While
the hold remains in place, the consumer uses
the credit card to make a $150 purchase. The
consumer checks out of the hotel after three
days, and the total cost of the stay is $450,
which is charged to the consumer’s credit
card account. Assuming that there is no other
activity on the account, the savings
association is prohibited from assessing a fee
for exceeding the credit limit with respect to
either the $750 hold or the $150 purchase. If,
however, the total cost of the stay charged to
the account had been more than $450, the
savings association would not be prohibited
from assessing a fee for exceeding the credit
limit.
4. Example of prohibition when
authorization and settlement amounts are
held for the same transaction. Assume that
a consumer credit card account has a credit
limit of $2,000 and a balance of $1,400. The
consumer uses the credit card to check into
a hotel for an anticipated stay of five days.
When the consumer checks in, the hotel
obtains authorization from the savings
association for a $750 hold on the account to
ensure there is adequate available credit to
cover the cost of the anticipated stay. The
consumer checks out of the hotel after three
days, and the total cost of the stay is $450,
which is charged to the consumer’s credit
card account. When the hotel presents the
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$450 transaction for settlement, it uses a
different transaction code to identify the
transaction than it had used for the preauthorization, causing both the $750 hold
and the $450 purchase amount to be
temporarily posted to the consumer’s account
at the same time, and the consumer’s balance
to exceed the credit limit. Under these
circumstances, and assuming no other
transactions, the savings association is
prohibited from assessing a fee for exceeding
the credit limit because the credit limit was
exceeded solely due to the $750 hold.
5. Example of permissible fee for exceeding
the credit limit in connection with a hold.
Assume that a consumer has a credit limit of
$2,000 and a balance of $1,400 on a
consumer credit card account. The consumer
uses the credit card to check into a hotel for
an anticipated stay of five days. When the
consumer checks in, the hotel obtains
authorization from the savings association for
a $750 hold on the account to ensure there
is adequate available credit to cover the cost
of the anticipated stay. While the hold
remains in place, the consumer uses the
credit card to make a $650 purchase. The
consumer checks out of the hotel after three
days, and the total cost of the stay is $450,
which is charged to the consumer’s credit
card account. Notwithstanding the existence
of the hold and assuming that there is no
other activity on the account, the savings
association may charge the consumer a fee
for exceeding the credit limit with respect to
the $650 purchase because the consumer
would have exceeded the credit limit even if
the hold had been for the actual amount of
the hotel transaction.
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Section 535.26—Unfair Balance
Computation Method
(a) General Rule
1. Two-cycle method prohibited. A savings
association is prohibited from computing the
finance charge using the so-called two-cycle
average daily balance computation method.
This method calculates the finance charge
using a balance that is the sum of the average
daily balances for two billing cycles. The first
balance is for the current billing cycle, and
is calculated by adding the total balance
(including or excluding new purchases and
deducting payments and credits) for each day
in the billing cycle, and then dividing by the
number of days in the billing cycle. The
second balance is for the preceding billing
cycle.
2. Example. Assume that the billing cycle
on a consumer credit card account starts on
the first day of the month and ends on the
last day of the month. A consumer has a zero
balance on March 1. The consumer uses the
credit card to make a $500 purchase on
March 15. The consumer makes no other
purchases and pays $400 on the due date
(April 25), leaving a $100 balance. The
savings association may charge interest on
the $500 purchase from the start of the billing
cycle (April 1) through April 24 and interest
on the remaining $100 from April 25 through
the end of the April billing cycle (April 30).
The savings association is prohibited,
however, from reaching back and charging
interest on the $500 purchase from the date
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of purchase (March 15) to the end of the
March billing cycle (March 31).
Section 535.27—Unfair Charging to the
Account of Security Deposits and Fees for
the Issuance or Availability of Credit
1. Initial credit limit for the account. For
purposes of this section, the initial credit
limit is the limit in effect when the account
is opened.
(a) Annual Rule
1. Majority of the credit limit. The total
amount of security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit constitutes
a majority of the initial credit limit if that
total is greater than half of the limit. For
example, assume that a consumer credit card
account has an initial credit limit of $500.
Under § 535.27(a), a savings association may
charge to the account security deposits and
fees for the issuance or availability of credit
totaling no more than $250 during the twelve
months after the date on which the account
is opened (consistent with § 535.27(b)).
(b) Monthly Rule
1. Adjustments of one dollar or less
permitted. When dividing amounts pursuant
to § 535.27(b)(2), the savings association may
adjust amounts by one dollar or less. For
example, if a savings association is dividing
$125 over eleven billing cycles, the savings
association may charge $12 for four months
and $11 for the remaining seven months.
2. Example. Assume that a consumer credit
card account opened on January 1 has an
initial credit limit of $500 and that a savings
association charges to the account security
deposits and fees for the issuance or
availability of credit that total $250 during
the twelve months after the date on which
the account is opened. Assume also that the
billing cycles for this account begin on the
first day of the month and end on the last day
of the month. Under § 535.27(b), the savings
association may charge to the account no
more than $250 in security deposits and fees
for the issuance or availability of credit. If it
charges $250, the savings association may
charge as much as $125 during the first
billing cycle. If it charges $125 during the
first billing cycle, it may then charge $12 in
any four billing cycles and $11 in any seven
billing cycles during the year.
(c) Fees for the Issuance or Availability of
Credit
1. Membership fees. Membership fees for
opening an account are fees for the issuance
or availability of credit. A membership fee to
join an organization that provides a credit or
charge card as a privilege of membership is
a fee for the issuance or availability of credit
only if the card is issued automatically upon
membership. If membership results merely in
eligibility to apply for an account, then such
a fee is not a fee for the issuance or
availability of credit.
2. Enhancements. Fees for optional
services in addition to basic membership
privileges in a credit or charge card account
(for example, travel insurance or cardregistration services) are not fees for the
issuance or availability of credit if the basic
account may be opened without paying such
fees.
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3. One-time fees. Only non-periodic fees
related to opening an account (such as onetime membership or participation fees) are
fees for the issuance or availability of credit.
Fees for reissuing a lost or stolen card and
statement reproduction fees are examples of
fees that are not fees for the issuance or
availability of credit.
Section 535.28—Deceptive Firm Offers of
Credit
(a) Disclosure of Criteria Bearing on
Creditworthiness
1. Designed to call attention. Whether a
disclosure has been provided in a manner
that is designed to call attention to the nature
and significance of required information
depends on where the disclosure is placed in
the solicitation and how it is presented,
including whether the disclosure uses a
typeface and type size that are easy to read
and uses boldface or italics. Placing the
disclosure in a footnote would not satisfy this
requirement.
2. Form of electronic disclosures.
Electronic disclosures must be provided
consistent with §§ 226.5a(a)(2)–8 and
226.5a(a)(2)–9 of this title.
3. Multiple annual percentage rates or
credit limits. For purposes of this section, a
firm offer of credit solicitation that states an
annual percentage rate or credit limit for a
credit card feature and a different annual
percentage rate or credit limit for a different
credit card feature does not offer multiple
annual percentage rates or credit limits. For
example, if a firm offer of credit solicitation
offers a 15% annual percentage rate for
purchases and a 20% annual percentage rate
for cash advances, the solicitation does not
offer multiple annual percentage rates for
purposes of this section.
4. Example. Assume that a savings
association requests from a consumer
reporting agency a list of consumers with
credit scores of 650 or higher, so that the
savings association can send those
consumers a firm offer of credit solicitation.
The savings association sends a solicitation
to those consumers for a consumer credit
card account advertising ‘‘rates from 8.99%
to 19.99%’’ and ‘‘credit limits from $1,000 to
$10,000.’’ Before selection of the consumers
for the offer, however, the savings association
determines that it will provide an interest
rate of 8.99% and a credit limit of $10,000
only to those consumers responding to the
solicitation who are verified to have a credit
score of 650 or higher, who have a debt-toincome ratio below a certain amount, and
who meet other specific criteria bearing on
creditworthiness. Under § 535.28, this
solicitation is deceptive unless the savings
association discloses, in a manner that is
reasonably understandable to the consumer
and designed to call attention to the nature
and significance of the information, that, if
the consumer is approved for credit, the
annual percentage rate and credit limit the
consumer will receive will depend on
specific criteria bearing on the consumer’s
creditworthiness. The savings association
may satisfy this requirement by using a
typeface and type size that are easy to read
and stating in boldface in a manner that
otherwise calls attention to the nature and
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significance of the information: ‘‘If you are
approved for credit, your annual percentage
rate and/or credit limit will depend on your
credit history, income, and debts.’’
5. Applicability of criteria in disclosure.
When making a disclosure under this section,
a savings association may only disclose the
criteria it uses in evaluating whether
consumers who are approved for credit will
receive the lowest annual percentage rate or
the highest credit limit. For example, if a
savings association does not consider the
consumer’s debts when determining whether
the consumer should receive the lowest
annual percentage rate or highest credit limit,
the disclosure must not refer to ‘‘debts.’’
Subpart D—Overdraft Service Practices
Section 535.32—Unfair Overdraft Service
Practices
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(a) Opt-Out Requirement
(a)(1) General Rule
1. Form, content and timing of disclosure.
The form, content and timing of the opt-out
notice required to be provided under
paragraph (a) of this section are addressed
under § 230.10 of this title.
(a)(3) Exceptions
Paragraph (a)(3)(i)
1. Example of transaction amount
exceeding authorization amount (fuel
purchase). A consumer has $30 in a deposit
account. The consumer uses a debit card to
purchase fuel. Before permitting the
consumer to use the fuel pump, the merchant
verifies the validity of the card by obtaining
authorization from the savings association for
a $1 transaction. The consumer purchases
$50 of fuel. If the savings association pays the
transaction, it would be permitted to assess
a fee or charge for paying the overdraft, even
if the consumer has opted out of the payment
of overdrafts.
2. Example of transaction amount
exceeding authorization amount (restaurant).
A consumer has $50 in a deposit account.
The consumer pays for a $45 meal at a
restaurant using a debit card. While the
restaurant may obtain authorization for the
$45 cost of the meal, the consumer may add
$10 for a tip. If the savings association pays
the $55 transaction (including the tip
amount), it would be permitted to assess a fee
or charge for paying the overdraft, even if the
consumer has opted out of the payment of
overdrafts.
Paragraph (a)(3)(ii)
1. Example of transaction presented by
paper-based means. A consumer has $50 in
a deposit account. The consumer makes a
$60 purchase and presents his or her debit
card for payment. The merchant takes an
imprint of the card. Later that day, the
merchant submits a sales slip with the card
imprint to its processor for payment. If the
consumer’s savings association pays the
transaction, it would be permitted to assess
a fee or charge for paying the overdraft, even
if the consumer has opted out of the payment
of overdrafts.
(b) Debit Holds
1. General. Under § 535.32(b), a savings
association may not assess an overdraft fee if
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the overdraft would not have occurred but for
a hold placed on funds in the consumer’s
account for a transaction that has been
authorized but has not yet been presented for
settlement, if the amount of the hold is in
excess of the actual purchase or transaction
amount when the transaction is settled.
Section 535.32(b) does not limit a savings
association from charging an overdraft fee in
connection with a particular transaction if
the consumer would have incurred an
overdraft due to other reasons, such as other
transactions that may have been authorized
but not yet presented for settlement, a
deposited check that is returned, or if the
purchase or transaction amount for the
transaction for which the hold was placed
would have also caused the consumer to
overdraw his or her account.
2. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for same transaction. A
consumer has $50 in a deposit account. The
consumer makes a fuel purchase using his or
her debit card. Before permitting the
consumer to use the fuel pump, the merchant
obtains authorization from the consumer’s
savings association for a $75 ‘‘hold’’ on the
account which exceeds the consumer’s
funds. The consumer purchases $20 of fuel.
Under these circumstances, § 535.32(b)
prohibits the savings association from
assessing a fee or charge in connection with
the debit hold because the actual amount of
the fuel purchase did not exceed the funds
in the consumer’s account. However, if the
consumer had purchased $60 of fuel, the
savings association could assess a fee or
charge for an overdraft because the
transaction exceeds the funds in the
consumer’s account, unless the consumer has
opted out of the payment of overdrafts under
§ 535.32(a).
3. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for another transaction. A
consumer has $100 in a deposit account. The
consumer makes a fuel purchase using his or
her debit card. Before permitting the
consumer to use the fuel pump, the merchant
obtains authorization from the consumer’s
savings association for a $75 ‘‘hold’’ on the
account. The consumer purchases $20 of
fuel, but the transaction is not presented for
settlement until the next day. Later on the
first day, and assuming no other transactions,
the consumer withdraws $75 at an ATM.
Under these circumstances, § 535.32(b)
prohibits the savings association from
assessing a fee or charge for paying an
overdraft with respect to the $75 withdrawal
because the overdraft was caused solely by
the $75 hold.
4. Example of prohibition when
authorization and settlement amounts are
held for the same transaction. A consumer
has $100 in his deposit account, and uses his
debit card to purchase $50 worth of fuel.
Before permitting the consumer to use the
fuel pump, the merchant obtains
authorization from the consumer’s savings
association for a $75 ‘‘hold’’ on the account.
The consumer purchases $50 of fuel. When
the merchant presents the $50 transaction for
settlement, it uses a different transaction
code to identify the transaction than it had
used for the pre-authorization, causing both
the $75 hold and the $50 purchase amount
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to be temporarily posted to the consumer’s
account at the same time, and the consumer’s
account to be overdrawn. Under these
circumstances, and assuming no other
transactions, § 535.32(b) prohibits the savings
association from assessing a fee or charge for
paying an overdraft because the overdraft
was caused solely by the $75 hold.
5. Example of permissible overdraft fees in
connection with a hold. A consumer has
$100 in a deposit account. The consumer
makes a fuel purchase using his or her debit
card. Before permitting the consumer to use
the fuel pump, the merchant obtains
authorization from the consumer’s savings
association for a $75 ‘‘hold’’ on the account.
The consumer purchases $35 of fuel, but the
transaction is not presented for settlement
until the next day. Later on the first day, and
assuming no other transactions, the
consumer withdraws $75 at an ATM.
Notwithstanding the existence of the hold,
and assuming the consumer has not opted
out of the payment of overdrafts under
§ 535.32(a), the consumer’s savings
association may charge the consumer an
overdraft fee for the $75 ATM withdrawal,
because the consumer would have incurred
the overdraft even if the hold had been for
the actual amount of the fuel purchase.
National Credit Union Administration
12 CFR Part 706
For the reasons discussed in the joint
preamble, the National Credit Union
Administration proposes to revise part
706 of title 12 of the Code of Federal
Regulations to read as follows:
PART 706—UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE
ACTS OR PRACTICES
Subpart A—General Provisions
Sec.
706.1 Authority, purpose, and scope.
706.2–706.10 [Reserved]
Subpart B—Consumer Credit Practices
706.11 Definitions.
706.12 Unfair credit contract provisions.
706.13 Unfair or deceptive cosigner
practices.
706.14 Unfair late charges.
706.15 State exemptions.
706.16–703.20 [Reserved]
Subpart C—Consumer Credit Card Account
Practices
706.21 Definitions.
706.22 Unfair time to make payments.
706.23 Unfair allocation of payments.
706.24 Unfair application of increased
annual percentage rates to outstanding
balances.
706.25 Unfair fees for exceeding the credit
limit caused by credit holds.
706.26 Unfair balance computation method.
706.27 Unfair financing of security deposits
and fees for the issuance or availability
of credit.
706.28 Deceptive firm offers of credit.
706.29–706.30 [Reserved]
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Subpart D—Overdraft Service Practices
706.31 Definitions.
706.32 Unfair practices involving overdraft
services.
Appendix to Part 706—Official Staff
Interpretations
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 57a(f).
Subpart A—General Provisions
§ 706.1
Authority, purpose and scope.
(a) Authority. This part is issued by
NCUA under section 18(f) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 57a(f).
(b) Purpose. The purpose of this part
is to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in violation of section 5(a)(1)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). This part defines and
contains requirements prescribed for the
purpose of preventing specific unfair or
deceptive acts or practices of federal
credit unions. The prohibitions in this
part do not limit NCUA’s authority to
enforce the FTC Act with respect to any
other unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.
(c) Scope. This part applies to federal
credit unions.
§§ 706.2–706.10
[Reserved]
Subpart B—Consumer Credit Practices
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§ 706.11
Definitions.
For purposes of this subpart, the
following definitions apply:
Antique means any item over one
hundred years of age, including items
that have been repaired or renovated
without changing their original form or
character.
Consumer means a natural person
member who seeks or acquires goods,
services, or money for personal, family,
or household purposes, other than for
the purchase of real property.
Cosigner means a natural person who
renders himself or herself liable for the
obligation of another person without
receiving goods, services, or money in
return for the credit obligation, or, in the
case of an open-end credit obligation,
without receiving the contractual right
to obtain extensions of credit under the
obligation. The term includes any
person whose signature is requested as
a condition to granting credit to a
consumer, or as a condition for
forbearance on collection of a
consumer’s obligation that is in default.
The term does not include a spouse
whose signature is required on a credit
obligation to perfect a security interest
pursuant to state law. A person is a
cosigner within the meaning of this
definition whether or not he or she is
designated as such on a credit
obligation.
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Debt means money that is due or
alleged to be due from one person to
another.
Earnings mean compensation paid or
payable to an individual or for his or her
account for personal services rendered
or to be rendered by him or her, whether
denominated as wages, salary,
commission, bonus, or otherwise,
including periodic payments pursuant
to a pension, retirement, or disability
program.
Household goods mean clothing,
furniture, appliances, one radio and one
television, linens, china, crockery,
kitchenware, and personal effects,
including wedding rings of the
consumer and his or her dependents,
provided that the following are not
included within the scope of the term
‘‘household goods’’:
(1) Works of art;
(2) Electronic entertainment
equipment, except one television and
one radio;
(3) Items acquired as antiques; and
(4) Jewelry, except wedding rings.
Obligation means an agreement
between a consumer and a federal credit
union.
Person means an individual,
corporation, or other business
organization.
§ 706.12
Unfair credit contract provisions.
In connection with the extension of
credit to consumers, it is an unfair act
or practice for a federal credit union,
directly or indirectly, to take or receive
from a consumer an obligation that:
(a) Constitutes or contains a cognovit
or confession of judgment (for purposes
other than executory process in the
State of Louisiana), warrant of attorney,
or other waiver of the right to notice and
the opportunity to be heard in the event
of suit or process.
(b) Constitutes or contains an
executory waiver or a limitation of
exemption from attachment, execution,
or other process on real or personal
property held, owned by, or due to the
consumer, unless the waiver applies
solely to property subject to a security
interest executed in connection with the
obligation.
(c) Constitutes or contains an
assignment of wages or other earnings
unless:
(1) The assignment by its terms is
revocable at the will of the debtor, or
(2) The assignment is a payroll
deduction plan or preauthorized
payment plan, commencing at the time
of the transaction, in which the
consumer authorizes a series of wage
deductions as a method of making each
payment, or
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(3) The assignment applies only to
wages or other earnings already earned
at the time of the assignment.
(d) Constitutes or contains a
nonpossessory security interest in
household goods other than a purchase
money security interest.
§ 706.13 Unfair or deceptive cosigner
practices.
(a) Prohibited practices. In connection
with the extension of credit to
consumers, it is:
(1) A deceptive act or practice for a
federal credit union, directly or
indirectly, to misrepresent the nature or
extent of cosigner liability to any
person.
(2) An unfair act or practice for a
federal credit union, directly or
indirectly, to obligate a cosigner unless
the cosigner is informed prior to
becoming obligated, which in the case
of open-end credit means prior to the
time that the agreement creating the
cosigner’s liability for future charges is
executed, of the nature of his or her
liability as cosigner.
(b) Disclosure requirement. (1) To
comply with the cosigner information
requirement of paragraph (a)(2), a clear
and conspicuous disclosure statement
shall be given in writing to the cosigner
prior to becoming obligated. The
disclosure statement must contain only
the following statement, or one which is
substantially similar, and shall either be
a separate document or included in the
documents evidencing the consumer
credit obligation.
Notice to Cosigner
You are being asked to guarantee this debt.
Think carefully before you do. If the
borrower doesn’t pay the debt, you will have
to. Be sure you can afford to pay if you have
to, and that you want to accept this
responsibility.
You may have to pay up to the full amount
of the debt if the borrower does not pay. You
may also have to pay late fees or collection
costs, which increase this amount.
The creditor can collect this debt from you
without first trying to collect from the
borrower. The creditor can use the same
collection methods against you that can be
used against the borrower, such as suing you,
garnishing your wages, etc. If this debt is ever
in default, that fact may become a part of
your credit record.
This notice is not the contract that makes
you liable for the debt.
(2) If the notice to cosigner is a
separate document, nothing other than
the following items may appear with the
notice. Paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (v)
of this section may not be part of the
narrative portion of the notice to
cosigner.
(i) The name and address of the
federal credit union;
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(ii) An identification of the debt to be
cosigned, e.g., a loan identification
number;
(iii) The amount of the loan;
(iv) The date of the loan;
(v) A signature line for a cosigner to
acknowledge receipt of the notice; and
(vi) To the extent permitted by state
law, a cosigner notice required by state
law may be included in the paragraph
(b)(1) notice.
(3) To the extent the notice to cosigner
specified in paragraph (b)(1) refers to an
action against a cosigner that is not
permitted by state law, the notice to
cosigner may be modified.
§ 706.14
Unfair late charges.
(a) In connection with collecting a
debt arising out of an extension of credit
to a consumer, it is an unfair act or
practice for a federal credit union,
directly or indirectly, to levy or collect
any delinquency charge on a payment,
which payment is otherwise a full
payment for the applicable period and
is paid on its due date or within an
applicable grace period, when the only
delinquency is attributable to late fee(s)
or delinquency charge(s) assessed on
earlier installment(s).
(b) For purposes of this section,
‘‘collecting a debt’’ means any activity
other than the use of judicial process
that is intended to bring about or does
bring about repayment of all or part of
a consumer debt.
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§ 706.15
State exemptions.
(a) If, upon application to the NCUA
by an appropriate state agency, the
NCUA determines that:
(1) There is a state requirement or
prohibition in effect that applies to any
transaction to which a provision of this
rule applies; and
(2) The state requirement or
prohibition affords a level of protection
to consumers that is substantially
equivalent to, or greater than, the
protection afforded by this rule; then
that provision of this rule will not be in
effect in the state to the extent specified
by the NCUA in its determination, for as
long as the state administers and
enforces the state requirement or
prohibition effectively.
(b) States that received an exemption
from the Federal Trade Commission’s
Credit Practices Rule prior to September
17, 1987, are not required to reapply to
NCUA for an exemption under
paragraph (a) of this section provided
that the state forwards a copy of its
exemption determination to the
appropriate Regional Office. NCUA will
honor the exemption for as long as the
state administers and enforces the state
requirement or prohibition effectively.
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Any state seeking a greater exemption
than that granted to it by the Federal
Trade Commission must apply to NCUA
for the exemption.
§§ 706.16–706.20
[Reserved]
Subpart C—Consumer Credit Card
Account Practices
§ 706.21
Definitions.
For purposes of this subpart, the
following definitions apply:
Annual percentage rate means the
product of multiplying each periodic
rate for a balance or transaction on a
consumer credit card account by the
number of periods in a year. The term
‘‘periodic rate’’ has the same meaning as
in 12 CFR 226.2.
Consumer means a natural person
member to whom credit is extended
under a consumer credit card account or
a natural person who is a co-obligor or
guarantor of a consumer credit card
account.
Consumer credit card account means
an account provided to a consumer
primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes under an open-end
credit plan that is accessed by a credit
card or charge card. The terms ‘‘openend credit,’’ ‘‘credit card,’’ and ‘‘charge
card’’ have the same meanings as in 12
CFR 226.2. The following are not
consumer credit card accounts for
purposes of this subpart:
(1) Home equity plans subject to the
requirements of 12 CFR 226.5b that are
accessible by a credit or charge card;
(2) Overdraft lines of credit tied to
asset accounts accessed by checkguarantee cards or by debit cards;
(3) Lines of credit accessed by checkguarantee cards or by debit cards that
can be used only at automated teller
machines; and
(4) Lines of credit accessed solely by
account numbers.
Promotional rate means:
(1) Any annual percentage rate
applicable to one or more balances or
transactions on a consumer credit card
account for a specified period of time
that is lower than the annual percentage
rate that will be in effect at the end of
that period; or
(2) Any annual percentage rate
applicable to one or more transactions
on a consumer credit card account that
is lower than the annual percentage rate
that applies to other transactions of the
same type.
§ 706.22
Unfair time to make payments.
(a) General rule. Except as provided in
paragraph (c) of this section, a federal
credit union must not treat a payment
on a consumer credit card account as
late for any purpose unless the
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consumer has been provided a
reasonable amount of time to make the
payment.
(b) Safe harbor. A federal credit union
provides a reasonable amount of time to
make a payment if it has adopted
reasonable procedures to ensure that
periodic statements specifying the
payment due date are mailed or
delivered to consumers at least 21 days
prior to the payment due date.
(c) Exception for grace periods.
Paragraph (a) of this section does not
apply to any time period provided by
the federal credit union within which
the consumer may repay any portion of
the credit extended without incurring
an additional finance charge.
§ 706.23
Unfair allocation of payments.
(a) General rule for accounts with
different annual percentage rates on
different balances. Except as provided
in paragraph (b) of this section, when
different annual percentage rates apply
to different balances on a consumer
credit card account, the federal credit
union must allocate any amount paid by
the consumer in excess of the required
minimum periodic payment among the
balances in a manner that is no less
beneficial to the consumer than one of
the following methods:
(1) The amount is allocated first to the
balance with the highest annual
percentage rate and any remaining
portion to the other balances in
descending order based on the
applicable annual percentage rate;
(2) Equal portions of the amount are
allocated to each balance; or
(3) The amount is allocated among the
balances in the same proportion as each
balance bears to the total outstanding
balance.
(b) Special rules for accounts with
promotional rate balances or deferred
interest balances. (1) Rule regarding
payment allocation. (i) In general, when
a consumer credit card account has one
or more balances at a promotional rate
or balances on which interest is
deferred, the federal credit union must
allocate any amount paid by the
consumer in excess of the required
minimum periodic payment among the
other balances on the account consistent
with paragraph (a) of this section. If any
amount remains after such allocation,
the federal credit union must allocate
that amount among the promotional rate
balances or the deferred interest
balances consistent with paragraph (a)
of this section.
(ii) Exception for deferred interest
balances. Notwithstanding paragraph
(b)(1)(i) of this section, the federal credit
union may allocate the entire amount
paid by the consumer in excess of the
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required minimum periodic payment to
a balance on which interest is deferred
during the two billing cycles
immediately preceding expiration of the
period during which interest is deferred.
(2) Rule regarding grace periods. A
federal credit union must not require a
consumer to repay any portion of a
promotional rate balance or deferred
interest balance on a consumer credit
card account in order to receive any
time period offered by the federal credit
union in which to repay other credit
extended without incurring finance
charges, provided that the consumer is
otherwise eligible for such a time
period.
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§ 706.24 Unfair application of increased
annual percentage rates to outstanding
balances.
(a) Prohibition on increasing annual
percentage rates on outstanding
balances.
(1) General rule. Except as provided
in paragraph (b) of this section, a federal
credit union must not increase the
annual percentage rate applicable to any
outstanding balance on a consumer
credit card account.
(2) Outstanding balance. For purposes
of this section, ‘‘outstanding balance’’
means the amount owed on a consumer
credit card account at the end of the
fourteenth day after the federal credit
union provides a notice required by 12
CFR 226.9(c) or (g).
(b) Exceptions. Paragraph (a) of this
section does not apply where the annual
percentage rate is increased due to:
(1) The operation of an index or
formula that is not under the federal
credit union’s control and is available to
the general public;
(2) The expiration or loss of a
promotional rate, provided that, if a
promotional rate is lost, the federal
credit union does not increase the
annual percentage rate to a rate that is
greater than the annual percentage rate
that would have applied after expiration
of the promotional rate; or
(3) The federal credit union not
receiving the consumer’s required
minimum periodic payment within 30
days after the due date for that payment.
(c) Treatment of outstanding balances
following rate increase. (1) Payment of
outstanding balances. When a federal
credit union increases the annual
percentage rate applicable to a category
of transactions on a consumer credit
card account, and the federal credit
union is prohibited by this section from
applying the increased rate to
outstanding balances in that category,
the federal credit union must provide
the consumer with a method of paying
the outstanding balance that is no less
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beneficial to the consumer than one of
the following methods:
(i) An amortization period for the
outstanding balance of no less than five
years, starting from the date on which
the increased annual percentage rate
went into effect; or
(ii) A required minimum periodic
payment on the outstanding balance
that includes a percentage of that
balance that is no more than twice the
percentage included before the date on
which the increased annual percentage
rate went into effect.
(2) Fees and charges on outstanding
balance. When a federal credit union
increases the annual percentage rate
applicable to a category of transactions
on a consumer credit card account, and
the federal credit union is prohibited by
this section from applying the increased
rate to outstanding balances in that
category, the federal credit union must
not assess any fee or charge based solely
on the outstanding balance.
§ 706.25 Unfair fees for exceeding the
credit limit caused by credit holds.
A federal credit union must not assess
a fee or charge for exceeding the credit
limit on a consumer credit card account
if the credit limit would not have been
exceeded but for a hold on any portion
of the available credit on the account
that is in excess of the actual purchase
or transaction amount.
§ 706.26 Unfair balance computation
method.
(a) General rule. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this section, a federal
credit union must not impose finance
charges on outstanding balances on a
consumer credit card account based on
balances for days in billing cycles that
precede the most recent billing cycle.
(b) Exceptions. Paragraph (a) of this
section does not apply to:
(1) The assessment of deferred
interest; or
(2) Adjustments to finance charges
following the resolution of a billing
error dispute under 12 CFR 226.12(b) or
12 CFR 226.13.
§ 706.27 Unfair financing of security
deposits and fees for the issuance or
availability of credit.
(a) Annual rule. During the period
beginning with the date on which a
consumer credit card account is opened
and ending twelve months from that
date, a federal credit union must not
charge to the account security deposits
or fees for the issuance or availability of
credit if the total amount of such
security deposits and fees constitutes a
majority of the credit limit for the
account.
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(b) Monthly rule. If the total amount
of security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit charged
to a consumer credit card account
during the period beginning with the
date on which a consumer credit card
account is opened and ending twelve
months from that date constitutes more
than 25 percent of the initial credit limit
for the account:
(1) During the first billing cycle after
the account is opened, the federal credit
union must not charge security deposits
and fees for the issuance or availability
of credit that total more than 25 percent
of the initial credit limit for the account;
and
(2) In each of the eleven billing cycles
following the first billing cycle, the
federal credit union must not charge to
the account more than one eleventh of
the total amount of any additional
security deposits and fees for the
issuance of availability of credit in
excess of 25 percent of the initial credit
limit for the account.
(c) Fees for the issuance or availability
of credit. For purposes of paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section, fees for the
issuance or availability of credit
include:
(1) Any annual or other periodic fee
that may be imposed for the issuance or
availability of a consumer credit card
account, including any fee based on
account activity or inactivity; and
(2) Any non-periodic fee that relates
to opening an account.
§ 706.28
Deceptive firm offers of credit.
(a) Disclosure of criteria bearing on
creditworthiness. If a federal credit
union offers a range or multiple annual
percentage rates or credit limits when
making a solicitation for a firm offer of
credit for a consumer credit card
account, and the annual percentage rate
or credit limit that consumers approved
for credit will receive depends on
specific criteria bearing on
creditworthiness, the federal credit
union must disclose the types of criteria
in the solicitation. The disclosure must
be provided in a manner that is
reasonably understandable to
consumers and is designed to call
attention to the nature and significance
of the information regarding the
eligibility criteria for the lowest annual
percentage rate or highest credit limit
stated in the solicitation. If presented in
a manner that calls attention to the
nature and significance of the
information, the following disclosure
may be used to satisfy the requirements
of this section, as applicable: ‘‘If you are
approved for credit, your annual
percentage rate and/or credit limit will
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depend on your credit history, income,
and debts.’’
(b) Firm offer of credit defined. For
purposes of this section, ‘‘firm offer of
credit’’ has the same meaning as ‘‘firm
offer of credit or insurance’’ in section
603(l) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(15 U.S.C. 1681a(l)).
§§ 706.29–706.30
[Reserved]
Subpart D—Overdraft Services
§ 706.31
Definitions.
For purposes of this subpart, the
following definitions apply:
Account means a share account at a
federal credit union that is held by or
offered to a consumer, and has the same
meaning as in § 707.2(a) of this chapter.
Consumer means a member who
holds an account primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes.
Overdraft service means a service
under which a federal credit union
charges a fee for paying a transaction,
including a check or other item, that
overdraws an account. The term
‘‘overdraft service’’ does not include any
payment of overdrafts pursuant to—
(1) A line of credit subject to the
Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Z,
12 CFR part 226, including transfers
from a credit card account, home equity
line of credit, or overdraft line of credit;
or
(2) A service that transfers funds from
another account of the consumer.
mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with PROPOSALS3
§ 706.32 Unfair practices involving
overdraft services.
(a) Opt-out requirement. (1) General
rule. A federal credit union must not
assess a fee or charge on a consumer’s
account in connection with an overdraft
service, unless the federal credit union
provides the consumer the right to opt
out of the federal credit union’s
payment of overdrafts and a reasonable
opportunity to exercise that opt-out, and
the consumer has not opted out. The
consumer must be given notice and an
opportunity to opt out before the federal
credit union’s assessment of any fee or
charge for an overdraft, and
subsequently at least once during or for
any periodic statement cycle in which
any fee or charge for paying an overdraft
is assessed. The notice requirements in
this paragraph (a)(1) and (a)(2) do not
apply if the consumer has opted out,
unless the consumer subsequently
revokes the opt-out.
(2) Partial opt-out. A federal credit
union must provide a consumer the
option of opting out only for the
payment of overdrafts at automated
teller machines and for point-of-sale
transactions initiated by a debit card, in
addition to the choice of opting out of
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the payment of overdrafts for all
transaction.
(3) Exceptions. Notwithstanding a
consumer’s election to opt out under
paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section,
a federal credit union may assess a fee
or charge on a consumer’s account for
paying a debit card transaction that
overdraws an account if:
(i) There were sufficient funds in the
consumer’s account at the time the
authorization request was received, but
the actual purchase amount for that
transaction exceeds the amount that had
been authorized; or
(ii) The transaction is presented for
payment by paper-based means, rather
than electronically through a card
terminal, and the federal credit union
has not previously authorized the
transaction.
(4) Time to comply with opt-out. A
federal credit union must comply with
a consumer’s opt-out request as soon as
reasonably practicable after the federal
credit union receives it.
(5) Continuing right to opt-out. A
consumer may opt out of the federal
credit union’s future payment of
overdrafts at any time.
(6) Duration of opt-out. A consumer’s
opt-out is effective unless subsequently
revoked by the consumer.
(b) Debit holds. A federal credit union
shall not assess a fee or charge on a
consumer’s account for an overdraft
service if the consumer’s overdraft
would not have occurred but for a hold
placed on funds in the consumer’s
account that is in excess of the actual
purchase or transaction amount.
Appendix to Part 706—Official Staff
Interpretations
Subpart C—Consumer Credit Card Account
Practices
Section 706.21—Definitions
(d) Promotional Rate
Paragraph (d)(1)
1. Rate in effect at the end of the
promotional period. If the annual percentage
rate that will be in effect at the end of the
specified period of time is a variable rate, the
rate in effect at the end of that period for
purposes of § 706.21(d)(1) is the rate that
would otherwise apply if the promotional
rate was not offered, consistent with any
applicable accuracy requirements under 12
CFR part 226.
Paragraph (d)(2)
1. Example. A federal credit union
generally offers a 15% annual percentage rate
for purchases on a consumer credit card
account. For purchases made during a
particular month, however, the creditor offers
a rate of 5% that will apply until the
consumer pays those purchases in full.
Under § 706.21(d)(2), the 5% rate is a
‘‘promotional rate’’ because it is lower than
the 15% rate that applies to other purchases.
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Section 706.22—Unfair Time To Make
Payment
(a) General Rule
1. Treating a payment as late for any
purpose. Treating a payment as late for any
purpose includes increasing the annual
percentage rate as a penalty, reporting the
consumer as delinquent to a credit reporting
agency, or assessing a late fee or any other
fee based on the consumer’s failure to make
a payment within the amount of time
provided under this section.
2. Reasonable amount of time to make
payment. Whether an amount of time is
reasonable for purposes of making a payment
is determined from the perspective of the
consumer, not the federal credit union.
Under § 706.22(b), a federal credit union
provides a reasonable amount of time to
make a payment if it has adopted reasonable
procedures designed to ensure that periodic
statements specifying the payment due date
are mailed or delivered to consumers at least
21 days prior to the payment due date.
(b) Safe Harbor
1. Reasonable procedures. A federal credit
union is not required to determine the
specific date on which periodic statements
are mailed or delivered to each individual
consumer. A federal credit union provides a
reasonable amount of time to make a
payment if the federal credit union has
adopted reasonable procedures designed to
ensure that periodic statements are mailed or
delivered to consumers no later than, for
example, three days after the closing date of
the billing cycle and the payment due date
on the periodic statement is no less than 24
days after the closing date of the billing
cycle.
2. Payment due date. For purposes of
§ 706.22(b), ‘‘payment due date’’ means the
date by which the federal credit union
requires the consumer to make payment to
avoid being treated as late for any purpose,
except as provided in § 706.22(c).
Section 706.23—Unfair Allocation of
Payments
1. Minimum periodic payment. This
section addresses the allocation of amounts
paid by the consumer in excess of the
minimum periodic payment required by the
federal credit union. This section does not
limit or otherwise address the federal credit
union’s ability to determine the amount of
the minimum periodic payment or how that
payment is allocated.
2. Adjustments of one dollar or less
permitted. When allocating payments, the
federal credit union may adjust amounts by
one dollar or less. For example, if a federal
credit union is allocating $100 equally among
three balances, the federal credit union may
apply $34 to one balance and $33 to the
others. Similarly, if a federal credit union is
splitting $100.50 between two balances, the
federal credit union may apply $50 to one
balance and $50.50 to another.
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(a) General Rule for Accounts With Different
Annual Percentage Rates on Different
Balances
1. No less beneficial to the consumer. A
federal credit union may allocate payments
using a method that is different from the
methods listed in § 706.23(a) so long as the
method used is no less beneficial to the
consumer than one of the listed methods. A
method is no less beneficial to the consumer
than a listed method if it results in the
assessment of the same or a lesser amount of
interest charges than would be assessed
under any of the listed methods. For
example, a federal credit union may not
allocate the entire amount paid by the
consumer in excess of the required minimum
periodic payment to the balance with the
lowest annual percentage rate because this
method would result in a higher assessment
of interest charges than any of the methods
listed in § 706.23(a).
2. Example of payment allocation method
that is no less beneficial to consumers than
a method listed in § 706.23(a). Assume that
a consumer’s account has a cash advance
balance of $500 at annual percentage rate of
15% and a purchase balance of $1,500 at an
annual percentage rate of 10% and that the
consumer pays $555 in excess of the required
minimum periodic payment. A federal credit
union could allocate one-third of this amount
($185) to the cash advance balance and twothirds ($370) to the purchase balance even
though this is not a method listed in
§ 706.23(a) because the federal credit union
is applying more of the amount to the
balance with the highest annual percentage
rate, with the result that the consumer will
be assessed less in interest charges, than
would be the case under the pro rata
allocation method in § 706.23(a)(3). See
comment 23(a)(3)–1.
Paragraph (a)(1)
1. Examples of allocating first to the
balance with the highest annual percentage
rate.
(A) Assume that a consumer’s account has
a cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 15% and a purchase
balance of $1,500 at an annual percentage
rate of 10% and that the consumer pays $800
in excess of the required minimum periodic
payment. None of the minimum periodic
payment is allocated to the cash advance
balance. A federal credit union using this
method would allocate $500 to pay off the
cash advance balance and then allocate the
remaining $300 to the purchase balance.
(B) Assume that a consumer’s account has
a cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 15% and a purchase
balance of $1,500 at an annual percentage
rate of 10% and that the consumer pays $400
in excess of the required minimum periodic
payment. A federal credit union using this
method would allocate the entire $400 to the
cash advance balance.
Paragraph (a)(2)
1. Example of equal portion method.
Assume that a consumer’s account has a cash
advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 15% and a purchase
balance of $1,500 at an annual percentage
rate of 10% and that the consumer pays $555
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in excess of the required minimum periodic
payment. A federal credit union using this
method would allocate $278 to the cash
advance balance and $277 to the purchase
balance, or vice versa.
Paragraph (a)(3)
1. Example of pro rata method. Assume
that a consumer’s account has a cash advance
balance of $500 at an annual percentage rate
of 15% and a purchase balance of $1,500 at
an annual percentage rate of 10% and that
the consumer pays $555 in excess of the
required minimum periodic payment. A
federal credit union using this method would
allocate 25% of the amount ($139) to the cash
advance balance and 75% of the amount
($416) to the purchase balance.
(b) Special Rules for Accounts With
Promotional Rate Balances or Deferred
Interest Balances
Paragraph (b)(1)(i)
1. Examples of special rule regarding
payment allocation for accounts with
promotional rate balances or deferred
interest balances.
(A) A consumer credit card account has a
cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 15%, a purchase balance
of $1,500 at an annual percentage rate of
10%, and a transferred balance of $3,000 at
a promotional rate of 5%. The consumer pays
$800 in excess of the required minimum
periodic payment. The federal credit union
must allocate the $800 between the cash
advance and purchase balances, consistent
with § 706.23(a), and apply nothing to the
transferred balance.
(B) A consumer credit card account has a
cash advance balance of $500 at an annual
percentage rate of 15%, a balance of $1,500
on which interest is deferred, and transferred
balance of $3,000 at a promotional rate of
5%. The consumer pays $800 in excess of the
required minimum periodic payment. None
of the minimum periodic payment is
allocated to the cash advance balance. The
federal credit union must allocate $500 to
pay off the cash advance balance before
allocating the remaining $300 among the
balance on which interest is deferred and the
transferred balance, consistent with
§ 706.23(a).
Paragraph (b)(1)(ii)
1. Examples of exception for deferred
interest balances. Assume that on January 1,
a consumer uses a credit card to make a
$1,000 purchase on which interest is deferred
until June 30. If this amount is not paid in
full by June 30, all interest accrued during
the six-month period will be charged to the
account. The billing cycle for this credit card
begins on the first day of the month and ends
on the last day of the month. Each month
from January through June, the consumer
uses the credit card to make $200 in
purchases on which interest is not deferred.
(A) The consumer pays $300 in excess of
the minimum periodic payment each month
from January through June. None of the
minimum periodic payment is applied to the
deferred interest balance or the purchase
balance. For the January, February, March,
and April billing cycles, the federal credit
union must allocate $200 to the purchase
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balance and $100 to the deferred interest
balance. For the May and June billing cycles,
however, the federal credit union has the
option of allocating the entire $300 to the
deferred interest balance, which will result in
that balance being paid in full before the
deferred interest period expires on June 30.
In this example, the interest that accrued
between January 1 and June 30 will not be
assessed to the consumer’s account.
(B) The consumer pays $200 in excess of
the minimum periodic payment each month
from January through June. None of the
minimum periodic payment is applied to the
deferred interest balance or the purchase
balance. For the January, February, March,
and April billing cycles, the federal credit
union must allocate the entire $200 to the
purchase balance. For the May and June
billing cycles, however, the federal credit
union has the option to allocate the entire
$200 to the deferred interest balance, which
will result in that balance being reduced to
$600 before the deferred interest period
expires on June 30. In this example, the
interest that accrued between January 1 and
June 30 will be assessed to the consumer’s
account.
Paragraph (b)(2)
1. Example of special rule regarding grace
periods for accounts with promotional rate
balances or deferred interest balances. A
federal credit union offers a promotional rate
on balance transfers and a higher rate on
purchases. The federal credit union also
offers a grace period under which consumers
who pay their balances in full by the due
date are not charged interest on purchases. A
consumer who has paid the balance for the
prior billing cycle in full by the due date
transfers a balance of $2,000 and makes a
purchase of $500. Because the federal credit
union offers a grace period, the federal credit
union must provide a grace period on the
$500 purchase if the consumer pays that
amount in full by the due date, even though
the $2,000 balance at the promotional rate
remains outstanding.
Section 706.24—Unfair Application of
Increased Annual Percentage Rates to
Outstanding Balances
(a) Prohibition Against Increasing Annual
Percentage Rates on Outstanding Balances
1. Example. Assume that on December 30
a consumer credit card account has a balance
of $1,000 at an annual percentage rate of
10%. On December 31, the federal credit
union mails or delivers a notice required by
12 CFR 226.9(c) informing the consumer that
the annual percentage rate will increase to
15% on February 15. The consumer uses the
account to make $2,000 in purchases on
January 10 and $1,000 in purchases on
January 20. Assuming no other transactions,
the outstanding balance for purposes of
§ 706.24 is the $3,000 balance as of the end
of the day on January 14. Therefore, under
§ 706.24(a), the federal credit union cannot
increase the annual percentage rate
applicable to that balance. The federal credit
union can apply the 15% rate to the $1,000
in purchases made on January 20 but,
consistent with 12 CFR 226.9(c), the federal
credit union cannot do so until February 15.
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2. Reasonable procedures. A federal credit
union is not required to determine the
specific date on which a notice required by
12 CFR 226.9(c) or (g) was provided. For
purposes of § 706.24(a)(2), if the federal
credit union has adopted reasonable
procedures designed to ensure that notices
required by 12 CFR 226.9(c) or (g) are
provided to consumers no later than, for
example, three days after the event giving
rise to the notice, the outstanding balance is
the balance at the end of the seventeenth day
after such event.
(b) Exceptions
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Paragraph (b)(1)
1. External index. A federal credit union
may increase the annual percentage rate on
an outstanding balance if the increase is
based on an index outside the federal credit
union’s control. A federal credit union may
not increase the rate on an outstanding
balance based on its own prime rate or cost
of funds and may not reserve a contractual
right to change rates on outstanding balances
at its discretion. In addition, a federal credit
union may not increase the rate on an
outstanding balance by changing the method
used to determine that rate. A federal credit
union is permitted, however, to use a
published prime rate, such as that in the Wall
Street Journal, even if the federal credit
union’s own prime rate is one of several rates
used to establish the published rate.
2. Publicly available. The index must be
available to the public. A publicly available
index need not be published in a newspaper,
but it must be one the consumer can
independently obtain (by telephone, for
example) and use to verify the rate applied
to the outstanding balance.
Paragraph (b)(2)
1. Example. Assume that a consumer credit
card account has a balance of $1,000 at a 5%
promotional rate and that the federal credit
union also charges an annual percentage rate
of 15% for purchases and a penalty rate of
25%. If the consumer does not make payment
by the due date and the account agreement
specifies that event as a trigger for applying
the penalty rate, the federal credit union may
increase the annual percentage rate on the
$1,000 from the 5% promotional rate to the
15% annual percentage rate for purchases.
The federal credit union may not, however,
increase the rate on the $1,000 from the 5%
promotional rate to the 25% penalty rate,
except as otherwise permitted under
§ 706.24(b)(3).
Paragraph (b)(3)
1. Example. Assume that the annual
percentage rate applicable to purchases on a
consumer credit card account is increased
from 10% to 15% and that the account has
an outstanding balance of $1,000 at the 10%
rate. The payment due date on the account
is the twenty-fifth of the month. If the federal
credit union has not received the required
minimum periodic payment due on March 15
on or before April 14, the federal credit union
may increase the rate applicable to the $1,000
balance once the federal credit union has
complied with the notice requirements in 12
CFR 226.9(g).
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(c) Treatment of Outstanding Balances
Following Rate Increase
1. Scope. This provision does not apply if
the consumer credit card account does not
have an outstanding balance. This provision
also does not apply if a rate is increased
pursuant to any of the exceptions in
§ 706.24(b).
2. Category of transactions. This provision
does not apply to balances in categories of
transactions other than the category for
which the federal credit union has increased
the annual percentage rate. For example, if a
federal credit union increases the annual
percentage rate that applies to purchases but
not the rate that applies to cash advances,
§ 706.24(c)(1) and (2) apply to an outstanding
balance consisting of purchases but not an
outstanding balance consisting of cash
advances.
Paragraph (c)(1)
1. No less beneficial to the consumer. A
federal credit union may provide a method
of paying the outstanding balance that is
different from the methods listed in
§ 706.24(c)(1) so long as the method used is
no less beneficial to the consumer than one
of the listed methods. A method is no less
beneficial to the consumer if the method
amortizes the outstanding balance in five
years or longer or if the method results in a
required minimum periodic payment on the
outstanding balance that is equal to or less
than a minimum payment calculated
consistent with § 706.24(c)(1)(ii). For
example, a federal credit union could more
than double the percentage of amounts owed
included in the minimum payment so long
as the minimum payment does not result in
amortization of the outstanding balance in
less than five years. Alternatively, a federal
credit union could require a consumer to
make a minimum payment on the
outstanding balance that amortizes that
balance in less than five years so long as the
payment does not include a percentage of the
outstanding balance that is more than twice
the percentage included in the minimum
payment before the effective date of the
increased rate.
Paragraph (c)(1)(ii)
1. Required minimum periodic payment on
other balances. This paragraph addresses the
required minimum periodic payment on the
outstanding balance. This paragraph does not
limit or otherwise address the federal credit
union’s ability to determine the amount of
the minimum periodic payment for other
balances.
2. Example. Assume that the method used
by a federal credit union to calculate the
required minimum periodic payment for a
consumer credit card account requires the
consumer to pay either the total of fees and
interest charges plus 1% of the total amount
owed or $20, whichever is greater. Assume
also that the federal credit union increases
the annual percentage rate applicable to
purchases on a consumer credit card account
from 10% to 15% and that the account has
an outstanding balance of $1,000 at the 10%
rate. Section 706.24(c)(1)(ii) would permit
the federal credit union to calculate the
required minimum periodic payment on the
outstanding balance by adding fees and
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interest charges to 2% of the outstanding
balance.
Paragraph (c)(2)
1. Fee or charge based solely on the
outstanding balance. A federal credit union
is prohibited from assessing a fee or charge
based solely on an outstanding balance. For
example, a federal credit union is prohibited
from assessing a maintenance or similar fee
based on an outstanding balance. A federal
credit union is not, however, prohibited from
assessing fees such as late payment fees or
fees for exceeding the credit limit even if
such fees are based in part on an outstanding
balance.
Section 706.25—Unfair Fees for Exceeding
the Credit Limit Caused by Credit Holds
1. General. Under § 706.25, a federal credit
union may not assess a fee for exceeding the
credit limit if the credit limit would not have
been exceeded but for a hold placed on the
available credit for a consumer credit card
account for a transaction that has been
authorized but has not yet been presented for
settlement, if the amount of the hold is in
excess of the actual purchase or transaction
amount when the transaction is settled.
Section 706.25 does not limit a federal credit
union from charging a fee for exceeding the
credit limit in connection with a particular
transaction if the consumer would have
exceeded the credit limit due to other
reasons, such as other transactions that may
have been authorized but not yet presented
for settlement, a payment that is returned, or
if the purchase or transaction amount for the
transaction for which the hold was placed
would have also caused the consumer to
exceed the credit limit.
2. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for same transaction.
Assume that a consumer credit card account
has a credit limit of $2,000 and a balance of
$1,500. The consumer uses the credit card to
check into a hotel for an anticipated stay of
five days. When the consumer checks in, the
hotel obtains authorization from the federal
credit union for a $750 hold on the account
to ensure there is adequate available credit to
cover the cost of the anticipated stay. The
consumer checks out of the hotel after three
days, and the total cost of the stay is $450,
which is charged to the consumer’s credit
card account. Assuming that there is no other
activity on the account, the federal credit
union is prohibited from assessing a fee for
exceeding the credit limit with respect to the
$750 hold. If, however, the total cost of the
stay charged to the account had been more
than $500, the federal credit union would not
be prohibited from assessing a fee for
exceeding the credit limit.
3. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for another transaction.
Assume that a consumer credit card account
has a credit limit of $2,000 and a balance of
$1,400. The consumer uses the credit card to
check into a hotel for an anticipated stay of
five days. When the consumer checks in, the
hotel obtains authorization from the federal
credit union for a $750 hold on the account
to ensure there is adequate available credit to
cover the cost of the anticipated stay. While
the hold remains in place, the consumer uses
the credit card to make a $150 purchase. The
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consumer checks out of the hotel after three
days, and the total cost of the stay is $450,
which is charged to the consumer’s credit
card account. Assuming there is no other
activity on the account, the federal credit
union is prohibited from assessing a fee for
exceeding the credit limit with respect to
either the $750 hold or the $150 purchase. If,
however, the total cost of the stay charged to
the account had been more than $450, the
federal credit union would not be prohibited
from assessing a fee for exceeding the credit
limit.
4. Example of prohibition when
authorization and settlement amounts are
held for the same transaction. Assume that
a consumer credit card account has a credit
limit of $2,000 and a balance of $1,400. The
consumer uses the credit card to check into
a hotel for an anticipated stay of five days.
When the consumer checks in, the hotel
obtains authorization from the federal credit
union for a $750 hold on the account to
ensure there is adequate available credit to
cover the cost of the anticipated stay. The
consumer checks out of the hotel after three
days, and the total cost of the stay is $450,
which is charged to the consumer’s credit
card account. When the hotel presents the
$450 transaction for settlement, it uses a
different transaction code to identify the
transaction than it had used for the preauthorization, causing both the $750 hold
and the $450 purchase amount to be
temporarily posted to the consumer’s account
at the same time, and the consumer’s balance
to exceed the credit limit. Under these
circumstances, and assuming no other
transactions, the federal credit union is
prohibited from assessing a fee for exceeding
the credit limit because the credit limit was
exceeded solely due to the $750 hold.
5. Example of permissible fee for exceeding
the credit limit in connection with a hold.
Assume that a consumer credit card account
has a credit limit of $2,000 and a balance of
$1,400. The consumer uses the credit card to
check into a hotel for an anticipated stay of
five days. When the consumer checks in, the
hotel obtains authorization from the federal
credit union for a $750 hold on the account
to ensure there is adequate available credit to
cover the cost of the anticipated stay. While
the hold remains in place, the consumer uses
the credit card to make a $650 purchase. The
consumer checks out of the hotel after three
days, and the total cost of the stay is $450,
which is charged to the consumer’s credit
card account. Notwithstanding the existence
of the hold and assuming there is no other
activity on the account, the federal credit
union may charge the consumer a fee for
exceeding the credit limit with respect to the
$650 purchase because the consumer would
have exceeded the credit limit even if the
hold had been for the actual amount of the
hotel transaction.
Section 706.26—Unfair Balance
Computation Method
(a) General Rule
1. Two-cycle method prohibited. A federal
credit union is prohibited from computing
the finance charge using the so-called twocycle average daily balance computation
method. This method calculates the finance
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charge using a balance that is the sum of the
average daily balances for two billing cycles.
The first balance is for the current billing
cycle, and is calculated by adding the
outstanding balance, including or excluding
new purchases and deducting payments and
credits, for each day in the billing cycle, and
then dividing by the number of days in the
billing cycle. The second balance is for the
preceding billing cycle.
2. Example. Assume that the billing cycle
on a consumer credit card account starts on
the first day of the month and ends on the
last day of the month. A consumer has a zero
balance on March 1. The consumer uses the
credit card to make a $500 purchase on
March 15. The consumer makes no other
purchases and pays $400 on the due date,
April 25, leaving a $100 balance. The federal
credit union may charge interest on the $500
purchase from the start of the billing cycle
April 1 through April 24, and interest on the
remaining $100 from April 25 through the
end of the April billing cycle, April 30. The
federal credit union is prohibited, however,
from reaching back and charging interest on
the $500 purchase from the date of purchase,
March 15, to the end of the March billing
cycle, March 31.
Section 706.27—Unfair Financing of
Security Deposits and Fees for the Issuance
or Availability of Credit
1. Initial credit limit for the account. For
purposes of this section the credit limit is the
limit in effect when the account is opened.
(a) Annual Rule
1. Majority of the credit limit. The total
amount of security deposits and fees for the
issuance or availability of credit constitutes
a majority of the credit limit if that total is
greater than half of the credit limit. For
example, assume that a consumer credit card
account has a credit limit of $500. Under
§ 706.27(a), a federal credit union may charge
to the account security deposits and fees for
the issuance or availability of credit totaling
no more than $250 during the twelve months
after the date on which the account is
opened, consistent with § 706.27(b), but may
not charge any more than that amount.
(b) Monthly Rule
1. Adjustments of one dollar or less
permitted. When dividing amounts pursuant
to § 706.27(b)(2), the federal credit union may
adjust amounts by one dollar or less. For
example, if a federal credit union is dividing
$125 over eleven billing cycles, the federal
credit union may charge $12 for four months
and $11 for the remaining seven months.
2. Example. Assume that a consumer credit
card account opened on January 1 has a
credit limit of $500 and that a federal credit
union charges to the account security
deposits and fees for the issuance or
availability of credit that total $250 during
the twelve months after the date on which
the account is opened. Assume also that the
billing cycles for this account begin on the
first day of the month and end on the last day
of the month. Under § 706.27(b), the federal
credit union may charge to the account no
more than $250 in security deposits and fees
for the issuance or availability of credit. If it
charges $250, the federal credit union may
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charge as much as $125 during the first
billing cycle. If it charges $125 during the
first billing cycle, it may then charge $12 in
any four billing cycles and $11 in any seven
billing cycles during the year.
(c) Fees for the Issuance or Availability of
Credit
1. Membership fees. Membership fees for
opening an account are fees for the issuance
or availability of credit. A membership fee to
join an organization that provides a credit or
charge card as a privilege of membership is
a fee for the issuance or availability of credit
only if the card is issued automatically upon
membership. If membership results merely in
eligibility to apply for an account, then such
a fee is not a fee for the issuance or
availability of credit.
2. Enhancements. Fees for optional
services in addition to basic membership
privileges in a credit or charge card account,
for example, travel insurance or cardregistration services, are not fees for the
issuance or availability of credit if the basic
account may be opened without paying such
fees.
3. One-time fees. Only non-periodic fees
related to opening an account, such as onetime membership or participation fees, are
fees for the issuance or availability of credit.
Fees for reissuing a lost or stolen card and
statement reproduction fees are examples of
fees that are not fees for the issuance or
availability of credit.
Section 706.28—Deceptive Firm Offers of
Credit
(a) Disclosure of Criteria Bearing on
Creditworthiness
1. Designed to call attention. Whether a
disclosure has been provided in a manner
that is designed to call attention to the nature
and significance of required information
depends on where the disclosure is placed in
the solicitation and how it is presented,
including whether the disclosure uses a
typeface and type size that are easy to read
and uses boldface or italics. Placing the
disclosure in a footnote would not satisfy this
requirement.
2. Form of electronic disclosures.
Electronic disclosures must be provided
consistent with 12 CFR 226.5a(a)(2)–8 and
–9.
3. Multiple annual percentage rates or
credit limits. For purposes of this section, a
firm offer of credit solicitation that states an
annual percentage rate or credit limit for a
credit card feature and a different annual
percentage rate or credit limit for a different
credit card feature does not offer multiple
annual percentage rates or credit limits. For
example, if a firm offer of credit solicitation
offers a 10% annual percentage rate for
purchases and a 15% annual percentage rate
for cash advances, the solicitation does not
offer multiple annual percentage rates for
purposes of this section.
4. Example. Assume that a federal credit
union requests from a consumer reporting
agency a list of consumers with credit scores
of 650 or higher so that the federal credit
union can send those consumers a firm offer
of credit solicitation. The federal credit union
sends a solicitation to those consumers for a
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consumer credit card account advertising
‘‘rates from 8.99% to 14.99%’’ and ‘‘credit
limits from $1,000 to $10,000.’’ Before
selection of the consumers for the offer,
however, the federal credit union determines
that it will offer an interest rate of 8.99%
only to those consumers responding to the
solicitation who are verified to have a credit
score of 650 or higher, who have a debt-toincome ratio below a certain amount, and
who meet other specific criteria bearing on
creditworthiness. Under § 706.28, this
solicitation is deceptive unless the federal
credit union discloses, in a manner that is
reasonably understandable to the consumer
and designed to call attention to the nature
and significance of the information, that, if
the consumer is approved for credit, the
annual percentage rate and credit limit the
consumer will receive will depend specific
criteria bearing on the consumer’s
creditworthiness. The federal credit union
may satisfy this requirement by using a
typeface and type size that are easy to read
and stating in boldface in a manner that
otherwise calls attention to the nature and
significance of the information: ‘‘If you are
approved for credit, your annual percentage
rate and/or credit limit will depend on your
credit history, debt-to-income ratio, and
debts.’’
5. Applicability of criteria in disclosure.
When making a disclosure under this section,
a federal credit union may only disclose the
criteria it uses in evaluating whether
consumers who are approved for credit will
receive the lowest annual percentage rate or
the highest credit limit. For example, if a
federal credit union does not consider the
consumer’s debts when determining whether
the consumer should receive the lowest
annual percentage rate or highest credit limit,
the disclosure must not refer to ‘‘debts.’’
Subpart D—Overdraft Services
Section 706.32—Unfair Practices Involving
Overdraft Services
(a) Opt-Out Requirement
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(a)(1) General Rule
1. Form, content, and timing of disclosure.
The form, content, and timing of the opt-out
notice required to be provided under
paragraph (a) of this section are addressed
under § 707.10 of this chapter.
(a)(3) Exceptions
Paragraph (a)(3)(i)
1. Example of transaction amount
exceeding authorization amount (fuel
purchase). A consumer has $30 in a deposit
account. The consumer uses a debit card to
purchase fuel. Before permitting the
consumer to use the fuel pump, the merchant
verifies the validity of the card by obtaining
authorization from the federal credit union
for a $1 transaction. The consumer purchases
$50 of fuel. If the federal credit union pays
the transaction, it would be permitted to
assess a fee or charge for paying the
overdraft, even if the consumer has opted out
of the payment of overdrafts.
2. Example of transaction amount
exceeding authorization amount (restaurant).
A consumer has $50 in a deposit account.
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The consumer pays for a $45 meal at a
restaurant using a debit card. While the
restaurant may obtain authorization for the
$45 cost of the meal, the consumer may add
$10 for a tip. If the federal credit union pays
the $55 transaction, including the tip
amount, it would be permitted to assess a fee
or charge for paying the overdraft, even if the
consumer has opted out of the payment of
overdrafts.
Paragraph (a)(3)(ii)
1. Example of transaction presented by
paper-based means. A consumer has $50 in
a deposit account. The consumer makes a
$60 purchase and presents his or her debit
card for payment. The merchant takes an
imprint of the card. Later that day, the
merchant submits a sales slip with the card
imprint to its processor for payment. If the
consumer’s federal credit union pays the
transaction, it would be permitted to assess
a fee or charge for paying the overdraft, even
if the consumer has opted out of the payment
of overdrafts.
(b) Debit Holds
1. General. Under § 706.32(b), a federal
credit union may not assess an overdraft fee
if the overdraft would not have occurred but
for a hold placed on funds in the consumer’s
account for a transaction that has been
authorized but has not yet been presented for
settlement, if the amount of the hold is in
excess of the actual purchase or transaction
amount when the transaction is settled.
Section 706.32(b) does not limit a federal
credit union from charging an overdraft fee
in connection with a particular transaction if
the consumer would have incurred an
overdraft due to other reasons, such as other
transactions that may have been authorized
but not yet presented for settlement, a
deposited check that is returned, or if the
purchase or transaction amount for the
transaction for which the hold was placed
would have also caused the consumer to
overdraw his or her account.
2. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for same transaction. A
consumer has $50 in a deposit account. The
consumer makes a fuel purchase using his or
her debit card. Before permitting the
consumer to use the fuel pump, the merchant
obtains authorization from the consumer’s
federal credit union for a $75 ‘‘hold’’ on the
account which exceeds the consumer’s
funds. The consumer purchases $20 of fuel.
Under these circumstances, § 706.32(b)
prohibits the federal credit union from
assessing a fee or charge in connection with
the debit hold because the actual amount of
the fuel purchase did not exceed the funds
in the consumer’s account. However, if the
consumer had purchased $60 of fuel, the
federal credit union could assess a fee or
charge for an overdraft because the
transaction exceeds the funds in the
consumer’s account, unless the consumer has
opted out of the payment of overdrafts under
§ 706.32(a).
3. Example of prohibition in connection
with hold placed for another transaction. A
consumer has $100 in a deposit account. The
consumer makes a fuel purchase using his or
her debit card. Before permitting the
consumer to use the fuel pump, the merchant
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obtains authorization from the consumer’s
federal credit union for a $75 ‘‘hold’’ on the
account. The consumer purchases $20 of
fuel, but the transaction is not presented for
settlement until the next day. Later on the
first day, and assuming no other transactions,
the consumer withdraws $75 at an ATM.
Under these circumstances, § 706.32(b)
prohibits the federal credit union from
assessing a fee or charge for paying an
overdraft with respect to the $75 withdrawal
because the overdraft was caused solely by
the $75 hold.
4. Example of prohibition when
authorization and settlement amounts are
held for the same transaction. A consumer
has $100 in his deposit account, and uses his
debit card to purchase $50 worth of fuel.
Before permitting the consumer to use the
fuel pump, the merchant obtains
authorization from the consumer’s federal
credit union for a $75 ‘‘hold’’ on the account.
The consumer purchases $50 of fuel. When
the merchant presents the $50 transaction for
settlement, it uses a different transaction
code to identify the transaction than it had
used for the pre-authorization, causing both
the $75 hold and the $50 purchase amount
to be temporarily posted to the consumer’s
account at the same time, and the consumer’s
account to be overdrawn. Under these
circumstances, and assuming no other
transactions, § 706.32(b) prohibits the federal
credit union from assessing a fee or charge
for paying an overdraft because the overdraft
was caused solely by the $75 hold.
5. Example of permissible overdraft fees in
connection with a hold. A consumer has
$100 in a deposit account. The consumer
makes a fuel purchase using his or her debit
card. Before permitting the consumer to use
the fuel pump, the merchant obtains
authorization from the consumer’s federal
credit union for a $75 ‘‘hold’’ on the account.
The consumer purchases $35 of fuel, but the
transaction is not presented for settlement
until the next day. Later on the first day, and
assuming no other transactions, the
consumer withdraws $75 at an ATM.
Notwithstanding the existence of the hold,
and assuming the consumer has not opted
out of the payment of overdrafts under
§ 706.32(a), the consumer’s federal credit
union may charge the consumer an overdraft
fee for the $75 ATM withdrawal, because the
consumer would have incurred the overdraft
even if the hold had been for the actual
amount of the fuel purchase.
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, May 2, 2008.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary of the Board.
Dated: April 29, 2008.
By the Office of Thrift Supervision.
John M. Reich,
Director.
By the National Credit Union
Administration Board, on May 2, 2008.
Mary F. Rupp,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. E8–10247 Filed 5–16–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210–01– (33%) 6720–01– (33%) 7535–
01– (33%) P
E:\FR\FM\19MYP3.SGM
19MYP3
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 97 (Monday, May 19, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 28904-28964]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-10247]
[[Page 28903]]
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Part III
Federal Reserve System
12 CFR Part 227
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Department of the Treasury
Office of Thrift Supervision
12 CFR Part 535
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National Credit Union Administration
12 CFR Part 706
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Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 97 / Monday, May 19, 2008 / Proposed
Rules
[[Page 28904]]
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 227
[Regulation AA; Docket No. R-1314]
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Thrift Supervision
12 CFR Part 535
[Docket ID. OTS-2008-0004]
RIN 1550-AC17
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION
12 CFR Part 706
RIN 3133-AD47
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices
AGENCIES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board);
Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury (OTS); and National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA).
ACTION: Proposed rule; request for public comment.
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SUMMARY: The Board, OTS, and NCUA (collectively, the Agencies) are
proposing to exercise their authority under section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
The proposed rule would prohibit institutions from engaging in certain
acts or practices in connection with consumer credit cards accounts and
overdraft services for deposit accounts. This proposal evolved from the
Board's June 2007 Notice of Proposed Rule under the Truth in Lending
Act and OTS's August 2007 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under
the Federal Trade Commission Act. The proposed rule relates to other
Board proposals under the Truth in Lending Act and the Truth in Savings
Act, which are published elsewhere in today's Federal Register.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before August 4, 2008.
ADDRESSES: Because paper mail in the Washington DC area and at the
Agencies is subject to delay, we encourage commenters to submit
comments by e-mail, if possible. We also encourage commenters to use
the title ``Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices'' to facilitate our
organization and distribution of the comments. Comments submitted to
one or more of the Agencies will be made available to all of the
Agencies. Interested parties are invited to submit comments as follows:
Board: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. R-1314, by
any of the following methods:
Agency Web site: https://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments at https://www.federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
E-mail: regs.comments@federalreserve.gov. Include the
docket number in the subject line of the message.
Facsimile: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.
Mail: Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue,
NW., Washington, DC 20551.
All public comments are available from the Board's Web site at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as
submitted, unless modified for technical reasons. Accordingly, your
comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact
information. Public comments may also be viewed electronically or in
paper form in Room MP-500 of the Board's Martin Building (20th and C
Streets, NW) between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. on weekdays.
OTS: You may submit comments, identified by OTS-2008-0004, by any
of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal- ``Regulations.gov'': Go to
https://www.regulations.gov, under the ``more Search Options'' tab click
next to the ``Advanced Docket Search'' option where indicated, select
``Office of Thrift Supervision'' from the agency drop-down menu, then
click ``Submit.'' In the ``Docket ID'' column, select ``OTS-2008-0004''
to submit or view public comments and to view supporting and related
materials for this proposed rulemaking. The ``How to Use This Site''
link on the Regulations.gov home page provides information on using
Regulations.gov, including instructions for submitting or viewing
public comments, viewing other supporting and related materials, and
viewing the docket after the close of the comment period.
Mail: Regulation Comments, Chief Counsel's Office, Office
of Thrift Supervision, 1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552,
Attention: OTS-2008-0004.
Facsimile: (202) 906-6518.
Hand Delivery/Courier: Guard's Desk, East Lobby Entrance,
1700 G Street, NW., from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on business days, Attention:
Regulation Comments, Chief Counsel's Office, Attention: OTS-2008-0004.
Instructions: All submissions received must include the
agency name and docket number for this rulemaking. All comments
received will be entered into the docket and posted on Regulations.gov
without change, including any personal information provided. Comments,
including attachments and other supporting materials received are part
of the public record and subject to public disclosure. Do not enclose
any information in your comment or supporting materials that you
consider confidential or inappropriate for public disclosure.
Viewing Comments Electronically: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov, select ``Office of Thrift Supervision'' from the
agency drop-down menu, then click ``Submit.'' Select Docket ID ``OTS-
2008-0004'' to view public comments for this notice of proposed
rulemaking.
Viewing Comments On-Site: You may inspect comments at the
Public Reading Room, 1700 G Street, NW., by appointment. To make an
appointment for access, call (202) 906-5922, send an e-mail to
public.info@ots.treas.gov, or send a facsimile transmission to (202)
906-6518. (Prior notice identifying the materials you will be
requesting will assist us in serving you.) We schedule appointments on
business days between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. In most cases, appointments
will be available the next business day following the date we receive a
request.
NCUA: You may submit comments, identified by number RIN 3133-AD47,
by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
NCUA Web site: https://www.ncua.gov/news/proposed_regs/
proposed_regs.html. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
E-mail: Address to regcomments@ncua.gov. Include ``[Your
name] Comments on Proposed Rule Part 706'' in the e-mail subject line.
Facsimile: (703) 518-6319. Use the subject line described
above for e-mail.
Mail: Address to Mary Rupp, Secretary of the Board,
National Credit Union Administration, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA
22314-3428.
Hand Delivery/Courier: Same as mail address.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Board: Benjamin K. Olson, Attorney, or Ky Tran-Trong, Counsel,
Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, at (202) 452-2412 or (202)
452-3667, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C
Streets,
[[Page 28905]]
NW., Washington, DC 20551. For users of Telecommunications Device for
the Deaf (TDD) only, contact (202) 263-4869.
OTS: April Breslaw, Director, Consumer Regulations, (202) 906-6989;
Suzanne McQueen, Consumer Regulations Analyst, Compliance and Consumer
Protection Division, (202) 906-6459; Glenn Gimble, Senior Project
Manager, Compliance and Consumer Protection Division, (202) 906-7158;
or Richard Bennett, Senior Compliance Counsel, Regulations and
Legislation Division, (202) 906-7409, at Office of Thrift Supervision,
1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552.
NCUA: Matthew J. Biliouris, Program Officer, Office of Examination
and Insurance, (703) 518-6360; or Moisette I. Green or Ross P. Kendall,
Staff Attorneys, Office of General Counsel, (703) 518-6540, National
Credit Union Administration, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 22314-
3428.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Reserve Board (Board), the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA) (collectively, the Agencies) are proposing
several new provisions intended to protect consumers against unfair or
deceptive acts or practices with respect to consumer credit card
accounts and overdraft services for deposit accounts. These proposals
are promulgated pursuant to section 18(f)(1) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act), which makes the Agencies responsible for
prescribing regulations that prevent unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce within the meaning of section 5(a)
of the FTC Act. See 15 U.S.C. 57a(f)(1), 45(a).
I. Background
A. The Board's June 2007 Regulation Z Proposal on Open-End (Non-Home
Secured) Credit
On June 14, 2007, the Board requested public comment on proposed
amendments to the open-end credit (not home-secured) provisions of
Regulation Z, which implements the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), as well
as proposed amendments to the corresponding staff commentary to
Regulation Z. 72 FR 32948 (June 2007 Proposal). The purpose of TILA is
to promote the informed use of consumer credit by providing disclosures
about its costs and terms. See 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. TILA's
disclosures differ depending on whether the consumer credit is an open-
end (revolving) plan or a closed-end (installment) loan. The goal of
the proposed amendments was to improve the effectiveness of the
disclosures that creditors provide to consumers at application and
throughout the life of an open-end (not home-secured) account.
As part of this effort, the Board retained a research and
consulting firm (Macro International) to assist the Board in conducting
extensive consumer testing in order to develop improved disclosures
that consumers would be more likely to pay attention to, understand,
and use in their decisions, while at the same time not creating undue
burdens for creditors. While the testing assisted the Board in
developing improved disclosures, the testing also identified the
limitations of disclosure, in certain circumstances, as a means of
enabling consumers to make decisions effectively. See 72 FR at 32948-
52.
In response to the June 2007 Proposal, the Board received more than
2,500 comments, including approximately 2,100 comments from individual
consumers. Comments from consumers, consumer groups, a member of
Congress, other government agencies, and some creditors were generally
supportive of the proposed revisions to Regulation Z. A number of
comments, however, urged the Board to take additional action with
respect to a number of credit card practices, including late fees and
other penalties resulting from perceived reductions in the amount of
time consumers are given to make timely payments, allocation of
payments to balances with the lowest annual percentage rate,
application of increased annual percentage rates to pre-existing
balances, and the so-called two-cycle method of computing interest.
B. The OTS's August 2007 FTC Act Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
On August 6, 2007, OTS issued an ANPR requesting comment on its
rules under section 5 of the FTC Act. See 72 FR 43570 (OTS ANPR). The
purpose of OTS's ANPR was to determine whether OTS should expand on its
current prohibitions against unfair and deceptive acts or practices in
its Credit Practices Rule (12 CFR part 535).
OTS's ANPR discussed a very broad array of issues including:
The legal background on OTS's authority under the FTC Act
and the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA);
OTS's existing Credit Practices Rule;
Possible principles OTS could use to define unfair and
deceptive acts or practices, including looking to standards the FTC and
states follow;
Practices that OTS, individually or on an interagency
basis, has addressed through guidance;
Practices that other federal agencies have addressed
through rulemaking;
Practices that states have addressed statutorily;
Acts or practices OTS might target involving products such
as credit cards, residential mortgages, gift cards, and deposit
accounts; and
OTS's existing Advertising Rule (12 CFR 563.27).
OTS recognized in its ANPR that the financial services industry and
consumers have benefited from consistency in rules and guidance as the
federal banking agencies and the NCUA have adopted uniform or very
similar rules in many areas. 72 FR at 43571. OTS emphasized in its ANPR
that it would be mindful of the goal of consistent interagency
standards as it considered issues relating to unfair and deceptive acts
or practices. Id.
OTS received 29 comment letters on its ANPR, including thirteen
from financial institutions and their trade associations, three from
consumer advocacy organizations, two from members of Congress, one from
the FTC, and ten from others. Generally speaking, the commenters agreed
on only one point . . . that OTS should adopt the same principles-based
standards for unfairness and deception used by the FTC, the other
federal banking agencies, and the NCUA.
Financial industry commenters opposed OTS taking any further action
beyond issuing guidance along those lines. They argued that OTS must
not create an unlevel playing field for OTS-regulated institutions and
that uniformity among the federal banking agencies and the NCUA is
essential. They questioned the need for any new OTS rules. They
challenged the list of practices OTS had indicated it could consider
targeting, arguing that the practices listed were neither unfair nor
deceptive under the FTC standards. They explained the reasons they use
the particular practices listed and how some benefit consumers. Some
commenters urged OTS to await the Board's rulemaking under the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) on unfair or deceptive acts
or practices and then follow the Board's lead.\1\ They also opposed
using state laws as a model or converting guidance to rules. Further,
they opposed OTS expanding its advertising rules.
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\1\ The Board issued its HOEPA proposed in January 2008. See 73
FR 1672 (Jan. 9, 2008).
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In contrast, the consumer commenters urged OTS to move ahead with a
rule that would combine the FTC's principles-based standards with
prohibitions on specific practices. They
[[Page 28906]]
urged OTS to ban numerous practices, including but not limited to those
the ANPR indicated OTS might target. One emphasized that whatever OTS
does must not preempt state laws on unfair and deceptive acts or
practices.
A joint comment from House Financial Services Committee Chairman
Barney Frank and Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit Chairman Carolyn Maloney urged OTS to proceed promptly to adopt
comprehensive regulations on unfair and deceptive acts or practices. A
comment from Senator Carl Levin urged OTS to move ahead with
rulemaking; he focused his comment on unfair or deceptive credit card
practices.
A comment from the FTC summarized the FTC's interest and experience
with respect to financial services, described how the FTC has used its
unfairness and deception authority in rulemaking and law enforcement
actions, and recommended that OTS consider the FTC's experience in
determining whether to impose rules prohibiting or restricting
particular acts and practices.
OTS received comments on several practices relevant to the specific
credit card practices addressed in today's proposal:
OTS received comments on the practice of ``universal
default'' or ``adverse action pricing,'' which the OTS ANPR described
as imposing an interest rate increase that is triggered by adverse
information unrelated to the credit card account. The OTS ANPR
contrasted this practice to long-established risk based pricing.
Consumer groups supported prohibiting these practices as abusive and
unfair to consumers. They cited inaccuracies in the credit reporting
system and disparate racial impact as reasons to prohibit using credit
reports or credit scores to impose penalty rates. On the other hand,
several industry commenters defended these practices. They commented
that credit cards should be priced to reflect their current risk. They
argued that otherwise, credit card issuers would build a risk premium
into all rates to the detriment of other customers.
OTS received comments on the practice of applying payments
first to balances subject to a lower rate of interest before applying
payments to balances subject to higher rates of interest, as well as
the practice of applying payments first to fees, penalties, or other
charges before applying them to principal and interest. Consumer groups
supported prohibiting these practices as abusive and unfair to
consumers. On the other hand, several industry commenters defended
these practices. They commented that if these practices were prohibited
fewer products would be available to consumers such as zero or low-cost
balance transfers. Some commented that applying payments in this manner
was fundamental and would impose significant implementation costs to
change.
OTS received comments on the practice of imposing an over-
the-credit-limit fee that is triggered by the imposition of a penalty
fee (such as a late fee) and the practice of charging penalty fees in
consecutive months based on previous late or over-the-credit-limit
transactions, not on new actions. Consumer groups supported prohibiting
these practices and prohibiting any over-the-credit-limit fee where the
creditor approved the transaction or padded the credit limit, as
abusive and unfair to consumers. On the other hand, several industry
commenters defended these practices. They commented that the practices
deter future defaults and are a way to charge a little more to a
customer who has demonstrated higher risk without permanently raising
the customer's borrowing costs. They argued that otherwise, these costs
would be passed on to borrowers who do not go over their credit limit
or pay late.
Consumer groups also commented on additional credit card practices
of concern that are relevant to the practices addressed in today's
proposal. They urged that payment cut-off times be prohibited and that
payments be treated as timely if they are postmarked as of the due
date. They also urged that subprime credit cards be prohibited if less
than $300 of available credit is left after initial fees are subtracted
or initial fees total more than 10% of the overall credit line.
C. Related Action by the Agencies
In addition to receiving information via comments, the Agencies
have conducted outreach regarding credit card practices, including
meetings and discussions with consumer group representatives, industry
representatives, other federal and state banking agencies, and the FTC.
On April 8, 2008, the Board hosted a forum on credit cards in which
card issuers and payment network operators, consumer advocates,
counseling agencies, and other regulatory agencies met to discuss
relevant industry trends and identify areas that may warrant action or
further study. Among the topics discussed were the Board's previously
announced plan to issue a proposal under the FTC Act and the Board's
June 2007 Proposal. In addition, the Agencies have reviewed consumer
complaints received by each of the federal banking agencies and several
studies of the credit card industry.\2\ The Agencies' understanding of
credit card practices and consumer behavior has also been informed by
the results of consumer testing conducted on behalf of the Board in
connection with its June 2007 Proposal under Regulation Z. Based on
this and other information discussed below, the Agencies have developed
proposed rules under the FTC Act prohibiting specific unfair acts or
practices regarding consumer credit card accounts.
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\2\ See, e.g., Am. Bankers Assoc., Likely Impact of Proposed
Credit Card Legislation: Survey Results of Credit Card Issuers
(Spring 2008); Darryl E. Getter, Cong. Research Srvc., The Credit
Card Market: Recent Trends, Funding Cost Issues, and Repricing
Practices (Feb. 2008); Tim Westrich & Christian E. Weller, Ctr. for
Am. Progress, House of Cards: Consumers Turn to Credit Cards Amid
the Mortgage Crisis, Delaying Inevitable Defaults (Feb. 2008)
(available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/02/pdf/
house_of_cards.pdf); Jose A. Garcia, Demos, Borrowing to Make Ends
Meet: The Rapid Growth of Credit Card Debt in America (Nov. 2007)
(available at https://www.demos.org/pubs/borrowing.pdf ); Nat'l
Consumer Law Ctr., Fee-Harvesters: Low-Credit, High-Cost Cards Bleed
Consumers (Nov. 2007) (available at https://www.consumerlaw.org/
issues/credit_cards/content/FEE-HarvesterFinal.pdf); Jonathan M.
Orszag & Susan H. Manning, Am. Bankers Assoc., An Economic
Assessment of Regulating Credit Card Fees and Interest Rates (Oct.
2007) (available at https://www.aba.com/aba/documents/press/
regulating_creditcard_fees_interest_rates92507.pdf); Cindy
Zeldin & Mark Rukavia, Demos, Borrowing to Stay Healthy: How Credit
Card Debt Is Related to Medical Expenses (Jan. 2007) (available at
https://www.demos.org/pubs/healthy_web.pdf); U.S. Gov't
Accountability Office, Credit Cards: Increased Complexity in Rates
and Fees Heightens Need for More Effective Disclosures to Consumers
(Sept. 2006) (``GAO Credit Card Report'') (available at https://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pdf ); Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Report to Congress on Practices of the
Consumer Credit Industry in Soliciting and Extending Credit and
their Effects on Consumer Debt and Insolvency (June 2006) (available
at https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/bankruptcy/
bankruptcybillstudy200606.pdf ); Demos & Ctr. for Responsible
Lending, The Plastic Safety Net: The Reality Behind Debt in America
(Oct. 2005) (available at https://www.demos.org/pubs/PSN_low.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Agencies have also gathered information from a number
of recent Congressional hearings on consumer protection issues
regarding credit cards.\3\ In these hearings, members of Congress heard
testimony from individual consumers,
[[Page 28907]]
representatives of consumer groups, representatives of financial and
credit card industry groups, and others. Consumer and community group
representatives generally testified that certain credit card practices
(including those discussed above) unfairly increase the cost of credit
after the consumer has committed to a particular transaction. These
witnesses further testified that these practices should be prohibited
because they lead consumers to underestimate the costs of using credit
cards and that disclosure of these practices under Regulation Z is
ineffective. Financial services and credit card industry
representatives agreed that consumers need better disclosures of credit
card terms but testified that substantive restrictions on specific
terms would lead to higher interest rates for all borrowers as well as
reduced access to credit for some. Members of Congress have proposed
several bills addressing consumer protection issues regarding credit
cards.\4\
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\3\ See, e.g., The Credit Cardholders' Bill of Rights: Providing
New Protections for Consumers: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on
Fin. Instits. & Consumer Credit, 110th Cong. (2007); Credit Card
Practices: Unfair Interest Rate Increases: Hearing before the S.
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 110th Cong. (2007); Credit
Card Practices: Current Consumer and Regulatory Issues: Hearing
before H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2007); Credit Card
Practices: Fees, Interest Rates, and Grace Periods: Hearing before
the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 110th Cong. (2007).
\4\ See, e.g., The Credit Card Reform Act of 2008, S. 2753,
110th Cong. (Mar. 12, 2008); The Credit Cardholders' Bill of Rights
Act of 2008, H.R. 5244, 110th Cong. (Feb. 7, 2008); The Stop Unfair
Practices in Credit Cards Act of 2007, H.R. 5280, 110th Cong. (Feb.
7, 2008); The Stop Unfair Practices in Credit Cards Act of 2007, S.
1395, 110th Cong. (May 15, 2007); The Universal Default Prohibition
Act of 2007, H.R. 2146, 110th Cong. (May 3, 2007); The Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2007, H.R. 1461,
110th Cong. (Mar. 9, 2007).
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D. Agency Actions on Overdraft Services
Overdraft services are sometimes offered to transaction account
customers as an alternative to traditional ways of covering overdrafts
(e.g., overdraft lines of credit or linked accounts). Coverage is
generally ``automatically'' provided to consumers that meet a
depository institution's criteria, and the service may extend to check
as well as other transactions, such as automated teller machine (ATM)
withdrawals, debit card transactions and automated clearinghouse (ACH)
transactions. Most institutions state that payment of an overdraft is
at their discretion. If an overdraft is paid, the consumer will be
charged a flat fee for each item. A daily fee also may apply for each
day the account remains overdrawn.
In response to the increased availability and customer use of these
overdraft protection services, the FDIC, Board, OCC, OTS, and NCUA
published guidance on overdraft protection programs in February
2005.\5\ The Joint Guidance addresses three primary areas--safety and
soundness considerations, legal risks, and best practices--while the
OTS guidance focuses on safety and soundness considerations and best
practices. The best practices focus on the marketing and communications
that accompany the offering of overdraft services, as well as the
disclosure and operation of program features, including the provision
of a consumer election or opt-out of the overdraft service. The
Agencies have also published a consumer brochure on overdraft
services.\6\
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\5\ See Interagency Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs
(Joint Guidance), 70 FR 9127 (Feb. 24, 2005) and OTS Guidance on
Overdraft Protection Programs, 70 FR 8428 (Feb. 18, 2005).
\6\ The brochure, entitled ``Protecting Yourself from Overdraft
and Bounced-Check Fees,'' can be found at: https://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bounce/default.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2005, the Board separately issued revisions to Regulation DD
and the staff commentary pursuant to its authority under the Truth in
Savings Act (TISA) to address concerns about the uniformity and
adequacy of institutions' disclosure of overdraft fees generally, and
to address concerns about advertised overdraft services in
particular.\7\ The goal of the final rule was to improve the uniformity
and adequacy of disclosures provided to consumers about overdraft and
returned-item fees to assist consumers in better understanding the
costs associated with the payment of overdrafts. In addition, the final
rule addressed some of the Board's concerns about institutions'
marketing practices with respect to overdraft services.
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\7\ 70 FR 29582 (May 24, 2005). A substantively similar rule
applying to credit unions was issued separately by the NCUA. 71 FR
24568 (Apr. 26, 2006). The NCUA issued an interim final rule in
2005. 70 FR 72895 (Dec. 8, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to regulatory actions, there has also been significant
Congressional interest in overdraft services, with legislation
introduced seeking to curb some of the perceived abusive practices
associated with these services. In June 2007, a hearing was held to
discuss the proposed legislation with testimony from consumer advocates
and industry representatives.\8\
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\8\ H.R. 946, ``The Consumer Overdraft Protection Fair Practices
Act.'' See also Overdraft Protection: Fair Practices for Consumers:
Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit, 110th Cong. (2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Statutory Authority Under the Federal Trade Commission Act To
Address Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices
A. Rulemaking and Enforcement Authority Under the FTC Act
Section 18(f)(1) of the FTC Act provides that the Board (with
respect to banks), OTS (with respect to savings associations), and the
NCUA (with respect to federal credit unions) are responsible for
prescribing ``regulations defining with specificity * * * unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, and containing requirements prescribed for
the purpose of preventing such acts or practices.'' 15 U.S.C.
57a(f)(1).\9\
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\9\ The FTC Act refers to OTS's predecessor agency, the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), rather than to OTS. However, in
section 3(e) of HOLA, Congress transferred this rulemaking power of
the FHLBB, among others, to the Director of OTS. 12 U.S.C. 1462a(e).
The FTC Act refers to ``savings and loan institutions'' in some
provisions and ``savings associations'' in other provisions.
Although ``savings associations'' is the term currently used in the
HOLA, see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1462(4), the terms ``savings and loan
institutions'' and ``savings associations'' can be and are used
interchangeably. OTS has determined that the outdated language does
not affect OTS's rulemaking authority under the FTC Act.
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The FTC Act allocates responsibility for enforcing compliance with
regulations prescribed under section 18 with respect to banks, savings
associations, and federal credit unions among the Board, OTS, and NCUA,
as well as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). See 15 U.S.C. 57a(f)(2)-
(4). The FTC Act grants the FTC rulemaking and enforcement authority
with respect to other persons and entities, subject to certain
exceptions and limitations. See 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. 57a(a).
The FTC Act, however, sets forth specific rulemaking procedures for the
FTC that do not apply to the Agencies. See 15 U.S.C. 57a(b)-(e), (g)-
(j); 15 U.S.C. 57a-3.
B. Standards for Unfairness Under the FTC Act
Congress has codified standards developed by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) for the FTC to use in determining whether acts or
practices are unfair under section 5(a) of the FTC Act.\10\
Specifically, the FTC Act provides that the FTC has no authority to
declare an act or practice is unfair unless: (1) It causes or is likely
to cause substantial injury to consumers; (2) the injury is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves; and (3) the injury is not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.
In addition, the FTC may consider established public policy, but public
policy may not serve as the primary basis for its determination that an
act or practice is unfair. See 15 U.S.C. 45(n).
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\10\ See 15 U.S.C. 45(n); FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness,
Letter from the FTC to the Hon. Wendell H. Ford and the Hon. John C.
Danforth, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp. (Dec. 17, 1980)
(FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness) (available at https://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm).
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[[Page 28908]]
In proposing rules under section 18(f)(1) of the FTC Act, the
Agencies have applied the statutory elements consistent with the
standards articulated by the FTC. The Board, FDIC, and OCC have issued
guidance generally adopting these standards for purposes of enforcing
the FTC Act's prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices.\11\
Although the OTS has not taken similar action in generally applicable
guidance,\12\ the commenters on OTS's ANPR who addressed this issue
overwhelmingly urged OTS to be consistent with the FTC's standards for
unfairness.
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\11\ See Board and FDIC, Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices
by State-Chartered Banks (Mar. 11, 2004) (available at https://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2004/20040311/
attachment.pdf ); OCC Advisory Letter 2002-3, Guidance on Unfair or
Deceptive Acts or Practices (Mar. 22, 2002) (available at https://
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2002-3.doc).
\12\ See OTS ANPR, 72 FR at 43573.
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According to the FTC, an unfair act or practice will almost always
represent a market failure or imperfection that prevents the forces of
supply and demand from maximizing benefits and minimizing costs.\13\
Not all market failures or imperfections constitute unfair acts or
practices, however. Instead, the central focus of the FTC's unfairness
analysis is whether the act or practice causes substantial consumer
injury.\14\
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\13\ Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis for
Federal Trade Commission Credit Practices Rule (Statement for FTC
Credit Practices Rule), 49 FR 7740, 7744 (Mar. 1, 1984).
\14\ Id. at 7743.
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First, the FTC has stated that a substantial consumer injury
generally consists of monetary, economic, or other tangible harm.\15\
Trivial or speculative harms do not constitute substantial consumer
injury.\16\ Consumer injury may be substantial, however, if it imposes
a small harm on a large number of consumers or if it raises a
significant risk of concrete harm.\17\
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\15\ See id.; FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness at 3.
\16\ See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rule, 49 FR at 7743
(``[E]xcept in aggravated cases where tangible injury can be clearly
demonstrated, subjective types of harm--embarrassment, emotional
distress, etc.--will not be enough to warrant a finding of
unfairness.''); FTC Unfairness Policy Statement at 3 (``Emotional
impact and other more subjective types of harm * * * will not
ordinarily make a practice unfair.'').
\17\ See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rules, 49 FR at
7743; FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness at 3 & n.12.
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Second, the FTC has stated that an injury is not reasonably
avoidable when consumers are prevented from effectively making their
own decisions about whether to incur that injury.\18\ The marketplace
is normally expected to be self-correcting because consumers are relied
upon to survey the available alternatives, choose those that are most
desirable, and avoid those that are inadequate or unsatisfactory.\19\
Accordingly, the test is not whether the consumer could have made a
wiser decision but whether an act or practice unreasonably creates or
takes advantage of an obstacle to the consumer's ability to make that
decision freely.\20\
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\18\ See FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness at 3.
\19\ See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rule, 49 FR at 7744
(``Normally, we can rely on consumer choice to govern the
market.''); FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness at 3.
\20\ See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rule, 49 FR at 7744
(``In considering whether an act or practice is unfair, we look to
whether free market decisions are unjustifiably hindered.''); FTC
Policy Statement on Unfairness at 3 & n.19 (``In some senses any
injury can be avoided--for example, by hiring independent experts to
test all products in advance, or by private legal actions for
damages--but these courses may be too expensive to be practicable
for individual consumers to pursue.'').
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Third, the FTC has stated that the act or practice causing the
injury must not also produce benefits to consumers or competition that
outweigh the injury.\21\ Generally, it is important to consider both
the costs of imposing a remedy and any benefits that consumers enjoy as
a result of the practice.\22\ The FTC has stated that both consumers
and competition benefit from prohibitions on unfair or deceptive acts
or practices because prices may better reflect actual transaction costs
and merchants who do not rely on unfair or deceptive acts or practices
are no longer required to compete with those who do.\23\
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\21\ See Statement for FTC Credit Practices Rule, 49 FR at 7744;
FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness at 3; see also S. Rep. 103-130,
at 13 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1776, 1788 (``In
determining whether a substantial consumer injury is outweighed by
the countervailing benefits of a practice, the Committee does not
intend that the FTC quantify the detrimental and beneficial effects
of the practice in every case. In many instances, such a numerical
benefit-cost analysis would be unnecessary; in other cases, it may
be impossible. This section would require, however, that the FTC
carefully evaluate the benefits and costs of each exercise of its
unfairness authority, gathering and considering reasonably available
evidence.'').
\22\ See FTC Public Comment on OTS-2007-0015, at 6 (Dec. 12,
2007) (available at https://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/9/963034.pdf ).
\23\ See FTC Public Comment on OTS-2007-0015, at 8 (citing
Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, Statement of Basis
and Purpose, 40 FR 53506, 53523 (Nov. 18, 1975) (codified at 16 CFR
433)); see also FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Letter from the
FTC to the Hon. John H. Dingell, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct.
14, 1983) (FTC Policy Statement on Deception) (available at https://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm) (``Deceptive practices
injure both competitors and consumers because consumers who
preferred the competitor's product are wrongly diverted.'').
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C. Standards for Deception Under the FTC Act
The FTC has also adopted standards for determining whether an act
or practice is deceptive under the FTC Act.\24\ Under the FTC's
standards, an act or practice is deceptive where: (1) There is a
representation or omission of information that is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances; and (2) that
information is material to consumers.\25\ Although these standards have
not been codified, they have been applied by numerous courts.\26\
Accordingly, in proposing rules under section 18(f)(1) of the FTC Act,
the Agencies have applied the standards articulated by the FTC for
determining whether an act or practice is deceptive.\27\
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\24\ FTC Policy Statement on Deception.
\25\ Id. at 1-2. The FTC views deception as a subset of
unfairness but does not apply the full unfairness analysis because
deception is very unlikely to benefit consumers or competition and
consumers cannot reasonably avoid being harmed by deception. Id.
\26\ See, e.g., FTC v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.
2003); FTC v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2001); FTC v. QT,
Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 957 (N.D. Ill. 2006); FTC v. Think
Achievement, 144 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1009 (N.D. Ind. 2000); FTC v.
Minuteman Press, 53 F. Supp. 2d 248, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
\27\ As noted above, the Board, FDIC, and OCC have issued
guidance generally adopting these standards for purposes of
enforcing the FTC Act's prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or
practices. As with the unfairness standard, comments on OTS's ANPR
addressing this issue overwhelmingly urged the OTS to adopt the same
deception standard as the FTC.
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A representation or omission is deceptive if the overall net
impression created is likely to mislead consumers.\28\ The FTC conducts
its own analysis to determine whether a representation or omission is
likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the
circumstances.\29\ When evaluating the reasonableness of an
interpretation, the FTC considers the sophistication and understanding
of consumers in the group to whom the act or practice is targeted.\30\
If a representation is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, and if one such interpretation is misleading, then the
representation is deceptive even if other, non-deceptive
interpretations are possible.\31\
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\28\ See, e.g., FTC v. Cyberspace.com, 453 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th
Cir. 2006); Gill, 265 F.3d at 956; Removatron Int'l Corp. v. FTC,
884 F.2d 1489, 1497 (1st Cir. 1989).
\29\ See FTC v. Kraft, Inc., 970 F.2d 311, 319 (7th Cir. 1992);
QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d at 958.
\30\ FTC Policy Statement on Deception at 3.
\31\ Id.
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A representation or omission is material if it is likely to affect
the consumer's conduct or decision regarding a product or service.\32\
Certain types of claims are presumed to be material, including express
claims and
[[Page 28909]]
claims regarding the cost of a product or service.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Id. at 2, 6-7.
\33\ See FTC Public Comment on OTS-2007-0015, at 21; FTC Policy
Statement on Deception at 6; see also FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33
F.3d 1088, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Peacock Buick, 86 F.T.C.
1532, 1562 (1975), aff'd 553 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1977).
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D. Choice of Remedy
The Agencies have wide latitude to determine what remedy is
necessary to prevent an unfair or deceptive act or practice so long as
that remedy has a reasonable relation to the act or practice.\34\ Thus,
the Agencies are not required to adopt the most restrictive means of
preventing the act or practice, nor are they required to adopt the
least restrictive means.
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\34\ See Am. Fin. Servs. Assoc. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 988-89 (DC
Cir. 1985) (citing Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13
(1946)).
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III. Summary of Proposed Revisions
In order to best ensure that all entities that offer the products
addressed in the proposed rule are treated in a like manner, the Board,
OTS, and NCUA have joined together to issue today's proposal. This
interagency approach is consistent with section 303 of the Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994. See 12
U.S.C. 4803. Section 303(a)(3), 12 U.S.C. 4803(a)(3), directs the
federal banking agencies to work jointly to make uniform all
regulations and guidelines implementing common statutory or supervisory
policies. In today's proposal, two federal banking agencies--the Board
and OTS--are primarily implementing the same statutory provision,
section 18(f) of the FTC Act, as is the NCUA. Accordingly, the Agencies
have endeavored to propose rules that are as uniform as possible. The
Agencies also consulted with the two other federal banking agencies,
OCC and FDIC, as well as with the FTC.
The effort to achieve an even playing field is also furthered by
the Agencies' focus on unfair and deceptive acts or practices involving
credit cards and overdraft services, which are generally provided only
by depository institutions such as banks, savings associations, and
credit unions. The Agencies recognize that state-chartered credit
unions and any entities providing consumer credit card accounts
independent of a depository institution fall within the FTC's
jurisdiction and therefore would not be subject to these rules. The
Agencies believe, however, that FTC-regulated entities represent a
small percentage of the market for consumer credit card accounts and
overdraft services. For OTS, addressing certain deceptive credit card
practices in today's proposal, rather than through an interpretation or
expansion of its Advertising Rule, also fosters consistency because the
other Agencies do not have comparable advertising regulations.
Credit Practices Rule
The Agencies are proposing to make non-substantive, organizational
changes to the Credit Practices Rule. Specifically, in order to avoid
repetition, the Agencies would move the statement of authority,
purpose, and scope out of the Credit Practices Rule and revise it to
apply not only to the Credit Practices Rule but also to the proposed
rules regarding consumer credit card accounts and overdraft services.
OTS and NCUA have made additional, non-substantive changes to the
organization of their versions of the Credit Practices Rule.
Consumer Credit Card Accounts
The Agencies are proposing seven provisions under the FTC Act
regarding consumer credit card accounts. These provisions are intended
to ensure that consumers have the ability to make informed decisions
about the use of credit card accounts without being subjected to unfair
or deceptive acts or practices.
First, institutions would be prohibited from treating a payment as
late for any purpose unless consumers have been provided a reasonable
amount of time to make that payment. The proposed rule would create a
safe harbor for institutions that adopt reasonable procedures designed
to ensure that periodic statements (which provide payment information)
are mailed or delivered at least 21 days before the payment due date.
Elsewhere in today's Federal Register, the Board has made two
additional proposals under Regulation Z that would further ensure that
consumers receive a reasonable amount of time to make payment.
Specifically, the Board is proposing to revise 12 CFR 226.10(b) to
prohibit creditors from setting a cut-off time for mailed payments that
is earlier than 5 p.m. at the location specified by the creditor for
receipt of such payments. The Board is also proposing to add 12 CFR
226.10(d), which would require that, if the due date for payment is a
day on which the U.S. Postal Service does not deliver mail or the
creditor does not accept payment by mail, the creditor may not treat a
payment received by mail the next business day as late for any purpose.
Second, when different annual percentage rates apply to different
balances, institutions would be required to allocate amounts paid in
excess of the minimum payment using one of three specified methods or a
method that is no less beneficial to consumers. The specified methods
are applying the entire amount first to the balance with the highest
annual percentage rate, splitting the amount equally among the
balances, or splitting the amount pro rata among the balances.
Furthermore, when an account has a discounted promotional rate balance
or a balance on which interest is deferred, institutions would be
required to give consumers the full benefit of that discounted rate or
deferred interest plan by allocating amounts in excess of the minimum
payment first to balances on which the rate is not discounted or
interest is not deferred (except, in the case of a deferred interest
plan, for the last two billing cycles during which interest is
deferred). Institutions would also be prohibited from denying consumers
a grace period on purchases (if one is offered) solely because they
have not paid off a balance at a promotional rate or a balance on which
interest is deferred.
Third, institutions would be prohibited from increasing the annual
percentage rate on an outstanding balance. This prohibition would not
apply, however, where a variable rate increases due to the operation of
an index, where a promotional rate has expired or is lost (provided the
rate is not increased to a penalty rate), or where the minimum payment
has not been received within 30 days after the due date.
Fourth, institutions would be prohibited from assessing a fee if a
consumer exceeds the credit limit on an account solely due to a hold
placed on the available credit. If, however, the actual amount of the
transaction would have exceeded the credit limit, then a fee may be
assessed.
Fifth, institutions would be prohibited from imposing finance
charges on balances based on balances for days in billing cycles that
precede the most recent billing cycle. The proposed rule would prohibit
institutions from reaching back to earlier billing cycles when
calculating the amount of interest charged in the current cycle, a
practice that is sometimes referred to as two-or double-cycle billing.
Sixth, institutions would be prohibited from financing security
deposits or fees for the issuance or availability of credit (such as
account-opening fees or membership fees) if those deposits or fees
utilize the majority of the available credit on the
[[Page 28910]]
account. The proposal would also require security deposits and fees
exceeding 25 percent of the credit limit to be spread over the first
year, rather than charged as a lump sum during the first billing cycle.
In addition, elsewhere in today's Federal Register, the Board is
proposing to revise Regulation Z to provide that a creditor that
collects or obtains a consumer's agreement to pay a fee before
providing account-opening disclosures must permit that consumer to
reject the plan after receiving the disclosures and, if the consumer
does so, must refund any fee collected or take any other action
necessary to ensure the consumer is not obligated to pay the fee.
Seventh, institutions making firm offers of credit advertising
multiple annual percentage rates or credit limits would be required to
disclose in the solicitation the factors that determine whether a
consumer will qualify for the lowest annual percentage rate and highest
credit limit advertised.
Overdraft Services
The Agencies are proposing two provisions prohibiting unfair acts
or practices related to overdraft services in connection with consumer
deposit accounts. The proposed provisions are intended to ensure that
consumers understand overdraft services and have the choice to avoid
the associated costs where such services do not meet their needs.
The first would provide that it is an unfair act or practice for an
institution to assess a fee or charge on a consumer's account for
paying an overdraft unless the institution provides the consumer with
the right to opt out of the institution's payment of overdrafts and a
reasonable opportunity to exercise the opt out, and the consumer does
not opt out. The proposed opt-out right would apply to all transactions
that overdraw an account regardless of whether the transaction is, for
example, a check, an ACH transaction, an ATM withdrawal, a recurring
payment, or a debit card purchase at a point of sale.
The second proposal would prohibit certain acts or practices
associated with assessing overdraft fees in connection with debit
holds. Specifically, the proposal would prohibit an institution from
assessing an overdraft fee if the overdraft is caused solely by a hold
placed on funds that exceeds the actual purchase amount of the
transaction, unless this purchase amount would have caused the
overdraft.
Elsewhere in today's Federal Register, the Board is also proposing
to address potentially misleading balance disclosures by generally
requiring depository institutions to provide only balances that reflect
the consumer's own funds (without funds added by the institution to
cover overdrafts) in response to consumer inquiries received through an
automated system such as a telephone response system, ATM, or an
institution's Web site.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Credit Practices Subpart
On March 1, 1984, the FTC adopted its Credit Practices Rule
pursuant to its authority under the FTC Act to promulgate rules that
define and prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.\35\ The FTC Act provides that, whenever the FTC
promulgates a rule prohibiting specific unfair or deceptive practices,
the Board, OTS (as the successor to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board),
and NCUA must adopt substantially similar regulations imposing
substantially similar requirements with respect to banks, savings and
loan institutions, and federal credit unions within 60 days of the
effective date of the FTC's rule unless the agency finds that such acts
or practices by banks, savings associations, or federal credit unions
are not unfair or deceptive or the Board finds that the adoption of
similar regulations for banks, savings associations, or federal credit
unions would seriously conflict with essential monetary and payment-
systems policies of the Board. The Agencies have adopted rules
substantially similar to the FTC's Credit Practices Rule.\36\
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\35\ See 42 FR 7740 (Mar. 1, 1984) (codified at 16 CFR part
444); see also 15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B), 45(a)(1).
\36\ See 12 CFR part 227, subpart B (Board); 12 CFR 535 (OTS);
12 CFR 706 (NCUA).
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As part of this rulemaking, the Agencies are proposing to
reorganize aspects of their respective Credit Practices Rules. Although
the Agencies have approached these revisions differently in some
respects, the Agencies do not intend to create any substantive
difference among their respective rules.
Proposal
Subpart A--General Provisions
Subpart A contains general provisions that apply to the entire
part. As discussed below, there are some differences among the
Agencies' proposals.
----.1 Authority, Purpose, and Scope 37
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\37\ The Board, OTS, and NCUA would place the proposed rules in,
respectively, parts 227, 535, and 706 of title 12 of the Code of
Federal Regulations. For each of reference, the discussion in this
Supplementary Information uses the shared numerical suffix of each
agency's rule. For example, proposed Sec. ----.1 would be codified
at 12 CFR 227.1 by the Board, 12 CFR 535.1 by OTS, and 12 CFR 706.1
by NCUA.
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The provisions in proposed Sec. ----.1 are largely drawn from the
current authority, purpose, and scope provisions in the Agencies'
respective Credit Practices Rules.
----.1(a) Authority
Proposed Sec. ----.1(a) provides that the Agencies have issued
this part under section 18(f) of the FTC Act. In OTS's proposed rule,
this provision further provides that OTS is also exercising its
authority under various provisions of HOLA, although the FTC Act is the
primary authority for OTS's rule.
----.1(b) Purpose
Proposed Sec. ----.1(b) provides that the purpose of the part is
to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of
section 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). It further provides
that the part contains provisions that define and set forth
requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing specific unfair
or deceptive acts or practices. The Agencies note that these provisions
define and prohibit specific unfair or deceptive acts or practices
within a single provision, rather than setting forth the definitions
and remedies separately. Finally, it clarifies that the prohibitions in
subparts B, C, and D do not limit the Agencies' authority to enforce
the FTC Act with respect to other unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.
----.1(c) Scope
Proposed Sec. ----.1(c) describes the scope of each agency's
rules. The Agencies have each tailored this paragraph to describe those
entities to which their part applies. The Board's provision states that
its rules would apply to banks and their subsidiaries, except savings
associations as defined in 12 U.S.C. 1813(b). The Board's provision
further explains that enforcement of its rules is allocated among the
Board, OCC, and FDIC, depending on the type of institution. This
provision has been updated to reflect intervening changes in law. The
Board's Staff Guidelines to the Credit Practices Rule would be revised
to remove questions 11(c)-1 and 11(c)-2 and the substance of the
Board's answers would be updated and published as commentary under
proposed Sec. 227.1(c). See proposed Board comments 227.1(c)-1 and -2.
The remaining questions and answers in the
[[Page 28911]]
Board's Staff Guidelines would remain in place.
OTS's provision would state that its rules apply to savings
associations and subsidiaries owned in whole or in part by a savings
association. OTS also enforces compliance with respect to these
institutions. The entire OTS part would have the same scope. OTS notes
that this scope is somewhat different from the scope of its existing
Credit Practices Rule. OTS's Credit Practices Rule currently applies to
savings associations and service corporations that are wholly owned by
one or more savings associations, which engage in the business of
providing credit to consumers. Since the proposed rules would cover
more practices than consumer credit, the reference to engaging in the
business of providing credit to consumers would be deleted. The
reference to wholly owned service corporations would be updated to
refer instead to subsidiaries, to reflect the current terminology used
in OTS's Subordinate Organizations Rule.\38\
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\38\ 12 CFR part 559. OTS has substantially revised this rule
since promulgating its Credit Practices Rule. See, e.g.,
Subsidiaries and Equity Investments: Final Rule, 61 FR 66561 (Dec.
18, 1996).
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The NCUA's provision would state that its rules apply to federal
credit unions.
227.1(d) Definitions
Proposed Sec. ----.1(d) of the Board's rule would clarify that,
unless otherwise noted, the terms used in the Board's proposed Sec. --
--.1(c) that are not defined in the FTC Act or in section 3(s) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(s)) have the meaning
given to them in section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978
(12 U.S.C. 3101). OTS and NCUA do not have a need for a comparable
subsection so none is included in their proposed rules.
227.2 Consumer-Complaint Procedure
In order to accommodate the revisions discussed above, the Board
would consolidate the consumer complaint provisions currently located
in 12 CFR 227.1 and 227.2 in proposed Sec. 227.2. OTS and NCUA do not
currently have and do not propose to add comparable provisions.
Subpart B--Credit Practices
Each agency would place the substantive provisions of their current
Credit Practices Rule in Subpart B. In order to retain the current
numbering in its Credit Practices Rule, the Board would reserve 12 CFR
227.11, which currently contains the Board's statement of authority,
purpose, and scope. The other provisions of the Board's Credit
Practices Rule (Sec. Sec. 227.12 through 227.16) would not be revised.
OTS is proposing the following notable changes to its version of
Subpart B:
Section 535.11 Definitions (Existing Section 535.1)
OTS would delete the definitions of ``Act,'' ``creditor,'' and
``savings association'' as unnecessary. For the convenience of the
user, OTS would incorporate the definition of ``consumer credit'' into
this section, instead of using a cross-reference to a definition
contained in a different part of OTS's rules. OTS would move the
definition of ``cosigner'' to the section on unfair or deceptive
cosigner practices. OTS would merge the definition of ``debt'' into the
definition of ``collecting a debt'' contained in the section on late
charges. OTS would move the definition of ``household goods'' to the
section on unfair credit contract provisions.
Section 535.12 Unfair Credit Contract Provisions (Existing Section
535.2)
OTS would revise the title of this section to reflect its focus on
credit contract provisions. OTS would delete the obsolete reference to
extensions of credit after January 1, 1986.
Section 535.13 Unfair or Deceptive Cosigner Practices (Existing Section
535.3)
OTS would delete the obsolete reference to extensions of credit
after January 1, 1986. OTS would substitute the term ``substantially
similar'' for the term ``substantially equivalent'' in referencing a
document that equates to the cosigner notice for consistency with the
Board's rule and to avoid confusion with the term of art ``substantial
equivalency'' used in the section on state exemptions. OTS would also
clarify that the date that may be stated on the cosigner notice is the
date of the transaction. NCUA would make similar amendments to its rule
in Sec. 706.13 (existing Sec. 706.3).
Section 535.14 Unfair Late Charges (Existing Section 535.4)
OTS would revise the title of this section to reflect its focus on
unfair late charges. OTS would delete the obsolete reference to
extensions of credit after January 1, 1986. Similarly, NCUA would
propose revisions to Sec. 706.14 (existing Sec. 706.4).
Section 535.15 State Exemptions (Existing Section 535.5)
OTS would revise the subsection on delegated authority to update
the current title of the OTS official with delegated a