Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions: The Office of Intelligence and Analysis Enterprise Records System, 28060-28062 [E8-10891]
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28060
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 73, No. 95
Thursday, May 15, 2008
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary; Privacy Office
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. DHS–2007–0018]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of
Exemptions: The Office of Intelligence
and Analysis Enterprise Records
System
Privacy Office, DHS.
Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
yshivers on PROD1PC62 with PROPOSALS
ACTION:
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland
Security is concurrently establishing a
new system of records pursuant to the
Privacy Act of 1974 [5 U.S.C. 552a], as
amended, to cover records maintained
by the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis. These records were previously
covered by the Department of Homeland
Security, Homeland Security Operations
Center Database [DHS/IAIP–001], last
published in full text on April 18, 2005
[70 FR 20156]. In this proposed
rulemaking, the Department of
Homeland Security proposes to exempt
this new system of records, entitled the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis
Enterprise Records System (ERS) [DHS/
IA–001], from subsections (c)(3), (d),
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) and (f) of the
Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k). As explained in the proposed
rule, the exemption is necessary to
avoid interference with the intelligence,
counterterrorism, and other homeland
security responsibilities, and any related
law enforcement functions of the
Department of Homeland Security and
its Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
Public comment is invited.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before June 16, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by DOCKET NUMBER DHS–
2007–0023 by one of the following
methods:
• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal:
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
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16:04 May 14, 2008
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instructions for submitting comments
via docket number DHS–2007–0018.
• Fax: 1–866–466–5370.
• Mail: Hugo Teufel III, DHS Chief
Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC
20528.
• Instructions: All submissions
received must include the agency name
and docket number for this rulemaking.
All comments received will be posted
without change to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided.
• Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received go to https://
www.regulations.gov.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: Hugo Teufel
III, Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane,
SW., Building 410, Washington, DC
20528, 7:30 a.m. to 4 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
general questions, please contact the
Director, Information Sharing and
Knowledge Management Division,
Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528, at (202) 282–
8248. For privacy issues, please contact:
Hugo Teufel III (571–227–3813), Chief
Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528, E-mail:
PIA@dhs.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Elsewhere in today’s Federal Register,
the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) is publishing a Privacy Act
system of records notice describing
records in the ‘‘Office of Intelligence
and Analysis Enterprise Records
System, DHS/IA–001’’ (ERS). These
records were previously covered by the
Department of Homeland Security,
Homeland Security Operations Center
(HSOC) Database [DHS/IAIP–001], last
published on April 18, 2005 [70 FR
20156]. The DHS/IAIP–001 SORN
originally addressed the treatment of
Privacy Act records under the
administrative and organizational
framework of the former DHS
Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) Directorate.
After successive organizational
realignments of the Department by the
Secretary and Congress, in 2005 and
2006 respectively, the IAIP Directorate
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Frm 00001
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
was effectively eliminated and the
functional responsibilities and
organization of what was then IAIP’s
Office of Information Analysis, today
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
(I&A), were elevated when I&A became
a stand alone organization within the
Department, headed by what is now the
position of Under Secretary for I&A,
with direct-report responsibilities to the
Secretary. Thus, ERS replaces those
aspects of the HSOC Database [DHS/
IAIP–001] SORN insofar as they
previously applied to I&A records, but
does not rescind, revoke, or supersede
any portion of the previously published
HSOC Database SORN, itself, insofar as
it continues to apply to other
components of DHS who maintain
records within and consistent with that
system.
ERS is a system of records established
pursuant to the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (Pub. L. 107–296), as amended,
and subject to the Privacy Act of 1974,
5 U.S.C. 552a, to support both the
mission of I&A in providing intelligence
and analysis support directly to DHS
leadership; to all DHS operational
components, elements, and other offices
and activities; and to the Under
Secretary for I&A, as Chief Intelligence
Officer of the Department, in his role of
effectively integrating and managing
DHS’s Intelligence Programs. I&A is the
DHS-wide analytic entity and unified
intelligence office which directly
supports the Under Secretary for I&A,
other DHS elements responsible for
carrying out the mission of the
Department under the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as amended, and
other federal, State, local, tribal, and
private sector DHS partners with
responsibilities for securing the
homeland from natural and manmade
threats. As a member of the National
Intelligence Community, I&A is also
obligated to conduct its mission in
conformance with the requirements of
Executive Order 12333, as amended,
‘‘United States Intelligence Activities,’’
dated December 4, 1981. Amongst other
requirements, Section 2.3 of Executive
Order 12333 requires that each agency
head within the IC establish procedures
to govern the collection, retention, and
dissemination of information
concerning U.S. Persons, in a manner
which protects the privacy and
Constitutional rights of those U.S.
Persons.
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The Privacy Act embodies fair
information principles in a statutory
framework governing the means by
which the United States Government
collects, maintains, uses and
disseminates personally identifiable
information. The Privacy Act applies to
information that is maintained in a
‘‘system of records.’’ A ‘‘system of
records’’ is a group of any records under
the control of an agency from which
information is retrieved by the name of
the individual or by some identifying
number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual.
Individuals may request their own
records that are maintained in a system
of records in the possession or under the
control of DHS by complying with DHS
Privacy Act regulations, 6 CFR part 5.
The Privacy Act requires each agency to
publish in the Federal Register a
description of the type and character of
each system of records that the agency
maintains, and the routine uses that are
contained in each system in order to
make agency recordkeeping practices
transparent, to notify individuals
regarding the uses to which personally
identifiable information is put, and to
assist individuals to more easily find
such files within the agency. Pursuant
to his statutory authorities under section
222 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, Public Law 107–296, section 222,
116 Stat. 2135, 2155, the DHS Chief
Privacy Officer is the senior DHS official
appointed by the Secretary to oversee
implementation of the Privacy Act
within the Department and to undertake
other privacy-related activities.
Accordingly, the DHS Chief Privacy
Officer published the system of records
notice which corresponds with this
proposed rule.
The Privacy Act also allows
government agencies, as appropriate, to
exempt certain records from the access
and amendment provisions. Where an
agency seeks to claim an exemption,
however, it must issue a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking to make clear to
the public the reasons why a particular
exemption is claimed. DHS is claiming
exemptions from certain requirements
of the Privacy Act by publication of this
proposed rule.
Accordingly, DHS proposes to exempt
this system, in part, from certain
provisions of the Privacy Act and to add
that exemption to Appendix C to Part 5,
DHS Systems of Records Exempt from
the Privacy Act. I&A needs these
exemptions in order to protect
information relating to authorized
intelligence, counterterrorism,
homeland security, and related law
enforcement activities from disclosure
to subjects of investigations and others
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who, by accessing or knowing this
information, could interfere with those
activities or otherwise place in jeopardy
the national or homeland security.
Specifically, the exemptions are
necessary in order to prevent revealing
information concerning intelligence,
counterterrorism, homeland security, or
related investigative efforts. Revealing
such information to the subject or other
individual could reasonably be expected
to compromise ongoing efforts of the
Department to identify, understand,
analyze, investigate, and counter the
activities that threaten national or
homeland security; compromise
classified or other sensitive information;
identify a confidential source or
disclose information which would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of
another individual’s personal privacy;
reveal a sensitive intelligence or
investigative technique or method, and
interfere with intelligence or law
enforcement analytic or investigative
processes; or constitute a potential
danger to the health or safety of
intelligence, counterterrorism,
homeland security, and law
enforcement personnel, confidential
sources and informants, or potential
witnesses.
The exemptions proposed here are
standard law enforcement and national
security exemptions exercised by a large
number of federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. In appropriate
circumstances, where compliance
would not appear to interfere with or
adversely affect the national or
homeland security of the United States,
or the law enforcement purposes of any
investigatory material contained within
this system, the applicable exemptions
may be waived.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Classified information, Privacy,
Courts; Freedom of information;
Government employees.
For the reasons stated in the preamble
and pursuant to the authority vested in
the Department of Homeland Security
by 5 U.S.C. 552a, and assigned to me
under Section 222 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, DHS proposes to
amend Chapter I of Title 6, Code of
Federal Regulations, as follows:
PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for Part 5
continues to read as follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135,
6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A
also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.
2. At the end of Appendix C to Part
5, add the following new section 8:
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Frm 00002
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of
Records Exempt From the Privacy Act
*
*
*
*
*
8. DHS/IA–001, Enterprise Records
System.
(a) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (2), (3),
and (5), this system of records is exempt from
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1), (2), (3), (4), and (5),
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). These
exemptions apply only to the extent that
information in this system is subject to
exemption. Where compliance would not
appear to interfere with or adversely affect
the intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland
security, and related law enforcement
purposes of this system, the applicable
exemption may be waived by DHS.
(b) Exemptions from the particular
subsections are justified for the following
reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for
Disclosures) because making available to a
record subject the accounting of disclosures
from records concerning him/her would
specifically reveal any interest in the
individual of an intelligence,
counterterrorism, homeland security, or
related investigative nature. Revealing this
information could reasonably be expected to
compromise ongoing efforts of the
Department to identify, understand, analyze,
investigate, and counter the activities of:
(i) Known or suspected terrorists and
terrorist groups;
(ii) Groups or individuals known or
believed to be assisting or associated with
known or suspected terrorists or terrorist
groups;
(iii) Individuals known, believed to be, or
suspected of being engaged in activities
constituting a threat to homeland security,
including (1) Activities which impact or
concern the security, safety, and integrity of
our international borders, including any
illegal activities that either cross our borders
or are otherwise in violation of the
immigration or customs laws and regulations
of the United States; (2) activities which
could reasonably be expected to assist in the
development or use of a weapon of mass
effect; (3) activities meant to identify, create,
or exploit the vulnerabilities of, or
undermine, the ‘‘key resources’’ (as defined
in section 2(9) of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002) and ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ (as
defined in 42 U.S.C. 5195c(c)) of the United
States, including the cyber and national
telecommunications infrastructure and the
availability of a viable national security and
emergency preparedness communications
infrastructure; (4) activities detrimental to the
security of transportation and transportation
systems; (5) activities which violate or are
suspected of violating the laws relating to
counterfeiting of obligations and securities of
the United States and other financial crimes,
including access device fraud, financial
institution fraud, identity theft, computer
fraud; and computer-based attacks on our
nation’s financial, banking, and
telecommunications infrastructure; (6)
activities, not wholly conducted within the
United States, which violate or are suspected
of violating the laws which prohibit the
production, transfer, or sale of narcotics or
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substances controlled in accordance with
Title 21 of the United States Code, or those
associated activities otherwise prohibited by
Titles 21 and 46 of the United States Code;
(7) activities which impact, concern, or
otherwise threaten the safety and security of
the President and Vice President, their
families, heads of state, and other designated
individuals; the White House, Vice
President’s residence, foreign missions, and
other designated buildings within the United
States; (8) activities which impact, concern,
or otherwise threaten domestic maritime
safety and security, maritime mobility and
navigation, or the integrity of the domestic
maritime environment; (9) activities which
impact, concern, or otherwise threaten the
national operational capability of the
Department to respond to natural and
manmade major disasters and emergencies,
including acts of terrorism; (10) activities
involving the importation, possession,
storage, development, or transportation of
nuclear or radiological material without
authorization or for use against the United
States;
(iv) Foreign governments, organizations, or
persons (foreign powers); and
(v) Individuals engaging in intelligence
activities on behalf of a foreign power or
terrorist group.
Thus, by notifying the record subject that he/
she is the focus of such efforts or interest on
the part of DHS, or other agencies with whom
DHS is cooperating and to whom the
disclosures were made, this information
could permit the record subject to take
measures to impede or evade such efforts,
including the taking of steps to deceive DHS
personnel and deny them the ability to
adequately assess relevant information and
activities, and could inappropriately disclose
to the record subject the sensitive methods
and/or confidential sources used to acquire
the relevant information against him/her.
Moreover, where the record subject is the
actual target of a law enforcement
investigation, this information could permit
him/her to take measures to impede the
investigation, for example, by destroying
evidence, intimidating potential witnesses, or
avoiding detection or apprehension.
(2) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4)
(Access to Records) because these provisions
concern individual rights of access to and
amendment of records (including the review
of agency denials of either) contained in this
system, which consists of intelligence,
counterterrorism, homeland security, and
related investigatory records concerning
efforts of the Department, as described more
fully in subsection (b)(1), above. Compliance
with these provisions could inform or alert
the subject of an intelligence,
counterterrorism, homeland security, or
investigatory effort undertaken on behalf of
the Department, or by another agency with
whom DHS is cooperating, of the fact and
nature of such efforts, and/or the relevant
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland
security, or investigatory interest of DHS
and/or other intelligence, counterterrorism,
or law enforcement agencies. Moreover,
compliance could also compromise sensitive
information either classified in the interest of
national security, or which otherwise
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requires, as appropriate, safeguarding and
protection from unauthorized disclosure;
identify a confidential source or disclose
information which would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of another individual’s
personal privacy; reveal a sensitive
intelligence or investigative technique or
method, including interfering with
intelligence or law enforcement investigative
processes by permitting the destruction of
evidence, improper influencing or
intimidation of witnesses, fabrication of
statements or testimony, and flight from
detection or apprehension; or constitute a
potential danger to the health or safety of
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland
security, and law enforcement personnel,
confidential sources and informants, and
potential witnesses. Amendment of the
records would interfere with ongoing
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland
security, and law enforcement investigations
and activities, including incident reporting
and analysis activities, and impose an
impossible administrative burden by
requiring investigations, reports, and
analyses to be continuously reinvestigated
and revised.
(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevant and
Necessary) because it is not always possible
for DHS to know in advance of its receipt the
relevance and necessity of each piece of
information it acquires in the course of an
intelligence, counterterrorism, or
investigatory effort undertaken on behalf of
the Department, or by another agency with
whom DHS is cooperating. In the context of
the authorized intelligence, counterterrorism,
and investigatory activities undertaken by
DHS personnel, relevance and necessity are
questions of analytic judgment and timing,
such that what may appear relevant and
necessary when acquired ultimately may be
deemed unnecessary upon further analysis
and evaluation. Similarly, in some situations,
it is only after acquired information is
collated, analyzed, and evaluated in light of
other available evidence and information that
its relevance and necessity can be established
or made clear. Constraining the initial
acquisition of information included within
the ERS in accordance with the relevant and
necessary requirement of subsection (e)(1)
could discourage the appropriate receipt of
and access to information which DHS and
I&A are otherwise authorized to receive and
possess under law, and thereby impede
efforts to detect, deter, prevent, disrupt, or
apprehend terrorists or terrorist groups, and/
or respond to terrorist or other activities
which threaten homeland security.
Notwithstanding this claimed exemption,
which would permit the acquisition and
temporary maintenance of records whose
relevance to the purpose of the ERS may be
less than fully clear, DHS will only disclose
such records after determining whether such
disclosures are themselves consistent with
the published ERS routine uses. Moreover, it
should be noted that, as concerns the receipt
by I&A, for intelligence purposes, of
information in any record which identifies a
U.S. Person, as defined in Executive Order
12333, as amended, such receipt, and any
subsequent use or dissemination of that
identifying information, is undertaken
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Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
consistent with the procedures established
and adhered to by I&A pursuant to that
Executive Order. Specifically, I&A
intelligence personnel may acquire
information which identifies a particular U.S.
Person, retain it within or disseminate it from
ERS, as appropriate, only when it is
determined that the personally identifying
information is necessary for the conduct of
I&A’s functions, and otherwise falls into one
of a limited number of authorized categories,
each of which reflects discrete activities for
which information on individuals would be
utilized by the Department in the overall
execution of its statutory mission.
(4) From subsections (e)(4) (G), (H) and (I)
(Access), and (f) (Agency Rules), inasmuch as
it is unnecessary for the publication of rules
and procedures contemplated therein since
the ERS, pursuant to subsections (1) and (2),
above, will be exempt from the underlying
duties to provide to individuals notification
about, access to, and the ability to amend or
correct the information pertaining to them in,
this system of records. Furthermore, to the
extent that subsection (e)(4)(I) is construed to
require more detailed disclosure than the
information accompanying the system notice
for ERS, as published in today’s Federal
Register, exemption from it is also necessary
to protect the confidentiality, privacy, and
physical safety of sources of information, as
well as the methods for acquiring it. Finally,
greater specificity concerning the description
of categories of sources of properly classified
records could also compromise or otherwise
cause damage to the national or homeland
security.
Hugo Teufel III,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. E8–10891 Filed 5–14–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–10–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. DHS–2008–0003]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of
Exemptions; Law Enforcement
Information Database (LEIDB)/
Pathfinder
Privacy Office, Office of the
Secretary, DHS.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland
Security is giving concurrent notice of a
system of records pursuant to the
Privacy Act of 1974 for the United
States Coast Guard’s Law Enforcement
Information Data Base (LEIDB)/
Pathfinder system. In this proposed
rulemaking, the Department proposes to
exempt this system of records from one
or more provisions of the Privacy Act
because of criminal, civil, intelligence
and administrative enforcement
requirements.
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 95 (Thursday, May 15, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 28060-28062]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-10891]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 95 / Thursday, May 15, 2008 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 28060]]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of the Secretary; Privacy Office
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. DHS-2007-0018]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions: The Office of
Intelligence and Analysis Enterprise Records System
AGENCY: Privacy Office, DHS.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security is concurrently
establishing a new system of records pursuant to the Privacy Act of
1974 [5 U.S.C. 552a], as amended, to cover records maintained by the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis. These records were previously
covered by the Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security
Operations Center Database [DHS/IAIP-001], last published in full text
on April 18, 2005 [70 FR 20156]. In this proposed rulemaking, the
Department of Homeland Security proposes to exempt this new system of
records, entitled the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Enterprise
Records System (ERS) [DHS/IA-001], from subsections (c)(3), (d),
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) and (f) of the Privacy Act pursuant to
5 U.S.C. 552a(k). As explained in the proposed rule, the exemption is
necessary to avoid interference with the intelligence,
counterterrorism, and other homeland security responsibilities, and any
related law enforcement functions of the Department of Homeland
Security and its Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Public comment is
invited.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before June 16, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by DOCKET NUMBER DHS-
2007-0023 by one of the following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments via docket number DHS-
2007-0018.
Fax: 1-866-466-5370.
Mail: Hugo Teufel III, DHS Chief Privacy Officer,
Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528.
Instructions: All submissions received must include the
agency name and docket number for this rulemaking. All comments
received will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov,
including any personal information provided.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background
documents or comments received go to https://www.regulations.gov.
Hand Delivery/Courier: Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy
Officer, Department of Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane, SW.,
Building 410, Washington, DC 20528, 7:30 a.m. to 4 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions, please contact
the Director, Information Sharing and Knowledge Management Division,
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528, at (202) 282-8248. For privacy issues, please
contact: Hugo Teufel III (571-227-3813), Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy
Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528, E-
mail: PIA@dhs.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Elsewhere in today's Federal Register, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is publishing a Privacy Act system of records notice
describing records in the ``Office of Intelligence and Analysis
Enterprise Records System, DHS/IA-001'' (ERS). These records were
previously covered by the Department of Homeland Security, Homeland
Security Operations Center (HSOC) Database [DHS/IAIP-001], last
published on April 18, 2005 [70 FR 20156]. The DHS/IAIP-001 SORN
originally addressed the treatment of Privacy Act records under the
administrative and organizational framework of the former DHS
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate.
After successive organizational realignments of the Department by
the Secretary and Congress, in 2005 and 2006 respectively, the IAIP
Directorate was effectively eliminated and the functional
responsibilities and organization of what was then IAIP's Office of
Information Analysis, today the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
(I&A), were elevated when I&A became a stand alone organization within
the Department, headed by what is now the position of Under Secretary
for I&A, with direct-report responsibilities to the Secretary. Thus,
ERS replaces those aspects of the HSOC Database [DHS/IAIP-001] SORN
insofar as they previously applied to I&A records, but does not
rescind, revoke, or supersede any portion of the previously published
HSOC Database SORN, itself, insofar as it continues to apply to other
components of DHS who maintain records within and consistent with that
system.
ERS is a system of records established pursuant to the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-296), as amended, and subject to the
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, to support both the mission of I&A
in providing intelligence and analysis support directly to DHS
leadership; to all DHS operational components, elements, and other
offices and activities; and to the Under Secretary for I&A, as Chief
Intelligence Officer of the Department, in his role of effectively
integrating and managing DHS's Intelligence Programs. I&A is the DHS-
wide analytic entity and unified intelligence office which directly
supports the Under Secretary for I&A, other DHS elements responsible
for carrying out the mission of the Department under the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as amended, and other federal, State, local,
tribal, and private sector DHS partners with responsibilities for
securing the homeland from natural and manmade threats. As a member of
the National Intelligence Community, I&A is also obligated to conduct
its mission in conformance with the requirements of Executive Order
12333, as amended, ``United States Intelligence Activities,'' dated
December 4, 1981. Amongst other requirements, Section 2.3 of Executive
Order 12333 requires that each agency head within the IC establish
procedures to govern the collection, retention, and dissemination of
information concerning U.S. Persons, in a manner which protects the
privacy and Constitutional rights of those U.S. Persons.
[[Page 28061]]
The Privacy Act embodies fair information principles in a statutory
framework governing the means by which the United States Government
collects, maintains, uses and disseminates personally identifiable
information. The Privacy Act applies to information that is maintained
in a ``system of records.'' A ``system of records'' is a group of any
records under the control of an agency from which information is
retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number,
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.
Individuals may request their own records that are maintained in a
system of records in the possession or under the control of DHS by
complying with DHS Privacy Act regulations, 6 CFR part 5. The Privacy
Act requires each agency to publish in the Federal Register a
description of the type and character of each system of records that
the agency maintains, and the routine uses that are contained in each
system in order to make agency recordkeeping practices transparent, to
notify individuals regarding the uses to which personally identifiable
information is put, and to assist individuals to more easily find such
files within the agency. Pursuant to his statutory authorities under
section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296,
section 222, 116 Stat. 2135, 2155, the DHS Chief Privacy Officer is the
senior DHS official appointed by the Secretary to oversee
implementation of the Privacy Act within the Department and to
undertake other privacy-related activities. Accordingly, the DHS Chief
Privacy Officer published the system of records notice which
corresponds with this proposed rule.
The Privacy Act also allows government agencies, as appropriate, to
exempt certain records from the access and amendment provisions. Where
an agency seeks to claim an exemption, however, it must issue a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking to make clear to the public the reasons why a
particular exemption is claimed. DHS is claiming exemptions from
certain requirements of the Privacy Act by publication of this proposed
rule.
Accordingly, DHS proposes to exempt this system, in part, from
certain provisions of the Privacy Act and to add that exemption to
Appendix C to Part 5, DHS Systems of Records Exempt from the Privacy
Act. I&A needs these exemptions in order to protect information
relating to authorized intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland
security, and related law enforcement activities from disclosure to
subjects of investigations and others who, by accessing or knowing this
information, could interfere with those activities or otherwise place
in jeopardy the national or homeland security. Specifically, the
exemptions are necessary in order to prevent revealing information
concerning intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, or
related investigative efforts. Revealing such information to the
subject or other individual could reasonably be expected to compromise
ongoing efforts of the Department to identify, understand, analyze,
investigate, and counter the activities that threaten national or
homeland security; compromise classified or other sensitive
information; identify a confidential source or disclose information
which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another individual's
personal privacy; reveal a sensitive intelligence or investigative
technique or method, and interfere with intelligence or law enforcement
analytic or investigative processes; or constitute a potential danger
to the health or safety of intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland
security, and law enforcement personnel, confidential sources and
informants, or potential witnesses.
The exemptions proposed here are standard law enforcement and
national security exemptions exercised by a large number of federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. In appropriate circumstances,
where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect
the national or homeland security of the United States, or the law
enforcement purposes of any investigatory material contained within
this system, the applicable exemptions may be waived.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Classified information, Privacy, Courts; Freedom of information;
Government employees.
For the reasons stated in the preamble and pursuant to the
authority vested in the Department of Homeland Security by 5 U.S.C.
552a, and assigned to me under Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, DHS proposes to amend Chapter I of Title 6, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 5--DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for Part 5 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 6 U.S.C. 101 et
seq.; 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.
2. At the end of Appendix C to Part 5, add the following new
section 8:
Appendix C to Part 5--DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy
Act
* * * * *
8. DHS/IA-001, Enterprise Records System.
(a) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (2), (3), and (5), this
system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1), (2),
(3), (4), and (5), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). These
exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system
is subject to exemption. Where compliance would not appear to
interfere with or adversely affect the intelligence,
counterterrorism, homeland security, and related law enforcement
purposes of this system, the applicable exemption may be waived by
DHS.
(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for
the following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because
making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures
from records concerning him/her would specifically reveal any
interest in the individual of an intelligence, counterterrorism,
homeland security, or related investigative nature. Revealing this
information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing
efforts of the Department to identify, understand, analyze,
investigate, and counter the activities of:
(i) Known or suspected terrorists and terrorist groups;
(ii) Groups or individuals known or believed to be assisting or
associated with known or suspected terrorists or terrorist groups;
(iii) Individuals known, believed to be, or suspected of being
engaged in activities constituting a threat to homeland security,
including (1) Activities which impact or concern the security,
safety, and integrity of our international borders, including any
illegal activities that either cross our borders or are otherwise in
violation of the immigration or customs laws and regulations of the
United States; (2) activities which could reasonably be expected to
assist in the development or use of a weapon of mass effect; (3)
activities meant to identify, create, or exploit the vulnerabilities
of, or undermine, the ``key resources'' (as defined in section 2(9)
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002) and ``critical
infrastructure'' (as defined in 42 U.S.C. 5195c(c)) of the United
States, including the cyber and national telecommunications
infrastructure and the availability of a viable national security
and emergency preparedness communications infrastructure; (4)
activities detrimental to the security of transportation and
transportation systems; (5) activities which violate or are
suspected of violating the laws relating to counterfeiting of
obligations and securities of the United States and other financial
crimes, including access device fraud, financial institution fraud,
identity theft, computer fraud; and computer-based attacks on our
nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure;
(6) activities, not wholly conducted within the United States, which
violate or are suspected of violating the laws which prohibit the
production, transfer, or sale of narcotics or
[[Page 28062]]
substances controlled in accordance with Title 21 of the United
States Code, or those associated activities otherwise prohibited by
Titles 21 and 46 of the United States Code; (7) activities which
impact, concern, or otherwise threaten the safety and security of
the President and Vice President, their families, heads of state,
and other designated individuals; the White House, Vice President's
residence, foreign missions, and other designated buildings within
the United States; (8) activities which impact, concern, or
otherwise threaten domestic maritime safety and security, maritime
mobility and navigation, or the integrity of the domestic maritime
environment; (9) activities which impact, concern, or otherwise
threaten the national operational capability of the Department to
respond to natural and manmade major disasters and emergencies,
including acts of terrorism; (10) activities involving the
importation, possession, storage, development, or transportation of
nuclear or radiological material without authorization or for use
against the United States;
(iv) Foreign governments, organizations, or persons (foreign
powers); and
(v) Individuals engaging in intelligence activities on behalf of
a foreign power or terrorist group.
Thus, by notifying the record subject that he/she is the focus of
such efforts or interest on the part of DHS, or other agencies with
whom DHS is cooperating and to whom the disclosures were made, this
information could permit the record subject to take measures to
impede or evade such efforts, including the taking of steps to
deceive DHS personnel and deny them the ability to adequately assess
relevant information and activities, and could inappropriately
disclose to the record subject the sensitive methods and/or
confidential sources used to acquire the relevant information
against him/her. Moreover, where the record subject is the actual
target of a law enforcement investigation, this information could
permit him/her to take measures to impede the investigation, for
example, by destroying evidence, intimidating potential witnesses,
or avoiding detection or apprehension.
(2) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) (Access to
Records) because these provisions concern individual rights of
access to and amendment of records (including the review of agency
denials of either) contained in this system, which consists of
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and related
investigatory records concerning efforts of the Department, as
described more fully in subsection (b)(1), above. Compliance with
these provisions could inform or alert the subject of an
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, or investigatory
effort undertaken on behalf of the Department, or by another agency
with whom DHS is cooperating, of the fact and nature of such
efforts, and/or the relevant intelligence, counterterrorism,
homeland security, or investigatory interest of DHS and/or other
intelligence, counterterrorism, or law enforcement agencies.
Moreover, compliance could also compromise sensitive information
either classified in the interest of national security, or which
otherwise requires, as appropriate, safeguarding and protection from
unauthorized disclosure; identify a confidential source or disclose
information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
another individual's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive
intelligence or investigative technique or method, including
interfering with intelligence or law enforcement investigative
processes by permitting the destruction of evidence, improper
influencing or intimidation of witnesses, fabrication of statements
or testimony, and flight from detection or apprehension; or
constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of
intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and law
enforcement personnel, confidential sources and informants, and
potential witnesses. Amendment of the records would interfere with
ongoing intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and law
enforcement investigations and activities, including incident
reporting and analysis activities, and impose an impossible
administrative burden by requiring investigations, reports, and
analyses to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.
(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevant and Necessary) because it
is not always possible for DHS to know in advance of its receipt the
relevance and necessity of each piece of information it acquires in
the course of an intelligence, counterterrorism, or investigatory
effort undertaken on behalf of the Department, or by another agency
with whom DHS is cooperating. In the context of the authorized
intelligence, counterterrorism, and investigatory activities
undertaken by DHS personnel, relevance and necessity are questions
of analytic judgment and timing, such that what may appear relevant
and necessary when acquired ultimately may be deemed unnecessary
upon further analysis and evaluation. Similarly, in some situations,
it is only after acquired information is collated, analyzed, and
evaluated in light of other available evidence and information that
its relevance and necessity can be established or made clear.
Constraining the initial acquisition of information included within
the ERS in accordance with the relevant and necessary requirement of
subsection (e)(1) could discourage the appropriate receipt of and
access to information which DHS and I&A are otherwise authorized to
receive and possess under law, and thereby impede efforts to detect,
deter, prevent, disrupt, or apprehend terrorists or terrorist
groups, and/or respond to terrorist or other activities which
threaten homeland security. Notwithstanding this claimed exemption,
which would permit the acquisition and temporary maintenance of
records whose relevance to the purpose of the ERS may be less than
fully clear, DHS will only disclose such records after determining
whether such disclosures are themselves consistent with the
published ERS routine uses. Moreover, it should be noted that, as
concerns the receipt by I&A, for intelligence purposes, of
information in any record which identifies a U.S. Person, as defined
in Executive Order 12333, as amended, such receipt, and any
subsequent use or dissemination of that identifying information, is
undertaken consistent with the procedures established and adhered to
by I&A pursuant to that Executive Order. Specifically, I&A
intelligence personnel may acquire information which identifies a
particular U.S. Person, retain it within or disseminate it from ERS,
as appropriate, only when it is determined that the personally
identifying information is necessary for the conduct of I&A's
functions, and otherwise falls into one of a limited number of
authorized categories, each of which reflects discrete activities
for which information on individuals would be utilized by the
Department in the overall execution of its statutory mission.
(4) From subsections (e)(4) (G), (H) and (I) (Access), and (f)
(Agency Rules), inasmuch as it is unnecessary for the publication of
rules and procedures contemplated therein since the ERS, pursuant to
subsections (1) and (2), above, will be exempt from the underlying
duties to provide to individuals notification about, access to, and
the ability to amend or correct the information pertaining to them
in, this system of records. Furthermore, to the extent that
subsection (e)(4)(I) is construed to require more detailed
disclosure than the information accompanying the system notice for
ERS, as published in today's Federal Register, exemption from it is
also necessary to protect the confidentiality, privacy, and physical
safety of sources of information, as well as the methods for
acquiring it. Finally, greater specificity concerning the
description of categories of sources of properly classified records
could also compromise or otherwise cause damage to the national or
homeland security.
Hugo Teufel III,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. E8-10891 Filed 5-14-08; 8:45 am]
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