Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Jetstream) Model 4101 Airplanes, 27477-27479 [E8-10648]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 93 / Tuesday, May 13, 2008 / Proposed Rules
compliances were assessed using Transport
Canada Policy Letter No. 525–001 to
determine if mandatory corrective action is
required.
This assessment showed that rupture of the
fuel tank climb vent loop pipe or leakage
from pipe couplings could result in fuel
coming in contact with hot anti-ice ducts,
creating potential fire on top of the centre
fuel tank.
To correct the unsafe condition, this
directive mandates the modification of the
fuel tank climb vent loop by installing
shrouding boots that direct leaked fuel safely
overboard.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI Canadian Airworthiness
Directive CF–2008–01, dated January 3, 2008,
and Bombardier Service Bulletin 670BA–28–
011, Revision B, dated July 4, 2007, for
related information.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 5,
2008.
Michael J. Kaszycki,
Acting Assistant Manager, Transport
Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E8–10647 Filed 5–12–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
Actions and Compliance
(f) Unless already done, do the following
actions.
(1) Within 4,500 flight hours after the
effective date of this AD, modify the fuel tank
climb vent loop pipes by installing shrouding
boots according to the Accomplishment
Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin
670BA–28–011, Revision B, dated July 4,
2007.
(2) Modification of the climb vent pipe
prior to the effective date of this AD
according to Bombardier Service Bulletin
670BA–28–011, dated November 7, 2005; or
Revision A, dated January 22, 2007; is
acceptable for compliance with the
corresponding requirements of this AD.
FAA AD Differences
Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/
or service information as follows: No
differences.
rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with PROPOSALS
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to
this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs): The Manager, New York Aircraft
Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
Send information to ATTN: Richard Fiesel,
Aerospace Engineer, Airframe and
Propulsion Branch, ANE–171, FAA, New
York Aircraft Certification Office, 1600
Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New
York 11590; telephone (516) 228–7304; fax
(516) 794–5531. Before using any approved
AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your appropriate principal
inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards
District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your
local FSDO.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement
in this AD to obtain corrective actions from
a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective
actions are considered FAA-approved if they
are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required
to assure the product is airworthy before it
is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any
reporting requirement in this AD, under the
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act,
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
has approved the information collection
requirements and has assigned OMB Control
Number 2120–0056.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:23 May 12, 2008
Jkt 214001
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2008–0541; Directorate
Identifier 2008–NM–063–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; BAE
Systems (Operations) Limited
(Jetstream) Model 4101 Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This proposed
AD results from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI)
originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct
an unsafe condition on an aviation
product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as:
Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank
wiring installations required by SFAR 88
(Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation
Authorities/European Aviation Safety
Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two
features in the Jetstream 4100 where the need
for design changes was apparent. * * *
Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel
tank area, if not corrected, could lead to
ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent fuel
tank explosion.
*
*
*
*
*
The proposed AD would require actions
that are intended to address the unsafe
condition described in the MCAI.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by June 12, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
27477
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the
Docket Operations office between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this proposed AD, the
regulatory evaluation, any comments
received, and other information. The
street address for the Docket Operations
office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in
the ADDRESSES section. Comments will
be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM–116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057–3356; telephone
(425) 227–1175; fax (425) 227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written
relevant data, views, or arguments about
this proposed AD. Send your comments
to an address listed under the
ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No.
FAA–2008–0541; Directorate Identifier
2008–NM–063–AD’’ at the beginning of
your comments. We specifically invite
comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy
aspects of this proposed AD. We will
consider all comments received by the
closing date and may amend this
proposed AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we
receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact we receive
about this proposed AD.
Discussion
The European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), which is the Technical Agent
for the Member States of the European
Community, has issued EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2008–0040,
dated February 27, 2008 (referred to
after this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an
unsafe condition for the specified
products. The MCAI states:
E:\FR\FM\13MYP1.SGM
13MYP1
27478
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 93 / Tuesday, May 13, 2008 / Proposed Rules
rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with PROPOSALS
Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank
wiring installations required by SFAR 88
(Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation
Authorities/European Aviation Safety
Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two
features in the Jetstream 4100 where the need
for design changes was apparent. One of
these is addressed by Service Bulletin (SB)
J41–28–013 which introduces additional
bonding leads between pipes, structure and
various components to improve the electrical
bond paths within the fuel tank areas. This
design change is identified by modification
number JM41659. Additionally, SB J41–28–
013 provides instructions to inspect the
existing bonding leads, to replace any
defective leads and to examine all fuel
system pipe runs in the wings to ensure
appropriate clearances are maintained.
Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel
tank area, if not corrected, could lead to
ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent fuel
tank explosion.
For the reason stated above, this EASA
Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires the
installation of additional bonding leads,
inspection [for defects] of existing bonding
leads and [for clearance of] all fuel system
pipe runs in the wings and follow-on
corrective actions, as necessary.
Corrective actions include replacing any
defective bonding leads and adjusting
clearances of the fuel system pipe runs.
You may obtain further information by
examining the MCAI in the AD docket.
The FAA has examined the
underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large
transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the
service history of airplanes subject to
those regulations, and existing
maintenance practices for fuel tank
systems. As a result of those findings,
we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport
Airplane Fuel Tank System Design
Review, Flammability Reduction and
Maintenance and Inspection
Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7,
2001). In addition to new airworthiness
standards for transport airplanes and
new maintenance requirements, this
rule included Special Federal Aviation
Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’
Amendment 21–78, and subsequent
Amendments 21–82 and 21–83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88
requires certain type design (i.e., type
certificate (TC) and supplemental type
certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate
that their fuel tank systems can prevent
ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This
requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered
transport airplanes and for subsequent
modifications to those airplanes. It
requires them to perform design reviews
and to develop design changes and
maintenance procedures if their designs
do not meet the new fuel tank safety
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:23 May 12, 2008
Jkt 214001
standards. As explained in the preamble
to the rule, we intended to adopt
airworthiness directives to mandate any
changes found necessary to address
unsafe conditions identified as a result
of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we
have established four criteria intended
to define the unsafe conditions
associated with fuel tank systems that
require corrective actions. The
percentage of operating time during
which fuel tanks are exposed to
flammable conditions is one of these
criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation:
Single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s),
and in-service failure experience. For all
four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken
that may mitigate the need for further
action.
The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)
has issued a regulation that is similar to
SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated
body of the European Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC) representing the
civil aviation regulatory authorities of a
number of European States who have
agreed to co-operate in developing and
implementing common safety regulatory
standards and procedures.) Under this
regulation, the JAA stated that all
members of the ECAC that hold type
certificates for transport category
airplanes are required to conduct a
design review against explosion risks.
We have determined that the actions
identified in this AD are necessary to
reduce the potential of ignition sources
inside fuel tanks, which, in combination
with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent
loss of the airplane.
Relevant Service Information
BAE Systems (Operations) Limited
has issued Service Bulletin J41–28–013,
Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008. The
actions described in this service
information are intended to correct the
unsafe condition identified in the
MCAI.
FAA’s Determination and Requirements
of This Proposed AD
This product has been approved by
the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation
in the United States. Pursuant to our
bilateral agreement with the State of
Design Authority, we have been notified
of the unsafe condition described in the
MCAI and service information
referenced above. We are proposing this
AD because we evaluated all pertinent
information and determined an unsafe
condition exists and is likely to exist or
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
develop on other products of the same
type design.
Differences Between This AD and the
MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and
related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But
we might have found it necessary to use
different words from those in the MCAI
to ensure the AD is clear for U.S.
operators and is enforceable. In making
these changes, we do not intend to differ
substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related
service information.
We might also have proposed
different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA
policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a NOTE within the
proposed AD.
Costs of Compliance
Based on the service information, we
estimate that this proposed AD would
affect about 7 products of U.S. registry.
We also estimate that it would take
about 80 work-hours per product to
comply with the basic requirements of
this proposed AD. The average labor
rate is $80 per work-hour. Required
parts would cost about $1,700 per
product. Where the service information
lists required parts costs that are
covered under warranty, we have
assumed that there will be no charge for
these costs. As we do not control
warranty coverage for affected parties,
some parties may incur costs higher
than estimated here. Based on these
figures, we estimate the cost of the
proposed AD on U.S. operators to be
$56,700, or $8,100 per product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701:
General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
E:\FR\FM\13MYP1.SGM
13MYP1
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 93 / Tuesday, May 13, 2008 / Proposed Rules
Regulatory Findings
Reason
We determined that this proposed AD
would not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This
proposed AD would not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on
the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify this proposed regulation:
1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this proposed AD and placed it in the
AD docket.
(e) The mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI) states:
Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank
wiring installations required by SFAR 88
(Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation
Authorities/European Aviation Safety
Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two
features in the Jetstream 4100 where the need
for design changes was apparent. One of
these is addressed by Service Bulletin (SB)
J41–28–013 which introduces additional
bonding leads between pipes, structures and
various components to improve the electrical
bond paths within the fuel tank areas. This
design change is identified by modification
number JM41659. Additionally, SB J41–28–
013 provides instructions to inspect the
existing bonding leads, to replace any
defective leads and to examine all fuel
system pipe runs in the wings to ensure
appropriate clearances are maintained.
Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel
tank area, if not corrected, could lead to
ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent fuel
tank explosion.
For the reason stated above, this EASA
Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires the
installation of additional bonding leads,
inspection [for defects] of existing bonding
leads and [for clearance of] all fuel system
pipe runs in the wings and follow-on
corrective actions, as necessary.
Corrective actions include replacing any
defective bonding leads and adjusting
clearances of the fuel system pipe runs.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part
39 as follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new AD:
BAE Systems (Operations) Limited
(Formerly British Aerospace Regional
Aircraft): Docket No. FAA–2008–0541;
Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–063–AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) We must receive comments by June 12,
2008.
rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with PROPOSALS
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to all BAE Systems
(Operations) Limited Model Jetstream 4101
airplanes, certificated in any category, all
serial numbers.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of
America Code 28: Fuel.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:23 May 12, 2008
Jkt 214001
Actions and Compliance
(f) Within 24 months after the effective
date of this AD, unless already done, do the
following actions.
(1) Inspect the bonding leads between ribs
1 and 9, and between ribs 16 and 19, in the
left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) wings in
accordance with paragraph 2.B.(2) of the
Accomplishment Instructions of BAE
Systems (Operations) Limited Service
Bulletin J41–28–013, Revision 1, dated
January 10, 2008; and, before next flight,
replace all defective bonding leads with
airworthy parts in accordance with the
service bulletin.
(2) Inspect all fuel system pipe runs inside
the LH and RH wings in accordance with
paragraph 2.B.(3) of the Accomplishment
Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations)
Limited Service Bulletin J41–28–013,
Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008; and, if
incorrect clearances are found, before next
flight, adjust clearances in accordance with
the service bulletin.
(3) Install additional electrical bonding of
components within the LH and RH wings in
accordance with paragraphs 2.B.(4) to
2.B.(15) of the Accomplishment Instructions
of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service
Bulletin J41–28–013, Revision 1, dated
January 10, 2008.
FAA AD Differences
Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/
or service information as follows: No
differences.
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Fmt 4702
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27479
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to
this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs): The Manager, International
Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane
Directorate, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
Send information to ATTN: Todd Thompson,
Aerospace Engineer, International Branch,
ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate,
FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425)
227–1175; fax (425) 227–1149. Before using
any approved AMOC on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies, notify your
appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the
FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO),
or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement
in this AD to obtain corrective actions from
a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective
actions are considered FAA-approved if they
are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required
to assure the product is airworthy before it
is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any
reporting requirement in this AD, under the
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act,
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
has approved the information collection
requirements and has assigned OMB Control
Number 2120–0056.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness
Directive 2008–0040, dated February 27,
2008, and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited
Service Bulletin J41–28–013, Revision 1,
dated January 10, 2008, for related
information.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 6,
2008.
Michael J. Kaszycki,
Acting Assistant Manager, Transport
Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E8–10648 Filed 5–12–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2008–0543; Directorate
Identifier 2007–CE–092–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Pacific
Aerospace Limited Model FU–24
Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
E:\FR\FM\13MYP1.SGM
13MYP1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 93 (Tuesday, May 13, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 27477-27479]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-10648]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2008-0541; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-063-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited
(Jetstream) Model 4101 Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation
authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as:
Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations
required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation
Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two features in the
Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. * * *
Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel tank area, if not
corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent
fuel tank explosion.
* * * * *
The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the
unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by June 12, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket
shortly after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-1175; fax (425) 227-1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2008-0541;
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-063-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.
Discussion
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2008-0040, dated February 27, 2008 (referred to
after this as ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for the
specified products. The MCAI states:
[[Page 27478]]
Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations
required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation
Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two features in the
Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. One
of these is addressed by Service Bulletin (SB) J41-28-013 which
introduces additional bonding leads between pipes, structure and
various components to improve the electrical bond paths within the
fuel tank areas. This design change is identified by modification
number JM41659. Additionally, SB J41-28-013 provides instructions to
inspect the existing bonding leads, to replace any defective leads
and to examine all fuel system pipe runs in the wings to ensure
appropriate clearances are maintained.
Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel tank area, if not
corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent
fuel tank explosion.
For the reason stated above, this EASA Airworthiness Directive
(AD) requires the installation of additional bonding leads,
inspection [for defects] of existing bonding leads and [for
clearance of] all fuel system pipe runs in the wings and follow-on
corrective actions, as necessary.
Corrective actions include replacing any defective bonding leads and
adjusting clearances of the fuel system pipe runs. You may obtain
further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review,
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements''
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,''
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e.,
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for
further action.
The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that
is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation
regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed
to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory
standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that
all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport
category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against
explosion risks.
We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
Relevant Service Information
BAE Systems (Operations) Limited has issued Service Bulletin J41-
28-013, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008. The actions described in
this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition
identified in the MCAI.
FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD
This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same
type design.
Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.
Costs of Compliance
Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD
would affect about 7 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that
it would take about 80 work-hours per product to comply with the basic
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per
work-hour. Required parts would cost about $1,700 per product. Where
the service information lists required parts costs that are covered
under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these
costs. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties,
some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these
figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to
be $56,700, or $8,100 per product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
[[Page 27479]]
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Formerly British Aerospace
Regional Aircraft): Docket No. FAA-2008-0541; Directorate Identifier
2008-NM-063-AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) We must receive comments by June 12, 2008.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited
Model Jetstream 4101 airplanes, certificated in any category, all
serial numbers.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.
Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations
required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation
Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two features in the
Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. One
of these is addressed by Service Bulletin (SB) J41-28-013 which
introduces additional bonding leads between pipes, structures and
various components to improve the electrical bond paths within the
fuel tank areas. This design change is identified by modification
number JM41659. Additionally, SB J41-28-013 provides instructions to
inspect the existing bonding leads, to replace any defective leads
and to examine all fuel system pipe runs in the wings to ensure
appropriate clearances are maintained.
Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel tank area, if not
corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent
fuel tank explosion.
For the reason stated above, this EASA Airworthiness Directive
(AD) requires the installation of additional bonding leads,
inspection [for defects] of existing bonding leads and [for
clearance of] all fuel system pipe runs in the wings and follow-on
corrective actions, as necessary.
Corrective actions include replacing any defective bonding leads and
adjusting clearances of the fuel system pipe runs.
Actions and Compliance
(f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, unless
already done, do the following actions.
(1) Inspect the bonding leads between ribs 1 and 9, and between
ribs 16 and 19, in the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) wings in
accordance with paragraph 2.B.(2) of the Accomplishment Instructions
of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin J41-28-013,
Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008; and, before next flight, replace
all defective bonding leads with airworthy parts in accordance with
the service bulletin.
(2) Inspect all fuel system pipe runs inside the LH and RH wings
in accordance with paragraph 2.B.(3) of the Accomplishment
Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin
J41-28-013, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008; and, if incorrect
clearances are found, before next flight, adjust clearances in
accordance with the service bulletin.
(3) Install additional electrical bonding of components within
the LH and RH wings in accordance with paragraphs 2.B.(4) to
2.B.(15) of the Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems
(Operations) Limited Service Bulletin J41-28-013, Revision 1, dated
January 10, 2008.
FAA AD Differences
Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows: No differences.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Todd
Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1175; fax (425) 227-1149.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness Directive 2008-0040, dated
February 27, 2008, and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service
Bulletin J41-28-013, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008, for related
information.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 6, 2008.
Michael J. Kaszycki,
Acting Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E8-10648 Filed 5-12-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P