Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Jetstream) Model 4101 Airplanes, 27477-27479 [E8-10648]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 93 / Tuesday, May 13, 2008 / Proposed Rules compliances were assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter No. 525–001 to determine if mandatory corrective action is required. This assessment showed that rupture of the fuel tank climb vent loop pipe or leakage from pipe couplings could result in fuel coming in contact with hot anti-ice ducts, creating potential fire on top of the centre fuel tank. To correct the unsafe condition, this directive mandates the modification of the fuel tank climb vent loop by installing shrouding boots that direct leaked fuel safely overboard. Related Information (h) Refer to MCAI Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF–2008–01, dated January 3, 2008, and Bombardier Service Bulletin 670BA–28– 011, Revision B, dated July 4, 2007, for related information. Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 5, 2008. Michael J. Kaszycki, Acting Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E8–10647 Filed 5–12–08; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P Actions and Compliance (f) Unless already done, do the following actions. (1) Within 4,500 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, modify the fuel tank climb vent loop pipes by installing shrouding boots according to the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 670BA–28–011, Revision B, dated July 4, 2007. (2) Modification of the climb vent pipe prior to the effective date of this AD according to Bombardier Service Bulletin 670BA–28–011, dated November 7, 2005; or Revision A, dated January 22, 2007; is acceptable for compliance with the corresponding requirements of this AD. FAA AD Differences Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/ or service information as follows: No differences. rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with PROPOSALS Other FAA AD Provisions (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD: (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Richard Fiesel, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe and Propulsion Branch, ANE–171, FAA, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone (516) 228–7304; fax (516) 794–5531. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO. (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service. (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120–0056. VerDate Aug<31>2005 14:23 May 12, 2008 Jkt 214001 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2008–0541; Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–063–AD] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Jetstream) Model 4101 Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). AGENCY: SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two features in the Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. * * * Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel tank area, if not corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent fuel tank explosion. * * * * * The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by June 12, 2008. ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods: • Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments. • Fax: (202) 493–2251. • Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 27477 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. • Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Examining the AD Docket You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–1175; fax (425) 227–1149. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Comments Invited We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2008–0541; Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–063–AD’’ at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments. We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD. Discussion The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2008–0040, dated February 27, 2008 (referred to after this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states: E:\FR\FM\13MYP1.SGM 13MYP1 27478 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 93 / Tuesday, May 13, 2008 / Proposed Rules rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with PROPOSALS Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two features in the Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. One of these is addressed by Service Bulletin (SB) J41–28–013 which introduces additional bonding leads between pipes, structure and various components to improve the electrical bond paths within the fuel tank areas. This design change is identified by modification number JM41659. Additionally, SB J41–28– 013 provides instructions to inspect the existing bonding leads, to replace any defective leads and to examine all fuel system pipe runs in the wings to ensure appropriate clearances are maintained. Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel tank area, if not corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent fuel tank explosion. For the reason stated above, this EASA Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires the installation of additional bonding leads, inspection [for defects] of existing bonding leads and [for clearance of] all fuel system pipe runs in the wings and follow-on corrective actions, as necessary. Corrective actions include replacing any defective bonding leads and adjusting clearances of the fuel system pipe runs. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket. The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’ Amendment 21–78, and subsequent Amendments 21–82 and 21–83). Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety VerDate Aug<31>2005 14:23 May 12, 2008 Jkt 214001 standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews. In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action. The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks. We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane. Relevant Service Information BAE Systems (Operations) Limited has issued Service Bulletin J41–28–013, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI. FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 develop on other products of the same type design. Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information. We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD. Costs of Compliance Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect about 7 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 80 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Required parts would cost about $1,700 per product. Where the service information lists required parts costs that are covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these costs. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be $56,700, or $8,100 per product. Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.’’ Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. E:\FR\FM\13MYP1.SGM 13MYP1 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 93 / Tuesday, May 13, 2008 / Proposed Rules Regulatory Findings Reason We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation: 1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket. (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states: Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two features in the Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. One of these is addressed by Service Bulletin (SB) J41–28–013 which introduces additional bonding leads between pipes, structures and various components to improve the electrical bond paths within the fuel tank areas. This design change is identified by modification number JM41659. Additionally, SB J41–28– 013 provides instructions to inspect the existing bonding leads, to replace any defective leads and to examine all fuel system pipe runs in the wings to ensure appropriate clearances are maintained. Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel tank area, if not corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent fuel tank explosion. For the reason stated above, this EASA Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires the installation of additional bonding leads, inspection [for defects] of existing bonding leads and [for clearance of] all fuel system pipe runs in the wings and follow-on corrective actions, as necessary. Corrective actions include replacing any defective bonding leads and adjusting clearances of the fuel system pipe runs. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety. The Proposed Amendment Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD: BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Formerly British Aerospace Regional Aircraft): Docket No. FAA–2008–0541; Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–063–AD. Comments Due Date (a) We must receive comments by June 12, 2008. rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with PROPOSALS Affected ADs (b) None. Applicability (c) This AD applies to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model Jetstream 4101 airplanes, certificated in any category, all serial numbers. Subject (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel. VerDate Aug<31>2005 14:23 May 12, 2008 Jkt 214001 Actions and Compliance (f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, unless already done, do the following actions. (1) Inspect the bonding leads between ribs 1 and 9, and between ribs 16 and 19, in the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) wings in accordance with paragraph 2.B.(2) of the Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin J41–28–013, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008; and, before next flight, replace all defective bonding leads with airworthy parts in accordance with the service bulletin. (2) Inspect all fuel system pipe runs inside the LH and RH wings in accordance with paragraph 2.B.(3) of the Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin J41–28–013, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008; and, if incorrect clearances are found, before next flight, adjust clearances in accordance with the service bulletin. (3) Install additional electrical bonding of components within the LH and RH wings in accordance with paragraphs 2.B.(4) to 2.B.(15) of the Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin J41–28–013, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008. FAA AD Differences Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/ or service information as follows: No differences. PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 27479 Other FAA AD Provisions (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD: (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–1175; fax (425) 227–1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO. (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service. (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120–0056. Related Information (h) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness Directive 2008–0040, dated February 27, 2008, and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin J41–28–013, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008, for related information. Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 6, 2008. Michael J. Kaszycki, Acting Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E8–10648 Filed 5–12–08; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2008–0543; Directorate Identifier 2007–CE–092–AD] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Pacific Aerospace Limited Model FU–24 Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). AGENCY: E:\FR\FM\13MYP1.SGM 13MYP1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 93 (Tuesday, May 13, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 27477-27479]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-10648]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0541; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-063-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited 
(Jetstream) Model 4101 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory 
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation 
authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe 
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 
condition as:

    Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations 
required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and 
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation 
Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two features in the 
Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. * * *
    Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel tank area, if not 
corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent 
fuel tank explosion.
* * * * *
The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the 
unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by June 12, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory 
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street 
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is 
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket 
shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 
227-1175; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2008-0541; 
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-063-AD'' at the beginning of your 
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
this proposed AD based on those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We 
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical 
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA 
Airworthiness Directive 2008-0040, dated February 27, 2008 (referred to 
after this as ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for the 
specified products. The MCAI states:


[[Page 27478]]


    Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations 
required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and 
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation 
Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two features in the 
Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. One 
of these is addressed by Service Bulletin (SB) J41-28-013 which 
introduces additional bonding leads between pipes, structure and 
various components to improve the electrical bond paths within the 
fuel tank areas. This design change is identified by modification 
number JM41659. Additionally, SB J41-28-013 provides instructions to 
inspect the existing bonding leads, to replace any defective leads 
and to examine all fuel system pipe runs in the wings to ensure 
appropriate clearances are maintained.
    Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel tank area, if not 
corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent 
fuel tank explosion.
    For the reason stated above, this EASA Airworthiness Directive 
(AD) requires the installation of additional bonding leads, 
inspection [for defects] of existing bonding leads and [for 
clearance of] all fuel system pipe runs in the wings and follow-on 
corrective actions, as necessary.

Corrective actions include replacing any defective bonding leads and 
adjusting clearances of the fuel system pipe runs. You may obtain 
further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.
    The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel 
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the 
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes 
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for 
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a 
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, 
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' 
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards 
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule 
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' 
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
    Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., 
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders 
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition 
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design 
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for 
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to 
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance 
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety 
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to 
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary 
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
    In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four 
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel 
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of 
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable 
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address 
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in 
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure 
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included 
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for 
further action.
    The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that 
is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European 
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation 
regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed 
to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory 
standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that 
all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport 
category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against 
explosion risks.
    We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are 
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel 
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result 
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

    BAE Systems (Operations) Limited has issued Service Bulletin J41-
28-013, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008. The actions described in 
this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition 
identified in the MCAI.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant 
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have 
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service 
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we 
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition 
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same 
type design.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are 
highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.

Costs of Compliance

    Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD 
would affect about 7 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that 
it would take about 80 work-hours per product to comply with the basic 
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per 
work-hour. Required parts would cost about $1,700 per product. Where 
the service information lists required parts costs that are covered 
under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these 
costs. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, 
some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these 
figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to 
be $56,700, or $8,100 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

[[Page 27479]]

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed 
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Formerly British Aerospace 
Regional Aircraft): Docket No. FAA-2008-0541; Directorate Identifier 
2008-NM-063-AD.

Comments Due Date

    (a) We must receive comments by June 12, 2008.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited 
Model Jetstream 4101 airplanes, certificated in any category, all 
serial numbers.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:
    Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations 
required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and 
equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation 
Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two features in the 
Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. One 
of these is addressed by Service Bulletin (SB) J41-28-013 which 
introduces additional bonding leads between pipes, structures and 
various components to improve the electrical bond paths within the 
fuel tank areas. This design change is identified by modification 
number JM41659. Additionally, SB J41-28-013 provides instructions to 
inspect the existing bonding leads, to replace any defective leads 
and to examine all fuel system pipe runs in the wings to ensure 
appropriate clearances are maintained.
    Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel tank area, if not 
corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent 
fuel tank explosion.
    For the reason stated above, this EASA Airworthiness Directive 
(AD) requires the installation of additional bonding leads, 
inspection [for defects] of existing bonding leads and [for 
clearance of] all fuel system pipe runs in the wings and follow-on 
corrective actions, as necessary.

Corrective actions include replacing any defective bonding leads and 
adjusting clearances of the fuel system pipe runs.

Actions and Compliance

    (f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, unless 
already done, do the following actions.
    (1) Inspect the bonding leads between ribs 1 and 9, and between 
ribs 16 and 19, in the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) wings in 
accordance with paragraph 2.B.(2) of the Accomplishment Instructions 
of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin J41-28-013, 
Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008; and, before next flight, replace 
all defective bonding leads with airworthy parts in accordance with 
the service bulletin.
    (2) Inspect all fuel system pipe runs inside the LH and RH wings 
in accordance with paragraph 2.B.(3) of the Accomplishment 
Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin 
J41-28-013, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008; and, if incorrect 
clearances are found, before next flight, adjust clearances in 
accordance with the service bulletin.
    (3) Install additional electrical bonding of components within 
the LH and RH wings in accordance with paragraphs 2.B.(4) to 
2.B.(15) of the Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems 
(Operations) Limited Service Bulletin J41-28-013, Revision 1, dated 
January 10, 2008.

FAA AD Differences

    Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information 
as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using 
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Todd 
Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1175; fax (425) 227-1149. 
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC 
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA 
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 
FSDO.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in 
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information 
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.

Related Information

    (h) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness Directive 2008-0040, dated 
February 27, 2008, and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service 
Bulletin J41-28-013, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2008, for related 
information.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 6, 2008.
Michael J. Kaszycki,
Acting Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
 [FR Doc. E8-10648 Filed 5-12-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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