Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants; Draft Statement of Policy, 26349-26351 [E8-10443]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 91 (Friday, May 9, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 26349-26351]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-10443]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[NRC-2008-0237]


Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants; Draft Statement of 
Policy

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Issuance of draft policy statement and notice of opportunity 
for public comment.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering 
adopting a statement of policy to improve the licensing environment for 
advanced nuclear power reactors to minimize complexity and uncertainty 
in the regulatory process. This statement would provide the 
Commission's policy regarding the review of, and desired 
characteristics associated with, advanced reactors. This policy 
statement would be the second revision of the policy statement titled 
``Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants; Statement of Policy.'' 
The purpose of this revision is to update the Commission's policy 
statement on advanced reactors to integrate the Commission's 
expectations for security and preparedness with the current 
expectations for safety. This draft policy statement is being issued 
for public comment.

DATES: Comments on this document should be submitted by July 8, 2008. 
Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent 
practical. To ensure efficient and complete comment resolution, 
comments should include references to the section, page, and line 
numbers of the document to which the comment applies, if possible.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be made 
available for public inspection. Because your comments will not be 
edited to remove any identifying or contact information, the NRC 
cautions you against including any information in your submission that 
you do not want to be publicly disclosed.
    Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and 
search for documents filed under Docket ID [NRC-2008-0237]. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 301-415-5905, e-mail 
Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you do not 
receive a reply e-mail confirming that we have received your comments, 
contact us directly at 301-415-1966.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. (Telephone 
301-415-1966.)
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
301-415-1101.
    You can access publicly available documents related to this 
document using the following methods:
    NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have 
copied for a fee publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Public 
File Area O F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland.
    NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):

[[Page 26350]]

Publicy available documents created or received at the NRC are 
available electronically at the NRC's electronic Reading Room at http:/
/www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain 
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public 
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems 
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR 
reference staff at 1-899-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to 
pdr.resources@nrc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wesley H. Held, Office of New 
Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, Telephone: 301-415-1583, e-mail: Wesley.Held@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On July 8, 1986 (51 FR 24643), the Commission published a policy 
statement on regulation of advanced reactors in the Federal Register. 
The Commission's primary objectives in issuing the advanced reactor 
policy statement were as follows:
     To maintain the earliest possible interaction of 
applicants, vendors, and government agencies with the NRC.
     To provide all interested parties, including the public, 
with the Commission's views concerning the desired characteristics of 
advanced reactor designs.
     To express the Commission's intent to issue timely comment 
on the implications of such designs for safety and the regulatory 
process.
    On July 12, 1994 (59 FR 35461), the Commission revised the 1986 
advanced reactor policy statement by addressing the Commission's policy 
on metrication (57 FR 46202; October 7, 1992; as revised June 19, 1996 
(61 FR 31169)).
    Since the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC has assessed 
potential threats and their possible impacts on the Nation's fleet of 
operating nuclear power reactors and has required upgrades of physical 
security measures and mitigative strategies through the issuance of a 
series of security orders and license conditions. For new nuclear power 
reactors, the Commission considers it prudent to provide expectations 
and guidance on security matters to prospective applicants so that they 
can use this information early in the design stage to identify 
potential mitigative measures and/or design features that provide a 
more robust and effective security posture. Therefore, the Commission 
decided to revise the advanced reactor policy statement to integrate 
these expectations for security and preparedness with the current 
expectations for safety.
    The NRC is seeking public comment in order to receive feedback from 
the widest range of interested parties and to ensure that all 
information relevant to developing this document is available to the 
NRC staff. This document is issued for comment only. The NRC will 
review public comments received on the document, incorporate suggested 
changes as necessary, and issue the final revision.

Commission Policy

    Consistent with its legislative mandate, the Commission's policy 
with respect to regulating nuclear power reactors is to ensure adequate 
protection of the environment and public health and safety and common 
defense and security. Regarding advanced reactors, the Commission 
expects, as a minimum, at least the same degree of protection of the 
environment and public health and safety and the common defense and 
security, that is required for current-generation light-water reactors. 
Furthermore, the Commission expects that advanced reactors will provide 
enhanced margins of safety and/or use simplified, inherent, passive, or 
other innovative means to accomplish their safety and security 
functions.
    The Commission's expectation for advanced reactor designs that 
consider the effects of a large, commercial airplane impact is 
currently being addressed through rulemaking (Consideration of Aircraft 
Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactor Designs--RIN AI19--ID Docket NRC-
2007-0009). The Commission believes that reactors designed with 
potential aircraft impact considerations resulting from this rule would 
be more robust than if they were designed in the absence of this rule.
    Among the attributes that could assist in establishing the 
acceptability or licensability of a proposed advanced reactor design, 
and therefore should be considered in advanced designs, are:
     Highly reliable and less complex shutdown and decay heat 
removal systems. The use of inherent or passive means to accomplish 
this objective is encouraged (negative temperature coefficient, natural 
circulation, etc.).
     Longer time constants and sufficient instrumentation to 
allow for more diagnosis and management before reaching safety systems 
challenge and/or exposure of vital equipment to adverse conditions.
     Simplified safety systems that, where possible, reduce 
required operator actions, equipment subjected to severe environmental 
conditions, and components needed for maintaining safe shutdown 
conditions. Such simplified systems should facilitate operator 
comprehension, reliable system function, and more straightforward 
engineering analysis.
     Designs that minimize the potential for severe accidents 
and their consequences by providing sufficient inherent safety, 
reliability, redundancy, diversity, and independence in safety systems.
     Designs that provide reliable equipment in the balance of 
plant (BOP) (or safety-system independence from BOP) to reduce the 
number of challenges to safety systems.
     Designs that provide easily maintainable equipment and 
components.
     Designs that reduce potential radiation exposures to plant 
personnel.
     Designs that incorporate the defense-in-depth philosophy 
by maintaining multiple barriers against radiation release, and by 
reducing the potential for, and consequences of, severe accidents.
     Design features that can be proven by citation of existing 
technology, or that can be satisfactorily established by commitment to 
a suitable technology development program.
     Designs that include considerations for safety and 
security requirements together in the design process such that security 
issues (e.g., newly identified threats of terrorist attacks) can be 
effectively resolved through facility design and engineered security 
features, and formulation of mitigation measures, with reduced reliance 
on human actions.
     Designs with features to prevent a simultaneous loss of 
containment integrity (including situations where the containment is 
by-passed), and the ability to maintain core cooling as a result of an 
aircraft impact, or identification of system designs that would provide 
inherent delay in radiological releases (if prevention of release is 
not possible).
     Designs with features to prevent loss of spent fuel pool 
integrity as a result of an aircraft impact.
    If specific advanced reactor designs with some or all of the 
previously mentioned attributes are brought to the NRC for comment and/
or evaluation, the Commission can develop preliminary design safety 
evaluation and licensing criteria for their safety-related and 
security-related aspects. Incorporating the above attributes may 
promote more efficient and effective design reviews. However, the 
listing of a particular attribute does not necessarily mean that 
specific licensing criteria will attach to

[[Page 26351]]

that attribute. Designs with some or all of these attributes are also 
likely to be more readily understood by the general public. Indeed, the 
number and nature of the regulatory requirements may depend on the 
extent to which an individual advanced reactor design incorporates 
general attributes such as those listed previously.
    In addition, the Commission expects that the safety features of 
these advanced reactor designs will be complemented by the operational 
program for Emergency Planning (EP). This EP operational program, in 
turn, must be demonstrated by inspections, tests, analyses, and 
acceptance criteria to ensure effective implementation of established 
measures. The Commission also expects that advanced reactor designs 
will comply with the Commission's safety goal policy statement (51 FR 
28044; August 4, 1986 as corrected and republished at 51 FR 30028; 
August 21, 1986), and the policy statement on conversion to the metric 
measurement system (61 FR 31169; June 19, 1996).
    To provide for more timely and effective regulation of advanced 
reactors, the Commission encourages the earliest possible interaction 
of applicants, vendors, other government agencies, and the NRC to 
provide for early identification of regulatory requirements for 
advanced reactors and to provide all interested parties, including the 
public, with a timely, independent assessment of the safety and 
security characteristics of advanced reactor designs. Such licensing 
interaction and guidance early in the design process will contribute 
towards minimizing complexity and adding stability and predictability 
in the licensing and regulation of advanced reactors.
    While the NRC does not develop new designs, the Commission intends 
to develop the capability, when appropriate, for timely assessment and 
response to innovative and advanced designs that might be presented for 
NRC review. Prior experience has shown that new reactor designs--even 
variations of established designs--may involve technical problems that 
must be solved to ensure adequate protection of the public health and 
safety. The earlier these design problems are identified, the earlier 
satisfactory resolution can be achieved. Prospective applicants are 
reminded that, while the NRC will undertake to review and comment on 
new design concepts, the applicants are responsible for documentation 
and research necessary to support a specific application. Research 
activities would include testing of new safety or security features 
that differ from existing designs for operating reactors, or that use 
simplified, inherent, passive means to accomplish their safety or 
security function. The testing shall ensure that these new features 
will perform as predicted, provide collection of sufficient data to 
validate computer codes, and show that the effects of system 
interactions are acceptable.
    During the initial phase of advanced reactor development, the 
Commission particularly encourages design innovations that enhance 
safety, reliability, and security (such as those described previously) 
and that generally depend on technology that is either proven or can be 
demonstrated by a straightforward technology development program. In 
the absence of a significant history of operating experience on an 
advanced concept reactor, plans for innovative use of proven technology 
and/or new technology development programs should be presented to the 
NRC for review as early as possible, so that the NRC can assess how the 
proposed program might influence regulatory requirements.
    Finally, the NRC also believes that it will be in the interest of 
the public as well as the design vendors' and the prospective license 
applicants to address security issues early in the design stage to 
achieve a more robust and effective security posture for future nuclear 
power reactors.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of May 2008.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
 [FR Doc. E8-10443 Filed 5-8-08; 8:45 am]
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