Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations, 25034-25050 [E8-9679]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 88 / Tuesday, May 6, 2008 / Notices
designate Antarctic Specially Protected
Areas.
The applications received are as
follows:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Permit Application No. 2009–003.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC;
Notice of Receipt and Availability of
Application for Renewal of Prairie
Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units
1 and 2 Facility Operating Licenses
Nos. DPR–42 and DPR–60 for an
Additional 20-Year Period
1. Applicant: Sam Feola, Director,
Raytheon Polar Services Company,
7400 South Tucson Way,
Centennial, CO 80112.
Activity for Which Permit Is
Requested: Enter Antarctic Specially
Protected Areas. The applicant plans to
enter Cape Crozier (ASPA 124) to install
radio equipment that will provide voice
and data services for the science team
working in the area. Equipment will be
located in the fish hut, as well as a small
radio link located approximately 100
yards away on the ridge facing Mt.
Terror. Additional visits to the site may
be necessary to repair the
communications equipment should a
failure of the radio links occur.
Location: Cape Crozier (ASPA 124).
Dates: October 1, 2008 to February 18,
2009.
Permit Application No. 2009–004.
2. Applicant: Sam Feola, Director,
Raytheon Polar Services Company,
7400 South Tucson Way,
Centennial, CO 80112.
Activity for Which Permit Is
Requested: Enter Antarctic Specially
Protected Areas. The applicant plans to
enter New College Valley, Caughley
Beach, Cape Bird (ASPA 116) to install
radio equipment that will provide voice
and data services for the science team
working in the area. Equipment will be
located in the fish hut, as well as a small
radio link located approximately 75
yards away on the ridge nearest Mt.
Bird. Additional visits to the site may be
necessary to repair the communications
equipment should a failure of the radio
links occur.
Location: New College Valley,
Caughley Beach, Cape Bird (ASPA 116).
Dates: October 1, 2008 to February 18,
2009.
Nadene G. Kennedy,
Permit Officer, Office of Polar Programs.
[FR Doc. E8–9943 Filed 5–5–08; 8:45 am]
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[Docket Nos. 50–282 And 50–306]
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or Commission) has
received an application, dated April 15,
2008, from Nuclear Management
Company, LLC, filed pursuant to
Section 104b of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, and Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations Part 54 (10
CFR Part 54), to renew the operating
license for the Prairie Island Nuclear
Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 (PINGP).
Renewal of the licenses would authorize
the applicant to operate the facilities for
an additional 20-year period beyond the
period specified in the current operating
licenses. The current operating licenses
for PINGP (DPR–42 and DPR–60) expire
on August 09, 2013, and October 29,
2014, respectively. PINGP Units 1 and 2
are pressurized-water reactors designed
by Westinghouse that are located 28
miles Southeast of Minneapolis, MN.
The acceptability of the tendered
application for docketing, and other
matters including an opportunity to
request a hearing, will be the subject of
subsequent Federal Register notices.
Copies of the application are available
to the public at the Commission’s Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852 or
through the internet from the NRC’s
Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room under
Accession Number ML081050100. The
ADAMS Public Electronic Reading
Room is accessible from the NRC Web
site at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. In addition, the application
is available at https://www.nrc.gov/
reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/
applications.html. Persons who do not
have access to the internet or who
encounter problems in accessing the
documents located in ADAMS should
contact the NRC’s PDR Reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, extension 4737, or by
e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.
A copy of the license renewal
application for the PINGP is also
available to local residents near the site
at the Red Wing Public Library, 225 East
Avenue, Red Wing, MN 55066.
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Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day
of April, 2008.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samson Lee,
Acting Director, Division of License Renewal,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E8–9939 Filed 5–5–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Biweekly Notice; Applications and
Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses Involving No Significant
Hazards Considerations
I. Background
Pursuant to section 189a. (2) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
(the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (the Commission or NRC
staff) is publishing this regular biweekly
notice. The Act requires the
Commission publish notice of any
amendments issued, or proposed to be
issued and grants the Commission the
authority to issue and make
immediately effective any amendment
to an operating license upon a
determination by the Commission that
such amendment involves no significant
hazards consideration, notwithstanding
the pendency before the Commission of
a request for a hearing from any person.
This biweekly notice includes all
notices of amendments issued, or
proposed to be issued from April 10 to
April 23, 2008. The last biweekly notice
was published on April 22, 2008 (73 FR
21567).
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing
The Commission has made a
proposed determination that the
following amendment requests involve
no significant hazards consideration.
Under the Commission’s regulations in
10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation
of the facility in accordance with the
proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2)
create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated; or (3)
involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The basis for this
proposed determination for each
amendment request is shown below.
The Commission is seeking public
comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received
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within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be
considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not
issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of
publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license
amendment before expiration of the 60day period provided that its final
determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards
consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment
prior to the expiration of the 30-day
comment period should circumstances
change during the 30-day comment
period such that failure to act in a
timely way would result, for example in
derating or shutdown of the facility.
Should the Commission take action
prior to the expiration of either the
comment period or the notice period, it
will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the
Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that
the need to take this action will occur
very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted
by mail to the Chief, Rulemaking,
Directives and Editing Branch, Division
of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, and should cite the publication
date and page number of this Federal
Register notice. Written comments may
also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two
White Flint North, 11545 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30
a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.
Copies of written comments received
may be examined at the Commission’s
Public Document Room (PDR), located
at One White Flint North, Public File
Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first
floor), Rockville, Maryland. The filing of
requests for a hearing and petitions for
leave to intervene is discussed below.
Within 60 days after the date of
publication of this notice, person(s) may
file a request for a hearing with respect
to issuance of the amendment to the
subject facility operating license and
any person whose interest may be
affected by this proceeding and who
wishes to participate as a party in the
proceeding must file a written request
via electronic submission through the
NRC E-Filing system for a hearing and
a petition for leave to intervene.
Requests for a hearing and a petition for
leave to intervene shall be filed in
accordance with the Commission’s
‘‘Rules of Practice for Domestic
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Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10 CFR Part
2. Interested person(s) should consult a
current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is
available at the Commission’s PDR,
located at One White Flint North, Public
File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be
accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management
System’s (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the Internet at the
NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a
request for a hearing or petition for
leave to intervene is filed within 60
days, the Commission or a presiding
officer designated by the Commission or
by the Chief Administrative Judge of the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or
petition; and the Secretary or the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board will issue a
notice of a hearing or an appropriate
order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a
petition for leave to intervene shall set
forth with particularity the interest of
the petitioner in the proceeding, and
how that interest may be affected by the
results of the proceeding. The petition
should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted
with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The
name, address, and telephone number of
the requestor or petitioner; (2) the
nature of the requestor’s/petitioner’s
right under the Act to be made a party
to the proceeding; (3) the nature and
extent of the requestor’s/petitioner’s
property, financial, or other interest in
the proceeding; and (4) the possible
effect of any decision or order which
may be entered in the proceeding on the
requestor’s/petitioner’s interest. The
petition must also set forth the specific
contentions which the petitioner/
requestor seeks to have litigated at the
proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a
specific statement of the issue of law or
fact to be raised or controverted. In
addition, the petitioner/requestor shall
provide a brief explanation of the bases
for the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention
and on which the petitioner/requestor
intends to rely in proving the contention
at the hearing. The petitioner/requestor
must also provide references to those
specific sources and documents of
which the petitioner is aware and on
which the petitioner/requestor intends
to rely to establish those facts or expert
opinion. The petition must include
sufficient information to show that a
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genuine dispute exists with the
applicant on a material issue of law or
fact. Contentions shall be limited to
matters within the scope of the
amendment under consideration. The
contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the petitioner/
requestor to relief. A petitioner/
requestor who fails to satisfy these
requirements with respect to at least one
contention will not be permitted to
participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become
parties to the proceeding, subject to any
limitations in the order granting leave to
intervene, and have the opportunity to
participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, and the
Commission has not made a final
determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration, the
Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide
when the hearing is held. If the final
determination is that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards
consideration, the Commission may
issue the amendment and make it
immediately effective, notwithstanding
the request for a hearing. Any hearing
held would take place after issuance of
the amendment. If the final
determination is that the amendment
request involves a significant hazards
consideration, any hearing held would
take place before the issuance of any
amendment.
A request for hearing or a petition for
leave to intervene must be filed in
accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule,
which the NRC promulgated in August
28, 2007 (72 FR 49139). The E-Filing
process requires participants to submit
and serve documents over the internet
or in some cases to mail copies on
electronic storage media. Participants
may not submit paper copies of their
filings unless they seek a waiver in
accordance with the procedures
described below.
To comply with the procedural
requirements of E-Filing, at least five (5)
days prior to the filing deadline, the
petitioner/requestor must contact the
Office of the Secretary by e-mail at
hearingdocket@nrc.gov, or by calling
(301) 415–1677, to request (1) a digital
ID certificate, which allows the
participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign
documents and access the E-Submittal
server for any proceeding in which it is
participating; and/or (2) creation of an
electronic docket for the proceeding
(even in instances in which the
petitioner/requestor (or its counsel or
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representative) already holds an NRCissued digital ID certificate). Each
petitioner/requestor will need to
download the Workplace Forms
ViewerTM to access the Electronic
Information Exchange (EIE), a
component of the E-Filing system. The
Workplace Forms ViewerTM is free and
is available at https://www.nrc.gov/sitehelp/e-submittals/install-viewer.html.
Information about applying for a digital
ID certificate is available on NRC’s
public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals/applycertificates.html.
Once a petitioner/requestor has
obtained a digital ID certificate, had a
docket created, and downloaded the EIE
viewer, it can then submit a request for
hearing or petition for leave to
intervene. Submissions should be in
Portable Document Format (PDF) in
accordance with NRC guidance
available on the NRC public Web site at
https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. A filing is considered
complete at the time the filer submits its
documents through EIE. To be timely,
an electronic filing must be submitted to
the EIE system no later than 11:59 p.m.
Eastern Time on the due date. Upon
receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing
system time-stamps the document and
sends the submitter an e-mail notice
confirming receipt of the document. The
EIE system also distributes an e-mail
notice that provides access to the
document to the NRC Office of the
General Counsel and any others who
have advised the Office of the Secretary
that they wish to participate in the
proceeding, so that the filer need not
serve the documents on those
participants separately. Therefore,
applicants and other participants (or
their counsel or representative) must
apply for and receive a digital ID
certificate before a hearing request/
petition to intervene is filed so that they
can obtain access to the document via
the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically may
seek assistance through the ‘‘Contact
Us’’ link located on the NRC Web site
at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html or by calling the NRC
technical help line, which is available
between 8:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m.,
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday.
The help line number is (800) 397–4209
or locally, (301) 415–4737.
Participants who believe that they
have a good cause for not submitting
documents electronically must file a
motion, in accordance with 10 CFR
2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
requesting authorization to continue to
submit documents in paper format.
Such filings must be submitted by: (1)
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First class mail addressed to the Office
of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or
(2) courier, express mail, or expedited
delivery service to the Office of the
Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff.
Participants filing a document in this
manner are responsible for serving the
document on all other participants.
Filing is considered complete by firstclass mail as of the time of deposit in
the mail, or by courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service upon
depositing the document with the
provider of the service.
Non-timely requests and/or petitions
and contentions will not be entertained
absent a determination by the
Commission, the presiding officer, or
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
that the petition and/or request should
be granted and/or the contentions
should be admitted, based on a
balancing of the factors specified in 10
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)–(viii). To be timely,
filings must be submitted no later than
11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due
date.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory
proceedings will appear in NRC’s
electronic hearing docket which is
available to the public at https://
ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp,
unless excluded pursuant to an order of
the Commission, an Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board, or a Presiding Officer.
Participants are requested not to include
personal privacy information, such as
social security numbers, home
addresses, or home phone numbers in
their filings. With respect to copyrighted
works, except for limited excerpts that
serve the purpose of the adjudicatory
filings and would constitute a Fair Use
application, participants are requested
not to include copyrighted materials in
their submission.
For further details with respect to this
amendment action, see the application
for amendment which is available for
public inspection at the Commission’s
PDR, located at One White Flint North,
Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be
accessible from the ADAMS Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet
at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If
you do not have access to ADAMS or if
there are problems in accessing the
documents located in ADAMS, contact
the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397–
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4209, (301) 415–4737 or by e-mail to
pdr@nrc.gov.
Arizona Public Service Company (APS),
et al., Docket Nos. STN 50–528, STN
50–529, and STN 50–530, Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2,
and 3, Maricopa County, Arizona
Date of amendment request: January
17, 2008, as supplemented February 29,
2008.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendments would
modify the Technical Specifications
(TS) to establish more effective and
appropriate action, surveillance, and
administrative requirements related to
ensuring the habitability of the control
room envelope (CRE) in accordance
with Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC)-approved TS Task Force (TSTF)
Standard Technical Specification
change traveler TSTF–448, Revision 3,
‘‘Control Room Habitability.’’
Specifically, the proposed amendments
would modify TS 3.7.11, ‘‘Control Room
Essential Filtration System (CREFS),’’
and add new TS 5.5.17, ‘‘Control Room
Envelope Habitability Program,’’ to TS
Administrative Controls Section 5.5,
‘‘Programs and Manuals.’’
The NRC staff issued a ‘‘Notice of
Availability of Technical Specification
Improvement to Modify Requirements
Regarding Control Room Envelope
Habitability Using the Consolidated
Line Item Improvement Process,’’
associated with TSTF–448, Revision 3,
in the Federal Register on January 17,
2007 (72 FR 2022). The notice included
a model safety evaluation, a model no
significant hazards consideration
(NSHC) determination, and a model
license amendment request. In its
application dated January 17, 2008, the
licensee affirmed the applicability of the
model NSHC determination which is
presented below.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of NSHC adopted
by the licensee is presented below:
Criterion 1—The Proposed Change[s]
[Do] Not Involve a Significant Increase
in the Probability or Consequences of an
Accident Previously Evaluated
The proposed change[s] [do] not
adversely affect accident initiators or
precursors nor alter the design
assumptions, conditions, or
configuration of the facility. The
proposed change[s] [do] not alter or
prevent the ability of structures,
systems, and components (SSCs) to
perform their intended function to
mitigate the consequences of an
initiating event within the assumed
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acceptance limits. The proposed
change[s] [revise] the TS for the CRE
[essential filtration] system, which is a
mitigation system designed to minimize
unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and
to filter the CRE atmosphere to protect
the CRE occupants in the event of
accidents previously analyzed. An
important part of the CRE [essential
filtration] system is the CRE boundary.
The CRE [essential filtration] system is
not an initiator or precursor to any
accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the probability of any
accident previously evaluated is not
increased. Performing tests to verify the
operability of the CRE boundary and
implementing a program to assess and
maintain CRE habitability ensure that
the CRE [essential filtration] system is
capable of adequately mitigating
radiological consequences to CRE
occupants during accident conditions,
and that the CRE [essential filtration]
system will perform as assumed in the
consequence analyses of design basis
accidents. Thus, the consequences of
any accident previously evaluated are
not increased. Therefore, the proposed
change[s] [do] not involve a significant
increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
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Criterion 2—The Proposed Change[s]
[Do] Not Create the Possibility of a New
or Different Kind of Accident From any
Accident Previously Evaluated
The proposed change[s] [do] not
impact the accident analysis. The
proposed change[s] [do] not alter the
required mitigation capability of the
CRE [essential filtration] system, or its
functioning during accident conditions
as assumed in the licensing basis
analyses of design basis accident
radiological consequences to CRE
occupants. No new or different
accidents result from performing the
new surveillance or following the new
program. The proposed change[s] [do]
not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (i.e., no new or different type of
equipment will be installed) or a
significant change in the methods
governing normal plant operation. The
proposed change[s] [do] not alter any
safety analysis assumptions and is
consistent with current plant operating
practice. Therefore, [the] change[s] [do]
not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 3—The Proposed Change[s]
[Do] Not Involve a Significant Reduction
in the Margin of Safety
The proposed change[s] [do] not alter
the manner in which safety limits,
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limiting safety system settings or
limiting conditions for operation are
determined. The proposed change[s]
[do] not affect safety analysis acceptance
criteria. The proposed change[s] will not
result in plant operation in a
configuration outside the design basis
for an unacceptable period of time
without compensatory measures. The
proposed change[s] [do] not adversely
affect systems that respond to safely
shut down the plant and to maintain the
plant in a safe shutdown condition.
Therefore, the proposed change[s] [do]
not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. Based upon the
reasoning presented above and the
previous discussion of the amendment
request, the requested change does not
involve a no-significant-hazards
consideration.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
analysis adopted by the licensee and,
based on that review, it appears that the
three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the request
for amendments involves NSHC.
Attorney for licensee: Michael G.
Green, Senior Regulatory Counsel,
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation, P.O.
Box 52034, Mail Station 8695, Phoenix,
Arizona 85072–2034.
NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50–333, James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County,
New York
Date of amendment request: January
22, 2008.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would
modify the Technical Specification (TS)
3.8.3 requirements related to Diesel Fuel
Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air by
replacing the specific fuel oil and lube
oil storage values with the
corresponding number of days supply.
The specific volumes would be
relocated to a licensee-controlled
document (i.e., the TS Bases). It would
also expand the ‘‘clear and bright’’ test
in TS 5.5.10 by allowing a water and
sediment test to be performed to
establish the acceptability of new fuel
oil prior to addition to the storage tanks.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
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The proposed change to the Diesel Fuel
Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air Specification
relocates the volume of diesel fuel oil and
lube oil required to support 7 day operation
of the onsite diesel generators, and the
volume equivalent to a 6 day supply, to
licensee control. The specific volume of fuel
oil equivalent to a 7 and 6 day supply is
calculated using the NRC approved
methodology described in Regulatory Guide
1.137, Revision 1, ‘‘Fuel Oil Systems for
Standby Diesel Generators’’ and ANSI/ANS
[American National Standards Institute/
American Nuclear Society] 59.51–1997
(formerly ANSI N195–1976), ‘‘Fuel Oil
Systems for Safety-Related Emergency Diesel
Generators.’’ The specific volume of lube oil
equivalent to a 7 and 6 day supply is based
on the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
manufacturer’s consumption values for the
run time of the EDG. Because the
requirements to maintain a 7 day supply of
diesel fuel oil and lube oil are not changed
and are consistent with the assumptions in
the accident analyses, and the actions taken
when the volume of fuel oil and lube oil are
less than a 6 day supply have not changed,
neither the probability nor the consequences
of any accident previously evaluated will be
affected. Therefore, the proposed change
does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
The proposed change to the Diesel Fuel Oil
Testing Program adds an option to use
already approved testing methodology. Since
the methodology is already discussed in
ASTM D975 [‘‘Standard Specification for
Diesel Fuel Oils’’] as an acceptable standard
to determine water and sediment content,
neither the probability nor the consequences
of any accident previously evaluated will be
affected. Therefore, the proposed change
does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to the Diesel Fuel
Oil, Lube Oil and Starting Air Specification
and Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program do not
involve physical alterations of the plant (i.e.,
no new or different type of equipment will
be installed) or changes in the methods
governing normal plant operation. The
changes do not alter assumptions made in the
safety analysis but ensure that the diesel
generator operates as assumed in the accident
analysis. The proposed changes are
consistent with the safety analysis
assumptions. Therefore, the proposed
changes do not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change to the Diesel Fuel
Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air Specification
relocates the volume of diesel fuel oil and
lube oil required to support 7 day operation
of the onsite diesel generators, and the
volume equivalent to a 6 day supply, to
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licensee control. As the bases for the existing
limits on diesel fuel oil and lube oil are not
changed and the methods used to determine
these limits have been previously approved,
no change is made to the accident analysis
assumptions and no margin of safety is
reduced as part of this change. Therefore, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed change to the Diesel Fuel Oil
Testing Program provides an option to use a
quantitative method of testing for sediment
and water content as an alternative to a
qualitative method. This option uses an
already accepted method for assessing fuel
oil quality. Based on this, there are no
alterations to any assumptions used in the
accident analysis and this change does not
reduce any margin of safety. Therefore, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. William C.
Dennis, Assistant General Counsel,
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440
Hamilton Avenue, White Plains, NY
10601.
NRC Branch Chief: Mark G. Kowal.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50–333, James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant (JAFNPP), Oswego
County, New York
Date of amendment request: February
7, 2008.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise
the Technical Specifications (TS)
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.3.2
frequency in TS 3.1.3, ‘‘Control Rod
OPERABILITY’’ from ‘‘7 days after the
control rod is withdrawn and
THERMAL POWER is greater than the
[Low Power Setpoint] LPSP of [Rod
Worth Minimizer] RWM’’ to ‘‘31 days
after the control rod is withdrawn and
THERMAL POWER is greater than the
LPSP of the RWM’’ and revise Example
1.4–3 in Section 1.4 ‘‘Frequency’’ to
clarify the applicability of the 1.25
surveillance test interval extension. The
proposed amendment does not adopt
the clarification of Source Range
Monitor (SRM) TS action for inserting
control rods. This clarification was
previously adopted during the JAFNPP
conversion to Improved Standard
Technical Specifications, TS Section
3.3.1.2, required Action E.2, ‘‘Source
Range Monitoring [SRM]
Instrumentation.’’
Date of publication of individual
notice in Federal Register: April 2, 2008
(73 FR 18008).
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Expiration date of individual notice:
May 2, 2008.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1,
Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: March
13, 2008.
Description of amendment request:
The licensee proposes to change the
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.5.8 to
require verification that the reactor
building spray nozzles are unobstructed
following maintenance that could result
in nozzle blockage in lieu of the current
SR of performing the test every 10 years.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The Reactor Building Spray System is not
an initiator of any analyzed event. The
proposed change does not have a detrimental
impact on the integrity of any plan structure,
system, or component that may initiate an
analyzed event. The proposed change will
not alter the operation or otherwise increase
the failure probability of any plant
equipment that can initiate an analyzed
accident. This change does not affect the
plant design. There is no increase in the
likelihood of formation of significant
corrosion products. Due to their location at
the top of the containment, introduction of
foreign material into the spray headers is
unlikely. Foreign materials exclusion
controls during and following maintenance
provides assurance that the nozzles remain
unobstructed. Consequently, there is no
significant increase in the probability of an
accident previously evaluated.
The Reactor Building Spray system is
designed to address the consequences of a
Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or a Main
Steamline Break (MSLB) inside the reactor
building. The Reactor Building Spray system
is capable of performing its function
effectively with the single failure of any
active component in the system, any of its
subsystems, or any of its support systems.
Therefore, the consequences of an accident
previously evaluated are not significantly
affected by the proposed change.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not physically
alter the plant (no new or different type of
equipment will be installed) or change the
methods governing normal plant operation.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
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3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The system piping and nozzles are made if
material that is not susceptible to corrosion.
Obstruction from sources external to the
system is highly unlikely due to the location
high in the reactor building and not being
readily accessible. Strict controls are
established to ensure the foreign material is
not introduced into the Reactor Building
Spray system during maintenance or repairs.
Maintenance activities that could introduce
significant foreign material into the system
require subsequent system cleanliness
verification which would prevent nozzle
blockage. The spray header nozzles are
expected to remain unblocked and available
in the event that the safety function is
required. The capacity of the system would
remain unaffected.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) staff has reviewed the licensee’s
analysis and, based on this review, it
appears that the three standards of 10
CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the
NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Terence A.
Burke, Associate General Counsel—
Entergy Nuclear Operations, P.O. Box
31995, Jackson, Mississippi 39286–
1995.
NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1,
Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: March
13, 2008.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed changes would replace
the current Technical Specification (TS)
3.4.12, ‘‘RCS [Reactor Coolant System]
Specific Activity’’ limit on reactor
coolant system (RCS) gross specific
activity with a new limit on RCS noble
gas specific activity. The noble gas
specific activity limit would be based on
a new dose equivalent Xe–133 (DEX)
definition that would replace the
current E Bar average disintegration
energy definition. In addition, the
current dose equivalent I–131 (DEI)
definition would be revised to allow the
use of additional thyroid dose
conversion factors (DCFs).
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
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consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
Reactor coolant specific activity is not an
initiator for any accident previously
evaluated. The Completion Time when
primary coolant gross activity is not within
limit is not an initiator for any accident
previously evaluated. The current variable
limit on primary coolant iodine
concentration is not an initiator to any
accident previously evaluated. As a result,
the proposed change does not significantly
increase the probability of an accident. The
proposed change will limit primary coolant
noble gases to concentrations consistent with
the accident analyses. The proposed change
to the Completion Time has no impact on the
consequences of any design basis accident
since the consequences of an accident during
the extended Completion Time are the same
as the consequences of an accident during
the current Completion Time. As a result, the
consequences of any accident previously
evaluated are not significantly increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change in specific activity
limits does not alter any physical part of the
plant nor does it affect any plant operating
parameter. The change does not create the
potential for a new or different kind of
accident from any previously calculated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change revises the limits on
noble gas radioactivity in the primary
coolant. The proposed change is consistent
with the assumptions in the safety analyses
and will ensure the monitored values protect
the initial assumptions in the safety analyses.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) staff has reviewed the licensee’s
analysis and, based on this review, it
appears that the three standards of 10
CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the
NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Terence A.
Burke, Associate General Counsel—
Entergy Nuclear Operations, P.O. Box
31995, Jackson, Mississippi 39286–
1995.
NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.
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17:11 May 05, 2008
Jkt 214001
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2,
Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: March
13, 2008.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed changes would replace
the current TS 3.4.8, ‘‘Reactor Coolant
System Specific Activity’’ limit on
reactor coolant system (RCS) gross
specific activity with a new limit on
RCS noble gas specific activity. The
noble gas specific activity limit would
be based on a new dose equivalent Xe133 (DEX) definition that would replace
the current E Bar average disintegration
energy definition. In addition, the
current dose equivalent I–131 (DEI)
definition would be revised to allow the
use of additional thyroid dose
conversion factors (DCFs).
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
Reactor coolant specific activity is not an
initiator for any accident previously
evaluated. The Completion Time when
primary coolant gross activity is not within
limit is not an initiator for any accident
previously evaluated. The current variable
limit on primary coolant iodine
concentration is not an initiator to any
accident previously evaluated. As a result,
the proposed change does not significantly
increase the probability of an accident. The
proposed change will limit primary coolant
noble gases to concentrations consistent with
the accident analyses. The proposed change
to the Completion Time has no impact on the
consequences of any design basis accident
since the consequences of an accident during
the extended Completion Time are the same
as the consequences of an accident during
the current Completion Time. As a result, the
consequences of any accident previously
evaluated are not significantly increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change in specific activity
limits does not alter any physical part of the
plant nor does it affect any plant operating
parameter. The change does not create the
potential for a new or different kind of
accident from any previously calculated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
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25039
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change revises the limits on
noble gas radioactivity in the primary
coolant. The proposed change is consistent
with the assumptions in the safety analyses
and will ensure the monitored values protect
the initial assumptions in the safety analyses.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) staff has reviewed the licensee’s
analysis and, based on this review, it
appears that the three standards of 10
CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the
NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Terence A.
Burke, Associate General Counsel—
Entergy Nuclear Operations, P. O. Box
31995, Jackson, Mississippi 39286–
1995.
NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2,
Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: March
13, 2008.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed change will relocate
Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.7,
‘‘Reactor Coolant System Chemistry,’’ to
the Technical Requirements Manual
(TRM).
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change acts to relocate
current Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
chemistry limits and monitoring
requirements from the TSs to the TRM.
Monitoring and maintaining RCS chemistry
minimizes the potential for corrosion of RCS
piping and components. Corrosion effects are
considered a long-term impact on RCS
structural integrity. Because RCS chemistry
will continue to be monitored and controlled,
relocating the current TS requirements to the
TRM will not present an adverse impact to
the RCS and, subsequently, will not impact
the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated. Furthermore,
once relocated to the TRM, changes to RCS
chemistry limits or monitoring requirements
will be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR
50.59.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
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probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not result in
any plant modifications or changes in the
way the plant is operated. The proposed
change only acts to relocate current RCS
chemistry limits and monitoring
requirements from the TSs to the TRM.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will maintain limits
on RCS chemistry parameters and will
continue to provide associated monitoring
requirements. Once relocated to the TRM,
changes to RCS chemistry limits or
monitoring requirements will be controlled
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. In
addition, the RCS chemistry limits are not a
structure, system, or component which
operating experience or probabilistic risk
assessment has shown to be significant to
public health and safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) staff has reviewed the licensee’s
analysis and, based on this review, it
appears that the three standards of 10
CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the
NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Terence A.
Burke, Associate General Counsel—
Entergy Nuclear Operations, P.O. Box
31995, Jackson, Mississippi 39286–
1995.
NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC,
Docket Nos. 50–352 and 50–353,
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1
and 2, Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request:
December 12, 2007.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed changes are
administrative in nature and provide
editorial changes to the technical
specifications (TSs). The proposed
changes involve: (1) Correcting the
index; (2) removing cycle specific
requirements or notes that have since
expired and are no longer applicable; (3)
deleting references to previously deleted
requirements; (4) changing references to
the location of previously relocated
information; and (5) other editorial
corrections. These proposed changes
correct minor inconsistencies that have
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17:11 May 05, 2008
Jkt 214001
been introduced over time as a result of
previous changes to the TSs or involve
changes that are solely editorial in
nature.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Do the proposed changes involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes are administrative
in nature and do not impact the physical
configuration or function of plant structures,
systems, or components (SSCs) or the manner
in which SSCs are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed
changes do not impact the initiators or
assumptions of analyzed events, nor do they
impact mitigation of accidents or transient
events.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Do the proposed changes create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes are administrative
in nature and do not alter plant
configuration, require that new plant
equipment be installed, alter assumptions
made about accidents previously evaluated,
or impact the function of plant SSCs or the
manner in which SSCs are operated,
maintained, modified, tested, or inspected.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Do the proposed changes involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes are administrative
in nature and do not involve any physical
changes to plant SSCs or the manner in
which SSCs are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed
changes do not involve a change to any safety
limits, limiting safety system settings,
limiting conditions of operation, or design
parameters for any SSC. The proposed
changes do not impact any safety analysis
assumptions and do not involve a change in
initial conditions, system response times, or
other parameters affecting an accident
analysis. Therefore, the proposed changes do
not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
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Attorney for licensee: J. Bradley
Fewell, Esquire, Associate General
Counsel, Exelon Generation Company,
LLC, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville,
IL 60555.
NRC Branch Chief: Harold K.
Chernoff.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, and
PSEG Nuclear, LLC, Docket Nos. 50–277
and 50–278, Peach Bottom Atomic
Power Station (PBAPS),
Units 2 and 3, York and Lancaster
Counties, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: July 13,
2007.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would
modify the Technical Specifications to
support application of Alternative
Source Term (AST) methodology at
PBAPS Units 2 and 3. The fission
product release from the reactor core
into containment is referred to as the
‘‘source term,’’ and is characterized by
the composition and magnitude of the
radioactive material, the chemical and
physical properties of the material, and
the timing of the release from the reactor
core as discussed in Technical
Information Document (TID) 14844,
‘‘Calculation of Distance Factors for
Power and Test Reactor Sites.’’ Since
the publication of TID 14844, advances
have been made in understanding the
composition and magnitude, chemical
form, and timing of fission product
releases from severe nuclear power
plant accidents. In light of these
insights, NUREG–1465, ‘‘Accident
Source Terms for Light-Water Nuclear
Power Plants,’’ was published in 1995
with revised ASTs for use in the
licensing of future light-water reactors.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), in Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Section 50.67 (10 CFR
50.67), ‘‘Accident source term,’’
subsequently allowed the use of the
ASTs described in NUREG–1465 at
operating plants. This request to apply
the AST methodology is made in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.67, with the
exception that TID 14844 will continue
to be used as the radiation dose basis for
equipment qualification at PBAPS Units
2 and 3. Application of the AST
methodology at PBAPS Units 2 and 3
requires that radiation dose limits
specified in 10 CFR 50.67 are adhered
to for the exclusion area boundary, the
low population zone outer boundary,
and the facility control room.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
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rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. The proposed changes do not involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The implementation of alternative source
term (AST) assumptions has been evaluated
in revisions to the analyses of the following
limiting design basis accidents (DBAs) at
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
(PBAPS):
• Loss-of-Coolant Accident,
• Fuel Handling Accident,
• Control Rod Drop Accident, and
• Main Steam Line Break Accident.
Based upon the results of these analyses,
it has been demonstrated that, with the
requested changes, the dose consequences of
these limiting events are within the
regulatory guidance provided by the NRC for
use with the AST. This guidance is presented
in 10 CFR 50.67 and associated Regulatory
Guide 1.183, and Standard Review Plan
Section 15.0.1. The Alternative Source Term
is an input to calculations used to evaluate
the consequences of an accident, and does
not by itself affect the plant response, or the
actual pathway of the radiation released from
the fuel. It does, however, better represent
the physical characteristics of the release, so
that appropriate mitigation techniques may
be applied. Therefore, the consequences of an
accident previously evaluated are not
significantly increased.
The equipment affected by the proposed
changes is mitigative in nature, and relied
upon after an accident has been initiated.
Application of the Alternative Source Term
(AST) does not involve any physical changes
to the plant design. While the operation of
various systems do change as a result of these
proposed changes, these systems are not
accident initiators. Application of the AST is
not an initiator of a design basis accident.
The proposed changes to the Technical
Specifications (TS), while they revise certain
performance requirements, do not involve
any physical modifications to the plant. As
a result, the proposed changes do not affect
any of the parameters or conditions that
could contribute to the initiation of any
accidents. As such, removal of operability
requirements during the specified conditions
will not significantly increase the probability
of occurrence for an accident previously
analyzed. Since design basis accident
initiators are not being altered by adoption of
the Alternative Source Term analyses, the
probability of an accident previously
evaluated is not affected.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The proposed changes do not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed amendment does not involve
a physical alteration of the plant (no new or
different type of equipment will be installed
and there are no physical modifications to
existing equipment associated with the
proposed changes). Similarly, it does not
physically change any structures, systems or
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17:11 May 05, 2008
Jkt 214001
components involved in the mitigation of any
accidents; thus, no new initiators or
precursors of a new or different kind of
accident are created. New equipment or
personnel failure modes that might initiate a
new type of accident are not created as a
result of the proposed amendment.
As such, the proposed amendment will not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. The proposed changes do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Safety margins and analytical
conservatisms have been evaluated and have
been found acceptable. The analyzed events
have been carefully selected and margin has
been retained to ensure that the analyses
adequately bound postulated event scenarios.
The dose consequences due to design basis
accidents comply with the requirements of
10 CFR 50.67 and the guidance of Regulatory
Guide 1.183. The proposed amendment is
associated with the implementation of a new
licensing basis for PBAPS Design Basis
Accidents (DBAs). Approval of the change
from the original source term to a new source
term taken from Regulatory Guide 1.183 is
being requested. The results of the accident
analyses, revised in support of the proposed
license amendment, are subject to revised
acceptance criteria. The analyses have been
performed using conservative methodologies,
as specified in Regulatory Guide 1.183.
Safety margins have been evaluated and
analytical conservatism has been utilized to
ensure that the analyses adequately bound
the postulated limiting event scenario. The
dose consequences of these DBAs remain
within the acceptance criteria presented in
10 CFR 50.67, ‘‘Accident Source Term’’, and
Regulatory Guide 1.183.
The proposed changes continue to ensure
that the doses at the exclusion area boundary
(EAB) and low population zone boundary
(LPZ), as well as the Control Room, are
within corresponding regulatory limits.
Therefore, operation of PBAPS in
accordance with the proposed changes will
not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. J. Bradley
Fewell, Associate General Counsel,
Exelon Generation Company LLC, 4300
Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
NRC Branch Chief: Harold K.
Chernoff.
FPL Energy, Point Beach, LLC, Docket
Nos. 50–266 and 50–301, Point Beach
Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Town of
Two Creeks, Manitowoc County,
Wisconsin
Date of amendment request: March
31, 2008.
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25041
Description of amendment request:
FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC, requests
adoption of an approved change to the
Standard Technical Specifications (STS)
for pressurized-water reactor (PWR)
plants (NUREG–1430, NUREG–1431, &
NUREG–1432) and plant-specific
technical specifications (TS), to replace
the current limits on primary coolant
gross specific activity with limits on
primary coolant noble gas activity. The
noble gas activity would be based on
dose equivalent Xenon-133 and would
take into account only the noble gas
activity in the primary coolant. In
addition, the current dose equivalent I–
131 definition would be revised to allow
the use of additional thyroid dose
conversion factors. The changes are
consistent with Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC)-approved Industry/
Technical Specification Task Force
(TSTF) Standard Technical
Specification Change Traveler, TSTF–
490, Revision 0.
Basis for proposed no-significanthazards-consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration is presented
below:
Criterion 1—The Proposed Change
Does Not Involve a Significant Increase
in the Probability or Consequences of an
Accident Previously Evaluated Reactor
coolant specific activity is not an
initiator for any accident previously
evaluated. The Completion Time when
primary coolant gross activity is not
within limit is not an initiator for any
accident previously evaluated. The
current variable limit on primary
coolant iodine concentration is not an
initiator to any accident previously
evaluated. As a result, the proposed
change does not significantly increase
the probability of an accident. The
proposed change will limit primary
coolant noble gases to concentrations
consistent with the accident analyses.
The proposed change to the Completion
Time has no impact on the
consequences of any design basis
accident since the consequences of an
accident during the extended
Completion Time are the same as the
consequences of an accident during the
Completion Time. As a result, the
consequences of any accident
previously evaluated are not
significantly increased.
Criterion 2—The Proposed Change
Does Not Create the Possibility of a New
or Different Kind of Accident from any
Accident Previously Evaluated.
The proposed change in specific
activity limits does not alter any
physical part of the plant nor does it
affect any plant operating parameter.
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The change does not create the potential
for a new or different kind of accident
from any previously calculated.
Criterion 3—The Proposed Change
Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in the Margin of Safety.
The proposed change revises the
limits on noble gas radioactivity in the
primary coolant. The proposed change
is consistent with the assumptions in
the safety analyses and will ensure the
monitored values protect the initial
assumptions in the safety analyses.
Based upon the reasoning presented
above, the requested change does not
involve a significant reduction in the
margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
analysis and based on this review, it
appears that the three standards of 10
CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the
NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Antonio
Fernandez, Esquire, Senior Attorney,
FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC, P. O. Box
14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408–0420.
NRC Branch Chief: Lois M. James.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC,
Docket No. 50–263, Monticello Nuclear
Generating Plant, Wright County,
Minnesota
Date of amendment request: March
31, 2008.
Description of amendment request:
The licensee proposed to increase the
current maximum power level
authorized by Section 2.C(1) of the
renewed facility operating license from
1,775 megawatts thermal (Mwt) to 1,870
Mwt, an approximately five percent
increase from the current licensed
thermal power. The current maximum
power level of 1,775 Mwt was approved
in 1998, an increase of 6.3 percent from
the original licensed thermal power of
1670 Mwt. Thus, when approved, the
licensee’s proposed amendment would
take the maximum power level to about
12 percent above the original license
thermal power. The licensee’s
application addresses in details each of
the following major technical areas:
Extended power uprate, containment
analysis methods change, increase in
credit for containment overpressure for
low head emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) pumps, and reactor
internal pressure differentials (RIPDs)
for the steam dryer.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part
50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC). The
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licensee’s NSHC analysis, addressing
each technical area listed above, is
reproduced below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Extended Power Uprate
Response: No.
The probability (frequency of occurrence)
of [d]esign [b]asis [a]ccidents occurring is not
affected by the increased power level,
because Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
(MNGP) continues to comply with the
regulatory and design basis criteria
established for plant equipment. A
probabilistic risk assessment demonstrates
that the calculated core damage frequencies
do not significantly change due to [e]xtended
[p]ower [u]prate (EPU). Scram setpoints
(equipment settings that initiate automatic
plant shutdowns) are established such that
there is no significant increase in scram
frequency due to EPU. No new challenges to
safety-related equipment result from EPU.
The changes in consequences of postulated
accidents, which would occur from 102
percent of the EPU [rated thermal power]
RTP compared to those previously evaluated,
are acceptable. The results of EPU accident
evaluations do not exceed the NRC[-]
approved acceptance limits. The spectrum of
postulated accidents and transients has been
investigated, and are shown to meet the
plant’s currently licensed regulatory criteria.
In the area of fuel and core design, for
example, the Safety Limit Minimum Critical
Power Ratio (SLMCPR) and other applicable
Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits
(SAFDL) are still met. Continued compliance
with the SLMCPR and other SAFDLs will be
confirmed on a cycle[-]specific basis
consistent with the criteria accepted by the
NRC.
Challenges to the [r]eactor [c]oolant
[p]ressure [b]oundary were evaluated at EPU
conditions (pressure, temperature, flow, and
radiation) and were found to meet their
acceptance criteria for allowable stresses and
overpressure margin. Challenges to the
containment have been evaluated, and the
containment and its associated cooling
systems continue to meet the current
licensing basis. The increase in the
calculated post[-] LOCA suppression pool
temperature above the currently assumed
peak temperature was evaluated and
determined to be acceptable. Radiological
release events (accidents) have been
evaluated, and have been shown to meet the
guidelines of 10 CFR 50.67.
Containment Analysis Methods Change
Response: No.
The use of passive heat sinks, variable RHR
[residual heat removal] heat exchanger
capability K-value, and mechanistic heat and
mass transfer from the suppression pool
surface to the wetwell airspace after 30
seconds for the long[-]term design[-] basis
[-]accident loss of coolant accident (DBA–
LOCA) containment analysis are not relevant
to accident initiation, but rather, pertain to
the method used to accurately evaluate
postulated accidents. The use of these
elements does not, in any way, alter existing
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fission product boundaries, and provides a
conservative prediction of the containment
response to DBA–LOCAs. Therefore, the
containment analysis method change does
not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
Increase in Credit for Containment
Overpressure for Low Head Emergency
Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pumps
Response: No.
These changes update parameters used in
the MNGP safety analyses and expand the
range and scope of the analyses. This will
result in a more realistic analysis of available
containment overpressure under design
[-]basis accident conditions. The updated
analyses affect only the evaluation of
previously reviewed accidents. No plant
structure, system, or component (SSC) is
physically affected by the updated and
expanded analyses. No method of operation
of any plant SSC is affected. Therefore, there
is no significant increase in the probability or
consequence of a previously evaluated
accident.
Reactor Internal Pressure Differentials
(RIPDs) for the Steam Dryer
Response: No.
The revised steam dryer RIPDs are used in
evaluating loads in reactor vessel internals
for various conditions (i.e., during normal,
upset and faulted conditions). The values
more accurately represent the actual plant
configuration. No plant structure, system, or
component (SSC) is physically affected by
the updated and expanded analyses. No
method of operation of any plant SSC is
affected. Therefore, there is no significant
increase in the probability or consequence of
a previously evaluated accident.
The analyses supporting the above
evaluations were performed at the EPU
power level of 2,004 Mwt, which bounds this
license amendment request to operate at
1,870 Mwt. Therefore, the proposed changes
do not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Extended Power Uprate
Response: No.
Equipment that could be affected by EPU
has been evaluated. No new operating mode,
safety-related equipment lineup, accident
scenario, or equipment failure mode was
identified. The full spectrum of accident
considerations has been evaluated and no
new or different kind of accident has been
identified. EPU uses developed technology
and applies it within capabilities of existing
or modified plant safety[-]related equipment
in accordance with the regulatory criteria
(including NRC[-]approved codes, standards
and methods). No new accidents or event
precursors have been identified.
The MNGP TS require revision to
implement EPU. The revisions have been
assessed and it was determined that the
proposed change will not introduce a
different accident than that previously
evaluated. Therefore, the proposed changes
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do not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Containment Analysis Methods Change
Response: No.
The use of passive heat sinks, variable RHR
heat exchanger capability K-value, and
mechanistic heat and transfer from the
suppression pool surface to the wetwell
airspace after 30 seconds for the long term
DBA–LOCA containment analysis are not
relevant to accident initiation, but pertain to
the method used to evaluate currently
postulated accidents. The use of these
analytical tools does not involve any physical
changes to plant structures or systems, and
does not create a new initiating event for the
spectrum of events currently postulated.
Further, they do not result in the need to
postulate any new accident scenarios.
Therefore, the containment analysis method
change does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
Increase in Credit for Containment
Overpressure for Low Head ECCS Pumps
Response: No.
The proposed change involves the
updating and expansion in scope of the
existing design bases analysis with respect to
the available containment overpressure. No
new failure mode or mechanisms have been
created for any plant SSC important to safety
nor has any new limiting single failure been
identified as a result of the proposed
analytical changes. Therefore, the change to
containment overpressure credited for low
pressure ECCS pumps does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
Reactor Internal Pressure Differentials for the
Steam Dryer
Response: No.
The revised steam dryer RIPDs are used in
evaluating loads in reactor vessel internals
for various conditions (i.e., during normal,
upset and faulted conditions). The steam
dryer RIPDs are not relevant to accident
initiation, but only pertain to the method
used to evaluate reactor vessel internals
loads. The revised steam dryer RIPD values
more accurately represent the actual plant
configuration. Therefore, the change to steam
dryer RIPDs does not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
The analyses supporting the above
evaluations were performed at the EPU
power level of 2,004 Mwt, which bounds this
license amendment request to operate at
1,870 Mwt. Therefore, the proposed changes
do not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Extended Power Uprate
Response: No.
The EPU affects only design and
operational margins. Challenges to the fuel,
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and
containment were evaluated for EPU
conditions. Fuel integrity is maintained by
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meeting existing design and regulatory limits.
The calculated loads on affected structures,
systems and components, including the
reactor coolant pressure boundary, will
remain within their design allowables for
design[-]basis event categories. No NRC
acceptance criterion is exceeded. Because the
MNGP configuration and responses to
transients and postulated accidents do not
result in exceeding the presently approved
NRC acceptance limits, the proposed changes
do not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
Containment Analysis Methods Change
Response: No.
The use of passive heat sinks, variable RHR
heat exchanger capability K-value, and
mechanistic heat and mass transfer from the
suppression pool surface to the wetwell
airspace after 30 seconds for the long[-]term
DBA–LOCA containment analysis are
realistic phenomena and provide a
conservative prediction of the plant response
to DBA–LOCAs. The increase in pressure and
temperature are relatively small and are
within design limits. Therefore, the
containment analysis methods change does
not involve a significant reduction in the
margin of safety.
Increase in Credit for Containment
Overpressure for Low Head ECCS Pumps
Response: No.
The proposed changes revise containment
response analytical methods and scope for
containment pressure to assist in ECCS pump
net positive suction head (NPSH). The
changes are still based on conservative but
more realistic analysis of available
containment overpressure determined using
analysis methods that minimize containment
pressure and maximize suppression pool
temperature. These changes do not constitute
a significant reduction in the margin of
safety.
Reactor Internal Pressure Differentials for the
Steam Dryer
Response: No.
The revised steam dryer RIPDs are used in
evaluating loads in reactor vessel internals
for various conditions (i.e., during normal,
upset and faulted conditions). The revised
steam dryer RIPD values more accurately
represent the actual plant configuration. The
changes are still conservative but more
accurately represent the MNGP
configuration. These changes do not
constitute a significant reduction in the
margin of safety.
The analyses supporting the above
evaluations were performed at the EPU
power level of 2,004 Mwt, which bounds this
license amendment request to operate at
1,870 Mwt. Therefore, the proposed changes
do not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on the
NRC staff’s own analysis above, it
appears that the three standards of 10
CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the
NRC staff proposes to determine that the
proposed amendment involves no
significant hazards consideration.
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25043
Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass,
Assistant General Counsel, Xcel Energy
Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall,
Minneapolis, MN 55401.
NRC Branch Chief: Lois M. James.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC,
Docket No. 50–263, Monticello Nuclear
Generating Plant, Wright County,
Minnesota
Date of amendment request: April 3,
2008.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would
modify Technical Specifications (TS)
requirements related to control room
envelope (CRE) habitability in TS
Section 3.7.4, ‘‘Control Room
Emergency Filtration (CREF) System,’’
and Section 5.5, ‘‘Programs and
Manuals.’’ The proposed changes are
consistent with Technical Specification
Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical
Specifications (STS) change TSTF–448,
Revision 3.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part
50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC) by
referencing the NRC staff’s model NSHC
analysis published on January 17, 2007
(72 FR 2022). The NRC staff’s model
NSHC analysis is reproduced below:
Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an
Accident Previously Evaluated
The proposed change does not adversely
affect accident initiators or precursors nor
alter the design assumptions, conditions, or
configuration of the facility. The proposed
change does not alter or prevent the ability
of structures, systems, and components
(SSCs) to perform their intended function to
mitigate the consequences of an initiating
event within the assumed acceptance limits.
The proposed change revises the TS for the
CRE emergency ventilation system, which is
a mitigation system designed to minimize
unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to
filter the CRE atmosphere to protect the CRE
occupants in the event of accidents
previously analyzed. An important part of
the CRE emergency ventilation system is the
CRE boundary. The CRE emergency
ventilation system is not an initiator or
precursor to any accident previously
evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any
accident previously evaluated is not
increased. Performing tests to verify the
operability of the CRE boundary and
implementing a program to assess and
maintain CRE habitability ensure that the
CRE emergency ventilation system is capable
of adequately mitigating radiological
consequences to CRE occupants during
accident conditions, and that the CRE
emergency ventilation system will perform as
assumed in the consequence analyses of
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design basis accidents. Thus, the
consequences of any accident previously
evaluated are not increased. Therefore, the
proposed change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
Kind of Accident From any Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change does not impact the
accident analysis. The proposed change does
not alter the required mitigation capability of
the CRE emergency ventilation system, or its
functioning during accident conditions as
assumed in the licensing basis analyses of
design basis accident radiological
consequences to CRE occupants. No new or
different accidents result from performing the
new surveillance or following the new
program. The proposed change does not
involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e.,
no new or different type of equipment will
be installed) or a significant change in the
methods governing normal plant operation.
The proposed change does not alter any
safety analysis assumptions and is consistent
with current plant operating practice.
Therefore, this change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Reduction in the
Margin of Safety
The proposed change does not alter the
manner in which safety limits, limiting safety
system settings or limiting conditions for
operation are determined. The proposed
change does not affect safety analysis
acceptance criteria. The proposed change
will not result in plant operation in a
configuration outside the design basis for an
unacceptable period of time without
compensatory measures. The proposed
change does not adversely affect systems that
respond to safely shut down the plant and to
maintain the plant in a safe shutdown
condition. Therefore, the proposed change
does not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s referenced analysis, and has
found that the three standards of 10 CFR
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the
NRC staff proposes to determine that the
proposed amendment involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass,
Assistant General Counsel, Xcel Energy
Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall,
Minneapolis, MN 55401.
NRC Branch Chief: Lois M. James.
PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50–
387 and 50–388, Susquehanna Steam
Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Luzerne
County, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: March
28, 2008.
Description of amendment request:
The amendments would revise PPL
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Susquehanna, LLC, Units 1 and 2 (PPL)
Technical Specifications (TSs) 3.8.4,
‘‘DC Sources—Operating,’’ to establish
two new Conditions, A and B the
associated Required Actions with their
completion times, and also, make some
editorial and administrative changes.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
No. The proposed changes revise the
Technical Specifications (TS) for the DC
Electrical Power Systems and propose new
Actions with increased completion times for
an inoperable battery charger. The DC
electrical power systems, including
associated battery chargers, are not initiators
to any accident sequence analyzed in the
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
Operation in accordance with the proposed
TS ensures that the DC electrical power
systems are capable of performing functions
as described in the FSAR. Therefore, the
mitigative functions supported by the DC
Power Systems will continue to provide the
protection assumed by the analysis. The
integrity of fission product barriers, plant
configuration, and operating procedures as
described in the FSAR will not be affected by
the proposed changes.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
No. The proposed changes only involve
revising the TS for the DC electrical power
systems. The DC electrical power systems are
used to supply equipment used to mitigate an
accident. These mitigative functions,
supported by the DC electrical power systems
are not affected by these changes and they
will continue to provide the protection
assumed by the safety analysis described in
the FSAR. There are no new types of failures
or new or different kinds of accidents or
transients that could be created by these
changes.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
No. The margin of safety is established
through equipment design, operating
parameters, and the setpoints at which
automatic actions are initiated. The proposed
changes will not adversely affect operation of
plant equipment. These changes will not
result in a change to the setpoints at which
protective actions are initiated. Sufficient DC
electrical system capacity is ensured to
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support operation of mitigation equipment.
The equipment fed by the DC electrical
sources will continue to provide adequate
power to safety related loads in accordance
with the safety analysis.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Bryan A. Snapp,
Esquire, Assoc. General Counsel, PPL
Services Corporation, 2 North Ninth St.,
GENTW3, Allentown, PA 18101–1179.
NRC Branch Chief: Mark G. Kowal.
PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50–
387 and 50–388, Susquehanna Steam
Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Luzerne
County, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: March
28, 2008.
Description of amendment request:
The amendments would revise PPL
Susquehanna, LLC, Units 1 and 2 (PPL)
Technical Specifications (TSs) TS
3.6.4.1 ‘‘Secondary Containment,’’ and
TS 3.6.4.3 ‘‘Standby Gas Treatment
System,’’ as follows:
(1) To add a new Required Action
option for TS 3.6.4.1 Condition A, to
allow additional time to restore
secondary containment to OPERABLE
when the inoperability is not caused by
a loss of secondary containment
integrity,
(2) To add a new Actions note TS
3.6.4.1, to allow opening of secondary
containment heating ventilation and air
conditioning duct access doors and
opening of a secondary containment
equipment ingress/egress door (102
door) under administrative controls
provided no movement of irradiated
fuel assemblies in the secondary
containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, or
operations with a potential for draining
the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) are in
progress,
(3) To modify the existing note to
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3
and add a second note to this same SR,
to expand upon the existing SR
exception note by adding other types of
door access openings that occur for
entry and exit of people or equipment,
and
(4) The administrative change to
remove a one-time allowance in TS
3.6.4.1 and TS 3.6.4.3 ‘‘Standby Gas
Treatment System [SGTS],’’ that
extended the allowable Completion
Time for Secondary Containment
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inoperable and two SGTS subsystems
inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3. This
allowance was previously incorporated
into both Unit 1 and Unit 2 TSs to
facilitate Reactor Recirculating Fan
Damper Motor work.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Do the proposed changes involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
These changes do not involve any physical
change to structures, systems, or components
(SSCs) and do not alter the method of
operation of any SSCs. The current
assumptions in the safety analysis regarding
accident initiators and mitigation of
accidents are unaffected by these changes. No
SSC failure modes or mechanisms are being
introduced, and the likelihood of previously
analyzed failures remains unchanged.
Operation in accordance with the proposed
new Required Action option for TS 3.6.4.1
Condition A and the Notes that are being
modified and added in both the Unit 1 and
Unit 2 Technical Specifications ensures that
the secondary containment remains capable
of performing its function. The Required
Action change, which will permit up to 72
hours to restore secondary containment
vacuum, only provides this additional time
when it can be shown that the vacuum loss
has not been caused through compromise of
the secondary containment boundary.
The proposed Note modifications and
additions addressing secondary containment
access door and duct access door openings
will provide relief from TS requirements that
must currently be implemented in response
to various routine plant activities. These
activities can be managed through
administrative controls that will ensure doors
can be closed quickly (within 30 minutes) to
re-establish secondary containment before
the early in-vessel release phase begins
(Regulatory Guide 1.183).
These changes do not, therefore, result in
an increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Do the proposed changes create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve a
physical alteration of any plant equipment.
No new equipment is being introduced, and
installed equipment is not being operated in
a new or different manner. There are no
setpoints, at which protective or mitigative
actions are initiated, affected by this change.
This change does not alter the manner in
which equipment operation is initiated, nor
will the function demands on credited
equipment be changed. No alterations in the
procedures that ensure the plant remains
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within analyzed limits are being proposed,
and no changes are being made to the
procedures relied upon to respond to an offnormal event as described in the FSAR [final
safety analysis report]. As such, no new
failure modes are being introduced. The
change does not alter assumptions made in
the safety analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Do the proposed changes involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is established through
equipment design, operating parameters, and
the setpoints at which automatic actions are
initiated. The proposed changes are
acceptable because the Completion Time for
the new Required Action to verify secondary
containment boundary integrity within 4
hours has been established to be consistent
with the current completion time of
Condition A. A failure or inability to
complete this verification will result in the
implementation of LCO [limiting condition
for operation] 3.6.4.1 requirements in the
same timeframe that currently exists. Upon
successful completion of this verification,
however, the proposed change will provide
72 hours to restore secondary containment to
an operable status through vacuum
restoration. When in this condition, the
secondary containment and SGTS are
capable of performing their design basis
function.
The Note modifications and additions to
TS 3.6.4.1 are also acceptable because the
revised Notes provide allowances and
exemptions to Technical Specification entry
for routine plant activities that can be
administratively controlled and quickly
restored.
The plant response to analyzed events is
not affected by these changes and will,
continue to provide the margin of safety
assumed by the safety analysis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Bryan A. Snapp,
Esquire, Assoc. General Counsel, PPL
Services Corporation, 2 North Ninth St.,
GENTW3, Allentown, PA 18101–1179.
NRC Branch Chief: Mark G. Kowal.
Southern California Edison Company, et
al., Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362,
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 2 and 3, San Diego County,
California
Date of amendment request:
November 30, 2007.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed Technical Specification
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changes will provide operational
flexibility supported by direct current
(DC) electrical subsystem design
upgrades that are in progress. These
upgrades will provide increased
capacity batteries, additional battery
chargers, and the means to crossconnect DC subsystems while meeting
all design battery loading requirements.
With these modifications in place, it
will be feasible to perform routine
surveillances as well as battery
replacements online.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Will operation of the facility in
accordance with this proposed change
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to Technical
Specifications (TS) 3.8.4 and 3.8.6 would
allow extension of the Completion Time (CT)
for inoperable Direct Current (DC)
distribution subsystems to manually crossconnect DC distribution buses of the same
safety train of the operating unit for 21 days
(30 days for upgrade to 1800 amp-hour rated
batteries). Currently the CT only allows for 2
hours to ascertain the source of the problem
before a controlled shutdown is initiated.
Loss of a DC subsystem is not an initiator of
an event. However, complete loss of a Train
A (subsystems A and C) or Train B
(subsystems B and D) DC system would
initiate a plant transient/plant trip.
Operation of a DC Train in cross-connected
configuration does not affect the quality of
DC control and motive power to any system.
Therefore, allowing the cross-connect of DC
distribution systems does not significantly
increase the probability of an accident
previously evaluated in Chapter 15 of the
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR).
The above conclusion is supported by
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
evaluation which encompasses all accidents,
including UFSAR Chapter 15.
New TS Surveillance Requirement (SR)
3.8.4.4 is added to allow the application of
the modified performance discharge testing
on batteries rated at 1800 amp-hour using a
frequency of 30 months. The application of
the modified performance test is the
preferred choice at SONGS for Class 1 E 1800
amp-hour rated batteries. Therefore, only the
modified performance discharge test will be
used which uses the combined duty cycle of
the cross-connected subsystems AC or B–D.
Battery life expectancy is optimized by using
a 30-month modified performance test
(service and performance test combined). The
more rigorous modified performance
discharge test will be applied in intervals of
30 months over the entire battery life. Using
the same test method and test frequency
throughout the battery life ensures that best
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trending results are achieved. The test
frequency of 30 months will better
correspond with scheduling of the more
rigorous 60-month interval battery
performance of modified performance
discharge tests. Based on operating
experience, the interval of 30 months is not
expected to affect SONGS’ capability to
detect battery health and capacity.
The relocation of preventive maintenance
surveillances and certain operating limits
and actions to the Licensee Controlled
Specifications and new Battery Monitoring
and Maintenance Program will not challenge
the ability of the DC electrical power system
to perform its design function. Appropriate
monitoring and maintenance consistent with
industry standards will continue to be
performed. In addition, the DC electrical
power system is within the scope of 10 CFR
50.65, ‘‘Requirements for monitoring the
effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear
power plants,’’ which will ensure the control
of maintenance activities associated with the
DC electrical power system. Enhancements
from TSTF–360, Rev. 1 and IEEE 450–2002
have been incorporated into TSs 3.8.4, 3.8.5,
and 3.8.6. These changes do not impact the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
Further, changes are made of an editorial
nature or provide clarification regarding
electrical ‘Trains’ and ‘Subsystems’ by using
a more conventional terminology. TSs
affected by editorial changes include 3.8.1,
3.8.4, 3.8.5, 3.8.6, 3.8.7, 3.8.9, and 3.8.10. The
changes being proposed in the TS do not
affect assumptions contained in other safety
analyses or the physical design of the plant,
nor do they affect other Technical
Specifications that preserve safety analysis
assumptions.
Therefore, operation of the facility in
accordance with the proposed amendment
would not involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an
accident previously analyzed.
2. Will operation of the facility in
accordance with this proposed change create
the possibility of new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes involve
restructuring the TS for the DC electrical
power system. The DC electrical power
system, including associated battery chargers,
is not an initiator to any accident sequence
analyzed in the UFSAR. Rather, the DC
electrical power system is used to supply
equipment used to mitigate an accident.
The proposed change modifies TSs and
surveillances for batteries and chargers to
meet the improvements of TSTF–360, Rev. 1
and IEEE 450–2002 whose intent is to
maintain the same equipment capability as
previously assumed in Southern California
Edison’s (SCE’s) commitment to IEEE 450–
1980.
The proposed change will allow the crosstie of DC subsystems and allow extension of
the CT for an inoperable subsystem to 21
days (30 days for upgrade to 1800 amp-hour
rated batteries). Failure of the cross-tied DC
buses and/or associated battery(ies) is
bounded by existing evaluations for the
failure of an entire electrical train.
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Swing battery chargers are added to
increase the overall DC system reliability.
Administrative and mechanical controls are
in place to ensure the design and operation
of the DC systems continue to meet the
UFSAR design basis.
Therefore, operation of the facility in
accordance with this proposed change will
not create the possibility of new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Will operation of the facility in
accordance with this proposed change
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is established through
equipment design, operating parameters, and
the setpoints at which automatic actions are
initiated. The proposed changes will not
adversely affect operation of plant
equipment. These changes will not result in
a change to the setpoints at which protective
actions are initiated. Sufficient DC capacity
to support operation of mitigation equipment
is ensured. The changes associated with the
new battery maintenance and monitoring
program will ensure that the station batteries
are maintained in a highly reliable manner.
The equipment fed by the DC electrical
sources will continue to provide adequate
power to safety related loads in accordance
with analysis assumptions.
Improvements in accordance with IEEE
450–2002 and TSTF–360, Rev. 1 maintain the
same level of equipment performance stated
in the UFSAR and the current Technical
Specifications.
The addition of swing battery chargers
increases the overall DC system reliability.
Administrative and mechanical controls will
be in place to ensure that the design and
operation of the DC systems continue to meet
the UFSAR design basis.
The addition of the DC cross-tie capability
proposed for TS 3.8.4 has been evaluated, as
described previously, using PRA and
determined to be of acceptable risk as long
as the duration while cross-tied is limited to
30 days. A new Condition has been included
as part of this proposed change to ensure that
plant operation, with DC buses cross-tied,
will not exceed 21 days (30 days for upgrade
to 1800 amp-hour rated batteries).
Revising the LCO statement to reflect the
SONGS-specific design terminology and
renaming existing conditions to make the
Condition more consistent with the Standard
Technical Specifications (STS) is considered
administrative.
Therefore, operation of the facility in
accordance with the proposed amendment
would not involve a significant reduction in
a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Terence A.
Burke, Associate General Counsel—
Nuclear Entergy Services, Inc., 1340
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Echelon Parkway, Jackson, Mississippi
39213.
NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company,
Inc., Georgia Power Company,
Oglethorpe Power Corporation,
Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia,
City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50–
321 and 50–366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 and 2, Appling County,
Georgia
Date of amendment request: August
29, 2006, as supplemented November 6,
November 27, 2006, January 30, June 22,
July 16, August 13, October 18,
December 11, 2007, January 24,
February 4, February 25 (two letters,
nos. 1389 and 0175), February 27, and
March 13, 2008.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendments would
revise the licensing and design basis,
including the Technical Specifications,
with a full scope implementation of an
alternative source term (AST). The
licensee states that the AST analyses
include determination of the onsite
radiological doses, specifically the main
control room, technical support center
and off-site radiological doses resulting
from the loss-of-coolant, main steam
line break, control rod drop, and fuelhandling design-basis accident (DBA)
analyses. The licensee states that the
analyses demonstrate that, using AST
methodologies, the post-accident onsite
and offsite doses remain within
regulatory acceptance limits.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Adoption of the AST and those plant
systems affected by implementing AST do
not initiate DBAs. The AST does not affect
the design or manner in which the facility is
operated; rather, once the occurrence of an
accident has been postulated, the new
accident source term is an input to analyses
that evaluate the radiological consequences.
The implementation of the AST and changed
Technical Specifications have been
incorporated in the analyses for the limiting
DBAs at HNP. The structures, systems, and
components affected by the proposed change
are mitigative in nature and relied upon after
an accident has been initiated. Based on the
revised analyses, the proposed changes to the
Technical Specifications (including revised
leakage limits) impose certain performance
criteria which do not increase accident
initiation probability. The proposed changes
do not involve a revision to the parameters
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or conditions that could contribute to the
initiation of a DBA discussed in Chapter 15
of the Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
result in an increase in the probability of an
accident previously identified. Plant specific
AST radiological analyses have been
performed and, based on the results of these
analyses, it has been demonstrated that the
dose consequences of the limiting events
considered in the analyses are within the
regulatory guidance provided by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for use with the
AST. This guidance is presented in [Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section
50.67] (10 CFR 50.67), [Accident Source
Term] Regulatory Guide 1.183, [Alternative
Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating
Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power
Reactors (ML003716792)] and Standard
Review Plan, Section 15.0.1. Therefore, the
proposed change does not result in a
significant increase in the consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated?
Implementation of AST and associated
changes does not alter or involve any design
basis accident initiators. These changes do
not affect the design function or mode of
operations of systems, structures, or
components in the facility prior to a
postulated accident. Since systems,
structures, and components are operated
essentially no differently after the AST
implementation, no new failure modes are
created by this proposed change. Therefore,
the proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant decrease in the margin of safety?
The changes proposed are associated with
a revision to the licensing basis for HNP.
Approval of the licensing basis change from
the original source term to the AST is
requested by this application for a license
amendment. The results of the accident
analyses revised in support of the proposed
change are subject to the acceptance criteria
in 10 CFR 50.67. The analyzed events have
been carefully selected, and the analyses
supporting these changes have been
performed using approved methodologies
and conservative inputs to ensure that
analyzed events are bounding and safety
margin has been retained. The dose
consequences of these limiting events are
within the acceptance criteria presented in
10 CFR 50.67, Regulatory Guide 1.183, and
Standard Review Plan 15.0.1. Therefore,
because the proposed changes continue to
result in dose consequences within the
applicable regulatory limits, the changes are
considered to not result in a significant
reduction in the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
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Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake,
Jr., Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and
Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20037.
NRC Branch Chief: Melanie C. Wong.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No.
50 390, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1,
Rhea County, Tennessee
Date of amendment request: March
27, 2008.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise
the allowable value for Function 3,
‘‘Containment Purge Exhaust Radiation
Monitors,’’ in Technical Specifications
(TSs) Table 3.3.6–1, ‘‘Containment Vent
Isolation Instrumentation,’’ of Limiting
Conditions for Operation 3.3.6, during
Modes 1 through 4. The current
allowable value was found to be nonconservative for operating Modes 1
through 4 because the basis for the
specified value inappropriately credited
the containment purge exhaust filters,
which are only required during
movement of irradiated fuel assemblies
within containment. The current
allowable value remains acceptable
during movement of irradiated fuel
assemblies within containment.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change is associated with
radiation effluent monitoring and isolation of
Containment Purge exhaust flow in the event
of a design basis SBLOCA [small break loss
of coolant accident]. The change is not
associated with equipment or processes
which can initiate a design basis accident.
Consequently, this change does not affect the
probability of an accident previously
evaluated.
The revised purge exhaust monitor
allowable value will ensure the monitors
isolate the purge exhaust and will limit the
offsite doses associated with a SBLOCA to
well within the limits of 10 CFR 100. This
change serves to ensure the consequences of
an accident previously evaluated remain
bounded by the plant’s current licensing
basis. Therefore, the consequences of
accidents previously evaluated are not
increased by this change.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create
the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
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Response: No.
The proposed change is associated with
radiation effluent monitoring and isolation of
Containment Purge exhaust flow in the event
of a design basis SBLOCA. The change is not
associated with equipment or processes
which can initiate a design basis accident.
The change does not introduce new accident
initiators or physical changes in plant
equipment.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change involves a
conservative change in the Containment
Purge exhaust radiation monitor allowable
value in TS Table 3.3.6–1. The new allowable
value reflects a change in the monitor
analytical limit which does not assume credit
for the Containment Purge exhaust filters.
The proposed allowable value will ensure the
monitors will isolate the purge exhaust as
assumed in the existing design basis
SBLOCA analysis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: General
Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,
400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11A,
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.
NRC Branch Chief: L. Raghavan.
Notice of Issuance of Amendments to
Facility Operating Licenses
During the period since publication of
the last biweekly notice, the
Commission has issued the following
amendments. The Commission has
determined for each of these
amendments that the application
complies with the standards and
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the
Commission’s rules and regulations.
The Commission has made appropriate
findings as required by the Act and the
Commission’s rules and regulations in
10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in
the license amendment.
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
Amendment to Facility Operating
License, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for A Hearing in
connection with these actions was
published in the Federal Register as
indicated.
Unless otherwise indicated, the
Commission has determined that these
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amendments satisfy the criteria for
categorical exclusion in accordance
with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant
to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental
impact statement or environmental
assessment need be prepared for these
amendments. If the Commission has
prepared an environmental assessment
under the special circumstances
provision in 10 CFR 51.22(b) and has
made a determination based on that
assessment, it is so indicated.
For further details with respect to the
action see (1) the applications for
amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3)
the Commission’s related letter, Safety
Evaluation and/or Environmental
Assessment as indicated. All of these
items are available for public inspection
at the Commission’s Public Document
Room (PDR), located at One White Flint
North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland. Publicly available records
will be accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management
Systems (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the internet at the
NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not
have access to ADAMS or if there are
problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, contact the PDR
Reference staff at 1 (800) 397–4209,
(301) 415–4737 or by e-mail to
pdr@nrc.gov.
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AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, Docket
No. 50–289, Three Mile Island Nuclear
Station, Unit 1 (TMI–1), Dauphin
County, Pennsylvania
Date of application for amendment:
April 12, 2007.
Brief description of amendment: The
amendment modifies the TMI–1
technical specifications related to
control room envelope habitability
consistent with Technical Specification
Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF–448.
Date of issuance: April 16, 2008.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be implemented
within 120 days of issuance.
Amendment No.: 264.
Facility Operating License No. DPR–
50. Amendment revised the license and
the technical specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: June 5, 2007 (72 FR 31100).
The supplements dated January 18,
2008, and March 14, 2008, provided
additional information that clarified the
application, did not expand the scope of
the application as originally noticed and
did not change the NRC staff’s original
proposed no significant hazards
determination.
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The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated April 16, 2008.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Carolina Power & Light Company,
Docket Nos. 50–325 and 50–324,
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1
and 2, Brunswick County, North
Carolina
Date of application for amendments:
January 22, 2007, as supplemented on
June 21, July 18, July 31, and October
15, 2007, and January 24, February 14,
March 5, and March 21, 2008.
Brief description of amendments:
Change the Technical Specifications
(TSs) to support the transition to
AREVA fuel and core design
methodologies.
Date of issuance: March 27, 2008.
Effective date: Date of issuance, to be
implemented on Unit 1 prior to startup
from the 2008 refueling outage, and to
be implemented on Unit 2 prior to
startup from the 2009 refueling outage.
Amendment Nos.: 246 and 274.
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–
71 and DPR–62: Amendments change
the TSs.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: December 4, 2007 (72 FR
68208). The supplements dated January
24, February 14, March 5, and March 21,
2008, provided additional information
that clarified the application, did not
expand the scope of the application as
originally noticed, and did not change
the staff’s original proposed no
significant hazards consideration
determination as published in the
Federal Register.
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendments is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated March 27, 2008.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
68211) The Commission’s related
evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated
April 15, 2008.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50–255, Palisades Plant, Van
Buren County, Michigan
Date of application for amendment:
May 22, 2007.
Brief description of amendment: The
amendment incorporates technical
specification (TS) changes based on
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)approved TS Task Force (TSTF)–497–A,
‘‘Changes to Reflect Revision of 10 CFR
50.55a,’’ Revision 0, as modified by
NRC-approved TSTF–497, ‘‘Limit
Inservice Testing Program [Surveillance
Requirements] SR 3.0.2 Application to
Frequencies of Two years or Less.’’
Specifically, the amendment revises
Palisades Nuclear Plant TS Section
5.5.7, ‘‘Inservice Testing Program,’’ to
update references to the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers code
and applicability of the provisions of SR
3.0.2.
Date of issuance: April 15, 2008.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be implemented
within 60 days.
Amendment No.: 232.
Renewed Facility Operating License
No. DPR–20: Amendment revised the
Renewed Facility Operating License and
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: August 28, 2007 (72 FR
49575). The Commission’s related
evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated
April 15, 2008.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Energy Northwest, Docket No. 50–397,
Columbia Generating Station, Benton
County, Washington
Date of application for amendment:
November 7, 2007.
Brief description of amendment: The
amendment deletes License Condition
2.F, which requires reporting of
violations of certain other requirements
contained in Section 2.C of the license.
Date of issuance: April 15, 2008.
Effective date: As of its date of
issuance and shall be implemented
within 90 days from the date of
issuance.
Amendment No.: 206.
Facility Operating License No. NPF–
21: The amendment revised the Facility
Operating License.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: December 4, 2007 (72 FR
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Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC
and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50–271, Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station, Vernon,
Vermont
Date of application for amendment:
October 18, 2007.
Brief description of amendment: The
amendment revised the Technical
Specifications to change requirements
related to emergency diesel generator
(EDG) fuel oil tank volume, EDG fuel oil
testing and reactor building crane
inspections.
Date of Issuance: April 17, 2008.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance, and shall be implemented
within 60 days.
Amendment No.: 231.
Facility Operating License No. DPR–
28: Amendment revised the License and
Technical Specifications.
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Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: December 18, 2007 (72 FR
71711).
The Commission’s related evaluation
of this amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated April 17, 2008.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
382, Waterford Steam Electric Station,
Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana
Date of amendment request: April 24,
2007, as supplemented by electronic
mail dated February 12, 2008.
Brief description of amendment: The
change adds Optimized ZIRLO as an
acceptable fuel rod cladding material in
the Waterford Steam Electric Station,
Unit 3, Technical Specification (TS)
5.3.1, ‘‘Fuel Assemblies.’’ TS 5.3.1
currently identifies, in part, Zircaloy or
ZIRLO PM fuel rod cladding as the
allowable fuel rod cladding material.
Date of issuance: April 16, 2008.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be implemented 60
days from the date of issuance.
Amendment No.: 215.
Facility Operating License No. NPF–
38: The amendment revised the Facility
Operating License and Technical
Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: May 22, 2007 (72 FR 28720).
The supplemental electronic mail dated
February 12, 2008, provided additional
information that clarified the
application, did not expand the scope of
the application as originally noticed,
and did not change the staff’s original
proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination. The
Commission’s related evaluation of the
amendment is contained in a Safety
Evaluation dated April 16, 2008.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
382, Waterford Steam Electric Station,
Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana
Date of amendment request: August 2,
2007, as supplemented by letters dated
January 17, March 10, and electronic
mail dated March 24, 2008. In addition,
Entergy submitted for review and
approval the revised emergency core
cooling system (ECCS) performance
analysis by letter dated August 9, 2007,
as supplemented by letter dated January
21, 2008; and a supplement to the ECCS
performance analysis by letter dated
October 4, 2007, as supplemented by
letter dated March 4, 2008.
Brief description of amendment: The
changes to the technical specifications
add new analytical methods and modify
the containment average air temperature
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:11 May 05, 2008
Jkt 214001
and safety injection tank level to
support the implementation of
Combustion Engineering 16 x 16 Next
Generation Fuel (NGF) as defined in
Westinghouse Topical Report WCAP–
16500–P beginning in Cycle 16
commencing after the spring 2008
refueling outage.
Date of issuance: April 15, 2008.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be shall be
implemented prior to startup following
the spring 2008 refueling outage.
Amendment No.: 214.
Facility Operating License No. NPF–
38: The amendment revised the Facility
Operating License and Technical
Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: September 11, 2007 (72 FR
51858). The supplemental letters dated
January 17, and March 10, 2008, and
electronic mail dated March 24, 2008,
for changes to the TSs; the supplemental
letter dated January 21, 2008, for review
and approval of the revised ECCS
performance analysis; and the
supplemental letter dated March 4,
2008, for review and approval of the
supplement to the ECCS performance
analysis, provided additional
information that clarified the
application, did not expand the scope of
the application as originally noticed,
and did not change the NRC staff’s
original proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination as
published in the Federal Register.
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated April 15, 2008.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC,
Docket Nos. STN 50–456 and STN 50–
457, Braidwood Station (Braidwood),
Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois
Date of application for amendment:
February 25, 2008, as supplemented by
letters dated March 27, 2008, and April
9, 2008.
Brief description of amendment: The
amendments revise Technical
Specification (TS) 5.5.9, ‘‘Steam
Generator (SG) Program,’’ and TS 5.6.9,
‘‘Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection
Report.’’ For TS 5.5.9, the amendment
replaces the existing alternate repair
criteria in the provisions for SG tube
repair criteria, during Braidwood, Unit
2, Refueling Outage 13 and the
subsequent operating cycle. For TS
5.6.9, three new reporting requirements
are added to the existing seven
requirements for Braidwood Station
(Braidwood), Unit 2. These changes
only affect Braidwood, Unit 2; however,
this action is docketed for Braidwood,
PO 00000
Frm 00112
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
25049
Units 1 and 2, because the TS are
common to both units.
Date of issuance: April 18, 2008.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be implemented
prior to the return to service from
Braidwood, Unit 2, spring 2008
Refueling Outage 13.
Amendment Nos.: Unit 1–150; Unit
2–150.
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–
72 and NPF–77: The amendment
revised the TSs and License.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: March 11, 2008 (73 FR
13029).
The March 27, 2008, and April 9,
2008, supplemental letters provided
additional information that clarified the
application, did not expand the scope of
the application as originally noticed,
and did not change the staff’s original
proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination.
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendments is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated April 18, 2008.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Indiana Michigan Power Company,
Docket Nos. 50–315, Donald C. Cook
Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (DCCNP–
1 and DCCNP–2), Berrien County,
Michigan
Date of application for amendments:
February 29, 2008.
Brief description of amendments: The
amendments revised the licensing basis
of ice condenser ice fusion time,
specifying conditions under which
plant operation may proceed in less
than 5 weeks after ice baskets have been
reloaded.
Date of issuance: April 16, 2008.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance, and shall be implemented
prior to Unit 1 entering Mode 4 at the
end of the 2008 refueling outage.
Amendment No.: 303 (for DCCNP–1)
and 286 (for DCCNP–2).
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–
58 and DPR–74: Amendments revised
the Renewed Operating Licenses.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: March 12, 2008 (73 FR 13253)
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendment is contained in a
safety evaluation dated April 16, 2008.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No.
50–328, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2,
Hamilton County, Tennessee
Date of application for amendment:
July 26, 2007, as supplemented by
letters dated October 3 and December
21, 2007, and February 29, 2008.
E:\FR\FM\06MYN1.SGM
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25050
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 88 / Tuesday, May 6, 2008 / Notices
Brief description of amendment: The
proposed amendment would add a new
reference to Technical Specification
6.9.1.14.a, which lists documents that
have been approved by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for use in
determining the core operating limits.
The new reference is the Areva NP, Inc.,
Topical Report EMF–2103P–A,
‘‘Realistic Large Break LOCA [Loss-OfCoolant Accident] Methodology for
Pressurized Water Reactors.’’
Date of issuance: April 10, 2008.
Effective date: As of the date of
issuance and shall be implemented
within 45 days.
Amendment No. 311.
Facility Operating License No. DPR–
79: Amendment revises the technical
specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal
Register: August 28, 2007 (72 FR
49583). The supplemental letters dated
October 3 and December 21, 2007, and
February 29, 2008, provided additional
information that clarified the
application, did not expand the scope of
the application as originally noticed,
and did not change the staff’s original
proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination as
published in the Federal Register.
The Commission’s related evaluation
of the amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated April 10, 2008.
No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Previously Published Notices of
Consideration of Issuance of
Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
The following notices were previously
published as separate individual
notices. The notice content was the
same as above. They were published as
individual notices either because time
did not allow the Commission to wait
for this biweekly notice or because the
action involved exigent circumstances.
They are repeated here because the
biweekly notice lists all amendments
issued or proposed to be issued
involving no significant hazards
consideration.
For details, see the individual notice
in the Federal Register on the day and
page cited. This notice does not extend
the notice period of the original notice.
Arizona Public Service Company, et al.,
Docket No. STN 50–529, Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2,
Maricopa County, Arizona
Date of amendment request: April 10,
2008.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:11 May 05, 2008
Jkt 214001
Brief Description of amendment
request: The proposed amendment
would revise Technical Specification
(TS) 3.5.5, Refueling Water Tank (RWT)
to increase the minimum required RWT
level indications and the corresponding
borated water volumes in TS Figure
3.5.5–1, ‘‘Minimum Required RWT
Volume,’’ by 3 percent. This change will
ensure that there is adequate water
volume available in the RWT to ensure
that the engineered safety feature pumps
and the new containment recirculation
sump strainers will meet their design
functions during loss-of-coolant
accidents.
Date of publication of individual
notice in Federal Register: April 17,
2008 (73 FR 20961).
Expiration date of individual notice:
May 1, 2008.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day
of April, 2008.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Catherine Haney,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. E8–9679 Filed 5–5–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–133]
Environmental Assessment and
Finding of No Significant Impact
Related to Issuance of Exemption for
the Humboldt Bay Power Plant Unit 3,
License DPR–007, Humboldt,
California
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Environmental Assessment and
Finding of No Significant Impact.
AGENCY:
John
Hickman, Division of Waste
Management and Environmental
Protection, Office of Federal and State
Materials and Environmental
Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Mail Stop:
T8F5, Washington, DC 20555–0001.
Telephone: (301) 415–3017; e-mail
john.hickman@nrc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) staff is considering a
request dated November 5, 2007, by the
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
(PG&E or the Licensee), to approve a
request for exemption from the
requirements set forth in 10 CFR
PO 00000
Frm 00113
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
50.54(p) and 10 CFR Part 73. The
requested exemptions from the security
requirements for Humboldt Bay Power
Plant (HBPP) would be effective after
the spent fuel has been removed from
the reactor site by the licensee and
relocated to the new Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).
This Environmental Assessment (EA)
has been developed in accordance with
the requirements of 10 CFR 51.21.
II. Environmental Assessment
Background
HBPP was permanently shut down in
July 1976, and until recently was in safe
storage condition (SAFSTOR).
SAFSTOR is defined as a method of
decommissioning in which the nuclear
facility is placed and maintained in safe
condition for an extended period of time
to permit radioactive material to decay
to levels that facilitate subsequent
decontamination and decommissioning
of the facility. A decommissioning plan
was approved in July 1988. Subsequent
to the 1997 decommissioning rule, the
licensee converted its decommissioning
plan into its Defueled Safety Analysis
Report which is updated every two
years. A Post Shutdown
Decommissioning Activities Report was
issued by the licensee in February 1998.
On September 2, 2005, the NRC
approved the HB ISFSI Physical
Security Plan (PSP) that PG&E
submitted on July 11, 2005. On
November 17, 2005, the NRC issued
Materials License SNM–2514 for the
HBPP ISFSI that included approval of
the HBPP ISFSI PSP. In approving the
Humboldt Bay ISFSI PSP, the NRC
found that the plan meets the security
requirements in 10 CFR Part 72 Subpart
H, ‘‘Physical Protection,’’ meets the
requirements in 10 CFR 73.51,
‘‘Requirements for the Physical
Protection of Stored Spent Nuclear Fuel
and High-Level Radioactive Waste,’’ and
provides reasonable assurance that
physical protection of the spent nuclear
fuel stored at the ISFSI will not
constitute an unreasonable risk to
public health and safety. Currently, the
licensee is maintaining the reactor
security plan consistent with the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 and 10
CFR 50.54(p). Contingent upon approval
of the subject exemption and associated
amendment, the ISFSI PSP will become
effective upon the complete transfer of
spent nuclear fuel from the spent fuel
pool to the ISFSI.
Proposed Action
The proposed action would eliminate
the security plan requirements for the
10 CFR Part 50 licensed site after the
E:\FR\FM\06MYN1.SGM
06MYN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 88 (Tuesday, May 6, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25034-25050]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-9679]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility
Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations
I. Background
Pursuant to section 189a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the
Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly notice.
The Act requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments
issued, or proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the
authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an
operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such
amendment involves no significant hazards consideration,
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a
hearing from any person.
This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or
proposed to be issued from April 10 to April 23, 2008. The last
biweekly notice was published on April 22, 2008 (73 FR 21567).
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under
the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation
of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown
below.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received
[[Page 25035]]
within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be
considered in making any final determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result,
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will
occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rulemaking,
Directives and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services,
Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and
page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also
be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the Commission's
Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public
File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland. The filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave
to intervene is discussed below.
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice,
person(s) may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to
participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request
via electronic submission through the NRC E-Filing system for a hearing
and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a
petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the
Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings''
in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested person(s) should consult a current copy of
10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the Commission's PDR, located at
One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be
accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's
(ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web
site, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request
for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed within 60
days, the Commission or a presiding officer designated by the
Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition;
and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an
appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must
also set forth the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner/
requestor intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The
petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the
petitioner/requestor intends to rely to establish those facts or expert
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the petitioner/requestor to relief. A petitioner/
requestor who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the
Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve
to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that
the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration,
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held
would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final
determination is that the amendment request involves a significant
hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the
issuance of any amendment.
A request for hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be
filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule, which the NRC
promulgated in August 28, 2007 (72 FR 49139). The E-Filing process
requires participants to submit and serve documents over the internet
or in some cases to mail copies on electronic storage media.
Participants may not submit paper copies of their filings unless they
seek a waiver in accordance with the procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least
five (5) days prior to the filing deadline, the petitioner/requestor
must contact the Office of the Secretary by e-mail at
hearingdocket@nrc.gov, or by calling (301) 415-1677, to request (1) a
digital ID certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and/or (2)
creation of an electronic docket for the proceeding (even in instances
in which the petitioner/requestor (or its counsel or
[[Page 25036]]
representative) already holds an NRC-issued digital ID certificate).
Each petitioner/requestor will need to download the Workplace Forms
ViewerTM to access the Electronic Information Exchange
(EIE), a component of the E-Filing system. The Workplace Forms
ViewerTM is free and is available at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals/install-viewer.html. Information about applying
for a digital ID certificate is available on NRC's public Web site at
https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html.
Once a petitioner/requestor has obtained a digital ID certificate,
had a docket created, and downloaded the EIE viewer, it can then submit
a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions
should be in Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC
guidance available on the NRC public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the
time the filer submits its documents through EIE. To be timely, an
electronic filing must be submitted to the EIE system no later than
11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of a
transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends
the submitter an e-mail notice confirming receipt of the document. The
EIE system also distributes an e-mail notice that provides access to
the document to the NRC Office of the General Counsel and any others
who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document
via the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically may seek assistance through the
``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals.html or by calling the NRC technical help line,
which is available between 8:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Eastern Time,
Monday through Friday. The help line number is (800) 397-4209 or
locally, (301) 415-4737.
Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file a motion, in accordance
with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing requesting
authorization to continue to submit documents in paper format. Such
filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail addressed to the
Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or expedited
delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852,
Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants filing a
document in this manner are responsible for serving the document on all
other participants. Filing is considered complete by first-class mail
as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service upon depositing the document with the
provider of the service.
Non-timely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be
entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer, or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition
and/or request should be granted and/or the contentions should be
admitted, based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR
2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii). To be timely, filings must be submitted no later
than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at
https://ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp, unless excluded pursuant
to an order of the Commission, an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, or
a Presiding Officer. Participants are requested not to include personal
privacy information, such as social security numbers, home addresses,
or home phone numbers in their filings. With respect to copyrighted
works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the
adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use application,
participants are requested not to include copyrighted materials in
their submission.
For further details with respect to this amendment action, see the
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible from the ADAMS Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS
or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS,
contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737 or
by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.
Arizona Public Service Company (APS), et al., Docket Nos. STN 50-528,
STN 50-529, and STN 50-530, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 1, 2, and 3, Maricopa County, Arizona
Date of amendment request: January 17, 2008, as supplemented
February 29, 2008.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would
modify the Technical Specifications (TS) to establish more effective
and appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative requirements
related to ensuring the habitability of the control room envelope (CRE)
in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved TS Task
Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification change traveler TSTF-448,
Revision 3, ``Control Room Habitability.'' Specifically, the proposed
amendments would modify TS 3.7.11, ``Control Room Essential Filtration
System (CREFS),'' and add new TS 5.5.17, ``Control Room Envelope
Habitability Program,'' to TS Administrative Controls Section 5.5,
``Programs and Manuals.''
The NRC staff issued a ``Notice of Availability of Technical
Specification Improvement to Modify Requirements Regarding Control Room
Envelope Habitability Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement
Process,'' associated with TSTF-448, Revision 3, in the Federal
Register on January 17, 2007 (72 FR 2022). The notice included a model
safety evaluation, a model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC)
determination, and a model license amendment request. In its
application dated January 17, 2008, the licensee affirmed the
applicability of the model NSHC determination which is presented below.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of NSHC adopted by the licensee is presented below:
Criterion 1--The Proposed Change[s] [Do] Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change[s] [do] not adversely affect accident
initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions,
or configuration of the facility. The proposed change[s] [do] not alter
or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to
perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an
initiating event within the assumed
[[Page 25037]]
acceptance limits. The proposed change[s] [revise] the TS for the CRE
[essential filtration] system, which is a mitigation system designed to
minimize unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to filter the CRE
atmosphere to protect the CRE occupants in the event of accidents
previously analyzed. An important part of the CRE [essential
filtration] system is the CRE boundary. The CRE [essential filtration]
system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident previously
evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident previously
evaluated is not increased. Performing tests to verify the operability
of the CRE boundary and implementing a program to assess and maintain
CRE habitability ensure that the CRE [essential filtration] system is
capable of adequately mitigating radiological consequences to CRE
occupants during accident conditions, and that the CRE [essential
filtration] system will perform as assumed in the consequence analyses
of design basis accidents. Thus, the consequences of any accident
previously evaluated are not increased. Therefore, the proposed
change[s] [do] not involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 2--The Proposed Change[s] [Do] Not Create the Possibility of
a New or Different Kind of Accident From any Accident Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change[s] [do] not impact the accident analysis. The
proposed change[s] [do] not alter the required mitigation capability of
the CRE [essential filtration] system, or its functioning during
accident conditions as assumed in the licensing basis analyses of
design basis accident radiological consequences to CRE occupants. No
new or different accidents result from performing the new surveillance
or following the new program. The proposed change[s] [do] not involve a
physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of
equipment will be installed) or a significant change in the methods
governing normal plant operation. The proposed change[s] [do] not alter
any safety analysis assumptions and is consistent with current plant
operating practice. Therefore, [the] change[s] [do] not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Criterion 3--The Proposed Change[s] [Do] Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in the Margin of Safety
The proposed change[s] [do] not alter the manner in which safety
limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for
operation are determined. The proposed change[s] [do] not affect safety
analysis acceptance criteria. The proposed change[s] will not result in
plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis for an
unacceptable period of time without compensatory measures. The proposed
change[s] [do] not adversely affect systems that respond to safely shut
down the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.
Therefore, the proposed change[s] [do] not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety. Based upon the reasoning presented
above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, the
requested change does not involve a no-significant-hazards
consideration.
The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis adopted by the licensee
and, based on that review, it appears that the three standards of 10
CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to
determine that the request for amendments involves NSHC.
Attorney for licensee: Michael G. Green, Senior Regulatory Counsel,
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation, P.O. Box 52034, Mail Station 8695,
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034.
NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-333, James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York
Date of amendment request: January 22, 2008.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
modify the Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.3 requirements related to
Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air by replacing the specific
fuel oil and lube oil storage values with the corresponding number of
days supply. The specific volumes would be relocated to a licensee-
controlled document (i.e., the TS Bases). It would also expand the
``clear and bright'' test in TS 5.5.10 by allowing a water and sediment
test to be performed to establish the acceptability of new fuel oil
prior to addition to the storage tanks.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change to the Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and
Starting Air Specification relocates the volume of diesel fuel oil
and lube oil required to support 7 day operation of the onsite
diesel generators, and the volume equivalent to a 6 day supply, to
licensee control. The specific volume of fuel oil equivalent to a 7
and 6 day supply is calculated using the NRC approved methodology
described in Regulatory Guide 1.137, Revision 1, ``Fuel Oil Systems
for Standby Diesel Generators'' and ANSI/ANS [American National
Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society] 59.51-1997 (formerly
ANSI N195-1976), ``Fuel Oil Systems for Safety-Related Emergency
Diesel Generators.'' The specific volume of lube oil equivalent to a
7 and 6 day supply is based on the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
manufacturer's consumption values for the run time of the EDG.
Because the requirements to maintain a 7 day supply of diesel fuel
oil and lube oil are not changed and are consistent with the
assumptions in the accident analyses, and the actions taken when the
volume of fuel oil and lube oil are less than a 6 day supply have
not changed, neither the probability nor the consequences of any
accident previously evaluated will be affected. Therefore, the
proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change to the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program adds
an option to use already approved testing methodology. Since the
methodology is already discussed in ASTM D975 [``Standard
Specification for Diesel Fuel Oils''] as an acceptable standard to
determine water and sediment content, neither the probability nor
the consequences of any accident previously evaluated will be
affected. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to the Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil and
Starting Air Specification and Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program do
not involve physical alterations of the plant (i.e., no new or
different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in the
methods governing normal plant operation. The changes do not alter
assumptions made in the safety analysis but ensure that the diesel
generator operates as assumed in the accident analysis. The proposed
changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change to the Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and
Starting Air Specification relocates the volume of diesel fuel oil
and lube oil required to support 7 day operation of the onsite
diesel generators, and the volume equivalent to a 6 day supply, to
[[Page 25038]]
licensee control. As the bases for the existing limits on diesel
fuel oil and lube oil are not changed and the methods used to
determine these limits have been previously approved, no change is
made to the accident analysis assumptions and no margin of safety is
reduced as part of this change. Therefore, the proposed change does
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed change to the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program
provides an option to use a quantitative method of testing for
sediment and water content as an alternative to a qualitative
method. This option uses an already accepted method for assessing
fuel oil quality. Based on this, there are no alterations to any
assumptions used in the accident analysis and this change does not
reduce any margin of safety. Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. William C. Dennis, Assistant General
Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 Hamilton Avenue, White
Plains, NY 10601.
NRC Branch Chief: Mark G. Kowal.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-333, James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAFNPP), Oswego County, New York
Date of amendment request: February 7, 2008.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise the Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR)
3.1.3.2 frequency in TS 3.1.3, ``Control Rod OPERABILITY'' from ``7
days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater
than the [Low Power Setpoint] LPSP of [Rod Worth Minimizer] RWM'' to
``31 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is
greater than the LPSP of the RWM'' and revise Example 1.4-3 in Section
1.4 ``Frequency'' to clarify the applicability of the 1.25 surveillance
test interval extension. The proposed amendment does not adopt the
clarification of Source Range Monitor (SRM) TS action for inserting
control rods. This clarification was previously adopted during the
JAFNPP conversion to Improved Standard Technical Specifications, TS
Section 3.3.1.2, required Action E.2, ``Source Range Monitoring [SRM]
Instrumentation.''
Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: April
2, 2008 (73 FR 18008).
Expiration date of individual notice: May 2, 2008.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit
No. 1, Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: March 13, 2008.
Description of amendment request: The licensee proposes to change
the Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.5.8 to require verification that
the reactor building spray nozzles are unobstructed following
maintenance that could result in nozzle blockage in lieu of the current
SR of performing the test every 10 years.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The Reactor Building Spray System is not an initiator of any
analyzed event. The proposed change does not have a detrimental
impact on the integrity of any plan structure, system, or component
that may initiate an analyzed event. The proposed change will not
alter the operation or otherwise increase the failure probability of
any plant equipment that can initiate an analyzed accident. This
change does not affect the plant design. There is no increase in the
likelihood of formation of significant corrosion products. Due to
their location at the top of the containment, introduction of
foreign material into the spray headers is unlikely. Foreign
materials exclusion controls during and following maintenance
provides assurance that the nozzles remain unobstructed.
Consequently, there is no significant increase in the probability of
an accident previously evaluated.
The Reactor Building Spray system is designed to address the
consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or a Main
Steamline Break (MSLB) inside the reactor building. The Reactor
Building Spray system is capable of performing its function
effectively with the single failure of any active component in the
system, any of its subsystems, or any of its support systems.
Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated
are not significantly affected by the proposed change.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not physically alter the plant (no new
or different type of equipment will be installed) or change the
methods governing normal plant operation.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The system piping and nozzles are made if material that is not
susceptible to corrosion. Obstruction from sources external to the
system is highly unlikely due to the location high in the reactor
building and not being readily accessible. Strict controls are
established to ensure the foreign material is not introduced into
the Reactor Building Spray system during maintenance or repairs.
Maintenance activities that could introduce significant foreign
material into the system require subsequent system cleanliness
verification which would prevent nozzle blockage. The spray header
nozzles are expected to remain unblocked and available in the event
that the safety function is required. The capacity of the system
would remain unaffected.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the
licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the
three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC
staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Terence A. Burke, Associate General
Counsel--Entergy Nuclear Operations, P.O. Box 31995, Jackson,
Mississippi 39286-1995.
NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit
No. 1, Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: March 13, 2008.
Description of amendment request: The proposed changes would
replace the current Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12, ``RCS [Reactor
Coolant System] Specific Activity'' limit on reactor coolant system
(RCS) gross specific activity with a new limit on RCS noble gas
specific activity. The noble gas specific activity limit would be based
on a new dose equivalent Xe-133 (DEX) definition that would replace the
current E Bar average disintegration energy definition. In addition,
the current dose equivalent I-131 (DEI) definition would be revised to
allow the use of additional thyroid dose conversion factors (DCFs).
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or
[[Page 25039]]
consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Reactor coolant specific activity is not an initiator for any
accident previously evaluated. The Completion Time when primary
coolant gross activity is not within limit is not an initiator for
any accident previously evaluated. The current variable limit on
primary coolant iodine concentration is not an initiator to any
accident previously evaluated. As a result, the proposed change does
not significantly increase the probability of an accident. The
proposed change will limit primary coolant noble gases to
concentrations consistent with the accident analyses. The proposed
change to the Completion Time has no impact on the consequences of
any design basis accident since the consequences of an accident
during the extended Completion Time are the same as the consequences
of an accident during the current Completion Time. As a result, the
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not
significantly increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change in specific activity limits does not alter
any physical part of the plant nor does it affect any plant
operating parameter. The change does not create the potential for a
new or different kind of accident from any previously calculated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change revises the limits on noble gas
radioactivity in the primary coolant. The proposed change is
consistent with the assumptions in the safety analyses and will
ensure the monitored values protect the initial assumptions in the
safety analyses.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the
licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the
three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC
staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Terence A. Burke, Associate General
Counsel--Entergy Nuclear Operations, P.O. Box 31995, Jackson,
Mississippi 39286-1995.
NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit
No. 2, Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: March 13, 2008.
Description of amendment request: The proposed changes would
replace the current TS 3.4.8, ``Reactor Coolant System Specific
Activity'' limit on reactor coolant system (RCS) gross specific
activity with a new limit on RCS noble gas specific activity. The noble
gas specific activity limit would be based on a new dose equivalent Xe-
133 (DEX) definition that would replace the current E Bar average
disintegration energy definition. In addition, the current dose
equivalent I-131 (DEI) definition would be revised to allow the use of
additional thyroid dose conversion factors (DCFs).
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Reactor coolant specific activity is not an initiator for any
accident previously evaluated. The Completion Time when primary
coolant gross activity is not within limit is not an initiator for
any accident previously evaluated. The current variable limit on
primary coolant iodine concentration is not an initiator to any
accident previously evaluated. As a result, the proposed change does
not significantly increase the probability of an accident. The
proposed change will limit primary coolant noble gases to
concentrations consistent with the accident analyses. The proposed
change to the Completion Time has no impact on the consequences of
any design basis accident since the consequences of an accident
during the extended Completion Time are the same as the consequences
of an accident during the current Completion Time. As a result, the
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not
significantly increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change in specific activity limits does not alter
any physical part of the plant nor does it affect any plant
operating parameter. The change does not create the potential for a
new or different kind of accident from any previously calculated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change revises the limits on noble gas
radioactivity in the primary coolant. The proposed change is
consistent with the assumptions in the safety analyses and will
ensure the monitored values protect the initial assumptions in the
safety analyses.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the
licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the
three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC
staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Terence A. Burke, Associate General
Counsel--Entergy Nuclear Operations, P. O. Box 31995, Jackson,
Mississippi 39286-1995.
NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit
No. 2, Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: March 13, 2008.
Description of amendment request: The proposed change will relocate
Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.7, ``Reactor Coolant System
Chemistry,'' to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM).
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change acts to relocate current Reactor Coolant
System (RCS) chemistry limits and monitoring requirements from the
TSs to the TRM. Monitoring and maintaining RCS chemistry minimizes
the potential for corrosion of RCS piping and components. Corrosion
effects are considered a long-term impact on RCS structural
integrity. Because RCS chemistry will continue to be monitored and
controlled, relocating the current TS requirements to the TRM will
not present an adverse impact to the RCS and, subsequently, will not
impact the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated. Furthermore, once relocated to the TRM, changes to RCS
chemistry limits or monitoring requirements will be controlled in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the
[[Page 25040]]
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not result in any plant modifications
or changes in the way the plant is operated. The proposed change
only acts to relocate current RCS chemistry limits and monitoring
requirements from the TSs to the TRM.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will maintain limits on RCS chemistry
parameters and will continue to provide associated monitoring
requirements. Once relocated to the TRM, changes to RCS chemistry
limits or monitoring requirements will be controlled in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.59. In addition, the RCS chemistry limits are not a
structure, system, or component which operating experience or
probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public
health and safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the
licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the
three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC
staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Terence A. Burke, Associate General
Counsel--Entergy Nuclear Operations, P.O. Box 31995, Jackson,
Mississippi 39286-1995.
NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353, Limerick
Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: December 12, 2007.
Description of amendment request: The proposed changes are
administrative in nature and provide editorial changes to the technical
specifications (TSs). The proposed changes involve: (1) Correcting the
index; (2) removing cycle specific requirements or notes that have
since expired and are no longer applicable; (3) deleting references to
previously deleted requirements; (4) changing references to the
location of previously relocated information; and (5) other editorial
corrections. These proposed changes correct minor inconsistencies that
have been introduced over time as a result of previous changes to the
TSs or involve changes that are solely editorial in nature.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes are administrative in nature and do not
impact the physical configuration or function of plant structures,
systems, or components (SSCs) or the manner in which SSCs are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed
changes do not impact the initiators or assumptions of analyzed
events, nor do they impact mitigation of accidents or transient
events.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes are administrative in nature and do not
alter plant configuration, require that new plant equipment be
installed, alter assumptions made about accidents previously
evaluated, or impact the function of plant SSCs or the manner in
which SSCs are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes are administrative in nature and do not
involve any physical changes to plant SSCs or the manner in which
SSCs are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The
proposed changes do not involve a change to any safety limits,
limiting safety system settings, limiting conditions of operation,
or design parameters for any SSC. The proposed changes do not impact
any safety analysis assumptions and do not involve a change in
initial conditions, system response times, or other parameters
affecting an accident analysis. Therefore, the proposed changes do
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: J. Bradley Fewell, Esquire, Associate
General Counsel, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 4300 Winfield Road,
Warrenville, IL 60555.
NRC Branch Chief: Harold K. Chernoff.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-
277 and 50-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS),
Units 2 and 3, York and Lancaster Counties, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: July 13, 2007.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
modify the Technical Specifications to support application of
Alternative Source Term (AST) methodology at PBAPS Units 2 and 3. The
fission product release from the reactor core into containment is
referred to as the ``source term,'' and is characterized by the
composition and magnitude of the radioactive material, the chemical and
physical properties of the material, and the timing of the release from
the reactor core as discussed in Technical Information Document (TID)
14844, ``Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor
Sites.'' Since the publication of TID 14844, advances have been made in
understanding the composition and magnitude, chemical form, and timing
of fission product releases from severe nuclear power plant accidents.
In light of these insights, NUREG-1465, ``Accident Source Terms for
Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants,'' was published in 1995 with revised
ASTs for use in the licensing of future light-water reactors.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Section 50.67 (10 CFR 50.67), ``Accident source
term,'' subsequently allowed the use of the ASTs described in NUREG-
1465 at operating plants. This request to apply the AST methodology is
made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.67, with the exception that TID 14844
will continue to be used as the radiation dose basis for equipment
qualification at PBAPS Units 2 and 3. Application of the AST
methodology at PBAPS Units 2 and 3 requires that radiation dose limits
specified in 10 CFR 50.67 are adhered to for the exclusion area
boundary, the low population zone outer boundary, and the facility
control room.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
[[Page 25041]]
consideration, which is presented below:
1. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The implementation of alternative source term (AST) assumptions
has been evaluated in revisions to the analyses of the following
limiting design basis accidents (DBAs) at Peach Bottom Atomic Power
Station (PBAPS):
Loss-of-Coolant Accident,
Fuel Handling Accident,
Control Rod Drop Accident, and
Main Steam Line Break Accident.
Based upon the results of these analyses, it has been
demonstrated that, with the requested changes, the dose consequences
of these limiting events are within the regulatory guidance provided
by the NRC for use with the AST. This guidance is presented in 10
CFR 50.67 and associated Regulatory Guide 1.183, and Standard Review
Plan Section 15.0.1. The Alternative Source Term is an input to
calculations used to evaluate the consequences of an accident, and
does not by itself affect the plant response, or the actual pathway
of the radiation released from the fuel. It does, however, better
represent the physical characteristics of the release, so that
appropriate mitigation techniques may be applied. Therefore, the
consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not
significantly increased.
The equipment affected by the proposed changes is mitigative in
nature, and relied upon after an accident has been initiated.
Application of the Alternative Source Term (AST) does not involve
any physical changes to the plant design. While the operation of
various systems do change as a result of these proposed changes,
these systems are not accident initiators. Application of the AST is
not an initiator of a design basis accident. The proposed changes to
the Technical Specifications (TS), while they revise certain
performance requirements, do not involve any physical modifications
to the plant. As a result, the proposed changes do not affect any of
the parameters or conditions that could contribute to the initiation
of any accidents. As such, removal of operability requirements
during the specified conditions will not significantly increase the
probability of occurrence for an accident previously analyzed. Since
design basis accident initiators are not being altered by adoption
of the Alternative Source Term analyses, the probability of an
accident previously evaluated is not affected.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed amendment does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed
and there are no physical modifications to existing equipment
associated with the proposed changes). Similarly, it does not
physically change any structures, systems or components involved in
the mitigation of any accidents; thus, no new initiators or
precursors of a new or different kind of accident are created. New
equipment or personnel failure modes that might initiate a new type
of accident are not created as a result of the proposed amendment.
As such, the proposed amendment will not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety.
Safety margins and analytical conservatisms have been evaluated
and have been found acceptable. The analyzed events have been
carefully selected and margin has been retained to ensure that the
analyses adequately bound postulated event scenarios. The dose
consequences due to design basis accidents comply with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.67 and the guidance of Regulatory Guide
1.183. The proposed amendment is associated with the implementation
of a new licensing basis for PBAPS Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).
Approval of the change from the original source term to a new source
term taken from Regulatory Guide 1.183 is being requested. The
results of the accident analyses, revised in support of the proposed
license amendment, are subject to revised acceptance criteria. The
analyses have been performed using conservative methodologies, as
specified in Regulatory Guide 1.183. Safety margins have been
evaluated and analytical conservatism has been utilized to ensure
that the analyses adequately bound the postulated limiting event
scenario. The dose consequences of these DBAs remain within the
acceptance criteria presented in 10 CFR 50.67, ``Accident Source
Term'', and Regulatory Guide 1.183.
The proposed changes continue to ensure that the doses at the
exclusion area boundary (EAB) and low population zone boundary
(LPZ), as well as the Control Room, are within corresponding
regulatory limits.
Therefore, operation of PBAPS in accordance with the proposed
changes will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. J. Bradley Fewell, Associate General
Counsel, Exelon Generation Company LLC, 4300 Winfield Road,
Warrenville, IL 60555.
NRC Branch Chief: Harold K. Chernoff.
FPL Energy, Point Beach, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point
Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc
County, Wisconsin
Date of amendment request: March 31, 2008.
Description of amendment request: FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC,
requests adoption of an approved change to the Standard Technical
Specifications (STS) for pressurized-water reactor (PWR) plants (NUREG-
1430, NUREG-1431, & NUREG-1432) and plant-specific technical
specifications (TS), to replace the current limits on primary coolant
gross specific activity with limits on primary coolant noble gas
activity. The noble gas activity would be based on dose equivalent
Xenon-133 and would take into account only the noble gas activity in
the primary coolant. In addition, the current dose equivalent I-131
definition would be revised to allow the use of additional thyroid dose
conversion factors. The changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC)-approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force
(TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-490,
Revision 0.
Basis for proposed no-significant-hazards-consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously
Evaluated Reactor coolant specific activity is not an initiator for any
accident previously evaluated. The Completion Time when primary coolant
gross activity is not within limit is not an initiator for any accident
previously evaluated. The current variable limit on primary coolant
iodine concentration is not an initiator to any accident previously
evaluated. As a result, the proposed change does not significantly
increase the probability of an accident. The proposed change will limit
primary coolant noble gases to concentrations consistent with the
accident analyses. The proposed change to the Completion Time has no
impact on the consequences of any design basis accident since the
consequences of an accident during the extended Completion Time are the
same as the consequences of an accident during the Completion Time. As
a result, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not
significantly increased.
Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of
a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Accident Previously
Evaluated.
The proposed change in specific activity limits does not alter any
physical part of the plant nor does it affect any plant operating
parameter.
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The change does not create the potential for a new or different kind of
accident from any previously calculated.
Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in the Margin of Safety.
The proposed change revises the limits on noble gas radioactivity
in the primary coolant. The proposed change is consistent with the
assumptions in the safety analyses and will ensure the monitored values
protect the initial assumptions in the safety analyses. Based upon the
reasoning presented above, the requested change does not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis and based on this review,
it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied.
Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Antonio Fernandez, Esquire, Senior Attorney,
FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC, P. O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-
0420.
NRC Branch Chief: Lois M. James.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-263, Monticello Nuclear
Generating Plant, Wright County, Minnesota
Date of amendment request: March 31, 2008.
Description of amendment request: The licensee proposed to increase
the current maximum power level authorized by Section 2.C(1) of the
renewed facility operating license from 1,775 megawatts thermal (Mwt)
to 1,870 Mwt, an approximately five percent increase from the current
licensed thermal power. The current maximum power level of 1,775 Mwt
was approved in 1998, an increase of 6.3 percent from the original
licensed thermal power of 1670 Mwt. Thus, when approved, the licensee's
proposed amendment would take the maximum power level to about 12
percent above the original license thermal power. The licensee's
application addresses in details each of the following major technical
areas: Extended power uprate, containment analysis methods change,
increase in credit for containment overpressure for low head emergency
core cooling system (ECCS) pumps, and reactor internal pressure
differentials (RIPDs) for the steam dryer.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (NSHC).
The licensee's NSHC analysis, addressing each technical area listed
above, is reproduced below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Extended Power Uprate
Response: No.
The probability (frequency of occurrence) of [d]esign [b]asis
[a]ccidents occurring is not affected by the increased power level,
because Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) continues to
comply with the regulatory and design basis criteria established for
plant equipment. A probabilistic risk assessment demonstrates that
the calculated core damage frequencies do not significantly change
due to [e]xtended [p]ower [u]prate (EPU). Scram setpoints (equipment
settings that initiate automatic plant shutdowns) are established
such that there is no significant increase in scram frequency due to
EPU. No new challenges to safety-related equipment result from EPU.
The changes in consequences of postulated accidents, which would
occur from 102 percent of the EPU [rated thermal power] RTP compared
to those previously evaluated, are acceptable. The results of EPU
accident evaluations do not exceed the NRC[-] approved acceptance
limits. The spectrum of postulated accidents and transients has been
investigated, and are shown to meet the plant's currently licensed
regulatory criteria. In the area of fuel and core design, for
example, the Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (SLMCPR) and
other applicable Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits (SAFDL) are
still met. Continued compliance with the SLMCPR and other SAFDLs
will be confirmed on a cycle[-]specific basis consistent with the
criteria accepted by the NRC.
Challenges to the [r]eactor [c]oolant [p]ressure [b]oundary were
evaluated at EPU conditions (pressure, temperature, flow, and
radiation) and were found to meet their acceptance criteria for
allowable stresses and overpressure margin. Challenges to the
containment have been evaluated, and the containment and its
associated cooling systems continue to meet the current licensing
basis. The increase in the calculated post[-] LOCA suppression pool
temperature above the currently assumed peak temperature was
evaluated and determined to be acceptable. Radiological release
events (accidents) have been evaluated, and have been shown to meet
the guidelines of 10 CFR 50.67.
Containment Analysis Methods Change
Response: No.
The use of passive heat sinks, variable RHR [residual heat
removal] heat exchanger capability K-value, and mechanistic heat and
mass transfer from the suppression pool surface to the wetwell
airspace after 30 seconds for the long[-]term design[-] basis [-
]accident loss of coolant accident (DBA-LOCA) containment analysis
are not relevant to accident initiation, but rather, pertain to the
method used to accurately evaluate postulated accidents. The use of
these elements does not, in any way, alter existing fission product
boundaries, and provides a conservative prediction of the
containment response to DBA-LOCAs. Therefore, the containment
analysis method change does not involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Increase in Credit for Containment Overpressure for Low Head
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pumps
Response: No.
These changes update parameters used in the MNGP safety analyses
and expand the range and scope of the analyses. This will result in
a more realistic analysis of available containment overpressure
under design [-]basis accident conditions. The updated analyses
affect only the evaluation of previously reviewed accidents. No
plant structure, system, or component (SSC) is physically affected
by the updated and expanded analyses. No method of operation of any
plant SSC is affected. Therefore, there is no significant increase
in the probability or consequence of a previously evaluated
accident.
Reactor Internal Pressure Differentials (RIPDs) for the Steam Dryer
Response: No.
The revised steam dryer RIPDs are used in evaluating loads in
reactor vessel internals for various conditions (i.e., during
normal, upset and faulted conditions). The values more accurately
represent the actual plant configuration. No plant structure,
system, or component (SSC) is physically affected by the updated and
expanded analyses. No method of operation of any plant SSC is
affected. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the
probability or consequence of a previously evaluated accident.
The analyses supporting the above evaluations were performed at
the EPU power level of 2,004 Mwt, which bounds this license
amendment request to operate at 1,870 Mwt. Therefore, the proposed
changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the pro