Order on Technical Conference, 18267-18270 [E8-6606]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 65 / Thursday, April 3, 2008 / Notices
the filing of protests. Accordingly, any
person desiring to be heard concerning
the blanket approvals of issuances of
securities or assumptions of liability by
Plum Point, should file a protest with
the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, in accordance
with Rules 211 and 214 of the
Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure. 18 CFR 385.211, 385.214
(2007). The Commission encourages the
electronic submission of protests using
the FERC Online link at https://
www.ferc.gov.
Notice is hereby given that the
deadline for filing protests is April 7,
2008.
Absent a request to be heard in
opposition to such blanket approvals by
the deadline above, Plum Point is
authorized to issue securities and
assume obligations or liabilities as a
guarantor, indorser, surety, or otherwise
in respect of any security of another
person; provided that such issuance or
assumption is for some lawful object
within the corporate purposes of Plum
Point, compatible with the public
interest, and is reasonably necessary or
appropriate for such purposes.
The Commission reserves the right to
require a further showing that neither
public nor private interests will be
adversely affected by continued
approvals of Plum Point’s issuance of
securities or assumptions of liability.
Copies of the full text of the Director’s
Order are available from the
Commission’s Public Reference Room,
888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426. The Order may also be viewed
on the Commission’s Web site at
https://www.ferc.gov, using the eLibrary
link. Enter the docket number excluding
the last three digits in the docket
number filed to access the document.
Comments, protests, and interventions
may be filed electronically via the
Internet in lieu of paper. See, 18 CFR
385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions
on the Commission’s Web site under the
‘‘e-Filing’’ link. The Commission
strongly encourages electronic filings.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8–6862 Filed 4–2–08; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
[Docket Nos. ER08–354–000; ER08–354–
001; ER08–354–002]
Wells Fargo Energy Markets, LLC;
Notice of Issuance of Order
March 27, 2008.
Wells Fargo Energy Markets, LLC
(Wells Fargo), filed an application for
market-based rate authority, with an
accompanying tariff. The proposed
market-based rate tariff provides for the
sale of energy, capacity and ancillary
services at market-based rates. Wells
Fargo also requested waivers of various
Commission regulations. In particular,
Wells Fargo requested that the
Commission grant blanket approval
under 18 CFR Part 34 of all future
issuances of securities and assumptions
of liability by Wells Fargo.
On March 6, 2008, pursuant to
delegated authority, the Director,
Division of Tariffs and Market
Development—West, granted the
request for blanket approval under Part
34 (Director’s Order). The Director’s
Order also stated that the Commission
would publish a separate notice in the
Federal Register establishing a period of
time for the filing of protests.
Accordingly, any person desiring to be
heard concerning the blanket approvals
of issuances of securities or assumptions
of liability by Wells Fargo, should file
a protest with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in
accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of
the Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure. 18 CFR 385.211, 385.214
(2007). The Commission encourages the
electronic submission of protests using
the FERC Online link at https://
www.ferc.gov.
Notice is hereby given that the
deadline for filing protests is April 7,
2008.
Absent a request to be heard in
opposition to such blanket approvals by
the deadline above, Wells Fargo is
authorized to issue securities and
assume obligations or liabilities as a
guarantor, indorser, surety, or otherwise
in respect of any security of another
person; provided that such issuance or
assumption is for some lawful object
within the corporate purposes of Wells
Fargo, compatible with the public
interest, and is reasonably necessary or
appropriate for such purposes.
The Commission reserves the right to
require a further showing that neither
public nor private interests will be
adversely affected by continued
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18267
approvals of Wells Fargo’s issuance of
securities or assumptions of liability.
Copies of the full text of the Director’s
Order are available from the
Commission’s Public Reference Room,
888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426. The Order may also be viewed
on the Commission’s Web site at https://
www.ferc.gov, using the eLibrary link.
Enter the docket number excluding the
last three digits in the docket number
filed to access the document.
Comments, protests, and interventions
may be filed electronically via the
Internet in lieu of paper. See, 18 CFR
385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions
on the Commission’s Web site under the
‘‘e-Filing’’ link. The Commission
strongly encourages electronic filings.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8–6861 Filed 4–2–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
[Docket No. AD08–2–000]
Order on Technical Conference
Issued March 20, 2008.
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Order on Technical Conference.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: On December 11, 2008, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
convened a technical conference on
interconnection queuing practices. This
order follows up that technical
conference and directs Regional
Transmission Organizations and
Independent System Operators to file
reports on the status of their efforts to
improve the processing of their
interconnection queues.
DATES: Reports are due April 21, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mary C. Morton, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426,
(202) 502–8040.
Michael G. Henry (Legal Information),
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
8532.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher,
Chairman; Suedeen G. Kelly, Marc Spitzer,
Philip D. Moeller, and Jon Wellinghoff.
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 65 / Thursday, April 3, 2008 / Notices
Order on Technical Conference
1. This order follows up on our
December 11, 2007, technical
conference (Technical Conference) on
interconnection queuing practices. In
this order, we direct the Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and
Independent System Operators (ISOs) to
file reports on the status of their efforts
to improve the processing of their
interconnection queues. We also
provide guidance to assist the RTOs and
ISOs and their stakeholders in those
efforts.
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Background
2. The Commission issued Order No.
2003 to standardize the agreements and
procedures related to the
interconnection of large generating
facilities.1 We found that ‘‘[a] standard
set of procedures as part of the [Open
Access Transmission Tariff] for all
jurisdictional transmission facilities will
minimize opportunities for undue
discrimination and expedite the
development of new generation, while
protecting reliability and ensuring that
rates are just and reasonable.’’ 2 Key to
balancing these goals was queue
management procedures, including
timelines that Transmission Providers 3
must use reasonable efforts to meet.
3. In response to concerns about the
effectiveness of queue management, the
Commission held the Technical
Conference. The Commission also
issued a notice afterward inviting
comments.4 The speakers at the
Technical Conference and the written
comments confirm that some
Transmission Providers are not
1 Standardization of Generator Interconnection
Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2003, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,146 (2003), order on reh’g, Order
No. 2003–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,160, order on
reh’g, Order No. 2003–B, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,171 (2004), order on reh’g, Order No. 2003–C,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,190 (2005), aff’d sub nom.
Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FERC,
475 F.3d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76
U.S.L.W. 3454 (Feb. 25, 2008). See also
Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection
Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2006, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,180, order on reh’g, Order No.
2006–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,196 (2005), order
granting clarification, Order No. 2006–B, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,221 (2006), appeal pending sub
nom. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, Nos.
06–1275 (DC Cir. filed July 14, 2006 and later);
Interconnection for Wind Energy, Order No. 661,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,186 (2005), order on reh’g,
Order No. 661–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,198
(2005).
2 Order No. 2003, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,146 at
P 11.
3 ‘‘Transmission Provider’’ is a defined term
under Order No. 2003. See Standard Large
Generator Interconnection Procedures (‘‘pro forma
LGIP’’) § 1.
4 Notice Inviting Comments, Interconnection
Queuing Practices, Docket Nos. AD08–2–000, et al.
(Dec. 17, 2007).
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processing their interconnection queues
with the timeliness envisioned in Order
No. 2003, in certain cases greatly
exceeding the timelines in their tariffs.
Surges in the volume of new generation
development are taxing the current
queue management approach in some
regions. Additionally, the
unprecedented demand in some regions
for new types of generation, principally
renewable generation, places further
stress on queue management because
such generation technologies can, for
example, be brought online more
quickly than traditional generation.
Finally, some regions have capacity
markets that did not exist when the
current queue management approach
was developed and are struggling with
how to manage their queues to
accommodate those new markets.
Discussion
4. The Commission is concerned
about delays in processing
interconnection queues. Although we
are concerned about delays in all
regions, the Technical Conference
revealed that the delays are particularly
significant in RTOs and ISOs that are
attracting significant new entry. Many of
the factors identified at the Technical
Conference as contributing to delays are
present for all Transmission Providers,
independent and non-independent
alike. For example, the need for restudy
when multiple projects withdraw from
a queue and the complexity of designing
interconnections within a system with
limited excess transmission capacity are
not confined to RTOs and ISOs. All
Transmission Providers should be
evaluating whether changes are needed
to their queue management practices to
ensure the expediency called for by
Order No. 2003. However, given the
greater interest of new generation
entrants in gaining access to RTO and
ISO markets compared to other markets,
the magnitude of the backlogs in RTOand ISO-managed queues is particularly
significant.
5. These backlogs not only deprive
generation developers of needed
business certainty, they also undermine
other important public goals. As
detailed by speakers at the Technical
Conference, delays in interconnecting
renewable generation in the footprints
of the Midwest Independent
Transmission System Operator, Inc. and
the California Independent System
Operator Corporation are creating
additional challenges in meeting state
renewable portfolio standards. In the
ISO New England Inc. and PJM
Interconnection, LLC regions, queue
delays could prevent least cost
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resources from being available in new
capacity markets auctions.
6. The Commission believes that over
the long term, the improved
transmission planning required under
Order No. 890 5 will address some of the
causes of the current interconnection
queue problems. In particular, the
planning reforms adopted by Order No.
890 should increase the transparency of
planning information to all customers,
increase coordination among
transmission owners in each region, and
otherwise result in a more robust
transmission system. These
improvements, in turn, should enable
developers to make fewer, more tailored
interconnection requests and make it
easier to interconnect with the
transmission system. However, while
the efforts currently under way to
comply with Order No. 890 hold
promise for the long-term processing of
interconnection queues, we cannot
afford to wait until those efforts are
completed to address the queue
management problem.
7. We note in particular the comments
of the ISO/RTO Council on the scope
and nature of the interconnection queue
problems facing ISOs and RTOs.
According to the ISO/RTO Council, the
queue backlog has increased in many of
the ISOs and RTOs because of the
significant new entry that is occurring.
The ISO/RTO Council states that
prompt action is necessary to address
these problems; however, the Council
urges that the Commission allow each
region to develop solutions that are
tailored to its specific circumstances
and contends that stakeholder processes
to discuss reforms are already underway
in several regions.
8. While the Commission could take
action to impose solutions, and may
need to do so if the RTOs and ISOs do
not act themselves, we agree that we
should allow each region the
opportunity to propose its own solution.
Although there are some common issues
affecting all the regions, there are also
significant differences in the nature and
scope of the problem from region to
region; there may, therefore, be no one
right answer for how to improve queue
management. Further, any solution
involves a balancing of interests.
Therefore, we urge the RTOs and ISOs
to work with their stakeholders to
develop consensus proposals.
9. While each of the RTOs and ISOs
represented at the conference indicated
5 Preventing Undue Discrimination and
Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890,
72 FR 12,266 (Mar. 15, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 (2007), order on reh’g, Order No. 890–A,
73 FR 2984 (Jan. 16, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,
261 (2007).
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that it was evaluating its queue
management, the RTOs and ISOs and
their stakeholders must proceed more
quickly, and the Commission intends to
monitor their efforts. Thus, we direct
each RTO and ISO to file a status report
with the Commission within 30 days of
the date of this order.6 The report must
describe the current size of the RTO’s or
ISO’s interconnection queue (i.e.,
number of pending interconnection
requests and total megawatts
represented by those requests), the
current projected timeframes for
processing pending interconnection
requests, and the nature and extent of
any problems that have led to any such
queue backlogs, including a discussion
of how clustering has or has not
alleviated those problems. The report
must also explain the status of
stakeholder discussions on queue
reform and provide a schedule for
selecting and implementing any
necessary reforms, including a target
date for filing any necessary tariff
amendments or waivers. To assist
stakeholders in their deliberations, we
offer the guidance set forth below.
10. The reforms that can be
implemented most quickly from a
regulatory standpoint are those that do
not require any revisions to an RTO’s or
ISO’s current tariff. For example, no
Commission filings are needed to
increase the staff available to work on
interconnection studies or adopt more
efficient modeling for feasibility studies
or system impact studies. Similarly,
each of the RTO and ISO tariffs already
provide an option for performing a
single system impact study for a cluster
of interconnection requests, so no
further Commission filings would be
necessary to take full advantage of the
existing flexibility to cluster. Therefore,
we urge the RTOs and ISOs when
evaluating ways to improve their queue
processing first to consider whether
they have taken all effective steps under
their current tariffs.
11. While there likely are reforms that
can be implemented without the need
for Commission filings, more may need
to be done. Reforms necessitating tariff
changes come in two forms: (1) Reforms
that apply to future interconnection
requests as well as existing
interconnection requests that are still at
an early stage in the interconnection
process; and (2) reforms that affect
existing interconnection requests that
are in later stages of the process. The
issues raised by these two classes of
reforms may well differ.
6 The reports will be noticed and subject to public
comment.
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12. With regard to reforms applicable
to future and early-stage existing
interconnection requests, we note that
Order No. 2003 authorizes a number of
options to streamline the
interconnection process. For example,
Order No. 2003 already allows for the
feasibility study to be combined with
the system impact study at the request
of the customer.7 Order No. 2003
permits Transmission Providers who
perform system impact studies on a
clustered basis to allocate the cost of
common upgrades to members of a
cluster without regard to queue
position.8 Further, Order No. 2003
authorizes the use of third party
consultants to conduct interconnection
studies.9 When considering tariff
changes applicable to future and earlystage existing interconnection requests,
the RTOs and ISOs should first consider
whether their current tariffs use all of
the streamlining options already
explicitly sanctioned under Order No.
2003.
13. If an RTO or ISO concludes that
the options already identified in Order
No. 2003 are inadequate to address its
queue problems, it may consider
proposing variations from Order No.
2003. Because RTOs and ISOs do not
own generation and thus do not have an
incentive to unduly discriminate,
variations sought by an RTO or ISO are
reviewed under the ‘‘independent entity
variation standard.’’ This standard
allows independent Transmission
Providers flexibility in designing their
interconnection procedures to
accommodate regional needs.10
14. The Commission recognizes that
the business of developing generation is
very dynamic and requires the
coordination of a whole host of factors
beyond interconnection, many of which
are outside the full control of the
developer. In the absence of alternative
sources of information about available
transmission capacity, the
7 Pro
forma LGIP § 6.1.
§ 4.2.
9 Id. § 13.4.
10 Order No. 2003 at P 822–27; Order No. 2003–
A at P 759. An RTO or ISO proposing a variation
must demonstrate that the variation is just and
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory, and
would accomplish the purposes of Order No. 2003.
See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, LLC., 108 FERC
¶ 61,025, at P 7 (2004) (‘‘[W]hen an RTO is the filing
entity, the Commission will review the proposed
variations to ensure that they do not provide an
unwarranted opportunity for undue discrimination
or produce an interconnection process that is unjust
and unreasonable.’’), order denying reh’g, 110 FERC
¶ 61,099 (2005); and Midwest Indep. Transmission
Sys. Operator, Inc., 117 FERC ¶ 61,128 (2006), order
on reh’g, 119 FERC ¶ 61,097, at P 7 (2007) (rejecting
a proposed pricing variation because the RTO ‘‘had
not shown that the proposal would accomplish the
purposes Order No. 2003 set forth as possible
justifications for this type of pricing’’).
8 Id.
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interconnection-related study process
may be the only reliable vehicle a
customer has to evaluate the merits of
different interconnection points and
configurations. Thus, it is critical that
reforms applicable to future and earlystage existing interconnection requests
provide customers with enough
flexibility and information to respond to
business uncertainties. At the same
time, the Commission realizes that the
actions of one party in the queue can
affect the interests of other parties in the
queue. Thus, there needs to be a way to
prioritize the processing of requests on
a fair basis and to ensure that the
flexibility for individual generators does
not undermine the certainty and speed
needed for the queue as a whole.
15. Order No. 2003 struck a balance
by establishing that material
modifications to an interconnection
request will result in loss of queue
position, while allowing a customer to
make multiple interconnection requests
for the same basic project, if it makes a
relatively modest demonstration that it
is serious about the project. These
requests are then processed and
allocated costs on a first-come, firstserved basis.11 While this approach
made good sense at the time Order No.
2003 was issued and still works well in
many situations, it has led to some
unexpected consequences, particularly
in transmission systems with numerous
interconnection customers and limited
excess transmission capacity. In markets
with numerous interconnection
customers, many of those customers
may be competing for the same load,
and not all will be needed. Further, in
systems with limited excess
transmission capacity, the first-come,
first-served approach to cost allocation
can result in great disparities between
the costs faced by the customer whose
request happens to trigger the need for
a network upgrade as opposed to those
in lower queue positions. Moreover, the
relatively small deposit amounts,
coupled with the incentives produced
by a first-come, first-served approach to
allocating capacity, provides an
incentive for developers to secure a
place in the queue even for projects that
may not be commercially viable. These
and other factors can result in large
numbers of interconnection requests
being ultimately withdrawn, which in
turn slows down the process by
necessitating more study and restudy.
While the Commission is open to
11 As noted above, Order No. 2003 did allow for
some flexibility in the first-come, first-served
approach where a Transmission Provider performs
a single system impact study for a cluster of
interconnection requests.
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considering a range of possible
variations from Order No. 2003 with
regard to future and early-stage existing
interconnection requests, we believe
that there are three types of variations
that, individually or in combination,
hold particular promise for speeding up
queue processing while remaining
faithful to the goals of Order No. 2003.
16. First, it may be appropriate to
increase the requirements for getting
and keeping a queue position. For
example, it may be appropriate to
increase the amount of the deposits
required at the different stages of the
process to more accurately reflect the
cost of the necessary studies. Such a
change would not only be consistent
with traditional ratemaking principles,
but would also increase the likelihood
that only projects that are likely to be
commercially viable (and hence willing
to commit to the cost of such studies in
advance) are in the queue. Such a
change also would likely reduce the
number of multiple interconnection
requests made by the same customer for
the purpose of speculating on the cost
impacts of different locations. However,
as discussed above, multiple requests
for a single project can result from a
legitimate desire to evaluate the merits
of different interconnection points and
configurations without having to go to
the back of the queue. Therefore, the
more stringent the requirements, the
more important it is to ensure that
customers have access to alternative
sources of reliable information about
available transmission capacity to help
them tailor their interconnection
requests more narrowly toward a single
acceptable interconnection
configuration. Further, the RTOs and
ISOs should address the impact of any
increases in the requirements on smaller
customers or any other class of
interconnection customers.
17. Second, elimination of the
feasibility study as a separate step could
reduce processing time without harming
interconnection customers. Under Order
No. 2003, the feasibility study is
intended, in part, to provide
preliminary information to assist
developers in deciding whether it is
even worth their while to pursue more
detailed interconnection studies.
Elimination of a separate feasibility
study could streamline the study
process and could reduce
interconnection requests by screening
out those customers who are not willing
to pay the higher deposit required for a
system impact study. However,
elimination of a feasibility study phase,
like increased requirements to obtain
and retain a queue position, creates a
greater need to develop alternative
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mechanisms through which customers
can gather the information necessary to
more narrowly tailor their
interconnection requests toward a final
acceptable configuration.
18. Third, there may be approaches to
prioritizing queue processing that
provide protection against
discrimination comparable to the firstcome, first-served approach, but that are
more efficient. For example, there may
be merit in a first-ready, first-served
approach, whereby customers who
demonstrate the greatest ability to move
forward with project development are
processed first. Further, the Commission
is open to considering methods of
clustering other than that provided in
Order No. 2003. Order No. 2003’s
approach to clustering is fundamentally
based on a first-come, first-served
paradigm, as clusters are limited to
requests filed within the same time
frame, not to exceed 180 days.12
Clustering that takes into account
factors other than proximity of filing
date may allow for more efficient
studies and we are open to reviewing
such proposals.
19. We note that reforms that would
affect existing interconnection requests
that are in later stages of the process
create special circumstances that require
careful consideration. Unlike reforms
applicable to future and early-stage
existing interconnection requests, any
such reforms could significantly disrupt
the activities of customers who may
have taken action in reliance upon the
existing process. Reforms of this sort
could take the form of a filing to make
generic revisions to the tariff, filings to
modify individual interconnectionrelated agreements, or a request for a
one-time waiver of the tariff.13 These
reforms could change both the timing
and the cost allocation for a customer.
Some customers may experience an
overall benefit from a particular reform,
while others may be disadvantaged by a
reform. In still other cases, perhaps the
majority, the difference between
continued processing under the existing
tariff provisions and processing under a
12 See pro forma LGIP § 4.2. But see id. § 4.1
(allowing allocation of cost of common upgrades for
clustered interconnection requests without regard
to queue position).
13 See, e.g., Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys.
Operator, Inc., 117 FERC ¶ 61,128 (2006), order on
reh’g, 119 FERC ¶ 61,097 (2007) (rejecting as
unsupported proposed tariff amendments
applicable to existing interconnection agreements
but without prejudice to future filings to revise
individual interconnection agreements); and Cal.
Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 118 FERC ¶ 61,226,
order on clarification, 120 FERC ¶ 61,180 (2007)
(granting one-time waiver of procedures for
conducting clustered system impact studies despite
application to protestor who had already undergone
a system impact study).
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reformed process may be speculative,
including as to ultimate timing and cost
allocation. In those cases, we would
expect proponents of reform to have an
easier time justifying such reform.14
Whether and how a particular reform
should apply to a late-stage request will
depend on the specific facts. The
Commission is open to considering such
reforms. Further, while such reforms do
pose more difficult issues than reforms
applicable to future and early-stage
existing requests, the Commission
recognizes that they may be necessary in
order to resolve current backlogs.
The Commission orders:
The RTOs and ISOs are hereby
directed to file reports as discussed in
the body of this order within 30 days of
the date of this order.
By the Commission.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8–6606 Filed 4–2–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
[Docket No. ER08–685–000]
TransCanada Maine Wind
Development Inc.; Notice of Filing
March 27, 2008.
Take notice that on March 17, 2008,
TransCanada Maine Wind Development
Inc submitted for filing an application
for authorization to make wholesale
sales of energy and capacity at
negotiated, market-based rates.
Any person desiring to intervene or to
protest this filing must file in
accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of
the Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214).
Protests will be considered by the
Commission in determining the
appropriate action to be taken, but will
not serve to make protestants parties to
the proceeding. Any person wishing to
become a party must file a notice of
intervention or motion to intervene, as
appropriate. Such notices, motions, or
protests must be filed on or before the
comment date. On or before the
comment date, it is not necessary to
serve motions to intervene or protests
on persons other than the Applicant.
The Commission encourages
electronic submission of protests and
14 See, e.g., New York Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.,
114 FERC ¶ 61,207 (2006) (granting one-time waiver
of interconnection procedure noting that protestor’s
claim that it would incur higher costs due to
potential loss of its queue position was speculative).
E:\FR\FM\03APN1.SGM
03APN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 65 (Thursday, April 3, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18267-18270]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-6606]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. AD08-2-000]
Order on Technical Conference
Issued March 20, 2008.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Order on Technical Conference.
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SUMMARY: On December 11, 2008, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
convened a technical conference on interconnection queuing practices.
This order follows up that technical conference and directs Regional
Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators to file
reports on the status of their efforts to improve the processing of
their interconnection queues.
DATES: Reports are due April 21, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mary C. Morton, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8040.
Michael G. Henry (Legal Information), Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-
8532.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman; Suedeen G.
Kelly, Marc Spitzer, Philip D. Moeller, and Jon Wellinghoff.
[[Page 18268]]
Order on Technical Conference
1. This order follows up on our December 11, 2007, technical
conference (Technical Conference) on interconnection queuing practices.
In this order, we direct the Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)
and Independent System Operators (ISOs) to file reports on the status
of their efforts to improve the processing of their interconnection
queues. We also provide guidance to assist the RTOs and ISOs and their
stakeholders in those efforts.
Background
2. The Commission issued Order No. 2003 to standardize the
agreements and procedures related to the interconnection of large
generating facilities.\1\ We found that ``[a] standard set of
procedures as part of the [Open Access Transmission Tariff] for all
jurisdictional transmission facilities will minimize opportunities for
undue discrimination and expedite the development of new generation,
while protecting reliability and ensuring that rates are just and
reasonable.'' \2\ Key to balancing these goals was queue management
procedures, including timelines that Transmission Providers \3\ must
use reasonable efforts to meet.
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\1\ Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and
Procedures, Order No. 2003, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,146 (2003),
order on reh'g, Order No. 2003-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,160,
order on reh'g, Order No. 2003-B, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,171
(2004), order on reh'g, Order No. 2003-C, FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,190 (2005), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76
U.S.L.W. 3454 (Feb. 25, 2008). See also Standardization of Small
Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2006,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,180, order on reh'g, Order No. 2006-A, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,196 (2005), order granting clarification, Order
No. 2006-B, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,221 (2006), appeal pending sub
nom. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, Nos. 06-1275 (DC Cir.
filed July 14, 2006 and later); Interconnection for Wind Energy,
Order No. 661, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,186 (2005), order on reh'g,
Order No. 661-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,198 (2005).
\2\ Order No. 2003, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,146 at P 11.
\3\ ``Transmission Provider'' is a defined term under Order No.
2003. See Standard Large Generator Interconnection Procedures (``pro
forma LGIP'') Sec. 1.
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3. In response to concerns about the effectiveness of queue
management, the Commission held the Technical Conference. The
Commission also issued a notice afterward inviting comments.\4\ The
speakers at the Technical Conference and the written comments confirm
that some Transmission Providers are not processing their
interconnection queues with the timeliness envisioned in Order No.
2003, in certain cases greatly exceeding the timelines in their
tariffs. Surges in the volume of new generation development are taxing
the current queue management approach in some regions. Additionally,
the unprecedented demand in some regions for new types of generation,
principally renewable generation, places further stress on queue
management because such generation technologies can, for example, be
brought online more quickly than traditional generation. Finally, some
regions have capacity markets that did not exist when the current queue
management approach was developed and are struggling with how to manage
their queues to accommodate those new markets.
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\4\ Notice Inviting Comments, Interconnection Queuing Practices,
Docket Nos. AD08-2-000, et al. (Dec. 17, 2007).
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Discussion
4. The Commission is concerned about delays in processing
interconnection queues. Although we are concerned about delays in all
regions, the Technical Conference revealed that the delays are
particularly significant in RTOs and ISOs that are attracting
significant new entry. Many of the factors identified at the Technical
Conference as contributing to delays are present for all Transmission
Providers, independent and non-independent alike. For example, the need
for restudy when multiple projects withdraw from a queue and the
complexity of designing interconnections within a system with limited
excess transmission capacity are not confined to RTOs and ISOs. All
Transmission Providers should be evaluating whether changes are needed
to their queue management practices to ensure the expediency called for
by Order No. 2003. However, given the greater interest of new
generation entrants in gaining access to RTO and ISO markets compared
to other markets, the magnitude of the backlogs in RTO- and ISO-managed
queues is particularly significant.
5. These backlogs not only deprive generation developers of needed
business certainty, they also undermine other important public goals.
As detailed by speakers at the Technical Conference, delays in
interconnecting renewable generation in the footprints of the Midwest
Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and the California
Independent System Operator Corporation are creating additional
challenges in meeting state renewable portfolio standards. In the ISO
New England Inc. and PJM Interconnection, LLC regions, queue delays
could prevent least cost resources from being available in new capacity
markets auctions.
6. The Commission believes that over the long term, the improved
transmission planning required under Order No. 890 \5\ will address
some of the causes of the current interconnection queue problems. In
particular, the planning reforms adopted by Order No. 890 should
increase the transparency of planning information to all customers,
increase coordination among transmission owners in each region, and
otherwise result in a more robust transmission system. These
improvements, in turn, should enable developers to make fewer, more
tailored interconnection requests and make it easier to interconnect
with the transmission system. However, while the efforts currently
under way to comply with Order No. 890 hold promise for the long-term
processing of interconnection queues, we cannot afford to wait until
those efforts are completed to address the queue management problem.
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\5\ Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in
Transmission Service, Order No. 890, 72 FR 12,266 (Mar. 15, 2007),
FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 (2007), order on reh'g, Order No. 890-
A, 73 FR 2984 (Jan. 16, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31, 261 (2007).
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7. We note in particular the comments of the ISO/RTO Council on the
scope and nature of the interconnection queue problems facing ISOs and
RTOs. According to the ISO/RTO Council, the queue backlog has increased
in many of the ISOs and RTOs because of the significant new entry that
is occurring. The ISO/RTO Council states that prompt action is
necessary to address these problems; however, the Council urges that
the Commission allow each region to develop solutions that are tailored
to its specific circumstances and contends that stakeholder processes
to discuss reforms are already underway in several regions.
8. While the Commission could take action to impose solutions, and
may need to do so if the RTOs and ISOs do not act themselves, we agree
that we should allow each region the opportunity to propose its own
solution. Although there are some common issues affecting all the
regions, there are also significant differences in the nature and scope
of the problem from region to region; there may, therefore, be no one
right answer for how to improve queue management. Further, any solution
involves a balancing of interests. Therefore, we urge the RTOs and ISOs
to work with their stakeholders to develop consensus proposals.
9. While each of the RTOs and ISOs represented at the conference
indicated
[[Page 18269]]
that it was evaluating its queue management, the RTOs and ISOs and
their stakeholders must proceed more quickly, and the Commission
intends to monitor their efforts. Thus, we direct each RTO and ISO to
file a status report with the Commission within 30 days of the date of
this order.\6\ The report must describe the current size of the RTO's
or ISO's interconnection queue (i.e., number of pending interconnection
requests and total megawatts represented by those requests), the
current projected timeframes for processing pending interconnection
requests, and the nature and extent of any problems that have led to
any such queue backlogs, including a discussion of how clustering has
or has not alleviated those problems. The report must also explain the
status of stakeholder discussions on queue reform and provide a
schedule for selecting and implementing any necessary reforms,
including a target date for filing any necessary tariff amendments or
waivers. To assist stakeholders in their deliberations, we offer the
guidance set forth below.
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\6\ The reports will be noticed and subject to public comment.
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10. The reforms that can be implemented most quickly from a
regulatory standpoint are those that do not require any revisions to an
RTO's or ISO's current tariff. For example, no Commission filings are
needed to increase the staff available to work on interconnection
studies or adopt more efficient modeling for feasibility studies or
system impact studies. Similarly, each of the RTO and ISO tariffs
already provide an option for performing a single system impact study
for a cluster of interconnection requests, so no further Commission
filings would be necessary to take full advantage of the existing
flexibility to cluster. Therefore, we urge the RTOs and ISOs when
evaluating ways to improve their queue processing first to consider
whether they have taken all effective steps under their current
tariffs.
11. While there likely are reforms that can be implemented without
the need for Commission filings, more may need to be done. Reforms
necessitating tariff changes come in two forms: (1) Reforms that apply
to future interconnection requests as well as existing interconnection
requests that are still at an early stage in the interconnection
process; and (2) reforms that affect existing interconnection requests
that are in later stages of the process. The issues raised by these two
classes of reforms may well differ.
12. With regard to reforms applicable to future and early-stage
existing interconnection requests, we note that Order No. 2003
authorizes a number of options to streamline the interconnection
process. For example, Order No. 2003 already allows for the feasibility
study to be combined with the system impact study at the request of the
customer.\7\ Order No. 2003 permits Transmission Providers who perform
system impact studies on a clustered basis to allocate the cost of
common upgrades to members of a cluster without regard to queue
position.\8\ Further, Order No. 2003 authorizes the use of third party
consultants to conduct interconnection studies.\9\ When considering
tariff changes applicable to future and early-stage existing
interconnection requests, the RTOs and ISOs should first consider
whether their current tariffs use all of the streamlining options
already explicitly sanctioned under Order No. 2003.
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\7\ Pro forma LGIP Sec. 6.1.
\8\ Id. Sec. 4.2.
\9\ Id. Sec. 13.4.
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13. If an RTO or ISO concludes that the options already identified
in Order No. 2003 are inadequate to address its queue problems, it may
consider proposing variations from Order No. 2003. Because RTOs and
ISOs do not own generation and thus do not have an incentive to unduly
discriminate, variations sought by an RTO or ISO are reviewed under the
``independent entity variation standard.'' This standard allows
independent Transmission Providers flexibility in designing their
interconnection procedures to accommodate regional needs.\10\
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\10\ Order No. 2003 at P 822-27; Order No. 2003-A at P 759. An
RTO or ISO proposing a variation must demonstrate that the variation
is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory, and would
accomplish the purposes of Order No. 2003. See, e.g., PJM
Interconnection, LLC., 108 FERC ] 61,025, at P 7 (2004) (``[W]hen an
RTO is the filing entity, the Commission will review the proposed
variations to ensure that they do not provide an unwarranted
opportunity for undue discrimination or produce an interconnection
process that is unjust and unreasonable.''), order denying reh'g,
110 FERC ] 61,099 (2005); and Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys.
Operator, Inc., 117 FERC ] 61,128 (2006), order on reh'g, 119 FERC ]
61,097, at P 7 (2007) (rejecting a proposed pricing variation
because the RTO ``had not shown that the proposal would accomplish
the purposes Order No. 2003 set forth as possible justifications for
this type of pricing'').
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14. The Commission recognizes that the business of developing
generation is very dynamic and requires the coordination of a whole
host of factors beyond interconnection, many of which are outside the
full control of the developer. In the absence of alternative sources of
information about available transmission capacity, the interconnection-
related study process may be the only reliable vehicle a customer has
to evaluate the merits of different interconnection points and
configurations. Thus, it is critical that reforms applicable to future
and early-stage existing interconnection requests provide customers
with enough flexibility and information to respond to business
uncertainties. At the same time, the Commission realizes that the
actions of one party in the queue can affect the interests of other
parties in the queue. Thus, there needs to be a way to prioritize the
processing of requests on a fair basis and to ensure that the
flexibility for individual generators does not undermine the certainty
and speed needed for the queue as a whole.
15. Order No. 2003 struck a balance by establishing that material
modifications to an interconnection request will result in loss of
queue position, while allowing a customer to make multiple
interconnection requests for the same basic project, if it makes a
relatively modest demonstration that it is serious about the project.
These requests are then processed and allocated costs on a first-come,
first-served basis.\11\ While this approach made good sense at the time
Order No. 2003 was issued and still works well in many situations, it
has led to some unexpected consequences, particularly in transmission
systems with numerous interconnection customers and limited excess
transmission capacity. In markets with numerous interconnection
customers, many of those customers may be competing for the same load,
and not all will be needed. Further, in systems with limited excess
transmission capacity, the first-come, first-served approach to cost
allocation can result in great disparities between the costs faced by
the customer whose request happens to trigger the need for a network
upgrade as opposed to those in lower queue positions. Moreover, the
relatively small deposit amounts, coupled with the incentives produced
by a first-come, first-served approach to allocating capacity, provides
an incentive for developers to secure a place in the queue even for
projects that may not be commercially viable. These and other factors
can result in large numbers of interconnection requests being
ultimately withdrawn, which in turn slows down the process by
necessitating more study and restudy. While the Commission is open to
[[Page 18270]]
considering a range of possible variations from Order No. 2003 with
regard to future and early-stage existing interconnection requests, we
believe that there are three types of variations that, individually or
in combination, hold particular promise for speeding up queue
processing while remaining faithful to the goals of Order No. 2003.
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\11\ As noted above, Order No. 2003 did allow for some
flexibility in the first-come, first-served approach where a
Transmission Provider performs a single system impact study for a
cluster of interconnection requests.
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16. First, it may be appropriate to increase the requirements for
getting and keeping a queue position. For example, it may be
appropriate to increase the amount of the deposits required at the
different stages of the process to more accurately reflect the cost of
the necessary studies. Such a change would not only be consistent with
traditional ratemaking principles, but would also increase the
likelihood that only projects that are likely to be commercially viable
(and hence willing to commit to the cost of such studies in advance)
are in the queue. Such a change also would likely reduce the number of
multiple interconnection requests made by the same customer for the
purpose of speculating on the cost impacts of different locations.
However, as discussed above, multiple requests for a single project can
result from a legitimate desire to evaluate the merits of different
interconnection points and configurations without having to go to the
back of the queue. Therefore, the more stringent the requirements, the
more important it is to ensure that customers have access to
alternative sources of reliable information about available
transmission capacity to help them tailor their interconnection
requests more narrowly toward a single acceptable interconnection
configuration. Further, the RTOs and ISOs should address the impact of
any increases in the requirements on smaller customers or any other
class of interconnection customers.
17. Second, elimination of the feasibility study as a separate step
could reduce processing time without harming interconnection customers.
Under Order No. 2003, the feasibility study is intended, in part, to
provide preliminary information to assist developers in deciding
whether it is even worth their while to pursue more detailed
interconnection studies. Elimination of a separate feasibility study
could streamline the study process and could reduce interconnection
requests by screening out those customers who are not willing to pay
the higher deposit required for a system impact study. However,
elimination of a feasibility study phase, like increased requirements
to obtain and retain a queue position, creates a greater need to
develop alternative mechanisms through which customers can gather the
information necessary to more narrowly tailor their interconnection
requests toward a final acceptable configuration.
18. Third, there may be approaches to prioritizing queue processing
that provide protection against discrimination comparable to the first-
come, first-served approach, but that are more efficient. For example,
there may be merit in a first-ready, first-served approach, whereby
customers who demonstrate the greatest ability to move forward with
project development are processed first. Further, the Commission is
open to considering methods of clustering other than that provided in
Order No. 2003. Order No. 2003's approach to clustering is
fundamentally based on a first-come, first-served paradigm, as clusters
are limited to requests filed within the same time frame, not to exceed
180 days.\12\ Clustering that takes into account factors other than
proximity of filing date may allow for more efficient studies and we
are open to reviewing such proposals.
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\12\ See pro forma LGIP Sec. 4.2. But see id. Sec. 4.1
(allowing allocation of cost of common upgrades for clustered
interconnection requests without regard to queue position).
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19. We note that reforms that would affect existing interconnection
requests that are in later stages of the process create special
circumstances that require careful consideration. Unlike reforms
applicable to future and early-stage existing interconnection requests,
any such reforms could significantly disrupt the activities of
customers who may have taken action in reliance upon the existing
process. Reforms of this sort could take the form of a filing to make
generic revisions to the tariff, filings to modify individual
interconnection-related agreements, or a request for a one-time waiver
of the tariff.\13\ These reforms could change both the timing and the
cost allocation for a customer. Some customers may experience an
overall benefit from a particular reform, while others may be
disadvantaged by a reform. In still other cases, perhaps the majority,
the difference between continued processing under the existing tariff
provisions and processing under a reformed process may be speculative,
including as to ultimate timing and cost allocation. In those cases, we
would expect proponents of reform to have an easier time justifying
such reform.\14\ Whether and how a particular reform should apply to a
late-stage request will depend on the specific facts. The Commission is
open to considering such reforms. Further, while such reforms do pose
more difficult issues than reforms applicable to future and early-stage
existing requests, the Commission recognizes that they may be necessary
in order to resolve current backlogs.
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\13\ See, e.g., Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc.,
117 FERC ] 61,128 (2006), order on reh'g, 119 FERC ] 61,097 (2007)
(rejecting as unsupported proposed tariff amendments applicable to
existing interconnection agreements but without prejudice to future
filings to revise individual interconnection agreements); and Cal.
Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 118 FERC ] 61,226, order on
clarification, 120 FERC ] 61,180 (2007) (granting one-time waiver of
procedures for conducting clustered system impact studies despite
application to protestor who had already undergone a system impact
study).
\14\ See, e.g., New York Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 114 FERC ]
61,207 (2006) (granting one-time waiver of interconnection procedure
noting that protestor's claim that it would incur higher costs due
to potential loss of its queue position was speculative).
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The Commission orders:
The RTOs and ISOs are hereby directed to file reports as discussed
in the body of this order within 30 days of the date of this order.
By the Commission.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8-6606 Filed 4-2-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P