Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701, & 702) and CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900) Airplanes, 14189-14191 [E8-5335]
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14189
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 73, No. 52
Monday, March 17, 2008
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
Examining the AD Docket
[Docket No. FAA–2008–0300; Directorate
Identifier 2008–NM–019–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier
Model CL–600–2C10 (Regional Jet
Series 700, 701, & 702) and CL–600–
2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900)
Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This proposed
AD results from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI)
originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct
an unsafe condition on an aviation
product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as:
pwalker on PROD1PC71 with PROPOSALS
The assessment and lightning tests showed
that certain fuel tube self-bonded couplings
do not provide sufficient lightning current
capability. The assessment also showed that
single failure of the integral bonding wire of
the self-bonded couplings could affect
electrical bonding between the tubes.
Insufficient electrical bonding between fuel
tubes or insufficient current capability of fuel
tube couplings, if not corrected, could result
in arcing and potential ignition source[s]
inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes
and consequent fuel tank explosion.
The proposed AD would require
actions that are intended to address the
unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by April 16, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:11 Mar 14, 2008
Jkt 214001
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the
Docket Operations office between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this proposed AD, the
regulatory evaluation, any comments
received, and other information. The
street address for the Docket Operations
office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in
the ADDRESSES section. Comments will
be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
James Delisio, Aerospace Engineer,
Airframe and Propulsion Branch, ANE–
171, FAA, New York Aircraft
Certification Office, 1600 Stewart
Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York
11590; telephone (516) 228–7321; fax
(516) 794–5531.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written
relevant data, views, or arguments about
this proposed AD. Send your comments
to an address listed under the
ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No.
FAA–2008–0300; Directorate Identifier
2008–NM–019–AD’’ at the beginning of
your comments. We specifically invite
comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy
aspects of this proposed AD. We will
consider all comments received by the
closing date and may amend this
proposed AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we
receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact we receive
about this proposed AD.
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Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
Discussion
Transport Canada Civil Aviation
(TCCA), which is the aviation authority
for Canada, has issued Canadian
Airworthiness Directive CF–2008–02,
dated January 3, 2008 (referred to after
this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe
condition for the specified products.
The MCAI states:
Bombardier Aerospace has completed a
system safety review of the CL–600–2C10/
CL–600–2D24 aircraft fuel system against
new fuel tank safety standards, introduced in
Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual
through Notice of Proposed Amendment
(NPA) 2002–043. The identified noncompliances were assessed using Transport
Canada Policy Letter No. 525–001 to
determine if mandatory corrective action is
required.
The assessment and lightning tests showed
that certain fuel tube self-bonded couplings
do not provide sufficient lightning current
capability. The assessment also showed that
single failure of the integral bonding wire of
the self-bonded couplings could affect
electrical bonding between the tubes.
Insufficient electrical bonding between fuel
tubes or insufficient current capability of fuel
tube couplings, if not corrected, could result
in arcing and potential ignition source[s]
inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes
and consequent fuel tank explosion. To
correct the unsafe condition, this directive
mandates the replacement of certain fuel tube
couplings with redesigned couplings.
For certain airplanes, the AD You may
obtain further information by examining
the MCAI in the AD docket.
The FAA has examined the
underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large
transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the
service history of airplanes subject to
those regulations, and existing
maintenance practices for fuel tank
systems. As a result of those findings,
we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport
Airplane Fuel Tank System Design
Review, Flammability Reduction and
Maintenance and Inspection
Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7,
2001). In addition to new airworthiness
standards for transport airplanes and
new maintenance requirements, this
rule included Special Federal Aviation
Regulation Number 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’
Amendment 21–78, and subsequent
Amendments 21–82 and 21–83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88
requires certain type design (i.e., type
certificate (TC) and supplemental type
certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate
E:\FR\FM\17MRP1.SGM
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14190
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 52 / Monday, March 17, 2008 / Proposed Rules
that their fuel tank systems can prevent
ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This
requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered
transport airplanes and for subsequent
modifications to those airplanes. It
requires them to perform design reviews
and to develop design changes and
maintenance procedures if their designs
do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble
to the rule, we intended to adopt
airworthiness directives to mandate any
changes found necessary to address
unsafe conditions identified as a result
of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we
have established four criteria intended
to define the unsafe conditions
associated with fuel tank systems that
require corrective actions. The
percentage of operating time during
which fuel tanks are exposed to
flammable conditions is one of these
criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation:
single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s),
and in-service failure experience. For all
four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken
that may mitigate the need for further
action.
We have determined that the actions
identified in this AD are necessary to
reduce the potential of ignition sources
inside fuel tanks, which, in combination
with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent
loss of the airplane.
Relevant Service Information
pwalker on PROD1PC71 with PROPOSALS
FAA’s Determination and Requirements
of This Proposed AD
This product has been approved by
the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation
in the United States. Pursuant to our
bilateral agreement with the State of
Design Authority, we have been notified
of the unsafe condition described in the
MCAI and service information
referenced above. We are proposing this
AD because we evaluated all pertinent
information and determined an unsafe
condition exists and is likely to exist or
develop on other products of the same
type design.
16:11 Mar 14, 2008
Jkt 214001
We have reviewed the MCAI and
related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But
we might have found it necessary to use
different words from those in the MCAI
to ensure the AD is clear for U.S.
operators and is enforceable. In making
these changes, we do not intend to differ
substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related
service information.
We might also have proposed
different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA
policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a NOTE within the
proposed AD.
Costs of Compliance
Based on the service information, we
estimate that this proposed AD would
affect about 160 products of U.S.
registry. We also estimate that it would
take about 32 work-hours per product to
comply with the basic requirements of
this proposed AD. The average labor
rate is $80 per work-hour. Required
parts would cost about $0 per product.
Where the service information lists
required parts costs that are covered
under warranty, we have assumed that
there will be no charge for these costs.
As we do not control warranty coverage
for affected parties, some parties may
incur costs higher than estimated here.
Based on these figures, we estimate the
cost of the proposed AD on U.S.
operators to be $409,600, or $2,560 per
product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Bombardier has issued Service
Bulletin 670BA–28–014, Revision A,
dated May 7, 2007. The actions
described in this service information are
intended to correct the unsafe condition
identified in the MCAI.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
Differences Between This AD and the
MCAI or Service Information
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701:
General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
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Frm 00002
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this proposed AD
would not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This
proposed AD would not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on
the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify this proposed regulation:
1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this proposed AD and placed it in the
AD docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part
39 as follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new AD:
Bombardier, Inc. (Formerly Canadair):
Docket No. FAA–2008–0300; Directorate
Identifier 2008–NM–019–AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) We must receive comments by April 16,
2008.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Bombardier Model
CL–600–2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701,
& 702) airplanes, serial numbers 10003
through 10169 inclusive; and Model CL–600–
2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900) airplanes,
serial numbers 15001 through 15025
inclusive; certificated in any category.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of
America Code 28: Fuel.
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 52 / Monday, March 17, 2008 / Proposed Rules
Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI) states:
Bombardier Aerospace has completed a
system safety review of the CL–600–2C10/
CL–600–2D24 aircraft fuel system against
new fuel tank safety standards, introduced in
Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual
through Notice of Proposed Amendment
(NPA) 2002–043. The identified noncompliances were assessed using Transport
Canada Policy Letter No. 525–001 to
determine if mandatory corrective action is
required.
The assessment and lightning tests showed
that certain fuel tube self-bonded couplings
do not provide sufficient lightning current
capability. The assessment also showed that
single failure of the integral bonding wire of
the self-bonded couplings could affect
electrical bonding between the tubes.
Insufficient electrical bonding between fuel
tubes or insufficient current capability of fuel
tube couplings, if not corrected, could result
in arcing and potential ignition source[s]
inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes
and consequent fuel tank explosion. To
correct the unsafe condition, this directive
mandates the replacement of certain fuel tube
couplings with redesigned couplings.
Actions and Compliance
(f) Within 4,500 flight hours after the
effective date of this AD, unless already
done, do the following actions.
(1) For airplanes on which Bombardier
Service Bulletin 670BA–28–014, dated
January 4, 2005, has not been incorporated as
of the effective date of this AD: Replace fuel
tube couplings inside the wing and center
fuel tanks with redesigned couplings, in
accordance with Part A of the
Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier
Service Bulletin 670BA–28–014, Revision A,
dated May 7, 2007.
(2) For airplanes on which Bombardier
Service Bulletin 670BA–28–014, dated
January 4, 2005, has been incorporated as of
the effective date of this AD: Do a visual
inspection of the aft scavenge ejector fuel
couplings inside the left- and right-hand
wing fuel tanks to determine if redesigned
couplings are installed, and replace with
redesigned couplings as applicable, in
accordance with Part B of the
Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier
Service Bulletin 670BA–28–014, Revision A,
dated May 7, 2007.
FAA AD Differences
pwalker on PROD1PC71 with PROPOSALS
Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/
or service information as follows: No
differences.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to
this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs): The Manager, New York Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: James
Delisio, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe and
Propulsion Branch, ANE–171, FAA, New
York ACO, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410,
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:11 Mar 14, 2008
Jkt 214001
Westbury, New York 11590; telephone (516)
228–7321; fax (516) 794–5531. Before using
any approved AMOC on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies, notify your
appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the
FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO),
or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement
in this AD to obtain corrective actions from
a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective
actions are considered FAA-approved if they
are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required
to assure the product is airworthy before it
is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any
reporting requirement in this AD, under the
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act,
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
has approved the information collection
requirements and has assigned OMB Control
Number 2120–0056.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI Transport Canada Civil
Aviation Canadian Airworthiness Directive
CF–2008–02, dated January 3, 2008, and
Bombardier Service Bulletin 670BA–28–014,
Revision A, dated May 7, 2007, for related
information.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 9,
2008.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E8–5335 Filed 3–14–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2008–0331; Directorate
Identifier 2008–CE–009–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Cessna
Aircraft Company, Models 208 and
208B Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
We propose to adopt a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna)
Models 208 and 208B airplanes. This
proposed AD would require inspection
of the left and right wing wire bundle(s)
and repair or replacement of damaged
wire. This proposed AD would also
require inspecting the wire bundles for
correct attachment to the anchor points
and correcting any deficient
attachments. This proposed AD results
SUMMARY:
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Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
14191
from chafed wiring found on wire
bundles in the left and right wings
containing the auto-control wing de-ice
system, fuel quantity indication, and
low fuel annunciation on the Cessna
208B airplanes. Improper installation of
wire bundle supporting hardware can
cause chafed wiring in the affected
bundles. We are proposing this AD to
detect and correct damaged wiring of
the auto-control wing de-ice system,
fuel quantity indication, and low fuel
annunciation systems. This condition
could result in incorrect fuel quantity
indications, loss of low fuel quantity
annunciations, or loss of the autocontrol
wing de-ice system.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by May 16, 2008.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following
addresses to comment on this proposed
AD:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in
this proposed AD, contact Cessna
Aircraft Company, One Cessna
Boulevard, P.O. Box 7706, Wichita, KS
67277–7704; telephone: (316) 517–5800;
fax: (316) 942–9006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Daniel Hilton, Aerospace Engineer,
FAA, Wichita Aircraft Certification
Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100,
Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone: 316–
946–4173; e-mail address:
daniel.hilton@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written
relevant data, views, or arguments
regarding this proposed AD. Send your
comments to an address listed under the
ADDRESSES section. Include the docket
number, ‘‘FAA–2008–0331; Directorate
Identifier 2008–CE–009–AD’’ at the
beginning of your comments. We
specifically invite comments on the
overall regulatory, economic,
environmental, and energy aspects of
the proposed AD. We will consider all
comments received by the closing date
E:\FR\FM\17MRP1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 52 (Monday, March 17, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 14189-14191]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-5335]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 52 / Monday, March 17, 2008 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 14189]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2008-0300; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-019-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional
Jet Series 700, 701, & 702) and CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900)
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation
authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as:
The assessment and lightning tests showed that certain fuel tube
self-bonded couplings do not provide sufficient lightning current
capability. The assessment also showed that single failure of the
integral bonding wire of the self-bonded couplings could affect
electrical bonding between the tubes.
Insufficient electrical bonding between fuel tubes or
insufficient current capability of fuel tube couplings, if not
corrected, could result in arcing and potential ignition source[s]
inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes and consequent fuel
tank explosion.
* * *The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to
address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by April 16, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket
shortly after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Delisio, Aerospace Engineer,
Airframe and Propulsion Branch, ANE-171, FAA, New York Aircraft
Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New
York 11590; telephone (516) 228-7321; fax (516) 794-5531.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2008-0300;
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-019-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.
Discussion
Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), which is the aviation
authority for Canada, has issued Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-
2008-02, dated January 3, 2008 (referred to after this as ``the
MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The
MCAI states:
Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the
CL-600-2C10/CL-600-2D24 aircraft fuel system against new fuel tank
safety standards, introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness
Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-043. The
identified non-compliances were assessed using Transport Canada
Policy Letter No. 525-001 to determine if mandatory corrective
action is required.
The assessment and lightning tests showed that certain fuel tube
self-bonded couplings do not provide sufficient lightning current
capability. The assessment also showed that single failure of the
integral bonding wire of the self-bonded couplings could affect
electrical bonding between the tubes.
Insufficient electrical bonding between fuel tubes or
insufficient current capability of fuel tube couplings, if not
corrected, could result in arcing and potential ignition source[s]
inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes and consequent fuel
tank explosion. To correct the unsafe condition, this directive
mandates the replacement of certain fuel tube couplings with
redesigned couplings.
For certain airplanes, the AD You may obtain further information by
examining the MCAI in the AD docket.
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review,
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements''
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation Number 88 (``SFAR 88,''
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e.,
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders
to substantiate
[[Page 14190]]
that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel
tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large
turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to
those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to
develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do
not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the
preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to
mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions
identified as a result of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for
further action.
We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
Relevant Service Information
Bombardier has issued Service Bulletin 670BA-28-014, Revision A,
dated May 7, 2007. The actions described in this service information
are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.
FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD
This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same
type design.
Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.
Costs of Compliance
Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD
would affect about 160 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that
it would take about 32 work-hours per product to comply with the basic
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per
work-hour. Required parts would cost about $0 per product. Where the
service information lists required parts costs that are covered under
warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these costs.
As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, some
parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these
figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to
be $409,600, or $2,560 per product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
Bombardier, Inc. (Formerly Canadair): Docket No. FAA-2008-0300;
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-019-AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) We must receive comments by April 16, 2008.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Bombardier Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional
Jet Series 700, 701, & 702) airplanes, serial numbers 10003 through
10169 inclusive; and Model CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900)
airplanes, serial numbers 15001 through 15025 inclusive;
certificated in any category.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.
[[Page 14191]]
Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the
CL-600-2C10/CL-600-2D24 aircraft fuel system against new fuel tank
safety standards, introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness
Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-043. The
identified non-compliances were assessed using Transport Canada
Policy Letter No. 525-001 to determine if mandatory corrective
action is required.
The assessment and lightning tests showed that certain fuel tube
self-bonded couplings do not provide sufficient lightning current
capability. The assessment also showed that single failure of the
integral bonding wire of the self-bonded couplings could affect
electrical bonding between the tubes.
Insufficient electrical bonding between fuel tubes or
insufficient current capability of fuel tube couplings, if not
corrected, could result in arcing and potential ignition source[s]
inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes and consequent fuel
tank explosion. To correct the unsafe condition, this directive
mandates the replacement of certain fuel tube couplings with
redesigned couplings.
Actions and Compliance
(f) Within 4,500 flight hours after the effective date of this
AD, unless already done, do the following actions.
(1) For airplanes on which Bombardier Service Bulletin 670BA-28-
014, dated January 4, 2005, has not been incorporated as of the
effective date of this AD: Replace fuel tube couplings inside the
wing and center fuel tanks with redesigned couplings, in accordance
with Part A of the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service
Bulletin 670BA-28-014, Revision A, dated May 7, 2007.
(2) For airplanes on which Bombardier Service Bulletin 670BA-28-
014, dated January 4, 2005, has been incorporated as of the
effective date of this AD: Do a visual inspection of the aft
scavenge ejector fuel couplings inside the left- and right-hand wing
fuel tanks to determine if redesigned couplings are installed, and
replace with redesigned couplings as applicable, in accordance with
Part B of the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service
Bulletin 670BA-28-014, Revision A, dated May 7, 2007.
FAA AD Differences
Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows: No differences.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, New
York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found
in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: James Delisio, Aerospace
Engineer, Airframe and Propulsion Branch, ANE-171, FAA, New York
ACO, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590;
telephone (516) 228-7321; fax (516) 794-5531. Before using any
approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your
appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards
District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI Transport Canada Civil Aviation Canadian
Airworthiness Directive CF-2008-02, dated January 3, 2008, and
Bombardier Service Bulletin 670BA-28-014, Revision A, dated May 7,
2007, for related information.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 9, 2008.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E8-5335 Filed 3-14-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P