Parks, Recreation Areas, Wildlife and Waterfowl Refuges, and Historic Sites, 13368-13401 [E8-4596]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 49 / Wednesday, March 12, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Highway Administration
Federal Transit Administration
23 CFR Parts 771 and 774
49 CFR Part 622
[Docket No. FHWA–2005–22884]
RIN 2125–AF14 and 2132–AA83
Parks, Recreation Areas, Wildlife and
Waterfowl Refuges, and Historic Sites
Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) and Federal
Transit Administration (FTA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: This final rule modifies the
procedures for granting Section 4(f)
approvals in several ways. First, the
final rule clarifies the factors to be
considered and the standards to be
applied when determining if an
alternative for avoiding the use of
Section 4(f) property is feasible and
prudent. Second, the final rule clarifies
the factors to be considered when
selecting a project alternative in
situations where all alternatives would
use some Section 4(f) property. Third,
the final rule establishes procedures for
determining that the use of a Section
4(f) property has a de minimis impact
on the property. Fourth, the final rule
updates the regulation to recognize
statutory and common-sense exceptions
for uses that advance Section 4(f)’s
preservation purpose, as well as the
option of applying a programmatic
Section 4(f) evaluation. Fifth, the final
rule moves the Section 4(f) regulation
out of the agencies’ National
Environmental Policy Act regulation,
‘‘Environmental Impact and Related
Procedures,’’ into its own part with a
reorganized structure that is easier to
use.
Effective Date: April 11, 2008.
For
FHWA: Diane Mobley, Office of the
Chief Counsel, 202–366–1366, or Lamar
Smith, Office of Project Development
and Environmental Review, 202–366–
8994. For FTA: Joseph Ossi, Office of
Planning and Environment, 202–366–
1613, or Christopher VanWyk, Office of
Chief Counsel, 202–366–1733. Both
agencies are located at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Office hours are from 7:45 a.m. to 4:15
p.m., e.t., for FHWA, and 9 a.m. to 5:30
p.m., e.t., for FTA, Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
DATES:
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
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Electronic Access
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (Overton
This document, the notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) of July 27, Park). In Overton Park, the Court
2006, at 71 FR 42611, and all comments articulated a very high standard for
compliance with Section 4(f), stating
received by the U.S. DOT Docket
that Congress intended the protection of
Facility may be viewed through the
parkland to be of paramount
Federal Docket Management System
importance. The Court also made clear
(FDMS) at https://www.regulations.gov.
that an avoidance alternative must be
The FDMS is available 24 hours each
selected unless it would present
day, 365 days each year. Electronic
‘‘uniquely difficult problems’’ or require
submission and retrieval help and
‘‘costs or community disruption of
guidelines are available under the help
extraordinary magnitude.’’ Id. at 411–
section of this Web site.
21, 416.
An electronic copy of this document
Courts around the country have
may be downloaded by using a
applied the Overton Park decision,
computer, modem, and suitable
reaching different conclusions as to how
communications software, from the
various factors may be considered and
Government Printing Office’s Electronic what weight may be attached to the
Bulletin Board Service at (202) 512–
factors an agency uses to determine
1661. Internet users may reach the
whether an avoidance alternative is or is
Office of the Federal Register’s home
not feasible and prudent. Some courts
page at: https://www.archives.gov and the have interpreted Overton Park to
Government Printing Office’s Web site
mandate the avoidance of Section 4(f)
at: https://www.access.gpo.gov/nara.
properties at the expense of other
important environmental and social
Statutory Authority
resources. Congress amended Section
The principal statutory authority for
4(f) in 2005 to address the uncertainty
this rulemaking action is Section 6009
surrounding its application. Section
of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
6009(b) of the Safe, Accountable,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU) (Pub.
Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU)
L. 109–59, Aug. 10, 2005, 118 Stat.
(Pub. L. 109–59, Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat.
1144).
1144) directed the Secretary of
Transportation to promulgate
Background
regulations clarifying ‘‘the factors to be
Section 4(f) of the Department of
considered and the standards to be
Transportation Act of 1966 (Pub. L. 89–
applied’’ in determining the prudence
670, 80 Stat. 931) 1 prohibits the use of
and feasibility of alternatives that avoid
land of significant publicly owned
the use of Section 4(f) property by
public parks, recreation areas, wildlife
transportation projects. The FHWA and
and waterfowl refuges, and land of a
FTA published a NPRM on July 27,
historic site for transportation projects
2006, at 71 FR 42611. The NPRM
unless the Administration (as defined in requested comments on the factors
section 774.17 of this part) 2 determines proposed to be considered and
that there is no feasible and prudent
standards proposed to be applied when
avoidance alternative and that all
determining whether an avoidance
possible planning to minimize harm has alternative is feasible and prudent. The
occurred. Early case law strictly
NPRM also solicited comments on a
interpreted Section 4(f), beginning with
new, alternative method of compliance
the Supreme Court’s decision in
created by SAFETEA–LU section
6009(a) for uses that result in a de
1 Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation
minimis impact to a Section 4(f)
Act of 1966 was technically repealed in 1983 when
property and on other proposed changes
it was codified without substantive change at 49
to the Section 4(f) regulation. The
U.S.C. 303. A provision with the same meaning is
found at 23 U.S.C. 138 and applies only to FHWA
comment period remained open until
actions. This regulation continues to refer to
September 25, 2006. All comments,
Section 4(f) as such because it would create
including several comments submitted
needless confusion to do otherwise; the policies
late, have been fully considered in this
Section 4(f) engendered are widely referred to as
‘‘Section 4(f)’’ matters.
final rule.
2 Section 774.14 of this final rule defines
‘‘Administration’’ as ‘‘The FHWA or FTA,
whichever is making the approval for the
transportation program or project at issue. A
reference herein to the Administration means the
State when the State is functioning as the FHWA
or FTA in carrying out responsibilities delegated or
assigned to the State in accordance with 23 U.S.C.
325, 326, 327, or other applicable law.’’ All
references to the ‘‘Administration’’ in the preamble
to this final rule are consistent with this definition.
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Profile of Respondents
The docket received a total of 37
responses to the NPRM. Out of the 37
responses, 17 were submitted by 20
State and regional transportation
agencies; 6 responses were submitted by
trade associations; 9 responses were
submitted by 11 national and local
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 49 / Wednesday, March 12, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
environmental advocacy groups; 2
responses were from Federal agencies; 1
response was from a State Historic
Preservation Officer; and 2 responses
were from private individuals. The trade
associations submitting comments were:
The American Association of State
Highway and Transportation Officials,
the American Council of Engineering
Companies, the American Cultural
Resources Association, the American
Highway Users Alliance, the American
Public Transportation Association, and
the American Road and Transportation
Builders Association. The Federal
agencies submitting comments were the
United States Department of the Interior
and the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation. The national
environmental advocacy organizations
submitting comments included the
National Recreation and Park
Association, The Nature Conservancy,
and the National Trust for Historic
Preservation, the Rails to Trails
Conservancy, the Surface
Transportation Policy Project, the
Natural Resources Defense Council, and
Environmental Defense.
Overall Position of Respondents
The majority of comments received in
response to the NPRM were generally
supportive of the proposed changes.
Most comments agreed with the
decision to clarify the feasible and
prudent test in a manner that will
continue a high level of protection of
Section 4(f) properties from the impacts
of transportation projects. Respondents
from all across the board, including
State Departments of Transportation
(SDOTs) and the private sector,
commented positively on the rule’s
specificity and the flexibility allowed in
dealing with various aspects of Section
4(f). Moreover, there was substantial
support for the idea that
implementation of the proposed
regulations would improve
transportation decisionmaking and
expedite environmental reviews, while
continuing to protect Section 4(f)
properties.
On the other hand, several
respondents had a generally negative
reaction to the proposed regulation.
Concerns included that the proposed
regulations do not track the actual
process the Administration and
applicant would follow in writing a
Section 4(f) evaluation; that the rule
exceeds the requirements of SAFETEA–
LU by addressing de minimis
requirements; that the proposed rule’s
writing, structure, and organization are
very confusing and will cause more
litigation; and that the proposed rule
will not streamline environmental
analysis or adequately protect Section
4(f) properties.
General Comments
A general comment noted that the
regulation often refers simply to
‘‘refuges’’ while the statute refers to
‘‘wildlife and waterfowl refuges.’’ For
consistency, we have replaced ‘‘refuges’’
with the statutory terminology
throughout the final rule.
Another general comment expressed
concern that the final decisionmaking
responsibility under the proposed rule
rests with the U.S. DOT. We considered
this view but concluded that the statute
entrusts final decisionmaking
responsibility for approving the use of
Section 4(f) property with the Secretary
of Transportation, who has delegated
that responsibility to the modal
Administrations within the U.S. DOT.
Another comment asked if this rule
would apply to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA). The
final rule will apply only to the FHWA
and FTA. However, section 6009 of
SAFETEA–LU amended 49 U.S.C. 303,
which applies to all U.S. DOT agencies
including FAA and FRA. The FAA and
FRA may choose to adopt or use this
rule and other FHWA and FTA
guidance on Section 4(f).
Finally, one commenter suggested
that ‘‘inside metropolitan areas, any 4(f)
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related activities, analysis, and
decisions should be carried out in the
context of the region-wide
environmental mitigation element of the
metropolitan transportation plan.’’
Reference is made to the transportation
planning regulation (23 CFR part 450)
published in February 2007. The FHWA
and FTA do not agree with this
comment. The environmental mitigation
discussed in the metropolitan plan
generally would not delve into the sitespecific impacts of individual projects
and the mitigation thereof. That impact
assessment will continue to be
performed at the project level generally
as part of the documentation prepared
under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). The discussion in
the transportation plan would identify
broader environmental mitigation needs
and opportunities that individual
transportation projects might later take
advantage of. For example, as a result of
consultation with resource agencies, the
plan might identify an expanse of
degraded wetlands associated with a
troubled body of water that represents a
good candidate for establishing a
wetlands bank or habitat bank for
wildlife and waterfowl. The plan might
identify locations where the purchase of
development rights would assist in
preserving a historic battlefield or
historic farmstead. Assessments of each
individual project would still be needed
to determine the appropriateness of
devoting project funds to one of the
mitigation activities identified in the
plan, to a mitigation bank discussed in
the plan, or to new mitigation
developed during the NEPA/Section 4(f)
process and not mentioned in the plan.
We therefore did not make changes in
response to this comment.
Section-by-Section Analysis of NPRM
Comments and the Administration’s
Response
For ease of reference, the following
table is provided which maps the former
sections of the rule into the
corresponding new sections:
New section in part 774
None .............................................................................................................................................................
771.135(a)(1) ................................................................................................................................................
771.135(i) [in part] ........................................................................................................................................
771.135(a)(2), (i) [in part], (j), (k), and (o) ....................................................................................................
771.135(b) [in part], (g)(1) [in part], (l), (m) [in part] and (n) ........................................................................
771.135(b) [in part], (c), (d), (e), (g)(1) [in part], (m)(4) and (p) (5)(v) .........................................................
771.135(f), (g)(2), (h), (p)(5) [in part], and (p)(7) .........................................................................................
771.135(p)(3), (p)(4), (p)(5) [in part] and (p)(6) ............................................................................................
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Former section in part 771
774.1 Purpose.
774.3 Section 4(f) approvals.
774.5 Coordination.
774.7 Documentation.
774.9 Timing.
774.11 Applicability.
774.13 Exceptions.
774.15 Constructive use determinations.
774.17 Definitions.
771.107(d) and 771.135(p)(1) and (p)(2) .....................................................................................................
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 49 / Wednesday, March 12, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
In this preamble, all references to
provisions of 23 CFR part 774 refer to
the final rule as presented herein.
Several provisions proposed in the
NPRM were moved to new sections in
response to comments on the NPRM. A
reference to an NPRM section will be
explicitly labeled as such.
Section 771.127 Record of Decision
One comment objected to the
provision for signing a Record of
Decision ‘‘no sooner than 30 days after
publication of the final environmental
impact statement (EIS) notice in the
Federal Register or 90 days after
publication of a notice for the draft EIS,
whichever is later.’’ This sentence was
incorporated verbatim from the FHWA
and FTA’s existing regulation
implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and
it is consistent with the NEPA
regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ), 40 CFR
1506.10(b). Substantive modifications to
the FHWA and FTA joint NEPA
regulation are outside the scope of this
rulemaking. Thus, we have retained the
language as proposed in the NPRM.
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Section 774.1 Purpose
This section clarifies the purpose of
the regulations, which is to implement
49 U.S.C. 303 and 23 U.S.C. 138
(Section 4(f)). There were no major
comments in response to this section.
Therefore, we have retained the
language as proposed in the NPRM.
Section 774.3 Section 4(f) Approvals
This section sets forth the
determination required by the
Administration prior to approving a
project that uses Section 4(f) property.
Paragraph 774.3(a) is the traditional
Section 4(f) approval, similar to the
previous rule at paragraph 771.135(a)(1).
Paragraph 774.3(b) implements the new
provision in section 6009(a) of
SAFETEA–LU for making de minimis
impact determinations in lieu of the
traditional analysis. Section 774.3
includes cross-references to the
definitions for ‘‘use,’’ ‘‘feasible and
prudent avoidance alternative,’’ ‘‘de
minimis impact,’’ and ‘‘all possible
planning,’’ which are located in the
definitions section, 774.17.
Paragraph 774.3(c) provides new
regulatory direction for how to analyze
and select an alternative when it has
been determined that no feasible and
prudent avoidance alternatives exist and
all viable alternatives use some Section
4(f) property. The paragraph provides a
list of factors that should be considered
in the analysis and selection of an
alternative. The factors were drawn
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from case law experience and the
FHWA ‘‘Section 4(f) Policy Paper.’’ 3 It
should be noted that the weight given
each factor would necessarily depend
on the facts in each particular case, and
not every factor would be relevant to
every decision. Our intent is to provide
the tools that will allow wise
transportation decisions that minimize
overall harm in these situations, while
still providing the special protection
afforded by Section 4(f) by requiring the
other weighed factors to be severe and
not easily mitigated.
Paragraph 774.3(d) provides a clear
regulatory basis for programmatic
Section 4(f) evaluations, and it
distinguishes between the promulgation
of new programmatic Section 4(f)
evaluations and the application of an
existing programmatic Section 4(f)
evaluation to a particular project.
Paragraph 774.3(e) provides crossreferences to the sections of the
regulation governing the coordination,
documentation, and timing of approvals
as a road map for the practitioner.
Many comments were received in
response to this section. The majority of
comments were generally supportive of
the approach proposed in the NPRM,
although many offered minor rewording for clarity. Those suggestions
are discussed below for each paragraph.
Several comments were strongly
opposed to the proposed procedural
structure. The NPRM proposed different
processes for approving uses with de
minimis and non-de minimis impacts to
Section 4(f) property, and the proposed
rule requires an additional step when
approving projects for which all
alternatives use some Section 4(f)
property. A use with more than de
minimis impacts would be processed
with the traditional two-step inquiry
pursuant to paragraph 774.3(a) (a
determination that there is no feasible
and prudent avoidance alternative,
followed by a determination that the
action includes all possible planning to
minimize harm to the property). A use
with de minimis impacts would be
processed in a single step pursuant to
paragraph 774.3(b) (without the need for
the development and analysis of
avoidance alternatives, and with the
planning to minimize harm folded into
the development of measures needed to
reduce the impacts of the Section 4(f)
use to a de minimis level). Projects for
which all viable alternatives use some
Section 4(f) property would be
processed in two steps pursuant to
3 The FHWA ‘‘Section 4(f) Policy Paper,’’ issued
March 1, 2005, is available for review online at
https://environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/
4fpolicy.htm. A copy was also placed in the docket
for this rulemaking.
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paragraph 774.3(c) (a determination that
there is no feasible and prudent
avoidance alternative, followed by the
selection of an alternative by weighing
the factors in paragraph 774.3(c) and a
determination, with documentation,
that the action includes all possible
planning to minimize harm).
The commenters opposed to the
structure proposed in the NPRM
indicated that the regulation in all
situations should first require a
determination of which alternative
minimizes harm to the Section 4(f)
resource(s), followed by a determination
of whether that alternative is feasible
and prudent and may therefore be
selected. Comments stated that in
Overton Park, the Supreme Court
required such a structure for Section 4(f)
decisionmaking. We disagree. We have
re-read Overton Park and considered
this concern very carefully, but we do
not agree that Overton Park stands for
the process favored by these
commenters or that the process
proposed in the NPRM should be
restructured. First, the NPRM structure
follows the order of the requirements as
they appear in the statute. Second, the
statute does not require a determination
of which alternative minimizes harm, it
requires ‘‘all possible planning’’ to
minimize harm. It is much more
efficient to conduct all possible
planning to minimize harm as the last
step for the selected alternative than to
undertake all possible planning
repeatedly for each alternative,
including those that are not feasible and
prudent, and for a variety of reasons,
cannot be selected. Such a process
would be very inefficient. Finally, the
structure and processes in the final rule
are consistent with longstanding FHWA
and FTA procedures, with the exception
of the procedures for approving the new
concept of de minimis impacts. For
these reasons, we retained the structure
proposed in the NPRM.
Another comment strongly
recommended the separation of the
analysis, coordination, documentation,
and timing requirements for de minimis
impacts and the traditional Section 4(f)
evaluation into discrete sections of the
regulation. We decided not to make this
proposed change because we do not
agree that re-structuring the regulation
in this manner would make it easier to
use. In addition, for those who prefer
the suggested structure, the existing
joint FHWA/FTA ‘‘Guidance for
Determining De Minimis Impacts to
Section 4(f) Resources,’’ December 13,
2005,4 already provides a complete
4 https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/hep/
guidedeminimus.htm.
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discussion of the process for
determining de minimis impacts,
separate from any discussion of the
requirements for traditional Section 4(f)
approvals.
Another comment requested
definitions of numerous phrases used in
section 774.3; for example, ‘‘relative
severity of the harm,’’ ‘‘relative
significance,’’ and ‘‘the ability to
mitigate.’’ We did not include the
requested definitions in the final rule
because these words are all used with
their common English meanings. The
provisions of section 774.3 will be
applied to an extensive variety of fact
situations, and regulatory definitions
would unduly limit the applicability of
the provisions to the particular fact
situations anticipated in those
definitions.
• Section 774.3—One comment
suggested that section 774.3, which
prohibits the use of Section 4(f) property
unless certain determinations are made,
should simply refer to ‘‘section 4(f)
property’’ instead of ‘‘public park,
recreation area, or wildlife and
waterfowl refuge, or any significant
historic site.’’ We agree that this
suggested change improves the
readability of the regulation, so we
substituted the phrase ‘‘Section 4(f)
property’’ and moved the terminology
proposed in the NPRM into a new
definition of ‘‘Section 4(f) property’’ in
section 774.17. The defined term is now
used throughout the regulation.
• Paragraph 774.3(a)(1)—Another
comment asked that we confirm ‘‘that
an alternative with a net benefit 4(f) use
can be chosen over an alternative with
no Section 4(f) use.’’ If avoidance
alternatives are determined not to be
feasible and prudent then the use may
be approved, whether or not it is a ‘‘net
benefit.’’ For FHWA projects, the
‘‘Nationwide Programmatic Section 4(f)
Evaluation and Determination for
Federal-Aid Transportation Projects
That Have a Net Benefit to a Section 4(f)
Property,’’ 70 FR 20618, April 20, 2005,
would generally apply to situations
envisioned by the commenter. This
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation
remains in effect. In cases where
application of this programmatic
evaluation is appropriate, the criteria for
evaluating the existence of a feasible
and prudent avoidance alternative is
specified in the Findings section of the
programmatic evaluation. If, through the
application of this programmatic
Section 4(f) evaluation, the FHWA
determines that there are no feasible and
prudent avoidance alternatives, then the
alternative with a net benefit to Section
4(f) property can be selected. This
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programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation is
applicable only to FHWA actions.
• Paragraph 774.3(b)—One comment
requested clarification whether an
analysis of avoidance alternatives must
be conducted when determining that a
de minimis impact occurs to a Section
4(f) property. An analysis of avoidance
alternatives is not necessary for a de
minimis impact determination, and the
NPRM did not propose to require one.
Using words taken directly from section
6009(a) of SAFETEA–LU, the NPRM
would have allowed a Section 4(f) de
minimis impact approval when ‘‘the use
of the property, including any
avoidance, minimization, mitigation, or
enhancement measures committed to by
the applicant, will have a de minimis
impact * * *.’’ We agree with the
commenter that the term ‘‘avoidance’’ as
used in this sentence could cause
confusion. The final rule was reworded
to clarify that the term ‘‘avoidance,’’
along with other mitigation or
enhancement measures, is used in the
context of project features or designs
that minimize harm to the individual
Section 4(f) property and not meant to
imply that the applicant must search for
alternatives avoiding the Section 4(f)
property altogether. In this context, the
term ‘‘avoidance’’ could mean a partial
change to the alignment to avoid a
portion of the Section 4(f) property. The
sentence now reads ‘‘* * * the use of
the property, including any measure(s)
to minimize harm (such as any
avoidance, minimization, mitigation, or
enhancement measures) committed to
by the applicant, will have a de minimis
impact, as defined in § 774.17, on the
property.’’ The development and
evaluation of alternatives that
completely avoid the use of the Section
4(f) property is not required when the
Administration intends to make a
finding of de minimis impact
determination. Indeed, to require such
an analysis would defeat the purpose of
the de minimis provision in the statute.
However, if the Administration’s
intention of making a de minimis
impact finding is not realized, then a
traditional Section 4(f) evaluation,
including the development and
evaluation of alternatives that
completely avoid the use of Section 4(f)
property, would be necessary.
• Paragraph 774.3(c)—Two comments
criticized the choice of the word ‘‘may’’
referencing the portion of the rule
which allows the Administration to
approve an alternative that ‘‘minimizes
overall harm’’ in light of the enumerated
factors. They explain that this
articulation leaves the FHWA and FTA
with too much discretion. We are
concerned that if the words ‘‘may
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select’’ were replaced with the
suggested ‘‘shall select’’ or ‘‘must
select,’’ the provision would require the
agencies to actually fund the project,
which is not an obligation imposed by
Section 4(f). In response to the
comments, after ‘‘may approve’’ we
added the word ‘‘only.’’ This change
clarifies our intent that the FHWA and
FTA may only select the alternative that
causes the least overall harm.
When there is no feasible and prudent
avoidance alternative, many comments
suggested various replacements for the
phrase ‘‘most prudent’’ as a criterion for
choosing among several project
alternatives and determining which
would cause the least overall harm.
After considering the range of proposals
and their rationales, we have decided to
remove the words ‘‘most prudent’’ from
the analysis of overall harm. It appears
to cause confusion and it detracts from
the purpose of this portion of the rule,
which is to provide clear criteria for
choosing a course of action when all
available alternatives use Section 4(f)
property. Deleting the modifier ‘‘most
prudent’’ appropriately shifts the focus
of the multi-factor inquiry to the
requirement of minimizing overall
harm.
Several commenters suggested that
the proposed weighing of factors in
determining the alternative with the
least overall harm would not place a
‘‘thumb on the scale’’ in favor of the
preservation of the Section 4(f)
properties, as required by the statute.
The FHWA and FTA agree that a
reminder about the preservation
purpose of the statute in the balancing
of various factors is appropriate.
Accordingly, paragraph 774.3(c)(1) now
states that the Administration may
approve the alternative that causes the
least overall harm ‘‘in light of the
statute’s preservation purpose.’’ The
preservation purpose of Section 4(f) is
described in 49 U.S.C. 303(a), which
states: ‘‘It is the policy of the United
States Government that special effort
should be made to preserve the natural
beauty of the countryside and public
park and recreation lands, wildlife and
waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.’’
Virtually identical language appears in
23 U.S.C. 138. This addition does not
change the settled principle that where
there is no feasible and prudent
avoidance alternative, Section 4(f) does
not preclude the Administration from
selecting any alternative from among
those with substantially equal harm. In
such instances, the selection will be
based primarily on the relative
performance of those alternatives with
respect to factors (v) ‘‘the degree to
which each alternative meets the
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purpose and need for the project,’’ (vi)
‘‘after reasonable mitigation, the
magnitude of any adverse impacts to
resources not protected by Section 4(f),’’
and (vii) ‘‘substantial differences in
costs among the alternatives.’’
Two comments proposed
incorporating by reference the NPRM
definition of ‘‘feasible and prudent
alternative’’ into paragraph 774.3(c),
explaining that this change would
ensure consistency in the use of the
term, especially in the meaning of
‘‘prudent.’’ We decline to adopt this
proposal because the term ‘‘feasible and
prudent alternative’’ as used in the
definitions and paragraph 774.3(a)
signifies an alternative to the use of
Section 4(f) property, whereas in
paragraph 774.3(c) all alternatives under
consideration use some Section 4(f)
property and use of the term in this
context would be confusing.
Several comments proposed
substituting the word ‘‘balancing’’ for
the term ‘‘considering,’’ as a more
precise way to describe the analytical
process described in the NPRM. We
have adopted the suggestion to replace
the term ‘‘considering’’ with the term
‘‘balancing’’ as a better way to articulate
the intent of paragraph 774.3(c). We
agree that such an inquiry will
necessarily involve a balancing of
competing and conflicting
considerations given that some of the
factors may weigh in favor of one
alternative, yet other factors may weigh
against it. Mere ‘‘consideration’’ of the
factors does not capture this idea—the
factors must be weighed against each
other. How the various factors listed in
paragraph 774.3(c)(1) are balanced and
weighed in a given instance is within
the discretion of FHWA and FTA, and
is subject to the facts and circumstances
of the particular project and Section 4(f)
properties involved. As previously
noted, the FHWA and FTA have
inserted a reminder that the
preservation purpose of the statute in
the balancing of the various factors must
be given its proper weight.
Several comments interpreted the
balancing test of paragraph 774.3(b) as
satisfying the statutory requirement to
undertake ‘‘all possible planning to
minimize harm’’ to the Section 4(f)
property. One comment proposed that
we add a statement that performing the
analysis pursuant to paragraph 774.3(c)
satisfies FHWA’s obligation to
undertake all possible planning to
minimize harm to Section 4(f)
properties. Other comments suggested
that paragraph 774.3(c) should expressly
state that any alternative selected based
on the enumerated factors should
include all possible planning to
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minimize harm to Section 4(f) property
resulting from the use.
Contrary to the interpretation
suggested in some comments, we did
not intend that engaging in the
balancing test alone would fulfill the
requirement to undertake ‘‘all possible
planning to minimize harm’’ to the
Section 4(f) property. The selection of
an alternative pursuant to paragraph
774.3(c) is not in itself a Section 4(f)
approval and does not complete the
evaluation process. After the alternative
is selected, the additional step of
identifying, adopting, and committing to
measures that will minimize the harm to
the Section 4(f) property must be
documented before Section 4(f)
approval can be granted. The extent of
effort needed to satisfy the requirement
to undertake all possible planning to
minimize harm is included in the
definitions section, 774.17. When the
characteristics of a Section 4(f) property
lend themselves to mitigation, and with
mitigation the alternative that uses that
property would have a lower net
impact, the balancing test would weigh
these facts and may result in the
alternative being selected. We addressed
the confusion on this topic by dividing
the NPRM paragraphs 774.3(a)(1) and
774.3(b) each into two paragraphs and
stating separately in each the
requirement to undertake all possible
planning to minimize harm. We also
slightly reworded the paragraph for
additional clarity.
We received a variety of comments
regarding the list of factors in paragraph
774.3(c)(1) which the Administration
would balance in making the decision
on which alternative causes the least
overall harm. It is important to keep in
mind the situations in which the factors
will apply—these factors will only
apply after a determination has already
been made that there is no feasible and
prudent alternative to avoid the use of
Section 4(f) property. The point of the
analysis is a comprehensive inquiry that
balances the net harm to Section 4(f)
properties caused by each alternative
with all other relevant concerns. One
comment provided examples of how the
balancing of factors in paragraph
774.3(c) will help transportation
agencies arrive at better overall
decisions.
We reiterate here the point made
above and in the NPRM that this
balancing must be done with a ‘‘thumb
on the scale’’ in favor of protecting
Section 4(f) properties. A scale that
takes into account the preservation
purpose of the statute must be used to
compare the net harm to Section 4(f)
properties (factors in paragraphs
774.3(c)(1)(i)–(iv)) with other relevant
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concerns (the remaining factors). One
commenter asked if this means ‘‘an
alternative with somewhat more harm to
Section 4(f) properties could be selected
over one with somewhat lesser harm if
the one with lesser harm to Section 4(f)
properties would result in more adverse
effects to non-Section 4(f) properties/
higher costs/lesser ability to satisfy
needs, or some combination thereof?’’
The answer is yes, so long as the
difference in overall harm is substantial.
Where the factors favoring the selection
of the alternative with greater harm to
Section 4(f) property do not clearly and
substantially outweigh the factors
favoring the alternative with less harm
to Section 4(f) property, the alternative
with less harm to Section 4(f) property
must be selected. As the significance of
the Section 4(f) property or the degree
of harm to the Section 4(f) property
increases, another alternative must
entail correspondingly greater harm to
non-Section 4(f) properties to outweigh
the harm to the Section 4(f) property
and be selected. Because there is
necessarily a degree of judgment
involved in these decisions, the
Administration must be mindful to
carefully document its reasoning.
With respect to the factors in
paragraphs 774.3(c)(1)(ii) and (iii), one
comment suggested that the
determinations of the relative severity of
the harm and relative significance of the
Section 4(f) properties should be made
solely by the officials with jurisdiction
over the resource. We did not adopt this
suggestion because, in practice,
competing views are often expressed
when multiple Section 4(f) properties
are being evaluated. The park may seem
more important to the park official than
the historic building beside the park,
whereas the SHPO may feel just the
opposite. The Administration, after
listening to these competing points of
view, must ultimately decide. In the
statute, Congress chose to entrust the
Secretary of Transportation with the
final decision.
With respect to the factor in
paragraph 774.3(c)(1)(i), ‘‘The ability to
mitigate adverse impacts to each Section
4(f) property (including any measures
that result in benefits to the property),’’
one comment suggested that only
‘‘legally binding’’ mitigation (i.e.,
mitigation committed to in the ROD)
should be considered. We do not agree
because the purpose of the balancing
test is to select an alternative, so there
is no legally binding mitigation at that
point in the process. However, we
expect that mitigation used to offset
harm would be a matter of record and
the appropriate commitments should be
included in the project decision.
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Another comment stated that nothing in
the regulation requires the adoption of
any mitigation relied upon in this factor.
This is not true. The new definition of
‘‘all possible planning’’ to minimize
harm sets forth specific criteria which
will govern whether the identified
mitigation must be adopted. Where the
availability of adequate mitigation
measures is a factor that is relied upon
in selecting an alternative, the measures
that were identified in the analysis must
be incorporated into the project through
the CE determination, ROD or FONSI, or
by other means. There is additional
discussion of this issue in the analysis
of section 774.17 below.
Several commenters felt that the only
consideration in alternative selection
should be minimizing harm to the
Section 4(f) properties. Consequently, in
their view, the factors in NPRM
subparagraphs 774.3(b)(5) through (8),
which introduce non-Section 4(f)related concerns into the selection
process, should be eliminated. We have
carefully reviewed those comments but
decided to keep the first three of these
factors, now numbered 774.3(c)(1)(v)–
(vii) for the reasons discussed below.
The final factor in the NPRM,
concerning joint planning, was dropped
for other reasons, as discussed below
following the discussion of the factors
retained.
The factors in 774.3(c)(1)(v)–(vii) were
retained in the final rule for several
reasons. First, the selection of an
alternative in instances where all viable
alternatives use some Section 4(f)
property must be distinguished from the
selection process where there is a viable
alternative that avoids using Section 4(f)
property. While the caselaw is not
entirely consistent, there is ample
support for the FHWA and FTA’s
approach in the courts. The Supreme
Court’s Overton Park decision did not
consider this aspect of Section 4(f), as
that case turned on the FHWA’s failure
to document any consideration of
feasible and prudent alternatives to the
use of the park. Second, since Section
4(f) was enacted in 1966, Congress has
identified many other types of
environmental resources for protection
under Federal law besides Section 4(f)
properties; for example, threatened and
endangered species, prime farmland,
and wetlands of national importance.
There is nothing in SAFETEA–LU to
suggest that Section 4(f) protection
should trump all other concerns when
there is no feasible and prudent
avoidance alternative. The FHWA and
FTA’s approach interprets Section 4(f),
as amended by SAFETEA–LU, in a way
that gives appropriate weight to all of
the resources impacted by a proposed
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transportation project. Third, 23 U.S.C.
109(h) directs FHWA to make final
project decisions ‘‘in the best overall
public interest, taking into account the
need for fast, safe and efficient
transportation, public services, and the
costs of eliminating such adverse effects
and the following: (1) Air, noise, and
water pollution; (2) destruction or
disruption of man-made and natural
resources, aesthetic values, community
cohesion and the availability of public
facilities and services; (3) adverse
employment effects, and tax and
property value losses; (4) injurious
displacement of people, businesses and
farms; and (5) disruption of desirable
community and regional growth.’’ FTA
law similarly requires that ‘‘the
preservation and enhancement of the
environment and the interest of the
community in which the project is
located’’ be considered. (49 U.S.C.
5324(b)(3)(A)(ii)). These statutes support
the FHWA and FTA’s interpretation of
Section 4(f) as allowing the
consideration of other significant
impacts when it is not possible to avoid
using Section 4(f) property. As
described in the NPRM preamble, the
balancing approach adopted in this rule
enables the Administration to take all of
these concerns into account by allowing
serious problems to outweigh relatively
minor Section 4(f) impacts, as well as
Section 4(f) impacts that can be
satisfactorily mitigated.
One comment pointed out that the list
of factors in paragraph 774.3(c)(1) is
inconsistent with the lists in the
proposed definitions of ‘‘all possible
planning’’ and ‘‘feasible and prudent
alternative’’ in 774.17, which includes
some similar and some additional
factors. This disparity, in the
commenter’s opinion, confused the
application of the factors in the overall
Section 4(f) analysis. This comment
proposed that we combine the multifactor lists. We considered this
comment, but decided not to adopt it.
The three lists of factors included in the
NPRM apply to three distinct situations.
The factors enumerated in the proposed
definition of ‘‘feasible and prudent
alternative’’ are used to determine
whether an alternative that avoids using
Section 4(f) property exists. If the
analysis concludes that no such
avoidance alternative exists, then a
different set of factors, those in
paragraph 774.3(c), comes into play to
guide the Administration in selecting
from among the alternatives all of which
use some Section 4(f) property. Once an
alternative is chosen, if it uses Section
4(f) property, then the Administration
has a further obligation to undertake all
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possible planning to minimize harm to
that property. The third set of factors in
the definition of this term is used to
determine the appropriate extent of the
planning to minimize harm.
With respect to the factor in
paragraph 774.3(c)(1)(vii),
‘‘[e]xtraordinary differences in costs
among the alternatives,’’ some
comments suggested that the word
‘‘extraordinary’’ should be deleted, thus
allowing any difference in costs to be
considered and balanced with all other
factors in determining which of the
alternatives minimizes overall harm.
Since this factor is a comparison of the
costs of alternatives under
consideration, all of which use Section
4(f) property, the FHWA and FTA agree
that the difference in cost would not
have to be ‘‘extraordinary,’’ but that the
magnitude of the difference would
determine its appropriate weight when
balancing it with the other factors.
Consideration of a minor difference in
the cost among alternatives in the
balancing test would be inappropriate in
that there must be a measurable and
significant degree of difference. For this
reason we are substituting the word
‘‘substantial’’ in place of the word
‘‘extraordinary’’ in this factor. Requiring
a substantial cost difference between
alternatives emphasizes the importance
of devoting funds to minimizing harm to
the Section 4(f) property and other
important resources more so than if any
difference in cost were allowed to
influence the choice of alternatives.
When deciding whether to consider a
cost difference ‘‘substantial,’’ in
addition to considering the cost as a
number in isolation, the FHWA and
FTA may consider factors such as the
percentage difference in the cost of the
alternatives; how the cost difference
relates to the total cost of similar
transportation projects in the applicant’s
annual budget; and the extent to which
the increased cost for the subject project
would adversely impact the applicant’s
ability to fund other transportation
projects.
Several comments expressed
confusion regarding the factor in NPRM
paragraph 773.4(b)(8), ‘‘[A]ny history of
concurrent planning or development of
the proposed transportation project and
the Section 4(f) property.’’ Some
commenters were concerned about how
this factor was related to, and would
apply in, the balancing of factors and
the ultimate determination of overall
harm. Others suggested that the scope of
concurrent planning in this context was
unclear and others thought the term
should be defined in section 774.17. In
response to these comments, we have
decided to eliminate concurrent
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planning as a factor in determining
overall harm. Concurrent planning, in
which the ‘‘concurrent or joint planning
or development of the transportation
facility and the Section 4(f) resource
occurs,’’ more appropriately relates to
the applicability of Section 4(f)
requirements to a specific property.
Concurrent planning in this context is
addressed in paragraph 774.11(i).
Another comment pointed out the
lack of reference to the no-action
alternative in this paragraph, and asked
whether that means it need not be
discussed in the evaluation. The noaction alternative should always be
considered in a Section 4(f) evaluation
and the reasons for not selecting it must
be identified.
• Paragraph 774.3(d)—Several
comments on the NPRM indicated that
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations
are misunderstood by some. In
response, we have clarified what is
meant by a programmatic Section 4(f)
evaluation in paragraph 774.3(d), and
have specified the process for the
development of a programmatic
evaluation as well as the application of
an existing programmatic evaluation.
The paragraph makes clear that a
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation
does not automatically satisfy Section
4(f) for an entire class of projects—
rather it establishes a simpler approach
to compliance that is tailored to that
class of projects. They are not
exemptions and individual projects
must still be reviewed in accordance
with the process established in the
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation.
• Paragraph 774.3(e)—No substantive
comments were received on this
subsection. We have retained the
language as proposed in the NPRM.
Section 774.5 Coordination
One general comment recommended
the separation of the analysis,
coordination, format, and timing
requirements for de minimis impacts
into discrete sections of the regulation.
We decided not to make this proposed
change because we believe that
grouping all of the requirements for
coordination, all of the requirements for
timing, and all of the requirements for
documentation together is a reasonable
structure for the regulation and is more
consistent with the familiar, former
regulation. For practitioners who need
more guidance on the de minimis
impact requirements, the joint FHWA/
FTA ‘‘Guidance for Determining De
Minimis Impacts,’’ December 13, 2005,
discusses all of the de minimis impact
requirements together in one document.
Another general comment suggested
that this section should be revised to
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explain the coordination of reviews
performed under NEPA, Section 4(f),
and Section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act. We did not adopt this
suggestion because it is already stated in
23 CFR 771.105(a), which explains that
it is the policy of the FHWA and FTA
that ‘‘[t]o the fullest extent possible, all
environmental investigations, reviews,
and consultations be coordinated as a
single process, and compliance with all
applicable environmental requirements
be reflected in the environmental
document required by this regulation.’’
A similar statement with regard to the
content of environmental documents is
found at 23 CFR 771.133.
We received a general comment that
clear guidance is needed on the
coordination process for Section 4(f)
uses with impacts greater than de
minimis, to ensure that the officials with
jurisdiction are fully engaged in the
development of avoidance alternatives
and the determination of appropriate
measures to minimize harm. We agree
that coordination with the officials with
jurisdiction is important and integral to
Section 4(f) compliance, and note that
the regulation already includes explicit
coordination requirements in paragraph
774.5(a). Additional guidance is
included in the FHWA ‘‘Section 4(f)
Policy Paper,’’ March 2, 2005, so we did
not make any changes in response to
this comment.
One general comment requested that
we clarify in the preamble to this
regulation that the existing Section 4(f)
de minimis impact guidance, issued on
December 13, 2005, remains in effect
and is not superseded by these
regulations. We agree that the inclusion
of requirements for de minimis impacts
in these regulations was not intended to
supersede or replace the existing
guidance, but to ensure that the current
Section 4(f) regulation is consistent with
the Section 4(f) statute, as amended by
SAFETEA–LU. The joint FHWA/FTA
‘‘Guidance for Determining De Minimis
Impacts to Section 4(f) Resources,’’
December 13, 2005, remains in effect,
but the Administration may review it
and make clarifying revisions some time
in the future. The FHWA ‘‘Section 4(f)
Policy Paper,’’ March 2, 2005, which
was written prior to enactment of the
SAFETEA–LU amendment to the
Section 4(f) statute, remains in effect
except where it could be interpreted to
conflict with this regulation, in which
case the regulation takes precedence.
The FHWA plans to update the ‘‘Section
4(f) Policy Paper’’ to reflect SAFETEA–
LU and this final rule.
One comment requested that the
regulation address the additional
coordination that is needed when the
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impacted Section 4(f) property was
created or was improved with funds
from various programs administered by
the U.S. Department of the Interior.
Guidance for such coordination is
already addressed in the FHWA
‘‘Section 4(f) Policy Paper’’ and in the
‘‘Guidance for Determining De Minimis
Impacts to Section 4(f) Resources.’’
However, because we agree that this
coordination is important, we addressed
the comment by adding a new
paragraph (d) to section 774.5: ‘‘When
Federal encumbrances on Section 4(f)
property are identified, coordination
with the appropriate Federal agency is
required to ascertain the agency’s
position on the proposed impact, as
well as to determine if any other Federal
requirements may apply to converting
the Section 4(f) land to a different
function. Any such requirements must
be satisfied, independent of the Section
4(f) approval.’’
• Paragraph 774.5(a)—A number of
comments focused on the length of the
notice and comment period. The NPRM
proposed to continue the current 45-day
comment period. The comments urged a
period ranging from as short as 15 days,
up to a maximum of 60 days.
Specifically, one comment urged a
maximum of 60 days with presumed
concurrence if no comment was
received within 15 days after the
deadline. One comment urged a period
of 60 days, but suggested that comments
be open to the public and other Federal
agencies, and not just to those with
jurisdiction over the Section 4(f)
property. One comment urged a period
of at least 45 days, not to exceed 60
days.
Several commenters reasoned that a
period with a maximum of 60 days
would be harmonious with the
streamlining provisions of section 6002
of SAFETEA–LU and the comment
period provided by Section 106 of the
National Historic Preservation Act for
consultation with State Historic
Preservation Officers and the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation. Those
urging a provision for presuming
concurrence if the comments are not
received by various deadlines stated
that such a provision is needed because,
in the experience of many applicants,
comments are routinely submitted many
months late. Another commenter
thought the requirement for the U.S.
Department of the Interior (DOI) to
review Section 4(f) evaluations added
minimal value to the process and
suggested that DOI’s role should be
eliminated altogether.
After considering all of the views
submitted, we decided to keep the 45day comment period in the final rule.
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This period appears to be a reasonable
length of time, in light of the current
practice with which all are familiar. We
did not eliminate the requirement for a
comment period because the statute
itself requires coordination with certain
agencies, including DOI. However, we
decided to adopt a deadline for the
receipt of comments by adding the
following at the end of paragraph
774.5(a): ‘‘If comments are not received
within 15 days after the comment
deadline, the Administration may
assume a lack of objection and proceed
with the action.’’ This change addresses
the concern that comments are routinely
sent late, but it allows flexibility for the
Administration to extend the comment
period in individual cases upon request.
• Paragraph 774.5(b)—Several
comments requested additional
requirements for public notice, review,
and comment related to de minimis
impacts to historic properties. In
response, the FHWA and FTA decided
to accept the wording suggested by one
of the commenters. Paragraph
774.5(b)(1)(iii) now says: ‘‘Public notice
and comment, beyond that required by
36 CFR Part 800, is not required.’’ The
regulation is consistent with the
provisions of SAFETEA–LU that allow
the de minimis impact determination to
be made based on the process required
under section 106 of the National
Historic Preservation Act.
Other comments requested additional
guidance on public notice, review, and
comment related to de minimis impacts
to parks, recreation areas, and wildlife/
waterfowl refuges. One commenter
believes that public notice, review, and
comment are adequately covered by
NEPA and its implementing regulations,
and any additional opportunities are
unnecessary. We decided to retain the
proposed regulatory text on public
notice and comment, but to add: ‘‘This
requirement can be satisfied in
conjunction with other public
involvement procedures, such as a
comment period provided on a NEPA
document.’’ SAFETEA–LU requires
public notice and the opportunity for
public review and comment before the
Administration can make a de minimis
impact determination. Where the NEPA
process already provides opportunities
for public notice, review, and comment
[i.e., for environmental assessments
(EAs) and EISs], the same opportunities
can be used for projects where the
Administration is considering a de
minimis impact determination. For
those actions that do not routinely
require public review and comment
under NEPA [e.g., categorical exclusions
(CEs) and certain reevaluations] a
separate public notice and opportunity
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for review and comment will be
necessary for a de minimis impact
determination. In these situations, the
public notice and opportunity for
review and comment should be based
on the specifics of the situation and
commensurate with the type and
location of the Section 4(f) property,
impacts, and public interest.
• Paragraph 774.5(b)(1)—Several
comments suggested that the
concurrence of the State Historic
Preservation Officer (SHPO) or Tribal
Historic Preservation Officer (THPO) in
a proposed de minimis impact
determination should be assumed if 30
days pass without written concurrence.
We did not adopt this change because
the statute explicitly requires written
concurrence in the Section 106
determination to support a de minimis
impact determination. The joint FHWA/
FTA ‘‘Guidance for Determining De
Minimis Impacts to Section 4(f)
Resources,’’ December 13, 2005,
explains the use of Section 106
programmatic agreements (PA) in
making de minimis impact
determinations. It says that when a
Section 106 PA explicitly states that an
individual Section 106 determination of
‘‘no historic property affected’’ or ‘‘no
adverse effect,’’ is made in accordance
with the PA, it may be relied upon as
the basis for de minimis impact
determination. If the PA specifies that
the SHPO or THPO’s concurrence in
such a determination may be assumed
after a specified timeframe, then the
SHPO or THPO’s signature on the PA
itself constitutes the required written
concurrence in the Section 106
determination that is necessary for a de
minimis impact determination. With
such a PA, a SHPO or THPO is within
its rights asking for a side agreement
that would specify conditions under
which a nonresponse would not be used
as the basis for a de minimis impact
determination. In any case it is expected
that the SHPO or THPO will be apprised
of the agency’s intention to make a de
minimis determination under the PA
approach and afforded an opportunity
to engage in the process on a project-byproject basis, if desirable by either party.
Several comments stated that
paragraph 774.5(b)(1) should spell out
the written concurrences necessary to
support a de minimis impact
determination for a historic property in
order to clarify which concurrences are
required. We agree, and the final rule
explicitly states which parties must
concur, consistent with 49 U.S.C.
303(d)(2)(B) and 23 U.S.C. 138(b)(2)(B).
A number of comments objected to
the statement in paragraph 774.5(b)(1)
that public notice and comment other
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than the Section 106 consultation is not
required. These commenters pointed out
that the Section 106 regulation (36 CFR
part 800) has its own public
involvement requirements, which may
apply in a particular case. One
commenter suggested alternative
language to recognize that pertinent
requirements of the Section 106
regulation must be met. We adopted the
suggested language, and the sentence
now says that ‘‘public notice and
comment, beyond that required by 36
CFR part 800, is not required.’’
• Paragraph 774.5(b)(2)—Several
commenters requested clarification of
the sequence of events for coordinating
with the official(s) with jurisdiction
over parks, recreation areas, and refuges
prior to making de minimis impact
determinations. These commenters
proposed revising the regulation to
enable the Administration to notify the
official(s) with jurisdiction of its intent
to make a de minimis impact
determination at any time during the
coordination process, instead of
postponing notification until the
conclusion of the public review and
comment period. The FHWA and FTA
decided to adopt this proposed change
by moving the clause ‘‘following an
opportunity for public review and
comment’’ from the beginning of the
second sentence and inserting it directly
before the concurrence requirement:
‘‘Following an opportunity for public
review and comment as described in
paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, the
official(s) with jurisdiction over the
property must concur in writing
* * *. ’’ The regulation would still
require the Administration to wait until
after the public comment process before
making a formal request for
concurrence, but no specific timeframe
is provided for notifying the officials
with jurisdiction. The revised paragraph
will begin with ‘‘The Administration
shall inform the official(s) with
jurisdiction of its intent * * *. ’’ The
FHWA and FTA reasoned that it would
be beneficial to have the flexibility to
notify the official(s) with jurisdiction
early in the coordination process to
ascertain the position of the officials
and so that the preliminary views of
such official(s), if available, can be
included in the notice provided to the
public.
One commenter suggested eliminating
the provision that requires the
Administration to inform the official(s)
with jurisdiction of the intent to make
a de minimis impact determination
based on those officials’ concurrence
that the project will not adversely affect
the Section 4(f) property. The FHWA
and FTA decided not to make this
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change. The sequence of events leading
to the Administration’s finding is
important and will ensure that the
official(s) with jurisdiction understand
that their written concurrence is
required for the Administration’s de
minimis impact determination and that
they agree with any proposed mitigation
necessary to the de minimis impact
determination.
One commenter suggested that the
FHWA and FTA add a further provision
to the coordination process in paragraph
774.5(b)(2) that would expressly allow
the concurrence in the de minimis
impact determination to be combined
with other comments provided by the
official(s) on the project. The FHWA
and FTA decided to follow this
recommendation and incorporated the
proposed language: ‘‘This concurrence
may be combined with other comments
on the project provided by the
official(s).’’ Another comment asked for
clarification whether the coordination
can be accomplished in conjunction
with other public involvement
procedures, such as a comment period
provided on a NEPA document. The
FHWA and FTA’s NEPA regulation
provides for integrated procedures in 23
CFR 771.105 and 771.133, so this point
was clarified as suggested. With the
clarifications described above, the new
provision will help streamline the
environmental review process because it
will allow the official(s) with
jurisdiction to combine comments on
the de minimis impact proposal with
comments submitted on other
environmental issues related to the
project.
• Paragraph 774.5(c)—One
commenter believed that the
coordination requirements discussed in
section 774.5 did not differentiate
between individual and programmatic
Section 4(f) evaluations and requested
clarification. Programmatic evaluations
are differentiated by virtue of being
addressed in a separate paragraph,
774.5(c). We have now clarified what is
meant by a programmatic evaluation in
paragraph 774.3(d), as previously
discussed.
Another comment suggested a 60-day
comment period be required when there
is a use of land from a Section 4(f)
property that is covered by a
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation.
The comment also suggested that the
coordination during the use of a
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation
should ‘‘be open to the public and not
just the official(s) with jurisdiction.’’
Programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations
provide procedural options for
demonstrating compliance with the
statutory requirements of Section 4(f).
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The FHWA has issued five nationwide
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations.
(FTA has not issued any, but has plans
to do so.) Before being adopted, all of
the FHWA programmatic evaluations
were published in draft form in the
Federal Register for public review and
comment. They were also provided to
appropriate Federal agencies for review.
Each programmatic evaluation contains
specific criteria, consultation
requirements, and findings that must be
met before the programmatic evaluation
may be applied on any given project. A
primary benefit to using this prescribed
step-by-step approach is a reduction of
the time it takes to achieve Section 4(f)
approval.
The NPRM did not stipulate any
specific comment period or
coordination process when
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations
are used. When applied to individual
projects each of the five approved
programmatic evaluations has
coordination requirements, but none of
them requires a specific comment
period.5 We did not make the changes
proposed by the commenter because we
believe the imposition of additional
comment periods, coordination periods,
or public involvement at the time a
programmatic evaluation is applied to
an individual project would severely
limit the effectiveness of this approach.
One commenter expressed concern
about the potential lack of public notice
or opportunity to comment on the
evaluation of certain historic resources,
such as bridges, under the relevant
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation,
when the project is processed with a
NEPA categorical exclusion (CE). It was
suggested that, at a minimum, a CE
project processed under a programmatic
Section 4(f) evaluation should be posted
on the applicant’s Web site. The public
involvement requirements related to
categorical exclusions, as well as other
classes of actions, are addressed in 23
CFR 771.111. The public involvement
requirements for application of a
particular programmatic Section 4(f)
evaluation are specified in the
5 Three of the programmatic Section 4(f)
evaluations have public involvement requirements.
The ‘‘Final Nationwide Programmatic Section 4(f)
Evaluation and Determination for Federal-Aid
Transportation Projects That Have a Net Benefit to
a Section 4(f) Property’’ requires project-level
public involvement activities consistent with 23
CFR 771.111. The ‘‘Final Nationwide Section 4(f)
Evaluation and Approval for Federally-Aided
Highway Projects with Minor Involvements with
Historic Sites’’ and the final ‘‘Programmatic Section
4(f) Evaluation and Approval for FHWA Projects
that Necessitate the Use of Historic Bridges’’ both
require coordination with various parties in
accordance with 36 CFR part 800, which may
include members of the public identified as
interested persons, or consulting parties.
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programmatic evaluation itself. Hence,
the FHWA and FTA concluded that the
issue has been adequately addressed
and additional requirements are not
necessary.
Section 774.7 Documentation
This section contains the
requirements related to the
documentation of the various Section
4(f) analyses and approvals. In the
NPRM this section was titled ‘‘Format.’’
The title was changed to
‘‘Documentation’’ to more accurately
reflect the content of this section.
In response to a general comment that
it was difficult to locate the
requirements for de minimis impact
determinations, the section was reordered so that it now tracks the order
of section 774.3, ‘‘Section 4(f)
approvals.’’ Thus, paragraph 774.7(a)
now addresses the documentation of
Section 4(f) evaluations prepared to
comply with approvals under 774.3(a);
paragraph 774.7(b) contains the format
requirements for de minimis impact
determinations under paragraph
774.3(b); and paragraph 774.7(c)
contains the requirements for
determinations of the least overall harm
under paragraph 774.3(c) when there is
no feasible and prudent avoidance
alternative. Paragraphs (d)–(f) are
additional documentation requirements
for particular situations that have no
corresponding paragraphs within
section 774.3.
Several comments demonstrated
confusion over NPRM paragraph
774.7(g) which contained the
documentation requirements for
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations.
This material was moved to paragraph
774.3(d) in the final rule so that the
discussion of approvals using
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations
and the documentation requirements are
now grouped together. We felt this
restructuring was needed to clarify the
difference between promulgating a
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation
and the subsequent application of the
programmatic evaluation to an
individual project decision.
Paragraph 774.7(e) in both the NPRM
and this final rule contains the
requirements for making Section 4(f)
approvals for tiered environmental
documents. This paragraph received the
most comments of any part of section
774.7; substantial parts of the paragraph
were re-worded for clarity in response
to the comments, as described below.
• Paragraph 774.7(a)—One comment
suggested that the last part of the
sentence be revised to repeat the exact
language from the statute. This section,
though, does not set forth the standard
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for Section 4(f) approvals, but rather
provides the format of the
documentation for Section 4(f)
approvals. Thus, the language need not
exactly duplicate the statutory standard
for approvals, which is implemented by
section 774.3. We believe that the
language used is consistent with the
statute but provides direction for project
applicants preparing Section 4(f)
documents.
Another comment suggested adding
the language ‘‘or reduce its use
significantly’’ after ‘‘that would avoid
using the Section 4(f) property.’’ We did
not adopt this change because the
language at the end of the paragraph
requires a summary of ‘‘the results of all
possible planning to minimize harm to
the Section 4(f) property.’’ The
documentation of ‘‘all possible planning
to minimize harm’’ would show, among
other things, how any reductions in the
use of Section 4(f) property would be
accomplished. In addition, the Section
4(f) caselaw is fairly uniform in holding
that an alternative that uses Section 4(f)
property is not properly considered an
‘‘avoidance alternative’’ under the
statute. Incidentally, the words ‘‘that
would avoid using the Section 4(f)
property’’ which delimited ‘‘avoidance
alternative’’ in the NPRM, have now
been deleted as redundant.
• Paragraph 774.7(b)—Regarding
paragraph 774.7(b), one commenter
requested clarification that the
mitigation measures suggested in the
proposed regulation should be
considered only if an applicant has
committed to incorporate the measures
into the project. The commenter
suggested changing the provision to
refer to ‘‘any avoidance, minimization,
mitigation, or enhancement measures
committed to by the applicant.’’ The
FHWA and FTA decided not to make
this proposed change because the
statute requires any measures that are
required to be implemented as a
condition of approval of a de minimis
impact determination to be part of the
project. An applicant does not have a
choice regarding whether to incorporate
the measures into a project if the
measures were mentioned when the
impacts were classified as de minimis.
Accordingly, the FHWA and FTA
determined that the suggested language
would be redundant since, as the
regulation currently states, the applicant
will automatically be required to
incorporate these measures.
Another commenter suggested that
the determination whether the project
impacts are de minimis for Section 4(f)
purposes should be made before
mitigation is applied, not after. This
commenter claimed that this regulation
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would allow an applicant to illegally
characterize the impacts of a project that
are greater than de minimis impacts as
de minimis to avoid having the project
analyzed, assessed, and evaluated. The
FHWA and FTA did not accept this
proposal because it violates the
governing statute. As amended by
section 6009(a) of SAFETEA–LU,
Section 4(f) plainly requires that ‘‘[t]he
Secretary shall consider to be part of a
transportation program or project any
avoidance, minimization, mitigation, or
enhancement measures that are required
to be implemented as a condition of
approval of the transportation program
or project.’’ 49 U.S.C. 303(d)(1)(C).
Mitigation measures must be applied up
front, with the determination made after
taking such mitigation into account. The
proposed language has been retained.
For consistency with paragraph
774.3(b) and the statute, the word
‘‘determination’’ was substituted for
‘‘finding’’ in this paragraph.
• Paragraph 774.7(c)—One
commenter pointed out that framing the
regulatory provision in terms of what an
‘‘applicant’’ must do is misleading as it
implies that, contrary to statute, the
applicant has a decision-making role in
the Section 4(f) approval process. This
commenter proposed rewriting
paragraph (c) to reflect the decisionmaking role of the Administration in the
Section 4(f) approval process: ‘‘the
Administration, in consultation with the
applicant, must select. . . .’’ Section 4(f)
assigns the responsibility for evaluating
and approving transportation projects to
the Secretary of Transportation (who, in
turn, has delegated it to the modal
administrations within the U.S. DOT).
The FHWA and FTA agree with the
comment that the Administration, and
not the applicant, has the statutory
authority to approve an alternative
under Section 4(f), but declines to adopt
the commenter’s proposed text. Instead,
the FHWA and FTA have decided to
convey the same idea by using language
consistent with paragraph 774.3(c), to
which the requirements in paragraph
774.7(c) pertain. The relevant portion of
the provision now reads as follows: ‘‘the
Administration may approve only the
alternative that causes the least overall
harm in accordance with § 774.3(c).’’
This language relies heavily on the
revised text of paragraph 774.3(c) and
appropriately reserves the decisionmaking role to the Administration.
In a slight variation on the comment
discussed above, one commenter
objected to the use of the word
‘‘applicant’’ because it fails to recognize
the role of most applicants and the
Administration as joint lead agencies in
preparing the NEPA review of the
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13377
project, in accordance with SAFETEA–
LU section 6002. The commenter
suggested changing the provision to
read ‘‘the applicant, with approval from
the NEPA Lead Agency, must select.
* * *’’ The FHWA and FTA did not
follow this recommendation because,
whereas the responsibility for document
preparation, review, and approval under
NEPA is now shared between the
Administration and the recipient of
Federal funds, the Administration has
the exclusive statutory authority to grant
Section 4(f) approvals. An applicant’s
role under NEPA does not authorize it
to make Section 4(f) approvals unless
the applicant is a State that has assumed
Section 4(f) responsibilities as part of an
assumption of environmental
responsibility under applicable law,
such as 23 U.S.C. 325, 326, or 327.
• Paragraph 774.7(d)—This paragraph
requires a legal sufficiency review for
certain Section 4(f) approvals. One
commenter questioned its need. The
Administration has legal responsibility
to ensure compliance with applicable
environmental laws, regulations, and
Executive Orders. Section 4(f) has been
extensively interpreted by the Courts,
and the application of the law to a
specific approval may involve the
application of complex legal principles.
The Administration’s application of
Section 4(f) benefits from the legal
sufficiency review. Moreover,
Administration attorneys familiar with
the judicial interpretations of Section
4(f) law in the Federal Circuit where the
project is located perform the legal
sufficiency review. Thus, the legal
sufficiency review enhances the
likelihood that the Administration’s
Section 4(f) decisions will be
appropriate and will be sustained in
Federal court if litigation ensues.
Finally, the legal sufficiency review is
required by a Department-wide order
implementing Section 4(f). See DOT
Order 5610.1C. The requirement for a
legal sufficiency review is retained.
Paragraph 774.7(d) says: ‘‘The
Administration shall review all Section
4(f) approvals under §§ 774.3(a) and
774.3(c) for legal sufficiency.’’ A
commenter suggested that the meaning
of ‘‘legal sufficiency’’ in the context of
a Section 4(f) approval be defined. We
decline to define ‘‘legal sufficiency’’ as
there are too many variable factors
considered in a legal sufficiency review.
These include, but are not limited to,
the type of Section 4(f) approval under
consideration, the law of the Federal
Circuit where the project is located, and,
most importantly, the facts and
circumstances of the particular project.
Legal sufficiency reviews assess the
Section 4(f) documentation from the
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perspective of legal standards, as well as
technical adequacy. Because of the
inherent differences among document
writers and reviewers, the projects,
court decisions in the relevant circuit,
and other factors, the comments on legal
sufficiency for one project may differ in
content and format from those for
another project with similar issues. This
variability makes defining a standard for
the review of legal sufficiency
impractical.
• Paragraph 774.7(e)—Numerous
comments were received about this
section, which concerns Section 4(f)
approvals of projects developed using
tiered environmental impact statements.
Most commenters thought it was helpful
to clarify the different levels of detail
necessary at the different stages,
although several negatively commented
on the proposal to consider the
preliminary first-tier Section 4(f)
approval final. Nearly all commenters
were confused by some aspect of what
the FHWA and FTA intended by
authorizing a ‘‘preliminary’’ Section 4(f)
approval to be made at the conclusion
of the first tier stage and a final Section
4(f) approval at the conclusion of the
second-tier stage. One commenter
thought we intended to ‘‘immunize’’ the
first-tier Section 4(f) approval from
reconsideration, even in the event it
should subsequently be determined no
longer valid during the second tier
review. This was not our intent. A
variety of revisions were suggested to
clarify the intent of this section. All of
these suggestions were considered in
revising the provision to clarify what is
required.
The intent behind this section is that
the relationship between the
preliminary and final Section 4(f)
approval should be analogous to the
relationship between a first-tier EIS and
a second-tier NEPA document. In the
same manner that a second-tier NEPA
document can rely on the conclusions of
the first-tier EIS (thereby avoiding
duplication), the final Section 4(f)
approval may rely upon the conclusions
reached in the preliminary Section 4(f)
approval. However, both the second-tier
NEPA document and the final Section
4(f) approval must still take into account
any significant new information or
relevant details that become known
during the second-level review.
If the second-tier NEPA document
identifies a new or additional use of
Section 4(f) property with greater than
de minimis impacts, then additional
consideration of feasible and prudent
avoidance alternatives and of potential
measures to minimize harm to Section
4(f) property will be necessary. If the
second-tier NEPA document does not
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identify any new or greater than
expected use of Section 4(f) property, or
if there is a new or additional use of
Section 4(f) property but its impacts are
determined to be de minimis under
paragraph 774.3(b) of this regulation,
then the final Section 4(f) approval shall
document the determination that the
new or additional use is de minimis and
may incorporate by reference the
documentation developed for the firsttier preliminary approval since the firsttier information remains valid. In this
situation, the applicant must consider
whether all possible planning to
minimize harm (which is defined in
section 774.17) has occurred. Additional
planning to minimize harm to a Section
4(f) property will often be needed
during the second-tier study and can be
undertaken without reopening the firsttier decision. Re-evaluation of the
preliminary Section 4(f) approval is
only needed to the extent that new or
more detailed information available at
the second-tier stage raises new Section
4(f) concerns not already considered.
The final regulation clarifies the
requirements for tiered Section 4(f)
approvals, consistent with the above
discussion.
• Paragraph 774.7(f)—One comment
suggested that paragraph 774.7(f) be
revised to clarify that including a
required Section 4(f) evaluation in the
NEPA document is normal practice but
is not mandatory. Another comment
suggested that such inclusion in the
NEPA document should be mandatory.
We re-worded this paragraph to clarify
our intent, but we do not agree that
including the Section 4(f) evaluation in
the NEPA document should be
mandatory. There are many instances
where the timing is off due to late
discoveries or other circumstances
beyond the control of the applicant. In
such cases, processing a stand-alone
Section 4(f) evaluation is permissible.
Thus, applicants should endeavor to
include any required Section 4(f)
evaluation within the relevant NEPA
document, to the extent possible.
Another comment suggested that
paragraph 774.7(b) should explicitly
state that the Section 4(f) evaluation
may be included in an appendix to the
NEPA document, with a summary of the
evaluation in the main body of the
document. FHWA will allow the
Section 4(f) evaluation to be included in
an appendix to the NEPA document, so
long as the appendices accompany the
NEPA document and the distribution
and commenting requirements of
Section 4(f) will be met. The FHWA and
FTA decline to include this provision in
the final rule as we believe that
guidance, not regulation, is the
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appropriate method for addressing the
issue. The FHWA and FTA will address
it in a future update of the Section 4(f)
Policy Paper or the Technical Advisory
on preparing and processing
environmental documents.
Section 774.9
Timing
This section addresses the timing of
Section 4(f) approvals within the NEPA
process, and after project approval or
during construction, where necessary.
There were no generally applicable
comments on this section. Comments on
specific paragraphs are discussed in
turn below.
• Paragraph 774.9(a)—One comment
asked for clarification that the analysis
of possible Section 4(f) uses during
project development is really only an
evaluation of ‘‘potential’’ uses (i.e., a
proposed project does not actually use
Section 4(f) property at the time of
project development). We agree, and
have clarified this point by changing the
beginning of the first sentence from
‘‘Any use of lands’’ to ‘‘The potential
use of lands.’’ The same comment also
suggested changing ‘‘shall be evaluated
early in the development’’ within the
same sentence to ‘‘shall be evaluated as
early as practicable in the
development,’’ because potential uses of
Section 4(f) property can only be
evaluated after a certain minimum level
of information about the proposed
action and alternatives has been
developed. We agree, and we have
adopted these proposed edits in this
final rule.
• Paragraph 774.9(b)—One comment
sought clarification that Section 4(f)
approval can be made ‘‘in a separate
Section 4(f) evaluation’’ in certain
circumstances. We agree, and
accordingly added at the beginning of
this paragraph ‘‘Except as provided in
paragraph (c), for * * *.’’ Paragraph
774.9(c) covers the circumstances where
a separate Section 4(f) approval is
appropriate.
Another comment sought clarification
that an EIS, EA, or CE must always
include the actual Section 4(f) approval.
Section 4(f) approvals are incorporated
and coordinated with the NEPA process,
and to the extent practicable, the NEPA
document should include all
documentation and analysis supporting
the Section 4(f) approval. However, the
actual approval may be made in the
subsequent decision document in order
to consider public and interagency
comment submitted in response to the
NEPA document. The Section 4(f)
approval and the supporting
information are always available to the
public for review upon request. As such,
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we have retained the proposed language
in the final rule.
• Paragraph 774.9(c)—Two comments
pointed out that the introductory clause
in NPRM paragraph 774.9(c), ‘‘If the
Administration determines that Section
4(f) is applicable’’ repeats one of the
numbered subparagraphs—‘‘(2) The
Administration determines that Section
4(f) applies to the use of a property.’’
The redundant language has been
deleted.
One comment suggested replacing
‘‘final EIS’’ with ‘‘ROD’’ to ensure
consistency with references to a FONSI
and a CE in paragraph 774.9(c). Both the
FONSI and CE are decision documents,
as is the ROD. The FHWA and FTA
decided to follow this recommendation.
The change helps clarify the timing of
the separate Section 4(f) approval
required by section 774.9. Paragraph (c)
applies only after the NEPA process has
been completed and the Administration
has already made a Section 4(f)
determination in a decision document.
One comment recommended
explicitly stating in paragraph
774.9(c)(2) that the identification of a
new property subject to Section 4(f)
does not require a separate Section 4(f)
approval if the ‘‘late designation’’
exception in paragraph 774.13(c)
applies. The FHWA and FTA agree with
the substance of this comment, though
not with the suggested language.
Instead, the FHWA and FTA included
the phrase ‘‘except as provided in
§ 774.13 of this title’’ at the end of the
introductory sentence of paragraph (c):
‘‘a separate Section 4(f) approval will be
required, except as provided in § 774.13,
if * * *.’’ The FHWA and FTA believe
that the exceptions listed in section
774.13 pertain to all three situations
addressed in paragraph (c), not
exclusively to the scenario in paragraph
(c)(2). Furthermore, exceptions other
than paragraph 774.13(c) dealing with
‘‘late designation’’ could potentially
apply to the circumstances described in
paragraph (c). Consequently, a more
general statement concerning exceptions
is appropriate.
Another comment asked for
clarification in paragraph 774.9(c)(2)
that the provision requires a separate
Section 4(f) approval when the
Administration determines after project
approval that Section 4(f) applies to a
new use of Section 4(f) property. That
was our intent, so we modified
paragraph 774.9(c)(2) to state that
‘‘Section 4(f) applies to ‘the use of’ a
property.’’
One comment proposed a slight
revision to the provision by substituting
‘‘if’’ instead of ‘‘when’’ before
enumerating situations necessitating a
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separate Section 4(f) evaluation. In the
context of the introductory sentence, the
choice of the word ‘‘if’’ better articulates
the conditional nature of the
applicability of paragraph (c) and is less
likely to be misconstrued. We have
therefore adopted this suggested change.
One commenter asked for definitions
of the phrases ‘‘substantial increase in
the amount of Section 4(f) property
used,’’ ‘‘substantial increase in the
adverse impacts to Section 4(f)
property,’’ and ‘‘substantial reduction in
mitigation measures.’’ These words
were used with their plain English
meanings. We think that the meanings
of these phrases are self-evident, and
they rely upon the context of each
particular factual situation to which this
paragraph of the regulation is being
applied. Therefore, we did not provide
definitions of these phrases.
• Paragraph 774.9(d)—Two
comments expressed the opinion that
new or supplemental environmental
documents should always be required if
a separate Section 4(f) approval is
required after the original
environmental document has been
processed. The proposed regulation
stated that a new or supplemental
environmental document ‘‘will not
necessarily’’ be required in such
instances and that project activities not
directly affected by the separate Section
4(f) approval may proceed. Paragraph
774.9(d) of this Section 4(f) regulation
deals strictly with Section 4(f)
requirements and is not intended to
explain when supplementation under
NEPA is required. A provision in the
joint FHWA/FTA NEPA regulation,
located at 23 CFR 771.130, governs
when supplementation is required
under NEPA. It requires a supplemental
EIS ‘‘whenever the Administration
determines that: (1) Changes to the
proposed action would result in
significant environmental impacts that
were not evaluated in the EIS; or (2)
New information or circumstances
relevant to environmental concerns and
bearing on the proposed action or its
impacts would result in significant
environmental impacts not evaluated in
the EIS.’’ The circumstances that
necessitate a separate Section 4(f)
approval under paragraph 774.9(c) may
or may not rise to the level of
significance described in 23 CFR
771.130(a). It should also be noted that
23 CFR 771.130(c) provides for the
preparation of environmental studies or,
if appropriate, an EA to assess the
impacts of the changes, new
information, or new circumstances and
determine whether a supplemental EIS
is necessary. The NEPA question must
be answered in the context of the
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particular new or changed impacts at
issue, while the Section 4(f) question
depends on the new or changed use of
Section 4(f) property at issue. The
FHWA and FTA recognize that the
changes, new information, or new
circumstance requiring a separate
Section 4(f) evaluation may also require
additional NEPA documentation.
Paragraph 774.9(d) now states that
when, in accordance with paragraph (c),
a separate Section 4(f) approval is
required and, in accordance with 23
CFR 771.130, additional NEPA
documentation is needed, these
documents should be combined for
efficiency and comprehensiveness.
Further, 23 CFR 771.130(f) provides for
a supplemental EIS of ‘‘limited scope’’
when issues of concern affect only a
limited portion of the project, and it
states that any project activity not
directly affected by the supplemental
review may proceed. The FHWA and
FTA believe that the last sentence in
paragraph 774.9(d) is consistent with 23
CFR 771.130(f) and that no change is
warranted.
• Paragraph 774.9(e)—Several
comments expressed support for the
proposal in paragraph 774.9(e) that,
when Section 4(f) applies to
archeological sites discovered during
construction, the Section 4(f) process
may be expedited and the evaluation of
alternatives may take into account the
level of investment already made. One
commenter objected to the expedited
process and consideration of prior
investment. Another stated that this
provision is too vague. However, no
substantive change was made to the
language because this paragraph
continues existing policy that has
worked well in past applications.
Because archeological resources are
underground and can occur in
unexpected locations, it is not always
possible to anticipate their presence
prior to construction. Thus, when such
resources are uncovered during
construction, it is appropriate to take
the scientific and historical value of the
resource into account in deciding how
to expedite the Section 4(f) process.
Further elaboration in the regulation
would hamper the deliberation
necessary when this circumstance
arises.
One commenter asked whether a
particular applicant can enter into a
programmatic agreement with their
SHPO setting forth more detailed
procedures to comply with Section 4(f)
and the National Historic Preservation
Act when archeological resources are
discovered during construction. We
believe that this would be appropriate
and desirable as long as the proposed
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agreement is reviewed by the
Administration through the appropriate
field office for consistency with this
regulation. Another approach that is
encouraged is the inclusion of
procedures for identifying and dealing
with archaeological resources in the
project-level Section 106 Memorandum
of Agreement under the National
Historic Preservation Act. Another
comment sought clarification whether
the exception in paragraph 774.13(b) for
archeological resources lacking value for
preservation in place applies when the
archeological resource is discovered
during construction. It does, and this
has been clarified in the final rule.
Section 774.11 Applicability
This section is intended to answer
many common questions about when
Section 4(f) is applicable. There were no
generally applicable comments on this
section. Comments on specific
paragraphs are discussed in turn below.
• Paragraph 774.11(a)—There were
no major comments in response to this
paragraph. Therefore, we have retained
the language as proposed in the NPRM.
• Paragraph 774.11(b)—Several
comments requested clarification on the
roles of the various agencies involved in
the Section 4(f) evaluation in relation to
the provisions of 23 U.S.C. 139, which
was created by SAFETEA–LU section
6002, regarding joint lead agencies.
Section 4(f) only applies to U.S. DOT
agencies, but there are transportation
projects for which a non-U.S. DOT
agency is the Federal lead agency and a
U.S. DOT agency is a cooperating or
participating agency. In these cases,
only the U.S. DOT agency can make the
Section 4(f) approval. For example, a
hospital expansion project was
proposed in the midwest, utilizing
funds from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, a non-U.S. DOT agency that
was the lead agency under NEPA, and
the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, another non-U.S.
DOT agency. The FHWA had funding
involvement for the relocation of roads
within the project area and was a
cooperating agency. FHWA was,
however, the Federal lead agency for
Section 4(f) approvals. To further clarify
this point, the word ‘‘Federal’’ was
inserted in the first sentence of this
paragraph: ‘‘When another ‘Federal’
agency is the Federal lead agency for the
NEPA process * * *. ’’
• Paragraphs 774.11(c) and (d)—
These paragraphs were proposed to
remain substantively unchanged from
the previous regulation. Three
comments objected to paragraph (c),
which presumes that parks, refuges, and
recreation areas are significant unless
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the official(s) with jurisdiction
determine that the entire property is not
significant. The FHWA and FTA
proposed in paragraph (d) to retain the
right to review such determinations of
non-significance for reasonableness.
One commenter objected to the
presumption of significance, stating ‘‘if
the official with jurisdiction over the
property chooses to not make a ruling
on significance, we should assume the
property is not significant as opposed to
assuming it is.’’ The same commenter
felt that the Administration should not
be permitted to overturn a nonsignificance determination. Another
commenter proposed adding a public
hearing requirement to this paragraph,
and the third comment proposed
deleting the paragraph (c) on
significance altogether because it ‘‘guts
the statutory standard’’ to allow the
official(s) with jurisdiction over a
property to declare it non-significant.
After considering these comments, we
decided to retain the language as
proposed. The statute is limited by its
own terms to significant properties ‘‘as
determined by the Federal, State, or
local officials having jurisdiction over
the park, area, refuge, or site.’’ 49 U.S.C.
303(c). Therefore, these paragraphs
implement a provision of the statute
itself and are part of the current Section
4(f) regulations at 23 CFR 771.135(c)
and (d). With respect to the
presumption of significance in
paragraph (c), the FHWA and FTA
decided to keep the presumption since
it continues to provide the benefit of a
doubt in favor of protecting the Section
4(f) property, which has been the FHWA
and FTA’s policy on this issue for
several decades.
• Paragraph 774.11(e)—Several
comments were received on this
paragraph, which specifies standards
and procedures for determining the
applicability of Section 4(f) to historic
sites. Two comments asked for a
definition of ‘‘historic site.’’ A definition
was added to section 774.17, which
defines the term as ‘‘any prehistoric or
historic district, site, building, structure,
or object included in, or eligible for
inclusion in, the National Register.’’ The
term ‘‘includes properties of traditional
religious and cultural importance to an
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization that are included in, or are
eligible for inclusion in, the National
Register.’’ This definition is consistent
with the definition of ‘‘historic
property’’ used in the regulation
implementing Section 106 of the
National Historic Preservation Act (36
CFR part 800).
Another comment on this paragraph
stated that we should not limit historic
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sites to those that are eligible for the
National Register of Historic Places, but
also consider other sites that may be
important for historic purposes. We
agree with the commenter that it is
important to allow for the possibility of
protecting sites that are historic but not
eligible for the National Register. The
proposed text of paragraph 774.11(e)(1)
provides for this situation by stating that
Section 4(f) applies ‘‘only to historic
sites on or eligible for the National
Register unless the Administration
determines that that the application of
Section 4(f) is otherwise appropriate.’’
This provision allows the
Administration to consider sites that are
historically important for protection but
are not eligible for the National Register.
Other comments stated that the
section did not adequately address
‘‘negligible’’ impacts to large historic
districts. We think that changes to the
proposed language to address this issue
are not warranted. For example, in the
case of historic districts, the assessment
of effects under Section 106 of the
National Historic Preservation Act
would be based on the effect to the
district as a whole, as opposed to
individual impacts on each contributing
property. Accordingly, when an
assessment of effects on the overall
historic district is performed, if the
effects on the historic district are truly
negligible, then the result of the
assessment of effects would be a ‘‘no
adverse effect’’ on the historic district.
With appropriate concurrences, such
finding would qualify the project as
having de minimis impact and therefore
not subject to further consideration
under Section 4(f). On the other hand,
where contributing elements of a
historic district are individually eligible
for the National Register, an assessment
of the effects on the individual
properties that are eligible would also
be required. This assessment of effects
would be independent of the assessment
for the overall historic district and may
or may not result in ‘‘no adverse effect’’
and de minimis impact determinations.
Paragraph 774.11(e)(2), concerning
the application of Section 4(f) to the
Interstate Highway System, was moved
to this location in the final rule (from
paragraph 774.13(j) in the NPRM) so
that all provisions governing the
applicability to historic sites are in one
location. One comment was received on
the exemption of the Interstate Highway
System. The comment expressed
concern over the inclusion of this
exemption in the proposed regulation.
This exception was included in the
NPRM in response to section 6007 of
SAFETEA–LU (codified at 23 U.S.C.
103(c)(5)), which states, in pertinent
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part, that the Interstate Highway System
is not considered to be a historic site
subject to Section 4(f), with the
exception of those individual elements
of the Interstate Highway System
formally designated by FHWA for
Section 4(f) protection on the basis of
national or exceptional historic
significance. FHWA implemented this
directive through a formal process that
designated 132 significant elements of
the Interstate Highway System for
Section 4(f) protection after considering
input from relevant agencies and the
public. See 71 FR 76019. While Section
4(f) does not apply to all other segments
and features of the Interstate Highway
System, Section 4(f) continues to apply
to any historic sites located in proximity
to an Interstate Highway that are
unrelated to the Interstate Highway
System. As an example, a highway
project will widen and reconfigure an
interchange on the Interstate System
constructed 50 years ago that has some
historic value but is not designated on
the list of 132 significant elements.
Section 4(f) does not apply to the use of
this interchange. However, a historic
farm, circa 1850 and on the National
Register, also abuts the project. Section
4(f) would apply to the project’s use of
the historic farm because the farm is not
part of the Interstate Highway System
and its historic significance is unrelated
to the Interstate Highway System.
• Paragraph 774.11(f)—One
commenter requested specific
procedures to be used for the
identification of archaeological
resources. The FHWA and FTA decided
not to include procedures for
identifying archaeological resources in
this regulation because it is beyond the
scope of this rulemaking. The FHWA
and FTA believe that a good faith effort
must be made to identify archaeological
resources, but specifying procedures to
be used in each situation is not
appropriate in this regulation.
• Paragraph 774.11(g)—This
paragraph of the final rule was added to
clarify the applicability of Section 4(f) to
Wild and Scenic Rivers. The provision
is consistent with longstanding FHWA
and FTA policy as set forth in FHWA’s
Section 4(f) Policy Paper. It was inserted
in response to the comments of the U.S.
Department of the Interior. The
provision limits the applicability of
Section 4(f), in accordance with the
statutory language, to those portions of
Wild and Scenic Rivers that are publicly
owned and serve a function protected
by Section 4(f). The paragraph states
‘‘Section 4(f) applies to those portions of
federally designated Wild and Scenic
Rivers that are otherwise eligible as
historic sites, or that are publicly owned
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and function as, or are designated in a
management plan as a significant park,
recreation area, or wildlife and
waterfowl refuge. All other applicable
requirements of the National Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act must be satisfied,
independent of the Section 4(f)
approval.’’
• Paragraphs 774.11(h) and (i)—These
paragraphs of section 774.11 concern
the applicability of Section 4(f) to
properties formally reserved for future
transportation projects but temporarily
serving a Section 4(f) purpose. One
commenter noted that the NPRM had
addressed interim Section 4(f) activity
on property reserved for transportation
use and the concurrent or joint
development of parks, recreation areas,
or refuges with transportation facilities
in the same paragraph. That commenter
suggested that these two topics should
be separated because the NPRM was
confusing. As these issues have been
traditionally treated separately, the
FHWA and FTA agree with this
suggestion, and the topics of interim
Section 4(f) activities and joint planning
are now addressed in paragraphs
774.11(g) and (h), respectively.
Another commenter was concerned
with the term ‘‘temporary recreational
activity’’ in the first sentence of this
paragraph of the proposed rule,
explaining that the word ‘‘temporary’’
could be construed to refer only to uses
of relatively short duration. The FHWA
and FTA have never imposed any time
limit on how long a future
transportation corridor can be made
available for recreation while it is not
yet needed for transportation, and there
is no public purpose in limiting the time
during which interim recreational
activities may be permitted on the
future transportation corridor.
The commenter was also concerned
that the proposed language did not
consider other non-recreational
temporary uses of a future
transportation corridor, for example as a
wildlife or waterfowl refuge. The FHWA
and FTA decided to address these
comments by clarifying the wording of
the section. The language in the final
rule says: ‘‘[w]hen a property formally
reserved for a future transportation
facility temporarily functions for park,
recreation, or wildlife and waterfowl
refuge purposes in the interim, the
interim activity, regardless of duration,
will not subject that property to Section
4(f).’’ The temporary activity is not
protected under Section 4(f) in this case,
regardless of whether the property
owner has authorized the interim use of
the transportation land or has simply
not fenced the property off or taken
other measures to prevent trespassing.
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Another comment suggested that
allowing temporary recreational activity
on a reserved transportation corridor is
an exception to Section 4(f) and
therefore should be moved from section
774.11, ‘‘Applicability,’’ to section
774.13, ‘‘Exceptions.’’ We think that the
proposed paragraph does not set forth
an exception to Section 4(f), but rather
explains the applicability of Section 4(f)
in certain situations. Therefore, this
provision was retained in the
‘‘Applicability’’ section.
Another comment addressed the
second example of joint planning
between two or more agencies with
jurisdiction over the transportation
project and Section 4(f) property. The
comment suggested that a broader range
of scenarios of joint planning be
addressed in the rule, and suggested the
example be revised to indicate that such
planning could be done concurrently or
in consultation between the agencies. It
appears the concern involved the need
for formal coordination, though the
word ‘‘formal’’ did not appear in the
NPRM. Since this paragraph of the rule
deals with joint planning of
transportation projects and Section 4(f)
properties, any instance of concurrent
planning would qualify for
consideration of whether Section 4(f)
applied. The basis for determining the
compatibility of jointly-planned
transportation projects and Section 4(f)
properties, however, depends heavily
upon the degree to which the multiple
agencies involved have consulted on
various aspects of the proposals. The
purpose of this provision had been
accurately described as:
Section 4(f) is not meant to force upon a
community, wishing to establish a less than
pristine park affected by a road, the choice
between a pristine park and a road. A
community faced with this choice might well
choose not to establish any park, thus
frustrating Section 4(f)’s goal of preserving
the natural beauty of the countryside.
See Sierra Club v. Dept. of Transp., 948
F.2d 568, 574–575 (9th Cir. 1991). The
consultation that occurs, formal or
otherwise, will be examined on a caseby-case basis in light of this purpose to
determine if a constructive use occurs
when the jointly-planned transportation
project is eventually proposed for
construction. We have retained the
proposed language in the final rule.
Section 774.13 Exceptions
This section sets forth various
exceptions to the otherwise applicable
Section 4(f) requirements. The
exceptions either are founded in statute
or reflect longstanding FHWA and FTA
policies governing when to apply
Section 4(f). The exceptions are limited
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in number and scope and do not
compromise the preservation purpose of
the statute, which is to ‘‘preserve the
natural beauty of the countryside and
public park and recreation lands,
wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and
historic sites.’’
One comment asked for clarification
whether an exception for a project
under this regulation would also
provide an exemption for the project
from compliance with the NEPA and the
National Historic Preservation Act. The
answer is no. The exceptions in Section
774.13 relate solely to the applicability
of, and requirements for, Section 4(f)
approval. All other applicable
environmental laws must still be
addressed.
Several comments favored additional
exceptions beyond those proposed by
the FHWA and FTA. One such comment
suggested that an exception be added for
active historic railroads and transit
systems, along the lines of the
exemption for the Interstate Highway
System that was included in section
6007 of SAFETEA–LU. The FHWA and
FTA decided not to pursue the
suggested exception for several reasons.
First and foremost, the FHWA and FTA
do not have statutory authority for such
an exception, as it was not included in
section 6007. Second, there is already
an exception in paragraph 774.13(a) for
the restoration, rehabilitation, or
maintenance of historic transportation
facilities when there is no adverse effect
on the historic qualities of the facility
that caused it to be on or eligible for the
National Register. For many FTAfunded maintenance or rehabilitation
projects on historic transit systems, such
as those in New York, Chicago, and
Boston, system-specific programmatic
agreements with the relevant SHPO
under Section 106 have specified the
conditions for a ‘‘no adverse effect’’
determination and, as a logical
consequence, the conditions for the
Section 4(f) exception noted above.
Finally, when the project does result in
an adverse effect and the traditional
Section 4(f) evaluation process applies,
the demonstration that there is no
feasible and prudent avoidance
alternative that would accomplish the
project purpose of keeping the historic
transportation facility in operation is
usually straightforward. Therefore, the
applicant in such a case can focus on
how to minimize the harm to historic
features of the transportation facility
and still accomplish the project’s
purpose. Accordingly, the FHWA and
FTA do not agree that the creation of a
new exception for active, historic
railroads and transit systems is
necessary or permissible.
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Another comment suggested adding
an exception for all ‘‘local or state
transportation projects that have not or
will not receive U.S. Department of
Transportation funds for construction of
the project.’’ In support of this proposal,
the commenter cited a number of court
cases holding that Section 4(f)
requirements are triggered when a U.S.
DOT agency approves a transportation
project receiving Federal construction
funds but not when the project is locally
funded. The FHWA and FTA decided
not to incorporate the proposed
exception because Federal funding is
not the sole determinant of Section 4(f)
applicability. Section 4(f) may be
implicated in other Administration
approval actions not involving the
disbursement of U.S. DOT funds when
there is sufficient control over the
project. For example, the U.S. DOT
approval of a new interchange on the
Interstate Highway System requiring the
use of adjacent parkland may trigger
Section 4(f) even if Federal funding is
not involved. The overwhelming
majority of projects not receiving U.S.
DOT funding, including those in the
court cases cited by the commenter, do
not require any Administration approval
at all and therefore would not trigger
Section 4(f).
Comments on specific paragraphs
within Section 774.13 are discussed in
order below.
• Paragraph 774.13(a)—Paragraph
774.13(a) is an exception from the
Section 4(f) process for projects
involving work on a transportation
facility that is itself historic. The FHWA
and FTA’s policy for several decades
has been that when a project involves a
historic facility that is already dedicated
to a transportation purpose, and does
not adversely affect the historic qualities
of that facility, then the project does not
‘‘use’’ the facility within the meaning of
Section 4(f). If there is no use under
Section 4(f), then its requirements do
not apply. This interpretation is
consistent with the preservation
purpose of Section 4(f) and with
caselaw on this issue.
Two comments recommended
revising this section to clarify that the
exception for restoration, rehabilitation,
or maintenance of transportation
facilities applies only if the
Administration makes a finding of ‘‘no
adverse effect’’ in accordance with the
consultation process required under
Section 106. One comment pointed out
that other interested parties besides the
official(s) with jurisdiction may be
participating in the Section 106
consultation. We agree and revised the
paragraph to clarify these points.
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• Paragraph 774.13(b)—Paragraph
774.13(b) is an exception from the
Section 4(f) process for those
archeological sites whose significance
lies primarily in the historical or
scientific information or data they
contain. The exception does not apply
when the Administration determines
that a site is primarily important for
preservation in place (e.g., to preserve a
major portion of the resource in place
for the purpose of public interpretation),
or that the site has value beyond what
may be learned by data recovery (e.g., as
a result of considerations that may arise
when human remains are present). This
distinction between the primary values
for what can be learned by data recovery
versus the primary value for
preservation in place has been central to
the Administration’s implementation of
the statute for archeological sites for
several decades.
The intent of the exception is not to
narrow unnecessarily the application of
Section 4(f) when dealing with
archeological sites, but, rather, to apply
the protections of Section 4(f) only in
situations where the preservation
purpose of the statute would be
sustained. Frequently, the primary
information value of an archeological
resource can only be realized through
data recovery. In those cases, the
primary mandate of Section 4(f)—to
investigate every feasible and prudent
alternative to avoid the site—would
serve no useful purpose. Conversely,
where the artifacts would lose essential
aspects of the information they might
yield if removed from the setting, or if
the site is complex and it is not
reasonable to expect to be able to
recover much of the data resident there,
or where technology does not exist to
preserve the artifacts once removed
from the ground, requiring the applicant
to search for a feasible and prudent
avoidance alternative is consistent with
the statute.
One commenter expressed the view
that in light of the 1999 and 2000
amendments to the Section 106
regulations concerning archeological
resources, ‘‘the outdated approach to
archeology reflected in the Section 4(f)
regulations is inconsistent with the
National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA).’’ Transportation projects
subject to Section 4(f) must also comply
with the NHPA, an entirely different
statute that also affords certain
protection to historic sites. The NHPA
has its own very detailed regulations
that must be followed. An ‘‘adverse
effect’’ to an archeological site under the
NHPA is not the same as a ‘‘use’’ of an
archeological site under Section 4(f).
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The comment did not propose
specific revisions to the proposed
regulation, but generally recommended
that consideration be given to whether
an archeological site may have ‘‘broader
religious or cultural significance to any
Indian tribe(s),’’ and that the
Administration should be required to
‘‘defer to the SHPO’s or THPO’s views
regarding significance.’’ We carefully
considered these suggestions and
decided to revise the wording in the
final rule in response to the concerns
raised. We agree that deference to the
expertise of SHPOs and THPOs is
warranted in determining whether an
archeological site is worthy of
preservation in place or is important
chiefly for what could be learned
through data recovery. Accordingly, the
final rule requires that ‘‘[t]he official(s)
with jurisdiction over the Section 4(f)
resource have been consulted and have
not objected to the Administration
finding * * *’’ regarding the relative
importance of data recovery versus
preservation in place.
• Paragraph 774.13(c)—This
paragraph is an exception to the
requirement for Section 4(f) approval for
parks, recreational areas, wildlife and
waterfowl refuges, and historic sites that
are designated or determined to be
significant late in the development of a
transportation project. Late designation
is not the same thing as a late discovery
of a Section 4(f) property. This
exception, which has been FHWA and
FTA policy for several decades, applies
only if a good faith effort was made
during the NEPA process to identify all
properties eligible for Section 4(f)
protection. The purpose of the
exception is to provide reasonable
finality to the environmental review
phase of project development.
Many comments were received on the
late-designation exception. One
comment asserted that no exception is
warranted until construction has begun
in order to provide maximum protection
to Section 4(f) properties. Another
comment objected to the exception in
the case of projects ‘‘languishing’’ in
project development for long periods of
time during which time a resource on
the project site might be legitimately
designated as a new or significant
Section 4(f) property. In this
commenter’s view, such projects should
not be allowed to proceed without a
new Section 4(f) evaluation, even if the
property in question was acquired by a
transportation agency for transportation
purposes prior to the new designation.
The commenter suggested limiting the
exception by including a ‘‘staleness’’
provision mandating that if a planned
transportation project is not constructed
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within a specified period of time (three
years was suggested) the exception
would not apply and a new evaluation
under Section 4(f) would be required. At
the opposite end of the spectrum, we
received comments asserting that
project opponents frequently wait until
late in project development to assert
that properties are eligible for Section
4(f) protection, solely for the purpose of
delaying the project. Several
modifications were suggested to guard
against that possibility. One such
proposal suggested broadening this
exception so that an applicant would
only need to establish the project’s
location and complete the NEPA
process in order to benefit from the latedesignation exception. The comment
proposed that the applicant not be
required to take the additional step of
acquiring the right-of-way for this
exception to apply.
The FHWA and FTA decided not to
adopt any of the suggested changes to
the proposed regulation. The exception
is intended to balance competing
interests—protecting Section 4(f)
properties while facilitating timely
project delivery. The exception provides
that ‘‘the Administration may permit a
project to proceed without
consideration under Section 4(f) if the
property interest in the Section 4(f) land
was acquired for transportation
purposes prior to the designation or
change in the determination of
significance and if an adequate effort
was made to identify properties
protected by Section 4(f) prior to
acquisition.’’ These conditions will
ensure that the initial Section 4(f)
approval was proper and that the project
has progressed far enough to warrant
special treatment. The acquisition of
right-of-way typically is the last step of
project development prior to
construction. Conversely, if the right-ofway has not yet been acquired prior to
the redesignation or change in
significance, then the exception does
not apply. Recognizing the variability in
development schedules among different
transportation projects, we did not
include any arbitrary time limits. A
‘‘staleness’’ provision would often delay
project implementation unnecessarily
and may compromise project plans after
considerable investment in engineering
design and land acquisition. The
regulatory language draws the line at
purchase of the property to ensure that,
prior to the redesignation or change in
significance, the applicant has
completed the NEPA process, has made
a good faith effort to address Section 4(f)
concerns, and has advanced the project
beyond preliminary engineering into
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actual implementation activities. We
also note that if, after the completion of
the NEPA process and Section 4(f)
approval, the project has to be modified
in a way that would use newly
designated Section 4(f) property, the
applicant would be obligated to conduct
a separate Section 4(f) evaluation in
accordance with paragraph 774.9(c).
Lastly, a comment suggested that the
FHWA and FTA should ‘‘ensure
internal consistency’’ between this
provision and Paragraph 774.15(f)(4),
which provides that there is no
constructive use if the Section 4(f)
designation occurs after either a right-ofway acquisition or adoption of project
location through the approval of a final
environmental document. We do not
agree. The ‘‘late designation’’ exception
in paragraph 774.13(c), which applies
generally to both actual and
constructive use, is distinct from the
narrower exception in paragraph
774.15(f)(4), which addresses proximity
impacts of a transportation project and
applies only to constructive use.
Several comments suggested
removing or modifying the sentence at
the end of paragraph 774.13(c) that, as
worded in the NRPM, would preclude
the use of the late-designation exception
where a historic property is close to, but
less than, 50 years of age. One
commenter pointed out that the
sentence would perpetuate the false
assumption that properties over 50 years
old are automatically eligible for the
National Register. Another commenter
stated that the provision is confusing
because there is no parallel in Section
106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act, and the sentence
could be read to effectively extend
Section 4(f) protections to properties
that are not necessarily historically
significant under Section 106. The
commenter also pointed out the
potential confusion caused by having an
exception to the exception. The FHWA
and FTA agree that this sentence was
confusing and has modified it to say: ‘‘if
it is reasonably foreseeable that a
property would qualify as eligible for
the National Register prior to the start of
construction, then the property should
be treated as a historic site for the
purposes of this section.’’ The
determination whether it is reasonably
foreseeable should take into account the
possibility that changes in the property
beyond the Administration’s control
might reduce its eligibility, as well as
the sometimes unpredictable nature of
construction schedules.
• Paragraph 774.13(d)—Paragraph
774.13(d) is an exception to the
requirement for Section 4(f) approval for
temporary occupancies of Section 4(f)
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property. This exception is limited to
situations where the official with
jurisdiction over the resource agrees that
a minor, temporary occupancy of
Section 4(f) property will not result in
any permanent adverse impacts and will
not interfere with the protected
activities, features, or attributes of the
property, the property will be fully
restored, and the ownership of the
property will not change. This
exception, which has been part of the
Section 4(f) regulation since 1991, is
founded on the FHWA and FTA’s belief
that the statute’s preservation purpose is
met when the Section 4(f) land, though
temporarily occupied, is not
permanently incorporated into a
transportation facility and is returned to
the same or better condition than it was
found, with the consent of the official
with jurisdiction over the Section 4(f)
resource. Some construction-related
activities taking place on Section 4(f)
property may be so minor in scope and
duration that its continued preservation
is in no way impeded. Using publicly
owned land for construction easements
can result in less disruption to the
surrounding community and often may
result in an enhancement of the
protected resource, such as landscaping,
installation of new play equipment, or
other improvement following
construction.
A commenter asked whether a
temporary occupancy not falling within
this exception could be treated as a use
with de minimis impact if the Section
4(f) land would be fully restored after
construction. The answer is yes, a
temporary occupancy that is determined
to be a Section 4(f) use may qualify for
a de minimis impact determination by
the Administration if the requirements
for such determination are met. This
circumstance would arise when one or
more of the criteria for the temporaryoccupancy exception are not met, but
the requirements for a de minimis
impact determination are met. De
minimis impact determinations related
to temporary occupancies are addressed
in more detail in the joint FHWA/FTA
‘‘Guidance for Determining De Minimis
Impacts to Section 4(f) Resources,’’
December 13, 2005.
One comment asserted that excepting
‘‘temporary’’ occupancies of land from
the provisions of Section 4(f) would be
problematic for ‘‘megaprojects’’ (usually
defined as projects with a total
estimated cost of more than $500
million) whose construction period
might stretch over a decade or more.
Another commenter expressed the
opinion that occupation of Section 4(f)
properties during such projects should
not be considered ‘‘temporary’’ even if
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the occupancy period is less than the
total time needed for construction. We
agree that in some circumstances a very
long-term occupancy of Section 4(f)
properties, even if shorter in duration
than the total time it takes to construct
a particular project, could be contrary to
the preservation purpose of Section 4(f)
and, therefore, constitute a use.
However, we did not change the
relevant text (‘‘[d]uration must be
temporary, i.e., less than the time
needed for construction of the project’’)
because the regulation imposes several
other stringent conditions that would be
difficult to satisfy in the case of a longterm occupancy. These other stringent
conditions include the requirement that
the occupancy not interfere with the
activities, features, and attributes that
qualify the property for Section 4(f)
protection, and that the official with
jurisdiction over the Section 4(f)
property concur in its being occupied
for this period of time.
Another commenter recommended
elimination of the conditions for the
‘‘temporary occupancy’’ of land. These
conditions, the commenter argues,
create a major burden for determining
whether the temporary-occupancy
exception applies. Another comment
recommended changing the wording in
paragraph 774.13(d)(1) from ‘‘less than
the time needed for construction’’ to
‘‘no greater than the time needed for
construction.’’ This change would allow
the temporary occupancy of land to
continue for the entire duration of
construction. After carefully considering
all of the comments, we decided that no
change to the proposed language of
paragraph 774.13(d) was warranted. If
an applicant finds the exception
burdensome, a traditional Section 4(f)
evaluation, programmatic evaluation, or
a de minimis impact determination are
potentially available options. The
paragraph is unchanged from the
provision that has been in effect since
1991 and has not been controversial,
and it strikes a reasonable balance
between protecting Section 4(f)
resources and advancing transportation
projects.
Other comments recommended
revising paragraph 774.13(d)(3). One
proposed adding the word ‘‘significant’’
to modify the word ‘‘interference,’’ and
another suggested deleting the words
‘‘either a temporary or’’ so that only
permanent interference would be a
concern. We considered these
comments, but decided not to make any
changes. The appropriate question is not
whether an interference with the
protected activities, features, or
attributes of a Section 4(f) property is
significant, but whether the
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interference, taken together with the
requirements of the other criteria in this
exception, constitutes a use of Section
4(f) property. The duration of the
interference is but one of several criteria
that must be satisfied in order for the
exception to apply. The criteria must be
addressed in consultation with the
official(s) with jurisdiction to determine
if the temporary-occupancy exception is
appropriate. The official with
jurisdiction over the property is in the
best position to determine whether the
temporary occupancy would interfere
inappropriately with any of the
protected activities, features, or
attributes of the property.
Several comments asked for
clarification as to whether the condition
of a Section 4(f) property after the
temporary occupancy must be identical
to the condition prior to the temporary
occupancy, and one comment proposed
an addition to the regulatory text to
address the issue. One comment further
requested that the regulation state that
the restoration after a temporary
occupancy must focus on the ‘‘protected
features, activities, or attributes’’ of the
site. We believe that the proposed text,
which states that the land must be
‘‘returned to a condition at least as good
as that which existed prior to the
project’’ already provides the flexibility
requested by these comments. The
regulation does not require that the
property be restored to a condition
identical to its pre-occupancy condition.
Often the official(s) with jurisdiction
have plans to improve the property in
some way and prefer to have the
property restored in a manner that is
consistent with those plans rather than
returning to its pre-occupancy
condition. Further, in light of the
preservation purpose of Section 4(f), the
focus of the restoration should certainly
be on the protected features, activities,
and attributes that make the property
eligible for Section 4(f) protection.
Because the proposed regulatory text
already covers the issues raised by the
comments, we did not make the
requested changes.
• Paragraph 774.13(e)—Paragraph
774.13(e) is an exception for park roads
and parkway projects under FHWA’s
Federal Lands Highway Program, 23
U.S.C. 204. Projects under this program
are expressly excepted from Section 4(f)
requirements within the Section 4(f)
statute itself. Several comments were
received on this exception. One
comment recommended deleting ‘‘in
accordance with’’ and substituting the
statutory term ‘‘under.’’ We agree, and
modified the final rule accordingly.
Another comment, repeated by several
commenters, urged that the exception be
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deleted, because parkways should be
designed and routed so as to minimize
damage to parks, and applying Section
4(f) would ensure that such planning
occurs. We agree that park roads and
parkways should be carefully designed
and routed, and note that the FHWA’s
program funding these roads is jointly
administered with the National Park
Service pursuant to an interagency
agreement that protects park values.
However, by its own terms, the statutory
language of Section 4(f) explicitly states
that it does not apply to projects ‘‘for a
park road or a parkway under section
204’’ of Title 23, United States Code. 49
U.S.C. 303(c); 23 U.S.C. 138(a).
Therefore, the Administration is not
required to apply Section 4(f) to these
projects.
• Paragraph 774.13(f)—Paragraph
774.13(f) is an exception for certain
trails, paths, sidewalks, bikeways, and
other recreational facilities designed
primarily for non-motorized vehicles
[all of which are referred to collectively
as ‘‘trails’’ in the remainder of the
discussion of paragraph 774.13(f)]. Such
trails generally serve recreational
purposes and therefore represent the
kind of resource that Section 4(f) was
enacted to protect. When the
Administration funds the construction
or maintenance of trails, the application
of Section 4(f), including the
consideration of avoiding the Section
4(f) property, would not advance the
preservation purpose of the statute.
One comment was received
specifically concerning the construction
of Recreational Trail projects. The
Recreational Trails Program is an FHWA
program that benefits recreation by
making funds available to the States to
develop and maintain recreational trails
and trail-related facilities for both nonmotorized and motorized recreational
trail uses. The statute authorizing the
Recreational Trails program (23 U.S.C.
206) limits the circumstances under
which trails for motorized vehicles can
be constructed and requires that States
give consideration to project proposals
that benefit the natural environment or
that mitigate and minimize the impact
to the natural environment. In addition,
these projects must comply with NEPA.
The comment notes that recreational
trails for all-terrain-vehicles (ATVs) and
motorcycles can cause significant
damage to park properties. The FHWA
and FTA acknowledge the validity of
this comment, but the authorizing
statute at 23 U.S.C. 206(h)(2)
specifically excepts Recreational Trail
projects from Section 4(f) because they
are intended to enhance recreational
opportunities. Thus, the FHWA and
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FTA have no discretion to apply Section
4(f) to these projects.
Several comments sought other types
of clarification concerning trails. The
FHWA and FTA have several
longstanding, common-sense policies
regarding trails which are articulated in
the FHWA’s Section 4(f) Policy Paper.6
First, Section 4(f) does not apply to
trails that are designated as part of the
local transportation system. The reason
for this policy is that such trails are not
primarily recreational in nature, even
though, like most transportation
facilities, they may occasionally be used
by the public for recreational purposes.
A related long-standing FHWA and FTA
policy from FHWA’s Section 4(f) Policy
Paper is that Section 4(f) does not apply
to a permanent trail within a
transportation corridor if the trail is not
limited to a specific location within the
right-of-way and the continuity of the
trail is maintained following a change to
the highway or transit guideway.7 For
example, an FHWA-funded project
would widen a 5-mile stretch of
roadway that has a parallel sidewalk
within its right-of-way. The sidewalk,
which is used primarily for recreation,
is not tied to any specific location
within the right-of-way through an
easement, permit, memorandum of
agreement, or other legal document. As
part of the widening project, the
sidewalk would be relocated several
hundred feet from its current location,
for the length of the project. All existing
connections with intersecting sidewalks
and paths would be maintained in the
new location. The trail exception in
paragraph 774.13(f) would apply to this
sidewalk. In this example, the
preservation purpose of Section 4(f)
would not be advanced by requiring a
search for alternatives that avoid
moving the sidewalk. A third longstanding FHWA and FTA policy on
trails concerns Section 7 of the National
Trail Systems Act, 16 U.S.C. 1246(g).
The National Trail Systems Act includes
an exception to Section 4(f) compliance
for any segment of a National Scenic
Trails and National Historic Trails that
is not on or eligible for the National
Register. In order to clarify the
application of Section 4(f) to trails, the
three FHWA and FTA policies
described above were incorporated into
the final rule in paragraph 774.13(f).
One commenter asked that the trails
exception specify that Section 4(f) does
not apply to trails that are located
6 ‘‘Section 4(f) Policy Paper,’’ March 1, 2005,
Question 14. See https://environment.fhwa.dot.gov/
projdev/4fpolicy.htm.
7 ‘‘Section 4(f) Policy Paper,’’ March 1, 2005,
Question 14. See https://environment.fhwa.dot.gov/
projdev/4fpolicy.htm.
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within a transportation corridor by
permission of the transportation agency,
regardless whether the trail is
permanent or temporary. We see no
basis for incorporating this suggestion
into the final rule. Permanent trails
within the transportation right-of-way
would be covered by the exception in
paragraph 774.13(f)(3) if the trail is not
limited to a specific location with the
right-of-way, and if the continuity of the
trail is maintained after the project.
Temporary trails within transportation
corridors are already adequately covered
by paragraph 774.11(h).
• Paragraph 774.13(g)—Paragraph
774.13(g) is the exception for
transportation enhancement projects
and mitigation activities. The
transportation enhancement activities
(TEAs) listed in 23 U.S.C. 101(a)(35)
that are eligible for certain FHWA funds
include several activities that are
intended to enhance Section 4(f)
properties. Such TEAs must therefore
use the Section 4(f) property, and
avoidance of the property would be
inconsistent with the authorizing statute
in this case. Also, this exception is
consistent with past FHWA and FTA
practice and caselaw. A use of Section
4(f) property under the statute has long
been considered to include only adverse
uses—uses that harm or diminish the
resource that the statute seeks to protect.
Accordingly, this exception is limited to
situations in which the official with
jurisdiction over the Section 4(f)
property agrees that the use will either
preserve or enhance an activity, feature,
or attribute of the property that qualifies
it for protection under Section 4(f).
Two comments were received on the
exception for transportation
enhancement projects and mitigation
activities. One comment suggested that
recreational facilities that have
previously been improved with
transportation enhancement funds
should not be subject to Section 4(f). We
see no legal basis for incorporating this
suggestion into the final rule. The
purpose of Section 4(f) is the
preservation of Section 4(f) property
without regard to the past history of the
property. A transportation enhancement
project may create, add to, or enhance
the Section 4(f) activities, features, or
attributes of a Section 4(f) property. The
result would be an improved Section
4(f) resource more deserving of Section
4(f) protection not less deserving. That
Section 4(f) property would have to be
afforded Section 4(f) protection in any
subsequent transportation project that
might use it.
The other commenter believed this
paragraph contradicts a statement in
FHWA’s ‘‘Section 4(f) Policy Paper’’
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involving a TEA that does not
incorporate land from the Section 4(f)
property into a transportation facility.
The statement from the ‘‘Section 4(f)
Policy Paper’’ cited by the commenter is
from Question and Answer (Q&A) 24A.
That Q&A illustrates two possible
scenarios in which transportation
enhancement funds are used for the
construction of a walkway or bike path,
one scenario resulting in a Section 4(f)
use and one not resulting in a Section
4(f) use. The commenter suggested that
the written concurrence of the officials
with jurisdiction should not be needed
for the latter scenario, since no Section
4(f) use would occur. The comment
does not appear to suggest that
coordination with the officials with
jurisdiction would not be necessary at
all, but rather it suggests that the
required written concurrence of those
officials in the second scenario would
be unnecessary. Certainly, thorough
coordination with the officials with
jurisdiction over any Section 4(f)
property involved in a project has been
a fundamental principle in complying
with Section 4(f). When a TEA or
mitigation activity is proposed on a
Section 4(f) property, the
Administration must ensure that the
resultant effect on the property is, in the
view of the officials with jurisdiction
over the property, acceptable and
consistent with the officials’ existing
and planned use of that property. Such
coordination and assurances are needed
even in situations where no transfer of
property to a transportation use is
anticipated. While the ultimate decision
on whether a Section 4(f) use occurs
always rests with the Administration,
documentation of the views of the
officials with jurisdiction over the
Section 4(f) property is needed in the
administrative record. Accordingly, the
requirement for the written concurrence
of the officials with jurisdiction was not
removed from the final rule, though the
text was revised for greater clarity.
• NPRM Paragraph 774.13(i)—The
FHWA and FTA proposed a Section 4(f)
exception for the new FTA program that
funds ‘‘Alternative Transportation in
Parks and Public Lands’’ (49 U.S.C.
5320). Avoidance of parks and public
lands seems inconsistent with a
program authorized by Congress
specifically to provide transportation
facilities in parks and public lands.
Nevertheless, several comments were
strongly opposed to this exception, and
none favored it. Considering the lack of
support for the proposed exception and
the lack of an explicit statutory basis for
the exception, we removed it from the
final rule.
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Section 774.15 Constructive Use
This section addresses the concept of
the constructive use of Section 4(f)
property, which can only occur where
there is no actual physical taking of the
property. One comment asserted that
the proposed constructive use
regulation is ‘‘much more extensive
than what exists now.’’ Aside from
reorganizing the content, the NPRM
only proposed adding to two of the
existing examples of when a
constructive use occurs, a minor change
from the current regulation. Many other
comments were received suggesting
additional examples, deletions,
modifications, and clarifications
regarding constructive use. One general
comment was that, to improve the
readability of the regulation, the
definition of constructive use and the
list of examples of circumstances not
constituting constructive use should be
consolidated in Section 774.15, which
already contained the bulk of the
provisions related to constructive use.
We agree and have accordingly moved
the definition of constructive use to
paragraph 774.15(a) and the list of
examples to paragraph 774.15(f).
Another comment suggested breaking
the several different but related
provisions of NPRM paragraph 774.15(a)
into separate paragraphs. Briefly, these
provisions are: that a traditional Section
4(f) evaluation process is appropriate
when there is a constructive use; that
the Administration’s determination that
there is no constructive use need not be
documented; and that a constructive use
determination will be based on certain
specified analyses. We agree that
separating these provisions would
improve the clarity and readability of
the rule, so the final rule addresses
these issues in three paragraphs
designated (b), (c) and (d), respectively.
Several comments asked that various
terms be defined, including ‘‘not
substantial enough to constitute a
constructive use,’’ ‘‘substantially impair
the activities, features, and attributes,’’
and ‘‘substantially diminish.’’ We did
not define these terms in the final rule
because the words are all used with
their common English meanings. The
terms will be applied to a variety of fact
situations, and narrowing the meaning
of any of the terms would limit its
applicability to particular fact situations
that cannot be anticipated now. In
addition, these terms are not new—the
same terminology is used in the current
regulation, and it has not been
controversial or problematic. Additional
guidance on the meaning of these terms
can be found in FHWA’s ‘‘Section 4(f)
Policy Paper.’’
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Another general comment proposed
adding a paragraph to the final rule to
clarify that a finding of ‘‘adverse effect’’
under Section 106 of the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) does
not automatically equate to constructive
use under Section 4(f), nor does an
adverse effect create a presumption of a
constructive use. We agree that the
threshold for constructive use under
Section 4(f) has generally been higher
than the threshold for finding an
adverse effect under Section 106 of the
NHPA. However, we believe that
making this distinction in the Section
4(f) regulation would be inappropriate
because the NHPA is an entirely
separate statute with its own
implementing regulation promulgated
by another Federal agency.
Comments on specific paragraphs
within Section 774.15 are discussed in
order below.
• Paragraph 774.15(a)—Paragraph
774.15(a) contains the definition of
‘‘constructive use.’’ The definition was
moved here from NPRM Section 774.17
as discussed above.
One comment asked for the word
‘‘permanently’’ to be added to the
definition, so that a constructive use
could not occur if the substantial
impairment is only temporary. We did
not adopt this proposal because some
‘‘temporary’’ impacts (for example, the
construction impacts of a major,
complex project) may last for many
years. In addition, we think that the
duration of the impacts can already be
considered under the existing
definition. A constructive use occurs
when the proximity impacts are so
severe as to substantially diminish the
activities, features, or attributes that
qualify the property for protection. The
duration of a proximity impact is one
factor that should be considered in
determining if the protected activities,
features, or attributes would be
substantially diminished.
Another commenter asked that the
last sentence of the definition be
deleted, as it purportedly discourages
findings of constructive use. The
sentence says ‘‘substantial impairment
occurs only when the protected
activities, features, or attributes of the
property are substantially diminished.’’
An identical sentence appears in the
current regulation. We carefully
considered this comment, but decided
to keep the sentence. It helps to explain
what is meant by ‘‘substantial
impairment.’’ In addition, we believe
that the concept of constructive use has
been correctly applied since the
promulgation of the constructive-use
provision in 1991. Findings that a
project constructively uses a Section 4(f)
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property have been appropriately rare,
because, by definition, there is no
physical taking of property in these
situations, and because the FHWA and
FTA support the mitigation of proximity
impacts on Section 4(f) properties to the
point that a substantial impairment of
the protected activities, features or
attributes does not often occur.
• Paragraphs 774.15(b), (c), and (d)—
A number of comments were received
on the constructive-use requirements in
paragraphs 774.15(b), (c), and (d), which
are separated into distinct paragraphs in
the final rule, as previously discussed.
Each comment proposed an alternative
re-wording purported to explain more
clearly how a constructive use should
be evaluated or to clarify that a
constructive use determination is not
required for each nearby Section 4(f)
property. These provisions have been in
place since 1991 and we think that they
are clear and are being applied
consistently. Therefore, we decided to
adopt only one proposed re-wording
and that is in paragraph 774.15(c). The
provision was clarified to convey our
intent to avoid excessive documentation
regarding determinations of no
constructive use, and not to avoid
determining whether or not a
constructive use exists. Paragraph (c)
now reads: ‘‘The Administration shall
determine when there is a constructive
use, but the Administration is not
required to document each
determination that a project would not
result in a constructive use of a nearby
Section 4(f) property. However, such
documentation may be prepared at the
discretion of the Administration.’’ The
same commenter also requested a
change to require ‘‘substantial
evidence’’ as the basis for a constructive
use finding. We considered the
comment but decided not to make the
change because it would introduce a
new term that provides little added
value. The Administration may decide
that a constructive use determination is
inappropriate if the evidence of
substantial impairment is inadequate.
Another comment expressed concern
with the inclusion of the phrase ‘‘to the
extent it reasonably can’’ in paragraph
774.15(d), related to basing a
determination of constructive use on
consultation with the official(s) with
jurisdiction over the Section 4(f)
property. The FHWA and FTA agree
that a determination of constructive use
should always be based upon the factors
identified, so the phrase ‘‘to the extent
it reasonably can’’ was removed from
the final rule.
Two comments expressed an opinion
that paragraph 774.15(d)(2) would invite
a great deal of inappropriate and
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irrelevant speculation about what might
or could occur to Section 4(f) properties
in the future if a project were not built.
One suggested that we strike the last
sentence, which states ‘‘The analysis
should also describe and consider the
impacts which could reasonably be
expected if the proposed project were
not implemented, since such impacts
should not be attributed to the proposed
project.’’ We disagree and have decided
not to make the suggested change. First,
the language proposed in the NPRM is
not new, and we have not proposed any
substantive change from current
regulation or practice. We have no
reason to believe, based on our
experience with Section 4(f) and
constructive use, that this consideration,
taken together with other
considerations, is an invitation to
‘‘speculate’’ about an owner’s future
plans regarding a Section 4(f) property.
To the contrary, the provision requires
an appropriate and relevant
consideration that must be grounded in
facts. Examples of the basis for
reasonable expectations of future
impacts include, in appropriate
situations: discussions with the
property owner, zoning applications,
analysis of local development trends,
and the existence of conservation
easements or other legal protections to
preserve the protected features,
activities, and attributes of the property.
The consideration of reasonably
foreseeable non-project impacts is both
appropriate and relevant to the decision
of whether or not the proximity impacts
of the project will cause a substantial
impairment of the protected features,
activities, or attributes of a Section 4(f)
property. Also, including this
information in the analysis could be
beneficial to the resource by
highlighting reasonably foreseeable
impacts not caused by the
transportation project because it would
inform the State or local governmental
authorities who are the best position to
consider protective actions that are not
within the power of the Administration.
• Paragraph 774.15(e)—Comments
were received on the list of examples of
situations in which a constructive use is
presumed to occur. One comment asked
for definitions of, and a method to
measure, many phrases in the paragraph
such as ‘‘substantially interferes with
use and enjoyment of a noise-sensitive
facility,’’ ‘‘substantially diminish the
utility of the building,’’ and
‘‘substantially reduces the wildlife use.’’
These words are all used with their
plain English meanings, and they
generally describe situations that
require judgment and are not conducive
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to standardized quantitative analysis.
The relevant phrase must be applied to
a particular set of facts to provide
context. For example, one would need
to know how a particular noise-sensitive
facility is used by the public and what
the layout and design of the facility is
in order to make a reasonable judgment
whether a proposed transportation
project would ‘‘substantially interfere
with use and enjoyment’’ of that noisesensitive facility. We did not make any
changes to the regulation in response to
this comment.
Another comment suggested removing
the examples from the regulation in
favor of including or expanding the
examples in the FHWA’s ‘‘Section 4(f)
Policy Paper.’’ This comment expressed
the view that the examples have the
potential to lead to more frequent
findings that proximity impacts
constitute constructive uses. The FHWA
and FTA considered this comment but
have decided to retain the examples in
the Section 4(f) regulation, where they
have been codified since 1991 and have
not resulted in the problems envisioned
by the commenter. Illustrating the
concept of constructive use through
practical examples has facilitated the
application of the concept in fact
situations not represented in the
examples.
Another comment asked for a
clarification that the list of examples in
which a noise impact would be
considered a constructive use is not an
exhaustive list. We agree and
restructured the paragraph in the final
rule to clarify that these are simply
illustrative examples of constructive use
and not an exhaustive list. The
reorganization of the paragraph also
makes the examples easier to follow by
separating them into subparagraphs.
Two additional comments specifically
focused on the examples of constructive
use due to noise. One comment
suggested that campgrounds should not
be considered Section 4(f) properties
because they are essentially multiple
use areas. We disagree with this
conclusion and therefore reject the
suggestion. The FHWA and FTA have
always considered publicly owned
campgrounds to be recreational areas
covered by Section 4(f), and this
position is supported by case law.
Another commenter suggested that an
example be added to clarify that the
provision applies not only to man-made
facilities such as campgrounds, but also
to natural areas where the protection of
natural sounds is important. We agree
that some Section 4(f) properties may
include natural features emitting sounds
that are enjoyed by humans, such as the
enjoyment of listening to a babbling
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brook. When such features are a
significant and officially recognized
attribute of a park, then the
Administration should consider
whether the noise increase attributable
to the highway or transit project would
substantially diminish the continued
enjoyment of the natural feature.
However, we did not add this example
to the regulation because the regulation
is necessarily applied on a case-by-case
basis and there are already four
examples of a constructive use due to
noise increases. Another substantially
similar example is not desirable, as this
narrow distinction can be adequately
covered in future FHWA and FTA
Section 4(f) guidance.
Another comment suggested
rewording the example in paragraph
774.15(e)(2) as follows: ‘‘the location of
a proposed transportation facility in
such proximity that it substantially
obstructs or completely eliminates the
primary view * * *’’ The FHWA and
FTA decided not to make the proposed
change. In some circumstances a
substantial impairment could result
from a partial obstruction or partial
elimination of the primary view of a
historic building, depending on the
criteria that makes the property eligible
for the National Register.
Another comment on this paragraph
referred to the noise abatement criteria
in FHWA’s noise regulation (23 CFR
part 772), and expressed the opinion
that, for certain types of properties there
may be more appropriate measures of
noise and unwanted sounds than those
used in the noise regulation. The
comment suggested that the FHWA and
FTA consult with the National Park
Service office working on
‘‘Soundscapes’’ for further information.
This comment and suggestion were
discussed with FHWA highway noise
experts, and the FHWA and FTA
considered the views of the National
Park Service office, as suggested.
However, we have concluded that the
suggestion is beyond the scope of this
rulemaking because it concerns an
entirely separate part of Title 23, Code
of Federal Regulations, which was not
proposed for revision in the NPRM.
Another commenter suggested that
the noise threshold for constructive use
should be specified as 57 dBA (Category
A, Table 1 in 23 CFR part 772). We
disagree that a single threshold can be
specified due to the varied purposes and
functions of different types of Section
4(f) property. The appropriate noise
abatement criteria will depend on the
activity category of the particular
Section 4(f) property. When a Section
4(f) property is determined to be
covered under Activity Category A in
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Table 1 of 23 CFR part 772, then the
applicable noise abatement criteria
would include the 57 dBA threshold.
Examples of Section 4(f) resources
covered under Category A are those for
which a quiet setting is essential to their
continued function, such as an
amphitheater or the gardens of an
historic monastery. The vast majority of
Section 4(f) properties will not fall
under Category A. Regardless of which
Category the Administration deems
applicable to the Section 4(f) property,
a constructive use occurs when the
relevant noise criteria cannot be met, if
the resulting noise substantially impairs
the protected activities, features, and
attributes of the Section 4(f) property.
Several comments focused on the
example of constructive use due to
substantial impairment of aesthetic
features. One comment asked that the
final rule clarify that for visual and
aesthetic effects to constitute a
constructive use of an architecturally
significant historic property, the site
would have to derive its value in
substantial part due to its setting. We
did not adopt this comment. Historic
buildings that are significant due to
their architecture, do not as a rule, rely
upon their setting. The language
proposed (‘‘[locating] a proposed
transportation facility in such proximity
that it obstructs or eliminates the
primary views of an architecturally
significant historical building’’) captures
the more important criteria—the views
of such a building available to the
public.
Another comment suggested adding
‘‘qualifying wild and scenic rivers’’ to
this paragraph. The Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. 1271–1287, sets
forth those rivers in the United States
designated as part of the Wild and
Scenic River System. Within the System
there are wild, scenic, and recreational
designations. In determining whether
Section 4(f) is applicable to a particular
river within the System, one must look
at the ownership of the river, how the
river is designated, how the river is
being used, and the management plan
for the relevant portion of the river.
Only if the river is publicly owned and
is designated as a recreational river
under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
or is designated in the management plan
for the river as serving a Section 4(f)
purpose would it be considered a
Section 4(f) property. A single river may
be divided into segments that are
separately classified as wild, scenic, or
recreational. Only those segments that
are classified as serving a purpose
protected by Section 4(f), such as
recreation, would be subject to Section
4(f). The designation of a river under the
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Wild and Scenic Rivers Act does not, by
itself, impart the protections of Section
4(f). Section 4(f) protections are
imparted only if the section of the river
used by the proposed project fits one or
more of the categories of properties
protected by Section 4(f). For example,
if a river is included in the System and
is designated as ‘‘wild,’’ but is not being
used as, or is not designated under a
management plan as, a park, recreation
area, wildlife or waterfowl refuge and is
not an historic site, then Section 4(f)
would not apply. In light of these
complexities, we believe that simply
adding the phrase ‘‘qualifying wild and
scenic river’’ could cause confusion and
create the potential for the
misapplication of Section 4(f).
Accordingly, the FHWA and FTA
decline to adopt the proposed language.
However, we have clarified the
applicability of Section 4(f) to Wild and
Scenic Rivers by adding paragraph (g) to
Section 774.11, which states: ‘‘Section
4(f) applies to those portions of federally
designated Wild and Scenic Rivers that
are otherwise eligible as historic sites, or
that are publicly owned and function as
or are designated in a management plan
as a significant park, recreation area, or
wildlife and waterfowl refuge. All other
applicable requirements of the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act must be satisfied,
independent of the Section 4(f)
approval.’’ This language is consistent
with long standing FHWA and FTA
policy presented in the FHWA’s
‘‘Section 4(f) Policy Paper.’’
Several comments were received on
the example of a constructive use due to
vibration impacts. One commenter
noted with approval that the proposed
language apparently only considered the
vibration impacts of operating a
transportation project and not the
construction impacts. Another
commenter had the opposite view, and
proposed that construction impacts be
added to the regulation, along with
other edits for clarity. We agree that
severe construction vibration can
substantially impair the use of a Section
4(f) property in the same way as severe
operational vibrations. The final rule
clarifies that vibration due to
construction should be considered, and
that vibration should be considered for
any mode of transportation project to
which this rule applies. Also in the
same sentence, we replaced ‘‘affect the
structural integrity of’’ with the simpler
and clearer ‘‘physically damage.’’
Another comment on this section
suggested that repair of damage should
be mandatory, and that irreparable
vibration damage should be considered
a use. The comment proposed adding at
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the end of the sentence, ‘‘unless the
damage is repaired and fully restored
consistent with the Secretary of the
Interior’s Standards for the Treatment of
Historic Properties, i.e., the site must be
returned to a condition which is at least
as good as that which existed prior to
the project.’’ We clarified the intent of
this paragraph with language similar to
what was proposed.
• Paragraph 774.15(f)—Many
comments were received on paragraph
774.15(f), which provides examples of
proximity impacts that are not severe
enough to constitute a constructive use.
Several comments asserted that the
regulation would be easier to use if this
list were moved to Section 774.15,
Constructive Use, so that all examples
regarding possible constructive uses are
in one place. We agree, and moved
NPRM paragraph 774.13(e) into
paragraph 774.15(f) in this final rule.
One general comment was that the list
should be deleted for fear that the
Administration will apply the paragraph
as if it were an inclusive list of all
possible proximity impacts that are not
constructive uses. This fear is
unfounded because the language,
‘‘examples include,’’ makes it clear that
the list is not all-inclusive. Another
comment asked that the examples
indicate the requirement that an EA or
EIS be prepared. The issue of which
NEPA document to prepare depends on
whether there are significant impacts
expected and is addressed in 23 CFR
Part 771. The issue is outside the scope
of this regulation. Several comments on
this paragraph requested clarification
that an adverse effect under Section 106
is not automatically a Section 4(f)
constructive use. We agree with this
comment. The FHWA ‘‘Section 4(f)
Policy Paper,’’ Question 3B, explains
that if a project does not physically take
(permanently incorporate) historic
property but the project causes an
adverse effect under Section 106, then
one should consider whether the
proximity impacts of the project
constitute a constructive use. We did
not, however, feel that this nuance
needed clarification within the
regulation itself.
Several comments suggested
modifying or deleting the last sentence
in paragraph 774.15(f)(4), which
disallows the use of a late-designation
exception where a historic property is
close to, but less than, 50 years of age.
In the case of a constructive use, the
late-designation exception says that a
constructive use does not occur if a
property has been acquired for
transportation purposes after adequate
effort to identify Section 4(f) resources
or if the project location has been
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established in a final environmental
document, and the property is
subsequently designated as a Section
4(f) property or is determined to be
significant. One commenter points out
that the sentence proposed for
modification or deletion perpetuates the
false assumption that properties over 50
years old are automatically eligible for
the National Register. Another
commenter states that the provision is
confusing because there is no parallel in
Section 106, and the sentence could be
read to effectively extend Section 4(f)
protections to properties that are not
necessarily historically significant
under Section 106. The FHWA and FTA
agree that this sentence could be
confusing and have modified the
sentence in question to clarify that if it
is reasonably foreseeable that a property
would qualify as eligible for the
National Register prior to the start of
construction, then the property should
be treated as a historic site for the
purposes of this section.
One comment suggested that in
paragraph 774.15(f)(6) we include
consultation on the appropriateness of
any mitigation proposed for proximity
impacts in order to ensure that the
views of the officials with jurisdiction
over the Section 4(f) property regarding
the appropriateness of the mitigation
and the resulting condition of the
Section 4(f) property are considered. We
agree, and have made this change. The
provision now reads: ‘‘Proximity
impacts will be mitigated to a condition
equivalent to, or better than, that which
would occur if the project were not
built, as determined after consultation
with the official(s) with jurisdiction.’’
Another comment requested that we
revise this paragraph so that the analysis
must include consideration of the
condition of the Section 4(f) resource as
it existed prior to construction of the
transportation project, rather than the
condition that would exist if the project
were not built. We did not make this
change because it is more appropriate to
consider the true future no-action
scenario than to invent a highly
unlikely, hypothetical future in which
current conditions are frozen in time.
This approach is consistent with NEPA
practice, in which the Administration
compares the impacts expected under
the future build alternatives to the
expected future no-action scenario.
We received one comment on the
example of a vibration impact not rising
to the level of a constructive use of a
Section 4(f) property. The comment
suggested that the regulatory text should
contain detailed, measurable limits for
vibration levels based on guidance
issued by FTA and guidance issued by
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the U.S. Bureau of Mines. (The FHWA
does not have equivalent guidance on
vibration.) The impact thresholds for
vibration are presented in voluminous
guidance that provides background on
the complex science involved in their
development and application. There are
different vibration metrics whose
appropriateness in a particular situation
must be determined by acoustical
experts. The background information
that would be needed would be highly
technical, voluminous, and difficult to
properly present in the regulation. The
FHWA and FTA does not agree with the
notion that a single vibration threshold
applicable in all situations could be
specified in regulation and has therefore
declined to do so.
Section 774.17 Definitions
A few comments stated that the
definitions should be moved to the
beginning of the regulation because the
beginning is the more common location.
The NPRM explained that the
definitions were placed at the end
because some of them are lengthy and
complex. The final rule includes crossreferences to the definitions at key
points within the regulatory text.
Therefore, we did not adopt the
suggestion to move the definitions.
Other comments proposed definitions
for various words that appear only once
in this regulation. Where we felt it was
appropriate to add clarification in those
instances, it was done where the term
appears and not in the definitions
section. For example, an explanation of
‘‘concurrent planning’’ was integrated
into paragraph 774.11(i). One comment
suggested combining the definitions of
‘‘all possible planning,’’ ‘‘de minimis
impact,’’ and ‘‘feasible and prudent
alternative’’ in a separate section of the
regulation. We did not adopt this
suggestion because it would not have
improved a reader’s understanding of
these terms.
One commenter felt that including a
definition of ‘‘transportation facility’’
would obviate the need for the
exception for transportation
enhancement activities. The idea likely
behind this is that, with most
transportation enhancement projects,
there is no use of the Section 4(f)
property by a transportation facility.
The FHWA and FTA decided not to
follow this suggestion because an
explicit exception for transportation
enhancement activities is more
definitive and covers a broader range of
possible transportation enhancement
activities.
Many comments proposed additional
definitions of various terms. These
proposals were all carefully considered,
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but in most cases were not adopted.
Many of the proposed definitions are
dependent on the context in which they
are applied, and therefore do not lend
themselves easily to definition. In other
cases, the meaning of the term is
obvious or the proposed definition is
beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
For example, we declined to include the
definition for the NEPA term
‘‘significant impact on the
environment,’’ which is addressed in
the NEPA regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ). One
comment recommended the addition of
definitions for all of the following words
and phrases: ‘‘Relative value,’’ ‘‘matter
of sound engineering judgment,’’
‘‘unreasonable to proceed,’’ ‘‘severe
safety or operation problems,’’
‘‘reasonable mitigation,’’ ‘‘severe social,
economic, or environmental impacts,’’
‘‘severe disruption to established
communities,’’ ‘‘severe disproportionate
impacts to minority or low income
populations,’’ ‘‘severe impacts to
environmental resources protected
under other Federal statutes,’’
‘‘operational cost of an extraordinary
magnitude,’’ ‘‘unique problems,’’ and
‘‘cumulatively cause unique problems
or impacts of extraordinary magnitude.’’
The FHWA and FTA decided that
including definitions for these terms in
this final rule was inappropriate or
unnecessary as the terms are used in
their plain English meaning and likely
involve judgments that depend on the
context of the specific project, location,
and Section 4(f) property.
Comments on specific definitions
within Section 774.17 are discussed in
order below.
• ‘‘Administration’’—One comment
noted that SAFETEA–LU amended
Sections 325, 326, and 327 of Title 23,
United States Code to allow the FHWA
(and in the case of Section 326, the FTA
also) to assign certain specified
environmental responsibilities to a State
through a written memorandum of
understanding (MOU) or agreement.
Section 4(f) is one of the assignable
responsibilities. When the FHWA or
FTA enters into such MOU or
agreement, the State will act in lieu of
the FHWA or FTA for those
responsibilities that are specified in this
regulation as Administration
responsibilities and that have been
assigned to the State through the MOU
or agreement. Therefore, the definition
of ‘‘Administration’’ was extended to
include a State that has been assigned
responsibility for certain environmental
requirements in accordance with 23
U.S.C. 325, 326, or 327, or other
applicable law, to the extent that the
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required agreement between the State
and FHWA or FTA allows the State to
act in place of the FHWA or FTA on
Section 4(f) matters.
• ‘‘All Possible Planning’’—The
NPRM proposed a definition of the
statutory phrase ‘‘all possible planning’’
to minimize harm when a transportation
project uses Section 4(f) property. A
number of comments were received
proposing various revisions to the
regulatory language addressing ‘‘all
possible planning’’ in the context of de
minimis impact determinations. One
commenter objected to the use of the
word ‘‘obviates’’ because, in the
commenter’s opinion, it would imply
that the Administration is not required
to reduce impacts to the minimum level
possible in the approval of a de minimis
impact determination. Another
commenter expressed a concern that
paragraph (5) of this definition would
relieve the Administration from any
‘‘independent obligation’’ to comply
with the ‘‘all possible planning to
minimize harm’’ requirement of Section
4(f) when the Administration makes a
de minimis impact determination.
According to this comment, the
proposed regulatory text is inconsistent
with SAFETEA–LU section 6009 which
‘‘explicitly retained’’ the ‘‘all possible
planning’’ requirement with respect to
projects with de minimis impact on
non-historic Section 4(f) properties.
Other comments suggested replacing the
phrase ‘‘subsumes and obviates’’ with
‘‘eliminates’’ or ‘‘is presumed to satisfy’’
the requirement for all possible
planning to minimize harm, in order to
convey more clearly the idea that if a de
minimis impact determination is made,
then no separate minimization-of-harm
finding is required.
The FHWA and FTA carefully
considered these objections and
alternative language proposals and has
deleted the word ‘‘obviates,’’ and has
retained the word ‘‘subsumes’’ in
response. The intent of the provision is
not to eliminate the Administration’s
obligation to minimize harm to affected
Section 4(f) properties, but rather to
explain that, in a de minimis impact
situation, the effort to reduce the
impacts to de minimis levels and ‘‘all
possible planning’’ to minimize harm
are folded together into a single step. In
other words, when a de minimis impact
determination is approved, either the
project already includes measure(s) to
minimize harm to which the applicant
is committed or the project will have
such minor impacts on the Section 4(f)
property that the harm to it is negligible
without additional measures. The
FHWA and FTA believe that the word
‘‘subsumes’’ articulates this intended
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meaning better than ‘‘presumed to
satisfy.’’
Lastly, in the FHWA and FTA’s view,
paragraph (5) as revised is entirely
consistent with the de minimis impact
provision in SAFETEA–LU section
6009. Contrary to the commenter’s
interpretation, 49 U.S.C. 303(d)(1)(B), as
amended by SAFETEA–LU, does not
impose on the Administration an
‘‘independent obligation’’ to comply
with the minimization of harm
requirement of Section 4(f). Rather, the
purpose of the provision is to ensure
that the applicant anticipating a de
minimis impact determination conducts
‘‘all possible planning’’ to minimize
harm when developing and committing
to ‘‘any avoidance, minimization,
mitigation, or enhancement measures’’
necessary to reduce impacts to de
minimis levels. Furthermore, paragraph
(5) of this definition must be read in
conjunction with paragraph 774.3(a)(2)
which precisely tracks the statutory
language regarding the inclusion of
measures to minimize harm, and the
definition of ‘‘De Minimis Impact’’ in
Section 774.17, which is an impact that
‘‘will not adversely affect the features,
attributes, or activities qualifying the
property for protection under Section
4(f).’’
• ‘‘Applicant’’—One comment was
received on the definition of applicant.
The comment notes that while the
definition provides for the applicant to
work with the Administration to
conduct environmental studies and
prepare environmental documents, the
definition does not provide for the
applicant to help prepare decision
documents and determinations. While
an applicant may in some cases be
asked to help prepare decision
documents and determinations, the
definition was not changed because the
applicant does not always do so. In any
case, all decisions and determinations
required under Section 4(f) are
ultimately the responsibility of the
Administration, unless the applicant is
a State that has been specifically
assigned Section 4(f) authority under
the aforementioned statutes providing
for such assignment.
• ‘‘CE’’—The proposed rule included
definitions for the NEPA terms ‘‘EIS’’
and ‘‘EA,’’ including cross-references to
the FHWA and FTA’s NEPA regulations.
A definition and cross-reference for the
NEPA term ‘‘CE’’ was added for
consistency. The definition states: ‘‘CE.
Refers to a Categorical Exclusion, which
denotes an action with no individual or
cumulative significant environmental
effect pursuant to 40 CFR § 1508.4 and
§ 771.117 of this title.’’ When deciding
whether to issue a CE from NEPA under
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the FHWA and FTA NEPA regulations,
FHWA and FTA take into account
whether there are unusual
circumstances.
• ‘‘De Minimis Impact’’—Several
comments asked that the proposed
definition of de minimis impact be
expanded not only to describe what a de
minimis impact is, but also to prescribe
the process for making a de minimis
impact determination. The FHWA and
FTA have considered these comments
and decided that the definition of de
minimis impact will not include the
procedures for making de minimis
impact determinations because the
regulation describes the process and
documentation in paragraphs 774.5(b)
and 774.7(b), which are the more
appropriate locations.
One comment requested that the
definition address the transfer of lands
in which there are Federal
encumbrances under other statutes. The
FHWA and FTA did not make this
change because it is an issue unrelated
to the definition and is addressed in
paragraph 774.5(d). In addition, the
joint FHWA/FTA ‘‘Guidance for
Determining De Minimis Impacts to
Section 4(f) Resources,’’ December 13,
2005, explains that Section 4(f) lands
with other Federal encumbrances must
address and comply with the
requirements of the laws associated
with those encumbrances.
One comment recommended the
elimination of de minimis impact
determinations from the final rule. The
FHWA and FTA retained the option to
grant Section 4(f) approvals via a de
minimis impact determination because
Congress amended Section 4(f) in 2005
to allow de minimis impact
determinations. (SAFETEA–LU, Pub. L.
109–59, sec. 6009(a), 119 Stat. 1144
(2005)).
One comment recommended a change
to the proposed language that would
allow a temporary adverse effect to be
treated as a de minimis impact. The
FHWA and FTA decided not to include
this change because temporary
occupancy of Section 4(f) property is
already dealt with under paragraph
774.13(d). The final rule provides the
flexibility to appropriately address
temporary adverse impacts, which may
or may not be de minimis.
Several comments recommended
changes to the definition of a de
minimis impact for historic sites. One
comment stated that the proposed
definition of de minimis impact for
historic sites did not adequately
emphasize that the determination of ‘‘no
adverse effect’’ or ‘‘no historic property
affected’’ must be made in accordance
with the requirements of the Section
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106 regulation, including consultation.
The FHWA and FTA agree and have
reworded the definition to emphasize
that the Administration must determine,
in accordance with the Section 106
regulation, that there is no adverse effect
or that no historic property is affected.
Another comment recommended
language that would allow adverse
effects to contributing elements of a
historic district to be considered a de
minimis impact if the historic district,
as a whole, is not adversely affected.
The FHWA and FTA did not adopt this
suggestion because Section 106 policy
and regulations define how adverse
effects to historic districts are to be
considered.
• ‘‘EA’’—One comment
recommended deleting this definition
from the regulation because it is defined
in the CEQ’s NEPA regulations. The
proposed definition is consistent with
the CEQ NEPA regulations and is
necessary to provide consistency
between the FHWA and FTA’s Section
4(f) and NEPA regulations.
• ‘‘EIS’’—One comment
recommended deleting this definition
from the regulation because it is defined
in the CEQ’s NEPA regulations. The
proposed definition is consistent with
NEPA and the CEQ NEPA regulations
and is necessary to provide consistency
between the FHWA and FTA’s Section
4(f) and NEPA regulations. Another
comment asked that this definition
define the phrase ‘‘significant impacts
on the environment.’’ The concept of
significant impacts is addressed by CEQ
in its NEPA regulations and by various
Federal courts in caselaw, and its
definition is outside the scope of this
rulemaking. The definition of EIS crossreferences the NEPA regulations.
• ‘‘Feasible and Prudent Avoidance
Alternative’’—This definition was the
primary impetus for this rulemaking. In
section 6009(b) of SAFETEA–LU,
Congress directed the U.S. DOT to
‘‘promulgate regulations that clarify the
factors to be considered and the
standards to be applied in determining
the prudence and feasibility of
alternatives’’ to using Section 4(f)
properties for transportation projects.
Because these are fact-specific
determinations, the NPRM proposed a
definition that requires consideration of
the totality of the circumstances and the
relative significance of the Section 4(f)
property. The definition proposed six
factors that could support a
determination that there is ‘‘no feasible
and prudent avoidance alternative.’’ A
seventh factor is the accumulation of the
other factors, and whether in
combination the overall impact is
severe.
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This definition was the subject of the
most comments of any proposed section
of the NPRM. The views expressed
varied drastically, and a wide variety of
revisions were proposed. In general,
comments opposed to the proposed
definition feared that it was not
stringent enough to protect Section 4(f)
properties because it involves a
balancing test. The definition provided
in this final rule addresses this concern
by adding the word ‘‘substantially’’ to
clarify that the balancing test is
weighted in favor of avoiding the use of
Section 4(f) properties: ‘‘A feasible and
prudent avoidance alternative avoids
using Section 4(f) property and does not
cause other severe problems of a
magnitude that substantially outweighs
the importance of protecting the Section
4(f) property.’’ Another general concern
was that the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected any type of balancing test in
Overton Park. After careful
consideration, the FHWA and FTA do
not agree with this view. In Overton
Park, the Court instructed that cost,
directness of route, and community
disruption should not be considered
‘‘on an equal footing with the
preservation of parkland.’’ 401 U.S. 402
at 412. The NPRM proposed to define a
feasible and prudent avoidance
alternative as one that ‘‘avoids using
Section 4(f) property and does not cause
other severe problems of a magnitude
that outweighs the importance of
protecting the Section 4(f) property. In
assessing the importance of protecting
the Section 4(f) property, it is
appropriate to consider the relative
value of the resource to the preservation
goals of the statute.’’ This definition is
consistent with the decision in Overton
Park because it requires the
Administration to take into
consideration the importance of
protecting the Section 4(f) property.
Avoiding the Section 4(f) property is not
on equal footing with other concerns
but, as the NPRM noted, the
consideration of avoidance alternatives
must begin with a ‘‘thumb on the scale’’
on the side of avoiding the Section 4(f)
property. 71 FR 42611, 42613 (2006).
Therefore, the definition in this final
rule is unchanged from that proposed in
the NPRM except for the
aforementioned addition of
‘‘substantial’’ and a change in reference
to ‘‘preservation goals’’ to refer to the
‘‘preservation purpose’’ in order to
emphasize that the statute itself in 49
U.S.C. 303(a) establishes as its purpose
‘‘that special effort should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the
countryside and public parks and
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recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl
refuges, and historic sites.’’
More specific comments and changes
are addressed below. One comment
opposed the requirement that balancing
be performed with a ‘‘thumb on the
scale’’ in favor of the Section 4(f)
property. This comment also opposed
the requirement that problems with an
avoidance alternative be severe and not
easily mitigated before that alternative
may be rejected as one that is not
prudent and feasible. The requirement
that balancing be done with a thumb on
the scale is at the very heart of Overton
Park, the only U.S. Supreme Court case
interpreting the application of Section
4(f) at this time. Further, in the
conference report accompanying
SAFETEA–LU, Congress made clear that
the U.S. DOT must set forth factors to
be considered and the standards to be
applied when determining whether an
avoidance alternative is prudent and
feasible, and that the factors must
adhere to the legal standard set forth in
Overton Park. H.R. Rep. No. 109–203, at
1057–58 (Conf. Rep.).
The precise term that the NPRM
proposed to define was ‘‘feasible and
prudent alternative.’’ In this final rule,
the defined term was changed to
‘‘feasible and prudent avoidance
alternative.’’ This change was necessary
to clarify that Section 4(f) directs the
Administration to search for alternatives
that avoid using Section 4(f) property.
One comment had suggested that we
clarify within the definition of ‘‘feasible
and prudent alternative’’ that the
feasible and prudent standard applies to
all project alternatives, not only
avoidance alternatives. Based on this
and other comments we took a close
look at the definition and the way in
which the term ‘‘feasible and prudent
alternative’’ was used throughout the
NPRM. We found that there were
instances in which the use of the term
was inconsistent with the definition.
This has been corrected throughout the
final rule and the definition has been
clarified as ‘‘feasible and prudent
avoidance alternatives,’’ as previously
discussed. In responding to the
comment, we point out that Section 4(f)
itself speaks of a ‘‘feasible and prudent
alternative to using that land’’, i.e., a
feasible and prudent avoidance
alternative. (49 U.S.C. 303(c)(1)). As a
result, the concept of a feasible and
prudent alternative is closely associated
with the avoidance of Section 4(f) use.
Several comments suggested that the
words ‘‘feasible’’ and ‘‘prudent’’ be split
and defined separately in the final rule
because the U.S. Supreme Court had
discussed each term separately in
Overton Park. Therefore, each word has
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‘‘a separate and distinct meaning,’’
which could become confused by
combining them into ‘‘a single concept.’’
The FHWA and FTA agree that the
comment has merit, and have modified
the definition to expand upon the
meaning of each specific word in a
separate paragraph within the definition
of ‘‘feasible and prudent avoidance
alternative.’’ The two terms were not
completely separated into distinct
definitions because ‘‘feasible’’ and
‘‘prudent’’ are two factors that, when
combined, constitute a single test. In
other words, the key is not whether a
particular avoidance alternative is
feasible or prudent, but rather whether
it is feasible and prudent. That being the
case, the agencies believe the regulation
should reflect this important link
between the terms.
Several comments opposed
designating ‘‘severe impacts to
environmental resources protected
under other Federal statutes’’ as a factor
in determining prudence. One favored
changing the language to require
another Federal agency to formally deny
a permit under another Federal law
before this factor could be considered in
rejecting an avoidance alternative. This
change was not adopted because there is
no indication that Congress intended
the Administration to elevate Section
4(f) protection above all other
environmental concerns. The FHWA
and FTA believe that the factor
proposed is a relevant concern for
determining the prudence of an
avoidance alternative and that the
language proposed is adequate.
Requiring an applicant to submit permit
applications and obtain a formal denial
when a regulatory agency has indicated
its objections to an avoidance
alternative would create additional
process and delay that do not
necessarily equate to better project
development. In addition, there is
substantial caselaw supporting the
consideration of other environmental
concerns.
One comment expressed concern that
designating ‘‘additional construction,
maintenance, or operational costs of an
extraordinary magnitude’’ as a factor in
determining prudence does not clarify
the issue of how much money should be
spent to avoid the use of Section 4(f)
property. Other comments questioned
the requirement that such costs be ‘‘of
extraordinary magnitude.’’ We
understand that deciding what amount
constitutes a reasonable public
expenditure for avoiding the use of a
Section 4(f) property may not be simple.
Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to set
a single dollar amount or even a
percentage of total project cost as the
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threshold. The decision must take into
account multiple factors including the
type, function, and significance of the
Section 4(f) property. Having multiple
factors to weigh, of which cost is but
one, should simplify the decision about
the prudence of an avoidance
alternative. If increased cost alone is the
only downside to an avoidance
alternative, the preservation purpose of
Section 4(f) requires that the increased
cost reach an extraordinary magnitude
before it would outweigh the protection
of Section 4(f) property. Merely a
‘‘substantial cost increase’’ is not
enough.
One commenter recommended the
deletion of the first two sentences of the
definition of ‘‘feasible and prudent
avoidance alternative’’ because the
commenter felt that measuring the
relative value of a Section 4(f) resource
would be difficult and that the language
is not consistent with paragraph
774.3(a). The FHWA and FTA decided
not to delete these sentences because
the regulation does not require the
measurement of the relative value.
Rather, it states that it is appropriate to
consider the relative value of the
Section 4(f) resource. Also, the FHWA
and FTA do not agree that this
definition is inconsistent with
paragraph 774.3(a) and are following an
explicit directive of Congress in
providing a definition that elaborates on
the meaning of that paragraph.
One comment advocated that a
feasible-and-prudent determination
should be based only upon whether the
alternative causes an extraordinary level
of disruption rather than balancing the
relative value of the resource and the
preservation purpose of the statute
against the drawbacks of the avoidance
alternative. The FHWA and FTA
decided not to change the definition in
response to this comment because we
continue to believe that it is appropriate
to consider the relative value of the
Section 4(f) resource and other
resources affected by an avoidance
alternative in assessing the importance
of protecting the Section 4(f) property.
Many comments questioned the
proposed provision allowing the
accumulation of multiple drawbacks to
be considered cumulatively when
assessing the prudence of an avoidance
alternative. The FHWA and FTA
decided to keep this provision because
a substantial body of caselaw supports
this approach, and because it allows for
prudent transportation decisions that
consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding each
alternative. In some instances, such as
where the Section 4(f) property is of
relatively low significance, a series of
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drawbacks associated with an avoidance
alternative may cumulatively be so
severe that it would not be prudent to
reject the alternative using the lowquality Section 4(f) property.
Several comments expressed concern
with the use of the word ‘‘severe’’ in the
proposed definition for various reasons,
while others supported this
terminology. The FHWA and FTA
proposed the term ‘‘severe’’ as a way to
encompass in simpler language, while
still providing stringent protection for
Section 4(f) properties, the more
complex and often confusing language
used in Overton Park—i.e., ‘‘unique
problems or unusual factors’’ and
‘‘extraordinary magnitude.’’ There is
case law support for the idea that the
Supreme Court did not literally intend
that those precise terms must be used.
We have reviewed each instance,
including the context, where the term
‘‘severe’’ was used in this definition,
and decided to retain the term except in
NPRM factor 3 (factor 2 in this final
rule) which now states: ‘‘It results in
unacceptable safety or operational
problems.’’ In this factor, the term
‘‘severe’’ was replaced with
‘‘unacceptable’’ to better reflect the
Administration’s knowledge of accepted
standards and practices for designing
safe and functional transportation
projects. In the other instances, ‘‘severe’’
was retained for the reasons stated
above.
One comment was concerned that
factors i, ii, and vi in the NPRM’s
definition of ‘‘feasible and prudent’’ are
subjective and unnecessary, and that
they may be adequately represented in
the other factors. This commenter
suggested that these three factors be
deleted or that guidance be issued as to
how they will be applied and by whom.
The factors will be applied by the
Administration in a manner consistent
with this final rule. Additional guidance
will be issued in the future if necessary.
The first of these factors, whether an
alternative can ‘‘be built as a matter of
sound engineering judgment,’’ defines
when an alternative is feasible. This
language was first used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Overton Park to
explain the meaning of ‘‘feasible,’’ and
was subsequently adopted verbatim by
every U.S. Circuit Court that has
considered the issue. The FHWA and
FTA will leave this factor in the
regulatory language because the
conference report for SAFETEA–LU
states that DOT must adhere to the legal
standard set forth in Overton Park and
this factor was so clearly articulated.
Clarifying language was added to the
final rule that makes clear the factor
defines whether an avoidance
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alternative is ‘‘feasible’’. See H.R. Rep.
No. 109–203, at 1057–58 (Conf. Rep.).
The second factor of concern to this
commenter, whether a project can go
forward in a way that meets its purpose
and need, is at the heart of why the
project is being built. For example, if a
primary purpose of the project is to
rectify a safety concern, it would not be
prudent to choose an avoidance
alternative that fails to address the
safety issue. The FHWA and FTA will
keep this factor because of its
importance to meeting the
transportation mission of the FHWA
and FTA and the clear support in
caselaw for eliminating alternatives that
do not meet the transportation needs
that the project is designed to fulfill.
See, e.g., City of Alexandria v. Slater,
198 F.3d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
The final factor of concern to this
commenter, whether an avoidance
alternative causes ‘‘unique problems or
unusual factors,’’ was included to
ensure that the standard in the
regulation is consistent with that set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Overton Park, which suggested that
avoidance alternatives that ‘‘involve
unique problems’’ could properly be
rejected as not prudent.
• ‘‘FONSI’’—No comments were
received on the proposed definition of
‘‘FONSI’’ and it is unchanged in this
final rule.
• ‘‘Historic Site’’—One comment
noted that the NPRM seemed to use the
terms ‘‘historic site’’ and ‘‘historic
property’’ interchangeably and
suggested that only one be used and that
a definition would be helpful. This final
rule consistently uses the statutory term
‘‘historic site’’ and a definition of
‘‘historic site’’ was added to distinguish
the term as it is used under Section 4(f)
from its use under other statutes. The
definition added is consistent with
current FHWA and FTA policy and the
National Historic Preservation Act. The
definition states: ‘‘Historic Site. For
purposes of this part, the term ‘‘historic
site’’ includes any prehistoric or historic
district, site, building, structure, or
object included in, or eligible for
inclusion in, the National Register. The
term includes properties of traditional
religious and cultural importance to an
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization that are included in, or are
eligible for inclusion in, the National
Register.’’
• Official(s) with Jurisdiction—One
comment stated that the rule fails to
provide clear guidance on the instances
in which coordination with, or
concurrence of, the officials with
jurisdiction is required. The final rule
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13393
requires coordination with the official(s)
with jurisdiction at the following points:
(1) Prior to making Section 4(f)
approvals under paragraphs 774.3(a)
and 774.5(a);
(2) When determining the least overall
harm under paragraph 774.3(c);
(3) When applying certain
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations
under paragraph 774.5(c);
(4) When applying Section 4(f) to
properties subject to Federal
encumbrances under paragraph
774.5(d);
(5) When applying Section 4(f) to
archeological sites discovered during
construction under paragraph 774.9(e);
(6) When determining if a Section 4(f)
property is significant under paragraph
774.11(c);
(7) When determining the application
of Section 4(f) to multiple use properties
under paragraph 774.11(d);
(8) When determining the
applicability of Section 4(f) to historic
sites under paragraph 774.11(e);
(9) When determining if there is a
constructive use under paragraph
774.15(d);
(10) When determining if proximity
impacts will be mitigated to a condition
equivalent to, or better than, that which
would occur if the project were not built
under paragraph 774.15(f)(6); and
(11) When evaluating the
reasonableness of measure to minimize
harm under paragraph 774.3(a)(2) and
Section 774.17.
The final rule published today
requires the concurrence of the
official(s) with jurisdiction at the
following points:
(1) When finding that there are no
adverse effects prior to making de
minimis impact determinations under
paragraph 774.5(b);
(2) When applying the exception for
restoration, rehabilitation, or
maintenance of historic transportation
facilities under paragraph 774.13(a);
(3) When applying the exception for
archeological sites of minimal value for
preservation in place under paragraph
774.13(b);
(4) When applying the exception for
temporary occupancies under paragraph
774.13(d); and
(5) When applying the exception for
transportation enhancement projects
and mitigation activities under
paragraph 774.13(g).
The FHWA and FTA gave careful
consideration to the statutory language
in determining the appropriate role of
other agencies within the procedures for
granting Section 4(f) approvals. The
statute requires consultation with the
U.S. Departments of Agriculture,
Housing and Urban Development, and
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the Interior, but the ultimate
responsibility for approving, or not
approving, the use of Section 4(f)
property is entrusted to the
Administration. Although no other
coordination is expressly required by
the statute, the FHWA and FTA have
decided to require consultation or
concurrence at the points listed above
with all officials with jurisdiction over
the impacted properties in order to
ensure that Section 4(f) approvals are
granted only after careful consideration
of all relevant facts.
One comment questioned the role that
designated Tribal Historic Preservation
Officers (THPOs) have in the Section
4(f) process. A THPO has jurisdiction
over historic sites located on tribal land
and is therefore an official with
jurisdiction over such historic sites.
When a project affects a historic site on
tribal land, a recognized THPO would
be acting in place of the SHPO, not in
addition to the SHPO. However, if in
this case the tribe in question has no
officially recognized THPO, then the
SHPO would be an official with
jurisdiction in addition to a
representative of the tribal government.
Applicants should be mindful of the
interest that many tribes hold in
properties of religious and cultural
significance off tribal lands. Although
the final rule does not designate the
THPO as an official with jurisdiction
over historic properties located off tribal
lands, all interested tribes should be
identified and consulted under the
National Historic Preservation Act. The
National Historic Preservation Act calls
for the agency official to acknowledge
the special expertise of tribes in
assessing the National Register
eligibility of historic properties that may
possess religious and cultural
significance to the tribe.
One comment noted that the
definition of ‘‘official(s) with
jurisdiction’’ is unclear in the case of
federally designated Wild and Scenic
Rivers. Suggested language was
provided. We agree that this point
should be clarified, and have added a
Paragraph (c) to the definition of
‘‘Official(s) with Jurisdiction’’ that
states: ‘‘In the case of portions of Wild
and Scenic Rivers to which Section 4(f)
applies, the official(s) with jurisdiction
are the official(s) of the Federal agency
or agencies that own or administer the
affected portion of the river corridor in
question. For State administered,
federally designated rivers [Section
2(a)(ii) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act, 16 U.S.C. 1273(a)(ii)], the officials
with jurisdiction include both the State
agency designated by the respective
Governor and the Secretary of the
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Interior.’’ Paragraph 774.11(g) explains
how Section 4(f) applies to designated
Wild and Scenic Rivers, and portions
thereof.
• ‘‘ ROD’’—No comments were
received on this definition and it is
unchanged in this final rule.
• ‘‘ Section 4(f) Evaluation’’—A
definition was added for this term to
clarify that a Section 4(f) Evaluation is
the documentation prepared to evidence
the consideration of feasible and
prudent avoidance alternatives when
the impacts to a Section 4(f) property
resulting from its use are not de
minimis. The documentation may be a
stand-alone document or part of a NEPA
document, and it may rely upon
information contained in technical
studies.
• ‘‘Section 4(f) Property’’—A
definition was added that incorporates
the statutory language.
• ‘‘Use’’—One comment
recommended that the definition of
‘‘use’’ be changed to clarify that a
permanent use occurs when land is
acquired for permanent incorporation
into a transportation facility. The FHWA
and FTA believe the proposed
definition, which has been a part of the
Section 4(f) regulations for many years,
is clear as written and has not been the
subject of controversy or confusion in
the past. Therefore, the FHWA and FTA
decline to make the suggested change.
Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review) and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
We have determined that this action
will be a significant regulatory action
within the meaning of Executive Order
12866 and will be significant within the
meaning of DOT regulatory policies and
procedures because of substantial
congressional, State and local
government, and public interest. Those
interests include the receipt of Federal
financial support for transportation
investments, appropriate compliance
with statutory requirements, and
balancing of transportation mobility and
environmental goals. We anticipate that
the direct economic impact of this final
rule will be minimal. The clarification
of current regulatory requirements is
mandated in SAFETEA–LU. We also
consider this final rule a means to
clarify and reorganize the existing
regulatory requirements. These changes
will not adversely affect, in a material
way, any sector of the economy. In
addition, we expect that these changes
will not interfere with any action taken
or planned by another agency and will
not materially alter the budgetary
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impact of any entitlements, grants, user
fees, or loan programs.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
In compliance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (Pub. L. 96–354, 5 U.S.C.
60l–612) the agencies have evaluated
the effects of this rule on small entities
and have determined that the rule will
not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities. This rule does not include any
new regulatory burdens that will affect
small entities. For this reason, the
FHWA and the FTA certify that this
action will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
This rule will not impose unfunded
mandates as defined by the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104–4, March 22, 1995, 109 Stat. 48).
This rule will not result in the
expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $128.1 million or more
in any one year (2 U.S.C. 1532).
Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
This rule has been analyzed in
accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order
13132, and the FHWA and the FTA
have determined that this rule will not
have sufficient Federalism implications
to warrant the preparation of a
Federalism assessment. The agencies
have also determined that this rule will
not preempt any State law or State
regulation or affect the States’ ability to
discharge traditional State governmental
functions.
Executive Order 12372
(Intergovernmental Review)
Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance Program Number 20.205,
Highway Planning and Construction;
20.500 et seq., Federal Transit Capital
Investment Grants. The regulations
implementing Executive Order 12372
regarding intergovernmental
consultation on Federal programs and
activities apply to these programs and
were carried out in the development of
this rule.
Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.),
Federal agencies must obtain approval
from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for each collection of
information they conduct, sponsor, or
require through regulations. The FHWA
and the FTA have determined that this
rule does not contain new collection of
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information requirements for the
purposes of the PRA.
National Environmental Policy Act
This rule will not have any effect on
the quality of the environment under
the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321) and is
categorically excluded under 23 CFR
771.117(c)(20). The rule is intended to
lessen adverse environmental impacts
by standardizing and clarifying
compliance for Section 4(f), including
the incorporation of clear direction to
take into account the overall harm of
each alternative.
Executive Order 12630 (Taking of
Private Property)
We have analyzed this rule under
Executive Order 12630, Government
Actions and Interface with
Constitutionally Protected Property
Rights. We do not anticipate that this
rule will effect a taking of private
property or otherwise have taking
implications under Executive Order
12630.
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with RULES
Executive Order 13045 (Protection of
Children)
We have analyzed this action under
Executive Order 13045, Protection of
Children from Environmental Health
Risks and Safety Risks. We certify that
this rule is not an economically
significant rule and will not cause an
environmental risk to health or safety
that may disproportionately affect
children.
Executive Order 13175 (Tribal
Consultation)
We have analyzed this rule under
Executive Order 13175, dated November
6, 2000, and believe that the rule will
not have substantial direct effects on
one or more Indian tribes; will not
impose substantial direct compliance
costs on Indian tribal governments; and
will not preempt tribal laws. The
rulemaking addresses obligations of
Federal funds to States for Federal-aid
highway projects and to public transit
agencies for capital transit projects and
would not impose any direct
compliance requirements on Indian
tribal governments. While some historic
Section 4(f) properties are eligible for
Section 4(f) protection because of their
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Executive Order 13211 (Energy Effects)
We have analyzed this action under
Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use, dated May 18,
2001. We have determined that this rule
is not a significant energy action
because, although it is a significant
regulatory action under Executive Order
12866, the rule is not likely to have a
significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy. Therefore,
a Statement of Energy Effects is not
required.
Privacy Act
Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
This action meets applicable
standards in Sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of
Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice
Reform, to minimize litigation,
eliminate ambiguity, and reduce
burden.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
cultural significance to a tribe, the rule
does not impose any new consultation
or compliance requirements on tribal
governments. Therefore, a tribal
summary impact statement is not
required.
Anyone is able to search the
electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the
comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT’s complete Privacy Act
Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (Volume
65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78), or you
may visit FDMS at https://
www.regulations.gov.
Regulation Identification Number
A regulation identification number
(RIN) is assigned to each regulatory
action listed in the Unified Agenda of
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory
Information Service Center publishes
the Unified Agenda in April and
October of each year. The RINs
contained in the heading of this
document can be used to cross-reference
this action with the Unified Agenda.
List of Subjects
23 CFR Part 771
Environmental protection, Grant
programs—transportation, Highways
and roads, Historic preservation, Mass
transportation, Public lands, Recreation
areas, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Wildlife refuges.
23 CFR Part 774
Environmental protection, Grant
programs—transportation, Highways
and roads, Historic preservation, Mass
transportation, Public lands, Recreation
areas, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Wildlife refuges.
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13395
49 CFR Part 622
Environmental impact statements,
Grant programs—transportation, Mass
transportation, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
Issued on: March 4, 2008.
James D. Ray,
Federal Highway Administrator, Acting
Administrator.
James S. Simpson,
Federal Transit Administrator.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, and under the authority of 23
U.S.C. 103(c), 109, 138, and 49 U.S.C.
303, and the delegations of authority at
49 CFR 1.48(b) and 1.51, the FHWA and
FTA hereby amend Chapter I of Title 23
and Chapter VI of Title 49, Code of
Federal Regulations, as set forth below:
I
Title 23—Highways
PART 771—ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
AND RELATED PROCEDURES
1. The authority citation for part 771
continues to read as follows:
I
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.; 23 U.S.C.
109, 110, 128, 138 and 315; 49 U.S.C. 303,
5301(e), 5323(b), and 5324; 40 CFR parts
1500 et seq.; 49 CFR 1.48(b) and 1.51.
2. Revise § 771.127(a) to read as
follows:
I
§ 771.127
Record of decision.
(a) The Administration will complete
and sign a record of decision (ROD) no
sooner than 30 days after publication of
the final EIS notice in the Federal
Register or 90 days after publication of
a notice for the draft EIS, whichever is
later. The ROD will present the basis for
the decision as specified in 40 CFR
1505.2, summarize any mitigation
measures that will be incorporated in
the project and document any required
Section 4(f) approval in accordance with
part 774 of this chapter. Until any
required ROD has been signed, no
further approvals may be given except
for administrative activities taken to
secure further project funding and other
activities consistent with 40 CFR
1506.1.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 771.135
I
I
[Removed]
3. Remove § 771.135.
4. Add part 774 to read as follows:
PART 774—PARKS, RECREATION
AREAS, WILDLIFE AND WATERFOWL
REFUGES, AND HISTORIC SITES
(SECTION 4(F))
Sec.
774.1
774.3
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Purpose.
Section 4(f) approvals.
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774.5 Coordination.
774.7 Documentation.
774.9 Timing.
774.11 Applicability.
774.13 Exceptions.
774.15 Constructive use determinations.
774.17 Definitions.
Authority: 23 U.S.C. 103(c), 109(h), 138,
325, 326, 327 and 204(h)(2); 49 U.S.C. 303;
Section 6009 of the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:
A Legacy for Users (Pub. L. 109–59, Aug. 10,
2005, 119 Stat. 1144); 49 CFR 1.48 and 1.51.
§ 774.1
Purpose.
The purpose of this part is to
implement 23 U.S.C. 138 and 49 U.S.C.
303, which were originally enacted as
Section 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act of 1966 and are still
commonly referred to as ‘‘Section 4(f).’’
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with RULES
§ 774.3
Section 4(f) approvals.
The Administration may not approve
the use, as defined in § 774.17, of
Section 4(f) property unless a
determination is made under paragraph
(a) or (b) of this section.
(a) The Administration determines
that:
(1) There is no feasible and prudent
avoidance alternative, as defined in
§ 774.17, to the use of land from the
property; and
(2) The action includes all possible
planning, as defined in § 774.17, to
minimize harm to the property resulting
from such use; or
(b) The Administration determines
that the use of the property, including
any measure(s) to minimize harm (such
as any avoidance, minimization,
mitigation, or enhancement measures)
committed to by the applicant, will have
a de minimis impact, as defined in
§ 774.17, on the property.
(c) If the analysis in paragraph (a)(1)
of this section concludes that there is no
feasible and prudent avoidance
alternative, then the Administration
may approve only the alternative that:
(1) Causes the least overall harm in
light of the statute’s preservation
purpose. The least overall harm is
determined by balancing the following
factors:
(i) The ability to mitigate adverse
impacts to each Section 4(f) property
(including any measures that result in
benefits to the property);
(ii) The relative severity of the
remaining harm, after mitigation, to the
protected activities, attributes, or
features that qualify each Section 4(f)
property for protection;
(iii) The relative significance of each
Section 4(f) property;
(iv) The views of the official(s) with
jurisdiction over each Section 4(f)
property;
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(v) The degree to which each
alternative meets the purpose and need
for the project;
(vi) After reasonable mitigation, the
magnitude of any adverse impacts to
resources not protected by Section 4(f);
and
(vii) Substantial differences in costs
among the alternatives.
(2) The alternative selected must
include all possible planning, as defined
in § 774.17, to minimize harm to Section
4(f) property.
(d) Programmatic Section 4(f)
evaluations are a time-saving procedural
alternative to preparing individual
Section 4(f) evaluations under
paragraph (a) of this section for certain
minor uses of Section 4(f) property.
Programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations
are developed by the Administration
based on experience with a specific set
of conditions that includes project type,
degree of use and impact, and
evaluation of avoidance alternatives.1
An approved programmatic Section 4(f)
evaluation may be relied upon to cover
a particular project only if the specific
conditions in the programmatic
evaluation are met
(1) The determination whether a
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation
applies to the use of a specific Section
4(f) property shall be documented as
specified in the applicable
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation.
(2) The Administration may develop
additional programmatic Section 4(f)
evaluations. Proposed new or revised
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations
will be coordinated with the
Department of Interior, Department of
Agriculture, and Department of Housing
and Urban Development, and published
in the Federal Register for comment
prior to being finalized. New or revised
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations
shall be reviewed for legal sufficiency
and approved by the Headquarters
Office of the Administration.
(e) The coordination requirements in
§ 774.5 must be completed before the
Administration may make Section 4(f)
approvals under this section.
Requirements for the documentation
1 FHWA has issued five programmatic Section
4(f) evaluations: (1) Final Nationwide Programmatic
Section 4(f) Evaluation and Determination for
Federal-Aid Transportation Projects That Have a
Net Benefit to a Section 4(f) Property; (2)
Nationwide Section 4(f) Evaluations and Approvals
for Federally-Aided Highway Projects With Minor
Involvement With Public Parks, Recreation Lands,
Wildlife and Waterfowl Refuges, and Historic Sites;
(3) Final Nationwide Section 4(f) Evaluation and
Approval for Federally-Aided Highway Projects
With Minor Involvements With Historic Sites; (4)
Historic Bridges; Programmatic Section 4(f)
Evaluation and Approval; and (5) Section 4(f)
Statement and Determination for Independent
Bikeway or Walkway Construction Projects.
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and timing of Section 4(f) approvals are
located in §§ 774.7 and 774.9,
respectively.
§ 774.5
Coordination.
(a) Prior to making Section 4(f)
approvals under § 774.3(a), the Section
4(f) evaluation shall be provided for
coordination and comment to the
official(s) with jurisdiction over the
Section 4(f) resource and to the
Department of the Interior, and as
appropriate to the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. The
Administration shall provide a
minimum of 45 days for receipt of
comments. If comments are not received
within 15 days after the comment
deadline, the Administration may
assume a lack of objection and proceed
with the action.
(b) Prior to making de minimis impact
determinations under § 774.3(b), the
following coordination shall be
undertaken:
(1) For historic properties:
(i) The consulting parties identified in
accordance with 36 CFR part 800 must
be consulted; and
(ii) The Administration must receive
written concurrence from the pertinent
State Historic Preservation Officer
(SHPO) or Tribal Historic Preservation
Officer (THPO), and from the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation
(ACHP) if participating in the
consultation process, in a finding of ‘‘no
adverse effect’’ or ‘‘no historic
properties affected’’ in accordance with
36 CFR part 800. The Administration
shall inform these officials of its intent
to make a de minimis impact
determination based on their
concurrence in the finding of ‘‘no
adverse effect’’ or ‘‘no historic
properties affected.’’
(iii) Public notice and comment,
beyond that required by 36 CFR part
800, is not required.
(2) For parks, recreation areas, and
wildlife and waterfowl refuges:
(i) Public notice and an opportunity
for public review and comment
concerning the effects on the protected
activities, features, or attributes of the
property must be provided. This
requirement can be satisfied in
conjunction with other public
involvement procedures, such as a
comment period provided on a NEPA
document.
(ii) The Administration shall inform
the official(s) with jurisdiction of its
intent to make a de minimis impact
finding. Following an opportunity for
public review and comment as
described in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this
section, the official(s) with jurisdiction
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over the Section 4(f) resource must
concur in writing that the project will
not adversely affect the activities,
features, or attributes that make the
property eligible for Section 4(f)
protection. This concurrence may be
combined with other comments on the
project provided by the official(s).
(c) The application of a programmatic
Section 4(f) evaluation to the use of a
specific Section 4(f) property under
§ 774.3(d)(1) shall be coordinated as
specified in the applicable
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation.
(d) When Federal encumbrances on
Section 4(f) property are identified,
coordination with the appropriate
Federal agency is required to ascertain
the agency’s position on the proposed
impact, as well as to determine if any
other Federal requirements may apply
to converting the Section 4(f) land to a
different function. Any such
requirements must be satisfied,
independent of the Section 4(f)
approval.
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with RULES
§ 774.7
Documentation.
(a) A Section 4(f) evaluation prepared
under § 774.3(a) shall include sufficient
supporting documentation to
demonstrate why there is no feasible
and prudent avoidance alternative and
shall summarize the results of all
possible planning to minimize harm to
the Section 4(f) property.
(b) A de minimis impact
determination under § 774.3(b) shall
include sufficient supporting
documentation to demonstrate that the
impacts, after avoidance, minimization,
mitigation, or enhancement measures
are taken into account, are de minimis
as defined in § 774.17; and that the
coordination required in § 774.5(b) has
been completed.
(c) If there is no feasible and prudent
avoidance alternative the
Administration may approve only the
alternative that causes the least overall
harm in accordance with § 774.3(c).
This analysis must be documented in
the Section 4(f) evaluation.
(d) The Administration shall review
all Section 4(f) approvals under
§§ 774.3(a) and 774.3(c) for legal
sufficiency.
(e) A Section 4(f) approval may
involve different levels of detail where
the Section 4(f) involvement is
addressed in a tiered EIS under
§ 771.111(g) of this chapter.
(1) When the first-tier, broad-scale EIS
is prepared, the detailed information
necessary to complete the Section 4(f)
approval may not be available at that
stage in the development of the action.
In such cases, the documentation
should address the potential impacts
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that a proposed action will have on
Section 4(f) property and whether those
impacts could have a bearing on the
decision to be made. A preliminary
Section 4(f) approval may be made at
this time as to whether the impacts
resulting from the use of a Section 4(f)
property are de minimis or whether
there are feasible and prudent avoidance
alternatives. This preliminary approval
shall include all possible planning to
minimize harm to the extent that the
level of detail available at the first-tier
EIS stage allows. It is recognized that
such planning at this stage may be
limited to ensuring that opportunities to
minimize harm at subsequent stages in
the development process have not been
precluded by decisions made at the
first-tier stage. This preliminary Section
4(f) approval is then incorporated into
the first-tier EIS.
(2) The Section 4(f) approval will be
finalized in the second-tier study. If no
new Section 4(f) use, other than a de
minimis impact, is identified in the
second-tier study and if all possible
planning to minimize harm has
occurred, then the second-tier Section
4(f) approval may finalize the
preliminary approval by reference to the
first-tier documentation. Re-evaluation
of the preliminary Section 4(f) approval
is only needed to the extent that new or
more detailed information available at
the second-tier stage raises new Section
4(f) concerns not already considered.
(3) The final Section 4(f) approval
may be made in the second-tier CE, EA,
final EIS, ROD or FONSI.
(f) In accordance with §§ 771.105(a)
and 771.133 of this chapter, the
documentation supporting a Section 4(f)
approval should be included in the EIS,
EA, or for a project classified as a CE,
in a separate document. If the Section
4(f) documentation cannot be included
in the NEPA document, then it shall be
presented in a separate document. The
Section 4(f) documentation shall be
developed by the applicant in
cooperation with the Administration.
§ 774.9
Timing.
(a) The potential use of land from a
Section 4(f) property shall be evaluated
as early as practicable in the
development of the action when
alternatives to the proposed action are
under study.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph
(c) of this section, for actions processed
with EISs the Administration will make
the Section 4(f) approval either in the
final EIS or in the ROD. Where the
Section 4(f) approval is documented in
the final EIS, the Administration will
summarize the basis for its Section 4(f)
approval in the ROD. Actions requiring
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13397
the use of Section 4(f) property, and
proposed to be processed with a FONSI
or classified as a CE, shall not proceed
until notification by the Administration
of Section 4(f) approval.
(c) After the CE, FONSI, or ROD has
been processed, a separate Section 4(f)
approval will be required, except as
provided in § 774.13, if:
(1) A proposed modification of the
alignment or design would require the
use of Section 4(f) property; or
(2) The Administration determines
that Section 4(f) applies to the use of a
property; or
(3) A proposed modification of the
alignment, design, or measures to
minimize harm (after the original
Section 4(f) approval) would result in a
substantial increase in the amount of
Section 4(f) property used, a substantial
increase in the adverse impacts to
Section 4(f) property, or a substantial
reduction in the measures to minimize
harm.
(d) A separate Section 4(f) approval
required under paragraph (c) of this
section will not necessarily require the
preparation of a new or supplemental
NEPA document. If a new or
supplemental NEPA document is also
required under § 771.130 of this chapter,
then it should include the
documentation supporting the separate
Section 4(f) approval. Where a separate
Section 4(f) approval is required, any
activity not directly affected by the
separate Section 4(f) approval can
proceed during the analysis, consistent
with § 771.130(f) of this chapter.
(e) Section 4(f) may apply to
archeological sites discovered during
construction, as set forth in § 774.11(f).
In such cases, the Section 4(f) process
will be expedited and any required
evaluation of feasible and prudent
avoidance alternatives will take account
of the level of investment already made.
The review process, including the
consultation with other agencies, will be
shortened as appropriate.
§ 774.11
Applicability.
(a) The Administration will determine
the applicability of Section 4(f) in
accordance with this part.
(b) When another Federal agency is
the Federal lead agency for the NEPA
process, the Administration shall make
any required Section 4(f) approvals
unless the Federal lead agency is
another U.S. DOT agency.
(c) Consideration under Section 4(f) is
not required when the official(s) with
jurisdiction over a park, recreation area,
or wildlife and waterfowl refuge
determine that the property, considered
in its entirety, is not significant. In the
absence of such a determination, the
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Section 4(f) property will be presumed
to be significant. The Administration
will review a determination that a park,
recreation area, or wildlife and
waterfowl refuge is not significant to
assure its reasonableness.
(d) Where Federal lands or other
public land holdings (e.g., State forests)
are administered under statutes
permitting management for multiple
uses, and, in fact, are managed for
multiple uses, Section 4(f) applies only
to those portions of such lands which
function for, or are designated in the
plans of the administering agency as
being for, significant park, recreation, or
wildlife and waterfowl refuge purposes.
The determination of which lands so
function or are so designated, and the
significance of those lands, shall be
made by the official(s) with jurisdiction
over the Section 4(f) resource. The
Administration will review this
determination to assure its
reasonableness.
(e) In determining the applicability of
Section 4(f) to historic sites, the
Administration, in cooperation with the
applicant, will consult with the
official(s) with jurisdiction to identify
all properties on or eligible for the
National Register of Historic Places
(National Register). The Section 4(f)
requirements apply to historic sites on
or eligible for the National Register
unless the Administration determines
that an exception under § 774.13
applies.
(1) The Section 4(f) requirements
apply only to historic sites on or eligible
for the National Register unless the
Administration determines that the
application of Section 4(f) is otherwise
appropriate.
(2) The Interstate System is not
considered to be a historic site subject
to Section 4(f), with the exception of
those individual elements of the
Interstate System formally identified by
FHWA for Section 4(f) protection on the
basis of national or exceptional historic
significance.
(f) Section 4(f) applies to all
archeological sites on or eligible for
inclusion on the National Register,
including those discovered during
construction, except as set forth in
§ 774.13(b).
(g) Section 4(f) applies to those
portions of federally designated Wild
and Scenic Rivers that are otherwise
eligible as historic sites, or that are
publicly owned and function as, or are
designated in a management plan as, a
significant park, recreation area, or
wildlife and waterfowl refuge. All other
applicable requirements of the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. 1271–1287,
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must be satisfied, independent of the
Section 4(f) approval.
(h) When a property formally reserved
for a future transportation facility
temporarily functions for park,
recreation, or wildlife and waterfowl
refuge purposes in the interim, the
interim activity, regardless of duration,
will not subject the property to Section
4(f).
(i) When a property is formally
reserved for a future transportation
facility before or at the same time a
park, recreation area, or wildlife and
waterfowl refuge is established and
concurrent or joint planning or
development of the transportation
facility and the Section 4(f) resource
occurs, then any resulting impacts of the
transportation facility will not be
considered a use as defined in § 774.17.
Examples of such concurrent or joint
planning or development include, but
are not limited to:
(1) Designation or donation of
property for the specific purpose of such
concurrent development by the entity
with jurisdiction or ownership of the
property for both the potential
transportation facility and the Section
4(f) property; or
(2) Designation, donation, planning,
or development of property by two or
more governmental agencies with
jurisdiction for the potential
transportation facility and the Section
4(f) property, in consultation with each
other.
§ 774.13
Exceptions.
The Administration has identified
various exceptions to the requirement
for Section 4(f) approval. These
exceptions include, but are not limited
to:
(a) Restoration, rehabilitation, or
maintenance of transportation facilities
that are on or eligible for the National
Register when:
(1) The Administration concludes, as
a result of the consultation under 36
CFR 800.5, that such work will not
adversely affect the historic qualities of
the facility that caused it to be on or
eligible for the National Register, and
(2) The official(s) with jurisdiction
over the Section 4(f) resource have not
objected to the Administration
conclusion in paragraph (a)(1) of this
section.
(b) Archeological sites that are on or
eligible for the National Register when:
(1) The Administration concludes that
the archeological resource is important
chiefly because of what can be learned
by data recovery and has minimal value
for preservation in place. This exception
applies both to situations where data
recovery is undertaken and where the
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Administration decides, with agreement
of the official(s) with jurisdiction, not to
recover the resource; and
(2) The official(s) with jurisdiction
over the Section 4(f) resource have been
consulted and have not objected to the
Administration finding in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section.
(c) Designations of park and
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl
refuges, and historic sites that are made,
or determinations of significance that
are changed, late in the development of
a proposed action. With the exception of
the treatment of archeological resources
in § 774.9(e), the Administration may
permit a project to proceed without
consideration under Section 4(f) if the
property interest in the Section 4(f) land
was acquired for transportation
purposes prior to the designation or
change in the determination of
significance and if an adequate effort
was made to identify properties
protected by Section 4(f) prior to
acquisition. However, if it is reasonably
foreseeable that a property would
qualify as eligible for the National
Register prior to the start of
construction, then the property should
be treated as a historic site for the
purposes of this section.
(d) Temporary occupancies of land
that are so minimal as to not constitute
a use within the meaning of Section 4(f).
The following conditions must be
satisfied:
(1) Duration must be temporary, i.e.,
less than the time needed for
construction of the project, and there
should be no change in ownership of
the land;
(2) Scope of the work must be minor,
i.e., both the nature and the magnitude
of the changes to the Section 4(f)
property are minimal;
(3) There are no anticipated
permanent adverse physical impacts,
nor will there be interference with the
protected activities, features, or
attributes of the property, on either a
temporary or permanent basis;
(4) The land being used must be fully
restored, i.e., the property must be
returned to a condition which is at least
as good as that which existed prior to
the project; and
(5) There must be documented
agreement of the official(s) with
jurisdiction over the Section 4(f)
resource regarding the above conditions.
(e) Park road or parkway projects
under 23 U.S.C. 204.
(f) Certain trails, paths, bikeways, and
sidewalks, in the following
circumstances:
(1) Trail-related projects funded under
the Recreational Trails Program, 23
U.S.C. 206(h)(2);
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(2) National Historic Trails and the
Continental Divide National Scenic
Trail, designated under the National
Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241–1251,
with the exception of those trail
segments that are historic sites as
defined in § 774.17;
(3) Trails, paths, bikeways, and
sidewalks that occupy a transportation
facility right-of-way without limitation
to any specific location within that
right-of-way, so long as the continuity of
the trail, path, bikeway, or sidewalk is
maintained; and
(4) Trails, paths, bikeways, and
sidewalks that are part of the local
transportation system and which
function primarily for transportation.
(g) Transportation enhancement
projects and mitigation activities,
where:
(1) The use of the Section 4(f)
property is solely for the purpose of
preserving or enhancing an activity,
feature, or attribute that qualifies the
property for Section 4(f) protection; and
(2) The official(s) with jurisdiction
over the Section 4(f) resource agrees in
writing to paragraph (g)(1) of this
section.
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with RULES
§ 774.15
Constructive use determinations.
(a) A constructive use occurs when
the transportation project does not
incorporate land from a Section 4(f)
property, but the project’s proximity
impacts are so severe that the protected
activities, features, or attributes that
qualify the property for protection
under Section 4(f) are substantially
impaired. Substantial impairment
occurs only when the protected
activities, features, or attributes of the
property are substantially diminished.
(b) If the project results in a
constructive use of a nearby Section 4(f)
property, the Administration shall
evaluate that use in accordance with
§ 774.3(a).
(c) The Administration shall
determine when there is a constructive
use, but the Administration is not
required to document each
determination that a project would not
result in a constructive use of a nearby
Section 4(f) property. However, such
documentation may be prepared at the
discretion of the Administration.
(d) When a constructive use
determination is made, it will be based
upon the following:
(1) Identification of the current
activities, features, or attributes of the
property which qualify for protection
under Section 4(f) and which may be
sensitive to proximity impacts;
(2) An analysis of the proximity
impacts of the proposed project on the
Section 4(f) property. If any of the
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proximity impacts will be mitigated,
only the net impact need be considered
in this analysis. The analysis should
also describe and consider the impacts
which could reasonably be expected if
the proposed project were not
implemented, since such impacts
should not be attributed to the proposed
project; and
(3) Consultation, on the foregoing
identification and analysis, with the
official(s) with jurisdiction over the
Section 4(f) property.
(e) The Administration has reviewed
the following situations and determined
that a constructive use occurs when:
(1) The projected noise level increase
attributable to the project substantially
interferes with the use and enjoyment of
a noise-sensitive facility of a property
protected by Section 4(f), such as:
(i) Hearing the performances at an
outdoor amphitheater;
(ii) Sleeping in the sleeping area of a
campground;
(iii) Enjoyment of a historic site where
a quiet setting is a generally recognized
feature or attribute of the site’s
significance;
(iv) Enjoyment of an urban park
where serenity and quiet are significant
attributes; or
(v) Viewing wildlife in an area of a
wildlife and waterfowl refuge intended
for such viewing.
(2) The proximity of the proposed
project substantially impairs esthetic
features or attributes of a property
protected by Section 4(f), where such
features or attributes are considered
important contributing elements to the
value of the property. Examples of
substantial impairment to visual or
esthetic qualities would be the location
of a proposed transportation facility in
such proximity that it obstructs or
eliminates the primary views of an
architecturally significant historical
building, or substantially detracts from
the setting of a Section 4(f) property
which derives its value in substantial
part due to its setting;
(3) The project results in a restriction
of access which substantially
diminishes the utility of a significant
publicly owned park, recreation area, or
a historic site;
(4) The vibration impact from
construction or operation of the project
substantially impairs the use of a
Section 4(f) property, such as projected
vibration levels that are great enough to
physically damage a historic building or
substantially diminish the utility of the
building, unless the damage is repaired
and fully restored consistent with the
Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for
the Treatment of Historic Properties,
i.e., the integrity of the contributing
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13399
features must be returned to a condition
which is substantially similar to that
which existed prior to the project; or
(5) The ecological intrusion of the
project substantially diminishes the
value of wildlife habitat in a wildlife
and waterfowl refuge adjacent to the
project, substantially interferes with the
access to a wildlife and waterfowl
refuge when such access is necessary for
established wildlife migration or critical
life cycle processes, or substantially
reduces the wildlife use of a wildlife
and waterfowl refuge.
(f) The Administration has reviewed
the following situations and determined
that a constructive use does not occur
when:
(1) Compliance with the requirements
of 36 CFR 800.5 for proximity impacts
of the proposed action, on a site listed
on or eligible for the National Register,
results in an agreement of ‘‘no historic
properties affected’’ or ‘‘no adverse
effect;’’
(2) The impact of projected traffic
noise levels of the proposed highway
project on a noise-sensitive activity do
not exceed the FHWA noise abatement
criteria as contained in Table 1 in part
772 of this chapter, or the projected
operational noise levels of the proposed
transit project do not exceed the noise
impact criteria for a Section 4(f) activity
in the FTA guidelines for transit noise
and vibration impact assessment;
(3) The projected noise levels exceed
the relevant threshold in paragraph
(f)(2) of this section because of high
existing noise, but the increase in the
projected noise levels if the proposed
project is constructed, when compared
with the projected noise levels if the
project is not built, is barely perceptible
(3 dBA or less);
(4) There are proximity impacts to a
Section 4(f) property, but a
governmental agency’s right-of-way
acquisition or adoption of project
location, or the Administration’s
approval of a final environmental
document, established the location for
the proposed transportation project
before the designation, establishment, or
change in the significance of the
property. However, if it is reasonably
foreseeable that a property would
qualify as eligible for the National
Register prior to the start of
construction, then the property should
be treated as a historic site for the
purposes of this section; or
(5) Overall (combined) proximity
impacts caused by a proposed project do
not substantially impair the activities,
features, or attributes that qualify a
property for protection under Section
4(f);
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(6) Proximity impacts will be
mitigated to a condition equivalent to,
or better than, that which would occur
if the project were not built, as
determined after consultation with the
official(s) with jurisdiction;
(7) Change in accessibility will not
substantially diminish the utilization of
the Section 4(f) property; or
(8) Vibration levels from project
construction activities are mitigated,
through advance planning and
monitoring of the activities, to levels
that do not cause a substantial
impairment of protected activities,
features, or attributes of the Section 4(f)
property.
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with RULES
§ 774.17
Definitions.
The definitions contained in 23 U.S.C.
101(a) are applicable to this part. In
addition, the following definitions
apply:
Administration. The FHWA or FTA,
whichever is making the approval for
the transportation program or project at
issue. A reference herein to the
Administration means the State when
the State is functioning as the FHWA or
FTA in carrying out responsibilities
delegated or assigned to the State in
accordance with 23 U.S.C. 325, 326,
327, or other applicable law.
All possible planning. All possible
planning means that all reasonable
measures identified in the Section 4(f)
evaluation to minimize harm or mitigate
for adverse impacts and effects must be
included in the project.
(1) With regard to public parks,
recreation areas, and wildlife and
waterfowl refuges, the measures may
include (but are not limited to): design
modifications or design goals;
replacement of land or facilities of
comparable value and function; or
monetary compensation to enhance the
remaining property or to mitigate the
adverse impacts of the project in other
ways.
(2) With regard to historic sites, the
measures normally serve to preserve the
historic activities, features, or attributes
of the site as agreed by the
Administration and the official(s) with
jurisdiction over the Section 4(f)
resource in accordance with the
consultation process under 36 CFR part
800.
(3) In evaluating the reasonableness of
measures to minimize harm under
§ 774.3(a)(2), the Administration will
consider the preservation purpose of the
statute and:
(i) The views of the official(s) with
jurisdiction over the Section 4(f)
property;
(ii) Whether the cost of the measures
is a reasonable public expenditure in
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light of the adverse impacts of the
project on the Section 4(f) property and
the benefits of the measure to the
property, in accordance with
§ 771.105(d) of this chapter; and
(iii) Any impacts or benefits of the
measures to communities or
environmental resources outside of the
Section 4(f) property.
(4) All possible planning does not
require analysis of feasible and prudent
avoidance alternatives, since such
analysis will have already occurred in
the context of searching for feasible and
prudent alternatives that avoid Section
4(f) properties altogether under
§ 774.3(a)(1), or is not necessary in the
case of a de minimis impact
determination under § 774.3(b).
(5) A de minimis impact
determination under § 774.3(b)
subsumes the requirement for all
possible planning to minimize harm by
reducing the impacts on the Section 4(f)
property to a de minimis level.
Applicant. The Federal, State, or local
government authority, proposing a
transportation project, that the
Administration works with to conduct
environmental studies and prepare
environmental documents. For
transportation actions implemented by
the Federal government on Federal
lands, the Administration or the Federal
land management agency may take on
the responsibilities of the applicant
described herein.
CE. Refers to a Categorical Exclusion,
which denotes an action with no
individual or cumulative significant
environmental effect pursuant to 40 CFR
1508.4 and § 771.117 of this chapter;
unusual circumstances are taken into
account in making categorical exclusion
determinations.
De minimis impact. (1) For historic
sites, de minimis impact means that the
Administration has determined, in
accordance with 36 CFR part 800 that
no historic property is affected by the
project or that the project will have ‘‘no
adverse effect’’ on the historic property
in question.
(2) For parks, recreation areas, and
wildlife and waterfowl refuges, a de
minimis impact is one that will not
adversely affect the features, attributes,
or activities qualifying the property for
protection under Section 4(f).
EA. Refers to an Environmental
Assessment, which is a document
prepared pursuant to 40 CFR parts
1500–1508 and § 771.119 of this title for
a proposed project that is not
categorically excluded but for which an
EIS is not clearly required.
EIS. Refers to an Environmental
Impact Statement, which is a document
prepared pursuant to NEPA, 40 CFR
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parts 1500–1508, and §§ 771.123 and
771.125 of this chapter for a proposed
project that is likely to cause significant
impacts on the environment.
Feasible and prudent avoidance
alternative. (1) A feasible and prudent
avoidance alternative avoids using
Section 4(f) property and does not cause
other severe problems of a magnitude
that substantially outweighs the
importance of protecting the Section 4(f)
property. In assessing the importance of
protecting the Section 4(f) property, it is
appropriate to consider the relative
value of the resource to the preservation
purpose of the statute.
(2) An alternative is not feasible if it
cannot be built as a matter of sound
engineering judgment.
(3) An alternative is not prudent if:
(i) It compromises the project to a
degree that it is unreasonable to proceed
with the project in light of its stated
purpose and need;
(ii) It results in unacceptable safety or
operational problems;
(iii) After reasonable mitigation, it
still causes:
(A) Severe social, economic, or
environmental impacts;
(B) Severe disruption to established
communities;
(C) Severe disproportionate impacts to
minority or low income populations; or
(D) Severe impacts to environmental
resources protected under other Federal
statutes;
(iv) It results in additional
construction, maintenance, or
operational costs of an extraordinary
magnitude;
(v) It causes other unique problems or
unusual factors; or
(vi) It involves multiple factors in
paragraphs (3)(i) through (3)(v) of this
definition, that while individually
minor, cumulatively cause unique
problems or impacts of extraordinary
magnitude.
FONSI. Refers to a Finding of No
Significant Impact prepared pursuant to
40 CFR 1508.13 and § 771.121 of this
chapter.
Historic site. For purposes of this part,
the term ‘‘historic site’’ includes any
prehistoric or historic district, site,
building, structure, or object included
in, or eligible for inclusion in, the
National Register. The term includes
properties of traditional religious and
cultural importance to an Indian tribe or
Native Hawaiian organization that are
included in, or are eligible for inclusion
in, the National Register.
Official(s) with jurisdiction. (1) In the
case of historic properties, the official
with jurisdiction is the SHPO for the
State wherein the property is located or,
if the property is located on tribal land,
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the THPO. If the property is located on
tribal land but the Indian tribe has not
assumed the responsibilities of the
SHPO as provided for in the National
Historic Preservation Act, then a
representative designated by such
Indian tribe shall be recognized as an
official with jurisdiction in addition to
the SHPO. When the ACHP is involved
in a consultation concerning a property
under Section 106 of the NHPA, the
ACHP is also an official with
jurisdiction over that resource for
purposes of this part. When the Section
4(f) property is a National Historic
Landmark, the National Park Service is
also an official with jurisdiction over
that resource for purposes of this part.
(2) In the case of public parks,
recreation areas, and wildlife and
waterfowl refuges, the official(s) with
jurisdiction are the official(s) of the
agency or agencies that own or
administer the property in question and
who are empowered to represent the
agency on matters related to the
property.
(3) In the case of portions of Wild and
Scenic Rivers to which Section 4(f)
applies, the official(s) with jurisdiction
are the official(s) of the Federal agency
or agencies that own or administer the
affected portion of the river corridor in
question. For State administered,
federally designated rivers (section
2(a)(ii) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act, 16 U.S.C. 1273(a)(ii)), the officials
with jurisdiction include both the State
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agency designated by the respective
Governor and the Secretary of the
Interior.
ROD. Refers to a Record of Decision
prepared pursuant to 40 CFR 1505.2 and
§ 771.127 of this chapter.
Section 4(f) evaluation. Refers to the
documentation prepared to support the
granting of a Section 4(f) approval under
§ 774.3(a), unless preceded by the word
‘‘programmatic.’’ A ‘‘programmatic
Section 4(f) evaluation’’ is the
documentation prepared pursuant to
§ 774.3(d) that authorizes subsequent
project-level Section 4(f) approvals as
described therein.
Section 4(f) Property. Section 4(f)
property means publicly owned land of
a public park, recreation area, or
wildlife and waterfowl refuge of
national, State, or local significance, or
land of an historic site of national, State,
or local significance.
Use. Except as set forth in §§ 774.11
and 774.13, a ‘‘use’’ of Section 4(f)
property occurs:
(1) When land is permanently
incorporated into a transportation
facility;
(2) When there is a temporary
occupancy of land that is adverse in
terms of the statute’s preservation
purpose as determined by the criteria in
§ 774.13(d); or
(3) When there is a constructive use
of a Section 4(f) property as determined
by the criteria in § 774.15.
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13401
Federal Transit Administration
Title 49—Transportation
CHAPTER VI—FEDERAL TRANSIT
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
PART 622—ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
AND RELATED PROCEDURES
5. Revise the authority citation for
Subpart A to read as follows:
I
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.; 49 U.S.C.
303, 5301(e), 5323(b), and 5324; Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users (Pub. L. 109–59, Aug. 10, 2005, 119
Stat. 1144); 40 CFR parts 1500 et seq.; 49 CFR
1.51.
I
6. Revise § 622.101 to read as follows:
Subpart A—Environmental Procedures
§ 622.101
Cross-reference to procedures.
The procedures for complying with
the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 et
seq.), and related statutes, regulations,
and orders are set forth in part 771 of
title 23 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. The procedures for
complying with 49 U.S.C. 303,
commonly known as ‘‘Section 4(f),’’ are
set forth in part 774 of title 23 of the
Code of Federal Regulations.
[FR Doc. E8–4596 Filed 3–11–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–22–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 49 (Wednesday, March 12, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 13368-13401]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-4596]
[[Page 13367]]
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Part III
Department of Transportation
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Federal Highway Administration
Federal Transit Administration
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23 CFR Parts 771 and 774
49 CFR Part 622
Parks, Recreation Areas, Wildlife and Waterfowl Refuges, and Historic
Sites; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 49 / Wednesday, March 12, 2008 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 13368]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Highway Administration
Federal Transit Administration
23 CFR Parts 771 and 774
49 CFR Part 622
[Docket No. FHWA-2005-22884]
RIN 2125-AF14 and 2132-AA83
Parks, Recreation Areas, Wildlife and Waterfowl Refuges, and
Historic Sites
AGENCY: Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and Federal Transit
Administration (FTA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This final rule modifies the procedures for granting Section
4(f) approvals in several ways. First, the final rule clarifies the
factors to be considered and the standards to be applied when
determining if an alternative for avoiding the use of Section 4(f)
property is feasible and prudent. Second, the final rule clarifies the
factors to be considered when selecting a project alternative in
situations where all alternatives would use some Section 4(f) property.
Third, the final rule establishes procedures for determining that the
use of a Section 4(f) property has a de minimis impact on the property.
Fourth, the final rule updates the regulation to recognize statutory
and common-sense exceptions for uses that advance Section 4(f)'s
preservation purpose, as well as the option of applying a programmatic
Section 4(f) evaluation. Fifth, the final rule moves the Section 4(f)
regulation out of the agencies' National Environmental Policy Act
regulation, ``Environmental Impact and Related Procedures,'' into its
own part with a reorganized structure that is easier to use.
DATES: Effective Date: April 11, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For FHWA: Diane Mobley, Office of the
Chief Counsel, 202-366-1366, or Lamar Smith, Office of Project
Development and Environmental Review, 202-366-8994. For FTA: Joseph
Ossi, Office of Planning and Environment, 202-366-1613, or Christopher
VanWyk, Office of Chief Counsel, 202-366-1733. Both agencies are
located at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. Office
hours are from 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., e.t., for FHWA, and 9 a.m. to
5:30 p.m., e.t., for FTA, Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Electronic Access
This document, the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) of July 27,
2006, at 71 FR 42611, and all comments received by the U.S. DOT Docket
Facility may be viewed through the Federal Docket Management System
(FDMS) at https://www.regulations.gov. The FDMS is available 24 hours
each day, 365 days each year. Electronic submission and retrieval help
and guidelines are available under the help section of this Web site.
An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded by using a
computer, modem, and suitable communications software, from the
Government Printing Office's Electronic Bulletin Board Service at (202)
512-1661. Internet users may reach the Office of the Federal Register's
home page at: https://www.archives.gov and the Government Printing
Office's Web site at: https://www.access.gpo.gov/nara.
Statutory Authority
The principal statutory authority for this rulemaking action is
Section 6009 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) (Pub. L.
109-59, Aug. 10, 2005, 118 Stat. 1144).
Background
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 (Pub.
L. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931) \1\ prohibits the use of land of significant
publicly owned public parks, recreation areas, wildlife and waterfowl
refuges, and land of a historic site for transportation projects unless
the Administration (as defined in section 774.17 of this part) \2\
determines that there is no feasible and prudent avoidance alternative
and that all possible planning to minimize harm has occurred. Early
case law strictly interpreted Section 4(f), beginning with the Supreme
Court's decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971) (Overton Park). In Overton Park, the Court articulated
a very high standard for compliance with Section 4(f), stating that
Congress intended the protection of parkland to be of paramount
importance. The Court also made clear that an avoidance alternative
must be selected unless it would present ``uniquely difficult
problems'' or require ``costs or community disruption of extraordinary
magnitude.'' Id. at 411-21, 416.
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\1\ Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966
was technically repealed in 1983 when it was codified without
substantive change at 49 U.S.C. 303. A provision with the same
meaning is found at 23 U.S.C. 138 and applies only to FHWA actions.
This regulation continues to refer to Section 4(f) as such because
it would create needless confusion to do otherwise; the policies
Section 4(f) engendered are widely referred to as ``Section 4(f)''
matters.
\2\ Section 774.14 of this final rule defines ``Administration''
as ``The FHWA or FTA, whichever is making the approval for the
transportation program or project at issue. A reference herein to
the Administration means the State when the State is functioning as
the FHWA or FTA in carrying out responsibilities delegated or
assigned to the State in accordance with 23 U.S.C. 325, 326, 327, or
other applicable law.'' All references to the ``Administration'' in
the preamble to this final rule are consistent with this definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Courts around the country have applied the Overton Park decision,
reaching different conclusions as to how various factors may be
considered and what weight may be attached to the factors an agency
uses to determine whether an avoidance alternative is or is not
feasible and prudent. Some courts have interpreted Overton Park to
mandate the avoidance of Section 4(f) properties at the expense of
other important environmental and social resources. Congress amended
Section 4(f) in 2005 to address the uncertainty surrounding its
application. Section 6009(b) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)
(Pub. L. 109-59, Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1144) directed the Secretary
of Transportation to promulgate regulations clarifying ``the factors to
be considered and the standards to be applied'' in determining the
prudence and feasibility of alternatives that avoid the use of Section
4(f) property by transportation projects. The FHWA and FTA published a
NPRM on July 27, 2006, at 71 FR 42611. The NPRM requested comments on
the factors proposed to be considered and standards proposed to be
applied when determining whether an avoidance alternative is feasible
and prudent. The NPRM also solicited comments on a new, alternative
method of compliance created by SAFETEA-LU section 6009(a) for uses
that result in a de minimis impact to a Section 4(f) property and on
other proposed changes to the Section 4(f) regulation. The comment
period remained open until September 25, 2006. All comments, including
several comments submitted late, have been fully considered in this
final rule.
Profile of Respondents
The docket received a total of 37 responses to the NPRM. Out of the
37 responses, 17 were submitted by 20 State and regional transportation
agencies; 6 responses were submitted by trade associations; 9 responses
were submitted by 11 national and local
[[Page 13369]]
environmental advocacy groups; 2 responses were from Federal agencies;
1 response was from a State Historic Preservation Officer; and 2
responses were from private individuals. The trade associations
submitting comments were: The American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials, the American Council of Engineering
Companies, the American Cultural Resources Association, the American
Highway Users Alliance, the American Public Transportation Association,
and the American Road and Transportation Builders Association. The
Federal agencies submitting comments were the United States Department
of the Interior and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. The
national environmental advocacy organizations submitting comments
included the National Recreation and Park Association, The Nature
Conservancy, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the
Rails to Trails Conservancy, the Surface Transportation Policy Project,
the Natural Resources Defense Council, and Environmental Defense.
Overall Position of Respondents
The majority of comments received in response to the NPRM were
generally supportive of the proposed changes. Most comments agreed with
the decision to clarify the feasible and prudent test in a manner that
will continue a high level of protection of Section 4(f) properties
from the impacts of transportation projects. Respondents from all
across the board, including State Departments of Transportation (SDOTs)
and the private sector, commented positively on the rule's specificity
and the flexibility allowed in dealing with various aspects of Section
4(f). Moreover, there was substantial support for the idea that
implementation of the proposed regulations would improve transportation
decisionmaking and expedite environmental reviews, while continuing to
protect Section 4(f) properties.
On the other hand, several respondents had a generally negative
reaction to the proposed regulation. Concerns included that the
proposed regulations do not track the actual process the Administration
and applicant would follow in writing a Section 4(f) evaluation; that
the rule exceeds the requirements of SAFETEA-LU by addressing de
minimis requirements; that the proposed rule's writing, structure, and
organization are very confusing and will cause more litigation; and
that the proposed rule will not streamline environmental analysis or
adequately protect Section 4(f) properties.
General Comments
A general comment noted that the regulation often refers simply to
``refuges'' while the statute refers to ``wildlife and waterfowl
refuges.'' For consistency, we have replaced ``refuges'' with the
statutory terminology throughout the final rule.
Another general comment expressed concern that the final
decisionmaking responsibility under the proposed rule rests with the
U.S. DOT. We considered this view but concluded that the statute
entrusts final decisionmaking responsibility for approving the use of
Section 4(f) property with the Secretary of Transportation, who has
delegated that responsibility to the modal Administrations within the
U.S. DOT.
Another comment asked if this rule would apply to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA). The final rule will apply only to the FHWA and FTA. However,
section 6009 of SAFETEA-LU amended 49 U.S.C. 303, which applies to all
U.S. DOT agencies including FAA and FRA. The FAA and FRA may choose to
adopt or use this rule and other FHWA and FTA guidance on Section 4(f).
Finally, one commenter suggested that ``inside metropolitan areas,
any 4(f) related activities, analysis, and decisions should be carried
out in the context of the region-wide environmental mitigation element
of the metropolitan transportation plan.'' Reference is made to the
transportation planning regulation (23 CFR part 450) published in
February 2007. The FHWA and FTA do not agree with this comment. The
environmental mitigation discussed in the metropolitan plan generally
would not delve into the site-specific impacts of individual projects
and the mitigation thereof. That impact assessment will continue to be
performed at the project level generally as part of the documentation
prepared under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The
discussion in the transportation plan would identify broader
environmental mitigation needs and opportunities that individual
transportation projects might later take advantage of. For example, as
a result of consultation with resource agencies, the plan might
identify an expanse of degraded wetlands associated with a troubled
body of water that represents a good candidate for establishing a
wetlands bank or habitat bank for wildlife and waterfowl. The plan
might identify locations where the purchase of development rights would
assist in preserving a historic battlefield or historic farmstead.
Assessments of each individual project would still be needed to
determine the appropriateness of devoting project funds to one of the
mitigation activities identified in the plan, to a mitigation bank
discussed in the plan, or to new mitigation developed during the NEPA/
Section 4(f) process and not mentioned in the plan. We therefore did
not make changes in response to this comment.
Section-by-Section Analysis of NPRM Comments and the Administration's
Response
For ease of reference, the following table is provided which maps
the former sections of the rule into the corresponding new sections:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Former section in part 771 New section in part 774
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
None.......................................... 774.1 Purpose.
771.135(a)(1)................................. 774.3 Section 4(f) approvals.
771.135(i) [in part].......................... 774.5 Coordination.
771.135(a)(2), (i) [in part], (j), (k), and 774.7 Documentation.
(o).
771.135(b) [in part], (g)(1) [in part], (l), 774.9 Timing.
(m) [in part] and (n).
771.135(b) [in part], (c), (d), (e), (g)(1) 774.11 Applicability.
[in part], (m)(4) and (p) (5)(v).
771.135(f), (g)(2), (h), (p)(5) [in part], and 774.13 Exceptions.
(p)(7).
771.135(p)(3), (p)(4), (p)(5) [in part] and 774.15 Constructive use determinations.
(p)(6).
771.107(d) and 771.135(p)(1) and (p)(2)....... 774.17 Definitions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 13370]]
In this preamble, all references to provisions of 23 CFR part 774
refer to the final rule as presented herein. Several provisions
proposed in the NPRM were moved to new sections in response to comments
on the NPRM. A reference to an NPRM section will be explicitly labeled
as such.
Section 771.127 Record of Decision
One comment objected to the provision for signing a Record of
Decision ``no sooner than 30 days after publication of the final
environmental impact statement (EIS) notice in the Federal Register or
90 days after publication of a notice for the draft EIS, whichever is
later.'' This sentence was incorporated verbatim from the FHWA and
FTA's existing regulation implementing the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), and it is consistent with the NEPA regulations of
the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), 40 CFR 1506.10(b).
Substantive modifications to the FHWA and FTA joint NEPA regulation are
outside the scope of this rulemaking. Thus, we have retained the
language as proposed in the NPRM.
Section 774.1 Purpose
This section clarifies the purpose of the regulations, which is to
implement 49 U.S.C. 303 and 23 U.S.C. 138 (Section 4(f)). There were no
major comments in response to this section. Therefore, we have retained
the language as proposed in the NPRM.
Section 774.3 Section 4(f) Approvals
This section sets forth the determination required by the
Administration prior to approving a project that uses Section 4(f)
property. Paragraph 774.3(a) is the traditional Section 4(f) approval,
similar to the previous rule at paragraph 771.135(a)(1). Paragraph
774.3(b) implements the new provision in section 6009(a) of SAFETEA-LU
for making de minimis impact determinations in lieu of the traditional
analysis. Section 774.3 includes cross-references to the definitions
for ``use,'' ``feasible and prudent avoidance alternative,'' ``de
minimis impact,'' and ``all possible planning,'' which are located in
the definitions section, 774.17.
Paragraph 774.3(c) provides new regulatory direction for how to
analyze and select an alternative when it has been determined that no
feasible and prudent avoidance alternatives exist and all viable
alternatives use some Section 4(f) property. The paragraph provides a
list of factors that should be considered in the analysis and selection
of an alternative. The factors were drawn from case law experience and
the FHWA ``Section 4(f) Policy Paper.'' \3\ It should be noted that the
weight given each factor would necessarily depend on the facts in each
particular case, and not every factor would be relevant to every
decision. Our intent is to provide the tools that will allow wise
transportation decisions that minimize overall harm in these
situations, while still providing the special protection afforded by
Section 4(f) by requiring the other weighed factors to be severe and
not easily mitigated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The FHWA ``Section 4(f) Policy Paper,'' issued March 1,
2005, is available for review online at https://
environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/4fpolicy.htm. A copy was also
placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph 774.3(d) provides a clear regulatory basis for
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations, and it distinguishes between the
promulgation of new programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations and the
application of an existing programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation to a
particular project. Paragraph 774.3(e) provides cross-references to the
sections of the regulation governing the coordination, documentation,
and timing of approvals as a road map for the practitioner.
Many comments were received in response to this section. The
majority of comments were generally supportive of the approach proposed
in the NPRM, although many offered minor re-wording for clarity. Those
suggestions are discussed below for each paragraph. Several comments
were strongly opposed to the proposed procedural structure. The NPRM
proposed different processes for approving uses with de minimis and
non-de minimis impacts to Section 4(f) property, and the proposed rule
requires an additional step when approving projects for which all
alternatives use some Section 4(f) property. A use with more than de
minimis impacts would be processed with the traditional two-step
inquiry pursuant to paragraph 774.3(a) (a determination that there is
no feasible and prudent avoidance alternative, followed by a
determination that the action includes all possible planning to
minimize harm to the property). A use with de minimis impacts would be
processed in a single step pursuant to paragraph 774.3(b) (without the
need for the development and analysis of avoidance alternatives, and
with the planning to minimize harm folded into the development of
measures needed to reduce the impacts of the Section 4(f) use to a de
minimis level). Projects for which all viable alternatives use some
Section 4(f) property would be processed in two steps pursuant to
paragraph 774.3(c) (a determination that there is no feasible and
prudent avoidance alternative, followed by the selection of an
alternative by weighing the factors in paragraph 774.3(c) and a
determination, with documentation, that the action includes all
possible planning to minimize harm).
The commenters opposed to the structure proposed in the NPRM
indicated that the regulation in all situations should first require a
determination of which alternative minimizes harm to the Section 4(f)
resource(s), followed by a determination of whether that alternative is
feasible and prudent and may therefore be selected. Comments stated
that in Overton Park, the Supreme Court required such a structure for
Section 4(f) decisionmaking. We disagree. We have re-read Overton Park
and considered this concern very carefully, but we do not agree that
Overton Park stands for the process favored by these commenters or that
the process proposed in the NPRM should be restructured. First, the
NPRM structure follows the order of the requirements as they appear in
the statute. Second, the statute does not require a determination of
which alternative minimizes harm, it requires ``all possible planning''
to minimize harm. It is much more efficient to conduct all possible
planning to minimize harm as the last step for the selected alternative
than to undertake all possible planning repeatedly for each
alternative, including those that are not feasible and prudent, and for
a variety of reasons, cannot be selected. Such a process would be very
inefficient. Finally, the structure and processes in the final rule are
consistent with longstanding FHWA and FTA procedures, with the
exception of the procedures for approving the new concept of de minimis
impacts. For these reasons, we retained the structure proposed in the
NPRM.
Another comment strongly recommended the separation of the
analysis, coordination, documentation, and timing requirements for de
minimis impacts and the traditional Section 4(f) evaluation into
discrete sections of the regulation. We decided not to make this
proposed change because we do not agree that re-structuring the
regulation in this manner would make it easier to use. In addition, for
those who prefer the suggested structure, the existing joint FHWA/FTA
``Guidance for Determining De Minimis Impacts to Section 4(f)
Resources,'' December 13, 2005,\4\ already provides a complete
[[Page 13371]]
discussion of the process for determining de minimis impacts, separate
from any discussion of the requirements for traditional Section 4(f)
approvals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/hep/guidedeminimus.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another comment requested definitions of numerous phrases used in
section 774.3; for example, ``relative severity of the harm,''
``relative significance,'' and ``the ability to mitigate.'' We did not
include the requested definitions in the final rule because these words
are all used with their common English meanings. The provisions of
section 774.3 will be applied to an extensive variety of fact
situations, and regulatory definitions would unduly limit the
applicability of the provisions to the particular fact situations
anticipated in those definitions.
Section 774.3--One comment suggested that section 774.3,
which prohibits the use of Section 4(f) property unless certain
determinations are made, should simply refer to ``section 4(f)
property'' instead of ``public park, recreation area, or wildlife and
waterfowl refuge, or any significant historic site.'' We agree that
this suggested change improves the readability of the regulation, so we
substituted the phrase ``Section 4(f) property'' and moved the
terminology proposed in the NPRM into a new definition of ``Section
4(f) property'' in section 774.17. The defined term is now used
throughout the regulation.
Paragraph 774.3(a)(1)--Another comment asked that we
confirm ``that an alternative with a net benefit 4(f) use can be chosen
over an alternative with no Section 4(f) use.'' If avoidance
alternatives are determined not to be feasible and prudent then the use
may be approved, whether or not it is a ``net benefit.'' For FHWA
projects, the ``Nationwide Programmatic Section 4(f) Evaluation and
Determination for Federal-Aid Transportation Projects That Have a Net
Benefit to a Section 4(f) Property,'' 70 FR 20618, April 20, 2005,
would generally apply to situations envisioned by the commenter. This
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation remains in effect. In cases where
application of this programmatic evaluation is appropriate, the
criteria for evaluating the existence of a feasible and prudent
avoidance alternative is specified in the Findings section of the
programmatic evaluation. If, through the application of this
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation, the FHWA determines that there
are no feasible and prudent avoidance alternatives, then the
alternative with a net benefit to Section 4(f) property can be
selected. This programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation is applicable only
to FHWA actions.
Paragraph 774.3(b)--One comment requested clarification
whether an analysis of avoidance alternatives must be conducted when
determining that a de minimis impact occurs to a Section 4(f) property.
An analysis of avoidance alternatives is not necessary for a de minimis
impact determination, and the NPRM did not propose to require one.
Using words taken directly from section 6009(a) of SAFETEA-LU, the NPRM
would have allowed a Section 4(f) de minimis impact approval when ``the
use of the property, including any avoidance, minimization, mitigation,
or enhancement measures committed to by the applicant, will have a de
minimis impact * * *.'' We agree with the commenter that the term
``avoidance'' as used in this sentence could cause confusion. The final
rule was reworded to clarify that the term ``avoidance,'' along with
other mitigation or enhancement measures, is used in the context of
project features or designs that minimize harm to the individual
Section 4(f) property and not meant to imply that the applicant must
search for alternatives avoiding the Section 4(f) property altogether.
In this context, the term ``avoidance'' could mean a partial change to
the alignment to avoid a portion of the Section 4(f) property. The
sentence now reads ``* * * the use of the property, including any
measure(s) to minimize harm (such as any avoidance, minimization,
mitigation, or enhancement measures) committed to by the applicant,
will have a de minimis impact, as defined in Sec. 774.17, on the
property.'' The development and evaluation of alternatives that
completely avoid the use of the Section 4(f) property is not required
when the Administration intends to make a finding of de minimis impact
determination. Indeed, to require such an analysis would defeat the
purpose of the de minimis provision in the statute. However, if the
Administration's intention of making a de minimis impact finding is not
realized, then a traditional Section 4(f) evaluation, including the
development and evaluation of alternatives that completely avoid the
use of Section 4(f) property, would be necessary.
Paragraph 774.3(c)--Two comments criticized the choice of
the word ``may'' referencing the portion of the rule which allows the
Administration to approve an alternative that ``minimizes overall
harm'' in light of the enumerated factors. They explain that this
articulation leaves the FHWA and FTA with too much discretion. We are
concerned that if the words ``may select'' were replaced with the
suggested ``shall select'' or ``must select,'' the provision would
require the agencies to actually fund the project, which is not an
obligation imposed by Section 4(f). In response to the comments, after
``may approve'' we added the word ``only.'' This change clarifies our
intent that the FHWA and FTA may only select the alternative that
causes the least overall harm.
When there is no feasible and prudent avoidance alternative, many
comments suggested various replacements for the phrase ``most prudent''
as a criterion for choosing among several project alternatives and
determining which would cause the least overall harm. After considering
the range of proposals and their rationales, we have decided to remove
the words ``most prudent'' from the analysis of overall harm. It
appears to cause confusion and it detracts from the purpose of this
portion of the rule, which is to provide clear criteria for choosing a
course of action when all available alternatives use Section 4(f)
property. Deleting the modifier ``most prudent'' appropriately shifts
the focus of the multi-factor inquiry to the requirement of minimizing
overall harm.
Several commenters suggested that the proposed weighing of factors
in determining the alternative with the least overall harm would not
place a ``thumb on the scale'' in favor of the preservation of the
Section 4(f) properties, as required by the statute. The FHWA and FTA
agree that a reminder about the preservation purpose of the statute in
the balancing of various factors is appropriate. Accordingly, paragraph
774.3(c)(1) now states that the Administration may approve the
alternative that causes the least overall harm ``in light of the
statute's preservation purpose.'' The preservation purpose of Section
4(f) is described in 49 U.S.C. 303(a), which states: ``It is the policy
of the United States Government that special effort should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.''
Virtually identical language appears in 23 U.S.C. 138. This addition
does not change the settled principle that where there is no feasible
and prudent avoidance alternative, Section 4(f) does not preclude the
Administration from selecting any alternative from among those with
substantially equal harm. In such instances, the selection will be
based primarily on the relative performance of those alternatives with
respect to factors (v) ``the degree to which each alternative meets the
[[Page 13372]]
purpose and need for the project,'' (vi) ``after reasonable mitigation,
the magnitude of any adverse impacts to resources not protected by
Section 4(f),'' and (vii) ``substantial differences in costs among the
alternatives.''
Two comments proposed incorporating by reference the NPRM
definition of ``feasible and prudent alternative'' into paragraph
774.3(c), explaining that this change would ensure consistency in the
use of the term, especially in the meaning of ``prudent.'' We decline
to adopt this proposal because the term ``feasible and prudent
alternative'' as used in the definitions and paragraph 774.3(a)
signifies an alternative to the use of Section 4(f) property, whereas
in paragraph 774.3(c) all alternatives under consideration use some
Section 4(f) property and use of the term in this context would be
confusing.
Several comments proposed substituting the word ``balancing'' for
the term ``considering,'' as a more precise way to describe the
analytical process described in the NPRM. We have adopted the
suggestion to replace the term ``considering'' with the term
``balancing'' as a better way to articulate the intent of paragraph
774.3(c). We agree that such an inquiry will necessarily involve a
balancing of competing and conflicting considerations given that some
of the factors may weigh in favor of one alternative, yet other factors
may weigh against it. Mere ``consideration'' of the factors does not
capture this idea--the factors must be weighed against each other. How
the various factors listed in paragraph 774.3(c)(1) are balanced and
weighed in a given instance is within the discretion of FHWA and FTA,
and is subject to the facts and circumstances of the particular project
and Section 4(f) properties involved. As previously noted, the FHWA and
FTA have inserted a reminder that the preservation purpose of the
statute in the balancing of the various factors must be given its
proper weight.
Several comments interpreted the balancing test of paragraph
774.3(b) as satisfying the statutory requirement to undertake ``all
possible planning to minimize harm'' to the Section 4(f) property. One
comment proposed that we add a statement that performing the analysis
pursuant to paragraph 774.3(c) satisfies FHWA's obligation to undertake
all possible planning to minimize harm to Section 4(f) properties.
Other comments suggested that paragraph 774.3(c) should expressly state
that any alternative selected based on the enumerated factors should
include all possible planning to minimize harm to Section 4(f) property
resulting from the use.
Contrary to the interpretation suggested in some comments, we did
not intend that engaging in the balancing test alone would fulfill the
requirement to undertake ``all possible planning to minimize harm'' to
the Section 4(f) property. The selection of an alternative pursuant to
paragraph 774.3(c) is not in itself a Section 4(f) approval and does
not complete the evaluation process. After the alternative is selected,
the additional step of identifying, adopting, and committing to
measures that will minimize the harm to the Section 4(f) property must
be documented before Section 4(f) approval can be granted. The extent
of effort needed to satisfy the requirement to undertake all possible
planning to minimize harm is included in the definitions section,
774.17. When the characteristics of a Section 4(f) property lend
themselves to mitigation, and with mitigation the alternative that uses
that property would have a lower net impact, the balancing test would
weigh these facts and may result in the alternative being selected. We
addressed the confusion on this topic by dividing the NPRM paragraphs
774.3(a)(1) and 774.3(b) each into two paragraphs and stating
separately in each the requirement to undertake all possible planning
to minimize harm. We also slightly reworded the paragraph for
additional clarity.
We received a variety of comments regarding the list of factors in
paragraph 774.3(c)(1) which the Administration would balance in making
the decision on which alternative causes the least overall harm. It is
important to keep in mind the situations in which the factors will
apply--these factors will only apply after a determination has already
been made that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to avoid
the use of Section 4(f) property. The point of the analysis is a
comprehensive inquiry that balances the net harm to Section 4(f)
properties caused by each alternative with all other relevant concerns.
One comment provided examples of how the balancing of factors in
paragraph 774.3(c) will help transportation agencies arrive at better
overall decisions.
We reiterate here the point made above and in the NPRM that this
balancing must be done with a ``thumb on the scale'' in favor of
protecting Section 4(f) properties. A scale that takes into account the
preservation purpose of the statute must be used to compare the net
harm to Section 4(f) properties (factors in paragraphs 774.3(c)(1)(i)-
(iv)) with other relevant concerns (the remaining factors). One
commenter asked if this means ``an alternative with somewhat more harm
to Section 4(f) properties could be selected over one with somewhat
lesser harm if the one with lesser harm to Section 4(f) properties
would result in more adverse effects to non-Section 4(f) properties/
higher costs/lesser ability to satisfy needs, or some combination
thereof?'' The answer is yes, so long as the difference in overall harm
is substantial. Where the factors favoring the selection of the
alternative with greater harm to Section 4(f) property do not clearly
and substantially outweigh the factors favoring the alternative with
less harm to Section 4(f) property, the alternative with less harm to
Section 4(f) property must be selected. As the significance of the
Section 4(f) property or the degree of harm to the Section 4(f)
property increases, another alternative must entail correspondingly
greater harm to non-Section 4(f) properties to outweigh the harm to the
Section 4(f) property and be selected. Because there is necessarily a
degree of judgment involved in these decisions, the Administration must
be mindful to carefully document its reasoning.
With respect to the factors in paragraphs 774.3(c)(1)(ii) and
(iii), one comment suggested that the determinations of the relative
severity of the harm and relative significance of the Section 4(f)
properties should be made solely by the officials with jurisdiction
over the resource. We did not adopt this suggestion because, in
practice, competing views are often expressed when multiple Section
4(f) properties are being evaluated. The park may seem more important
to the park official than the historic building beside the park,
whereas the SHPO may feel just the opposite. The Administration, after
listening to these competing points of view, must ultimately decide. In
the statute, Congress chose to entrust the Secretary of Transportation
with the final decision.
With respect to the factor in paragraph 774.3(c)(1)(i), ``The
ability to mitigate adverse impacts to each Section 4(f) property
(including any measures that result in benefits to the property),'' one
comment suggested that only ``legally binding'' mitigation (i.e.,
mitigation committed to in the ROD) should be considered. We do not
agree because the purpose of the balancing test is to select an
alternative, so there is no legally binding mitigation at that point in
the process. However, we expect that mitigation used to offset harm
would be a matter of record and the appropriate commitments should be
included in the project decision.
[[Page 13373]]
Another comment stated that nothing in the regulation requires the
adoption of any mitigation relied upon in this factor. This is not
true. The new definition of ``all possible planning'' to minimize harm
sets forth specific criteria which will govern whether the identified
mitigation must be adopted. Where the availability of adequate
mitigation measures is a factor that is relied upon in selecting an
alternative, the measures that were identified in the analysis must be
incorporated into the project through the CE determination, ROD or
FONSI, or by other means. There is additional discussion of this issue
in the analysis of section 774.17 below.
Several commenters felt that the only consideration in alternative
selection should be minimizing harm to the Section 4(f) properties.
Consequently, in their view, the factors in NPRM subparagraphs
774.3(b)(5) through (8), which introduce non-Section 4(f)-related
concerns into the selection process, should be eliminated. We have
carefully reviewed those comments but decided to keep the first three
of these factors, now numbered 774.3(c)(1)(v)-(vii) for the reasons
discussed below. The final factor in the NPRM, concerning joint
planning, was dropped for other reasons, as discussed below following
the discussion of the factors retained.
The factors in 774.3(c)(1)(v)-(vii) were retained in the final rule
for several reasons. First, the selection of an alternative in
instances where all viable alternatives use some Section 4(f) property
must be distinguished from the selection process where there is a
viable alternative that avoids using Section 4(f) property. While the
caselaw is not entirely consistent, there is ample support for the FHWA
and FTA's approach in the courts. The Supreme Court's Overton Park
decision did not consider this aspect of Section 4(f), as that case
turned on the FHWA's failure to document any consideration of feasible
and prudent alternatives to the use of the park. Second, since Section
4(f) was enacted in 1966, Congress has identified many other types of
environmental resources for protection under Federal law besides
Section 4(f) properties; for example, threatened and endangered
species, prime farmland, and wetlands of national importance. There is
nothing in SAFETEA-LU to suggest that Section 4(f) protection should
trump all other concerns when there is no feasible and prudent
avoidance alternative. The FHWA and FTA's approach interprets Section
4(f), as amended by SAFETEA-LU, in a way that gives appropriate weight
to all of the resources impacted by a proposed transportation project.
Third, 23 U.S.C. 109(h) directs FHWA to make final project decisions
``in the best overall public interest, taking into account the need for
fast, safe and efficient transportation, public services, and the costs
of eliminating such adverse effects and the following: (1) Air, noise,
and water pollution; (2) destruction or disruption of man-made and
natural resources, aesthetic values, community cohesion and the
availability of public facilities and services; (3) adverse employment
effects, and tax and property value losses; (4) injurious displacement
of people, businesses and farms; and (5) disruption of desirable
community and regional growth.'' FTA law similarly requires that ``the
preservation and enhancement of the environment and the interest of the
community in which the project is located'' be considered. (49 U.S.C.
5324(b)(3)(A)(ii)). These statutes support the FHWA and FTA's
interpretation of Section 4(f) as allowing the consideration of other
significant impacts when it is not possible to avoid using Section 4(f)
property. As described in the NPRM preamble, the balancing approach
adopted in this rule enables the Administration to take all of these
concerns into account by allowing serious problems to outweigh
relatively minor Section 4(f) impacts, as well as Section 4(f) impacts
that can be satisfactorily mitigated.
One comment pointed out that the list of factors in paragraph
774.3(c)(1) is inconsistent with the lists in the proposed definitions
of ``all possible planning'' and ``feasible and prudent alternative''
in 774.17, which includes some similar and some additional factors.
This disparity, in the commenter's opinion, confused the application of
the factors in the overall Section 4(f) analysis. This comment proposed
that we combine the multi-factor lists. We considered this comment, but
decided not to adopt it. The three lists of factors included in the
NPRM apply to three distinct situations. The factors enumerated in the
proposed definition of ``feasible and prudent alternative'' are used to
determine whether an alternative that avoids using Section 4(f)
property exists. If the analysis concludes that no such avoidance
alternative exists, then a different set of factors, those in paragraph
774.3(c), comes into play to guide the Administration in selecting from
among the alternatives all of which use some Section 4(f) property.
Once an alternative is chosen, if it uses Section 4(f) property, then
the Administration has a further obligation to undertake all possible
planning to minimize harm to that property. The third set of factors in
the definition of this term is used to determine the appropriate extent
of the planning to minimize harm.
With respect to the factor in paragraph 774.3(c)(1)(vii),
``[e]xtraordinary differences in costs among the alternatives,'' some
comments suggested that the word ``extraordinary'' should be deleted,
thus allowing any difference in costs to be considered and balanced
with all other factors in determining which of the alternatives
minimizes overall harm. Since this factor is a comparison of the costs
of alternatives under consideration, all of which use Section 4(f)
property, the FHWA and FTA agree that the difference in cost would not
have to be ``extraordinary,'' but that the magnitude of the difference
would determine its appropriate weight when balancing it with the other
factors. Consideration of a minor difference in the cost among
alternatives in the balancing test would be inappropriate in that there
must be a measurable and significant degree of difference. For this
reason we are substituting the word ``substantial'' in place of the
word ``extraordinary'' in this factor. Requiring a substantial cost
difference between alternatives emphasizes the importance of devoting
funds to minimizing harm to the Section 4(f) property and other
important resources more so than if any difference in cost were allowed
to influence the choice of alternatives. When deciding whether to
consider a cost difference ``substantial,'' in addition to considering
the cost as a number in isolation, the FHWA and FTA may consider
factors such as the percentage difference in the cost of the
alternatives; how the cost difference relates to the total cost of
similar transportation projects in the applicant's annual budget; and
the extent to which the increased cost for the subject project would
adversely impact the applicant's ability to fund other transportation
projects.
Several comments expressed confusion regarding the factor in NPRM
paragraph 773.4(b)(8), ``[A]ny history of concurrent planning or
development of the proposed transportation project and the Section 4(f)
property.'' Some commenters were concerned about how this factor was
related to, and would apply in, the balancing of factors and the
ultimate determination of overall harm. Others suggested that the scope
of concurrent planning in this context was unclear and others thought
the term should be defined in section 774.17. In response to these
comments, we have decided to eliminate concurrent
[[Page 13374]]
planning as a factor in determining overall harm. Concurrent planning,
in which the ``concurrent or joint planning or development of the
transportation facility and the Section 4(f) resource occurs,'' more
appropriately relates to the applicability of Section 4(f) requirements
to a specific property. Concurrent planning in this context is
addressed in paragraph 774.11(i).
Another comment pointed out the lack of reference to the no-action
alternative in this paragraph, and asked whether that means it need not
be discussed in the evaluation. The no-action alternative should always
be considered in a Section 4(f) evaluation and the reasons for not
selecting it must be identified.
Paragraph 774.3(d)--Several comments on the NPRM indicated
that programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations are misunderstood by some.
In response, we have clarified what is meant by a programmatic Section
4(f) evaluation in paragraph 774.3(d), and have specified the process
for the development of a programmatic evaluation as well as the
application of an existing programmatic evaluation. The paragraph makes
clear that a programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation does not
automatically satisfy Section 4(f) for an entire class of projects--
rather it establishes a simpler approach to compliance that is tailored
to that class of projects. They are not exemptions and individual
projects must still be reviewed in accordance with the process
established in the programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation.
Paragraph 774.3(e)--No substantive comments were received
on this subsection. We have retained the language as proposed in the
NPRM.
Section 774.5 Coordination
One general comment recommended the separation of the analysis,
coordination, format, and timing requirements for de minimis impacts
into discrete sections of the regulation. We decided not to make this
proposed change because we believe that grouping all of the
requirements for coordination, all of the requirements for timing, and
all of the requirements for documentation together is a reasonable
structure for the regulation and is more consistent with the familiar,
former regulation. For practitioners who need more guidance on the de
minimis impact requirements, the joint FHWA/FTA ``Guidance for
Determining De Minimis Impacts,'' December 13, 2005, discusses all of
the de minimis impact requirements together in one document.
Another general comment suggested that this section should be
revised to explain the coordination of reviews performed under NEPA,
Section 4(f), and Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation
Act. We did not adopt this suggestion because it is already stated in
23 CFR 771.105(a), which explains that it is the policy of the FHWA and
FTA that ``[t]o the fullest extent possible, all environmental
investigations, reviews, and consultations be coordinated as a single
process, and compliance with all applicable environmental requirements
be reflected in the environmental document required by this
regulation.'' A similar statement with regard to the content of
environmental documents is found at 23 CFR 771.133.
We received a general comment that clear guidance is needed on the
coordination process for Section 4(f) uses with impacts greater than de
minimis, to ensure that the officials with jurisdiction are fully
engaged in the development of avoidance alternatives and the
determination of appropriate measures to minimize harm. We agree that
coordination with the officials with jurisdiction is important and
integral to Section 4(f) compliance, and note that the regulation
already includes explicit coordination requirements in paragraph
774.5(a). Additional guidance is included in the FHWA ``Section 4(f)
Policy Paper,'' March 2, 2005, so we did not make any changes in
response to this comment.
One general comment requested that we clarify in the preamble to
this regulation that the existing Section 4(f) de minimis impact
guidance, issued on December 13, 2005, remains in effect and is not
superseded by these regulations. We agree that the inclusion of
requirements for de minimis impacts in these regulations was not
intended to supersede or replace the existing guidance, but to ensure
that the current Section 4(f) regulation is consistent with the Section
4(f) statute, as amended by SAFETEA-LU. The joint FHWA/FTA ``Guidance
for Determining De Minimis Impacts to Section 4(f) Resources,''
December 13, 2005, remains in effect, but the Administration may review
it and make clarifying revisions some time in the future. The FHWA
``Section 4(f) Policy Paper,'' March 2, 2005, which was written prior
to enactment of the SAFETEA-LU amendment to the Section 4(f) statute,
remains in effect except where it could be interpreted to conflict with
this regulation, in which case the regulation takes precedence. The
FHWA plans to update the ``Section 4(f) Policy Paper'' to reflect
SAFETEA-LU and this final rule.
One comment requested that the regulation address the additional
coordination that is needed when the impacted Section 4(f) property was
created or was improved with funds from various programs administered
by the U.S. Department of the Interior. Guidance for such coordination
is already addressed in the FHWA ``Section 4(f) Policy Paper'' and in
the ``Guidance for Determining De Minimis Impacts to Section 4(f)
Resources.'' However, because we agree that this coordination is
important, we addressed the comment by adding a new paragraph (d) to
section 774.5: ``When Federal encumbrances on Section 4(f) property are
identified, coordination with the appropriate Federal agency is
required to ascertain the agency's position on the proposed impact, as
well as to determine if any other Federal requirements may apply to
converting the Section 4(f) land to a different function. Any such
requirements must be satisfied, independent of the Section 4(f)
approval.''
Paragraph 774.5(a)--A number of comments focused on the
length of the notice and comment period. The NPRM proposed to continue
the current 45-day comment period. The comments urged a period ranging
from as short as 15 days, up to a maximum of 60 days. Specifically, one
comment urged a maximum of 60 days with presumed concurrence if no
comment was received within 15 days after the deadline. One comment
urged a period of 60 days, but suggested that comments be open to the
public and other Federal agencies, and not just to those with
jurisdiction over the Section 4(f) property. One comment urged a period
of at least 45 days, not to exceed 60 days.
Several commenters reasoned that a period with a maximum of 60 days
would be harmonious with the streamlining provisions of section 6002 of
SAFETEA-LU and the comment period provided by Section 106 of the
National Historic Preservation Act for consultation with State Historic
Preservation Officers and the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation. Those urging a provision for presuming concurrence if the
comments are not received by various deadlines stated that such a
provision is needed because, in the experience of many applicants,
comments are routinely submitted many months late. Another commenter
thought the requirement for the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)
to review Section 4(f) evaluations added minimal value to the process
and suggested that DOI's role should be eliminated altogether.
After considering all of the views submitted, we decided to keep
the 45-day comment period in the final rule.
[[Page 13375]]
This period appears to be a reasonable length of time, in light of the
current practice with which all are familiar. We did not eliminate the
requirement for a comment period because the statute itself requires
coordination with certain agencies, including DOI. However, we decided
to adopt a deadline for the receipt of comments by adding the following
at the end of paragraph 774.5(a): ``If comments are not received within
15 days after the comment deadline, the Administration may assume a
lack of objection and proceed with the action.'' This change addresses
the concern that comments are routinely sent late, but it allows
flexibility for the Administration to extend the comment period in
individual cases upon request.
Paragraph 774.5(b)--Several comments requested additional
requirements for public notice, review, and comment related to de
minimis impacts to historic properties. In response, the FHWA and FTA
decided to accept the wording suggested by one of the commenters.
Paragraph 774.5(b)(1)(iii) now says: ``Public notice and comment,
beyond that required by 36 CFR Part 800, is not required.'' The
regulation is consistent with the provisions of SAFETEA-LU that allow
the de minimis impact determination to be made based on the process
required under section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.
Other comments requested additional guidance on public notice,
review, and comment related to de minimis impacts to parks, recreation
areas, and wildlife/waterfowl refuges. One commenter believes that
public notice, review, and comment are adequately covered by NEPA and
its implementing regulations, and any additional opportunities are
unnecessary. We decided to retain the proposed regulatory text on
public notice and comment, but to add: ``This requirement can be
satisfied in conjunction with other public involvement procedures, such
as a comment period provided on a NEPA document.'' SAFETEA-LU requires
public notice and the opportunity for public review and comment before
the Administration can make a de minimis impact determination. Where
the NEPA process already provides opportunities for public notice,
review, and comment [i.e., for environmental assessments (EAs) and
EISs], the same opportunities can be used for projects where the
Administration is considering a de minimis impact determination. For
those actions that do not routinely require public review and comment
under NEPA [e.g., categorical exclusions (CEs) and certain
reevaluations] a separate public notice and opportunity for review and
comment will be necessary for a de minimis impact determination. In
these situations, the public notice and opportunity for review and
comment should be based on the specifics of the situation and
commensurate with the type and location of the Section 4(f) property,
impacts, and public interest.
Paragraph 774.5(b)(1)--Several comments suggested that the
concurrence of the State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) or Tribal
Historic Preservation Officer (THPO) in a proposed de minimis impact
determination should be assumed if 30 days pass without written
concurrence. We did not adopt this change because the statute
explicitly requires written concurrence in the Section 106
determination to support a de minimis impact determination. The joint
FHWA/FTA ``Guidance for Determining De Minimis Impacts to Section 4(f)
Resources,'' December 13, 2005, explains the use of Section 106
programmatic agreements (PA) in making de minimis impact
determinations. It says that when a Section 106 PA explicitly states
that an individual Section 106 determination of ``no historic property
affected'' or ``no adverse effect,'' is made in accordance with the PA,
it may be relied upon as the basis for de minimis impact determination.
If the PA specifies that the SHPO or THPO's concurrence in such a
determination may be assumed after a specified timeframe, then the SHPO
or THPO's signature on the PA itself constitutes the required written
concurrence in the Section 106 determination that is necessary for a de
minimis impact determination. With such a PA, a SHPO or THPO is within
its rights asking for a side agreement that would specify conditions
under which a nonresponse would not be used as the basis for a de
minimis impact determination. In any case it is expected that the SHPO
or THPO will be apprised of the agency's intention to make a de minimis
determination under the PA approach and afforded an opportunity to
engage in the process on a project-by-project basis, if desirable by
either party.
Several comments stated that paragraph 774.5(b)(1) should spell out
the written concurrences necessary to support a de minimis impact
determination for a historic property in order to clarify which
concurrences are required. We agree, and the final rule explicitly
states which parties must concur, consistent with 49 U.S.C.
303(d)(2)(B) and 23 U.S.C. 138(b)(2)(B).
A number of comments objected to the statement in paragraph
774.5(b)(1) that public notice and comment other than the Section 106
consultation is not required. These commenters pointed out that the
Section 106 regulation (36 CFR part 800) has its own public involvement
requirements, which may apply in a particular case. One commenter
suggested alternative language to recognize that pertinent requirements
of the Section 106 regulation must be met. We adopted the suggested
language, and the sentence now says that ``public notice and comment,
beyond that required by 36 CFR part 800, is not required.''
Paragraph 774.5(b)(2)--Several commenters requested
clarification of the sequence of events for coordinating with the
official(s) with jurisdiction over parks, recreation areas, and refuges
prior to making de minimis impact determinations. These commenters
proposed revising the regulation to enable the Administration to notify
the official(s) with jurisdiction of its intent to make a de minimis
impact determination at any time during the coordination process,
instead of postponing notification until the conclusion of the public
review and comment period. The FHWA and FTA decided to adopt this
proposed change by moving the clause ``following an opportunity for
public review and comment'' from the beginning of the second sentence
and inserting it directly before the concurrence requirement:
``Following an opportunity for public review and comment as described
in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, the official(s) with
jurisdiction over the property must concur in writing * * *. '' The
regulation would still require the Administration to wait until after
the public comment process before making a formal request for
concurrence, but no specific timeframe is provided for notifying the
officials with jurisdiction. The revised paragraph will begin with
``The Administration shall inform the official(s) with jurisdiction of
its intent * * *. '' The FHWA and FTA reasoned that it would be
beneficial to have the flexibility to notify the official(s) with
jurisdiction early in the coordination process to ascertain the
position of the officials and so that the preliminary views of such
official(s), if available, can be included in the notice provided to
the public.
One commenter suggested eliminating the provision that requires the
Administration to inform the official(s) with jurisdiction of the
intent to make a de minimis impact determination based on those
officials' concurrence that the project will not adversely affect the
Section 4(f) property. The FHWA and FTA decided not to make this
[[Page 13376]]
change. The sequence of events leading to the Administration's finding
is important and will ensure that the official(s) with jurisdiction
understand that their written concurrence is required for the
Administration's de minimis impact determination and that they agree
with any proposed mitigation necessary to the de minimis impact
determination.
One commenter suggested that the FHWA and FTA add a further
provision to the coordination process in paragraph 774.5(b)(2) that
would expressly allow the concurrence in the de minimis impact
determination to be combined with other comments provided by the
official(s) on the project. The FHWA and FTA decided to follow this
recommendation and incorporated the proposed language: ``This
concurrence may be combined with other comments on the project provided
by the official(s).'' Another comment asked for clarification whether
the coordination can be accomplished in conjunction with other public
involvement procedures, such as a comment period provided on a NEPA
document. The FHWA and FTA's NEPA regulation provides for integrated
procedures in 23 CFR 771.105 and 771.133, so this point was clarified
as suggested. With the clarifications described above, the new
provision will help streamline the environmental review process because
it will allow the official(s) with jurisdiction to combine comments on
the de minimis impact proposal with comments submitted on other
environmental issues related to the project.
Paragraph 774.5(c)--One commenter believed that the
coordination requirements discussed in section 774.5 did not
differentiate between individual and programmatic Section 4(f)
evaluations and requested clarification. Programmatic evaluations are
differentiated by virtue of being addressed in a separate paragraph,
774.5(c). We have now clarified what is meant by a programmatic
evaluation in paragraph 774.3(d), as previously discussed.
Another comment suggested a 60-day comment period be required when
there is a use of land from a Section 4(f) property that is covered by
a programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation. The comment also suggested that
the coordination during the use of a programmatic Section 4(f)
evaluation should ``be open to the public and not just the official(s)
with jurisdiction.'' Programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations provide
procedural options for demonstrating compliance with the statutory
requirements of Section 4(f). The FHWA has issued five nationwide
programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations. (FTA has not issued any, but has
plans to do so.) Before being adopted, all of the FHWA programmatic
evaluations were published in draft form in the Federal Register for
public review and comment. They were also provided to appropriate
Federal agencies for review. Each programmatic evaluation contains
specific criteria, consultation requirements, and findings that must be
met before the programmatic evaluation may be applied on any given
project. A primary benefit to using this prescribed step-by-step
approach is a reduction of the time it takes to achieve Section 4(f)
approval.
The NPRM did not stipulate any specific comment period or
coordination process when programmatic Section 4(f) evaluations are
used. When applied to individual projects each of the five approved
programmatic ev