United States v. Bain Capital, LLC, Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P., and Clear Channel Communications, Inc.; Proposed Final Judgement and Competitive Impact Statement, 10808-10824 [08-867]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 40 / Thursday, February 28, 2008 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States v. Bain Capital, LLC,
Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P., and
Clear Channel Communications, Inc.;
Proposed Final Judgement and
Competitive Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), that a proposed
Final Judgment, Hold Separate
Stipulation and Order, and Competitive
Impact Statement have been filed with
the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in United States of
America v. Bain Capital, LLC, Civil
Action No. 1:08–cv–00245. On February
13, 2008, the United States filed a
Complaint alleging that the proposed
acquisition by Bain Capital, LLC and
Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P. of a
controlling interest in Clear Channel
Communications, Inc. would violate
section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
18. The proposed Final Judgment, filed
the same time as the Complaint,
requires Clear Channel to divest radio
stations in Cincinnati, Ohio; Houston,
Texas; Las Vegas, Nevada; and San
Francisco, California, along with certain
related assets.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed
Final Judgment and Competitive Impact
Statement are available for inspection at
the Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, Antitrust Documents Group,
325 7th Street, NW., Room 215,
Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202–
514–2481, on the Department of
Justice’s Web site (https://
www.usdoj.gov/atr), and at the Office of
the Clerk of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.
Copies of these materials may be
obtained from the Antitrust Division
upon request and payment of the coping
fee set by Department of Justice
regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60
days of the date of this notice. Such
comments, and responses thereto, will
be published in the Federal Register
and filed with the Court. Comments
should be directed to John Read, Chief,
Litigation III section, Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530 (telephone: 202–307–0462).
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Patricia A. Brink,
Deputy Director of Operations.
United States District Court for the
District of Columbia
United States of America, Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, 325 7th Street,
NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20530,
Plaintiff, v. Bain Capital, LLC, 111
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Huntington Ave., Boston, MA 02199, and
Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P., 100 Federal St.
35th Fl., Boston, MA 02110, and Clear
Channel Communications, Inc., 200 E. Basse
Rd., San Antonio, TX 78209, Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 1:08–cv–00245
Filed: Feb. 13, 2008
Assigned to: Robertson, James
Assign. Date: 2/13/2008
Description: Antitrust
Complaint
The United States of America, acting
under the direction of the Attorney
General of the United States, brings this
civil action to enjoin the proposed
acquisition of Clear Channel
Communications Inc. (‘‘Clear Channel’’)
by a private equity group of investors
led by Bain Capital, LLC (‘‘Bain’’) and
Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P. (‘‘THL’’),
and to obtain other relief as appropriate.
Plaintiff United States alleges as
follows:
I. Nature of the Action
1. Bain and THL, two of the world’s
leading private investment firms, are
planning to acquire, each through
various affiliated funds, substantial
ownership interests in Clear Channel,
the largest operator of radio stations in
the United States (the ‘‘transaction’’).
The anticipated value of the transaction
is $28 billion.
2. After the transaction, Bain and THL
each would control at least 35 percent
of the voting interests in Clear Channel
and each would designate four members
to the 12 member Clear Channel Board
of Directors. Together, Bain and THL
would control at least 70 percent of the
voting interests of Clear Channel and
designate two-thirds of the members of
its Board of Directors. Further, Bain and
THL, either directly or indirectly
through management teams they install,
typically manage and operate the assets
in which they invest.
3. Bain and THL, through affiliated
funds and co-investment vehicles, have
substantial ownership interests in
Cumulus Media Partners LLC (‘‘CMP’’),
another large nationwide operator of
radio stations. Bain and THL each
control 25 percent of the voting interests
of CMP and designate two members to
its eight member Board of Directors.
Together, Bain and THL control 50
percent of the voting interests of CMP
and designate one-half of the members
of its Board of Directors. CMP operates
radio stations that compete head-tohead with Clear Channel radio stations
in Cincinnati, Ohio and Houston/
Galveston, Texas (‘‘Houston’’).
4. After the transaction, Bain and THL
would have governance rights in Clear
Channel and CMP sufficient to enable
Bain and THL, individually or together,
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to control or influence the companies’
competitive decisions to produce an
anticompetitive outcome in markets
where both Clear Channel and CMS are
significant competitors. Accordingly,
Bain’s and THL’s acquisitions of
substantial partial ownership interests
in Clear Channel would substantially
lessen competition between Clear
Channel and CMP in the sale of radio
advertising in Cincinnati and Houston
in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
5. THL, through affiliated funds and
co-investment vehicles, currently olds a
20 percent equity interest and a 14
percent voting interest in Univision
Communications, Inc. (‘‘Univision’’), a
large nationwide operator of radio
stations that broadcast primarily in
Spanish-language format. THL
designates three members to Univision’s
17 member Board of Directors.
Univision operates radio stations that
compete head-to-head with Clear
Channel’s Spanish-language radio
stations in Houston; Las Vegas, Nevada;
and San Francisco, California.
6. After the transaction, THL would
have governance rights in Clear Channel
and Univision sufficient to influence the
companies’ competitive decisions to
produce an anticompetitive outcome in
markets where both Clear Channel and
Univision are significant competitors.
Accordingly, THL’s acquisition of a
substantial partial ownership interest in
Clear Channel would substantially
lessen competition in the sale of
Spanish-language radio advertising in
Houston, Las Vegas, and San Francisco
in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
II. Jurisdiction and Venue
7. Plaintiff United States brings this
action under section 15 of the Clayton
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 25, to
prevent and restrain defendants from
violating section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
8. Bain and THL, through CMP and
Univision, and Clear Channel sell radio
advertising to local and national
advertisers, a commercial activity that
substantially affects and is in the flow
of interstate commerce. This court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this action pursuant to sections 15 and
16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 25, 26,
and 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337.
9. Bain, THL, and Clear Channel
transact business within the District of
Columbia. Venue is therefore proper in
this Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 22 and
28 U.S.C. 1391.
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III. Defendants and Other Relevant
Entities
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10. Clear Channel is a diversified
media company incorporated in Texas
and headquartered in San Antonio,
Texas. Clear Channel owns various
media outlets including radio stations,
domestic and international outdoor
advertising assets, television stations,
and a media representation firm. Radio
broadcasting is Clear Channel’s largest
business segment, representing over 50
percent of Clear Channel’s total revenue.
As of February 5, 2008, Clear Channel
owned 833 radio stations in the United
States, 508 of which were located
within the top 100 markets as ranked by
Arbitron, an international media
marketing and research firm, including
stations in Cincinnati, Houston, Las
Vegas, and San Francisco.
11. Bain is a Delaware limited liability
company headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts. Bain is one of the
world’s leading private investment firms
with over $40 billion in assets under
management.
12. THL is a Delaware limited
partnership headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts and also is one of the
world’s leading private investment
firms. THL currently manages
approximately $12 billion of committed
capital.
13. Bain and THL raise pools of
capital from private investors,
controlling and managing that capital
through private equity funds and coinvestment vehicles that invest in
discrete opportunities, such as venture
capital, public equity, and leveraged
debt assets.
14. CMP is a limited liability
company formed in 2005 that is owned
by Bain, THL, Cumulus Broadcasting
Inc., the Blackstone Group, and their
affiliates. As of February 5, 2008, CMP
owned 34 radio stations in various
markets, including Cincinnati and
Houston.
15. Univision is headquartered in
New York City and is the largest
broadcaster of Spanish-language
television programming in the United
States. Univision also owns 70 radio
stations that broadcast in Spanish
language in various markets, including
Houston, Las Vegas, and San Francisco.
Univision is owned and operated by five
private equity firms: THL, Haim Saban,
TPG Capital, Providence Equity,
Madison Dearborn, and their affiliates.
IV. The Proposed Acquisition
16. Clear Channel, Bain, and THL
have agreed that funds and coinvestment vehicles under the direction
of Bain (collectively ‘‘Bain CC
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Affiliates’’) and funds and coinvestment vehicles under the direction
of THL (collectively ‘‘THL CC
Affiliates’’) will purchase a controlling
interest in Clear Channel. Under their
proposal, Bain and THL each will
acquire at least a 35 percent voting and
economic interest in Clear Channel,
with the remaining interest of up to 30
percent staying in the hands of those
current Clear Channel investors and
option-holders who elect to retain an
equity interest in Clear Channel rather
than to receive cash for their shares and/
or stock options. Under the purchase
arrangement, Bain and THL, through
Bain CC Affiliates and THL CC
Affiliates, each will also acquire the
right to designate four directors of the
12 member Clear Channel Board of
Directors. If the transaction is
consummated, Bain and THL together
will control at least 70 percent of the
voting interests of Clear Channel and
designated two-thirds of the members of
the Board of Directors.
V. Relevant Markets
A. Relevant Product Markets
17. Radio Advertising. Radio stations
employ various formats for their
programming, such as Adult
Contemporary, Sports, or Rock. A
station’s format can be important in
determining the size and characteristics
of its listening audience. Companies
that operate radio stations, like Clear
Channel, CMP, and Univision, sell
advertising time to local and national
advertisers in each geographic market
where they operate those stations.
Advertising rates charged by a radio
station are based primarily on the
station’s ability to attract listening
audiences having certain demographic
characteristics in the market area that
advertisers want to reach, as well as on
the number of stations and the relative
demand for radio in the market.
18. Many local and national
advertisers purchase radio advertising
time because they consider it preferable
to advertising in other media to meet
their specific needs. They may consider
radio advertising time to be more costeffective than other media to reach their
target audiences. They may also
consider radio advertising to be more
efficient than other media to reach their
target audiences. Additionally, radio
stations render certain services or
promotional opportunities to advertisers
that the advertisers cannot exploit as
effectively using other media. For these
reasons, many local and national
advertisers who purchase radio
advertising time view radio as a
necessary advertising medium,
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sometimes as a complement to other
media. A substantial number of
advertisers with strong radio
preferences would not turn to other
media if faced with a small but
significant increase in the price of
advertising time on radio stations.
19. Radio stations generally can
identify advertisers with strong radio
preferences. Radio stations also
negotiate prices individually with
advertisers; consequently, radio stations
can charge different advertisers different
prices. Because of this ability to price
discriminate among customers, radio
stations may charge higher prices to the
substantial number of advertisers that
view radio as particularly effective for
their needs, while maintaining lower
prices for other advertisers.
20. In the event of a price increase in
radio advertising time, some local and
national advertisers may switch some of
their advertising to other media rather
than absorb a price increase in radio
advertising time. However, the existence
of such advertisers would not prevent
radio stations from profitably raising
their prices by a small but significant
amount for a substantial number of
advertisers that would not switch.
21. Accordingly, the provision of
advertising time on radio stations is a
line of commerce and a relevant product
market within the meaning of section 7
of the Clayton Act.
22. Spanish-language Radio
Advertising. In markets with a large
Hispanic population, many local and
national advertisers also consider
Spanish-language radio to be
particularly effective or necessary to
reach their desired customers,
particularly consumers who listen
predominantly or exclusively to
Spanish-language radio. A substantial
number of these advertisers consider
Spanish-language radio, either alone or
as complement to other media, to be the
most effective way to reach their target
audience, and do not consider other
media, including non-Spanish-language
radio, to be a reasonable substitute.
These advertisers would not turn to
other media, including radio that is not
broadcast in Spanish, if faced with a
small but significant increase in the
price of advertising time on Spanishlanguage radio.
23. Accordingly, the provision of
advertising time on Spanish-language
radio stations to these advertisers is a
line of commerce and a relevant product
market within the meaning of section 7
of the Clayton Act.
B. Relevant Geographic Markets
24. Local and national advertisers buy
radio advertising time on Clear Channel,
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CMP, and Univision radio stations
within areas defined by an Arbitron
Metro Survey Area (‘‘MSA’’). An MSA
is the geographic unit that is widely
accepted by radio stations, advertisers,
and advertising agencies as the standard
geographic market to use in evaluating
radio audience size and composition.
25. Local and National advertising
that is placed on radio stations in an
MSA is aimed at reaching listening
audiences in that MSA. Radio stations
in other MSAs do not provide effective
access to these audiences. If there were
a small but significant price increase
within an MSA, an insufficient number
of advertisers would switch their
advertising time purchases to radio
stations outside the MSA to make the
price increase unprofitable.
26. In the Houston and Cincinnati
MSAs, Clear Channel and CMP stations
compete against each other and against
other stations in the provision of radio
advertising time to advertisers,
regardless of the language broadcast
over the station. If there were a small
but significant increase in radio
advertising prices within the Houston or
Cincinnati MSA, an insufficient number
of advertisers seeking to reach listeners
in the Houston or Cincinnati MSA
would switch their advertising time
purchases to radio stations outside that
MSA to make the price increase
unprofitable. Accordingly, the Houston
and Cincinnati MSAs (the ‘‘Overlap
Markets’’) are each relevant geographic
markets within the meaning of section
7 of the Clayton Act.
27. In the Houston, Las Vegas, and
San Francisco MSAs, Clear Channel and
Univision compete against each other in
the provision of Spanish-language radio
advertising time to advertisers. If there
were a small but significant increase in
Spanish-language radio advertising
prices in the Houston, Las Vegas, or San
Francisco MSAs, an insufficient number
of advertisers seeking to reach listeners
in the any of those MSAs would switch
their Spanish-language advertising
purchases to radio stations outside that
MSA to make the price increase
unprofitable. Accordingly, the Houston,
Las Vegas, and San Francisco MSAs (the
‘‘Spanish-language Overlap Markets’’)
are each relevant geographic markets
within the meaning of section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
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VI. Harm to Competition
A. Competition in the Relevant
Geographic Markets
1. Radio Advertising in the Overlap
Markets
28. Advertisers who use radio to reach
their target audience select radio
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stations on which to advertise based
upon a number of factors including,
among others, the size of the station’s
audience and the characteristics of its
audience. Many advertisers seek to
reach a large percentage of their target
audience by selecting those stations
whose listening audience is highly
correlated to their target audience.
29. Clear Channel and CMP
vigorously compete for listeners and
closely monitor each other’s competitive
position in the Cincinnati and Houston
MSAs. Their stations are similarly
formatted and programmed with an eye
toward attracting listeners from each
other.
30. Clear Channel and CMP stations
in Houston and Cincinnati also
currently compete vigorously for radio
advertisers who seek to reach the
specific demographic groups listening to
their stations. For many local and
national advertisers buying radio
advertising time in the Houston and
Cincinnati markets, Clear Channel and
CMP stations are each other’s next best
substitutes. During individualized rate
negotiations, the substantial number of
advertisers who desire to reach these
listeners can benefit from this
competition by ‘‘playing off’’ Clear
Channel and CMP stations against each
other to reach better terms.
31. Radio station ownership in
Houston and Cincinnati is highly
concentrated, with Clear Channel and
CMP’s combined listener share
exceeding 34 percent in Houston and 59
percent in Cincinnati. Additionally,
Clear Channel and CMP’s combined
advertising revenue share exceeds 37
percent in Houston and 65 percent in
Cincinnati.
32. Using a measure of market
concentration called the HerfindahlHirschman Index (‘HHI’’), explained in
Appendix A annexed hereto,
concentration in these markets would
increase significantly as a result of the
acquisition, with post-acquisition HHIs
of approximately 2,100 in Houston and
approximately 4,700 in Cincinnati, well
above the 1,800 threshold at which the
Department normally considers a
market to be highly concentrated.
2. Spanish-Language Radio
Advertising Overlap Markets
33. Clear Channel and Univision are
currently vigorous competitors and
closely monitor each other’s competitive
position for Spanish-language listeners
in the Houston, Las Vegas, and San
Francisco MSAs, each of which has a
large Hispanic population. Their
stations in these markets are similarly
formatted and programmed with an eye
toward attracting Spanish-language
listeners from each other.
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34. Clear Channel and Univision
stations also currently compete
vigorously for radio advertisers who
seek to reach Spanish-language
listeners. For many local and national
advertisers buying Spanish-language
radio advertising time in the Houston,
Las Vegas, and San Francisco Spanishlanguage Overlap Markets, Clear
Channel and Univision stations are each
other’s next best substitutes. During
individualized rate negotiations, the
substantial number of advertisers who
desire to reach these listeners can
benefit from this competition by
‘‘playing off’’ Clear Channel and
Univision stations against each other to
reach better terms.
35. Spanish-language radio station
ownership in Houston, Las Vegas, and
San Francisco is highly concentrated.
Clear Channel and Univision’s
combined Spanish-language listener
share exceeds 75 percent in Houston, 73
percent in Las Vegas, and 70 percent in
San Francisco. Additionally, Clear
Channel and Univision’s combined
Spanish-language advertising revenue
share exceeds 79 percent in Houston, 78
percent in Las Vegas, and 63 percent in
San Francisco.
36. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index, concentration in these markets
would increase significantly as a result
of the acquisition, with post-acquisition
HHIs exceeding 6,500 in all three
markets, well above the 1,800 threshold
at which the Department normally
considers a market to be highly
concentrated.
B. This Acquisition Would Substantially
Lessen Competition
1. Radio Advertising in Houston and
Cincinnati
37. Clear Channel is one of only a few
radio companies competing with CMP
in the sale of radio advertising in
Houston and Cincinnati, and within
those markets, the two companies are
each other’s next best substitutes for
advertisers seeking to reach several key
demographic groups. Bain and THL
together possess the ability to control
CMP; they hold 50 percent of the voting
and equity interests and have the right
to choose half of the members of its
Board of Directors. CMP’s Board of
Directors cannot make decisions
without the agreement of either Bain or
THL, which also have access to CMP’s
non-public, competitively sensitive
information and its officers and
employees. These ownership interests
and associated rights give each of Bain
and THL, as well as Bain and THL
acting together, influence over, if not
outright control of, CMP’s management
decisions.
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38. Upon consummation of their
proposed acquisition of interests in
Clear Channel, defendants Bain and
THL together would also control Clear
Channel. Together, they would own at
least 70 percent of the equity and voting
interests of Clear Channel and have the
right to select eight of Clear Channel’s
12 directors. In addition, Bain and THL
would have access to Clear Channel’s
non-public, competitively sensitive
information and to the company’s
officers and employees. After the
acquisition, each of Bain and THL, as
well as Bain and THL acting together,
would have influence over, if not
outright control of, Clear Channel’s
management decisions.
39. Bain or THL, or Bain and THL
acting together, would have the
incentive and ability to use their
ownership, control and influence, and
access to information as to both Clear
Channel and CMP to reduce
competition between the companies in
markets where they are significant
competitors, resulting in an increase in
prices for a significant number of
advertisers. The Houston and Cincinnati
radio markets are highly concentrated,
and these advertisers will find it
difficult or impossible to ‘‘buy around’’
Clear Channel and CMP, i.e., to
effectively reach their targeted audience
without using Clear Channel or CMP
radio stations. Thus, Bain and THL’s
proposed acquisitions of ownership
interests in Clear Channel, if
consummated, would substantially
reduce competition for radio advertising
in the Houston and Cincinnati markets.
2. Spanish-language Radio
Advertising
40. Clear Channel is one of only a few
radio companies competing with
Univision for Spanish-language radio
advertising time in Houston, Las Vegas,
and San Francisco, and within those
markets, the two companies are each
other’s next best substitutes for
advertisers targeting Spanish-language
listeners. THL currently has a 20
percent equity interest and a 14 percent
voting interest in Univision, as well as
the right to designate three Univision
board members. THL also has access to
Univision’s non-public, competitively
sensitive information and its officers
and employees. Significant corporate
decisions at Univision require the assent
of three of its five owners. THL’s
ownership interest and associated rights
give it influence over Univision’s
management decisions.
41. Upon consummation of the
proposed acquisition of Clear Channel,
defendant THL would own at least 35
percent of the equity and voting interest
of Clear Channel, as well as a right to
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choose four of its 12 directors. In
addition, after the acquisition, THL
would have access to Clear Channel’s
non-public, competitively sensitive
information and its officers and
employees. THL’s ownership interest
and associated rights would give it
influence over Clear Channel’s
management decisions.
42. THL would have the incentive and
ability to use its ownership, control and
influence, and access to information as
to both Clear Channel and Univision to
reduce competition between the
companies in markets where they are
significant competitors, resulting in an
increase in prices for a significant
number of advertisers. The Houston, Las
Vegas, and San Francisco radio markets
are highly concentrated, and these
advertisers will find it difficult or
impossible to ‘‘buy around’’ Clear
Channel and Univision, i.e., to
effectively reach their targeted audience
without using Clear Channel or
Univision radio stations. Thus, THL’s
proposed acquisition of an ownership
interest in Clear Channel, if
consummated, would substantially
reduce competition in the Spanishlanguage Overlap Markets.
C. Entry Conditions
43. Entry of new radio stations into
the relevant geographic markets would
not be timely, likely, or sufficient to
mitigate the competitive harm likely to
result from this acquisition. Entry could
occur by obtaining a license for new
radio spectrum or by reformatting an
existing station.
44. Acquisition of new radio spectrum
is highly unlikely because spectrum is
a scarce and expensive commodity.
45. Reformatting by existing stations
in any of the relevant geographic
markets would not be sufficient to
mitigate the competitive harm likely to
result from this acquisition. For those
stations in these markets that have large
shares in other coveted demographics, a
format shift solely in response to small
but significant increases in price by
Clear Channel, CMP, or Univision is not
likely because it would not be
profitable. For those radio stations that
may have incentives to change formats
in response to small but significant
increases in price by Clear Channel,
CMP, and Univision, their shift would
not be sufficient to mitigate the
anticompetitive effects resulting from
this acquisition.
VIII. Violation Alleged
46. Each and every allegation in
paragraphs 1 through 45 of this
Complaint is here realleged with the
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same force and effect as though said
paragraphs were here set forth in full.
47. The effect of the proposed
acquisition of interests in Clear Channel
by Bain and THL would be to
substantially lessen competition in
interstate trade and commerce, in
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.
48. Unless restrained, the transaction
would likely have the following effects,
among others, in the provision of radio
advertising and Spanish-language radio
advertising in the relevant geographic
markets:
a. competition in the sale and
provision of advertising on radio
stations in the relevant markets would
be substantially lessened or eliminated;
and
b. the prices for advertising on radio
stations in the relevant markets would
likely increase, and the quality of
services would likely decline.
IX. Requested Relief
49. The plaintiff requests:
a. That Bain’s and THL’s proposed
acquisitions of interests in Clear
Channel be adjudged to violate Section
7 of the Clayton Act;
b. That the defendants and all persons
acting on their behalf be permanently
enjoined and restrained from
consummating the proposed
acquisitions or from entering into or
carrying out any agreement,
understanding, or plan, the effect of
which is to bring radio stations in the
relevant markets under common
ownership or control;
c. That the United States be awarded
the costs of this action; and
d. That the United States be granted
such other and further relief as the
Court may deem just and proper.
Dated: February 13, 2008.
Respectfully submitted,
For Plaintiff United States:
Thomas O. Barnett (D.C. Bar No. 426840),
Assistant Attorney General
David L. Meyer,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Patricia A. Brink,
Deputy Director of Operations
John R. Read,
Chief, Litigation III Section,
Nina B. Hale,
Assistant Chief, Litigation III Section
Christopher M. Ries,
Daniel McCuaig (D.C. Bar No. 478199),
Attorneys for the United States, Litigation III
Section, Antitrust Division, United States
Department of Justice, 325 7th Street, NW.,
Suite 300, Washington, DC 20530
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on February 13,
2008, I caused a copy of the foregoing
Complaint, proposed Final Judgment,
Competitive Impact Statement, Hold
Separate Stipulation and Order, and
Explanation of Consent Decree
Procedures to be served on the
defendants in this matter in the manner
set forth below:
By electronic mail and hand delivery:
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Counsel for Defendants Bain Capital, LLC
and Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P.,
James M. ‘‘Mit’’ Spears,
Ropes & Gray LLP,
700 12th Street, NW., Suite 900, Washington,
DC 20005–3948, Telephone: (202) 508–4681,
Facsimile: (202) 383–8320, E-mail:
mit.spears@ropesgray.com.
Counsel for Defendant Clear Channel
Communications, Inc.,
Phillip A. Proger,
Jones Day,
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW., Washington, DC
20001–2113, Telephone: (202) 879–4668,
Facsimile: (202) 626–1700, E-mail:
paproger@jonesday.com.
Daniel McCuaig (D.C. Bar No. 478199),
United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, Litigation III Section, 325
Seventh Street, NW., Suite 300, Washington,
DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 307–0520,
Facsimile: (202) 514–7308, E-mail:
daniel.mccuaig@usdoj.gov.
Appendix A Definition of HHI
The term ‘‘HHI’’ means the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a
commonly accepted measure of market
concentration. The HHI is calculated by
squaring the market share of each firm
competing in the market and then
summing the resulting numbers. For
example, for a market consisting of four
firms with shares of 30, 30, 20, and 20
percent, the HHI is 2,600 (30 2 + 30 2 +
20 2 + 20 2 = 2,600). The HHI takes into
account the relative size and
distribution of the firms in a market. It
approaches zero when a market is
occupied by a large number of firms of
relatively equal size and reaches its
maximum of 10,000 when a market is
controlled by a single firm. The HHI
increases both as the number of firms in
the market decreases and as the
disparity in size between those firms
increases.
Markets in which the HHI is between
1000 and 1800 are considered to be
moderately concentrated, and markets
in which the HHI is in excess of 1800
points are considered to be highly
concentrated. Transactions that increase
the HHI by more than 100 points in
highly concentrated markets
presumptively raise significant antitrust
concerns under the Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
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United States District Court for the
District of Columbia
United States Of America, Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division 325 7th Street,
NW., Suite 300 Washington, DC 20530,
Plaintiff, v. Bain Capital, LLC 111 Huntington
Ave., Boston, MA 02199, and Thomas H. Lee
Partners L.P., 100 Federal St. 35th Fl. Boston,
Massachusetts 02110, and Clear Channel
Communications, Inc. 200 E. Basse Rd., San
Antonio, TX 78209, Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 1 :08-cv-00245
Filed: Feb. 13, 2008
Assigned to: Robertson, James
Assign. Date: 2/13/2008
Description: Antitrust
Final Judgment
Whereas, plaintiff, United States of
America, filed its Complaint on
February 13, 1998, the United States
and Defendants Bain Capital, LLC
(‘‘Bain’’), Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P.
(‘‘THL’’), and Clear Channel, by their
respective attorneys, have consulted to
entry of this Final judgment without
trial or adjudication of any issue of fact
or law, and without this Final Judgment
constituting any evidence against or
admission by any party regarding any
issue of fact or law;
And whereas, defendants agree to be
bound by the provisions of this Final
Judgment pending its approval by the
Court;
And whereas, the essence of this Final
Judgment is the prompt and certain
divestiture of certain rights or assets by
defendants to assure that competition is
not substantially lessened;
And whereas, the United States
requires defendants to make certain
divestitures for the purpose of
remedying the loss of competition
alleged in the Complaint;
And whereas, defendants have
represented to the United States that the
divestitures required below can and will
be made and that defendants will later
raise no claim of hardship or difficulty
as grounds for asking the Court to
modify any of the divestiture provisions
contained below;
Now therefore, before any testimony
is taken, without trial or adjudication of
any issue of fact or law, and upon
consent of the parties, it is ordered,
adjudged and decreed:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of and each of the parties
to this action. The Complaint states a
claim upon which relief may be granted
against defendants under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, as amended, 15. U.S.C.
18.
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
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A. ‘‘Bain’’ means Bain Capital, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company
headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts, its directors, officers,
partners, managers, employees, agents,
representatives, successors, and assigns;
and its joint ventures, subsidiaries,
partnerships, divisions, groups,
affiliates, investment funds, hedge
funds, and certain other private equity
investment vehicles controlled or
managed by Bain Capital Partners, LLC,
and the respective directors, officers,
general partners, managers, employees,
agents, representatives, successors, and
assigns of each.
B. ‘‘THL’’ means Thomas H. Lee
Partners, L.P., a Delaware limited
partnership headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts, its directors, officers,
partners, managers, employees, agents,
representatives, successors, and assigns;
and its joint ventures, subsidiaries,
partnerships, divisions, groups,
affiliates, investment funds, hedge
funds, and certain other private equity
investment vehicles controlled or
managed by Thomas H. Lee Partners,
L.P., and the respective directors,
officers, general partners, managers,
employees, agents, representatives,
successors, and assigns of each.
C. ‘‘Clear Channel’’ means Clear
Channel Communications, Inc., a Texas
corporation headquartered in San
Antonio, Texas, its directors, officers,
managers, agents and employees, its
successors and assigns, and its
subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents and employees.
D. ‘‘Univision’’ means Univision
Communications, Inc., a Delaware
corporation headquartered in Los
Angeles, California, its directors,
officers, managers, agents and
employees, its successors and assigns,
and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
E. ‘‘BMP–Univision Holdings’’ means
Broadcasting Media Partners, Inc., a
Delaware corporation headquartered in
New York that holds all of Univision’s
outstanding shares, its directors,
officers, managers, agents and
employees, its successors and assigns,
and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
F. ‘‘CMP Susquehanna’’ means CMP
Susquehanna Holdings, Corp., a
Delaware corporation headquartered in
Atlanta that is owned by Cumulus
Media Partners, its directors, officers,
managers, agents and employees, its
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successors and assigns, and its
subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
G. ‘‘Cumulus Media Partners’’ means
Cumulus Media Partners, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company
headquartered in Atlanta, its directors,
officers, managers, agents and
employees, its successors and assigns,
and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
H. ‘‘MSA’’ means Metro Survey Area.
A Metro Survey Area is a geographical
area in which Arbitron, a radio industry
survey company, collects listener data
to aid radio stations, advertisers, and
advertising agencies in evaluating radio
audience size and composition.
I. ‘‘Cincinnati’’ means the Cincinnati,
Ohio MSA.
J. ‘‘Houston’’ means the Houston/
Galveston, Texas MSA.
K. ‘‘Las Vegas’’ means the Las Vegas,
Nevada MSA.
L. ‘‘San Francisco’’ means the San
Francisco, California MSA.
M. ‘‘WLW’’ means the radio station
WLW-AM located in Cincinnati owned
by defendant Clear Channel.
N. ‘‘WKFS’’ means the radio station
WKFS-FM located in Cincinnati owned
by defendant Clear Channel.
O. ‘‘WOFX’’ means the radio station
WOFX–FM located in Cincinnati owned
by defendant Clear Channel.
P. ‘‘WNNF’’ means the radio station
WNNF located in Cincinnati owned by
defendant Clear Channel.
Q. ‘‘KLOL’’ means the radio station
KLOL–FM located in Houston owned by
defendant Clear Channel.
R. ‘‘KHMX’’ means the radio station
KHMX–FM located in Houston owned
by defendant Clear Channel.
S. ‘‘KTBZ’’ means the radio station
KTBZ–FM located in Houston owned by
defendant Clear Channel.
T. ‘‘KWID’’ means the radio station
KWID–FM located in Las Vegas owned
by defendant Clear Channel.
U. ‘‘KSJO’’ means the radio station
KSJO–FM located in San Francisco
owned by defendant Clear Channel.
V. ‘‘Cincinnati Assets’’ means either
(1) WLW and WKFS or, at the discretion
of the defendants, (2) WOFX and
WNNF.
W. ‘‘Houston Assets’’ means either (1)
KHMX or, at the discretion of the
defendants, (2) KTBZ.
X. ‘‘Houston Spanish-language
Assets’’ means KLOL.
Y. ‘‘Las Vegas Spanish-language
Assets’’ means KWID.
Z. ‘‘San Francisco Spanish-language
Assets’’ means KSJO.
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AA. ‘‘Clear Channel Assets’’ means
collectively, the Cincinnati Assets and
the Houston Assets.
AB. ‘‘Clear Channel Spanish-language
Assets’’ means, collectively, the
Houston Spanish-language Assets, Las
Vegas Spanish-language Assets, and San
Francisco Spanish-language Assets.
AC. ‘‘Divestiture Assets’’ means all of
the assets, tangible or intangible, used in
the operations of the Clear Channel
Assets and the Clear Channel Spanishlanguage Assets, including, but not
limited to: (i) All licenses, permits,
authorizations, and applications
therefor issued by the Federal
Communications Commission (‘‘FCC’’)
and other government agencies related
to the Clear Channel Assets and the
Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets;
(ii) all contracts (including
programming contracts and rights),
agreements, leases, and commitments
and understandings of defendants
relating to the operations of the Clear
Channel Assets and the Clear Channel
Spanish-language Assets; (iii) all
interest in real property (owned or
leased) relating to the transmitter
facilities of the Clear Channel Assets
and the Clear Channel Spanish-language
Assets and all items of tangible property
used in the operation of the Clear
Channel Assets and the Clear Channel
Spanish-language Assets at such
transmitter facilities; (iv) all interest in
the real property lease relating to the
studios of the Clear Channel Assets and
the Clear Channel Spanish-language
Assets; (v) all broadcast equipment,
office equipment, office furniture,
fixtures, materials, supplies, and other
tangible property used in the operation
of the Clear Channel Assets and the
Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets;
(vi) all interests in trademarks, service
marks, trade names, copyrights, patents,
slogans, programming materials, and
promotional materials relating to the
Clear Channel Assets and the Clear
Channel Spanish-language Assets; (vii)
all customer lists, accounts, and credit
records relating to the Clear Channel
Assets and the Clear Channel Spanishlanguage Assets; and (viii) all other
records maintained by defendants in
connection with the Clear Channel
Assets and the Clear Channel Spanishlanguage Assets; however, assets that:
(a) Are principally devoted to the
operation of stations other than the
Clear Channel Assets and the Clear
Channel Spanish-language Assets or to
the operation of their parent companies,
and are not necessary to the operation
of the Clear Channel Assets and the
Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets
shall not be included within the
Divestiture Assets; or (b) are part of a
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shared group of like assets (including,
but not limited to, microphones and
office supplies) shall be allocated to
Clear Channel Assets and Clear Channel
Spanish-language Assets, and thus to
Divestiture Assets, only in proportion
with their use by the Clear Channel
Assets or the Clear Channel Spanishlanguage Assets.
AD. ‘‘Clear Channel Divestiture
Assets’’ are the Divestiture Assets
relating to the Clear Channel Assets.
AE. ‘‘Clear Channel Spanish-language
Divestiture Assets’’ are the Divestiture
Assets relating to the Clear Channel
Spanish-language Assets.
AF. ‘‘Acquirer’’ means the entity or
entities to whom defendants divest any
Divestiture Assets.
III. Applicability
A. This Final Judgment applies to
THL, Bain, and Clear Channel, as
defined above, and all other persons in
active concert or participation with any
of them who receive actual notice of this
Final Judgment by personal service or
otherwise.
B. If, prior to complying with Sections
IV and V of this Final Judgment,
Defendants sell or otherwise dispose of
all or substantially all of their assets or
of lesser business units that include the
Divestiture Assets, they shall require the
purchaser to be bound by the provisions
of this Final Judgment. Defendants need
not obtain such an agreement from the
acquirers of the assets divested pursuant
to this Final Judgment.
IV. Divestitures
A. Defendant Clear Channel is
ordered and directed to divest the
Divestiture Assets in a manner
consistent with this Final Judgment to
an Acquirer or Acquirers acceptable to
the United States in its sole discretion,
within ninety (90) calendar days from
the date of the closing of the transaction
that is the subject of the Final Judgment
or five (5) calendar days after notice of
the entry of this Final Judgment by the
Court, whichever is later. The United
States, in its sole discretion, may agree
to one or more extensions of this time
period not to exceed in total sixty (60)
calendar days, and shall notify the Court
in each such circumstance. If, within
the period permitted for divestitures,
defendants have filed applications with
the FCC seeking approval to assign or
transfer licenses to the Acquirer(s)
(previously approved by the United
States, pursuant to the terms of this
paragraph) of the Clear Channel Assets
and the Clear Channel Spanish-language
Assets, but an order or other dispositive
action by the FCC on such applications
has not been issued before the end of
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the period permitted for divestitures,
the period shall be extended with
respect to divestiture of those Clear
Channel Assets and Clear Channel
Spanish-language Assets for which FCC
final approval has not been issued until
ten (10) calendar days after such
approval is received. Defendant Clear
Channel agrees to use its best efforts to
divest the Divestiture Assets, and to
obtain all regulatory approvals
necessary for such divestitures, as
expeditiously as possible.
B. The Divestiture Assets shall not
include the Clear Channel Assets if,
prior to the completion of the
divestitures required by this Final
Judgment, both THL and Bain no longer
have any have limited liability company
membership or any type of debt, equity
governance, or other beneficial interest
in either Cumulus Media Partners or
CMP Susquehanna, and have provided
written certification (and supporting
documentation) satisfactory to the
United States that they have divested all
such assets.
C. The Divestiture Assets shall not
include the Clear Channel Spanishlanguage Assets if, prior to the
completion of the divestitures required
by this Final Judgment, defendant THL
no longer has any shares of capital stock
or any type of debt, equity, governance,
or other beneficial interest in either
BMP-Univision Holdings or Univision,
and has provided written certification
(and supporting documentation)
satisfactory to the United States that it
has divested all such assets.
D. The obligation to divest the San
Francisco Spanish-language Assets shall
be suspended if, prior to the completion
of the divestitures required by this Final
Judgment, those assets have been
transferred to an FCC-authorized trust,
and shall cease if such assets are sold
under the terms of the FCC-authorized
trust.
E. In accomplishing the divestitures
ordered by this Final Judgment,
defendant Clear Channel promptly shall
make known, by usual and customary
means, the availability of the Divestiture
Assets. Defendants shall inform any
person making inquiry regarding a
possible purchase of the Divestiture
Assets that they are being divested
pursuant to this Final Judgment and
provide that person with a copy of this
Final Judgment. Defendant Clear
Channel shall offer to furnish to all
prospective Acquirers, subject to
customary confidentiality assurances,
all information and documents relating
to the Divestiture Assets customarily
provided in a due diligence process
except such information or documents
subject to the attorney-client privilege or
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work-product doctrine. Defendant Clear
Channel shall make available such
information to the United States at the
same time that such information is
made available to any other person.
F. Defendant Clear Channel shall
provide to the Acquirer or Acquirers
and the United States information
relating to personnel involved in the
operation of the Divestiture Assets to
enable the Acquirer or Acquirers to
make offers of employment. Defendants
shall not interfere with any negotiations
by the Acquirer or Acquirers to employ
any Clear Channel employee whose
primary responsibility is the operation
of the Divestiture Assets.
G. Defendant Clear Channel shall
permit prospective Acquirers of the
Divestiture Assets to have reasonable
access to personnel and to make
inspections of the physical facilities of
the Divestiture Assets; access to any and
all environmental, zoning, and other
permit documents and information; and
access to any and all financial,
operational, or other documents and
information customarily provided as
part of a due diligence process.
H. Defendant Clear Channel shall
warrant to the Acquirer or Acquirers
that each of the assets will be
operational on the date of sale.
I. Defendants shall not take any action
that will impede in any way the
permitting, operation, or divestiture of
the Divestiture Assets.
J. Defendant Clear Channel shall
warrant to the Acquirer or Acquirers
that there are no material defects in the
environmental, zoning, or other permits
pertaining to the operation of the
Divestiture Assets, and that following
the sale of the Divestiture Assets,
defendants will not undertake, directly
or indirectly, any challenges to the
environmental, zoning, or other permits
relating to the operation of the
Divestiture Assets.
K. Unless the United States otherwise
consents in writing, any divestiture
pursuant to Section IV, or by trustee
appointed pursuant to Section V, of this
Final Judgment, shall include the entire
Divestiture Assets, and shall be
accomplished in such a way as to satisfy
the United States, in its sole discretion
that (i) the Clear Channel Assets can and
will be used by the Acquirer or
Acquirers as part of viable, ongoing
businesses engaged in ongoing
commercial radio broadcasting; (ii) the
Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets
can and will be used by the Acquirer or
Acquirers as part of viable, ongoing
businesses engaged in ongoing
commercial Spanish language radio
broadcasting; (iii) that the Divestiture
Assets will remain viable; and (iv) that
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the divestiture of such assets will
remedy the competitive harm alleged in
the Complaint. The sale of the
Divestiture Assets may be made to one
or more Acquirers, provided that in
each instance it is demonstrated to the
sole satisfaction of the United States
that the Divestiture Assets will remain
viable. The divestitures, whether
pursuant to Section IV or Section V of
this Final Judgment:
1. Shall be made to an Acquirer or
Acquirers that, in the United States’ sole
judgment, has the intent and capability
(including the necessary managerial,
operational, technical, and financial
capability) to compete effectively in
either the commercial radio
broadcasting business (for the
Cincinnati Assets and the Houston
Assets) or the commercial Spanishlanguage radio broadcasting business
(for the Houston Spanish-language
Assets, the Las Vegas Spanish-language
Assets, and the San Francisco Spanishlanguage Assets); and
2. shall be accomplished so as to
satisfy the United States, in its sole
discretion, that none of the terms of any
agreement between an Acquirer or
Acquirers and defendant Clear Channel
gives defendant the ability to
unreasonably raise the Acquirer’s costs,
to lower the Acquirer’s efficiency, or
otherwise to interfere in the ability of
the Acquirer to compete effectively.
v. Appointment of Trustee
A. If defendant Clear Channel has not
divested the Divestiture Assets within
the time period specified in Paragraph
IV (A), defendants shall notify the
United States of that fact in writing.
Upon application of the United States,
the Court shall appoint a trustee
selected by the United States and
approved by the Court to effect the
divestiture of the Divestiture Assets.
B. After the appointment of a trustee
becomes effective, only the trustee shall
have the right to sell the Divestiture
Assets. The trustee shall have the power
and authority to accomplish the
divestiture to an Acquirer acceptable to
the United States at such price and on
such terms as are then obtainable upon
reasonable effort by the trustee, subject
to the provisions of Sections IV, V, and
VI of this Final Judgment, and shall
have such other powers as this Court
deems appropriate. Subject to Paragraph
V(D) of this Final Judgment, the trustee
may hire at the cost and expense of
defendants any investment bankers,
attorneys, or other agents, who shall be
solely accountable to the trustee, and
are reasonably necessary in the trustee’s
judgment to assist in the divestiture.
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C. Defendants shall not object to a sale
by the trustee on any ground other than
the trustee’s malfeasance. Any such
objection by defendants must be
conveyed in writing to the United States
and the trustee within ten (10) calendar
days after the trustee has provided the
notice required under section VI.
D. The trustee shall serve at the cost
and expense of the defendants, on such
terms and conditions as the United
States approves, and shall account for
all monies derived from the sale of the
assets sold by the trustee and all costs
and expenses so incurred. After
approval by the Court of the trustee’s
accounting, including fees for its
services and those of any professionals
and agents retained by the trustee, all
remaining money shall be paid to the
defendants and the trust shall then be
terminated. The compensation of the
trustee and any professionals and agents
retained by the trustee shall be
reasonable in light of the value of the
Divestiture Assets and based on a fee
arrangement providing the trustee with
an incentive based on the price and
terms of the divestiture and the speed
with which it is accomplished, but
timeliness is paramount.
E. Defendants shall use their best
efforts to assist the trustee in
accomplishing the required divestiture.
The trustee and any consultants,
accountants, attorneys, and other
persons retained by the trustee shall
have full and complete access to the
personnel, books, records, and facilities
of the business to be divested, and the
defendants shall develop financial and
other information relevant to such
business as the trustee may reasonably
request, subject to reasonable protection
for trade secrets or other confidential
research, development, or commercial
information. Defendants shall take no
action to interfere with or to impede the
trustee’s accomplishment of the
divestiture.
F. After its appointment, the trustee
shall file monthly reports with the
United States and the Court setting forth
the trustee’s efforts to accomplish the
divestiture ordered under this Final
Judgment. To the extent such reports
contain information that the trustee
deems confidential, such reports shall
not be filed in the public docket of the
Court. Such reports shall include the
name, address, and telephone number of
each person who, during the preceding
month, made an offer to acquire,
expressed an interest in acquiring,
entered into negotiations to acquire, or
was contacted or made an inquiry about
acquiring any interest in the Divestiture
Assets, and shall describe in detail each
contact with any such person. The
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trustee shall maintain full records of all
efforts made to divest the Divestiture
Assets.
G. If the trustee has not accomplished
the divestitures ordered under this Final
Judgment within six months after its
appointment, the trustee shall promptly
file with the Court a report setting forth:
(1) The trustee’s efforts to accomplish
the required divestiture; (2) the reasons,
in the trustee’s judgment, why the
required divestiture has not been
accomplished; and (3) the trustee’s
recommendations. To the extent such
report contains information that the
trustee deems confidential, such report
shall not be filed in the public docket
of the Court. The trustee shall at the
same time furnish such report to the
United States, which shall have the
right to make additional
recommendations consistent with the
purpose of the trust. The Court
thereafter shall enter such orders as it
shall deem appropriate to carry out the
purpose of the Final Judgment, which
may, if necessary, include extending the
trust and the term of the trustee’s
appointment by a period requested by
the United States.
VI. Notice of Proposed Divestitures
A. Within two (2) business days
following execution of a definitive
divestiture agreement, defendant Clear
Channel or the trustee, whichever is
then responsible for effecting the
divestitures required herein, shall notify
the United States of any proposed
divestitures required by Section IV or V
of this Final Judgment. If the trustee is
responsible, it shall similarly notify
defendants. The notice shall set forth
the details of the proposed divestiture(
s) and list the name, address, and
telephone number of each person not
previously identified who offered or
expressed an interest in or desire to
acquire any ownership interest in the
Divestiture Assets, together with full
details of the same.
B. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of
receipt by the United States of such
notice, the United States may request
from the defendants, the proposed
Acquirer or Acquirers, any other third
party, or the trustee, if applicable,
additional information concerning the
proposed divestitures, the proposed
Acquirer or Acquirers, and any other
potential Acquirer. Defendants and the
trustee shall furnish any additional
information requested within fifteen
(15) calendar days of the receipt of the
request, unless the parties shall
otherwise agree.
C. Within thirty (30) calendar days
after receipt of the notice or within
twenty (20) calendar days after the
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10815
United States has been provided the
additional information requested from
defendants, the proposed Acquirer or
Acquirers, any third party, and the
trustee, whichever is later, the United
States shall provide written notice to
defendants and the trustee, if there is
one, stating whether or not it objects to
the proposed divestiture(s). If the
United States provides written notice
that it does not object, the divestitures
may be consummated, subject only to
defendants’ limited right to object to the
sale under Paragraph V(C) of this Final
Judgment. Absent written notice that the
United States does not object to the
proposed Acquirer or upon objection by
the United States, a divestiture
proposed under Section IV or Section V
shall not be consummated. Upon
objection by defendant Clear Channel
under Paragraph V(C), a divestiture
proposed under Section V shall not be
consummated unless approved by the
Court.
VII. Financing
Defendants shall not finance all or
any part of any purchase made pursuant
to Section IV or V of this Final
Judgment.
VIII. Preservation of Assets/Hold
Separate
Until the divestitures required by this
Final Judgment have been
accomplished, defendants shall take all
steps necessary to comply with the Hold
Separate Stipulation and Order entered
by this Court. Defendants shall take no
action that would jeopardize the
divestitures ordered by this Court.
IX. Affidavits
A. Within twenty (20) calendar days
of the filing of the Complaint in this
matter, and every thirty (30) calendar
days thereafter until the divestitures
have been completed under section IV
or V, defendants shall deliver to the
United States an affidavit as to the fact
and manner of their compliance with
section IV or V of this Final Judgment.
Each such affidavit shall include the
name, address, and telephone number of
each person who, during the preceding
thirty (30) calendar days, made an offer
to acquire, expressed an interest in
acquiring, entered into negotiations to
acquire, or was contacted or made an
inquiry about acquiring, any interest in
the Divestiture Assets, and shall
describe in detail each contact with any
such person during that period. Each
such affidavit shall also include a
description of the efforts defendants
have taken to solicit buyers for the
Divestiture Assets, and to provide
required information to any prospective
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Acquirer, including the limitations, if
any, on such information. Assuming the
information set forth in the affidavit is
true and complete, any objection by the
United States to information provided
by defendants, including limitations on
the information, shall be made within
fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of
such affidavit.
B. Within twenty (20) calendar days
of the filing of the Complaint in this
matter, defendants shall deliver to the
United States an affidavit that describes
in reasonable detail all actions
defendants have taken and all steps
defendants have implemented on an
ongoing basis to comply with Section
VIII of this Final Judgment. Defendants
shall deliver to the United States an
affidavit describing any changes to the
efforts and actions outlined in
defendants’ earlier affidavits filed
pursuant to this section within fifteen
(15) calendar days after the change is
implemented.
C. Defendants shall keep all records of
all efforts made to preserve and divest
the Divestiture Assets until one year
after such divestitures have been
completed.
X. Compliance Inspection
A. For the purposes of determining or
securing compliance with this Final
Judgment, or of determining whether
the Final Judgment should be modified
or vacated, and subject to any legally
recognized privilege, from time to time
authorized representatives of the United
States Department of Justice, including
consultants and other persons retained
by the United States, shall, upon written
request of a duly authorized
representative of the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust
Division, and on reasonable notice to
defendants, be permitted:
1. Access during defendants’ office
hours to inspect and copy, or at the
option of the United States, to require
defendants to provide hard or electronic
copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts,
records, data, and documents in the
possession, custody, or control of
defendants, relating to any matters
contained in this Final Judgment; and
2. to interview, either informally or on
the record, defendants’ officers,
employees, or agents, who may have
their individual counsel present,
regarding such matters. The interviews
shall be subject to the reasonable
convenience of the interviewee and
without restraint or interference by any
defendant.
B. Upon the written request of an
authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division, defendants shall
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submit written reports or responses to
written interrogatories, under oath if
requested, relating to any of the matters
contained in this Final Judgment as may
be requested.
C. No information or documents
obtained by the means provided in this
section shall be divulged by the United
States to any person other than an
authorized representative of the
executive branch of the United States,
except in the course of legal proceedings
to which the United States is a party
(including grand jury proceedings), or
for the purpose of securing compliance
with this Final Judgment, or as
otherwise required by law.
D. If, at the time information or
documents are furnished by defendants
to the United States, defendants
represent and identify in writing the
material in any such information or
documents to which a claim of
protection may be asserted under Rule
26( c)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and defendants mark each
pertinent page of such material,
‘‘Subject to claim of protection under
Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,’’ then the United States
shall give defendants ten (10) calendar
days notice prior to divulging such
material in any legal proceeding (other
than a grand jury proceeding).
XI. No Reacquisition
A. As long as defendant Bain has any
limited liability company membership
or debt, equity, governance, or other
beneficial interest in Clear Channel and
either Cumulus Media Partners or CMP
Susquehanna, defendants Bain and
Clear Channel may not reacquire any
part of the Clear Channel Divestiture
Assets nor enter into any local
marketing agreement, joint sales
agreement, or any other cooperative
selling arrangement with respect to the
Clear Channel Divestiture Assets.
B. As long as defendant THL has any
limited liability company membership
or debt, equity, governance, or other
beneficial interest in Clear Channel and
either Cumulus Media Partners or CMP
Susquehanna, defendants THL and
Clear Channel may not reacquire any
part of the Clear Channel Divestiture
Assets nor enter into any local
marketing agreement, joint sales
agreement, or any other cooperative
selling arrangement with respect to the
Clear Channel Divestiture Assets.
C. As long as defendant THL has any
limited liability company membership
or debt, equity, governance, or other
beneficial interest in Clear Channel and
either Univision or BMP-Univision
Holdings, defendants THL and Clear
Channel may not reacquire any part of
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the Clear Channel Spanish-language
Divestiture Assets nor enter into any
local marketing agreement, joint sales
agreement, or any other cooperative
selling arrangement with respect to the
Clear Channel Spanish-language
Divestiture Assets.
D. If defendants Bain and THL
satisfied the requirements of Paragraph
IV (B) of this Final Judgment and thus
did not divest the Clear Channel Assets,
no defendant may, so long as Bain or
THL has any limited liability company
membership or debt, equity,
governance, or other beneficial interest
in Clear Channel, acquire any beneficial
interest in either Cumulus Media
Partners or CMP Susquehanna nor enter
into any local marketing agreement,
joint sales agreement, or any other
cooperative selling arrangement
between Clear Channel and Cumulus
Media Partners or CMP Susquehanna
with respect to radio stations in
Cincinnati or Houston.
E. If defendant THL satisfied the
requirements of Paragraph IV(C) of this
Final Judgment and thus did not divest
the Clear Channel Spanish-language
Assets, neither THL nor Clear Channel
may, so long as THL has any limited
liability company membership or debt,
equity, governance, or other beneficial
interest in Clear Channel, acquire any
beneficial interest in either BMPUnivision Holdings or Univision nor
enter into any local marketing
agreement, joint sales agreement, or any
other cooperative selling arrangement
between Clear Channel and BMPUnivision or Univision with respect to
radio stations in Houston, Las Vegas, or
San Francisco.
XII. Retention of Jurisdiction
This Court retains jurisdiction to
enable any party to this Final Judgment
to apply to this Court at any time for
further orders and directions as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out or
construe this Final Judgment, to modify
any of its provisions, to enforce
compliance, and to punish violations of
its provisions.
XIII. Expiration of Final Judgment
Unless this Court grants an extension,
this Final Judgment shall expire ten
years from the date of its entry.
XIV. Public Interest Determination
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the
public interest. The parties have
complied with the requirements of the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. Section 16, including making
copies available to the public of this
Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact
Statement, and any comments thereon
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and the United States’ responses to
comments. Based upon the record
before the Court, which includes the
Competitive Impact Statement and any
comments and response to comments
filed with the Court, entry of this Final
Judgment is in the public interest.
Date:
llllllllllllllllll
l
Court approval subject to procedures of
the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 16: United States
District Judge.
In the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia
United States of America, Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, 325 7th Street,
NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20530,
Plaintiff, v. Bain Capital, LLC, 111
Huntington Ave., Boston, MA 02199, and
Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P., 100 Federal St.
35th Fl., Boston, MA 02110, and Clear
Channel Communications, Inc., 200 E. Basse
Rd., San Antonio, TX 78209, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 1:08–cv–00245
Filed: Feb. 13, 2008
Assigned to: Robertson, James
Assign Date: 2/13/2008
Description: Antitrust
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Competitive Impact Statement
Plaintiff United States of America
(‘‘United States’’), pursuant to section
2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act (‘‘APPA’’ or ‘‘Tunney
Act’’), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), files this
Competitive Impact Statement relating
to the proposed Final Judgment
submitted for entry in this civil antitrust
proceeding.
Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
Defendants entered into an Agreement
and Plan of Merger dated November 16,
2006, pursuant to which a private equity
group of investors led by Bain Capital,
LLC (‘‘Bain’’) and Thomas H. Lee
Partners, L.P. (‘‘THL’’) will acquire a 70
percent interest in Clear Channel
Communications Inc. (‘‘Clear Channel’’),
the largest operator of radio stations in
the United States.
Plaintiff filed a civil antitrust
Complaint on February 13, 2008 seeking
to enjoin the proposed acquisition of a
controlling interest in Clear Channel by
Bain and THL. The Complaint alleges
that, because Bain and THL hold
sizeable interests in two radio operators
that compete with Clear Channel—
Cumulus Media Partners LLC (‘‘CMP’’)
and Univision Communications, Inc.
(‘‘Univision’’)—the proposed
acquisition would substantially lessen
competition in the provision of radio
advertising and Spanish-language radio
advertising in several relevant
geographic markets, in violation of
section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
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section 18. This loss of competition
likely would result in the lessening or
elimination of competition in the sale
and provision of advertising on radio
stations in the relevant markets, and
increased prices and reduced services
associated with advertising on radio
stations in those relevant markets.
At the same time the Complaint was
filed, plaintiff also filed a Hold Separate
Stipulation and Order and a proposed
Final Judgment, which, as explained
more fully below, are designed to
eliminate the anticompetitive effects of
the acquisition. Under the proposed
Final Judgment, defendants are required
to divest radio stations in Cincinnati,
Ohio; Houston/Galveston, Texas
(‘‘Houston’’); Las Vegas, Nevada; and
San Francisco, California (collectively,
the ‘‘Divestiture Assets’’). Under the
Hold Separate Stipulation and Order,
defendants will take certain steps to
ensure that the Divestiture Assets will
remain independent of and
uninfluenced by defendants during the
pendency of the ordered divestiture,
and that competition is maintained
during the pendency of the ordered
divestiture.
Plaintiff and defendants have
stipulated that the proposed Final
Judgment may be entered after
compliance with the APPA. Entry of the
proposed Final Judgment would
terminate this action, except that the
Court would retain jurisdiction to
construe, modify, or enforce the
provisions of the proposed Final
Judgment and to punish violations
thereof.
II. Description of the Events Giving Rise
to the Alleged Violations
A. Defendants, Other Relevant Entities,
and the Proposed Transaction
Defendant Bain is a Delaware limited
liability company headquartered in
Boston, Massachusetts. Bain is one of
the world’s leading private investment
firms with over $40 billion in assets
under management. Defendant THL is a
Delaware limited partnership
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts
and also is one of the world’s leading
private investment firms. THL currently
manages approximately $12 billion of
committed capital. Bain and THL raise
pools of capital from private investors,
controlling and managing that capital
through private equity funds and coinvestment vehicles that invest in
discrete opportunities, such as venture
capital, public equity, and leveraged
debt assets. Bain and THL, either
directly or indirectly through
management teams they install,
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typically manage and operate the assets
in which they invest.
Defendant Clear Channel is a
diversified media company
incorporated in Texas and
headquartered in San Antonio, Texas.
Clear Channel owns various media
outlets including radio stations,
domestic and international outdoor
advertising assets, television stations,
and a media representation firm. Radio
broadcasting is Clear Channel’s largest
business segment, representing over 50
percent of Clear Channel’s total revenue.
As of February 5, 2008, Clear Channel
owned 833 radio stations in the United
States, 508 of which were located
within the top 100 markets as ranked by
Arbitron, an international media
marketing and research firm, including
stations in Cincinnati, Houston, Las
Vegas, and San Francisco.
Bain and THL are owners, along with
the Blackstone Group, Cumulus
Broadcasting, Inc., and their affiliates, of
CMP, a limited liability company
formed in 2005. Bain and THL each
control 25 percent of the voting interests
of CMP and designate two members to
its eight member Board of Directors.
Together, Bain and THL control 50
percent of the voting interests of CMP
and designate one-half of the members
of its Board of Directors. As of February
5, 2008, CMP owned 34 radio stations
in various markets, including stations
that compete head-to-head with Clear
Channel stations in Cincinnati and
Houston.
THL is an owner, along with Haim
Saban, TPG Capital, Providence Equity,
Madison Dearborn, and their affiliates,
of Univision, the largest broadcaster of
Spanish-language television
programming in the United States.
Univision is headquartered in New York
City. THL, through affiliated funds and
co-investment vehicles, currently holds
a 20 percent equity interest and a 14
percent voting interest in Univision and
designates three members to Univision’s
17 member Board of Directors.
Univision owns 70 radio stations that
broadcast in Spanish language in several
markets, including Houston, Las Vegas,
and San Francisco, where Univision
radio stations compete head-to-head
with Clear Channel’s Spanish-language
radio stations.
Bain and THL are planning to acquire,
each through various affiliated funds,
substantial ownership interests in Clear
Channel (the ‘‘transaction’’). The
anticipated value of the transaction is
$28 billion. Under the purchase
arrangement, Bain and THL each will
acquire at least a 35 percent voting and
economic interest in Clear Channel,
with the remaining interest of up to 30
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percent staying in the hands of those
current Clear Channel investors and
option-holders who elect to retain an
equity interest in Clear Channel rather
than to receive cash for their shares and/
or stock options. Bain and THL each
also will acquire the right to designate
four directors of the 12 member Clear
Channel Board of Directors. If the
transaction is consummated, Bain and
THL together will control at least 70
percent of the voting interests of Clear
Channel and designate two-thirds of the
members of the Board of Directors. This
acquisition is the subject of the
Complaint and proposed Final
Judgment filed by plaintiff.
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III. The Competitive Effects of the
Acquisition
Given their existing ownership
interests in CMP and Univision, the
effect of Bain’s and THL’s acquisition of
substantial partial ownership interests
in Clear Channel may be to substantially
lessen competition in markets in which
stations owned by CMP or Univision—
Houston, Cincinnati, Las Vegas, and San
Francisco—compete head-to-head with
Clear Channel stations.
A. Relevant Product Markets
1. Radio Advertising is a Relevant
Product Market
Radio stations employ various formats
for their programming, such as Adult
Contemporary, Sports, or Rock. A
station’s format can be important in
determining the size and characteristics
of its listening audience. Companies
that operate radio stations, such as Clear
Channel, CMP, and Univision, sell
advertising time to local and national
advertisers in each geographic market
where they operate those stations.
Advertising rates charged by a radio
station are based primarily on the
station’s ability to attract listening
audiences having certain demographic
characteristics in the market area that
advertisers want to reach, as well as on
the number of stations and the relative
demand for radio in the market.
Many local and national advertisers
purchase radio advertising time because
they consider it preferable to advertising
in other media to meet their specific
needs. They may consider radio
advertising time to be more costeffective than other media to reach their
target audiences. They may also
consider radio advertising to be more
efficient than other media to reach their
target audiences. Additionally, radio
stations render certain services or
promotional opportunities to advertisers
that the advertisers cannot exploit as
effectively using other media. For these
reasons, many local and national
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advertisers that purchase radio
advertising time view radio as a
necessary advertising medium,
sometimes as a complement to other
media. A substantial number of
advertisers with strong radio
preferences would not turn to other
media if faced with a small but
significant increase in the price of
advertising time on radio stations.
Radio stations generally can identify
advertisers with strong radio
preferences. Radio stations also
negotiate prices individually with
advertisers. Consequently, radio stations
can charge different advertisers different
prices. Because of this ability to price
discriminate among customers, radio
stations may charge higher prices to the
substantial number of advertisers that
view radio as particularly effective for
their needs, while maintaining lower
prices for other advertisers.
In the event of a price increase in
radio advertising time, some local and
national advertisers may switch some of
their advertising to other media rather
than absorb a price increase in radio
advertising time. However, the existence
of such advertisers would not prevent
radio stations from profitably raising
their prices by a small but significant
amount for the substantial number of
advertisers that would not switch.
Accordingly, the Complaint alleges
that the provision of advertising time on
radio stations is a line of commerce and
a relevant product market within the
meaning of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
2. Spanish-language Radio
Advertising is a Relevant Product
Market
In markets with a large Hispanic
population, many local and national
advertisers also consider Spanishlanguage radio to be particularly
effective or necessary to reach their
desired customers, especially
consumers who listen predominantly or
exclusively to Spanish-language radio.
A substantial number of these
advertisers consider Spanish-language
radio, either alone or as a complement
to other media, to be the most effective
way to reach their target audience, and
do not consider other media, including
non-Spanish-language radio, to be a
reasonable substitute. These advertisers
would not turn to other media,
including radio that is broadcast in a
language other than Spanish, if faced
with a small but significant increase in
the price of advertising time on
Spanish-language radio.
Accordingly, the Complaint alleges
that the provision of advertising time on
Spanish-language radio stations to these
advertisers is a line of commerce and a
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relevant product market within the
meaning of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
B. Relevant Geographic Markets
Local and national advertisers buy
radio advertising time on stations
within areas defined by an Arbitron
Metro Survey Area (‘‘MSA’’). An MSA
is the geographic unit that is widely
accepted by radio stations, advertisers,
and advertising agencies as the standard
geographic market to use in evaluating
radio audience size and composition.
Local and national advertising that is
placed on radio stations in an MSA is
aimed at reaching listening audiences in
that MSA. Radio stations in other MSAs
do not provide effective access to these
audiences. If there were a small but
significant price increase within an
MSA, an insufficient number of
advertisers would switch their
advertising time purchases to radio
stations outside the MSA to make the
price increase unprofitable.
In the Houston and Cincinnati MSAs,
Clear Channel and CMP stations
compete against each other and against
other stations in the provision of radio
advertising time to advertisers,
regardless of the language broadcast
over the station. If there were a small
but significant increase in radio
advertising prices within the Houston
MSA or the Cincinnati MSA, an
insufficient number of advertisers
seeking to reach listeners in the Houston
MSA or the Cincinnati MSA would
switch their advertising time purchases
to radio stations outside that MSA to
make the price increase unprofitable.
Accordingly, the Complaint alleges that
the Houston and Cincinnati MSAs (the
‘‘Overlap Markets’’) are each relevant
geographic markets within the meaning
of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In the Houston MSA, Las Vegas MSA,
and San Francisco MSA, Clear Channel
and Univision compete against each
other in the provision of Spanishlanguage radio advertising time to
advertisers. If there were a small but
significant increase in Spanish-language
radio advertising prices in the Houston
MSA, Las Vegas MSA, or San Francisco
MSA, an insufficient number of
advertisers seeking to reach listeners in
any of those MSAs would switch their
Spanish-language advertising purchases
to radio stations outside that MSA to
make the price increase unprofitable.
Accordingly, the Complaint alleges that
the Houston, Las Vegas, and San
Francisco MSAs (the ‘‘Spanish-language
Overlap Markets’’) are each relevant
geographic markets within the meaning
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
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C. Competition in the Relevant Markets
1. Competition in Radio Advertising
in Houston and Cincinnati.
Advertisers that use radio to reach
their target audience select radio
stations on which to advertise based
upon a number of factors including,
among others, the size and
characteristics of the station’s audience.
Many advertisers seek to reach a large
percentage of their target audience by
selecting those stations with a listening
audience that is highly correlated to the
advertisers’ target audience.
Clear Channel and CMP vigorously
compete for listeners and closely
monitor each other’s competitive
position in the Cincinnati MSA and the
Houston MSA. Their stations are
similarly formatted and programmed
with an eye toward attracting listeners
from each other.
Clear Channel and CMP stations in
Houston and Cincinnati also currently
compete vigorously for radio advertisers
that seek to reach the specific
demographic groups listening to their
stations. For many local and national
advertisers buying radio advertising
time in the Houston MSA and the
Cincinnati MSA, Clear Channel and
CMP stations are each other’s next best
substitutes. During individualized rate
negotiations, the substantial number of
advertisers that desire to reach these
listeners can benefit from this
competition by ‘‘playing off’’ Clear
Channel and CMP stations against each
other to reach better terms.
Radio station ownership in Houston
and Cincinnati is highly concentrated,
with Clear Channel and CMP’s
combined advertising revenue share
exceeding 37 percent in Houston and 65
percent in Cincinnati. Additionally,
Clear Channel and CMP’s combined
listener share exceeds 34 percent in
Houston and 59 percent in Cincinnati.
2. Competition in Spanish-language
Radio Advertising in Houston, Las
Vegas, and San Francisco
Clear Channel and Univision
currently are vigorous competitors and
closely monitor each other’s competitive
position for Spanish-language listeners
in the Houston, Las Vegas, and San
Francisco MSAs, each of which has a
large Hispanic population. Their
stations in these markets are similarly
formatted and programmed with an eye
toward attracting Spanish-language
listeners from each other.
Clear Channel and Univision stations
also currently compete vigorously for
radio advertisers that seek to reach
Spanish-language listeners. For many
local and national advertisers, buying
Spanish-language radio advertising time
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in the Houston, Las Vegas, and San
Francisco Spanish-language Overlap
Markets, Clear Channel and Univision
stations are each other’s next best
substitutes. During individualized rate
negotiations, the substantial number of
advertisers that desire to reach these
listeners can benefit from this
competition by ‘‘playing off’ Clear
Channel and Univision stations against
each other to reach better terms.
Spanish-language radio station
ownership in Houston, Las Vegas, and
San Francisco is highly concentrated.
Clear Channel and Univision’s
combined Spanish-language listener
share exceeds 75 percent in Houston, 73
percent in Las Vegas, and 70 percent in
San Francisco. Additionally, Clear
Channel and Univision’s combined
Spanish-language advertising revenue
share exceeds 79 percent in Houston, 78
percent in Las Vegas, and 63 percent in
San Francisco.
D. Anticompetitive Effects of the
Transaction in Houston and Cincinnati
Radio Advertising Markets
Clear Channel is one of only a few
radio companies competing with CMP
in the sale of radio advertising in
Houston and Cincinnati, and within
those markets, the two companies are
each other’s next best substitutes for
advertisers seeking to reach several key
demographic groups. Bain and THL
currently control CMP; together they
hold 50 percent of the voting and equity
interests and have the right to choose
half of the members of its Board of
Directors. CMP’s Board of Directors
cannot make decisions without the
agreement of either Bain or THL, which
have access to CMP’s non-public,
competitively sensitive information and
its officers and employees. These
ownership interests and associated
rights give each of Bain and THL, as
well as Bain and THL acting together,
influence over, if not outright control of,
CMP’s management decisions.
Upon consummation of their
proposed acquisition of interests in
Clear Channel, defendants Bain and
THL together would also control Clear
Channel. Together, they would own at
least 70 percent of the equity and voting
interests of Clear Channel and have the
right to select eight of Clear Channel’s
12 directors. In addition, Bain and THL
would have access to Clear Channel’s
non-public, competitively sensitive
information and its officers and
employees. After the acquisition, each
of Bain and THL, as well as Bain and
THL acting together, would have
influence over, if not outright control of,
Clear Channel’s management decisions.
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Bain and THL, either directly or
indirectly through management teams
they install, typically manage and
operate the assets in which they invest.
As significant equity holders in both
Clear Channel and CMP, Bain and THL
each would seek to maximize the value
of their investments by increasing the
profitability of those companies. With
respect to their interests in CMP and
Clear Channel, Bain and THL’s interests
would be aligned and they would be
expected to work together to achieve
maximum profits at the two companies,
including by using their control,
influence, and access to information to
reduce competition between Clear
Channel and CMP in order to increase
the companies’ total profits.
Bain or THL, or Bain and THL acting
together, would have the incentive and
ability to use their ownership, control
and influence, and access to information
as to both Clear Channel and CMP to
reduce competition between the
companies in markets where they are
significant competitors. They could
accomplish such a reduction in
competition in at least four ways:
(1) Through their control of or
influence over both Clear Channel and
CMP, Bain or THL, or Bain and THL
working together, could cause Clear
Channel and CMP to coordinate their
competitive behavior in a manner that
increased both companies’ profits but
harmed consumers;
(2) Through their governance rights
relating to both Clear Channel and CMP,
Bain or THL, or Bain and THL working
together, could install a management
team at one of the companies motivated
to act in the interest of Bain and THL,
and thereby reduce the vigor of its
competition against the other company
in which Bain and THL had a
significant stake;
(3) Through their access to nonpublic, competitively sensitive
information of both Clear Channel and
CMP, and through their contacts with
management at both Clear Channel and
CMP, Bain or THL, or Bain and THL
working together, could facilitate
coordination between Clear Channel
and CMP; and
(4) Through their control of or
influence over both Clear Channel and
CMP, Bain or THL, or Bain and THL
working together, could cause either
Clear Channel or CMP to forbear from
competing against the other, knowing
that a significant portion of lost sales
would be recaptured by a company in
which Bain and THL had a significant
ownership interest.
For example, Clear Channel’s
management team, acting pursuant to
either Bain’s or THL’s corporate
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influence, or pursuant to their joint
voting control, could be expected to
increase the price of advertising at Clear
Channel to those advertisers that view
CMP as Clear Channel’s closest
alternative, knowing that Bain and THL
would reap the benefits of the price
increase at Clear Channel and recapture
the lost profits from any advertisers that
chose to switch to CMP. Alternatively,
the transaction would result in higher
prices for purchasers of radio
advertising if management teams at
Clear Channel and CMP, acting
pursuant to either Bain’s or THL’s
influence or their joint voting control,
were to go along with price increases at
the other’s stations, which would be
known to Bain and THL even if not
publicly disclosed. Given that Houston
and Cincinnati are highly concentrated
markets, advertisers would find it
difficult or impossible to ‘‘buy around’’
Clear Channel and CMP, i.e., to
effectively reach their targeted audience
without using Clear Channel or CMP
radio stations.
Thus, the Complaint alleges that
Bain’s and THL’s proposed acquisitions
of ownership interests in Clear Channel,
if consummated, would substantially
reduce competition for radio advertising
in the Houston and Cincinnati Overlap
Markets.
E. Anticompetitive Effects of the
Acquisition in Houston, Las Vegas, and
San Francisco Spanish-Language Radio
Markets
Clear Channel is one of only a few
radio companies competing with
Univision for Spanish-language radio
advertising time in Houston, Las Vegas,
and San Francisco, and within those
markets, the two companies are each
other’s next best substitutes for
advertisers targeting Spanish-language
listeners. THL currently has a 20
percent equity interest and a 14 percent
voting interest in Univision, as well as
the right to designate three Univision
board members. THL also has access to
Univision’s non-public, competitively
sensitive information and its officers
and employees. Significant corporate
decisions at Univision require the assent
of three of its five owners. THL’s
ownership interest and associated rights
give it influence over Univision’s
management decisions.
Upon consummation of the proposed
acquisition of Clear Channel, defendant
THL would own at least 35 percent of
the equity and voting interest of Clear
Channel, as well as a right to choose
four of its 12 directors. In addition, after
the acquisition, THL would have access
to Clear Channel’s non-public,
competitively sensitive information and
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its officers and employees. THL’s
ownership interest and associated rights
would give it influence over Clear
Channel’s management decisions.
As a significant equity holder in both
Clear Channel and Univision, THL
would seek to maximize the value of its
investments by increasing the
profitability of those companies. THL
likely would work to achieve maximum
profits at the two companies, including
by using its influence and access to
information to reduce competition
between Clear Channel and Univision,
in order to increase THL’s total profits.
THL would have the incentive and
ability to use its ownership, control and
influence, and access to information as
to both Clear Channel and Univision to
reduce competition between the
companies in markets where they are
significant competitors. THL could
accomplish such a reduction in
competition in at least four ways:
(1) Through its influence over both
Clear Channel and Univision, THL
could cause Clear Channel and
Univision to coordinate their
competitive behavior in a manner that
increased both companies’ profits but
harmed consumers;
(2) Through its governance rights
relating to both Clear Channel and
Univision, THL could work to install a
management team at one of the
companies motivated to act in THL’s
interests, or influence a management
team to account for THL’s interests, and
thereby reduce the vigor of its
competition against the other company
in which THL had a significant stake;
(3) Through its access to non-public,
competitively sensitive information of
both Clear Channel and Univision, and
through its contacts with management at
both Clear Channel and Univision, THL
could facilitate coordination between
Clear Channel and Univision; and
(4) Through its influence over both
Clear Channel and Univision, THL
could cause either Clear Channel or
Univision to forbear from competing
against the other, knowing that a
significant portion of lost sales would be
recaptured by a company in which THL
had a significant ownership interest.
For example, as a result of the
acquisition, with access to both
companies’ non-public competitively
sensitive information, THL would have
the ability and the incentive to facilitate
the coordination of pricing and other
competitive decisions between Clear
Channel and Univision in the Spanishlanguage Overlap Markets. Given that
those markets are highly concentrated,
advertisers would find it difficult or
impossible to ‘‘buy around’’ Clear
Channel and Univision, i.e., to
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effectively reach their targeted audience
without using Clear Channel or
Univision radio stations, resulting in
higher prices and lower service levels
for purchasers of Spanish-language
radio advertising. Thus, the Complaint
alleges that THL’s acquisition of a
substantial partial ownership interest in
Clear Channel would substantially
lessen competition in the sale of
Spanish-language radio advertising in
Houston, Las Vegas, and San Francisco,
in violation of section 7 of the Clayton
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
F. Federal Communication Commission
Obligations
In order to meet FCC radio ownership
rules, Bain and THL, prior to
consummating their acquisition of
ownerships interests in Clear Channel,
plan to convert all of their governance
rights and ownership interests in CMP
into passive equity interests, which
means they will no longer have voting
rights and will withdraw all Bain and
THL directors from the CMP Board. For
the same reason, THL likewise plans to
convert its interests in Univision to
passive equity interests, and withdraw
from the Univision Board.
Such changes would not eliminate the
potential for the competitive harm in
the markets where Clear Channel
competes with CMP or Univision.
Because the FCC-required conversions
would not reduce the magnitude of any
defendant’s equity stake in the three
companies, the defendants would still
profit from any reduction in
competition between either Clear
Channel and CMP or between Clear
Channel and Univision. In addition, the
FCC-required conversions would not
affect Bain or THL’s control of Clear
Channel, or eliminate their access to
non-public, confidential information
and officers and employees at Clear
Channel, CMP, and Univision.
As a result, the conversions would not
eliminate the ability of Bain and THL,
whether acting individually or together,
to cause a reduction in competition. For
example, Bain and/or THL would still
have the incentive and ability, given
their combined 70 percent share in
Clear Channel, to influence Clear
Channel’s management team to increase
the price of advertising at Clear Channel
to those advertisers that view CMP as
Clear Channel’s closest alternative,
knowing that Bain and THL would reap
the benefits of the price increase at Clear
Channel and recapture the lost profits
from any advertisers that chose to
switch to CMP. Alternatively, because
the FCC regulatory scheme does not
require that THL relinquish its access to
non-public, confidential information at
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either Clear Channel or Univision, THL
could still have the ability to be an
information conduit between the two
companies so as to facilitate the
coordination of pricing and other
competitive decisions between them in
the Spanish-language Overlap Markets.
Accordingly, a decree mandating
divestitures is necessary to restore
competition.
G. Entry Will Not Mitigate the Likely
Anticompetitive Effects
Successful entry into the Houston or
Cincinnati Overlap Markets or the
Houston, Las Vegas, or San Francisco
Spanish-language Overlap Markets
would not be timely, likely, or sufficient
to offset the anticompetitive effects
resulting from this transaction.
Entry could occur by obtaining a
license for new radio spectrum or by
reformatting an existing station.
However, acquisition of new radio
spectrum is highly unlikely because
spectrum is a scarce and expensive
commodity. Reformatting by existing
stations in any of the relevant
geographic markets would not be
sufficient to mitigate the competitive
harm likely to result from this
acquisition. For those stations in these
markets that have large shares in other
coveted demographics, a format shift
solely in response to small but
significant increases in price by Clear
Channel, CMP, or Univision is not likely
because it would not be profitable. For
those radio stations that may have
incentives to change formats in response
to small but significant increases in
price by Clear Channel, CMP, and
Univision, their shift would not be
sufficient to mitigate the
anticompetitive effects resulting from
this acquisition.
IV. Explanation of the Proposed Final
Judgment
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A. Clear Channel Radio Stations Must
Be Divested
The proposed Final Judgment will
eliminate the anticompetitive effects
that would result from Bain’s and THL’s
acquisition of substantial ownership
interests in Clear Channel. Paragraph
IV(A) of the proposed Final Judgment
requires defendant Clear Channel,
within 90 days after the closing of their
transaction, or five calendar days after
notice of the entry of the Final Judgment
by the Court, whichever is later, to
divest certain of its radio stations in
Houston, Cincinnati, Las Vegas, and San
Francisco. In order to maximize the
likelihood that appropriate radio
stations are divested promptly to
qualified buyers, the proposed Final
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Judgment provides Clear Channel with
the flexibility to choose between two
equivalently effective divestiture
packages in Houston and Cincinnati.
The Divestiture Assets comprise the
following stations and all tangible and
intangible assets used in their operation:
1. the Clear Channel Assets are:
a. a Houston station—either KHMX
or, at the discretion of the defendants,
KTBZ;
b. two Cincinnati stations—either
WLW and WKFS or, at the discretion of
the defendants, WOFX and WNNF;
2. the Clear Channel Spanishlanguage Assets are:
a. KLOL, a Houston Spanish-language
station;
b. KWID, a Las Vegas Spanishlanguage station; and
c. KSJO, a San Francisco Spanishlanguage station.
These stations must be divested to
acquirer(s) that, in the United States’
sole judgment, will use them as part of
viable, ongoing businesses engaged in
commercial radio broadcasting or
Spanish-language radio broadcasting.
The proposed Final Judgment requires
defendants to take all reasonable steps
necessary to accomplish the divestiture
quickly and to cooperate with
prospective acquirers.
The sale of the Divestiture Assets
according to the terms of the proposed
Final Judgment will eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in
the Houston and Cincinnati Overlap
Markets for radio advertising and in the
Houston, Las Vegas, and San Francisco
Spanish-language Overlap Markets for
Spanish-language radio advertising. In
each market, the divestitures will
establish a new, independent, and
economically viable competitor.
The proposed Final Judgment relieves
the defendants of some or all of their
obligations to divest under three sets of
circumstances. First, the proposed Final
Judgment takes into account that the
FCC has required that Clear Channel sell
a San Francisco station in order to
comply with FCC media ownership
limitations. Paragraph IV(D) of the
proposed Final Judgment thus provides
that, if the San Francisco station has
been transferred to an FCC-authorized
trust prior to the completion of the
required divestitures, defendants’
obligation to divest that station is
suspended and will be eliminated if the
station is sold under the terms of the
FCC-authorized trust, in which case the
objectives of the proposed Final
Judgment would have been achieved.
Second, if Bain and THL both divest
100 percent of their interests in CMP,
thereby eliminating the overlap between
CMP and Clear Channel achieved by the
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transaction, Paragraph IV(B) of the
proposed Final Judgment would no
longer require that the defendants divest
those stations that comprise the Clear
Channel Assets. If these assets are not
divested, Paragraph XI(D) of the
proposed Final Judgment would bar the
reacquisition by Bain or THL of any
interest in CMP so long as they continue
to have some interest in Clear Channel.
Third, if THL divests 100 percent of
its interests in Univision, thereby
eliminating the overlap between
Univision and Clear Channel achieved
by the transaction, Paragraph IV(C) of
the proposed Final Judgment would no
longer require that the defendants divest
those stations that comprise the Clear
Channel Spanish-language Assets. If
these assets are not divested, however,
Paragraph XI(E) of the proposed Final
Judgment would bar the reacquisition of
by THL of any interest in Univision so
long as it continues to have some
interest in Clear Channel.
B. Timing of Divestitures
In antitrust cases involving mergers or
joint ventures in which the United
States seeks a divestiture remedy, it
requires completion of the divestiture
within the shortest time period
reasonable under the circumstances. As
noted above, the proposed Final
Judgment requires defendant Clear
Channel to complete the divestitures
within 90 days after the transaction
closes, or five calendar days after notice
of the entry of the Final Judgment by the
Court, whichever is later. The United
States in its sole discretion may extend
the time period for divestiture by up to
60 days.
In this matter, Paragraph IV(A) of the
proposed Final Judgment also provides
for an additional extension in certain
circumstances. This extension takes into
account the FCC’s role in connection
with transfers of radio stations from one
operator to another. If the defendants
have found a buyer or buyers for the
assets (and the buyers have been
approved by the United States) and have
filed applications with the FCC seeking
approval to assign or transfer the
licenses within the initial period for
divestiture, but the FCC has not yet
issued a final order approving such
transfers, the proposed Final Judgment
allows for an extension of the
divestiture period until ten days after
the FCC’s order approving the transfer is
issued.
The divestiture timing provisions of
the proposed Final Judgment will
ensure that the divestitures are carried
out in a timely manner, and at the same
time will permit defendants an adequate
opportunity to accomplish the
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divestitures consistent with their FCC
obligations. Even if the Clear Channel
stations have not been divested upon
consummation of the transaction, there
should be no adverse impact on
competition given the limited duration
of the period of common ownership and
the detailed requirements of the Hold
Separate Stipulation and Order.
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C. Use of a Trustee
In the event that the defendants do
not accomplish the divestiture within
the periods prescribed in the proposed
Final Judgment, the Final Judgment
provides that the Court will appoint a
trustee selected by plaintiff to effect the
divestiture.
Section V details the requirements for
the establishment of the divestiture
trust, the selection and compensation of
the trustee, and the responsibilities of
the trustee in connection with the
divestiture. The trustee will have the
sole responsibility, under Paragraph
V(B), for the sale of the stations to be
divested. The trustee has the authority
to accomplish the divestiture at the
earliest possible time and ‘‘at such price
and on such terms as are then
obtainable upon reasonable effort by the
trustee.’’
The proposed Final Judgment
provides that defendants will pay all
costs and expenses of the trustee. The
trustee’s commission will be structured,
under Paragraph V(D) of the proposed
Final Judgment, so as to provide an
incentive for the trustee based on the
price and terms obtained and the speed
with which the divestiture is
accomplished. After his or her
appointment becomes effective, the
trustee will file monthly reports with
the Court and plaintiff setting forth his
or her efforts to accomplish the
divestiture. At the end of six months, if
the divestiture has not been
accomplished, the trustee and plaintiff
will make recommendations to the
Court, which shall enter such orders as
appropriate in order to carry out the
purpose of the Final Judgment,
including extending the trust or term of
the trustee’s appointment.
D. The Hold Separate Stipulation and
Order
The Hold Separate Stipulation and
Order, filed at the same time as the
Complaint, ensures that, pending
divestiture of the Clear Channel
stations, (i) defendants will take no
steps to limit those stations’ ability to
operate as competitively independent,
economically viable, and ongoing
business concerns, (ii) defendants will
not influence those stations’ business,
and (iii) competition will be
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maintained. The Hold Separate
Stipulation and Order requires Clear
Channel to hold the stations to be
divested separate as independent,
ongoing, economically viable, and
active competitors in their particular
markets. This means that their
management, including decisionmaking functions relating to marketing
and pricing, will be kept separate and
apart from, and not influenced by,
defendants Bain or THL or Clear
Channel’s other operations.
Written comments should be
submitted to: John R. Read, Chief,
Litigation III Section, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, 325 7th
Street, NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC
20530.
The proposed Final Judgment
provides that the Court retains
jurisdiction over this action, and the
parties may apply to the Court for any
order necessary or appropriate for the
modification, interpretation, or
enforcement of the Final Judgment.
V. Remedies Available to Potential
Private Litigants
VII. Alternatives to the Proposed Final
Judgment
Plaintiff considered, as an alternative
to the proposed Final Judgment, a full
trial on the merits against defendants.
Plaintiff could have continued the
litigation and sought preliminary and
permanent injunctions against Bain and
THL’s acquisition of Clear Channel.
Plaintiff is satisfied, however, that the
divestiture of the stations described in
the proposed Final Judgment will
preserve competition in the provision of
radio advertising in Houston and
Cincinnati, and competition in the
provision of Spanish-language radio
advertising in Houston, Las Vegas and
San Francisco, the relevant markets
identified in the Complaint. Thus, the
proposed Final Judgment would achieve
all or substantially all of the relief the
United States would have obtained
through litigation, but avoids the time,
expense, and uncertainty of a full trial
on the merits of the Complaint.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 15, provides that any person who
has been injured as a result of conduct
prohibited by the antitrust laws may
bring suit in federal court to recover
three times the damages the person has
suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys’ fees. Entry of the proposed
Final Judgment will neither impair nor
assist the bringing of any private
antitrust damage action. Under the
provisions of section 5(a) of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed Final
Judgment has no prima facie effect in
any subsequent private lawsuit that may
be brought against defendants.
VI. Procedures Available for
Modification of the Proposed Final
Judgment
Plaintiff and defendants have
stipulated that the proposed Final
Judgment may be entered by the Court
after compliance with the provisions of
the APPA, provided that plaintiff has
not withdrawn its consent. The APPA
conditions entry upon the Court’s
determination that the proposed Final
Judgment is in the public interest.
The APPA provides a period of at
least sixty (60) days preceding the
effective date of the proposed Final
Judgment within which any person may
submit to plaintiff written comments
regarding the proposed Final Judgment.
Any person who wishes to comment
should do so within sixty (60) days of
the date of publication of this
Competitive Impact Statement in the
Federal Register or the last date of
publication in a newspaper of the
summary of this Competitive Impact
Statement; whichever is later. All
comments received during this period
will be considered by the United States
Department of Justice, which remains
tree to withdraw its consent to the
proposed Final Judgment at any time
prior to the Court’s entry of judgment.
The comments and the response of
plaintiff will be filed with the Court and
published in the Federal Register.
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VIII. Standard of Review Under the
APPA for the Proposed Final Judgment
The Clayton Act, as amended by the
APPA, requires that proposed consent
judgments in antitrust cases brought by
the United States be subject to a sixtyday comment period, after which the
Court shall determine whether entry of
the proposed Final Judgment ‘‘is in the
public interest.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In
making that determination, the court, in
accordance with the statute as amended
in 2004, is required to consider:
(A) The competitive impact of such
judgment, including termination of
alleged violations, provisions for
enforcement and modification, duration
of relief sought, anticipated effects of
alternative remedies actually
considered, whether its terms are
ambiguous, and any other competitive
considerations bearing upon the
adequacy of such judgment that the
court deems necessary to a
determination of whether the consent
judgment is in the public interest; and
(B) The impact of entry of such
judgment upon competition in the
relevant market or markets, upon the
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public generally and individuals
alleging specific injury from the
violations set forth in the complaint
including consideration of the public
benefit, if any, to be derived from a
determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In
considering these statutory factors, the
court’s inquiry is necessarily a limited
one, as the government is entitled to
‘‘broad discretion to settle with the
defendant within the reaches of the
public interest.’’ United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461
(D.C. Cir. 1995); see generally United
States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing
public interest standard under the
Tunney Act).1
As the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has
held, under the APPA a court considers,
among other things, the relationship
between the remedy secured and the
specific allegations set forth in the
government’s complaint, whether the
decree is sufficiently clear, whether
enforcement mechanisms are sufficient,
and whether the decree may positively
harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1458–62. With respect to the
adequacy of the relief secured by the
decree, a court may not ‘‘engage in an
unrestricted evaluation of what relief
would best serve the public.’’ United
States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462
(9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v.
Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th
Cir. 1981)); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d
at 1460–62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc.,
152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001).
Courts have held that:
The balancing of competing social and
political interests affected by a proposed
antitrust consent decree must be left, in the
first instance, to the discretion of the
Attorney General. The court’s role in
protecting the public interest is one of
insuring that the government has not
breached its duty to the public in consenting
to the decree. The court is required to
determine not whether a particular decree is
the one that will best serve society, but
whether the settlement is ‘‘within the reaches
of the public interest.’’ More elaborate
requirements might undermine the
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by
consent decree.
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Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).2 In
1 The 2004 amendments substituted ‘‘shall’’ for
‘‘may’’ in directing relevant factors for court to
consider and amended the list of factors to focus on
competitive considerations and to address
potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15
U.S.C. 16(e) (2004), with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006);
see also SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11
(concluding that the 2004 amendments ‘‘effected
minimal changes’’ to Tunney Act review).
2 Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the
court’s ‘‘ultimate authority under the [APPA] is
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determining whether a proposed
settlement is in the public interest, a
district court ‘‘must accord deference to
the government’s predictions about the
efficacy of its remedies, and may not
require that the remedies perfectly
match the alleged violations.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see
also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting
the need for courts to be ‘‘deferential to
the government’s predictions as to the
effect of the proposed remedies’’);
United States v. Archer-DanielsMidland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6
(D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the court
should grant due respect to the United
States’ prediction as to the effect of
proposed remedies, its perception of the
market structure, and its views of the
nature of the case).
Courts have greater flexibility in
approving proposed consent decrees
than in crafting their own decrees
following a finding of liability in a
litigated matter. ‘‘[A] proposed decree
must be approved even if it falls short
of the remedy the court would impose
on its own, as long as it falls within the
range of acceptability or is ‘within the
reaches of public interest.’ ’’ United
States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations
omitted) (quoting United States v.
Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D.
Mass. 1975)), aff’d sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983);
see also United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622
(W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving the consent
decree even though the court would
have imposed a greater remedy). To
meet this standard, the United States
‘‘need only provide a factual basis for
concluding that the settlements are
reasonably adequate remedies for the
alleged harms.’’ SBC Commc’ns, 489 F.
Supp. 2d at 17.
Moreover, the court’s role under the
APPA is limited to reviewing the
remedy in relationship to the violations
that the United States has alleged in its
Complaint, and does not authorize the
court to ‘‘construct [its] own
hypothetical case and then evaluate the
decree against that case.’’ Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1459. Because the ‘‘court’s
authority to review the decree depends
entirely on the government’s exercising
its prosecutorial discretion by bringing
a case in the first place,’’ it follows that
limited to approving or disapproving the consent
decree’’); United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp.
713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way,
the court is constrained to ‘‘look at the overall
picture not hypercritically, nor with a microscope,
but with an artist’s reducing glass’’). See generally
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing whether ‘‘the
remedies [obtained in the decree are] so
inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall
outside of the ‘reaches of the public interest’ ’’).
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‘‘the court is only authorized to review
the decree itself,’’ and not to ‘‘effectively
redraft the complaint’’ to inquire into
other matters that the United States did
not pursue. Id. at 1459–60. As this Court
recently confirmed in SBC
Communications, courts ‘‘cannot look
beyond the complaint in making the
public interest determination unless the
complaint is drafted so narrowly as to
make a mockery of judicial power.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
In its 2004 amendments to the APPA,
Congress made clear its intent to
preserve the practical benefits of
utilizing consent decrees in antitrust
enforcement, adding the unambiguous
instruction that ‘‘[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to require the
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
or to require the court to permit anyone
to intervene.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). The
language wrote into the statute what
Congress intended when it enacted the
Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator Tunney
explained: ‘‘The court is nowhere
compelled to go to trial or to engage in
extended proceedings which might have
the effect of vitiating the benefits of
prompt and less costly settlement
through the consent decree process.’’
119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement
of Senator Tunney). Rather, the
procedure for the public interest
determination is left to the discretion of
the court, with the recognition that the
court’s ‘‘scope of review remains
sharply proscribed by precedent and the
nature of Tunney Act proceedings.’’
SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.3
IX. Determinative Documents
There are no determinative materials
or documents within the meaning of the
APPA that were considered by plaintiff
United States in formulating the
proposed Final Judgment.
Dated: February 13, 2008
Respectfully submitted,
Daniel McCuaig (DC Bar No. 478199),
Christopher Ries,
3 See United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp.
2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the ‘‘Tunney
Act expressly allows the court to make its public
interest determination on the basis of the
competitive impact statement and response to
comments alone’’); S. Rep. No. 93–298, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., at 6 (1973) (‘‘Where the public interest can
be meaningfully evaluated simply on the basis of
briefs and oral arguments, that is the approach that
should be utilized.’’); United States v. Mid-Am.
Dairymen, Inc., 1977–1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,508,
at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (‘‘Absent a showing of
corrupt failure of the government to discharge its
duty, the Court, in making its public interest
finding, should * * * carefully consider the
explanations of the government in the competitive
impact statement and its responses to comments in
order to determine whether those explanations are
reasonable under the circumstances.’’).
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 40 / Thursday, February 28, 2008 / Notices
Attorneys, Litigation III Section, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 325 7th
Street, NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC
20530, (202) 307–0520, Facsimile: (202) 514–
7308.
[FR Doc. 08–867 Filed 2–27–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–11–M
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Office of the Secretary
Submission for OMB Review:
Comment Request
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
February 22, 2008.
The Department of Labor (DOL)
hereby announces the submission of the
following public information collection
requests (ICR) to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and approval in accordance with
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104–13, 44 U.S.C. chapter 35).
A copy of each ICR, with applicable
supporting documentation; including
among other things a description of the
likely respondents, proposed frequency
of response, and estimated total burden
may be obtained from the RegInfo.gov
Web site at https://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/PRAMain or by contacting
Darrin King on 202–693–4129 (this is
not a toll-free number) / e-mail:
king.darrin@dol.gov.
Interested parties are encouraged to
send comments to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Attn: Katherine Astrich, OMB Desk
Officer for the Employment and
Training Administration (ETA), Office
of Management and Budget, Room
10235, Washington, DC 20503,
Telephone: 202–395–7316/Fax: 202–
395–6974 (these are not a toll-free
numbers), e-mail:
OIRA_submission@omb.eop.gov within
30 days from the date of this publication
in the Federal Register. In order to
ensure the appropriate consideration,
comments should reference the OMB
Control Number (see below).
The OMB is particularly interested in
comments which:
• Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
• Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
• Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
VerDate Aug<31>2005
18:23 Feb 27, 2008
Jkt 214001
• Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submission of
responses.
Agency: Employment and Training
Administration.
Type of Review: Extension without
change of a currently approved
collection.
Title: Interstate Arrangement for
Combining Employment and Wages.
OMB Control Number: 1205–0029.
Form Number: ETA–586.
Affected Public: State Governments.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
53.
Estimated Total Annual Burden
Hours: 848.
Estimated Total Annual Costs Burden:
$0.
Description: Section 3304(a)(9)(B), of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
requires states to participate in an
arrangement for combining employment
and wages covered under the different
state laws for the purpose of
determining unemployed workers’
entitlement to unemployment
compensation. The Interstate
Arrangement for Combining
Employment and Wages for combined
wage claims (CWC), promulgated at 20
CFR 616, requires the prompt transfer of
all relevant and available employment
and wage data between states upon
request. The Benefit Payment
Promptness Standard, 20 CFR part 640,
requires the prompt payment of
unemployment compensation including
benefits paid under the CWC
arrangement. The ETA–586 report
provides the ETA/Office of Workforce
Security with information necessary to
measure the scope and effect of the
CWC program and monitor the
performance of each state in responding
to wage transfer data requests and the
payment of benefits. For additional
information, see related notice
published at 72 FR 68594 on December
5, 2007.
Agency: Employment and Training
Administration.
Type of Review: New Collection
(Request for a new OMB Control
Number).
Title: High Growth and CommunityBased Job Training Grants.
OMB Control Number: 1205–0NEW.
Form Number: ETA–9134.
Affected Public: Private Sector: Notfor-profit institutions.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
272.
PO 00000
Frm 00086
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Estimated Total Annual Burden
Hours: 53,464.
Estimated Total Annual Costs Burden:
$0.
Description: This information
collection request is to implement new
reporting requirements for ETA’s High
Growth Job Training Initiative (HGJTI)
and the Community-Based Job Training
Grants (CBJTG). ETA will require
grantees to submit standardized
quarterly reports summarizing the
number and types of participants served
by grantees, the number of exiters, the
number of participants engaged in
training activities, and some participant
outcomes. To calculate the common
measures for each grantee and for the
program as a whole, ETA will also
require grantees to submit quarterly
participant records for exiters that
contain the minimum number of
elements needed to obtain the
information to calculate the common
measures. ETA plans to use these
records to obtain wage record
information from the Wage Record
Interchange System (WRIS), which in
turn ETA will use to compute common
measures. These reports and records
will help ETA gauge the effects of the
HGJTI and CBJTG grants, identify
grantees that could serve as useful
models, and target technical assistance
appropriately. ETA’s statutory and
regulatory authority to administer these
programs includes provisions for the
requirement of performance reporting
from grantees. The legislative authority
for these programs comes from the
Workforce Investment Act (29 U.S.C.
2801 et seq.) and the American
Competitiveness in the Twenty-first
Century Act of 2000 as amended, both
of which authorize and/or require that
ETA collect information from grantees
regarding program performance and
participant outcomes.
Darrin A. King,
Acting Departmental Clearance Officer.
[FR Doc. E8–3740 Filed 2–27–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–FM–P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employment and Training
Administration
Request for Certification of
Compliance—Rural Industrialization
Loan and Grant Program
Employment and Training
Administration, Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Employment and
Training Administration is issuing this
E:\FR\FM\28FEN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 40 (Thursday, February 28, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10808-10824]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 08-867]
[[Page 10808]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States v. Bain Capital, LLC, Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P.,
and Clear Channel Communications, Inc.; Proposed Final Judgement and
Competitive Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment,
Hold Separate Stipulation and Order, and Competitive Impact Statement
have been filed with the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia in United States of America v. Bain Capital, LLC, Civil
Action No. 1:08-cv-00245. On February 13, 2008, the United States filed
a Complaint alleging that the proposed acquisition by Bain Capital, LLC
and Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P. of a controlling interest in Clear
Channel Communications, Inc. would violate section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The proposed Final Judgment, filed the same time as
the Complaint, requires Clear Channel to divest radio stations in
Cincinnati, Ohio; Houston, Texas; Las Vegas, Nevada; and San Francisco,
California, along with certain related assets.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment and Competitive
Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 325 7th Street,
NW., Room 215, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-2481, on the
Department of Justice's Web site (https://www.usdoj.gov/atr), and at the
Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. Copies of these materials may be obtained from
the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the coping fee set
by Department of Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this
notice. Such comments, and responses thereto, will be published in the
Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be directed
to John Read, Chief, Litigation III section, Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-307-0462).
Patricia A. Brink,
Deputy Director of Operations.
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
United States of America, Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, 325 7th Street, NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20530,
Plaintiff, v. Bain Capital, LLC, 111 Huntington Ave., Boston, MA
02199, and Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P., 100 Federal St. 35th Fl.,
Boston, MA 02110, and Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 200 E.
Basse Rd., San Antonio, TX 78209, Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 1:08-cv-00245
Filed: Feb. 13, 2008
Assigned to: Robertson, James
Assign. Date: 2/13/2008
Description: Antitrust
Complaint
The United States of America, acting under the direction of the
Attorney General of the United States, brings this civil action to
enjoin the proposed acquisition of Clear Channel Communications Inc.
(``Clear Channel'') by a private equity group of investors led by Bain
Capital, LLC (``Bain'') and Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P. (``THL''), and
to obtain other relief as appropriate. Plaintiff United States alleges
as follows:
I. Nature of the Action
1. Bain and THL, two of the world's leading private investment
firms, are planning to acquire, each through various affiliated funds,
substantial ownership interests in Clear Channel, the largest operator
of radio stations in the United States (the ``transaction''). The
anticipated value of the transaction is $28 billion.
2. After the transaction, Bain and THL each would control at least
35 percent of the voting interests in Clear Channel and each would
designate four members to the 12 member Clear Channel Board of
Directors. Together, Bain and THL would control at least 70 percent of
the voting interests of Clear Channel and designate two-thirds of the
members of its Board of Directors. Further, Bain and THL, either
directly or indirectly through management teams they install, typically
manage and operate the assets in which they invest.
3. Bain and THL, through affiliated funds and co-investment
vehicles, have substantial ownership interests in Cumulus Media
Partners LLC (``CMP''), another large nationwide operator of radio
stations. Bain and THL each control 25 percent of the voting interests
of CMP and designate two members to its eight member Board of
Directors. Together, Bain and THL control 50 percent of the voting
interests of CMP and designate one-half of the members of its Board of
Directors. CMP operates radio stations that compete head-to-head with
Clear Channel radio stations in Cincinnati, Ohio and Houston/Galveston,
Texas (``Houston'').
4. After the transaction, Bain and THL would have governance rights
in Clear Channel and CMP sufficient to enable Bain and THL,
individually or together, to control or influence the companies'
competitive decisions to produce an anticompetitive outcome in markets
where both Clear Channel and CMS are significant competitors.
Accordingly, Bain's and THL's acquisitions of substantial partial
ownership interests in Clear Channel would substantially lessen
competition between Clear Channel and CMP in the sale of radio
advertising in Cincinnati and Houston in violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
5. THL, through affiliated funds and co-investment vehicles,
currently olds a 20 percent equity interest and a 14 percent voting
interest in Univision Communications, Inc. (``Univision''), a large
nationwide operator of radio stations that broadcast primarily in
Spanish-language format. THL designates three members to Univision's 17
member Board of Directors. Univision operates radio stations that
compete head-to-head with Clear Channel's Spanish-language radio
stations in Houston; Las Vegas, Nevada; and San Francisco, California.
6. After the transaction, THL would have governance rights in Clear
Channel and Univision sufficient to influence the companies'
competitive decisions to produce an anticompetitive outcome in markets
where both Clear Channel and Univision are significant competitors.
Accordingly, THL's acquisition of a substantial partial ownership
interest in Clear Channel would substantially lessen competition in the
sale of Spanish-language radio advertising in Houston, Las Vegas, and
San Francisco in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended,
15 U.S.C. 18.
II. Jurisdiction and Venue
7. Plaintiff United States brings this action under section 15 of
the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 25, to prevent and restrain
defendants from violating section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15
U.S.C. 18.
8. Bain and THL, through CMP and Univision, and Clear Channel sell
radio advertising to local and national advertisers, a commercial
activity that substantially affects and is in the flow of interstate
commerce. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
action pursuant to sections 15 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 25,
26, and 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337.
9. Bain, THL, and Clear Channel transact business within the
District of Columbia. Venue is therefore proper in this Court pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. 22 and 28 U.S.C. 1391.
[[Page 10809]]
III. Defendants and Other Relevant Entities
10. Clear Channel is a diversified media company incorporated in
Texas and headquartered in San Antonio, Texas. Clear Channel owns
various media outlets including radio stations, domestic and
international outdoor advertising assets, television stations, and a
media representation firm. Radio broadcasting is Clear Channel's
largest business segment, representing over 50 percent of Clear
Channel's total revenue. As of February 5, 2008, Clear Channel owned
833 radio stations in the United States, 508 of which were located
within the top 100 markets as ranked by Arbitron, an international
media marketing and research firm, including stations in Cincinnati,
Houston, Las Vegas, and San Francisco.
11. Bain is a Delaware limited liability company headquartered in
Boston, Massachusetts. Bain is one of the world's leading private
investment firms with over $40 billion in assets under management.
12. THL is a Delaware limited partnership headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts and also is one of the world's leading private investment
firms. THL currently manages approximately $12 billion of committed
capital.
13. Bain and THL raise pools of capital from private investors,
controlling and managing that capital through private equity funds and
co-investment vehicles that invest in discrete opportunities, such as
venture capital, public equity, and leveraged debt assets.
14. CMP is a limited liability company formed in 2005 that is owned
by Bain, THL, Cumulus Broadcasting Inc., the Blackstone Group, and
their affiliates. As of February 5, 2008, CMP owned 34 radio stations
in various markets, including Cincinnati and Houston.
15. Univision is headquartered in New York City and is the largest
broadcaster of Spanish-language television programming in the United
States. Univision also owns 70 radio stations that broadcast in Spanish
language in various markets, including Houston, Las Vegas, and San
Francisco. Univision is owned and operated by five private equity
firms: THL, Haim Saban, TPG Capital, Providence Equity, Madison
Dearborn, and their affiliates.
IV. The Proposed Acquisition
16. Clear Channel, Bain, and THL have agreed that funds and co-
investment vehicles under the direction of Bain (collectively ``Bain CC
Affiliates'') and funds and co-investment vehicles under the direction
of THL (collectively ``THL CC Affiliates'') will purchase a controlling
interest in Clear Channel. Under their proposal, Bain and THL each will
acquire at least a 35 percent voting and economic interest in Clear
Channel, with the remaining interest of up to 30 percent staying in the
hands of those current Clear Channel investors and option-holders who
elect to retain an equity interest in Clear Channel rather than to
receive cash for their shares and/or stock options. Under the purchase
arrangement, Bain and THL, through Bain CC Affiliates and THL CC
Affiliates, each will also acquire the right to designate four
directors of the 12 member Clear Channel Board of Directors. If the
transaction is consummated, Bain and THL together will control at least
70 percent of the voting interests of Clear Channel and designated two-
thirds of the members of the Board of Directors.
V. Relevant Markets
A. Relevant Product Markets
17. Radio Advertising. Radio stations employ various formats for
their programming, such as Adult Contemporary, Sports, or Rock. A
station's format can be important in determining the size and
characteristics of its listening audience. Companies that operate radio
stations, like Clear Channel, CMP, and Univision, sell advertising time
to local and national advertisers in each geographic market where they
operate those stations. Advertising rates charged by a radio station
are based primarily on the station's ability to attract listening
audiences having certain demographic characteristics in the market area
that advertisers want to reach, as well as on the number of stations
and the relative demand for radio in the market.
18. Many local and national advertisers purchase radio advertising
time because they consider it preferable to advertising in other media
to meet their specific needs. They may consider radio advertising time
to be more cost-effective than other media to reach their target
audiences. They may also consider radio advertising to be more
efficient than other media to reach their target audiences.
Additionally, radio stations render certain services or promotional
opportunities to advertisers that the advertisers cannot exploit as
effectively using other media. For these reasons, many local and
national advertisers who purchase radio advertising time view radio as
a necessary advertising medium, sometimes as a complement to other
media. A substantial number of advertisers with strong radio
preferences would not turn to other media if faced with a small but
significant increase in the price of advertising time on radio
stations.
19. Radio stations generally can identify advertisers with strong
radio preferences. Radio stations also negotiate prices individually
with advertisers; consequently, radio stations can charge different
advertisers different prices. Because of this ability to price
discriminate among customers, radio stations may charge higher prices
to the substantial number of advertisers that view radio as
particularly effective for their needs, while maintaining lower prices
for other advertisers.
20. In the event of a price increase in radio advertising time,
some local and national advertisers may switch some of their
advertising to other media rather than absorb a price increase in radio
advertising time. However, the existence of such advertisers would not
prevent radio stations from profitably raising their prices by a small
but significant amount for a substantial number of advertisers that
would not switch.
21. Accordingly, the provision of advertising time on radio
stations is a line of commerce and a relevant product market within the
meaning of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
22. Spanish-language Radio Advertising. In markets with a large
Hispanic population, many local and national advertisers also consider
Spanish-language radio to be particularly effective or necessary to
reach their desired customers, particularly consumers who listen
predominantly or exclusively to Spanish-language radio. A substantial
number of these advertisers consider Spanish-language radio, either
alone or as complement to other media, to be the most effective way to
reach their target audience, and do not consider other media, including
non-Spanish-language radio, to be a reasonable substitute. These
advertisers would not turn to other media, including radio that is not
broadcast in Spanish, if faced with a small but significant increase in
the price of advertising time on Spanish-language radio.
23. Accordingly, the provision of advertising time on Spanish-
language radio stations to these advertisers is a line of commerce and
a relevant product market within the meaning of section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
B. Relevant Geographic Markets
24. Local and national advertisers buy radio advertising time on
Clear Channel,
[[Page 10810]]
CMP, and Univision radio stations within areas defined by an Arbitron
Metro Survey Area (``MSA''). An MSA is the geographic unit that is
widely accepted by radio stations, advertisers, and advertising
agencies as the standard geographic market to use in evaluating radio
audience size and composition.
25. Local and National advertising that is placed on radio stations
in an MSA is aimed at reaching listening audiences in that MSA. Radio
stations in other MSAs do not provide effective access to these
audiences. If there were a small but significant price increase within
an MSA, an insufficient number of advertisers would switch their
advertising time purchases to radio stations outside the MSA to make
the price increase unprofitable.
26. In the Houston and Cincinnati MSAs, Clear Channel and CMP
stations compete against each other and against other stations in the
provision of radio advertising time to advertisers, regardless of the
language broadcast over the station. If there were a small but
significant increase in radio advertising prices within the Houston or
Cincinnati MSA, an insufficient number of advertisers seeking to reach
listeners in the Houston or Cincinnati MSA would switch their
advertising time purchases to radio stations outside that MSA to make
the price increase unprofitable. Accordingly, the Houston and
Cincinnati MSAs (the ``Overlap Markets'') are each relevant geographic
markets within the meaning of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
27. In the Houston, Las Vegas, and San Francisco MSAs, Clear
Channel and Univision compete against each other in the provision of
Spanish-language radio advertising time to advertisers. If there were a
small but significant increase in Spanish-language radio advertising
prices in the Houston, Las Vegas, or San Francisco MSAs, an
insufficient number of advertisers seeking to reach listeners in the
any of those MSAs would switch their Spanish-language advertising
purchases to radio stations outside that MSA to make the price increase
unprofitable. Accordingly, the Houston, Las Vegas, and San Francisco
MSAs (the ``Spanish-language Overlap Markets'') are each relevant
geographic markets within the meaning of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
VI. Harm to Competition
A. Competition in the Relevant Geographic Markets
1. Radio Advertising in the Overlap Markets
28. Advertisers who use radio to reach their target audience select
radio stations on which to advertise based upon a number of factors
including, among others, the size of the station's audience and the
characteristics of its audience. Many advertisers seek to reach a large
percentage of their target audience by selecting those stations whose
listening audience is highly correlated to their target audience.
29. Clear Channel and CMP vigorously compete for listeners and
closely monitor each other's competitive position in the Cincinnati and
Houston MSAs. Their stations are similarly formatted and programmed
with an eye toward attracting listeners from each other.
30. Clear Channel and CMP stations in Houston and Cincinnati also
currently compete vigorously for radio advertisers who seek to reach
the specific demographic groups listening to their stations. For many
local and national advertisers buying radio advertising time in the
Houston and Cincinnati markets, Clear Channel and CMP stations are each
other's next best substitutes. During individualized rate negotiations,
the substantial number of advertisers who desire to reach these
listeners can benefit from this competition by ``playing off'' Clear
Channel and CMP stations against each other to reach better terms.
31. Radio station ownership in Houston and Cincinnati is highly
concentrated, with Clear Channel and CMP's combined listener share
exceeding 34 percent in Houston and 59 percent in Cincinnati.
Additionally, Clear Channel and CMP's combined advertising revenue
share exceeds 37 percent in Houston and 65 percent in Cincinnati.
32. Using a measure of market concentration called the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (`HHI''), explained in Appendix A annexed hereto,
concentration in these markets would increase significantly as a result
of the acquisition, with post-acquisition HHIs of approximately 2,100
in Houston and approximately 4,700 in Cincinnati, well above the 1,800
threshold at which the Department normally considers a market to be
highly concentrated.
2. Spanish-Language Radio Advertising Overlap Markets
33. Clear Channel and Univision are currently vigorous competitors
and closely monitor each other's competitive position for Spanish-
language listeners in the Houston, Las Vegas, and San Francisco MSAs,
each of which has a large Hispanic population. Their stations in these
markets are similarly formatted and programmed with an eye toward
attracting Spanish-language listeners from each other.
34. Clear Channel and Univision stations also currently compete
vigorously for radio advertisers who seek to reach Spanish-language
listeners. For many local and national advertisers buying Spanish-
language radio advertising time in the Houston, Las Vegas, and San
Francisco Spanish-language Overlap Markets, Clear Channel and Univision
stations are each other's next best substitutes. During individualized
rate negotiations, the substantial number of advertisers who desire to
reach these listeners can benefit from this competition by ``playing
off'' Clear Channel and Univision stations against each other to reach
better terms.
35. Spanish-language radio station ownership in Houston, Las Vegas,
and San Francisco is highly concentrated. Clear Channel and Univision's
combined Spanish-language listener share exceeds 75 percent in Houston,
73 percent in Las Vegas, and 70 percent in San Francisco. Additionally,
Clear Channel and Univision's combined Spanish-language advertising
revenue share exceeds 79 percent in Houston, 78 percent in Las Vegas,
and 63 percent in San Francisco.
36. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, concentration in these
markets would increase significantly as a result of the acquisition,
with post-acquisition HHIs exceeding 6,500 in all three markets, well
above the 1,800 threshold at which the Department normally considers a
market to be highly concentrated.
B. This Acquisition Would Substantially Lessen Competition
1. Radio Advertising in Houston and Cincinnati
37. Clear Channel is one of only a few radio companies competing
with CMP in the sale of radio advertising in Houston and Cincinnati,
and within those markets, the two companies are each other's next best
substitutes for advertisers seeking to reach several key demographic
groups. Bain and THL together possess the ability to control CMP; they
hold 50 percent of the voting and equity interests and have the right
to choose half of the members of its Board of Directors. CMP's Board of
Directors cannot make decisions without the agreement of either Bain or
THL, which also have access to CMP's non-public, competitively
sensitive information and its officers and employees. These ownership
interests and associated rights give each of Bain and THL, as well as
Bain and THL acting together, influence over, if not outright control
of, CMP's management decisions.
[[Page 10811]]
38. Upon consummation of their proposed acquisition of interests in
Clear Channel, defendants Bain and THL together would also control
Clear Channel. Together, they would own at least 70 percent of the
equity and voting interests of Clear Channel and have the right to
select eight of Clear Channel's 12 directors. In addition, Bain and THL
would have access to Clear Channel's non-public, competitively
sensitive information and to the company's officers and employees.
After the acquisition, each of Bain and THL, as well as Bain and THL
acting together, would have influence over, if not outright control of,
Clear Channel's management decisions.
39. Bain or THL, or Bain and THL acting together, would have the
incentive and ability to use their ownership, control and influence,
and access to information as to both Clear Channel and CMP to reduce
competition between the companies in markets where they are significant
competitors, resulting in an increase in prices for a significant
number of advertisers. The Houston and Cincinnati radio markets are
highly concentrated, and these advertisers will find it difficult or
impossible to ``buy around'' Clear Channel and CMP, i.e., to
effectively reach their targeted audience without using Clear Channel
or CMP radio stations. Thus, Bain and THL's proposed acquisitions of
ownership interests in Clear Channel, if consummated, would
substantially reduce competition for radio advertising in the Houston
and Cincinnati markets.
2. Spanish-language Radio Advertising
40. Clear Channel is one of only a few radio companies competing
with Univision for Spanish-language radio advertising time in Houston,
Las Vegas, and San Francisco, and within those markets, the two
companies are each other's next best substitutes for advertisers
targeting Spanish-language listeners. THL currently has a 20 percent
equity interest and a 14 percent voting interest in Univision, as well
as the right to designate three Univision board members. THL also has
access to Univision's non-public, competitively sensitive information
and its officers and employees. Significant corporate decisions at
Univision require the assent of three of its five owners. THL's
ownership interest and associated rights give it influence over
Univision's management decisions.
41. Upon consummation of the proposed acquisition of Clear Channel,
defendant THL would own at least 35 percent of the equity and voting
interest of Clear Channel, as well as a right to choose four of its 12
directors. In addition, after the acquisition, THL would have access to
Clear Channel's non-public, competitively sensitive information and its
officers and employees. THL's ownership interest and associated rights
would give it influence over Clear Channel's management decisions.
42. THL would have the incentive and ability to use its ownership,
control and influence, and access to information as to both Clear
Channel and Univision to reduce competition between the companies in
markets where they are significant competitors, resulting in an
increase in prices for a significant number of advertisers. The
Houston, Las Vegas, and San Francisco radio markets are highly
concentrated, and these advertisers will find it difficult or
impossible to ``buy around'' Clear Channel and Univision, i.e., to
effectively reach their targeted audience without using Clear Channel
or Univision radio stations. Thus, THL's proposed acquisition of an
ownership interest in Clear Channel, if consummated, would
substantially reduce competition in the Spanish-language Overlap
Markets.
C. Entry Conditions
43. Entry of new radio stations into the relevant geographic
markets would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to mitigate the
competitive harm likely to result from this acquisition. Entry could
occur by obtaining a license for new radio spectrum or by reformatting
an existing station.
44. Acquisition of new radio spectrum is highly unlikely because
spectrum is a scarce and expensive commodity.
45. Reformatting by existing stations in any of the relevant
geographic markets would not be sufficient to mitigate the competitive
harm likely to result from this acquisition. For those stations in
these markets that have large shares in other coveted demographics, a
format shift solely in response to small but significant increases in
price by Clear Channel, CMP, or Univision is not likely because it
would not be profitable. For those radio stations that may have
incentives to change formats in response to small but significant
increases in price by Clear Channel, CMP, and Univision, their shift
would not be sufficient to mitigate the anticompetitive effects
resulting from this acquisition.
VIII. Violation Alleged
46. Each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 45 of this
Complaint is here realleged with the same force and effect as though
said paragraphs were here set forth in full.
47. The effect of the proposed acquisition of interests in Clear
Channel by Bain and THL would be to substantially lessen competition in
interstate trade and commerce, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.
48. Unless restrained, the transaction would likely have the
following effects, among others, in the provision of radio advertising
and Spanish-language radio advertising in the relevant geographic
markets:
a. competition in the sale and provision of advertising on radio
stations in the relevant markets would be substantially lessened or
eliminated; and
b. the prices for advertising on radio stations in the relevant
markets would likely increase, and the quality of services would likely
decline.
IX. Requested Relief
49. The plaintiff requests:
a. That Bain's and THL's proposed acquisitions of interests in
Clear Channel be adjudged to violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act;
b. That the defendants and all persons acting on their behalf be
permanently enjoined and restrained from consummating the proposed
acquisitions or from entering into or carrying out any agreement,
understanding, or plan, the effect of which is to bring radio stations
in the relevant markets under common ownership or control;
c. That the United States be awarded the costs of this action; and
d. That the United States be granted such other and further relief
as the Court may deem just and proper.
Dated: February 13, 2008.
Respectfully submitted,
For Plaintiff United States:
Thomas O. Barnett (D.C. Bar No. 426840),
Assistant Attorney General
David L. Meyer,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Patricia A. Brink,
Deputy Director of Operations
John R. Read,
Chief, Litigation III Section,
Nina B. Hale,
Assistant Chief, Litigation III Section
Christopher M. Ries,
Daniel McCuaig (D.C. Bar No. 478199),
Attorneys for the United States, Litigation III Section, Antitrust
Division, United States Department of Justice, 325 7th Street, NW.,
Suite 300, Washington, DC 20530
[[Page 10812]]
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on February 13, 2008, I caused a copy of the
foregoing Complaint, proposed Final Judgment, Competitive Impact
Statement, Hold Separate Stipulation and Order, and Explanation of
Consent Decree Procedures to be served on the defendants in this matter
in the manner set forth below:
By electronic mail and hand delivery:
Counsel for Defendants Bain Capital, LLC and Thomas H. Lee Partners,
L.P.,
James M. ``Mit'' Spears,
Ropes & Gray LLP,
700 12th Street, NW., Suite 900, Washington, DC 20005-3948,
Telephone: (202) 508-4681, Facsimile: (202) 383-8320, E-mail:
mit.spears@ropesgray.com.
Counsel for Defendant Clear Channel Communications, Inc.,
Phillip A. Proger,
Jones Day,
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20001-2113, Telephone:
(202) 879-4668, Facsimile: (202) 626-1700, E-mail:
paproger@jonesday.com.
Daniel McCuaig (D.C. Bar No. 478199),
United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Litigation
III Section, 325 Seventh Street, NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC
20530, Telephone: (202) 307-0520, Facsimile: (202) 514-7308, E-mail:
daniel.mccuaig@usdoj.gov.
Appendix A Definition of HHI
The term ``HHI'' means the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a commonly
accepted measure of market concentration. The HHI is calculated by
squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then
summing the resulting numbers. For example, for a market consisting of
four firms with shares of 30, 30, 20, and 20 percent, the HHI is 2,600
(30 \2\ + 30 \2\ + 20 \2\ + 20 \2\ = 2,600). The HHI takes into account
the relative size and distribution of the firms in a market. It
approaches zero when a market is occupied by a large number of firms of
relatively equal size and reaches its maximum of 10,000 when a market
is controlled by a single firm. The HHI increases both as the number of
firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in size between
those firms increases.
Markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 are considered to
be moderately concentrated, and markets in which the HHI is in excess
of 1800 points are considered to be highly concentrated. Transactions
that increase the HHI by more than 100 points in highly concentrated
markets presumptively raise significant antitrust concerns under the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines.
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
United States Of America, Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division 325 7th Street, NW., Suite 300 Washington, DC 20530,
Plaintiff, v. Bain Capital, LLC 111 Huntington Ave., Boston, MA
02199, and Thomas H. Lee Partners L.P., 100 Federal St. 35th Fl.
Boston, Massachusetts 02110, and Clear Channel Communications, Inc.
200 E. Basse Rd., San Antonio, TX 78209, Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 1 :08-cv-00245
Filed: Feb. 13, 2008
Assigned to: Robertson, James
Assign. Date: 2/13/2008
Description: Antitrust
Final Judgment
Whereas, plaintiff, United States of America, filed its Complaint
on February 13, 1998, the United States and Defendants Bain Capital,
LLC (``Bain''), Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P. (``THL''), and Clear
Channel, by their respective attorneys, have consulted to entry of this
Final judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or
law, and without this Final Judgment constituting any evidence against
or admission by any party regarding any issue of fact or law;
And whereas, defendants agree to be bound by the provisions of this
Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
And whereas, the essence of this Final Judgment is the prompt and
certain divestiture of certain rights or assets by defendants to assure
that competition is not substantially lessened;
And whereas, the United States requires defendants to make certain
divestitures for the purpose of remedying the loss of competition
alleged in the Complaint;
And whereas, defendants have represented to the United States that
the divestitures required below can and will be made and that
defendants will later raise no claim of hardship or difficulty as
grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the divestiture
provisions contained below;
Now therefore, before any testimony is taken, without trial or
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of the
parties, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and each of
the parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which
relief may be granted against defendants under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, as amended, 15. U.S.C. 18.
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
A. ``Bain'' means Bain Capital, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts, its directors,
officers, partners, managers, employees, agents, representatives,
successors, and assigns; and its joint ventures, subsidiaries,
partnerships, divisions, groups, affiliates, investment funds, hedge
funds, and certain other private equity investment vehicles controlled
or managed by Bain Capital Partners, LLC, and the respective directors,
officers, general partners, managers, employees, agents,
representatives, successors, and assigns of each.
B. ``THL'' means Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P., a Delaware limited
partnership headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts, its directors,
officers, partners, managers, employees, agents, representatives,
successors, and assigns; and its joint ventures, subsidiaries,
partnerships, divisions, groups, affiliates, investment funds, hedge
funds, and certain other private equity investment vehicles controlled
or managed by Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P., and the respective
directors, officers, general partners, managers, employees, agents,
representatives, successors, and assigns of each.
C. ``Clear Channel'' means Clear Channel Communications, Inc., a
Texas corporation headquartered in San Antonio, Texas, its directors,
officers, managers, agents and employees, its successors and assigns,
and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships and
joint ventures, and their directors, officers, managers, agents and
employees.
D. ``Univision'' means Univision Communications, Inc., a Delaware
corporation headquartered in Los Angeles, California, its directors,
officers, managers, agents and employees, its successors and assigns,
and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and
joint ventures, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and
employees.
E. ``BMP-Univision Holdings'' means Broadcasting Media Partners,
Inc., a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York that holds all
of Univision's outstanding shares, its directors, officers, managers,
agents and employees, its successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries,
divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and
their directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.
F. ``CMP Susquehanna'' means CMP Susquehanna Holdings, Corp., a
Delaware corporation headquartered in Atlanta that is owned by Cumulus
Media Partners, its directors, officers, managers, agents and
employees, its
[[Page 10813]]
successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and their directors,
officers, managers, agents, and employees.
G. ``Cumulus Media Partners'' means Cumulus Media Partners, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company headquartered in Atlanta, its
directors, officers, managers, agents and employees, its successors and
assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates,
partnerships, and joint ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
H. ``MSA'' means Metro Survey Area. A Metro Survey Area is a
geographical area in which Arbitron, a radio industry survey company,
collects listener data to aid radio stations, advertisers, and
advertising agencies in evaluating radio audience size and composition.
I. ``Cincinnati'' means the Cincinnati, Ohio MSA.
J. ``Houston'' means the Houston/Galveston, Texas MSA.
K. ``Las Vegas'' means the Las Vegas, Nevada MSA.
L. ``San Francisco'' means the San Francisco, California MSA.
M. ``WLW'' means the radio station WLW-AM located in Cincinnati
owned by defendant Clear Channel.
N. ``WKFS'' means the radio station WKFS-FM located in Cincinnati
owned by defendant Clear Channel.
O. ``WOFX'' means the radio station WOFX-FM located in Cincinnati
owned by defendant Clear Channel.
P. ``WNNF'' means the radio station WNNF located in Cincinnati
owned by defendant Clear Channel.
Q. ``KLOL'' means the radio station KLOL-FM located in Houston
owned by defendant Clear Channel.
R. ``KHMX'' means the radio station KHMX-FM located in Houston
owned by defendant Clear Channel.
S. ``KTBZ'' means the radio station KTBZ-FM located in Houston
owned by defendant Clear Channel.
T. ``KWID'' means the radio station KWID-FM located in Las Vegas
owned by defendant Clear Channel.
U. ``KSJO'' means the radio station KSJO-FM located in San
Francisco owned by defendant Clear Channel.
V. ``Cincinnati Assets'' means either (1) WLW and WKFS or, at the
discretion of the defendants, (2) WOFX and WNNF.
W. ``Houston Assets'' means either (1) KHMX or, at the discretion
of the defendants, (2) KTBZ.
X. ``Houston Spanish-language Assets'' means KLOL.
Y. ``Las Vegas Spanish-language Assets'' means KWID.
Z. ``San Francisco Spanish-language Assets'' means KSJO.
AA. ``Clear Channel Assets'' means collectively, the Cincinnati
Assets and the Houston Assets.
AB. ``Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets'' means, collectively,
the Houston Spanish-language Assets, Las Vegas Spanish-language Assets,
and San Francisco Spanish-language Assets.
AC. ``Divestiture Assets'' means all of the assets, tangible or
intangible, used in the operations of the Clear Channel Assets and the
Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets, including, but not limited to:
(i) All licenses, permits, authorizations, and applications therefor
issued by the Federal Communications Commission (``FCC'') and other
government agencies related to the Clear Channel Assets and the Clear
Channel Spanish-language Assets; (ii) all contracts (including
programming contracts and rights), agreements, leases, and commitments
and understandings of defendants relating to the operations of the
Clear Channel Assets and the Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets;
(iii) all interest in real property (owned or leased) relating to the
transmitter facilities of the Clear Channel Assets and the Clear
Channel Spanish-language Assets and all items of tangible property used
in the operation of the Clear Channel Assets and the Clear Channel
Spanish-language Assets at such transmitter facilities; (iv) all
interest in the real property lease relating to the studios of the
Clear Channel Assets and the Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets; (v)
all broadcast equipment, office equipment, office furniture, fixtures,
materials, supplies, and other tangible property used in the operation
of the Clear Channel Assets and the Clear Channel Spanish-language
Assets; (vi) all interests in trademarks, service marks, trade names,
copyrights, patents, slogans, programming materials, and promotional
materials relating to the Clear Channel Assets and the Clear Channel
Spanish-language Assets; (vii) all customer lists, accounts, and credit
records relating to the Clear Channel Assets and the Clear Channel
Spanish-language Assets; and (viii) all other records maintained by
defendants in connection with the Clear Channel Assets and the Clear
Channel Spanish-language Assets; however, assets that: (a) Are
principally devoted to the operation of stations other than the Clear
Channel Assets and the Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets or to the
operation of their parent companies, and are not necessary to the
operation of the Clear Channel Assets and the Clear Channel Spanish-
language Assets shall not be included within the Divestiture Assets; or
(b) are part of a shared group of like assets (including, but not
limited to, microphones and office supplies) shall be allocated to
Clear Channel Assets and Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets, and
thus to Divestiture Assets, only in proportion with their use by the
Clear Channel Assets or the Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets.
AD. ``Clear Channel Divestiture Assets'' are the Divestiture Assets
relating to the Clear Channel Assets.
AE. ``Clear Channel Spanish-language Divestiture Assets'' are the
Divestiture Assets relating to the Clear Channel Spanish-language
Assets.
AF. ``Acquirer'' means the entity or entities to whom defendants
divest any Divestiture Assets.
III. Applicability
A. This Final Judgment applies to THL, Bain, and Clear Channel, as
defined above, and all other persons in active concert or participation
with any of them who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by
personal service or otherwise.
B. If, prior to complying with Sections IV and V of this Final
Judgment, Defendants sell or otherwise dispose of all or substantially
all of their assets or of lesser business units that include the
Divestiture Assets, they shall require the purchaser to be bound by the
provisions of this Final Judgment. Defendants need not obtain such an
agreement from the acquirers of the assets divested pursuant to this
Final Judgment.
IV. Divestitures
A. Defendant Clear Channel is ordered and directed to divest the
Divestiture Assets in a manner consistent with this Final Judgment to
an Acquirer or Acquirers acceptable to the United States in its sole
discretion, within ninety (90) calendar days from the date of the
closing of the transaction that is the subject of the Final Judgment or
five (5) calendar days after notice of the entry of this Final Judgment
by the Court, whichever is later. The United States, in its sole
discretion, may agree to one or more extensions of this time period not
to exceed in total sixty (60) calendar days, and shall notify the Court
in each such circumstance. If, within the period permitted for
divestitures, defendants have filed applications with the FCC seeking
approval to assign or transfer licenses to the Acquirer(s) (previously
approved by the United States, pursuant to the terms of this paragraph)
of the Clear Channel Assets and the Clear Channel Spanish-language
Assets, but an order or other dispositive action by the FCC on such
applications has not been issued before the end of
[[Page 10814]]
the period permitted for divestitures, the period shall be extended
with respect to divestiture of those Clear Channel Assets and Clear
Channel Spanish-language Assets for which FCC final approval has not
been issued until ten (10) calendar days after such approval is
received. Defendant Clear Channel agrees to use its best efforts to
divest the Divestiture Assets, and to obtain all regulatory approvals
necessary for such divestitures, as expeditiously as possible.
B. The Divestiture Assets shall not include the Clear Channel
Assets if, prior to the completion of the divestitures required by this
Final Judgment, both THL and Bain no longer have any have limited
liability company membership or any type of debt, equity governance, or
other beneficial interest in either Cumulus Media Partners or CMP
Susquehanna, and have provided written certification (and supporting
documentation) satisfactory to the United States that they have
divested all such assets.
C. The Divestiture Assets shall not include the Clear Channel
Spanish-language Assets if, prior to the completion of the divestitures
required by this Final Judgment, defendant THL no longer has any shares
of capital stock or any type of debt, equity, governance, or other
beneficial interest in either BMP-Univision Holdings or Univision, and
has provided written certification (and supporting documentation)
satisfactory to the United States that it has divested all such assets.
D. The obligation to divest the San Francisco Spanish-language
Assets shall be suspended if, prior to the completion of the
divestitures required by this Final Judgment, those assets have been
transferred to an FCC-authorized trust, and shall cease if such assets
are sold under the terms of the FCC-authorized trust.
E. In accomplishing the divestitures ordered by this Final
Judgment, defendant Clear Channel promptly shall make known, by usual
and customary means, the availability of the Divestiture Assets.
Defendants shall inform any person making inquiry regarding a possible
purchase of the Divestiture Assets that they are being divested
pursuant to this Final Judgment and provide that person with a copy of
this Final Judgment. Defendant Clear Channel shall offer to furnish to
all prospective Acquirers, subject to customary confidentiality
assurances, all information and documents relating to the Divestiture
Assets customarily provided in a due diligence process except such
information or documents subject to the attorney-client privilege or
work-product doctrine. Defendant Clear Channel shall make available
such information to the United States at the same time that such
information is made available to any other person.
F. Defendant Clear Channel shall provide to the Acquirer or
Acquirers and the United States information relating to personnel
involved in the operation of the Divestiture Assets to enable the
Acquirer or Acquirers to make offers of employment. Defendants shall
not interfere with any negotiations by the Acquirer or Acquirers to
employ any Clear Channel employee whose primary responsibility is the
operation of the Divestiture Assets.
G. Defendant Clear Channel shall permit prospective Acquirers of
the Divestiture Assets to have reasonable access to personnel and to
make inspections of the physical facilities of the Divestiture Assets;
access to any and all environmental, zoning, and other permit documents
and information; and access to any and all financial, operational, or
other documents and information customarily provided as part of a due
diligence process.
H. Defendant Clear Channel shall warrant to the Acquirer or
Acquirers that each of the assets will be operational on the date of
sale.
I. Defendants shall not take any action that will impede in any way
the permitting, operation, or divestiture of the Divestiture Assets.
J. Defendant Clear Channel shall warrant to the Acquirer or
Acquirers that there are no material defects in the environmental,
zoning, or other permits pertaining to the operation of the Divestiture
Assets, and that following the sale of the Divestiture Assets,
defendants will not undertake, directly or indirectly, any challenges
to the environmental, zoning, or other permits relating to the
operation of the Divestiture Assets.
K. Unless the United States otherwise consents in writing, any
divestiture pursuant to Section IV, or by trustee appointed pursuant to
Section V, of this Final Judgment, shall include the entire Divestiture
Assets, and shall be accomplished in such a way as to satisfy the
United States, in its sole discretion that (i) the Clear Channel Assets
can and will be used by the Acquirer or Acquirers as part of viable,
ongoing businesses engaged in ongoing commercial radio broadcasting;
(ii) the Clear Channel Spanish-language Assets can and will be used by
the Acquirer or Acquirers as part of viable, ongoing businesses engaged
in ongoing commercial Spanish language radio broadcasting; (iii) that
the Divestiture Assets will remain viable; and (iv) that the
divestiture of such assets will remedy the competitive harm alleged in
the Complaint. The sale of the Divestiture Assets may be made to one or
more Acquirers, provided that in each instance it is demonstrated to
the sole satisfaction of the United States that the Divestiture Assets
will remain viable. The divestitures, whether pursuant to Section IV or
Section V of this Final Judgment:
1. Shall be made to an Acquirer or Acquirers that, in the United
States' sole judgment, has the intent and capability (including the
necessary managerial, operational, technical, and financial capability)
to compete effectively in either the commercial radio broadcasting
business (for the Cincinnati Assets and the Houston Assets) or the
commercial Spanish-language radio broadcasting business (for the
Houston Spanish-language Assets, the Las Vegas Spanish-language Assets,
and the San Francisco Spanish-language Assets); and
2. shall be accomplished so as to satisfy the United States, in its
sole discretion, that none of the terms of any agreement between an
Acquirer or Acquirers and defendant Clear Channel gives defendant the
ability to unreasonably raise the Acquirer's costs, to lower the
Acquirer's efficiency, or otherwise to interfere in the ability of the
Acquirer to compete effectively.
v. Appointment of Trustee
A. If defendant Clear Channel has not divested the Divestiture
Assets within the time period specified in Paragraph IV (A), defendants
shall notify the United States of that fact in writing. Upon
application of the United States, the Court shall appoint a trustee
selected by the United States and approved by the Court to effect the
divestiture of the Divestiture Assets.
B. After the appointment of a trustee becomes effective, only the
trustee shall have the right to sell the Divestiture Assets. The
trustee shall have the power and authority to accomplish the
divestiture to an Acquirer acceptable to the United States at such
price and on such terms as are then obtainable upon reasonable effort
by the trustee, subject to the provisions of Sections IV, V, and VI of
this Final Judgment, and shall have such other powers as this Court
deems appropriate. Subject to Paragraph V(D) of this Final Judgment,
the trustee may hire at the cost and expense of defendants any
investment bankers, attorneys, or other agents, who shall be solely
accountable to the trustee, and are reasonably necessary in the
trustee's judgment to assist in the divestiture.
[[Page 10815]]
C. Defendants shall not object to a sale by the trustee on any
ground other than the trustee's malfeasance. Any such objection by
defendants must be conveyed in writing to the United States and the
trustee within ten (10) calendar days after the trustee has provided
the notice required under section VI.
D. The trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of the
defendants, on such terms and conditions as the United States approves,
and shall account for all monies derived from the sale of the assets
sold by the trustee and all costs and expenses so incurred. After
approval by the Court of the trustee's accounting, including fees for
its services and those of any professionals and agents retained by the
trustee, all remaining money shall be paid to the defendants and the
trust shall then be terminated. The compensation of the trustee and any
professionals and agents retained by the trustee shall be reasonable in
light of the value of the Divestiture Assets and based on a fee
arrangement providing the trustee with an incentive based on the price
and terms of the divestiture and the speed with which it is
accomplished, but timeliness is paramount.
E. Defendants shall use their best efforts to assist the trustee in
accomplishing the required divestiture. The trustee and any
consultants, accountants, attorneys, and other persons retained by the
trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books,
records, and facilities of the business to be divested, and the
defendants shall develop financial and other information relevant to
such business as the trustee may reasonably request, subject to
reasonable protection for trade secrets or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information. Defendants shall take no action
to interfere with or to impede the trustee's accomplishment of the
divestiture.
F. After its appointment, the trustee shall file monthly reports
with the United States and the Court setting forth the trustee's
efforts to accomplish the divestiture ordered under this Final
Judgment. To the extent such reports contain information that the
trustee deems confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the
public docket of the Court. Such reports shall include the name,
address, and telephone number of each person who, during the preceding
month, made an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring,
entered into negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an
inquiry about acquiring any interest in the Divestiture Assets, and
shall describe in detail each contact with any such person. The trustee
shall maintain full records of all efforts made to divest the
Divestiture Assets.
G. If the trustee has not accomplished the divestitures ordered
under this Final Judgment within six months after its appointment, the
trustee shall promptly file with the Court a report setting forth: (1)
The trustee's efforts to accomplish the required divestiture; (2) the
reasons, in the trustee's judgment, why the required divestiture has
not been accomplished; and (3) the trustee's recommendations. To the
extent such report contains information that the trustee deems
confidential, such report shall not be filed in the public docket of
the Court. The trustee shall at the same time furnish such report to
the United States, which shall have the right to make additional
recommendations consistent with the purpose of the trust. The Court
thereafter shall enter such orders as it shall deem appropriate to
carry out the purpose of the Final Judgment, which may, if necessary,
include extending the trust and the term of the trustee's appointment
by a period requested by the United States.
VI. Notice of Proposed Divestitures
A. Within two (2) business days following execution of a definitive
divestiture agreement, defendant Clear Channel or the trustee,
whichever is then responsible for effecting the divestitures required
herein, shall notify the United States of any proposed divestitures
required by Section IV or V of this Final Judgment. If the trustee is
responsible, it shall similarly notify defendants. The notice shall set
forth the details of the proposed divestiture( s) and list the name,
address, and telephone number of each person not previously identified
who offered or expressed an interest in or desire to acquire any
ownership interest in the Divestiture Assets, together with full
details of the same.
B. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of receipt by the United
States of such notice, the United States may request from the
defendants, the proposed Acquirer or Acquirers, any other third party,
or the trustee, if applicable, additional information concerning the
proposed divestitures, the proposed Acquirer or Acquirers, and any
other potential Acquirer. Defendants and the trustee shall furnish any
additional information requested within fifteen (15) calendar days of
the receipt of the request, unless the parties shall otherwise agree.
C. Within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the notice or
within twenty (20) calendar days after the United States has been
provided the additional information requested from defendants, the
proposed Acquirer or Acquirers, any third party, and the trustee,
whichever is later, the United States shall provide written notice to
defendants and the trustee, if there is one, stating whether or not it
objects to the proposed divestiture(s). If the United States provides
written notice that it does not object, the divestitures may be
consummated, subject only to defendants' limited right to object to the
sale under Paragraph V(C) of this Final Judgment. Absent written notice
that the United States does not object to the proposed Acquirer or upon
objection by the United States, a divestiture proposed under Section IV
or Section V shall not be consummated. Upon objection by defendant
Clear Channel under Paragraph V(C), a divestiture proposed under
Section V shall not be consummated unless approved by the Court.
VII. Financing
Defendants shall not finance all or any part of any purchase made
pursuant to Section IV or V of this Final Judgment.
VIII. Preservation of Assets/Hold Separate
Until the divestitures required by this Final Judgment have been
accomplished, defendants shall take all steps necessary to comply with
the Hold Separate Stipulation and Order entered by this Court.
Defendants shall take no action that would jeopardize the divestitures
ordered by this Court.
IX. Affidavits
A. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint
in this matter, and every thirty (30) calendar days thereafter until
the divestitures have been completed under section IV or V, defendants
shall deliver to the United States an affidavit as to the fact and
manner of their compliance with section IV or V of this Final Judgment.
Each such affidavit shall include the name, address, and telephone
number of each person who, during the preceding thirty (30) calendar
days, made an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring,
entered into negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an
inquiry about acquiring, any interest in the Divestiture Assets, and
shall describe in detail each contact with any such person during that
period. Each such affidavit shall also include a description of the
efforts defendants have taken to solicit buyers for the Divestiture
Assets, and to provide required information to any prospective
[[Page 10816]]
Acquirer, including the limitations, if any, on such information.
Assuming the information set forth in the affidavit is true and
complete, any objection by the United States to information provided by
defendants, including limitations on the information, shall be made
within fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of such affidavit.
B. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint
in this matter, defendants shall deliver to the United States an
affidavit that describes in reasonable detail all actions defendants
have taken and all steps defendants have implemented on an ongoing
basis to comply with Section VIII of this Final Judgment. Defendants
shall deliver to the United States an affidavit describing any changes
to the efforts and actions outlined in defendants' earlier affidavits
filed pursuant to this section within fifteen (15) calendar days after
the change is implemented.
C. Defendants shall keep all records of all efforts made to
preserve and divest the Divestiture Assets until one year after such
divestitures have been completed.
X. Compliance Inspection
A. For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with this
Final Judgment, or of determining whether the Final Judgment should be
modified or vacated, and subject to any legally recognized privilege,
from time to time authorized representatives of the United States
Department of Justice, including consultants and other persons retained
by the United States, shall, upon written request of a duly authorized
representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to defendants, be
permitted:
1. Access during defendants' office hours to inspect and copy, or
at the option of the United States, to require defendants to provide
hard or electronic copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts, records,
data, and documents in the possession, custody, or control of
defendants, relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment;
and
2. to interview, either informally or on the record, defendants'
officers, employees, or agents, who may have their individual counsel
present, regarding such matters. The interviews shall be subject to the
reasonable convenience of the interviewee and without restraint or
interference by any defendant.
B. Upon the written request of an authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
defendants shall submit written reports or responses to written
interrogatories, under oath if requested, relating to any of the
matters contained in this Final Judgment as may be requested.
C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in
this section shall be divulged by the United States to any person other
than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the United
States, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United
States is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the
purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as
otherwise required by law.
D. If, at the time information or documents are furnished by
defendants to the United States, defendants represent and identify in
writing the material in any such information or documents to which a
claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26( c)(7) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and defendants mark each pertinent page of
such material, ``Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(7) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then the United States shall
give defendants ten (10) calendar days notice prior to divulging such
material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding).
XI. No Reacquisition
A. As long as defendant Bain has any limited liability company
membership or debt, equity, governance, or other beneficial interest in
Clear Channel and either Cumulus Media Partners or CMP Susquehanna,
defendants Bain and Clear Channel may not reacquire any part of the
Clear Channel Divestiture Assets nor enter into any local marketing
agreement, joint sales agreement, or any other cooperative selling
arrangement with respect to the Clear Channel Divestiture Assets.
B. As long as defendant THL has any limited liability company
membership or debt, equity, governance, or other beneficial interest in
Clear Channel and either Cumulus Media Partners or CMP Susquehanna,
defendants THL and Clear Channel may not reacquire any part of the
Clear Channel Divestiture Assets nor enter into any local marketing
agreement, joint sales agreement, or any other cooperative selling
arrangement with respect to the Clear Channel Divestiture Assets.
C. As long as defendant THL has any limited liability company
membership or debt, equity, governance, or other beneficial interest in
Clear Channel and either Univision or BMP-Univision Holdings,
defendants THL and Clear Channel may not reacquire any part of the
Clear Channel Spanish-language Divestiture Assets nor enter into any
local marketing agreement, joint sales agreement, or any other
cooperative selling arrangement with respect to the Clear Channel
Spanish-language Divestiture Assets.
D. If defendants Bain and THL satisfied the requirements of
Paragraph IV (B) of this Final Judgment and thus did not divest the
Clear Channel Assets, no defendant may, so long as Bain or THL has any
limited liability company membership or debt, equity, governance, or
other beneficial interest in Clear Channel, acquire any beneficial
interest in either Cumulus Media Partners or CMP Susquehanna nor enter
into any local marketing agreement, joint sales agreement, or any other
cooperative selling arrangement betwee