Airworthiness Directives; Lockheed Model L-1011 Series Airplanes, 9235-9239 [E8-2996]
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9235
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 73, No. 34
Wednesday, February 20, 2008
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2008–0181; Directorate
Identifier 2007–NM–180–AD]
Examining the AD Docket
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Lockheed
Model L–1011 Series Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a
new airworthiness directive (AD) for all
Lockheed Model L–1011 series
airplanes. This proposed AD would
require revising the FAA-approved
maintenance program by incorporating
new airworthiness limitations for fuel
tank systems to satisfy Special Federal
Aviation Regulation No. 88
requirements. This proposed AD would
also require the accomplishment of
certain fuel system modifications, the
initial inspections of certain repetitive
fuel system limitations to phase in those
inspections, and repair if necessary.
This proposed AD results from a design
review of the fuel tank systems. We are
proposing this AD to prevent the
potential for ignition sources inside fuel
tanks caused by latent failures,
alterations, repairs, or maintenance
actions, which, in combination with
flammable fuel vapors, could result in a
fuel tank explosion and consequent loss
of the airplane.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by March 21, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 202–493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations,
M–30, West Building Ground Floor,
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Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations,
M–30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590,
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in
this AD, contact Lockheed Continued
Airworthiness Project Office, Attention:
Airworthiness, 86 South Cobb Drive,
Marietta, Georgia 30063–0567.
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the
Docket Management Facility between
9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD
docket contains this proposed AD, the
regulatory evaluation, any comments
received, and other information. The
street address for the Docket Office
(telephone 800–647–5527) is in the
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be
available in the AD docket shortly after
receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Robert A. Bosak, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion and Services Branch, ACE–
118A, FAA, Atlanta Aircraft
Certification Office, One Crown Center,
1895 Phoenix Boulevard, Suite 450,
Atlanta, Georgia 30349; telephone (770)
703–6094; fax (770) 703–6097.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written
relevant data, views, or arguments about
this proposed AD. Send your comments
to an address listed under the
ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No.
FAA–2008–0181; Directorate Identifier
2007–NM–180–AD’’ at the beginning of
your comments. We specifically invite
comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy
aspects of this proposed AD. We will
consider all comments received by the
closing date and may amend this
proposed AD because of those
comments.
We will post all comments we
receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each
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substantive verbal contact we receive
about this proposed AD.
Discussion
The FAA has examined the
underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large
transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the
service history of airplanes subject to
those regulations, and existing
maintenance practices for fuel tank
systems. As a result of those findings,
we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport
Airplane Fuel Tank System Design
Review, Flammability Reduction and
Maintenance and Inspection
Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7,
2001). In addition to new airworthiness
standards for transport airplanes and
new maintenance requirements, this
rule included Special Federal Aviation
Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’
Amendment 21–78, and subsequent
Amendments 21–82 and 21–83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88
requires certain type design (i.e., type
certificate (TC) and supplemental type
certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate
that their fuel tank systems can prevent
ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This
requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered
transport airplanes and for subsequent
modifications to those airplanes. It
requires them to perform design reviews
and to develop design changes and
maintenance procedures if their designs
do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble
to the rule, we intended to adopt
airworthiness directives to mandate any
changes found necessary to address
unsafe conditions identified as a result
of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we
have established four criteria intended
to define the unsafe conditions
associated with fuel tank systems that
require corrective actions. The
percentage of operating time during
which fuel tanks are exposed to
flammable conditions is one of these
criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation:
Single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s),
and in-service failure experience. For all
four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken
that may mitigate the need for further
action.
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rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS
We have determined that the actions
identified in this proposed AD are
necessary to reduce the potential of
ignition sources inside fuel tanks,
which, in combination with flammable
fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank
explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Lockheed Service
Bulletin 093–28–098, Revision 1, dated
January 22, 2008. The service bulletin
describes procedures for incorporating
new airworthiness limitations for fuel
tank systems into the operator’s FAAapproved maintenance program. The
airworthiness limitations for fuel tank
systems include fuel system limitations
(FSLs) and critical design configuration
control limitations (CDCCLs). FSLs are
modifications, design features, and
periodic inspections of certain features
for latent failures that could contribute
to an ignition source. CDCCLs are
limitation requirements to preserve a
critical ignition source prevention
feature of the fuel tank system design
that is necessary to prevent the
occurrence of an unsafe condition. The
purpose of a CDCCL is to provide
instruction to retain the critical ignition
source prevention feature during
configuration change that may be
caused by alterations, repairs, or
maintenance actions. A CDCCL is not a
periodic inspection.
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–
098 refers to the following service
information for doing certain CDCCLs:
• Hamilton Sundstrand Overhaul
Manual 28–24–03, Revision 14, dated
May 15, 2000, or later, for overhauling
and repairing the electrically-operated
fuel boost pumps.
• Lockheed L–1011 Service
Information Letter 28–12 for keeping the
electrical conduit for the electricallyoperated fuel boost pumps open and
unplugged at the wing rear spar.
• Lockheed Drawing 1527514 for
installing the fuel tank valves, auxiliary
power unit pump, sight gages, fuel
quantity indicating system tank units,
over wing filler cap adapter ring, boost
pump mounting plate, and access doors
for the boost pump, vent box, vent
valve, and fuel level control switch.
• Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–
098 also refers to the following service
bulletins as additional sources of service
information for doing the FSLs:
• Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–
062, Revision 7, dated December 9,
1983, for Model L–1011 series airplanes,
which describes procedures for
inspecting and modifying the plug-in
valve assemblies of the fuel shutoff
system.
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• Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–
089, Revision 3, dated October 4, 2006,
for Model L–1011–385–3 series
airplanes, which describes procedures
for removing auxiliary fuel tank No. 4.
• Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–
093, Revision 1, dated February 8, 1999,
for Model L–1011 series airplanes,
which describes procedures for
installing and inspecting fuel boost
pumps and modifying the centrifugal
pump and motor.
• Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–
094, Revision 1, dated June 23, 2006, for
Model L–1011 series airplanes. This
service bulletin describes procedures for
(1) modifying the wiring harnesses of
the fuel level control switch, (2)
repetitively inspecting the fuel level
control switch, wiring harnesses, and
harness conduit for any visible damage,
wear or chafing, broken or missing Orings, or indications of electrical arcing,
(3) replacing the fuel level control
switch assembly with a new assembly if
any damage, wear or chafing, or
indications of electrical arcing to the
wiring is found or any broken or
missing O-rings are found, (4) notifying
Lockheed of any discrepancies found
during the inspection, and (5) revising
the airplane records and maintenance
planning documents to require the
repetitive inspections. The modification
involves replacing the braided fiberglass
sleeving with PVC electrical sleeving
over each wiring harness and replacing
the smaller inside diameter conduit
with the larger inside diameter conduit,
if applicable. (Although AD 2001–08–
21, amendment 39–12198 (66 FR 21072,
April 27, 2001) mandated
accomplishment of Lockheed Service
Bulletin 093–28–094, dated March 3,
2000, more work is necessary for
Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin
093–28–094.)
• Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–
095, dated September 13, 2006, for
Model L–1011 series airplanes. This
service bulletin describes procedures for
(1) repetitively inspecting the airplane
fuel tanks and vent boxes for cleanliness
and evidence of deteriorated or
damaged fuel/vent tubes and
components, (2) repetitively inspecting
bonding jumpers on the fuel/vent tubes
and components for proper installation,
corrosion, frayed or broken strands, and
the condition of the environmental
sealing or bonding clamps and
hardware, (3) correcting any discrepant
conditions, (4) notifying Lockheed of
any discrepancies found during the
inspection, (5) adding about 444
bonding jumpers across the fuel/vent
tube fittings located in fuel tanks 1, 2L,
2R, and 3, (6) repetitively inspecting the
bonding jumpers on the fuel/vent tube
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fittings, and (7) revising the airplane
records and maintenance planning
documents to require the repetitive
inspections.
• Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–
096, Revision 2, dated June 23, 2006, for
Model L–1011 series airplanes. This
service bulletin describes procedures for
(1) repetitively inspecting the wiring
harnesses of the No. 1 and No. 3 engine
tank valves for evidence of damage and
fuel contamination, (2) replacing any
damaged wire with new wire, (3)
repairing or replacing any contaminated
wires as applicable, (4) reporting any
evidence of damage or wire replacement
to Lockheed, and (5) revising the
airplane records and maintenance
planning documents to require the
repetitive inspections.
• Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–
097, dated August 3, 2006, for Model
L–1011 series airplanes. This service
bulletin describes procedures for (1)
installing identification markers or
sleeving on the wiring harnesses of the
fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS),
(2) repetitively inspecting the FQIS
wiring harnesses for any visible damage,
wear, chafing, or indications of
electrical arcing, (3) replacing or
repairing any damaged wires, (4)
notifying Lockheed of any discrepancies
found during the inspection, and (5)
revising the airplane records and
maintenance planning documents to
require the repetitive inspection.
Accomplishing the actions specified
in the service information is intended to
adequately address the unsafe
condition.
FAA’s Findings
During the SFAR 88 safety
assessment, Lockheed concluded that
no operator had installed auxiliary fuel
tank No. 4, in accordance with
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–089,
on Model L–1011–385–3 series
airplanes. Thus, safety assessments for
the auxiliary fuel tank, including the
electrical equipment involved with the
modification, did not need to be
analyzed to show compliance with
SFAR 88. Since Lockheed has not
provided the service information
required under SFAR 88 that could lead
the FAA to make a finding of
compliance, and there is a possibility
that there may be unreported
installations of the modification, we
must mandate the removal of auxiliary
fuel tank.
If an operator does not wish to remove
the auxiliary fuel tank, we will consider
requests for alternative methods of
compliance (AMOCs). The most likely
requests would be to allow continued
use of the tank by showing compliance
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with SFAR 88. This would involve
obtaining STCs and developing design
and maintenance procedures to address
all identified safety issues.
FAA’s Determination and Requirements
of the Proposed AD
We have evaluated all pertinent
information and identified an unsafe
condition that is likely to exist or
develop on other airplanes of this same
type design. For this reason, we are
proposing this AD, which would require
revising the FAA-approved maintenance
program to incorporate the FSLs and
CDCCLs specified in Lockheed Service
Bulletin 093–28–098. This proposed AD
would also require the accomplishment
of certain fuel system modifications, the
initial inspections of certain repetitive
FSLs to phase in those inspections, and
repair if necessary.
Differences Between the Proposed AD
and Service Bulletin
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–
098 specifies to revise the operator’s
maintenance program to incorporate
Revision 7 of Lockheed Service Bulletin
093–28–062 and Revision 1 of Lockheed
Service Bulletin 093–28–093. However,
this proposed AD would not require
those actions, since Lockheed Service
Bulletins 093–28–062 and 093–28–093
are mandated by other ADs. AD 99–24–
12, amendment 39–11436 (64 FR 66756,
November 30, 1999), mandated Revision
1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–
093. AD 80–25–04, amendment 39–3983
(45 FR 79011, November 28, 1980),
mandated Revision 1 of Lockheed
Service Bulletin 093–28–062, but this
proposed AD would not require
accomplishing Revision 7 of the service
bulletin since both Revisions 1 and 7
adequately address the unsafe
condition.
Where Lockheed Service Bulletin
093–28–098 specifies to inspect, this
proposed AD would require a general
visual inspection. We have included
Note 2 in this proposed AD to define
this type of inspection.
Although Lockheed Service Bulletins
093–28–094, 093–28–095, 093–28–096,
and 093–28–097 describe procedures for
notifying Lockheed of any discrepancies
found during inspection or any
evidence of damage or wire
replacement, this proposed AD would
not require those actions.
Explanation of Compliance Time
In most ADs, we adopt a compliance
time allowing a specified amount of
time after the AD’s effective date. In this
case, however, the FAA has already
issued regulations that require operators
to revise their maintenance/inspection
programs to address fuel tank safety
issues. The compliance date for these
regulations is December 16, 2008. To
provide for efficient and coordinated
implementation of these regulations and
this proposed AD, we are using that
same compliance date in this proposed
AD.
Costs of Compliance
There are about 108 airplanes of the
affected design in the worldwide fleet.
The following table provides the
estimated costs, at an average labor rate
of $80 per hour, for U.S. operators to
comply with this proposed AD.
ESTIMATED COSTS
Work
hours
Action
Maintenance program revision to incorporate FSLs and CDCCLs ......................
Removal of auxiliary fuel tank No. 4, if applicable ................................................
Modification and inspection of the wiring harnesses of the fuel level control
switch.
Inspection of the airplane fuel tanks, vent boxes, and bonding jumpers, and the
addition of bonding jumpers to the fuel/vent tube fittings.
Inspection of the wiring harnesses of the No. 1 and No. 3 engine tank valves ...
Identification and inspection of the FQIS wiring harnesses ..................................
Parts
$320
3,200
2,494
63
8
63
$20,160
25,600
157,122
370
$18,491
48,091
63
3,029,733
$41,785
$336 .....
41,945
656
63
63
2,642,535
41,328
2
4
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
Section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701,
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this
proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order
13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the
States, on the relationship between the
national Government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that the proposed regulation:
1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
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Fleet cost
None ....
None ....
$974 .....
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
16:20 Feb 19, 2008
Number
of U.S.registered
airplanes
4
40
19
Authority for This Rulemaking
VerDate Aug<31>2005
Cost per
airplane
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this proposed AD and placed it in the
AD docket. See the ADDRESSES section
for a location to examine the regulatory
evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part
39 as follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 34 / Wednesday, February 20, 2008 / Proposed Rules
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13
by adding the following new
airworthiness directive (AD):
Lockheed: Docket No. FAA–2008–0181;
Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–180–AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on
this AD action by March 21, 2008.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to all Lockheed Model
L–1011 series airplanes, certificated in any
category.
Note 1: This AD requires revisions to
certain operator maintenance documents to
include new inspections. Compliance with
these inspections is required by 14 CFR
91.403(c). For airplanes that have been
previously modified, altered, or repaired in
the areas addressed by these inspections, the
operator may not be able to accomplish the
inspections described in the revisions. In this
situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c),
the operator must request approval for an
alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in
accordance with paragraph (k) of this AD.
The request should include a description of
changes to the required inspections that will
ensure the continued operational safety of
the airplane.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from a design review
of the fuel tank systems. We are issuing this
AD to prevent the potential for ignition
sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent
failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance
actions, which, in combination with
flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel
tank explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the
actions required by this AD performed within
the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Service Bulletin Reference
(f) The term ‘‘service bulletin,’’ as used in
this AD, means the Accomplishment
Instructions of Lockheed Service Bulletin
093–28–098, Revision 1, dated January 22,
2008.
Maintenance Program Revision
(g) Before December 16, 2008, revise the
FAA-approved maintenance program to
incorporate the fuel system limitations (FSLs)
specified in paragraph 2.B. of the service
bulletin and the critical design configuration
control limitations (CDCCLs) specified in
paragraph 2.C. of the service bulletin; except
as provided by paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of
this AD.
(1) Where the FSLs specify to inspect, this
AD would require doing a general visual
inspection.
Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a
general visual inspection is: ‘‘A visual
examination of an interior or exterior area,
installation, or assembly to detect obvious
damage, failure, or irregularity. This level of
inspection is made from within touching
distance unless otherwise specified. A mirror
may be necessary to ensure visual access to
all surfaces in the inspection area. This level
of inspection is made under normally
available lighting conditions such as
daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or
droplight and may require removal or
opening of access panels or doors. Stands,
ladders, or platforms may be required to gain
proximity to the area being checked.’’
(2) For the CDCCLs specified in paragraphs
2.C.(2)(c), 2.C.(2)(d), and 2.C.(15)(a) of the
service bulletin, do the applicable actions
using a method approved in accordance with
the procedures specified in paragraph (k) of
this AD. The applicable service information
listed in Table 1 of this AD is one approved
method.
TABLE 1.—APPROVED METHODS FOR CERTAIN CDCCLS
For the CDCCL identified in
the service bulletin in paragraph—
One approved method is—
For—
2.C.(2)(d) ..............................
Hamilton Sundstrand Overhaul Manual 28–24–03, Revision 14, dated May 15, 2000.
Lockheed L–1011 Service Information Letter 28–12,
dated March 17, 1998.
2.C.(15)(a) ............................
Lockheed Drawing 1527514, Revision D, dated November 11, 1981.
Overhauling and repairing the electrically-operated fuel
boost pumps.
Keeping the electrical conduit for the electrically-operated fuel boost pumps open and unplugged at the
wing rear spar.
Installing the fuel tank valves, auxiliary power unit
pump, sight gages, fuel quantity indicating system
tank units, over wing filler cap adapter ring, boost
pump mounting plate, and access doors for the boost
pump, vent box, vent valve, and fuel level control
switch.
2.C.(2)(c) ..............................
Initial Accomplishment of FSLs and Repair
if Necessary
(h) Before December 16, 2008, do the
applicable FSLs specified in paragraphs
2.B.(1)(b), 2.B.(1)(d), 2.B.(1)(e), 2.B.(1)(f), and
2.B.(1)(g) of the service bulletin and repair
any discrepancy, in accordance with the
service bulletin. Any repair must be done
before further flight.
Note 3: The service bulletin refers to the
service information listed in Table 2 of this
AD as additional sources of service
information for doing the FSLs and repair.
TABLE 2.—ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF SERVICE INFORMATION FOR CERTAIN FSLS
The FSL identified in the
service bulletin in paragraph—
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2.B.(1)(b) ..............................
2.B.(1)(d) ..............................
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Refers to Lockheed Service Bulletin—
For—
093–28–089, Revision 3, dated October 4, 2006 (or
later).
093–28–094, Revision 1, dated June 23, 2006 (or later)
Removing auxiliary fuel tank No. 4, if applicable.
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Modifying the wiring harnesses of the fuel level control
switch; repetitively inspecting the fuel level control
switch, wiring harness, and harness conduit for any
visible damage, wear or chafing, broken or missing
O-rings, or indications of electrical arcing; and replacing the fuel level control switch assembly with a new
assembly if any damage or evidence of chafing to
the wiring is found.
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9239
TABLE 2.—ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF SERVICE INFORMATION FOR CERTAIN FSLS—Continued
The FSL identified in the
service bulletin in paragraph—
Refers to Lockheed Service Bulletin—
For—
2.B.(1)(e) ..............................
093–28–095, dated September 13, 2006 (or later) ........
2.B.(1)(f) ...............................
093–28–096, Revision 2, dated June 23, 2006 (or later)
2.B.(1)(g) ..............................
093–28–097, dated August 3, 2006 (or later) ................
Repetitively inspecting the airplane fuel tanks and vent
boxes for cleanliness and evidence of deteriorated or
damaged fuel/vent tubes and components; repetitively inspecting bonding jumpers for proper installation, corrosion, frayed or broken strands, and the
condition of the environmental sealing or bonding
clamps and hardware; correcting any discrepant conditions; adding bonding jumpers to the fuel/vent tube
fittings; and repetitively inspecting the bonding jumpers on the fuel/vent tube fittings.
Repetitively inspecting the wiring harnesses of the No.
1 and No. 3 engine tank valves for evidence of damage and fuel contamination; replacing any damaged
wire with new wire; and repairing or replacing any
contaminated wires as applicable.
Identifying the wiring harnesses for the fuel quantity indicator system (FQIS); repetitively inspecting the
FQIS wiring harnesses for any visible damage, wear,
chafing, or indications of electrical arcing; and replacing or repairing any damaged wires as applicable.
No Reporting Requirement
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February
11, 2008.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E8–2996 Filed 2–19–08; 8:45 am]
(i) Although Lockheed Service Bulletin
093–28–094, Revision 1, dated June 23, 2006;
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093–28–095,
dated September 13, 2006; Lockheed Service
Bulletin 093–28–096, Revision 2, dated June
23, 2006; and Lockheed Service Bulletin
093–28–097, dated August 3, 2006; specify to
notify Lockheed of any discrepancies found
during inspection or any evidence of damage
or wire replacement, this AD does not require
that action.
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
No Alternative Inspections, Inspection
Intervals, or CDCCLs
14 CFR Part 39
(j) After accomplishing the actions
specified in paragraphs (g) and (h) of this AD,
no alternative inspections, inspection
intervals, or CDCCLs may be used unless the
inspections, intervals, or CDCCLs are part of
a later revision of the service bulletin that is
approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO), FAA; or unless
the inspections, intervals, or CDCCLs are
approved as an AMOC in accordance with
the procedures specified in paragraph (k) of
this AD.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(k)(1) The Manager, Atlanta ACO, FAA, has
the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD,
if requested in accordance with the
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) To request a different method of
compliance or a different compliance time
for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR
39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on
any airplane to which the AMOC applies,
notify your appropriate principal inspector
(PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District
Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:20 Feb 19, 2008
Jkt 214001
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
[Docket No. FAA–2007–0177; Directorate
Identifier 2007–CE–093–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Taylorcraft
Models A, B, and F Series Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Taylorcraft Models A, B, and F series
airplanes. This proposed AD would
require inspection of the wing strut
attach fittings for corrosion or cracks
and would require repair or replacement
if corrosion or cracks are found. This
proposed AD results from data collected
from an accident involving a Taylorcraft
Model BF12–65 airplane. The wing
separated from the airplane after the
wing strut attach fitting failed due to
corrosion. We are proposing this AD to
detect and correct corrosion or cracks in
the wing strut attach fittings. This
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
condition, if not corrected, could result
in failure of the wing strut attach fittings
and lead to wing separation and loss of
control.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by March 21, 2008.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following
addresses to comment on this proposed
AD:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in
this proposed AD, contact Taylorcraft
Aviation, LLC, 2124 North Central
Avenue, Brownsville, Texas 78521;
telephone: 956–986–0700.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Andy McAnaul, Aerospace Engineer,
10100 Reunion Place, San Antonio,
Texas 78216; telephone: (210) 308–
3365; fax: (210) 308–3370.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written
relevant data, views, or arguments
regarding this proposed AD. Send your
comments to an address listed under the
E:\FR\FM\20FEP1.SGM
20FEP1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 34 (Wednesday, February 20, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 9235-9239]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-2996]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 34 / Wednesday, February 20, 2008 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 9235]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2008-0181; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-180-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Lockheed Model L-1011 Series Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD)
for all Lockheed Model L-1011 series airplanes. This proposed AD would
require revising the FAA-approved maintenance program by incorporating
new airworthiness limitations for fuel tank systems to satisfy Special
Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 requirements. This proposed AD would
also require the accomplishment of certain fuel system modifications,
the initial inspections of certain repetitive fuel system limitations
to phase in those inspections, and repair if necessary. This proposed
AD results from a design review of the fuel tank systems. We are
proposing this AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside
fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or
maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors,
could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane.
DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by March 21, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this AD, contact Lockheed
Continued Airworthiness Project Office, Attention: Airworthiness, 86
South Cobb Drive, Marietta, Georgia 30063-0567.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert A. Bosak, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion and Services Branch, ACE-118A, FAA, Atlanta Aircraft
Certification Office, One Crown Center, 1895 Phoenix Boulevard, Suite
450, Atlanta, Georgia 30349; telephone (770) 703-6094; fax (770) 703-
6097.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2008-0181;
Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-180-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD because of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.
Discussion
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review,
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements''
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,''
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e.,
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for
further action.
[[Page 9236]]
We have determined that the actions identified in this proposed AD
are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098, Revision 1,
dated January 22, 2008. The service bulletin describes procedures for
incorporating new airworthiness limitations for fuel tank systems into
the operator's FAA-approved maintenance program. The airworthiness
limitations for fuel tank systems include fuel system limitations
(FSLs) and critical design configuration control limitations (CDCCLs).
FSLs are modifications, design features, and periodic inspections of
certain features for latent failures that could contribute to an
ignition source. CDCCLs are limitation requirements to preserve a
critical ignition source prevention feature of the fuel tank system
design that is necessary to prevent the occurrence of an unsafe
condition. The purpose of a CDCCL is to provide instruction to retain
the critical ignition source prevention feature during configuration
change that may be caused by alterations, repairs, or maintenance
actions. A CDCCL is not a periodic inspection.
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098 refers to the following
service information for doing certain CDCCLs:
Hamilton Sundstrand Overhaul Manual 28-24-03, Revision 14,
dated May 15, 2000, or later, for overhauling and repairing the
electrically-operated fuel boost pumps.
Lockheed L-1011 Service Information Letter 28-12 for
keeping the electrical conduit for the electrically-operated fuel boost
pumps open and unplugged at the wing rear spar.
Lockheed Drawing 1527514 for installing the fuel tank
valves, auxiliary power unit pump, sight gages, fuel quantity
indicating system tank units, over wing filler cap adapter ring, boost
pump mounting plate, and access doors for the boost pump, vent box,
vent valve, and fuel level control switch.
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098 also refers to the
following service bulletins as additional sources of service
information for doing the FSLs:
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-062, Revision 7, dated
December 9, 1983, for Model L-1011 series airplanes, which describes
procedures for inspecting and modifying the plug-in valve assemblies of
the fuel shutoff system.
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-089, Revision 3, dated
October 4, 2006, for Model L-1011-385-3 series airplanes, which
describes procedures for removing auxiliary fuel tank No. 4.
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-093, Revision 1, dated
February 8, 1999, for Model L-1011 series airplanes, which describes
procedures for installing and inspecting fuel boost pumps and modifying
the centrifugal pump and motor.
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-094, Revision 1, dated
June 23, 2006, for Model L-1011 series airplanes. This service bulletin
describes procedures for (1) modifying the wiring harnesses of the fuel
level control switch, (2) repetitively inspecting the fuel level
control switch, wiring harnesses, and harness conduit for any visible
damage, wear or chafing, broken or missing O-rings, or indications of
electrical arcing, (3) replacing the fuel level control switch assembly
with a new assembly if any damage, wear or chafing, or indications of
electrical arcing to the wiring is found or any broken or missing O-
rings are found, (4) notifying Lockheed of any discrepancies found
during the inspection, and (5) revising the airplane records and
maintenance planning documents to require the repetitive inspections.
The modification involves replacing the braided fiberglass sleeving
with PVC electrical sleeving over each wiring harness and replacing the
smaller inside diameter conduit with the larger inside diameter
conduit, if applicable. (Although AD 2001-08-21, amendment 39-12198 (66
FR 21072, April 27, 2001) mandated accomplishment of Lockheed Service
Bulletin 093-28-094, dated March 3, 2000, more work is necessary for
Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-094.)
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-095, dated September 13,
2006, for Model L-1011 series airplanes. This service bulletin
describes procedures for (1) repetitively inspecting the airplane fuel
tanks and vent boxes for cleanliness and evidence of deteriorated or
damaged fuel/vent tubes and components, (2) repetitively inspecting
bonding jumpers on the fuel/vent tubes and components for proper
installation, corrosion, frayed or broken strands, and the condition of
the environmental sealing or bonding clamps and hardware, (3)
correcting any discrepant conditions, (4) notifying Lockheed of any
discrepancies found during the inspection, (5) adding about 444 bonding
jumpers across the fuel/vent tube fittings located in fuel tanks 1, 2L,
2R, and 3, (6) repetitively inspecting the bonding jumpers on the fuel/
vent tube fittings, and (7) revising the airplane records and
maintenance planning documents to require the repetitive inspections.
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-096, Revision 2, dated
June 23, 2006, for Model L-1011 series airplanes. This service bulletin
describes procedures for (1) repetitively inspecting the wiring
harnesses of the No. 1 and No. 3 engine tank valves for evidence of
damage and fuel contamination, (2) replacing any damaged wire with new
wire, (3) repairing or replacing any contaminated wires as applicable,
(4) reporting any evidence of damage or wire replacement to Lockheed,
and (5) revising the airplane records and maintenance planning
documents to require the repetitive inspections.
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-097, dated August 3,
2006, for Model L-1011 series airplanes. This service bulletin
describes procedures for (1) installing identification markers or
sleeving on the wiring harnesses of the fuel quantity indicating system
(FQIS), (2) repetitively inspecting the FQIS wiring harnesses for any
visible damage, wear, chafing, or indications of electrical arcing, (3)
replacing or repairing any damaged wires, (4) notifying Lockheed of any
discrepancies found during the inspection, and (5) revising the
airplane records and maintenance planning documents to require the
repetitive inspection.
Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is
intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.
FAA's Findings
During the SFAR 88 safety assessment, Lockheed concluded that no
operator had installed auxiliary fuel tank No. 4, in accordance with
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-089, on Model L-1011-385-3 series
airplanes. Thus, safety assessments for the auxiliary fuel tank,
including the electrical equipment involved with the modification, did
not need to be analyzed to show compliance with SFAR 88. Since Lockheed
has not provided the service information required under SFAR 88 that
could lead the FAA to make a finding of compliance, and there is a
possibility that there may be unreported installations of the
modification, we must mandate the removal of auxiliary fuel tank.
If an operator does not wish to remove the auxiliary fuel tank, we
will consider requests for alternative methods of compliance (AMOCs).
The most likely requests would be to allow continued use of the tank by
showing compliance
[[Page 9237]]
with SFAR 88. This would involve obtaining STCs and developing design
and maintenance procedures to address all identified safety issues.
FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD
We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an
unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes
of this same type design. For this reason, we are proposing this AD,
which would require revising the FAA-approved maintenance program to
incorporate the FSLs and CDCCLs specified in Lockheed Service Bulletin
093-28-098. This proposed AD would also require the accomplishment of
certain fuel system modifications, the initial inspections of certain
repetitive FSLs to phase in those inspections, and repair if necessary.
Differences Between the Proposed AD and Service Bulletin
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098 specifies to revise the
operator's maintenance program to incorporate Revision 7 of Lockheed
Service Bulletin 093-28-062 and Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin
093-28-093. However, this proposed AD would not require those actions,
since Lockheed Service Bulletins 093-28-062 and 093-28-093 are mandated
by other ADs. AD 99-24-12, amendment 39-11436 (64 FR 66756, November
30, 1999), mandated Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-093.
AD 80-25-04, amendment 39-3983 (45 FR 79011, November 28, 1980),
mandated Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-062, but this
proposed AD would not require accomplishing Revision 7 of the service
bulletin since both Revisions 1 and 7 adequately address the unsafe
condition.
Where Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098 specifies to inspect,
this proposed AD would require a general visual inspection. We have
included Note 2 in this proposed AD to define this type of inspection.
Although Lockheed Service Bulletins 093-28-094, 093-28-095, 093-28-
096, and 093-28-097 describe procedures for notifying Lockheed of any
discrepancies found during inspection or any evidence of damage or wire
replacement, this proposed AD would not require those actions.
Explanation of Compliance Time
In most ADs, we adopt a compliance time allowing a specified amount
of time after the AD's effective date. In this case, however, the FAA
has already issued regulations that require operators to revise their
maintenance/inspection programs to address fuel tank safety issues. The
compliance date for these regulations is December 16, 2008. To provide
for efficient and coordinated implementation of these regulations and
this proposed AD, we are using that same compliance date in this
proposed AD.
Costs of Compliance
There are about 108 airplanes of the affected design in the
worldwide fleet. The following table provides the estimated costs, at
an average labor rate of $80 per hour, for U.S. operators to comply
with this proposed AD.
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
Work Cost per U.S.-
Action hours Parts airplane registered Fleet cost
airplanes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maintenance program revision to 4 None................. $320 63 $20,160
incorporate FSLs and CDCCLs.
Removal of auxiliary fuel tank No. 4, 40 None................. 3,200 8 25,600
if applicable.
Modification and inspection of the 19 $974................. 2,494 63 157,122
wiring harnesses of the fuel level
control switch.
Inspection of the airplane fuel tanks, 370 $18,491.............. 48,091 63 3,029,733
vent boxes, and bonding jumpers, and
the addition of bonding jumpers to the
fuel/vent tube fittings.
Inspection of the wiring harnesses of 2 $41,785.............. 41,945 63 2,642,535
the No. 1 and No. 3 engine tank valves.
Identification and inspection of the 4 $336................. 656 63 41,328
FQIS wiring harnesses.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the
ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
[[Page 9238]]
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec. 39.13 by
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):
Lockheed: Docket No. FAA-2008-0181; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-
180-AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by March 21,
2008.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to all Lockheed Model L-1011 series
airplanes, certificated in any category.
Note 1: This AD requires revisions to certain operator
maintenance documents to include new inspections. Compliance with
these inspections is required by 14 CFR 91.403(c). For airplanes
that have been previously modified, altered, or repaired in the
areas addressed by these inspections, the operator may not be able
to accomplish the inspections described in the revisions. In this
situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must
request approval for an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in
accordance with paragraph (k) of this AD. The request should include
a description of changes to the required inspections that will
ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from a design review of the fuel tank
systems. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential for
ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures,
alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination
with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion
and consequent loss of the airplane.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Service Bulletin Reference
(f) The term ``service bulletin,'' as used in this AD, means the
Accomplishment Instructions of Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098,
Revision 1, dated January 22, 2008.
Maintenance Program Revision
(g) Before December 16, 2008, revise the FAA-approved
maintenance program to incorporate the fuel system limitations
(FSLs) specified in paragraph 2.B. of the service bulletin and the
critical design configuration control limitations (CDCCLs) specified
in paragraph 2.C. of the service bulletin; except as provided by
paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this AD.
(1) Where the FSLs specify to inspect, this AD would require
doing a general visual inspection.
Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection
is: ``A visual examination of an interior or exterior area,
installation, or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, or
irregularity. This level of inspection is made from within touching
distance unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be necessary to
ensure visual access to all surfaces in the inspection area. This
level of inspection is made under normally available lighting
conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or
droplight and may require removal or opening of access panels or
doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be required to gain
proximity to the area being checked.''
(2) For the CDCCLs specified in paragraphs 2.C.(2)(c),
2.C.(2)(d), and 2.C.(15)(a) of the service bulletin, do the
applicable actions using a method approved in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (k) of this AD. The applicable
service information listed in Table 1 of this AD is one approved
method.
Table 1.--Approved Methods for Certain CDCCLs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the CDCCL identified in the service
bulletin in paragraph-- One approved method is-- For--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.C.(2)(c)................................... Hamilton Sundstrand Overhaul Overhauling and repairing the
Manual 28-24-03, Revision 14, electrically-operated fuel
dated May 15, 2000. boost pumps.
2.C.(2)(d)................................... Lockheed L-1011 Service Keeping the electrical conduit
Information Letter 28-12, dated for the electrically-operated
March 17, 1998. fuel boost pumps open and
unplugged at the wing rear
spar.
2.C.(15)(a).................................. Lockheed Drawing 1527514, Installing the fuel tank
Revision D, dated November 11, valves, auxiliary power unit
1981. pump, sight gages, fuel
quantity indicating system
tank units, over wing filler
cap adapter ring, boost pump
mounting plate, and access
doors for the boost pump, vent
box, vent valve, and fuel
level control switch.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial Accomplishment of FSLs and Repair if Necessary
(h) Before December 16, 2008, do the applicable FSLs specified
in paragraphs 2.B.(1)(b), 2.B.(1)(d), 2.B.(1)(e), 2.B.(1)(f), and
2.B.(1)(g) of the service bulletin and repair any discrepancy, in
accordance with the service bulletin. Any repair must be done before
further flight.
Note 3: The service bulletin refers to the service information
listed in Table 2 of this AD as additional sources of service
information for doing the FSLs and repair.
Table 2.--Additional Sources of Service Information for Certain FSLs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FSL identified in the service bulletin in Refers to Lockheed Service
paragraph-- Bulletin-- For--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.B.(1)(b)................................... 093-28-089, Revision 3, dated Removing auxiliary fuel tank
October 4, 2006 (or later). No. 4, if applicable.
2.B.(1)(d)................................... 093-28-094, Revision 1, dated Modifying the wiring harnesses
June 23, 2006 (or later). of the fuel level control
switch; repetitively
inspecting the fuel level
control switch, wiring
harness, and harness conduit
for any visible damage, wear
or chafing, broken or missing
O-rings, or indications of
electrical arcing; and
replacing the fuel level
control switch assembly with a
new assembly if any damage or
evidence of chafing to the
wiring is found.
[[Page 9239]]
2.B.(1)(e)................................... 093-28-095, dated September 13, Repetitively inspecting the
2006 (or later). airplane fuel tanks and vent
boxes for cleanliness and
evidence of deteriorated or
damaged fuel/vent tubes and
components; repetitively
inspecting bonding jumpers for
proper installation,
corrosion, frayed or broken
strands, and the condition of
the environmental sealing or
bonding clamps and hardware;
correcting any discrepant
conditions; adding bonding
jumpers to the fuel/vent tube
fittings; and repetitively
inspecting the bonding jumpers
on the fuel/vent tube
fittings.
2.B.(1)(f)................................... 093-28-096, Revision 2, dated Repetitively inspecting the
June 23, 2006 (or later). wiring harnesses of the No. 1
and No. 3 engine tank valves
for evidence of damage and
fuel contamination; replacing
any damaged wire with new
wire; and repairing or
replacing any contaminated
wires as applicable.
2.B.(1)(g)................................... 093-28-097, dated August 3, 2006 Identifying the wiring
(or later). harnesses for the fuel
quantity indicator system
(FQIS); repetitively
inspecting the FQIS wiring
harnesses for any visible
damage, wear, chafing, or
indications of electrical
arcing; and replacing or
repairing any damaged wires as
applicable.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No Reporting Requirement
(i) Although Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-094, Revision 1,
dated June 23, 2006; Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-095, dated
September 13, 2006; Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-096, Revision
2, dated June 23, 2006; and Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-097,
dated August 3, 2006; specify to notify Lockheed of any
discrepancies found during inspection or any evidence of damage or
wire replacement, this AD does not require that action.
No Alternative Inspections, Inspection Intervals, or CDCCLs
(j) After accomplishing the actions specified in paragraphs (g)
and (h) of this AD, no alternative inspections, inspection
intervals, or CDCCLs may be used unless the inspections, intervals,
or CDCCLs are part of a later revision of the service bulletin that
is approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), FAA; or unless the inspections, intervals, or CDCCLs are
approved as an AMOC in accordance with the procedures specified in
paragraph (k) of this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(k)(1) The Manager, Atlanta ACO, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 11, 2008.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E8-2996 Filed 2-19-08; 8:45 am]
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