Passenger Train Emergency Systems; Emergency Communication, Emergency Egress, and Rescue Access, 6370-6413 [08-247]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 22 (Friday, February 1, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 6370-6413]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 08-247]



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Part III





Department of Transportation





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Federal Railroad Administration



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49 CFR Parts 223 and 238



Passenger Train Emergency Systems; Emergency Communication, Emergency 
Egress, and Rescue Access; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 22 / Friday, February 1, 2008 / Rules 
and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 223 and 238

[Docket No. FRA-2006-25273, Notice No. 2]
RIN 2130-AB72


Passenger Train Emergency Systems; Emergency Communication, 
Emergency Egress, and Rescue Access

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule is intended to further the safety of passenger 
train occupants through both enhancements and additions to FRA's 
existing requirements for emergency systems on passenger trains. In 
this final rule, FRA is enhancing existing requirements for emergency 
window exits and establishing requirements for rescue access windows 
for emergency responders to use to evacuate passenger train occupants. 
FRA is also enhancing passenger train emergency system requirements by 
expanding the application of existing requirements that are currently 
applicable only to passenger trains operating at speeds in excess of 
125 mph (Tier II passenger trains) to cover passenger trains operating 
at speeds at or below 125 mph (Tier I passenger trains) as well; in 
particular, these enhancements require that Tier I passenger trains be 
equipped with public address (PA) and intercom systems for emergency 
communication and that passenger cars provide emergency roof access for 
use by emergency responders. FRA is applying certain of the 
requirements to both existing and new passenger equipment, while other 
requirements apply to new passenger equipment only.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The final rule is effective April 1, 2008. The 
incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the rule 
is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 1, 
2008. Petitions for reconsideration of this final rule must be received 
not later than March 17, 2008.

ADDRESSES: Any petition for reconsideration should reference Docket No. 
FRA-2006-25273, Notice No. 2, and be submitted by any of the following 
methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Docket Management Facility, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. 
ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting petitions for 
reconsideration and additional information on the rulemaking process, 
see the Public Participation heading of the Supplementary Information 
section of this document. Note that all petitions for reconsideration 
received will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, 
including any personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act 
heading below.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents, 
comments, or petitions for reconsideration received, go to https://
www.regulations.gov anytime, or to the Docket Management Facility, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. 
ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Follow the online 
instructions for accessing the dockets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brenda J. Moscoso, Office of Safety, 
Staff Director, Planning and Evaluation, Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad 
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590 
(telephone 202-493-6282); Daniel L. Alpert, Trial Attorney, Office of 
Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6026); or 
Anna Nassif Winkle, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 
10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6166).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Statutory Background
II. Proceedings to Date
    A. Proceedings To Carry Out the Initial Rulemaking Mandate
    B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking
    C. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview
    D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group
    E. Establishment of the Emergency Preparedness Task Force
    F. Development of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
    G. Development of the Final Rule, including Response to Written 
Comments
III. Technical Background
    A. Change in the Composition of the Passenger Car Fleet
    B. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety 
Recommendation on Windows
    C. Need for Emergency Communication Systems
    D. Window Technology
    E. American Public Transportation Association's (APTA) Standard 
for Emergency Evacuation Units
IV. General Overview of Requirements
    A. Emergency Window Exits and Rescue Access Windows
    B. Emergency Communication Systems--PA and Intercom Systems
    C. Emergency Roof Access
    D. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995
    G. Energy Impact
    H. Trade Impact
    I. Privacy Act
VII. List of Subjects

I. Statutory Background

    In September of 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) 
convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail 
industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the 
initiatives arising from this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary 
announced that DOT would begin developing safety standards for rail 
passenger equipment over a five-year period. In November of 1994, 
Congress adopted the Secretary's schedule for implementing rail 
passenger equipment safety regulations and included it in the Federal 
Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act), Pub. L. No. 103-
440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 1994). Congress also 
authorized the Secretary to consult with various organizations involved 
in passenger train operations for purposes of prescribing and amending 
these regulations, as well as issuing orders pursuant to them. Section 
215 of the Act is codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133.

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II. Proceedings to Date

A. Proceedings To Carry Out the Initial Rulemaking Mandate

    The Secretary delegated these rulemaking responsibilities to the 
Federal Railroad Administrator, see 49 CFR 1.49(m), and FRA formed the 
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group to provide FRA with 
advice in developing the regulations. On June 17, 1996, FRA published 
an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the 
establishment of comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger 
equipment. See 61 FR 30672. The ANPRM provided background information 
on the need for such standards, offered preliminary ideas on 
approaching passenger safety issues, and presented questions on various 
passenger safety topics. Following consideration of comments received 
on the ANPRM and advice from FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
Working Group, FRA published an NPRM on September 23, 1997, to 
establish comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger 
equipment. See 62 FR 49728. In addition to requesting written comment 
on the NPRM, FRA also solicited oral comment at a public hearing held 
on November 21, 1997. FRA considered the comments received on the NPRM 
and prepared a final rule establishing comprehensive safety standards 
for passenger equipment, which was published on May 12, 1999. See 64 FR 
25540.
    After publication of the final rule, interested parties filed 
petitions seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements 
contained in the rule. These petitions generally related to the 
following subject areas: structural design; fire safety; training; 
inspection, testing, and maintenance; and movement of defective 
equipment. To address the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and 
published in the Federal Register three sets of amendments to the final 
rule. Each set of amendments summarized the petition requests at issue, 
explained what action, if any, FRA decided to take in response to the 
issues raised, and described FRA's justifications for its decisions and 
any action taken. Specifically, on July 3, 2000, FRA issued a response 
to the petitions for reconsideration relating to the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment, the movement of 
defective passenger equipment, and other miscellaneous provisions 
related to mechanical issues contained in the final rule. See 65 FR 
41284. On April 23, 2002, FRA responded to all remaining issues raised 
in the petitions for reconsideration, with the exception of those 
relating to fire safety. See 67 FR 19970. Finally, on June 25, 2002, 
FRA completed its response to the petitions for reconsideration by 
publishing a response to the petitions for reconsideration concerning 
the fire safety portion of the rule. See 67 FR 42892. (For more 
detailed information on the petitions for reconsideration and FRA's 
response to them, please see these three rulemaking documents.) The 
product of this rulemaking was codified primarily at 49 CFR part 238 
and secondarily at 49 CFR parts 216, 223, 229, 231, and 232.
    Meanwhile, another rulemaking on passenger train emergency 
preparedness produced a final rule codified at 49 CFR part 239. See 63 
FR 24629 (May 4, 1998). The rule addresses passenger train emergencies 
of various kinds, including security situations, and requires the 
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness 
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains. 
The emergency preparedness plans must include elements such as 
communication, employee training and qualification, joint operations, 
tunnel safety, liaison with emergency responders, on-board emergency 
equipment, and passenger safety information. The rule requires each 
affected railroad to instruct its employees on the applicable 
provisions of its plan, and the plan adopted by each railroad is 
subject to formal review and approval by FRA. The rule also requires 
each railroad operating passenger train service to conduct emergency 
simulations to determine its capability to execute the emergency 
preparedness plan under the variety of emergency scenarios that could 
reasonably be expected to occur.
    In addition, in promulgating the rule, FRA established specific 
requirements for passenger train emergency systems. Among these are 
requirements that all emergency window exits and all windows intended 
for rescue access by emergency responders be marked and that 
instructions be provided for their use; and also requirements that all 
door exits intended for egress be lighted or marked, all door exits 
intended for rescue access by emergency responders be marked, and that 
instructions be provided for their use.

B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking

    While FRA had completed these rulemakings, FRA had identified 
various issues for possible future rulemaking, including those to be 
addressed following the completion of additional research, the 
gathering of additional operating experience, or the development of 
industry standards, or all three. One such issue concerned expanding 
the application of emergency system requirements pertaining to Tier II 
passenger equipment to Tier I passenger equipment as well. Another 
issue concerned specifying minimum numbers and locations of windows 
intended for emergency responder access to passenger cars, as 49 CFR 
223.9(d)(2) addressed only marking and instruction requirements and did 
not provide any express requirement that any rescue access windows be 
present. FRA and interested industry members also began identifying 
other issues related to the new passenger equipment safety standards 
and the passenger train emergency preparedness regulations. FRA decided 
to address these issues with the assistance of RSAC.

C. RSAC Overview

    In March 1996, FRA established RSAC, which provides a forum for 
developing consensus recommendations to FRA's Administrator on 
rulemakings and other safety program issues. The Committee includes 
representation from all of the agency's major customer groups, 
including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, 
and other interested parties. A list of member groups follows:
     American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners 
(AAPRCO);
     American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials (AASHTO);
     American Chemistry Council;
     American Petroleum Institute;
     APTA;
     American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association 
(ASLRRA);
     American Train Dispatchers Association;
     Association of American Railroads (AAR);
     Association of Railway Museums;
     Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
     Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
     Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division;
     Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
     Chlorine Institute;
     Federal Transit Administration (FTA)*;
     Fertilizer Institute;
     High Speed Ground Transportation Association (HSGTA);
     Institute of Makers of Explosives;
     International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers;
     International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);

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     Labor Council for Latin American Advancement*;
     League of Railway Industry Women*;
     National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
     National Association of Railway Business Women*;
     National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
     National Railroad Construction and Maintenance 
Association;
     National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
     NTSB *;
     Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
    Indicates associate, non-voting membership.
     Safe Travel America (STA);
     Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte*;
     Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
     Tourist Railway Association, Inc.;
     Transport Canada*;
     Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
     Transportation Communications International Union/BRC 
(TCIU/BRC);
     Transportation Security Administration (TSA)*; and
     United Transportation Union (UTU).
    * Indicates associate, non-voting membership.
    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after 
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the 
task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the 
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop 
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations 
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more 
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a 
given task. The individual task force then provides that information to 
the working group for consideration. If a working group comes to 
unanimous consensus on recommendations for action, the package is 
presented to the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a 
simple majority of RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. 
FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because 
FRA staff play an active role at the working group level in discussing 
the issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus 
proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC 
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the 
recommendation, and the agency exercises its independent judgment on 
whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is 
soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal 
requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC 
recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal or final 
rule. Any such variations would be noted and explained in the 
rulemaking document issued by FRA. If the working group or RSAC is 
unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, FRA moves 
ahead to resolve the issue through traditional rulemaking proceedings.

D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and RSAC accepted, the task of 
reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and 
recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in 
advancing the safety of rail passenger service. The RSAC established 
the Passenger Safety Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task 
and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of 
the Working Group, in addition to FRA, include the following:
     AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), 
CSX Transportation, Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company;
     AAPRCO;
     AASHTO;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., LDK 
Engineering, Herzog Transit Services, Inc., Long Island Rail Road 
(LIRR), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North), Northeast 
Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra), Southern 
California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), and Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
     BLET;
     BRS;
     FTA;
     HSGTA;
     IBEW;
     NARP;
     RSI;
     SMWIA;
     STA;
     TCIU/BRC;
     TWU; and
     UTU.
    Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the meetings and contributed to 
the technical discussions. In addition, staff from the NTSB met with 
the Working Group when possible. The Working Group has held ten 
meetings on the following dates and locations:
     September 9-10, 2003, in Washington, DC;
     November 6, 2003, in Philadelphia, PA;
     May 11, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
     October 26-27, 2004 in Linthicum/Baltimore, MD;
     March 9-10, 2005, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     September 7, 2005 in Chicago, IL;
     March 21-22, 2006 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     September 12-13, 2006 in Orlando, FL;
     April 17-18, 2007 in Orlando, FL; and
     December 11, 2007 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL.
    At the meetings in Chicago and Ft. Lauderdale in 2005, FRA met with 
representatives of Tri-County Commuter Rail and Metra, respectively, 
and toured their passenger equipment. The visits, which included 
demonstrations of emergency system features, were open to all members 
of the Working Group, and FRA believes they have added to the 
collective understanding of the Group in identifying and addressing 
passenger train emergency system issues.

E. Establishment of the Emergency Preparedness Task Force

    Due to the variety of issues involved, at its November 2003 meeting 
the Working Group established four task forces--smaller groups to 
develop recommendations on specific issues within each group's 
particular area of expertise. Members of the task forces include 
various representatives from the respective organizations that were 
part of the larger Working Group. One of these task forces was assigned 
the job of identifying and developing issues and recommendations 
specifically related to the inspection, testing, and operation of 
passenger equipment as well as concerns related to the attachment of 
safety appliances on passenger equipment. An NPRM on these topics was 
published on December 8, 2005 (see 70 FR 73069), and a final rule was 
published on October 19, 2006 (see 71 FR 61835). Another of these task 
forces was assigned the job of developing recommendations related to 
window glazing integrity, structural crashworthiness, and the 
protection of occupants during accidents and incidents. This work of 
this task force led to the publication of an NPRM focused on enhancing 
the front-end strength of cab cars and multiple-unit (MU) locomotives 
on August 1, 2007. See 72 FR 42016. Another task force, the Emergency 
Preparedness Task Force (Task Force), was established to identify

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issues and develop recommendations related to emergency systems, 
procedures, and equipment. Specifically, the Task Force was charged 
with evaluating APTA's standards for emergency systems for their 
incorporation by reference as Federal standards and requirements. These 
APTA standards are aimed at promoting the ability of passenger car 
occupants to reach, identify, and operate emergency exits under various 
conditions. The Task Force was also given the responsibility of 
addressing a number of other emergency systems issues and to recommend 
any research necessary to facilitate their resolution. Members of the 
Task Force, in addition to FRA, include, or have included, the 
following:
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Ellcon National, 
Go Transit, Interfleet, Jacobs Civil Engineering, Jessup Manufacturing 
Company, Kawasaki Rail Car, Inc., LDK Engineering, LIRR, LTK, 
Luminator, Maryland Transit Administration, Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority (MBTA), Metrolink, Metro-North, Northern 
Indiana Commuter Transit District (NICTD), SEPTA, San Diego Northern 
Commuter Railroad (Coaster), Permalight, PO's Ability USA, Inc., 
Prolink, Transit Design Group (TDG),Transit Safety Management (TSM), 
Translite, STV Inc., and Visual Marking Systems, Inc.;
     BLET;
     California Department of Transportation (Caltrans);
     FTA;
     NARP;
     RSI, including Globe Transportation Graphics;
     TWU; and
     UTU.
    While not voting members of the Task Force, representatives from 
the NTSB and from TSA, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), attended certain of the meetings and contributed to the 
discussions of the Task Force. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center 
attended all of the meetings and contributed to the technical 
discussions through their comments and presentations and by setting up 
various lighting, marking, and signage demonstrations.
    The Task Force has held 15 meetings on the following dates and 
locations:
     February 25-26, 2004, in Los Angeles, CA;
     April 14-15, 2004, in Cambridge, MA;
     July 7-8, 2004, in Washington, DC;
     September 13-14, 2004, in New York, NY;
     December 1-2, 2004, in San Diego, CA;
     February 16-17, 2005, in Philadelphia, PA;
     April 19-20, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
     August 2-3, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
     December 13-14, 2005, in Baltimore, MD;
     August 10, 2006, in Grapevine, TX;
     October 25-26, 2006, in Philadelphia, PA;
     December 6-7, 2006, in Washington, DC;
     March 28-29, 2007, in Los Angeles, CA;
     June 13-14, 2007, in San Francisco, CA; and
     October 17-18, 2007, in Arlington, VA.
    At meetings in Los Angeles, Cambridge, Washington, New York, San 
Diego, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, FRA met with representatives of 
Metrolink, MBTA, Amtrak, LIRR, Coaster, SEPTA, and Caltrans, 
respectively, and toured their passenger equipment. The visits were 
open to all members of the Task Force and included demonstration of 
emergency system features. As in the case of the Working Group visits, 
FRA believes they have added to the collective understanding of the 
Task Force in identifying and addressing passenger train emergency 
system issues for not only this rulemaking, but for future rulemakings 
as well.

F. Development of the NPRM

    The NPRM was developed to address a number of the concerns raised 
and issues discussed during the various Task Force and Working Group 
meetings. Minutes of each of these meetings have been made part of the 
docket in this proceeding and are available for public inspection. The 
Working Group reached full consensus on all the regulatory provisions 
contained in the NPRM at its meetings in March and September 2005. 
After the March 2005 meeting, the Working Group presented its 
recommendations to the full RSAC for concurrence at its meeting in May 
2005. All of the members of the full RSAC in attendance at its May 2005 
meeting accepted the regulatory recommendations submitted by the 
Working Group. Thus, the Working Group's recommendations became the 
full RSAC's recommendations to FRA. In October 2005, the full RSAC also 
recommended that FRA adopt a further recommendation from the Working 
Group at its September 2005 meeting--that FRA grant additional time for 
compliance with the proposal on rescue access windows. After reviewing 
the full RSAC's recommendations, FRA agreed that the recommendations 
provided a sound basis for a proposed rule and adopted the 
recommendations with generally minor changes for purposes of clarity 
and formatting in the Federal Register.
    The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on August 24, 2006 
(see 71 FR 50276), and FRA solicited public comment on it. FRA 
specifically invited comment on a number of issues related to the 
proposed requirements for the purpose of developing the final rule, in 
addition to notifying the public of its option to submit written 
comments on the NPRM and to request a public, oral hearing on the NPRM.

G. Development of the Final Rule, including Response to Written 
Comments

    This final rule is the product of FRA's review, consideration, and 
acceptance of the recommendations of the Task Force, Working Group, and 
full RSAC, and of the written comments on which they are based. FRA 
received two written comments in response to the publication of the 
NPRM: one from the NTSB; the other from Caltrans. The NTSB indicated 
that the NPRM was consistent with the intent of its safety 
recommendation to FRA relevant to these emergency systems, and 
expressed support for the proposed emergency communication system and 
emergency roof access requirements. Caltrans' comments related to the 
requirement for staggering the location of emergency window exits to 
the extent practical and to the proposed requirement for inspecting 
emergency roof access markings. As explained further below, after 
discussing the comments with the Task Force, the Task Force made 
consensus recommendations to resolve Caltrans' two concerns by 
clarifying in this preamble the requirement for staggering, and by 
granting Caltrans' request to extend the interval between inspections 
for roof access markings to a maximum of 368 days, instead of the 184 
days that FRA had proposed. FRA agrees with the underlying rationale 
for these recommendations and has modified the final rule accordingly. 
FRA did not receive a request for a public, oral hearing on the NPRM, 
and none was held.
    Throughout the preamble discussion of this final rule, FRA refers 
to comments, views, suggestions, or recommendations made by members of 
the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC, as they are identified or 
contained in the minutes of their

[[Page 6374]]

meetings. FRA does so to show the origin of certain issues and the 
nature of discussions concerning those issues at the Task Force, 
Working Group, and full RSAC level. FRA believes this serves to 
illuminate factors that it has weighed in making its regulatory 
decisions, as well as the logic behind those decisions. The reader 
should keep in mind, of course, that only the full RSAC makes 
recommendations to FRA and that it is the consensus recommendation of 
the full RSAC on which FRA is acting. However, as noted above, FRA is 
in no way bound to follow the recommendation, and the agency exercises 
its independent judgment on whether the recommended rule achieves the 
agency's regulatory goal, is soundly supported, and is in accordance 
with policy and legal requirements.

III. Technical Background

    Trends in new passenger car orders, experience with passenger train 
accidents, concern about emergency communication, and technological 
advances in emergency systems provided the main impetus for these 
enhancements and additions to FRA's standards for passenger train 
emergency systems, as highlighted below.

A. Change in the Composition of the Passenger Car Fleet

    While FRA was developing the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
and the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness regulations in the 
1990s, the operation of multi-level passenger cars having two seating 
levels for passengers (i.e., bi-level cars) was common. However, the 
operation of multi-level passenger cars having three seating levels for 
passengers (i.e., cars with intermediate (or mezzanine) seating levels) 
was not as prevalent in the U.S. as it is today. As a result, in those 
rulemakings there was less focus on the need for applying emergency 
system safety standards to intermediate seating levels of multi-level 
passenger cars.
    Since that time, the composition of the Nation's commuter rail 
fleet has changed. Multi-level passenger cars with passenger seating in 
intermediate levels have become more prevalent and now account for over 
15 percent of all passenger cars. The intermediate seating levels in 
these multi-level passenger cars are normally located at the far ends 
of the cars and are connected to the upper and lower seating levels by 
stairs. Exterior side doors are also often located toward the ends of 
these cars to facilitate boarding and de-boarding. Given the constraint 
posed by station platform lengths and the desire to minimize station 
dwell time, railroads have turned to multi-level passenger cars with 
intermediate seating levels to meet much of the increased demand for 
service, to the extent that vertical clearances permit their operation.
    In light of the growing use of multi-level passenger cars with 
intermediate seating levels, this final rule helps to address the need 
to provide more explicit emergency system safety standards for these 
passenger cars.

B. NTSB Safety Recommendation on Windows

    On April 23, 2002, a BNSF freight train collided head on with a 
standing Metrolink passenger train near Placentia, CA, resulting in two 
fatalities and numerous injuries on the Metrolink train. Though not a 
contributing factor to the fatalities or injuries, the force of the 
collision blocked the rear end door and also blocked the rear stairway 
linking the upper and lower seating levels to the seating area on the 
intermediate level at the rear of the Metrolink cab car. Although 
passengers in that intermediate level seating area did exit through an 
emergency window, no windows on the intermediate level had been 
designated for rescue access, and consequently no instructions for 
emergency responders to gain access to the intermediate level through a 
window had been posted. Concerned with the extent of Federal 
requirements relating to rescuing passengers from the intermediate 
level of a multi-level passenger car, the NTSB issued Safety 
Recommendation R-03-21 to FRA on November 6, 2003. Safety 
Recommendation R-03-21 provides in full as follows:

Revise the language of 49 Code of Federal Regulations 238.113(a)(1) 
to reflect that appropriate exterior instructional signage 
describing the emergency removal procedure be required at emergency 
windows on all levels of a multiple-level passenger railcar.

    In a February 20, 2004 letter to the NTSB, FRA noted that its 
existing regulations do require that windows intended for emergency 
responder access on every level of a multi-level passenger car be 
clearly marked and that clear and understandable instructions for their 
removal be posted at or near the windows on the car's exterior. See 49 
CFR 223.9(d)(2). FRA also sent a letter to passenger railroads to make 
this clear in the event there was any confusion about these 
requirements. Nevertheless, the NTSB's recommendation highlighted the 
fact that several related concerns were not specifically addressed in 
FRA's regulations. One of these concerns was specifying minimum numbers 
and locations of windows intended for emergency responder access to 
passenger cars, as 49 CFR 223.9(d)(2) addressed only marking and 
instruction requirements and did not provide any express requirement 
that any such rescue access windows be present. A second prominent 
issue concerned specifying minimum numbers and locations of emergency 
window exits on any level of a multi-level passenger car--not just on 
main levels, as then provided in 49 CFR 238.113(a)(1).
    FRA informed the NTSB that it was reviewing and considering the 
necessity of making amendments to its safety standards for passenger 
trains through the RSAC process and that these and other passenger 
safety issues would be presented to the Working Group and the Task 
Force for their consideration. Therefore, FRA asked that the NTSB 
classify Safety Recommendation R-03-21 as ``Open--Acceptable 
Response,'' pending the results of this effort. (The NTSB 
classification ``Open--Acceptable Response'' means a ``[r]esponse by 
recipient indicates a planned action that would comply with the safety 
recommendation when completed.'') By letter dated June 2, 2004, the 
NTSB formally classified the recommendation as FRA requested.
    The Task Force reviewed the NTSB's recommendation and the related 
issues that FRA presented to it and agreed to address emergency window 
exits and rescue access windows on a broad basis, with the goal that 
windows for emergency egress and rescue access would be available on 
every level of a passenger car in the event that a stairway or interior 
door is compromised and access to the primary means of exit (doors) is 
blocked. To this end, the Task Force agreed to develop requirements for 
emergency window exits on non-main levels of multi-level passenger 
cars, and rescue access windows on all levels of these cars, thus 
addressing requirements for every seating level of a passenger car.

C. Need for Emergency Communication Systems

    Traditionally, conductors and assistant conductors have been relied 
upon to relay information to passengers in both normal and emergency 
situations through face-to-face communication or by use of the PA 
system. However, with smaller crew sizes, passengers may not be able to 
tell the crew about a medical emergency, report a fire on board the 
train, or provide notification of other safety issues as quickly as may 
be necessary. For instance, a passenger in the last car of a train 
needing to report an

[[Page 6375]]

emergency situation could potentially have to walk the entire length of 
the train to communicate with the conductor (assuming the crew is 
composed of an engineer and only one conductor). Further, if the 
conductor became incapacitated, passengers would need to communicate 
directly with the engineer.
    FRA also notes that the NTSB's report on its investigation of the 
February 9, 1996 collision near Secaucus, NJ, that involved two New 
Jersey Transit Rail Operations (NJTR) trains and resulted in three 
fatalities and numerous injuries, touches on the importance of 
emergency communication systems to prevent panic and further injuries. 
According to the NTSB report of the accident investigation,

    [a]lthough the train crews said that they went from car to car 
instructing passengers to remain seated, passengers said that they 
were not told about the severity of the situation and were concerned 
about a possible fire or being struck by an oncoming train. They 
therefore left the train and wandered around the tracks waiting for 
guidance, potentially posing a greater hazard because of the leaking 
fuel from train 1107.
    No crewmember used the public address system to communicate with 
passengers. By using the public address system, all passengers would 
have received the same message in less time than it would have taken 
the NJT employees to walk from car to car.

    The report also stated:

    Information about the possibility of a fire or a collision with 
an oncoming train could have been provided to passengers over the 
public address system to address their concerns and prevent them 
from leaving the train. The Safety Board concludes that the lack of 
public announcements addressing the passengers' concerns caused them 
to act independently, evacuate the train, and wander along the 
tracks, thus potentially contributing to the dangerous conditions at 
the collision site.

NTSB/RAR-97/01, at p. 27.

    In 1998, APTA recognized the importance of emergency communication 
systems when it issued APTA SS-PS-001-98, ``Standard for Passenger 
Railroad Emergency Communications,'' noting that the establishment and 
execution of communications among train crews, operations control 
personnel, and train passengers are of the utmost importance under 
normal circumstances. According to the APTA standard, during emergency 
situations such communications take on added importance in the task of 
assuring the safety of all involved.
    While the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards issued in 1999 by 
FRA contain requirements for two-way emergency communication systems 
for Tier II passenger equipment (trains operating at speeds exceeding 
125 mph, but not exceeding 150 mph), there are no requirements that 
Tier I passenger cars be equipped with any emergency communication 
system. In that rulemaking, concern had been raised about the 
practicability of applying such requirements to Tier I passenger 
equipment because of the interoperability of such equipment and the 
possible incompatibility of communications equipment in a Tier I 
passenger train. See 64 FR 25540, 25641 (May 12, 1999). Nevertheless, 
most existing passenger cars are equipped with PA systems, and intercom 
systems are common in new passenger cars.
    FRA notes that, while there are many possible ways for an emergency 
situation to arise on a passenger train, an emergency system may be 
useful in many situations, regardless of the origin of the emergency. 
In this regard, emergency communication systems provide the added 
benefit of conveying information about security threats and handling 
security concerns. According to TSA, terrorists have considered attacks 
on subways and trains in the U.S., and TSA has found that passenger 
railroads and subways in the U.S. are particularly high-consequence 
targets in terms of potential loss of life and economic disruption. 
DHS, including TSA, as well as DOT's FRA and FTA have been actively 
engaged in responding to the threat of terrorism to our Nation's rail 
system, and have undertaken numerous initiatives to advance the safety 
and security of railroad passengers, railroad employees, and the public 
as a whole. Consistent with this response, the ability of passengers to 
timely report suspicious items and suspicious activity onboard 
passenger trains to appropriate personnel increases the likelihood of 
detecting terrorist planning activity or an attempted attack and 
thwarting it, or at least disrupting it and minimizing its 
consequences. This would also be facilitated by the ability of the 
train crew to timely communicate emergency information and instructions 
to passengers in response to a security threat.
    FRA also notes that emergency system requirements for such features 
as emergency window exits and emergency lighting, which were not 
specifically developed to address security threats, may play a critical 
role in minimizing the consequences of a terrorist attack onboard a 
passenger train. The safety and security functions that passenger train 
emergency systems may serve make them vital, and further enhancements 
and additions to emergency systems should be explored both to reduce 
the risk of a terrorist attack to passenger trains, to minimize the 
consequences of such an attack if it occurs, and to promote passenger 
train safety overall.

D. Window Technology

    A ``zip-strip'' is a strip of rubber gasketing that holds a window 
panel in place and is capable of being pulled, or pried and then 
pulled, like a zipper from the panel that it holds. Zip-strips have 
been used for window removal for some time. Yet, the introduction of 
windows using zips-strips on both faces of the same window has allowed 
railroads to designate for rescue access those windows that are best 
suited for that purpose, without impacting the selection of emergency 
window exits or compromising compliance with safety glazing 
requirements. Before this technology was available, railroads that used 
zip-strips for window removal had to decide which windows would be 
designated for emergency egress and which would be designated for 
rescue access, as there was only one zip-strip available to open. 
Equipping cars with more rescue access windows with zip-strips meant 
having fewer emergency window exits, all things being equal, even 
though it would be preferable to have more emergency window exits than 
rescue access windows as occupants should normally begin to self-
evacuate via emergency window exits before emergency responders arrive 
to assist. Whereas railroads could generally designate any window for 
rescue access by providing instructions for removal using tools 
normally available to emergency responders to pop out a window, such as 
a sledge hammer or a fire axe, some railroads prefer to equip windows 
with exterior zips-strips for rescue access because they allow for 
window removal with less effort.
    In the NPRM, FRA did not propose that the rule require the use of 
zip-strips for rescue access windows. Nevertheless, FRA did propose to 
recognize ``dual-function windows,'' which serve as both emergency exit 
and rescue access windows, through the use of zip-strips on both faces 
of the window. FRA has adopted this proposal in the final rule. As 
explained below, ``dual-function windows'' afford railroads additional 
flexibility in the location of their windows in that railroads are not 
required to find locations for emergency window exits distinct from the 
locations specified for rescue access windows, and vice-versa.

[[Page 6376]]

E. APTA's Standard for Emergency Evacuation Units

    As FRA noted in the preamble to the final rule promulgating the 
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, FRA has had under consideration a 
performance standard for emergency evacuation similar to that used in 
commercial aviation where a sufficient number of emergency exits must 
be provided to evacuate the maximum passenger load in a specified time 
for various types of emergency situations. See 64 FR 25550. FRA further 
noted that it would evaluate whether an APTA performance standard for 
emergency egress, then under development in APTA's PRESS Task Force, 
should be incorporated into FRA's standards. 64 FR 25551. FRA's intent 
is that such a performance standard would serve to supplement, as 
necessary, FRA's minimum requirements for emergency window exits and 
door exits.
    In 1999, APTA issued APTA SS-PS-003-98, ``Standard for Emergency 
Evacuation Units for Rail Passenger Cars.'' This standard assigns to 
doors and window exits a numerical value, referred to as an ``emergency 
evacuation unit'' (EEU), that is intended to correlate to the speed and 
ease of passenger egress. Each emergency window exit is assigned an EEU 
of 1, and each door leaf an EEU of 2. The standard defines the ``usable 
exit path'' (UXP) as the number of emergency window and door exits that 
can be used by passengers after an incident that requires emergency 
egress from the vehicle, and provides that the UXP be calculated as 
``the sum of EEUs for one side of the car less 50% of car end doors.'' 
The APTA standard also requires railroads to assign to each new 
passenger car a ``capacity exit factor'' (CXF), which is a value equal 
to the seating capacity of the car divided by 17 and rounded up to the 
next whole number, and to designate a sufficient number of exits to 
achieve a total EEU value equal to or larger than the CXF or the UXP.
    Although the basic approach to establishing egress requirements 
based on car configuration and occupant capacity was widely accepted, 
during development of the APTA standard several organizations raised 
issues regarding the methodology for assigning EEU values to exits. For 
instance, Volpe Center staff suggested that point values for windows be 
reduced to numbers that are approximately in proportion to estimated 
passenger flow rates as compared with low-platform doors without steps, 
and that upper-level windows receive no credit toward the minimum EEU 
criterion but still be required to provide exit paths for certain rare 
accident scenarios. It was also questioned whether egress rates through 
windows could be half as great as through single-leaf doors, as implied 
by the standard.
    The Task Force reviewed the APTA standard and recommended the 
continuation of evacuation test experiments and research to establish 
relative exit flow rates using different types of exits at distinct 
locations in the car, prior to considering adoption of the APTA 
standard into FRA's standards. To this end, the Volpe Center conducted 
a series of test experiments on commuter rail car evacuation in August 
2005, and in April and May 2006, in Boston, MA, with the cooperation of 
the MBTA. Test experiments were conducted under normal and emergency 
lighting conditions, and evaluated three different ways of evacuating a 
car: Directly into an adjoining car; to a high platform using one or 
more side doors; and to a simulated, low platform using side doors with 
stairways. A report, which is in the process of being finalized, will 
document the results of these test experiments. (Due to safety 
concerns, it is not anticipated that test experiments will be conducted 
using windows as a means of emergency egress.) FRA does note that the 
emergency evacuation approach underlying the requirements in this final 
rule is consistent with the basic approach taken in developing APTA's 
standard, as the requirements do take into consideration both car 
configuration and occupant capacity.

IV. General Overview of Requirements

A. Emergency Window Exits and Rescue Access Windows

    Among the most prominent issues identified for consideration by the 
Working Group were those involving emergency window exits and rescue 
access windows and how these windows relate to the emergency systems 
requirements overall. Emergency window exits are intended to supplement 
door exits, which serve as the preferred means of egress in an 
emergency situation, and provide an alternative means of emergency 
egress in life-threatening situations, should doors be rendered 
inaccessible or inoperable. Prior to this rulemaking FRA's regulations 
had required that each single-level car and each main level of a multi-
level passenger car have a minimum of four emergency window exits, 
either in a staggered configuration where practical or with one exit 
located in each side of each end, on each level; that these windows be 
designed to permit rapid and easy removal during an emergency without 
the use of a tool or other implement; and that conspicuous photo-
luminescent marking of the windows, as well as instructions for their 
use, be provided. FRA's regulations had also required that windows 
intended for rescue access be marked with retroreflective material, and 
that instructions for their use also be provided. However, FRA's 
regulations did not require any minimum number of rescue access windows 
for passenger cars.
    One of the basic principles underlying the final rule's 
requirements for both emergency window exits and rescue access windows 
has been to locate these windows in such a manner that passengers would 
be able to exit from, and emergency responders would be able to gain 
direct access to, each passenger compartment without requiring that 
they first go to another level of a car or through an interior door. 
Optimally, there would be a sufficient number of windows for passengers 
to exit from, and for emergency responders to get access to, the 
following: (i) Every level with passenger seating of a multi-level 
passenger railcar; (ii) both sides of the passenger railcar, in the 
event of a derailment where the exits on one side are compromised; and 
(iii) each end (half) of the passenger railcar, in the event that one 
end is crushed or the exits on that end are otherwise rendered 
inaccessible or inoperable. A constraint for both new and existing 
intermediate levels of multi-level passenger car designs is that there 
is limited space for side windows due to the presence of bathrooms, 
equipment closets, and side door exits. Thus, the Task Force 
recommended making the requirements flexible and consistent with 
existing car designs and, in certain cases, providing for exceptions. 
The exceptions for new equipment are limited to situations that arise 
from the need to provide accessible accommodations under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) in compartments where there are no 
more than four seats and a suitable alternative is provided. The Task 
Force recommended greater flexibility for existing equipment to avoid 
costly window installations where none had previously existed (e.g., 
relocating an electrical closet so that a space large enough to 
accommodate a new window could be cut into the side of the car).
    During Task Force discussions, it became apparent that the phrase 
``rapid and easy'' in the emergency window exit regulation was being 
interpreted in different ways by commuter railroads and car 
manufacturers. Some believed

[[Page 6377]]

that only the removal of the gasket had to be rapid and easy; however, 
FRA clarified that while FRA may have cited examples of gaskets that 
were becoming stuck and were therefore not removable in a rapid and 
easy fashion, the central goal of this provision is to create an 
opening that could be used for egress, which necessarily includes 
removal of the window panel as well. If the removal of the gasket is 
rapid and easy, but the removal of the window panel is not, the opening 
becomes less useful in an emergency situation, or in some cases, 
effectively non-existent. Several members of the Task Force also 
expressed their concern that the phrase ``rapid and easy'' was too 
subjective and not quantifiable. They requested that FRA adopt a more 
measurable performance-based standard instead. Yet, various proposals 
to do so based on a specific allotment of time to open the window were 
not adopted, as consensus was not reached on how that time would be 
determined. Variables such as a person's height, weight, strength, and 
awareness of emergency exit operation and procedures all could affect 
the ease of opening a window. For example, a railroad maintenance 
employee who installs emergency window exits or is otherwise trained on 
their use should be able to open a window more quickly than many 
passengers would be able to do. While there was general agreement that 
a time-performance standard should be based on the time taken by a 
representative sample of people to open the window, the Task Force was 
not in a position to specify that sample.
    Although unsuccessful at reaching consensus on an actual measure of 
``rapid and easy,'' the Task Force was able to agree that promoting 
``rapid and easy'' removal of emergency windows is desirable. A 
combination of interior car fixtures, such as headrests and luggage 
racks, as well as larger and heavier windows, can create a situation 
where the most effective and efficient method for removing a window is 
not immediately apparent. As a step towards promoting rapid and easy 
removal of the window and to address the situation of particular 
concern, the Task Force recommended requiring that instructions 
specifically take into account potential hindrances. The instructions 
may be in written or pictorial format, since including pictorials 
depicting the window removal method as part of the instructions can be 
extremely helpful.
    As for rescue access windows, the Task Force generally recommended 
requiring two windows on each level of a passenger car for rescue 
access (versus four as is required for emergency exit). The principal 
reason for requiring only two windows for rescue access is that rescue 
access windows are the third means of egress in the overall emergency 
evacuation approach, in which door exits serve as the first (preferred) 
means of egress and emergency window exits serve as the second. Rescue 
access windows have this tertiary role because they would be used as a 
means of last resort when passengers cannot evacuate themselves and 
require aid from emergency responders. The design of window gaskets 
also affects how many rescue access windows can be placed in a car, 
especially on levels where there is limited space for windows. For 
instance, on certain types of cars, zip-strips installed to facilitate 
rapid and easy removal of a window can be placed either on the interior 
or the exterior of the car, but not on both. In this case, if FRA were 
to require four rescue access windows, then a railroad that has cars 
with additional emergency window exits (i.e., beyond the minimum of 
four per main level) would likely just replace some of its emergency 
window exits with rescue access windows, resulting in fewer emergency 
window exits, and thereby limiting the more preferred means of egress. 
For the above reasons, as well as for the cost of retrofitting existing 
equipment, flexibility for locating rescue access windows in side doors 
was added for existing equipment.
    FRA did not propose, and the final rule does not make, any change 
to existing requirements for emergency window exits in sleeping 
compartments or similar private compartments. Yet, in establishing 
requirements for minimum numbers of rescue access windows in passenger 
cars, FRA is requiring that each sleeping compartment or similar 
private compartment in a passenger car have a rescue access window. FRA 
believes that this new requirement is consistent with current practice.

B. Emergency Communication Systems--PA and Intercom Systems

    While the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards issued in 1999 by 
FRA contain requirements for two-way (i.e., crew-to-passenger and 
passenger-to-crew) emergency communication systems for Tier II 
passenger equipment, FRA did not require that Tier I passenger cars be 
equipped with any emergency communication system. Nevertheless, most 
existing passenger cars are equipped with PA systems, and after 
discussing the benefits of PA systems in light of the challenge and 
expense of retrofitting older, existing passenger equipment with 
limited service life, the Task Force agreed that all passenger cars 
should, at a minimum, have functioning PA systems. A PA system allows 
the train crew to keep their passengers informed in an emergency 
situation and provide instructions to them in a timely manner. In 
particular, the train crew can provide instructions to passengers not 
to take an action that could place them in any greater danger, such as 
instructing them, as appropriate, to remain on the train and not 
endanger themselves by unnecessarily evacuating the train on their own.
    The Task Force also agreed that emergency communication systems in 
all new passenger cars should include intercom systems that would 
enable passengers to quickly communicate in emergency situations with 
the train crew. During the discussions in developing the NPRM 
concerning whether to require intercom systems on Tier I passenger 
equipment, some Task Force members expressed concern that if intercom 
systems were added at each end of a car, were conspicuously marked, and 
had instructions provided for their use, passengers may use them in 
non-emergency situations. Amtrak and various commuter railroads that 
operate cars with intercom systems indicated that they have 
successfully implemented measures to deter misuse, however, such as by 
placing the intercom transmission button under a protective covering 
(which also prevents accidental operation by a passenger leaning 
against it) and by marking it ``FOR EMERGENCY USE ONLY''.
    The emergency communication system requirements in this final rule 
generally reflect current practice for Tier I passenger equipment 
operating with PA and intercom systems and existing requirements for 
Tier II passenger equipment. FRA understands that those Tier I 
passenger cars that currently do not have PA systems are scheduled to 
be retired from service before the requirement to have PA systems on 
existing Tier I passenger equipment becomes effective.

C. Emergency Roof Access Locations

    Emergency roof access locations (i.e., roof hatches or structural 
weak points) can be especially useful in emergency situations where 
passenger cars have rolled onto their sides following certain collision 
and derailment scenarios. In such situations, doors, which are the 
preferred means of egress and access under normal circumstances, may be 
rendered inoperable due to structural damage to the door or the door 
pocket, or become extremely difficult to use because the car is no 
longer upright. Moreover, although emergency

[[Page 6378]]

responders may be able to enter a car that is on its side via a rescue 
access window, the removal of an injured occupant through a side window 
in such circumstances would likewise be difficult or complicated, 
especially depending upon the condition of the occupant.
    FRA's 1999 final rule on Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
required emergency roof access locations for Tier II passenger 
equipment, but not for Tier I passenger equipment. The Task Force 
examined both these requirements and the APTA PRESS recommended 
practice RP-C&S-001-98, ``Recommended Practice for Passenger Equipment 
Roof Emergency Access,'' in recommending that emergency roof access 
requirements be applied to Tier I passenger equipment. FRA adopted the 
Task Force's recommendation and, in general, is requiring that each new 
passenger car (both Tier I and Tier II) have a minimum of two emergency 
roof access locations. Existing Tier I passenger cars are not subject 
to the requirements, while existing Tier II passenger cars continue to 
be subject to existing requirements. For further discussion and 
explanation of the requirements, including the treatment of Tier II 
power cars, please see the Section-by-Section Analysis of this preamble 
at Section V.

D. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance

    This final rule amends Sec. Sec.  238.17, 238.303, and 238.305 
(which contain standards for movement of passenger equipment with other 
than power brake defects, for inspection of passenger equipment, and 
for repair of passenger equipment) by adding requirements for the 
inspection, testing, maintenance and repair of emergency communication 
systems, emergency roof access points, and rescue access markings. To 
allow railroads sufficient time to repair the equipment with minimal 
disruption to normal operations, however, flexibility is provided for 
operating equipment in passenger service with certain noncompliant 
conditions. In affording this flexibility, the final rule requires the 
railroad to adhere to specified procedures for the safe operation of 
the equipment.

V. Section-by-Section Analysis

    This section-by-section analysis explains the provisions of the 
final rule and any changes made from the 2006 NPRM. Of course, a number 
of the issues and provisions involving this rule have been discussed 
and addressed in detail in the preceding discussions. Accordingly, the 
preceding discussions should be considered in conjunction with those 
below and will be referenced as appropriate.

Amendments to 49 CFR Part 223, Safety Glazing Standards--Locomotives, 
Passenger Cars and Cabooses

Subpart A--General

Section 223.5 Definitions
    This section, which contains a set of definitions of terms used in 
part 223, has been modified to clarify the definition of one term and 
to remove the definitions of two terms that are no longer used in the 
part because of the removal of Sec.  223.9(d)(2).
    The definition of ``emergency window'' has been revised in this 
section, as well as in Sec.  238.5 of this chapter, to clarify that the 
purpose of an emergency window is egress, and thus an emergency window 
needs to be removable only from the inside of a passenger car. 
Accordingly, FRA has revised the definition of ``emergency window'' to 
mean the segment of a side-facing glazing panel that has been designed 
to permit rapid and easy removal from inside a passenger car in an 
emergency situation. FRA has also removed the definitions ``emergency 
responder'' and ``passenger train service'' in accordance with the 
removal of Sec.  223.9(d)(2), the only section in part 223 that 
referenced these terms. The definition ``emergency responder'' has been 
moved to part 238 of this chapter.

Subpart B--Specific Requirements

Section 223.9 Requirements for New or Rebuilt Equipment
    In the discussion of Sec.  223.5, FRA has noted that the definition 
of ``emergency window'' has been amended to clarify that the purpose of 
the windows is egress, and thus such a window would need to be 
removable only from the inside of a passenger car. Section 223.9(c) 
required ``at least four emergency opening windows.'' As the term 
``emergency opening window'' was not specifically defined--but had been 
understood to mean ``emergency window''--FRA has modified the rule text 
in Sec.  223.9(c) to require ``at least four emergency windows'' and 
restructured the section in order to provide more clarity.
    FRA has removed Sec.  223.9(d) and merged the requirements 
previously contained therein into Sec. Sec.  238.113 and 238.114 of 
part 238. The requirements in Sec.  223.9(d) had been added by FRA's 
May 4, 1998 final rule on Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness. See 
63 FR 24629, 24643. The Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness final 
rule required the marking of both emergency window exits and windows 
intended for rescue access, and also required that instructions be 
provided for their use. However, the requirements applied only to 
``each railroad providing passenger train service,'' a class of train 
service purposefully narrower than the general application section in 
part 223. See Sec.  223.9. Because FRA has addressed marking and 
instruction requirements for such windows in this train service in part 
238, and because the requirements of Sec.  223.9(d) did not apply to 
other equipment covered by part 223, they have been removed from part 
223, along with the corresponding definition of ``emergency responder'' 
and ``passenger train service.'' Further, removal of Sec.  223.9(d) 
avoids creating any confusion due to duplication of the marking and 
instruction requirements in two different parts of the CFR, especially 
since the marking requirements in part 238 that have been adopted by 
FRA vary somewhat from the ones that were contained in Sec.  223.9(d). 
Nevertheless, Sec.  223.8 will continue to alert the reader to 
additional requirements for emergency window exits for ``passenger 
equipment'' in part 238, as defined in that part.
    However, because the ``application'' section of part 223 is broader 
than that of part 238, FRA has been mindful not to alter